Enclaves as Process

Space, Security and Violence in Karachi

Sobia Ahmad Kaker

School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape

Newcastle University

Thesis Submitted for Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

June 2015
ABSTRACT

Presenting a case study of enclavisation and violence in Karachi (Pakistan) as relational processes, this interdisciplinary project addresses key conceptual and empirical gaps in the scholarship on enclaves and enclaved urbanism. The project is presented in two parts. In the first part, I highlight that urban residential enclaves are presently under-theorised in the urban studies literature. Consequently, scholars and policymakers often problematically regard enclavisation as a response to increasing crime and violence in the city and not as a process that perpetuates urban violence. Engaging with relational theories of space, and using the concepts of assemblage and performativity, I re-theorise enclaves as relational and processual socio-material and socio-political assemblages best characterised through the arrangements through which space, security and circulation are governed in the city. In the second part of this project, I use this re-conceptualisation to review empirical evidence from three different types of residential enclaves in Karachi. First, I introduce my study sites by demonstrating how each residential enclave crystallises through differential multi-scalar relations between urban governance and political life. Next, I move on to show how Karachi’s enclaves are often performatively and discursively constructed, and are made apparent through patterns of circulation rather than physical form. By revealing the underlying tensions, contests and negotiations between variously positioned actors interacting within and between Karachi’s enclaves, I establish that enclaves are dynamic spaces. Moreover, in emphasising the ways in which processes of enclavisation shape urban socio-spatial relations and restructure wider relations of power and politics in the Pakistani megacity, I finally establish that urban residential enclaves are agential geo-political processes which perpetuate violence and conflict in an already divided megacity. In conclusion, I argue that this project makes important contributions for scholars and policymakers engaging with enclaves, urban governance, security and violence.
DEDICATION

This thesis is lovingly dedicated to my parents, Dr. Nazeer Ahmad and Tahira Parveen Ahmad, who have always encouraged me to be curious and to question things. It is also dedicated to my dear husband, Usman Ali Kaker, who has consistently believed in me more than I have believed in myself. This work would not have been possible without the inspiration, selfless love and continuous support all three have provided.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Looking back at the years I have worked on this project, I recognise that this thesis is the culmination not just of my own efforts, but also of those of many who have knowingly or unknowingly been an integral part of this journey. Here, I would like to acknowledge the contribution of my mentors, colleagues, friends and of course my family in Pakistan and the U.K. It would have been impossible to produce this piece of work without their overwhelming support and encouragement.

Firstly, I owe an immeasurable debt of gratitude to my supervisors, Stephen Graham and Martin Coward. In choosing me from the range of applicants who applied for the Newcastle University studentship on Cities, Infrastructure and Political Violence, both Steve and Martin provided me with an opportunity for which I am eternally grateful. From thereon, they have played a significant role in helping me develop this project, as well as my professional career. I am very appreciative of both Steve’s and Martin’s enthusiasm for my work, and their generosity in providing advice on any issue about which I approached them. They have contributed greatly to this project and to my own professional development—from introducing me to novel concepts and methods to providing advice and support for participation in workshops, teaching assignments, publications and job applications. Most of all, I am obliged for their tireless efforts in pushing me to improve my work. From the very beginning, Steve’s encouragement for me to ‘find the Sobia-isation’ of this project, and Martin’s close reading of multiple drafts of my work and their combined dedication to pushing me to find my ‘critical voice’ have allowed me develop my ideas more clearly and forcefully. I really am very grateful for the unsurpassable support they have offered me by generously sharing their thoughts, comments and critiques throughout the process. I could not have wished for a better supervisory team!

Secondly, I must thank my colleagues at LSE Cities, who perhaps may not be aware of their substantial influence on my research. I especially appreciate the fact that Austin Zeiderman, Ricky Burdett and Philipp Rode provided me with the space and flexibility to pursue my PhD work alongside my work on the Urban Uncertainty project. Numerous conversations with Austin and Jonathan Silver stimulated my thoughts on global South urbanism, and the research we conducted for the Urban Uncertainty project helped me
think through governance in Karachi critically. Also, Suzi Hall and Alexandra Gomez deserve special thanks for their motivational talks when I needed them most. As well as enriching my PhD research, my experience at LSE Cities gave me the motivation to finish the project quickly, so that I may move on to the exciting world of professional life.

Yet, completing this project would not have been possible without the generosity of colleagues, friends and family in Karachi. Haris Gazdar played a significant role as a sincere advisor and mentor throughout my research career prior to and during this project. I am grateful for being granted affiliation at the Collective for Social Sciences Research (Karachi) as a Visiting Research Associate in the first year of this project. In that capacity, I was able to organise brownbag sessions and get feedback from renowned researchers within the collective such as Haris, Asad Sayeed, Ayesha Khan, Irfan Khan, Hussain Bux Mallah and Faiza Mushtaq amongst others. It was in various conversations around the lunch table at the Collective that I started thinking of disconnects between the present conceptualisations of enclaves and the ground realities of Karachi.

Of course, I must also thank all those in Karachi who accommodated my multiple requests for meetings and interviews, and who very kindly shared information and expertise. There are really too many to name—Arif Hasan, Nausheen Anwar, Jameel Yusuf, Sharfuddin Memon, Ahmed Chinoy, Kamran Khan and the late Perween Rahman were key amongst these. It grieves me that my acknowledgement will not be read by Perween, who was brutally killed in March 2013. Others too, who have been of immense help to me, have met a similarly violent fate. In late 2013 just after my last visit to Karachi, I was saddened to hear of the assassination of Mairaj Khattak and Sultan Beg in Sultanabad—less well known, but no less heroic than Perween. I am forever grateful for their generosity in welcoming and facilitating an awkward and curious ‘outsider’ to Sultanabad. Through their support, I was able to conduct research in a place which would have been impossible to access otherwise. The loss of their goodwill and selfless devotion to enriching the lives of people in Sultanabad has left a void in the hearts of many, myself included. I am also extremely grateful to my respondents in Clifton Block 7, Askari III and Sultanabad. I am indebted for their unsurmountable hospitality and kindness in welcoming me into their lives.

This list of acknowledgements of people in Karachi is incomplete without mention of my brother and sister in law, Usman and Fatima, and my close friends Salina and Faisal, who
provided me with a home away from home during my prolonged visits. I disrupted all their lives in many ways while staying with them for months on end. All four have borne this trial with utmost grace, especially as I would make off with their cars or keep plans on hold while waiting to hear back from respondents. Other than providing exemplary support, Usman, Fatima, Salina and Faisal have also assisted my research by introducing me to their networks in Karachi. Most of all, I must thank Usman for accompanying me to places I was uncomfortable visiting alone, cruising around town with me while I took suspect photographs, and even sending me pictures, texts and maps which I often desperately needed when away from Karachi.

Finally, I cannot fail to acknowledge the enormous support that other colleagues, friends and family have shown me throughout my years as a post-graduate research student. Marian Kyte at Newcastle University has always been someone I could count on for help in navigating the various administrative issues attached to being a student at a British university. Colleagues at the School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape and Politics at Newcastle University have made my time at Newcastle memorable. I would especially like to thank Tugce and Ulpia for their constant friendship, and particularly Chryssa, without whose companionship my life as a PhD student would not have been half as enjoyable or even manageable!

Also, I could not have wished for more understanding friends and family, who have patiently tolerated missed celebrations and continued absences, all in the name of PhD related deadlines. I would especially like to acknowledge the kind support that my family have showered me with throughout these years. Thanks to my father, for taking a keen interest in my work, offering perceptive feedback and advice and showing such pride in all my achievements, and to my mother, who has at times offered to visit me in Karachi to assist me in my fieldwork if I would allow her to. Their enthusiasm for my work has often motivated me when I have needed it most. My sisters and my parents in law also deserve mention for their continued encouragement throughout the process of working on this project. Last but not least, thanks to Ali, without whom this would never have been possible. His enduring love and unwavering support has allowed me to work through moments of high stress with much ease. You continue to be a rock by my side, thank you for that.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................i

DEDICATION .............................................................................................................................................

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................................i

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................................................... iv

LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................... ix

LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................................................... xiii

PART-I ....................................................................................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER 1 .............................................................................................................................................. 2

ENCLAVED URBANISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENCLAVISATION AND VIOLENCE IN KARACHI ......................................................................................................................... 2

Introduction to Enclavisation and Violence in Karachi................................................................. 6
The Problematic Uptake of Enclavisation in Karachi ................................................................. 13
Aims, Objectives, and Key Contributions .................................................................................... 17
Why Cities of the Global South and Why Karachi? ................................................................. 21
Outline of the Thesis .......................................................................................................................... 22

CHAPTER 2 .............................................................................................................................................. 28

ENCLAVES, ENCLAVISATION, AND ENCLAVED URBANISM WITH RELEVANCE FOR URBAN VIOLENCE .................................................................................................................. 28

Definitions and Key Concepts of Urban Violence................................................................. 29
Weaknesses in the Conceptualisation of Enclaves as Political Processes ......................... 33
Methodological and Conceptual Conundrums ........................................................................ 34
‘Disembeddedness’ and the Neglect of Urban Circulations .................................................. 35
Failing to Look Beyond the Gated Enclave .............................................................................. 38
Flattening Out Enclaves and Resulting Analytical Losses .................................................... 40
Enclaves, Enclaved Urbanism, and Urban Violence: Possibilities of Establishing Causality .................................................................42
Conclusion .............................................................................44

CHAPTER 3 .............................................................................46
CONCEPTUALISING ENCLAVES AS RELATIONAL PROCESSES .......46
Theorising Relational ‘Enclaved Space’ ...........................................46
Assemblages as a Suitable Analytic to Study Relational Enclaves ..........48
Conceptualising Enclaves through the Concept of Assemblages ............50
Assembling Enclaves as Socio-Material Processes ..........................53
Enclaves as Fluid and Osmotic Assemblages: Materialising Processes of Governing Circulation ..............................................................53
Enclaves as Performative Spaces: Discursively Formed and Productive of Identities ..................................................................................................................55
Enclaves as Spaces of Subjectivities: Problematising the Boundary of the Enclave 58
The Juridico-Political Space of Enclaves and the Sociology of Exception .......61
The Agency of Enclaves: How Processual Enclaves are Productive of Urban Violence ..................................................................................................................63
Conclusion .............................................................................67

CHAPTER 4 .............................................................................68
ENCLAVISATION, GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS IN CITIES OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH .................................................................68
Enclavisation, Governance, and Politics in Cities of the Global South..............69
Fragmented Sovereignty and Contested Power: Enclaved Spaces as Contradictory Sites of Marginality, Empowerment, and Conflict .................................74
State Spaces and the Politics of Power in Pakistan ..................................75
Relations of Power between Enclaves, Cities, and the State .....................82
Fragmented State Power and Violence in Enclaved Cities ..........................83
Conclusion .............................................................................86
CHAPTER 5

METHODOLOGY FOR STUDYING ENCLAVES AS RELATIONAL PROCESSES

Assembling a Suitable Methodology for Studying Enclaves Relationally

Research Design

Studying Agential Assemblages

Studying Contests of Space and Political Subjectivities

Ethnography as Method

A Case Study Approach

Case Selection

Practical Details and Means of Data Collection

Participant observation

Interviews

Media reports and grey material

Field notes

Practical Limitations, Possible Biases and Ethical Concerns

Methods of Data Analysis

Conclusion

PART II

CHAPTER 6

VARIED RELATIONS OF GOVERNANCE AND URBAN POLITICAL LIFE IN KARACHI'S ENCLAVES

Askari III: An Enclave of Order in a Sea of Disorder

Civil-Military Relations, Disaffected Citizenship, and Enclavisation

Clifton Block 7: An Enclave in Process

Associational Politics, Governance, and Enclavisation

Sultanabad and the Balti Mohallah: Enclaves of Marginality
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>NEGOTIATING CIRCULATION, SECURITY AND IDENTITY IN KARACHI'S ENCLAVES</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negotiating Identity at the Gates: Failures of Total Security in Askari III</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security, Discipline and Identity</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power, Negotiation, and Resistance</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Circulation, Security and Identity</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Osmotic Walls, Shifting Borders</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performative Security and Paradoxes of Inclusion and Exclusion: Emplacing the Enclave in Clifton Block 7</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defensible Space, Community, Security</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Performing Security, Embodying Difference</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inside-Outside Relationships</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restricted Circulation, Insecurity and Violent Identities: Tracing Subjectivities in Sultanabad's Enclaves</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural Difference, Space, and Circulation</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Circulation, Social Control and Enclavisation</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violence, Identity, and Subjectivities of Inside/Outside</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion and Subjectivities of Inside/Outside</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>ENCLAVISATION AND THE CONTINUUM OF VIOLENCE IN KARACHI</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Agency of Enclaves: Enclavisation and Identity Formation</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socio-Political Homogeneity, Identity of Place, and Urban Violence</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Securitisation, the Production of Criminal Identities and Violence</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relational Processes of Enclavisation, Marginality and Violence in Karachi</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Governmentality, ‘Grey Zones’ and Violence ................................................................. 224
Enclavisation and the Continuum of Urban Violence ......................................................... 229
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 232

CHAPTER 9 .......................................................................................................................... 234

CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 234

Meeting Initial Aims and Objectives ................................................................................... 234
Key Gaps in Scholarship ........................................................................................................ 237
Re-Conceptualising Residential Enclaves as Relational and Processual Spaces .... 238
Understanding Enclaves as AgentiaSpaces that Restructure Urban Socio-Political Relations......................................................................................................................... 239
Key Contributions and Related Avenues for Future Research ........................................... 242
The Agency of Urban Space ................................................................................................. 243
Enclaves as Everyday Securitisation .................................................................................... 243
Alternative Modalities of Urban Planning and Governance ................................................. 244
Empirical Significance and Opportunities for Comparative Research ......................... 245
Practical Implications .......................................................................................................... 246
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 249

REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 250
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Picture of CID building after the November 2010 terrorist attack................. 2

Figure 2: Spatial map of killings in Karachi............................................................................ 7

Figure 3: Complex security infrastructure outside the offices of Dawn Newspapers in Saddar. .................................................................................................................................................................................. 9

Figure 4: Community watch (in blue uniforms) in MQM dominated Azizabad, North Karachi............................................................................................................................................................................. 9

Figure 5: The guarded gates of Bin Qasim Park, Clifton....................................................... 10

Figure 6: Multiple layers of security outside the Sindh High Court in Saddar................. 10

Figure 7: Karachi Sheraton Hotel............................................................................................ 14

Figure 8: Overlapping and Interconnected Forms of Urban Violence.................................. 30

Figure 9: Map of Saddar and Clifton, showing Askari III, Clifton Block 7, and Sultanabad .................................................................................................................................................................................. 100

Figure 10: ‘Saddar Town’ ...................................................................................................... 116

Figure 11: Askari III main entrance gate. ............................................................................. 117

Figure 12: Askari III Commercial Avenue............................................................................ 117

Figure 13: Canteen Stores Department (CSD) shop in Askari III........................................ 118

Figure 14: Park inside Askari III............................................................................................ 121

Figure 15: Uniformly planned apartment complexes in Askari III....................................... 121

Figure 16: ‘Goodbye Karachi Cantonment’...................................................................... 122

Figure 17: Neighbouring Spaces in Clifton: Block 7 and Tikri Colony.............................. 127

Figure 18: Map of volatile areas in Karachi for robberies and burglaries....................... 129
Figure 19: Cars fall in potholes following torrential rains in Karachi (2006). .................. 132

Figure 20: ‘City Mayor says the situation in Karachi city is under control’. .................... 132

Figure 21: Mrs. Khushbakht Shujaat at the inaugural ceremony of Aga Khan Park. ..... 134

Figure 22: Aga Khan Park inaugural plaque styled in the colours of the MQM party flag. .................................................................................................................................................. 134

Figure 23: Block 7 Residents’ Association members sitting with municipal staff. ............ 136

Figure 24: Sultanabad’s proximity to critical sites within the security red zone......... 141

Figure 25: Sultanabad was settled in the early 1950s on marshy land reclaimed from a mangrove forest.................................................................................................................................................. 143

Figure 26: A view of Sultanabad from the Shia mosque in Sultanabad. ......................... 143

Figure 27: Pieces of wood and sticks block entry to the Balti Mohallah from a connecting lane in Sultanabad. .................................................................................................................................................. 148

Figure 28: Graffiti alluding to violence within the Balti Mohallah................................. 148

Figure 29: ‘Government’ Boys Secondary School in Intelligence Colony (Sultanabad). 151

Figure 30: Picture of the Bawani house the day the murder was discovered. ............... 158

Figure 31: Picture of Askari III’s perimeter walls and main gate................................. 159

Figure 32: Physical Layout of Askari III. ........................................................................ 160

Figure 33: Maid undergoing security check in Askari III. ......................................... 163

Figure 34: Domestic servants walking in Askari III. ....................................................... 167

Figure 35: News broadcast of police press conference following Ishaq’s capture. ....... 170

Figure 36: Guarded barrier at one of Clifton Block 7’s entry points............................. 172

Figure 37: Block 7 residents in Aga Khan Park.......................................................... 173

Figure 38: Open, unguarded barrier along Khyaban-e-Roomi in Clifton Block.......... 174
Figure 39: Layout and barriers in Clifton Block 7. .......................................................... 176

Figure 40: Private security guards on duty in Clifton Block 7. .................................. 178

Figure 41: Domestic staff members of a house in Clifton Block 7. .......................... 182

Figure 42: A narrow lane in Sultanabad Block H leading towards the Balti Mohallah. 185

Figure 43: One of the main entrances into Sultanabad. ............................................. 185

Figure 44: Map showing the main entry routes into Sultanabad and the Balti Mohallah 187

Figure 45: Picture of unhindered access to Balti Mohallah from within the Habib Public School .......................................................... 194

Figure 46: Entrance of the Habib Public School, which Balti residents can use to access their Mohallah........................................ 194

Figure 47: Physical segregation between Habib Public School and the rest of Sultanabad .......................................................... 195

Figure 48: Pole mounted transformers in Balti Mohallah. ........................................ 195

Figure 49: Sultanabad, outlined in orange and denoted as no. 6, is listed as a no-go area for particular ethnicities in times of ethnic violence. ................................. 207

Figure 50: Political graffiti indicative of ethno-political association on walls in Sultanabad. .................................................................................................. 208

Figure 51: ‘Identify him if is the one who has robbed you’. ..................................... 212

Figure 52: Dense katchi abadis (outlined in red) are nested within affluent spaces (annotated) in Clifton and Defence................................................................. 219

Figure 53: Television coverage of Sarfaraz Shah seen begging for mercy before the Rangers shot him dead................................................................. 220

Figure 54: Screen grab of a televised overnight operation in Sultanabad, 3 May 2013. The raid was televised on Samaa News ............................................. 223

Figure 55: ‘Anyone willing to give cash prize to police constable who killed robbers?’ 226
Figure 56: Karachi Airport in flames following a terrorist attack.
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Percentage of urban land controlled and administered by various land development authorities in Karachi. ................................................................. 77

Table 2: Distribution of urban governance functions in Karachi by level of government. .................................................................................................................. 78

Table 3: Political parties in power at the local, provincial and national levels. ............... 78

Table 4: Major political parties in Karachi and Pakistan. ......................................................... 80

Table 5: Methodology for studying enclaves as relational and agential processes........... 92
PART-I
CHAPTER 1
ENCLAVED URBANISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENCLAVISATION AND VIOLENCE IN KARACHI

In a posthumous claim released on video in November 2010, a terrorist who had violently detonated himself in a deadly attack on the highly securitised Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in Saddar, Karachi stated:

*I am fit and healthy and can fight anywhere, but I have offered myself for the suicide attack only to defeat the enemy’s technology. The enemy has technology that can only be defeated by the suicide attack. (Dawn News, 2011e).*

The fortified enclave had been securitised with razor wire on top of walls, guarded barriers and round the clock surveillance. It was situated within Karachi’s security red zone, within walking distance of strategically important buildings such as government offices, foreign consulates and various five-star hotels. However, given the uneven and often unplanned nature of urban land development in Karachi, the red zone is also peppered with dense irregular settlements (*katchi abadis*), where many of the low-income workers who service the global city live. The CID building was situated on a particularly busy intersection, at the foot of a flyover which bypasses Karachi’s oldest *katchi abadis* to connect the city centre with the financial district. The bombing of the CID building took place towards the end of an ordinary working day within this busy environment. CCTV

*Figure 1: Picture of CID building after the November 2010 terrorist attack. Source: BBC, 2014.*
footage of the spectacular terrorist attack shows that the physical fortifications and complex security protocols were reduced to rubble in a matter of seconds (see figure 1). Eye witnesses reported how the enclave came under attack by a few men armed with guns, who paved the way for the suicide bomber. CCTV footage revealed that the terrorist rammed the explosive laden vehicle he was driving into the fortified and heavily policed gate of the enclave.

The terrorist’s actions and his posthumous claim reveal the political agency of the otherwise inert infrastructure of the enclave. Firstly, the attack on the CID building highlights how even the most securitised enclaves remain vulnerable to acts of violence. Secondly, it demonstrates how such fortified enclaves may become discursive representations of state power, and hence objects of war, in a violent megacity. In this spectacular event, for example, terrorists affiliated with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) targeted the building that housed the government’s anti-terrorism investigative cell in response to the state-led surgical operations against TTP militants in Karachi. Thirdly, the aftermath of the event saw the criminalisation of ethnic Pashtun migrants who had recently arrived in Karachi from the war-struck regions along the Pakistan-Afghan border (Sahoutara, 2014). Following the attack, hundreds of Pashtun migrants were ‘picked up’ by state security forces from neighbouring kachi abadis as part of on-going investigations (The Express Tribune, 2010). Finally, the mobilisation of violent policies of repression against Pashtun migrants by the state, as well as related military incursions into migrant enclaves, discursively produced the city’s poor ethnic enclaves as imagined places of criminality and terrorism (Khan, 2013; Zaman and Ali, 2013). As a result of this, other urban city residents increasingly viewed such enclaves as pockets of criminality that produced urban violence.

This spectacular event therefore illustrates the political agency of enclaves, and brings us to consider how enclaves and urban violence may be related to each other. While this particular example focuses on a dramatic attack against a strategic enclave, it is especially

---

1The Pashtuns are an ethnic group with populations living in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In Pakistan, Pashtuns are mostly resident in the Northern and North Western regions of the country, some of which are tribally administered areas. Since the 1960s, Pashtuns have been migrating to Karachi to work in the transport, construction, and low-skilled service sectors of the economy. At present, there is a significant number of Pashtun population in Karachi, and this is rapidly rising due to ongoing migration from conflict-struck tribal regions.
useful for introducing this thesis, which aims to present a critical analysis of spatial politics in an enclaved urbanism. Although various scholars have denoted how urban socio-political relations are radically altered in enclaved cities (Graham and Marvin, 2000; Low and Smith, 2006; Davis, 1996; Lemanski, 2004; Moser, 2004; Atkinson and Flint, 2004; Falzon, 2004), I have found current scholarship on enclaved urbanism inadequate for understanding enclaves as agential urban spaces that transform urban socio-political relations in often violent ways. Meanwhile, although the literature on urban violence studies socio-political violence, structural violence, criminality and terrorism through the lenses of marginality, social polarisation, inequality and splintering urbanism, this literature does not make a forceful connection between enclavisation and violence as relational processes (Koonings and Kruijt, 2009; Koonings and Kruijt, 2007a; Moser, 2004; Muggah, 2012; Wacquant, 2009; Graham, 2009). In this literature, enclaved urbanism is widely reviewed as a backdrop to urban violence, and enclaves are hardly understood as agential in producing urban violence.

This two-part thesis therefore aims to fill this existing gap in scholarship on enclaves and enclaved urbanism. Overall, this project aims to present a relational analysis of spatial politics in an enclaved urbanism. By revealing the political agency of ordinary residential enclaves in Karachi, a complex Pakistani megacity of approximately 20 million people (Cox, 2013; Qureshi, 2010), this thesis intends to highlight how enclavisation and urban violence are relational processes, and how enclaved urbanism is not only a consequence of urban conflict and violence but is also a cause of it. In the first part of this project, I will address existing theoretical limitations of the scholarship on enclaves and enclaved urbanism, and offer a critical conceptualisation of enclaves as agential processes. In the second part, I will present detailed case studies of enclavisation in Karachi, through which I will highlight how enclavisation and urban violence are relational processes.

Although various scholars struggle to present a clear definition of urban violence, they agree that it is distinguishable as a form of violence specific to the conditions and processes of urbanisation (Koonings and Kruijt, 2007; Muggah, 2012; Moser, 2004; Winton, 2014; O’Neill and Rodgers, 2012). In this literature, ‘urban violence’ is used as an umbrella term which encompasses political, social, institutional, structural and/or economic violence. These different forms of violence are often overlapping and interconnected and may be produced through structural conditions that mediate urban socio-political relations and processes of urban governance, or through urban spaces and
infrastructures. Moreover, such forms of urban violence may also have these structures, processes and infrastructures as their target (Moser, 2004; Muggah, 2012; Vanderschueren, 1996; Winton, 2004; O’Neill and Rodgers, 2012; Coward, 2012; Graham, 2010b; Coward, 2009). In Chapter 2, I will elaborate how such understandings of urban violence make it possible to consider enclaves as agential spaces that are productive of urban violence. However, in Chapter 2, I will also argue that such an analysis is presently hindered by theoretical limitations in the scholarship on enclaves and enclaved urbanism, and that in order to understand enclaves as spaces that are productive of urban violence, it is necessary to conceptualise them as socio-material processes that restructure relations of power and politics in the city in ways that exacerbate marginality, vulnerability and difference. This re-conceptualisation of enclaves allows me to offer an analysis of enclavisation in Karachi as an ongoing process that is generative of perpetuating forms of structural and socio-political violence.

In the remaining chapters, I use the term ‘enclave’ to refer to exclusionary residential spaces organised through the instantiation of inside/outside relationships, and which restrict public access (whether this is though physical or social boundaries). I also use the term as a concept to refer to socio-material structures that impose immobility, social control and identities of self and other. In the urban studies literature, enclaves are described as including gated communities, ghettos, theme parks, global financial districts, asylum and detention centres and special economic zones (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Sidaway, 2007; De Cauter, 2004; Diken and Lausten, 2005). All these spaces are termed enclaves primarily because they share a common sociology of immobility and exclusion (Diken and Lausten, 2005). Such enclaves attempt to restrict, filter and monitor circulation through various mechanisms such as physical enclosures, technological and human security infrastructures and also simply by intimidation and force (Caldeira, 2000; Glasze et al., 2006; Atkinson and Blandy, 2006; Burgess, 2010; Graham, 2010). In the next chapter, my critique of existing scholarship on enclaves and enclaved urbanism rests on the urban studies literature on residential enclaves, while in Chapter 3, my reconceptualisation of enclaved spaces is based on insights from scholarship on logistical and political enclaves (Turner, 2007; Turner, 2010; Diken and Lausten, 2005; Agamben, 1998; Sidaway, 2007). However, in the second part of this thesis, my analysis of enclaved urbanism in Karachi will specifically focus on residential enclaves, such as gated communities, enclosed neighbourhoods and ethnic enclaves.
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I will provide a more detailed overview of my interdisciplinary study of enclaved urbanism in Karachi. In the first section I will outline how escalating crime and urban violence in Karachi is pushing urban residents to live within fortified enclaves, and examine why this practice is tacitly supported by the city authorities. In the second section I will argue that the present uptake of enclavisation in Karachi is problematic, especially considering the particularities of urban life in this deeply divided megacity. Within this context, in the third section I will present my aims and objectives for this study and outline the relevance of this project for urban studies scholarship. In the fourth section I will explain my choice to situate this study within the context of cities of the global South in general and Karachi in particular. I will conclude this chapter by outlining the organisation of this thesis.

**Introduction to Enclavisation and Violence in Karachi**

Since the 1980s, Karachiites have lived through and survived phases of extreme murderous violence. Up until recently, the ongoing battle between conflicting ethno-political groups, criminal gangs and state security forces had mostly been ‘contained’ within Karachi’s peripheral zones (Gayer, 2014). Consequently, news of violent clashes between various criminal groups, their political sponsors and the armed forces in outlying areas such as Lyari, Orangi or North Karachi often did little to disrupt everyday life in the vibrant central districts of the city, which lie within the black box in figure 2 on the following page. However, present day events have come to challenge this oversimplified popular imagery of the Pakistani megacity as a divided city where urban violence and its related insecurities are neatly containable. Today, violence is no longer limited to Karachi’s politicised and criminalised peripheral zones, but has permeated the previously safe districts of central Karachi which are more developed and deeply integrated within the global economy.

---

2 Better-off Karachiites used to consider insecurity to be a condition limited to the lived experiences of the urban poor or to parts of the city popularly referred to as ‘north of the bridge’. The discursively constructed urban divide between the city north and south of Clifton Bridge signifies an oversimplification of characteristics particular to some zones within North and South Karachi. The central districts, which lie in the administrative zones of Central and South Karachi, are popularly regarded by urban residents as the infallible ‘global city’, where the hyper-global elite live, work and are entertained. Meanwhile, through frequent news of industrial action and violent clashes, North, East and West Karachi have been discursively constructed as the peripheral zones of production, labour, violence and dissent (Shamsie, 2002; Asharf, 2012; Ahmed, 2013).
Over the last few years, new criminal actors such as jihadist groups and extortionist gangs have added strength to the city’s existing ethno-political-criminal nexus (Yusuf, 2012; Mezzera, 2011; Walsh and Rehman, 2013). With the arrival of these actors, the range of felonious activities that Karachiites are made victim to has widened. Today, all urban residents—whether they live in Karachi’s peripheral zones or the central districts—live under the constant threat of armed robberies, kidnap for ransom, muggings and vehicle snatchings. Added to this, citizens are increasingly frightened by the relentless terrorist attacks which target government and military offices, foreign consulates, luxury hotels and busy shopping districts within the administrative districts of Saddar Town and Clifton Cantonment (Yusuf, 2012; Anis, Anthony and Mangi, 2014). As urban violence related to ordinary crime, political conflict and terrorism has spiralled out of control, Karachi has become notorious as ‘one of the most dangerous cities in the world’ (Hashim, 2012; Khan, 2013; Magnier, 2013).

In this environment of heightened insecurity, the bid to restore order and safety has had visible effects on Karachi’s landscape. Permanent and temporary pickets, road blocks, identity check posts and barriers pepper ordinary urban spaces in an enactment of what Graham calls ‘the new military urbanism’ (2010: xiv), describing it as a condition whereby
ordinary cities which are not formal sites of war are securitised through militaristic logics. As the images on the next page illustrate, this is increasingly becoming the case for Karachi too, where schools, recreational parks, offices and residential neighbourhoods are enacting extreme security protocols. Alarmingy, the securitisation of such spaces is equivalent to that of strategic urban sites in Karachi which are specifically under threat from terrorism.

As a result of this, Karachiites are bunkering down in fortified enclaves, which Caldeira (1996: 303) describes as ‘privatised, enclosed and monitored spaces for residence, consumption, leisure, and work’. The securitisation of ordinary urban spaces is not unique to Karachi, and various scholars have highlighted how cities as diverse as Los Angeles and Lima, Bombay and Beirut are increasingly socio-spatially fractured. In these cities, a combination of factors, including historical infrastructural inequalities, deregulation and fragmentation of state authority, social polarisation and intensifying insecurity are combining to produce a splintered urban landscape. In this environment, urban residents are turning to live in exclusionary spaces and fortified enclaves such as gated communities, enclosed neighbourhoods and ethnic enclaves (Davis, 2002; Caldeira, 2000; Glasze et al., 2006; Atkinson and Blandy, 2006; Soja, 2005; Marcuse, 1997). Similarly to what is found in cities elsewhere, Karachi’s enclaves are usually privately governed spaces that attempt to provide safety, exclusivity and order to residents living in an environment of fear. In such spaces, authors note that public access is restricted through various physical or social forms of security, while those inside are protected from the insecure city outside (Atkinson and Blandy, 2006; Glasze, Webster, and Frantz, 2006; Caldeira, 2000; Plöger, 2012; Paasche and Sidaway, 2010; Lemanski, 2004; Akar, 2012). In the context of this brief introduction to insecurity and related enclavisation in Karachi, in the next section, I will elaborate the policy context within which this enclavisation was made possible and highlight why I believe that this is problematic for the city’s future.

In Karachi, the above-described ubiquity of militaristic security is representative of a culture of security that focuses on reactive measures as opposed to symptomatic treatment. City governors have resignedly accepted urban violence as a complex condition that is largely out of their control, and they therefore consider the production of fortified enclaves to be a necessary stop-gap measure to ensure public security. ‘Where do we start from?’ says Jamaluddin, a police officer. ‘It’s difficult to clean up this mess—
this (conflict) is a hydra-headed monster, and the political pressures don’t make the task easier,’ he continues, ‘Practically, we can increase security to ensure some level of order’.

Figure 3: Complex security infrastructure outside the offices of Dawn Newspapers in Saddar. Source: Robert J. Byers/Charleston (W.Va.) Gazette, 2013.

Figure 4: Community watch (in blue uniforms) in MQM dominated Azizabad, North Karachi. Source: Photograph by author, 2013.
Figure 5: The guarded gates of Bin Qasim Park, Clifton. Source: Flikr, photograph by bennylin0724, 2012.

Figure 6: Multiple layers of security outside the Sindh High Court in Saddar. Source: Photograph by author, 2011.
In reality, however, the task of securing the rapidly expanding megacity is beyond governmental capacity. Karachi’s police force is well known to be ill-trained, ill-equipped and understaffed (Javaid, 2013). According to Shahid Hayat, the Inspector General of Karachi Police, the city’s police force consists of 27,000 officers. Of these, only 4,000 are actively policing in the field at any given time. Of the remaining personnel, around 9,000 officers are diverted to provide protection duty to VIPs such as politicians, judges or businessmen. The remainder undertake non-policing duties. Given these circumstances, senior police officials explain that the policy of allowing privately securitised enclaves to flourish rests on the premise that citizens have the right to live secure lives in an otherwise insecure city. ‘It is not an ideal system’, says Imtiaz, a security consultant at the Home Office, ‘but at the moment we are facing a crisis. By helping themselves, those who can afford it (private security) are helping us. We can divert resources to where they are most needed.’

The official consensus on allowing enclavisation to flourish is also a reaction to pressure from urban economic elites (Zamir, 2014; Zaheer, 2011). As Karachi contributes a quarter of the country’s Gross Domestic Product, and its industries produce 30 percent of Pakistan’s industrial output, the city’s economy is crucial to Pakistan’s financial survival. Similarly, Karachi’s port and its other businesses help generate more than half of the central government’s tax revenues and 70 percent of national income tax revenue (Budhani, Gazdar, Kaker and Mallah, 2010). In this context, the cost of economic disruption caused by events of mass violence and the ensuing insecurity is significant. A single day of suspended economic activities in Karachi can cost up to $10 billion in lost trade and industrial revenue (Yusuf, 2012). In this context, business lobby groups have become active players in influencing urban security policies and have convinced the government to allow privately securitised and policed enclaves in business and financial districts (Express Tribune, 2014c). By extension, these lobby groups have also set up civil society organisations such as the Citizen Police Liaison Committee (CPLC), which both encourage and offer support for enclavisation in middle-class and affluent residential areas.

However, the city government’s encouragement of enclavisation in Karachi is selective. Although implicitly supported in middle-class and upper middle class localities, officials do not tolerate similar processes of enclavisation in many of the city’s lower income neighbourhoods, and especially not in the many irregular settlements (katchi abadis) where
approximately half of the urban population resides (Hasan and Mohib, 2003). In these politically charged and often volatile *katchi abadis*, enclavisation and security are organised in various, often informal, ways. In some *katchi abadis*, residents organise collective enclosure, community watches and patrols to keep out threatening outsiders. In others, residents subscribe to protection rackets organised by members of ethno-political organisations or criminal gangs. In yet others, prominent community leaders provide protection to their community members through inter-community dialogue and negotiation. When I broached the topic of enclavisation in *katchi abadis* with Imtiaz, his response was forceful: ‘We are trying to open up these no-go areas in *katchi abadis*—they are known to harbour non-state miscreants. They (the *katchi abadis*) are contributing to the problem of insecurity, and a military operation is the only solution.’

Clearly, the right to ensure personal safety through collectively organised enclosure is a privilege not granted equally to all Karachiites. While officials consider enclavisation in middle class and affluent residential areas to be an act of necessity, enclavisation in *katchi abadis* is criminalised. In such spaces, enclavisation is considered to be a territorialisation activity carried out by illicit groups aiming to challenge state authority and spread violence and terror in the city. This bias is tied to the particular political history of Karachi, where members of the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM, a militant ethno-political party) have in the past entrenched themselves in low income and lower-middle income neighbourhoods, creating no-go areas for police and security forces (Gayer, 2014). Operating from within their enclaves, MQM members fought a protracted war with other political groups throughout the 1990s in a bid to gain political influence in city and national politics. In the early 1990s, MQM enclaves were ‘opened up’ after a protracted brutal military operation which helped weaken the party’s political organisation (Gayer, 2012; Gayer, 2014; Khan, 2010).

Despite this past history of enclavisation as an antecedent to urban violence in Karachi, in the present climate of insecurity, police officials continue to support the process in most residential neighbourhoods in the city. Today, such enclaves are allowed to exist

---

3 At present, such enclaves do not fully fit into the popular categories of residential enclaves, i.e. gated communities, enclosed neighbourhoods and ethnic enclaves. However, as I will argue through my reconceptualisation of enclaves (in Chapter 3), such *katchi abadis* can be understood as enclaved spaces especially as they embody several characteristics of enclaved spaces. *Katchi abadis* are often discursively produced and privately governed and guarded spaces of exception.
because of the MQM’s co-option by the provincial and national government and due to a
general understanding of present-day urban violence as an all-pervasive, uncontrollable
force that is no longer simplistically tied to ethno-political contests in the city. Although
police and security officials clearly imagine that present day enclavisation in most planned
neighbourhoods is distinguishable from its historical form, they do not feel the same way
about enclavisation in the city’s informal kachi abadis. Yet, as I will explain in more detail
below, such a view is problematic, as is the present policy of encouraging enclavisation as
a response to widespread insecurity.

The Problematic Uptake of Enclavisation in Karachi

Thus, the proliferation of fortified enclaves in Karachi is tied to a crisis of urban security
governance in an increasingly violent city. In this section, however, I will elaborate on
why the current opinion of fortified enclaves as an effective response to urban insecurity
is problematic—especially considering the realities of everyday life, governance and
politics in complex urban systems such as Karachi. This problematic became obvious to
me following my preliminary field visit to Karachi, when I was able to critically reflect on
my literature review on enclaved spaces through personal encounters with Karachi’s
enclaves and in the process finding unaccounted complexities.

Firstly, and most significantly, I found that the present uptake of enclavisation by
Karachi’s policymakers signals an environmentally deterministic view of fortified
enclaves, which is reflected in the writings of scholars dealing with the phenomenon. The
emphasis on gates, walls, razor-wire, checkpoints and barriers is suggestive of an
understanding that physical fortification is effective in isolating spaces and protecting the
‘inside’ from the ‘feral city’ outside (Davis, 1990; Rodgers, 2006; De Cauter, 2004). This
treatment of enclaves as producing binaries of inside and outside is also mirrored in
scholarship on enclaved urbanism, where the term ‘enclave’ is often used synecdochically
to explain encapsularisation, segregation, urban fragmentation and a general
‘disembedding’ of the city (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Landman and Schönteich, 2002;
Rodgers, 2004; Lemanski, 2004).

I find such a view of enclaves as capsular spaces debatable, especially as it fails to
consider the impossibility of total isolation and security in lived enclaves. A wide range of
activities and ongoing labour is necessary, not only to sustain everyday life within the
enclave, but also to uphold enclosure. This became visible to me during a visit to the
Karachi Sheraton Hotel (pictured below), a fortified enclave in Karachi. There, I encountered Aslam, a private security guard employed to carry out the monotonous labour of monitoring all pedestrians who crossed the electronic security gates in order to enter the hotel. Although Aslam played a key role within the security architecture at the Sheraton, his very presence in the hotel demonstrated that the process of upholding the enclave necessarily produced interactions and interconnections between the inside and outside of fortified enclaves. Many of the staff members who worked at the Sheraton—including Aslam—lived in nearby irregular settlements (katchi abadis). As I mentioned earlier, affluent urban residents and city officials largely consider such katchi abadis to be zones of criminality. In essence, despite active measures being taken to clearly separate the enclave inside from the city outside, it was impossible to enact total separation. In order to ensure the smooth functioning of enclaved spaces, a range of circulations and interconnections between those inside and those outside was necessary. To me, this impossibility of total isolation through enclavisation demonstrates the futile nature of the exercise.

Figure 7: Karachi Sheraton Hotel. Source: Sheraton Karachi, 2012.

Secondly, and relatedly, by focusing on the everyday and processual elements of enclavisation, i.e. on Aslam’s role in upholding the enclave boundaries, I was able to find that it was in fact impossible to impose total security through enclavisation. The present
view of enclaves taken by officials and enclave managers overlooks the more negotiated and discursive aspects of security and enclosure. This omission also characterises the urban studies literature, where boundedness emerges as a key signifier of enclaves and enclaved urbanism (De Cauter, 2004; Atkinson and Blandy, 2009). As a result, the enclave as ‘concept’ often becomes significantly inflexible and fixed. This is especially so when the term ‘enclave’ is used as a descriptor for architectures of enclosure, incarceration and securitisation. Through this onto-epistemological treatment, the meaning of the term conflates with the function of the space.

By considering walls, gates, and security guards to be effective measures to restrict urban circulations, proponents of enclavisation overlook the often performative functions of security. Recalling Aslam’s role in screening pedestrians who cross the security gates of the Karachi Sheraton Hotel, I realised that although Aslam played a small part in the impressive socio-technical infrastructure of security at the Sheraton, his role was integral to the discursive creation of the impregnable enclave. Aslam was supported by a range of other security workers, some of whom operated the electronic security barriers to allow cars through, while others walked around with sniffer dogs and radioactive scanners and yet others sat in control rooms looking out for suspicious activity. Through their repetitive gestures of militaristic security protocols, Aslam and his colleagues contributed to the range of discursive practices put in place by the hotel management to provide guests with an assurance of impregnable security in a volatile environment.

Yet, because security in the enclave was performatively produced, I also realised that it was open to subversion. For example, in moving through the Sheraton’s security protocols, I found that Aslam’s routine motions of asking people to show their bags to check for any dangerous objects left much to be desired in terms of providing effective security. As I passed through the pedestrian security gates without a proper check, I put a direct question to Aslam: ‘How did you know I wasn’t carrying any explosives?’ Aslam gave a resigned reply, saying ‘my presence here shows how strict the Sheraton’s security is. Even if I don’t fully check people’s bags [...] I take a cursory look anyway. I really have no way of stopping a blast. That is all up to Allah!’

Finally, I found the official view of physical enclavisation as a panacea or silver bullet response to urban insecurity in Karachi to be extremely problematic. This uptake rests on an understanding of enclaves as inert infrastructures which effectively impose security and immobility through their physical characteristics. However, as I will argue in more
detail in chapters 2 and 3, this view demonstrates obliviousness to the osmotic, contested and negotiated nature of enclaved spaces and the processual, political and agential nature of urban infrastructures (Bennett, 2005; McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008). Moreover, as I will argue in detail in Chapter 2, this view fails to consider that a policy of encouraging enclavisation may be productive of the very conditions against which enclaves are prescribed. For example, as I will highlight in chapters 3 and 7, the processes of bordering in enclaved spaces exacerbate social differences and alter urban political relations in ways that engender urban violence. Furthermore, as I will highlight in chapters 4 and 8, the processes of enclavisation fragment governmental authority in potentially disastrous ways.

In this way, Karachi’s officials also fail to consider how the production of such enclaves may create structural conditions or change urban socio-political relations in ways that could inflame socio-political violence in Karachi. This is especially relevant when considering the present policy stance towards ‘selective’ enclavisation. By supporting the production of elite enclaves while vehemently opposing the production of enclaves by disenfranchised urban groups, policymakers show an failure to understand how the latter are often produced in response to structural inequalities that emerge from the instantiation of the former (Moser, 2009; Chatterjee, 2009). In effect, current attitudes ignore the relational nature of urban space, i.e. the idea that urban space is a product of complex multi-scalar relations and interconnections (Massey, 2005). Such conceptualisations, which I will elaborate in more detail in Chapter 3, will help in understanding how residential enclaves are co-constituted and self-perpetuating spaces. It also forces us to consider how processes of enclavisation in one part of the city may be productive of structural inequalities and social difference—conditions which often push crime and violence (Winton, 2004; Muggah, 2012).

While my experiences in the field forced me to challenge the predominant ways in which enclaves were reviewed in broader urban studies scholarship, as well as the ways in which the concept was taken up by Karachi’s residents and governors, I turned to reflect on broader implications of enclavisation as an activity that may magnify existing ethno-political and socio-spatial tensions in Karachi, a megacity that is already conflict prone. In thinking this through, I began to wonder why, despite the fact that residents were bunkering down within secure enclaves, urban violence related to ethno-political conflict, terrorist attacks and ordinary crime continued to paralyse everyday life in Karachi with
more intensity and force. Statistical reports highlight that between 2010 and 2013 kidnappings increased by 55 percent, and other incidents of crime such as vehicle snatching, telephone snatching and robberies increased by 50 percent (Cplc.org.pk, 2014). Meanwhile, in the same period the number of violent killings related to ethno-political violence and terrorism spiked. In 2013, the homicide rate in Karachi was 15.5 per 100 000 people, compared to 9.9 per 100 000 people in 2010.\(^4\) I found that this dramatic rise in urban violence, which occurred in spite of continuing urban fortification and enclavisation, demanded closer scrutiny. It hinted at a possible causal relationship between enclavisation and urban violence in Karachi.

This thesis is therefore based on the argument that enclaves and the city are related to each other—especially as they are co-constituted in multiple ways through urban socio-political relations. Based on my preliminary experiences of interacting with city governors, enclave managers, residents and workers in Karachi’s enclaved spaces, as well as on the contextual understanding which I gained of politics and governance in Karachi, I found the socio-political dynamics of enclavisation to be an often ignored aspect in the literature on enclaves and enclaved urbanism. I also found that paying closer attention to the complexities of inside-outside relationships, paradoxes of security/insecurity and the political subjectivities produced through everyday interactions between residents, workers and visitors living and moving within and between enclaved spaces is perhaps essential if we are to understand the form and function of enclaved spaces, as well as being highly relevant to the generation of a critical conceptualisation of enclaves. Similarly, I felt that it was possible to consider enclavisation and urban violence as relational processes and to hold processes of enclavisation and enclaved urbanism responsible for escalating urban violence. I will explain this in more detail in the following section, where I will clearly outline the aims and objectives of this project.

**Aims, Objectives, and Key Contributions**

Nuanced accounts disclose that socio-spatial inequalities, difference and fear of the other are pronounced in enclaved cities (Caldeira, 2000; Low, 2003; Glasze et al., 2006; Low and Smith, 2006). In some cases, scholars hold the geography of exclusion accountable for perpetuating novel forms of apartheid (Lemanski, 2004; Dawson, 2006). In enclaved

\(^4\) Based on author’s calculations from various sources.
African cities, for example, authors highlight how the production of gated communities is tied to the ghettoisation of the poor in ways that mirror colonial projects of segregation and social control (Jürgens and Landman, 2006; Dawson, 2006). Other studies focus on political and governmental aspects of enclaved urbanism, concluding that processes of creating and upholding enclaved spaces spatialise governmentality (Sidaway, 2007; Turner, 2010; Caldeira, 1996). Meanwhile, scholars such as Caldeira (2000) and Alsayyad and Roy (2006) also highlight how processes of enclavisation restructure state-society relations by displacing the social contract between citizens and the state. In such cases, these authors suggest that individuals or governing bodies who watch over residents’ interests in enclaved spaces may emerge as authoritative actors who may begin to threaten state authority in enclaved cities (De Souza 2009; Fregonese, 2012). However, despite elaborating the effects of enclaved urbanism on urban socio-political relations, current scholarship on enclaves fails to forcefully interrogate enclaves as relational processes that continuously interact with wider socio-political structures and shape urban power and politics in ways that perpetuate urban violence.

As I will outline in more detail in the following chapter, in accounts of spatial politics in enclaved cities, enclaves remain unproblematised and are treated as the ‘place’ from which urban social and political relations extend outwards (Atkinson and Blandy, 2005; Glasze et al., 2006). In the same literature, there is an over-determinism around the physicality of enclaves and enclaved spaces are not conceptually understood as processes that may be agential. The ‘blackboxing’ of enclaved spaces is further made complete as the term ‘enclave’ is synecdochically used by scholars to explain encapsularisation, segregation, urban fragmentation and a general ‘disembedding’ of the city (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Landman and Schönteich, 2002; Rodgers, 2004; Lemanski, 2004). Consequently, the descriptive treatment of enclaves reifies them as homogenous, insular, incarcerating spaces (Atkinson and Blandy, 2006; Glasze et al., 2006; Landman, 2006; Landman, 2004; Rodgers, 2004). As a result, the varying textures of governance and

5 ‘Blackboxing’ is an abstract notion used by Bruno Latour to describe the social processes that make scientific and technical works invisible because of their success. Blackboxing results in the creation of an artefact that seems static or closed from the outside. Latour explains how technologies are blackboxed: ‘When a machine runs efficiently, when a matter of fact is settled, one need focus only on its inputs and outputs and not on its internal complexity. Thus, paradoxically, the more science and technology succeed, the more opaque and obscure they become’ (Latour, 1999: 304).
socio-political lived realities within enclaved spaces tend to be overlooked, as does the processual nature of enclaves.

This analytical blind spot is also mirrored in current scholarship on enclaves and enclaved urbanism. In this scholarship, enclaves are currently studied merely as consequences of escalating urban violence and not as agential processes that are productive of urban violence. In Chapter 2, I will expand this argument in detail, highlighting how the literature on enclaved urbanism conspicuously ignores the agential, relational, processual and geopolitical nature of enclaved space. This literature rests on analytical weaknesses which can be remedied if enclaves are conceptualised through concepts of relationality, performativity and assemblage. Such a view necessitates that urban space is considered to be multi-scalar, processual and mutable, and not fixed in any way. Moreover, a relational view of space forces us to consider that processes of enclave-making may be consensual as well as contested. Hence, it becomes possible to understand the activity of enclavisation as inherently political and power-laden (Massey, 2005; Murdoch, 2005). Based on the earlier elaborated evidence of enclavisation in Karachi, and in the context of the above-mentioned gaps in scholarship on enclaved urbanism, the overall aim of this project and its related key objectives are as follows:

**Overall aim:**

- To develop an understanding of enclavisation and urban violence in Karachi as relational processes.

**Key objectives:**

- Firstly, to highlight key gaps in the scholarship on enclaved urbanism which currently inhibit the generation of an understanding of enclaves as spaces that are productive of urban violence.
- Secondly, to re-conceptualise residential enclaves as relational, dynamic, political and socio-material spaces that have flexible and negotiated boundaries and are always in process.
- Thirdly, to develop an understanding of enclaves as agential spaces that restructure urban governance, politics and socio-political relations.
- Finally, to present empirical evidence on enclavisation in Karachi in order to elaborate how processual enclaves intersect with complex urban systems to
generate inequalities, marginalities and disjunctive forms of citizenship in ways that reproduce patterns of violence and victimisation in the city.

As an interdisciplinary exercise, this thesis will make important theoretical and empirical contributions to existing scholarship on gating, fortification, urban conflict, violence and everyday life in contemporary cities. These are summarised below:

- Firstly, using concepts of assemblage, materiality and performativity, the project will open up residential enclaves to critical scrutiny for urban studies scholars, allowing them to consider the agential and political nature of otherwise ordinary spaces of residence. This would be especially useful for scholars engaged with enclaved urbanism (Atkinson and Blandy, 2006; Glasze et al., 2006; De Cauter, 2004; Graham and Marvin, 2001), as well as for others who study insecurity, citizenship, governance and everyday life in contested and divided cities (Soja, 2005; Caldeira, 2000; Holston, 2009; De Souza, 2014; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008b).

- Secondly, by analysing enclaved spaces as infrastructures that exacerbate the underlying conditions of structural and socio-political violence, I will add to critical scholarship on the role of infrastructures as mediators and mediums of urban violence (Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012; Graham, 2010; Coward, 2009). In fact, I will add to this literature by demonstrating that infrastructures are not only channels for urban violence, but are also agential in producing it.

- Thirdly, by situating my research within a thriving Pakistani megacity that is otherwise marginalised in urban studies research, the empirical details presented in this project and the resulting analysis will present valuable possibilities for scholars engaged in advancing scholarship on postcolonial and comparative urbanism (Robinson, 1996; Roy, 2009b; Simone, 2009).

Having highlighted the aims, objectives and key contributions of this thesis, in the following section I will explain my empirical emphasis on cities of the global South and my rationale for using Karachi as a case study. Following this, I will conclude this chapter by outlining my approach to studying enclaves as processes and as spaces that not only emerge as consequences of the escalating insecurity and violence in Karachi but which are also productive of these same conditions.
Why Cities of the Global South and Why Karachi?

In the past decade, critical urban research has been involved with the project of ‘post-colonising’ urban theory and developing new geographies of theory (Roy, 2009b; Robinson, 2006). This critical orientation stems from the recognition that cities of the global South have been historically marginalised in urban studies. At the same time, there is also a realisation that whilst the global urban future lies in cities of the global South (Dawson and Edwards, 2004), urban theory has largely focused on issues that are removed from the real world imperatives of planning, governing, managing and living in these cities (Simone, 2009; Watson, 2009b; Lindell, 2008; Gaffikin and Perry, 2012; Roy, 2009b; Roy, 2011b).

This critical project is also a political agenda and a postcolonial critique of the global cities literature. Robinson (2006) leads the argument by suggesting that the global cities literature discursively ‘others’ megacities of the global South by assessing them through developmentalist criteria, or reifies them as un-modern places beyond the ‘developed’ world. Such an act silences the diversity of urban life and fails to acknowledge other categories and ways to be urban which are thriving in cities of the global South (Robinson, 2006; Simone, 2009; Roy, 2011). In response, Robinson (2006) calls attention to the varied geographies of the cities of the global North and South, arguing that all cities need to be treated as what Amin and Graham (1997: 411) refer to as ‘ordinary cities’. Robinson describes ordinary cities as ‘[…] diverse, differentiated, and contested, shaped by processes stretching far beyond their physical extent, but also by the complex dynamics of the city itself’ (Robinson, 2006: 10).

My own focus on cities of the global South, and on Karachi in particular, is both a dedication and a contribution to this shift in critical urban studies research. I promote the case of ‘ordinary cities’ by choosing Karachi—a complex, dynamic, and diverse megacity—as a site for theory production and analysis. However, I also choose to focus on Karachi for particular conceptual and methodological reasons. First of all, given that in Karachi the global city is entrenched within the subaltern city, it is an ideal place from which to theorise the enclaved city in totality—as a constellation of processual, relational, mobile and unequal spatialisations.

Secondly, a focus on Karachi in particular, and cities of the global South in general, expands the scope of the study of enclaves beyond experiences and contexts particular to
cities of the global North. For example, criticisms of the *splintering urbanism* thesis acknowledge the currency of the concept but warn against generalising the processes of urban fragmentation and enclave production (Coutard, 2008). A view from cities of the South provides a contextualised flavour of enclaved urbanism in cities with differential state spatialisations (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Brenner, Jessop, Jones and MacLeod, 2003), alternative modes of governance (Gaffikin and Perry, 2012; Roy, 2011b) and varying forms of citizenship (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006; Holston and Appadurai, 2003; Caldeira, 2000).

