For Disharmony and Strength: 
Factionalism within the Conservative Parties 
in Japan, 1945-1964

Hulda Thóra Sveinsdóttir
ABSTRACT

The numerous studies that exist on political factionalism in Japan have mostly limited themselves to factionalism after the establishment of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955. This thesis attempts to throw light on factionalism within the conservative parties in Japan between 1945 and 1964 by comparing factionalism within the two main conservative parties until 1955, the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō, with that of the LDP.

The thesis is an attempt to answer three basic questions. First, what was the character of factionalism within the early conservative parties and how was it different from the LDP factionalism? Second, how and why did the character of factionalism change in this period? Third, what maintains the factionalism within the LDP?

I argue that the factionalism of the Jiyūtō and Minshutō did not affect the whole party and did not affect electoral politics in any significant way. The factions were fluid entities, with no organisational structure and very loosely defined membership. They were not effective tools to enhance political advancement within the parties. This contrasts with the politically significant LDP factions, which have clear membership and a clearly defined organisational structure which cuts through the whole party.

In answer to the second question, I argue that the dominant view that the multimember electoral system is vitally important in the emergence and maintenance of factionalism is flawed, and that factionalism in the LDP evolved out of power politics within the party which were exacerbated by the organisational environment.

Although I accept the dominant view that the electoral system has been important in maintaining the LDP factions once they were established, I conclude by arguing that the factions were legitimised and maintained by ascribing to them features seen as 'traditional' but which, I argue, were recent inventions when it comes to factionalism in Japan.
# CONTENTS

- Statement of copyright vi
- Acknowledgements vii
- List of tables ix
- List of figures x
- List of Japanese terms xi
- Note on romanisation xiii

## PART I

### Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. The aims 2
1.2. What is a faction? 3
1.3. Institutions, culture and rationality 6
  1.3.1. Historical and cultural institutionalism 8
  1.3.2. Rational choice 12
1.4. Political Change and the development of factionalism in Japan 15
  1.4.1. Historical continuity or change 16
  1.4.2. Institutional changes 17
  1.4.3. Entrenching the new factions 22
1.5. Methodology 24
1.6. Scope 27
1.7. The chapters 28

## PART II: FACTIONALISM 1945–1955

### Chapter 2: The early conservative parties: factionalism and polarisation 33

2.1. Introduction 33
2.2. The conservative factional divisions 34
  2.2.1. The Jiyūtō 35
  2.2.2. The Minshutō 38
2.3. The factions and their structural characteristics 41
2.4. Polarisation and instability 51
  2.4.1. The Jiyūtō polarisation 55
  2.4.2. The Minshutō polarisation 62
2.5. Factionalism and ideology 69
2.6. Conclusion 76
### Chapter 3:
The extent of factionalism: advancement, funding and electoral politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1. Introduction</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. Distribution of party and cabinet posts</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1. Appointments to the three highest party posts</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2. Cabinet appointments</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3. Factionalism and electoral politics</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4. Political funding and party leadership</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5. Perceptions of factional membership</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6. Conclusion</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PART III: FACTIONALISM 1955–1964**

### Chapter 4:
The LDP factions: Factionalism as a force of stability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1. Introduction</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2. 1956—A year of fluid factions</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3. Factional reorganisation and the 1956 presidential elections</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4. Consolidation of faction membership</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1. Historical continuity in factional composition</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.2. Faction size</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.3. Increasing diversity in membership</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5. Factions as policy groups</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6. Fractional distribution of posts</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6.1. Factions and cabinet formation</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6.2. Appointments to the three highest party posts</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7. From instability to stability</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7.1. Polarisation and political instability</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7.2. Factions as a force of stability</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8. Conclusion</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Chapter 5:
The new factions: from the centre to the periphery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1. Introduction</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2. Factionalism in the periphery and the electoral system</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.1. Factionalism, party size and organisation</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.2. Factional endorsements</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.3. Kōenkai</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3. Power struggles at the centre</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4. Factions and political finance</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.1. Business and conservative politics</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.2. Seiji kessha</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.3. Forging links between factions and business</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4.4. The financial relations between leaders and followers</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5. Conclusion</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6: Tradition, modernisation and attempts to abolish factions

6.1. Introduction 238
6.2. Democratising Japan: uprooting the traditional 239
6.3. The modernisation theory: the traditional and the modern 246
6.4. The movement for dissolution of factions 248
   6.4.1. The first movement for dissolution 248
   6.4.2. The second attempt at dissolution 249
6.5. The premodern factions and modernisation 259
   6.5.1. Factionalism as hindrance to democracy 260
   6.5.2. Factionalism as protector of democracy 262
6.6. Factions as traditional entities 264
6.7. Inventing 'traditional' factions 267
6.8. Conclusion 275

Chapter 7: Conclusion 279

Bibliography 288
STATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without her prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
I am indebted to many people who have helped me and supported me throughout the time it has taken to write this thesis. I would first like to thank my supervisor, James Babb, for his help and for convincing me that I should embark on this research in the first place. Professor Tim Gray gets my heartfelt thanks for being of great support throughout my studies at the University of Newcastle, and for being immensely helpful and supportive during the last stage of my writing up. I am indebted to Robin Humphrey for giving much of his time to help me design a data base for my findings and teaching me how to use it. Professor Reinhard Drifte I also thank for his help. Many friends have helped to keep me going: Heike and John get special thanks along with Elaine, Jane, Mimi, Frank, Anna, Kaori, and Shaun.

During my time doing fieldwork in Japan between October 1998 and December 2000 many people were of enormous help. I would like to thank Professor Iwai Tomoaki at Tokiwa University for his support to my Japan Foundation application to go to Japan and for his help with my research between 1998-2000. Professor Chris Braddick at Musashi University has helped me in countless ways both during my time in Japan and after returning to Britain and for that I am immensely grateful. Without his help, advice, support, and insights into Japanese politics and the Japanese political system I doubt that I could have completed my research there. He read various versions of this thesis and has acted like a second supervisor. I would like to thank him for his continuing guidance and encouragement.

I consider myself very fortunate to have met Professor Steven Reed at Chūō University and would like to thank him for his help and contagious enthusiasm for the subject of this thesis. He read several drafts of chapters at various stages, and has provided immensely valuable advice and insights as well as much needed encouragement.
Dr. Verena Blechinger at the German Institute for Japanese Studies in Tokyo I thank for introducing me to various aspects of the academic world in Tokyo and for being a friend. Many thanks go to the staff at the Musashi University library for allowing me to use their facilities while in Japan. Okabe Naoko and Matsumoto Eriko at Ibaraki University I thank for helping to prepare factional lists. Oba Kota was a friend in need when I first came to Japan with my family. I am forever grateful for his help. Yanagi Masao and Andō Shigeyoshi have helped me in numerous ways for which I am very thankful. I am also indebted to Eythór Eyjólfsson, consul to Iceland in Tokyo, Junya, and Simon for looking after me during my frequent stays in Tokyo. I am eternally indebted to Otsuji Hiroko for mothering and supporting me and my family throughout our two years in Japan.

Thanks are due to the ORS which funded my research between 1997-1998 and 1999-2000 and to the Japan Foundation for granting me a scholarship for doctoral students to do research in Japan for 14 months between 1998-1999.

I am grateful to my family in Iceland for their support to me throughout my research. I thank my daughters, Hrafnkátla and Hörn, who have had to endure many things in the course of this research, for their patience. To my husband Arnar, my deepest gratitude for keeping me going throughout the many years it has taken to write this thesis.

The first part of the title of this thesis is of course a wilful corruption of the title of Thomas P. Rohlen’s classic book *For Harmony and Strength: Japanese White Collar Organization in Anthropological Perspective*. 
### TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2–1</td>
<td>Factional divisions within the Jiyūtō 1946–1954</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2–2</td>
<td>Factional divisions within the Shinpotō/Minshutō/Kaishintō 1947–1954</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4–1</td>
<td>Factional divisions within the LDP 1955–1964</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4–2</td>
<td>Mainstream-antimainstream divisions in the LDP 1956–1964</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURES

3-1: Appointments to the three party posts to mainstream and antimainstream
   —Jiyūtō 1949–1954 90
3-2: Division of cabinet posts to mainstream and antimainstream factions
   —Jiyūtō 1949–1953 97
3-3: Factional affiliation of cabinet members 1946–1954 101
3-4: Number of districts with 2 or more members elected —Jiyūtō 1947–1953 107
3-5: Number of districts where more than one member of the same faction runs
   —Jiyūtō 1949 109
3-6: Sizes of factions—Jiyūtō 1946–1951 125
3-7: Election results to the Lower House 1946–1955 127
3-8: Fluctuations in membership—Jiyūtō 1947–1953 131
4-1: Development of membership—LDP factions 1956–1964 158
4-2: Number of members with double faction membership or no membership
   —LDP 1956–1964 161
4-3: Division of cabinet posts between mainstream and antimainstream factions
   —LDP 1956–1963 174
4-4: Distribution of the three party posts to mainstream and antimainstream
   —LDP 1955–1964 181
5-1: Number of districts electing 2 or more members—LDP 1958–1963 200
5-2: Factions with one or more member elected to a district—LDP 1958 203
5-3: LDP factions with one or more member elected to a district—LDP 1960 204
5-4: LDP factions with one or more member to a district—LDP 1963 205
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JAPANESE TERMS</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amakudari</td>
<td>descendance of bureaucrats into business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bon Kure</td>
<td>presents given at the Bon festival and at year-end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunjitō</td>
<td>see Buntōha Jiyūtō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buntōha Jiyūtō</td>
<td>Separatist Liberal Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chōrō</td>
<td>party elders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chōrō seiji</td>
<td>politics of elders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dai Nihon Seijika</td>
<td>Great Japan Political Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genrō</td>
<td>Council of Elder Statesmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunbatsu</td>
<td>military faction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ha</td>
<td>faction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habatsu</td>
<td>faction/factionism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habatsu kinkō</td>
<td>factional balancing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanshūryūha</td>
<td>anti-mainstream faction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatsugenken</td>
<td>influence/right to speak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoshuha</td>
<td>Conservative faction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ipponka Dōmei</td>
<td>Unity League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiban</td>
<td>personal constituency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jitsuryokusha</td>
<td>powerful men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiyū Kokumin Rengo</td>
<td>National Union of Liberals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiyūminshutō</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiyūtō</td>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaishintō</td>
<td>Reform Progressive Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kei</td>
<td>lineage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keidanren</td>
<td>Federation of Economic Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keizai Dōyūkai</td>
<td>Japan Committee for Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keizai saiken kondankai</td>
<td>Economic Reconstruction Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindaika</td>
<td>modernisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindaihugi</td>
<td>modernisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kobun</td>
<td>client</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Köenkai</td>
<td>personal support group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokumin Kyōdōtō</td>
<td>People’s Cooperative Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokumin Kyōkai</td>
<td>People’s Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokutai</td>
<td>The National Polity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyōkōha</td>
<td>Hard-line faction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindōha</td>
<td>see Minshuka Dōmei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minseitō</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minshūjyūtō</td>
<td>Democratic Liberal Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minshuka Dōmei (Mindōha)</td>
<td>Democratisation League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minshutō</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mochidai</td>
<td>spending money</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Monbatsu
Nihon Jiyūtō
Nihon Shōkō Kaigisho
Nihonjinron
Nikkeiren
Jinshin isshin tō kindaika suishin honbu Headquarters to Promote the Transformation of
People's Minds and Party Modernisation
see Nihon Shōkō Kaigisho
mid-summer gift
patron
Reconstruction League
political association
Political Friends Association
postwar politician's faction
Electoral Strategy Committee
the seven divisions and three regiments
divisional commander
political funding office
Progressive Party
rising factions
mainstream faction
cabinet formation staff
executive faction
politics of associates
the three most important party posts
Party Moral Reform Meeting
Party Moral Reform League
gangsters
Yoshida School
influential men
financial conglomerates
NOTE ON ROMANISATION

In this thesis I have used the modified Hepburn system for romanisation of Japanese words, with long vowels indicated by macrons.
PART I
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. The aims

This thesis is about factionalism (habatsu) within the conservative parties in Japan from 1945 to 1964. The thesis has three aims. The first is to fill some gaps in the history of factionalism in Japan by examining the factionalism of the early postwar conservative parties, the Jiyūtō (Liberal Party) and the Minshutō (Democratic Party), particularly as it compares with that of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP, Jiyūminshutō). Much has been written about the history of political factionalism in Japan but most analyses only deal with factionalism within the LDP since its establishment in 1955. The history of factionalism in the first ten years of the postwar period has not been investigated in detail in English publications. The data presented here will, I hope, be a valuable contribution towards a more comprehensive picture of the development of conservative factionalism in postwar Japan. The central argument of the thesis is that we should focus on change rather than continuity in Japanese factionalism, and seek to identify the forces that cause and shape factional changes. Second, the thesis will seek to clarify how and why factionalism has changed in this period. The thesis assesses the main approaches to factionalism in Japan, their strengths and weaknesses. While my approach is essentially institutional, it differs in focus from existing approaches to factionalism in Japan, emphasising micro organisational changes rather than macro institutional arrangements. Third, although institutional changes produce changes in factionalism, I aim to show how a discursive approach can help to explain how factionalism has been maintained.

This introduction will discuss and evaluate the existing scholarly debate on factionalism in Japan and will explain my theoretical approach. I will start with an overview of discussions of the concept of ‘faction’, and will consider how intra-party divisions have been variously defined and understood.
1.2. What is a faction?

Factions have been widely studied within both political science and anthropology, particularly in the period 1950–1980, but there is still great divergence in approaches and definitions. What is a ‘faction’? What structure do factions have, what causes them, and what functions do they serve? These are questions that scholars have sought to answer in comparative studies of factionalism. Most have agreed that a political ‘faction’ is a group within a political party with separate existence from the party leadership (see Stockwin 1989:164). More specific definitions have, however, varied in terms of how extensive the division is considered to be within the party, how the factions are internally organised, and what their functions are.

A point of divergence is whether all internal groups within a party should be called factions or only those with extensive organisation and membership. A number of scholars have argued that two main internal party groups exist and that ‘factions’ are only those groups which are organised, cohesive and permanent, and cut the party vertically from the top to the rank and file. Groups at the top without organised rank and file, with little structure, vague membership and no official headquarters, have thus been termed ‘tendencies’ (Rose 1964:37-8; Panebianco 1988:38–9; Beller and Belloni 1978c:422; Zariski 1978:20; Zuckerman 1975:20; Lande 1977:xxxii). Some scholars, like Sartori (1979), Hoffman (1981:232) and Stockwin (1989:164), choose not to make such distinctions and treat all internal groups as factions irrespective of these structural differences (see also Beller and Belloni 1978c).

In spite of the existence of such definitional schemes in the comparative literature, there have been few attempts to study the meaning of the word ‘faction’ in Japan (ha in Japanese). Scholars tend to use LDP factions as the model of a ‘Japanese faction’ and this has corresponded most closely to Rose (1964) and Panebianco’s (1988) definition of ‘factions’. As will be seen in Chapters 2 and 3, however, no matter what definitional scheme we adopt for the study of factionalism in early postwar Japan, it becomes clear that the early postwar factions, which were all called ‘factions’, are not the same
phenomenon as the LDP factions. In fact, a study of the way the word 'ha' was used and understood in the early postwar period reveals many different meanings. However, generally speaking it may be said that to scholars and observers in the early postwar period, factions were small, impermanent groups that appeared within political parties, causing great instability. Ward (1965:71–2) defined factions as small, informal groups, based on personal or limited loyalty. This corresponds to an understanding of factions in many of the first studies on the subject. Lasswell viewed factions as impermanent groups, a precursor to political parties, and that therefore 'past a certain point a "solidification" of factional divisions turns the factions concerned into parties in their own right' (Stockwin 1970:362). Huntington (1968) saw the development of the party system in similar terms, arguing that factions would develop into polarised units which would then turn into political parties. This understanding of factions as unstructured, impermanent factions causing instability and threatening splits, quite accurately describes the Jiyūtō and Minshutō factions between 1945 and 1955.

As mentioned before, permanent factions developed within the LDP after 1955, which vertically divided the party into clearly defined groups with membership. The development of factionalism within the LDP and the great increase in studies of factions during that time changed the general perception of what a 'faction' was in Japan. Using the example of the LDP, scholars have made a standard definition of what, at least, a conservative faction is, which challenges Lasswell's definition of factions as impermanent. Stockwin summarised succinctly the general characteristics commonly thought to apply to Japanese factions, and defined a Japanese faction as

a) ... a semi-permanent grouping, with a history and even a tradition to which its members can relate; ... [it is] an integral part of the parent body (i.e. party) but in competition with other factions within the same party (as well as with other parties, or even with factions in other parties);

b) ... a focus of loyalty for its members which may be weaker or stronger than party as a focus of loyalty for the same members;

c) ... a mechanism for more or less institutionalised maximising of political advantage within the party (and within the broader political arena), in terms particularly of distribution of posts and accumulation of funds (Stockwin 1989:163).
Most scholars have emphasised the relative permanence of Japanese factions, as seen in their sophisticated organisation, permanent offices, and regular publications; the clear sense of membership to a faction and strong identification and loyalty to faction over party; and the role factions play in distributing posts and political funds (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993:60-63; Bocking 1989:145; Stockwin 1970:363). As will be seen later, this definition with its emphasis on the institutionalised existence of factions within a party is apt for the LDP. The majority of studies of factions in Japan have focused on the LDP and therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, ‘Japanese factions’ have been defined from the LDP example. ‘Factions’ in Japan have thus been described as permanent, organised, highly politically active, non-ideological groups which divide the party. At the same time it has become widely accepted that factions eventually solidify, and, rather than split from the mother party as Lasswell and Huntington argued, become permanent features of parties, as in the LDP (see also Nicholas 1965:58).

How are we then to understand factionalism in Japan? I will argue here that it is important to understand that the ‘faction’ has not been a static phenomenon in postwar Japan, and that the meaning of the word itself has changed greatly in this time. This has been largely ignored in studies of factions in Japan. The early postwar factions were significantly different from the LDP factions in terms of organisation, functions and political importance. All the same, scholars have been tempted to view earlier factions as if they were the same as LDP factions, ignoring the differences between them. However, because in historical and analytical work in the postwar era internal party groups in Japan, small or big, temporary or permanent, structured or unstructured, have been referred to as ‘ha’, or factions, I will, in this thesis, refer to all the various internal groups as ‘factions.’ At the same time, I hope to show how our understanding of the term has changed over time. Using the categorisation developed by comparative analysists, I will seek to point out the structural and organisational variations between different factions within and between periods, and the way their different structures affected political outcomes in different ways. These differences, I argue, do not just represent different stages of organisation on some predetermined developmental path within factionalism.
Factions do not automatically mature into more complex, structured, permanent units. To do that they need a certain impetus.

Now that we have clarified our understanding of the word faction, let us turn to the main approaches to factionalism in Japan as presented in political studies and the way scholars have viewed factional development and change.

1.3. Institutions, culture and rationality

As seen in the previous section, scholars have found it difficult to agree on what a faction is, but they have also varied in their approach to intra-party groups, particularly in explaining what causes and sustains them. In both comparative studies and in studies of Japanese factions, two main approaches have emerged, both of which can be termed institutional: the historical and cultural institutional approach, and the rational choice approach. I will discuss these briefly in this section.

Factions were not studied in Japan as independent political units until the late 1950s. Western studies done on Japanese politics during and following the end of the war, were simultaneously reductionist, viewing politics in terms of behavior, and contextual, reducing political organisation in Japan to geography, economic development and culture (see March and Olsen 1989:3). Scholars were interested in identifying aspects of Japanese culture that were alien to Western societies and in using these to explain political behaviour and political structures in Japan (Yanaga 1956; Colton 1948). As will be discussed in Chapter 6, Western scholars tended to approach the study of Japan with a rather patronising air, looking for cultural characteristics to the Japanese that made them different if not inferior to Westerners (see Dower 1986; Said 1987). Japanese scholars also commented on the backwardness of politics in Japan. Sakano noted that the leading party politicians of the Jiyūtō operated in a ‘feudal or half feudal environment of oyabun–kobun relations’ that stood in the way of more ‘modern’ politics (Sakano 1948:99). The prevailing view was that Japanese politics were heavily ‘cultural’ and coloured by personalism, whereby the Japanese, be they politicians or the public, sought to cultivate personal relationships and showed personal allegiance to political leaders rather than to political principles. Japanese politics were to be understood in terms of social behaviour.
and psychology, and as a peculiarly Japanese phenomenon (Ike 1957; Yanaga 1956; Colton 1948; Quigley and Turner 1957).

In Japanese political studies, as in political science in general, there was a resurgence of institutional or organisational approaches in the 1960s onwards, in reaction to the behavioral approach that had dominated the 1950s. It was during this period that the study of factions in Japan as independent political entities started to develop. A pioneering study was Watanabe Tsuneo's book, published in 1958, on conservative factions in Japan. This study was the first to provide detailed information about the factions that had emerged within the LDP, their development, activities and membership. Watanabe's book was historical in nature, tracing the personal connections of politicians to the prewar era, but also emphasising the impact of the wider structural and institutional environment on the development of factions. The work had a great impact on the study of Japanese factions and informed many subsequent analyses by Japanese and Western scholars. Although an emphasis on the prevalence of personalism, a group mentality and hierarchy in Japanese political culture continued to inform many studies of factions (see Ike 1958; Nakane 1970; Yanaga 1956; Thayer 1968; Baerwald 1964; Scalapino and Masumi 1962), there developed simultaneously an interest in the influence of institutions on the political system (Scalapino 1968; Thayer 1968; Baerwald 1986; Curtis 1988).

The study of factionalism in Japan has since been heavily influenced by institutional approaches. Studies focusing on institutions as important political phenomena multiplied in political science in the 1970s, and their approach became known as the New Institutionalism. They emphasised that 'institutional arrangements and social processes matter' (Grendstad and Selle 1995:5; Ware 1996:11) but they were not able to agree on much more than this (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Grendstad and Selle 1995). They differed in their definition of institutions, but generally they showed an interest in 'the whole range of state and societal institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and that structure their relations of power to other groups' (see Thelen and Steinmo 1992:2). The New Institutionalism as an approach to politics included three dimensions: a historical approach, a cultural approach, and a rational choice (calculus) approach (see Thelen and Steinmo 1992). These three approaches share a basic interest
in institutional features of the political system and the political parties, and the way they influence outcomes in the political system. But there are also important differences between them, as they view political agents, their relationship with institutions and the role of culture in shaping institutions in different ways. The diversity and incompatibility of the New Institutionalist approaches can also be seen in the studies of factions in Japan. However, most of these studies fall into two main categories: a historical and cultural institutional approach on one hand, and a rational choice approach on the other. I will discuss these in turn.

1.3.1. Historical and Cultural Institutionalism

Most scholars of Japanese factionalism from the 1960s to the 1980s adopted a historical view of factions, and can thus be termed historical institutionalists. The historical institutional approach which developed in response to structural-functionalism in political science 'reacted against the tendency of many structural functionalists to view the social, psychological or cultural traits of individuals as the parameters driving much of the system's operation' (Hall 1996:937). It gives institutions a great weight in shaping political history (see Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Historical institutionalists have argued that political agents are heavily conditioned by their institutional environment and that thus 'not just the strategies but also the goals actors pursue are shaped by the institutional context' (DiMaggio and Powell 1991:11; Thelen and Steinmo 1992:8; Ware 1996:9).

A variety of historical factors have been found in comparative studies of factionalism (Beller and Belloni 1978c:435; Panebianco 1988; Zariski 1960) to have contributed to or encouraged factional divisions. Researchers in Japanese politics have drawn attention to a variety of historical factors in the early postwar period, such as the Occupation purges following the end of the war, which led to a political division between depurges and new politicians, the lack of reform of the bureaucracy, which led to struggles between bureaucratic politicians and party politicians, and the merger in 1955 of the conservative parties into one big party with many different internal elements (see Baerwald 1986:19–21; Tomita et al. 1986:257). The advent of secret ballot elections for the LDP party
president in December 1956 was also considered by many to be instrumental in encouraging factionalism.

Other scholars put more emphasis on the broader structural features of the political system. A dominant party system, it was argued, produces factional divisions (Beller and Belloni 1978c:435; Zariski 1978:26). In Japan the dominant 'one and a half party system' of LDP dominance after 1955 was widely considered to contribute to continuing factionalism (Masumi 1985). Other political factors to do with the political system as a whole, such as electoral competition, the electoral system, and political funding rules were also studied, as they were in other countries where factionalism was found. Of these institutional factors, the multimember electoral system, continuously in force from 1925 to 1993, with the exception of the 1946 election, came to feature strongly in most explanations of factionalism in Japan (Baerwald 1986:22; Calder 1988:24; Curtis 1988; Hrebenar 1986b; Iseri 1988; Richard and Flanagan 1984; Satō and Matsuzaki 1986; Thayer 1968; Uchida 1983; Watanabe 1958). In such a system, a big political party was forced to run many candidates in each district, pitting them against each other. The electoral system thus encouraged politicians to minimise such intraparty competition by creating factions. By running as candidates of factions politicians could divide resources and votes (see Baerwald 1986:22; Curtis 1988:85; Hrebenar 1986b:37; Stockwin 1983:221; Stockwin 1989:165). These issues will be discussed in Chapter 5.

Although most studies of Japanese factionalism emphasised historical and institutional frameworks, they tended also to argue that Japanese culture played an important role in creating and maintaining factionalism in Japan. In political science, cultural institutionalism, sometimes termed sociological institutionalism, differs from the historical institutionalism in that it assumes political actors are capable of showing 'bounded rationality' (DiMaggio 1991; Hall 1996; Immergut 1998). The goals and strategies of politicians are shaped by not only the institutions that the actors work within, but also the cultural environment (Elkins and Simeon 1979:131). In order to reach their goals political actors 'turn to established routines or familiar patterns of behaviour' (Hall 1996:939). Institutional continuity is explained by arguing that many conventions of institutions are not readily open to choice (Hall 1996).
Most studies of factionalism in Japan until the 1980s adopted some features of the cultural approach combined with aspects of historical institutionalism (see Baerwald 1986; Thayer 1968; Curtis 1988) but many of the views on Japanese culture derived from prewar and early postwar views of Japanese society. Scholars argued that in spite of the important effect of historical and structural frameworks, political factionalism in Japan could not be understood without an understanding of Japanese culture, such as Japan’s feudal background, the historically hierarchical nature of Japanese society, and the historical prevalence of leader-follower relationships at all levels of society (Baerwald 1986:17; Scalapino and Masumi 1962; Thayer 1968). This cultural environment created a tradition and a need to work in clearly defined patron-client based hierarchical groups (Baerwald 1986; Hoffman 1981; Nakano 1970; Richard and Flanagan 1984; Stockwin 1989:168). Baerwald (1986:17), for example, argued that factionalism was such an ingrained cultural component of Japanese society that ‘to anticipate or wish that factionalism could or should be eliminated from the LDP, as its critics so ardently desire, is to expect this political party to be something other than a Japanese organization’. Japan’s political culture was traced back to the Tokugawa era, while the hierarchical nature of Japanese politics, personalism and loyalty were traced back to feudal values. Richardson’s famous study of political culture in Japan found that ‘personalism,’ was a major theme in political attitudes in Japan, and ‘is also associated with traditional tendencies toward dependence on paternalistic leaders for representation of interests’ (Richardson 1974:235; see also Shiratori 1988:187).

A major criticism on the historical and cultural institutional approach to factions in Japan, as in political science in general, is its inadequate explanatory power in relation to institutional formation and change (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Historical institutionalists have had ‘a strong tendency toward “static” institutional analyses’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:13), and also tend to neglect institutional change, evolution and the dynamism that can often be found in institutions (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:14–15). As Thelen and Steinmo (1992:14–15) point out, the historical institutional approach has been valuable in explaining cross-national differences but it tends to obscure change and give too much weight to certain institutions by assuming that no other outcomes were possible under the
institutional constraints, thus showing a kind of 'institutional determinism'. This can be seen in the weight that has been given to the multimember electoral system in Japan as a force creating and maintaining factionalism. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, no studies have addressed the question whether there could have been any other possible solutions to the problems created by the system, and whether the electoral system in fact created factionalism or only allowed it to exist. If the electoral system is a major factor explaining the existence and maintenance of factionalism, major changes in the factional system under this particular electoral system must seem unlikely. As will be shown, however, conservative factionalism has indeed changed significantly under the multimember electoral system.

The cultural approach has also faced criticism relating to institutional change. It has been criticised for its use of 'political culture' and its lack of theoretical content (Hoffman 1981:231; Kohno 1997). Culture was a residual category, used to account for features that the historical institutional approach could not adequately explain. Again, this approach, owing to its inability to account for changes in political culture, was unable to explain how political factions emerged and how and why they changed. Adherents of the political culture approach had not addressed the problem of political and cultural change in any systematic way and had a tendency to emphasise continuity rather than change. The political culture was static. With regard to factions specifically, there was also a tendency to view the development of factionalism as moving forwards in some sort of continuity. Critics pointed out that the cultural approach to Japanese factions was not able to account for changes in factionalism in the 1960s and 1970s as the LDP factions adopted many seemingly 'cultural' features that had not been there before (Kohno 1992:377). The cultural approach was criticised for its inability to explain why preoccupation with seniority and factional balancing, factors that might be considered derived from such cultural values as hierarchy and consensus, did not become pronounced within the LDP factions until the 1960s and 1970s (Kohno 1992:377–8; 1997:97).
This criticism seemed justified. As seen before, scholars using cultural explanations to account for the factionalised nature of political parties in Japan tended to use culture as a variable without fully theorising it. As discussed in Chapter 6, ‘Japanese culture’ was often viewed as a static phenomenon, a heritage from the feudal past brought into the present. If factionalism was unavoidable in a Japanese organisation, as Baerwald argued (1986:17) then what cultural features created it, what maintained it and what could change it? Some scholars claimed that Japan’s culture was changing. For instance, Richardson (1974:13) argued that ‘[a]lthough many continuities undoubtedly can be observed between prewar and postwar political cultures in Japan, it is equally important to appreciate the degree of change in political life and socialization patterns in these two periods’. However, very few ventured to explain how political culture was changing in relation to factional development. Some argued that the massive changes taking place in the internal organisation of the LDP in the 1950s and 1960s were in part a generational change which produced a shift in political culture when the old political leaders died. For example, Curtis (1988:81) held that the LDP factions changed from patron-client groups into more ‘collegial’ structures, signaling a change in the political culture towards greater modernisation. Factions in the early postwar period, he claimed, were ‘traditional’, built on Japanese cultural traditions, which revered the old Confucian values of loyalty and respect for authority, and emphasised group work. After the formation of the LDP, many of the old-time factional leaders died, giving way to a new political culture, a new way of running factions. Factions ceased to be based on personal relations and instead become institutions, built on clear rules, although still bearing the hallmark of traditional values (Curtis 1988:80–81). But few ventured to explain what changes were taking place and how political culture was changing. Was personalism decreasing, and if so, why? And how should it be measured? In the 1990s cultural approaches faced increasing criticism as a result of these questions, not the least from the rational choice approach to factionalism which was gaining momentum, and to which we turn now.

1.3.2. Rational choice

The third strand of the New Institutionalism, rational choice, was not used as an approach to Japanese factionalism until the 1990s. Like the two other strands, the rational choice
approach emphasised the effect of institutions on political structures, but it viewed the relationship between institutions and agents in different terms. In the rational choice model, the agent is rational and seeks to maximise his gains from the political system. Thelen and Steinmo (1992:7) pointed out that ‘political and economic institutions are important for rational choice scholars interested in real-world politics because the institutions define (or at least constrain) the strategies that political actors adopt in the pursuit of their interests’. The institutional environment shapes the strategies adopted, the argument goes, but the goals themselves are exogenous to the institutional structure (Hall and Taylor 1996:939). In the studies of Japanese factionalism it was thus argued that political actors seek to maximise their ‘profit’ from the political system, and a primary goal is to get (re)elected. However, this goal is subject to institutional constraints, primarily the multimember electoral system (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993:7; see also Kohno 1992:382, 1998). A rational way to enhance your chances of getting elected in a multimember district system where you fight other members of your party is thus to form factions. With regard to continuity and change within institutions, the rational choice approach suggested that institutions (such as factions) persist because they reach some sort of equilibrium whereby a deviation from them would result in loss (see Hall 1996; Kohno 1997).

Both the historical institutional approach and the rational choice approach thus recognised the electoral system as a key influence on factional development. In the rational choice approach, however, the explanation was almost totally reduced to this factor, and it was argued that ‘[T]he electoral system alone is sufficient to explain the survival of LDP factions’ (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993:59). It was essentially an approach that was willing to ‘sacrifice nuance for generalizability, detail for logic’ (Levi 1997:21). Because it was argued that the goals of political actors were exogenous to the institutional or cultural framework, the notion of culture was abandoned. Rational choice theory thus proposed that factionalism could be explained without any reference to culture or cultural change, and argued that given the rationality of political actors, political phenomena like factions could be explained by focusing on the institutional (i.e.
electoral) environment and the way it influences and constrains the strategies of political actors.

Although the rational choice model has been widely used in analyses of Japanese politics in the past decade, and in particular in factional studies, it too has come under increasing criticism for its failure to explain change. First, the rational choice approach was criticised for being too simplistic in assuming that rationality was bound by nothing but institutional structures (Curtis 1999:6). Panebianco pointed out that it is not possible to determine the aims of organisations as easily as the rational choice approach leads us to believe. To the advocates of rational choice, organisations like factions are instruments for ‘the realization of specific (and specifiable) goals’ (Panebianco 1988:6), a goal which is most often said to be one’s re-election (see Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Kohno 1992). Panebianco (1988:7) argued that organisations have many aims and the primary goal may be subordinate to less ambitious aims, and that even when they do have manifest aims, the real aim may be to ensure survival only, or survival of power positions. It has also been pointed out that action is often based on ‘identifying the normatively appropriate behaviour’ and not the calculated maximising aim (March and Olsen 1989:23). Organisations need to balance demands and thus aims can change. They are not independent of the institutional environment.