Thirdly, by presenting an in-depth case study of Karachi, a thriving yet often disrupted megacity within what is popularly conceived as a ‘fragile’ state, I offer a vantage point from a city which is off the academic map of urban studies. Despite various portrayals of urban life and urbanisation in the city (Budhani et al., 2010; Gazdar and Mallah, 2013; Hasan and Mohib, 2003), Karachi, the world’s seventh largest urban agglomeration (Cox, 2012), is yet to receive the paradigmatic status in critical urban studies enjoyed by other megacities in the subcontinent such as Delhi, Calcutta and Mumbai. While Karachi has a unique status in local and global politics, there are noticeable gaps in the scholarship on urban political life in the city beyond accounts of ethno-political conflict or informality and urban life (see Budhani et al., 2010; Gazdar and Mallah, 2011; Gazdar and Mallah, 2013; Gayer, 2007; Gayer, 2012).

**Outline of the Thesis**

The narrative that follows is divided in two parts. In the first part, I will elaborate a theoretical framework within which I can ground my analysis of enclaves as spaces that perpetuate urban violence. In the second part, I will present detailed case studies of enclavisation and enclaved urbanism in Karachi and illustrate how enclavisation and urban violence are relational processes.

Each chapter in part one makes a contribution to the development of a critical conceptualisation of enclaves as agential and processual spaces. In Chapter 2, I critically review the literature on enclaves, enclavisation and urban violence in order to demonstrate how it may be possible to understand urban violence as an outcome of enclavisation. After introducing the key characteristics of urban violence and outlining the dominant frameworks for its study, I will explain how current conceptualisations inhibit the study of enclaves as spatial processes that are productive of this phenomenon.
In the remainder of the chapter, I will present a detailed critique of existing theorisations of enclaves. I will highlight how the current methodological, conceptual and empirical engagement with enclaves across the urban studies literature limits analysis of enclaves as contextually relevant processes that restructure urban-political relations in ways that perpetuate urban violence.

Taking this argument forward in Chapter 3, I use relational theories, assemblage theory and the theory of performativity to critically re-conceptualise enclaves as processual and socio-material assemblages (McFarlane, 2011a; Massey, 2005). The main argument throughout this chapter is that enclaves are relational processes that are produced through a combination of factors, including social interactions, political space, discursive acts and the instantiation of inside/outside relations. Such a conceptualisation forces us to move beyond fixations on urban form, while also revealing the dynamic and fluid nature of enclaved spaces. Moreover, such a conceptualisation allows us to consider the agential and political nature of processual enclaves, especially as it reveals how processes of enclavisation are productive of identities, subjectivities and political exception. Therefore, understanding enclaves in this way brings us closer to studying enclaves as spaces that perpetuate urban violence.

Having laid the conceptual groundwork in Chapter 3, in Chapter 4 I present a framework for reviewing processes of enclavisation with reference to wider urban political processes related to governance and statehood in contemporary cities. At the same time, I also provide a more detailed background of processes of governance and urban politics in Karachi. This relational comparison of processes of enclavisation in different settings is an attempt to contextualise the production of enclaved space within particular historical and socio-political contexts in Karachi and in cities which share similarities with Karachi (Ward, 2010). In the process, I demonstrate how the production of enclaved spaces in cities of the global South is intricately tied to power and politics, thereby drawing attention to the political nature of enclaved spaces. In the process, I emphasise the ways in which actors governing enclaved spaces interact with practices of government and hence produce an understanding of enclaves as significant geo-political spaces. As a result, the arguments presented in Chapter 4 suggest a framework for analysing relations of governance and urban political life in enclaved cities so as to explain how relational enclaves are productive of urban conflict and violence.
In Chapter 5, I provide a methodological overview of this project in light of my theorisation of enclaves and urban violence as relational processes. I explain the relevance of relational theory to presenting enclaves as vibrant processual constellations of physical space, politics and social relations, all of which exist in a permanent state of negotiated tension between openness and closure, inside and outside, security and insecurity (Bennett, 2010; McFarlane, 2011a; Massey, 2005; Amin and Graham, 1999). I then justify and outline my research design, which uses ethnography as a method to collect data from case study sites. Using Karachi as my case study, I use ethnographic methods to study the inter-relationships and interconnections within and between three residential enclaves which lie in close proximity to each other. Very briefly, these are Askari III, a gated community developed on Cantonment land; Clifton Block 7, an open plan residential neighbourhood governed by the Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC) which is now privately secured and enclosed by a residents’ association; and Sultanabad, a *katchi abadi* which is largely perceived as a no-go area, but is further divided into ethnic enclaves, many of which are formally enclosed or discursively constructed as spaces of danger. I have chosen these three sites because they broadly characterise the different forms of residential enclaves widely referred to in the literature, and also because they are in close proximity to each other. All three enclaves are located in areas broadly considered ‘south of the bridge’.

Part II is organised in three chapters. Each of these chapters draws evidence from my fieldwork in Karachi to illustrate how enclaved spaces are multi-scalar processes that spatialise urban socio-political relations in various ways, as well as showing how processes of enclavisation are generative of urban violence. In Chapter 6, I introduce the case study sites of Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad, while tracing the processes of enclavisation in these. I highlight how each enclave is produced through the intersection of contemporary and historical processes of urban fragmentation, privatisation, securitisation and political exceptionalism in Karachi. Through this focus on processes of enclavisation, I highlight how each enclave is uniquely different to the other, as it crystallises varied experiences of urban political life in Karachi. Overall, this chapter provides an understanding of governance and politics in Karachi, while also introducing Karachi’s enclaves as spaces that are relational to urban politics and governance.
In Chapter 7, I delve into the relationship of enclavisation with circulation, security and identity. Here, I examine the ways in which the discursive and performative practices of securitisation within enclaved spaces relate with existing imaginative geographies of self and other. After examining the processes of bordering and securitising in Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad, I suggest that registers of inclusion and exclusion shape the permeability of urban borders. Using personal observations and interviews with people governing, living and working in each of the three field sites, as well as with those performing security, I demonstrate that the production of enclaved spaces is generative of tensions between space, security and circulation. The evidence presented in Chapter 7 thus suggests that identity is tied to relations between enclavisation and circulation, and that enclaves have fluid borders which regularly shift and blur to accommodate or exclude people. Overall, the evidence presented in this chapter is reflective of my critical conceptualisation of enclaved spaces (in Chapter 3). Furthermore, by emphasising how processes of enclavisation are productive of marginalities and political subjectivities, this chapter provides an essential background for the next chapter, Chapter 8, which analyses enclavisation and urban violence as inter-related processes.

Chapter 8, the final empirical chapter, develops an analysis of urban violence in Karachi as an outcome of enclavisation. In order to do this, the chapter builds on the connections between enclavisation, governance and urban violence which were theorised in the first part of this thesis. Firstly, it suggests that as spaces that project homogeneity, enclaves themselves may become sites that attract terror and violence. Hence, enclaves become paradoxical sites of security and insecurity. Secondly, by demonstrating how processes of enclavisation in Karachi are generative of identities of self and other, Chapter 8 highlights how enclaves are productive of racialised and criminalised identities of people and place. In connection to this, the evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that processes of enclavisation exacerbate the vulnerabilities of marginalised populations, making them both victims of state terror and vigilante justice. Finally, following from an understanding of urban violence as an interrelated process that produces chains and spirals of violence, Chapter 8 argues that processes of enclavisation can be held directly responsible for producing concatenations of violence. The arguments presented in Chapter 8 are therefore instrumental in exposing the agency of urban space in perpetuating conflict and violence in Karachi.
In the concluding chapter, I return to the aims and objectives outlined in this introductory chapter, and demonstrate how the arguments presented in each chapter meets them. Next, I outline the conceptual, empirical, and practical contributions of this project as well as on avenues for future research. Firstly, I suggest that my novel conceptual framework within which to understand enclaves analyse them as relational and processual spaces opens up the agenda for renewed critical scrutiny on enclaved urbanism. By focusing on how enclaves embody collective social and political values; how they materialise fear, insecurity, social difference and uneven development; and how they spatialise power, governmentality and inequality, I have highlighted how enclaves are indeed paradigmatic spaces that remain under-studied. Taken as such, enclaves may become a domain of renewed interest for scholars working on securitisation, innovative practices of urban governance, state spaces and citizenship, and/or urban conflict and violence. Such a nuanced study of enclaved urbanism is especially relevant since the proliferation of enclaves is visibly shaping urban landscapes across contemporary cities (Caldeira, 2000; Graham and Marvin, 2000; Atkinson and Blandy, 2006; Shatkin, 2007; Neil and Smith, 2006; Glasze, Webster and Frantz, 2006; Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Graham, 2010).

Secondly, I argue that my focus on processes of enclavisation in cities of the global South furthers the project of ‘worlding cities’ (Robinson, 2006). In focusing on Karachi, I have offered insights into a city which remains off the ‘academic map’ despite being an important world city. Furthermore, the in-depth case studies presented would allow further comparative work by scholars wishing to engage with issues related to urban governance, socio-spatial relations, citizenship and conflict in similar contexts. This is especially timely as influential urban studies scholars are now concerned with ‘post-colonising’ urban theory and developing new geographies of theory (Roy, 2009b; Robinson, 2006). There is also a realisation that, whilst the global urban future lies in cities of the global South (Dawson and Edwards, 2004), urban theory has largely focused on issues that are removed from the real world imperatives of planning, governing, managing and living in such cities (Simone, 2009; Watson, 2009b; Lindell, 2008; Gaffikin and Perry, 2012; Roy, 2009b; Roy, 2011b).

Finally, and most significantly, in explicating the political and agential nature of enclaved spaces, I demonstrate how this project is of significant relevance for policy makers and urban planners working across socio-spatially polarised, unevenly developed, and
fragmented cities. I forcefully argue that in cities such as Karachi, academics and policymakers alike should consider how processes of enclavisation restructure power and politics in the city and beyond in ways that cause instability, insecurity, and concatenations of violence.
CHAPTER 2

ENCLAVES, ENCLAvisATION, AND ENCLAved URBANISM WITH RELEVANCE FOR URBAN VIOLENCE

Enclave: A small piece of territory that is culturally distinct and politically separate from another territory within which it is located. [...] The term is increasingly used to refer to a city neighbourhood displaying distinctive economic, social and cultural attributes from its surroundings. (Flint, 2009: 191)

Presented in the dictionary of human geography, the above definition of an enclave offers a broad-brush understanding of enclaves as territorial spaces that are socio-culturally, economically and politically distinct from their surroundings. In urban studies scholarship, however, residential enclaves are also defined by their capacity to restrict circulation through physical fortification and practices of enclosure (Davis, 1990; Caldeira, 1996; Ellin, 1997; Flusty, 1994). Increasingly, the term enclave is used to denote segregated spaces which are delinked from the wider city through premium infrastructural networks, exclusive politico-legal arrangements with city governments and a sociology of exclusion which attempts to create separation between those inside and outside (Glasze et al., 2006; Diken and Lausten, 2005; Atkinson, 2008). The most common types of residential enclaves studied within urban studies are gated communities and enclosed neighbourhoods (Landman, 2000; Low, 2003; Atkinson and Blandy, 2006; Glasze et al., 2006; Lemanski et al., 2008; Ploger, 2010), while some authors also highlight ethno-racial enclaves, favelas and no-go areas as types of enclaves (Caldeira, 2000; Marcuse, 1997)

Many scholars describe the contemporary urban condition—characterised by the proliferation of enclaves—as enclaved urbanism (Wissink, 2013; Douglas, Wissink and Van Kempen, 2012; Sharma, 2010). In their discussions, these authors demonstrate how such a form of urbanism denotes socio-spatial segregation, fragmented and splintered infrastructural development and ambiguous planning and governmental regimes (Roy, 2011a; Douglas, Wissink and Van Kempen, 2012). In such respects, enclaved urbanism is understood to be productive of inclusions and exclusions, connections and disconnections and differentiated notions of citizenship (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006; Graham and Marvin, 2001; Soja, 2005).
However, as I have briefly outlined in the introductory chapter, despite presenting detailed accounts of the politics of space and governance in an enclaved urbanism, these scholars do not sufficiently interrogate urban violence as a continuum tied to enclavisation. In this chapter, I will elaborate this proposition in more detail by arguing that analysis of enclaves as spaces that perpetuate urban violence is inhibited because of weaknesses in present theorisations of enclaved spaces. I will make this argument by presenting a critical review of scholarship on enclaves and enclaved urbanism in light of the literature on urban violence.

To do so, in the first section I will introduce key definitions of urban violence and outline frameworks through which it becomes possible to study urban violence as a phenomenon that is tied to enclavisation. In the second section I will highlight existing weaknesses in the scholarship on enclaves and enclaved urbanism which inhibit the conceptualisation of enclavisation and urban violence as relational processes. Keeping in mind these critical gaps in the literature on enclaves and enclavisation, in the third section I will outline the ways in which existing gaps in the scholarship on enclaved urbanism and urban violence can be bridged through a reconceptualisation of enclaves and enclavisation. These critiques therefore form a basis for the next two chapters, where I re-theorise enclaves as processual spaces that are directly responsible for escalating urban violence in Karachi.

**Definitions and Key Concepts of Urban Violence**

Scholars studying urban violence across anthropological, sociological, political and criminological disciplines find it to be an extremely complex phenomenon that is difficult to define and delimit. Across this literature, the category of urban violence encompasses forms of violence that is enacted in cities and produced through processes of city-making and urbanisation (Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012; Moser, 2004; Winton, 2004; Muggah, 2012). Such violence may be manifested directly through brutal force, causing physical or psychological harm, or indirectly through structural conditions which may lead to direct violence (Muggah, 2012; Moser, 2004; Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012; Moser and McIlwaine, 2004).

Based on this general definition of urban violence, the diagram below is representative of prevalent understandings of urban violence as a dynamic, multi-scalar, and interrelated process. This diagrammatic representation of urban violence rests on a literature review.
which illustrates that underlying structural and material conditions are productive of concatenations of violence in megacities (Auyero, Lara, and Berti, 2014; Schepers-Hughes, 2004; Muggah, 2012; Moser, 2004; Moser and McIlwaine, 2006; Winton, 2004; Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012). The resultant urban violence may play out as social, economic, institutional, political, structural and/or infrastructural (outer circles in figure 8), and may be manifested in a variety of ways (outer boxes in figure 8). Moreover, as the overlapping circles and multi-directional arrows in figure 8 represent, emergent forms of urban violence may be interrelated, and also may affect urban socio-political relations in ways that cause other forms of urban violence.

For example, scholars studying urban violence in divided megacities have demonstrated that state policies which result in inequality, exclusion and deprivation are a type of violence against urban residents (structural violence), as well as a key underlying factor in other forms of urban violence (Muggah, 2012; Moser, 2004; Winton, 2004). In Latin American cities, for example, Koonings and Kruijt (2007; 2009), De Souza (2009) and Jütersonke et al. (2009) highlight how political abandonment from formal authorities opens up space for violent urban actors such as gangs or mafia groups to legitimise
themselves as providers of institutional support to otherwise marginalised urban residents. In such instances, non-state actors may appropriate legitimacy by developing infrastructures such as low cost housing for otherwise ignored populations or by providing access to security and justice for the disenfranchised (Budhani et al., 2010; Jütersonke et al., 2009; Kooning and Kruijt, 2009). Moreover, evidence from Latin American, Middle Eastern and African megacities has suggested that the resulting fragmentation of state authority often results in conflict amongst competing state and non-state political actors and institutions (Fregonese, 2012; Beall et al., 2013). Ensuing contests of control between different actors trying to establish authority further escalate urban violence, which may be manifested as politico-institutional violence (Winton, 2004; Beall et al., 2013; De Souza, 2009; De Souza, 2014; Muggah, 2012).

Meanwhile, since this violence usually plays out amongst marginalised communities or in places where they interact, reports of violence and crime discursively represent the urban poor or particular ethno-racial groups as violent urban actors (Vanderschueren, 1996; Caldeira, 2000). As social anxieties amongst urban residents are heightened, empirical evidence suggests that powerful urban groups perpetuate socio-political violence by organising themselves as vigilante groups, or they may push state authorities to crack down on ‘troublesome communities’ (Moser, 2004; Moser and McIlwaine, 2006; Winton, 2004; Schuberth, 2013; Robins, 2002). In such situations, structural violence ceases to simply be a type of violence, as it is also a condition that develops concatenations of violence, or what Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004) have famously termed chains, spirals and mirrors of violence.

This brief introduction to urban violence illustrates the complex nature of the phenomenon, and is therefore suggestive of the difficulty of teasing apart types of urban violence in order to establish causalities within particular contexts. Despite this difficulty, it is possible to study urban violence (as a category that encompasses political, social, institutional, structural and economic violence) through ecological frameworks of analysis. Such frameworks review urban violence as a multi-scalar process that is contextually produced through socio-political relations at the individual, interpersonal, institutional and structural level (Moser and McIlwaine, 2006). In effect, ecological frameworks of analysis pay attention to the underlying structures of political power and urban socio-political relations in megacities (Moser and McIlwaine, 2004, 2006; Scheper-Huges and Bourgois, 2004; Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012). Analysing urban violence
through ecological frameworks also reveals that people not only experience violence through changes in the underlying structures of power and control, but also through differences in their identity position in relation to these changes. In this way, studying the interrelationship between structure, identity and agency in cities is an appropriate framework of analysis for studying urban violence (Moser and McIlwaine, 2006).

In light of these frameworks of analysis, it becomes possible for me to consider how the widespread proliferation of enclaves in Karachi may be productive of urban violence. To do so, it will be important to study how enclaved spaces—as socio-material infrastructures—may affect social and political relations in cities. Here, I build on Rodgers and O’Neill’s (2012) argument that urban infrastructures are both material channels of structural violence and instrumental mediums of urban violence (Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012). The authors argue that infrastructures demarcate urban connections and disconnections, shape urban circulations and establish literal as well as figurative inclusions and exclusions within the city (Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012).

The above-mentioned arguments are based on relational concepts within poststructuralist geography, whereby material infrastructures are understood as ecological, agential and political processes (Star, 1999; Bennett, 2005; McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008; Graham, 2010b). Such a conceptualisation reveals the political nature of infrastructures, showcasing how infrastructures are agential in shaping urban socio-political relations (McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008; Graham, 2010b). This agential capacity of infrastructures in producing urban violence is presented by Rodgers and O’Neill (2012) in their introductory chapter in the *Ethnography* special issue on infrastructural violence (volume 13, issue 4), and is further revealed by other authors contributing to the special issue. Using empirical examples, various authors illustrate how the development of premium infrastructural networks, such as highways or spaces of off-shore extraction, operationalises structural violence (Apello, 2012) and socio-political violence (Rodgers, 2012). Moreover, the authors also highlight that such infrastructures produce unequal power-geometries (Massey, 1994; 2005) of connections and disconnections which, in turn, generate structural conditions such as inequalities, exclusion, and marginalisation (Apello, 2012; Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012; Auyero and de Lara, 2012). As I have highlighted earlier through a comprehensive review of literature on urban violence, such structural conditions are well known to be productive of various other forms of urban violence (Winton, 2004; Muggah, 2012; Moser and McIlwaine, 2006)
Taken together, these accounts open up the possibilities of developing causalities between enclavisation and urban violence. However, although these accounts are valid contributions, they lack one important element in that they still do not reveal the agential nature of infrastructures, that is, the ways in which socio-material infrastructures are actively responsible for changing the underlying relations of urban governance, power and political life. In this project, I aim to establish causalities between urban violence and enclavisation by building on these accounts of infrastructural violence. Overall, this is firstly to consider enclaves as spaces that are productive of structural inequalities; secondly to consider how enclaves are shaped by as well as shape urban socio-political relations to create identities of self and other and exacerbate social difference; and thirdly to demonstrate that enclaves are agential in skewing urban governance structures so that relations of urban power and politics shift in ways that exacerbate urban violence.

However, as I will briefly outline below, various theoretical and conceptual weaknesses within the scholarship on enclaves currently restrict analysis of enclaves as agential political spaces that exacerbate inequalities and social difference or change socio-political structures in ways that are productive of urban violence. I will highlight these criticisms in more detail in the next section.

**Weaknesses in the Conceptualisation of Enclaves as Political Processes**

In this section, I will argue that theoretical gaps in the literature on enclaves conspicuously inhibit us from considering the political and processual nature of enclaved spaces, and hence from understanding enclaves as spaces that are agential in perpetuating urban violence. I will do this by presenting a critique of the literature on residential enclaves and enclaved urbanism. My critiques highlight first how methodological shortcomings limit generating an in-depth conceptualisation of enclaves, second how enclaves are presently theorised as fixed and static urban spaces, third how there is a failure to conceptualise enclaves as a variety of urban forms characterised through socio-political characteristics, and fourth how the North American gated community is used as a heuristic device for conceptualising enclaved spaces and for understanding processes of enclavisation across a variety of contexts. I present these critiques in more detail below.
Methodological and Conceptual Conundrums

Firstly, I faced difficulties conceptualising enclaves as agential spaces after realising that enclaves are often synecdochically treated as spatial forms that characterise certain phenomena without nuanced engagement with theorising enclaves or problematising the descriptive features of enclaved spaces. In important contributions to the literature on enclaved urbanism, various authors present enclaves as paradigmatic spaces for the study of broader phenomena such as the unequal spatialities of globalisation, the politics of space, fear of crime or the changing relations of urban governance (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006; Lemanski, 2007; Caldeira, 2000; Low and Smith, 2006; Graham and Marvin, 2001). However, in so doing, these authors start by descriptively characterising enclaved spaces as physically fortified and impregnable spaces without problematising enclaves conceptually.

For example, widely cited works by Blakely and Snyder (1997), Marcuse (1997), Low (2003) and Caldeira (2000) remain the ground-breaking research which inspires scholars working on enclaves across the world. The key characterisations of enclaved spaces which these authors have referred to—i.e. fortification, spatial segregation, private governance and exclusivity—are taken up by researchers working on various aspects of enclaves and enclaved spaces. In sociological accounts of gated enclaves across different contexts, authors mostly define such spaces through standardised sets of characteristics or simply by processes which denote spatial segregation. For example, researchers either define the key features of enclaves and enclaved spaces through their physical form, such as gates, walls and security architectures (Hook and Vrdoljak, 2002; Landman, 2000, Lemanski, 2004; Falzon, 2004), or they focus on enclaves as spaces that denote socio-spatial segregation in an environment of insecurity (Dawson, 2006; Lemanski, 2004; Rosen and Razin, 2000; Landman, 2006; Coy and Pöhler, 2002). While there are nuanced discussions over the political exercise of spatial segregation in enclaved cities (Waldrop, 2004; Lemanski, 2004), and research on the politics of exception or spatialised governmentality in enclaved cities (Diken and Lausten, 2005; Glaszenson and Blandy, 2006; AlSayyad and Roy, 2006) may be helpful in understanding the political nature of enclaved spaces, these accounts still treat enclaves as the backdrops for wider social processes and do not analyse how enclaves are processual spaces that are continuously shaped through urban socio-political relations, and in turn also shape urban relations.
Therefore, there is little focus on developing a critical agenda for studying enclaves and enclaved urbanism. While these are extremely useful contributions in themselves, by not problematising ‘enclosure’ as a socio-material exercise that takes place at the points of entry to the enclave, and instead taking up an environmentally deterministic view of walls and gates, scholars tend to reify enclaves as static spaces. As a result, this treatment has created a fixed and static notion of enclaves—as mere backdrops against which social relations play out.

There is therefore a complete neglect of the dynamism that is inherent in enclaved spaces. This is something I found especially limiting after reflecting on my fieldwork in Karachi, which led me to consider how enclaves take shape in different ways because they spatialise varying experiences of citizenship and divergent arrangements of spatial governance. I also found that enclaves continue to be shaped through everyday interactions with urban processes and urban life, and that the ‘boundaries’ of residential enclaves were not always physical, nor were they fixed. Instead, gated enclaves were often more ‘open’ than they seemed, while other relatively accessible looking ethnic enclaves may become impossible to access at certain times of day or during certain events in the city. As I will explain below, this methodological weakness of ignoring urban circulations limits analysis by supressing the political agency of enclaved spaces.

‘Disembeddedness’ and the Neglect of Urban Circulations

Secondly, the political agency of enclaves is stunted by an over-emphasis on fortification and disembeddedness as key features of enclaves, and a disappointing neglect of urban circulations. In mainstream urban studies literature, enclaves are primarily defined through an environmentally deterministic uptake of physical characteristics, premium networked space and spatial bypass and extraterritoriality. In such literature, enclavisation is explained through themes such as military urbanism, splintering urban infrastructure, urban fragmentation and political exceptionalism in an environment of increasing inequality and insecurity (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Graham, 2010; Atkinson and Blandy, 2006; Davis, 1990). Moreover, there is also a strong emphasis on enclaves as spaces of political exception, which are organised around the sociology of the ‘camp’ (Diken and Lausten, 2005, Alsayyad and Roy, 2006, Agamben, 1998). Taken together, these understandings discursively produce meanings of enclaves which emphasise political, social, and structural secession from the broader urban fabric.
This conceptual weakness has its roots in popular uptakes of the influential accounts of residential enclaves provided by Blakely and Snyder’s (1997) concept of gated communities and Teresa Caldeira’s (1996) theorisation of fortified enclaves (1996; 2000). Blakely and Snyder (1997) describe such enclaves as both old (retrofitted) and new residential developments that are privately governed and physically enclosed, while subjecting users to rules and regulations that regulate membership. The authors further suggest that there are varying types of gated communities which offer either one or a combination of functions, such as exclusive lifestyles, prestige or fetishised security. Meanwhile, Caldeira uses the term ‘fortified enclave’ to encompass all types of residential enclaves which are ‘privatized spaces for residence, consumption, leisure, and work’ (Caldeira, 1996: 303). She describes fortified enclaves as socially homogenous private properties for collective use, which ‘cultivate a relationship of rupture and denial with the rest of the city and with what can be called a modern style of public space open to free circulation’ (Caldeira, 2000: 258).

In defining these enclaves, Blakely and Snyder (1997) and Caldeira (1996; 2000) therefore focuses on segregationist tendencies which are imposed by design. Access is restricted through walls, gates and empty spaces that discourage pedestrian circulation. Security is buttressed with round the clock private security systems, guards and CCTV cameras that control and surveil the area. In divided cities, where such enclaves are located with close proximity to marginalised neighbourhoods, these gated communities and fortified enclaves are designed as self-sufficient, inward-facing private spaces which offer enough amenities to allow withdrawal from the rest of the city. These conceptualisations of enclaves have led scholarly engagement with residential enclaves—especially that on variations of gated communities across different political and cultural contexts (Hook and Vrdoljak, 2002; Landman, 2006; Low, 2001; Falzon, 2004; Pow, 2011).

This neglect of urban circulations is further perpetuated through analysis of secessionary territorial enclaves that are inter-connected with other such enclaves through privatised premium infrastructural networks (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Sidaway, 2007). Such enclaves create what Graham and Marvin term ‘spatial bypass’, i.e. the potential for some to pass seamlessly from one place to the other. Various authors attribute the production of elite fortified enclaves in global cities and insecure cities to the networked possibilities created through splintering urbanism (De Cauter, 2004; Atkinson, 2008; Rodgers, 2004). For example, Rodgers (2004; 2012) presents the case of enclavisation in Nicaragua in an
environment of widespread insecurity tied to political and gang violence. Rodgers (2004) explains how urban elites are pushed into fortified enclaves and are further ‘disembedded’ from the city as they live their everyday lives within insular and networked enclaves, and that this ‘disembeddedness’ is made possible through processes of splintering urbanism (Graham and Marvin, 2001). Similarly, in sociological accounts of elite lifestyles, Atkinson and Blandy (2009) describe new emerging forms of enclaves which rest on the gated community model, but are instead mobile and not rooted. The authors introduce *The World*, a luxury residential cruise liner which forms a nomadic enclave for those wishing to live outside the unpredictable city. Atkinson and Blandy (2009) refer to enclaves such as *The World* as mobile forms of secessionary life, which allow the ‘super-affluent’ to live within networked extra-territoriality.

These descriptions effectively allow us to consider encapsulation and ‘disembeddedness’ as key characteristics of enclaved spaces. However, I would argue that such an understanding is deeply flawed. Thinking through the example of Karachi’s Sheraton hotel, which I presented in the introductory chapter, it becomes obvious how these accounts fail to recognise the various circulations, interconnections and interactions between labour, goods and infrastructure which are integral for the smooth functioning of such hyper-elite networked spaces.

Consequently, a focus on circulatory life is lost and instead replaced by a static focus on urban form. As boundedness emerges as a key signifier of enclaves and enclaved urbanism, the enclave as ‘concept’ often becomes very immobile and fixed. This is especially so when the meaning of the term ‘enclave’ is fixed through the architectures of enclosure, incarceration and securitisation. The processual nature of urban life, characterised by a varied range of urban circulations, contestations and negotiation between the inside and outside of such enclaves, tends to be overlooked (cf. Simone, 2009; Fawaz and Akar, 2012; Tanulku, 2013), as does the transient and ever evolving nature of dwelling (Hailey, 2009). This neglect of urban circulations not only leads to a failure to understand the dynamic and transient nature of enclaves and enclaved spaces, but in so failing it supresses the potential for the political nature of enclaved spaces to be analysed. As I will highlight further in the next chapter, enclaves are subjectively materialised and their degrees of openness and enclosure vary depending on who encounters them. Moreover, practices of regulating circulation are inherently political, as they are productive of identities of self and other and subjectivities of inside and outside.
Addressing this conceptual weakness and ‘unblackboxing’ enclaves therefore helps reveal the agential and political nature of urban space.

**Failing to Look Beyond the Gated Enclave**

My third criticism of scholarship on enclaves is that it is dominated by discussions of gated enclaves—whether these are gated communities, fortified enclaves or enclosed neighbourhoods. As a consequence, scholars contributing to this literature do not present analysis of other variants of enclaved spaces—such as ethno-racial enclaves or cultural enclaves—as being of a similar type. Instead, other residential enclaves, such as squatter settlements, slums and ghettos, are referred to merely as ‘other spaces’ in contrast to which gated communities emerge (Lemanski et al., 2008; Le Goix and Webster, 2008). Such a treatment tends to discursively produce biases regarding the type and function of different enclaves.

For example, in many cases, Blakely and Snyder’s account of gated enclaves has led the discussion on gated communities across the Americas and beyond (Low, 2001; Calderia, 2000; Waldorp, 2004; Rosen and Razin, 2009). Authors working in the cities of the global South use concepts and frameworks developed in this literature for analysing gated communities within their local contexts. In these accounts, various kinds of gated communities are portrayed by authors as defensive spaces established for elite comfort and consumption in response to the unruly and unpredictable ‘outside’ (Falzon, 2004; Caldeira, 2000; Hook and Vrdoljak, 2002; Pow, 2011). However, the literature on ethnic enclaves in irregular settlements stands in strong contrast. In such contexts, less affluent enclaved spaces are widely described as no-go areas, spaces of marginality and lawlessness which are beyond the control of the state (Davis, 2002; Rodgers, 2005; Yassin, 2010). Instead, I would argue that both enclaves are ‘ordinary’ (Robinson, 2006: 1), and both equally characterise, as well as emerge in response to, insecurity.

Moreover, I find that this discursive bias in the literature on enclaves also tends to suppress the idea that such enclaves may emerge in response to socio-spatial expulsions and political exclusions that are common in enclaved cities. Therefore, failures to look beyond the gated community and to other forms of enclaves stunt analysis of enclaves as contextually produced political processes and of processes of enclavisation as a political activity. Instead, paying attention to gated communities and cultural enclaves across different contextual settings will allow us to critically conceptualise enclaves as relational
spaces that emerge in response to changing contextual realities of urban planning, governance, and socio-politics.

For example, authors studying enclavisation in cities with stark communal and sectarian differences suggest that gated enclaves may emerge to support ethno-racial segregation as a means of organising community protection and identity (Chatterjee, 2008; Yassin, 2010; Rosen and Razin, 2008). Similarly, authors studying enclosed neighbourhoods suggest that these emerge in cities where residents either feel unprotected by the state or mistrust the effectiveness of state security (Ploger, 2007; Lemanski, 2004). Such enclaves are similar to gated communities as they are physically enclosed in order to restrict access. Yet, they differ from gated communities because the roads within these neighbourhoods are developed as public property, and often remain public property, serviced by the city authorities (Landman, 2006). Ploger (2006) uses examples from Lima to highlight that this spatial practice is not limited to the affluent or well off, but is uniform across all income groups (Ploger, 2006). In the case of Lima, Ploger highlights how poorer urban residents often enclose their neighbourhoods informally in response to the inadequate and unequal security provision by the state which makes lower-income groups more susceptible to crime and violence (Ploger, 2012). However, the author highlights that in order to be successful in creating an enclosure, the neighbourhood has to be socially well organised and the community has to have a high degree of social cohesion (Ploger, 2006; Ploger, 2012).

Meanwhile, in violently divided cities there are other variants of enclaves which are hard to categorise within the dominant categories of gated communities fortified enclaves or enclosed neighbourhoods. This is highlighted by Peteet (2011), who traces complexities in defining the spaces of confinement for politically marginalised populations who nevertheless occupy a pivotal position in the local economy in Israel/Palestine. The resulting space is explained as a de-territorialised mix of ghetto, gulag and enclave, where residents are incarcerated but at the same time feel protected from the violence they may encounter ‘outside’ (Peteet, 2011). Similarly, ethnic enclaves in Beirut also reflect the central role played by inter-ethnic violence in creating ethnically homogenised space. In Beirut, enclavisation occurred following the Lebanese civil war between the various sectarian communities, which left Beirut divided between Christian and Muslim enclaves in the east and west of the city. The ‘enclave’ in this context is defined as socio-political and territorial control of a physically demarcated place (Yassin, 2010). It denotes a
physical partition through various materials (such as walls, sandbags and buses), reinforced by security structures like checkpoints and snipers (Yassin, 2010).

The cases of Beirut and Israel/Palestine demonstrate how enclaves may also emerge through violent means of homogenising space. However, not all ethnic enclaves might emerge this way. Literature on informal settlements and slum housing demonstrates that homogenous enclaves within low-income settlements emerge in response to a lack of state support in accommodating poor urban migrants (Dupont, 2011). As I will show in the second part of this thesis, such enclaves also exist in Karachi, whereby urban life is often mediated through community and kinship ties. New immigrants to the city rely on kinship networks to operate in and integrate into the city, or simply live together to benefit from the social capital of cultural cohesion (Nijman, 2010; Gazdar, 2005; Budhani et al., 2010). Furthermore, as I will further elaborate in the next section, processes of migrant settlement may often legitimise non-state actors and may empower them in ways that may threaten state interests (Fregonese, 2012). Such ethnic enclaves may therefore spatialise alternative systems of governance and authority (Fregonese, 2012; Yassin, 2010). Although such enclaves may not be strictly gated or bounded, they become apparent and distinct through the collective cultural practices of the community or through political cohesion (Sharma, 2003; Chatterjee, 2008). The socio-spatial form of such enclaves allows key community leaders to exercise extreme forms of social control over residents, particularly women and minorities (Khan, 2007; Nijman, 2010).

The above examples show that moving away from the heuristic of gated community as a form of enclaved space forces us to look beyond physical form and broaden our conceptual focus on enclaves. In addition, paying attention to alternative forms of enclaves also opens up space to think about how such enclaves may affect urban relations and urban politics in potentially violent ways.

**Flattening Out Enclaves and Resulting Analytical Losses**

My fourth criticism of present scholarship is related to my previous argument. It rests on the suggestion that the current literature on enclaves and enclaved urbanism relies too heavily on concepts and themes identified through a study of enclaves in cities of the global North (see for example Glasze et al., 2006; Le Goix and Webster, 2008; Lemanski et al., 2008). This literature on gated enclaves in cities of the global South often uses the North American ‘gated community’ as a heuristic device for studying the production of
enclaved spaces, the politics of space in residential enclaves and urban socio-political relations in an enclaved urbanism across a wide range of cities and subject areas. However, I argue that this focus flattens out the contextual nuances of enclavisation, and fails to consider enclaves as spaces that are produced through multi-scalar and relational processes. This failure results in analytical limitations for studying the politics of enclaved urbanism, or enclavisation and urban violence as relational processes.

In particular, present conceptualisations of enclaved and enclaved spaces presented me with difficulties in analysing Karachi’s enclaves. I was left wishing for a more suitable framework through which I could capture enclaves as relational to contemporary and historical processes of urbanism and urban politics in Karachi, where, similarly to many other cities of the global South, the realm of urban planning and governance is splintered, negotiated and contested (Shatkin, 2014; Watson, 2009). As I will highlight in more detail in Chapter 4, in Karachi, urban spatial development and socio-spatial relations are assembled through intersections of contemporary and historical processes of urbanism. These are linked to the city’s postcolonial history of uneven infrastructural development, the prevalence of informality as a mode of governance, ethnic diversity and rapid population growth, the culture of political clientelism and the fragmented nature of state-power (see for e.g. Hasan, 2004; Gayer, 2014; Budhani et al., 2010). Furthermore, as I will explain in detail in Chapter 4, by focusing on these contextual and relational processes of enclavisation, it will become possible to consider that enclaved spaces are produced through particular modalities of state power, through changing rationalities of governance in postcolonial cities and through the interplay of structural conditions and local cultural and socio-political relations. As a result, by conceptualising enclaves as topological processes it may become possible to consider the agential and geopolitical nature of residential enclaves.

In conclusion, then, the critiques presented in this section reveal the need to develop a project that presents a clearer conceptualisation of enclaved spaces. Moving beyond physical features as defining characteristics, such a conceptualisation should rest on the multiple processes through which enclosure is enacted and performed. More importantly, it should reflect the varied cultural histories, state spatialisations and planning histories of postcolonial cities of the global South. Equally significantly, a critical conceptualisation of enclaved spaces needs to attend to urban circulations. It needs to pay attention to the porosity and continuous interconnections between enclaves and the city ‘outside’.
Conceived this way, enclaved spaces would be understood through various characteristics including and not limited to urban form. The resulting enclaves would be considered dynamic, contested, differentiated, and relational processes. In the next chapter, I will take up the project of conceptualising enclaves in this manner. But first, in the next section I will review the arguments made in this section in relation to the earlier elaborated literature on urban violence in order to show how it is possible to establish causalities between enclaves and urban violence.

**Enclaves, Enclaved Urbanism, and Urban Violence: Possibilities of Establishing Causality**

As I have highlighted throughout this chapter, although various authors detail the politics of space in enclaved urban forms, the existing discourse on enclaves and enclaved cities does not adequately address urban violence as a consequence of enclave creation in cities of the global South (Low and Smith, 2006; Burgess, 2010; Glasze et al., 2006). Empirical accounts referring to continuing crime and violence in enclaved spaces remain focused on explaining conflict as a result of tensions in public space and displacement of crime (Lemanski, 2004; Breetzke, Landman and Cohn, 2014) without elaborating how urban conflict and violence is an outcome of changes in underlying structures of power and politics in an enclaved urbanism, or a reflection of the political agency of enclaves.

Furthermore, throughout the critical review of literature in the earlier section, I have argued that scholars working on enclaves and enclaved urbanism could suggest a more powerful connection between enclavisation and violence by elaborating the agential nature of enclavisation in shaping power, politics and patterns of governance as well as social relations in enclaved cities. In this regard, discourse on enclaved urbanism could be enriched from empirical evidence from violent megacities of the global South. If patterns and processes of enclavisation are paid attention to, it will become much easier to develop a relational understanding of enclaves and violence.

This argument can be elaborated with reference to empirical details presented in two books edited by Koonings and Kruijt: Fractured Cities: Social exclusion, urban violence and contested spaces in Latin America and Megacities: The politics of urban exclusion and violence in the global south. The various contributors to Fractured Cities and Megacities pay attention to conditions of criminality in favelas and slums in relation to institutional and governmental failures in a context of growing urban insecurity. The
authors outline that state failures to provide urban residents with security opens up space for armed actors and violence brokers to establish power and authority (Koonings and Kruijt, 2007; Moser, 2009; Rodgers, 2007). Meanwhile, the absence of effective systems of policing and justice push affluent and poor urban residents into supporting vigilante systems of policing and justice (Koonings and Kruijt, 2007a; Pansters and Berthier, 2007; McIlwaine and Moser, 2007). In such cities, fear of crime and violence pushes urban residents into various forms of fortified enclaves, whether these are no-go areas which keep out repressive and corrupt state security forces or elite fortified enclaves which create distance from the feral city outside (Rodgers, 2009; McIlwaine and Moser, 2007). In effect, the emerging fractured urban landscape spatialises contested state power, marginality and fear of crime and violence (Koonings and Kruijt, 2007a).

In these accounts of violently divided cities, the above-mentioned scholars frequently draw attention to the fragmentation of the cityscape into segregated territorialisied spaces (Koonings and Kruijt, 2009; 2007). The authors make reference to violence as an outcome of changing governance structures and political processes that emerge to uphold privately secured neighbourhoods—whether these are favelas, slums, or gated communities (Kruijt and Degregori, 2007; Kruitt and Koonings, 2007). However, they fail to analyse how the production of enclaved spaces in particular mediates urban socio-political relations through these structures in ways that perpetuate urban violence. Treating enclaves as socio-material processes that spatialise order and governmentality could make it possible for us to fill this analytical gap and consider how privately governed spaces could restructure urban power and politics in ways that may be productive of political and institutional violence. For example, various scholars have already paid attention to ways in which the deregulation of urban security governance may legitimise forms of vigilante justice or create groups that may challenge state authority in potentially violent ways (Fregonese, 2012; Schuberth, 2013; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008a).

Meanwhile, it is also possible to consider causalities between enclavisation and urban violence if we consider how micro-level processes of enclavisation build up to affect wider political and socio-economic power structures. For example, as I will highlight in the next chapter, by conceptualising enclaves as osmotic spaces that are performatively produced through repetitive processes of bordering, it may become possible to consider how processes of enclavisation are productive of identities of self and other. Such
processes of enclavisation may therefore establish identities of criminality, or they may racialise certain populations as dangerous in ways that encourage ethnic and communal violence. Furthermore, such on-going processes of enclavisation also discursively produce identities of place in enclaved spaces, and enclaves may become known as socio-politically homogenous spaces. In such instances, enclaves may also become the targets of ethno-political or state violence in violently divided cities (Chatterjee, 2008; Thomas, 2000).

Furthermore, focusing on the processes of creating enclaves and macro-processes of enclavisation, it becomes possible to understand how, as spaces that instantiate inside/outside relations, enclaves could be agential in exacerbating urban marginality and social difference, and hence structural violence. Returning to the concepts and theories outlined in the first section of this chapter, various scholars have argued that such manifestations of violence are not isolated or containable. Instead, urban violence occurs in chains and spirals. Therefore, as a process that triggers various types of urban violence it may be possible to study enclavisation as being productive of chains and spirals of violence in various ways across different contexts.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have expanded on my argument that present scholarship on enclaves and enclaved urbanism does not adequately interrogate urban violence as a continuum tied to enclavisation. After describing urban violence as a multi-scalar process that is contextually produced through socio-political relations at the individual, interpersonal, institutional and structural level (Moser and McIlwaine, 2006), I have argued that present conceptualisations of enclaves hinder us in considering enclaves as spaces that actively perpetuate urban violence. In order to support this argument, I have highlighted how the political agency of enclaved spaces is supressed by present methodological, conceptual and empirical shortcomings in scholarship on enclaves. In the process of this critique, I have presented potential ways in which enclaves could be understood as agential political spaces, and the related possibilities of establishing causalities between enclaves and urban violence. However, I have argued that in order to study enclaves as agential spaces that perpetuate urban violence, it is imperative to re-conceptualise enclaves as relational socio-material processes that are continuously in the making, and that are both shaped by as well as shape urban socio-political relations. With this in mind, in the next chapter I will turn to the conceptualisation of enclaves as relational processes.
CHAPTER 3
CONCEPTUALISING ENCLAVES AS RELATIONAL PROCESSES

In the previous chapter, I outlined that theoretical gaps in current scholarship on enclaves prevent us from developing a critical understanding of enclaves as spaces that interact with wider urban processes. I have argued that in order to analyse how enclaves may be productive of urban violence, it is therefore essential to reconceptualise enclaves as relational and socio-material spaces that take shape from governmental and political processes, while also influencing relations of urban governance and socio-politics. With this in mind, in this chapter I will reconceptualise enclaves. Using poststructuralist theories of relational space, discourse and performativity, I will explain how enclaves are dynamic and agential spaces, made up of relations between human and non-human actants.

The first step for reconceptualising enclaves is to explain the site of enclaves, i.e. the ‘place’. In the first section, I will therefore start by introducing relational theories of space, before moving on in the second section to explain how I will apply relational theories to conceptualise enclaves as complex socio-spatial assemblages of form, function and action. In the third section, I will use this theoretical framework to elaborate how enclaves assemble as fluid, negotiated, contested, political and relational processes. To do this, I will outline the various processes, relations and materials through which enclaves are assembled, spatialised and materialised, and with what political effects. These include processes of governing circulation, discursive practices of security and enclosure, political processes of bordering, and multi-scalar relations of urban governance. Building on this, in the final section, I will present my argument that enclaves are processual spaces that restructure urban socio-political relations and state-society relations. I will conclude by arguing that considering enclaves as relational processes makes it possible to understand how enclaves are geopolitical spaces that are productive of urban violence in extremely polarised cities.

Theorising Relational ‘Enclaved Space’

The starting point for re-conceptualising enclaves is to develop an onto-methodological understanding of enclaved space as relational space. Such a view stems from the idea that space only exists in relation to the objects, events, and processes that define it (Harvey, 1996). Within this context, place formation—which is the physical and material
experience of temporal and spatial ordering—is a ‘permanence’ within the flow of processes that create space (Harvey, 1996). Harvey elaborates that such permanences are temporal in nature, and are replaced when new relations form. This idea is taken further by Graham and Healey (1999), who explain that space exists through relations amongst the objects it contains, reflecting their variations over time. Thus, space is ‘relational’ because it stems from the relations produced by objects, events and processes stretched across various temporal and spatial scales. The resulting landscape is conceptualised as a multiple and heterogeneous time-space process, wherein diverse spatio-temporalities coexist (Amin and Graham, 1999; Massey, Allen and Pile, 1999). Massey further elaborates the notion of relational space by defining space as a product of interrelations: ‘as constituted through interactions, from the immensity of the global to the intimately tiny’ (Massey, 2005: 9). Secondly, she explains space as being characterised by multiplicity: ‘as the sphere in which distinct trajectories coexist; as the sphere therefore of coexisting heterogeneity’ (Massey, 2005: 9). And lastly, she contends that space is always under construction: ‘it is always in the process of being made. It is never finished; never closed’ (Massey, 2005: 9).

In this context, considering enclaves as relational spaces would require elaborating how they are produced though ongoing multi-scalar processes. Such processes include broader institutional, socio-economic and socio-political processes of place-making (such as uneven urban infrastructural development, changing ethnic and class relations, fragmentation of governmental authority) and ongoing relations between and amongst urban residents, urban governors, enclave residents, workers and managers of enclaved spaces. Conceptualising enclaves as spaces that are produced through these micro and macro processes of place-making will allow for a holistic view of enclaved space as a temporal permanence which exists within a dynamic social, economic, political and institutional context. Moreover, it will allow us to consider how enclaves take shape in ways that are subjective to those encountering it, and therefore understand that enclaved spaces are mutable as well as transformative.

Therefore, moving away from notions of space as a static container and towards a relational understanding of space as a product of sets of relationships opens up room to conceive the political nature of space as an arena within which power is distributed. In this vein, poststructuralist theorists highlight that understanding space relationally allows us to consider the play of power and politics in urban spaces. Given that ‘permanences’
develop through some interactions and not others, it is possible to suggest that the shape of place or resulting space emerges through a particular arrangement of multi-scalar socio-spatial and socio-political relations. In this way, the production of relational space involves either alignments between sets of relations or exclusions and rejections of sets of multi-scalar relations (Murdoch, 2006). Such arrangements are in turn generative of further inequalities and contestations. For example, Amin and Graham (1999) highlight how emerging interactions and interrelations in one place cause various connections and disconnections elsewhere.

This understanding illustrates how particular spatial arrangements are entangled with relations of power. Massey (1991) develops this argument further, outlining that when socio-spatial and socio-political relations meet in space, they produce power-geometries. She argues that:

Different social groups and individuals are placed in very distinct ways in relation to these flows and interconnections. This point concerns not merely the issue of who moves and who doesn’t, although that is an important element of it; it is also about power in relation to the flows and the movement. Different social groups have distinct relationships to this anyway differentiated mobility: some people are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movement, others don’t; some are more on the receiving end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it (Massey, 1991: 25–6).

Given these guiding concepts of relational space, understanding enclaved spaces as relational would allow us to tune into the inherent interconnectedness of urban enclaves with the other spaces, actors, and events in the city. This conceptualisation therefore holds promise for un-blackboxing spatial arrangements of power, politics and identity within enclaved spaces and understanding how these project outwards to the rest of the city. Moreover, considering urban enclaves as ‘permanences’ that emerge from the interactions of wider urban processes such as security, governance, politics and circulation forces us to consider enclaves as temporal processes which are dynamic and constantly in flux. I will elaborate this in more detail below.

**Assemblages as a Suitable Analytic to Study Relational Enclaves**

From the various (and often contradictory) relational theories that now pepper the landscape of geography and urban studies (Jacobs, 2012; Anderson, Kearnes, McFarlane
and Swanton, 2013), I have chosen to approach relational enclaves through the concept of assemblages. In its simplest sense, the concept of ‘assemblage’ comes from the idea that the social world is not rooted in a fixed or stable ontology, but rather is constituted through a complex mosaic of configurations, which in turn play a role in shaping other configurations (Law, 2004; DeLanda, 2006; Bennet, 2010). Stemming from a rough translation of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘agencement’, assemblage is a combination of arrangement and agency (Palmas, 2007). In her ground-breaking work describing the agency of the electricity grid during the North American blackout, Bennett (2005) describes an assemblage as an anti-structural, historic, circumstantial and ad-hoc emergence that is decentred, temporal, topographical and continuously in flux. She further explains that it is both materially and discursively constructed, and is made up of both human and non-human actants (Bennet, 2005).

The concept of assemblage is currently gaining popularity in geography and critical urban studies for its ability to trace processes of socio-material transformations by grasping the multiple, relational and processual nature of urban space (McFarlane, 2011a; Anderson and McFarlane, 2011). The oft-cited debates on urban assemblages throughout various issues of the journals *City* and *Area* (McFarlane 2011a; Anderson and McFarlane, 2011) demonstrate the multiple (and sometimes contradictory) applications of assemblage theory as either descriptor or concept or ethos of engagement. Despite the novelty of these applications and their uses, the concept of assemblage has been criticised for being too broadly framed and hence indeterminable (Brenner et al., 2011). Its use as an idea, concept, imaginary, process, orientation, methodology etc. is critiqued for reducing its capability as a focused theory (Brenner et al., 2011; Jacobs, 2012).

However, I would argue that this open-to-interpretation quality of the concept is advantageous. The concept allows us to grasp the meaning of objects of analysis, as well as providing us with a lens to analyse otherwise complex processes. Therefore, I will not add more arguments to the debate, but instead will position myself within the debate as someone who uses the concept of assemblage primarily as an ‘ethos of engagement’ (Anderson et al., 2012: 175) to study complex urban processes. According to Anderson et al. (2012), assemblage as ethos firstly ‘attends to the messiness and complexity of the phenomenon’ (175), secondly, it offers a way into studying an open ended, process based understanding of a complex phenomenon. And finally, assemblage as an ethos of engagement is oriented towards the instability of interactions (Anderson et al., 2012.
Given these ideas, I find the concept of assemblage to be useful for unpacking as well as for becoming attuned to the complex, varied and dynamic nature of enclaves. As I have outlined in the previous chapter, this will be essential for studying Karachi’s enclaves as self-perpetuating spaces that are both consequences and causes of urban violence.

In this sense, thinking enclaves through assemblages allows me to capture a sense of structure/order, as well as a notion of movement/agency that emerges from such an order. This provides a way to examine the intermingling of heterogeneous actors, materials and agencies; but also the various forms of actions that result from this. For example, in the case of Karachi’s enclaves, I found that using the analytic of assemblages allowed me to highlight how enclaves in Karachi are related to the history of urban spatial development, the contemporary crisis of security and infrastructure and differentiated forms of urban citizenship. At the same time, by investigating as assemblages the various parts that make up Karachi’s enclaves, I am able to understand how each enclave emerges as a unique assemblage of social interactions, material infrastructures, performative discourses and political space. Finally, in attuning to this I am able to unravel the agential and political capacity of enclaves as assemblages. I will expand on the advantages of conceptualising enclaves through assemblages in more detail below.

**Conceptualising Enclaves through the Concept of Assemblages**

Firstly, thinking of enclaves through assemblages allows me to advance a conceptualisation of enclaves that is topological, i.e. constituted by relations that are natural and social rather than nested in territorial or geometric structures (Murdoch, 2005; Amin, 2002). So, for example, the concept of assemblages would help me review the production of enclaved space through the lens of various historical and contemporary processes of spatial segregation which may be tied to conditions such as globalisation, re-scaled state power, transnational capital and culture, crises of governance and increasing social difference. Moreover, in necessarily reviewing spaces as topological, the concept of assemblages allows a relational notion of power to be developed. For example, Allen and Cochrane (2010: 1073) suggest that ‘topological thinking suggests that the powers of the state are not so much “above us” as more or less present through mediated and real-time connections, some direct, others more distanciated’. Applying this practice to understand enclaves would therefore mean looking beyond territory and form to include the intermingling of wider temporal and spatial scales with everyday practices.
that create and recreate enclaves, and to consider how such practices shape relations of urban power and politics. This conceptualisation will allow me to move beyond environmental determinist accounts of enclavisation and instead comprehend enclaves as materialisations of inside/outside relationships based on discourses and performativity, political processes, imaginative geographies, subjectivities, identities and institutional structures.

Secondly, conceiving enclaves as socio-material assemblages allows me to think of them as constellations of everyday social and political relations and sets of performative practices which combine to discursively produce the enclave as a restricted and exclusive space. Enclaves can thus be thought of as discursively produced spaces where discourse can be understood as ‘a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible’ (Bialasiewics et al., 2007: 406). The concept of assemblage is especially useful in considering enclaves as discursively produced spaces, because it offers a way of thinking beyond the separation of material and discursive realms, and allows us to consider how meaning and matter may be co-constituted (Aradau et al., 2014). This leads us to believe that repetitive representations of enclosure and security through various socio-political and socio-material practices may stabilise over time to performatively produce enclosure (Bialasiewics et al., 2007). While I will elaborate this in more detail in the next section, in this brief section, I want to simply suggest that a focus on assemblages makes it possible to consider that enclaves become apparent through the everyday political arrangements, meanings, identities, and social relations that emerge from everyday (discursive) practices such as rules of conduct, visuality of barriers and gates, narratives of risk for ‘outsiders’, wall markings/notices etc. The focus on the ‘everyday’ is also equally significant as ordinary enactments that are contingent to context help shape ideas such as place, power, subjectivity, identity, and resistance (Anderson and Harrison, 2010).

Thirdly, thinking of enclaves through assemblages would draw attention to how enclaved spaces are characterised by flux. Flux here connotes a sense of constant change. This stems from the idea in non-representation theory that humans interact with their environment through a constant relation of modification and reciprocity, and ‘action’ is a relational phenomenon that loops back as interaction (Anderson and Harrison, 2010). Thus, the physical space of enclaves (i.e. their environment, built form and borders), and
the materialisations of social space (i.e. the notion of insider/outsider, safety/threat, friend/enemy) all interact together in various ways to produce and reproduce enclaved space in various manifestations and forms. Enclaves therefore remain continuously in a state of becoming, or as the title of this PhD suggests, in process.