As will be seen in this thesis, this criticism is well justified. A comparison of the early postwar factions and the LDP factions reveals a more complex picture of organisational aims within the parties. As seen in Chapter 4, factionalisation was at times driven forward by short term aims to bolster one’s power position or get the upper hand in a battle within the party, and not by broad political factors like maximising one’s gain from the electoral system. As will be seen in Chapter 3, there is little to suggest that the Jiyūtō and Minshutō factions served the purpose of ensuring the re-election of their members. Recent studies have also pointed out that even after the introduction of a new electoral system consisting of single member districts and proportional representation lists in 1994, the factions have not disappeared. To argue therefore that the electoral system alone could explain factionalism is a massive simplification (see Reed 2003:185). The rational
choice approach put all its eggs in the same basket by arguing that the electoral system was the key to factional formation and maintenance. They assumed that the effect of the electoral system was the same for the whole period in which it was used, while only studying a small part of that period. Thus, Ramseyer and Rosenbluth argued that political actors in prewar Japan behaved in the same way as LDP politicians in the postwar period, without ever studying the earlier period in the same detail (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993:62). As will be seen in Chapter 3, it is critically problematic to assume that factionalism in Japan has remained essentially the same ever since 1925, when the multimember electoral system was established. The rational choice approach, while focusing on institutional change, left out any consideration of the interaction of institutional and ideational variables. The importance given to institutional and structural forces and the total disregard of any cultural or ideational factors has given factional development in Japan a much greater sense of continuity than it is due.

Neither the historical and cultural approaches nor the rational choice approach to factionalism can adequately explain factional change in postwar Japan. They each have their own shortcomings although they all share the tendency to assume historical and organisational continuity. I will now turn to situating my own approach to factionalism in Japan within the existing approaches, focusing on the interplay between organisational factors and culture. I will argue that factional change has to be explained through a historical institutional approach that is more organisational and less concerned with the wider structural features of the political system, such as the electoral system. Furthermore, I argue that by looking at discourses on factionalism we can better understand the way factions are maintained. I develop this explanation in the next section.

1.4. Political change and the development of factionalism in Japan

This thesis starts from the often overlooked observation that the nature of factionalism in postwar Japan has changed significantly and that the existing approaches to factionalism cannot account for these changes. First, it will be argued that we need to focus more on institutional change than on continuity in politics. Second, I argue that the narrow
structural focus of all the existing approaches to factionalism in Japan needs to be replaced with a more micro level historical and organisational focus. Third, I argue that a discursive approach is helpful in illuminating the way particular political phenomena such as factions are maintained through specific discourses which give them legitimacy. I will discuss each of these arguments in turn.

1.4.1. Historical Continuity or Change

The tendency to present history as coherent has been strong in political science (Najita 1982:6). Political development has been viewed in terms of progress, 'the more or less inexorable historical movement towards some more "advanced" level' (March and Olsen 1989:7, 54). Both Japanese and Western scholars have been preoccupied with theorising about Japan's modernisation and her development. Most have tended to view this development as a progressive movement, away from traditional society and its feudal characteristics, towards a modern society, a society similar to Western societies (see Kersten 2000; Nakane 1970:viii–ix). In a similar way, the predominant view amongst commentators has been that political factionalism has been advancing towards a more institutionalised level (see Fukui 1970; Scalapino 1953, 1968). Scholars have been interested in the changing aspects of factions, identifying traditional and modern elements and viewing trends in their development along a continuum away from the traditional towards the modern (see Curtis 1988). For instance, Fukui (1970:53) argued that at the time of its establishment, the LDP had 'an enormous amount of tradition and experience behind it...in terms of membership composition, organisation structure, factionalism, and relationships with extra-party groups, all of which had evolved over many decades.' The LDP built on this experience, creating factions that were more institutionalised. However, there were some exceptions to this interpretation. For example, Leiserson argued in 1968 that the LDP factions were really new organisations, and Kitaoka argued that they did not represent Japanese traditions but were a modern phenomenon (Kitaoka 1995:27–8). These were, however, minority views.

The emphasis on continuity and progressive development is detectable in all the major theoretical approaches to Japanese factionalism. One of the main criticisms of the cultural
approach made by proponents of the rational choice approach was that it tended to accentuate the continuity of traditions in Japanese society (Kohno 1997:96). However, they themselves have tended to emphasise the continuity of specific institutional arrangements, such as the electoral system, and the influence of such structures on political phenomena. Their problem has been similar to that of other approaches in that they have focused on limited periods in the history of factions and failed to acknowledge that changes can be random and irrational. Some scholars have studied the prewar period (Scalapino 1953) while most others have focused on factionalism within the LDP since the late 1950s with very limited comparisons to early postwar and prewar factions (Fukui 1970; Kohno 1997; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Scalapino 1968). Although historical analysts have in recent years started to emphasise the contingencies of history and the way chance affects institutional development (see Immergut 1998:19), the tendency is still strong in Japanese studies to view the history of factionalism as a continuous history.

It will be argued here that the focus on continuity presents great difficulties to the study of factions. First, I will present data on the early postwar factions and compare them to the LDP factions in order to show that factionalism changed greatly in organisational terms in the first 20 years of the postwar period. Second, I argue that the LDP factions showed more assumedly ‘cultural’ characteristics than the Jiyūtō and Minshutō factions. These findings raise questions about all the major approaches to factionalism—about the role the multimember district system plays in creating and sustaining factionalism, and about the way we view culture and its effect on political institutions. I argue that it is important to look at the development of political factionalism in a more extended historical time scale in order to counter the tendency to ‘present a coherent sequence along an historical time line’ (Najita 1982:6) and to be able to recognise changes when they occur.

1.4.2. Institutional changes

If factionalism has changed so much it is important to theorise about how and why such changes occur. I will argue that we need to look at both structural and discursive factors
to explain factional change adequately. My approach could be termed institutional, although it is more concerned with organisational development in its historical context than specific institutions, such as the electoral system, which the current institutional approaches to Japanese factions emphasise. I agree with institutionalists that politics are affected by the institutional environment, but argue that in the study of factionalism it is the organisational features of the party itself in its specific historical environment, rather than the party-external institutional arrangements, that affect factional patterns. Institutions are defined here as not only formal organisations but also informal rules and procedures that affect political behaviour. It is true that the institutional environment in which factions emerged after the end of the war and the institutional changes that took place between 1945 and 1955 shaped factionalism and the institutional development of the conservative parties. However, the current approaches leave unanswered the question why the Jiyūtō and Minshutō were so different from the LDP.

Panebianco's (1988) theory of the organisational development of parties has not been used on Japanese parties before, but it captures well the differences between the inner organisation of the early postwar parties and the LDP in terms of their levels of factionalism and centralisation. His theory was more encompassing than most previous historical theories, explaining factionalism from the genesis of parties. He (1988:55) measured party institutionalisation on two scales: systemness, i.e. the interdependence of its internal components, and the degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the environment. His hypothesis was that the way parties were formed, their 'genetic model', affected their level of institutionalisation. The degree of institutionalisation in turn shaped the dominant coalition's internal cohesion. The greater the institutionalisation, the less organised the internal groups were and the more cohesive the dominant coalition (Panebianco 1988:60). The Jiyūtō and Minshutō were parties which fitted into Panebianco's (1988:50) model of a fairly institutionalised party created through penetration and internal legitimacy; i.e. the centre controlled and directed the development of the periphery, leading to a cohesive parliamentary elite rallying behind a prestigious leader. The LDP, on the other hand, was created more through diffusion, as local party organisation already existed when the party was established through the two previous conservative parties. Such a genetic model,
according to Panebianco (1988:63), leads to weak cohesion of the dominant coalition and the ‘presence of many competing elites controlling conspicuous organisational resources’. The centre was not strong enough to control the development of the periphery.

Regarding its relationship with the external environment, Panebianco argued that if the party controlled resources centrally then there was greater interdependence between sub-party groups and limited autonomy for factions. If, however, the sub-party groups had autonomy in their relations with external actors, such as the business community, then the systemness of the party would be low and factionalisation greater (Panebianco 1988:51). The Jiyūtō and Minshūtō were institutionalised to a greater degree than the LDP, and the party leadership had greater control over political funding, giving less leverage to factions. The LDP, on the other hand, was decentralised and the factions were able to gain great financial autonomy at the party’s expense. This model thus provides convincing explanations of the differences in level of factionalism. However, because the theory is so focused on the formative stage of party development its disregard of institutional dynamism makes it rather inadequate in explaining changes over time. Panebianco’s model (1988) captures well organisational development where institutions change from their genesis through institutionalisation to maturity, changing their aims and focusing more on survival. Although Panebianco argued that a natural history for parties does not exist and that ‘the fact that a party is highly institutionalized is no guarantee that de-institutionalization, loss of autonomy vis-à-vis the environment, and decline in organizational “systemness” will not take place when its environment undergoes radical changes’ (1988:63), his theory does not allow adequate theorising about such changes away from the institutional characteristics prescribed by the original organisational environment, and thus places too much emphasis on continuity in institutional development. As will be seen in Chapters 4 and 5, the history of postwar factionalism in Japan needs a more dynamic theory to account for changes in factionalism in the 1950s. I argue that two main adjustments need to be made to institutional approaches to factionalism in Japan in order to offer a deeper understanding of the development of factionalism in the postwar period.
First, taking my cue from Thelen and Steinmo’s ‘dynamic constraints model’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:17), I propose that the institutional approach to factionalism needs to be refocused in order to recognise the interplay of institutional factors and political strategies. Institutionalism as an approach has had to deal with the dilemma of explaining the complex interplay between institutions, where institutions can be viewed as an independent variable shaping politics, and as a dependent variable, shaped by political forces at times of breakdown (see Thelen and Steinmo 1992:15). Krasner argued that stable institutions were occasionally ‘punctuated’ by crises that brought about change, then reverted to institutional stasis again (Krasner 1984; see also DiMaggio and Powell 1991:30). According to Thelen’s ‘dynamic constraints’ model, institutional breakdown could occur without such crises. Institutional changes take place in a:

pattern in which changes in the meaning and functioning of institutions (associated with broader socioeconomic and political shifts) set in motion political struggles within but also over those institutions that in fact drive their development forward (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:17).

Such critical junctures when institutional changes occur lay down the course of development and limit the range of viable policy options (March and Olsen 1989:64). This captures very well the changes that took place within the LDP after its formation in 1955 where, through power struggles, tactical alliances and movements between factions, the conservative factions changed so dramatically that the ‘faction’ as an institution acquired a new meaning and new roles. Strategic manoeuvring and conflict can influence the institutional parameters to such an extent that clear institutional change becomes evident (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:17). This relates to Panebianco’s assertion (1988:7–8) that organisations are often concerned with survival of power positions only, which in itself can produce change. The institutional pressures changing the factions in the late 1950s were manifold and worked together in a much more complicated process than the current approaches can account for. The party was already susceptible to internal divisions because of the division of the leadership caused by the way the party emerged. The presidential elections adopted in 1956 were a major catalyst in encouraging changed factional patterns within the party, leading to more permanent groups. This is discussed
in Chapter 4. As seen in Chapter 5, changes in political funding patterns were also a major factor changing the nature of factionalism within the conservative parties, and giving factions greater permanency. The factions did not appear out of the decontextualised rationality of political actors, as the rational choice approach would have it. On the other hand they were not a natural development of the factions as they had existed either. The LDP factions took on functions and shape that the old factions did not have, enabling them to react to a new institutional environment. Thus there was clear discontinuity in their development.

Second, my critique of both the rational choice approach and the conventional historical and cultural approach to factions is directed towards the narrow institutional focus they use with respect to factionalism within the LDP. Both approaches have argued that the multimember electoral system, established in 1925, is the main cause of factionalism (Baerwald 1986; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Kohno 1997). The factional systems of the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō, on one hand, and the LDP, on the other, existed within the same electoral framework, yet were very different. The former was elitist factionalism with restricted elite competition, while that of the latter was open factionalism, organised through the party ranks (see Beller and Belloni 1978c:437–8). Rational choice has had difficulties in explaining institutional change; the rationality of politicians defined by the structural environment of multi-member electoral districts does not explain why the Jiyūtō and Minshutō politicians behaved so differently. I argue that the electoral system alone cannot explain changes in factionalism in Japan. The electoral system did come to play a role in maintaining factionalism but while the electoral system may explain continuity of certain kinds of factionalism, it was only one of many forces shaping it (see Reed 2003:185), and furthermore, it does not allow adequate theorising about how this factionalism came about. Contrary to most analyses, I find that the changes in the organisational parameters within the party and the power struggle they produced led to factionalism spreading out to the electoral districts, giving the factions new roles. The constraints of the electoral system, which has been the main focus of factional analyses in the past, did not affect factionalism in any major way until this process had commenced.
Thus a closer look at the interplay between constraints such as the electoral system, and political strategies and the broader political context, will give us a better picture of factional change, and of how factions come to play new roles for new ends. The same institutions (such as factions) can produce different outcomes at different times; political manoeuvres can affect the institutional environment; and the strategies of the actors can also change to accommodate changes in the institutions themselves (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:17). But I will also argue that political discourses on factions also play their role in defining factionalism. Factions changed in organisational terms but, more than that, the very notion of what factions are and what effect they have was transformed as well. The political factions of the early postwar period in many ways resembled the prewar factions of the Seiyūkai and the Minseitō, and thus retained much of their prewar character until the mid-1950s when the LDP was formed. As pointed out by many scholars (Tominomori 1994; Uchida 1983), the first ten years after the war were characterised by great instability and continuous splits and mergers of political groups. However, in spite of their fluidity, unclear boundaries and limited relevance to political processes, the factions of the Jiyūtō and Minshutō were viewed as highly destabilising entities that disrupted political life. In the LDP, this notion of factionalism was slowly replaced as the factions adopted new functions and became tightly knit entities. The factions came to be viewed as a ‘binding agent’ that kept the party together, increased unity, gave all party members the opportunity to air their views, and allowed leadership changes. It can thus be argued that in the early 1960s a major transformation occurred in a discursive sense as well. To this aspect I turn now.

1.4.3. Entrenching the new factions

In Chapters 2 to 5 I describe how the old factions of the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō were fundamentally different from the ones that later appeared in the LDP. I detail how and why the old factions changed into the new ones. Through that I show that the ‘traditional’ characteristics of the LDP factions, considered by many observers to have survived into the present, were not evident in the political factions in the 10 years preceding it. The personalistic and non-ideological LDP factions were described as a ‘feudal inheritance’ (Kurzman 1960:277), but as will be seen, the early factions were more policy based and
personal allegiance was not as deep as in the LDP factions. The LDP factions performed 'traditional' roles that factions had not served before. These traditions had not come from the factions preceding them. And so—I finish this thesis on an interesting paradox. Just as the new LDP factions had emerged they began to be described, by scholars and other observers both Japanese and foreign, as typically and traditionally Japanese. In Chapter 6 I ask: why was it that a form of factionalism that had only just come into being was described as traditional and Japanese and what where the consequences of those descriptions?

Evoking Dryzak's (1997) study on discourses I ask what ‘faction’ was in the 1960s, what was said about ‘factions’ at that time, how they were understood, and what the perceived effects of factionalism were. I describe movements to dissolve factions in the LDP in the early 1960s and how they were related to debates in and about Japan on modernisation and democracy. I distinguish between two different discourses existing at the time: one which sees factionalism as premodern, traditional, typically Japanese and a hindrance to modernisation and democracy; and another which sees factionalism as traditional, typically Japanese but democratic, and working against autocratic power within the LDP. I argue that the new LDP factions can be described as ‘invented traditions’ (Dirks et al. 1994:4; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Immergut 1998; Vlastos 1998) and suggest that the movements for the dissolution of factions may, ironically, have unwittingly had the opposite effect of what they intended. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the Japanese moved somewhat away from the self-criticism they had practised in the early period, and became more interested in exploring their own culture as a tool to aid modernisation. This change in perspective affected Japanese views of their own political system and thus affected the political development (see Davis 1992; Kersten 2000). Describing factionalism within the LDP as typically and traditionally Japanese, at a time when, with the re-emergence of Japan as an economic power, ‘Japanese values’ were being reasserted, may, I suggest, have lent legitimacy to factionalism and have thus helped to entrench the LDP factions.
1.5. Methodology

This thesis relies solely on written data. For data on the development of factionalism I have relied on both English and Japanese material on factions and the political history of Japan. There is an abundance of material to be found on the period after the formation of the LDP in 1955 but analytical material on factionalism in the early period is scarce. Very little information is available that tells us anything about ordinary rank-and-file politicians, and their own views of the factional manoeuvres. As well as relying on the few existing political and factional analyses from the early period I have tried to build a coherent picture of factionalism through newspapers, biographies of and autobiographies by Japanese politicians of this period, and journal articles. This material has provided important historical information about the period in question.

However, the material for the first 10 years of the postwar era is rather sketchy in that there are very few sources that provide detailed information about factionalism, membership, movements between factions, and the functions of factions. This information has had to be collated from a wide variety of historical sources. Unavoidably there are gaps in the information. However, it has been possible to gather enough information to give quite a full picture of the factions that existed and their general movements. The material available in the early postwar years says little about what the factions were, but more about what the factions were not. This has given some insight into where and when factions featured in political life.

Information on factional membership is also very scarce for the early postwar period because membership was fluid and ill-defined. The functions of factions were also far from clear. I have been able to assemble a number of faction lists for the first years of the postwar period. In his book in 1948 Sakano presented lists of the internal divisions of the Jiyūtō in 1946 after Yoshida had taken over the leadership, and in 1947 after the general election. SCAP made their own lists of internal divisions within the conservative parties in 1949 and 1951, including the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō. For the period 1952–55 I have relied on Japanese newspapers and historical analyses of the time, such as Watanabe (1958) and various memoirs of politicians, to build a picture of factional membership.
Chapter 1: Introduction

As factions did not keep official membership lists, the lists made by various observers may have been largely based on observations and conclusions drawn from a variety of connections between politicians and their actions. The criteria used for making the lists were not specified. The lists may thus not be completely accurate but are all the same an important historical source, and an indication of the nature of membership in the early postwar factions.

Information on factions in the Minshutō is much more scarce than on the Jiyūtō, perhaps primarily because the latter was bigger and in government for much of the early period in question and thus received more scholarly attention. The only complete factional lists that I have for the Minshutō are in 1949 and 1951, put together by SCAP. I have tried to expand these lists by using a variety of contemporary sources but there are still unavoidable gaps that prevent full use of the data. This lack of material is unfortunate as it has prevented me from discussing the Minshutō in as much detail as I would have liked. I decided however to include the party in my analysis as I felt the material was sufficient to give indications as to the type of factionalism that existed within it. Data for the Jiyūtō is also sketchy in the early 1950s. For 1952–54 I only have complete lists of the forces opposing Yoshida in 1953 as well as a list of neutral forces in the centre faction. The remaining Dietmembers are taken to be Yoshida supporters or otherwise neutral people. Biographies give some insight into the internal discord in the parties and these are used as much as possible to fill in the picture. These sources have been sufficient to build a database that can give us a broad idea of factional development between 1946 and 1954, movements and membership of internal party groups, and appointments to cabinet posts and the three most important party posts.

Information on the period 1956–1964 is much more abundant and bears witness to the changing nature of the factions. For information on this period I have relied on the daily newspapers which started to print lists of membership, as well as historical sources such as Watanabe (1958) and Kokkai Binran, which give almost yearly accounts of factional developments and movements.
Chapter 1: Introduction

The data on faction membership I gathered were used to create a large database holding information on all Jiyūtō, Minshutō, and LDP Dietmembers in the 1945–64 period. The data include information on their party affiliation, election district, years elected, party and cabinet posts held, and affiliation with a number of formal and informal intra-party groups. This database was used extensively in Chapters 2–5 to compare early postwar factions with the later LDP factions, and to test existing theories on the importance of the electoral system to factional development, which scholars invariably emphasise. The database gives us an idea of the extent of factional divisions in the early conservative parties and tells us important things about the role that factions played in recruitment within party and cabinet. As far as I am aware, never has so much data on factional divisions in early postwar Japan been put together before.

For an analysis on the changing discourse on factions in 1945–1964 I relied on Japanese and English speaking newspapers, contemporary scholarly commentaries and biographies. The initial analysis was done by going through all articles written on factions in the Asahi Shimbun. Asahi Shimbun was chosen for the initial analysis as the newspaper is available on CD-ROM, which makes it very convenient to work with. By using CD-ROM I was able to find all newspaper articles which had ‘faction’ (ha/habatsu), or the names of any of the factions, in their heading. Well aware of the leftist leanings of the newspaper, I then compared my findings with articles in some of the other main newspapers, such as Mainichi Shimbun and the Yomiuri Shimbun. There were no discernible differences between the sources in the samples I took, so I feel confident that the Asahi can be taken as a reliable source on political factionalism in this period. The Japan Times also turned out to be a very valuable source for tracing the broad changes in the discourse on factions. Many of the political columnists writing for the paper in this period were Japanese, although quite a few articles could also be found by foreign analysts.
1.6. Scope
The thesis covers the 19 years between 1945 and 1964. When first approaching my topic I was increasingly drawn to the factional history of the early postwar period, largely because so little was known about it. The many analyses of factionalism after 1955 have been built on certain ideas and assumptions about political factionalism historically, but there was very little material to consult to confirm these views. A number of approaches have been used to explain how factionalism is sustained within the LDP, but few, if any, have extended their approaches to the development of factionalism before 1955. I therefore decided that it was paramount in theorising about LDP factions to gain a greater understanding of factionalism within the early postwar conservative parties. We know very little about the nature and activities of factions that existed between 1945 and 1955. Without such background information, it is impossible to understand how factionalism has changed, as we do not know exactly what it was changing from. This 19 year period was chosen in the end to make possible a historical approach to the study of factions—one that compared the nature of the early postwar factions with the factions that developed within the LDP, and allowed me to theorise about the factors that shaped those changes.

The closing date for the thesis is 1964, and the reasons for that are twofold. First, Ikeda Hayato’s term as prime minister ended late in that year, giving some sort of historical cut-off point. Satō Eisaku, his successor, was to be the longest serving prime minister Japan has had in the postwar era, serving for eight years. Second, in the first few years after its formation in 1955, rapid changes took place within the LDP which changed the factions. Kohno has argued that a major change in factional patterns emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s, reducing the number of factions while increasing their size, and leaving important political processes to five major factions. The internal organisation of the LDP also showed signs of formal structure akin to a political party, with factional posts mirroring party posts, and formal channels established for interaction between factions and party leadership concerning promotion and distribution of posts (see Kohno 1997:92–96). However, by 1964, this brief transitional phase in which factions developed from the fluid factions into structured entities had already started, as they had come to
show many of the characteristics that Kohno (1997) identifies. My aim was to gain an understanding of how factions within the LDP differed from the preceding factions, and to shed some light on the process whereby the factions changed. I felt that this aim could be achieved by ending the study in 1964.

1.7. The Chapters

The thesis is divided into three main sections. This includes the introduction discussing the theoretical framework of the thesis and constitutes the first part. Part 2, with Chapters 2 and 3, discusses the factions within the early postwar conservative parties, the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō (which was later to be known as the Kaishintō) between 1945 and 1955.

In Chapter 2, I look at the Jiyūtō and Minshutō factions, their characteristics and place in the political system. I argue that the factions were fundamentally different from the LDP factions as the developed in the late 1950s. In spite of factional struggles, the factions were not the bases of the political parties. It was of more significance that the early postwar conservative parties were polarised in ways similar to the prewar parties and were considered to be highly destabilising entities. Ideology and policy were important to some of the factions, and then primarily in exacerbating polarisation. Factional conflict was of political relevance primarily when the two wings of the parties clashed internally. In particular, the factional struggles between these two wings were considered highly destabilising for the political system. Factionalism was bad for party unity and tore both parties apart.

Chapter 3 discusses more specifically what purpose the early factions served. I argue that, as in the case of the LDP factions, the early conservative factions served a role as distributors of financial aid to the rank-and-file. However, this function was limited by the economic and political environment of the era and the relatively centralised nature of the conservative parties. This limited the political importance the factions could have. Factions could not build up permanent membership. Factions did not have the leverage to influence the party leadership with any consistency and thus did not distribute posts in
party or cabinet to faction members. Factions were not the basis for decision making in the party in terms of leadership selection or candidate selection. I further argue that factionalism did not reach out to the electoral districts because of the limited political importance it had at the core of the party. The multimember electoral system can thus not be considered a defining influence on the factions in this period.

Part 3 focuses on the transformation of factionalism in Japan from the destabilising factionalism of the early postwar period towards a clearly visible factional system which could increase political stability. It discusses the institutional environment and the effect the electoral system, political funding systems and internal party rules had on the character of factionalism. It also considers the discursive forces at work which increasingly presented factionalism as cultural, traditional and Japanese.

Chapter 4 focuses on the way factionalism changed after the formation of the LDP in December 1955. The notion of a polarised party faded after the first year of the party. As membership formed and the factions took on new functions as primary participants in the distribution of cabinet and party posts, and the main forums for discussion on party policy, policy became less important as a binding agent for the factions themselves. The factions became patronage groups with clear membership and invoked loyalty through an extensive system of material awards. The new factional system was consequently different from the one that existed in the first ten years of the postwar period when factionalism had been considered deeply disturbing for the political system. Within the LDP, factionalism became a potential stabilising force, holding the party together through more widespread internal representation.

Chapter 5 deals more specifically with the question why factionalism changed in the first years of the LDP, and focuses on the institutional and wider political and economic environment of the first few years of the party. It is argued that, contrary to most institutional analyses of conservative factionalism in Japan, the election system cannot be considered as a primary factor in causing the factionalisation of the party. More important were a series of institutional changes brought about by power struggles such as the
presidential elections; the establishment of factions as financial associations; and then the rapidly growing economy which allowed closer relations between politics and business, and created an environment where political leaders were encouraged to use organised support to secure their power. The centralised power conflict within the party then spread out to the periphery, with the result that by 1964 the electoral districts were becoming dominated by factional conflict.

Chapter 6 shows what influence the debate on Japan’s modernisation in the early 1960s had on discourses on factionalism in the LDP. In the early 1960s a debate commenced on the success of Japanese democracy and how Japan could embrace modernity without having to give up Japanese traditions for Westernisation. The movement within the LDP in the early 1960s to abolish factionalism and create a modern party, which has usually been dismissed by scholars and observers as a failed attempt of little historical importance, was heavily influenced by this debate on democracy and modernisation. I argue that while the movement failed to disband factions, it influenced the perception of factions greatly. It put into the limelight issues such as the nature of party management, intra-party democracy, and cultural influence. As the LDP factions took on new functions, views of their value varied: many argued that factions were a part of Japan’s past that ought to be abolished, since they stood in the way of democratic development and modernisation, but to others, factions were a tool to achieve democracy. Simultaneously, the discussion on Japanese culture and traditions merged with the debate on factionalism, with the result that factions came to be increasingly described in cultural terms that were resonant of Japan’s feudal past. Although the LDP factions were in many ways new groups, with new functions and new characteristics, they were increasingly seen to be traditional and thus Japanese. While the connotations of this were negative in the debates on democracy and modernisation, portraying the factions as traditional and Japanese, I suggest, gave them certain amount of legitimacy.

Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and draws together the main findings of the research. A historical approach shows that factionalism has changed significantly in the postwar period. Institutionally, the factions have changed. The Jiyūtō, Minshutō and LDP factions
had very different levels of organisation and their importance for the political system was very different. I argue that in order to understand factional development in the postwar period we need a dynamic institutional approach that allows us to theorise about complex institutional changes and the way political tactics and power politics produce unintended changes. A more general and genetic approach, looking at the way the parties emerged, like Panebianco’s, is more powerful in explaining changes and differences than the more narrow focus on the electoral system found in rational choice and institutional approaches. Using a discursive approach we can better understand how institutional changes were made sense of and given legitimacy. Factions have changed in discursive terms. The LDP factions in 1964 were very different political groups from the 1940s conservative factions. In this period journalistic, scholarly and political discourses reveal a number of competing paradigms for understanding factionalism. Cultural rhetoric was much used throughout the period in discussion of politics in Japan, but it is interesting to note than in the early 1960s there was a noted difference in the discourse, with increasing use of cultural references to describe factions, and to explain why they existed, and why they couldn’t be eradicated. I believe that a comparison of institutional frameworks and discursive practices can provide meaningful understanding of factional development and a basis for cross-cultural comparison with factionalism in other political systems.

Notes
1 The Jiyūtō and Minshutō changed names a number of times during the first ten years of the postwar period. The Jiyūtō was called Minshu Jiyūtō from March 1948 till March 1950 when it changed back to its original name, Jiyūtō. The Shinpotō, formed in 1945, changed its name to Minshutō in March 1947, to Kaishintō in February 1952, and then back to Minshutō in 1954. For reasons of simplicity these parties will be termed Jiyūtō and Minshutō throughout the thesis, unless otherwise required to prevent misunderstanding.
2 Scholars have not agreed as to exactly how to categorise the works that adopt institutional approaches. Thelen and Steinmo (1992) see two main approaches, a historical institutional tradition and a rational choice approach, while some scholars have identified a third approach, social institutionalism, arguing that cultural theory should be considered an institutional theory (Grendstad and Selle 1995:6; Hall and Taylor 1996:936). Others, such as Lichbach and Zuckerman (1997) argue that the field of comparative politics can be divided into three distinctive approaches: rational choice theories, cultural theories, and structuralism.
PART II

Factionalism 1945-1955
2.1. Introduction

Ever since the end of the Second World War, Western scholars have emphasised the factionalised nature of Japanese society and the influence factionalism has had on politics in Japan (Nakane 1970:3; Maki 1962:161; Quigley and Turner 1956:277; Stockwin 1982:66). This view has informed many of the studies on factionalism within the LDP and the point is frequently made that factions have always formed the basis of politics in Japan (Baerwald 1986:17; Maki 1962; Mitchell 1996; Ward 1969; Quigley and Turner 1956:277; Scalapino and Masumi 1962:149). All the major approaches to factionalism in Japan have emphasised continuity and sought to find similarities rather than differences between factionalism in different periods (see for example Baerwald 1986; Fukui 1970; Hrebenar 1986; Kohno 1997; Maki 1962; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Scalapino 1968; Scalapino and Masumi 1962; Stockwin 1983:209; Totten and Kawakami 1965:113). A noticeable exception to this tendency is Leiserson (1968:770), who argues that until presidential elections were introduced in the LDP in 1956, ‘factions in the LDP were more or less what factions in Japan—or anywhere—had always been: a nucleus of a few lieutenants around a leader, with a rather unreliable following’. All the same, factional studies frequently lead us to conclude that conservative politics in Japan have always been factionalised and that the LDP factions are typical Japanese factions (see Stockwin 1982:36–7).

This chapter will discuss the nature of factionalism within the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō between 1945 and 1955 and the effect it had on the political environment. First, a number of observations will be made about the structural features of the factions and the factional system. It is argued that the Jiyūtō and Minshutō factions were fundamentally different from the later time LDP factions. The early factions were not uniform groups resting on a clearly defined patron-client relationship between leader and follower. Structurally, the
intra-party groups called *ha* (faction) in Japanese, in the first decade following the end of the war, ranged from being very small groups, often of very short duration—what some scholars refer to as ‘cliques’ or ‘tendencies’ (Beller and Belloni 1978:422; Rose 1964:37-8)—to more structured and personal patron-client groups, where the leader served a more unifying role (see Beller and Belloni 1978:422–27; Rose 1964:37). This leads to a second major observation. Because of their loose structure, the factions had a very different place in the political system in the early postwar period than they came to have within the LDP. Most of these factions were not important to the political process in this period and were not the ‘vital center of the political process’ that Scalapino and Masumi (1964:149) argued them to be. I contend that it was much more important to the political system that the parties themselves, like the prewar conservative parties, tended to polarise. Third, although, or perhaps because, the factions were not the basis of political decision-making, they were considered politically very destabilising entities. This was certainly the prevailing scholarly understanding of party factions at the time (Stockwin 1970:362). Factional conflict often caused irreparable rifts within parties, especially within the conservative parties. The structural characteristics of the early postwar factions made them significantly different from the LDP factions. In conclusion, I argue that policy differences played a more important role in differentiating between the factions in early postwar Japan than in the LDP, and that these differences reinforced the polarisation of the parties.

2.2. The conservative factional divisions

Before discussing the characteristics of the factional groups within the Jiayuō and the Minshutō, I will provide a brief overview of the factional landscape within these parties between 1945 and 1954. The Jiayūō and Minshutō were the two main parties formed on the right wing following Japan’s surrender in August 1945. Other minor parties existed to the right of centre, the most important being the Kyōdōtō (Cooperative Party), the only party with no organisational roots in the prewar period (Reed 1988:315).
2.2.1. The Jiyūtō

The Jiyūtō was established on 9 November 1945 by a leading prewar conservative politician, Hatoyama Ichirō, and included 43 existing Diet members most of whom had been in some opposition to the military regime during the war (Uchida 1987:310). The party was relatively free of factionalism at the time of its formation because the majority of its members had supported Hatoyama within the prewar Seiyukai.¹ The Jiyūtō was the leading government party in the first decade of the postwar era. The party was in government in 1946–47², and again in 1949–54, after brief spells of coalition governments led by the Shakaitō (Socialist Party) in 1947–48 and by the Minshutō in 1948.

Both the main conservative parties were heavily affected by the removal from office by the Allied Powers of ‘undesirable influences’—the so-called purges of 1946–48.³ The Jiyūtō lost more than half of its 45 founding members through the purges (Baerwald 1977:84; Fukui 1970:38; Sims 2000:247). Hatoyama himself was purged in May 1946, only a few days after he had been recommended to SCAP as the next prime minister following the Jiyūtō victory in the general election. Yoshida Shigeru, a former foreign ministry diplomat, took over the leadership of the party and was to lead the party for the next eight and a half years (Baerwald 1977:21–24; Stockwin 1982:61).

Until 1948, the factional divisions of the Jiyūtō were based mostly on prewar affiliations and the division into old and new politicians. The earliest factional chart available, in 1946, divides the Jiyūtō into two wings, Fudai and Tozama (Sakano 1948:78). The terminology dates back to Tokugawa times and was used to distinguish between those close to the leadership, the Fudai wing, and those further removed from it, the ‘Tozama allies’ (Koschmann 1982:82). As seen in Table 2–1, the factional divisions were not conspicuous in 1947 and the factions Sakano (1948) identifies mirrored largely prewar groupings such as the Nakajima support faction, the Hoshijima faction and the Matsuno faction. Yoshida, as the new leader of the party, had formed a small group of supporters, but his group did not become conspicuous until after Yoshida recruited a number of former bureaucrats into the party in 1948 who came to form the core of his
Table 2-1: Factional divisions within the Jiyūtō 1946-1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fudai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hatoyama wing:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hatoyama</td>
<td>Hatoyama/ Mindōba</td>
<td>Hatoyama/ Mindōba</td>
<td>Hatoyama</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ōno/Ōkubo</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Kishi</td>
<td>Kishi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uehara</td>
<td>Uehara</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hayashi</td>
<td>Hayashi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kuhara</td>
<td>Kuhara</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Masuno</td>
<td>Masuno</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Masutani</td>
<td>Masutani</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hoshijima</td>
<td>Hoshijima</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakajima</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoshijima</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional faction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Maeda</td>
<td>Maeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tozama</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yoshida wing:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hirokawa</td>
<td>Hirokawa</td>
<td>Hirokawa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Satō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masuda</td>
<td>Masuda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shidehara</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imakai</td>
<td>Imakai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogata</td>
<td>Ogata</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Compiled from Sakano 1948; SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups 1949 GS(B) 02683, SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties 1951 GS(B) 02674-5; Asahi Shimbun; Nagata 1953; Watanabe 1958; Fukui 1970; Iyasu 1996.
support faction. Ōno Bamboku and Ōkubo Tōmejirō led the old party politicians, who now felt threatened by the leadership change. A group of former supporters of Ashida Hitoshi existed within the party in 1947 but quickly dispersed (Sakano 1948:78). Ashida himself had by then split from the Jiyūtō. A Shidehara faction emerged within the party in 1948 when a group of dissidents from the Minshutō, led by Shidehara Kijurō, joined their ranks. In 1949 the factional pattern looked fairly simple. In addition to the Yoshida and Ōno factions, a Hirokawa group started forming between 1948 and 1950 which was closely aligned with Yoshida. The Shidehara group continued to exist for a few years. In addition there was a group of neutral politicians.

The early 1950s saw a large number of small factions appearing that seemed largely sub-factions within the large Yoshida and Hatoyama factions (see Table 2-1). Most of these were very small and had a very short lifespan. The Ōno faction (supporters of Hatoyama Ichirō), the Yoshida faction, the Hirokawa faction, the Shidehara faction and the Inukai faction, another group of defectors from the Minshutō who had joined the Jiyūtō in March 1950, remained the biggest and most powerful (SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties 1951 GS(B) 02674-5).

In late 1952 and early 1953 there was much factional activity within the party. This was in large part caused by the return of purged politicians to politics in 1950–1951. The depurges were returned in three main waves but Hatoyama himself was one of the last to be depurged in August 1951 (Calder 1988:83–4; Masumi 1985:279-81). The general elections in October 1952 caused great upheaval in Japanese politics as many districts saw fierce battles between the ‘new politicians’, who had been elected following the purge, and the ‘depurges’, who now sought to retrieve their Diet seats. The depurge affected the Jiyūtō in particular, making clearer the internal divisions within the party and starting a major leadership struggle.

The return of Hatoyama and the depurged party politicians sharpened the struggles between the party politicians and party leader Yoshida and his supporters. This culminated in the establishment of the Minshuka Dōmei or the Democratisation League
(Mindōha for short) in October 1952, a group of party members disillusioned with Yoshida’s leadership and in favour of Hatoyama taking over the party reins again. A Maeda faction, housing many of the newly depurged politicians returning to politics, was also established. These factions joined in the factional struggle taking place between the Yoshida and Hatoyama factions. The factional struggle led to a split in the Jiyūtō in March 1953 as the Mindōha and the Hirokawa factions left to form their own party, Buntōha Jiyūtō (Bunjītō). These groups joined the party again in November 1953. By then a faction had started to form around Kishi Nobusuke in the Jiyūtō, but he had just joined the party, and it, along with the Hatoyama and Ishibashi factions, split in spring 1954 to form the Minshutō (Democratic Party) with the Kaishintō (Reformist Party) (Nagata 1953). As Ogata Taketora established himself as leader of the Jiyūtō, following the resignation of Yoshida in 1954, a faction formed around him.

### 2.2.2. The Minshutō

The other main conservative party, the Nihon Shinpotō (Japan Progressive Party), was formed on 16 November 1945 and included mostly existing Dietmembers who had been associated with the wartime Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association and sought to preserve the prewar political system. Of the 273 Dietmembers affiliated with the party when it was established, more than half had been elected before 1937. The majority of those—89 members—had belonged to the prewar Minseitō and then mainly the Machida faction, while 39 had been members of the Seiyukai’s Nakajima faction, which had bitterly fought Hatoyama in the prewar period. Seven came from the Kuhara faction, and a few from the neutral Kanemitsu faction (Colton 1948:943–4; Fukui 1970:36; SCAP History of Political Parties 1945–1951 GS(A) 02519). However, 45% of the party members were first term Dietmembers (Colton 1948:943–44).

In the purges of 1946, 250 party members were removed from political life (Fukui 1970:38). As new candidates came forward, the prewar political divisions decreased greatly. Seiyukai’s influence dwindled particularly, and Inukai Ken was the only one remaining of the old Seiyukai leadership (Colton 1948:945). The party came to rely mostly on Minseitō politicians and the division became that of the Minseitō and the
newcomers. The party changed leaders frequently in the first years due to the purges. Ugaki Kazushige was the first president of the party but he was purged shortly afterwards and Machida Chûji of the old Minseitô was made president. Machida was also purged along with secretary general Tsurumi Yûsuke (Uchida 1969:57) and Shidehara Kijûrô was made leader of the party in April 1946. As with the Jiyûtô, the party seemed at first divided along prewar party lines.

As seen in Table 2-2, the Minshutô, like the Jiyûtô, had a number of internal groups that increased in number in the early 1950s. In spite of the relative lack of data about the factions it seems safe to state that, unlike the Jiyûtô, these factions were all small. In early 1947 the Shinshinkai, led by Inukai Ken, Chairman of the Executive Council, and the Taiyokai, led by President Shidehara Kijûrô, were the main factions within the party. In March 1947 the party changed its name to Minshutô when Ashida Hitoshi and a few other members of the Jiyûtô and other minor parties joined the party, and Ashida was made party president. Although this wing of the conservative forces was largely in opposition it participated in the Katayama cabinet from May 1947 to March 1948, and in the short-lived Ashida cabinet that succeeded the Katayama cabinet and only lasted until October 1948.

As seen in Table 2–2, the Ashida and Shidehara factions were the main factions within the party in 1947–48, and fought bitterly for control of the party. Ishigurô Takeshige, minister in the Shidehara cabinet, also had a small faction around him. He was purged in 1947 but the faction existed until 1949, although very small. The Shinshinkai was also left without a leader when Inukai was purged in April 1947. One of its members, Kitamura Tokutarô, acted as leader and the faction threw its support behind Ashida in the leadership struggle that ensued within the party (Uchida 1969:58). When Inukai returned to the party in 1949, a new faction, the Inukai faction, formed around him (Watanabe 1958:204). The Shidehara faction decided to split from the party in 1948 to join the Jiyûtô in 1948. In 1949 two loosely organised factions, the Coalition (renritsu ha) and Opposition (yatô ha) factions existed briefly, as the party split over the issue of cooperation with the Jiyûtô (see Table 2–2).
The struggle between these two groups resulted in another split in 1950 when Inukai Ken, after a year as party president, left the party along with many of the Coalition faction, to join the Jiyūtō. Following the split, the party changed its name to the Kokumin Minshutō (National Democratic Party) as it joined with the Kokumin Kyōdōtō (National Cooperative Party). Many of the Coalition faction who did not leave formed a new faction within the Minshutō, led by Kimura Kozaemon. In February 1952 the party changed its name again, this time to the Kaishintō (Reformist Party), as it merged with the small Shinsei Club, a group of depurged Minseitō politicians in 1952, and Shigemitsu Mamoru became leader. These mergers led to some new factional groups emerging: the Miki and Matsumura factions from the Kyōdōtō, and the Ōasa faction, consisting of recently depurged politicians. In 1954 the Kaishintō disbanded as it joined with dissident elements from the Jiyūtō to form the Minshutō (Democratic Party). The Minshutō was in government again between 1954 and 1955, following the fall of the long lived Yoshida administration.

Table 2-2: Factional divisions within the Shinpōtō/Minshutō/Kaishintō 1947–1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposition:</td>
<td>Conservative:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shidehara</td>
<td>Shidehara</td>
<td>Shidehara</td>
<td>Taiyokai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashida</td>
<td>Ashida</td>
<td>Ashida</td>
<td>Ashida</td>
<td>Ashida</td>
<td>Ashida</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinshinkai</td>
<td>Shinshinkai</td>
<td>Shinshinkai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishiguro</td>
<td>Ishiguro</td>
<td>Ishiguro</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ōasa</td>
<td>Ōasa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomabechi</td>
<td>Tomabechi</td>
<td>Tomabechi</td>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inukai</td>
<td>Inukai</td>
<td>Inukai</td>
<td>Kimura</td>
<td>Keisetsu kai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Miki</td>
<td>Miki</td>
<td>Miki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kitamura</td>
<td>Kitamura</td>
<td>Kitamura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Matsumura</td>
<td>Matsumura</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sources: Asahi Shimbun; SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups 1949 (GSB) 02683; SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties 1951 GS(B) 02674-5; Watanabe 1958.

After this short overview of the factions, I turn now to an analysis of their characteristics to provide a fuller picture of their structure.

2.3. The factions and their structural characteristics

The Jiyūtō and Minshutō factions were not of uniform character. The diversity in visibility, durability, organisational tightness and political importance is in fact confusingly varied. Although, as explained in Chapter 1, I will view and refer to all of these groups as ‘factions,’ these factions were fundamentally different from the factions that came to develop within the LDP in the late 1950s. In order to clarify the structural differences between the early postwar conservative factions and the LDP factions, I will use categorisations developed by scholars of factions, in particular those of Beller and Belloni (1976, 1978c) and Rose (1964). Beller and Belloni argued that all intra-party groups could be divided into three main groups: tendencies, patron-client groups, and institutionalised, organisational factions (1978c:422–27). Beller and Belloni (1978c:427) define the last category, institutionalised factions, as groups with developed ‘organizational structure and...relative formalization’. They may build on the appeal of a leader, like smaller patron-client groups, but that appeal is more public and symbolic than personal and private. The group resembles a corporate group because it has developed organisational features such as membership, leadership, procedures and durability, recruitment is important and aggressively prosecuted and the members’ ‘consciousness of their factional identity is one basis of the existence of the faction’ (1978c:427-8). This description is very apt for the LDP factions (Baerwald 1986:21-22; Scalapino and Masumi 1962:19; Richardson and Flanagan 1984:102-3; Stockwin 1989:163).

I will argue, however, that the Jiyūtō and Minshutō factions fall variously into the first two categories. Some factions resembled more tendencies, others patron-client groups, but most showed some characteristics of both types of factions. Tendencies have been defined in varying terms but scholars using this term agree that they are intra-party
groups which have very little structure, are almost totally lacking in organisation and are of very short duration (Beller and Belloni 1978c:422). They often emerge as consolidated support for a single issue or an electoral campaign. In Rose’s view tendencies have a clear policy-based foundation, and a stable set of attitudes rather than a stable group of politicians (Rose 1964:37). To both Beller and Belloni and Rose, membership of tendencies is very vague, often externally ascribed or dependent on the individual’s self-identification, and usually there is no purposeful recruitment.8 These groups can have leadership but they do not have the clientelistic character the patron-client groups have (Beller and Belloni 1978c:422).

On the other hand, political scientists who have researched patron–client groups define them as small groups based on the relationship between leader and followers, where the leader grants favours to his clients, party members or electorate, in return for loyalty, political allegiance or other services (Hall 1977:510; Weingrod 1968:324; Beller and Belloni 1978c:427). Patronage refers to the way political leaders ‘seek to turn public institutions and public resources to their own ends’ (Weingrod 1968:324). Perhaps because anthropologists were the first to study factions as groups which structured conflict within communities in non-Western societies (Beller 1978a:7), patron client groups have often been viewed through a cultural lens. Beller and Belloni ignore the cultural aspect in their definition and attempt a structural description of client groups as based on the person of their leader, more structured than tendencies, and of ‘intermediate duration’ although rarely lasting longer than the leader (1978c:424–5). Like the tendencies, these groups are rather informal, they do not have headquarters or regular meetings although they may meet at a leader’s home. Usually such groups are small, although they may become larger when they include sub-leaders, each with their own following (1978c:424).

A number of factions within both parties lacked the durability ascribed to institutionalised factions such as the LDP factions and were often established for a specific purpose, e.g. electoral campaign or a specific political issue. The Maeda faction, for example, also called the Hatsukakai (20th Day Club), was a group formed in 1952 by Maeda Yonezō
The Jiyūtō Ipponka Dōmei (Jiyūtō Union Alliance), formed within the Jiyūtō in 1952, was another group formed for a specific, short-term purpose and thus resembled closely the tendency as described by Rose (1964:37). It was a group of people, who, through their neutral standing within the party, sought to reconcile the warring Yoshida and Hatoyama factions. All those who attended a meeting in October 1952, calling for an end to factional infighting, were assumed to be members of this faction but the group depended less on the sense of membership than an agreed goal (see AS 8.10.52). It did not expect to continue to operate as a group (see Rose 1964:38), and it was soon whittled away as its members dispersed.

Within the Minshutō a number of factions also existed united more by issues than leadership. The Shinshinkai and the Taiyokai were groups that did not adopt the name of their leader and did not possess formal organisation or continuity but tended to be mobilised for specific issues (see Beller and Belloni 1978c:423). The Taiyokai consisted mainly of party members interested in a merger with the Jiyūtō (Colton 1948:952). When the group joined the Jiyūtō in 1948 it slowly faded away. The Shinshinkai was initially led by Inukai Ken but his leadership was not as crucial to its existence as the common view that collaboration with the Jiyūtō was not desirable and the group continued to exist after Inukai had been purged (Fukui 1970:41; Colton 1948:952). Other groups within the Minshutō also had characteristics of being formed around topical issues. The 'Opposition faction' and the 'Coalition faction' emerged within the party in 1949 as party members were forced to take a stance on the issue of whether or not to cooperate more closely with the Jiyūtō, but they dissolved when the issue was solved.
All the Jiyūtō and Minshutō factions differed from the LDP factions in that none had permanent offices. Some set up offices temporarily, to fight in general elections or when a split was imminent, but more often they would meet intermittently at the leader's home. The meetings did not have many formal procedures as far as can be seen, although some would meet on certain days of the week. All of these groups had at least one leader at the centre, and sometimes two. The core of the faction was usually referred to by journalists and politicians as the 'executive,' but there were no posts or clearly defined hierarchy within the groups.

Furthermore, the early factions varied greatly in size—some were very small while others reached many dozens. The bigger groups took on a character of machine-type client-group factions, built on layers of leaders and followers, or had a dual structure of an inner and outer circle of members where the latter would not be closely or clearly attached to the faction. A large number of small factions, that were essentially patronage groups, existed within the Hatoyama and Yoshida wings of the Jiyūtō in the early 1950s. In the Yoshida faction small groups, such as the Fukunaga, Asō, Tsubokawa, Hori, Satō, Ikeda and Masuda factions, could be found. Within the Hatoyama faction, the Ishibashi, Uehara, Hayashi, Matsuno, Masutani and Hoshijima factions could be found (Dower 1979; Fukui 1970:45; Tominomori 1994:72). These groups were very small with an estimated membership of 4–6 members, and were centred on personal relations with the leader (Masumi 1985; Tominomori 1994).

Most factions resembled the LDP factions in that they were named after their leaders (for example, the Yoshida, Hatoyama, Miki, Kimura and Ashida factions), indicating that the appeal of the leader was important. However, there was an important difference in the role of the leader between the early factions and those of the LDP. Beller and Belloni note that in machine-type patron–client factions there were often layers of sub-factions whose members were leaders of other sub-factions (1978c:424). Many small factions existing within the larger Hatoyama and Yoshida factions of the Jiyūtō appeared to be groups of this kind. A faction leader was linked to another leader higher up who in turn was linked to the leader of one of the biggest factions. However, these sub-factions
resembled tendencies as well because of the way they lacked visibility, often surfacing when the leader needed to assert himself, and then disappearing from public view again. In spite of the large number of such small groups in the early 1950s, they had no visible impact on political developments, and rarely feature in historical material from the period or in the newspapers. They did not act independently as groups or take part in decision-making as formal entities, but always acted in relation to one of the two wings—the Hatoyama or Yoshida factions. These factions did not meet regularly, or have exclusive membership; in fact, it is doubtful whether the members consciously identified with them. The groups were probably held together rather by vertical links between leaders and followers than by horizontal links between members. There are indications that the members of these very small client groups had multiple identities. Because of their small size, unorganised nature and lack of purposeful recruitment, these groups may be described as tendencies with a patron-client element (see Beller and Belloni 1978c:422).

Although policy could be important in some factions, many groups in both Jiyūtō and Minshutō rested to some degree on the personal relationship between leader and followers like the LDP factions. Party members would join factions in the hope that it would help them advance in exchange for support of some kind. Tanaka Kakuei was, for example, said to have joined the Shidehara faction in 1947 to increase his chances of breaking 'into the fraternity of elites' in exchange for financial backing (Hunziker and Kamimura 1994:47). However, because the big factions, such as the Hatoyama and Yoshida factions were multi-layered machine-type patron–client groups they could not act as uniform patronage factions. The Hatoyama faction, led by Ōno Bamboku and Ōkubo Tomejirō following Hatoyama's purge in May 1946, counted up to 100 members and could be said to be a machine-type faction, including sub-groups of a leader-follower nature. The faction was considered by many observers to be a prime example of an 'old fashioned' patronage faction (Watanabe 1958; Colton 1948; Nippon Times, hereafter NT 5.5.47; Fukui 1970)—an entourage of the personal friends of Hatoyama from the prewar political scene. These party politicians stood for 'the earthly, unsophisticated, rustic and occasionally uncouth and blunt ways for which the Seiyukai used to be outstanding' (Yanaga 1956:275). Such negative connotations also owed much to the fact that many of
these politicians had strong relations with gamblers, gangsters, black marketeers, brothels, restaurants and industrialists, as well as with the construction business.\textsuperscript{13} However, the Ōno faction was a group with an externally ascribed identity as the ‘party politicians’ within the party, in opposition to Yoshida and his support faction but the core of the Ōno faction, which stayed within its fold, was much smaller than the group of people who would occasionally provide the faction with support, depending on circumstances and issues (see Rose 1964:38). Many of the leading members of the core faction even worked closely with Yoshida, while the group retained its image as Hatoyama’s ‘party politician’ faction. Ōno Bamboku, along with Masutani Shūji and Hayashi Jōji,\textsuperscript{14} came to be a powerful and important link between the ‘party politicians’ and the ‘bureaucrats’ that Yoshida Shigeru recruited into the party (Masumi 1985:278). When Hatoyama returned to the party, Ōno was still a member of the Hatoyama wing within the party and was one of the eleven politicians surrounding Hatoyama and preparing his comeback to politics. But he had also moved close to Yoshida and was not willing to take the aggressive stand against Yoshida that Hatoyama did. More than a third of those considered members of the Ōkubo/Ōno faction in 1947 had moved over to Yoshida in 1949 (Sakano 1948: 80; SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups 1949 GS(B) 02683).\textsuperscript{15} Because of the fluidity of the Hatoyama/Ōno faction it never split clearly, but slowly dispersed as some decided to stay within the Yoshida wing, while others decided to ally with Hatoyama as he returned to politics in 1951 (Hatoyama 1957:139; Ōno 1964:66; Fukui 1970:45–6).

Size was not always indicative of political power. In spite of the size of the Ōno faction and its patronage image, the faction had limited political impact. It was important politically in the late 1940s and early 1950s as a group of party politicians resisting Yoshida’s leadership of the party, but it did not act independently as a group until after the depurges when Hatoyama, Miki and Kōno returned. Ōno was given the post of secretary general because of his prominent status as a party politician, but in spite of his leadership of such a big faction he was never considered party leadership material. While Ōno was secretary general of the Jiyūtō from 1946–48\textsuperscript{16} he used his position to further his interests and build up a following, but it was a blow to his status when he got embroiled
in the Showa Denkō scandal in 1948 and lost much personal support (Watanabe 1958:119). This incident showed that only few were willing to follow Ōno personally (Watanabe 1958:127).  

The discrepancy between size and political power in the early factions was in large part due to the lack of clearly defined membership and the limited emphasis on recruitment, which made the factions very different from the LDP factions. Even in factions such as the Hirokawa faction, within the Jiyūtō, which aggressively sought to recruit members, this different understanding of membership was obvious. The faction rested clearly on the personal leadership of Hirokawa Kōzen who formed the faction and led it throughout its lifetime. However, the patronage was limited by the fact that the faction was dual ringed with a large number of politicians considered ‘quasi-Hirokawa faction members’ (Igarashi 1952:20).

Hirokawa was a party politician aligned with the Ōno-Ōkubo group in the first few years of the postwar period (Sakano 1948:75; Masumi 1985:278) but when he was made vice secretary general in 1946 he started to build support around him. While secretary general of the party between October 1947 and April 1950 he further consolidated his support of largely new politicians and worked closely with Yoshida. He was firmly entrenched in the Yoshida camp until 1952 as leader of the biggest anti-Hatoyama party-politician faction and was one of Yoshida’s closest associates (sokkin) between 1949 and 1952 (Igashira 1952:22; Tominomori 1994:72). He used his faction as a bargaining chip for his own advancement within the party apparatus, showing his influence through sheer numbers and thus enabling him to stay at the party centre (Watanabe 1958). An observer commented in 1952 that the faction was ‘Hirokawa’s own show’ and that ‘the growth of Hirokawa is the growth of the faction’ (Igashira 1952:20). As seen later, Hirokawa decided to move from the Yoshida wing in 1953 to the Hatoyama wing and left the party in 1953. After that the faction slowly dispersed.

Yet another characteristic of the early factions, differentiating them from the LDP factions, was that they were not permanent organisations and leadership was never passed
from one leader to the next. Groups dispersed rather than disbanded. This was seen with the Shidehara, Inukai, Hirokawa and Maeda factions. The Shidehara and Inukai factions dispersed after entering the Jiyūtō in 1948 and 1950 respectively. The Shidehara faction maintained itself until 1951 when 26 of its 28 members from 1948 were still in the faction. Twelve of those were still in the party in 1952, but ten were by then either neutral or had joined the Yoshida faction, while two had joined the Hatoyama faction. Eight of the twelve Inukai faction members in 1951 did not have known factional affiliation in 1952. Two had, however, joined Hirokawa, one had joined the Yoshida faction and one was neutral.

As in the LDP, the patronage groups were groups serving the purpose of political expediency rather than policy. However, they were built around a prominent politician who used his position to attract followers with the foremost goal of promoting himself. Throughout the early 1950s many of these groups were very big and claimed a membership of up to 100 members. The factions were multi-layered with smaller patrons inside the faction. The outer, and much bigger, circle of these factions was not built on the same patronage links with the leader. This made the machine-type client factions disparate groups with no unifying character.

Factionalism within the early postwar parties was also significantly different from that of the LDP, which cut through the party ranks (see Beller and Belloni 1978c:437–8), in that although a great number of factions existed within the early parties, a large section of the parties either chose to stay outside the factional struggles or participated marginally by taking a neutral stance. The antagonisms and political manoeuvrings which were evident within both parties in the 1940s and 1950s occupied the highest echelon of the party, and not the whole of its rank-and-file. This fact has often been ignored in analyses of factional politics in Japan. The result has been an exaggerated picture of widespread and pervasive factionalism in early postwar Japan (see Scalapino and Masumi 1962; Scalapino 1968).
That section of the parties which chose to stand outside the factional ranks was often referred to as the 'Centre faction' (ちゅうかん派) in both parties, but it was not a united group. Rather, it involved a number of transient groups that could change rapidly. Rose pointed out that such a group could 'represent a slack resource which disputants attempt to mobilize in order to shift the balance' at times of intense differences within a party (1964:38). This was very true of the neutrals within both the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō. At times of internal turmoil the neutrals would emerge as a faction standing between the biggest rival groups, trying to act as a mediator. The rival factions would also try to woo neutral party members to expand their own ranks.

There is less information available about the centre faction in the Minshutō than about the corresponding faction in the Jiyūtō. All the same, it is clear that a significant number of party members remained non-aligned. This group became visible at the height of the struggle between the Coalition faction and the Opposition faction in 1949 when it urged both sides to become reconciled so as to keep the party together (SCAP, *Review of Government and Politics in Japan*, February 1951 GS(B) 02558-60).

At the height of the factional strife within the Jiyūtō after the general election in 1952 a neutral group, called the Ipponka Dōmei, mentioned before, was established, calling for an end to factional fighting (Nagata 1953:37; AS 8.10.52). The group was neutral in the sense that it stood outside the polarised struggle although many individuals had connections to one camp or the other. The group held a meeting in October 1952 with 74 participants. Of these, 35 were in the Jiyūtō in 1951 with differing factional identities (fourteen in the Yoshida faction, eight were neutral, six were in the Shidehara faction, five in the Ōno faction, and one in the Inukai faction). The criticism was often heard that the centre faction was taking advantage of the difficult situation in order to improve its own standing, and Miki Bukichi was quoted as saying that the central faction should be called the 'Opportunistic Alliance' (-binjō dōmei) (Nagata 1953:37). However, the centre faction was of great importance before and after the general elections in 1952 as both the Yoshida and Hatoyama factions openly called for the faction to join them in order to obtain total control of the party (AS 1.10.52). But the Ipponka Dōmei did not act
as a unified group for long, and by 1953 its members had merged with other factions (Nagata 1953:37). Sixteen of the 74 joined the Maeda faction, two were Hatoyama supporters, one joined the Hirokawa faction, four the Mindōha, and 48 had unknown affiliations, suggesting neutral status or alignment with Yoshida (AS 8.10.52; AS 1953).

Another section of the 'centre faction' in 1952–3 was the Maeda faction, mentioned above. The Maeda faction emerged following Maeda Yonezō's return to politics and had around 30 members (Nagata 1953:37–8; Yanaga 1956:256). This group, which included mostly prewar politicians who had been affiliated with the Seiyukai's Maeda and Nakajima factions and had been purged following the end of the war, was significant in the power struggle within the Jiyūtō because of Maeda's history as a political enemy of Hatoyama in the Seiyūkai (Nagata 1953:37; SCAP Concerning the Recent Political Situation, April 1951 (GSB) 02683; NT 20.10.52). After the depurge, however, his faction stood outside the struggles between the Yoshida and Hatoyama factions and was thus often labeled 'centre' in the press. However, it tried to use the hostilities between the Hatoyama and Yoshida factions to its advantage by maintaining connections with both camps. The Maeda faction was generally aligned with other pro-Yoshida forces and against Hatoyama but some members of the group were more pro-Hatoyama and some had connections with the Hirokawa faction (Nagata 1953:37; Hatoyama 1957:133). In early 1953, Maeda and leading members of his faction joined the Mindōha in putting pressure on Yoshida to withdraw his selection of Satō Eisaku as party secretary general (NT 28.1.53). On this occasion, the Maeda faction was able to affect the political balance within the framework of the Yoshida-Hatoyama struggle, but was otherwise an inconspicuous group. It was believed to have the potential to become influential within the party in 1953 (Nagata 1953) but with the split of the Mindōha in 1953 the basic tactic of the group of keeping a foot in both camps ceased to be effective. The Maeda faction came to play a role again in early 1954 when Maeda joined Hatoyama and his forces within the Jiyūtō and the Kishi faction in talks with Kaishintō (Hatoyama 1957:133). However, with Maeda's death in March 1954 the group dispersed. Its strong prewar character hindered its growth, with most of its most influential members having been prewar former bureaucrats.
In spring 1952 another group emerged within the Jiyūtō that claimed to be neutral on the issue of whether elections were required following Japan’s full independence. It included people like Ishida Hirohide, who was close to Ishibashi and Hatoyama; Sasaki Hideyo and Fukunaga Isshin, who were close to Hatoyama; and Yamamoto Takeo, who was of the Shidehara faction and closely connected to Ishibashi (Ishida 1985:62). After Yoshida announced he would continue with his administration until the end of its term the anti-Yoshida leanings of this group became evident. After this group, along with the Hatoyama forces, opposed the appointment of Fukunaga Isshin as secretary general in 1952—an issue which led to fist fights in the Diet—and attended a party in support of Hatoyama, it came to be called the hanrangun (rebel army) by the Yoshida faction (Ishida 1985:62). The group had dispersed by the general elections of October 1952.

Although the Jiyūtō and Minshutō factions varied greatly in their characteristics, they were all very different from the LDP factions. They resembled the tendencies and patron-client groups as defined by a number of scholars and not the institutionalised, organisational factions that Beller and Belloni discuss (1978c:427). Furthermore, the existence of a large group of non-aligned party members in both the Minshutō and the Jiyūtō tells us much about the limits of factionalism at this time and is an important indicator of a dualistic power struggle within the two parties. I will now turn to a discussion of the tendency of both parties to polarise, rather than factionalise, throughout the early postwar period, and the political consequences of this polarisation.

2.4. Polarisation and instability

As can be seen from the above discussion, the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō had a number of factions with different structural characteristics which has led scholars to argue that factionalism was rife in the early postwar period (Scalapino and Masumi 1962:149). I have argued that these factions were very different from the LDP factions—a point which has also been made by a number of Japanese scholars (Kitaoka 1995; Tominomori 1994:72; Gotō, Uchida and Ishikawa 1982:138; Iyasu 1984:122). Kitaoka for instance, argues that ‘it is a misunderstanding that the [LDP] factions are a Japanese peculiarity
and a traditional feature. Factions like those in the LDP where almost all party members would join did not exist in prewar Japan' (1995:27–8). Rather, the factions were described as ‘free comrade groups that met and parted’ (Tominomori 1994:72). Watanabe (1962:103) pointed out that ‘there were no factions at the height of Yoshida’s ‘one-man’ rule comparable to today’s eight army (gundan) factions, although the Hatoyama faction had a few members.’ Matsuno Raizō (1994:203), a member of the Jiyūtō similarly emphasised that

at that time there was no ‘mainstream factional system’ or such like. They were meaningless words. You could meet up with other faction leaders and say what you wanted without worry. That feeling of freedom was strong. Those were the times of the good old factions.

I would like to take this argument a step further and argue that not only was the factionalism of the early postwar period different from that of the LDP, but that most of the factions were of limited importance. They were not at the centre of the political process. What was of greater importance was that both the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō were dominated by intra-party polarisation between two large, fluid groups rather than by factionalisation. These wings, rather than the factional system itself, were important political groups affecting political stability greatly as a result of their confrontations, debate over policies and fight for political power.

This situation within each party of two wings contending over leadership and causing political instability resembled strongly the prewar factionalism within the Seiyukai. The Seiyukai, formed in 1900, developed an organisational structure similar to the Jiyūtō and the later LDP (Fukui 1970:18). It had factions based originally on regional and prefectural ties but these started to give way to different cleavages around 1920 (Fukui 1970:231; Kitaoka 1995:27; Scalapino 1953). Fukui (1970:23) argues that factionalism naturally thrived within conservative parties in prewar Japan as influential politicians ‘engaged in factional manoeuvres against one another’ to get hold of the post of party president. As in the postwar Jiyūtō and Minshutō, this factionalism was largely polarised between two groups vying for the presidency. In 1922, Prime Minister Takahashi and his ‘dominant faction’, which was in favour of a cabinet reshuffle, and a group led by
Nakahashi Tokugorō and Motoda Hajime, which opposed it, fought for control of the party. The infighting between them led to a split in district organisation, funds and personnel in 1924, as in the Jiyūtō in 1953 (Fukui 1970:23; Scalapino 1968:275). Another fight erupted in 1929 between Suzuki Kisaburo and Tokonami Takejirō following the death of president Tanaka Giichi (Fukui 1970:24). A similar situation arose again in 1938 when Suzuki, then president of the party, had to withdraw from politics because of bad health. His departure led to a split between a Hatoyama support faction on the one hand, and the anti-mainstream, anti-Hatoyama, anti-Suzuki faction led by Maeda Yonezō and Shimada Toshio on the other. The latter grouping became the Nakajima faction when they put the wealthy Nakajima forward as presidential candidate. Many within the party did not take part in this struggle and stayed neutral.

Many scholars in the early postwar period have pointed out the resemblance between prewar and postwar factional politics (Brines 1948; Colton 1948; Fukui 1970; Quigley and Turner 1956; Scalapino 1968). More controversially, it was also often claimed that LDP politics closely resembled the prewar pattern because of the dominance of factional conflict (Fukui 1970; Scalapino 1968). Fukui asserts for example (1970:23), that the polarised factionalism within the Seiyūkai, starting in the 1920s, was ‘clearly a harbinger of the postwar type of factionalism, particularly that of the LDP’.

However, I would like to argue that there are important contrasts to be observed between the factionalism of the pre- and early postwar periods and that of the LDP. The prewar Seiyūkai and the postwar Jiyūtō and Minshutō closely resembled each other because of the fluid nature of the factions and the dominating polarised division of each party into two groups contending for leadership, even while a large section of each party remained neutral and outside the factional struggle (Kitaoka 1995:27–8). The similarities between the Jiyūtō and the Seiyūkai were thus extensive and significant, but many of their key characteristics were greatly modified or changed after the formation of the LDP in 1955. This will be discussed further in Chapter 4.
I would further like to argue that this polarised nature of both the prewar and early postwar conservative parties made the parties and the political system very unstable. The perceived instability caused by the ha, in particular in the context of the polarised conflict, was widely seen in the press at the time. The term ‘meeting and parting’ (rigōshūsan) was much used by Japanese observers in the early postwar period to refer to the fluidity of the conservative parties and the instability caused by their incessant splits and mergers. In a polarised political environment factions were a tool to achieve political power. As Quigley and Turner commented,

it is not surprising that the parties have become faction-ridden in the mad scramble for power and advantage ... Politicians attract following by personality, money, status, and prestige, then when seniority or size of the group allows it, the leader tries to expand his holding on the party. If not recognized, the leader will leave with his ‘flock’ (1956:357–59).