For example, as I will elaborate in more detail in Chapter 7, in the gated communities I visited in Karachi I found that the gates were usually open during the day, when guards filtered circulation. While residents were allowed through based on stickers on cars, visitors were screened through practices of profiling. Yet, in doing this, guards were often found responding to the gender and class positions of visitors. Similarly, in enclosed neighbourhoods, street closures that enclosed whole streets provided security to all lane residents. However, not all lane residents were ‘members’, because a few did not regularly pay the Residents Association managing enclosure their membership dues. Such ‘non-members’ were often excluded by other practices such as refusal of help for solving municipal problems etc. Therefore, it was evident that everyday practices of living combined with external conditions that surround enclaved space constantly mediate to shift the status quo. The heterogeneity of identities of residents is a significant source of this change. It is their everyday practices of living in and performing enclaved space on one hand; being subjugated while subjugating ‘others’ on the other hand, which means that enclaved spaces remain in a flux rather than being static.

Finally, conceptualising enclaves as socio-political and socio-material assemblages will allow me to consider them to have agency over urban socio-political relations. Given that the whole is considered greater than the sum of its parts, and thinking of the ways in which the infrastructures, social relations and discursive practices which combine to create enclaves may interact to produce political and structural inequalities and marginality, we are forced to consider how enclaves as assemblages can shape urban politics and social relations in potentially violent ways. Therefore, as I will explain in more detail in the final section below (and in Chapters 4 and 8), such a conceptualisation will demonstrate that enclaves are geopolitical actors that discipline populations and reconfigure power and politics in the city in violent ways, and with violent outcomes.

Having explained how using the concept of assemblages is helpful for theorising enclaved spaces, in the next section I will focus on the processes, physical and non-physical characteristics, and socio-political relations through which enclaves come into being.
Assembling Enclaves as Socio-Material Processes

In this section, I will specifically outline the processes, relations and materials through which enclaves are assembled, spatialised and materialised. I demonstrate firstly that enclaves materialise processes of governing circulation and as such exist along a spectrum of openness and enclosure; secondly that enclaves are performative spaces that are discursively produced; thirdly, that enclaves are spaces of subjectivities that produce notions of inclusion and exclusion; and fourthly, that enclaves spatialise a sociology of exception and operate through high degrees of social control. Together, these dynamics combine to highlight how enclaves are complex socio-material processes which are inextricably tied to political relations of governance, power, subjectification and difference.

Enclaves as Fluid and Osmotic Assemblages: Materialising Processes of Governing Circulation

Firstly, I will suggest that enclaves materialise through the socio-spatial and political processes which govern circulation. Therefore, rather than keeping the focus on physical boundaries as key identifying features of enclaved space, it becomes possible to identify enclaves through patterns of circulation. Un-bounded enclaves may thus be identifiable when a number of passage points become visible where mobility and immobility is negotiated. This focus on negotiable passage points also opens up space to understand that enclaves are fluid spaces that are characterised by varying degrees of openness and enclosure.

According to Aradau and Blanke (2010), contemporary practices of securing populations through managing circulation have their precedents in changes in town planning in the eighteenth century. Foucault (2009) outlined that the central problem for governance of the open city was that of ‘organizing circulation, eliminating its dangerous elements, making a division between good and bad circulation, and maximizing the good circulation by diminishing the bad’ (Foucault, 2009: 18). Foucault further describes security as a practice that emerged within this milieu when governors were tasked with ensuring the smooth running of social, economic and political life while reducing dispersed threats entering and circulating in the city. As the literature on global politics demonstrates, circulation is once again a central problem in governing security. Today, various kinds of enclaves (residential, commercial, and biopolitical) are becoming
common forms of organising urban life in an increasingly open and interconnected world, one that remains characterised by uncertainty and insecurity (Reid, 2006; Bauman, 2000; Appadurai, 1996; Turner, 2010).

In this context, emerging enclaves exist as spaces that govern circulations in an increasingly interconnected world where borders are de-territorialised. However, Shamir (2005) names the current framework of governing circulation as ‘the global mobility regime’, explaining that this is premised on a paradigm of suspicion and actively and systematically seeks to contain social movement within and across borders in order to facilitate globalisation. Replicating physical state borders, various authors find that logistical enclaves, airports and check posts become essential passage points for this global mobility regime (Shamir, 2005; Graham and Marvin, 2001; Turner, 2010).

Yet, sociological critique of this global mobility regime suggests that it cannot be conceived without paying attention to the temporal ‘moorings’ that accompany mobilities (Hannam, Sheller and Urry, 2006). Here, ghettos, gated communities, prisons, asylum detention centres and refugee camps are listed as various types of moorings (Shamir, 2005; Turner, 2010). Such moorings are a spatial by-product of a ‘paradigm of suspicion’, which uses various technologies and risk assessment techniques to regulate circulation within a contained environment, or to contain risky elements within spaces of consumption (Shamir, 2005; Turner, 2010). In these spaces, authors outline how controls over free circulation are enacted through regulatory systems such as ID cards, entry passes, profiling etc.

However, I would argue that in order to regulate circulation, enclaves do not necessarily have to be physically enclosed or fortified. It is possible to replicate features of discipline, security and immobility in such spaces without heavy emphasis on walls and gates. For example, Bottomley and Moore (2007) suggest that contemporary advances in architectural practices and security technologies mean that discipline and social control can be organised through diffused and dematerialised processes. This leads the authors to suggest that in the fortressed city governance can shift focus from walls to membranes. The very word membrane is used by Bottomley and Moore (2007) to emphasise the osmotic nature of the boundaries of such fortressed spaces: the virtual fortress is described as a temporary and mobile structure, which can be switched on and off to discriminate between the friend and enemy. This is made possible through supporting technologies of identification such as biometric border technologies that recognise whom
to allow entry into the country and whom to deny it. Or in the case of enclaved spaces, this could translate to resident ID cards that determine inclusion in enclaved spaces (Tawil-Souri, 2012).

These interdisciplinary accounts are useful to add variety to dominant interpretations of enclaves which focus on their enclosed, fixed, static nature. By understanding enclaves as paradoxical spaces of fixity and mobility, it becomes possible to consider that residential enclaves have varying degrees of openness and closure. Such a conceptualisation will help us overcome the analytical limitations posed through the current literature on gated communities (Caldeira, 1996; Caldeira, 2000; Low, 2003), which essentialises the impregnable walls of the enclave and therefore ignores the negotiated nature of enclave boundaries and the permeability of walls. Moreover, blackboxing the continuous and ongoing processes of enclosure in such spaces de-politicises enclaves, shifting attention away from the politics of security and bordering within enclaved spaces. In the next section, I will pay detailed attention to the various processes and practices that converge to ‘assemble’ enclaves, and in so doing, I will delve into the political and agential nature of enclave infrastructures.

**Enclaves as Performative Spaces: Discursively Formed and Productive of Identities**

In the previous section, I established that enclaves materialise processes of governing circulation and, as a result have osmotic borders. In this section, I build on this conceptualisation of enclaves as fluid and dynamic spaces while shedding light on the materiality of enclaves. Here, I move forward from my earlier critique of the over-emphasis on physical fortification and boundedness as a key feature of residential enclaves, and build on the argument introduced in the previous chapter that enclaves are discursively and performatively materialised through processes of securitisation and bordering and practices of differentiation.

Performativity in particular is the construction of an identity that is contextual, fragmented and continually constructed. The concept of performativity is taken from Judith Butler, who outlines the way in which gender identity congeals over time through repetitive enactments, bodily gestures and movements that are structured within regulatory frameworks (1990; 1993). Thus, Butler theorises gender as a form of identity that is not a ‘being’, but rather is a ‘doing’. However, this ‘doing’ exists within a
regulatory framework which has assigned certain actions to a particular gender. For example, Butler describes ‘girling’ as a process that reiterates performances of action, behaviour, costume and features that are commonly associated with female. Moreover, these performances are recognisable as those of ‘girling’ through discourses generated by various institutions within the regulatory framework, such as the medical sciences, which biologically define male and female, or other state institutions such as marriage laws that categorise subjects into male and female. The theory of performativity places primacy on discourse as the space within which subject formation takes place. Discourses are therefore said to be performative: they open up the realm of materialisation. In this way, discourses are also mediums—spatial, visual, or linguistic—through which personhood is embodied, identities take shape or subject positions can be negotiated.

Butler’s concept of performativity is important for theorising enclaved spaces for two main reasons. Firstly because it opens up a framework within which to consider how enclaves may take shape through discursive practices. For example, the stylised performances of processes of enclavisation—such as laying down architectures that represent fortressed spaces (gates, walls, surveillance cameras, barbed wires), and enacting border control practices (checking of visitors’ ID cards, issuing entry stickers to members)—exist within a regulatory framework which recognises such repetitive acts as those of enacting a border, and hence of filtering circulation. Through these acts, we can argue that the gated enclave is discursively created as an exclusive space. In the case of architecturally ‘open’ ethnic enclaves or no-go areas in irregular settlements, instead of these visible architectures of security and walling in, other repetitive visual and linguistic acts help mark territories as exclusive enclaves. These may include for example political graffiti on walls and flags displaying sectarian and ethno-political affiliations on house tops. These symbols combine to produce identities of such places as sanctuaries for ethno-political or sectarian groups, which may not be as welcoming or open to others. In some cases, signs warning outsiders to steer clear or outright intimidation towards outsiders also produce such spaces as enclaves. These couple with media representations of danger and violence affiliated with certain ethno-political or sectarian groups or certain classes. Therefore, the concept of performativity helps us to consider how repeated practices and processes that generate discourses of identity, homogeneity and securitisation coalesce over time to performatively produce exclusive spaces which may have visible or invisible walls, gates and boundaries. In such instances, enclaves become apparent at crossing points or at the instantiation of inside/outside dichotomies.
Secondly, and following from this, the concept of performativity also helps reveal the politics of identity and subjectivity in discursively produced enclaves. It helps unpack how the processes through which enclaves emerge as exclusive spaces may be generative of identities of self and other, and of political subjectivities. Using performativity as a lens therefore widens our scope to understand the political functions that accompany bordering practices and boundary making processes in enclaved spaces. However, as Butler (1993) explains, the fact that effects are produced through repeated iterations and citational practices shows that there is no singular moment in which subjects are created. Instead, the repeated stylisations of exclusivity may coalesce over time to produce identities of place, as well as produce those excluded from such places as the unwanted and undesirable. As I will elaborate in Chapter 8, over time such activities may be productive of the racialisation and criminalisation of certain populations, which may also render certain enclaved spaces as targets of terror or police repression. In this vein, Butler’s concept of performativity has been applied in critical geography and cultural studies when weaving together the notions of space, place and identity (Nelson, 1999; Keith and Pile, 1993; Gupta and Ferguson, 1992), and in international politics by scholars who study the spaces of performative security (Campbell, 1998; Bialasiewics et al., 2007; Aradau, 2010; Weber, 1998). Moreover, the theory is also increasingly popular in theorising borders and bordering practices and security practices in Critical Border Studies (Tawil-Souri, 2012; Johnson et al., 2011).

The concept of performativity is therefore important for our discussion of enclaves for three reasons. In the first instance, it draws attention to the fact that enclave borders are discursively produced. This is helpful in bringing to light how everyday practices of security and exclusivity in enclaved spaces are enacted through repeated performances, and hence performativity creates the geography of enclaves. Related to this, and secondly, when read through bordering practices, performativity draws attention to the political implications of enclavisation as a process that creates subjectivities of inside and outside, of self and other, and is generative of identities of place and people. Lastly, performativity generates a more fluid and dynamic theorisation of enclaves. As explained previously, the notion of boundaries being fluid, shifting and osmotic is best captured within the essence of performativity. Similarly, the shifting subject position and blurring identity between inside/outside are also best captured by performativity. Such notions help move towards a processual understanding of enclaved spaces, while opening up
space for considering enclaves as agential spaces that restructure urban socio-political relations in potentially violent ways.

However, although the concept of performativity is useful in locating and unpacking the boundary/border of enclaves, we are still left with fundamental questions about what the border looks like, where it is located, who creates it, who operates it and how it restructures socio-political relations at various spatial scales, both within and beyond the city. In critical border studies, these questions are answered innovatively through an analysis of subjectivity and identity. Although most of this literature is focused on sovereign national borders, it still provides extremely relevant concepts for analysis of intra-urban borders and for understanding how these are distributed within an enclaved urbanism. I will elaborate this in more detail below.

**Enclaves as Spaces of Subjectivities: Problematising the Boundary of the Enclave**

In this section, I will delve into the instantiation of inside/outside relationships in enclaved spaces in order to explain how enclaves are subjectively constituted spaces. In making this argument, I will use concepts and debates that are popular in critical border studies. To start with, I will outline the very basic features of (sovereign) borders in an elementary sense. Firstly, they perform the state in terms of authority and right to exercise coercion. Secondly, they are regulatory conduits of movement. Thirdly, they demarcate the spatial limits of citizenship rights and duties. Finally, they are instruments for classifying people and institutions for determining inclusion within and exclusion from political and social communities (Cox, 2004; Weber, 1998). Moving forward from these basics, the reconfiguration of territorial authority and rights following globalisation has resulted in the deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of states (Sassen, 2008). Borders are thus no longer fixed lines on the map—they have become increasingly dispersed, diffused, and polymorphic (Balibar, 2002). This forces the notions of de-jure authority, mobility, citizenship and territory and the criteria of inclusion and exclusion to be re-thought.

Using the example of sovereign borders, Salter (2012) highlights how the dispersal of bordering practices beyond the site of the border raises questions about where exactly the border lies within the reconfiguration of territory, authority and rights in a globalised world. He argues that conceiving the physical border as a line that divides the internal and external is irrelevant, instead suggesting the suture as a more appropriate expression
of the border (Salter, 2012). The suture stitches together and yet separates the inside and the outside, and more importantly it defines the border itself as a space that exists between two spheres of possibility. Salter (2012) describes the transit space of the border as a space heavy with meaning, as it defines the subject and also establishes the sovereign.

The everyday practices of border crossings are meaningful in the sense that they reflect the varied differential enactments of both subjectivity and sovereignty (Salter, 2012). In the same vein, the border itself has been described as a fundamental political institution, as bordering practices are markers of subjectivity and identity which delineate the inside and outside; self and other; risky and safe (Amoore, Marmura, and Salter, 2008). This is useful to know, as such theorisations of borders help identify ‘where’ the border is emplaced within enclaves. They therefore help in turning attention away from physical sites—such as gates and walls—which are presently essentialised as enclave borders. Instead, in understanding and defining enclaves, scholars such as myself will be able to focus on issues such as subjectivity, identity and inclusion/exclusion as concepts through which enclavisation and enclaved spaces are made apparent.

In order to understand the materiality of the enclave ‘border’, it therefore becomes relevant to unpack the subjectivities emerging from the situated practices of those performing the border and those crossing it. Such an analysis of everyday practices is also increasingly popular in critical border studies, where scholars find that the performativity of the border is made evident through security practices and everyday border crossings. Through his ethnography of everyday border crossings along the Kenyan-Ugandan border, Allen (2012) highlights how the border is in fact materialised as a bureaucratic process. Locals regularly cross the border to visit relatives, shop and hide from the authorities (in the case of criminals). They invariably circumvent formal processes of border crossing by negotiating procedures for short-term access to places across the border with personnel performing the border (Allen, 2012). This shows the porosity of the border, as well as emphasising that the border is a set of bureaucratic processes rather than an arrangement of check-posts. A focus on the everyday therefore shows the border as a dynamic process that is shaped and reshaped according to local and personal expectations and perceptions (Allen, 2012).

Similarly, in a study of intra-urban borders in Istanbul, Karaman and Islam (2012) show how the infrastructure of bordering rests on physical impediments, gatekeeping practices, warning signs, but most importantly on a consolidated sense of community. These
practices are plural in the sense that they exist on both sides of the border. Identity
creation and differentiation occurs both inside and outside, and factors such as
architecture and spatial pattern of building combine with narratives and cultural practices
to create a right to the city as well as a right to difference (Karaman and Islam, 2012). In
such a case, the consolidated sense of community and identity is what materialises ethnic
enclaves. In a widely different scenario, Tawil-Souri (2012) highlights how intra-urban
borders become de-territorialised through everyday technologies of categorisation and
surveillance. The author draws attention to the ID card regime as a bordering practice
which aims to limit the mobility of Palestinian/Arabs while freeing the mobility of
Jewish/Israeli populations in Israel. By doing so, she draws attention to urban enclave
borders as being virtual and dispersed in the everyday life of urban residents (Tawil-
Souri, 2012).

Everyday practices of border crossing and the theatrical rituals of border security
therefore offer a lens to unpack the materiality of enclaves. This critical conception of
borders is extremely useful for analysing the boundaries of urban residential enclaves. It
gives primacy to the notion of a border that is established at the point of crossing. I
argue that this also gives meaning to the border as a site heavy with political meaning. As
both a physical site, as well as sets of practices which establish both sovereign and
subject, borders and bordering processes become integral to re-territorialising urban
space. The notions of citizenship rights, inclusion and identity become determined
through these processes, as do notions of power, governmentality and sovereignty.

With these concepts in mind, I contend that conceptualising enclaves as sites that
establish inside/outside relationships through practices and processes of bordering is a
first step towards envisioning urban enclaves as fragmentary spaces that have agency in
shaking up the status quo through reconfiguring the power and rights of urban residents.
The boundary (whether material or virtual) of such enclaves is considered the frontier
that determines the inclusion and exclusion of people inside and outside the enclave and
as the site where security and insecurity intersect. This inevitably makes the border of
such enclaves a highly politicised site, giving the people/infrastructures/systems that
perform the boundary significant power over populations. Having described the political
nature of enclave borders, I will now explain the political space of enclaves themselves,
and will elaborate on the sociology of enclaved spaces.
The Juridico-Political Space of Enclaves and the Sociology of Exception

Fourthly, in considering the political space and sociology of enclaves, I would like to focus on how enclaves generate a distinct juridico-political space through which they operate. Literature on governance across a wide variety of residential enclaves across different contexts suggests that enclaves tend to be managed through formally or informally constituted governance structures that displace state authority and establish high degrees of social control over enclave residents (Fregonese, 2012; Alsayyad and Roy, 2006; Galsze et al., 2006). For example, in gated communities or common interest developments, such governance is usually constituted through a formal charter (Galsze et al., 2006). In other types of enclaves, such forms of authority may surface through the operation of power and social control tied to processes of enclave formation and securitisation (Benit-Gbaffoou, 2008a; Caldeira, 2000). For example, through his study of neighbourhood enclosures in Lima, Ploger (2006) highlights that such practices follow from the homogenisation of political space within enclaves.

The unique political space of enclaves thus becomes very important for a comprehensive understanding of the concept. After analysing economic enclaves such as logistical sites, Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and sites of resource extraction operated by multinational corporations, Sidaway (2007) asserts that enclaves imitate features of ‘formal territorial enclaves’, which are described as ‘a detached part of a country surrounded by another state’ (Sidaway, 2007). The geo-political nature of enclaves is further illuminated by Alsayyad and Roy (2006) who argue that gated enclaves and informal settlements materialise the ‘powers of freedom’ (i.e. a form of governing that pre-supposes the freedom of the governed), and they signify the ‘multiplication and fragmentation of sovereignty’ (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006: 8). In this way, gated communities can be thought of as technologies of spatiality, subjectivities and sovereignty (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006). As state-society relations between enclave residents and the state come to be mediated through governing authorities within enclaved spaces, Alsayyad and Roy (2006) highlight that the production of such spaces raises alarming questions for issues of citizenship and democracy (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006; Caldeira, 2000).

Having established that enclaved spaces are inevitably political in nature, the particular politics of space in such enclaves remains poorly explored—especially with relevance to cities of the global South. In the interdisciplinary literature on enclaves, the distinctive juridico-political structure of enclaved spaces is likened to that of Agamben’s (1998)
paradigm of the Nazi concentration camp, which is a particular territorialised political space that subjects its inhabitants to an extreme form of vulnerability that arises from the enactment of the ‘state of exception’ (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006; Diken and Lausten, 2005; Turner, 2010; Peteet, 2011).

Though gated communities, enclosed neighbourhoods, slums, ghettos and favelas do not duplicate the extremities of the Nazi concentration camps, Diken and Lausten (2005) nevertheless argue that sociology in these spaces follows the ‘logic of the camp’, arguing that ‘camps’ are spatio-temporal entities which signify a position/doctrine. The authors further explain how difference between those inside camp spaces is less consequential than between those inside and outside. Yet, in being constituted against negativity, the camp creates a sense of ‘other’, or a form of ‘outside’. In this way, the camp produces as much order as disorder.

Finally, Diken and Lausten (2005: 18) argue that the camps are ‘social and (bio)political orders producing subjectivities’, especially as the objective of producing order necessitates the production of various processes, rules and regulations which aim at controlling populations. In such spaces, therefore, discipline creates sovereignty by generating zones of exception through confinement, where ‘freedom of movement coexists with fixation, and in this situation it becomes difficult to tell the difference between “free subject” and “inmates”’ (Diken and Lausten, 2005: 74). Such a conceptualisation of enclaves shows how enclaves embody subjectivities of exclusion and inclusion, inside and outside, and security and terror.

Having illustrated the political nature of space in the enclave, the sociology of enclaved spaces can be paralleled to the sociology of the camp, which is inherently based on attempts at high degrees of social control, denial of political rights, extreme vulnerability and violence (Diken and Lausten, 2005). Enclaves are attempts to enforce immobility on those considered criminals as well as to create barriers against the surrounding ‘criminal places’. In megacities in the global South, the proliferation of enclaves is explained as a reaction to rising levels of urban violence and crime in the face of growing scepticism about the government’s ability to provide security and policing (Caldeira, 2000; Koonings and Kruijt, 2009; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008a).

In the emerging ‘vigilantopolis’ (Davis, 1999: 391), the poor and less powerful are widely subjected to suspicion, control and repressive state policies. These mechanisms of
dealing with urban crime and violence further skew structures in unfavourable ways for
the urban poor: conditions of extreme deprivation result in strained social relations due
to contests over space, the reliance on crime and drugs for income and reliance on
informal networks for security and contract enforcement (Koonings and Kruijt, 2009). In
such conditions, the poor tend to suffer from violence in two ways: inter-communal
personal violence and also from state-led violence. The extreme vulnerability created by
such a combination often plunges the urban poor into a continuum of violence. In the
final section below, I will expand on this argument in more detail, where I explain how
enclaves can be understood to be agential in perpetuating urban violence.

The Agency of Enclaves: How Processual Enclaves are Productive of Urban
Violence

In this section, I will bring together the different concepts presented in the last section in
order to build an argument to suggest that enclaves are agential processes that are
productive of urban violence. My conceptualisation of enclaves as relational assemblages
is essential to this understanding, as it allows focus on how securitised enclaves are
produced through the interaction of a range of actors—public and private—and on how
power continuously shifts between these actors (Allen and Cochrane, 2010; Allen and
Cochrane, 2007; Allen, 2011). Here, I argue that just as enclosure, intra-urban walling and
gating and the splintering of urban security are viewed as losses or weakening of state
sovereignty (Brown, 2010; Ramadan, 2013; Tawil-Souri, 2012; Benit-Gbaffou et al.,
2012), the processes of walling and generating enclosure may be studied in relation to the
shifting relations of power, subjectivity and identity in the city.

Controlling patterns of circulation through regulatory practices and architectures of
security creates an unequal power-geometry, especially as some people are included while
others are excluded (Massey, 1993). In the process, the architectures of the fragmented,
splintered and securitised city create subjects and reproduce difference. Building on my
arguments in the previous chapter, I would like to suggest that enclaves can be held
responsible, as multi-scalar and relational socio-material processes that govern
circulations, for restructuring relations of power in the city as well as for affecting urban
socio-political relations. In speaking of gated communities, for example, Graham (2010)
notes that ‘gated communities embody ideas of securocratic war just as powerfully as
does the militarisation of international boundaries, but they operate at a different and
complementary scale’ (Graham, 2010: 107). By his reference to securocratic war, Graham
extends Feldman’s (2004) concept of securocratic warfare to the production of enclaved spaces. Feldman (2004) introduces securocratic warfare as consisting of open-ended, deterritorialised campaigns for public safety. He argues that such wars do not have an identifiable enemy, nor are they easily locatable, but they are instead focused on countering territorial transgression and contamination, often through the production of cultural imaginaries. Therefore, Graham argues that seemingly innocuous gated enclaves are productive of generating discourses of risk and insecurity in ways that may criminalise certain populations.

Similarly, the practices and technologies of surveillance which are critical for enclavisation also lead to the identification and generalisation of deviant behaviour (Bottomley and Moore, 2007). In extreme cases, Graham (2010) highlights how complex technologies of surveillance are deployed in securitising urban spaces. Some technologies integrate face-recognition software, while others are operated through intelligent systems that track particular behaviours, movements and objects. Together, these warn security guards and officials of people who fit the profile of previously programmed ‘faces of terror’ (Graham, 2010). Though ordinary residential enclaves of the global South may not deploy such complex technologies, as I will demonstrate in more detail in the empirical chapters, the repeated practices of bordering lead to profiling which fetishises the ‘other’ and deepens racist paranoia. In this sense, enclaves can also be characterised as producing racialised identities.

The above parallel invokes the notion of gated communities (or other securitised enclaves) as a materialisation of ‘othering’. Both boundaries—local and international—are architectures of exclusion which attempt to keep out what is deemed risky and offensive. Evidence from enclaved cities suggests that the privatised space and security inside the enclave is often deregulated, and in extreme cases may also lie beyond state control (Glasze et al., 2006; Ploger, 2012; Fregonese, 2012). Meanwhile, governance of security outside these enclave ‘borders’ mostly falls within the ambit of the civilian and military security structures (Graham, 2010). As I will highlight further in the next chapter, in such a situation the national security apparatus is supplemented or partially replaced by the development of a security system that is decentralised and involves the participation of individuals and private firms (Benit-Gbaffou, 2008a; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008b).

For example, gated communities have been portrayed by various scholars as ‘armoured enclaves’ of the middle class—securitised through patrols by civil police auxiliaries, state
of the art technologies or even private security companies (Robb, 2007; Graham, 2010). On the other hand, enclaves in favelas and other marginal spaces may not be out rightly recognisable as fortified and militarised enclaves, though they may be equally inaccessible for the public. In such cases, privately organised non-state actors securitise and govern the enclave through fear and violence. For example, de Souza (2014) provides examples from Rio de Janeiro to describe how urban militarisation is ubiquitous in the ‘phobopolis’ (extremely fear-struck cities). He further explains how ‘micro-local warlords’ (de Souza, 2014: 161) have territorialised marginal urban spaces from where they challenge state monopoly over violence and subject residents to coercion. While the affluent feel safe in gated communities, the freedoms of association and movement are severely restricted for the urban poor resident in settlements controlled by criminal gangs and mafias.

Therefore, it is evident that it not just the gated community that is an exclusionary securitised space. The condition runs across all enclosed spaces: ghettos and enclosed neighbourhoods as well as gated communities. Such spaces are also characterised by a high degree of social control and discipline, and hence they are acknowledged as spaces that spatialise governmentality (Merry, 2001). Spatial governmentality refers to the governing of populations through the control and regulation of space (Merry, 2001). The referent object of this form of governmentality is a population of people identified as exhibiting offensive or potentially dangerous behaviour, and the space of operation is physical action, legislation, architectural design and/or security practices that isolate the dangerous or protect the vulnerable (Merry, 2001). This follows from the Foucauldian notion of governmentality as the art of government which includes a wide range of technologies and techniques of control applied to various objects. These range from the control of self through disciplinary practices to the control of a population through biopolitical practices.

Various authors have described how enclaves spatialise governmentality. Merry (2001), for example, describes how states produce social order by structuring urban space in ways that isolate risky populations through exclusion from particular spaces, while at the same time establishing rules of conduct in such spaces (Merry, 2001). As a technology of government, governmentality structures behaviour and subjects users of space to a high degree of social control. However, in studying practices of spatial governmentality in post-apartheid Cape Town, Robins (2002) highlights how the exercise of spatial
governmentality rests with state as well as non-state actors. Sharing examples from the emergence of fortified enclaves—elite gated communities as well as low income enclaves—Robins (2002) highlights that in enclaved cities punishment and discipline are often enforced through community based organisations which enact community policing to securitise themselves in the absence of state presence (Robins, 2002). This attention to the exercise of spatial governmentality as resting with state as well as non-state actors is significant for opening up space for discussion to understand notions of power and subjectivity in cities of the global South, where sovereignty is a hybrid concept and non-state actors play significant roles in structuring urban power and politics (Fregonese, 2012; Yacobi, 2012).

Keeping this in mind, I would argue that using Foucault’s concept of governmentality can help in decentreing the state as the omni-powerful political actor in enclaved cities of the global South, and can help us understand the multi-directional and relational notion of power. Such an understanding of power emerges from Foucault’s definition of governmentality as:

…the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge [...] political economy, and its essential technical means [...] apparatuses of security (Foucault, 1991b: 102).

Thus, power is not just placed in the hands of the state, but more in institutions that produce power/knowledge. As I explained earlier, enclaves are performative spaces and hence have been understood as institutions that produce discourses. In this way, it is possible to understand that enclaves exercise power through their discursive practices. Moreover, going over my reconceptualisation of enclaves as processual spaces, I have illustrated how enclaves are agential spaces that restructure urban socio-political relations and relations: by creating a space of exception, structuring civil order, practicing bordering, delimiting rights and access to insiders through inclusion; enclaves themselves seem to embody characteristics that perform sovereignty. Furthermore, the administrative bodies, community organisations and resident committees that underpin such enclaves thus hold political power which subjugates their residents. In this way, enclaves are identified as agents of power who wield control over residents in ways that replicate the state’s authority.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I have developed a critical conceptualisation of enclaves using theories of relationality, assemblage and performativity. This framework has allowed me to conceptualise enclaves as relational spaces that are in continuous process, ‘assembled’ through the interactions and relations between material infrastructure, discursive practices, socio-spatial relations and socio-political relations. As a result, I have been able to theorise enclaves as dynamic and fluid spaces. Once produced, enclaves do not remain static ‘containers of space’. Instead, I have argued that enclave boundaries are osmotic and temporal—they shift and blur to accommodate and/or exclude people in different ways. Hence, this conceptualisation of enclaves allows us to review enclaves as spaces of negotiations, contestations and subjectivities. Moreover, by focusing on the distinctive politics of enclaved spaces I have been able to highlight how enclaves may re-organise socio-political relations and governance in ways that exacerbate marginalities and inequalities. Therefore, by reading enclaves through the analytic of assemblages, I am able to provide an alternative to the existing fixed and static descriptions of spaces. Moreover, I am able to outline key characteristics of enclaved spaces which focus precisely on the processual, relational and agential nature of enclaved spaces.

Through this reconceptualisation of enclaves as agential urban processes, I have covered significant ground in responding to the criticisms of existing scholarship on enclaves and enclaved urbanism which I outlined in the previous chapter. In Chapter 2, I outlined that such criticisms limited a comprehensive analysis of enclaves, as agential spaces not only emerge in response to increasing urban violence, but also perpetuate such violence. While my conceptualisation of enclaves has brought me a step closer to such an analysis, I have yet to respond to a major criticism of existing scholarship on enclaves. That is, I have yet to contextualise my study of enclavisation and violence in Karachi within the local context, and to further elaborate how relations of governance and urban political life structure enclavisation, and contests of power in global south cities. I will address this analytical shortcoming in the following chapter, where I will elaborate how enclaves restructure relations of power and politics in cities with violent effects.
CHAPTER 4
ENCLAVISATION, GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS IN CITIES OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH

In this chapter, I will build on my conceptualisation of enclaves as dynamic political processes by demonstrating how enclaves are constituted through multi-scalar relations of governance and politics and by elaborating how related enclaves both territorialise as well as restructure urban political relations in cities such as Karachi. Linked to this objective, I will present two key arguments. The first is that enclaves spatialise fragmented forms of urban governance, differentiated forms of citizenship and disjunctive state-society relations. Secondly, I argue that as a result of these processes, enclaves restructure relations of power and politics within complex urban systems in ways that produce contests of control and hence urban violence.

To make these arguments, in the first section I will contextualise processes of enclavisation through an analysis of relations of urban governance and related urban politics in cities such as Karachi. In the process, I will highlight how enclaves, which are borne out of these relations, spatialise fragmented forms of urban governance and disjunctive forms of citizenship. This background will be helpful in understanding the multi-scalar and contested relations of power and politics in enclaved cities, a topic which I will focus on in more detail in the second section. In the second section, I will present evidence from Karachi and other global South cities to highlight how enclaves manifest fragmented and hybridised forms of sovereignty and power, and how such power relations interact within an urbanism. Moreover, I will demonstrate that in an enclaved urbanism, the resulting negotiations and contestations of power between competing state and non-state political agents are often generative of conflict and various forms of urban violence.

Before moving on, I would like to highlight that my analysis in this chapter is grounded in the specificities of urban governance and politics in cities of the global South. This is mainly to keep in line with my earlier outlined arguments (see chapters 1 and 2), which made the case for the need to analyse processes of enclavisation within contextually specific histories and trajectories of urban planning, politics and governance structures. Throughout this chapter, I will therefore make reference to the literature on processes of urban planning, governance and politics in Karachi. Where relevant literature is not
available, I will provide evidence from cities of the global South that are comparable to Karachi.

**Enclavisation, Governance, and Politics in Cities of the Global South**

In the absence of a detailed study of urban governance in an enclaved urbanism, in this section I will draw on the literature on global cities and postcolonial urbanism in order to outline processes of urbanisation and urban politics in contemporary cities of the global South (Shatkin, 2014; Weinstein, 2014; Gaffikin and Perry, 2012; Alsayyad and Roy, 2006; Watson, 2009a; Roy, 2009a). I find this literature useful for understanding how relations between multi-scalar processes of urban spatial planning and urban development are tied to relations of power and politics in the city. Even though enclaves are not the primary focus of this scholarship, these authors do make tangential reference to the socio-spatially divided nature of such cities, thus making this literature appropriate for contextualising analysis of enclavisation and violence in enclaved cities such as Karachi.

In the above-mentioned scholarship, various authors highlight that urbanisation is structured through multi-scalar interactions between multiple governance actors and differentiated planning trajectories. In Indian cities, for example, Benjamin (2000) and Dupont (2011) show how urban spatial planning and development is often negotiated between urban business and political elites, middle class elites and slum-dweller associations. Yet, given that all these groups have different interests, Shatkin (2014) highlights that the realm of urban planning and governance in such cities is contingent, highly contested and inevitably political in nature.

For example, the emerging urban middle class in India has been the subject of much political-economic scholarship on urban power relationships and planning orientations. Urban planning in India is documented as having shifted from social-oriented goals that support the urban poor to an elite revolt that favours growth oriented policies (Baviskar, 2003; Ghertner, 2011). In such cities, spatial planning is no longer inclusive, and is instead tied to dreams of making Indian cities ‘world class’ (Dupont, 2011; Ghertner, 2011; Schindler, 2014b). In this literature on Indian urbanism, there is evidence of increasing socio-spatial segregation and the often violent displacement of the urban poor (Baviskar, 2003; Roy 2011a, Dupont, 2011). Such expulsions compound existing socio-spatial inequalities, which are tied to the legacies and traditions of colonial planning
(Nijman, 2010; Coutard, 2008; Jaglin 2008; Dupont, 2004). Scholars note that the resulting urban landscape is deeply divided—politically and spatially—between the affluent and poor urban residents, who are entrenched in gated communities and urban slums respectively (Dupont, 2011; Falzon, 2004). The resulting orientation of planning therefore often operates at the expense of the interests of the urban poor (Benjamin, 2000; Baviskar, 2003).

On the other hand, I would like to draw attention to the literature on subaltern urbanism, which challenges the assumption that the urban poor are powerless to shape their urban environments. This literature focuses on how the urban poor are increasingly prominent actors in relations of urban governance, especially as they participate in urban planning decisions through vote bank politics or a politics of patronage and state-clientelistic relations (Benjamin, 2000; Benjamin, 2008; Chatterjee, 2004). For example, Benjamin (2000) highlights how disenfranchised urban residents who have access neither to the formal planning system nor to resources which they can use to influence it may still have a voice. We also know this from the case of Karachi, where successful entrepreneurs from within marginal neighbourhoods who are able to influence how people vote develop crucial links with councillors and lower level bureaucrats at the municipal government in order to negotiate for civic services on behalf of fellow slum dwellers (Budhani et al., 2010; Gazdar and Mallah, 2013). The ensuing politics of patronage is of course tied to individuals rather than parties, but it nevertheless offers marginal populations access to local government (Benjamin, 2000; Benjamin, 2008).

Such trends and patterns are also noticeable in many other contemporary postcolonial contexts (Simone 2011, Watson 2009b, Lindell, 2008; Roy and Alsayyad, 2004). Scholarship on contemporary urbanism suggests that, in cities as diverse as Johannesburg, Jakarta, Cairo and Beirut, failures in urban governance force citizens to collaborate and build ephemeral relations in order to navigate and negotiate insecurities in their everyday lives (Simone and Fauzan, 2012; Bayat, 2012). Such practices of collaboration both support and supplant existing processes and relations of urban governance. In enclaved cities especially, home-owner associations, civil society groups, political patrons and community organisations often emerge as governance actors which increasingly mediate relations of governance and politics between the state and urban residents.
Building on this evidence, I would argue that enclavisation is made possible through the existing complexities of relations of urban governance and politics in global south cities, while at the same time, processes of enclavisation restructure state-society relations. For example, scholars are increasingly reviewing enclavisation as an outcome of deregulation and of the neoliberal rationalities of urban governance (Shatkin, 2007; Dick and Rimmer, 1998). Yet, such rationalities of urban governance may problematically empower non-state actors who appropriate responsibilities which are traditionally associated with the realm of the state. Roy (2009a) elaborates this through the examples of civil society organisations such as Hezbollah and SPARC in Beirut and Mumbai respectively. She highlights how each organisation engages in practices of ‘civic governmentality’ by providing an infrastructure of mediation with the state, engaging in technologies of governing and promoting norms of self-rule. In providing examples from Hezbollah’s role in Beirut, Fregonese (2012) too argues that such processes of governance change the existing balance of power between state and non-state actors, and shift the social contract. Fregonese (2012) argues that by providing space to organisations such as Hezbollah to provide urban services in Beirut, the Lebanese state operates under a condition she terms as ‘hybrid sovereignties’, whereby powerful non-state actors effectively appropriate state functions and hence command legitimacy and power.

Similarly, in the South African context, such forms of neoliberal governance also extend to urban security governance, whereby municipal governments relinquish powers of spatial governmentality to private actors and institutions (Benit-Gbaffou et al., 2012; Murray, 2004). In South African cities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town and Maputo, such arrangements of governance are institutionalised through legal regulations, thus formalising the previously informal or tacit security governance arrangements between the state and private sector actors. While they regulate processes of enclavisation, institutionalised forms of enclavisation also allow space for civil society to respond privately to urban insecurity.

However, as a process that empowers non-state actors, the devolution of spatial governmentality from state actors to civil society often restructures relations of power and politics in potentially problematic ways (Fregonese, 2012; De Souza, 2014). This is especially the case where the privatisation of security governance is not regulated. For example, various authors document the privatisation and splintering of security provision in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Rio de Janeiro for example (Clarno and Murray,
In this regard, actors such as private security companies, community watches, vigilante groups and criminal networks emerge to fill the security gap left by inadequate public policing and security provision (Benit-Gbaffou, 2008a; Putzel and Di John, 2012). Such alternative security practices and enclosures are often organised by quasi-private or private management structures though illegal or extra-legal practices (Lemanski and Oldfield, 2008; Landman and Schonteich, 2002). Yet, such forms of innovative governance are ethically questionable, as they reproduce the vulnerabilities and restrict the freedoms of certain groups at the behest of others. This is especially troubling when considering my arguments in the previous chapter, where I demonstrated how related processes of securitisation and bordering are productive of unequal power relations.

The above-mentioned accounts suggest that in contemporary cities of the global South, enclaved spaces territorialise diverse regimes of governance. Moreover, it becomes evident that the production of enclaves in cities of the global South—when viewed in relation to the multiplicities and various modes of governance—is in fact an arena of political relations. Reviewing enclavisation as tied to such relations and processes of governance and urban political life, it becomes possible to conceive how enclavisation is tied to the spatialisation of differentiated forms of citizenship. In many cases, processes of enclavisation may be linked to the various ways in which citizens engage with the public sphere, especially in cities where the public sphere itself is not singular. This relates to Holston and Appadurai’s (1996) concept of disjunctures in citizenship, and Chatterjee’s differentiation between civil and political society.

Holston and Appadurai (1996) elaborate how cities are strategic sites for the development of citizenship. The authors explain that, as lived spaces of nation-states and sites where emergent forms of statehood take shape, cities are arenas through which multiple associations form and people with differing civic, civil and cultural rights converge to engage with the state (Holston and Appadurai, 1996). The authors therefore contend that the socio-spatial inequalities and the range of cultural diversity in cities create disjunctures between formal and substantive forms of citizenship. Whereas formal citizenship is tied to membership of the nation-state, substantive citizenship corresponds to the array of political, social, cultural and socio-economic rights. Chatterjee (2004; 2008) also discusses how the rationalities of government and forms of political engagement in the Indian context are different for the poor and the middle class. He
differentiates civil society from political society, presenting the former as the domain of middle-class who seek to align themselves with normative models of bourgeois civil society and hence represent capitalist interests. On the other hand, he describes political society as comprising the urban and rural poor who make demands on the state based on a violation of the law. More specifically, Chatterjee (2008) explains that political society holds a differentiated position in state-society relations:

Those in political society make their claims on government, and in turn are governed, not within the framework of stable constitutionally defined rights and laws, but rather through temporary, contextual and unstable arrangements arrived at through direct political negotiations. (Chatterjee, 2008: 57) Yet, I would argue that processes of enclavisation are also productive of fractures in state-society relations, and hence restructure the realm of power and politics in the city. AlSayyad and Roy (2006) succinctly summarise how processes of enclavisation mediate with power and politics in the city. They argue that the enclaved city represents a form of ‘medieval modernity’, whereby citizenship is no longer individual and rational, but is instead tied ‘to either patronage (as in the bishop) or to associational membership (as in the guild) and in both cases it is fundamentally about protection’ (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006: 3). AlSayyad and Roy (2006) further highlight that such forms of state-society relations restructure relations of power and politics, as these devolved citizens are governed by norms which are often contrary to national law. Relatedly, the resultant logic of rule also affects urban political geography. The authors stipulate that the resultant city ‘comes to be articulated in what Holston and Appadurai (1999, p. 13) have termed a “honeycomb of jurisdictions”, a “medieval body” of “overlapping, heterogeneous, nonuniform, and increasingly private memberships”’ (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006: 3).

Therefore, considering how disjunctures in urban governance, planning processes and urban political life restructure state-society relations, it becomes possible to argue that enclaves spatialise multi-scalar relations of governance and politics in cities, and that they restructure relations of power and politics. In the next section, I will elaborate how this understanding of restructured relations of power and politics in enclaved cities is helpful for considering the relationship between enclavisation and urban conflict and violence.
Fragmented Sovereignty and Contested Power: Enclaved Spaces as Contradictory Sites of Marginality, Empowerment, and Conflict

The evidence presented in the previous section demonstrated that enclaves are produced through negotiated relations of governance and politics in cities. Through this understanding, we can also consider enclaves as sites that influence relations of power and politics in the city. In this context, it is important to relate enclavisation to issues of fragmented sovereignty and contested power. Such an analysis will help highlight how enclaves are significant geopolitical actors that reconfigure power and politics in the city. Keeping this in mind, in this section I will develop an analysis of relations between enclavisation, power and sovereignty in cities of the global South, which will be instrumental in understanding violence and conflict in the city.

Using examples from enclaved cities of the global South, I have previously argued that enclaves are sites of contested urban politics and fragmented governance. To unpack state-spaces in such sites and cities, I turn to the critical literature on state spatialisations. As Brenner, Jessop, Jones and McLeod (2003) define it, state spatiality refers to the ‘complex expression of ongoing processes and practices of socio-spatial regulation at various scales’ (Brenner, Jessop, Jones and McLeod, 2003: 7). Spatial processes in turn refer to ‘metaphors and practices that constitute assemblages of political power in and through geographical space’ (Gazit, 2009: 85). This conception of space highlights its political value, as it is in fact an active variable in the manipulation of politics, the assertion of power and the manifestation of authority (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002). This relates well to the earlier outlined descriptions of politics of enclavisation and of enclaved spaces in cities of the global South, where it was obvious how enclaves emerge as inherently territorial spaces which are configured along complex state and non-state power structures. Moreover, the fact that processes of enclavisation subjugate ordinary residents to (often extra-legal) regulations set by non-state actors make it evident that processes of enclavisation are entangled with relations of power.

Reading power through the concept of assemblages, various scholars highlight that power and political agency are often not just limited to the realm of the state. Instead, they argue that power is often negotiated and renegotiated (Lindell, 2008; Sassen, 2008; Allen and Cochrane, 2010). These arguments are based on Michael Foucault’s notion of power (Foucault and Faubion, 2002), where it is described not as an object of possession but as an all-compelling, ubiquitous and pervasive force that is linked to the art of
dispersed government. Resultantly, power as Foucault describes it has no obvious location(s) or centre. Instead, it is internalised by subjects, who both exercise power and are subjugated to it. Foucault further explains that resistance and domination are hybrid and mutually constituted, and that power is made apparent at points of resistance (Foucault and Faubion, 2002).

Having explained the notion of power, and keeping in mind how processes of enclavisation are both products of and productive of multi-scalar and multi-sited relations of power and authority, it is important to understand how enclaved spaces interact with the state, and with what results. To do so, it is necessary to understand the relations of power between cities and states. Before I turn to the task of generalising these for cities of the global South, I will present evidence from the literature on state power in Pakistan. This will be helpful both in contextualising my empirical observations in the second half of this project and in presenting a deeper understanding of state-spaces in global cities such as Karachi.

**State Spaces and the Politics of Power in Pakistan**

Alavi (1972) contends that state power in Pakistan is dispersed and contested between the military, the bureaucracy and democratic institutions. The Pakistani state was not born from grassroots movements within its own territory, but from the struggle for an independent Muslim nation by Jinnah’s Muslim League, ‘a coalition of individuals, factions and segmentated political interests belonging mostly to the landlord stratum’ (Ali, 2002: 46). Consequently, at the time of independence, Pakistan was an ‘overdeveloped’ state, as the military and bureaucracy were stronger than the indigenous bourgeoisie who form the elected ruling classes (Shaikh, 2010; Alavi, 1972). To this day, the military and bureaucracy co-exist as autonomous and coercive arms of the state, and they often intercede in democratic politics in ways that undermine the civilian government (Rizvi, 1998; Shaikh, 2009). Overall though, the military remains the most powerful of all government institutions, and it is a key strategic, political and economic player in Pakistan (Siddiqa, 2007; Rizvi, 1998; Hoffman, 2011).

In Pakistan’s 67 years since independence, democracy has never really taken hold. In 2008, for the first time in the country’s political history, a democratically elected government was able to complete its term without being forcibly removed through a military coup or falling through political conflict causing dissolution of the parliament.
The fact that Pakistan has spent more than three decades under military rule is also widely acknowledged to have weakened civil society and political institutions in the country (Shaikh, 2009; Gardezi and Mumtaz, 2004; Jones, 2009). The constantly shifting tide of power between civilian and military governments, and between one democratically elected government and another, has meant that governance is often managed through arrangements which supersede state instability (Gardezi and Mumtaz, 2004; Shaikh, 2009; Gazdar, Kaker and Khan, 2010). As a result, international hegemonic powers, global financial institutions, landed and business elites, prominent bureaucrats and retired civil and military officers all play key roles in brokering power and politics in Pakistan (Gardezi and Mumtaz, 2004; Shaikh, 2009; Gazdar et al., 2010).

Within this broader political environment, urban governance has become extremely volatile. As successive governments experiment with different local government structures—from centralised to devolved forms of power—major urban centres such as Karachi become political battlegrounds for various actors vying for a take in power (Gayer, 2014). As a consequence, as illustrated in Table 1 and Table 2 below, present day urban governance is a tangled web crossing various scales of government. Municipal and land development functions in Karachi are formally divided between local, provincial and national governments. Meanwhile, the military, state monopolies and business elites also exercise control over these functions within the megacity (Ahmed, 2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Land Development Authority</th>
<th>Percentage of Land Owned</th>
<th>Percentage by level of government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>Lyari Development Authority</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>Malir Development Authority</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>Karachi city government</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Sindh</td>
<td>Sindh Industrial Trading Estate</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Sindh</td>
<td>Government of Sindh – other land</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Sindh</td>
<td>Kirthar National Park</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government</td>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government</td>
<td>Port Qasim</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government</td>
<td>Karachi Port Trust</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Government</td>
<td>Federal Government – other land</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Military</td>
<td>Defence Housing Authority</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Military</td>
<td>Cantonment Boards</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Private – other</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Jurisdiction</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Name of Authority/Department performing function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General administration</td>
<td>All districts of Karachi</td>
<td>City Government (KMC) and Govt. of Sindh</td>
<td>Administrator KMC and Chief Secretary Sindh Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>administration of Justice</td>
<td>Sindh province</td>
<td>Govt. of Sindh</td>
<td>Various courts headed by the Sindh High Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing</td>
<td>Sindh province</td>
<td>Govt. of Sindh</td>
<td>Home Department and Karachi Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land development, housing, and physical planning</td>
<td>All districts of Karachi</td>
<td>Govt. of Sindh; various local authorities; private sector</td>
<td>City Government offices; Defence Housing Authority; Cantonment Boards; other societies and private development agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulk water supply</td>
<td>All districts of Karachi</td>
<td>Govt. of Sindh; various local authorities; private sector</td>
<td>Karachi Water and Sanitation Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>Sindh province</td>
<td>Federal Govt.</td>
<td>Karachi Electric Supply Corporation; Water and Power Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas</td>
<td>Sindh province</td>
<td>Federal Govt.</td>
<td>Sui Gas Southern Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public transport</td>
<td>All districts of Karachi</td>
<td>Federal Govt. and private sector</td>
<td>Private sector; Pakistan Railways; Karachi Urban Transport Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port development</td>
<td>All districts of Karachi</td>
<td>Federal Govt.</td>
<td>Karachi Port Trust; Port Qasim Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial estates</td>
<td>All districts of Karachi</td>
<td>Govt. of Sindh and Federal Govt.</td>
<td>Sindh Industrial Trading Estate; Export Processing Zone Authority; Pakistan Steel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Percentage of urban land controlled and administered by various land development authorities in Karachi. Source: MPGO-CDGK, 2007 p. 3.
These complex structures of governance essentially ‘hedge’ authority in Karachi. Given that urban governance is fragmented between local, provincial and national governance agencies, different institutional actors claim control over certain functions of urban governance at all times. As I have demonstrated in Tables 3 and 4 below, different political parties are usually in power at different levels of government. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), for example, all have considerable weight in politics and governance in the city, and they often use this as a point of negotiation for bargaining over political settlements with the federal government (Budhani et al., 2010).

Table 2: Distribution of urban governance functions in Karachi by level of government. Source: Ahmed, 2010 p.127.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taxation: property, customs, income, and sales</th>
<th>Sindh Province</th>
<th>Govt. of Sindh (property tax); Federal Govt. (others)</th>
<th>Excise and Taxation Department, GoS; Federal Board of Revenue, GoP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taxation: water, fire, conservancy, and other municipal taxes</td>
<td>All districts of Karachi</td>
<td>Various local authorities</td>
<td>KMC; private sector; Cantonment Boards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Political parties in power at the local, provincial and national levels. Source: Authors’ compilations from various sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Karachi</th>
<th>Sindh</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td>Jamat e Islami</td>
<td>PML Q and MQM</td>
<td>PML Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2007</td>
<td>MQM⁷</td>
<td>PML Q and MQM</td>
<td>PML Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2010</td>
<td>MQM</td>
<td>PPP and MQM</td>
<td>PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>PPP and MQM</td>
<td>PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 to date</td>
<td>Administrator</td>
<td>PPP and MQM</td>
<td>PML N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Political parties in power at the local, provincial and national levels. Source: Authors’ compilations from various sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Political History</th>
<th>Party Appeal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

⁶ Since local elections were declared ‘non-party elections’, the Jamat e Islami was not ‘directly’ in power. The Al-Khidmat Group won the local government elections, but since it was patronised by the JI, the JI can be said to have been in power

⁷ Similarly, the MQM-supported Haq Parast Group was in power.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religion:</td>
<td>Plural</td>
<td>Supports the Baloch gangs in Lyari (Karachi)</td>
<td>Ethnic: Sindhi and Baloch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PML Q and PML N</td>
<td>Ideology: centrist conservative party</td>
<td>Formed in 1948 (bifurcated from the All India Muslim League after the creation of Pakistan). Now known as PML Q, the party is made up of prominent politicians, usually rural landlords, who attract votes regardless of party affiliation. After 1988, PML Q was popularly known as the ‘establishment’ party for its role in bringing military governments to power and being the ‘democratic face’ of military government. After further splits in the following years, in 1988, PML N became the most popular breakaway faction</td>
<td>Province: Urban and rural Punjab and Sindh, Balochistan (PML Q)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion:</td>
<td>Plural</td>
<td></td>
<td>Appeal: urban and rural poor, conservative middle class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic: various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Province:</td>
<td>Urban and rural Punjab</td>
<td>Province: Urban and rural Punjab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appeal:</td>
<td>Widely popular across Punjab province, very popular amongst conservative middle class, religiously oriented voters, and the business class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic: Punjabi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MQM</td>
<td>Ideology: politicisation of ‘Muhajir’ ethnic identity</td>
<td>Formed in 1985, as Muhajir Qaumi Movement Internal split over name change and wider mandate in 1997. Now known as the Muttahida Qaumi Movement Has a well-known 'militant wing' operative in Karachi</td>
<td>Province: Sindh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion:</td>
<td>Occasionally Sectarian (Shia)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Appeal: urban low and middle income groups in Sindh, young disenfranchised youths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic: ‘Urdu-speaking’ migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMA</td>
<td>Ideology: centrist, Islamic religious ideology, ultra conservative, economically socialist</td>
<td>Formed in 2002. Coalition of six religious parties, including Jamate Ulema Islami and Jamat e Islami</td>
<td>Province: NWFP and Balochistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Appeal: Conservative urban voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic: Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion:</strong> Occasionally Sectarian (Sunni)</td>
<td><strong>Province:</strong> NWFP and Balochistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JUI</strong></td>
<td><strong>Appeal:</strong> Urban and rural religious Muslim nationalists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology: Islamic religious ideology, mostly coalition party, pro-democracy</td>
<td><strong>Ethnic:</strong> various, majority Pashtun in Karachi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion:</strong> Occasionally Sectarian (Sunni)</td>
<td><strong>ANP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed in 1945 in a split from Jamiat ul Ulema Hind, which was founded by the ulema of the Deoband Movement in pre-partition India.</td>
<td>Formed in 1986 after a merger of the National Democratic Party and other groups.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Province:</strong> NWFP, Balochistan, FATA, Western Punjab, Karachi</td>
<td><strong>Appeal:</strong> Pashtun nationalist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic:</strong> Pashtun</td>
<td><strong>Ethnic:</strong> Pashtun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Major political parties in Karachi and Pakistan. Source: Authors’ Compilation from Various Sources.

Each political party mobilises mass support through well documented politics of land settlement, patronage and vote bank politics in Karachi (Gayer, 2014; Budhani et al., 2010; Hasan et al., 2013). In this megacity of 20 million people, where more than 50 percent of the population live in marginal slums, land settlement processes are heavily politicised as well as ethnicised. Interviews with prominent urban planners, activists, and government officials reveal that informal land developers settle precarious migrants in the city on illegally subdivided land, while promising them security of tenure on the basis of rent extraction and political loyalty. This ‘protection racket’, itself a profitable business, is supplemented by political power on the basis of which informal land developers develop links with political party bosses, the police and municipal government officials.

The emerging vote bank politics is also common in Indian megacities (Benjamin, 2008; Schindler, 2014b), and it coalesces earlier described ‘political society’ (Chatterjee, 2004). Gayer (2014) describes the volatility in Karachi as a direct outcome of such urban politics, where different ethno-political parties territorialise land and develop ‘turfs’ within the various ethnic enclaves in the city. Competition over rent extraction, political
influence or even contests between local and provincial/federal governments escalate urban conflict and violence. Such conflict often also challenges state authority, especially as politicised enclaves often emerge as no-go areas for state security forces (Gayer, 2014; Gazdar and Mallah, 2013).

Gayer (2014) further argues that the political patrons of such enclaves orchestrate violence to destabilise the federal government in the manner of an ‘ordered disorder’ (Gayer, 2014: 210). Gayer (2014) explains that such an ordered form of disorder is only possible in countries like Pakistan, where forms of state power are decidedly non-Weberian, and where elites play a significant role in brokering settlements. The structures of local government and state power are such that they can be held hostage to political mobilisation by powerful ethno-political parties. Given this evidence, post-colonial state spaces can be envisioned as scrambled webs of power between state, bureaucracy, powerful political actors, NGOs and criminal groups. Despite being an overdeveloped state, certain regions and cities in Pakistan (including Karachi) exhibit the political logic of ‘fragmented sovereignty’ i.e. conditions where the state exhibits ‘multiple, localised, and temporal cores of power’ (Gazit, 2009).

While this is true of the particular multi-sited and multi-scalar relations of state power and politics in Karachi, evidence from similarly contested African and Middle Eastern cities also shows how non-state actors and local power brokers can acquire state-like functions and consequently appropriate sovereignty (Gazit, 2009). Evidence from Beirut, for example, suggests how religiously and politically oriented civil society groups provide residents with protection and settlement, and thus eventually earn legitimacy and displace traditionally existing state-society relations (Yassin, 2010; Fregonese, 2012). This effectively challenges state authority in urban centres, thereby propelling conflict and terror. Although not productive of similar violent outcomes, in Indian cities too, the appropriation of governance functions by community leaders, businesses, NGOs and other civil society mediators is a common way in which sovereignty in cities of the global South is graduated from the state. Such patterns are traced by various authors who review participatory governance (Zerah, 2009: 874) or even urban informality and changing forms of citizenship (Alsawayyad and Roy, 2006; Benjamin, 2008) in contemporary cities of the global South. I will explain the relevance such state spaces and politics of power have for enclaved cities in more detail below.
Keeping in mind the above-mentioned context of state spaces and the politics of power in Karachi, I will now discuss what this means for a study of enclaved urbanism more generally. In this section, I will elaborate how relations of power are mediated through enclaves and are restructured through changing structures of urban governance in enclaved cities. Here, in the absence of relevant detailed research on Karachi, I will use examples from other cities of the global South to supplement my arguments related to Karachi.

For example, Benit-Gbaffou, Fourchard and Wafer (2012) trace the dynamic interaction between various community-based security initiatives and the state in South African cities. Here, communities have converged, institutionalised and then politicised over security initiatives. Initiatives to ‘discipline’ populations soon became a flashpoint for political contestation with the state. In elite and middle class areas, road closures generated a discourse on security models, criminality and apartheid before eventually being legalised after structural changes in urban governance. Community security initiatives became co-opted to the political agendas of the African National Congress (ANC) and other parties, and have since been constantly reshaped and redefined because of shifting relationships between the state and communities.

Enclaves are thus strategic geopolitical sites that materialise civic life as well as projecting civic politics. Moreover, enclaved spaces re-territorialise state spaces and relate to urban and national politics through various associational relations. The force and direction of political agency depends on the unique cultural and socio-political context of enclaves, as well as the overall polity within which they operate. As demonstrated earlier, in postcolonial countries power is dispersed between competing state institutions and powerful local or global non-state actors. Moreover, as outlined earlier, even though some of the processes of enclavisation are enacted illegally or extra-legally, informality is also a modality of power (Roy, 2005; Roy, 2009c). Here, informality does not suggest state weakness but, insofar as it is produced by the state itself, is a function of governmentality, as it allows the manipulation and control of subject groups (Alsayyad, 2004). Yet, as examples of civic engagement from global South cities suggest (Goodfellow and Titeca, 2012; Tanulku, 2012) this power can also be manipulated by ordinary urban residents who organise themselves as collective political agents.
Moreover, other examples from the scholarship on global South urbanism suggest that even though informality has long been championed as the habitus of subaltern urbanism, it is as much within the purview of the rich as it is of the poor (Ranganathan, 2011; Ghertner, 2008). Yet, in the case of Karachi’s enclaves, selective legitimising practices of informal spaces highlight state biases. The political choices of the state are highlighted when urban elites are allowed to privatise public space and restrict circulation through informal practices, while ‘slums’ are controlled through military operations carried out against non-state actors. Such interactions of state power within the informal spaces of the rich and poor further highlight how a politicised politics of land development, capital accumulation and value creation emerges. However, as I will elaborate further in Chapter 8, the selective co-option of certain groups over others may perhaps denote a purposeful creation of ‘grey areas’ that can be manipulated for making political settlements (Yiftachel, 2009). In such instances, graduated and hybrid sovereignties may destabilise the central state, but may also be a modality of its power.

Moreover, even though I will not elaborate this further within this research, it is important to note that in its attempts to consolidate power, making strategic alliances with some actors and rejecting others may be a strategy that the state employs to keep powerful non-state actors under control. This has been true in Karachi in the past, where political settlements with the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), for example, have been a very important factor in securing a democratic majority at the centre. At other times, however, the MQM has been subject to violent military operations after it threatened to destabilise the federal government by inciting inter-party violence and conflict in Karachi. Keeping a relational view of power in mind, in such a political environment, enclaves could be understood as spaces that do not only devolve state power, but also project power outwards to affect urban and national politics. I will expand this theme in more detail below, where I will outline how political relations in enclaved and fractured state spaces result in conflict and violence.

**Fragmented State Power and Violence in Enclaved Cities**

Thus, as state space and political power are fragmented, and power and governance functions are shared by non-state actors, the resulting contestations between competing political agents often leads to violent conflict (Gazit, 2009; Koonings and Kruijt, 2007b). This is especially evident in the megacities of the global South, where competing claims by various political actors can lead to violent contestation and recurring civic conflict.
Such civic conflict is often tied to the unequally accrued effects of globalisation (Appadurai, 2006). Beall et al. (2013) present a scalar notion of civic conflict, defining it as a reactive violent expression of social, political or economic grievances against state or non-state actors with the purpose of reconfiguring power relations. Amongst other forms, it may include terrorist violence, gang warfare or violent organised crime. Although reactive in nature, civic conflict may overlap with civil conflict if it involves a higher degree of organisation, stronger economic interests and the presence of state elements.

However, I would like to argue that in megacities of the global South such as Karachi, such scalar categorisations of conflict are not useful. This is because in Karachi, local, national and international actors all compete for power. Furthermore, in cities such as Karachi, it is hard to differentiate between civil, civic and sovereign conflict (Gayer, 2014). For example, in 2008, local Pashtun settlers in Karachi’s low income ethnic enclaves who had grievances over the unequal distribution of civic resources in the city increasingly pledged allegiance to the Pashtun Nationalist Party (ANP). In 2008, the ANP was part of the coalition government, and as a function of that had control over some urban services, such as water provision. The ANP is opposed to the MQM (then in power at the local government level). In an attempt to show its power, the MQM launched a campaign against the Pashtun dominated slums. This demonstrates how civic conflict co-opts sovereign conflict and shows how shifts in loyalties between political actors can lead to political abandonment, violence and conflict. Therefore, in cities such as Karachi where political authority is fragmented and politicised, violence is not just played out on the turf, but also through policies which render other groups more vulnerable (Gayer, 2014; Budhani et al., 2010; Gazdar and Mallah, 2013). The political nature of enclaved spaces is hence critical. By re-orienting structures of power and authority, enclaves can be argued to create conditions under which conflict festers and violence is perpetuated.

This violence is exacerbated by the political sociology of enclaved urbanism. Examples from low income enclaved spaces demonstrate how powerful actors use violence as a basis for creating order and discipline while seeking to build on their de-facto power through engagement with policy makers and urban politics (Koonings and Kruijt, 2009). In such instances, for example, community organisations that emerge as neighbourhood watches can easily morph into violent, ethnocentric bodies (Benit-Gbaffou et al., 2008).
The situation may worsen in cases where residents lose trust of the formal policing system. Given that the literature on fragile cities highlights how non-state actors who command authority may appropriate the juridical functions of contract enforcement or sentencing for crime (Pillay, 2008; Budhani, Gazdar, Kaker and Mallah, 2010), it becomes more important to consider how processes of enclavisation may heighten vulnerabilities and marginalities in enclaved spaces, as well as propelling similar processes of enclavisation in other parts of the city.

In such an urbanism, as I will further elaborate in Chapter 8, the relationships between enclavisation and violence are therefore often circular. Processes that seek to install governmentality, discipline and control over populations often do so with violent outcomes. The growth of such processes is often linked to increasing insecurity at the domestic and international levels, tied to the increasing mobility of the urban poor and democratisation of their rights. The megacity is both a place where violence is structurally played and a potential site of ideologically/politically motivated ‘urban insurgency’. Enclaves are thus attempts to enforce immobility on those considered criminals, as well as to erect barriers against surrounding ‘criminal places’. On the one hand, the process of enclavisation is in itself a form of violence, as it creates structures that reduce the life chances of those ‘outside’. Turner (2010) offers a parallel between the US experience of ‘ghettoisation’ and the stringent citizenship laws imposed on external migrants as similar forms of exclusion. In both instances, those excluded from access (to decent housing or citizenship) face reduced opportunities to integrate into the economic and political life of the city. On the other hand, the literature on the violent megacities of the South points towards enclavisation as a process that emerges as a way of creating order in a city otherwise characterised by disorder (Caldeira, 2000; Koonings and Kruijt, 2009; Gayer, 2014).

As violence escalates, repressive state policies are enacted in response to appeals by urban residents who see the poorer neighbourhoods as sites of incivility and extreme disorder. The poor are thus represented as perpetrators of violence and not only suffer from inter-communal personal violence but also from state-led violence. As Galtung (1969) asserts, the increasing intensity of personal violence is a manifestation of latent structural violence. The perpetuation of violence—structural and political—in such urban conditions is a situation that Schepers-Hughes and Bourgois refer to as ‘chains, spirals and mirrors’ or the ‘continuum of violence’ (2004: 1). In this way, I argue that by
creating conditions that engender structural violence, enclavisation perpetuates another form of violence that is manifested by the politics of control as well as repressive state policies.

Enclaves also spatialise governmentality, i.e. they sort, order and control people through notions of inclusion and exclusion and the categorisation of inside and outside (Diken and Lausten, 2005; Alsayyad and Roy, 2006). This exercise becomes one of governance, and in many countries of the global South this governance often extends beyond the state (Swyngedouw, 2005). Whether or not this signifies a ‘retreat’ of state power remains debatable and is beyond the scope of my argument here, but it does signify a transformation of state power. Moreover, as alternate systems of governance, enclaves appropriate power and enjoy the possibility of manipulating political leaders and the state. Nevertheless, as sites of governmentality and power, the politics surrounding processes of enclavisation and enclaved urbanism closely link the phenomenon to violence. While emerging as safe havens in response to crime as violence, enclaves also perpetuate violence by politicising urban space and creating conditions under which contests over space amongst urban residents and between urban residents and the state fester.

Therefore, reviewing processes of enclavisation in relation to forms of governance and authority in urbanism in the global South makes it obvious that enclaves are significant geopolitical sites which spatialise contested rights, power and authority in the city. While urban space is divided and territorialised, processes of providing protection and discipline subjugate populations. In this respect, enclaved spaces are constituted as sites of power and alternative authority. Paying attention to these shifts opens up the debate and allows enclaves to be viewed as spatial outcomes of a renegotiation of democratic engagement and the social contract (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006), as well as helping to highlight how enclaves are agential geopolitical spaces. Equally significantly, it helps underline how enclavisation and violence are relational and circular processes.

**Conclusion**

Having previously argued that current scholarship on enclavisation and enclaved urbanism is limiting for scholars working on enclavisation in cities of the global South because related literature does not sufficiently address the multi-scalar, relational and processual nature of power in cities of the global South, nor does it elaborate the
complex relations of power in most post-colonial cities and states. In this chapter, I have aimed to redress this conceptual gap. I have presented a framework within which to contextualise the multi-scalar and multi-sited relations of governance and power in enclaved cities in order to understand enclaves as agential geopolitical spaces.

In this chapter, I have highlighted how enclaves embody myriad forms of governance and emerge as important urban geopolitical spaces. By showing how processes of enclavisation are tied to multiple and divergent relations of governance and urban political life, I have elaborated how processes of enclavisation are productive in reconfiguring relations of power and politics in the city. Moreover, using examples from Karachi and other cities of the global South, I have elaborated how the production of enclaves symbolises as well as perpetuates contests of control over different levels of governance. Finally, I have explained the relations of power and politics in the enclaved city, outlining how this ties to urban socio-political relations, state power and authority. Through this, I have argued that enclavisation and violence are closely linked, and that their linkage is a circular, self-perpetuating phenomenon.

This chapter is therefore crucial in developing a framework for understanding the relations between enclavisation, governance and politics in cities of the global South. It is also important in linking enclavisation to more contextual processes of urbanisation in such cities. In this way, it builds on my earlier defined agenda to ‘post-colonise’ the literature on enclavisation and enclaved urbanism. Overall, the arguments and explanations presented in this chapter elaborate how power and politics are structured in post-colonial enclaved cities, and they help explain how enclaved spaces interact with state spaces in contemporary postcolonial cities. This chapter therefore informs my analysis of enclavisation and violence in Karachi in part II of this project. In Chapter 6, for example, I introduce processes of enclavisation in relation to governance and urban political life in Karachi. In embedding this analysis within the specificity of governance, politics and citizenship within the city, I am able to highlight how different enclaves in Karachi emerge as unique socio-material and socio-political assemblages that crystallise varying forms of citizenship. Similarly, in Chapter 8 I elaborate how the restructured relations of power and politics in the enclaved city couple with the socio-political consequences of enclavisation, and thus perpetuate violence and conflict in the city. Before moving on to these empirical chapters, in the next chapter I will outline a suitable
methodology for studying enclaves and enclavisation through the reconceptualisation proposed thus far.
CHAPTER 5
METHODOLOGY FOR STUDYING ENCLAVES AS RELATIONAL PROCESSES

In earlier chapters, I have offered suitable frameworks through which I can critically analyse enclaves and enclavisation in Karachi. Thus far, I have reconceptualised enclaves as dynamic spaces that are produced through everyday negotiations of urban space, security, governance and social relations in cities with infrastructural development, multiple actors in urban governance and conditions of insecurity. Moreover, by unpacking enclaves as assemblages I have highlighted that enclaves are socio-material, performative, agential and political processes that spatialise social difference, subjectivities and governmentality. Understanding enclaves as such helps highlight how enclaves restructure relations of urban power and politics in ways that may perpetuate urban violence. To summarise, the key propositions I have highlighted in Part I of this thesis are as follows:

1. Enclaves are socio-material and political assemblages.
2. Enclaves are performative spaces that create political subjectivities.
3. Enclaves are agential processes that restructure relations of urban governance and socio-politics in ways that engender urban violence.

In this chapter, I will present the methodology that has guided both the fieldwork I carried out in Karachi and my analysis of the data collected for my study of the above-mentioned propositions. In the first section, I will briefly introduce the intellectual processes that have guided my research strategy. In the following sections, I will outline my research strategy and design in more detail. I will explain my choice of ethnography as a method, my reasons for following a case study approach, my case selection, the means through which I collected data and the methods of data analysis. I will conclude with a discussion on the practical and ethical responsibilities associated with my research methodology, and some limitations.

Assembling a Suitable Methodology for Studying Enclaves Relationally

In this section, I will outline my research design in light of relationality and assemblage, both of which are key concepts that underpin my research. Overall, I will explain how my theoretical framework (outlined in the previous chapters) has led me to study the key
propositions of this thesis. I will justify my focus on urban relations as a site of analysis, and the use of the concepts of relational space, agency, performativity, subjectivity and identity for this analysis.

**Research Design**

An assemblage is, first, an ad hoc grouping, a collectivity whose origins are historical and circumstantial, though its contingent status says nothing about its efficacy, which can be quite strong. An assemblage is, second, a living, throbbing grouping whose coherence coexists with energies and countercultures that exceed and confound it. An assemblage is, third, a web with an uneven topography: some of the points at which the trajectories of actants cross each other are more heavily trafficked than others, and thus power is not equally distributed across the assemblage. An assemblage is, fourth, not governed by a central power: no one member has sufficient competence to fully determine the consequences of the activities of the assemblage. An assemblage, finally, is made up of many types of actants: humans and nonhumans; animals, vegetables, and minerals; nature, culture, and technology. (Bennett, 2005: 445)

Jane Bennett (2005: 445) articulates the concept of assemblage as a contextual, topographical, ad-hoc grouping of humans and non-humans along which action and relations of power are dispersed unevenly. In Chapter 3, I mentioned ‘assemblage’ as a concept that is central to my description as well as characterisation of enclaves. I clarified my use of the concept in detail in Chapter 3, explaining how it best serves to capture an understanding of enclaves that is emergent, processual, constantly shifting shape and composed of socio-material and socio-political relations. As suggested by Bennett (2005: 445), an assemblage is a complex whole which is conjoined through relationality between its parts, which include the human and non-human. It may be thought of as an emergent and transient structure—a sort of permanence—that comes into being through the various interactions of its parts (McFarlane, 2011).

Based on the assumption that assemblages are made meaningful through the relationality between their parts, identifying and tracing the social and political relations of the various objects underpinning and constituting assemblages is critical for studying processes and outcomes related to assemblages (Mutlu, 2013). Salter and Mutlu (2013) further highlight that it is possible to map processes surrounding the emergence and transformation of assemblages by tracing relations between the objects and subjects (both human and non-human) that comprise the whole.
Methodologically, this means that to identify the best method for gathering data to study enclaves as socio-material, political and agential processes, it is important for me to think of key relations tied to each of my research propositions and the core concepts that will be useful in studying these relations. I have illustrated this in detail in the methodology table on the next page. In making this table, I was able to recognise ethnography as a suitable method for gathering the necessary information, and I was able to identify the means through which relevant information can be collected. However, before I go on to elaborate these methodological choices in the next section, I would first like to examine in more detail the concepts of performativity, actant, agency, power, identity and subjectivity, which are central to any task of studying relations within assemblages with the intent of studying my research propositions (see table 5 below). In the following section, I have outlined these concepts in detail, grouping them together in such a way that they cover particular propositions.

**Studying Agential Assemblages**

The first set of concepts, which are central to studying the first and last proposition illustrated in table 5 are those of *performativity*, *actant* and *agency*. The concept of performativity is methodologically suitable for studying assemblages as outcomes of discursive-material relations. Performativity (explained in more detail in Chapter 3), as a concept that identifies objects through stylised acts of repetition (Butler 1990; 1993), is helpful in studying assemblages because it reveals how the iteration of particular material-discursive relations produces stable structures. As I elaborated in Chapter 3, the concept of performativity will be helpful in highlighting how enclaves are constituted through repetitive acts of bordering and curtailing urban circulations.

Similarly, the concepts of actant and agency are also extremely useful in capturing the relations within different parts of the assemblage. The concept of ‘actant’, which is prominent in Actor Network Theory, is relational. An actant refers to the human or non-human mediator which modifies other actors (within the assemblage) through a series of actions (Latour, 2004: 75). It therefore refers to the source of action which has the ability to produce effects, and it is not discriminatory regarding whether this source lies in human or non-human actors, thus distributing agency within the assemblage (Bennett, 2005). The concept of actant is therefore useful in tracing how socio-material assemblages come to exist and how the various parts act together to produce particular outcomes. In my empirical analysis, I emphasise how certain actors and objects relate
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Argument</th>
<th>Key Relations</th>
<th>Key Concepts</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Collection (data)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enclaves are socio-material and political assemblages</td>
<td>Multi-sector relations between enclave residents and other governance actors; relations between mobility and socio-material and discursive processes of securitisation; emergence, process, continuity, and transformation</td>
<td>Performativity (relationality between discourse and materiality)</td>
<td>Ethnography</td>
<td>Observation (field notes, material culture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Actant (mediator between actors in a system)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Respondent practices and experiences (interviews, field notes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agency (capacity of objects to shape relations)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discourse (text from interviews, media reports, popular culture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enclaves are performative spaces that create political subjectivities</td>
<td>Tensions, contests and negotiations between and amongst different enclave dwellers, workers and visitors; subjugation through material and discursive bordering practices</td>
<td>Norms (culture of group); Identity (self/other, inside/outside, excluded/included)</td>
<td>Ethnography</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Performativity (bordering practices and identity construction)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Power and subjectivity (discursively produced subjectivity)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enclaves are agential processes that restructure relations of urban governance and socio-politcs in ways that engender violence</td>
<td>State-society relations of enclave residents; relations between enclave governors and state institutions; relations between urban residents inside and outside enclaves</td>
<td>Identity (in group/out group)</td>
<td>Ethnography</td>
<td>Respondent experiences (interviews, field notes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Power and subjectivity (discipline, governmentality, discursively produced subjectivity)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Discourse (grey material, media reports, text from interviews)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agency (capacity of enclaves to impact politics)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5: Methodology for studying enclaves as relational and agential processes. (Design adapted from Salter and Mutlu, 2012)*
together to produce certain outcomes. For example, in Chapter 6 I outline the various associations and relations that emerge from events such as insecurity, infrastructural disruption or precarious conditions of living to produce differently formed enclaved spaces. Similarly, in Chapter 7 I outline how socio-material and discursive processes of securitisation assemble in various ways to restrict circulation in different ways in each of my study sites.

Meanwhile, the concept of agency within socio-material assemblages refers to the capacity of the object to effect change in the world. This concept too is relational in nature, and I use it in the micro and macro context. By this, I mean that I am interested in agency within micro-assemblages (i.e. enclaves), but also the agential capacity of enclaves to change power and politics in the macro-assemblage (i.e. the city). In the macro-context, the concept builds a layer upon the concepts of performativity and actant. For example, given that enclaves are materialisations of discursive-material iterations, and secondly that there are various ‘actants’ within the socio-material assemblages that make up enclaves, the concept of agency attends to the impact that individual actants have within enclaves on their immediate surroundings (objects affecting bodies in micro-environments), but also on the wider city (i.e. enclaves as agential socio-material assemblages within the macro-environment). Following Bennett’s (2005) work on locating agency within the North American electricity blackout, agency within micro-environments and macro-environments is best studied at particular eventful moments. Methodologically, this means identifying how different forms of agency are mobilised, where such agency originates, and what effect it has in relation to other actors, institutions, discourses and structures (Aradau et al., 2014; Mutlu, 2013). It is with the help of these concepts that I will be able to highlight how enclaves change urban socio-political relations in potentially violent ways.

**Studying Contests of Space and Political Subjectivities**

The second key argument that I make is that enclaves create political subjectivities and constitute contested identities. As I highlighted in table 5, this argument intersects the second and third research propositions, and can be studied through an analysis of social relations constituted at various ‘nodes’ of the assemblage, at particular moments. For example, the relations between different human and non-human objects and users of enclaved spaces (e.g. visitors, residents, workers, security infrastructure or architecture) at passage points might reveal tensions, contests and negotiations between and amongst
different users of space and highlight subjectivities that emerge through material and
discursive bordering practices. In this regard, the key concepts that guide investigation
are space, identity, subjectivity, and power.

While I have detailed the concept of space in much detail throughout, I would like to
define the concept of identity as I use it. I take the concept of identity as a relational
construct that is discursively and performatively constituted (Butler, 1990; 1993). Taken
in this critical sense, identity can be applied as a category of social and political analysis
that reveals expressions of group affiliations either imposed by dominant forces or
contested through subversive tactics (Butler, 1990). In the case of enclaved spaces, the
concept is useful for revealing the contested nature of place-identity (i.e. what enclaved
space means for its users), as well as for highlighting the significance of spatial practices
in constituting identity and subjectivity (for example rules for screening service providers
more carefully than residents constitute service workers as dangerous subjects). In this
way, the concept brings out the political nature of enclaved space by highlighting
contests, negotiations and tensions in space.

Similarly, I would also like to define my use of the concepts of power and subjectivity,
both of which are relational constructs. Foucault defines power in different stages in his
books *The History of Sexuality* and *Discipline and Punish* and his work on governmentality
(Foucault and Faubion, 2002; Foucault 1991a; 1991b). He defines power as a relational,
diffuse and ephemeral concept, and traces relations of power in the discursive field,
suggesting that knowledge and power are intertwined, as regimes of truth establish
subjectivity by controlling how people define and position themselves within the social
world. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1991a) gives the example of the panopticon to
describe how power is diffused through society through disciplinary technologies which
mediate relations of power between the sovereign and the subject. He elaborates how the
design of the panopticon, which allows constant surveillance, creates an environment by
which prisoners self-regulate themselves in fear of being found in violation of the rules.
This is also elaborated in his work on governmentality, where Foucault (1991b) suggests
that governmentality is a mode of governance by which individuals internalise the effects
of state power and believe that the well-being of the individual is linked to the well-being
of the state. Foucault’s concept of power is therefore extremely relevant for
understanding the political environment of enclaves. The processes of securitisation and
related practices of bordering in effect create discourses and mediate relations of power
and hence subjectivities amongst and between urban residents and various urban governance actors. Overall, once again, an analysis of social relations through these concepts will help illustrate the agential nature of enclaves in restructuring urban relations of power and politics in ways that are productive of urban violence. Below, I will explain how ethnography is a suitable method for operationalising this research design.

**Ethnography as Method**

Thus far, I have outlined the socio-material relations central for investigating my research propositions, and I have explicated relevant concepts for analysing these. As I have suggested in table 5, given my research objectives of studying urban relations, ethnography is a suitable method for data collection. In this section, I will explain why this is so in more detail.

The aims and activities of ethnography are described by Geertz as:

> Establishing rapport, selecting informants, transcribing texts, taking genealogies, mapping fields, keeping a diary, and so on. But it is not these things [...] that define the enterprise. What defines it is the kind of intellectual effort it is: an elaborate venture in, to borrow the notion from Ryle, ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973: 6).

Indeed, it is the very notion of ‘thick description’ that makes ethnography an extremely useful method. The key task in ethnography is to be holistic in gathering data, arrange it in ways that present recognisable patterns and then contextualise this within wider processes to fully understand the phenomenon (Geertz, 1973; Hanwerker, 2001). This promise of conducting exploratory research (Schensul and LeCompte, 2012; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000) along with a commitment to contextualising emerging patterns within phenomena has popularised ethnography in research which aims to study relations between various actors.

Ethnography, or thick description, has traditionally been a popular method used in anthropology for studying various aspects of social life such as culture, identity, power and marginalisation. Given the exploratory nature of the method, there are flexibilities associated with the research design which allow researchers to follow lines of inquiry as events unfold or new information emerges. Because of its attention to both verbal and non-verbal details, and the possibility of conducting research through observation as well as participation, ethnographies have also been extremely useful in developing and
contributing to the subjects of social marginalisation and exclusion, which are sensitive and difficult to explore otherwise (Bourgois, 2002; Gregory, 2003; Kuper, 2003). The embeddedness of the researcher in the field (as a participant observer) makes contrasts between the private and public worlds more visible. The relationships developed between the researcher and participants allows access to the ‘insider view’ of the society or people being researched in contrast to other quantitative methods that only provide an outsider’s perspective.

In the past few decades, however, ethnography has also been adopted by Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars, operationalising elements from Actor Network Theory, who aim to study intersecting relations within and between various objects (human and non-human) within networks and assemblages (Star, 1999; Bennett, 2005; Latour, 1996). The appeal of ethnographic methods for studying relationally produced phenomenon is summarised by John Law (2004) below:

Realities are not explained by practices and beliefs, but are instead produced in them. They are produced, and have a life, in relations. So what we need is ethnography, or what Mol calls praxiography. [...] A praxiography allows us to investigate the uncertain and complex lives of objects in a world where there is no closure. [...] It allows us to explore the continued enactment of objects. And as a part of this, it allows us to investigate the multiplicity of those objects, the ways in which they interact with each other (Law, 2004: 59).

The quotation above, while highlighting the advantages presented by ethnography as an explorative method, also signals the potential difficulty of ‘containing’ the inquiry and delimiting the exercise of gathering data while tracing processes. Here, I would like to point out once again how the researcher is significant within the project. As related by O’Reilly (2005), ethnography is an iterative-inductive approach. The method is inductive in the sense that the researcher does not start with the expectation of testing set hypotheses, but instead starts out with very few propositions in mind so as to keep a focus on the messiness of reality. At the same time the researcher also plays an important role in shaping the research through iterations, i.e. a constant to and fro between what he observes in the field alongside and guiding preconceptions/theses which help shape the direction of the project (O’Reilly, 2005). It is for this reason that reflexivity—i.e. critical reflections on the researcher’s positionality, limitations and other factors which influence the quality and output of research—is an important concept in ethnographic research.
In the next section, I will explain how I operationalise ethnography as a method for studying enclaves as agential socio-material assemblages that create tensions in space, security and circulation, produce subjectivities and perpetuate urban violence.

**A Case Study Approach**

In this section, I present an argument for a case study approach to studying enclaves. Next, I will describe the sites which will make up my case studies, explaining how these will be useful for illustrating the arguments presented in the first part of this thesis. I will then summarise the methods used for data collection.

A case study approach presents opportunities for collecting and analysing in-depth, contextual data.

> [...] most case studies feature descriptions that are complex, holistic, and involving a myriad of not highly isolated variables; data that are likely to be gathered at least partly by personalistic observation; and a writing style that is informal, perhaps narrative, possibly with verbatim quotation, illustration, and even allusion and metaphor. Comparisons are implicit rather than explicit. Themes and hypotheses may be important, but they remain subordinate to the understanding of the case. (Stake, 1978: 7)

The above quote highlights the promising qualities of case study analysis for studying relational phenomena such as enclavisation and governance. Case studies are usually undertaken to exemplify a situation, though the method can be applied in various ways depending on the type and aims of the study. The method allows for an in-depth investigation of what the case is i.e. an individual, population, event or structure (Stake, 1978). While the method can also be descriptive, it is largely used for explanatory research (Yin, 2009). Yin (2009) highlights case study research as being used to explore causation in order to find underlying principles—the method usually asks ‘how’ and ‘why’ outcomes occur in an uncontrolled environment. For the purpose of this research, case studies will flesh out the various typologies of enclaves and the emerging socio-political relations which result from processes of enclavisation.

Case study research places heavy emphasis on in-depth analysis: Ethnographic data from case studies presents thick description of interrelated variables, and the importance of understanding the case allows a flexible protocol for studying the object of analysis (Yin, 1984). The approach is also extremely useful for studying a real-life phenomenon within
its contextual conditions, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are not clear (Yin 1982; 2009). The method requires that the research strategy is strictly followed through (selecting the site/sites, collecting and managing data and analysing information) in a logical way (Yin, 2009). As a result, a clearer understanding of a phenomenon is presented through case study analysis, and opportunities for further examination may be opened up. In this way, case studies not only test, but may also generate theories (Flyvbjerg, 2006).

Case studies are increasingly popular in urban studies research, and are progressively featured in critical research that critiques the universal generalisability of established phenomenon across different contexts (Coutard, 2008). I find this approach useful for my research because it can allow me to simultaneously study and compare different enactments of enclaves and enclavisation in Karachi. The emphasis on contextual data would allow me to analyse the ethnographic data collected from each case in relation to wider processes in the city. Such an approach will allow a more varied and nuanced understanding of enclaves and urban life.

However, case study research can also fall into the trap of essentialising certain phenomena. Applications of comparative case study research have been critiqued for generalising the experiences of a single city or a part of a city to predict wider urban trends, as well as for fetishising the origins of a phenomenon to the city where it was first studied (Robinson, 2006; Ward, 2010; Hogan et al., 2012). I argue that my conceptual groundings counter such potential misappropriations of my case studies. Moreover, I have purposefully selected widely divergent case study sites in order to illustrate the variety of physical forms and variations of functions and structures that enclaves create and support. Furthermore, my commitment to relational comparative strategies and my understanding of the contextual nature of socio-material assemblages ensure that I avoid inaccurate extrapolations on my part as well as discouraging misappropriation of my findings.

Finally, on a broader scale, the very fact that my cases are situated in Karachi, a megacity of the global South, helps subvert the existing frameworks of enclaved urbanism which rest on paradigmatic cities of the global North. As I have argued in detail in the introductory chapter, my choice to situate my research in Karachi is a response to Robinson’s call for post-colonising urban theory (Robinson, 2006), and Roy’s (2009) encouragement to locate new geographies of theory. My focus on Karachi will help to
dislocate the dominant narrative of the North American gated community and its variations as a prototype for enclaves, while also drawing attention to alternative processes of governance, planning and securitisation in a burgeoning megacity of more than 20 million people which largely remains off the map in urban studies. Having given this brief overview of my choice of city, in the following section I will provide more detail of my case study sites within Karachi, and outline my reasons for choosing these.

**Case Selection**

I have outlined above the reasons for my choice to focus this study on Karachi, as well as justifying the generalisability that Karachi offers to scholars wishing to use this case study for comparison. Here, however, I will present more details of the particular sites I have chosen for in-depth analysis. Within Karachi, I have decided to choose case study sites from neighbourhoods in Saddar Town and Clifton Cantonment, which are the central districts of the city. I have selected case study sites from the central districts of Saddar and Clifton for three main reasons: firstly because of the strategic relevance of these districts; secondly because places within these districts are becoming increasingly fortified; and thirdly because of the blunt contrasts which exist between governance structures and socio-political life in these neighbourhoods.

As areas that lie in the city core, Saddar and Clifton are more densely populated than any other district, and they are the oldest settled parts of Karachi. For this reason, these districts are symbolically and strategically significant for Karachi’s governors (Hasan, 1999). Saddar is often metaphorically referred to as the ‘heart’ of Karachi. It houses the financial district, the city government offices and the historical bazaar area, while the city’s elite residential areas, shopping districts and leisure centres lie within the neighbouring area of Clifton. Moreover, as I described in the introductory chapter, these central districts are also becoming increasingly fortified because the changing nature and intensity of violence in Karachi has deeply affected security in these areas. Parts of Saddar lie within the security red zone (see figure 9 on following page). The prevailing insecurity is not only intensifying militarisation of strategic buildings at threat from terrorist violence, but the escalation of political violence and crime is also pushing residents living in ordinary neighbourhoods to turn towards enclavisation. The high number of enclaved neighbourhoods within Clifton and Saddar therefore makes it an ideal area to study the relations within and between enclaved spaces, and how these affect everyday life in the city centre.
Figure 9: Map of Saddar and Clifton, showing Askari III, Clifton Block 7, and Sultanabad
Equally significantly, Saddar and Clifton display glaring socio-spatial inequalities. As the oldest parts of Karachi, they are scarred by the uneven history of infrastructural development and the fragmented nature of urban governance in the city—both of which are remnants of Karachi’s colonial past. As a result, the juxtapositions of the historic and the contemporary, of public and private spaces, of elite residential areas and katchi abadis, are more stark and proximate in the city’s central districts. Here, contiguous patches of land have been developed and are managed by the city government, cantonment boards and private (informal) land developers—a situation which usually causes confusion and contests over jurisdiction between the multiple governance actors, frequently resulting in crisis.

Within this part of Karachi, I have selected three different enclaves that lie in close proximity to each other. These are Askari III (a gated community), Clifton Block 7 (an enclosed neighbourhood) and Sultanabad (an ethnic enclave). As Figure 9 on the previous page shows, these three sites are within a 5 mile radius of each other, and are also close to the security red zones. Askari III is a middle class, multi-ethnic gated community built in the late 1980s which houses ex-military and civilian residents. This gated community was developed and is managed by the Cantonment Board, one of the several governing bodies of Karachi. The Cantonment Board is an institution which dates back to British times and falls under the rubric of the Ministry of Defence, placing it beyond scrutiny or control by the civilian city government. Given its reputation for militaristic control and order, civilians hoping to escape the problems of insecurity and disorder in Karachi have recently started moving into the neighbourhood as tenants.

Clifton Block 7, on the other hand, is an ordinary public neighbourhood which was developed by the Karachi Development Authority in the 1970s. It is an upper middle class neighbourhood, mostly populated by Ismaili Muslims (a minority sect of Islam in Pakistan). Following failures in municipal governance and increasing fear of crime and sectarian violence, residents—who are mostly businessmen and high ranking serving and retired government officials—have recently organised themselves into a residents’ association and have taken to enclosing and privately securitising the neighbourhood.

My third case study site is Sultanabad, a low income neighbourhood which originated as an informal squatter settlement or katchi abadi in the 1940s. With the exception of a few blocks, most parts of the settlement have been regularised. Sultanabad is a densely populated and ethnically heterogeneous settlement which is fast expanding due to an
influx of Pashtun migrants pouring in from the war-torn Pakistan-Afghan border. Despite not being bounded at all, Sultanabad is perceived as an enclave by the other residents of Karachi. The imaginative geographies of danger and criminality related to the multi-ethnic and highly politicised katchi abadi discourage outsiders from entering. While Karachiites perceive all of Sultanabad to be one enclave, the settlement is in fact further fragmented into various ethnic enclaves.

I have selected Askari III, Clifton Block 7, and Sultanabad for data collection keeping my research design in mind. As an approach to data collection, the case study offers a thick description of the complexities of the situation, focusing on a variety of viewpoints and sources (Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2009). In this context, my choice of sites are appropriate because they offer insights into the variations in types of enclaves, and complexity of enclaved urbanism in Karachi. More specifically, I have selected these three sites for five main reasons. I will elaborate these in detail below.

Firstly, I chose these three particular enclaves because of their conformability with prevalent descriptions of enclaves. On the surface, each site corresponds to a popular type of residential enclave that is outlined in the literature (Caldeira, 2000; Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Glasze et al., 2006; Marcuse, 1997). For example, Askari III offers an example of a highly fortified gated community, Clifton Block 7 corresponds to what scholars describe as an enclosed neighbourhood and Sultanabad is a typical ethnic enclave. Secondly, I felt that these enclaves would make good case studies because of their proximity to each other. As well as sharing a common immediate environment, the proximity of Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad leads to frequent interactions between the people who are resident in these enclaves. Residents of Askari III and Clifton Block 7 have friends or distant relations living in either enclave whom they visit often, while residents of Sultanabad work in both Askari III and Clifton Block 7 as domestic workers, drivers or security guards. This proximity and interaction between each enclave would be helpful for analysing the everyday interactions and relations between these enclaves.

Thirdly, and more significantly, I selected these sites because they are not only representative of the diverse forms which enclaves can take, but they also have different histories, functions and structures. As described in the previous paragraph, each site has emerged as an enclave through different circumstances and has been developed and settled through varied processes. Moreover, their residents have different
ethnic/sectarian/political affiliations and socio-economic status. As study samples, these diverse sites are therefore representative of the heterogeneity of Karachi, and therefore allow me to study differentially spatialised socio-political relationships within an enclaved urbanism. Taken together, these three sites offer an analysis of enclave formation and enclavisation through a variety of structural, class and political positions, and will hence ensure that my study is well rounded. Moreover, another aspect of diversity that these three sites offer is that of governance structures. For example, Askari III is administered by an executive committee overseen by the Ministry of Defence; Clifton Block 7 is an ordinary neighbourhood where a recently incorporated residents association assists the city government in carrying out its municipal and security governance functions within the enclave; and in Sultanabad, community elders govern everyday life in the neighbourhood by liaising with political patrons (at the city, provincial and state government level). In this respect, each neighbourhood offers a different perspective of changing state-society relations, a key focus for my study.

Fourthly, I have chosen these sites because each was created in response to different particular fears of insecurity. As an enclave that is well known for its affiliation with the military, Askari III has recently increased its security following increased risk of terrorism in the city. In response to the military operation against terrorists, Karachi has witnessed an escalation in terrorist attacks, most of which target state and military machinery. On the other hand, Clifton Block 7 has buttressed its security protocols following an increase in ordinary crime such as robberies, kidnappings, vehicle snatching and muggings in the neighbourhood and its surrounding areas. Finally, enclavisation in parts of Sultanabad has emerged in response to increasing ethno-political violence in the city, while in other parts of this large neighbourhood it has emerged in response to state-terror.

Finally, I chose these three study sites because these were the most accessible of an array of similar choices available within Saddar and Clifton. However, I would like to highlight that selecting my case study sites according to accessibility has not resulted in any sampling biases, especially as each site chosen within the sampling framework is as ordinary as those not chosen for the purpose of this study. This is especially clear when recalling my broad conceptualisation of enclaves as processual assemblages, whereby each enclave is a unique constellation of architectures, actors, cultures, imaginative geographies, performative practices and governance structures, producing varying relations, actants and agents. Keeping this consideration in mind, even if the
particularities of the chosen study sites may differ from those not chosen, a study of social-political relations within these sites and between these sites and the city would highlight the distinct, dynamic and political nature of enclaved spaces in the same way as if I were studying any other enclave within the city.

Having outlined my overall methodological framework, research design and case selection in this section, in the next section I will present my means of data collection and provide practical details of data collection, emerging limitations and ethical concerns.

**Practical Details and Means of Data Collection**

I conducted fieldwork in Karachi over the course of six months, spread over three visits. Given that I had lived and worked in Karachi previously, I was able to gather substantial data within my six months of fieldwork, as I did not have to spend time establishing contacts or familiarising myself with the local culture and language. On my first trip, I visited different enclaves within the city to conduct preliminary observations. On this visit, I tried to find enclaves that matched the criteria and descriptions of enclaves which I had read about in human geographical, sociological and anthropological literature on enclaves. As I highlighted in the introductory chapter, in this visit I was able to identify inconsistencies with what I had read about enclaves in urban studies literature. I found Karachi’s enclaves to be more physically open, built through different rationales and more porous than what I had read about gated and fortified enclaves. These inconsistencies between the literature and my fieldwork data led me to reflect on and re-think my conceptual framework for studying enclaves. For this reason, my preliminary field visit was extremely influential in shaping the critical conceptualisation of enclaves which I presented in the earlier chapters. It was also helpful in my case selection, where I chose widely different case study sites in order to illustrate the diversity of types of enclaves. Following this, the next two phases of fieldwork were substantive.

Over my second and third rounds of fieldwork, I collected around 48 in-depth interviews. I collected 13 from each of my case study sites and nine from outside. Within the case study sites, I interviewed residents, enclave managers, security guards and visitors (including maids and drivers). Outside my case study sites, I interviewed serving mid-level and senior city government officials, an owner of a private security company, mid-level and senior police officials, the ex-mayor of Karachi and professional urban planners and activists. Some of these interviews were gathered in the last phase of
fieldwork, while in the last phase I also returned to some of the people I had previously interviewed for more explanation or to confirm my initial analysis.

Before I outline the interviews and other means of data collection in more detail and explain how these correspond with my theoretical framework and research design, I would like to explain some practical issues of access to neighbourhoods and interview subjects. In most cases, I gained access through friends (or friends of friends) and ex-colleagues. For example, in Askari III, my first interview was with the sister of a friend of mine who allowed me to visit her. In Clifton Block 7, an ex-colleague informed me of the site, while I established contact with the residents’ associations myself, whereas I visited Sultanabad with a driver previously employed by my brother, who lived there. He introduced me to a former city councillor who lived there, with whom I established a relationship, thus gaining access. Although these introductions allowed me initial entry, there are important practical and ethical considerations and limitations tied to this which I will discuss in more detail in the next section. Here, I will only focus on details of data collection.

Once I had access to these neighbourhoods, I selected respondents through a combination of snowballing and random sampling techniques. Snowballing is a process that refers to gaining access to interview respondents with the help of leads or introductions from previous interviewees (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). Although this strategy has been criticised for not being adequately representative of the views of people beyond a limited social network, as well as for resulting in community biases (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981), it is still considered a valid and effective sampling strategy for obtaining in-depth and quality interviews from otherwise impenetrable groups (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). For me, this strategy was helpful for obtaining interviews from residents in Clifton Block 7 and Askari III, as I had obtained very few interviews through cold calling. However, in each site, I managed to obtain at least two interviews from residents via cold calling. For interviews with workers, visitors and security guards I used random sampling methods, trying to reach respondents personally when ‘hanging out’ in each enclave. For interviewing enclave governors or members of residents’ associations, I made formal applications.

---

8 Access to government and police officers and urban planning professionals was made possible through formal interview requests.
Once I had gained access to the field sites and established independent relationships with respondents, I went about collecting data for analysis. In the rest of this section I will elaborate the means of data collection and highlight how these satisfied my inquiry into enclavisation and urban socio-political relations in Karachi. In the following section, however, I will present more detail on my limitations, biases, and ethical concerns raised by my sampling methods and methods of access. I will also elaborate my positionality as a researcher and how this affected data collection and interpretation.

**Participant observation**

First, during fieldwork I spent time in my selected sites to observe interactions between residents, workers, users, managers and governors of enclaved spaces; as well as patterns of movement into and inside enclaved spaces. In my repeated visits, I particularly observed issues of acceptance and access, particularly at points of entry and exit. This was to trace how patterns of circulation for residents and non-residents varied at each site across identity-based registers (ethnicity, class, colour, gender and affluence) and by mode of entry (pedestrians, motorists and cyclists). Such an exercise which focuses on crossings and movements along the boundaries/borders of enclaves will help in discovering the phenomenological aspects of enclaves and enclaved spaces, i.e. the relations between material things and moving and perceiving bodies. As Büscher and Urry highlight, ‘Through investigations of movement, blocked movement, potential movement, and studies of immobility, dwelling and place making, analysts are showing how ‘moves’ make social and material realities’ (Büscher and Urry, 2009: 99). Such observations, supplemented by interviews and casual interactions, will also allow a critical analysis of enclave borders as dynamic spaces that create subjectivities (Parker and Vaughn-Williams, 2009).

I also gathered observations by sitting in residents’ association meetings, administrative offices and community events within my selected sites. As Munck and Sobo (1998) suggested, these were extremely helpful in allowing me to develop meaningful insights into community concerns and perceptions of enclosure and insecurity, as well as relations between community members, associations governing the enclaved spaces and other urban governance bodies.
Interviews

Second, I conducted unstructured, in-depth interviews with residents, workers, users, managers and governors of enclaved spaces. Observations and reflections from my field notes allowed me to frame a few leading questions which would open up responses. Discussion with residents and users of enclaved spaces focused on the challenges of negotiating life in an insecure city and on the complexities of living/working within enclaved spaces. Community leaders/managers of such spaces, as well as government officials, were repeatedly interviewed to piece together information on processes of enclavisation; relations between the underpinning structures of governance, residents and the city government; and relations between urban security and enclaved spaces.

Media reports and grey material

Third, media reports and grey material played a very important part in shaping my research. Literature collected from online newspapers, NGO libraries and local policy documents helped me to understand contextual issues relating to municipal and security governance in Karachi. This has been very useful for me in understanding politics and processes of enclavisation in Karachi. Similarly, notices presented by key informants and circulars collected from home associations have been helpful in highlighting discursive practices of enclavisation as well as the documented notions of personal and collective identity and difference.

Field notes

Finally, I kept a field journal, in which I recorded my interviews and observations. As Silverman (2010) and Madison (2011) suggest, I found reflective field notes especially helpful in developing my research questions and critical insights. After recording my reflections, I would share these with my research participants on a regular basis during casual interactions. Sharing my thoughts allowed me to present and hence question my assumptions regarding the field, and also helped qualify and validate my observed findings. I also made it a point to regularly discuss my thoughts and pose questions to friends living in Karachi (outside of study sites). These sessions were often very helpful for me in thinking through what I had observed in the field or even just adding useful context of which I was not aware to some piece of information. While I have done my best to obtain the information required in the most satisfactory and ethical ways possible,
I have faced some challenges. Below, I will elaborate the main limitations and the practical and ethical concerns that arise from this research.

**Practical Limitations, Possible Biases and Ethical Concerns**

In the course of my fieldwork, I found that cultural issues and my positionality as a middle class Pakistani woman both mediated and stunted my interactions in the field (c.f. Mandel, 2003, Merriam et al., 2001). I found that I had to negotiate this carefully—and often very differently—for each case study site. While I found it easy enough to gain access to my research sites, I was consciously aware of my gendered socio-economic position, especially in Sultanabad where I was more of an ‘outsider’. While I had expected that it would be hardest to gain trust in Sultanabad, I was pleasantly surprised that respondents were extremely happy to see a middle class woman break the normal rules of social (dis)engagement and show interest in their lives and their neighbourhood. Yet, throughout my study sites, I often felt that I had to take a more submissive and passive persona in order to persuade my respondents to accept me (Arendell, 1997). On the one hand, this allowed me to mitigate the usual power relations which strengthen the position of the researcher against that of the researched, while on the other hand it meant that I could not always push forward proactively in approaching potential respondents or develop more casual relations with them. Although these were limiting factors in establishing deeper relationships with respondents in ways that ethnographic accounts suggest, I still felt that these cultural norms did not limit me in obtaining access to respondents or gaining their trust (Merriam et al., 2001). If anything, working within cultural norms earned me respect and continued access. Furthermore, being a woman I was always treated courteously, and people went out of their way to help me. Moreover, I was able to access male as well as female respondents, and this was useful for me in achieving a gender balance in my responses.

The practical considerations arising from issues of access were not just linked to identity and related cultural issues. Problems of safety were also evident in negotiating fieldwork and access. Research in an insecure and dangerous environment necessitates creative responses which sometimes go against the grain of conventional ethnographic enquiry (Kovats-Bernat, 2002). I chose my research sites keeping personal safety in mind, knowing that I would require gatekeepers to help me build relationships within the communities. I used my links with friends living in Karachi, in Askari III and Clifton
Block 7, to access residents and managers of these enclaves. Keeping in mind the prevalence of violent crime in squatter settlements, I had to balance the ethical problematic of asking my brother’s ex-driver to guide me around the settlement where he resided. This was a necessary step to ensure my safety in the field, though it was impossible to shake off the power relations (as his ex-employer’s sister) that mediated our relationship. Also, my access to Sultanabad was further cemented through support of the local union council leader who lives within Sultanabad. As a respected member of the community, his introduction provided me with some level of protection as well as support. This may have caused bias as respondents may not openly voice concerns or accept me as unbiased. I attempted to mitigate this by a few short interactions with workers in Clifton Block 7 and Askari III who lived in Sultanabad. I felt that perhaps being away from the environment and its encumbrances might allow people to speak more openly and freely.

Having outlined these practical limitations, I will now turn to a reflection on my personal biases and my strategies for mitigating these. Various authors critique ethnography as a method and suggest that the researcher may affect or effect outcomes by becoming a research variable, or that issues of representation and hence legitimation might dilute the reliability, validity and objectivity of ethnographic research (Marcus, 1998; Hammersley, 1992; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). However, as O’Reilly (2005) suggests, it is impossible to separate the researcher from the research context, and instead it is important to accept and acknowledge positionality and to be reflexive about this throughout the research project. I have therefore stayed conscious of any personal biases that might exist prior to or during the investigation. In order to stay reflexive, I noted down personal emotions/feelings during and after fieldwork and critically assessed these at the end of the day. This reflexivity has helped me to stay focused throughout the fieldwork, especially as at times it became a particularly emotional exercise. It was impossible for me not to suffer at the inequalities and violence that I witnessed or heard of, or to remain disengaged and dispassionate when speaking with people who may support such structures or who may be victim to them. In my case, given the loop of observations, interactions and interviews, it is true that I may have affected research variables through involvement in the lives of participants and by inadvertently questioning and probing an otherwise ubiquitous phenomenon. However, this criticism is challenged by feminist scholars who argue that researchers can never fully separate or distance themselves from
participants, and that in fact any attempt to do so might create power inequalities between the researcher and the researched (McDowell, 1992).

Related to this is the ethical issue surrounding my relationship with my respondents. In gaining privileged access, I was careful to keep the trust they vested in me intact. This was done by repeating my understanding of the situation as respondents describe it, and sharing my initial analysis along the various stages of fieldwork. This added to the integrity of my research, while helping to balance the power dynamics of the relationship, as my respondents might feel more like participants in my research. Another significant ethical issue is that of protecting the interests and rights of the participants in my research. The American Anthropological Association stresses that information taken from participants must be with their consent, and conditions of anonymity must be respected (American Anthropological Association, 2009). Although I was able to get verbal informed consent, a few respondents were hesitant to provide written informed consent. Initially, this posed setbacks for my research. A few respondents who were initially open to being interviewed subsequently declined, and particularly those who could not read were mistrustful of signing a document which I had explained verbally. This was not surprising given the environment of insecurity in Karachi and the nature of my project, which asked questions which explored personal interactions with securitised spaces and political structures. A lot of respondents agreed to be interviewed with the caveat that they would not sign any paperwork. I proceeded to record these interviews and include them in my research, after gaining verbal consent.

Having outlined these details on data collection, I will elaborate in more detail below how this rich information on enclavisation gathered in each study site will be analysed.

**Methods of Data Analysis**

Personal observations, the practices and experiences of respondents and the discourses gathered during field work are all useful in providing information for studying the various relations produced by and productive of enclavisation. For example, by exploring relations between the various objects that comprise enclaves, and by tracing relations between the discourses which constitute enclaves and the practices which perform them, enclaves can be studied as processual socio-material assemblages. In analysing these relations, key concepts such as performativity, actants and agency have helped make sense of the data that I collected through ethnographic methods.
Similarly, I have studied inside/outside relations and inclusion/exclusion within and between my different case study sites. A comparative approach to studying such varied instantiations of access and inaccessibility, inclusion and exclusion and security and insecurity has helped configure an accurate interpretation of how restrictions on circulation affect identity, subjectivity and urban space. The data collected through interviews and personal observations was also analysed to reveal respondents’ experiences as well as their practices for negotiating contested space and emergent subjectivities.

To contextualise some of the responses, I have applied discourse analysis, a method which seeks to uncover the political and historic (discursive) construction of symbolic systems and social orders (Howarth, 2000). It seeks to investigate the different ways in which social practices challenge as well as articulate the discourses that make up social reality (Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis, 2000). Discourse analysis is rooted within the theoretical assumption that all objects are discursively constituted (i.e. their meaning depends on socially constructed rules). An analysis of particular data as a discursive form forms the basis of such an analysis. This data, known as text, is wide ranging and can be linguistic as well as non-linguistic. It includes actions, interviews, manifestos, policy reports and historical events, as well as institutions (Howarth, 2000).

Discourse analysis can highlight how social practices form the identity of objects and subjects through social imaginaries. It can lay bare hegemonic practices which attempt to produce collective imaginaries and social myths, as well as establishing how political identities are formed/dissolved (Laclau, 1994). For this reason, the method can be extremely useful for understanding how identity and difference is constructed in spatial terms (as it can help inform how ‘place’ is a marker for social inclusion/exclusion). My own methods of conducting discourse analysis were as follows. From news reports and my own field notes, I carefully noted instances where allusions to violence and insecurity were tied to location, or perpetuators of crime and violence were pointed out as a particular group of people or even people belonging to a certain place. I also noted whether the choice of living in localities had any links to security, crime or fear. This helped draw a link between the ‘representation’ of conflict and the subjectification and identity formation of people who live in these ‘insecure and conflict ridden’ areas. Attention to such details has meant that I am able to present a richer and more detailed analysis of the politics of space, identity and difference across the three case study sites.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I have operationalised a methodology for theorising enclaves and enclavisation as relational processes. Foregrounding my onto-epistemological emphasis on relationality, I have presented an appropriate research design through which I will be able to gather data relevant for studying enclaves as spaces that are productive of urban violence. More specifically, I will use ethnographic methods to study the socio-political processes of enclavisation, relations of governance and urban political life, relations between space, security and circulation in enclaved spaces, and tensions, contests and negotiations between residents, visitors and workers within enclaves and between enclaves and the city. By studying these relations, I will be able to exemplify the socio-material and socio-political nature of enclaved spaces and highlight the agential and political nature of enclaved spaces. Moreover, in elaborating my research methodology, I also explained that I will use a case study approach in gathering and analysing data. Relatedly, I introduced my three case study sites—Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad—while outlining my rationale for selecting these sites. I further explained my sampling techniques, methods of data collection, the limitations of these choices and other practical and ethical issues. Following this, I presented my methods of data analysis.