The common view of factions was that they were groups producing strife, stress and strain in party organisation (see Beller and Belloni 1978a:6). Newspapers did not discuss factions much in the 1940s and the first half of 1950s, but they featured much in the period 1952–3 when confrontation between the Yoshida and Hatoyama wings was at its height. The vocabulary of this conflict was dominantly aggressive and often had militaristic undertones. Factions fought (arasoi), they gathered strength (ikioizuku), attacked each other (oiuchi), fought battles (kessen), and worked underground to undermine the other side (senkōteki ni yaru). Each wing within the Jiyūtō was said to have a camp (jinei) and commanders (shōsui) and factional manoeuvres were compared to natural disasters: Asahi Shimbun reported in 1952 that strong undercurrents could be detected under a quiet surface (hageshii teiryū), with tremors and fires, and that the Jiyūtō was like a volcano waiting to erupt because of factional infighting. The formation and choice of name for the centrist group Ipponka Dōmei (Unification Alliance) in October 1952 was demonstrative of the view of factions as disruptive forces that caused parties to fall apart. The opposite of factionalism was ‘unity’ (ipponka) and ‘stability’ (seikyoku antei).
Chapter 2: The Early Conservative Parties

The polarised wings of both the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō were highly unstable and were intent on splitting from the mother party if they could not realise their goals. There were two major defections from the Minshutō in 1948 and 1950 when the Shidehara and Inukai factions left, and in 1953 and 1954 the Hatoyama, Hirokawa, Ishibashi and Kishi factions left the Jiyūtō. Reed notes (1988:309) that in this period ‘elite maneuvering was vigorous and vicious, parties formed and failed, and factional groups switched parties and undermined the leadership of their own parties.’ The next two sections will describe the polarised structure of each party.

2.4.1. The Jiyūtō polarisation

Totten and Kawakami (1965:113) argue that ‘one reason why he [Yoshida] was less troubled by factionalism [than the LDP] was simply the fact that his strongest conservative contenders were to be found in the rival conservative party.’ This was not true. Yoshida faced a formidable opposition within his own party and for most of its lifetime, the Jiyūtō was divided into two main wings. This polarisation was visible in 1946–51 but became acute in 1952–54 and was the most prominent cleavage of the party. Sometimes these camps were referred to as the mainstream and anti-mainstream (tō shuryū, han-shuryū) but more often they were referred to by their names (see for example Sakano 1948:73). The polarisation occurred at a number of different levels. It involved a struggle between the new and the old, as was evident in the division between the Tozama and Fudai wings; between types of political leadership, such as a reform/parliamentary group and the machine faction (Sakano 1948:73; Colton 1948:947);35 and between the leadership and those in opposition to it. In the late 1940s these different levels came together in the Jiyūtō in the struggle between the Yoshida and Hatoyama factions.

When Hatoyama was purged in May 1946 the Jiyūtō was left without a leader. It was decided, after complicated manoeuvres behind the scenes, that Yoshida Shigeru, a foreign ministry diplomat, should assume the party reigns (Dower 1979:310; Kōno 1958:146-51). This met resistance within the party from the outset and was criticised as a ‘resurgence of the bureaucratic regime’ (see NT 14.6.46). The rift between the old and the new politicians became more pronounced after Yoshida took over the leadership. The old
party politicians who had been involved in the formation of the Jiyūtō in 1945 were against Yoshida as he was a high ranking former foreign ministry bureaucrat and they opposed many of his political decisions. Yoshida was considered lacking in political fervour and was described as being 'lazy' and politically 'inept' by General McArthur (Dower 1979:311), but he was also dictatorial, as suggested by his nickname ‘One Man’. In contrast, Hatoyama was considered by many a very skilled politician who maintained good relations with most political forces (Finn 1992:108).

In 1946 and 1947 the ‘Old Guard’, sometimes also referred to as the ‘anti-Yoshida faction’, protested against Yoshida’s decisions to appoint a number of non-party people to the cabinet (NT 6.46; 2.47). The Fudai wing was weakened in 1946–7 as many of its most prominent leaders were purged but it retained its mainstream status within the party, including more than half the Jiyūtō members (Sakano 1948:77).36 After the general election in 1947 the party was clearly polarised, as Sakano noted that there ‘were two factions within the party that were easily visible to the public’ (1948:73).

A split between the new leadership and the old became apparent at the party convention in 1948 when Yoshida became more involved in appointments (Sakano 1948:84) and a great number of former bureaucrats were recruited into the party, many at Yoshida’s instigation (Finn 1992:218). This weakened the Fudai wing further (Sakano 1948:73). In 1949, 42 bureaucrats were elected, raising the percentage of bureaucrats from 2.7% to 18.9% of the HR members (Johnson 1982:46; Masumi 1985:279). Some became known as the ‘Yoshida School’ (Yoshida Gakkō).37 Eleven people were said to have been members of the school in the late 1950s (see Dower 1979:315; Masumi 1985:279).

Bureaucratic power had been strong in Japan, especially during the previous 20 years, when the power of politicians had been curtailed. Political distrust of bureaucrats was thus deeply embedded. But in the 1946 election the drastic decline in the number of politicians with bureaucratic backgrounds and the necessary administrative and legal skills, caused great problems for the political parties and the Diet (see Fukui 1970:40). It meant that bureaucrats became again indispensable to the novice politicians who were
unable to draft legislation on their own (Johnson 1982:45). The historical distrust between politicians and bureaucrats underscored the polarised factional divisions in the Jiyūtō, especially after the depurge in 1951, as many of the former bureaucrats came to form the core of Yoshida’s support faction, while many of the party politicians supported Hatoyama. This division dominated party affairs in 1951–54 and was to continue into the 1960s. The antagonisms between the Yoshida camp and the party politicians during the purge were fuelled by the personal antagonisms between Ōno and Hirokawa that started in 1949 (see Ōno 1964:71). Ōno felt that Hirokawa was getting into Yoshida’s favour at his expense and was trying to gain control over the anti-Yoshida Hatoyama group within the party (Ōno 1964:71-2; Tominomori 1994; Watanabe 1958:120). This led Ōno to threaten to leave the party (SCAP Review of Government and Politics GS(A) 02553-02555; see Ishida 1985:60).

After the depurge, layers were added to the polarisation. The division between the old and the new was renewed as depurged politicians fought the new politicians who had taken their seats, the division between the party politicians and the bureaucrats continued, and a clearer split between the old and new leadership emerged (see Ishida 1985:75; Johnson 1982:46).³⁸

Hatoyama and Kōno were both reluctant to return to the Jiyūtō in 1951 after the depurge and were in favour of forming a new party, as the party had, in their opinion changed too much from its original state (Tominomori 1994:74–5).³⁹ However, Hatoyama collapsed with a brain hemorrhage in June 1951 shortly before his depurge and it seems that the matter did not move any further. This made Kōno and Miki determined to try to get the leadership of the party into Hatoyama’s hands again (Tominomori 1994:74).

In spite of the polarisation, the fluidity between these two groups was considerable. Views within the Hatoyama differed considerably after the depurges. Kōno and Miki led those forces which wanted to get Yoshida to resign immediately (bōryoku kakumei) (Watanabe 1958:121).⁴⁰ A number of Hatoyama faction members such as Ōno Bamboku, Masutani Shūji and Hayashi Jōji, had moved closer to Yoshida during the purge and were
in favour of a peaceful shift (*heiwa kakumei*) of leadership. Some other prominent depurged party politicians like Sudō Hideo, Ōkubo Tomejirō and Ishii Mitsujirō, who had all been close to Hatoyama before the purges, also moved closer to Yoshida (Watanabe 1958:163; Nagata 1953).

Yoshida sought to isolate the dissident elements of the party. He decided to dissolve the Lower House in what was called the ‘surprise dissolution’ (*nukiuchi kaisan*) in August 1952 and called for an election. This surprised the Hatoyama forces as they had expected elections in October or November to give the public the opportunity to vote on the Peace Treaty (Fukui 1970:44; Ishida 1985:71–2, 59–60).

Yoshida also decided to expel two key members of the Hatoyama faction, Kōno Ichirō and Ishibashi Tanzan, just before the elections as a retaliation for what he considered criticism of the party leadership. This caused a split in the party and the Hatoyama faction fought the general election on 1 October 1952 separately, with its own headquarters and separate election funds (Ishida 1985:72). The Jiyūtō got 240 seats in the election, of which the Hatoyama faction got 68 and the Yoshida faction 73 (Masumi 1985:285). The depurgees won a great victory: winning 79 seats for the Jiyūtō (Fukui 1970:45).

The opposition to Yoshida’s rule became even clearer after the election, when Hatoyama opened an office in the Nikkatsu International Hall on 16 October, where he waged a campaign against Yoshida, calling for internal party ‘democratisation.’ As will be seen later, the two poles represented different economic and foreign policies, but their conflict was also personal. A major demand was that Kōno and Ishibashi be readmitted to the party (Ishida 1985:77; Masumi 1985:286). When, on 24 October, the Hatoyama faction felt that Yoshida had not taken notice of these demands the Minshuka Dōmei was formed with 35 founding members and sixteen other party members (Ishida 1985:80).

The formation of the Mindōha made the polarisation of the party clearer than before but it also divided the anti-Yoshida forces further. These two factions, the Hatoyama and Yoshida factions, had one feature in common, which distinguished them from most other
factions at the time: neither was clearly based on the personal authority of its leader. In both camps party members were taking a stance on who would be a better party leader, Yoshida or Hatoyama. The Mindōha was under the apparent leadership of Hatoyama but it was actually led by Kōno, Miki and Ishibashi, while Hatoyama was more of a figurehead, partly because of his bad health (see Ishida 1985:81; Tomioka 1953:107). It included close followers of Hatoyama, such as Andō, Makino and Ōkubo, and also more independent politicians like Miki, Ishibashi and Kōno, who were key strategists of the movement and led it behind the scenes and had some followers of their own. There were also some centrist figures driven by their dislike of Yoshida (Masumi 1985:287). They all wanted changes to Yoshida’s policies, and some, like Ishibashi, wanted an immediate resignation of the Yoshida administration (Ishida 1985:75). Most were reluctant to split, but some, like Ishibashi, declared they would do so if necessary (Ishida 1985:75).

The core of the Yoshida faction, the ‘close associates’ (sokkin), were those people Yoshida trusted best, including Satō Eisaku, Ikeda Hayato, Hori Shigeru and Hirokawa Közen. This group was sometimes referred to as the ‘Four-man Alliance’ (Yonsha Dōmei), or the ‘three houses and four shogunate administrators’ (gosanka yonbugyō) (Hori 1975:82). The three houses in this context were Hayashi, Ōno and Masutani, and the four shogunate administrators were Hirokawa Közen, Ikeda Hayato, Satō Eisaku and Hori Shigeru. According to Hori ‘this was not an organised group, but a group in the sense that Yoshida would consult with us on important matters’ (1975:82; Iyasu 1996:151).

In the Yoshida wing there were also various forces that were not very close to Yoshida. Old Hatoyama politicians now in the party executive, such as Hayashi and Masutani, maintained links with both wings by attending meetings of the Hatoyama faction and may have been instrumental in softening Yoshida’s approach and securing party nomination for Hatoyama faction candidates (Ishida 1985:73). The Maeda and Hirokawa factions were also independent groups within the wing.
The Mindōha showed its clout in a series of conflicts with the Yoshida wing in the Diet, first in November 1952 when they absented themselves from a no-confidence motion on Ikeda Hayato, the finance minister, and again in February 1953 when they supported a disciplinary motion against Yoshida after he shouted bakayarō (‘fool’) at a member of the Shakaitō in the Diet (see Hatoyama 1957:123; Kitaoka 1995:56; Masumi 1985:292). These radical actions of the Mindōha split the Hatoyama faction further as well as widening the gap between the two factions vying for the leadership.46

The Hirokawa faction was instrumental in shifting the balance in the Jiyūtō between the Yoshida and Hatoyama factions. Between 1952 and 1953 there were a series of conflicts over appointments which in most cases involved Hirokawa (see Masumi 1985:282). In early 1953, after internal wrangles over party posts, Hirokawa left the Yoshida camp and joined the Hatoyama forces in their bid to pull down the Yoshida administration. There were also personal considerations involved, such as the promotion of Ogata Taketora to cabinet secretary in 1952 just after he had been elected to the Diet for the first time. He was considered to be a likely successor to Yoshida (Ishida 1985:84; Masumi 1985:288).

Hirokawa’s actions were intended to destabilise the party and split it, and were thus of great importance for the party because they were situated within the wider framework of polarised conflict. Hirokawa worked in close cooperation with Yoshida in the late 1940s and into the 1950s. During his term as secretary general he gathered around him a group of followers, but this factional gathering became increasingly important in 1952 and 1953 when Hirokawa deliberately moved away from Yoshida and towards Hatoyama. It was observed at the time that

since he took over the secretary generalship from Ōno, Hirokawa has preserved his contact with Yoshida, but now that he understands Yoshida’s way of working he has concluded that he is not going to be controlled by him. Yoshida’s puppet government under the Occupation is now weakening because of the widespread feeling that maybe he cannot continue his political life endlessly (Tomioka 1953:104).

Hirokawa thus strengthened his following in an obvious attempt to boost his position within the party. After he lost his post of secretary he was eager to push out close
associates of Yoshida and regain the post (Tomioka 1953:104). However, the Hirokawa faction was not united in its attitude to Yoshida—some were more pro-Yoshida than others—and Hirokawa could not force the faction to support his actions when he turned away from Yoshida (Nagata 1953:36). He kept the support of around fifteen members and in March 1953 the Mindōha and Hirokawa factions, a total of 44 people, finally split from the Jiyūtō (Kitaoka 1995:57; Masumi 1985; Togawa 1980:271). Yoshida then dissolved the Diet again on 14 March 1953 in what came to be known as the ‘Bakayarō Dissolution’ (bakayarō kaisan), only five months after the ‘surprise dissolution’. The loose organisation of the Mindōha was revealed in the fact that Miki, Kōno and around 20 people of the Mindōha decided to split from the party on that day to form the Bunjítō, without consulting Hatoyama (Hatoyama 1957:125) while many others decided to stay in the Jiyūtō. Hatoyama wrote in his memoirs:

It was unfortunate that the Mindō split in two. But those who split from the Jiyūtō, Miki, Kōno and Ishibashi, left with around ten of Hirokawa’s men and they reported the establishment of a new party. They supported me as president and I was happy to accept it (Hatoyama 1957:126).

The Mindōha joined the Jiyūtō again in November that year, almost in its entirety, after pleas from Yoshida, who had difficulties forming a minority cabinet. But the polarisation continued and the party suffered another split in 1954.

The dominating importance of the struggle between the Yoshida and anti-Yoshida forces, and not the factional divisions of the party as such, on the stability of the political system was clear, and this was obvious in reports made by observers and the press (Asahi Shimbun; Burks 1964; Nagata 1953; Japan Times). When the Mindōha and the Yoshida faction came head to head before the general election in 1952 the Asahi wrote that ‘the Jiyūtō has until now been divided in two factions’ (AS, 1.10.52). The Nippon Times pointed out that the Yoshida, Hatoyama and neutral factions were of similar strength, and concluded that

Chances of an amicable solution of the differences appear to be very slim. Essentially, it is not the two individuals [Yoshida and Hatoyama] who contend for the Premiership, but
their henchmen who scramble for power. And there is a third group definitely critical of
the two other groups (13.10.52).

According to many observers, the factional warfare within the party was no natural state
of affairs but a direct consequence of the fighting for leadership within the party. In the
Saiken journal in 1953 it was observed that

The Yoshida-Hatoyama presidential fight has become the origin of the factional fighting
in the Jiyūtō. The party leadership fight has become the source of such intense factional
antagonism. The illegitimate child is the Mindōha. The Mindō started moving under an
anti-Yoshida banner and then the Yoshida support faction [Yoshida shijihā] emerged as
an opposing force to the Mindō, with the central faction floating in the middle of the fight
between the Yoshida and anti-Yoshida forces (Nagata 1953:36–7).

Judging from political analyses of the time, it was mainly the Yoshida faction and the
Hatoyama faction that were believed to be of political importance. The myriad of factions
that could be found within the Jiyūtō between 1951 and 1953 featured very little in
political discussions. Even groups of considerable size, such as the Ōno, Maeda and
Inukai factions, and the central faction had very little visible effect on the political
development of the early 1950s. The same can be said of the large number of small
patronage groups. These groups and factions stayed within the wings and did not act as
separate entities in times of instability. Their activities in-between the struggles that
erupted every now and then within the party were not clearly known and did not affect
the political development.

2.4.2. The Minshutō polarisation
The Minshutō was also divided into two main groups—a division that played a primary
role in the politics of the party. These groups were polarised between support for the
leadership and opposition to it, as well as being split over policy and the basic orientation
of the party. The polarisation was more complicated than that of the Jiyūtō because the
leadership of the party changed more often.

The Minshutō/Kaishintō was almost permanently divided over the basic ideological
orientation of the party. There were major disagreements over whether the party should
cooperate or even merge with the more conservative Jiyūtō, or whether it should be more
progressive, aligning with the Socialists when possible. These issues came to the surface whenever cabinet formation or merger issues were raised.

Factional conflicts based on these ideological issues started in 1947. Ashida Hitoshi, a Jiyūtō member, had entered the Shidehara cabinet in 1946 against the will of some of the leaders of the Jiyūtō, which caused a rift in the party (see Kōno 1958:140; Watanabe 1958:198). Ashida, and Shidehara within the Minshutō, had been in favour of a merger of the two parties but this was opposed by groups in both parties (Quigley and Turner 1956:280). A partial merger happened a year later, in March 1947, when Ashida bolted from the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō was formed. Some of Ashida's supporters within the Jiyūtō went with him into the Minshutō (see Kōno 1965:189; Masumi 1985:135) where he was made secretary general.

At the time of the merger in 1947, two factions existed within the party, the Taiyōkai and the Shinshinkai. The former, led by Shidehara, leader of the party, represented the more conservative elements within the party in favour of expanded links with the Jiyūtō (Colton 1948:952; NT 9.5.47; Quigley and Turner 1956:281). On the other hand, the Shinshinkai, led by Inukai Ken, who was then chairman of the Executive Council, was opposed to collaboration with the Jiyūtō and ‘insisted on building a middle-of-the-road party to promote the idea of ‘modified capitalism’ against the traditional conservatism embodied by the Liberals’ (Colton 1948:952; Fukui 1970:41; Quigley and Turner 1956:281).

These two factions were ideologically opposed to each other but they also represented a generational divide within the party. The Taiyōkai included many older Dietmembers who had been prewar Minseitō Dietmembers, while the Shinshinkai included largely new Dietmembers (Colton 1948:952; Quigley and Turner 1956:281; Concerning the Recent Political Situation April 1951, GS(B) 02683). The struggles between the two wings thus resembled in some ways the struggle between Hatoyama and Yoshida (Watanabe 1958:203).
Ashida’s entrance into the party caused disagreements over leadership and the general direction of the party. A presidential committee had to be set up with six members representing the two factions. Those representing Ashida in the committee were Ashida, Kitamura Tokutarō and Nagao Tatsuo, while Saito Takao, Ichimatsu Sadakichi and Tanaka Kakuei represented Shidehara (Watanabe 1958:203). At the same time, Inukai Ken was purged and the Shinshinkai was left without a leader. It was rumoured that the purge of Inukai, along with Narahashi Wataru, Ishiguro Takeshige and Chizaki Usaburō in 1947, was political (Baerwald 1977:84). Their purge aided Shidehara’s efforts to quell the revolt by this wing of the party, and increased the likelihood of a merger between the Jiyūtō and Minshutō (Baerwald 1977:84). The conflict continued, however. The Shinshinkai threw its support behind Ashida and the conflict was now centred on Ashida and Shidehara (Uchida 1969:58). This shift in the factional support led to Ashida being nominated party president of the Minshutō on 18 May 1947 by a special nine-man committee. Shidehara was made honorary president and Saito advisor (Uchida 1969:58). After Inukai’s purge, the Shinshinkai chose Kitamura Tokutarō as its leader. The bulk of this group eventually became the Kitamura faction (Watanabe 1958:203).

After Ashida was chosen as president, a struggle ensued between the two factions. In spring 1947, the Shidehara faction started working with forces within the Jiyūtō to fight against communism and the Ashida faction. The Ashida faction was not interested in cooperation with the Jiyūtō as it ‘would doom the Democratic Party permanently to the unimportant and ignoble role of a tail wagged at will by the Liberal dog’ (JT 9.5.47). Instead the party, under Ashida’s leadership, decided on participation in a cabinet led by the Shakaitō with the Kokumin Kyōdōtō. The Katayama cabinet spelled the end of the cross-party anti-communism movement (Sakano 1948:83) but the Shidehara faction made clear its discontent with the socialist Katayama cabinet (Quigley and Turner 1956:284). The inner instability of the Minshutō was considered to be the main danger to the Katayama government (JT 1.6.47). The Jiyūtō, anxious to overthrow the Katayama cabinet, considered a union with a part of the Minshutō or even a union of all conservative groups (see NT in November 1947) but it was clear that the Ashida faction would not support such a merger (see NT 21.11.47).
Although the Shidehara and Ashida factions were mainly at odds over leadership, there were also clear ideological differences between them. Shidehara and the Taiyokai were ideologically identical to the Jiyūtō, in favour of laissez-faire and supportive of the constitution created by the Occupation Authorities (see Fukui 1970:41). Ashida and the supporting Shinshinkai were considered the stronger and 'the more progressive and conciliatory element' of the Minshutō (NT 5.5.47), aiming for 'revised capitalism' (NT 21.11.47). In the autumn of 1947 these differences culminated in the coal mining issue (Watanabe 1958:203; Masumi 1985:145). The coal-mine state-control measure led 23 members of the Shidehara faction to leave the party in 1948 and form a temporary group, Dōshi Kurabu (Quigley and Turner 1956:285), which joined the Jiyūtō in March 1948 to form the Minshu Jiyūtō.

Although the right wing of the party had defected, the problems within the Minshutō were not over. Fierce factional fighting ensued when Ashida retired from the presidency in the summer of 1948 following his implication in the Shipbuilding Scandal (Watanabe 1958:199). Inukai was returned to the Diet in the 1949 general election, but was now in opposition to the Shinshinkai which had supported him in 1947 (Watanabe 1958:204). He was chosen president by the end of the year. Inukai's attitude to the Jiyūtō changed and he became an advocate of a closer relationship with the Jiyūtō (Uchida 1969:60). The conflict was now between Inukai and his new group on one hand, and Ashida and his supporters on the other.

The main issue that divided the party was its relationship with the Jiyūtō, resulting in great shifts in factional divisions as many of those formerly associated with the Shinshinkai shifted to a coalitional stance. The Coalition faction (renritsu ha) wanted cooperation with Yoshida and a merger of the two parties, while the Ashida wing was against such cooperation (Quigley and Turner 1956:288; Watanabe 1958:199). The Nippon Times declared that the internal debates over whether or not to join the third Yoshida cabinet had 'created a schism which nothing can now bridge' (NT 15.2.49). When Yoshida's third cabinet was formed in February 1949 after a massive electoral
victory, the Minshutō was effectively divided into two parties. On the one hand, the Coalition faction, numbering around 33 people, felt confident that they could get the whole party to follow them into the coalition government \((NT\ 22.2.49;\ Watanabe\ 1958:177)\). On the other hand, the Opposition faction \((yatō\ ha)\), led by Tomobechi Gizō, around 37 people (see Watanabe 1958:177), was pushing for an outright split and had elected their own officials and an acting president by late February.\(^{60}\) The two factions went on to occupy separate floors of the party headquarters in February, with separate leadership and different rooms in the Diet \((NT\ 22.2.49)\). In March 1949 the Minshutō finally split into two political groups—the Coalition faction led by Inukai, and the Remaining faction led by Tomabechi—and reported this to the Diet \((SCAP\ Concerning\ the\ Recent\ Political\ Situation\ April\ 1951\ GS(B)\ 02683)\).

The overtures of the Coalition faction to the Jiyūtō were, however, not welcomed by all Jiyūtō members \((Quigley\ and\ Turner\ 1956:288–9;\ Hori\ 1975:50)\). Many in the Hatoyama faction, and especially Ōno Bamboku, were against the merger, arguing that it would weaken the party, and Shidehara and his group, who had joined the party in 1948, were adamantly against Inukai \((Hori\ 1975:50;\ see\ SCAP\ Review\ of\ Government\ and\ Politics\ January\ 1950,\ GS(A)\ 02553–02555)\). The issue therefore divided both the Minshu Jiyūtō and the Minshutō as the ‘amalgamation question became caught in the crosscurrents of the factional struggle between the “bureaucratic” and “party” groups, the latter seeking issues and devices by which to break Yoshida’s tightening control of the Minshu-Jiyutō’ \((Quigley\ and\ Turner\ 1956:289)\).

However, in late 1949, after pleas by the neutrals in the Minshutō that both groups should ‘forget their differences’ and ‘reunite into one strong party’ \((SCAP\ Review\ of\ Government\ and\ Politics\ 1949,\ GS(A)\ 02551–02553)\), it seemed that the Coalition and the Opposition factions were ready to be reconciled, and it was agreed that the incumbent ministers in the third Yoshida cabinet would be allowed to retain their positions \((NT\ 24.12.49)\). However, at the same time, the Opposition faction had reached an agreement on merger with the New Political Council, which was headed by Miki Takeo of the Kokumin Kyōdōtō, and included the Farmers’ Party and several independents \((NT\
This move led to a breakdown in the reconciliation process taking place between the two factions, because the policies of the New Political Council were not compatible with those of the Coalition faction or the Minshu Jiyūtō. In February 1950 the Minshutō split again, and this time it was Inukai and his faction who left to join the Minshu Jiyūtō. It was not known until the last minute how many would be leaving the Minshutō. Pessimistic estimates said five to six people (Hori 1975:53) but in the end 23 of the 34 members of the Coalition faction, led by Hori Shigeru, moved over to the Minshu Jiyūtō and the party changed its name to the Jiyūtō once more (Hori 1975:52). Most of those who did not leave, joined the Kimura faction in the Minshutō. Because of opposition of some forces within the Jiyūtō, Inukai did not join the party with his faction, but stayed an independent. He was, however, accepted as a member in February 1951 with Hori Shigeru and Hirokawa Kōzen as his sponsors (SCAP Review of Government and Politics, June 1950, 02555–02557).

This split transformed the factional pattern again within the Minshutō. Efforts by the Opposition faction to merge with Miki Takeo and his party, the Kyōdōtō, led to the formation of Kokumin Minshutō (People’s Democratic Party) in April 1950 (with 67 representatives in the Lower House, and 43 in the Upper) (Quigley and Turner 1956:289; Uchida 1969:61; Watanabe 1958:199, 178). The polarisation had, until 1950, been between the Cooperative and Opposition factions. After the merger, the party remained polarised but this time between the Ashida group, including Kitamura and the Shinshinkai, now considered to be the right wing, and the left wing, headed by Miki Takeo, the party’s new secretary general (see Watanabe 1958:183; Igarashi 1985:334). Miki’s group consisted mainly of former Kyōdōtō members (NT 9.5.52). Miki was clearly anti-Yoshida and joined the Kaishintō in aiming to defeat the Yoshida administration (Watanabe 1958:184).

The depurge affected the factional divisions within the Minshutō, as it did those in the Jiyūtō, leading to a number of new factions appearing. 32 depurges were elected for the Kaishintō in 1952 (Fukui 1970:45) but a few depurges from the old Minseitō, Ōasa Tadao, Matsumura Kenzō and Miyazawa Taneo, formed a political group called the
Shinsei (New Politics) Club in August 1951. Before the 1952 elections, they merged with the Minshutō, a few anti-Yoshida liberals and scattered groups to form a new party, the Kaishintō (Quigley and Turner 1956:293; Tominomori 1994:75). However, because the party was unable to reach an agreement on who should lead the new party, it was decided to try to find a leader outside the party ranks. Shigemitsu Mamoru revealed his willingness to accept the presidency and had the support of the Ashida faction, but the Miki faction was against this choice (NT 9.5.52). However, after Ōasa threw his support behind Shigemitsu and became part of the mainstream (Watanabe 1958:192), Shigemitsu was made leader and Ashida special advisor. The right wing was thus put in control of the party.

The polarisation of the Kaishintō was more complicated than that of the Jiyūtō in that the factions moved with greater frequency between the wings. The Ashida faction, for example, which was in the opposition arm of the party between 1948 and 1952, became the ‘right wing’ of the party in 1953 when the issue of a conservative merger came up again. The descriptive terms for factions in the party often referred to this polarisation: there were progressive and conservative, oppositional and coalitional, left and right factions. The party was now led by Shigemitsu, and the conservative factions—the Ōasa and Matsumura factions—aimed for constitutional revision (Watanabe 1958:183). The Kitamura faction, which had been situated within the Ashida wing in 1947–49, was now, along with the Miki faction, at the centre of the progressive or radical faction (AS 3.12.52). Again, as in the early postwar years, there were traces of a generational polarisation. The progressive faction included many younger members while the conservative faction was led by people who had been associated with the prewar Minseitō (Uchida 1969:61). Although the Miki and Kitamura factions were both in the ‘radical wing’, they did not cooperate very closely. The two factions had fought over the presidency in 1950 following Inukai’s defection, but Narahashi Wataru of the Centre faction was elected (Watanabe 1958:204), and they clashed again over the secretary generalship in 1952.
As the issue of a merger between the Jiyūtō and the Kaishintō progressed in 1954, the two wings within the Kaishintō distanced themselves from each other. The factions within the party in 1953–54 were largely four: the Radicals, including the Miki and Kitamura factions; the Conservatives, led by Ōasa and Ashida; the Neutrals, who included the ‘collaboration group’, which aimed at unification with the Jiyūtō, and the ‘bureaucrats’; and the Matsumura Kenzō group, closely connected to the Miki faction (Fukui 1970:46). The Miki and Matsumura factions were anti-Jiyūtō while Ashida represented the cooperative forces (Fukui 1970:47; Quigley and Turner 1956:296; Uchida 1969:65). In April 1954 the Shakaitō put forward a no-confidence motion against the Jiyūtō in relation to the Shipbuilding Scandal, but in spite of Miki’s support, 20 Kaishintō people were absent from the vote (Kitaoka 1995:59). This was probably due to the possibility of a merger between the two parties but Ogata had publicly spoken for a merger in March that year. Ashida and Ōasa were keen on conservative unification and although initially interested in cooperation with Yoshida, they switched to seek cooperation with Hatoyama, Kishi and Ishibashi from April 1954 to discuss a merger (Kitaoka 1995:60; Hori 1975).

Although, as seen earlier, both the Jiyūtō and Kaishintō had a number of factions, they were characterised by a polarisation which represented multilayered antagonisms. These polarised groups fought over leadership and policy, and also represented antagonisms between the prewar and postwar generations. The two poles, rather than the factions, were important political entities, determining party policy orientation and general political strategies. I will now turn to discuss the way ideology and policy served to sharpen the polarisation of the parties.

2.5. Factionalism and ideology

It has often been argued that conservative factions in Japan are based on personality and not ideology. Scalapino (1968:272) argues that in the prewar conservative parties there were no ideological confrontations, although at times ‘non-ideological practical problems’ such as fiscal policy, agricultural policy, and subsidies may have divided the parties. Kurzman (1960:277) argues similarly that factional divisions within the early
Chapter 2: The Early Conservative Parties

postwar conservative parties were of little substance. It is argued here that although policy was usually not the underlying or exclusive principle for factional formation, policy differences were very important in creating and maintaining the polarisation within the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō until after the end of the Occupation.

There can be little doubt that there were important ideological differences between the Minshutō and Jiyūtō in the immediate postwar period that spilled over into intra-party groups as well. These differences centred on economic policy and foreign policy. Yoshida and the Jiyūtō executive were pro-American and supported the postwar constitution. In September 1951, Yoshida concluded a ‘separate peace’ with the signing of a peace treaty in San Francisco, which ended the Occupation, and was linked to a military agreement with the USA. The latter agreement, the Security Treaty, committed Japan to rearment and indefinite stationing of US forces in Japan (Dower 1979:370; Igarashi 1985:324). The San Francisco Treaty built on the assumption that Japan would gradually assume responsibility for self-defence—a notion which emerged from the US’s ‘reverse course’ and plans to make Japan central to its strategic defences in Asia (Dower 1979:378). Yoshida opposed these plans initially but a change was detected in his speeches around 1949 or 1950 (Dower 1979:381). Yoshida became convinced that neutrality, wished for by the Socialists, was not an option and that a bilateral agreement with the USA was the only option to end the Occupation (Dower 1979:373). He felt that Japan should be an ally of the USA rather than seek a neutral position in the world (Uchida 1969:20–21). He also believed that relations with China should be cultivated in order to prise it away from Communism (Braddick 1998:208). A 75,000-man National Police Reserve (Kokka Keisetsu Yobitai) was formed in July 1950. It was enlarged into the National Safety Force in 1952. Rearmanent thus commenced, but it was slower than both the US and the Hatoyama faction and the Minshutō wanted. Yoshida, although considered in favour of self defence through international cooperation, resisted US pressures and would not refer to his policy implementations as ‘rearmament’ (Dower 1979:438–9). Until 1952 he argued, in fact, that the Police Reserve was not part of remilitarisation (Dower 1979:384; Igarashi 1985:329).
Yoshida’s foreign policy was in clear opposition to that of the Minshutō. The Minshutō generally positioned itself between the Jiyūtō and the Shakaitō and was ‘critical of the untempered conservative approach’ (Quigley and Turner 1956:311). It saw itself as a centrist force and an advocate of ‘reform capitalism’ and some form of economic planning (Babb, unpublished paper). Regarding foreign policy, it was clearly opposed to Yoshida’s pro-US approach and his emphasis on national self-defence. In the early 1950s the party called for the early conclusion of a peace treaty and full independence, entry into the United Nations, economic self-sufficiency, bipartisan foreign policy, retention of the Bonin, Kurile and Ryūkyū Islands, independent self-defence, and rearmament, with the Security Treaty being changed into a Mutual Defence Treaty (Igarashi 1985:335; Tominomori 1994:75). As will be seen below, however, the party was divided internally on these issues.