This chapter concludes the first part of this thesis. In the following three chapters, of which part II consists, I will present my empirical analysis. Each of these chapters presents facets of identified relations (through key propositions) linked to processes of enclavisation and urban politics. In Chapter 6, I trace the processes of enclavisation within Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad, and explain how each enclave emerged as a differentially spatialised response to contemporary and historical processes of splintering urbanism, the crisis of urban governance, widespread insecurity and political exceptionalism in Karachi.

In Chapter 7, I present how enclaves both shape and continue to be shaped by patterns of circulation, processes of securitisation and performative security. In examining the material, discursive and performative processes of bordering and securitising in detail, I argue that enclaves are often discursively produced and that enclave ‘borders’ are not best defined by urban form. Instead, I argue that enclave borders are permeable and dynamic. In this chapter, I also elaborate tensions between enclaved space and circulation, which further highlight that enclaves produce political subjectivities and
identities. The chapter thus suggests that identity is tied to relations between enclavisation and circulation, and that enclaves have fluid borders which regularly shift and blur to accommodate or exclude people.

In the final empirical chapter, I build on the evidence presented in the previous chapters and focus on the relations between enclavisation and urban violence. Here, I elaborate how processes of enclavisation restructure urban socio-political and state-society relations. While residents’ associations appropriate functions of sovereignty and exacerbate the vulnerabilities of marginalised populations, processes of securitisation produce racialised identities. Moreover, processes of enclavisation also re-arrange the relations of power and governmentality. Such outcomes disturb the existing balance of power amongst and between the various private and public governance actors in the city, often with violent consequences. Therefore, in this chapter I demonstrate how enclaves can be understood as significant political actors that perpetuate cycles of urban violence.
PART II
CHAPTER 6
VARIED RELATIONS OF GOVERNANCE AND URBAN POLITICAL LIFE IN KARACHI'S ENCLAVES

In this first empirical chapter, I will introduce my three case study sites: Askari III, Clifton Block 7, and Sultanabad. More specifically, I will provide an overview of the context within which each enclave was formed, the governance structure of each enclave, the urban socio-political relations in response to which each enclave emerged and the state-society relationship that each enclave coalesced. I will therefore highlight how Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad all spatialise differentiated forms of citizen engagement in response to governance failures in Karachi. In the end, I will argue firstly that Karachi’s enclaves spatialise social, material and political inequalities in the megacity; secondly that they are self-perpetuating spaces that relationally reproduce existing spatial inequalities; and finally that processes of enclavisation in Karachi both operate through and reinforce cultures of political patronage and alternative institutions of urban governance. In conclusion, I will summarise the key points presented in the in-depth case studies concerning relations of governance and urban political life and I will tie together the way in which all three enclaves are relational to each other. In this way, this chapter offers a first glimpse into the way in which enclavisation may change relations of power and politics in the city and hence escalate urban violence. This is a theme that I introduced in Chapter 4, and which I will pay more attention to in Chapter 8.

However, in describing enclavisation in this chapter, I will not delve into details of security practices, the physical security architecture and the specific urban form of each enclave. I will focus on these issues in greater depth in the next chapter. Though these aspects are equally significant for understanding the political and agential nature of enclaved spaces, I find that entering into these details at this point would distract me from the key objective of this chapter, which is to follow the framework suggested in Chapter 4 so as to contextualise processes of enclavisation in Karachi through relational processes of urbanisation, and in so doing, to reveal the macro-politics of enclavisation.

Askari III: An Enclave of Order in a Sea of Disorder

Usman, a resident of Askari III, describes the gated community as a ‘sea of order in a city of disorder’. This middle class enclave is located near the densely populated and extremely
busy downtown bazaar district of Saddar (see figure 10). The area is a thriving multi-ethnic and mixed income residential area. It is also the seat of government offices, five star hotels and important foreign consulates, as parts of Saddar lie within the security red zone. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, despite heavy securitisation and fortification around the area, Saddar is frequently paralysed by violence (Ullah, 2012; The News, 2012; Dawn News, 2011b). Residents of the area live with the constant threat of disruption to their everyday lives caused by ethno-political violence, mobs of angry rioters and suicide bombings. They also live in perpetual fear of crime, especially as Saddar is the second largest hotspot for cell-phone and vehicle snatchings in Karachi (Cple.org.pk, 2014). As in other parts of Karachi, life in Saddar is also often made unbearable by the constant inconveniences caused by municipal mismanagement and crisis. The central district is notorious for substandard municipal upkeep, regular electricity outages and the non-existent public water supply.

Figure 10: ‘Saddar Town’. Source: Flikr, photograph by Damien Entwistle, 2008.

9 The ‘Saddar’ area is different from the Saddar Town administrative district. The Saddar area is the historic city centre, parts of which are governed by the cantonment board while parts fall under the city government’s jurisdiction.
Figure 11: Askari III main entrance gate. Source: Photograph by Ejazdar, 2011.

Figure 12: Askari III Commercial Avenue. Source: Photograph by Ejazdar, 2011.
However, life in Askari III (pictured in figures 11, 12 and 13 above) is very different from that outside. Amna, a house wife who has recently moved to Askari III, elaborates this further, explaining:

*When there is trouble in the city, people get quarantined inside their houses. For us, it is not as depressing. Thank God I can bring my kids down to the park where they can play tennis, and our special events can continue in the community centre. Even the market (inside the complex) remains open, so it’s easy to get everyday groceries. We are not worried about stray bullets or rioters disturbing us as we go about our day!*

Similarly, Molly is happy to elaborate the advantages of life in Askari III:

*Here, there are few water problems. In fact, hardly ever! Garbage disposal is timely – it is done by Askari’s own contractor. The mosque is extremely well maintained, and the building gets painted on the outside every year. […] The electricity situation isn’t as bad as in other parts of the city either. There is load shedding for only 3 hrs a day.*

Such interactions with Askari III residents demonstrate how those inside live a much more secure, predictable and comfortable life compared to other Saddar residents living outside of the gated community. Residents of the gated community also speak enthusiastically about how living in Askari III takes them back to the Karachi of old, as densification and commercialisation haven’t ruined the sense of community, municipal water and electricity provision supplies continue uninterrupted and people feel so secure that they can happily state that they can ‘sometimes even leave our front doors unlocked.
when we step out to the mini-mart!’. Minahil, a mother of two young children who had recently moved to Askari III from an apartment in Clifton explained:

*I like this mohallah [communitarian] style of living – where we socialise with our neighbours in the park or pop over to their flat to ask for a missing ingredient. It takes me back to my childhood days.*

In this regard, Askari III is an archetypical gated community. It offers its residents security, premium service delivery, a comfortable lifestyle, a sense of community and a well-ordered environment (cf. Glasze et al., 2006; Atkinson and Blandly, 2006). Quotes such as ‘Once I enter the gates, I feel relieved and safe’, or ‘No one can over-price here – the army is very strict about fair prices’ show how the gates act as a symbolic form of order and separation from the chaotic city—one that gives residents an immediate sense of safety and confidence. However, as is common in many such gated communities (Peyroux, 2006; Low, 2001), residents have to conform to the strict normative framework that structures the use of space and everyday life within the community. Many do this grudgingly, yet having their individual freedoms compromised is a bitter pill they are willing to swallow given the range of advantages that living in the community offers: ‘Yes, I do resent that I’m not allowed to sell or rent out my house without their (the Executive Committee’s) approval’, said Asad, a businessman, ‘But that’s just how it is’. Naz had a similar opinion: ‘I feel bad. My maid complains that they check her bags all the time, especially when she is on her way out, and she hates it. She’s been working for me for so long. But I guess we don’t have a choice’.

Such expressions illustrate how well Askari III conforms to the notion of a heterotopia, which Foucault describes as a space that exists in otherness, ‘another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well-arranged, as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled’ (Foucault, 1997: 356). He further describes such spaces as illusions that conceal exclusions which people submit to in order to escape there. Yet, while residents live in Askari III to escape the city of disorder, for many the choice is based on limited options in a city where life is always a struggle. As I will outline in the rest of this section, Askari III’s production as an enclave is largely a function of the unequal civil-military relations in Pakistan and their effect on urban governance, politics and experiences of citizenship. Created as a residential space for retired military officers, Askari III is now extremely
popular amongst Karachiites whose priorities between security and democracy have become skewed: living in Askari III is a lifestyle choice which denotes a disaffection with citizenship rights and signifies dilemmas of attachment to the public realm (Sennett, 2000; Low and Smith, 2006), especially in the context of an increasing reliance on the Pakistan Army as saviour.

**Civil-Military Relations, Disaffected Citizenship, and Enclavisation**

*Let me tell you, you can go around all the (housing) societies that are developed. [...] You won’t find this kind of thing anywhere on a private development—whether that is in Clifton or Gulshan-e-Iqbal. This amount of open space, green areas, parks for kids to play in or cleanliness doesn’t exist anywhere else. Wherever the army is, it has done well!*

These remarks were made by Colonel, a resident and a senior member of the Residents’ Executive Committee which governs the day to day functioning of Askari III. In his comment, Colonel credits the Karachi Cantonment Board, a civic body that falls under the ambit of the Ministry of Defence, lauding its municipal planning and management skills as superior to those of Karachi’s civilian city government and other land development agencies. Karachi is in fact an archetypical splintered megacity, where, as I explained in tables 1 and 2 in Chapter 4, the realm of urban governance is fragmented between various city level, provincial and federal authorities. The distribution of powers among these various scales of governance is often manipulated by the federal government as a way of maintaining ‘control’ over the city, often causing confusion and ambiguity and problems of efficient urban planning and municipal service delivery. The cantonment areas, however, do not suffer any of these confusions, and as a result remain well managed and governed. Figures 14 and 15 displayed below show the neatly ordered communal spaces within Askari III, while figure 16 illustrates the contrast between the environment inside and outside the cantonment area.

In fact, Askari III is not only unique for being so well-planned and managed, but also for being one of the very few horizontally developed lifestyle communities in Karachi. Unlike in other cities of the global South, privately developed gated communities are not common forms of residential development in Karachi as yet (Caldeira, 2000; Landman, 2006; Falzon, 2004). In most Pakistani cities, gated communities such as Askari III have developed as housing societies to provide affordable homes to professionals working within government institutions (Hasan et al., 2013). Askari III, for example, was settled in
Figure 14: Park inside Askari III. Source: Photograph by author, 2011.

Figure 15: Uniformly planned apartment complexes in Askari III. Source: Photograph by author, 2011.
the 1960s by the Ministry of Defence to address the housing needs of ex-army officers. Even though it was exclusively built to house members of the armed forces, a significant number of residents today are civilians, as properties have changed hands over generations and many have come onto the rental market.

In telling the history of Askari III, Colonel explained that Askari III used to be an open-plan neighbourhood, but was walled and gated in the 1990s. Colonel stated that at the height of ethno-political violence between the MQM and state forces during the mid-nineties, ‘the green open areas of this place became a dumping ground for dead bodies’. While the perimeter walls and gates effectively provided adequate protection from such acts throughout the 1990s, in the past few years security in the enclave has been visibly enhanced to counter increased threats of terrorist violence and crime. Armed security guards patrol the neighbourhood, strict mechanisms control entry and the gates have been physically reinforced. As I explained in the introduction, I will elaborate these processes of securitisation and enclavisation in more detail in the next chapter, while here I will only focus on the relations of urban governance and politics through which the enclave was formed.
Following my reconceptualisation of enclaves in Chapter 3, I found that Askari III is an enclave not just because of its fortified physical structure, but also because of the juridico-political structures underpinning it. Since the gated community is built within the cantonment area, its administration and control is divested from the authority of the civilian government and related institutions. Cantonment areas are a remnant of Karachi’s colonial past, and were initially British military enclaves which accommodated military depots, camps and/or garrisons to house officers and auxiliary personnel. After independence, control of these cantonment areas was passed to the Pakistan Army, but even then these areas lay outside the remit of the civilian constitution. Today, many cantonment boards have entered the profitable business of real estate development for commercial use, and as a result the various cantonment boards in Karachi—including the KCB which governs Askari III—are independent local bodies governed by the Ministry of Defence.

As it is built within a cantonment area, Askari III benefits from subsidised and preferential supply of electricity and water in a city where these utilities are otherwise scarce and frequently disrupted. This privilege is a function of legal agreements with the Karachi Water and Sanitation Board (KWSB) and the Karachi Electric Supply Company (KESC), which have been shaped by successive military dictatorships to favour military enterprises. In a country where the military enjoys unparalleled power and authority, such agreements serve to increase the prestige and value of military and development enterprises at the cost of other government and private land development projects (Siddiqa 2007).10

Although the Karachi Cantonment Board is the administrative authority which overlooks Askari III, budgeting and day to day running and administration is maintained through a voluntary Residents’ Executive Committee. The committee is structured along army

---

10 However these inequitable agreements have recently been challenged by the KESC and the KWSB (Dawn News, 2009a; Dawn News 2009b), who have taken legal action against the cantonment board in a bid to end these preferential agreements (Express Tribune, 2013; Express Tribune, 2014a). The legal argument is based on the fact that cantonment areas no longer hold military significance, but instead the military is slowly becoming a ‘land baron’ while flourishing on public subsidies (Dawn News, 2011c). The KESC and KWSB have sought legal action after facing severe financial difficulties caused by cost inefficiencies. Previously, the ordinary public has been made to bear the cost of agreements which are preferential towards cantonment boards, but this financial model is no longer practically or politically sustainable.
hierarchies, and its members are approved by Station Headquarters in Karachi. It is headed by a president and vice president who are usually retired colonels or higher ranking officers. They in turn preside over six other committee members (four retired army officers of major rank and two civilians). The committee members manage a small number of paid staff who are hired to prepare and manage the budget, oversee cleaners, security guards and handymen, manage rents and payments from shopkeepers and also follow up on service provision complaints. For living in the community, residents are charged a reasonable tax in the form of ‘maintenance fees’ for the range of services they receive. When it comes to having a say in setting the agenda or in the Executive Committee’s decision making process, residents are mostly sidelined. As Colonel put it:

We do listen to them and hear their (residents’) suggestions, even though we might not be able to implement everything. It is impossible to make everyone happy. […] Not all of them want the same thing. We make decisions that offer a common benefit for the whole community.

The administrative structure of Askari III is therefore militaristic and authoritative. As the majority of executive committee members are retired or serving officers of the armed forces, the current administrative structure is overly representative of military interests. However, even though the rule-setting and decision making environment is biased against the under-represented civilians, most civilians living in Askari III do not lament their loss of democratic freedom much. The majority of those interviewed had little confidence in the current democratically elected government to deliver basic rights such as security and good governance. Even though there is a general acceptance that successive military takeovers disrupt natural political processes, and that in the long term military governance destabilises the polity (Malik, 2001; Gregory and Revill, 2008), those living in Askari III find the weight of the everyday insecurities, struggles and disruptions which come with democracy more unbearable. Irfan’s comments below sum up the contempt residents have of democracy for having failed them, especially when considering the current state of affairs:

The police are a source of insecurity rather than security, the government is extremely corrupt. Look at all the violence in Karachi. Look at the high food prices, electricity shortages, fuel price rises. Current events have completely destroyed my trust in these institutions. The only time the government runs properly is when it is under the Army’s baton!
Irfan’s comment about mismanagement in the face of recurrent instability was reflective of popular sentiments within Askari III, whose residents were clearly disaffected citizens, willing to retreat from public space by way of rejecting the public sphere (Smith and Low, 2006). Irfan’s nostalgia for military rule and his disaffection with democracy is also common in other similar cases, where residents of newly democratising states become dissatisfied with insecurity and everyday uncertainties, and wish for the stability and order that military rule offered (Benson, Thomas and Fischer, 2011). The regimented organisation of municipal services, security, the clockwork maintenance of common spaces and the well-controlled, socially homogenous environment are actually craved in a city where everyday life frequently spirals out of control. Hashim, a civilian renting in Askari III, articulated this in one of our conversations: ‘If only rules could be enforced everywhere like they are here (in Askari III), we’d have such a beautiful city and a prosperous country’.

Such sentiments are illustrative of the imprint of military dictatorships in generating a discourse of deliverance and progress, and they resonate especially with Karachi’s middle class. The military has ruled the country for more than 30 of the 66 years since Pakistan’s independence. Despite the fact that the last military regime was driven out of power in 2008 after a popular political uprising which demanded the restoration of democracy, today most middle class urban residents nostalgically evoke the order and stability of the dictatorship years. They continue to regard the military as the antithesis of all the current problems associated with democratic government in Pakistan. The army is popular with many Pakistanis, who believe it is able to deliver prosperity and security due to its historical success as an institution. In contrast, the democratic government is seen as ineffectual and corrupt. History has shown that political negotiations between coalition parties result in perpetual uncertainty over who holds power. Civil conflict often ensues, and the government repeatedly loses credibility and legitimacy, especially as local and international expert opinion-makers tend to classify such governments as inefficient and corrupt (Malik, 2001; Gregory and Revill, 2008). In such an environment, the idea of the army as a saviour, or as an institution that has mastered the art of governance, starts gaining strength. Manan, a retired major living in Askari III, echoed this sentiment:

*The point is: why does the whole nation look to the armed forces for solutions? I don’t know! Their work, their job, their planning is the best. This has been the same since 1947. The army comes to power because there is this wish that the army should rule, it does the best job at that.*
Manan’s attitude, and that of others like him, is largely in line with the ethos of Askari III. In creating a space structured around strict and enforceable rules and regulations, Askari III’s governing body creates a highly controlled and predictable environment within which residents can live and go about their daily lives. For some residents, however, this overt governmentality is less palatable. This is the case for most civilians living in Askari III, who are less used to rigid militaristic discipline in everyday life. Yet, Askari III remains desirable for them as a space that offers privileges that they are willing to make sacrifices for. Sana, one such resident, elaborated this:

_We a get new circular with new rules every day. We must inform those at the gates if we expect guests, we can’t water our garden, paint our house the colour we like or hang our clothes outside to dry. [...] I just don’t like this kind of life, but what do you do? You know what life in Karachi is like. No water, no electricity, no security!_

Sana’s comments suggest that the varied rules and regulations imposed by the Askari III authorities on its residents are definitely seen as inconvenient, imposing and even restrictive of basic freedoms. Yet, Sana and other such dissatisfied residents understand that life outside the enclave can be harsher in the unpredictable and volatile city. Other interviewed residents echoed this, and were quick to forgive the militaristic administrators for the high degree of social control they exert, because they inspire a sense of confidence and a promise of deliverance. ‘It’s the only way to live in Karachi’, said Hashim, a resigned resident.

Such interactions with Askari III residents, when contextualised within the history of land development, unequal civil-military relations, conditions of insecurity and the crisis of civilian governance, allowed me to understand the processes through which Askari III flourished as an enclave which is a popular place to live for a certain class of Karachiites, especially as everyday life in Karachi becomes more volatile and unpredictable. Askari III residents clearly reject the public sphere, which they find is laden with uncertainty, unpredictability and chaos. Instead, they prefer to live within a tightly controlled environment, even if this means that this may curtail personal freedoms, or that they may be forced to comply with rules they disagree with. In fact, Askari III residents resign themselves to unequal representation and rights to participative decision making and
place their trust in the army—especially after their disappointments with the democratic experience within national politics.

Keeping in mind Holston and Appadurai’s (2003) argument that the city is a place where experiences of citizenship vary, I will now illustrate how enclavisation in Clifton Block 7 takes place through a reassertion of democratic rights by the urban middle class. In the following section, as I have done for Askari III, I will trace enclavisation in Clifton Block 7 through the lens of relations between governance and urban political life. The introduction below will demonstrate how Karachi’s enclaves take different forms and crystallise variant state-society relations. Moreover, keeping in line with my arguments in Chapter 3 that enclaves are relational processes, I will also highlight how Clifton Block 7 coalesces as an enclave in response to the fragmented urban governance which is a function of cantonment areas.

**Clifton Block 7: An Enclave in Process**

*Life always went on in Clifton—no matter who was fighting or who got killed. It is different now—we have to be careful. When Benazir was killed, mobs attacked cars on Zamazma, they burnt tyres on Teen Talwar, ripping open ATMs along the banks at Schön circle. Even now, 12 May was shocking—gun fights on the streets! These things never happened here before!*

![Figure 17: Neighbouring Spaces in Clifton: Block 7 and Tikri Colony. Source: Photograph by author, 2012.](image)

Samira, a long-time resident of Clifton Block 7 expressed her shock at the fact that popular areas within Clifton had come under violent attack at times when political violence in the city flared. Up until recently, Clifton had remained one of the safest localities in Karachi. During the military’s ‘Operation Clean-Up’ against the MQM and in its violent political aftermath in the mid-90s, a number of residents from older elite
residential areas in the north and west of Karachi such as KDA Scheme 1, North Nazimabad and Federal B area flocked to Clifton and neighbouring Defence in the south of Karachi to escape militant ethno-politicisation. Luxury houses and apartments, global commercial outlets and entertainment centres flourished within Clifton and Defence, popularly considered to be less volatile areas, making the area one of Karachi’s trendiest localities. However, this popular imagery of Clifton and Defence as posh localities is simplistic, especially as neighbourhoods within this area remain unequally developed and socio-spatially polarised. As depicted in figure 52 in Chapter 8 (showing a map of South Karachi), and the picture of neighbouring spaces in Clifton above, Clifton and Defence are peppered with katchi abadis that make a clean division between the affluent and the urban poor.

The close proximity of katchi abadis and affluent neighbourhoods within Clifton is a cause of much concern for affluent residents of Clifton Block 7, who feel increasingly concerned that rising political violence in their neighbourhood is due to ‘the scores of people who live around the corner, who are knee deep in crime and violent political activism. They spill over to our neighbourhoods to earn some easy money looting and thieving’. Such attitudes are spurred by the reality of increased crime within Clifton and Defence, especially as spatial crime analysis data published by the Citizen Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) demonstrates the spike in robberies and burglaries within these localities (see figure 18 on the next page). Interviews with data analysts at the CPLC also suggest that certain pockets within Clifton and Defence—such as Sea View and Boat Basin—are crime hotspots where muggings, car-jackings and kidnappings are frequent.

In light of these trends, various neighbourhoods in Clifton and Defence, one of which is Clifton Block 7, have started practicing enclosure. Alluding to the private organisation of security and enclosure in his neighbourhood, Imran, a resident of Clifton Block 7, states, ‘We have no illusions. We know how incapable the government is—it’s just easier to manage it ourselves’. Imran’s words reflect common attitudes to gaps in governmental

11 Defence (short for Defence Housing Authority) is an open plan residential area developed by the Clifton Cantonment Board largely as a commercial enterprise. Defence is different to Askari III because it is not walled or gated and it was not specifically developed to house those linked to the armed forces, even though army officers (serving or retired) are allowed to purchase land at discounted prices. There are also no restrictions on civilians purchasing or renting properties like in Askari III. Similarly, the by-laws governing Defence are different to those governing Askari III.
service delivery, whereby Karachiites are accustomed to privately organised individual or collective efforts, similarly to cities such as Johannesburg and Maputo (Lindell, 2008; Benit-Gbaffou, Didier, and Morange, 2008).

![Map of volatile areas in Karachi for robberies and burglaries. Source: Cplc.org.pk, 2014.](image)

In fact, enclosure in Clifton Block 7 is unique in Karachi for many reasons. Firstly, the securitised enclosure is quite wide, extending beyond individual streets to cover almost the whole block. Secondly, it is led by a committed residents’ association, which actively engages with the municipal government and police and security forces in aiding governance. In the process, it receives disproportionate funds, favours and attention from the city government, which is happy to support a civic-oriented middle-class. Relatedly, and thirdly, the instantiation of the Block 7 Residents’ Association signifies a shift in urban middle class politics. In stark contrast to the residents of Askari III, who remain disaffected with democratic politics, Clifton Block 7 demonstrates a case where a previously aloof urban middle class has re-engaged with urban politics and exercised their citizenship rights, albeit in ways that attempt to create expulsions and exclusions of the urban poor.
In the wider literature on enclavisation, the production of enclaved spaces is largely viewed as an elite retreat from public sphere and public life (Smith and Low, 2006; Caldeira, 2000). Yet, I argue that the opposite is true in the case of Clifton Block 7, where an analysis of processes of enclavisation demonstrates that the activity of creating enclosure and privatising public space is made possible through middle class reassertion of citizenship rights in response to insurgent citizenship (Holston, 2009). Holston explains insurgent citizenship as the exercise of a ‘right to the city’ by the dispossessed urban poor, who confront regimes of citizen inequality through organised social movements, appropriation of public spaces and evocation of a rights-based discourse. In this section, I will explain how, far from pushing the middle class into a politico-spatial retreat (Caldeira, 2000; Holston, 2009), enclavisation denotes an elite assertion of a right to the city through active civic engagement. It is this aspect of enclavisation that I will pay detailed attention to in this section.

**Associational Politics, Governance, and Enclavisation**

Unlike Askari III, Clifton Block 7 was developed by the city government, hence the neighbourhood is a public space. Nevertheless, public access to the neighbourhood is now limited by strategically placed road blocks and guarded barriers which attempt to monitor and filter movement into the neighbourhood. As I will elaborate in more detail in the next chapter, the barriers are open but guarded by private security guards during the day, while all except one are closed at night (from 10pm until dawn). Private security guards also patrol the neighbourhood 24 hours a day, seven days a week for added vigilance. In addition to this, 24 hour CCTV cameras supplement the guards’ gaze. Moreover, mobile police units are stationed just outside the main entrance of the neighbourhood so as to provide support to the private guards in case of emergency.

The processes of enclosure and collective security are overseen by the Block 7 Residents’ Association. The privatisation of public space within Block 7 also comes with the informally-sanctioned privilege, bestowed by the city police, of apprehending criminals caught in the area. The city police have also offered their full support to the association’s members in related investigations, detentions and trials. Zaman, a senior police official in the nearby Boat Basin police station, explains his own opinion of the policy:
We definitely don’t have the resources, so we can’t condemn those that do who secure themselves. We are here to provide support, and meanwhile we can focus our attention on other troubled areas.

Such practices of devolved security governance and collaborative forms of policing in Block 7 are one aspect of enclavisation in the neighbourhood. In fact, processes of enclavisation in Clifton Block 7 are tied to wider collaborative arrangements between the neighbourhood and the city government. The relationship between the city government and the residents of Block 7 developed following a city-wide municipal crisis in 2007, when heavy rainfall caused severe flooding in parts of Karachi (see figure 19 below). As water stagnated on Karachi’s streets for days and a health emergency became imminent, (Qizilbash, 2006; Dawn News, 2006b), the serious incapacity of the city government was revealed.

As the cartoon image in figure 20 shows, the rainwater floods became an issue that caused public outrage and the city government faced ridicule. Syed Mustafa Kamal, the mayor of Karachi at the time the flooding occurred, continued to defend the city government in an interview. He spoke with resignation, arguing that fragmented urban planning and governance had led to haphazard infrastructural development in Karachi, while the illegal expansion of the city’s katchi abadis has made the problem worse. He pointed towards maps showing how most katchi abadis had developed along open storm water drains, and over the years had encroached further and blocked parts of the network. Yet, conversations with Mustafa Kamal and Clifton Block 7 residents and analysis of archival news reports suggests that Mustafa Kamal used the flooding crisis to garner support for his political party in areas previously out of the MQM’s constituency, and also to lead a campaign to solidify control over urban planning and development across the splintered city (Dawn News 2006a; Dawn News, 2007b). Kamal blamed the fragmented nature of urban planning and land development bodies for having led to infrastructural collapse, arguing that other land development bodies had encroached upon existing drainage systems in some places and overburdened them in others (Dawn News, 2007b; MPGO-CDGK, 2007).

The city government also used the crisis as an opportunity to build its support base in areas outside its existing constituencies. One such area was Clifton, where the rival Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) had historically held sway, especially as it had a wide support base within the high density katchi abadis within the locality. However, this
Figure 19: Cars fall in potholes following torrential rains in Karachi (2006). Source: Fravahr.org, 2014.

Figure 20: ‘City Mayor says the situation in Karachi city is under control’. Source: Siasat.pk, 2014.
situation soon turned around, especially once Clifton Block 7 residents approached political patrons and saw positive results. As Farrah, a resident who was closely involved in liaising between the association and the city government, stated:

> We are very supportive of the MQM—especially as we have seen how active they are in responding to our calls. We approached the Nazim of Saddar Town, Mrs. Khushbakht Shujaat. She was extremely sensitive to our plight, and promised to help us. There was no system in the local government. Still, we did it! 260 garbage dumpers were called to lift the garbage in one day.

In the general elections held the following year, Mrs. Khushbakht Shujaat (an MQM candidate) went on to win a seat in the National Assembly for the NA-250 constituency, which includes Clifton and Defence. The constituency had previously supported Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) candidates. Mayor Kamal’s initiatives and his response to the flooding crisis had paid off. In an interview published soon after, Mrs. Shujaat publicly sympathised with the problems faced by her middle class constituents:

> So while all of Karachi might have water shortages, people in these areas (Clifton and Defence) will buy themselves Rs. 10,000 worth of water, but it isn’t something they should have to do. On top of the taxes that they pay, which katchi abadi residents don’t, they have added expenses due to the add-ons such as water or generators they have to invest in (Baig, 2008: 6).

Mrs Shujaat’s speech reflected the local government’s clear acknowledgement of the middle class as tax-paying citizens. It further justified supporting policies that protected middle class interests. It also reflected an awareness of her new constituency, which comprised middle-class residents who had started to engage in civic politics through an entitlement based discourse. Mrs. Shujaat had won by a narrow majority, and her support base was the middle class living in Clifton, while her rival belonging to the Pakistan People’s Party had received more votes from the neighbouring katchi abadis (Kamran, 2013).

The floods therefore served as a watershed moment whereby Block 7 residents were able to navigate the messy web of urban governance in Karachi through civic and political engagement, realising that the city government was sympathetic to middle class interests.
Figure 21: Mrs. Khushbakht Shujaat at the inaugural ceremony of Aga Khan Park. Source: Clifton Block 7 Residents’ Association, 2012.

Figure 22: Aga Khan Park inaugural plaque styled in the colours of the MQM party flag. Source: Clifton Block 7 Residents’ Association, 2012.
Buoyed by their success, the residents who were involved in resolving the flooding crisis started to formalise their initiatives and expand their areas of collaboration with the city government. They were now prepared to take more active control of municipal and security governance within their neighbourhood. This was the birth of the Block 7 Residents’ Association, which now operates through its slogan ‘My block, my responsibility’. The founding members formally registered the association as a charity and decided to run it through an elected governing body. They also kept close ties with the MQM and Mrs Shujaat, who emerged as their political patron (see figures 21 and 22). Azim, a senior office holder in the association, related that the Block 7 residents became popular once the success of collective efforts in delivering a cleaner, greener and safer neighbourhood became visible, saying:

"First we had to go door to door to convince people to join us. [...] But now people come after us to become members’. In the span of a few years, membership grew from 28 members to 200."

At this point, the association also started to expand its mandate to include private provision of security. As I will highlight in more detail below, the community association was able to do this by actively enforcing their citizenship rights through negotiations with the city government and other civil society bodies. The step towards formalising the association as a civil society body denoted a significant shift in elite attitudes towards public and civic life in Karachi. ‘We are honest citizens—but we’ve just never fought for our rights before!’ exclaimed Farrah, a recent member of the association. At the same time, the association worked as a catalyst for residents to re-orient their expectations of the city government. Rejecting a previous disposition towards individually responding to infrastructural breakdown, members of the Block 7 Residents’ Association now actively claim civic rights by engaging with the city government. ‘We would just sit outside their office all day, continuously call them, harass them’, said Imtiaz, a member of the Management Committee (MC) which steers the Block 7 Residents’ Association. ‘Eventually, they had no choice but to listen’, he continued.

Having cemented their relationship with the city government, members of the association organised themselves by setting up task-oriented Management Committees (MC). Each MC looked after a specific area of collective interest, and at the time of interviewing, these included committees for security, garbage collection, street lighting and development, electricity and water. The administrative head of each MC is responsible for dealing directly with the corresponding Executive Directors (EDs) of the
local government. Through this structure, MC members support EDs in managing and administering services in Block 7. Imtiaz elaborated how the association’s strict organisation, passion and demonstration of civic responsibility have been rewarded by the city government:

The only reason that the government cannot provide proper services is because it lacks funds. Block 7 gets premier services (such as door to door garbage collection), because we take an interest in our neighbourhood. No one else (neighbourhood) does.

Although the infrastructure and manpower required for carrying out municipal upkeep and neighbourhood development are provided by the city authorities, these remain under the plan and management of the Residents’ Association (c.f. figure 23). For example, the Association sets rules whereby residents are allowed to carry out ‘tree cutting’ only on Thursdays, because municipal dumpers are scheduled to collect all debris on Fridays. Similarly, the Association has also set up an efficient service monitoring, management and complaint system between the neighbourhood and the government departments. Security, however, is managed differently. The task of purchasing and installing security infrastructure such as barriers, guard rooms and CCTV cameras has been a private
Initiative, although the CPLC played a guiding role in providing expert advice. Moreover, all guards patrolling the neighbourhood are hired privately, thereby making security the costliest service provided by the Association. However, the head of MC Security is given extraordinary support by the city police through extra deployment of police outside the neighbourhood as well as back-up support in apprehending criminals.

Even though there is no legal precedent for the current system, the fragmented and splintered nature of urban governance in Karachi allows flexibilities for innovative systems of management such as these. As the literature in global South urbanism suggests, illegality and informality are tools that urban residents and governors use to plan, develop and govern cities characterised by uncertainties (Vera da Silva and Hirata, 2007; Simone and Fauzan, 2012; McFarlane, 2012). Therefore, similarly to other cities of the global South, the realm of urban governance in Karachi is fragmented, dynamic and flexible (Benit-Gbaffou, 2008b; Simone and Fauzan, 2012; Lindell, 2008), allowing space for innovative ways of managing everyday crisis in the crisis prone megacity. Although, as I will highlight at the end of this chapter, the politics of such initiatives is questionable, the method seems to be working well for Clifton Block 7 residents and city officials. City government officials and local residents argue that the current system of cooperation and devolved governance allows more efficient resource management and better service delivery at reduced costs to both the city government and residents. Farrah explains this by her observation that ‘now there is less *rishwat* [bribery] going around. The municipal staff have also become more efficient, as they are now liable to answer to people’.

Similarly, Sitwat, a municipal official, elaborated:

> We know so many workers cheat the system by claiming they’ve been to work—they set up arrangements with foremen, but we can’t be present everywhere to monitor them can we? By sharing their records of attendance, the Block 7 admin officer is doing us a huge favour.

Other interviews with municipality officials and the town administration demonstrated that the initiatives of Clifton Block 7 Residents’ Association and the resultant enclavisation in Clifton Block 7 was made more successful because it is warmly welcomed by bureaucrats working in city government institutions. In the past decade of transition from military rule to democratic consolidation, urban governance has really suffered. As I highlighted in Chapter 4, the consistently changing structures of local government and the civic contests between different tiers of government have resulted in disorder (Gayer, 2012). Infrastructural development in the city has suffered, while
delivery of municipal services is also negatively affected. This has left town administrators, who are keen to demonstrate good governance to international donors through positive results, desperate. Also, in a city where the town administration rarely gets any praise, improved performance with the help of urban residents wins accolades and hence secures promotions for bureaucrats. The Saddar Town Administrator elaborated this as follows:

*With people taking ownership of their neighbourhood, Clifton Block 7 is emerging as a model neighbourhood which the city government can claim credit for. In an environment where it continuously faces critique for its failures, the successes of Block 7 as a clean, well-functioning and secure neighbourhood allow the city government to gain political support and credibility. It’s a star we can pin on our shoulders.*

Although such engagement could be considered a novel solution to problematic governance in complex megacities, the present ways in which enclavisation is structured within Block 7 are not entirely ideal. Presently, there are clear biases in urban governance priorities, as the local government rewards the Block 7 Residents’ Association for its active engagement in and help with municipal resource management by prioritising the needs of the area over other areas perhaps deserving more urgent attention. This is especially troubling when considering that prioritised relationships between the city government and the residents’ association have recently spilled over to the realm of security provision as well. In fact, the form within which enclavisation is practiced in Clifton Block 7 runs contrary to the law regarding privatisation of space and enclavisation. Although there has been legislation demanding the removal of all street barriers (Dawn News, 2008), urban security officials continue to look the other way when it comes to Clifton Block 7 and other such affluent localities (The Express Tribune, 2014b). When questioned over the legality of their barriers, MC members insisted that they have all the necessary permissions in place. Nasir, one of the MC members for security elaborated:

*We have permission from the CPLC, and we even sought approval from the Home Office. The Boat Basin Police are extremely invested in security in this area—you see the fully equipped and staffed police car at the main entrance? So how can all this be illegal?*

By cordoning off access to the public, enclavisation in Clifton Block 7 therefore not only blurs the boundaries between formality and informality, but also those between legality
and illegality. This is also the case in South African cities, for example, where enclavisation and enclosures are often illegal, unregulated and contested (Lemanski, 2004; Landman, 2004). Yet, as I will elaborate in the next chapter, the practice is problematic because it produces tensions in urban space and exacerbates existing marginalities. In the case of Clifton Block 7, enclavisation is evidently possible within a particular governance regime in Karachi. Roy (2009c) explains the planning regime in Indian cities along the same lines. She highlights that it is an informalised entity characterised by a state of deregulation, ambiguity, and exception. Such a mode of planning—where informality and formality are considered relational practices tied to planning, development and politics—presents governments in contemporary cities of the global South with opportunities for urban development, while also creating possibilities to exercise governmentality and fulfil political objectives (Roy, 2005; Roy, 20011a; McFarlane, 2012).

Therefore, as public priorities shift in unequal and undemocratic ways, the political nature of enclaved spaces is revealed. The process demonstrates government biases in favour of the urban elite, while it also demonstrates the middle class’s reactionary appropriation of public space. This appropriation, however, paradoxically exists through the privatisation of public space, and at the same time reveals the fractured and subjective nature of citizenship rights in Karachi (Chakrabarti, 2007). Enclavisation in Clifton Block 7 therefore spatialises what Baviskar (2003) describes as bourgeois environmentalism. This is a form of spatial governmentality oriented towards elite interests prioritising aesthetics, leisure, safety and health. However, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, this process also marginalises a large population of people who live and work in Clifton Block 7, either people who don’t buy into the enclave experience and remain non-members or those who aren’t seen to belong, such as servants. I will expand the topic of exclusion and violence further in the next two chapters.

However efficient the current system may be, the related politics underpinning it nevertheless produce structural inequalities. The relations between government institutions and Clifton Block 7 Residents’ Association is predicated on a form of preference, or a politics, whereby elite neighbourhoods are favoured and supported in ways which are denied to other neighbourhoods in the city. While this is different from the vote bank politics or a politics of patronage that the urban poor are party to (see the case of Sultanabad below), such a relationship is more stable and perhaps can be linked to the institutionalised politicisation of pockets of the urban middle-class and elites. Even
though such a politics of governance has been much studied in the Indian context as one that heightens marginalities and urban contestations (Benjamin, 2008; Chatterjee, 2004; Benjamin, 2000; Zerah, 2010), I find there to be some differences in the context of Karachi, where the emerging practices of enclavisation in middle-class and more affluent areas remain fragmented and limited within different neighbourhoods and do not coalesce as broader-based civil society movements. Nevertheless, as I will expand upon in Chapter 8, this system is also productive of structural, social, and political/institutional violence in Karachi.

I will end this section by highlighting that enclavisation in Clifton Block 7 is evidently related to a turn towards associational politics in the face of governmental failures. In contrast to the disaffection with democratic politics which was productive of political space in the enclavisation seen in Askari III, Clifton Block 7 demonstrates a case where members of a previously distant urban middle class re-engage with urban politics and exercise their citizenship rights. In the process, the affluent produce an entitlement-based discourse in urban politics which re-orient political support away from the politicised masses of the urban poor to the ‘deserving’ privileged few in ways that exacerbate urban inequalities. In such an environment, where there is little governmental support, the urban poor are in turn pushed into their own marginal enclaves. Living within such spaces, the urban poor are able to strengthen community ties, construct associational networks, and build political alliances in order to navigate everyday life in the insecure city, and negotiate with the state for protection and community development. I will elaborate this argument in more detail in the following section, where I introduce enclavisation, governance, and politics in Sultanabad.

Sultanabad and the Balti Mohallah: Enclaves of Marginality

On hearing that I regularly ventured into Sultanabad for fieldwork, Shaheen, a senior police officer, remarked:

*It [Sultanabad] is a no-go area. It is a dangerous place—full of troublemakers! Those people are best left to themselves. Why would you go there?*

Other well-meaning people from Askari III and Clifton Block 7 echoed Shaheen’s warning and entreated me to steer clear of Sultanabad. Despite being well within the security red zone (see figure 24), this dense inner-city low income settlement is popularly
regarded a source of criminality in the city. This reputation is built from stories circulating in various news media which describe the katchi abadi as a hub of ethno-political conflict, a home to Taliban sympathisers and a place from which violent riots which disrupt the city often emerge (Khan, 2013; Zaman and Ali, 2013).

Figure 24: Sultanabad’s proximity to critical sites within the security red zone.

Sultanabad gained especial notoriety in the aftermath of the deadly bombing of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) on 11 November 2010, an event which I described in the introductory chapter. In the aftermath, police suspected that a few of Sultanabad’s residents may have abetted the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the attack (Walsh, 2010b; Dawn News, 2010a). Consequently, the police initiated a large-scale campaign of rounding up ‘suspects’ and forcibly taking them in for ‘questioning’. At the same time, Awami National Party (ANP) leaders resident in Sultanabad made forceful media statements claiming that the youths picked up were innocent ANP party workers and that the police exercise was a biased targeting of ethnic Pashtuns. ANP leaders also publicly threatened police against entering the area, and warned of dire consequences if those arrested were not freed quickly (Dawn News, 2011d). Evidence
suggests that these threats are worth heeding, especially since in the past, Sultanabad’s residents have lethally targeted security officers and have driven the police out by force.  

Therefore, even though Sultanabad (pictured in figures 25 and 26 on the following page) is not walled and gated like Askari III, or enclosed like Clifton Block 7, the *katchi abadi*’s reputation as a no-go area outside the sphere of law produces imaginative geographies (Gregory, 2003) of the *abadi* as a distinctive and inaccessible enclave. However, in this section, I elaborate how Sultanabad is not simply a no-go area or an enclave of criminality. Instead I will outline how processes of enclavisation in Sultanabad are tied to residents’ experiences of living in marginal conditions within the megacity. I will highlight how in Sultanabad, enclavisation is a necessary tactic of living everyday life in insecure environment where the state has failed to provide protection or support. More broadly, related processes of enclavisation are built on relations of governance and urban political life that have been strengthened through experiences of land settlement, infrastructural development, and dispute resolution in the starkly polarised megacity.

The process of land development and settlement in Sultanabad is similar to accounts of settlement in other *katchi abadis* in Karachi (Budhani et al., 2010; Gazdar and Mallah, 2011). Interviews with long-time residents revealed that Sultanabad originated in the early 1950s, when migrant labourers working in the nearby port faced problems finding low-income housing due to supply shortages and were allowed to build shacks on the marshy land owned by the Karachi Port Trust (KPT) with KPT’s express permission. Given its extremely central location and its proximity to Saddar, demand for housing in the settlement rose, especially as migrants continued to flock to Karachi in the decade following the creation of Pakistan. Early migrants subdivided their land to accommodate growing families and close relatives migrating from their villages, thereby creating ethnic clusters. Earlier settlers recalled their active lobbying activities with federal government bureaucrats and senior-level political party officials in order to develop electricity, water and gas connections within the settlement in ways that have been documented in other studies as well (Budhani et al., 2010; Gazdar and Mallah, 2011). These connections soon became the basis for claims of regularisation of land under the Sindh Katchi Abadi Act

---

12 Compiled from field research, while this information has been corroborated in various news reports. See for example Khan (2013) and Dawn News (2011b).
1987, which allowed squatters to formalise ownership of what was previously considered illegally occupied and developed land.

Figure 25: Sultanabad was settled in the early 1950s on marshy land reclaimed from a mangrove forest. Source: Photograph by author, 2011.

Figure 26: A view of Sultanabad from the Shia mosque in Sultanabad. Source: Photograph by author, 2011.
In Sultanabad, this history of successful collective action has helped strengthen residents’ belief in activism and associational membership. Today, associational membership continues to ensure the development and maintenance of community infrastructures when the state fails to provide such services. Similar to what we saw in Clifton Block 7, in Sultanabad, associational membership is therefore strongly tied to political organisation around community interests in an environment of governmental inadequacies. However, in Sultanabad, such associational membership differs because it is more tightly organised around ethno-political clusters. As I will highlight in more detail in the next section through the example of the Balti Mohallah, these ethno-political clusters are smaller units of territorial governance within Sultanabad, and in this respect, can be viewed as enclaves within the larger settlement.

However, even though Sultanabad is internally divided into further enclaves, the whole settlement stands united in blocking access and maintaining security against external threats. This collective protective stance leads ‘outsiders’ to consider all of Sultanabad as a singular enclave. For example, given the current environment of urban insecurity, Nishat (a resident) explains how young men within the settlement have become mistrustful of people from ‘outside’ visiting their neighbourhood, and take up protective roles to guard the community:

*You know how it is. One MQM party worker dies, and they try killing twenty Pashtuns. They don’t care if the man is politically oriented or not. […] We have to take our security into our own hands. If we don’t recognise someone, we check their National Identity Cards [for clues of ethnicity]. If they look like trouble, we ask them to leave immediately. It is for their own safety.*

In this section, I will therefore introduce Sultanabad as an alternative form of enclave which is established through relational processes of socio-spatial community formation. Moreover, I will highlight how enclaves within Sultanabad emerge through reactionary politics of making do in an environment where the state has lost its legitimacy and authority, and where residents have to make do with living in an insecure megacity. In doing so, I will illustrate how the differentiated experience of citizenship—whereby residents of Sultanabad are both abandoned by the state and themselves reject state forces—results in the creation of a different form of enclaved space. This contrasts with enclavisation in Askari III, which is a process tied to disaffected citizenship. It is also relational to enclavisation in Clifton Block 7, where middle-class residents are actively re-asserting their citizenship rights while generating a discourse of rights based citizenship
which further marginalises residents of *katchi abadis* such as Sultanabad, who find themselves largely abandoned by the state.

**Marginality, Negotiating Urban Life, and Enclavisation**

As I have briefly explained above, to those on the outside, all of Sultanabad is considered a unitary cohesive enclave. In reality, Sultanabad is further fragmented into various socio-politically homogenous ethnic enclaves. Therefore, the patterns of enclavisation in Sultanabad are more nuanced than one would expect. The *katchi abadi* is formally divided into 8 blocks spread over approximately 600 square kilometres, housing around 80,000 people.\(^\text{13}\) These blocks are administrative subdivisions which do not correspond with the loosely organised ethnic clusters, *mohallahs*, which spatialise the socio-spatial limits of ‘community’. In Sultanabad, there are numerous *mohallahs*, some of which are distinctive enclaves because of their unique character as homogenous ethnic clusters, which are well-organised around a common politics. The shared spaces within these *mohallahs* have a quasi-private character, and are tacitly acknowledged by residents of the wider settlement to be for the private use that *mohallah’s* residents.

In rough translation, a *mohallah* is a tight-knit urban community that is spatialised around a common culture. The *mohallah* characterises a form of living where norms of governance, social relations and public and private space are different to those in other urban neighbourhoods. Usually an ethnic cluster, the public spaces of the *mohallah* are appropriated as collectively owned private spaces, and *mohallah* residents are often considered an extension of one’s own family (Gayer, 2014; Datta, 2008; Khan, 2007). In this respect, the *mohallah* also denotes a boundary based on perceived differences between inside and outside (Chakrabarty, 1991). Here, I would suggest that *mohallah* organisation in Sultanabad can be understood as a marker of enclavisation in the settlement. Following from this, in the remaining section I will elaborate how Sultanabad’s *mohallahs* have coalesced as enclaves through processes of migrant settlement, community governance and negotiation of everyday life in an insecure (and

\[^{13}\text{This is a rough approximation made by the author using Google Maps. Around 60\% of residents in Sultanabad are ethnically Pashtun, mostly living in G block. The remainder of the population is mostly Hazara (Hindko speaking), populating blocks A, B, C, E and K. There are very few Mohajir, Sindhis or Balochis living in the settlement.}\]
often violent) heterogeneous *katchi abadi*. I will support these claims by drawing on personal encounters with residents of the Balti Mohallah in Sultanabad.

The Balti Mohallah houses migrants from Gilgit-Baltistan (popularly known as Balti for short). As the illustrations in the next chapter show (see figures 45 and 46), the *mohallah* is situated behind the Habib Public School (HPS) by special permission of the school’s owners. The first houses were built in 1982 after Balti employees of HPS (who were Ismaili-Shia) felt unsafe travelling to work because of heightened sectarian violence in the city.14 ‘We did feel safe living there’, said Sakina, an early settler of the Balti Mohallah, recalling her previous neighbourhood. ‘But knowing that my husband had to cross the city to get to work struck my heart with fear—they were killing Shias everywhere at that time!’ Such fears led Balti workers to ask for permission to build residential quarters in the marshy wasteland behind the school. The school’s owners—themselves Shia Muslims—sympathised with their poorer staff members’ plight and gave them permission. The *mohallah*, which initially consisted of four or five houses, has now grown to accommodate 75-85 families.

The Balti Mohallah is one of the most tightly organised ethnic enclaves in Sultanabad. Matters of community life are overseen by a community association which is presided over by Imam—a respected community elder and a religious instructor who was called by residents to lead them as a community because of his knowledge of religious and legal affairs:

> They asked me to move here in 1999 and lead their Jamat (prayers). I was also asked take over religious instruction and resolve community matters. My job is to ensure the welfare of the population by providing security and structural development in the mohallah. I do this for them in exchange for their loyalty and obedience.

This arrangement suits most residents who have full confidence in Imam and the three-member team he leads. ‘The elders know what’s best for us’, says Qaiser, a small trader who lives in Sultanabad with his family. Qaiser then shared the fact that his work

---

14 Ismailis are a sect within Shia Islam. Shia Muslims are a minority in Pakistan, and since the 1980s there has been increased incitement of violence against Shia Muslims by hardline Sunni clerics. This has often led to cycles of sectarian violence in Pakistani cities. In recent years, with the increased presence of Taliban forces in Karachi, sectarian violence has once again escalated as all Taliban are militant Sunni Muslims.
required him to travel for days on end. For him it was important to feel that his wife and family were looked after and safe in his absence. He explained that the small rules that residents were made to live by were actually for common benefit:

“We are not allowed to sell or rent our property without their approval; they want to make sure this remains a Balti or at least a Shia Mohallah. This is for our own protection—it will ensure that we remain a majority within this mohallah. Of course I support Imam, he is passionate about making things better for us!”

Unlike residents of Askari III or Clifton Block 7, the Baltis didn’t mind the strict rules imposed by the community elders, or feel resentful about restrictions on freedoms. This is because they felt a real need for these rules in the environment they live in. With the influx of new tribal Pashtuns engaged in violent sectarian conflict in the tribal regions of Pakistan, the Baltis, who belong to the minority Shia sect of Islam, feel more insecure living in a settlement that is fast radicalising. Through Imam’s leadership, the Baltis were able to securitise themselves through enclavisation in various ways. Firstly they were able to organise protection from emerging threats by physical enclosure; secondly they could forge political alliances that ensured the community remained protected; and thirdly they represented community interests through their elders in dispute settlement mechanisms within Sultanabad.

The Balti Mohallah is therefore a unique form of enclave within Sultanabad, as it has only recently been enclosed. As illustrated in Figure 27 on the next page, residents have attempted to restrict access to the enclave by blocking various entrances with thorny shrubs and other scrap materials. They have left one point of access from Sultanabad, which is gated. The narrow steel gate is locked from 11pm to sunrise, during which time watchmen hired from within the community keep patrol. This enclosure is a defence mechanism against the neighbouring Pashtun areas, which Shafqat describes as a troublesome community which in his words houses ‘gun toting tribals with a Taliban mindset’. However, despite these measures, residents continue to face threats (see figure 28). Majid, a young Balti student, elaborated one of these incidents in detail:

“The other day, two armed Pashtun men came into our mohallah, taunting us, mocking us for being Shia Muslims. They threatened that if we didn’t vote for the Awami National Party (ANP), we would suffer. Our elder sorted it out, I think. He’s well respected in Sultanabad […] that is why he is our leader.”
Figure 27: Pieces of wood and sticks block entry to the Balti Mohallah from a connecting lane in Sultanabad. Source: Photograph by author, 2011.

Figure 28: Graffiti alluding to violence within the Balti Mohallah. Source: Photograph by author, 2011.
The incident Majid spoke of was confirmed by Imam. ‘These stupid children are full of hot air’ he retorted. ‘I recognised them, and complained to the elders of their community of their behaviour. They were made to apologise soon enough, and that was the end of the matter.’ When I asked Imam on what basis he was able to offer protection to his community members within the increasingly radical settlement, his answer was simple:

*We are 300 votes. Everybody in our community—men, women, and young adults—is a registered voter, as opposed to the Pashtun families here whose women aren’t voters. We may be a minority community, but our voting power adds weight to our numbers.*

Imam’s statement highlighted how democracy has been a force of empowerment for residents, and more importantly it is a means of ensuring security. Imam, for example, had struck a political alliance with Khattak, a respected community elder amongst the religiously moderate long-settled Pashtuns within Sultanabad.

Imam explained his reasons for trusting Khattak:

*Khattak has ties with political groups who have done extensive development work in Sultanabad. He is progressive, open minded and is well connected to people in power (in the city government). We usually follow his advice on voting and fully support him.*

Interviews with other ethnic communities living outside the Balti Mohallah confirmed that the exercise of the right to vote had been an essential turning point within the *katchi abadi*. Khattak, a prominent community elder and an ex-councillor who has lived in Sultanabad (G Block) all his life, revealed the significance of voting for residents of the community:

*Voting has changed our lives. I still remember how Zulfiqar Bhutto\(^{15}\) came here in 1968, rallying support against Ayub Khan’s military dictatorship. Bhutto’s slogan of roti, kapra, makan (bread, clothes and shelter) aroused fire in our hearts. He liberated us and gave us a new lease on life with the power to vote. Now we own our houses—we are not poor and downtrodden as long as we have the power of our vote.*

---

\(^{15}\)Founder of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), a left wing party that garners support from across the country
As is common in recently democratising states (Caldeira, 2000; Chatterjee, 2008), Karachi’s urban poor have been able to seize the opportunities offered by democracy and have been able to improve their conditions of life on the urban peripheries. However, despite this political activism, the social contract between the residents and the state remains weak, especially as the urban poor make up what Chatterjee (2004) refers to as political society and not civil society. The difference between these two forms of civic engagement is that the former is developed through tactical patrimonial arrangements with state actors, while the latter signifies a sustained political engagement. Sultanabad’s residents can therefore use vote bank politics to gain benefits of regularisation and infrastructural development, but they are unable to access benefits other than municipal infrastructural development. This is mainly because under the current administrative system in Karachi, social development funding is beyond the purview of local body electoral candidates. These candidates, therefore, do not have the power to provision funds for health care, schooling or youth development. In this respect, Khattak and other prominent local elders have successfully reached out to various NGOs, philanthropists and even US-Aid for assistance in developing the neighbourhood.

For example, the settlement has a basic health centre funded by affiliates of the Aga Khan University Hospital.16 It is staffed by paid health workers who care for patients with basic ailments at nominal rates and educate residents about hygiene and family planning. At the same time, the health centre allows a platform for the university’s doctors and students to conduct sampling for academic research on various health-related issues. Similarly, Khattak has overseen the construction of primary and secondary schools in Sultanabad and Intelligence Colony where children from the settlement have access to heavily subsidised education (see figure 29 on the next page).