Foreign policy, particularly in relation to the peace settlement and the presence of American military bases, was also a contentious issue within the Jiyūtō and hotly debated in the Diet in 1949–51 (Igarashi 1985:333–5). The cleavage within the Jiyūtō over foreign policy was between the Hatoyama faction and the Mindōha on one hand, and the Yoshida leadership on the other, and thus coincided with the main polarisation of the party. Although there were no fundamental ideological differences between the Yoshida and Hatoyama groups, there were real differences in policies. This was clear in 1951 when Hatoyama gave a speech at Hibiya in preparation for his return to the Jiyūtō after the lifting of the purge, and again in August 1952 when pro-Hatoyama people and the party executive met to discuss party policy (Ishida 1985:71). There was real disaffection within the Hatoyama group after the depurge over the direction in which the Jiyūtō policies had moved, and particularly over Yoshida’s cautious approach to remilitarisation, his close cooperation with the USA, and the Security Treaty (Hatoyama 1957:116). The Hatoyama group promoted constitutional revision and rearmament, and, after the formation of the Mindōha in 1952, called for party democratisation (Tominomori 1994:74). It has been suggested that the depurge helped to reinforce ideological differences within the conservative parties (Babb, unpublished paper). This may well have been the case in both the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō. The depurged
politicians were mainly prewar politicians who were eager to establish and differentiate themselves from the politicians who had replaced them. This was seen in particular in the Hatoyama and Maeda factions within the Jiyūtō.

Hatoyama also supported a foreign policy 'independent of external pressures' by seeking reapproachment with China and the USSR (Quigley and Turner 1956:313) and joined those forces critical of Yoshida’s agreement to ‘subordinate independence’ in 1951 (Dower 1979:371–2). It has been argued that Hatoyama and his allies in fact stole the normalisation issue with China from Yoshida in the early 1950s and used it to undermine his leadership (Braddick 1998:230). The policy differences were made even clearer in the 1953 general election, after the Mindōha and the Hirokawa factions split from the Jiyūtō to form the Bunjitō. Rearmament was a crucial issue separating the two parties. In open opposition to the Jiyūtō’s policy of gradual increase in defensive capacity, the Bunjitō called for constitutional revision and rearment (Ishida 1985:88).

An important contribution to the policy cleavage within the Jiyūtō was made by the Kishi faction that emerged in the party in 1953. The faction built on old friendships and patronage but its policies differed from those of the leadership. Kishi Nobusuke was imprisoned after the end of the war as a class A war criminal but was released in 1948 and depurged in 1952. He formed his own party, Nihon Saiken Remmei (Japan Reconstruction Federation) in 1952 with a number of depurged friends. The Saiken Remmei advocated the ‘removal of communist aggression and adherence to liberal diplomacy, cooperation with the Japanese and American economies, increased commerce with Asia, as well as the establishment of an independent nation and the revision of the constitution’ (Kitaoka 1995:54). These policies resembled those of the Kaishintō and the Hatoyama faction much more than the policy of the Jiyūtō. Kishi, however, entered the Jiyūtō in 1953, after Yoshida’s initial refusal to admit him (Kurzman 1960), and ran in the 1953 elections for the Jiyūtō from Yamaguchi prefecture. His influence grew rapidly within the party and after a meeting in November with around 40 Dietmembers, the Kishi faction was formed (Kitaoka 1995:57). Kishi quickly emerged as critical of Yoshida in spite of being Satō’s brother, and was the main opposition force to the Yoshida wing after
the split of the Hatoyama faction in 1953 (Ashida 1986 vol.4:328). The faction showed clear alignment with the policies advocated by the Bunjítō, Hatoyama’s party in 1953, on armament and constitutional revision. The Kishi faction thus became an important addition to the issue-based struggle between Hatoyama and Yoshida in the Jiyútō. These forces, favouring more rapid rearmanent, joined hands with the left-wing forces which supported neutrality and were against rearmanent. Their common enemy was Yoshida and the dependence on the USA (Dower 1979:446). Yoshida’s policies were under attack from the left and from various groups within the right wing which argued that he had agreed to the subordination of the country in 1951 while at the same time criticising him for rearming too slowly (Dower 1979:418).

The Minshítō was also internally divided on the basis of policy. The early factional differences centred around the basic ideological orientation of the party and the future of conservatism in Japanese politics. As seen earlier, a recurrent issue was whether the party should seek to cooperate or even merge with the Jiyútō—an issue which caused internal divisions from the start. The Shidehara faction was formed in the early days of the Minshítō, when the party was debating whether it should look left or right in its coalition strategies. The Shidehara faction had been formed partly on the basis of its willingness to join the Jiyútō. The Inukai faction similarly formed as a group in opposition to those plans. (Ishida 1985:57). The Ashida faction was similarly opposed to collaboration with the Jiyútō and preferred the party to stay independent of the more conservative forces. There were also differences in the economic policies of the factions. The Miki faction brought into the party from the Cooperative Party an emphasis on reform capitalism and the cooperative spirit (Uchida 1969:62).

The official foreign policies of the Kaishintó and the Bunjitó closely resembled each other (Kitaoka 1995:56). However, the internal divisions of the Kaishintó were clearest on foreign policy. The party was largely against the Security Treaty since it opposed the continued presence of the US in Japan but there were factional differences in the extent of party members’ opposition to the treaty. These differences became clear following negotiations between the Jiyútō and Minshútō on the formation of a delegation to the
Peace Conference in San Francisco in 1951. Tomabechi Gizō, chairman of the Minshutō, accepted an offer to join the delegation, but the Miki, Kitamura and Ashida factions opposed the plans (Igarashi 1985:337). Miki and Kitamura were critical of the peace settlement and the latter also thought Yoshida’s pro-US approach prevented a sound Asia policy (Igarashi 1985:338). After the peace conference, factional conflict centring on foreign policy continued. A number of people in the opposing factions voted against the Security Treaty, while others voted against both the Security and Peace Treaties (Igarashi 1985: 339).70

The policy similarities between the Bunjitō and certain forces within the Kaishintō, in particular the Miki Takeo faction, did not pass unnoticed (Quigley and Turner 1956:293). Links were between forged between the Kaishintō, Bunjitō and certain businesses to discuss trade with communist countries. This group wielded considerable influence within the Diet in the Dietmember’s League (Braddick 1998:221). Hatoyama, Ashida and Shigemitsu all attacked Yoshida’s programme of camouflaged rearmament, hinting that the outright rebuilding of defence forces would be a wiser course (Dower 1979:391; Quigley and Turner 1956:313; Tominomori 1994:79). The press commented on the election results in relation to these issues. The Asahi Shimbun noted especially that the socialist parties, opposing rearmament, had gained votes, while support for the Jiyūtō, which did not advocate rearmament openly but did so de facto, and for the Kaishintō and Bunjitō, both of which supported rearmament, had not changed (Masumi 1985:293). The Jiyūtō did not manage to get a majority in the election.

There were also differences over economic policy. The third Yoshida cabinet followed the Dodge Line, ending subsidies to industry, but Ishibashi was openly against the economic policies of Yoshida and finance minister Ikeda. He was considered an inflationist, supporting a ‘positive fiscal policy’ (sekkyoku zaisei), expansion of industries, full employment and continuing subsidies to industry (see the Osaka hatsugen mondai) (Babb, unpublished paper; Ishida 1985:83). Although the economic policy differences were largely between Ishibashi and Ikeda, both of whom had very small
factional followings, they added to the policy divide between the Yoshida and Hatoyama wings (Ishida 1985:71).

The internal conflicts within the Jiyūtō, the cooperation of the dissident elements with both the Kaishintō and the left wing, and the weakened position in which Yoshida found himself forced Yoshida to seek the Kaishintō’s cooperation on the reformulation of Japan’s defence policy so as to make it compatible with the Mutual Security Assistance Act in 1953. This cooperation led to major compromises on the political issues that had separated the parties and the two main factions of the Jiyūtō. After the election, the Jiyūtō and the Kaishintō reached an agreement on gradual reduction of foreign forces and on the establishment of a long-term defence plan (Masumi 1985:297; Kitaoka 1995:58). Within the Jiyūtō, Yoshida was forced to reach some concessionary agreements with his opponents. In November 1953, when most of the Hatoyama faction returned to the fold, a committee for the revision of the Constitution and rearmament, chaired by Kishi Nobusuke, was set up (Uchida 1969:64). Following this, it was agreed in 1954 to revise the Safety Agency Law, and upgrade the National Safety Force (Hoantai) into the Self-Defence Forces (SDF, in Japanese Jieitai), a decision which was approved by the USA (Masumi 1985:297; Sims 2000:273). The Mutual Security Assistance (MSA) agreement with the USA was signed in April 1954, formalising Japan’s rearmanent and industrial remilitarisation (Dower 1979:417; Masumi 1985:298).

It has been commonly argued that after the end of the Occupation, and especially after the agreements between the Jiyūtō and the Kaishintō in 1953, which made the fifth Yoshida cabinet possible, the issue-based differences gradually decreased and the conservative parties moved closer together (Uchida 1969:64). Quigley and Turner (1956:313-4) said:

As the frequent defections and ententes led to a cross-fertilization of personnel and policies, the doctrinal differences between the two conservative parties became more obscure, and the Minshuto had to content itself with lines of action which, in many respects, closely resembled those of the rival Jiyuto.

The cooperation of the Jiyūtō and the Kaishintō in the fifth Yoshida cabinet and the signing of the MSA in 1954 certainly did signal a narrowing of the division over foreign
Chapter 2: The Early Conservative Parties

Policy between the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō, and between the Yoshida and Hatoyama factions, leading politicians like Kishi and Ishida to argue that these were so minimal that a merger was natural (Ishida 1985:93). However, although the parties had reached a compromise on defence issues, the policy differences did not disappear altogether. In spite of the similarities between the Hatoyama faction’s policies and those of the Kaishintō, there were differences that became clear when these forces came together in the Minshutō in 1954. The newspapers speculated at the time about the policy differences between the different groups within both sides and pointed out that for instance, the reform faction within the Kaishintō, led by Miki Takeo, did not support the remilitarisation proposed by both Hatoyama and Ashida, nor constitutional revision (AS 9.11.54).

Policy was important in creating divisions on the conservative wing of Japanese politics and in reinforcing polarised factional divisions in early postwar Japan. However, it is not easy to separate the power politics and the policy differences. In some factions, leadership considerations, not policies, were the basis for the formation of these groups. The Yoshida group had slowly emerged as the ‘executive faction’ of the party, while the Hatoyama faction, first formed in 1945, was clearly contending for the leadership in 1951. Even the Mindōha was the result of a combination of forces within the Jiyūtō that were primarily concerned with Yoshida’s leadership style, and was initially driven by the desire to get Kōno and Ishibashi readmitted to the party (Ishida 1985:80). The Hatoyama faction always emphasised the need to return leadership of the party to Hatoyama, and this, rather than policy, drove the faction on. All the same, policy or issue stances did play an important part in increasing cohesion in the groups and in distinguishing them from other factions, in particular within the polarisation within the parties. On the whole it can be said that policy differences polarised the parties rather than fragmenting them.

2.6. Conclusion

Although the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō had a number of internal factions between 1945 and 1955, these factions have to be distinguished from the LDP factions which scholars later came to view as representing typical Japanese conservative factions. A great number
Chapter 2: The Early Conservative Parties

of factions existed throughout the first ten years of the postwar period and proliferated further in the early 1950s. Although the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō were rife with factionalism between 1951 and 1954; with up to eighteen groups existing within them at different times, we should be careful about giving them the importance the LDP factions were to have. The factions varied greatly in size, for while some comprised more than a hundred members, others had a very small and unspecified membership, which overlapped with other factions, and were of such limited importance that they hardly feature in historical references. Many groups appeared for a limited time when a political leader got to a prominent position, such as secretary general or vice secretary general, but then dwindled again. Factions were never passed on to new leaders but died. Members of small factions had multiple membership to different groups while the big groups had a small core of supporters and a big outer layer where people moved freely. These factions represented the leader rather than the membership of a group.

All these characteristics made the Jiyūtō and Minshutō factions fundamentally different from the LDP factions. They had structural features more commonly associated with patron-client groups and tendencies than with organised factions such as those found within the LDP. It was consequently of much greater importance for the political system that the factions in the conservative parties were divided into two wings which contended for leadership. The factions were important for the political process only as part of either of the two poles or wings of the parties. What affected the political landscape in both parties and in the political system at the time was their polarisation into two wings, which represented not unified groups but an amalgamation of many forces. This polarisation resembled that seen within the prewar conservative parties. It was in this context that policy differences were important. The divergent views of the polarised factions of the parties accentuated the polarisation of the parties. The struggle between these wings led to political instability when groups split and merged with or formed other parties. This instability contrasted with the commonly perceived stability of the factionalism in the LDP in the 1960s onwards when it came to form a part of the institutional framework of the party. But before discussing LDP factionalism in depth, I will seek to establish in
more detail how the early postwar factions differed from the LDP factions in terms of inner organisation and functional relations with the parties as a whole.

Notes

1 Seventeen of the nineteen former Seiyūkai members had belonged to the Kuhara faction to which Hatoyama belonged, and only one to the rival Nakajima faction (Fukui 1970:35, 40). Seven party members came from the Minseitō, the main rival to the Seiyūkai in prewar Japan (Fukui 1970:40; Colton 1948).

2 The Jiyūtō, however, only had five cabinet members. The Shinpotō had four ministerial posts and four were given to non-partisans.

3 Two main issues guided the purges: involvement with the war, and/or perceived undemocratic inclinations of individuals (Baerwald 1977:10).

4 SCAP Miscellaneous Parties and Groups 1949–50 GS(B) 02683.

5 In 1953 for example, the Miki faction was estimated to have eight members, the Kitamura faction three or four, and Ōasa five or six (Ashida 1986:327).

6 The Katayama cabinet was a coalition and included seven members from the Shakaitō, seven from the Minshutō, one from the Ryokufūkai (Green Wind Society in the HC), and one independent from the House of Councillors (Sims 2000:256).

7 The Ashida cabinet was a coalition with the Shakaitō and included eight Socialist ministers.

8 Zariski argued, on the other hand, that an intra-party group was not a faction unless the members shared a sense of common identity (1960:33).

9 Hatoyama Ichirō, Hirokawa Kōzen and Yoshida Shigeru all had frequent meetings at their homes (Watanabe 1958; Hatoyama 1957).

10 Tsubokawa Shinzō was a member of the Inukai faction when it entered the Jiyūtō in 1950 and at least until 1951 (Hori 1975; SCAP 1949 Miscellaneous Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674-5). He was made vice secretary general of the Jiyūtō in 1951 and may have acquired a small following then (see Hori 1975:61). According to some sources, the Hori, Inukai and Shidehara factions that came from the Minshutō were outside the Yoshida camp, although anti-Hatoyama (Tominomori 1994: 72). According to Hori himself, he only led the Inukai faction into the Jiyūtō in 1950 and did not have a faction of his own (Hori 1975:60). It seems more likely that Hori acquired an independent following in the end of 1951 when he was made cabinet secretary.

Little is known about the Satō faction. It is believed to have had seven members (Tominomori 1994:71–2). Tanaka Kakuei, a member of the Yoshida Gakkō was considered a ‘member’ (Babb 2000). Hashimoto Tomisaburō was also considered close to Satō (Watanabe 1958).

The Ikeda faction was of a similar size (Tominomori 1994:71–2). Maeo Shigesaburō was said to be one of his closest supporters (Togawa 1980:242).

Masuda Kaneshichi was a bureaucratic politician who entered the Jiyūtō in 1947. His rise within the party was fast: he was made transport minister and chairman of the Policy Affairs Council in 1947 (Sakano 1948:105). He was described as a ‘bureaucratic boss’ (Sakano 1948:107) but the Masuda faction did not come into public view until 1951 when Masuda became secretary general. The faction reportedly had 25 members in 1952, situated in the Yoshida wing (kei) (SCAP Conservative Parties 1951 GS(B) 04352; see also Tominomori 1994; Masumi 1985:283; Igashira 1952:20). Aoki Masashi may have been a Masuda kobun. The Masuda faction seems to have faded soon after and aligned with Ōno Bamboku (Watanabe 1958:125).

There seems to have been a consolidation around Ishibashi after he returned to the Jiyūtō in 1953 and became an icon of anti-Yoshida sentiment. Before this, and in the short lifetime of the Buntōha Jiyūtō, the group did not behave like a faction (see Ishida 1985). Ishida was probably closest to Ishibashi at this time and aided his comeback in 1951, supporting him on election tours (Ishida 1985:65). He split from the Jiyūtō with him in 1953 but advocated returning later in the year (see Hatoyama 1957:129). Others close to Ishibashi were Matsuda Tetsuzō, Nakagawa Shunji, Satō Torajirō, Shimamura Ichirō, Sasaki Hideyo and Tsuji Kanichi (Watanabe 1958:136, 165–66). They were all in the Mindōha and split from the Jiyūtō in 1953, with the exception of Tsuji.
Hayashi was an old Hatoyama supporter but became close to Yoshida as well during the latter's rule of the Jiyūtō. He played a political role primarily as a close associate of Yoshida and not as a faction leader.

It was only rarely that a faction was given a formal name in the Jiyūtō. The Hirokawa faction decided on February 18, 1953 to be called the 'Comrade Club' (Dōshi Kurabu—the name the Shidehara faction had in the late 1940s) to strengthen their presence within the Jiyūtō as an anti-Yoshida group. This was a first step towards a split from the party which materialised in March (see AS 19.2.53). Most other factions bore the name of their leader.

Ishida Hirohide, for example, was close to Ishibashi Tanzan and was thus considered a member of the Ishibashi faction. However, Ishida was also prominent within the Hatoyama faction and in the Mindōha (Ishida 1985:58). His factional identities may thus have included all of these. Tanaka Kakuci is also a good example. He was a member of the Shidehara faction when he entered the Jiyūtō in 1948 but became close to Satō Eisaku too following Satō's support to him during a bribery case (Togawa 1980; Hunziker and Kamimura 1994:55; Johnson 1986:6). However, he was also close to Yoshida, and was sometimes considered a member of the Yoshida Gakkō (Togawa 1980).

Ono Bamboku, Hatoyama Ichirō, Miki Bukichi and Ōkubo Tomejirō were all said to have such connections (Sakano 1948:101-2).

Kōno says Ōno and Hayashi formed the mainstay of the Hatoyama sokkin within the Seiyukai (Kōno 1958:133). When Kuhara was made the mainstream candidate against Nakajima for the party leadership, Hayashi refused to work with the former because of his 'loyalty' to Hatoyama (Kōno 1965:152; Kōno 1958:138).

Many of the Traditional faction had moved to Ōno in 1949 but three of the ten had transferred their support to Yoshida. The majority of the Nakajima faction went to the Ōno faction while the Hoshijima and Matsuno faction in 1947 had almost moved in their entirety to Yoshida by 1949.

He was made chairman of the House of Representatives in 1952 which boosted his position further.

In his memoirs Ōno talks for the first time about the 'Ōno faction' in 1954 when the party turned against Yoshida and his intention to dissolve the Diet (Ōno 1964: 79–80). The faction did exist before that though, but the membership is very unclear. It is though clear that Konishi Hideo was a member of the group from the late 1940s and into the 1950s (see Ōno 1964:96; SCAP Miscellaneous Parties 1951 GS(B) 02674-5). Key members of the Ōno faction that did not leave in 1953 or take part in the Mindōha were Tsukada Jūjirō and Murakami Isamu.

Hirokawa's appointment was made after Ōkubo's recommendation. Ōno felt resentful that he had aided Hirokawa's promotion within the party after seeing the way Hirokawa got into Yoshida's favour and received patronage from him (see Ōno 1964:71–2). Ōno and Hirokawa had a number of clashes, first in the 'Kitchen attacks' and then over Ōno's nomination after his involvement in the Shoden scandal (Ōno 1964:73).

Fukui has asserted that Hirokawa created his faction in 1953 after distancing himself from Yoshida (1970:45). However, it is clear that he had personal following from the late 1940s but was firmly situated within the Yoshida camp.

Hirokawa was very aggressive in recruiting followers concentrating on new politicians and former Minshutō members (Igashira 1952:20). Of the fifteen Hirokawa faction members in 1954 who had also been in the party in 1951, 60% had been outside the Yoshida camp (where the Hirokawa faction was situated) in 1951; 27% had been in the Ōno faction in 1951; while one had been a Shidehara faction member and one in the Inukai faction. Of those belonging to the Hirokawa faction in 1953, 50% had been in the Yoshida camp in 1949, and 50% in Ōno, Shidehara, Inukai and neutral groups (SCAP Miscellaneous Parties and Groups 1949, GS(B) 02683; SCAP Miscellaneous Parties 1951 GS(B) 02674-5; Watanabe 1958; Hatoyama 1964).

It was led by Hoshijima Jirō, Ōmura Seiichi and Yamaguchi Kikuichirō. At its first meeting 74 Dietmembers attended (AS 8.10.52).

This information comes from my database and builds on information from the AS 7.10.52, and SCAP Miscellaneous Parties and Groups 1951, GS(B) 02673.

Another ipponka group existed around the same time, which was led by the secretary general, Hayashi Jōji, and Masutani, Chairman of the Executive Council.

See Nagata 1953 for a list of members.
Chapter 2: The Early Conservative Parties

25 In 1952, when the struggle between the Yoshida and Hatoyama factions was at its height three of the Maeda faction's members were considered Hatoyama faction members, two were thought to support Yoshida, while the rest were either neutral or claimed by both camps (see AS 3.10.52).

26 Hatoyama says in his memoirs that he thinks the Yoshida administration would have crumbled much earlier had Maeda lived (Hatoyama 1957:134). In 1954 four members had joined Kishi but in the database affiliation of twelve is not known, indicating that they were either neutral or affiliated with Yoshida. The faction thus became powerless after Maeda's death.

27 The rift between the 'postwar group' (sengoha) and the prewar politicians, or depurgees, was evident in 1951-3 when the SCAP depurred a great number of politicians (see Kaijo gumi ha to sengo gumi ha 1952; Fukui 1970:44). The return of the depurgees caused great problems in electoral districts where postwar politicians had run in their place and were unwilling to give their seats up (Kaijo gumi ha to sengo gumi ha 1952).

28 This was pointed out in the press too. The Nippon Times said at the height of the struggle within the Jiylito over appointments in 1952 that 'The present situation of the Liberal Party curiously reminds us of the last days of its prewar forerunner the Seiyukai. A little [sic] before the Pacific War, Hatoyama wanted to become president of the Seiyukai. But his influence was not powerful enough. His ambition merely caused definite breakup of the party into three factions—one led by Hatoyama, the second by Fusanosuke Kuhara, who was also elected in the recent elections as an independent, and the third by the late Chikuhei Nakajima, an aviation tycoon. The decadent groups were then easily smothered by the military' (NT 13.10.52).

29 Suzuki won with the assistance of his brother-in-law, Hatoyama Ichirō (Fukui 1970:24).

30 The most prominent members of the Hatoyama camp in the Seiyukai were Ota, Ōno, Okada, Matsuno, Inukai and Funada Naka (Kōno 1965:150–1). Others were Andō, Ashida and Kojima (Hatoyama 1957:112). Inukai, Ota and Funada were said to be the 'interim faction' or the young Dietmembers, but they gradually deserted Hatoyama. They were not close to Hatoyama in the postwar Jiylito (Kōno 1958:133).

31 The Hatoyama faction was said to have 30–35 followers within the 71-member Kuhara faction, while the Nakajima faction had 96 members. Eleven were said to be neutral—‘the ambitious who sought to offend neither faction’ (Colton 1948:941).

32 The Yamamoto faction, for example, was a centrist faction, to which Kōno Ichirō belonged. He moved closer to Hatoyama around this time, following Yamamoto's death (Kōno 1965:148; Kōno 1958:129–130). Another was the faction led by Kanemitsu Tsuneō (Fukui 1970:24).

33 Fukui further argued that the period between 1945 and 1950 was an aberration from the prewar period because of the less conspicuous factionalism under the Occupation (Fukui 1970:41).

34 A computer-aided search in Asahi Shimbun between 1945 and 1959 for the word ‘habatsu’ reveals that of 108 entries for this word only fourteen appear before the merger of the two parties in 1955, or 13%. The rest, 87%, appeared in the period 1956–9.

35 In the Jiylito, Ashida was one of the leaders of the reform faction, but he left the party in 1947. The machine faction was led by Hatoyama (Colton 1948:947). The machine faction was dominant in the first year, especially after Ashida left, but after the 1947 purges and the removal of more of its leaders, Ōkubo Tomejirō and Hanashi Shingoro, the reform faction was strengthened again (Colton 1948:947).

36 This included Hatoyama Ichirō, Kōno Ichirō, Miki Bukichi, Andō Masazumi, Matsuno Tsuruhei and Makino Ryōzō.

37 The bureaucrats recruited in 1949 were, among others: Satō Eisaku, Ikeda Hayato, Okazaki Katsuo, Yoshitake Eichi, Sakata Eichi, Endō Saburō, Fukui Isamu, Okada Gorō, Kogane Yoshitoku, Hashimoto Ryūgō, Fukuda Tokuyasu, Kitazawa Naokichi, Minami Yoshio, Nakamura Kōhachi, Nishimura Eiichi, Mitsuo Kimisuke, Koda Haruyuki, Setoyama Kazuo, Nakamura Junichi, Tamaki Minoru, Tsukahara Toshirō, Ōhashi Takeo, Nakamura Kiyoshi, Tanaka Keiichi, Fukanaga Kenji, Fujieda Sensuke, Aoyagi Ichirō, Nishimura Naomi (Togawa 1980:91–2). Because of their bureaucratic background and the fact that they were recruited by Yoshida himself, these politicians have been considered Yoshida faction members or even members of the Yoshida School. However, some of these politicians did not stay close to Yoshida. A substantial number kept a neutral stance. Mitsuo Kimisuke, Nishimura Eiichi, Nakamura Kōhachi, Minami Yoshio, Fujieda Sensuke, Nakamura Kiyoshi, Tamaki Minoru, Nakamura Junichi were not fully entrenched in the Yoshida faction and kept a neutral stance while Aoyagi was associated with.
the Shidehara group (SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups 1949, GS(B) 02683 and SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674-5).

38 A number of groups, such as the Kisasagi Kai, the Ni Hachi Kai, and the Tōkakai, were established in the HR in 1949 for Jiyūtō Dietmembers which crossed the factional divide but at the same time served to consolidate the division of the party into two camps. These groups served as support groups for Dietmembers who had been elected once, twice or three times, respectively (SCAP Political Parties and Groups 1949, GS(B) 02683).

39 Miki Bukichi was depurged in June 1951 along with Ishibashi Tzan (Tominomori 1994:73) but Hatoyama was not depurged until August 1951.

40 Those instrumental in paving the way for Hatoyama to return to politics were Miki Bukichi, Kōno Ichirō, Ōkubo Tomejirō, Ōno Bamboku, Andō Masazumi, Ishii Mitsujirō, Makino Ryōzō, Uehara Etsujirō, Hoshijima Jirō, Hayashi Ōji and Hiratsuka Tsunejirō. Of these eleven people only four left the Jiyūtō with Hatoyama in 1953: Miki, Kōno, Uehara and Hiratsuka. Andō and Ōkubo had led the group of Hatoyama supporters who advocated a return to the Jiyūtō in 1951 in the hope of getting hold of the party again but they turned out the be the more conciliatory elements of the group and refused to leave in 1953 (see Tominomori 1994:73).

41 Hatoyama made four demands: that political stability be reached through cooperation with other parties; that a reshuffle take place to show dedication to liberal rule over autocratic politics; that the party stop secret diplomacy and seek cooperation and peace with other nations; and that the expulsion of Kōno and Ishibashi be rescinded as it endangered the unity of the party (Ishida 1985:78).

42 Andō Masazumi was chosen chairman and Hiratsuka Tsunejirō vice chairman. Members of the committee were Miki Bukichi, Sunada Shigemasa, Makino Ryōzō, Uehara Etsujirō, Mori Kōtarō and Kawai Yoshinari (Ishida 1985:80).

43 Matsuda seems to have been a follower of Miki at this time (Kono 1958:182) and followed him into the Bunjūtō and then into the Minshūtō and through the Hatoyama cabinets (Hatoyama 1957:156).

44 Tomioka calls those who surrounded Yoshida at this time the ‘union of four descendants’ (chokkei yonska remmei) (Tomioka 1953:105; see Hori 1975).

45 Yoshida started to distance himself from Hirokawa, one of his ‘administrators’ in the early 1950s. He was one of the few sokkin who was not told about Yoshida’s intention to dissolve the Diet in 1952 (Tomioka 1953:105).

46 Some of Hatoyama’s closest allies, the so-called ‘cautious faction’ within the Minshōha, Andō, Ōkubo and Makino, showed signs of wanting to ease the pressure on Yoshida at this point (Masumi 1985).

47 This data builds on my database. Their factional affiliation in 1953 had been as follows: 30 people had belonged to the Hatoyama faction and/or Minshōha, thirteen were members of the Hirokawa faction and one came from the Maeda faction. They left the party and ran for the Bunto Jiyūtō in 1953.

48 Miki, Kōno and Ishibashi had decided to follow Hatoyama back into the Jiyūtō, according to Kōno’s autobiography, but they changed their minds after two members of the Bunjūtō, Matsuda Takechiyo and Yamamura Shinjiro, said resolutely that they would not return. Miki and Kōno then decided to stay as well, and were joined by Matsunaga Higashi, Nakamura Umekichi, Ikeda Masanosuke and Andō Kaku. They came to be called the ‘eight samurai’ (Kōno 1958:182).

49 In the 1953 election the Jiyūtō got 199 seats and with the cooperation of the Kaishintō, formed the fifth Yoshida cabinet (Masumi 1985; Togawa 1980).

50 There were disagreements between Ashida and the Hatoyama sokkin over who should take over from Hatoyama in 1946, as well as over the appointment of the secretary general when Kōno was appointed. Hostilities between Kōno and Ashida in particular were considerable (Watanabe 1958:198).

51 Party members associated with the Shinshinkai were Hori Shigeru, Chizaki Usaburo, Kitamura Tokutaro, Kosaka Zentarō, Kawasaki Hideji (Uchida 1969:58), as well as Shiikuma Saburō, Nakasone Yasuhiro, Yamasaka Harue, and Sakurachi Yoshi (SCAP Political Parties in Japan 02519–22).

52 In 1949 the Taiyokai had been reduced to a ‘one-man party’ with Hashimoto Kinichi representing the group. Hashimoto was a member of the Inukai group but joined the Opposition group at the party conference on March 8. The Shinshinkai only had two members in 1949, Shiikuma Saburō and Kawasaki Hideji, and was on the anti-coalition side (SCAP Concerning the Recent Political Situation April 1951 (GS(B) 02683; SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups 1949 GS(B) 02683).

53 There seems to have been a neutral group which wanted Saito Takao as president of the party (NT 9.5.47).
Chapter 2: The Early Conservative Parties

54 Four important leaders of the Minshutō were declared ineligible in the 1947 general election: Inukai Ken, Narahashi Wataru, Ishiguro Takeshige and Chizaki Usaborō (Colton 1948:947).
55 The Anti-Communism League had nineteen Jiyūtō members, sixteen Minshutō members and two from the Kokukyōtō (Sakano 1948:83).
56 The coal mining issue revolved around the government’s plans to nationalise the coal mines.
57 The Ashida faction was affected by Ashida’s involvement in the Showa Denkō scandal which boosted the anti-Yoshida elements in the party (NT 22.2.49).
58 They were Inukai Ken, Hori Shigeru, Kozaka Zentarō, Kimura Kozaemon (Uchida 1969:60).
59 A number of small groups existed in 1949 as seen in Table 2–2. The Keisetsu Kai Group was in the Coalition faction, had many former Minseitō members and was against the Ashida faction (SCAP Miscellaneous Parties and Groups 1949 GS(B) 02683). Its members were close to Inukai and six of eight members left with Inukai in 1950. The Kyojin Kai had two members who both left with Inukai in 1950. In the Opposition faction the Taiyokai, Shidehara’s old faction, had become very small as the Shidehara faction had mostly defected in 1948. The Kyojin Kai included former Jiyūtō members who were centrist. The Ishiguro group was very small, but Ishiguro himself was in the Upper House. The Shinshinkai was a group of Minshutō members who had lost the election in 1947 or 1949 and included 34 members (SCAP Political Parties in Japan 02519–22).
60 On 23 January five members of the coalition group resigned from their group to join the anti-coalitionists. They were Yoshida An, Hara Takeshi, Amano Hisashi, Komatsu Yiiji and Yamamoto Toshinaga. The anti-coalition group thus came to number 43 members in the HR (SCAP Review of Government and Politics January 1950 GS(A) 02553–5).
61 It seems that although the Shinshinkai had distanced itself from Inukai following his purge in 1947, a few members decided to side with him when the party split in 1949, but the group was very small (SCAP Miscellaneous Parties and Groups GS(B) 02683). The Jiyūtō also got seven Diet members who had run as independents in 1947, giving them a total of 30 new party members (Reed 1988).
62 Miki Takeo, who was later to become a politician central to conservative politics, was secretary general of the People’s Cooperative Party in March 1947 and had been Postal Minister in the Katayama cabinet. In June 1948 he was elected chairman of the Executive in his party. In April 1950 he led the party in its merger with the Minshutō to form the Kokumin Minshutō (Quigley and Turner 1956:289).
63 The Shinse Club was initially called Minsei Kyūyū Kai (Old Comrade Society) and included depurged former Minseitō members. They were anti-Jiyūtō but also critical of the Minshutō and decided to watch developments for a while (SCAP Conservative Parties 1951, GS(B) 04352–3).
64 Hopefuls were Ishiguro, former agriculture minister (elected to the HC from Shizuoka prefecture for the Ryokufukai with Jiyūtō recommendation, NT 9.5.52), Ashida, Murata Shōzō, Ichimanda Hisato, Kitamura Tokutarō, Miki Takeo and Tsurumi Yiisuke, former secretary general (Watanabe 1958:192).
65 Shigemitsu Mamoru was a wartime foreign minister and was purged by the SCAP. According to the NT the Chief Prosecutor at the International War Crimes Trials, however, later admitted that ‘his inclusion among the war crimes suspects was solely a result of Soviet insistence’ (NT 9.5.52).
66 Not all in the Buntō Jiyūtō were as adamant that constitutional revision was necessary. Ishibashi was quite favourable to the constitution and was most interested in changing the economic policy (Ishida 1985:88).
67 His closest supporters were Miyoshi Hideyuki and Kawashima Shōjirō as well as Ayabe Kentarō, Arima Eiji, Iko Yoshiaki, Yuki Takechi and Morishita Kunio (Kurzman 1960:258).
68 Kishi’s party had fared badly in the 1952 elections, winning only one seat when Takechi Yuki was elected in Ehime 1st district. The party’s days were numbered after that.
69 Kishi attracted people who had been neutral in the party until then. Of the ten Kishi faction members in 1954, six had unknown affiliation in 1952, while four were neutral, being claimed by both the Hatoyama and Yoshida factions (AS 23.11.54, 3.10.52).
70 See Uchida 1969:18 and Igarashi 1985:339 for more detailed information on the way votes were cast.
71 Joseph Dodge arrived in Japan in early 1949 with the aim of curbing inflation and increasing export production in industry. This demanded austerity in domestic consumption, a reduction in public works and services, the sacrifice of smaller businesses, restriction on wage increases, and repression of labour activism with layoff of workers (Dower 1979:416).
CHAPTER 3:

THE EXTENT OF FACTIONALISM: ADVANCEMENT, FUNDING AND ELECTORAL POLITICS

3.1. Introduction

In Chapter 2 it was established that in early postwar Japan the factions within the conservative parties were different to those of the LDP and that this affected the overall characteristics of factionalism. Having discussed the structural characteristics of the early postwar factionalism I will now turn to the functions and political consequences of factionalism. Why did the factions exist, what attracted leaders and followers to them, and how far did they reach within the political system?

Nicholas (1966:57) pointed out that the aim of organising a faction was to 'give the leader an advantage in political conflict' and that the aim of entering into such a conflict was to 'increase one's control over resources' (see also Zariski 1960:29; Beller and Belloni 1978c:437). The patronage element of factionalism has been much emphasised in studies of Japanese factions and it been widely argued that factions are tools to distribute posts in cabinet and party and funding to their members (Baerwald 1986:23; Leiserson 1968:770; Stockwin 1989:168; Thayer 1969:35; Totten and Kawakami 1965:115). Factions thus serve a purpose for both leaders and followers. I will look at first, how factionalism affected promotions within the parties and in government. I will show that the factions were used to elevate leaders to posts but that they were ineffective in promoting faction members in any systematic way. Second, I will look at the electoral districts and seek to establish to what extent factional struggles within the parties affected electoral politics. I will argue that in spite of the multimember electoral system, there are indications that factional manoeuvres played less a role than is usually assumed and that conservative factional conflict in the immediate postwar period did not reach the electoral districts. In the few instances when it did, splinter groups suffered (Reed 1988:310). Third, I will look at political funding patterns and the role of factions in distributing
funding to the rank-and-file. I hope to show that funding arrangements created a certain level of factionalism but that financial assistance was not provided within the strict limits of the factions. Candidates did not avoid running against members of their own factions, and because of the fluid nature of the funding system, did not run and fight their electoral campaigns with exclusive financial aid from factional sources.

I will argue that an important indicator of the nature and extent of factionalism in the early postwar period is the nature of faction membership. It has been widely assumed in studies of factions in Japan that faction membership has always been fairly well defined (Fukui 1970:45–6; Scalapino 1953:118; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993:60). It will be shown here that faction membership in the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō factions was very different from that of the LDP, they had very vaguely defined membership and ill-defined roles for members and leaders. This affected the functions that the factions served and the political importance these groups could have, making factionalism significantly different from that which is usually taken to characterise conservative parties in Japan. The reasons for the relatively loose nature of the factions and the differences in the functions they carried, compared to the LDP factions, can not be explained with the usual institutional emphasis on the electoral system. Taking my cue from Panebianco, I argue that the relative institutionalisation of the Jiyūtō and Minshutō allowed the leadership to control vital resources, such as recruitment and distribution of selective incentives so as to curb factional activity (Panebianco 1988:60). Although challenged by other groups, the party centre was strong enough to maintain centripetal power and maintain the support of the majority of the party, making horizontal power games among leaders in the parties, rather than vertical power games between leaders and followers, more important (see Panebianco 1988:23).

3.2. Distribution of party and cabinet posts
As noted earlier, factions are said to define struggles for control of the party; they distribute party patronage and generate rival candidacies for office (Beller and Belloni 1978c:437). The LDP factions have been studied as the main distributive organs of party
and cabinet posts (Baerwald 1986; Leiserson 1968; Masumi 1967, 1995; Totten and Kawakami 1965). Masumi (1967:35) described them thus:

The factions have various functions but their most important function is that of distributor of government and party posts. When cabinets are formed or reshuffled, the factions put pressure on the Prime Minister to have their own candidates chosen based on their wishes. The effectiveness of the pressure depends on the degree of cooperation with the Prime Minister until then, as well as the number of affiliated Diet members and the capacity for united action.

It has been widely put that the distribution of posts to faction members as a reward for their support is a historic feature of factionalism in Japan (Fukui 1970:22–3; Totten and Kawakami 1965:111). In relation to the early postwar conservative parties, Ike (1958:177) argued that:

[b]y the judicious distribution of party posts and committee chairmanships, cabinet posts (when the party is in power), and material rewards, several factions can be kept together under one party banner.

However, when we look at the distribution of cabinet posts and appointments in the three most important posts in the Minshutō and Jiyūtō,1 apart from the presidency, it becomes clear that these appointments were not generally decided upon on the basis of factions. Panebianco (1988:60) observed that in highly institutionalised parties, recruitment tends to have a centripetal movement and therefore ‘there is thus only one way to make one’s career in the party: To allow oneself to be co-opted by the centre.’ In the following two sections, I will look at the distribution of posts within party and cabinet and show that the Jiyūtō and Minshutō conformed largely to this model. The most fruitful way of advancing within the parties was to align with the dominant leadership and not the factions.

3.2.1. Appointments to the three highest party posts

Appointments to the three main party posts (tō sanyaku), the secretary-general, the chairman of the Executive Council and the chairman of the Policy Affairs Council in the Jiyūtō and Minshutō, show, in spite of some changes over time, a very limited factional pattern. The party leadership tried to exclude dissident elements from the executive and therefore, the most fruitful way to advance was to align with the dominant elite.
In both parties the secretary-general was usually handpicked by the president, as he was considered the ‘alter ego’ of the president (see Yanaga 1956:250). The Executive Committee took decisions on various matters, including candidacy to the Diet, and party endorsements (Yanaga 1956:251). The Policy Research Committee, drafted policies and was assisted by around 5 deputy chairmen (Yanaga 1956:250).

Turning first to the Jiyūtō, Yoshida did not start to exert any real influence on party appointments until 1948. Until then ‘the partisans, the technicians and mechanics, were...left safely in control’ (Colton 1948:946; see Sakano 1948:75). Sakano noted that the Fudai wing (party politicians) was still influential in 1947 in spite of the purges and that they were very skilful with party management (Sakano 1948:75). Until 1948 the main party posts went to people of varying factional alignments but all close to Hatoyama. In 1945 Hatoyama made Kōno Ichirō secretary-general, but they had become close in the last years of the Seiyukai although Kōno had not been a member of Hatoyama’s inner support circle. Miki Bukichi, an old friend of Hatoyama although they had not been political allies in the prewar period, was made chairman of the Executive Council, and Andō Masazumi, a close friend of Hatoyama, was made chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). Kōno, Miki and Andō were purged in spring 1946 and Ōno Bamboku, a central figure amongst the party politicians, and a close associate of Hatoyama since the Seiyūkai days, was made secretary-general. Hoshijima Jirō was made chairman of the Executive Council, and the PARC chair too went to people close to Hatoyama.

Another reshuffle took place in March 1948 as the party changed its name to the Minshu Jiyūtō. The domination of the party politicians was still evident although Yoshida’s influence seemed to be growing. Yamazaki Takeshi was elected secretary-general. He was a party politician but considered neutral and above the fights between the wings of the party (Sakano 1948:107). Saitō Takao was made chair of the Executive Council, but he had joined the party in the Shidehara group in 1948, which was positioned in the
Chapter 3: The Extent of Factionalism

Yoshida wing. Sudō Hideo, who had belonged to the Ōno/Ōkubo group in 1947, but was now moving closer to Yoshida, was made PARC chairman.

From the time of the reshuffle in October 1948 discontent amongst the party politicians was rising (Sakano 1948:94). Yoshida’s interest in party appointments was increasing (Sakano 1948), he was recruiting bureaucrats into the party, and forming the Yoshida Gakkō.8 Yoshida had also received extra support with the merger of the Shidehara faction in 1948. This changed the pattern of appointments to the three party posts and Yoshida started to exercise much greater independence, slowly introducing a policy of isolating elements critical of him. From this time on, all three posts were given to people who were either firmly in the Yoshida wing or neutral.

In the reshuffles that followed, close associates of Yoshida came to play a more important role. Satō Eisaku was appointed PARC chairman in 1949 after being elected to the Diet for the first time. Hoshijima Jirō served as chair of the Executive Council for four years. Hoshijima was a party politician but considered to be quite neutral in the conflict between Yoshida and Hatoyama (see Sakano 1948:103). Although their factional leanings varied, all three supported Yoshida’s leadership. This support, much more than their factional affiliation, was of critical importance. In the election for the executive posts in April 1950 all three posts went to the Yoshida wing; Satō Eisaku was in the Yoshida sokkin, Masutani Shūji was neutral but in the presidential faction as he was supportive of Yoshida, and Nemoto Ryūtarō was in the Hirokawa faction, which was then well entrenched in the Yoshida wing.

In May 1951 all three posts again went to the president’s group. Masuda Kaneshichi was made secretary-general, Hirokawa Kōzen became chairman of the Executive Council, and Yoshitake Keiichi, in the Yoshida faction, became PARC chairman. These appointments were made with some influence from the Hatoyama faction. The latter had strongly opposed a proposal that Hirokawa be made secretary-general and so Masuda was appointed. This confrontation was not only between the two wings but included personal antagonisms between Masuda and Hirokawa. Masuda thus worked with the Hatoyama
group to curb the influence of Hirokawa. The ill feeling between Masuda and Hirokawa continued until the party split in 1953 (Ishida 1985:60). The appointment of Masuda rather than Satō Eisaku, whom Yoshida had wanted, was also made in light of the anticipated reaction of the Hatoyama group as Satō was very close to Yoshida (AS 26.5.51).9

In 1952 a reshuffle to all three posts was made but at different times. All the posts were given to people close to Yoshida. Mizuta Mikio was made chair of PARC in February, Fukunaga Kenji, a first term Dietmember, was made secretary-general in July, and Masutani Shūji became chair of the Executive Council in December 1951.10 The opposition to Fukunaga in July 1952 was widespread within and outside the Yoshida wing. A centre faction led by Ishida Hirohide to which Fukunaga himself belonged, was also against the appointment on the basis that Fukunaga was too inexperienced (Ishida 1985:61). Fukunaga was replaced almost immediately by Hayashi Jōji, who like Masutani had a centrist position in the party, but was more to the liking of the Hatoyama wing.11 Their appointment into these posts did not have direct factional relations. Both Masutani and Hayashi had been situated outside the two camps and it was only after their appointment to these posts that they were clearly seen as situated within the Yoshida wing (AS 30.9.52).12

Yoshida’s decisions on appointments in main posts were not fundamentally based on advice from factional leaders. There are a number of examples where prominent faction leaders recommended people in posts but these were not explicitly factional appointments as the people recommended were not nearly always members of their faction. Politicians at this time did of course try to move upwards in the party, sometimes by recommending themselves or through the recommendation of others but such interferences were usually ignored (Kōno 1965:179).13 There were no structures in place whereby faction leaders could put forward their recommendations. Yoshida did not consult with factional leaders and in fact shunned Hatoyama, his greatest contender. Yoshida instead consulted with people with whom he had cooperated closely, the sokkin, some of who were factional leaders but many of who were not. In the 1953 party post reshuffle, for example, he
consulted with Ogata Taketora, Ôno Bamboku, leader of the party politicians but close to Yoshida, Hayashi Jōji, the outgoing secretary-general, and Masutani Shūji, the outgoing chairman of the Executive Council. Ôno was the only one of those politicians who was a factional leader at the time (Tomioka 1953:106–7). When appointing Miki Bukichi as chairman of the Executive Committee Yoshida conferred with Ogata, Hirokawa and Satō, all in the Yoshida wing (Yanaga 1956:250–1). Of these, only Hirokawa led a substantial faction.

In the early postwar conservative politics, an informal system of ‘elders’ (chōrō), sometimes called ‘advisers’, was in place, who would advise the president and the Executive Council. Watanabe refers to this system as ‘politics of the elders’ (chōrō seiji) (Watanabe 1966:34; Watanabe 1958:132). The elders of the Jiyūtō varied in number; they were not faction leaders but acquired their special status because of their age, long service to the party and political connections and, as Quigley and Turner note, were ‘perhaps unconsciously patterned after the prewar genrō [senior statemen] in their relation to the governmental structure’ (see Quigley and Turner 1956:340; Yanaga 1956:249). Yoshida would look to the elders for advice but often he nominated people into the top party posts without such assistance. His freedom was increased in that from 1953 onwards Yoshida removed a rule demanding the approval of the Board and Dietmembers’ Assembly as a method of ‘...tightening his control of the party against the threat of the Hatoyama faction’ (Quigley and Turner 1956:339). The selection power of the three main party posts was thus basically put into the hands of Yoshida.

As seen in Figure 3–1, in the period 1948–1952, promotional success within the party hinged on good relations with the president or someone close to him. Key party posts were increasingly given to those supportive of Yoshida and until 1953 distribution of posts seems to have been used to exclude dissident elements. The three party posts were largely given to prominent politicians within the party who were sometimes factional leaders, like Hirokawa and Ôno, but often influential politicians without their own political following, like Hayashi, Masutani, Miki, Kōno, Hoshijima, and Yamazaki.
Fig. 3-1 Distribution of the three party posts to mainstream and antimainstream - Jiyūtō 1949-54

I have left out Yoshida's 2nd cabinet in 1948 because of lack of applicable factional data.
Chapter 3: The Extent of Factionalism

However, Yoshida was also well known for disregarding such rules and often appointed new Diet members in high posts, such as in the case of Fukunaga's appointment as secretary-general in July 1952 (see Kitaoka 1995:53). By 1952, the Hatoyama faction was effectively barred from influence, which contributed to the image of factionalism as a destabilising force, as discussed in the previous chapter. Voices could be heard that argued that the problems of the Jiyūtō stemmed from Yoshida's unwillingness to listen to the party members and accommodate the Hatoyama wing (see Nippon Times, hereafter NT 17.12.52). Wildes (1954:139) pointed out that:

Of all the men who revived the prewar Liberal Party after surrender, but two remained in 1953 as high party officers, and both of these, Masazumi Andō and Tsuruhei Matsuno, had been politically inactive during the greater portion of the postwar period, because of the purge. All others who had helped Hatoyama form the Liberals were either driven from its ranks and in active rebellion against the man they had raised from political obscurity to high office [i.e.Yoshida], or if still in the party, were silent and ineffective members of the rank and file.

No attempts were made to accommodate the Hatoyama faction for some time after the depurge in 1952. The Hatoyama faction tried to reach an agreement with Yoshida that Hatoyama be consulted on appointments in both party and cabinet until leadership could be passed on to him (AS 5.10.52) but such demands were not met with much enthusiasm in the Yoshida camp. The Yoshida faction hoped to continue the isolation of 'antagonistic' forces within the party and thus tried to win over neutral forces to strengthen their hold on the party (AS 1.10.52). The antagonism of the two groups thus escalated. The Hatoyama faction criticised the leadership of the party for its 'sokkin appointments' and started manoeuvres with the Hirokawa faction within the Yoshida wing to seek to topple Yoshida (AS 30.1.53).

However, the return of the depurges to the political arena in 1952 and the ensuing struggle between Yoshida and Hatoyama forced Yoshida to change his tactics. A number of intra-party conflicts arose between the Yoshida and Hatoyama wings between July 1952 and January 1953 that involved personal warfare between the Ōno and Hatoyama factions on one hand and the Hirokawa faction on the other (see Masumi 1985:282; AS 25.2.52; Ishida 1985:64; Igashira 1952:21). These conflicts centred on disagreements
over appointments to party and parliamentary posts. However, these factional manoeuvres were usually designed so as to curb the influence of certain politicians rather than to increase their own representations.\(^{20}\)

The formation of the Mindōha in October 1952 increased the ability of the Hatoyama faction to disrupt party affairs. In October the Mindō stalled Yoshida’s plans to make Tanaka Isaji chairman of the House Management committee in the Diet by putting pressure on the party executive to accept Fukunaga Kenji instead (Ishida 1985:80), another example of mutual concessions. After the clashes between the Hatoyama faction/Mindōha and the Yoshida faction late in 1952, Hayashi secretary-general and Masutani, chairman of the Executive Council, declared their intention to resign from their posts to allow a reshuffle. They resigned in January 1953 but factional fighting between the Yoshida and Hatoyama factions flared up again on this occasion. Hirokawa was unhappy with the intended reshuffle as he had wanted the secretary-general chair for himself. Hirokawa then joined hands with Mindō to stop Masutani being reinstated as chairman of the Executive Council. These struggles had, however, a cumulative effect and at the party convention on January 25 the party reached a stalemate over the secretary-general post. After negotiations between the Yoshida and Hatoyama factions, Satō Eisaku was made secretary-general and Miki Bukichi, one of the leaders of the Mindōha, was made chairman of the Executive Council (Ishida 1985:84-5; AS 30.1.53). Yoshida’s change in tactic had the effect to alienate the Hirokawa faction further, leading to a split when the Mindōha left the party along with the Hirokawa faction in March 1953.

The left and right wing factions of the Kaishintō also fought over the party executive posts in 1952–54. As in the Jiyūtō, party leaders were, at times, forced to listen to factional objections but the factions were not part of the decision making process nor was there a system whereby each faction could be guaranteed representation. Appointments were primarily affected by the polarisation of the party. It seems that in the Minshutō, as in the Jiyūtō, the leadership tried to keep the discontented elements out of the three main posts and until 1952, one wing tended to dominate the three party posts, but after that
there were increased attempts at balancing between the left and the right. In the Minshutō, the General Affairs Committee was consulted on the appointment of the secretary-general and the chairman of the PARC, and the president then appointed him (Quigley and Turner 1956:341). According to Quigley and Turner (1956:342), the deputy secretaries-general were ‘frequently appointed to represent the intraparty factions, but may be selected on a geographical basis.’ Unlike the Jiyūtō, the party changed president a number of times so the elements kept out were not always the same. In 1947, most Minshutō party posts were held by former Minseitō people (Colton 1948:949). Inukai Ken'21 was made president at the end of 1948 and sought to exclude the main opposition, Ashida faction, from executive posts.22 Inagaki Heitarō, member of the House of Councillors, was elected secretary-general but in February 1949 Hori Shigeru replaced him (NT 2.2.49). Both were supportive of Inukai. The party was split in 1949 and the Opposition faction and the Coalition faction set up separate party posts. In 1950, after the split of the Inukai faction, Chiba Saburō of the Ashida faction, was made secretary-general.

1952–54 saw greater conflict over the three party posts between the two wings of the party who fought for these posts in order to be able to influence the basic policy orientation of the party with the result that the early 1950s saw increasing attempts to keep both wings content. After Shigemitsu Mamoru was made president, supported by the Ōasa and Ashida factions, factional conflict forced him to ask his party to ratify his choice of party personnel (Ashida 1986 vol.4:356). The left wing of the party gained influence as Miki Takeo, who had been against Shigemitsu’s election as president, was made secretary-general. Kitamura Tokutarō, who had been closely aligned with Ashida until then, but was now moving into the left wing of the party, was chosen chairman of the Policy Research Committee.

Appointments to the three party posts in 1953 and 1954 revealed further struggles over the basic orientation of the party but at the same time attempts to balance the demands by both wings. The Ashida faction was increasingly interested in closer cooperation with the Jiyūtō, while the Miki faction was strongly against such moves. There was disagreement
over the secretary-general post between the Miki faction on the one hand, and the centre faction and the Ashida faction on the other. The Ashida and Centre factions felt shunned in the party and tried actively to curb the influence of the Miki faction. The Centre faction wanted Narahashi Wataru of the Centre faction or Matsumura Kenzō chosen secretary-general (AS 10.2.53). In the end Shigemitsu appointed Kiyose Ichirō of the Miki faction. Another disagreement concerned the appointment of the chairman of the Policy Research Committee. The Miki and Kitamura factions temporarily cooperated with the conservative Ōasa faction in order to get Kawazaki Hideji of the Kitamura faction chosen in this post to ensure that the party kept its distance from the Jiyūtō (AS 30.1.53, 10.2.53). The Ashida faction was vehemently against this and threatened to split if Araki Masuo of the Ashida faction was not chosen (AS 9.2.53, 10.2.53). The Centre faction supported the Ashida faction in its opposition to the appointments. Shigemitsu then decided to appoint Miura Kazuo who was more to the liking of the Ashida faction, instead.

In June 1953 Matsumura of the left faction was chosen secretary-general but Miura continued in his post as chairman of the Policy Research Committee, giving both wings representation. After the Kaishintō merged with the anti-Yoshida elements of the Jiyūtō in November 1954 to form the Minshūtō there was much internal strife surrounding the distribution of posts between the factions of the party. Again, the struggle seemed to be mostly between the Progressive faction and the Ashida faction (AS 25.11.54).

Individual factions within the parties tried at times to attract followers through the distribution of posts, but they were unable to retain such support and membership as there was no system in force that allowed such rewards. Hirokawa Közen was the clearest example of this practice. The Jitsugyō no Nihon journal remarked in 1952 that ‘Hirokawa secretary-general, Yoshida’s close associate, is attracting followers (dōshi) by sprinkling posts in every direction’ (Igarashi 1952:40). Hirokawa tried to appoint his faction members in the Executive Council in 1951 when he replaced standing directors in the Council with his own men causing uproar in the Ōno faction. He also established a ‘Directors Board’ and put his own men in there as well as Ozawa Saeki as Chief of
Chapter 3: The Extent of Factionalism

Secretary (SCAP *Conservative Parties* 1951, GS(B) 04352). He got a supportive majority in the Executive Council to aid him in his struggle with Masuda, who had been made secretary-general in May 1952 (Masumi 1985:282). But this was such an unusual and blatant misuse of power that it was noted. The Occupation authorities remarked that

This is an unprecedented matter and there arose from the inside and outside of the party a criticism that it is an evil matter apt to extend the influence of factional conflict to the Secretariate by dividing the party into voting and executive organs (SCAP *Conservative Parties* 1951 GS(B) 04352).

Nemoto Ryūtarō, one of Hirokawa’s best known followers, was also made Agriculture Minister for a few months in 1951 while Hirokawa served as chair of the Executive Council. Generally, however, the factions were at this time tools to promote the leader to one of the three top party posts and party members would put pressure on the leadership to realise that goal. The aggressive strategy of Hirokawa to expand the influence of factionalism was said to be one of the main reasons why he was removed from his post as chairman of the Executive Council in December 1951 (Igarashi 1952:20). On the whole, a faction was not considered a tool to distribute posts to members of the factions.

In both parties, faction leaders were often able to attract followers by being elevated to one of the three party posts, rather than the opposite, whereby they would get these posts because of their following, as in the LDP. Politicians like Ōno Bamboku, Hirokawa Kōzen, Masuda Kaneshichi, Satō Eisaku and Ikeda Hayato attracted following within the Jiýítô while serving as secretary-general or chair of the Executive Council. Hori Shigeru, Kitamura Tokutarō, Matsumura Kenzô and Miki Takeo are also good examples of politicians who were able to strengthen their position within the Kaishintô through the secretary-generalship. There were however also many instances where the secretary-generalship failed to attract a considerable following as in the case of Hoshijima, Fukunaga, Masutani and Hayashi.

Factions and factional leaders tried to affect who was elected into the three party posts in the conservative parties, as the struggles of the early 1950s show in both the Jiýítô and Kaishintô. However, these struggles were primarily coloured by the polarisation of both
parties as party leaders in opposition to the party executive fought for a more balanced relationship between the two wings of the party. The pattern in the Kaishintō was more complicated but, as in the Jiyūtō, it revealed a struggle between the two wings of the party, rather than a factional struggle.

3.2.2. Cabinet appointments

It became a distinctive feature of the LDP early on that the party leadership distributed cabinet posts to factions and sought to achieve factional balance in cabinets. Many scholars have argued that this is a ‘traditional concern’ and that the early postwar cabinets were formed with similar balancing principles (Ike 1958:177; Hoffman 1981:253). Ike (1958:177) argued that factional affiliation was needed to advance within institutions, and according to Quigley and Turner (1956:357)

[I]oyalty in Japanese politics has been complicated by the lure of government office, the cash nexus, and the informal contact and association which develop in club and office. Personal loyalties, financial favors, the promise of a government post, and similar appeals are utilized by political leaders to build, hold, and expand their “following”.

However, my data shows that distribution of cabinet posts in the five Yoshida cabinets shows a pattern of party executive dominance similar to that of the party appointments, and no attempts at factional balancing in cabinets.

Turning first to cabinet appointments, as seen in Figure 3–2, most cabinet posts went to the mainstream in Jiyūtō cabinets between 1946 and 1954, i.e. those who supported Yoshida. Yanaga pointed out that ‘[m]ost of the leading party members in effect choose themselves so that the party’s inner circle is well represented. Cabinet positions are the reward for faithful party men’ (Yanaga 1956:162). Party and cabinet posts were used as rewards. Still, they were not rewards to factional leaders, but to those who supported the leadership of the party (see Yanaga 1956:247). Yoshida was able to appoint people at his own will in so many cases partly because one of the conditions that he had set for becoming leader of the party following Hatoyama’s purge was that he could decide on his personnel without interference from the party (Ōno 1964:68; Kōno 1965:195–6).
Fig. 3-2 Division of cabinet posts to mainstream and antimainstream - Jiyūtō 1949-1953

Sources: Hayashi and Tsuji 1981; SCAP Misc. Parties and Groups 1949 GS(B) 02683; SCAP Misc. Parties 1951 GS(B) 02674-5; Watanabe 1958: 91-2. The 1st and 2nd Yoshida Cabinets have been left out because of lack of applicable factional data.
Yoshida did not consult with factional leaders about cabinet formation but conferred with his *sokkin* or the party executive as well as his son-in-law, Asō Tagakichi. Thayer (1969:184) notes that until 1955:

> The Prime Minister, of course, held consultations before selecting a cabinet. Every prime minister had his advisors. But these advisors were not always even politicians. Many of them were simply personal friends of the prime minister or, in the case of Yoshida Shigeru, members of his family. They rarely met as a group.

In October 1952, when he was preparing his fourth cabinet Yoshida consulted with Hayashi, secretary-general, Ikeda finance minister and Hirokawa agriculture minister, who were among his closest *sokkin* (*JT* 27.10.52). He asked Hatoyama for his views at this point but Hatoyama claimed he was not interested even if members of his faction were offered new cabinet posts (*AS* 16.10.52). Ōno (1964:85) described Yoshida’s methods thus:

> Today [1964] the method of selecting ministers is that it is divided between factions in accordance with their influence, but during Yoshida’s time things were completely different. When he was starting forming cabinets, some names floating in Yoshida’s head became ministerial appointments, just like that. He planned two people in each ministerial chair and then he would ask us to help form the cabinet: “this man or that, which one is better?” Even though he listened to our views in the executive it was a “one-man like” process.

Yoshida was famous for his frequent reshuffles of cabinets and a large number of Dietmembers held cabinet posts in the period between 1948 and 1954 (see Iyasu 1996:151). The number of new Dietmembers was high due to the purges and so many were unknown entities. Judging by the many accounts of Yoshida’s selection methods, it seems that personality issues were often decisive (Masumi 1985; Ōno 1964; Hatoyama 1957).²⁷ Financial capacity was also said to be important (Iyasu 1996:152).

As faction leaders were not consulted with any regularity on appointments, it was difficult for them to exert influence on the process. It seems that factional influence on cabinet appointments was even less than in the case of party appointments. Hatoyama recommended Ōno, Hayashi and Masutani for posts in the first Yoshida cabinet when he was purged, which was to be expected as they had been his main supporters in the
Seiyūkai (Kōno 1958:139). Their promotion did not maintain and sharpen the factional divisions but in fact resulted in them slowly moving closer to Yoshida, becoming central to the Yoshida system after this (Kōno 1958:139). There are a number of examples to be found where politicians recommended people outside their own factions for posts. Their recommendation only rarely resulted in the nominee joining that faction.

There were, however, times when faction leaders would put forward their own members. Ōno Bamboku tells the story of how he convinced Yoshida to choose a member of his faction, Tsukada Jūichirō, as postal minister in the fifth cabinet in 1953, rather than Nadao Hirokichi, whom Yoshida had wanted to choose (Ōno 1964:85–6). It is, however, indicative of the way faction leaders did not habitually recommend their own followers for posts that Tsukada did not know that his faction leader, Ōno, had helped him to get this post and thought it was Satō Eisaku who had got him the post (Ōno 1964:86–7).

Seniority rules had guided promotions before the war in both politics and bureaucracy (see Johnson 1982:66), and although there was no set practice of faction leaders being consulted or putting forward their own preferences for appointments in the political world, the party seemed to have worked on a broad principle of seniority and ranking (junjo). Yoshida, however, often ignored these principles. Ōno said that Yoshida’s practice was to ‘choose close to one hundred ministers he didn’t know personally. It seems that many of them were simply a sudden idea and this upset the party at times’ (Ōno 1964:89). Whenever a party leader appointed people without regard to seniority it caused uproar, as was seen a number of times during both Hatoyama and Yoshida’s reign.

Second, there were few attempts to achieve factional balance in the Yoshida cabinets. There were times in the prewar period when the Prime Minister sought to achieve some sort of balance within the cabinet by appointing members of the two main factions within the Seiyūkai (see for example AS 23.8.62). The Hatoyama faction put pressure on the Yoshida cabinets after the depurge arguing that both main factions should be represented.
in the cabinet, and this was sometimes echoed in the press, (NT 17.12.52). However, appointments to cabinet had no clear factional pattern until the Hatoyama cabinets in 1954 and 1955, when factional appointments started to increase. Attempts at achieving factional balance was in fact only seen once within the Jiyūtō during its time in power, and that was in 1953 when one Hatoyama member got a post (Fig.3–2.).

The Yoshida cabinets were mostly composed of people whom Yoshida trusted. The same could be said of the cabinet Hatoyama had started planning in the spring of 1946 before he was purged. It included many of those he trusted most and with whom he conferred, when planning the establishment of the Jiyūtō.

The Yoshida cabinets were characterised by the relative absence of party forces critical of his leadership, which contributed to the nickname ‘One Man Yoshida’ (wanman Yoshida). Yoshida, however, included representatives of new elements joining the party in his cabinets to reward their joining the party. This was clear in 1948 and 1950 when the Shidehara and Inukai factions joined the Jiyūtō and were given representatives in cabinets at that time. Almost immediately after joining the Jiyūtō in 1950, Hori Shigeru, de-facto leader of the Inukai faction, was made labour minister in the third Yoshida cabinet (see Hori 1975:54). It was said that a cabinet post had been reserved for Inukai as well but he had not yet joined the Jiyūtō at that time (Hori 1975:54–56).

However, as seen in Figure 3–3, there were no attempts to give all factions representation within cabinets and the largest challenge to the Yoshida administration, the Hatoyama faction (the anti-mainstream), was largely left out. Tominomori argued that ‘the Hatoyama people were indeed treated coldly after Yoshida established his one man rule in February 1949’ (Tominomori 1994:72; see also Watanabe 1958:159–60). In the first Yoshida cabinet in 1946, seven Hatoyama people got posts. In the second and third cabinets in 1948 and 1949 three Hatoyama supporters got posts, Hayashi, Masutani and Mori Kōtarō, but all were increasingly supportive of Yoshida by this time. In addition, Higai Senzō, of the Ōno faction was made state minister. In the fourth cabinet 1952, after the depurgees had been returned to the Diet, and in spite of the pressure the
Fig. 3-3  Factional affiliation of cabinet members 1946-1954


101
Mindōha had been putting on the party leadership in form of demands for various posts, all Hatoyama people were barred from the cabinet.\(^{40}\)

Most ministers were Yoshida supporters. In the fifth cabinet in 1953, almost all posts went to people close to Yoshida. One minister had been in the Maeda faction (Katō Ryōgorō) and one Hatoyama supporter was given a post, Andō Masazumi. The Ōno faction, which by then had moved much closer to the Yoshida faction, got two: Ōno himself and Tsukada Jūichirō, who was made postal minister (see Watanabe 1958 and Tominomori 1994:72).

The fact that the Hatoyama faction had been left out of the fourth Yoshida cabinet led to the hardening of anti-Yoshida feeling (see Kitaoka 1995:35). The Hatoyama faction, and in particular the Mindōha, after its formation in October 1952, complained about the lack of intraparty democracy and the isolation of the Hatoyama forces in the party. Yoshida had considerable power in choosing personnel for party and cabinet, and the way in which he exercised that power excluded the Hatoyama wing from posts, especially in the third Yoshida cabinet and onwards (see Tominomori 1994:74). There is however little to suggest that at the time other factions voiced such concerns or felt that they had a right to representation in cabinet as independent forces. Indeed, even factions like the Hirokawa faction and the Ōno faction do not seem to have voiced any concerns.

The first Hatoyama cabinet, formed in 1954 after the merger of the anti-Yoshida forces from the Jiyūtō and the Kaishintō, was the first postwar cabinet to seek a balance in cabinet appointments between forces of the two parties. Apart from the fact that half of the cabinet consisted of depurges, a much greater proportion than in the Yoshida cabinets (Quigley and Turner 1956:299), Hatoyama stated in his memoirs that when he formed his first cabinet in December 1954 his primary concern in appointments had been to

treat well those politicians who had stood together since the creation of the Buntō Jiyūtō, and to respect the Kaishintō people's intentions. The people from the Buntō Jiyūtō had over the years shared hardship and knew each other hearts, and we felt gratitude to the
Chapter 3: The Extent of Factionalism

Kaishintō because they had assisted in creating the Hatoyama cabinet (Hatoyama 1957:143).