Both schools are funded jointly by politicians and philanthropists. As well as failing to provide the community with welfare and social development, the state also fails the urban poor when it comes to providing protection and justice. Despite their increased troubles, residents feel the police can never provide protection. In common with many other marginal settlements, the Karachi police are often an integral part of criminality in

16 The closest hospital is the Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre, which neighbours Askari III and is approximately 5 km away.
poor enclaves (Auyero et al., 2004). Kamal, a Pashtun who has lived in Sultanabad for over 40 years says:

_We are helpless—they (the new Pashtun migrants into Sultanabad) are drug addicts with a backward mentality. They steal, beat our children up for no reason, and have brought a rural culture to this place. We don’t support this Talibanisation. But we can’t trust the police either. They take cuts from the drug mafia and happily look the other way._

Many residents also alluded to hindrances in accessing justice against such criminals within the settlement. For them, reporting a crime was an expensive process that came...
without any guarantee of dispensation of justice. Nighet, a mother of two young boys, spoke of the community’s ordeal in trying to keep drug dealers away from their mohallah:

*We had to bribe policemen to register a First Information Report (FIR). Then we faced continuous harassment for more bribes throughout the process of investigation. Even accessing the courts is expensive. Where do we get the money to hire lawyers, especially when the judges are corrupt and lengthen the trial process?*

As a result of these grievances, residents of Sultanabad place higher trust in the ‘jirga system’, a traditional dispute settlement mechanism led by trusted and respected community elders who are in charge of adjudicating complaints. The community elders receive the facts of the case from both parties and are trusted to act in neutrality to both complainant and defendant. Justice is dispensed immediately, and is also enforced through communal pressure. Residents in Sultanabad express more confidence in this traditional system for dispute resolution compared to the legal system, especially since problems are adjudicated quickly and rulings are respected within the community. Irfan, a clerical officer at the Karachi Port Trust, explains why he prefers the Jirga system:

*The courts are inaccessible, inefficient and unjust—everyone knows that judges award decisions to the party with deeper pockets! It takes months, sometimes years to get a judgement. The Jirga decides cases within a few weeks!*

These interviews and observations within different enclaves of Sultanabad therefore suggest that processes of enclavisation in Sultanabad are made possible through strong community cohesion. Setting up community-level governance structures and ensuring socio-spatial and political homogenisation within each mohallah helps residents of the marginal settlement overcome the inadequacies of state protection against escalating violence, substandard provision of social and infrastructural development and the corrupt and inefficient systems of policing and justice. In such an environment, enclavisation also becomes a means to strengthen the bargaining position of ethnic communities within Sultanabad both within the heterogeneous and often violent enclave and outside in the polarised megacity. In the process, enclavisation strengthens and institutionalises alternative structures of urban governance and reinforces a vote bank politics which I have alluded to and explained earlier in this section.
Yet, the above-related experience of security provision and justice in Sultanabad demonstrates how the democratic right to vote in enclaves such as Sultanabad goes beyond the traditional vote-bank politics of clientelism and patronage as described in scholarship (Benjamin, 2008; Chatterjee, 2008; Huq, 2014). Instead, such a politics is an essential means of ensuring protection for minority communities within Sultanabad, while practices of pledging community votes to local political groups also enfranchise local community elders with respect and voice within the wider community.

More importantly, processes of enclavisation in Sultanabad may be understood as encompassing governance of everyday life in a violent settlement where the state is visibly absent in the provision of services such as housing, land titles, urban infrastructure and personal and community security. Community affairs are managed by well-respected ‘elders’, who are prominent within the community as well as influential within the wider settlement. While these elders are not elected, their authority stems from their capability to meet community needs through connections with other elders within the settlement as well as with local police and lower-tier municipal officers. The key task for elders is to maintain strong relationships with other elders within the settlement and with prominent politicians or government officials outside. Such alliances are necessary for matters such as security, dispute resolution and coordinated infrastructural development work within the settlement.

Overall, I found that practices of enclavisation in Sultanabad were largely inspired by learned experiences of living in conditions of marginality within an insecure city. Here, enclavisation seems to be a spatialisation of what Simone refers to as an anticipatory urban politics that creates conditions for knowledge and navigating the city to one’s advantage (2009: 62), or which Bayat describes of politics in a ‘city-inside-out’, where the disenfranchised collectively negotiate with institutions and emerge as key players in urban politics and governance (Bayat, 2012: 119). Similarly, as highlighted in the previous chapter, it is also tied to a form of associational politics which provides ways for citizens to access the state at the margins, or simply ensures community protection in a violent city (Benit-Gbaffou and Oldfield, 2011; Fregonese, 2012; Akar, 2012).

However, I would like to argue that the current processes of enclavisation within Sultanabad clearly skew the social contract, especially as community elders become key mediators between people and the state. The processes of enclavisation in Sultanabad’s *mohallabs*—seen through the case of the Balti Mohallah—demonstrates that individual
rights to vote are stripped away from residents in a bid to ensure collective bargaining power. As citizenship rights are divested away from individuals, elders emerge as powerful political brokers between citizens and other urban political agents. As I have elaborated in chapters 2 and 4, this potentially distorts individual democratic rights and freedoms, while at the same time creating structural conditions that may exacerbate marginalities within the settlement or create political/institutional violence in the city.

For example, in the marginal Balti enclave within Sultanabad, voting is recognised as a powerful instrument for ensuring protection against violence from within the settlement. As Imam explained through his comment about being able to influence his community’s vote, he was able to protect his community by using his ability to command more than 300 votes, which are enough to swing the vote bank within the settlement. This makes the Balti community strategically significant for other politicised communities within Sultanabad who are interested in winning political patronage for claiming infrastructural improvements from an otherwise inefficient state (Benjamin, 2008). However, this situation gives rise to a paradoxical condition whereby the individual right to vote is stripped away by elders who advise *mohalla* residents on which local political candidate to support. At the same time, the community elder’s decision about which candidate to garner votes for is an outcome of extensive negotiations amongst the various *mohalla* elders.

The process of pledging votes, as well as that of seeking broader political alliances within the community, strengthens the power of community elders, and by extension ensures protection and support for the community. Moreover, such processes of enclavisation shift structures of urban governance in ways that displace the social contract (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006). In Sultanabad, for example, community elders are evidently key mediators between citizens and the state, and often command more legitimacy than state actors and institutions. Nevertheless, as I have briefly elaborated in Chapter 4, and will outline in greater detail in Chapter 8, even though such changes in structures of urban governance emerge because of unequal socio-political relations and structural violence, they result in the displacement of state authority and may create conditions that are generative of concatenations of violence in Karachi. In the next two chapters, I will expand these arguments in greater detail. Before moving on, I will argue that overall, enclavisation in Sultanabad is a product of strategies that the marginalised and
abandoned urban poor use to navigate insecurity and vulnerability in a conflicted megacity. It is therefore a form of anticipatory urban politics (Simone, 2009).

Conclusion

The three enclaves introduced in this chapter demonstrate how enclaves in Karachi are relational spaces that are produced through varying interactions between urban governance and political life. The case studies presented here help highlight three key points. The first is that enclavisation is a differential process which is produced, enacted and materialised in diverse ways within the same city. This is reflective of Holston and Appadurai’s (2003) argument that, as lived spaces of uncertainties, cities become sites where differentiated citizenships are constituted. The authors suggest that in contemporary cities, substantive citizenship (tied to civil, political, socio-economic and cultural rights) may not correspond with the formal citizenship status that is associated with being a member of the nation state (Holston and Appadurai, 2003).

In ethnically heterogeneous, politically fractured and socio-spatially divided megacities such as Karachi, such disjunctures are often spatialised. This is clearly evident in the case studies presented in this chapter, whereby each case demonstrates how processes of enclavisation crystallise subjective experiences of urban political life. Enclavisation in Askari III seemingly spatialises disaffection with democracy and the rejection of citizenship rights, while in Clifton Block 7 it is suggestive of the re-appropriation of civic responsibility and the public sphere. Meanwhile, the case of Sultanabad suggests that enclavisation is tied to a constant struggle of assertion of citizenship rights through practices of insurgent citizenship (Holston, 2009).

Secondly, I have also demonstrated that experiences of urban political life are relational to the particularities of urban governance in Karachi (as set out in Chapter 4). Not only does the fragmented nature of urban governance create recurrent infrastructural disruptions in Karachi, but it also leads to a variety of governmental responses and governance arrangements. The case studies of Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad illustrate how enclavisation often becomes possible within a regime of urban governance which is structured around informality and insurgence being the ‘idiom of urbanisation’ (Roy, 2009c). Roy (2009c) describes this to be true for processes of urban planning in Indian cities, which are informalised and hence lend to a state of deregulation, ambiguity, and exception.
Finally, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that enclavisation in Karachi is a self-perpetuating phenomenon. For example, the case of Askari III demonstrates that residents’ relationship with public life echoes the civic-military relations which are embedded in Pakistan’s statehood. Askari III residents reject the disorderly spaces of the city and its public, having full confidence in the ability of the authoritarian regime to provide regimented order. Yet, this order is often at the cost of other spaces and citizens of Karachi (Hasan et al., 2013; Dawn News, 2007a). By disconnecting from the city government in planning and developing cantonment areas, by walling off spaces such as Askari III, and by demanding priority provision of scarce resources such as water and electricity, the Military Lands and Cantonments Department reproduces the disorder, insecurity and crisis which fuels demand for accommodation in cantonment areas in the first place.

Meanwhile, increasing urban crime and violence and an intensifying crisis of governance also orients residents living in areas such as Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad towards enclavisation. While residents in both spaces enter associational memberships to navigate urban uncertainties and engage with the city government (Tostensen, Tvedten, and Vaa, 2001), the modes of such engagement and the response it generates from the city government are entirely different. In the case of Clifton Block 7, the formation of the Clifton Block 7 Residents’ Association and its engagement with the city government and police has helped fuel the processes of enclavisation. Here, enclavisation stemmed from an otherwise uninterested neighbourhood organising to actively re-engage with the public sphere and help the city government to fulfil its duties to citizens. The primary feature of Clifton Block 7 as an enclave is not necessarily that it is a securitised space, but that it is also a unique political space organised through its orientation towards middle class interests and bourgeois environmentalism (Zerah, 2010; Chatterjee, 2008; Baviskar, 2003).

The engagement of the city government and police with Clifton Block 7 suggests the biases in governing the city. While enclavisation is encouraged in Clifton Block 7, it is often justified as a reaction to the troubles of the city which are linked to the poor’s undeserved appropriation of urban land and public services through insurgent forms of citizenship (Holston, 2009). Electricity and water shortages are unfairly attributed to the burden ‘non-taxpaying’ kachi abadi residents place on urban infrastructures (Shujaat, quoted in Baig, 2008). In the aftermath of the flooding crisis, for example, the city
government blamed *katchi abadis* constructed along storm water drains for causing blockages and hence overflow. Contrary to this discourse, Arif Hasan, a prominent architect and planner in Karachi confided in an interview that ‘it’s not because of katchi abadis, it’s the huge encroachments by the military and railways’. Nevertheless, the poor are easy victims. The earlier-mentioned quotes from Shujaat (MNA) and Shaheen (the police official) demonstrate how *katchi abadi* dwellers are considered to be urban residents who are not deserving of citizenship rights. As I will elaborate further in Chapter 8, they are abandoned and criminalised. In light of this treatment, as the case of Sultanabad shows, the urban poor are pushed into their own more marginal enclaves for protection and mutual support.

Overall, by contextualising these relational processes of enclavisation within the socially and politically polarised megacity, I have outlined how enclaves spatialise multi-scalar relations of power and politics in the city and restructure urban socio-political relations. The evidence presented in this chapter has helped illustrate how enclaves are intertwined with urban politics. The analysis presented in this chapter is also critical in setting up my arguments for the final empirical chapter, where I will elaborate how enclaves are agential in perpetuating urban violence. However, as I outlined in the introduction to this chapter, in the interest of detailing the relations of governance and political life in enclaved spaces, I set aside the task of interrogating the spatial form of enclaved spaces. I will take this up in the next chapter, where I will outline negotiations of security and circulation in enclaved spaces, so as to complete my analysis of enclaves as dynamic and processual spaces.
CHAPTER 7
NEGOTIATING CIRCULATION, SECURITY AND IDENTITY IN KARACHI’S ENCLAVES

On February 29th 2012, five members of the Bawani family were found stabbed to death in their house in Askari III. Following the murder, news reports quoted the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) of Saddar Town, who suspected that the murderer was someone who knew the family well—possibly another family member. His suspicion was rooted in the knowledge that the murder took place in one of the safest residential neighbourhoods in Karachi. The picture below accompanied the article, which read, ‘tight security inside the Askari-III and the 10-foot-high walls of the house left little chances of an outsider breaking into the house’ (Pakistan Today, 2012).

Askari III indeed has very strict security protocols. It has one main gate, which is open for entry from 5am but closes to traffic at midnight. The main gate (shown in figure 31 below), is for all kinds of traffic, though this is monitored closely by guards. The check post at the main gate forces vehicles to slow down for security checks, while CCTV cameras supplement human surveillance. There are also two supplementary gates (Jinnah Gate and Stadium Gate) which are equally guarded and open only intermittently to allow particular traffic to flow during set times of the day. The guards are Karachi Cantonment Board’s own and their surveillance is sometimes supplemented by privately-hired security
guards. At all times, a mobile police unit is stationed outside the gates, ready for a chase if needed.

Figure 31: Picture of Askari III’s perimeter walls and main gate. Source: photograph by author, 2011

The event was therefore shocking because it was a spectacularly violent breach of security. The Bawani family lived in one of the few semi-detached houses close to the main gate, and the house’s outer walls adjoined the enclave’s boundary wall. The murder suggested lapses in the security infrastructure of Askari III and the permeability of its perimeter walls.

At the same time, the event is also a suitable departure for introducing this chapter. Here, I will address my earlier critiques of existing scholarship on urban enclaves. In Chapter 2, I argued that in order to understand how enclaved urbanism is productive of urban violence, we need to shift attention away from established paradigms of describing and characterising enclaved spaces which fetishise enclaves as heavily securitised and tightly bordered ‘capsular’ spaces that are disembedded from the city. Instead, I argued that it is important to unblackbox enclaves, and consider the multiple processes through which they produce enclosure and regulate circulation. In Chapter 3, I presented a critical reconceptualisation of enclaved spaces through relational theories of performativity and assemblage (Butler, 1990; McFarlane, 2009; McFarlane, 2011c), thereby demonstrating that enclaves are always in process. The proposed reconceptualisation looks beyond physical fortification as a determinant feature of enclaves, and instead recognises that
enclaves are socio-political spaces that are often materialised discursively and performatively.

Taking my cue from this, in this chapter, I will attempt to ‘locate the enclave and determine its form’. I will present detailed vignettes of relations of space, security and circulation within and between enclaved spaces for each of my study sites. In each of these vignettes, I will outline the various practices, performances and technologies of securitisation and enclosure, and thus highlight the fact that enclave borders are often produced performatively. Moreover, I will also present evidence of the fluid and osmotic nature of enclave borders, which shift and blur to accommodate or exclude people based on negotiations of power and politics. In the process, I will highlight how practices of filtering and restricting circulation are tied to relations of power, and are productive of identities and social differences. Therefore, overall, I will showcase how processes of enclavisation are generative of complex inside/outside relationships and produce political subjectivities. In conclusion, I will elaborate how evidence presented in this chapter substantiates my earlier critical conceptualisation of enclaves as processual and political spaces.

**Negotiating Identity at the Gates: Failures of Total Security in Askari III**

*Figure 32: Physical Layout of Askari III. Source: Photograph by author and Google Earth, 2011.*

As described earlier, strict security procedures are in place to provide surveillance and to filter circulation in Askari III. Perimeter walls enclose the neighbourhood, and passage is possible through three gates. The main gate is open 24 hours a day, while the other two are opened intermittently during the day and closed throughout the night. The main gate services residents and visitors, while municipal workers and deliverymen enter through a
secondary gate. A third gate is assigned exclusively for the passage of domestic staff and pedestrians entering the enclave. I have presented the physical layout of the gated enclave in figure 32 above.

All three gates are guarded at all times by Cantonment guards. Security at the main gate is further enhanced by police stationed outside the enclaves. Although the gates and walls structure movement, it is the guards who carry out the important task of surveillance and allowing entry. To make their task easier, the Executive Committee issues security passes to residents to display on their vehicles. Guards are instructed to grant entry on sight of the security passes. On the other hand, guards are tasked with stopping all visitors for security checks. Visitors are only allowed to pass once they satisfy conditions which deem them harmless. On reaching the gates, visitors are asked the purpose of their visit as guards look into the car to mitigate suspicions of risky intentions. At times, guards may hold onto visitors’ National Identity Cards (NICs) for proof of identity and as security for the duration of the visit. If there is a high security alert in the city, or if violent events flare up, guards are instructed by the Executive Committee to become more vigilant and make their checks more rigorous.

On the other hand, guards are instructed to subject those crossing the service gates to closer scrutiny than visitors at the main gate. Domestic workers are not allowed to enter unless they carry and display an Identification (ID) card, which is issued by the Executive Committee after the applicant satisfies criminal background checks. As an added layer of security, guards are also assigned to ‘frisk’ household staff when they enter and leave to ensure they are not carrying anything dangerous inside nor taking anything with them on their way out which has not been authorised by their employers.

Given knowledge of these strict security protocols, the murder of the Bawani family puzzled everyone. It led police officials and ordinary residents to speculate that the killer was someone familiar—most likely a member of the family—who could have slipped through security much more easily. This assumption was tied to tacit knowledge of the negotiable and subjective nature of security enforcement in enclaves such as Askari III. Similarly to the experience of security zones in Beirut (Fawaz, Harb and Gharbieh, 2012; Munroe, 2011), interviews and observations revealed that the processes, performances and practices of security varied greatly based on who encountered them.
The evidence I will present in this section details how the imposition and enforcement of security protocols in Askari III is not an impartial exercise. The process is laden with prejudice against poor service workers and domestic staff, who are both generalised as risky bodies and further criminalised through practices of securitisation within Askari III. The discursive production of criminal identity through security checks also undermines the security process, as residents, their guests and other visitors become offended if they are checked. As I will show in this section, they often resist security procedures, either by dodging questions or by expressing anger at security guards doing their duty. The process is therefore often open to subversion and is negotiated through the interplay of power and politics between the guards and those crossing the gates, fluctuating according to affective responses to identity and behaviour, as well as perceived positions of power. All in all, such practices frustrate the possibility of total security, and make it impossible to enforce set protocols.

**Security, Discipline and Identity**

*We may meet people for the first time, but we know who they are. I've been a security guard for so many years. [...] It is a matter of experience.*

The above quote from Masood, a guard, explains how profiling based on experiential knowledge of how to translate different registers of identity—age, class, gender and modes of entry—into insecurity events was crucial in his application of Askari III’s security protocols. In this broad scheme of classification, male domestic workers are generally categorised as suspicious bodies: ‘We always stop young men who are unaccompanied by anyone—especially if they are drivers or domestic workers’. Such attitudes are also reflected more broadly within Askari III. ‘(Whenever) incidents of petty crime have occurred, it’s always the maids—one has to be very careful!’ said Nighat, a house wife. Similarly, during a conversation, Major, a member of the Executive Committee, angrily stated: ‘These bloody servants are not loyal like before. They are our first point of suspicion and we are usually right’. Such attitudes criminalising domestic workers are largely a function of past events, where domestic staff-members have been involved in crime in Askari III. Yet, despite being regarded as criminal elements, maids and other domestic staff remain integral to the smooth functioning of everyday life in Askari III. More importantly, their continued presence within Askari III makes it difficult to cleanly separate the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. I will elaborate this point further in the vignette about Clifton Block 7. This runs contrary to some popular imaginations of gated
communities which typify them as homogenous ‘enclaves of privilege’ (Diken and Lausten, 2005).

To ameliorate the risks of future occurrences, guards are especially instructed to stop maids, servants, pedestrians, and motorcyclists, while those in vehicles are often simply waved past (see figure 33 above). Sitting in the passenger seat next to the driver of the car, I usually got past security easily. In cases where guards did stop me to ask who I was or where I was going, a simple answer of ‘I’m here to meet a friend’ was often sufficient. Contrary to what I had heard from Colonel about the security procedure described above, I was never asked for ID. On the other hand, my driver Nawaz revealed his various tribulations at points of entry ‘It’s always easier when someone’s in the car with me. Otherwise it’s all sorts of questions and identification checks’.

The repetitive and continuous practice of stopping people and asking them for ID becomes an act of performative security (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007), and the associated iterative performative practices of securitisation (Butler, 1993) produce the identities both of those who are to be secured and those who constitute the threat that makes security necessary (Aradau, 2010). The form of ID itself—whether stickers for residents, ID cards issued by executive committee for domestic staff or National Identification Cards (NICs) issued by the government—becomes an artefact through which governmentality is appropriated by guards and exercised over those interacting with them (Tawil-Souri, 2012). At the same, given that it is mostly the urban poor who are taken aside for security checks or questioned about the purpose of their visit, such security acts
fix suspicious identities as a certain ‘type’. Following from Foucault’s (1998; 2002) concept of identity as a construct of regulatory ideals and Butler’s (1993) notion of identity as a construct of repetitive acts which both uphold existing regulatory norms and at the same time name what they produce, the act of stopping someone for a security check can be seen as criminalising the apprehended.

For these reasons, even though middle-class residents and visitors are subjected to less stringent checks, responses from interviews suggest that they lash out at guards carrying out their duty because they read restrictions on movement as affronts and thus find such hindrances harder to bear. At the same time, their behaviour is also an expression of their middle class identity, which is seen to be elaborated in other contexts as that of ‘rights bearing citizens’ (Holston, 2009). Furthermore, it is also an expression of being tired of the performative security checks. Within Askari III, despite understanding the need for heightened security, residents complain of the constant monotony of repetitive checking and surveillance. Usman, a resident, expressed his annoyance, wondering, ‘why are they stopping us, why are they harassing us? We live here for God’s sake!’ However, Major, a member of the residents’ executive committee, also expressed his frustration at the uncooperative behaviour of residents:

When the guards stop them they complain to us. But when we ask why they haven’t displayed the ‘resident’ sticker on their cars, they avoid the question. Instead, they say things like, ‘We have been living here for so long, how can we not be allowed inside—don’t you recognise us?’ Well, I might recognise them, but the person who stands on guard duty keeps changing, it’s not certain that he would recognise them as well! We keep telling them that they must clearly display the stickers we issue them on their cars—it shows guards that you live here! But still, they refuse. They try arguing their way through the guards, and they resist our efforts at securing Askari III!

Often, in anticipation of a belligerent response, guards even refrain from asking. On one visit to Askari III, when I questioned Nauman, one of the guards, why he let me pass so easily, he responded: ‘I didn’t want to upset you’. Similarly, although the security procedures are enacted for their benefit, many residents still resist the initiatives. Nishtar, a freshly recruited guard, articulated the paradox of trying to do his job and stop people from entering Askari III:
They don’t put up stickers on their cars, and then they protest if I stop them. I’m a poor man—
I’m in the position that damns me if I ask and damns me if I don’t.

**Power, Negotiation, and Resistance**

Thinking through these interactions, I found that the act of restricting and stopping people in enclaves such as Askari III is mediated through complex relations of power. Foucault describes power as an operative and productive force that is exercised between all points in a relation (Foucault and Faubion, 2002). Further, he explains that it is often manifested through disciplinary regulations and is also open to resistance and subversion (Foucault and Faubion, 2002). Interviews with guards in Askari III reveal that the will to stop and check people is not just born of representative notions of the identity of those attempting to gain entry, but also that the act is tied to negotiated relations of power. For example, reading into Nishtar’s earlier comment, I understand that negotiations around entry into the enclave are reflective of socio-political relations of power. When confronting middle class residents or visitors, a guard’s authority is often undermined by his weaker socio-economic position. This observation weakens the authenticity of Masood’s earlier comment, where he spoke of filtering people simply on the basis of profiling. My observations lead me to believe that perhaps the activity of profiling is not simplistically a derivative of probabilistic assumptions drawn from a register of experience, but is possibly a strategy that is also tied to relations of power and experiences of resistance.

As a member of the Askari III administration, Colonel was clearly aware of these relations. He found the appropriation and subversion of disciplinary and security practices by relationships of power frustrating. This resistance was clearly a common theme that he encountered in his role of administrating and monitoring security protocols:

*They don’t even check anymore! Their (the armed guards’) job is to watch over the entry and exit of cars. Even then 100 percent security is not provided. They are very careless. Every day I scold them and threaten to fire them! It is also their (the residents’) fault. No one cooperates! [...] they don’t display the stickers! They have them, but won’t display them.*

Much of Karachi’s middle-class feels a sense of entitlement that contrasts with the acceptance of such treatment by the marginalised poor. Based on their cultural learning
as urban residents, middle class Karachiites flare up and often disrespect private guards and police if apprehended, while they also direct anger at guards for misjudging who to stop. Guards in Askari III, however, speak of the difficulties such resistance causes them. According to Fateh, an Askari III guard, their most common response is ‘Do I look like I’m trouble?’ He continues:

_But to be honest, how can we really tell what trouble looks like? There was an incident of car stereo system theft here. Such good kids, some of whom lived with their parents here—they were responsible for it! Since then, I stop haughty residents who are not displaying stickers. If they get angry, we tell them that we are just doing our job, following orders._

Yet, it is also simplistic to assume that domestic helpers are passive subjects in front of security guards. When I asked Nawaz, a driver employed by my friend who took me to Askari III for my visits, how he was able to pass through the gates, especially considering that he didn’t have any ID on his person, he nonchalantly replied:

_They know not to bother me too much, because I take Amjad Sahib’s name [his boss], and tell them he’s the brother of Molly Baji [the resident I was visiting]. When he stopped me today, I told him I’m on duty with Amjad Sahib’s guest and that Sahib will get really angry if I tell him he delayed me._

Nawaz’s interaction with the guards, and especially the way he used his boss’s name as reference, reveals how drivers and other domestic help often project their relationship with someone of higher social authority as a way of signifying their own power position. Such accounts therefore suggest that efforts to securitise circulation, such as the act of stopping residents or visitors at the gates, produce a moment where power relations are negotiated. Therefore, the politics of who is stopped and who is allowed to pass is both an outcome of the affective dimensions of securitisation and a result of situated positionalities and subjectivities (Monroe, 2011; Fawaz, Harb and Gharbieh, 2012). However, research from Beirut suggests that urban residents often become accustomed to such situations, and in turn develop a range of tactics and strategies to navigate their own movements (Fawaz et al., 2012). Nevertheless, as I will elaborate further in the next section, in the job of guarding Askari III’s gates, processes of bordering reveal the contests and relations of power that come with performing security. Such processes also reveal the emerging tensions, struggles and negotiation of power between different actors encountering the enclave.
Circulation, Security and Identity

The act of moving through the gates of Askari III therefore reveals the power relationships between various actors interacting within enclaved spaces. At the same time, attitudes to security also reveal how its disciplinary impositions—i.e. attempts to enclose, structure, or order patterns of movements—aren’t entirely welcomed by residents. For most residents, security is only desirable insofar as it is not overly restrictive of their freedoms. Adam, a 19 year old university student, explains how he prefers this variable exercise of security:

*I think it’s okay […] it’s enough to keep this place safe and keep trouble out without being too troublesome. It’s very rare that friends have a problem coming in. the guards don’t always ask for their authorisation to enter (like an entry sticker). They may sometimes ask for their National ID Card, and take a cursory look at it, but they usually let them in without much hassle.*

Adam’s approval of the strength of security protocols picks up on the notion of circulation as used by Foucault, who explained it as a form of freedom within a security regime (Foucault, 2007). According to Foucault: ‘it is in terms of this option of circulation, that we should understand the word freedom, and understand it as one of the facets, aspects, or dimensions of the deployment of apparatuses (dispositifs) of security’ (2007: 49). The processes of security in Askari III therefore restrict the entry of undesirables, thereby allowing residents to move around freely within Askari III.

*Figure 34: Domestic servants walking in Askari III. Source: Photograph by author, 2011.*
At the same time, Askari III’s regime of restricting circulation also creates racialised identities of the poor as potential threats to security. While residents are dependent on domestic staff in their everyday lives (see figure 34 above), quotes like, ‘Having a live-in maid is like inviting a thief to live in your house,’ or ‘You have to be careful of these Pathan drivers, you never know, they might be Taliban’ suggest how the otherwise essential household staff is also a source of much anxiety. Such relations of dependency, mistrust and insecurity are also common between domestic staff and employers in other cities with similar socio-economic and class structures (Dickey, 2000; Qayum and Ray, 2003). In such situations, Waldrop (2004) highlights that gates are especially important in symbolising distance and creating a sense of order and control over domestic staff (Waldrop, 2004).

While I thought that perhaps maids and drivers would find such attitudes in Askari III offensive, I was surprised to find that this was not always so. ‘It’s better than crossing the police checkpoints out there’ said Nawaz, making reference to the tedious random police checks at checkpoints peppered across Karachi’s streets. Similarly, Maskeen rationalised the procedures as for the greater good: ‘I like working here—it’s such a secure space! No one harasses me. Yes, we have to carry cards and permission notes, but it’s only because the actions of some people have condemned us!’

While the responses of Nawaz and Maskeen convey their lack of indignation at being treated differently, their attitudes are merely indicative of their relational experiences of life and movement in Karachi. Maskeen perhaps contrasted her experience in Askari III with her life as a woman who would otherwise suffer harassment in public spaces including her own neighbourhood (Ali, 2012). Similarly, listening to her accounts of home, it is obvious that for Maskeen, a resident of Sultanabad, coming into work was a refuge from an otherwise violent neighbourhood. Meanwhile, Nawaz was used to regular profiling at police checkpoints, which are notorious in Pakistan for drivers or less influential young men being hassled for bribes (Hisam, 2006). In the event, Nawaz had learned to master the skill of negotiating passage by making references to his relationships to people with more power, and the potential wrath the inquisitor might face for delaying him or interrupting his work.

Thinking through these relations between security and circulation, it becomes evident that the processes of securing circulation generate difference and disjunctures in urban socio-political relations. Similarly, it is obvious that gates, perimeter walls and techniques
of monitoring behaviours create a sense of security for residents, who feel well protected from the dangers of the chaotic city outside and from potentially deviant domestic staff. However, as I will show below, such physical architectures and security measures are not always effective. In this section, I have presented evidence which suggests that enclave borders are fluid and negotiable. In the next section, I will elaborate on how the perimeter walls of Askari III are often osmotic.

**Osmotic Walls, Shifting Borders**

The mystery of the murder of the Bawani family was solved soon enough (see figure 35). In fact, the culprit turned out to be known to the family. The murderer was Ishaq, a driver who had been dismissed after serving the family for six months. The killer had scaled the enclave’s walls and entered the house with the intention of robbing the family. In his statement to the police, Ishaq claimed that he had been carrying the knife for protection in case things went wrong. Instead, he ended up viciously stabbing the family to death as they woke up one after the other after hearing him inside. The foiled robbery had turned into a brutal murder.

Ishaq confessed that he had killed his victims in a rage, even though he had only intended to rob them:

> I worked there for six months and then took leave for ten days. When I came back, Arif Sahib said I was an alcoholic and that I gambled. I needed money to pay off a loan. And it made me really angry (Hasan, 2014a).

The tragic murder demonstrated that, despite the controlled entry of outsiders, round-the-clock security and the extra efforts to monitor domestic staff, the enclave was susceptible to desperate acts of violence. It also demonstrated that small acts of everyday abuse tipped the driver to a point to which he became a brutal murderer. While the act shocked residents, because the perpetrator was someone whom the victims encountered in their everyday interactions, the dependency on household staff could not be shaken off. The driver, along with a fleet of other staff such as maids, servants and guards, is integral to the daily functioning of most households in Askari III.
In the aftermath of the murder, I couldn’t help but recall an earlier interview with Colonel, who had singled out the potentiality of security breaches tied to security passes issued to household staff:

*The security card we issue to non-live-in servants is a one year card. In this time, if the servant/maid leaves the job they are supposed to inform us so we cancel the card. What happens if the servant/maid leaves their job and the resident doesn’t inform us? They can either pass that card on, or keep using it to enter the premises without anyone being any wiser. I’m sure that most servants/maids who got a card from one employer are now working for entirely another.

As yet, we have no rule about where we stop or check the validity of these cards.*

This vignette from Askari III exposes the range of circulations that continuously connect the inside and outside of enclaved spaces, and hence the impossibility of imposing total separation and security. Meanwhile, the continuous interactions between guards, visitors and household staff also affect the practice of security. Not only does the task become monotonous for guards, but it also generates learned behaviours on the part of those encountering it in ways which might undermine processes of security. Similarly, the fact that access is often a negotiated outcome of power struggles enacted at enclave crossings...
challenges the task of complete control and effective filtering. This would be something Ishaq (the murderer) must have been aware of, given his experience of working in Askari III. While the human task of filtering circulation is varied, as it rests on arbitrary and extremely subjective registers of profiling, Ishaq’s mode of entry—scaling the enclave’s walls—also shows how the very infrastructure that inspires most confidence in securing Askari III is not entirely effective at providing complete separation between inside and outside.

At the same time, this vignette also illustrates the porous and fluid nature of enclave borders and the impossibility of cleanly separating risky and malign bodies. The evidence presented in this vignette has suggested that walls are osmotic, their degrees of openness and closure varying depending on who confronts them. As a process of enabling flows, as much as one which restricts movement, the decision about whom to stop and whom to allow through is highly subjective and based on strategically employed registers of identity. As Balibar (2002) suggests, sovereign borders are subjective and exist differently for individuals belonging to different social groups. Since identity itself is a process that is always under construction and negotiation, capable of being subverted, strengthened or constructed through discursive and performative practices (Hall 2000; Butler, 1993), security personnel at Askari III find it difficult to distinguish ‘dangerous’ from ‘safe’. Moreover, as I highlighted earlier, the processes of filtering circulation are also steeped in power relations and are open to resistance and subversion. Therefore, the complexities of security, identities and circulation within Askari III mean that it is impossible to achieve the ideal of total security in such enclaves. Moreover, these complexities of space, circulation and securitisation further illustrate the dynamic and processual nature of enclaved spaces.

At most, the practices, procedures and processes of security in Askari III help to give residents a sense of security and distance from the violent ‘outside’. The enclave’s borders are therefore more symbolic architectures of security than they are points of surveillance and filtering circulation. I will take this theme further in the next vignette, where I discuss the case of Clifton Block 7 in detail.
Performative Security and Paradoxes of Inclusion and Exclusion: Emplacing the Enclave in Clifton Block 7

Figure 36: Guarded barrier at one of Clifton Block 7’s entry points. Source: Photograph by author, 2011.

On my first visit to Block 7, I encountered Mehboob, who was guarding a neighbourhood security barrier. Sitting on a chair in his uniform which denoted his status as a private security guard, Mehboob read the Quran while squinting through his thick glasses. His sleeves were rolled up and he was wearing slippers in place of shoes. He glanced up as we neared the open barrier, while the driver slowed the car down and drove past well under the speed limit. When I questioned my driver about his slowing down the car despite the fact that Mehboob hadn’t really responded, Mushtaq said, ‘Baji (sister), it was a checkpoint’. My interest was piqued. I had heard of Block 7’s reputation as an enclave with round the clock security and closed off streets through a friend, but the effortless movement through the barriers spoke otherwise. Yet it became obvious that despite being open, barriers such as the one pictured above performed the site of a border, forcing my driver to slow the car down. I therefore arranged an interview with Azim, a senior member of the Block 7 association, to talk me through the neighbourhood’s security plan. At the same time, I interviewed residents, visitors and guards to get a better sense of how the enclave was performatively produced in Clifton Block 7.
Defensible Space, Community, Security

My first meeting with Azim, president of the Clifton Block 7 Residents’ Association, took place in the Aga Khan Park. The part was situated in the centre of the neighbourhood, and members of the Residents’ Association frequently met there to discuss issues relating to enclave management. As the image below shows, I found it to be a surprisingly busy park, with children playing and adults mingling. This is not a common feature in affluent neighbourhoods in Karachi, where affluent and middle class residents usually avoid public spaces. Azim waved his arms around him, proudly stating:

You see this—we have worked hard to securitise ourselves. This thriving community is proof that our efforts have succeeded.

Figure 37: Block 7 residents in Aga Khan Park. Source: Block 7 Residents Association, 2011.

Recalling the harmless-looking guard, I asked Azim to elaborate how the neighbourhood had been securitised and through what processes. He responded by explaining that the key had been in closing unnecessary traffic out of the neighbourhood: ‘Between Boat Basin and Sultanabad, we were like sitting ducks waiting to get robbed. Anyone could come in from wherever they liked and disappear’. In explaining the constant threat of crime prior to enclosure, Azim made reference to the physical geography of Clifton Block 7 as a space of connectivity and intersection. Given the neighbourhood’s location, its open streets were conduits for people avoiding heavy traffic around the busy
commercial areas of Boat Basin and Schön Circle while crossing over from Mai Kolachi or the various katchi abadis.

Street barriers, the physical infrastructure of enclosure, were placed along entry and exit points to manage circulation in and around Clifton Block 7. Although some of these barriers (see for example figure 38 below) remained open and unguarded during the day from 5am to 10pm, they were nevertheless effective material artefacts that signified security during the daytime. ‘They show outsiders that this is a residential community, not just any street that they can drive through’, said Jawad, another senior member of the Block 7 Residents’ Association.

Figure 38: Open, unguarded barrier along Khyaban-e-Roomi in Clifton Block. Source: Photograph by author, 2011.

In this way, attempts to create physical enclosure by members of the Block 7 Residents’ Association, the architects of the enclave, worked to produce a ‘defensible space’ (Newman, 1972). Newman’s concept of defensible space relates to the construction of a secure environment where physical characteristics such as neighbourhood design and layout allow residents to appropriate spaces and take ownership of their security (Newman, 1972). In Block 7 too, such practices encouraged a territorial appropriation of
space which improved neighbourhood security and fostered a sense of community. As Kamran, a recent member of the Block 7 Residents’ Association happily stated:

_We don’t need to look over our shoulders all the time now. Muggings are reduced, the barriers and round the clock guards really give us confidence, and our kids can cycle freely around the neighbourhood. We’re also becoming more of a community now!_

While Newman’s concept of defensible space is rooted in an environmentally deterministic notion of social relations structured through physical geography, I would instead argue that it is more revealing to regard Clifton Block 7 as a discursively produced enclave, where symbolic and discursive acts such as street signs giving warning of surveillance or street barriers substantiate security (Agnew, 1993). Such aspects of enclavisation have also produced a sense of community within the neighbourhood, where the structure and layout of houses—which were detached, set off from streets and bounded by perimeter walls and gates—had created an environment of substantial privacy. However, Kamran’s sentiments above were echoed by Rubina, who happily spoke of a newfound camaraderie within the neighbourhood:

_It’s nice that we have finally come out of our shells. I see my neighbours in the Aga Khan Park, we stop and chat. I’ve lived here twenty years, but it’s only now we’re getting to know who our neighbours are._

However, despite this sense of shared community, the enclave is also productive of fractures, and processes of enclavisation are generative of inside-outside relationships. I will elaborate this in more detail next.

**Performing Security, Embodying Difference**

Members of the Block 7 Residents’ Association have devised a comprehensive security plan inspired by the militaristic forms of security which exist in fortified enclaves such as Askari III. As figure 39 on the following page shows, zones A and B of Clifton Block 7 are enclosed by strategically placed street barriers on the main entry and exit points. These ‘borders’ are policed by private security guards who are instructed to keep an eye out for suspicious activity and asked to apprehend anyone who looks out of place. At the same time, guards on motorcycles patrol the neighbourhood, providing round the clock security. Strategically placed CCTV cameras supplement surveillance. The association’s members have also devised contingency protocols: in the case of emergency, members
CLIFTON BLOCK 7 LAYOUT AND SECURITY BARRIERS

During the day time, all barriers (marked in black and green) remain open.

At night, all 10 barriers are closed, while the 3 denoted by green lines allow guarded access.

Figure 39: Layout and barriers in Clifton Block 7. Source: Block 7 Residents Association.
call Adil, the MC member in charge of security. Adil in turn calls for police backup while alerting the guards—some of whom rush to the scene with him while others are instructed to immediately close the entrance/exit barriers. Meanwhile, police stationed in mobile units outside the neighbourhood’s main entrance ready themselves to chase the criminals across town if need be.

As explained in the previous chapter, Block 7’s security plan aspires to follow the institutionalised scheme of private governance offered by the Citizen Police Liaison Committee CPLC), i.e. the CPLC Neighbourhood Care program (CPLC, 2014). Installing structures of private security governance through the CPLC Neighbourhood Care program is extremely costly, as the initiative covers the costs of consultancy, private guards, public services (police mobiles) and infrastructural provision (street barriers and CCTV cameras). In contrast, enclavisation in Block 7 has been incremental, and as a result, it has not been possible to translate it into militaristic securitisation. Over time, the Residents’ Association has been able to secure tax revenue, private investment and corporate sponsorship to fund the installation of barriers and CCTV cameras and the ongoing labour costs of private security guards.

Yet, the plan requires constant management by the association’s members and continued support from the public police. Despite this, the best efforts of the association’s members do not translate into the provision of strict regimented security protocols like those that exist in Askari III. This is firstly because, as a public neighbourhood, members of the Block 7 association are constrained in their attempts to fully enclose the neighbourhood in the same way as cantonment areas such as Askari III. Efforts to close all barriers or overtly restrict circulation have met with severe criticism by the residents of neighbouring localities who have successfully engaged with the public authorities to reach a compromise. The barriers have not been removed as long as they remain open during the daytime, and a few remain guarded at night to allow vehicles to pass. The resulting security protocols are therefore largely symbolic in nature.

Secondly, it is not just enclosures and security practices that are symbolic in nature, but as a security practice, also the guards are largely symbolic in and of themselves. As the picture on the next page suggests, security guards in Clifton Block 7 are mostly unarmed, and largely benign-looking. They may deter visitors with criminal intentions, but as Paasche and Sidaway (2010) demonstrate in the case of Maputo, private security guards usually avoid responding to acts of crime with violence. Salman, the owner of a private
security company, reveals how private security guards (pictured in figure 40 below) are often merely performative symbols of security:

These guards are not really there to take action, but just there to provide confidence. Even in the event of violent incidents, our laws don’t allow private guards to shoot someone. To avoid any legal trouble, we let our guards know that they are under no obligation from our side to engage with criminals or use their weapons. They can do so voluntarily on their own accord if they wish. We also let our customers know that this is their limitation. Our only job is to recruit people with a clean record, train them and discipline them to offer surveillance services.

Figure 40: Private security guards on duty in Clifton Block 7. Source: Block 7 Residents Association, 2011.

As a result, the association’s members are aware that even though they may have private guards, this does not translate into crime prevention or the apprehension of criminals. As a result, they must prepare contingency protocols to support the community’s members in catching criminals or supporting the police in bringing them to justice. Consequently, security protocols necessarily involve both community support and the police. In response, the Block 7 Residents’ Association has developed a strong relationship with the police in the same way as it has with the municipality. ‘It’s like a public-private partnership’, claims Jawad, whom I introduced earlier. ‘We make some contribution and
they (the Sindh Police) provide us with their manpower,’ he continues. The police stationed immediately outside the enclave are also demonstrative of the Karachi Police’s bias towards supporting the urban elite. In a city where insecurity is widespread and there is already a notoriously low police to citizen ratio, a quarter of the police force is deployed to provide security to influential residents and foreign missions (Dawn News, 2012). When questioned over why the police are overly helpful in assisting the residents of enclaves such as Clifton Block 7, Zeeshan, a senior police officer at the nearby Darakhshan police station, says simplistically, ‘We all know who gets burgled most’.

Thirdly, the job of ensuring closure is constrained, because daily interactions are much more varied than in Askari III. This is a function of mushrooming commercial activity within the neighbourhood, as well as activities spurred by ancillary household staff. ‘This is a residential area, these firms should either be pushed out or closed down,’ says Adil. ‘They invite all sorts of traffic,’ he continues. Similarly, Farrah contends that ‘The biggest security problem is of course because of visitors for our domestic staff. In my house, there are ten domestic staff members—they all have visitors coming and going.’

This necessarily frustrates the task of security, as there is no way of either distinguishing residents from non-residents or of stopping them. Interactions with guards reveal a lack of clear direction and their confusion over whom to secure and against what. When asked to explain the responsibilities of his job, Mehboob, the guard I encountered earlier, explained, ‘my job is to open the barrier when the cars come, and close it when they leave.’ When I asked Mehboob to further elaborate how he knew who to let in, he merely shrugged, showing that he had little idea of the objects of security within the enclave. Similarly, Ishaq, another guard, voiced his confusion, ‘They tell us we should only let members through. But I don’t know who they (the members) are.’ Personal observations and detailed interactions with guards in Block 7 thus revealed that the task of providing security merely produces theatrical symbols of distancing between inside and outside. Yet, as is expected (Marcuse, 1997), such symbols effectively relieve residents and make them feel safe. Laila, a long-time resident, said, ‘I would always look fearfully over my shoulder when I made my way into my driveway. Now at least we are safe from muggings!’

As theatrical as they seem, the architectures of enclosure—uniformed guards, security barriers, signs welcoming residents to Clifton Block 7 and CCTV cameras—work. Given the notion of discourse as spaces within which subject formation takes place, or the
realm within which identity is materialised (Butler, 1993), Clifton Block 7 can be viewed as an enclave developed through citational practices of securitisation and restrictions on circulation. This means that visual signs such as CCTV cameras and notices, architectures which restrict circulation such as street barriers, the repeated acts of opening and closing barriers by privately employed guards and occasional street patrols all discursively create Clifton Block 7 as an enclave.

**Inside-Outside Relationships**

As is elaborated in critical research on borders (Johnson et al., 2011; Donnan and Wilson, 2010; Salter, 2012), borders are not just physical and territorial sites, but are also materialised through various practices, processes and discourses of identity and differentiation, inclusion and exclusion. Taking my cue from this, I would like to argue that in Clifton Block 7, street barriers are not the only structures delimiting separation and distance or creating inside-outside relationships. Rather, there are other registers of inclusion. In the case of Clifton Block 7, this is formal membership in the Residents’ Association, which is tied to an agreement to pay a service fee covering the costs of enclavisation. As I described in the previous chapter, the leadership of the association has generated a rule whereby only members are eligible to access support in security or municipal service delivery.

Members are also informed of rules and regulations that are tied to the daily running of the enclave. Various methods of surveillance—such as guards, CCTV cameras and social media notices—all combine to ensure that the rules of conduct imposed by the residents’ association are followed by all residents, and especially association members. Through such practices, the ‘border’ is de-materialised as technologies of control are put in place (Bottomley and Moore, 2007) to ensure that all residents conform to the sets of behaviour that membership prescribes. Such practices further help to re-produce inside-outside relationships within Clifton Block 7.

In such circumstances, the emerging communal space becomes a site of struggle over relations of dominance and identity, inclusion and exclusion, privilege and deprivation (Nagar and Leitner, 1998). While a large majority of residents within the enclosed area I am referring to as an enclave have bought into the experience, some residents are opposed to the association’s work and remain non-members. They do not pay the monthly contribution to the association because they do not support the enclosures or
the costly security initiatives within the block. ‘Why should I pay?’ asked Hasan. ‘I have my own chowkidar [informal guard], and I don’t need their services. Also, I find these barriers inconvenient’, he continued. On the other hand, for Natasha non-membership was a non-issue. ‘I don’t really know of the association and its activities’ she said. ‘I know the Ismaili community has gotten together to work for their own welfare—they do look after each other [...] but I do think they are selfish. My friend who had a break in recently asked to see CCTV coverage and they refused!’ Natasha felt that the association was exclusionary in nature because it seemingly served the interests of the majority of members who belonged to the Ismaili community, a minority Muslim sect which is popularly considered a tight knit community. Natasha therefore viewed membership through the lens of sectarian affiliation and ignored the formalised structure of paid membership.

However, non-membership is taken seriously by contributing members, who argue that the association is for all residents irrespective of faith and that non-members are purposeful free riders. During one of my visits to the Aga Khan Park, Jamal, an elderly member angry at those who don’t ‘pay up’ getting a free ride at his cost, angrily lashed out at Farrah, a senior member of the Association, saying, ‘You should smash their cars, threaten them!’ Azim, another senior member of the association, also expressed his frustration over the involuntary inclusion of non-members in a cleaner, safer environment. ‘I strongly feel that if they (non-members) complain or seek help from the association for any municipal issue, the association should refuse it so that they are made to feel helpless,’ he said, adding, ‘I have told my security guards to reject security assistance outright if requested by non-member’.

Similarly, contacts and relationships with the municipal government, developed by the Clifton Block 7 association, are often exploited to push non-members to agree to membership. Azim highlighted that public service agencies (water and sewage, electricity, gas) are encouraged to refuse service unless the recommendation of the association is provided. Such tactics to create distance between residents and governance agencies ensures that the Block 7 Residents’ Association becomes a powerful mediator between the two. The quest for more efficient service delivery on the part of municipal agencies and the need to divert public policing resources to other security imperatives combine to encourage a shift in the burden of responsibility for the provision of public goods towards private actors. As I have highlighted in the case of Sultanabad in the previous
chapter, in Clifton Block 7 the processes of enclavisation shift the social contract in ways that devolve state power to privately organised bodies such as the Block 7 Association. The resulting re-structured relations of power strip citizenship rights from those who are not ‘included’ within the political community of the Residents’ Association.

Figure 41: Domestic staff members of a house in Clifton Block 7. Source: Clifton Block 7 Residents Association, 2011.

While tensions between members and non-members in the block make evident how enclaved spaces create paradoxes of inclusion and exclusion, another set of inside-outside relationships in Clifton Block 7 reveals paradoxes of security and insecurity. These inside-outside relationships are revealed by rules and regulations concerning the use of public space. Service providers and domestic workers are not allowed into parks at certain times of the day and are discouraged from ‘loitering’ in the streets. These limitations are set in order to produce a sanitised space where children can cycle in the streets, neighbours can mingle in the park and there is no fear of crime and insecurity. Yet, service providers, who often live and work within the premises (see image on previous page), resent these rules. For example Akmal, a domestic help in one of the houses in Block 7, finds the rules ironic. ‘That guard who says I shouldn’t sit in the park, who is he? He is the same as me except that he’s wearing a uniform, getting paid to push
people who look like him away!' Other than restrictions on movement in leisure hours, domestic service workers also resent being criminalised. As Farzana says:

> *Just because a few servants commit crimes, we all have to bear the brunt. They (employers) trust us to watch their children, look after their house, but they would easily hand us over to the police if someone robbed them.*

Farzana’s comments deriding her employers’ paradoxical sense of simultaneous trust and insecurity are reflective of the treatment meted out to ancillary service staff throughout the enclave. The inclusion of security guards within the security architecture of enclaves generates insecurities for residents and managers. ‘I don’t like the idea of these guards watching me all the time. I feel more insecure knowing that they are aware of my movements and my daily pattern,’ says Samina, a resident. However, the system of surveillance turns in on itself in multiple ways. While showing me the CCTV control room, Azim proudly stated that ‘we tell our guards these cameras are watching them too—lax behaviour or involvement in criminal activities on their part would be seen immediately’. The very guards who perform security for the enclave are therefore kept on edge, made to feel fearful that lapses in their front will be punished, or worse still, potentially regarded as complicity in criminal acts.

Other quotes—such as, ‘99 percent of the time, guards are in cahoots with robbers’; ‘it’s almost always an inside job, they (domestic workers) may talk about our security details at the local tea shop in their katchi abadi? What then […] they live amongst criminals!’—further suggest the paradoxical relationship between workers and enclave residents. Similarly to what Benit-Gbaffou (2008a) says of community policing practices in suburban Johannesburg, the enclave managers wish to have total social control over the workers in the neighbourhood. Given the deep mistrust of domestic workers and private guards, Adil, the head of the Management Committee (MC) for security, stated that he had instructed all association members to verify the validity of their servants’ National Identity Cards before employing them. This can be done using an SMS service that checks NIC numbers against personal information recorded in the government’s database. The next step is to register the NIC with the local police. This allows the police to check whether the applicant has a criminal record, and in any case provides the police with the essential information needed to locate the employee in case he or she becomes a suspect in any criminal activity in the neighbourhood.
The example of Clifton Block 7 shows how enclaved spaces produce paradoxical subjectivities along binaries of inside and outside, included and excluded and security and insecurity. Security guards, along with other service workers, are simultaneously placed inside and outside: they are bound by the rules governing life within the enclave, but they do not enjoy the benefits of membership. They may be part of the enclave’s security infrastructure, but they never truly belong within the enclave. Moreover, contrary to popular representations (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Low, 2003), enclaves are not entirely homogenous spaces that cement community. In Clifton Block 7, it becomes obvious that the enclavisation process both cements and fractures the neighbourhood and creates relations of power and disempowerment between the different users of space—whether between members or non-members or between residents and workers (Nagar and Leitner, 1998; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008a; Hook and Vrdoljak, 2002). At the same time, it also shows how enclave borders—used here to denote registers of inclusion—are not spatially contiguous. As registers of membership and inclusion change, the borders of the enclave become apparent as they become more diffuse. In the next section, I will take a further step in shifting attention away from defining enclaves through physically bordered sites by sharing examples from Sultanabad, the katchi abadi which is home to many of the workers and guards employed at Askari III, Clifton Block 7, and other fortified enclaves within the security red zone.

**Restricted Circulation, Insecurity and Violent Identities: Tracing Subjectivities in Sultanabad's Enclaves**

Walking through the haphazardly arranged narrow alleyways of Sultanabad, crowded with multi-storey houses on each side (see figure 42 above), I became resigned to the fact that there was no way that I could remember my way back. I had left my car behind as the road got narrower, and I soon realised that I was fully dependent on my guide. With no markers to guide me, and with constant twists in the lanes, I lost my bearings and recalled Azim’s (of Clifton Block 7) description of the katchi abadi as a strategically located labyrinth which criminals enter to lose their pursuers before spreading out across the city.

Azim explained that this was possible because the few wide roads leading into Sultanabad from the main road (one of which is pictured below) don’t fully penetrate or cross through the settlement, thus restricting entrants unfamiliar with the settlement’s geography. On the other hand, residents expertly navigate the narrow lanes or jump over
Figure 42: A narrow lane in Sultanabad Block H leading towards the Balti Mohallah. Source: Photograph by author, 2011.

Figure 43: One of the main entrances into Sultanabad. Source: Photograph by author, 2011.
the walls surrounding houses in order to exit the area at any point they like, before jumping onto the public transport that spreads out to all parts of Karachi. As described in the last chapter, such geography combines with the discursive production of Sultanabad as a lawless no-go area for police to create an imagined geography of the settlement as an enclave best avoided.

At the same time, as I elaborated in the previous chapter, after several visits to Sultanabad I started to understand how it is configured as a highly complex neighbourhood which is further fragmented into enclaves structured around different norms and regulations. As explained earlier, the patterns of settlement coupled with the experiences of urban political life have created distinctly recognisable cultural enclaves or mohallahs within Sultanabad, where new and old migrants coalesce to negotiate their place within the multicultural megacity and perform community-making (Keith, 2005). As is usual in such mohallahs, the boundaries between Sultanabad’s ethnic enclaves are mostly symbolic constructs (Datta, 2012; Chatterjee, 2009).

It is this aspect of Sultanabad’s enclaves which I will pay attention to in this vignette. While the approach here is different to that I have used to describe the earlier enclaves, I make this distinction in this section so as to better highlight the diversity of enclaves within Sultanabad and the multiple ways in which they are materialised. This will help substantiate my earlier outlined argument that enclaves are dynamic spaces which exist along a continuum of extreme fortification and openness, yet which are made apparent through patterns of circulation.