This cabinet was notable in that factional appointments were more obvious than before, as seen in Fig.3–3, partly because it was a party created out of groups from two parties. The two parties divided the cabinet posts between them but there were factional appointments as well, indeed the clearest factional appointments so far. Hatoyama sought to reward his closest friends and allies, Miki, Kōno, Andō and Ishibashi who had a total of five posts, while Kaishintō got five. None of the Kōno/Miki Jiyūtō’s eight members got cabinet posts but Miki supported Matsunaga Tō, one of the ‘eight samurai’ for speaker of the Lower House (gichō). Kishi recommended three people for posts — his long time friend and political ally Miyoshi Hideyuki from the Upper House, and Takeichi Yūki and Ōmura Seiichi from the Lower House (Hatoyama 1957:145; Togawa 1982:196; Kitaoka 1995:62). Miki, Kishi, Kōno and Hatoyama jointly supported Ichimanda, president of the Japan Bank, as finance minister in the hope that this could help the finances of the new party (Ishida 1985:104).

In the ‘Hatoyama boom’ elections in 1955 the Minshutō did not get a majority, but they increased their seats from 121 to 185 and became the biggest party in the Diet. The second Hatoyama cabinet was formed on March 19th, 1955. Contrary to the Yoshida cabinets, the Hatoyama cabinets were nearly void of bureaucrats (Watanabe 1958:159). Hatoyama says about the appointments:

In the first Hatoyama cabinet the thinking was strong that my own friends (dōshi) from old times should be rewarded as well as men of distinguishing service from the time of the establishment of the Minshutō. In the second cabinet we moved away from the previous way of thinking and formed the cabinet with men of talent (Hatoyama 1957:155).

All the same, distribution of posts in the second Hatoyama cabinet in March 1955 was similar to that of the first cabinet as posts were distributed to former Kaishintō members, Hatoyama faction members and Kishi members (see Hatoyama 1957:155–6). The factional character was in part understandable as it was a coalition of two very recent parties or sections of parties. Division of posts between Jiyūtō and Kaishintō was thus
natural. The factional division into the Kishi and Hatoyama factions was, however, an addition to these cleavages and clearly showed the increasing power of Kishi as secretary-general within the party.

Yoshida’s appointments in cabinet and party and the tendency to choose close supporters with very limited experience in the Diet, led to much criticism from within and outside the party. Yoshida was accused of ignoring all rules of seniority and was said to practice ‘sokkin politics’ (close associate politics) and ‘backroom politics’ (Ishida 1985:57; Kitaoka 1995; Watanabe 1958). Such criticisms could be heard during the purge but increased greatly after the return of the depurges, in particular after the formation of the Mindōha in 1952. Watanabe Tsuneo (1962:103) commented on the dominating power of the Jiyūtō president and said:

With the support of the Occupation Yoshida ‘one-man’ exercised autocratic power so a few close associates (sokkin) grasped hold of the cabinet and the administration. People Yoshida disliked were stepped over for administrative and party posts and were not given a political voice (hatsugenken). Through nepotism and pedigree they supported Yoshida and incompetent people were made ministers with great amount of funding.

The Jiyūtō was ruled by the president and the executive (sokkin) who were handpicked by him. Yoshida’s ousting in 1954 was seen as a reaction to this type of politics. Watanabe vehemently criticised Yoshida’s style of leadership and argued that the development of factionalism within the LDP was a step in the right direction, giving the rank-and-file a greater voice (Watanabe 1962:97). However, the Hatoyama cabinets that followed did not show much deviance from this practice, in that they ignored dissident elements.

Joining a faction did not represent an open path up the party and governmental ranks within the early postwar parties. In both parties the leadership attempted to keep dissident elements out of key party and government posts. In the Jiyūtō, this tactic was largely effective as Yoshida managed to limit the Hatoyama faction’s ability to gain power, thereby limiting factionalism. Within the Minshutō, there were greater attempts at representing dissident elements within the party, but in both parties appointments were determined by the polarisation of the parties rather than the factionalisation. In
government, cabinets were the cabinets of the dominant elite. I will now turn to the electoral districts and the influence factionalism had on electoral politics.

3.3. Factionalism and electoral politics
The first postwar elections held in 1946 were conducted under a new large district electoral system where each prefecture was a single district with up to fifteen seats, while seven prefectures were divided to maintain the fifteen seat maximum (see Reed 1988:316). In the 1947 election, the electoral system was changed back to the prewar multimember system where each district had between three and five seats. In the literature on factions in Japan the influence of the multimember electoral system on party organisation has almost invariably been considered crucial. This type of electoral system, it has been argued, maintains factionalism as it forces members of big parties to compete against each other in electoral districts. It has been argued that factions have come to provide candidates with the financial and electoral support the party executive of a big party cannot give to all its candidates when they compete against each other in the districts. Second, it has been argued that the factions soften the intra-party conflict as they try to prevent running more than one candidate in any given district. It has been argued by both those who favour historical and cultural explanations of factions and those promoting rational choice explanations of factionalism, that the medium sized electoral system plays in this way a considerable part in at least sustaining political factionalism, if not causing it in both prewar and postwar Japan (Baerwald 1986; Curtis 1988; Kohno 1997; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Thayer 1969; Watanabe 1958). Scalapino (1968:272–3) argued that in prewar Japan 'the multimember district system abetted factionalism within the major parties by making possible the election of several candidates from the same party and thus encouraging intraparty rivalry.' Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993:61), in their study of factionalism in the LDP, also argued that the electoral system sustained factionalism in the prewar parties.

Contrary to these theories, I argue that the electoral system played a very limited role in early postwar conservative party politics. The parties were centralised enough for the
leadership to manage nominations and prevent factional politics from affecting the nomination process.

Calder (1988:193) argued that the electoral system is one of the major factors contributing to factionalism in the LDP. Noting that the level of factionalism within the Jiyūtō and Minshutō seemed lower than in the LDP, he argued that the increased factionalism within the LDP was caused by the size of the party, adversely affecting the party in the electoral districts:

Until 1955 intraparty competition in conservative ranks was moderated by the relatively small size of parties. Neither the Liberal nor the Democratic Party, nor any of their various permutations over the first postwar decade, was large enough to run more than one, or occasionally two, candidates in a single constituency. Hence there was relatively little pressure from the electoral system for intraparty competition (Calder 1988:193).

This interpretation is, however, not altogether persuasive. The election system did cause problems within the big parties, even in prewar Japan, as Kitaoka (1995:27) shows:

If three people ran from one district in elections at this time [1920s and 1930s], they would divide the vote as equally as possible to get all candidates elected. If the outlook was bad they would abandon one and try to get the other two elected. But a great waste of votes could not be avoided when one candidate was more prominent than another. It caused great problems.

In early postwar Japan the parties continued to battle with the electoral system. My data shows that although the Jiyūtō was not as big as the LDP, it was very common for two members of the party to be elected from the same district. As seen in Figure 3–4, there were 29 districts where two Jiyūtō members were elected in 1947, while in 1949 the number rose to 49 districts. In the 1952 general election, which showed a postwar peak in voter turnout, the number rose further when 58 districts elected two Jiyūtō candidates. In 1953 it was at 52 districts.

In 1949, 41 districts elected three Jiyūtō members, the biggest ever number for the Jiyūtō, while the 1947 election had only seen five districts electing 3 members of the party. In 1952 the number had dropped to 22 and to 16 in 1953 when the party had split. What these figures show is that it was very common for 2 or even 3 members of the Jiyūtō to compete in the same district. Although such intraparty competition increased
after the merger of the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō in 1955, it did exist before the merger too. It is thus unconvincing to explain increasing factionalism within the LDP after 1955 in terms of party size and number of candidates.

Let us now look at the electoral districts in more detail and focus on factional affiliation of politicians running against candidates of their own party. In spite of the large number of districts with more than one candidate of the same party being elected, there are few indications that politicians used factions to manage the intra-party struggles that the multi-member district caused in the early postwar period. The data I have available is incomplete for many elections, but in 1949, for example, a number of factions ran and elected members in the same district. As seen in Figure 3–5, the Yoshida, Ōno, Shidehara and Neutral factions all had a number of districts where two faction members were elected. In the Minshutō, in spite of the small size of the factions, there was also a number of cases where members of the same faction ran and got elected in the same district. The Ashida faction ran two members in three different districts in 1949 and the Inukai faction did so in two districts.

It makes an interesting contrast to the LDP that there are indications that candidates of the same party running against each other in districts actually sought to work together rather than create a distance between themselves through different factional affiliation. This appears to be the case particularly when one of the candidates was a faction leader. Hatoyama and Andō Masazumi, for example, were political allies and personal friends and both ran in Tokyo first district for the Jiyūtō in 1952 after the depurge, and again in 1955 for the Minshutō. Yoshida Shigeru and Hayashi Jōji in the Yoshida faction both ran in Kochi district in 1947–1952. In that district, a third Yoshida faction member, Hamada Yukio, also ran in 1952. Kōno Ichirō and Andō Kaku were both elected from Kanagawa third district in 1953 for the Buntō Jiyūtō. Andō had left the Jiyūtō before the election with Kōno and went on to form the Nihon Jiyūtō with Kōno later that year. Ōno Bamboku and Kimura Kōhei of the Ōno faction, both ran in Gifu first district in 1947. Kimura, however, joined the Hirokawa faction around 1952, and it was speculated that this was due to a personal discord between him and Ōno (Igarashi 1952).
Fig. 3-5 Number of districts with more than one member of the same faction elected - Jiyūtō 1949

Sources: Reed 1992; SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups 1949 GS(B) 02683.
and Okada Seiichi were both elected from Tokushima district between 1949 and 1953 and both were in the Miki faction in the Kyōdōtō and then the Minshutō (Uchida 1969:59).

However, there were times when factional struggles reached the districts. These were mainly instances where faction leaders sought to manipulate nominations to work against other factions, and not to secure nomination of their own faction members. There were signs of a factional fight between the Hirokawa faction and the Ōno faction over nomination in Tokyo's sixth district in 1952 where they fought over who should be nominated, but it was resolved (Kaijo gumi to sengo ha gumi 1952). In 1953 the Yoshida sokkin decided to put a new candidate, Yasui Daikichi, against Hirokawa in Tokyo third district as a retaliation for Hirokawa's betrayal of the Yoshida wing in 1953, with the result that Hirokawa lost his Diet seat (Ishida 1985:87).

The behaviour of the depurges when running in elections again in 1952 was also indicative of the limited relevance the factions had in the electoral districts. The depurges, often having to defeat incumbents of their own parties to regain their seats (see Reed 1988:327), did not seek to enter factions straight away to aid them, but rather sought to organise amongst themselves to fight for the eventual return of their electoral districts from the 'postwar politicians' (sengo ha).

The data compiled for this study shows that the Jiyūtō politicians did not use factions to help them manipulate the multimember district system. Although the Jiyūtō was running multiple candidates in many districts, the factional fighting did not reach the districts. Candidates would not seek to avoid running in districts where their political or factional friends were running. Indeed, there are indications that regional factionalism was still quite prominent and that leading politicians supported and helped candidates of the same party in their own district. Kōno Ichirō, for example, relates in his memoirs (1958:156) that as secretary-general of the Jiyūtō in 1945 he sought to help politicians in his own prefecture. This is synonymous with Reed's (1988) argument that in early postwar Japan it was not the factions and the candidates who were the main political actors, but that the
electedate had a considerable effect on political results. The electorate treated splinters badly and favoured government parties (1988:338). The electorate were not given factional choices and party labels mattered. They preferred bigger parties to splinter groups as seen in the election results of the Bunjitō in 1953 (Reed 1988:338).

The formation of personal electoral support groups, the kōenkai, in the districts in the early 1950s played an important role in spurring increased intra-party competition in the districts. Tanaka Kakuei’s kōenkai, the Etsuzankai, which has been said to be the ‘model for all Dietmember’s local organizations’ (Johnson 1986:4), was formed in June 1953. It sponsored all sorts of social events to raise money, received donations from businesses to promote candidates and was very active in campaigning (Hunziker and Kamimura 1994:65). Kōenkai formation could also be fuelled by intra-party clashes. In Hiroshima second district, Ikeda Hayatō’s district, three Jiyūtō members planning to run, came out in support of Ishibashi Tanzan when he went there in August 1952 on an election trip. Ikeda, who had clashed over economic policy with Ishibashi, then went on to form a support organisation, the ‘Ikeda Kai,’ against these competitors for votes in the district.

There were thus indications before the mid-1950s that factional divisions and personal antagonisms at the centre of the party were spreading out to the electoral districts. However, the relative centralised control of the party and the centralisation of political funding in the Jiyūtō and Minshutō worked against electoral factionalism. It is to this latter point that we now turn.

3.4. Political funding and party leadership

It has often been argued that the reason factionalism has been so pronounced in the LDP is that under the multimember district system the party cannot provide funding for all candidates running against each other in the districts (Kohno 1997:102; Thayer 1969:35). Under such an electoral system factions thus serve an important role by creating a diversified system of financial assistance. There can be no doubt that in the early postwar parties, personal power was considered important and that financial power was used to bolster that power. Sakano (1948:76) pointed out that ‘the conservative parties are built
around money power and *jiban* [personal constituency] strength and personalities and therefore they have many factions'. It was in their function as distributors of political funding, that the Jiyūtō and Minshutō factions most resemble the LDP factions. However, there were important differences in the structure of political funding that affected the factional setup in the earlier period, and made it significantly different from that of the LDP.

The structure of political funding related to the degree of institutionalisation of the parties. As Panebianco (1988:58–9) pointed out, highly institutionalised parties are more likely to have a plurality of sources. The Jiyūtō and Minshutō were fairly institutionalised and this affected funding patterns and thus factionalism.

As in the prewar conservative parties, political funding channels to the party were relatively centralised. Political fundraising was left to the party leader (Iseri 1988:73; Kitaoka 1995:23) and the secretary-general (Fukui 1970:11). Fukui noted that as the regional character of factions faded in the 1920s and with the increasing ties with the rising *zaibatsu*, the conservative factions came to be increasingly based on political finance (Fukui 1970:24). The Seiyūkai had strong links with Mitsui and the Minseitō with Mitsubishi (Yanaga 1956:258; Fukui 1970:25; Watanabe 1958:17–18), but as pointed out by scholars, these links were volatile and the parties had to ‘search for funds in all directions’ (Colton 1948:942; Kitaoka 1995:25). Moreover, Watanabe pointed out that funding from the *zaibatsu* ‘flowed into the hands of the president, or the president and secretary-general, or only the latter, and was then distributed to the rank and file’ (Watanabe 1962:98; Fukui 1970:25). Iseri argues that those who were good at gathering money got into party leadership, but once there, they would use funding ability to tie themselves to the presidency (Iseri 1988:73). This was apparent at the time when the Seiyūkai split into the Kuhara and Nakajima factions in 1939. Winning the factional struggle hinged on financial power.

The financial power of the party president and the secretary-general continued to be important after the war (Yanaga 1956:248). The *zaibatsu* were abolished during the
Occupation, eliminating big business contributions to political parties as well as secret government funds. However, construction companies and industrial loans controlled by the government became a new source for the political parties (Mitchell 1996:94). Colton pointed out that 'the growing importance of money in winning support for the new faces in the post-war political battles, plus the element of favoritism involved in the award of government construction contracts, made an expose of such political contributions headline news' (Colton 1948:955). A flourishing black market was also a source of campaign funds (see Colton 1948:955; Wildes 1948:1152; Mitchell 1996:96).

In both the Shinpotō and the Jiyūtō, the president had extensive financial connections. It was said that Machida Chūji won the presidency of the Shinpotō over Ugaki Kazushige because of his overwhelming ability to collect funds (Babb 2000:25; Hunziker and Kamimura 1994). In the Jiyūtō, Hatoyama had access to a wealth of funding, which was largely due to private and personal connections with wealthy businessmen. He supplied funds into the party from a well known nationalist, Kodama Yoshio (Fukui 1970:43), who had acquired his wealth in Asia through the opium trade while an employee for the navy in Shanghai (Hunziker and Kamimura 1994:43–4). Another major source was Ishibashi Seijirō, chairman of Bridgestone, but Hatoyama’s son was married to Ishibashi’s daughter (Wildes 1954:108). Hagiwara Kichitarō of the Hokkaido Coal Mines and Steamship company was another source of funds. He helped Hatoyama when the latter returned to political life following the depurge in 1951 (Fukui 1970:43). Although politicians of all parties were suspected of accepting funds from illegal sources in the early postwar years (NT 2.5.48, 20.4.48; Thayer 1968; Yanaga 1956), prewar party politicians like Hatoyama and Ōno were particularly well connected to blackmarket rings and famous middle men like Tsuji Karoku. Tsuji was a friend of Hatoyama and had helped to fund the Jiyūtō from the time it was formed (Kōno 1965:179; NT 20.4.48). The Jiyūtō and the party politicians became closely linked in people’s mind to the underworld. As Colton observed,

Control of the government also exposed the party to the liaisons traditionally tempting to partisan political machine leaders of Japan. That such elements as the 'gumi' (company) gang leaders, Ozu Kennosuke and Sekine Ken, were affiliated in any way with the
Chapter 3: The Extent of Factionalism

Liberal party is probably an inevitable result of that party's control of the government during the early stages of the occupation (Colton 1948:952).

Yoshida seemed to deviate from the norm as he made it one of his preconditions for taking over leadership of the party from Hatoyama in 1946, that he would not be involved in funding efforts (Hatoyama 1957; Kōno 1965:197). However, he built up financial contributions with the support of his son-in-law, Asō Tagakichi, who had zaibatsu connections and was very wealthy. This independent source of funding was important to assure Yoshida’s ‘independence from the old guard’ – i.e. the Hatoyama faction (Wildes 1954:108).

Sources of financial contributions are not easily identified but it seems clear that the conservative parties were being funded largely through personal connections of politicians in key posts such as the presidency and the secretary-generalship. The SCAP Government Section concluded that

This might be the result of the real state of affairs that election campaign in Japan has been much influenced by individual power of the leaders of the political parties and contributions for the political leaders themselves have been estimated more than for the parties and that they have appropriated them at their own discretion, to the fund of their individual political activities as well as to the candidates under their influence without putting them in the political parties’ fund (SCAP Financial Supporters 1947–48, GS(B) 00832–3).

In spite of the fundraising ability of the president it was largely the responsibility of the secretary-general ‘that the party coffers are kept full’ (Yanaga 1956:250; Watanabe 1958:18). Diversification of political contributions during the Occupation may also have contributed to a more extensive involvement of the party executive in fundraising. In the Jiyūtō the chairman of the Executive Committee and the Policy Research Council became involved (Yanaga 1956:257), while in the Minshūtō, even more party members were involved in fundraising. Yanaga reports that in 1953, all electoral policy committee members, the secretary-general, ex-secretary-general and the PARC chairman helped out (Yanaga 1956:257).
However, fundraising remained relatively centralised and the politician chosen as 
secretary-general had to have strong financial connections. This was a major 
consideration for the choice of people like Kōno Ichirō, Ōno Bamboku, Hirokawa Kōzen 
and Ikeda Hayato in the Jiyūtō as secretary-general, as well as men such as Yamaguchi 
Kikuichirō as vice secretary-general (see Colton 1948; Sakano 1948:111). The post was 
important as it was one of the three most senior posts in the party. The political power of 
the secretary-general was also increased by the fact that it acted as a magnet on rank and 
file Dietmembers who needed access to political funding.

It has often been noted that election campaigning in Japan is very expensive and that 
"...candidates and their sponsoring organizations are driven into the arms of those who 
possess wealth" (Quigley and Turner 1956:346). The financial power of the secretary-
general was often used to build up a personal factional following. Watanabe points out 
that ‘because of this power the secretary-general attracted ‘kobun’ [protegees or 
followers] and fostered a feeling of obligation amongst those who received a lot of 
money from him’ (Watanabe 1958:19; Tomiooka 1953:105).

In the Jiyūtō, Kōno Ichirō, Fukunaga Kenji, Ikeda Hayato, Masuta Kaneshichi, and 
Hayashi Jōji acquired a few factional protegees, while others, such as Ōno and Hirokawa 
actively attracted large factional followings which they were able to maintain (Tomiooka 
1953:105). Ōno Bamboku attracted a following while he was secretary-general and 
admitted, when called before the Illegal Property Transactions Committee in 1948, to 
have received loans from friends for ‘pocket money.’ Some of this money had been 
donated to the party but Ōno was also suspected of having distributed the money to 80– 
100 members of his party running in prefectural or municipal assemblies (NT 25.6.48). In 
the Minshutō, those holding this post also frequently built up a factional following. 
Tomabechi Gizō formed a faction following his term as secretary-general in 1947–48, 
and the Kitamura faction appeared in 1949 when Kitamura was in the post. Matsumura 
Kenzo’s faction also appeared around the time he was secretary-general, in 1953–54. 
Miki Takeo already had factional following after his term as secretary-general in the 
Kyōdōtō but his faction strengthened further after his term in the Kaishintō in 1952.
Chapter 3: The Extent of Factionalism

It is, however, indicative of the different uses of political funding in the fight for influence within the early conservative parties compared to the LDP, that many of the most able fundraisers of the party were not prominent factional leaders but used their financial ability to raise funds either for the party as a whole, or even for other factions (Yanaga 1956:257). Kōno Ichirō, for example, did not have a substantial faction within the Jiyūtō and worked instead with Hatoyama Ichirō in the fight with Yoshida in the early 1950s. Miki Bukichi, who was also a very able fundraiser (Kōno 1958:143), had no faction either. Miki and Kōno seem to have had stronger business connections than Hatoyama himself and were very active in providing funding for Hatoyama’s political activities, both in the Seiyūkai and in the Jiyūtō (Kōno 1958:132–3).

Politicians with the financial ability but not the status to go with it seemed to face difficulties in using money to assemble a faction. Tanaka Kakuei, when elected to the House of Representatives in 1947, attempted unsuccessfully to build up following. Matsumura Kenzō explained what he did when Tanaka gave him a large sum of money:

I had no reason to receive the money so I went to return it. Two well-known MPs did not return it but I did. That was decisive. Tanaka was a simple person. He distributed money and those who accepted it were his friends but those who did not take were enemies (Babb 2000:23).

Kitaoka argued that in prewar Japan 'there were few faction leaders who supplied political funding like today' and that those who did were frowned upon (Kitaoka 1995:24). The same still held true in early postwar Japan.

The power of the secretary-general post in building up a following was clearly exhibited in the fact that most of these politicians lost their factional following once they left the post. It was said that Hirokawa was able to maintain his influence for some time after losing hold of the secretariat by gathering around him Dietmembers related to agriculture and fisheries (Tomioka 1953:105), and still have lucrative connections to the business world (Tomioka 1953:107). Ishibashi Tanzan, though not secretary-general of the Bunjūtō in 1953, was said to be the party’s most able fundraiser (Ishida 1985:90) and this may have helped to increase his following within the Jiyūtō after he returned to the fold in
November that year. When Ōno was implicated in the Showa Denkō scandal in 1948, most of his followers left him (Watanabe 1958:119). He continued to head the Hatoyama faction in Hatoyama’s absence, but his personal following was small. Kôno supported representatives of his own prefecture while he was secretary-general (Kôno 1958:156). He writes:

Tsuji Karoku was a powerful sympathiser of Hatoyama. I had known him since the days of the Seiyūkai but we became first friends when I became secretary-general [in the Jiyūtō]. He turned to me one day and said “when you are purged the representatives of Kanagawa prefecture will face difficulties with election costs. Invite the necessary people so that I can offer to look after them”. I was grateful as I had been worrying what to do about the representatives that I had looked after when I was secretary-general (Kôno 1958:156).

The secretary-general post was thus clearly used for personal faction building. Yoshida tried to counter this development while at the same time trying to encourage financial contributions from the business community, which was growing increasingly reluctant to support the party as the struggle between the Hatoyama and Yoshida factions increased. Businessmen told Yoshida that they would be willing to give him, but not the party, money under these circumstances (Hori 1975:80). In 1953, Yoshida decided to create a new institution within the party, the Funding Office (shikinkyoku). Hori related that it was Yoshida’s view that:

- It is essential for a political party to get essential funding and if we don’t make that clear we will not get any. It is my opinion that it is not appropriate that the secretary-general can freely use the party’s funds, and so I have made a Funding Office. The chair will have the power to manage the party finances at his discretion... He did not say more, but it meant that the president would exercise direct supervision (Hori 1975:80).

This ‘reception’ created by Yoshida was meant to enable businessmen to contribute to the party finances more freely and to counter the factional buildup around the secretary-general. But the influence wielded by politicians with financial ability was obvious as seen when Hori Shigeru and then Tsubokawa Shinzō acquired factional following whilst in charge of the Funding office. Politicians with fundraising ability were put in financial posts at all levels. When the Shidehara faction defected from the Minshuto in 1948 and briefly formed the Dōshi Club before joining the Jiyūtō, Tanaka Kakuei, a very wealthy member of the faction, was put in charge of the group’s political funds (Hunziker and
Kamimura 1994:48). When the group joined the Jiyūtō to form the Minshu Jiyūtō, Tanaka was again put in charge of the party’s election campaigns (Hunziker and Kamimura 1994:49).

It was conducive to factionalism that while political fundraising was relatively centralised, there were other politicians who had some access to political funding themselves and were able to attract a small following through that financial power. Wildes (1954:109) was aware of the problem caused by this leverage of politicians outside the immediate party leadership on party unity and warned that:

Collection of campaign contributions by others than the party president or the party managers weakens the grip of the figurehead president upon party machinery and facilitates both interparty shifts and supposedly independent action. Each leader in party management may withdraw, taking with him his financial following, as did Ashida and, in 1952, Hatoyama, in seceding from the Liberals, and Shidehara, and later Inukai when deserting the Democrats and Progressives.

The effect of these trends towards factional formation was however limited by the wider structural characteristics of the political and financial environment. Although politicians would use money to build up factional following, the financial relations of the secretary-general and other fundraising politicians with the rank-and-file were not as exclusive as they were in the LDP. This tempered the need for clearly defined factional relations. Financial benefits could be obtained through a variety of channels (see Panebianco 1988:31). Although the secretary-general might give more to his own faction he was responsible for distributing funding to party members for election purposes and to tend to their electoral districts (Watanabe 1958:19). Other politicians with financial connections also supported a very limited number of rank and file Dietmembers on a regular basis. Much more common seems to have been the practice of temporary and somewhat random ‘rewards’ disregarding factional, and even party, lines. Dietmembers of this period have noted that they would go to more than one leader of the party to ask for funding (AS 23.8.62). Sakano emphasised this fleeting character of the financial bonds between leaders and followers when he pointed out that factions built on money power but that the ‘coming together and parting is a daily thing’ (Sakano 1948:76). Therefore, when leading Dietmembers were reported to be trying to buy the support of rank and file
members in the struggle for the leadership of the Jiyūtō in 1952, for example (AS 5.10.52), it was a temporary support with a specific aim and not long term. Kishi Nobusuke was also said to have distributed between 500,000 and 1 million yen to 60 Jiyūtō candidates and 30 Minshūtō candidates in the general election of 1952, although he was then leading the Saiken Renmei which itself ran 16 candidates (Masumi 1985:300). Money was thus given without the clearly defined obligations that came to characterise contributions within the LDP. This temporary character of financial provisions created a very fluid factional environment where, in Sakano’s words, ‘what may be the anti-Ōno faction can in a month’s time become an Ōno faction, and then the Ōno faction can become anti-Ōno again’ (Sakano 1948:76).

Two structural factors seem to have been responsible for this vague financial relationship between leaders and party members. First, the ties between political fundraisers and business were of a very personal nature and on a much smaller scale than is the case today. Prominent politicians such as Yoshida Shigeru, Hatoyama Ichirō, Kōno Ichirō and Ōno Bamboku all had their personal connections to individual businessmen, rather than to organisations, to provide funding for their party. SCAP noted that Ōno had ‘many financial supporters to himself because he has been elected several times...and he has money which he can dispose of freely that is, money he can use to assist his party at his own discretion’ (SCAP Financial Supporters 1947–48, GS(B) 00832–3). A number of politicians thus had their own personal connections to businessmen. In Fukui’s (1970:43) words:

> the pattern of relationships between the conservative parties and extra-party groups which thus emerged during this pre-independence period was basically transitional and unstable. Often they were based on purely personal ties and involved obscure individuals, rather than established firms or business associations.

Examples of the transitional ties between politicians and businessmen can be found in many of the autobiographies by politicians of the period. Kōno Ichirō mentions that while public sympathy was with the Hatoyama faction in the Jiyūtō in 1952 (the time of the Surprise Solution) the faction had no problems getting funding. However, when the faction split from the Jiyūtō, public sympathy was not as strong, and Kōno says: ‘funding
problems in the Hatoyama Jiyūtō prevented us from fighting the Yoshida Jiyūtō effectively and thus only 35 were elected' (Kōno 1958:181; Ishida 1985:90). It was rumoured that the Jiyūtō offered to pay the Bunjiitō’s outstanding debts if Hatoyama returned to the fold in November 1953 and that money from the Shipbuilding scandal may have been used for that purpose (Masumi 1985:297; Kitaoka 1995:59). The eight member Nihon Jiyūtō formed late in 1953 led by Kōno and Miki Bukichi, also faced serious financial difficulties:

At the end of the year [1953] we were in funding trouble and even living fees were lacking. Miki and I were burdened with loans of 7-8 million yen from the time the Hatoyama Jiyūtō was formed. Around this time, one day a message came from the... chairman of the Meiji Company. The eight of us were called to a restaurant and...[he] gave us 1 million yen with the words 'please use it'. I will never forget this (Kono 1958:183). 64

Other members of the Jiyūtō in the House of Representatives known to have ability to gather funding were Nakajima Moritoshi, Hirokawa Kōzen, Yamaguchi Kikuichirō, Kimura Kohei, and Kuraishi Tadao (Sakano 1948:111–12). SCAP assumed that although individuals seemed largely to bear the cost of elections and funds, it was likely that ‘substantial amounts’ were being given to officers and party members without it being reported (SCAP Financial Supporters 1947–48, GS(B) 00832–00833). 65 Many candidates had financial connections to local businessmen in their electoral districts but Wildes pointed out that it was not viable at this time to rely on such sources for long as ‘many contributions pour into central headquarters’ (Wildes 1954:109). The party was thus an important and indispensable distributor of funds, with business sources often small and unreliable. 66

The second structural factor explaining why funding was only used in limited ways for factional purposes, was the restricted relationship between politicians and interest groups. The Occupation affected the relationship between the political parties and the emerging interest groups. The ‘four economic organisations’ were formed in the 1940s. Keizai Dōyukai (Committee for Economic Development) was established in April 1946, Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organisations) in August 1946, Nihon Shōkō Kaigisho (Japan Chamber of Commerce) in November 1946, and Nikkeiren (Japan
Chapter 3: The Extent of Factionalism

Federation of Employers’ Associations) in April 1948. Fukui (1970:43) has argued that interest groups and pressure groups were discouraged from forming relations with the parties because it was the bureaucracy and the parties that were central to the execution of SCAP orders. It was thus more sensible to put pressure on bureaucrats.

In the first decade of the postwar period the relationship between big business and the conservative parties was thus not very close. Business distributed money to a variety of political parties so as ‘not to be left out on a political limb in the event of a change of government involving a shift in power from one party to another’ (Yanaga 1956:259)—the bulk of the campaign funds from such sources went to the conservative parties (NT 27.3.46; 16.9.45). As seen before, Ishibashi Seijirō, chairman of Bridgestone, was a major source of funds for Hatoyama Ichirō, but he also gave money to Hatoyama’s rivals, as was customary. Major contractors for example gave to all the parties without discrimination (Wildes 1954:108). In the early 1950s the three biggest contributors of political funds67 gave to all three main parties, although most was given to the Jiyūtō (Yanaga 1956:259).

Business pressure on the conservative parties was mainly to call for political stability, i.e. a halt to factional infighting, and in 1952–54 when factional conflict between Yoshida and the Hatoyama was at its height, both sides were urged to solve the factional problems (Masumi 1985:248, 286, 295–301; Uchida 1969:85–61, 86). Business may sometimes have donated money to the parties with the condition that stability be maintained. Ashida related in his diary that Nagano Mamoru had been given money twice to stop the apparent split of the Jiyūtō in the early 1950s, and that after the split in 1953 he saw no chance of receiving any more assistance (Ashida 1986 vol.4:328).

The external institutional and structural environment changed in fundamental ways in the first decade of the postwar period and thus heavily affected the funding patterns and the political organisation. Fundamental changes took place in the late 1950s that altered the relations between conservative politicians and business, and diversified funding routes. Fukui argued that as economic diversity increased in prewar Japan, so factionalism
increased in the Seiyūkai in the 1930s (Fukui 1970:25–6). The same happened in the 1950s. The big economic federations by the mid-1950s had come to replace the zaibatsu but there was a much greater ‘inclusiveness and totality’ in the relationship between parties and business (Fukui 1970:52). Fukui has shown the process of change whereby industrial organizations became increasingly involved in political fundraising in the 1950s. During the Occupation, individual entrepreneurs were the main contributors to the parties. In 1951, 80% of the donations reported by the Jiyūtō to the National Election Administration Committee came from such sources, while only 20% came from employer organisations. In 1955, more than 50% came from individual associations and national organisations creating a more stable relationship between politics and business (Fukui 1970:51). What was of great significance was the fact that a greater number of politicians were getting involved in funding. Babb has argued that a new type of self-made elite was appearing in the postwar period which was wealthy and spread money within the political world (Babb 2000:33). As Japan’s economy accelerated in the late 1950s, the capacity of businesses to give, as well as the capacity of politicians to gather funding, increased substantially which transformed the funding methods of the LDP and formed the basis for the LDP factions (Uchida 1969:85). The move away from one major channel into the party, through the secretary-general, towards multiple channels through a number of factional leaders, was a major factor making possible the permanence of factions as the political centre of the LDP. Through these new channels emerged the ability of a large number of faction leaders to hold on to the factional support they had attracted, and as a result the factions became a vital provider of political funds. This will be discussed further in Chapter 5.