Moving on, Sultanabad’s mohallahs are rarely materialised through physical infrastructures, but rather are subjective and temporal. For example, Khattak, a prominent local resident, explains that Sultanabad is generally open to outsiders but that police and security forces may find it harder to penetrate. At the same time, outsiders may find it hard to access the same spaces at night or at times when urban violence intensifies. Some of these enclaves are well-known militant hubs, while others are home to more marginal ethnic groups.

Keeping this in mind, in this vignette I will detail how enclaves in Sultanabad are defined by uses of space, notions of socio-spatial community or simply a strong sense of difference. Rather than being visible through their borders, these enclaves are often made visible by tensions in space and patterns of circulation. At the same time, the existence of multiple enclaves within Sultanabad creates confusion based on perspective. To some,
the whole settlement is an enclave, while to those inside, the rules, regulations, norms and physical architectures subvert subjectivities, creating confusions about the limits and purpose of enclaves: who is walled in and who is walled out?

**Cultural Difference, Space, and Circulation**

This discussion about the width of roads and entry and exit points in the settlement is important, as I soon learned that such indicators shape ideas of community space and trespass. For many outsiders, it is usually impossible to get beyond the wide commercial lanes that stop halfway through the settlement (see figure 44), while for Sultanabad’s residents, knowledge of street layouts—dead ends or wider lanes—is important in negotiating safe movement within the settlement. When I asked visitors to Sultanabad about whether they had problems moving around the settlement, or whether they could define the borders of the enclaves within Sultanabad, Salman, a non-resident community health worker at the Aga Khan Health Centre in Sultanabad, explained:

> The border of the enclave—if such a thing exists—is defined by violence. There is no warning that you have crossed it. But someone will call you out and threaten you. You may be simply intimidated, or forcefully asked to leave.

![Figure 44: Map showing the main entry routes into Sultanabad and the Balti Mohallah](image)
by self-constructed steel gates, most other enclaves were unrestricted and allowed passage, yet often remained inaccessible. Norms structuring movement between mohallahs were often constructed through culturally defined notions of public versus private space. In the dense katchi abadi, where large families live within one bedroom apartments in tall buildings, street spaces usually become extensions of homes, and hence become quasi-private ‘communal’ spaces. For this reason, densely populated streets along narrow alleyways are territorialised as the mohallah’s own, and often become protected as such.

This was made apparent through narrated experiences of trespass. For example Shamim, a health worker at the Aga Khan Health Centre, spoke of her initial naivety when she started working in Sultanabad. As an outsider she wasn’t familiar with the nuances of territoriality within the settlement. She narrated an incident where an ambulance couldn’t access a woman in labour who needed to get to a hospital for emergency care. She was carted out through Sultanabad on a wheelbarrow. Following this, the health centre raised money to initiate a road widening project, so that a thoroughfare could be constructed through the settlement. However, Shamin explained that despite best efforts, the project was not successful:

*The road was only widened up to a certain point. When we tried to extend it towards the other end of the settlement (as planned), some people came waving guns and warned us not to expand the road any further.*

The incident in which an attempt to open up roads incited violence took place in the Mehsud Mohallah. Residents of this mohallah perceived the road widening as a violation of their territorial claim and an attempt to ‘open up’ the enclave to more traffic. Given the reputation of the Mehsud Mohallah as a fiercely private space, and not being able to find any gatekeeper within, I was not able to access the enclave myself. However, narratives from other Sultanabad residents highlighted how the Mehsud Mohallah was often aggressively defended. Imam, the elder of the Balti Mohallah, expressed his frustration at the Mehsuds, who he says ‘use cultural use of space as an excuse. If the street is closed, then they can use it as private, but if the street is a thoroughfare, how can they call it private and refuse access?’

The Mehsud Mohallah therefore used violence and the threat of violence as a way of subverting cultural norms in appropriating and privatising space not traditionally
conceived as public. Their actions were widely opposed by most Sultanabad residents, who resent the violent intent with which the Mehsuds selfishly appropriate space. Khattak explained that his resentment was primarily because the Mehsuds gave such enclosure practices a bad name, as their territorialisation of cultural space was defined by a violent intent to keep out the police and security forces and other outside interference so that they could continue nefarious activities:

Everyone knows that area as a den for marijuana, alcohol and gambling. The police also know. The corrupt get protection money from these wrongdoers, while the honest are scared for their life. [...] These people (of the Mehsud Mohallah) stop access so they can continue (illegal) business.

Another enclave within Sultanabad is the Wazir Mohallah. The Wazirs are a distinct Pashtun community hailing from the tribal region along the Pakistan-Afghan border. The first Wazirs to settle in Sultanabad arrived in the 1980s, and they have successfully integrated into the community. However, recent migrants who have come to Karachi in order to escape the conflict around the War on Terror are much more conservative and insular, and they differentiate themselves from other (longer settled) Pashtuns in Sultanabad. They have mostly clustered into one area of Sultanabad, and violently defend their space. Furthermore, like the Mehsuds, the Wazirs are reputed to use coercion as a way of restricting access into the spaces of their mohallah. Gul, a long-time resident of Sultanabad and an older settled Wazir Pashtun, narrated his disgust at the new settlers’ enclave, and their backward way of life:

They even don’t allow internet or TV cables to run through there. They cut them themselves, and warn operators to not come there. They don’t allow their families to watch TV. Not all of them are living here with their families though, and some are alone sharing a small flat with other men. They are ruining the mahaul [socio-cultural environment] and peace in the area. They are illiterate and have brought rural culture here. Since they have come, petty crime has also increased. They are also rude to children and other people—we know to generally avoid that area now—they are trouble!

Although I was not able to interview anyone from the Wazir Mohallah myself for safety reasons, interviews with residents such as Gul who lived close to the Wazir Mohallah suggested that the mohallah was constructed as an enclave in an effort to preserve cultural values. Rejecting the opportunities for integration and diversity offered by ‘cityness’ and urban life (Sennett, 2008; Keith 2005), the Wazir Mohallah could be regarded as a
spatialised effort to resist the loss of cultural values in a multicultural environment. Therefore, in the Wazir and Mehsud Mohallahs, circulation was restricted by intimidation and force in an effort to preserve culture as well as ensure community security.

**Circulation, Social Control and Enclavisation**

Such violent spatial practices of maintaining enclaved spaces highlight how practices of enclavisation and restricting circulation create vulnerabilities and differences within the multi-ethnic enclave. Older migrants from the same ethnic group who had assimilated to cosmopolitan city life found themselves in a difficult position negotiating their own identity in comparison. They resented such behaviour by new migrants as it ‘tarnished’ the reputation of Pashtuns in the city. As I will show in the next chapter, the Pashtun identity in Karachi is now racialised as violent, uncouth and uncultured. Yet, given the current system of conflict resolution in Sultanabad, whereby elders arbitrate disputes on behalf of the community, Chaman explained how older Pashtun migrants from Waziristan such as himself are caught in an awkward situation when recently migrated Wazirs initiate violence:

_Elders come and ask us to have a talk with them, or to explain to them how things work here, but it’s difficult. It’s just going to create enmity, and we want to avoid that. When these people go back to the village, they’ll make life hard for us and our families there. It is cultural: it’s hard to refuse to help newcomers coming in from the village, and it’s difficult in this case especially because these people are uncivilised._

The presence of the new migrants has therefore altered the social profile and ethnic balance within Sultanabad. This also corresponds with the altered dynamics of urban security and politics in Karachi. Militant ethno-politics and religious conservatism have reared their head within the _katchi abadi_, which was previously a stable and peaceful settlement. Khattak elaborated that as a result of this, the political profile of the neighbourhood is changed: ‘We’ve all been PPP supporters here, but now you can see ANP and JUI [a sectarian political party traditionally opposed to Shia Muslims] flags here. Things are not the same anymore’. Essentially, such attitudes have intensified fear, especially for Balti residents in Sultanabad, who are long-time supporters of the PPP and as Shia Muslims feel threatened by the JUI’s political supporters. In the previous chapter, I elaborated how the Baltis have responded to this environment of insecurity by
fortifying their enclave through physical architectures such as walls and gates, as well as through practices of socio-political homogeneity as a means of ensuring protection.

Such practices were informed by their community elder’s previous experiences of feeling safe living in a majority Shia settlement in Karachi at a time when sectarian violence against Shia Muslims was high. Imam elaborated this by narrating his previous experiences of living in another Shia enclave elsewhere in Karachi before he moved to the Balti Mohallah:

People would stop me and ask about my own sectarian affiliation, but then left me alone. That’s because where I lived, the majority was Shia Muslim, so no problems existed inside. But if there is a minority living there, that’s where people had a problem

In light of these experiences of living navigating urban insecurity, living in fear of increasingly radicalised neighbours, the elders of the Balti Mohallah have imposed control over their community. As Riaz related, elders restrict residents from renting or selling accommodation within the Balti Mohallah to anyone outside their own ethnic community:

Obviously, this (selling/renting) will increase the chances of a clash. For example, what we see on TV, conflicts arise because of differences. […] If there is an urgent need, we might accommodate any Shia [in case there is no Balti interested in buying/renting].

At the same time, youngsters are strictly discouraged from socialising with others ‘outside’. Majid, a student at Karachi University elaborated this while explaining restrictions to socialise with other youths living beyond the Bali Mohallah ‘Our elders know best, they tell us to steer clear of them (kids from Sultanabad), the kids there are no good. They are uneducated and violent. I don’t usually hang out with them’, he said.

As a learned man with experience and exposure in the city, Imam commanded the following of his community. The rules and regulations he imposed on his community shaped the enclave as much as did the physical structures surrounding it. Enclavisation was therefore a function of social control as much as of security provision through walls and gates. It was a process that conflated cultural cohesion with security. Most importantly, the process helped preserve a sense of mutual interest though the option of collective bargaining, which was helpful in the settlement where power relations were often guided through patrimonial and clientelistic politics (Gazdar and Mallah, 2011).
Imam proudly stated his command over his community’s 400 precious votes as an asset ‘If the entire community casts their vote, we can make candidates win elections. That’s why they ensure that we are happy, and that nobody bothers us’.

Yet, the community leaders of the Balti Mohallah placed a disproportionate amount of emphasis on secure circulation. Although the Mohallah’s gates and walls manifested the prickly nature of the enclaved space (Flusty, 1996), interviews with Imam and other residents of the Balti Mohallah revealed an obsession with creating ways of ensuring complete spatial bypass of other areas in Sultanabad (Graham and Marvin, 2001: 228). Residents spoke of being victims of violence or of being fearful of being in harm’s way when moving through Sultanabad to access the main road. For this reason, they had petitioned the Habib Public School to allow them passage so that they could avoid other mohallabs in Sultanabad altogether. Below, I will elaborate this fear in more detail in the context of the production of difference and emerging subjectivities of inside and outside.

**Violence, Identity, and Subjectivities of Inside/Outside**

Issues of access and inaccessibility in Sultanabad reveal paradoxical subjectivities: do enclaves materialise as secure havens that keep out insecurities, or are they ghettos that wall in residents, trapping them? This was particularly evident when considering the case of the Balti Mohallah, which I described in the last chapter as a walled and gated enclave within Sultanabad. Yet, despite this added security feature, residents of the Balti Mohallah continued to aspire for complete ‘disembedding’ (Rodgers, 2004) from the rest of Sultanabad. They aimed to create an exclusive passage between the Balti Mohallah and the main road, one that would bypass Sultanabad. Riaz, a resident of the Balti Mohallah, shared the routine insecurity Baltis face in moving through Sultanabad. He explained the problem in detail:

*We are 80 to 90 families who are trapped because we are not safe travelling through Sultanabad, especially through the adjoining Wazir Mohallah. Since the people from Waziristan have come, they have changed the way things are done. They find violence to be the best way to resolve disputes or get a message across. Poor people in our area cut their houses alongside the Storm drain to make way for a narrow passage so we can have secure access to and from our Mohallah. We used to find it easy to come and go from Sultanabad, but now there is a problem.*
Riaz’s sentiments about feeling trapped were relational to the increased threats of violence from neighbouring Wazirs when travelling through other lanes across Sultanabad. Majid, a university student living in the Balti Mohallah, mentioned how his friend had been assaulted by young Wazir boys for no particular reason, except perhaps that he was a Balti and hence a Shia Muslim:

They accosted the boy walking to the shops just because he happened to walk past—beat him up. Then (at another time), they threatened someone with a revolver and said they won’t let our women cross their area. They are extremists, and don’t like Shias.

However, speaking to non-Balti residents of Sultanabad, it seemed that such violence was not specifically targeted at Baltis. Khan, a Pashtun resident who lived in H block, just outside the Balti Mohallah, spoke of his own trials related to living in the settlement:

We all get roughed up. Parts of this neighbourhood are rough and best avoided, but such violence is not directed at any particular community. The Baltis are creating baseless rumours about us Pashtuns, we are equal victims. And we’ve never threatened them [the Baltis]. My house is along the same lane as the Baltistani mohallah. The electricity transmitter for this area is next to their water tank, and in case there is an outage late at night, we don’t have access to check it because they lock their gates at night! It doesn’t bother them, because their electricity is drawn from the school. They have access to the open school grounds in case there is an electricity outage, while we have to stay cooped up in our narrow lane. They have all these benefits, but they create problems for us. And then they still complain!

Khan’s comments reveal how enclaves produce subjectivities of inside and outside. From Khan’s reaction, it seemed as if those living in H block Sultanabad had been ‘walled in’, instead of ‘walled out’. The Baltis enjoy a monopoly over the entrance to Sultanabad through the Habib Public School (see figures 45, 46, and 47 below). As explained in the previous chapter, the arrangements between the school administration and the Balti elders allowed the Baltis to enjoy school facilities such as the parking space and playgrounds outside school hours. Khan felt that such exclusive permissions unfairly privileged the Baltis, who were inconsiderate to their neighbours at times of infrastructural failure. Since gating, those living outside the Balti Mohallah had no choice but to wait for morning to get access to the electricity transmitter situated within the Balti Mohallah (see figure 48) and check it for faults.
Figure 45: Picture of unhindered access to Balti Mohallah from within the Habib Public School. Source: Photograph by author, 2011.

Figure 46: Entrance of the Habib Public School, which Balti residents can use to access their Mohallah. Source: Photograph by Khadim-un-Nabi Rao, 2012.
Figure 47: Physical segregation between Habib Public School and the rest of Sultanabad. Source: Photograph by author, 2011.

Figure 48: Pole mounted transformers in Balti Mohallah. Source: Photograph by author, 2011.
Such attitudes and practices work to intensify difference and grievances between the Baltis and other community members in Sultanabad. Sultanabad is generally a more peaceful *katchi abadi* than other more troubled ones in Karachi. In Sultanabad, residents claim life is somewhat better ‘because we have been living as neighbours for so long—we are no longer really Pashtun or Mohajir or Sindhi but Karachiites now.’

Another resident claimed that ‘there are a few trouble spots—just as there would be anywhere in the city—but most *mohallahs* within the settlement are not violent ethnic clusters’. However, my interviews with residents from various *mohallahs* revealed that the Balti Mohallah was unique in nature, and also more extreme in its practices of isolation and socio-spatial differentiation. I also felt the socio-spatial practices of enclavisation within the Balti Mohallah had led to an intensified fear of the others ‘outside’, and had constructed a racialised view of their neighbours in ways that are similar to how poor domestic workers are victimised in gated communities and enclosed neighbourhoods such as Askari III and Clifton Block 7. The Baltis, like much of Karachi’s middle class, have turned to fearing all of Sultanabad as a space of criminality and danger.

Yet, it became evident that the relationship between identity and violence was entirely subjective. The Baltis were adamant that their community faced a threat from those ‘outside’, and that this threat was based on religious differences. However, as interviews progressed, it was obvious that all of Sultanabad’s residents lived in an environment of extreme vulnerability and insecurity. Moreover, descriptions of violent events and the identity of violent actors changed depending on which ethnic group was being interviewed. For example Khan, a Pashtun living in close proximity to the Wazir Mohallah, was quite used to aerial gunfire and seeing people wield guns. He agreed that most people living in his neighbourhood and most Pashtuns within Sultanabad own guns and are not scared to use them. Yet, he argued that owning weapons is a norm in the tribal areas and hence the act of displaying weapons or firing them does not necessarily denote violent intentions:

---

17 Although other *mohallahs* may have their own norms of spatial use, interviews with residents of other parts of Sultanabad suggested that none are violent or dangerous to cross through with the exception of the Mehsud and Wazir Mohallahs.
We are used to firearms from our visits to our village. My uncles get cartridges and fire them on celebratory occasions, such as weddings. We’re from the tribal areas, and that’s what’s done there. Sometimes, we do that here as well, but we have to be careful. I’d never pick up a gun because it can be mistaken as a sign of aggression. My father is very strict and has taught us that those who live with guns die with guns.

Politically active residents, on the other hand, spoke of routine aerial gunfire as a demonstration of power. For example, Khattak, a Pashtun who supported the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), mentioned that aerial gunfire was common for members of the ANP (Pashtun Nationalist Party) who ‘see this as a way of bravado and intimidation.’ Interviews with others in Sultanabad revealed that violence and shootings in Sultanabad were indiscriminate and that such acts of violence were perpetrated by actors external to the settlement. This was especially the opinion of Hazara and Punjabi residents in Sultanabad. The Hazara and Punjabi ethnic groups are largely neutral in Karachi’s sectarian and ethnicised politics. In an interaction with two Punjabi women living in an ethnically mixed mohallah along the main road leading into Sultanabad, one of them related:

It has been three or four months, it has never been like this before. They are Pashtuns and I think Mohajirs who are fighting together? Yes, Pashtuns and Mohajirs are fighting. They just stand here and start firing—I don’t know if they are residents or outsiders. The boy next door got injured by a stray bullet. Poor guy, thank God he survived. My daughter was walking home from a friend’s house when they started firing. They just do it for no reason. These are people affiliated with some party—I don’t know which, they come out wearing face masks and start shooting for no rhyme or reason. Maybe, just firing because they just have to (are ordered to) kill people. The situation has become so bad that we hardly leave our house because of fear.

Based on the different narratives surrounding violence in Sultanabad, it was obvious how perspectives on violence changed depending on the identity of the person. Baltis, for example, argued that their identity as Shia Muslims made them vulnerable to sectarian violence perpetrated by recent Sunni Muslim migrants who had joined the ANP. On the other hand, as a Pashtun himself, Khan claimed to be unaffected by the gunfire because he had grown up in a culture where the use of firearms was normalised. Sarah, however, spoke of it as an event with a vague purpose that she couldn’t understand: it was perhaps political, but she wasn’t quite sure. She did not attribute it as directed against any community in particular, but it nevertheless instilled deep fear in her.
Within this context, the claims made by Balti community elders that their community is singled out and targeted may be true, but it was also obvious that others within Sultanabad were equal victims of everyday violence. Yet, the Balti Mohallah was one of the few moballas that restricted circulation (others being the Wazir and Mehsud Mohallas). Considering that understandings of objectives and targets of violence in Sultanabad are subjectively constructed (depending on identity positions), it follows that the processes of enclavisation and restriction of circulation in these moballas is contingent on generating a strong sense of differentiated community. Yet, as Werbner (2005) highlights in his study on community and the translocation of culture, community is not a static formulation, but is heterogeneous (e.g. political, cultural, social and ethno-linguistic), and its boundaries change situationally. This is helpful in considering not only how moballas may coalesce as enclaves that look after community interests, but then also for understanding that the ‘borders’ of such enclaves are flexible and may shift to include and exclude certain people based on changing community interests.

In conclusion, although organised differently from Askari III and Clifton Block 7, a few moballas within Sultanabad were identifiable as enclaves thorough protective practices which limited access to outsiders, as well as the instantiation of collectivised identities. My own movement through the different moballas of Sultanabad led me to believe that, similarly to Askari III, access was negotiable based on registers of identity (whether ethnicity, religion, gender or class), the declared intention for a visit and building trust with gatekeepers. At the same time, I also became aware that socio-spatial practices of community formation are closely tied to bordering practices in spaces where no physical architectures exist to define enclave boundaries. As a non-resident woman who had no history of engagement with residents beyond academic interest, I was able to obtain access especially since my own presence within the neighbourhood was not as politically identifiable as that of many others.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented detailed vignettes of Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad in an effort to explain my earlier-outlined reconceptualisation of enclaves as dynamic socio-material and socio-political assemblages formed through discursive and material processes of securitisation. By paying attention to practices of bordering and securitisation and patterns of circulation, I have attempted to highlight how processes of enclavisation are productive of identities and subjectivities. Overall, highlighting the
range of ‘forms’ that enclaves may take—from physically gated to enclosed to open—I have argued that the ‘borders’ of all these enclaves are dynamic, fluid and often simply discursively produced. Moreover, I have also emphasised how processes of restricting circulation are a key feature of enclaved spaces.

Therefore, by presenting the various processes, practices and performances that combine to filter circulation in Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad, this chapter has taken another step towards highlighting enclaves as processual socio-material assemblages. Firstly, in each of my field sites I have focused on how the socio-material or performative architectures of enclosure are enacted, and how they work to constitute the enclave and filter circulation. Such a focus has helped in highlighting enclaves as spaces that are continuously assembled and re-assembled between varying degrees of openness and closure. Secondly, focusing on interactions between residents, enclave management and processes of enclosure and security in each of the enclaves has highlighted the constant contests, tensions and negotiations that exist between security and circulation in enclaved spaces. I have understood these tensions through critical theories of difference which highlight how identity is irreducible to a single construct and how power relations contribute to the construction of identity (Butler, 1993; Massey, 1995). Such a focus has allowed me to lay bare the way in which physical security architectures cannot be entirely credited for creating distance and separation. Instead, the processes of enacting enclosure are closely linked to symbolic and discursive practices that perform security and structure movement.

For example, in the vignette on Askari III, I demonstrated the way in which disciplining circulation and enforcing enclosure is a constant negotiation between residents, guards, ID cards, gates and walls. It is also embedded in processes of bordering and securitising, which discursively and performatively produce identities of self and other (Butler, 1993). At the same time, examples from Clifton Block 7 demonstrated how physical architectures of security are usually symbolic in nature, yet they produce security performatively (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007). At the same time, viewing community identity through registers of inclusion and exclusion has demonstrated how processes of enclavisation not only cement community but also fracture it. Following from this, ‘the enclave’ can no longer be conceived as a spatially bounded category defined by physical architectures alone.
Similarly, experiences of circulation in Sultanabad’s mohallahs demonstrate how negotiations of space and movement co-produce identity and difference in a heterogeneous and violent settlement. Moreover, I have highlighted how these categories often become confused in relation to broader urban identities. The arrival of new migrant groups, the increasing densification of the settlement and the proximity of mohallahs to each other, as well as the constant need to cross certain areas in order to move through others, all combine to create tensions in space. As most of the settlement’s enclaves exist as culturally distinct mohallahs, this spatial pattern becomes a platform from which elders collectively organise ‘community’, and in the process registers of political, ethnic or religious affiliation become strong markers.

Although such tactics are deemed essential to negotiating daily life in the precarious settlement, invoking such a politics politicises everyday life and movement within Sultanabad. In the next chapter, I will detail how, in a city where violent ethno-politics is recurrent and peace routinely hangs in the balance, such politicisation can threaten to destabilise the delicate balance of peace. I will elaborate this by focusing on the ways in which enclavisation performatively produce identities of self and other, as well as identities of place. Recalling the causalities of violence presented in Chapter 2, I will argue that such processes of identity creation re-produce structural violence, while they also attract political and terrorist violence. Moreover, I will elaborate how violence often becomes a means of ensuring justice in an enclaved urbanism, and how resulting forms of extra-judicial violence further marginalise urban residents—especially the urban poor, pushing them to seek protection from militant actors who challenge state authority.

To conclude, drawing on the evidence presented in his chapter, I will briefly summarise two key points about residential enclaves which meet my research objectives of reconceptualising enclaves as agential and political spaces that are continuously in process. Firstly, comparing the security practices within walled and gated Askari III, enclosed Clifton Block 7 and fractured Sultanabad, I found that urban form is not the defining feature of enclaves and that their walls and gates are not adequate markers for borders. Instead, it is the patterns of circulation, bordering practices and registers of inclusion and exclusion which make enclave borders more visible. Studying patterns of circulation also reveals that enclaves are not singular uniform spaces, but that each is subjective to whoever encounters it. As access and rights are subjectively granted to people based on various registers of identity and status, it becomes evident that enclave
spaces are processual in nature. Building on to the argument presented in the previous chapter, it can be concluded that each enclave is a topological construct (Massey, 2005) in which a particular form of social life is organised through eclectic spatialisations that manage circulation. This frees us from a vision of enclaves viewed solely through panoptic disciplinary spaces that exist through sovereign exception, and instead allows a more mobile and fluid conception as elaborated in chapters 2 and 3.

Secondly, I will argue that enclaves configure urban-socio-political relations in ways that perpetuate urban violence. Having already defined how enclavisation affects citizenship and alters state-society relationships in the previous chapter, this chapter’s focus on practices and processes of governing circulation and security within and between enclaved spaces highlights how enclaved spaces denote a system of governance that displaces responsibility from the state and places it on those systems, mechanisms or persons now governing enclaves. The evidence presented in this chapter therefore supplements my previously outlined arguments (in chapters 3, 4 and 6) that enclaved spaces spatialise governmentality (Foucault, 1991b; Robbins, 2002).

Moreover, the evidence presented in this chapter also makes it possible to start considering how processes of enclavisation radicalise urban identities and produce subjectivities (Jacobs and Fincher, 1998). By elaborating how enclavisation, identity and subjectivities are intertwined, the arguments in this chapter allow us to view enclavisation as a potent force that reconfigures socio-political identities in the city. As I will demonstrate further in the next chapter, the inside-outside relationships resulting from enclavisation determine racialised identities and differentiations between self and other. Not only does the resulting fear propagate processes of enclavisation in polarised and heterogeneous parts of the city, but the processes of enclavisation also make particular enclaves identifiable as territorialisied spaces or ‘turfs’. In such cases, enclavisation perpetuates marginality and extra-judicial violence, while enclaves themselves may become the targets of ethno-political or criminal violence. Building on evidence presented in this chapter and Chapter 6 before it, I will elaborate this argument in more detail in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 8
ENCLAVISATION AND THE CONTINUUM OF VIOLENCE IN KARACHI

Building upon the evidence presented in the previous two chapters, in this final chapter, I will consolidate my argument that enclaved spaces and processes of enclavisation in Karachi are productive of concatenations of urban violence in the city. Thus far, I have argued that processes of enclavisation are highly political in nature, and that the division of the city into guarded enclaves plays a critical role in amplifying structural inequalities, magnifying existing socio-political divisions, and restructuring relations of power and politics. In this chapter I will further elaborate these arguments to illustrate how processes of enclavisation are generative of urban violence in Karachi.

Giving examples from Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad, I will first highlight how enclaves territorialise identities of people as well as place, as well as showing how such territorialisation is generative of socio-political violence, state-violence and even terrorism. Secondly, I will elaborate how processes of enclavisation in Karachi materialise differentiated forms of citizenship, create stark structural inequalities and consequently violently marginalise the urban poor. Thirdly, and relatedly, I will elaborate how processes of enclavisation spatialise forms of governmentality and graduated sovereignties. The resulting enclaves emerge as spaces of sovereignty, political exception and extreme violence. Finally, I will elaborate the ways in which all these relations of power, politics and identity tie together in an enclaved urbanism. Viewing Karachi’s enclaves as relational and self-perpetuating spaces, I will emphasise that processes of enclavisation in Karachi are generative of continuums of violence.

The Agency of Enclaves: Enclavisation and Identity Formation

In this section, I will use evidence from my three case study sites to demonstrate that enclaves are generative of various forms of urban violence. I will first argue that processes of enclavisation produce socio-political homogeneity, and as a result, residents of such enclaves become the targets of terrorism and socio-political violence. Next, I will illustrate how the processes of securitisation are productive of criminalised and racialised identities. Such processes of identity formation magnify social difference between urban groups in ways that exacerbate the vulnerabilities of the urban poor, who become victim to structural violence, vigilante justice and state terror.
At the start of the introductory chapter, I quoted a posthumous claim by a terrorist who carried out a suicide attack against the CID building in Karachi in November 2015. His claim that ‘the enemy has technology that can only be defeated by a suicide attack’ was significant. It explained that the brutal action of blowing up his body was intended to be a forceful attack on the otherwise impenetrable fortified structures of the building. More generally, his act of terror was an attempt to destroy the heavily fortified office of the Karachi Police’s anti-terrorist cell, from where officers carried out investigations which had helped capture high-level Taliban operatives in Karachi. The terrorist bombing of the CID building was one of many that Karachi has been victim to since Pakistan’s alliance with the US and NATO security forces in the ‘War on Terror’. Between 2007 and 2012, 1360 people were killed and more than 2209 injured in terrorist attacks (suicide bombings and sectarian killings) (San-pips.com, 2014). These attacks have targeted members of the public who may be representative of a particular sectarian or political identity as well as symbols of state power or foreign intervention. In the process, many attacks have hit fortified enclaves such as foreign consulates (including those of the USA, Japan and Saudi Arabia), five star hotels, sectarian enclaves and VIP houses within enclosed neighbourhoods.

Even though the inhabitants of such enclaves may not have any direct relevance to militants’ grievances, the attacks demonstrate that as militarised and securitised spaces, such enclaves have become the symbolic frontiers of a war fought elsewhere. Sassen (2010) eloquently suggests that, given the nature of contemporary asymmetric warfare, cities have become key sites of resistance as well as the targets of war. However, I would extend her argument and propose that in Karachi violence against enclaves is tied to political circumstances, whereby terrorists unable to counter state power on remote battlefields bring war to the city, targeting high-value sites which are representative of particular political identities. Related enclaves become targets in this war as they denote spatial identities of state power, global influence or integration, or even sectarian/ethnic distinctiveness. As a result, such acts of violence paradoxically reproduce insecurity in enclaves which have been securitised in anticipation of such acts of violence in the first place. In an interview, Jamal, a resident and member of the Clifton Block 7 association, made reference to this being the case for a neighbouring enclave:
Government officers live in In Bath Island. No one else will come or is allowed to live over there. Last year, security barriers and mobile police were installed outside the Corps Commander’s house and the Army house in Bath Island in order to protect them. It was right across the street from my house. Initially I felt more secure because of this, thinking the security there will improve my own security. But now we feel more insecure because of this! They [criminals] are more likely to target such places.’

I found such sentiments to be especially true in Askari III, where residents felt concerned about their neighbourhood being identified as a space housing military personnel. As Asma, a resident of Askari III, stated:

The way that army enclaves are currently under attack by the Taliban makes me feel nervous about our security in terms of living here. What do these militants know? They’ll see ‘Askari’ [a word denoting ‘local soldier’ in the British Colonial Army] written outside on the walls and gates. They may target us for getting the army’s attention—how do they know that not everyone here is affiliated with the army?

Such fears of being identified as an army colony were especially strong following recent events in Pakistan, when terrorist attacks started to concentrate on soft targets within armed forces institutions. In a chilling statement made in the aftermath of the Peshawar School Massacre in December 2014, Khalifa Omar Mansoor, the Taliban commander who masterminded the attack stated:

I want to tell the Pakistan government, and the directors, teachers and students of the army’s affiliated institutions, that you are the ones strengthening this un-Islamic democratic system […] and if you continue to target our women and children, then your children will not be safe anymore (Hasan, 2014c).

The fear that Askari III residents felt in light of the threat of terrorism showed the paradox of security and insecurity that was produced through processes of enclavisation. Using feminist theories of geography (Massey, 1994; 2005), in previous chapters I have elaborated how enclaves are relational processes that are socially constituted through multiple socio-political and socio-material interrelations. Moreover, understanding identity as a discursive construct that is stabilised over time through repetitive iterations (Butler, 1990), we can understand how enclaves materialise spatial identities through structures, norms and processes that differentiate between inside and outside and
regulate movement and action within the enclave on a daily basis. Such ideas, whereby bordering processes and physical boundaries create identities of self and other and territorialise political identities of space, are also widely popular in scholarship on political geography (Newman and Paasi, 1998; Paasi, 1998; Mbembe, 2000).

In the context of this literature, it becomes evident that the production of enclaved space, which rests on processes which border and instantiate inside/outside relations, can be considered to be generative of the identities of each enclave. By extension, I would argue that enclavisation in Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad does not simply work to provide security to residents of the enclave, but also makes them more susceptible to forms of violence which are tied to collective identity. Recalling the evidence presented in the previous two chapters, in the case of Askari III the enclave is not only created by perimeter walls and gates, but also through militaristic rules governing access and spatial practices within the enclave. Moreover, the enclave is also made distinctive as an ex-military residential community by function of applicable legal covenants that are limited to Cantonment areas. These formal and informal laws, coupled with bordering practices at the gates, combine to generate an identity of the enclave as a homogenous space that has strong ties with the Pakistan Army. As a result, the residents of Askari III—whether they are civilian or have ties to the military—are equally susceptible to terrorist violence.

Similarly, in Clifton Block 7, processes of enclavisation are led by the Block 7 Residents’ Association, which is representative of the interests of its upper middle-class members. Even though some residents remain non-members and refuse to contribute to the association’s activities, the physical enclosure of the neighbourhood has discursively created an identity of the enclave as a space of homogeneity, prestige and exclusivity. In Karachi, privately guarded enclosed streets are usually common in areas where prominent (and sometimes controversial) politicians, public servants, religious leaders, business tycoons or media moguls reside. Therefore, the securitisation of Clifton Block 7 may have reduced the incidence of burglaries, muggings and street crime within the enclave, but it has nevertheless increased the vulnerability of residents by way of drawing undue attention to their socio-economic status. Radha, a female resident who was not a member of the Block 7 Residents’ Association, spoke of this paradox:

*It is not as if we can just incarcerate ourselves in our homes! Twice, I have heard friends speaking of being followed, or of being burgled on the road when coming home from visiting the*
bank. Our servants have ears—they know what we possess, where we are going. These barriers don’t stop them from collaborating with others to rob us outside. If anything, we look like we have something to protect—that makes us a better target.

In the case of Clifton Block 7, however, the enclosure of otherwise public streets not only projects this identity of exclusivity, but also symbolises the socio-political homogeneity of its residents. However, as I have explained earlier, in reality, the neighbourhood was divided and not all residents were members of the Residents’ Association or supported its activities. This was because they either did not agree with the rules and regulations imposed by the association, did not approve of the strong political ties with the MQM, or considered that the association disproportionately looked after the dominant interests of Ismaili residents. Despite these internal fractures, the act of physical enclosure nevertheless generated a socially constructed notion of the enclave as a community with a shared political identity (Newman and Paasi, 1998). Those living outside the enclave made comments such as, ‘Oh yes, isn’t that where the Ismaili community live? It’s a very well organised neighbourhood, but Ismailis are like that—they look after their own interests really well.’ Such notions made the enclave more susceptible to sectarian violence from outside. As Naghma, an Ismaili resident, mentioned:

*We have recently increased security in the Aga Khan Park because of threats from sectarian groups who may attack us on the way to the Jamat Khana [Ismaili Mosque].*

Similarly, in Sultanabad’s Balti Mohallah, the link between enclavisation and the territorialisation of identity was similar to that experienced in Clifton Block 7. In the Balti Mohallah, inside-outside relations were demarcated through socio-political registers of ethnic, political and sectarian identities (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992; Paasi, 1998). As described in Chapter 6, the community elders prohibited the sale or rental of property within the Mohallah to Sunni Muslims, or to people outside the Balti community, therefore ensuring ethnic homogeneity within the enclave. Moreover, since commanding a vote bank was essential to ensure security within the rough settlement, the elders who represented the Balti Mohallah strictly imposed electoral unity within the community. This made the enclave more identifiable as a place with particular political leanings. As explained in chapters 6 and 7, residents and elders of the Balti Mohallah deemed socio-political homogeneity to be essential for enhancing their power position within the neighbourhood, and thus for negotiating the minority group’s safety within the complex
and divided neighbourhood. However, such practices attracted hostility from rival ethno-political groups. Simran, a resident of the Balti Mohallah, explained this situation: ‘even though we try to separate from them [politically active Pashtun nationalists within Sultanabad] as far as possible, their youth threaten our boys saying, “We know you vote PPP, if you don’t vote for ANP there will be consequences”.

Figure 49: Sultanabad, outlined in orange and denoted as no. 6, is listed as a no-go area for particular ethnicities in times of ethnic violence. Source: Khan, 2013

Yet, critical scholars of space and place argue that it is problematic to assign spatial identities along territorial lines (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992; Newman and Paasi, 1998). This may be true for most enclaves, which I have argued are not as socio-politically homogenous as they seem. As I have mentioned in the previous two chapters, this is also the case with Sultanabad, which is divided into various socio-spatial mohallahs. Not only are there different ethnic groups resident in the various mohallahs of Sultanabad, but Pashtun identity within the settlement is also splintered between different social views and political affiliations. Nevertheless, as explained previously, thus far some mohallahs within Sultanabad have formed political alliances with others in order to ensure protection and safety, especially from external threats. Media coverage of resistance to state forces conducting military operations within the settlement, or representations of
the enclave as a Pashtun-dominated no-go area (see Khan, 2013, and figure 49), combine to discursively produce all of Sultanabad as a homogenous enclave. As a discursively constructed Pashtun majority enclave, Sultanabad attracts not only state-terror (as I will explain later), but also ethno-political violence at times when political tensions are high in the city. This is especially since as figure 50 below illustrates, some of Sultanabad’s enclaves are territorially marked by political workers through graffiti.

![Figure 50: Political graffiti indicative of ethno-political association on walls in Sultanabad. Source: Photograph by author, 2011.](image)

Such graffiti cements notions of socio-political homogeneity in enclaves and discursively creates such enclaves as political strongholds. Asad, a Punjabi resident, spoke of his fear at times like this saying:

*They (MQM) workers are given a target—kill ten Pashtuns today. Where do they find ten Pashtuns? Here, sitting in the tea shop, or perhaps at the corner store. They come with their masks and open fire, killing anyone who comes in the way. They put no value on human life. Now kids from here are doing the same to them in their neighbourhoods—they have hot blood in their veins, and we can’t control them anymore. But unfortunately, innocent people die in this madness.*

These interactions suggest that, even though enclavisation was enacted as a protective strategy to ensure safety and security, the production of enclaved spaces has generated
identities of place and further solidified social difference. Regardless of whether there were social fractures within each enclave, evidence suggests that enclaves have become identifiable as socio-politically homogenous spaces. As a result, enclaves can be understood as spaces that produce paradoxes of security and insecurity. While they are instantiated as protected and securitised spaces, the socio-political processes through which they are produced territorialise space. As Paasi (1998) argues, every time a boundary is drawn, identities of self and other are produced.

Therefore, the evidence presented in this section helps reveal the agency of enclaved spaces in perpetuating urban conflict in Karachi. Although Gupta and Ferguson (1992) argue that notions of culture and community can no longer be fixed to a territory because of the de-territorialised nature of urban interactions in mega-cities, the production of enclaved spaces brings territory squarely back into discussions of identity, difference and conflict. Thinking through the evidence presented here, and recalling the discussion in the previous chapter, it is evident that the production of enclaved space spatialises politics and reconfigures notions of rights, access, community and belonging. These affective binds become stronger and more fixed in relation to the discursive and performative aspects of the enclave, and the resulting tensions pertaining to space and circulation produce conflict between ‘outside’ and ‘inside’. As a result, Karachi’s enclaves territorialise identity politics and become identifiable sites of difference. In these circumstances, the very act of securitisation runs counter to its intent, and enclaves become easy targets for violent political actors such as terrorists or militant ethno-political groups.

In addition to this, I will also argue that enclaves are agential in perpetuating urban violence through the production of identities of people. In the next section, I will elaborate this by highlighting how processes of securitisation tied to enclavisation criminalise and racialise urban actors in often violent ways.

**Securitisation, the Production of Criminal Identities and Violence**

Here, I will argue that the socio-political practices of securitisation, which are tied to processes of enclavisation, criminalise particular urban groups by way of making them referent objects of security. This argument follows social constructivist ideas of securitisation, which consider that actors transform subjects into matters of security. Such acts are extreme versions of politicisation and allow extraordinary means to be used
against referent objects, which are politicised in the name of security (Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, 1998). In observing the everyday protocols and procedures enacted to control the movement and behaviour of domestic workers, guards and drivers in Clifton Block 7 and Askari III, I found that service workers were overly securitised. The repetitive processes of securitisation were also generative of the performative identities of such workers as potential criminals (Butler, 1990). Furthermore, the figure of residents of katchi abadis, especially young Pashtun males, was further criminalised through discursive practices.

For example, in the aftermath of an attack on a mosque within a military residential enclave in Rawalpindi, Major—an Askari III resident and member of the Residents’ Executive Committee—narrated the difficulties of ensuring security given the continuous and ongoing traffic produced by way of employment within the enclave:

They (terrorists) can come to the mosque and drop off a bag. No one knows what’s going on. How far can security be foolproof? A terrorist can come and get employment here. Who’s to know? Everyone has a responsibility to be careful. Even the GHQ cannot provide 100 percent security to their people.

In light of such suspicions, the Askari III Residents’ Executive Committee has instantiated strict security protocols for hiring and monitoring service workers. These are described in detail by Naz below:

There’s now a separate entrance for pedestrians, and the guards there check for their specially issued ID card on the way in. On the way out, they look through their possessions as well. This is just to catch petty theft that these maids might be carrying out. It is very common for them to sometimes steal things like money, clothes, makeup, food items, jewellery etc. If I want to give something to my maid to take home, I’m instructed to write this down on a slip of paper which she will show the guard on the way out. The slip shows her name and the details of what’s in the bag.

Naz’s comments reflect how the spectre of terrorism has worked to securitise ordinary circulations of domestic staff within the enclave. Other residents echoed Naz’s and Major’s sentiments, and suggested that monitoring maids and domestic servants was essential in the present climate of insecurity. Many did not trust their domestic staff, and instead considered them potential security threats. While the threat of terrorist violence
was more remote, the processes of securitisation of Askari III were found extremely helpful in keeping residents secure from ordinary crime. Sana, a professional woman and mother of two young children elaborated her dilemma:

> Though I haven’t been robbed, one has to be careful of servants and workers. What do people do? Increasing expenses and inflation have played a big role in changing their loyalties. The new measures to ensure security keep us secure from threats. Similarly, I think we have personal responsibility as well. My own maid has been working for me for quite a while now, so we have an understanding. I normally wouldn’t hire anyone without proper references, and would make sure to register them with the police like we are asked to here at Askari III. Also, I am wary of hiring new help. Even knowing some things about my current maid, that she does sometimes pinch groceries or loose change, I would never want to change her because I’ve known her for so long, and she knows the ins and outs of my house. If I hire someone new, they too would learn my routine and understand the way my family works or my house operates. Many people knowing this kind of information makes people more insecure.

Sana’s comments were suggestive of the prevalent attitude towards domestic workers in middle class households in Karachi. Yet, in enclaved spaces such as Askari III and Clifton Block 7 (see for example Radha’s comment presented in the previous section), the fear of domestic workers, drivers or guards is heightened, especially as residents recognise that these were constant sources of interconnection between the secure ‘inside’ of enclaves and the violent city outside. Even if the presence of these outsiders was a constant cause of worry for residents of middle class enclaves such as Askari III and Clifton Block 7, residents found it difficult to live without such help. In these circumstances, the only route available for residents was to constantly check and monitor staff members. In doing so, as I have described in the previous chapter, the system of securitisation turned in on itself in Ballardian ways. Sarmad, a member of the Clifton Block 7 Residents’ Association revealed:

> The guards patrolling the neighbourhood are hired from private companies. However, we do check their registration and their ID cards and police records. We do monitor them. The guards for the park are CDGK employees, but we keep a check on them too. We monitor them by raiding the park at odd times—for example I might come to the park outside my usual visiting time to check what’s going on. We also ask the police to check the park at odd times.
Such comments demonstrate that insecurity is a self-perpetuating feature of enclaved spaces. Even though the job of private security guards is integral to upholding the enclave as an exclusive space, their very presence is generative of insecure circulations. Not only are their bodies deemed risky, but recalling Samina’s quote in the earlier chapter, their knowledge of people’s movements and constant surveillance is in itself considered problematic by residents. In light of these insecurities, the protective measures taken against such staff members and guards—which involve multiple background checks, registration with the police and the issuance of security IDs—are resignedly accepted by workers within the enclave. Such acts of securitisation marginalise workers and residents, and even though workers submit to them, they feel antagonised. Mudassar, a young domestic worker employed in Askari III mentioned:

_It's scary. My heart races every time I hear that something valuable has gone missing, and I am always fearful of a robbery. I know they will suspect me and torture me. But what do we do? We are poor people, and we have mouths to feed._

![Figure 51: 'Identify him if is the one who has robbed you'. Source: Clifton Block 7 Residents Association, 2012.](image)
Mudassar’s fears were not ill founded, especially considering that the poor become victims of personal and structural violence as a consequence of such criminalisation. I heard various accounts from poor service providers within Askari III and Clifton Block 7 who were threatened with abuse after being suspected of petty crime. Worse still, the privatisation of security governance and the criminalisation of the urban poor often lead to direct violence against the urban poor who become victims of acts of vigilante justice. For example, the Clifton Block 7 Residents’ Association regularly detains ‘suspected criminals’ who are found loitering around the neighbourhood, trespassing, and in some cases are apprehended during attempted criminal acts (see figure 51 above).

As the image above illustrates, captured suspects are often subjected to physical violence so that, as Adil stated, ‘they may be taught a lesson to never do this again, and so that everyone can see this is the fate of criminals trying to act in our neighbourhood!’ In some cases, the suspects are officially turned over to the police after being caught and beaten ‘just to extend their punishment, or to get help in recovering any stolen goods’. At other times, the police are complicit and enable extra-judicial trials of suspects, knowing full well that there is little possibility of keeping the suspect in lockup, especially if there is no evidence that a crime has been committed.

The poor are not only subject to direct violence, but certain populations within them are also racialised as criminals and hence made victim to extreme marginality, socio-political violence and state-terror in an enclaved urbanism. Such forms of violence are mostly cyclical, since they are the outcomes of insecurities relating to escalating terrorist and criminal violence in the city, which in turn are outcomes of structural violence in the megacity. For example, speaking in response to the fear evoked by a terrorist attack on Mehran Base (a military base in Karachi), Molly elaborated how an event elsewhere in Karachi reproduced insecurity within Askari III:

> A few weeks ago, just before or after the Mehran base attack—I don’t remember now, some Pashtun men came into the compound in a rush. They took a look round the place and went away. That was scary; we wondered why they came, and who they were. After that threat, there were steps to increase security by calling in police mobiles and setting up check posts.

Similarly, in describing problems in ensuring security within Clifton Block 7, Azim, a senior member of the Residents’ Association, remarked:
We have briefed our guards to stop young men on motorcycles, as they are usually involved in muggings, and also these wild Pashtuns who are poor and are usually looking to make money from crime.

In describing the suspicious and potentially threatening visit from outsiders to Askari III, Molly matter-of-factly made reference to the identity of the suspects as Pashtun. Her words were reflective of the wider racialisation of the Pashtun, and the conflation of Pashtun and terrorist identity. Similarly, Amir too attributed criminal activity to Pashtuns, calling them ‘wild’ and making reference to their marginality as a reason for their criminal intent. While I have already elaborated how processes of filtering circulation in Askari III and Clifton Block 7 subjugate poor urban workers and discursively produce criminalised identities, I will now showcase how the figure of the Pashtun is particularly singled out as dangerous, why this is so, and how this affects urban socio-political relations in the enclaved city more generally.

As terrorist attacks in the city are increasing, the ‘Taliban’ identity is placed on new migrants hailing from the tribal hinterland (Chinoy, 2009; Curran, 2009). The discourse is spurred on by media reports that link the recent Pashtun migrants to Karachi from Quetta, Swat and Waziristan to threats to law and order in the city (Craig, 2014; Wash, 2010a). The MQM, threatened by the swelling numbers of Pashtuns in Karachi, perpetuates this discourse by publicly warning urban governors of an impending ‘Talibanisation’ of Karachi (Mehdi, 2008; The Express Tribune, 2013c). Although the labelling is unfair, as some of these migrants are actual victims who have been displaced by the war, it is widely taken up by ordinary residents. Even, Gul, himself a Pashtun resident in Sultanabad, described the new migrants by refusing to call them Pashtun and at the same time conflating their actions in Sultanabad with performative constructs of Taliban identity:

They are not Pashtun! Look at this park. [These Wazirs] have destroyed it—they are illiterate, uncivilised. They have changed the environment and made it so it mirrors their own. Like a dirty, barren land. This area was very peaceful—it was an exemplar. We are patient with them, but they are really destroying these areas. Since they’ve come, there has been an increase in petty crime, theft, cutting of electricity wires. If you yourself see their neighbourhoods, you’ll wonder how these people are living. This park was so beautiful; it was an example for the whole city! They have uprooted the trees, pulled out benches, the rail around the park has disappeared, it’s as if they are detonating bombs in the park!
In Chapter 6, I also elaborated how, in the same settlement, Imam justifies enclosing the Balti Mohallah as a response to the ‘gun toting Taliban’ abundant in Sultanabad. Viewing identity formation as the articulation of a more dynamic process of representation, signification and performativity which is intertwined with the material conditions of everyday life (Keith and Pile, 1993; Fincher and Jacobs, 1998), the racialisation of Pashtuns in Karachi as Taliban can be therefore be considered the outcome of present day insecurity events in Karachi. Yet, the same critical perspectives on difference lead one to understand how relational processes of enclavisation construct racialised and criminalised identities of both people (as safe or unsafe) and enclaved spaces (as targets), and that such identification marginalises populations who are securitised and politicised as potentially violent.

The evidence I have shared thus far suggests that processes of securitisation in enclaved spaces racialise ethnic Pashtuns as violent, irrational, uncivil and anti-modern. This racialisation is related to the fact that Pashtuns hail from the north-west frontier regions of Pakistan, which have been famous for armed resistance to authority since colonial days.\(^{18}\) Countless narratives construct Pashtun identity as fierce, belligerent and self-determining, essentialising their identity as both honour driven and militant (Caroe, 2011; Khan, 2007). Yet, such forms of racialisation are productive of structural violence against Pashtuns in Karachi. For example, I heard countless recent Pashtun migrants in Sultanabad bemoan their inability to find jobs in Karachi because of racial discrimination. Zakir, a middle aged man who had recently moved to Sultanabad with his family from the tribal region of Parachinar, shared his ordeal:

*I am trained as a guard. I know how to handle firearms, and I have experience protecting people and their properties. I’ve been looking for a job for three months, but nobody wants to hire me because I am Pashtun. I have even tried going to a security agency but they too say they can’t hire me because they can’t provide a security check for me.*

Such accounts resonate with Fincher and Jacob’s (1998) argument that processes of identification—which are grounded in institutions, structures of governmentality and

---

\(^{18}\) Even in contemporary times, many Pashtun areas remain ‘tribal belts’, and juridico-political systems in these areas are not incorporated into the Pakistani state. Tribal Pashtuns have played significant roles in global politics as freedom fighting mujahedeen fighting alongside the Taliban in the 1988 Afghan War, and as members of the Taliban today,
relational frameworks of power—not only create subjectivities, but also determine their rights and privileges. In the context of the empirical evidence presented thus far, since enclaved spaces are established through relations of governance, social control and power, enclaved spaces can be considered identity producing processes. Following from this, it becomes possible to conceive enclaves as agential and political spaces that enhance the marginalities of vulnerable groups such as domestic workers and Pashtuns, who become victim to structural violence and vigilante justice. In the next section, I will further elaborate on how enclaves are productive of the perpetuation of urban violence in Karachi by focusing on the ways in which processes of enclavisation exacerbate marginalities and inequalities.

**Relational Processes of Enclavisation, Marginality and Violence in Karachi**

In this section, I will argue that in Karachi relational processes of enclavisation are reflective of structural violence and that this form of urbanism, i.e. enclaved urbanism, exacerbates existing marginalities and perpetuates various forms of urban violence. Previously, I have highlighted how enclaves such as Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad are each outcomes of a crisis of urban governance and spiralling urban insecurity. Yet, given the relational nature of urbanism (Massey, 2005), enclavisation is a self-perpetuating process. As I elaborated in Chapter 6, premium infrastructural development and exclusive resource allocations to army enclaves such as Askari III create shortages and infrastructural failures in other parts of the city. In this environment, middle-class urban residents, organised in enclaves such as Clifton Block 7, successfully engage the city government and attract an undue share of public resources from the sympathetic city government. In this context, residents of *katchi abadis* such as Sultanabad are left to their own devices in solving problems of community development and security.

Furthermore, as I explained in Chapter 6, each enclave also crystallises differentiated forms of state-society relations in Karachi. In the socially polarised megacity, enclavisation is made possible through devolved forms of state power, fragmented urban governance and particular rationalities of governance which allow flexibilities to some citizens and not others. In Askari III, enclavisation is tied to the instantiation of a state of exception from the civil state by the military. The enclave offers a refuge for residents who are disaffected from the public sphere and wish to retreat from civic life. In rejecting the disorder of the city outside, residents chose to live behind walls in an enclave.
developed and overseen by the military. In Block 7, enclavisation embodies a revanchist (Smith, 1996) appropriation of public spaces and public services by the urban middle-class. Residents of the enclave have organised themselves and actively engaged with a sympathetic state so as to protect themselves and their communal interests. On the other hand, the various enclaves in Sultanabad emerged as a response to an otherwise negligent state, whereby residents formed their own structures of governance, justice and political action in order to navigate everyday life in a violent environment. Even though the physical form, political space and socio-political processes through which each enclave comes into being may vary, each of these enclaves has cemented over time in response to increasing urban insecurity and recurrent crises of urban governance.

Recalling these relational processes of enclavisation is important because it helps contextualise the rationalities of governance in Karachi through which these enclaves were born. Here, I would argue that Karachi’s enclaves are spatial outcomes of market-driven strategies of neoliberal governance, which exacerbate inequalities and existing differences in citizenship (Holston and Appadurai, 2003; Ong, 2000). In a severely polarised city such as Karachi, such strategies of governance are similar to what Ong (2000) describes in the case of South East Asia, whereby states govern populations according to ethno-racial differences in relation to market calculations. In Karachi’s case, this is not so much a function of ethno-racial difference as of social class. As I highlighted in the introductory chapter, interviews with state officials suggest that citizenship rights are granted or restricted in accordance with the class and socio-economic standing of residents. State officials in Karachi reveal that socio-political rights associated with enclavisation—i.e. political activism, privatisation of space, rights of enclosure and self-governance—were readily conferred on affluent urban residents, while similar practices were criminalised and violently suppressed in the marginal katchi abadis.

Such differential attitudes towards enclavisation—where it is tacitly approved of in well-to-do neighbourhoods and severely opposed in slum settlements—are reflective of governmental attitudes towards ensuring that the everyday life and economy of Karachi continues uninterrupted in an environment of insecurity and uncertainty. Relatedly, by virtue of their value within the financial and economic life of Karachi, affluent urban residents are considered actors who need protection. Meanwhile, the urban poor—even though they are similarly integrated into the global economy—are deemed less significant urban actors, and as I have elaborated in the previous section, risky and criminal bodies.
Discourses of insecurity and fear of crime highlight how *katchi abadi* residents are both criminalised and made ready culprits of the city’s problems (Inskeep, 2011: 175). Such attitudes have become more deeply entrenched with the escalation of ethno-political, criminal and terrorist violence in Karachi. In this environment, previously ordinary *katchi abadis* such as Sultanabad are gaining local and international media attention as spaces where Taliban groups have entrenched themselves, swelling the ranks of existing criminal and mafia groups (Khan, 2013; Walsh, 2010a; Zaman and Ali, 2013).

However, interviews with residents of Sultanabad and the neighbouring Hijrat Colony and Railway Colony (all *katchi abadis*) reveal that such neighbourhoods are spaces of marginality (Perlman, 2009) and those living in them are often victims of everyday violence and state brutality. Interviews with residents of Sultanabad and neighbouring *katchi abadis* reveal that such settlements house migrants who came to Karachi in successive waves, escaping disaster and conflict in their homes elsewhere in Pakistan or in Bangladesh, Afghanistan or India. Residents were often hard working people who provided essential labour and services to affluent enclaves that were deemed integral to the functioning of the ‘global city’. Yet, the reputation of such *katchi abadis* as hotbeds of political, ethnic, sectarian, criminal and everyday violence caused much anxiety to the neighbouring middle-class residents of Askari III and Clifton Block 7 (such as Adil, Azim, and Major), who conveyed their prejudices about such spaces and their residents, viewing them as sources of insecurity in an already violent and unpredictable urban environment. This spatial proximity of well-to-do spaces with *katchi abadis* within Clifton and Defence (see figure 52 on the next page) has therefore propelled processes of enclavisation in spaces such as Askari III and Clifton Block 7. Anwar, a resident of Clifton Block 7 explained this in detail:

> Criminals used to come into our neighbourhood, commit crimes, and make off into the katchi abadi on the other side. I once went with the police after my maid stole my wife’s jewellery but we couldn’t catch her. They [the residents] came out in droves, violently pushing the police away. The only way we have is to prevent crime in the first place. We are safer now—with our guarded barriers, 24 hour patrols and CCTV cameras!

However, conversations with residents of *katchi abadis* show that practices which restrict ‘outsiders’ from entering the *katchi abadis* are related to the high-handedness and forms of subjection tied to processes of enclavisation in affluent areas. Recalling the incident Anwar related, Mumtaz, a resident of Sultanabad who had previously worked as a maid
in Askari III, said that she stood by such tactics which bar outsiders and the police. Mumtaz and her family had been victims of police brutality at the behest of her previous employer, a housewife in Askari III, who had lost her diamond ring and immediately suspected Mumtaz:

The police came after me the next day, even after I had cried and begged my innocence to master and mistress. They couldn’t take me away because I’m a woman and so they took my young son instead. He is only nineteen! They beat him up, and I pleaded with them to let him go, I was innocent. They found the ring after all. They recovered it from the other maid who was hired to wash clothes. It’s terrible that she stole it. Its actions like these that make us all look like criminals!

Figure 52: Dense katchi abadis (outlined in red) are nested within affluent spaces (annotated) in Clifton and Defence. Source: Google Earth
Despite having suffered for her wrongdoing, Mumtaz sympathised with the other maid. She felt that many domestic workers are tempted into conducting petty crime, especially as they are exposed to the stark inequalities between their own lives and the luxurious lives of their employers. Mumtaz explained this by saying:

_Stealing is against my morality, but others justify it. The houses where we work, people leave food around and throw it out because they can't eat it. They just have so much that they aren't careful with their belongings. They are out of touch with us—they would understand us if they had lived our hard lives._

Like Mumtaz, even though other _kachi abadi_ residents were aware that the police were carrying out their responsibility to arrest criminal suspects, they loathed letting the police enter the settlement and dispense justice. Jugnu, a young resident of Sultanabad, elaborated his reasons for restricting police access to the neighbourhood by making reference to the brutal extra-judicial killing of Sarfaraz, a 19 year old resident of Hijrat Colony (a _kachi abadi_ adjoining Sultanabad). ‘Yes, we don’t let the police in—for our own safety!’ he said. ‘You saw how the Rangers killed Sarfaraz? How can we let them in when they bypass justice to punish us on the behest of the rich?’

![Image](image_url)

*Figure 53: Television coverage of Sarfaraz Shah seen begging for mercy before the Rangers shot him dead.*

*Source: Khan, 2011.*

Sarfaraz was tragically killed by the Rangers (an urban police force) after he was caught attempting to mug a couple in a park in Clifton. The event sparked widespread public
outrage, especially as a mobile phone video released to the media showed the heartless shooting, where the young criminal was shot in cold blood while he begged for mercy (See Khan, 2011, and figure 53). On the one hand the event struck fear into the hearts of poor young men, who had always felt alienated by the policing and judicial system, while on the other hand it cemented the reputation of the already dreaded Rangers as a brutal police force that was callous and disrespectful of life. Overall, the event further polarised urban socio-political relations between the affluent and the poor, especially as some affluent residents said that the boy had got what he deserved.

My initial impressions therefore led me to realise that the production of enclaves in Karachi—especially in areas south of the bridge—was a relational phenomenon. Interviews with residents living in affluent areas neighbouring katchi abadis revealed that such residents live with a magnified sense of insecurity caused by their spatial proximity to what many termed ‘unsafe places’. Meanwhile, conversations with residents in katchi abadis highlighted that they were victims of police brutality, vigilante justice and extreme marginality. They were left to cope with the insecurity brought about by everyday violence, but they were also extremely vulnerable to ethno-political violence and state terror. ‘We are the abandoned, the dispensable people’, said Jugnu describing the political situation of his co-habitants. ‘They have left us to fend for ourselves, while the city government and police are interested only in solving the problems of the “big people”’, he added.

The obviously biased attitude of the police against Sultanabad’s residents has not only led to frustration and anger, but has also de-legitimised the authority of police force. As is common in other such marginal spaces (Ploeger, 2006; Wacquant, 2008b), residents feel that they have no choice but to trust local strongmen. Mehran, a young Pashtun resident, explained his reasons for doing so:

“They (the police) are just a joke. They don’t have any interest in protecting us or solving our problems. They just come in to pick up as many people as possible [...] with TV crews behind them. They arrest us indefinitely. Why would we go to them if we have any problems? They don’t do their jobs. They just want to make money off us (through bribes). We are better off trusting people like Niaz, who are real heroes, not afraid of anyone!”

In making reference to Niaz, Mehran was speaking of a resident political worker who had a reputation for working in the community’s interests. Niaz was a member of the ANP
militia, and was wanted by the police for killing an officer on duty, who had come into Sultanabad to arrest him. Despite his criminal record, many young men in Sultanabad look up to Niaz for his ‘loyalty to the community’, and for often being the ‘first one to rush to the scene to help people against the authorities’. Niaz’s protection became especially valuable after the escalation of terrorist violence in Karachi, following which police would conduct raids and arrest scores of young men from Sultanabad (see figure 54 on the next page). Even though Niaz was considered a hero by young men, his activities were looked down upon by community elders such as Khattak:

_These young men are turning towards violence. This is not how we have managed things in Sultanabad—we have built dialogue with the police and the city government. We believe in negotiation, not bullets. Unfortunately, things are changing for the worse in Karachi, and these boys are getting frustrated._

This perceived notion of state abandonment in the face of marginality was a common theme in most interviews. Similarly to what is common in other such spaces existing on the ‘margins’ (Koonings and Kruijt, 2009; Das and Poole, 2004), I found that processes of enclavisation in Sultanabad are tied to community cohesion, political consolidation and discursive construction of exception and lawlessness. Moreover, this form of enclavisation is tied to the de-legitimisation of state authority in much the same way as is common in other fragile cities (Jaffe, 2013; Moser, 2009; Fregonese, 2012). In the ensuing enclave, protective policing, gang identities and alternative systems of justice and governance help residents negotiate everyday life in a tough urban environment. In this environment, relations between citizens and the state continue to change, especially as citizenship is mediated through associational membership or patronage and thus becomes tied to protection (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006). As Alsayyad and Roy argue (2006: 3), ‘such forms of citizenship substitute for or are even hostile to the state’. Through these examples, it becomes obvious that enclavisation in Karachi’s _katchi abadis_ is not only an outcome of structural inequalities and violence produced through enclavisation in the city’s affluent areas, but also that such processes of enclavisation territorialise _katchi abadis_ as no go areas i.e. as spaces that lie outside state control and that violently oppose state control.
Therefore, in this section, I have argued that processes of enclavisation across Karachi are tied to the differentiated experiences of insecurity between urban residents from various walks of life. Yet, I demonstrated that related activities of securitisation have compounded urban insecurity by generating identities of self and other, exacerbating material and political inequalities, and hence marginalising poor urban populations to a point where they are forced to retreat into their own territorial enclaves. In short, I have outlined how enclavisation in Karachi is a self-perpetuating process which is relational to structural violence: In the present environment of insecurity, the urban poor have become targets for vigilante justice and state terror, and in response have turned towards consolidating their political power through alternative means which include enclavisation, political engagement, and establishing parallel forms of authority. However, as I will outline in the final section of this chapter, such relational processes of enclavisation and insecurity are productive of concatenations of urban violence. Related processes of enclavisation rest on ensuring socio-political and ethnic homogeneity, a process that rests on strong political control over populations. Such processes of enclavisation make Sultanabad’s enclaves identifiable as a stronghold of particular ethno-political parties, thus attracting sectarian or ethno-political violence from opposing groups living within, or outside the settlement. Furthermore, in such enclaves, state legitimacy is eroded. As a consequence, violent non-state actors became appropriators of authority and legitimacy.
Khattak’s earlier comment served well to explain how, in these extreme circumstances, negotiation and dialogue becomes less popular. Instead, violence becomes a pervasive means of exhibiting power. In the final section of this chapter, I will extend the argument presented in this section and elaborate the relational processes of enclavisation and urban violence in greater detail. Before that, in the next section, I will elaborate how processes of enclavisation spatialise forms of governmentality and graduated sovereignties and with what violent effects.

**Governmentality, ‘Grey Zones’ and Violence**

Thus far, I have outlined that enclaved spaces both structure and mediate urban socio-political relations and state-society relations. Moreover, enclaves seem to embody characteristics that perform sovereignty: They structure civil order, delimit citizenship rights, instantiate boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, and generate identities. In the cases of Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad, the structures of governance that underpin such enclaves hold political power over residents. In this way, enclaves are identified as agents of power which wield control over residents in ways that replicate the state’s authority. In this section, I will unravel the relations of power and politics in enclaved urbanism and interrogate issues of ethics, responsibility and regulation and the related forms of violence associated with such strategies of governance.

This is especially apparent when considering that the checkpoint is often considered ‘a technology of government, the embodiment of a claim to sovereign power, the practice of sovereignty’ (Sidaway, 2003: 164). Bordering practices are attempts to establish local spaces of sovereignty (Sidaway, 2003; Jaganathan, 2004), and in this manner the processes of restricting circulation in Karachi’s enclaves—whether through physical infrastructures or other violent means—performatively reproduce the state’s bordering practices of de-limiting citizens from non-citizens. Yet, this task is not limited to interactions at the gates or the entry points of physically enclosed enclaves, but is also de-territorialised through other mechanisms of de-limiting inside/outside relationships. For example, the rules that require maids to carry ID cards and residents to place stickers on their cars in Askari III, the requirement to pay a membership fee in Clifton Block 7 and the ethno-political registers of belonging in Sultanabad are all bordering practices which are reproductive of state-practices of conferring citizenship rights.
This is significant, because understanding enclavisation as a practice that seeks to control circulation and understanding circulation as ‘the set of regulations, constraints, and limits, or the facilities and encouragements that will allow the circulation of men and things in the kingdom and possibly beyond its borders’ (Foucault, 2007: 325), it becomes possible to understand how power and politics are configured in enclaved cities and with what consequences. Keeping in mind Foucault’s example of the creation of the free market system in order to solve the problem of food security, circulation can be understood as a sort of freedom which is in fact a facet and dimension of apparatuses of security (Foucault, 2007: 49). It was also a mechanism whereby the state de-politicised the negative consequences of free market food shortages. In creating a system of governance through which the market would fix itself, circulation was itself a system of governance which made food shortages a problem that the sovereign could no longer be directly accountable for. Taking this forward, I would like to suggest that as a process tied to ‘securing circulation’, the encouragement of enclavisation in affluent areas is not only a means of securing the economy of the city, but is also a governmental practice that de-politicises the forms of violence associated with processes of ensuring security.

Consequently, viewing enclaves as spaces that control circulation, as ‘moorings’ that make circulation possible (Urry, 2003), it becomes obvious that enclaved spaces do not denote the absence of state authority, but instead emerge as a system of governance that displaces responsibility from the state and places it on those systems, mechanisms or persons now governing enclaves. As found elsewhere (Benit-Gbaffou, 2008a; Robins, 2002), interviews with senior government officials in Karachi suggest that the state has sanctioned community policing and the privatisation of security in urban residential spaces in acknowledgment of its own limitations. The resulting enclaves spatialise new forms of governmentality, whereby urban spaces are regulated through policing, regulating or removing offensive behaviour or disruptive populations (Robins, 2002; Merry, 2001).

Yet, emerging forms of spatial governmentality are highly problematic in Karachi. In producing security, justice and order in a city where all these are currently lacking, enclaves in Karachi are productive of authoritarian systems of governance that appropriate functions that traditionally belong to the state. This is not a problem in itself, but it becomes so when these structures of governance produce mob and vigilante justice and remain either unregulated or silently supported through governmental biases. This is
evidenced in the brutality of privatised policing in Clifton Block 7 and Askari III which I outlined earlier. However, the system of private policing has recently become more brutal. In a recent extreme case, a suspect was extra-judicially killed by police in Clifton Block 7 (Dawn News, 2014), and this trend has been escalating recently, and is spurred on by residents who encourage ‘no tolerance’ policing.

Figure 55: ‘Anyone willing to give cash prize to police constable who killed robbers?’ Source: Clifton Block 7 Residents Association, 2014.

In the aftermath of the extra-judicial killing, a few members of the Clifton Block 7 association lauded the efforts of the police offer who killed the suspected offender, encouraging other members to offer him a cash prize (see figure 55). News of such incidents is not always made public, and when it is, reports are confused and mired with ambiguity over the circumstances of the killings (The News, 2014; Dawn News, 2014). In an enclaved city, where violence has become ordinary, the lives of residents have become more contingent and precarious. This precarity is compounded in a city where regimes of circulation are operationalised through notions of graduated sovereignty, a concept which Ong (2000) describes as a form of governance whereby populations are governed through different modes according to their strategic place within global markets. In a
system of governance organised through graduated sovereignty, socio-economic elites are given rights, freedoms and privileges which those less visibly integrated into the global economy do not enjoy.

However, such brutality is not just tied to graduated sovereignty, but also the notion of hybrid sovereignties which Fregonese (2012) explains as a form of sovereignty that is structured along a complex hybridisation between state and non-state actors. This concept is useful for contextualising the complex arrangements of power within Karachi as a function of state practice. Here, I would argue in Karachi, the state is complicit in allowing brutal disciplinary regimes to foster in affluent enclaves as well as in marginal enclaves such as Sultanabad. For this reason, the state is not weak or absent, but is present through its knowledge of such activities and allowing them to pass. Just as Alsayyad (2004) highlighted in the case of urban informality, the prevalence of such systems of governance are a function of governmentality, and allow the state with alternative ways of ruling populations and controlling subject groups.

For example, senior government officers are aware that the unregulated Jirga system of dispute settlement, which I explained in Chapter 6, often metes out brutal punishments for crime within the settlement. ‘It is not our problem, until someone reports it or registers a case against it. Moreover, police officers are aware that the ‘elders are often reasonable people, with the best interests of the community at heart’, and hence trust their practices of regulating criminals from within the settlement and meting out fair warnings and justice. However, such disciplinary practices are often as brutal as they are in places like Clifton Block 7. For example, Aijaz, a young community leader in Sultanabad, spoke of ‘disciplining boys who people complain about, those who cause trouble in the neighbourhood’ through violence. In speaking of the ways he disciplines them, Aijaz nonchalantly stated:

*We could turn them in to the police. But we tell the police to let us handle our problems ourselves. Spending a night in jail will only harden them—they will see the system, meet other criminals, and come out ready for the next robbery. Instead, I discipline them. I found out that this one kid had just started mugging people around boat basin. I put a gun to his head, saying his mother will find his body in the dump if he continues.*

Such brazenly violent practices are only made possible by the ‘de-facto authority’ vested in enclave managers brought about by the collective understanding or ‘trust’ in such
figures of authority. Such relations are not peculiar to marginal settlements in Karachi. Jaffe (2012) imparts how ‘Dons’ in Kingston also enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of residents, as they often replace state-institutions as guarantors of security and order in enclaved spaces. Yet, in interviews with enclave residents in Karachi, it was evident how the stature of local elders or key community association members, as those who organise and govern life in enclaves, legitimises such practices. In the case of Sultanabad, for example, most residents commend Aijaz’s methods for keeping youths out of trouble, while interviewed members of the Block 7 Residents’ Association also support practices of violent defence.

Borrowing the concept from Levi (1988), in such circumstances, processes of enclavisation may be tied to the production of a ‘grey zone’, a space of moral ambiguity which challenges perceived notions of right and wrong, legal and illegal. For example, in marginal enclaves such as Sultanabad, the state is both absent (from the provision of justice and security) while also being present (as a potentially violent actor). Processes of enclavisation here create conditions which improve residents’ security and safety, while also producing repression and violent methods of securitisation. On the other hand, in affluent enclaves such as Askari III and Clifton Block 7, processes of enclavisation allow conditions whereby ordinary residents uphold the law and punish transgressors with utmost violence. The state, although absent as a dominant actor in the violent act, remains present as a guarantor of this extra-state violence.

The practices of securitisation and policing that accompany processes of enclavisation therefore work to exploit these grey zones with violent consequences. Alternative systems of governance in enclaved spaces perform state-like functions as they provide security, dispense justice and maintain a monopoly of violence in enclaved spaces. In such cities, urban political life is characterised through marginality, as ‘there is a gradual expansion of a “grey zone” between the order of inclusion (formality, legality, lawfulness and civility) and the order of exclusion (illegality, criminality and the “uncivil” society and political arena)” (Koonings and Kruijt, 2009: 20). Such grey zones are managed by both state and non-state actors in ways which reproduce urban violence and conflict. Yet, studies of urban violence show that such forms of violence often perpetuate a continuum (Schepers-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004), or what Auyero et al. (2014) refer to as a concatenation, whereby one form of violence is generative of other forms. I will explain this in more detail below.
Enclavisation and the Continuum of Urban Violence

In this concluding section, I will use the literature on violent megacities as a backdrop for analysing the relationship between enclavisation and urban violence in Karachi. Focusing on the politics of difference and issues of marginality and vulnerability, I will highlight how enclaved spaces and processes of enclavisation are tied to conditions that engender urban conflict and violence in the city. In such a city, violence is manifested by repressive politics of control, intolerance of other groups and the biased nature of urban governance. This is a relational process tied to a perpetual search for order, security and justice. At the same time, violence is an outcome of these same processes, as disenfranchised groups battle with elite enclaves in a bid to take on state and security forces and assert their power over urban spaces.

Here, I will argue that processes of enclavisation across the urban landscape reproduce conditions of marginality and generate a continuum of violence. Various authors describe violence as a condition that emerges when voids in formal governance interact with the loss of the state’s political legitimacy or gaps in state authority (Koonings and Kruijt, 2009; Agostini et al., 2007; Jutersonke, Muggah and Rodgers, 2009). Under such conditions, order is maintained through myriad political actors such as gangs, militias and community security practices (Moser, 2009; de Souza, 2014; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008b). This literature also directs attention towards the reinforcing, self-perpetuating nature of urban violence. Not only does weakening state control over crime and insecurity in the city lock poor urban residents into a cycle of violence as they are pushed into a state of vulnerability at the hands of militias and gangs (DeSouza, 2006; Perlman, 2009), but residents in such spaces are often made the targets of state repression as the marginal are further militarised and marginalised (Wacquant, 2008a; Wacquant, 2008b; Auyero et al., 2014). As a result, violence becomes pervasive and circulates as a continuum (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004; Auyero et al., 2014). In this section, I will elaborate this by reviewing the relational production of enclavisation and violence in Karachi.

In Karachi especially, the intermingling landscapes of ‘everyday life’ and ‘international relations’ have spatialised governmentality and politics with violent consequences. In the aftermath of the War on Terror, various informal settlements in and around Karachi have come under scrutiny. Local and international news articles, academic journals and policy papers describe such spaces as breeding grounds for militant political activism and potential hiding places for Al Qaeda operatives (Thomas, 2000; Norton, 2003; Walsh,
Complimenting this stance, international development agencies also progressively foreground security as a prerogative that showcases ‘good governance’ (Dodds and Ingram, 2009; Abrahamsen, Hubert, and Williams, 2009). Such reports are mobilised by local political groups who are set to gain from militaristic action against katchi abadi dwellers either from the perspective of vote politics or through an alignment with middle class interests of revanchist urbanism. Despite personal political prerogatives, however, the resulting campaign for paramilitary operations in the city’s informal settlements is often disguised by discourses of global and urban security threats (Anwar, 2013). This provides an impetus for local governments to use the trope of security in order to invoke a special kind of urban governance where repression and states of exception are normalised.

I argue that enclavisation in Karachi is directly related to these processes. Given the environment of increasing urban insecurity, municipal authorities and police departments allow middle class urban residents to organise private security themselves at the neighbourhood level. While most affluent enclaves are securitised through private security guards, the police continue to provide support and backup. Statistics show that there are approximately 50,000 registered private security guards in comparison to a police force of 30,000 men (Rehman, 2012). However, the actual figures for private guards should be much higher given the large number of unregistered private guards hired directly by families rather than through security companies. Similarly, the number of policemen on public duty is as low as 11,000, as 7,000 are deployed with VIPs, foreign missions or elite neighbourhoods, while 12,000 are assigned to administrative and other non-policing official duties (Rehman, 2012).

Policing priorities and the thriving market for private security guards highlights the glaring gaps in security provision for the approximately half of urban residents who reside in katchi abadis. As explained in Chapter 6, in Sultanabad processes of enclavisation often came about directly a result of ways of managing the everyday insecurities of living in a precarious neighbourhood. Having lost confidence in the public provision of security and policing, residents resorted to their own mechanisms for ensuring peace and order. Jutersonke, Muggah and Rodgers (2009) elaborate how such relational practices of enclavisation are also evident in many Central American cities.

Despite the fact that enclavisation in katchi abadis is related to that in affluent neighbourhoods, the government views enclavisation in low income areas negatively. An
interview with the Special Advisor to the Sind Government Home Office (which commands the Karachi Police) revealed that the process is widely regarded as a strengthening of non-state actors and mafia groups and hence as a threat to urban security. In low income settlements, local organisation is often the first step in political bargaining. Emergent community leaders often negotiate votes in exchange for public works in the settlement and the politics of patronage is often tied to political mobilisation. This situation is perceived as especially troublesome by state actors because urban conflict and violence in Karachi is inextricably linked to tussles over power between various political parties hoping to gain a majority vote in the city’s various constituencies (Gazdar and Mallah, 2013; Budhani et al., 2010). Violence is readily deployed within and between ethnic enclaves by heavily armed and politically charged residents, while in extreme cases such violence is used by political parties to bargain with the state (Yusuf, 2012).

The fact that all such enclaves in Karachi create conditions where hostility towards the state is possible is largely ignored by the city’s government. As agents of governmentality, organisations which structure enclaved spaces come to wield considerable power within the community (Hansen, 2001). Fieldwork shows that, at present, processes of enclavisation are not legally regulated and the resulting enclosures and attempts to filter circulation remain heavily contested. The existing rationality of government, according to which policing is entrusted to citizens, creates conditions of severe marginality—in voluntarily giving up these functions in affluent enclaves, the government creates conditions of unequal citizenship (Holston and Appadurai, 2003). At the same time, the creation of ‘brokers’ between citizens and the state also re-structures the social contract in ways that exacerbate existing marginalities (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006). Those considered ‘outsiders’ to enclaved spaces—such as domestic workers in Askari III and Clifton Block 7, non-members in Clifton Block 7 and ethnic minorities and those without the right to vote in the various mohallas of Sultanabad—find themselves increasingly vulnerable.

Moreover, when elite enclaves criminalise the urban poor, police brutality and state violence is pushed into low income settlements. As is common in many other cities, increased marginality and insecurity push poor urban residents towards protection racketeers or prominent elders who secure residents against a repressive state (DeSouza, 2009; Mcllwaine and Moser, 2007; Wacquant, 2008a; Jaffe, 2012). In ethnically heterogeneous settlements, violence is exacerbated by the very political sociology of
enclaved urbanism. Community organisation, vote politics and ethnic affiliation all combine to form a mix that explodes in violence (Budhani et al., 2010). This is supported by evidence from cities such as Bombay and Rio de Janeiro which suggests that community associations can easily morph into violent, ethnocentric bodies (Hansen, 2001; de Souza, 2014). Evidence from other cities further suggests that increasing marginality breeds inter-communal and inter-personal violence (Chatterjee, 2008; Appadurai, 2006), perpetuating structural and political violence in ‘chains, spirals and mirrors’ or the ‘continuum of violence’ (Schepja-Hughes, and Bourgois, 2004).

These chains, spirals and concatenations of violence are often not limited to the city, but ripple beyond the urban sphere. In this thesis, I have focused on how state-power is devolved into enclaved spaces, and how these have restructured urban socio-political relations in ways which foster urban conflict and violence. However, it is also important to consider how socio-political processes of enclavisation influence conflict and violence at the municipal and national level. I have introduced this as a possibility in Chapter 4, where I described how contests between competing political actors who are in power at different levels of governance generally lead to ethno-political violence and civic conflict in the city (Gayer, 2014). However, such an investigation was beyond the scope of this study. Linking such forms of political violence with processes of enclavisation warrants further detailed research, and as I will elaborate in the concluding chapter, could be an avenue of future research.

Conclusion

In a city where ethnicity, language, religious belief and political affiliation are all potentially volatile markers of identity (Gayer, 2007; Gayer, 2012), the evidence presented in this chapter has demonstrated how processes of enclavisation add another dimension to identity construction in Karachi. Pashtun as terrorist, the affluent as safe and the poor as risky: these identities shape issues of rights and access within and between urban enclaves, as well as allowing a repressive and violent politics to be mobilised against weaker and marginalised groups. At the same time, conditions of graduated sovereignty combine with practices of spatial governmentality to produce a politics of space which marginalises those considered ‘deviant’ within enclaved spaces. Consequently, enclaves—seen as spaces in which discipline, governmentality and biopolitics are re-territorialised—re-structure power and politics in the city, often with violent consequences. While the changing landscape of urban security in Karachi is
responsive to wider global political processes, the state emerges as a biased entity which serves elite interests at the cost of poor urban residents, many of whom are forced to negotiate between a repressive state and violent militias. As a result, the enclaved city becomes wrought with violence and insecurity.

Overall in this chapter, I have argued that processes of enclavisation are agential in perpetuating various forms of structural, social and political violence. I have demonstrated how structures of urban governance and related state-society relations become skewed in ways that displace state power, legitimacy and authority in enclaved Karachi. Moreover, I have illustrated how practices of securitisation tied to enclavisation in Karachi territorialise urban space, are generative of identities of self and other and spatialise hybrid sovereignties. Furthermore, I have elaborated how related changes in urban socio-political relations are productive of structural and political violence, vigilante justice and terrorism. Finally, by illustrating how enclaves in Karachi are relational to each other, and how it is impossible to separate the violent consequences of enclavisation from the conditions which propelled the process in the first place, I have argued that enclavisation is a self-perpetuating process that generates a continuum of violence.

However, in conclusion I reiterate that in presenting the evidence in this chapter, even though I argue that the various expressions of urban violence in Karachi can be viewed as outcomes of processes of enclavisation, I do not attempt to claim that there is any linear relationship between enclaves and urban violence. If anything, as I will outline in the following concluding chapter, I would hope that my arguments could help policymakers and urban residents in Karachi change their current view of enclavisation as a suitable response to escalating urban crime and violence in their city. Moreover, I expect that the arguments presented in this thesis would be of extreme relevance to academics and policy makers alike, who could finally consider enclaves as geopolitical processes that are agential in generating conflict and violence in the city.
CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

As I outlined in the introductory chapter, in this thesis I set out to develop an understanding of enclaves and urban violence as relational processes. In this chapter, I will elaborate how I have achieved this aim through a nuanced analysis of spatial politics in Karachi, an increasingly splintering city. Furthermore, I will emphasise the important academic and practical contributions that I have made through my study of enclaves as processes. In the first section, I will highlight how each chapter in this thesis works towards the key aims and objectives of this project. In the second section, I will highlight this project’s theoretical, empirical and policy implications. Here, I will suggest how the concepts, arguments and empirical material presented within this project may be of interest to scholars working on various aspects of governance, politics and social relations in contemporary cities. Moreover, I will highlight how my findings open up possible avenues for future research which are tied to the key findings and arguments developed in this project. In conclusion, I will reiterate the significance of this project for academics and policymakers alike.

Meeting Initial Aims and Objectives

This project was inspired by my experiences in Karachi, a complex Pakistani megacity, where I found processes of enclavisation to be intensifying as a reaction to escalating urban crime and violence. While the city has gained a reputation for being one of the most dangerous cities in the world (Mercer.com, 2012), governmental failures to police Karachi and secure its citizens sit alongside a growing list of failures of urban governance in this highly polarised and splintered city. In this context, by way of managing insecurity and uncertainty in everyday life, differentially positioned urban actors have taken to governing neighbourhood security privately through enclavisation. In the starkly polarised megacity, I found that government officials tacitly support enclavisation in middle-class and elite residential neighbourhoods, while they vehemently oppose related processes of enclavisation in the city’s katchi abadis, where more than half of the urban population live. Despite this constraint, Karachi’s enclaves are distributed across both affluent and poor areas of the city, and are of varying forms, functions, and character.

However, even though more and more urban spaces are being governed and securitised privately, urban crime and violence in Karachi continue to rise dramatically. This
observation led me to question whether current practices of enclavisation are merely responses to urban crime and violence or whether they are in fact also productive of these conditions. As a result, I set out to study how the transformation of Karachi into an archipelago of enclaves could perpetuate urban violence in the city. This research problematic was developed from my understanding of cities and urban space as dynamic, multi-scalar and relational constructs (Massey, 2005; Amin and Graham, 1999; McFarlane, 2011c). From this theoretical vantage point, I began to consider that enclaves and the city are related to each other, especially as they are co-constituted in multiple ways through socio-political relations tied to processes of enclavisation. This ont-epistemological position (which I detail in chapters 3 and 5) allows us to consider enclaves to be agential political processes.

Yet, a review of the urban studies literature on enclaves, coupled with my personal experiences and interviews in Karachi, led me to believe that the present uptake of enclavisation in Karachi defied these theoretical considerations. I found that the production of fortified enclaves in Karachi as a silver-bullet response to the need to ensure security denoted a form of environmental determinism, whereby policymakers and enclave managers believed that physical fortification, enclosure and visible security protocols would effectively distance the inside of enclaved spaces from the dangerous city outside. In reality, however, such enclaves remained highly interconnected with the rest of the city. To ensure both the production of enclaved space and the smooth organisation of everyday life within enclaves such as the Karachi Sheraton Hotel, Askari III and Clifton Block 7 it was necessary to admit maids, drivers, private security guards and many other people whom affluent residents deemed ‘risky’ in the first place. Therefore, my experiences of everyday life in Karachi’s enclaves demonstrated the impossibility of isolating and containing movement through physical architectures alone. It also revealed how the transformation of megacity landscapes into securitised enclaves created varied experiences and different forms of urban political life. A focus on interactions between urban residents thus promised to reveal the complex political negotiations relating to politics, security and governance that accompany enclavisation, and hence allow us to think through enclavisation and violence in complex cities such as Karachi as relational processes. It was this aspect of enclavisation which I felt needed to be highlighted, as it addresses key gaps in the current theorisation of enclaves and empirical studies on enclaved urbanism.
These experiences led me to consider that a relational analysis of the spatial politics of enclaved spaces would be important in understanding how enclaves influence urban socio-political life in ways that create marginality, vulnerability and identity of people and place. Yet, my initial attempts to understand how enclaves relate to urban political life in Karachi were frustrated by the broad generalisations found in the enclave literature. I found that the terms used to denote enclaves—such as gated communities, enclosed neighbourhoods, fortified enclaves and ethnic enclaves—are synecdochically used to refer to spatial forms that characterise phenomena attributed to enclaves and enclavisation. As a result, analysis often fails to progress as far as to develop a nuanced understanding or meaning of enclaves in and of themselves, or to conceptualise enclaves as agential processes that are both shaped by and shape urban socio-political relations in ways that may perpetuate urban violence.

As I outlined in the introductory chapter, in light of these reflections and the gaps I identified in the scholarship, I developed my aims of objectives for this study. After reproducing these below, I will elaborate how I have met these throughout the thesis.

Overall aim:

- To develop an understanding of enclavisation and urban violence in Karachi as relational processes.

Key objectives:

- To highlight key gaps in the scholarship on enclaved urbanism which currently inhibit the generation of an understanding of enclaves as spaces that are productive of urban violence.
- To re-conceptualise residential enclaves as relational, dynamic, political and socio-material spaces that have flexible and negotiated boundaries and are always in process.
- To develop an understanding of enclaves as agential spaces that restructure urban governance, politics and socio-political relations.
- To present empirical evidence on enclavisation in Karachi in order to elaborate how processual enclaves intersect with complex urban systems to re-produce inequalities, marginalities and disjunctive forms of citizenship in ways that reproduce patterns of violence and victimisation in the city.
Key Gaps in Scholarship

In Chapter 2, I presented a critical review of the scholarship on enclaves, enclaved urbanism and urban violence. The aim of doing so was to highlight conceptual and empirical gaps which currently limit the development of an understanding of enclaves as spaces that are productive of urban violence. After presenting a definition of urban violence and outlining key concepts and frameworks of analysis related to the phenomenon, I emphasised crucial weakness in the current conceptualisation of enclaves as follows. I argued firstly that methodological and conceptual weaknesses get in the way of understanding enclaves as agential and dynamic spaces. In urban studies scholarship, enclaves are synecdochically treated as spatial forms that characterise particular phenomena. Consequently, scholars do not problematise the descriptive features of enclaved spaces, and instead treat enclaves as the ‘place’ where urban political processes and social relations are played out (Low and Smith, 2006; Lemanski, 2007; Alsayyad and Roy, 2006).

Secondly, and relatedly, I elaborated how overemphasis on physical enclosure and fortification develops an environmentally deterministic understanding of enclaves as encapsular or dis-embedded spaces (Rodgers, 2004; De Cauter, 2004). I argued that such understandings ignore circulatory life and the interconnected nature of urbanism. Overlooking the myriad circulations, interconnections and transgressions that are continuously taking place within and between enclaved spaces fails to consider the political agency of enclaves as spaces that produce contestations, identities of self and other and of space and place.

Thirdly, I argued that in the urban studies literature on residential enclaves, the gated community is treated as a paradigmatic form of enclave. Scholars contributing to studies on residential enclaves do not present analysis of other variants of spaces such as ethnoroacial or cultural enclaves. This failure to look beyond the heuristic of the gated community produces biases regarding the type and function of gated communities, and hence supresses the idea that enclaves may be relational and self-perpetuating spaces that emerge in response to socio-political expulsions and exclusions in other enclaves.

Fourthly, I criticised the lack of contextual focus in the scholarship on enclaved urbanism. I found that the literature on enclaves in cities of the global South often uses the North American gated community as a heuristic device to study varied types of
enclaved spaces elsewhere. This is problematic because it ignores the particular modalities of state power, the changing rationalities of urban governance and the complex interplay of socio-political relations in a postcolonial city.

Finally, reviewing these critiques in light of the scholarship on urban violence, I argued that in order to understand enclaves as agential spaces that are productive of urban violence, it is essential to unblackbox enclaves as dynamic and contextual socio-spatial arrangements of governance, power and socio-political relations. Moreover, it is essential to move away from an environmentally deterministic review of enclaves as physically enclosed, capsular and fortified spaces, and instead pay equal attention to the socio-political and socio-material characteristics of enclaved spaces. The arguments presented in Chapter 2 therefore led me to address the next key objective in Chapter 3, which I will detail below.

**Re-Conceptualising Residential Enclaves as Relational and Processual Spaces**

Following the arguments presented in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 I set out to reconceptualise enclaves as dynamic, political and socio-material spaces that are always in process. My re-conceptualisation of enclaves rested on poststructuralist theories of relational space—whereby space is understood to exist through multi-scalar relations between various objects, events and processes (Massey, 2005; Amin and Graham, 1999). Moreover, I elaborated how the concept of ‘assemblage’ was suitable for understanding the complex and messy relations that both constitute enclaved spaces and are emergent from processes of enclavisation (McFarlane, 2011a; McFarlane, 2011c; Bennett, 2005). Once I had established the theoretical significance of concepts of relationality and assemblage, I turned towards outlining the relational and socio-material processes through which we can understand how enclaves are materialised, spatialised and assembled. I theorised enclaves as fluid and osmotic spaces which are discursively formed and are productive of identities of self and other. Moreover, I conceptualised enclaves as spaces of subjectivities that create binaries of inclusion and exclusion. In addition to this, I elaborated on how enclaves are juridico-political spaces that spatialise the sociology of exception. This re-theorisation of enclaved space was generated by applying the concepts of governmentality and biopolitics, performativity, bordering and identity. In concluding Chapter 3, I argued that the resulting re-conceptualisation of enclaves opens up opportunities to study the spatial arrangements of power, politics and identity in enclaved spaces and to review enclaves and violence as processes that are
relational to each other. Therefore, as I will elaborate further in the next section, such a reconceptualisation enables me to develop an understanding of enclaves as agential processes that restructure urban socio-political relations and the relations of power and politics in the city.

**Understanding Enclaves as Agential Spaces that Restructure Urban Socio-Political Relations**

In Chapter 3, I argued that conceptualising enclaves as negotiated processes of securing circulation and spatialising governmentality allows us to understand how enclaves are agential in restructuring urban socio-political relations and relations of power and politics in the city. In Chapter 4, I extended this argument in more detail by contextualising the structural processes of enclavisation with relevance to Karachi and other cities of the global South. By presenting an understanding of how enclaves are relational to governance and politics in increasingly fragmented, contested and divided cities, I was able to highlight how enclaves emerge through complex arrangements of urban governance. In enclaved cities of the global South, state institutions favour urban elites and are oriented towards global capitalist interests, while the urban poor build ephemeral collaborative relations amongst themselves and with political patrons in order to navigate everyday uncertainty and insecurity (Simone and Fauzan, 2012; Ong, 2000; Dupont, 2011; Falzon, 2004). As both products of such relations and processes of urban governance, enclaves both materialise through and spatialise differentiated forms of citizenship and multi-scalar relations of power and politics in the city. Moreover, using examples from Karachi and other postcolonial cities, I showed how processes of enclavisation both symbolise and perpetuate contests of control over different levels of governance. In this respect, I argued that enclaves are sites of contested urban governance through which various urban actors attempt to manipulate urban politics, access state power and/or manifest authority. By making these arguments in Chapter 4, I was able to demonstrate how processes of enclavisation restructure power and politics in the city, and how enclavisation and violence are closely linked, their linkage being a circular, self-perpetuating phenomenon.

The concepts and arguments that I presented in chapters 2, 3 and 4 provided a conceptual background for addressing my final research objective, which was to offer empirical evidence to illustrate how enclaves intersect with complex urban systems to generate inequalities, marginalities and disjunctive forms of citizenship in ways that reproduce patterns of violence and victimisation in the city. In Chapter 5, which dealt with methodology, I explained the methods I used to gather and analyse data in order to meet this research objective. Embedded in the onto-epistemology of ‘relationality’, I identified key relations and processes through which I could study propositions which had emerged from chapters 2, 3, and 4 (see table 5 in Chapter 5 for details). Having identified the relevant concepts for studying these, I proceeded to explain why ethnography was a suitable method for data collection and a case study a suitable research design. After elaborating on the rationale behind my case study selection of Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad, enclaves of three different types, I outlined my means of data collection and my method of data analysis. Having dealt with the practical limitations of carrying out such fieldwork in Karachi, I went on to present my empirical analysis in Part II of the thesis.

In Chapter 6, the first empirical chapter, I traced spatialised relations of governance and urban political life in Karachi in introducing Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad. By outlining the context of the processes through which each enclave was created, I signified how different types of enclaves in Karachi crystallise through variable relations of governance and differentiated political subjectivities in a city where urban governance is fragmented and substantive citizenship rights are unequal. Crucially, I highlighted that processes of enclavisation shift relations of urban governance and politics in ways which necessitate the production of other forms of enclaves in Karachi, thereby suggesting that enclaves are inter-linked and self-perpetuating processes. Moreover, I demonstrated how the governance structures that underpin enclaves disrupt existing state-society relationships by displacing the social contract.

In effect, the detailed elaboration of relations and processes of enclavisation in each case study site presented in Chapter 6 provided insights into the ways in which Karachi’s enclaves are both produced through and productive of hybridising and exclusionary regimes of urban governance and varying forms of urban political life. Therefore, the
arguments presented in this chapter helped introduce the ways in which enclaves restructure state-society relations and relations of power and politics in the city, while also being productive of tensions in space, political subjectivities and marginalities. This evidence was essential for introducing urban residential enclaves as spaces that can be held accountable for wider problems of conflict and violence in the city, a project that I continued to develop in the following two chapters.

In Chapter 7, I focused on the embodied relations of space, security and circulation in Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad. I provided detailed vignettes of socio-material processes of securitisation and bordering, and the resulting tensions and negotiations in space between enclave residents, workers and visitors. I paid particular attention to relations of power and identity which are tied to inside-outside relationships in each study site. Instead of conforming to existing conceptualisations of enclaves, which tend to view them as fixed as static panoptical disciplinary spaces that exist through sovereign exception (as the literature often assumes), I traced the practices, performances and processes of bordering and securitisation in enclaved spaces, which helped me to substantiate the arguments I had presented in Part I of the thesis. This allowed me to present a more mobile and fluid elaboration of Karachi’s enclaves, while also revealing their political nature.

By focusing on practices, performances and processes of securitisation in Askari III, Clifton Block 7 and Sultanabad, I demonstrated firstly that circulation in enclaved spaces is often restricted through performative practices of securitisation and identity formation. This helped me to highlight how enclaves spatialise performative security. Secondly, I showed how the task of restricting circulation produces political subjectivities and exacerbates difference between different social groups. Paying attention to circulations and practices of bordering also led me to understand the complex inside and outside relationships that are often produced within seemingly homogenous enclaves. Thirdly, considering enclaves as performatively produced spaces also led me to highlight that enclaves are osmotic and dynamic spaces, the ‘boundaries’ of which are porous, constantly shifting and open to negotiation. Overall, these insights, coupled with the evidence presented in Chapter 6, helped illustrate how enclaves are processual spaces that are agential and political in nature.

In Chapter 8, the final empirical chapter, I built on my earlier elaborated arguments to trace how processes of enclavisation are agential in perpetuating victimisation and
violence. In this chapter, I first highlighted how in a city where secure enclaves often become targets for terrorist violence, discursive security practices tied to processes of enclavisation racialise poor urban dwellers as potential criminals. Secondly, I demonstrate how the production of enclaved spaces—as spaces of governmentality and graduated sovereignties—exacerbate marginality and create structural conditions which encourage structural violence and vigilante justice. I highlighted how such practices are problematic, especially when considering the biased role of the state. Related to this, thirdly, I elaborated on how processes of enclavisation restructure urban socio-political relations and relations of urban power and politics in ways that produce concatenations of violence. As the urban poor become racialised and targeted as perpetrators of crime, a continuum of enclavisation and violence is created, especially as it becomes obvious that the violent consequences of enclavisation create conditions which allow non-state actors to acquire legitimacy and power in competition with the state. Thus, even though it is impossible to unravel the complex forms of urban violence in Karachi precisely (Zakaria, 2012) in order to present straightforward causalities of violence, the analysis presented in this final empirical chapter makes crucial links between enclavisation and violence.

Overall, through the arguments presented in the first half of this thesis and the evidence presented in the second half, I am able to meet the key aim of this project. I have been able to highlight how enclaves are self-perpetuating spaces which in their process of becoming continuously reshape structural conditions and socio-political relations in the city in ways that propagate marginality, vulnerability and various forms of urban violence. In the next section, I will highlight how this project has made significant theoretical and empirical contributions to scholarship on cities, security, violence and governance, and I will elaborate on the significance of this project for academics and policymakers alike.

**Key Contributions and Related Avenues for Future Research**

In this section, I will elaborate the key contributions made by this project, and its significance for academics and policymakers in understanding enclavisation, governance, insecurity and urban violence in cities of the global South. I will also suggest pathways for future research.
**The Agency of Urban Space**

Firstly, while my research has bridged significant conceptual gaps in the scholarship on enclaved urbanism, fragmented governance and urban violence, my reconceptualisation of enclaves as relational processes has also contributed to inquiry into relational space, the agency of socio-material objects and infrastructural violence. By theorising enclaves as performative, agential and geo-political assemblages, I have demonstrated that enclaves are political spaces and shown that socio-material enclaves are not passive backdrops against which urban relations play out, but rather are dynamic spaces which actively shape urban socio-politics and experiences. Such a theorisation will be of interest to scholars such as Massey (2005) and Bennett (2010), who are interested in exploring the relational nature of urban space and the vibrant and agential nature of material objects. Moreover, this study would be of equal interest to Rodgers and O’Neill (2012), whose investigations of infrastructural violence aim to assign responsibility to infrastructures and spaces that are otherwise considered static and inert.

**Enclaves as Everyday Securitisation**

Secondly, by focusing on the instantiation of inside-outside relations through processes of bordering and restricting circulation, this research presents enclaves as paradigmatic spaces for studying everyday processes of securitisation. This is a central question in securitisation theory, which aims to understand security as a social construction and as the outcome of specific social processes (Balzacq, 2008; Buzan and Wæver, 2009). My emphasis on how everyday processes and practices of enclavisation generate identities of self and other and delimit rights and privileges between those considered ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ is therefore of special interest for scholars such as Huysmans (2011) who are interested in developing a ‘bottom up’ approach to understanding securitisation processes at the national level. Relatedly, a future project could extend the argument that I presented in Chapter 8, where I illustrated how referent objects of security are performatively constructed in an enclaved urbanism. Such a study would identify the ways in which everyday practices of security may shape identities of risk, danger and ‘otherness’ in contemporary cities, and how these identities may produce broader discourses of insecurity across various scales of governance.

Yet another future project might consider how the production of enclaved spaces ties with issues of governance, state-power and conflict at the national and global levels.
Although I have already elaborated how re-distributed relations of power between enclave spaces and the state are productive of urban violence, the practical limitations of this project left me unable to develop an understanding of how similar relations of power are productive of civic, national or global conflict. In future research, I am therefore keen to investigate how processes and relations of governance tied to enclavisation are linked to issues of legitimacy, authority and state-power within globalising states, and with what effects. For example, in considering how state-power is often performative (Weber, 1998), it becomes possible to understand enclaves as ‘micro-sovereignties’ where various actors and institutions appropriate significant power. In addition to this, considering that enclaves are seemingly ‘grey spaces’, in which boundaries between formality and informality, legality and illegality and protection and violence often blur (see chapters 4, 6, and 8), such an appropriation of power becomes problematic. Future research could focus on how enclaves may be agential geopolitical spaces which emerge as modalities of administration by national and global state and non-state actors. Such research would be of primary significance to scholars and policymakers working on violence, national and global security and global governance.

**Alternative Modalities of Urban Planning and Governance**

Thirdly, this project makes significant contributions to the literature on urbanism, urban planning and governance in the global South (Simone, 2010; Simone, 2013; Bayat, 2012; McFarlane, 2012; Roy, 2009b; McCann et al., 2013). In outlining enclavisation in Karachi in relation to processes of urban governance and politics in the fragmented global city, this research responds to the call to develop detailed and contextualised research on governance and planning in cities of the global South (Watson, 2009; Lindell, 2008; Roy, 2009b).

Moreover, the evidence presented in this thesis also contributes to critical inquiry into urbanism in Karachi and other megacities. By foregrounding urban space as agential in perpetuating violence, this project helps shake off the typical notion of crises in megacities being predominantly tied to poverty, governmental failures and state fragility (Muggah, 2012, Moser, 2004; Davis, 2006). Such an emphasis can be helpful in providing a critique of scholarship on megacities, where ‘the megacity’ itself is considered a cause of conflict and dystopia (Davis, 2006; Norton, 2003). Instead, in illustrating how conflict and violence in Karachi is tied to processes that are generalisable across megacities and global cities, my research suggests that megacities are in fact ‘ordinary’ (Robinson, 2006),
and that urban conflict and violence in such megacities is tied to discursive practices of securitisation that are connected to the production of enclaves.

Linked to this, this project presents empirical accounts of innovative forms of urban governance in crisis prone cities. While I have presented how processes of enclavisation shape urban interactions, experiences and urban political life in multiple ways, often with violent effects, I have also introduced enclavisation as a spatial response to residents’ vulnerability to urban crime, violence and crisis of governance. Focusing on enclaves as spatial outcomes of governing insecurity and uncertainty in a society where the state is unable to provide residents with order and security, the production of such spaces may be seen as an innovative modality of urban governance. Such an outlook takes up optimistic accounts of urban political life in megacities, considering them to be cities where inventive political technologies are played out in the face of uncertainties (Simone, 2013). The resulting processes of enclavisation could be viewed by interested scholars as processual strategies that ameliorate hardships and uncertainties, or simply as processes that spatialise an ‘anticipatory urban politics’ (Simone, 2010). Such a focus would be of special interest for urban studies scholars such as Simone (2010), McFarlane (2012), Bayat (2012) and Roy (2011b).

Following from this, this project has opened up clear pathways for future research on innovative ways of governing uncertainties in fragmented and divided cities such as Karachi. Yet, as my own research on enclavisation and violence suggests, any such research would beg important political questions. By what processes, actors, objects and institutions would such governance be structured? What are the ethics of governance and governmentality in cities orientated towards an anticipatory urban politics, and how are these set? What political outcomes would be related to such technologies of urban governance?

**Empirical Significance and Opportunities for Comparative Research**

Fourthly, as outlined in the introductory chapter, Karachi largely remains ‘off the map’ in research on urban space, security and governance. Therefore, as a case study, this research offers rich contextual material for scholars interested in comparative work on enclaves and violence more specifically, and on urban space, security, governance and politics more generally.
Moreover, this research also contributes to current scholarship on urban violence, governance and socio-political relations in Karachi. At present, various scholars, analysts and policymakers explain violence in Karachi as the outcome of political and institutional conflict, as a phenomenon tied to contests between state and non-state actors, ethno-political groups and different levels of government who are vying for control of urban resources in the city (Budhani et al., 2010; Gayer, 2014; Esser, 2004). Moreover, scholars have effectively elaborated on how violence in Karachi is tied to processes of urbanisation and related issues of informality, ethnic politics and migrant settlement in the megacity (Gayer, 2007; Waseem, 1996; Gazdar and Mallah, 2013). While these are no doubt valid accounts, they do not consider the political and agential capacity of enclaves as processes that perpetuate urban violence. Furthermore, such accounts tend to describe informality, illegality and insurgent citizenship as issues that are exceptional to the lived experiences of Karachi’s urban poor. In contrast, the rich empirical evidence presented in this project suggests that such practices are equally tied to the ways that Karachi’s affluent residents navigate urban life in the megacity. Therefore, by presenting in-depth insights into conditions of widespread insecurity, fragmented urban governance, uneven spatial development and differential forms of citizenship in Karachi, this project adds a wealth of knowledge to the existing scholarship on urban geography, sociology, politics and governance in Karachi.

Practical Implications

Finally, this project reveals significant policy implications for enclaved cities such as Karachi, where state officials and urban residents problematically consider enclavisation as an appropriate response to urban insecurity and crime. As I elaborated in the introductory chapter, my interviews with urban security officials reveal a deep concern about the rapid escalation of crime and violence in Karachi. Government officials shared their alarm over the rising influence of gangs and violent ethno-political groups, acknowledging that institutional weaknesses in urban governance have led to a loss of state authority and failures in effective policing. Yet, as I outlined earlier, in an environment of escalating urban insecurity, government officials have condoned enclavisation as a stopgap strategy for providing residents with relief from living everyday

19 Interview, Arif Hasan Karachi, 29 June 2011; Interview, Parween Rehman, Karachi, 19 July 2011
life in an unpredictable and insecure environment. However, while enclavisation is especially encouraged in affluent residential areas, it is opposed in the city’s katchi abadis.

In this context, the rationale for this project is, in fact, the paradox of increasing crime and violence in a city where processes of enclavisation intensify in response to prevailing insecurity. I therefore make my most significant contribution by presenting an understanding of how enclaves are self-perpetuating processes and how they are agential in escalating urban conflict and violence in Karachi. This has direct implications for urban governors and policymakers in Karachi and other similar cities, who may come to understand that enclavisation is not an adequate response to governing urban violence, especially since the conditions and processes tied to it merely exacerbate marginality, victimisation and terror.

Crucially, present day events in Karachi demonstrate the relevance of this project, while also serving as a warning for policymakers in Karachi and other similar cities. As I write this conclusion, another violent event has shaken Karachi to the core (see figure 56). At 11:05pm on 9th June 2014, ten Taliban militants engaged in a violent siege of Karachi Airport—an archetypical enclave. Disguised in the uniforms of the Airport Security Forces (ASF), five heavily armed militants breached security at Fokkar Gate, one of the less guarded gates providing access for ground control and engineering staff working at the airport. Upon entering, the militants attacked the ASF guarding the gate, while
another team of five bombed the Cargo Gate. Both gates lead to the west side of the airport which serves cargo and VIP planes. In a matter of minutes, a violent skirmish ensued. Back-up security forces stormed the airport to assist the ASF in a protracted fight, lasting six hours. The battle left all ten militants dead (either killed or suicidally blown up), while 28 members of the security forces and airport staff were also killed.20

The attack on Karachi Airport was reported as a militant backlash in the face of the suspended peace talks with the government, as well as a violent reprisal for the killing of Hakimullah Mehsud by a drone strike in Waziristan in November 2013 (Gul, 2014). As the battleground of the war along the Pakistan-Afghan border was brought to Karachi by the militants, it became obvious that the city had itself become a technology of war (Sassen, 2010). Meanwhile, the aftermath of the event demonstrated how the military authorities had shifted their focus onto the city’s enclaved spaces. I found that my arguments in Chapter 8 had come to life: Enclaves such as Karachi airport had become paradoxical sites of security and insecurity, while related criminalisation and racialisation had gradually worked to structure a form of securocratic warfare (Graham, 2010; Feldman, 2004) against the urban poor. Immediately after the airport attack, news articles hinted at the proximity of *katchi abadis* to the airport as points of entry or planning grounds for the militant operation, and of ‘militant infiltration’ in these settlements (Khan, 2014). Similarly, government responses in rounding up ‘Afghan suspects’ from neighbouring *abadis* demonstrated how new migrants into the city flocking into *katchi abadis* were made biopolitical targets. Once more, the city’s many *katchi abadis* came to be viewed as sources of urban insecurity, while poor Pashtun migrants were made referent objects of security (Dawn News, 2014).

This violent event once again demonstrated the relevance of this research project in developing an understanding of how urban insecurity and violence relates to processes of enclavisation. As I outlined in Chapter 8, just as securitised enclaves attract insecurity events such as terrorist bombings, the urban poor continue to be racialised as criminals and hence themselves practice enclavisation in response to their increased vulnerabilities. And so continues the continuum of enclavisation and violence in the megacity.

20 Various news articles, including Hasan (2014b); Ayub and Haider (2014); Boone (2014); Quinn (2014).
Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate the significance of my research. By understanding enclaves in process and explicating the relational processes of enclavisation and violence, I reveal the agential and geopolitical nature of urban enclaves. Moreover, by offering a re-conceptualisation of enclaves as socio-material and socio-political assemblages, this project opens up discussion about the agency of enclaves and the politics of enclaved urbanism. Overall, this project has made significant contributions and has opened up important pathways for future research on enclaved urbanism, securitisation, urban governance and critical urban studies. Moreover, the arguments presented in this project are crucial for academics and policymakers alike, who would benefit from considering how processes of enclavisation restructure power and politics in the city (and beyond) in ways that cause instability, insecurity, violence and conflict.
REFERENCES


(Published: 15 March 2013).