3.5. Perceptions of faction membership

It has been argued in the preceding chapters that Panebianco's genetic model of political parties is helpful in understanding the way internal party politics developed in the Jiyūtō and Minshutō. Both parties were formed through penetration rather than fusion, making the party leadership more cohesive and the party structure relatively centralised. This affected the extent to which factional divisions could develop and how extensively they could affect the parties. Factionalism could not affect the appointments to party and
governmental posts, it did not affect nominations and electoral politics greatly, and funding ability was largely restricted to the dominant leadership. The structure of the two parties also affected the nature of faction membership. Panebianco has argued that all parties rely on varying amounts of collective and selective incentives to attract members (1988:26). He also believed that if party members are mainly attracted by the former then many will not be participating in factional games. The party member is loyal to the party and will thus support the leadership (1988:30). This was the case in Minshutō, and in particular in the Jiyūtō. Selective incentives were not many because of the cohesiveness of the leadership. The factions could not offer clear paths for advancement or secure funding. These restrictions were reflected in the limited factional conflicts.

The limited incentives the faction leaders could offer their members both affected the nature of faction membership and was in turn affected by it. As seen earlier, scholars have differed in their view of how to define factions, but their views on membership also differ. Zariski (1960:33) argued that a intra-party group could only be called a faction if its members shared 'a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organised to act collectively—as a distinct bloc within the party—to achieve their goals'. Other scholars, such as Rose (1964:37) and Beller and Belloni (1978c:425) offer a wider definition and argue that although factions are self-consciously organised, the discipline and cohesion can be limited. Beller and Belloni (1978c:425) argued that in patron-client factions, in particular, members could be aware of a common identity but were 'not necessarily mobilised by that awareness' because of the vertical links within the group.

Scholars have tended to give us a very simplified picture of intra-party relations in Japan (Baerwald 1986; Nakane 1966; Thayer 1969). Quigley and Turner (1956:354) argued that

In the basically hierarchical social system, the individual who seeks advancement is expected to enter into a personal relation with men of influence. The leader under whom he serves and to whom he must give allegiance thus becomes a guarantor of security and status. At the same time the individual must enter into a similar relation with his protégés of his own who will enable him to overcome the power of his rivals. In both situations the reciprocal obligations are those of paternalism and obedience which exist between master and servant.
As seen earlier, the rank-and-file did enter into relationships with party leaders, but it is also clear from the data we have on advancement, electoral politics and political finance that the relationships were not well defined or exclusive. The Jiýutô and Minshutô factions conform largely to Beller and Belloni's definition of faction membership. As seen in Chapter 2, the factions tended to situate themselves within the two poles of the party and faction members could thus act as members of a variety of groups within the wing. Many of the Jiýutô and Minshutô factions were very big and in the former, could count over one hundred members. As seen in Fig.3–6, of the Jiýutô's 134 members in 1947, 32 were in the Ōkubo/Ōno group, 13 in the Traditional Faction and a handful in Nakajima, Hoshijima, Matsuno and ex-Ashida groups, while 50 were neutral (Sakano 1948:78). Thirteen had unknown affiliation. In 1949 when Yoshida had secured his position within the party, the Yoshida wing (including the Hirokawa faction) had 92 members (34%), Ōno had 47 members (18%) and the Shidehara faction which had joined in 1948 had 29 members (11%) (SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups 1949 GS(B) 02683). The neutral group had 88 members. In 1951, 94 were in the Yoshida wing, 59 in the Ōno faction (22%), 28 in the Shidehara faction (10.6%) and 24 in the Inukai faction (SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674–5). In October 1952, after the surprise dissolution, the Jiýutô had practically split into two. The Hatoyama faction set up an office in the Station Hotel for the elections with separate funding. The Asahi Shimbun reported that the Hatoyama faction had 67 members against 101 of the Yoshida faction (AS 2.10.52). A mad scramble commenced over the many neutrals and the new Diet members by both factions and the Hatoyama faction announced on that same day that it had 119 members (AS 3.10.52; Hatoyama 1957:116; Masumi 1985:283; Tominomori 1994:77). After the election the Hatoyama faction secured 66 seats compared to the Yoshida faction's 73 seats (Masumi 1985:284).

As seen in Figure 3–6 the neutral group in the Jiýutô was consistently big and between 1947 and 1953 around a third of the party stood outside the factional conflict between Yoshida and Hatoyama. In 1947 and 1949, 33% of Jiýutô members were neutral, and in 1951 30% were neutral (Sakano 1948; SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups 1949, GS(B) 02683). In 1952 at the time of the election, 27% were neutral. After the
election, when the confrontation between the two wings of the party was reaching its peak, the number of non-aligned members rose rapidly and went to 41%, or 99 people (Masumi 1985:284). In October 1952, 76 people attended the Ipponka Dōmei meeting calling for a halt in factional fighting, most of whom had a centrist position in the party. In 1953, 30 people belonged to the centrist Maeda faction (Igarashi 1953).

Minshutō factions were generally smaller, partly because the party was usually much smaller than the Jiyūtō (Figure 3–7). The biggest factions of the party in 1949 when the party split were the Coalition and Opposition factions. Both groups were trying to win over as many freshmen Dietmembers from the neutral group as possible before a final split. Of the 60 party members, 37 were in the Opposition group while the Coalition group had 34 members. In 1951, the Ashida faction had 28 members, the Miki faction 20 members, the Kimura faction nine, the Kitamura faction four, and six were neutral (SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674–5).

The Jiyūtō and Minshutō factions thus varied greatly in size, but the two poles within the parties, in particular, could be very large. What did this membership entail? Looking at the behaviour of factions in times of political struggles it seems that membership was not very binding and that many members were indeed ‘not necessarily mobilised’ by the faction membership (Beller and Belloni 1978c:425). First, none of the factions held any membership lists over time. Even when such lists were made, as happened in October 1952 when the factional struggle between the Hatoyama and Yoshida factions was at its peak, they were highly inaccurate and did not reflect clear or even conscious membership, but rather vague and temporary support. The use of the terms ‘Yoshida faction’ and ‘Hatoyama faction’ was very imprecise. The ‘Yoshida faction’, for example, referred to all those Dietmembers who were broadly in favour of Yoshida’s leadership, but could also refer to a smaller group, sometimes called the ‘President’s faction’ or the ‘Yoshida faction’, more closely connected to Yoshida,71 or the former high-level
Fig. 3.7 Election results to the Lower House 1946-1955

Sources: Curtis 1988.
bureaucrats ‘reared’ by Yoshida, the so-called ‘Yoshida School’ (*Yoshida gakkō*) (Dower 1979:315). The ‘Hatoyama faction’ sometimes referred to all those party members who had been close to Hatoyama from the time of the establishment of the Jiyūtō, or even before the war; at other times it referred to those opposing Yoshida or in favour of the party leadership being returned to Hatoyama at some point. The use of factional terms was imprecise and did not represent clearly defined internal divisions but rather broad divisive tendencies.

When observers tried to clarify the internal divisions of the Jiyūtō their, and politicians’, definition of the faction membership was very broad. Kōno Ichirō, speaking on behalf of the Hatoyama faction in October 1952, defined Hatoyama faction ‘members’ as all those ‘hoping to see a Hatoyama cabinet realised’ (*AS 3.10.52*), and by the same token the Yoshida faction included all those supportive of Yoshida’s continuing leadership. These wide definitions of membership allowed both factions to contest the others’ list and argue over the stance of individual party members (*AS 3.10.52*). The Yoshida faction refuted Kōno’s list, and the faction’s spokesman, Hirokawa Kōzen, announced that around 71 of those Kōno had listed were Yoshida faction members or neutral and thus had other ‘funding or personal relations’ (*AS 3.10.52*; Reed unpublished paper). The notion of membership was often temporary and arbitrary to show outside strength for a specific purpose.

Other factions had smaller and more public membership, such as the Hirokawa faction. Factional movements in times of crises show, however, that these factions had a small inner ring and a much larger outer sphere of ‘members’ which was fluid. At the centre was a handful of core members ready to follow factional leadership when clashes occurred. The outer ring of the faction was much bigger and consisted of people with vague membership links to the faction (see Thayer 1969). The outer sphere was by far the largest part of the faction and those members had very loose ties with the faction (see *AS 3.10.52*). Accordingly, the big factions showed very little cohesiveness (Reed, unpublished).
Second, although many factions seemed to consistently have a massive membership there was considerable movement of the rank-and-file between these groups. A significant number of the bureaucrats that Yoshida recruited into the party in 1949 took a neutral stance in the party, while others moved closer to other factions, such as the Ōno faction.73 The party politician faction, under Ōno’s leadership during the purge, also dispersed somewhat. Of those belonging to the Ōkubo/Ōno group in 1947 and who were still in the Diet in 1949, 11 were still in the Ōno faction, 10 had joined the Yoshida faction, 4 were neutral and 3 not known (Sakano 1948; SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups 1949, GS(B) 02683). In 1951, 10 former Ōno faction members were still in the Ōno faction, 13 in the Yoshida faction and 11 neutral (SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674–5). Of those who had been considered members of the Ōno faction in 1951, 11 people (50%) had left the faction in 1953. Of the other 50% who did not leave, 6 were still in the LDP in 1956. Of these 3 were still Ōno faction members, one in the Yoshida faction, one with no factional affiliation and one in both the Kōno and Ishibashi factions. Seven people (11%) of the Yoshida faction in 1951 had left the faction in 1953.

The number of people belonging to the Yoshida faction was believed close to 100 between 1949 and 1952 (see SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups 1949, GS(B) 02683; SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674–5; AS 3.10.52). When the purge was lifted Yoshida’s faction decreased somewhat in size but remained large—because being in the Yoshida wing had few political risks while Yoshida was the party leader. Yoshida’s support, as party leader, thus stayed fairly constant. However, just before the unification of the two conservative parties in 1955, after Yoshida had lost power the faction only had 13 key members (Masumi 1985:283).

The factions could not count on the members to follow faction lines in voting, or to follow the faction out of the party. Between October 1952 and March 1953, the Hatoyama faction gradually became more opposed to Yoshida’s leadership of the party. The faction increasingly sought to show its force against Yoshida by voting against the
party line in the Diet. These actions affected the size of the faction and it started decreasing rapidly in size, losing quite a few members to the Yoshida wing (Fig 3–8). After the general election, membership had decreased further and the faction decided therefore not to split from the party yet (Hatoyama 1957:116; Tominomori 1994:77). The Mindōha was formed after the general election, late in October 1952, by 35 Diet members but the first meeting was attended by 51 people (Ishida 1985:85–6). The groups behaved similar to a tendency. Politicians shifted their support between issues, making it difficult to predict the party cleavage (Rose 1964:48). In November 1952, 35 members were absent from the no-confidence motion on Ikeda, while 47 attended a meeting calling for the readmission of Kōno and Ishibashi after their expulsion from the party in the electoral campaign in 1952 (Ishida 1985:79–81; Reed unpublished). 38 were absent from a Diet session when a reprimand on Yoshida was put forward after the Bakayaro incident in March 1953. In spite of this, Ashida estimated that the Mindōha had around 70 members in early 1953 (Ashida 1986 vol.4:303). However, before the elections in 1953, the anti-Yoshida forces were estimated to have 33 members (ten definite Hatoyama faction members and another 22 first and foremost connected to Mindō) in addition to the 17 Hirokawa faction members, a total of 49 against the Yoshida executive (Watanabe 1958:91; AS 16.3.53).

The Mindōha decided to leave the Jiyūtō on March 19 1953 after the opposition parties had decided to put forward a no-confidence motion on the Yoshida cabinet (Ashida 1986 vol.4:303). However, even in a fairly tight organisation like the Mindōha, which acted under the clear aim to pass leadership of the party to Hatoyama, the group split and only 22 ‘die hards’ (kyōkōha), or 61%, of the group left with Hatoyama (AS 5.10.52; Fukui 1970:45–6; Ishida 1985:85–6). It seems that five other Diet members left a little later (Tominomori 1994:78–9), and they formed the Buntoha Jiyūtō. In 1954, after Hatoyama had returned to the party, the faction counted 24 members, most of who had been in the Bunjitō. Some of Hatoyama’s oldest supporters, like Ōno Bamboku and Andō Masazumi did not leave. Hatoyama’s closest associates criticised Ōno for his ‘betrayal’ and said he had sacrificed his friendship with Hatoyama for political gain (Ōno 1964:114; Kōno 1958; Hatoyama 1957:123–4; Kitaoka 1995:56).
Note: Unfortunately no data is available for the Yoshida wing or neutral party members after 1952.
Chapter 3: The Extent of Factionalism

A similar decrease in membership could be seen in the Hirokawa faction when the faction was forced to act. The faction had at its height between 70 and 80 members as a result of Hirokawa’s aggressive methods within the Executive Council to attract people (Masumi 1985:283; Igarashi 1952:20). Hirokawa tried to increase the distance between himself and Ōno by aligning more closely to the bureaucratic forces in the Yoshida wing, particularly Satō and Ikeda (SCAP Conservative Parties 1951, GS(B) 04352; AS 28.4.50). He used this group to put pressure on the party leadership, e.g. in the controversy over party post appointments late in 1951 (Igashira 1952:21). A small group, the so-called ‘four emperors’ (Takahashi Eikichi, Kimura Kōhei, Suzuki Shimpachi, and Makino Kansaku) led the core followers, but the faction had a much larger outer sphere of ‘semi members’ (jun Hirokawa ha) which counted a few dozen (Igarashi 1952:20). Observers at the time commented on the fleeting nature of the faction, knowing that membership numbers were not an accurate estimate of real following. It was observed in 1953 during the tug of war between Hirokawa and Yoshida which resulted in the former’s move to the Hatoyama wing, that

Hirokawa was pushed out of the secretary-general seat and if he loses his status the unity of the faction will be weakened as the riff-raff around Hirokawa act on self interest. It is obvious that many would leave (Tomioka 1953:106).

By early 1953 the Hirokawa faction had gone down to around 40 followers (Ashida 1986 vol.4:303). When it was clear that a split was likely in February 1953, 15 members of the Hirokawa faction held a meeting and decided on a formal name, Dōshi Kurabu (Comrade Club) (AS 19.2.53). At the disciplinary motion against Yoshida in March at least 30 Hirokawa faction members absented themselves from the vote. On March 16 the faction decided to split from the party but only 14 members left with Hirokawa to run for the Bunjitō (Ishida 1985:86; Tominomori 1994:78). Hirokawa lost his Diet seat in the 1953 election and in 1954 when the party split again, the Hirokawa faction had nearly ceased to exist (AS 9.11.54; Watanabe 1958:88).

The Minshutō factions seemed more cohesive. 24 members of the Shidehara faction showed their opposition to the party leadership when they voted against the government
bill on coal nationalisation in November 1947, and 25 left the party to join the Jiyūtō (see Masumi 1985:148). The Coalition faction of the Minshutō had 33 members in 1949, as seen above. Of this group nearly 70%, or 22 members, left with Inukai in 1950 to join the Jiyūtō.

The Kishi faction also showed relative cohesiveness, which may be due to the fact that the faction only existed within the Jiyūtō for about a year between 1953 and 1954. During that time, Kishi built up a following very rapidly in the Jiyūtō. All but three of the Kishi faction members in 1954 (Ishida 1985:101–2; Kitaoka 1995:57) had been elected to the Jiyūtō in 1953, meaning that they had not been active in the fight against Yoshida along with the Mindōha. 13 left the party with him in November that year, at least five of whom had been connected to Kishi since the prewar days (Watanabe 1958:102).

Scalapino and Masumi (1962:122) argued that Japanese factions were exclusive mutual help groups that relied on the consensus of the group and that faction members thus showed 'subordination' and loyalty which 'in terms of voting, ...means essentially subordinating one's personal choice for the choice designated by the leader.' As seen in this chapter, the relationships between leaders and followers were, however, much more complicated and multilayered to be explained in such simple terms. Politicians were connected to political leaders but also participated in factional activities at other levels within the party. They could have financial connections to a number of leaders, and fixed relationships to ensure advancement did not exist. Although a sense of identity with a faction may thus have existed it was corrupted by multiple identities which prevented the formation of clear and extensive factional loyalties. Factions did not have clearly defined membership and did not hold membership lists. There were no attempts to prevent overlapping loyalty, as many Jiyūtō members were close to a number of leading politicians. In times of struggles factions tried to attract new members for increased political force, promising financial and political assistance. However, these tactics did not lead to a greater institutionalisation of these factions because the factions did not have the means or the institutional structure to keep such promises. There were few attempts to achieve conformity of the group and factions participated in few attempts to establish
organisational tightness. Permanent membership could thus not form and the factions remained fluid.

3.6. Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated, by looking at promotions within party and government, electoral politics, and political funding, that factionalism within the Jiyūtō and Minshutō was much less extensive than it later became within the LDP. The factions were used to elevate leaders to posts but they were ineffective in promoting faction members in any systematic way. The polarisation of the parties was much more influential in determining advancement and so the most effective way of being promoted through party or government was to align with the dominant elite. Furthermore, in spite of the multimember electoral system, factional manoeuvres played less a role in electoral politics than is usually assumed. The Jiyūtō often had two to three party members elected in the same district, as did the LDP, but in spite of that candidates did not seek opposing factional alignments. The multimember electoral system created problems in that members of the same parties had to stand against each other. However, the system did not create factionalised electoral politics. The factions did not seek to interfere with the nomination process in the electoral districts to increase the possibility of winning over another candidate of the same party. Politicians sought to temper the effects of the system by supporting each other. Funding arrangements created a certain level of factionalism but financial assistance was not provided within the strict limits of the factions. Because of the fluid nature of the funding system, candidates did not run and fight their electoral campaigns with exclusive financial aid from factional sources. This tempered the need to move factional conflict into the electoral districts further. The electoral politics of the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō show that the multimember electoral system cannot be said to be the most important contribution to factionalism in Japan.

The nature of membership within the factions affected and was affected by the limited functions the factions served. Taking my cue from Panebianco (1988:60), I argued that the relative institutionalisation of the Jiyūtō and Minshutō allowed the leadership to control vital resources, such as recruitment and distribution of selective incentives so as
to curb factional activity. Although challenged by other groups, the party centre was strong enough to maintain centripetal power and maintain the support of the majority of the party, making horizontal power games among leaders in the parties, rather than vertical power games between leaders and followers, more important. Panebianco’s model is useful as a starting point to an understanding of why factionalism was not as persistent within the Minshūtō and Jiyūtō as in the LDP. The parties’ emergence allowed strong leadership and a coherent dominant coalition that prevented factionalism from escalating. This structural environment prevented factionalism from taking on the prominence that it took in the LDP, and made polarised struggle within the parties much more important.

I will now move on to the formation of the LDP in 1955. Part III will discuss factional development within the LDP after its formation in 1955 and the reasons for the great shift in the underlying principle of the conservative factions. I will show that the changes in factionalism after the formation of the LDP represent a fundamental shift in the structure and role of factionalism, and in the meaning of factionalism as a political phenomenon, compared to the factionalism of the Jiyūtō and Minshūtō.

Notes

1 For reasons of manageability my discussion here will be confined to the three main party posts. A more detailed study needs to be done on the distribution of other posts in committees in party and Diet, such as the chairmen of the Diet’s Upper and Lower Houses, and vice secretary-general of the party, but unfortunately that is outside the scope of this thesis.

2 There were a number of deputy secretaries-general too, as many as six (Yanaga 1956:250).

3 The Jiyūtō Executive Council had 30 members: 10 chosen by the president, 20 chosen from the regions. The Minshūtō Council had 21 members. The Bunjūtō in 1953 had only 10 members in the Executive Council, because of the party’s small size (Yanaga 1956:251).

4 Colton argues that the ‘parliamentarians’ were left relatively isolated after the purges and that the ‘machine elements’ took over, leading to the defection of the former, as seen in Ashida’s split in 1947 (Colton 1948:946).

5 In the Seiyūkai, Ōno was one of the Hatoyama faction’s inner circle, or sokkin (Kōno 1958:133).

6 Hoshijima was considered amongst Hatoyama’s allies and held the chairmanship of the Executive Council between 1946 and 1948. In 1948 he took part in a plot to have Yamaguchi Yukuchirō replace Yoshida as president of the Jiyūtō because of opposition to Yoshida returning to power by key people in SCAP (Masumi 1985; Babb 2000).

7 When he entered the party he was considered a member of the Matsuno faction from the old Minseitō (Sakano 1948:107).

8 The Yoshida Gakkō was not a formal establishment but an idea by Yoshida to train some of the bureaucrats he was recruiting into the party in 1949 as politicians and elevate them into high positions (Togawa 1980:94). Only a small portion of the bureaucrats recruited became ‘members’ of the school.
Chapter 3: The Extent of Factionalism

9 The Hirokawa faction felt threatened by the increasing influence of Masuda during his term as secretary-general and when Hirokawa left his post as chair of the Executive Council to enter cabinet again, the faction feared that his influence would diminish and the Masuda ‘sub-faction’s’ influence expand. Both Masuda and Hirokawa were situated within the Yoshida wing (AS 26.12.51).

10 Masutani had been close to Hatoyama in the Seiyūkai and Hatoyama recommended him to Yoshida for promotion when he made his first cabinet in 1946 (Kōno 1958:139). He however moved closer to Yoshida over the years (Kōno 1958:138).

11 Hayashi, like Ōno, had historical ties with Hatoyama since the days of the Seiyūkai (Hori 1975:139).

12 Hayashi and Masutani approved of Ishibashi Tanzan and Kono Ichirō’s expulsion from the party in September 1952. This was a great shock to Hatoyama and after this those close to Hatoyama considered both Hayashi and Masutani to be members of the Yoshida wing (Kōno 1958:139; Hori 1975:85).

13 This practice was referred to as ‘jisen tasen’ (recommending oneself and others) by observers at the time (see e.g. Nagata 1953:39).

14 Ogata was made vice prime minister on November 28 1952 but had been cabinet secretary before that (Hori 1975:76).

15 In 1953 the Jiyūtō had five, the Bunjūtō six, and Kaishintō 36 (Yanaga 1956:249).

16 Sometimes the appointment of an elder was an attempt by the party leadership to remove the politician from the front line, or ‘kick him upstairs’. Yoshida asked Hatoyama to become an elder in 1952 after the depurge, in an apparent attempt to pacify him and his group without having to include him in the executive of the party.

17 The prewar parties seemed similarly to allot posts to those favourable to the leadership. Totten and Kawakami point out that in the prewar conservative parties ‘party factions had served as channels for advancement’ (1965:111). There is, however, nothing to indicate that such posts were distributed on basis of factions within the ‘mainstream’.

18 The depurge was done in four waves between October 1950 and August 1951: In October 1950 10,090 members of the bureaucratic, finance and political worlds were depurged. This included Jiyūtō members such as Ōkubo, Andō and Makino Ryōzō. In June 1951, 2,958 were depurged, including Ishibashi, Miki and Kōno. In July 1951 a further 66,425 were depurged and in August 13,904 were depurged, including Hatoyama (Masumi 1985:279–81).

19 There were speculations in the newspapers that Miki Bukichi, Andō Masazumi or Sunada Shigemasa of the Mindōha might be chosen chairman of the Executive Council, but at the same time acknowledged that the Yoshida group did not see need to give in to Mindō pressures (AS 24.1.53).

20 This was clear in 1951 when the Hatoyama faction opposed to Hirokawa’s reinstatement as secretary-general as discussed before (Ishida 1985:64; Igashira 1952:21). Hirokawa in turn objected to Masuda’s appointment and insisted on his removal late in 1951 and again in March 1952 but had no suggestions as to who should replace him (Masumi 1985:282). Another incident centered around the Speaker of the Lower House. Hirokawa wanted Hoshijima Jirō to take over from Hayashi as Speaker but the Hatoyama faction threw its support behind Ōno Bamboku who was elected in August (Ishida 1985:71). Again in July 1952, Fukunaga Kenji’s appointment as secretary-general, supported by Hirokawa, was opposed by Ōno, Hayashi, Masutani and Uehara who decided to support Hayashi instead but he was a party politician and old Hatoyama supporter but had moved close to Yoshida. In this case the Hatoyama faction thus sought primarily to curb the influence of the Yoshida wing. Again in January 1953, Hirokawa vehemently opposed the appointment of Šatō Eisaku as secretary-general. Hirokawa had at that point moved from the Yoshida faction to work with the Hatoyama faction. Unsurprisingly therefore, the Mindōha also objected to Šatō’s appointment (Masumi 1985:292).

21 Inukai changed his first name from Ken to Takeru in 1952 (Wildes 1954:142).

22 Some of the most influential members of the Ashida faction in 1949 were Tomabechi Gizo, Narashashi Wataru, Shikumak Shuji, Ogawa Hanji and Takasone Yasuhiro (NT 2.2.49).

23 The centre faction was then led by Narashashi Wataru and Chiba Saburō.

24 When Hirokawa became chairman of the Executive Council in 1951 he immediately replaced three members of the Council who had connections with Hatoyama, Yamaguchi Kikuichirō, Mori Kōtarō, and Ōmura Seiichi, with three Hirokawa faction men, Suzuki Senpachi, Ikeda Kikujirō and Mori Kōtarō, and Ōmura Seiichi, with three Hirokawa faction men, Suzuki Senpachi, Ikeda Masanosuke and Tsuchikura Somei (SCAP Conservative Parties 1951, GS(B) 04352; AS 31.5.51).

25 Four members of the Hirokawa faction, for example, the so-called ‘four emperors’ (yon tenno) are said to have visited Yoshida in 1953 to warn him that it would be a mistake if Ogata, who had replaced
Chapter 3: The Extent of Factionalism

Hirokawa as a close associate of Yoshida, ignored Hirokawa. This was exertion of pressure on Yoshida to reinstate Hirokawa as secretary-general (Tomioka 1953:106).

This chapter deals only with the Jiyūtō as it was mostly in power in the period in question. This includes all the Yoshida cabinets in 1946–7, and 1948–54. The two cabinets that the Minshūtō participated in were coalition governments which makes it difficult to draw any conclusions about the principles behind the party’s appointments. However, it can be noted that Ashida Hitoshi rewarded leading members of his faction in the Ashida cabinet and both Kitamura Tokutaro and Ichimatsu Sadakichi, who had made his election as president of the Minshūtō possible, were rewarded with cabinet posts. Tomabechi Gizō was also given a post (Ashida 1986 vol.4).

See Masumi 1985:278–9 on an account of Izumiyama’s appointment.

In the late 1930s Masutani had some connections with Hatoyama but did actually belong to the rival Nakajima faction (Kōno 1958:133).

Ōno recommended for example Fukuda Tokuyasu for vice minister, but Fukuda was in the Yoshida faction in 1951 (SCAP Miscellaneous Parties 1951, GS(B) 02683). He later joined the Ōno faction and became one of Ōno’s most trusted followers (Sumitomo 1959:125). Ōno also recommended Honda Ichirō for an Administrative Management Agency post in 1949 but Honda was a member of the Yoshida faction (Ōno 1964:85; SCAP Miscellaneous Parties and Groups 1949, G(SB) 02683). Recommendation sometimes had a reverse effect. Ōno Bamboku recommended, for example, Yamaguchi Kikuchihiro, who was in the Hatoyama wing, for a cabinet post in 1949 because of his good services to the party, with the support of Hoshijima, chairman of the Executive Board, Hayashi Jōji and Masutani, (Ōno 1964:64). However, by 1951 Yamaguchi had joined the Yoshida faction (SCAP Miscellaneous Parties 1951, G(SB) 02674–5).

It is unclear when Tsukada entered the Ōno faction but he was believed to be a member of the Yoshida faction in 1951 (SCAP Miscellaneous Parties 1951, G(SB) 02674–5).

Johnson notes that seniority increased in importance after the war within the bureaucracy. He shows that in the early 1950s there were eruptions within ministries over appointments that disregarded the seniority hierarchy and Johnson notes that ‘It was during this period of poverty and firings that seniority became entrenched in all Japanese organizations as a vital source of job security’ (Johnson 1982:214).

Ōno mentions that Suzuki Masabumi from Yamanashi prefecture, first elected in 1947, was made labour minister in 1949, despite objections from the party executive (Ōno 1964:89).

A good example is the appointment of Ikeda as finance minister in February 1949. His appointment caused much discontent within the party, as he was a first year legislator being appointed to one of the top ministerial posts (Ōno 1964:91). Similar discontent was expressed when Okazaki Katsuo was made foreign minister (Ishida 1985:57).

Prime Minister Inukai felt for example compelled to give cabinet posts to both main factions in the Seiyūkai in 1931 to avoid schism within the party (AS 23.8.62).

Andō Masazumi was made state minister in Yoshida’s fifth cabinet.

This included people like Kōno Ichirō, Ashida Hitoshi, Hoshijima Jirō, Kita Reikichi, Ōkubo Tomejirō, Sudo Hideo, Ishii Mitsujirō and Yamazaki Iwao (Watanabe 1958:162–3).

Shidehara became advisor to Yoshida in March 1948 when his group joined the party (Watanabe 1958:199) and two of his faction members were given cabinet posts: Inoue Tomoharu was made Director of the Reparations Agency and Furuhata Tokuya became Communications Minister.

Ishibashi was however unhappy that he had not been given the finance ministry as he had strongly advocated certain economic policies in his opposition to the Yoshida administration (Ishida 1985:103–4).

Two of the Kaishintō ministers were from the Miki faction, one from the Ōasa faction, one from the Ashida faction, and then Shigemitsu Mamoru.
Chapter 3: The Extent of Factionalism

43 Hatoyama and Miki actually disagreed on this appointment. Hatoyama had wanted to reward Hoshijima with this post but Matsunaga was chosen (Hatoyama 1957:145).

44 Takechi was the only candidate for Saiken Renmei who got elected in 1952 and then joined the Jiyūtō in 1953 with Kishi. Omura Seiichi had been neutral in the Jiyūtō in the early 1950s but joined the Kishi faction in 1953.

45 The Minshūtō had 124 Dietmembers at the time of the dissolution. In the election the Jiyūtō got 112 seats, down from 180 at the time of the dissolution (Hatoyama 1957:143; Kohno 1997:70).

46 Hatoyama had thought not always observed such rules himself as was clear when he made the young and inexperienced Kōno Ichirō secretary-general in 1946 (Kōno 1965:180).

47 The data used here ignores the 1946 election as the results from that election are not comparable to those of later elections under the multimember electoral system.

48 The following discussion only takes account of members of the same party elected from the district, and not all those running for the party in the district.

49 Reed (1988:319) points out that the Minshūtō was the first party to utilise the strategy of reducing the number of candidates in this election, running 87 fewer candidates and thereby gaining seats in spite of a drop in votes.

50 Data on factional affiliation is very incomplete for the general elections in 1952 and 1953, with factional affiliation not known for nearly half the parties. It is therefore not possible to make accurate estimates.

51 Kimura became a member of the Ōno faction again in 1960 in the LDP.

52 Hirokawa wanted Amano Kimiyoshi to run, while Ōno supported Arai Kyōta. Neither of these candidates was a protégé of Ōno or Hirokawa; Arai was neutral in 1952 and in the Maeda faction in 1953, while Amano was in the Yoshida faction.

53 At its peak the Etsuzan-kai had nearly 100,000 members and 317 local chapters in Tanaka's district in Niigata (Hunziker and Kamimura 1994:66).

54 They were Nakagawa Shunji and Tanigawa Noboru who were both neutral in the party, and a Hatoyama faction member, Nagano Mamoru.

55 The Jiyūtō was believed to be more dependent on the construction and broker funding than Minshūtō. However, Ashida, then president of the Minshūtō, was prosecuted for accepting bribes from a construction company in relation to the Showa Denkō scandal (Mitchell 1996:100). One of his main supporters for the presidency was Sugawara Michinari but his brother in law was Hinohara Setsuzo, president of Showa Denkō (Mitchell 1996:102).

56 Hunziker and Kamimura (1994:38) state that the party decided to 'elect as president the first member who could come up with three million yen ...inn campaign funds.' Babb (2000:25) points out that Machida was supported by Tanaka Kakuei who was then not yet a Dietmember, but a wealthy construction businessman.

57 Through his financial support Ishibashi tried to contribute to unity within the Jiyūtō. In the summer of 1953 he approached those in the Jiyūtō still close to Hatoayama, after the latter had split and asked them to try to get along and work for the unity of conservatives (Hatoyama 1957:127). Ishibashi also put constant pressure on Hatoyama, probably through their family connections, to return to the Jiyūtō (Hatoyama 1957:128).

58 There were attempts to curb corruption in the first years of the postwar period through Political Funds regulations. In July 1948 a law was passed requiring political parties to provide periodic reports on funding (NT 9.10.47). In April 1950 a Public Offices Law was passed, consolidating all local and national election regulations and placing severe restrictions on campaign activities. However, little change was detected and Mitchell in his study of corruption concluded that the legislators "...failed to stop the old custom of using illegal fund and bribery to win elections" (Mitchell 1996:107). The Shipbuilding scandal of 1954 was a case in point (see Mitchell 1996:110).

59 Kōno Ichirō had good business connections and was nicknamed 'God of elections' (Wildes 1954:108; Colton 1948:942). This made him ideal for the post of secretary-general in 1945 in spite of his young age. Ikeda was chosen because of his connections since his days in the Finance Ministry (Watanabe 1958:20). Ōno also had extensive financial ties (SCAP Financial Supporters 1947–8, GS(B) 00832–3). Financial connections were also a criteria for appointments in cabinet posts, and in particular the Finance Ministry post. Ikeda Hayato and Mukai Tadaharu were chosen in that post partly because they were principal fundraisers for the party (Yanaga 1956:257).

60 These were Niwa Hyōkichi, Mitsui Kyūjirō and Hanabusa Toshio (NT 25.6.48).
The scandal arose over bribes offered by the largest fertiliser producer to politicians for special consideration in arranging low-interest loans from the Reconstruction Finance Bank. Only two of the 64 persons implicated were found guilty in 1962 (Calder 1988:77).

This came about when Kōno was imprisoned for receiving money from Tsuji while he was purged in the SCAP’s efforts to decrease the influence of ‘wirepullers’ (kuromaku) (Kōno 1958:156–7).

Hori had also been secretary-general of the Coalition faction in 1949 before joining the Jiyūtō but he was a member of the Inukai faction when he entered the party (Hori 1975:81). A Hori faction was said to exist only after he joined. Hori says he did not recommend Tsubokawa specifically for the post though they were in the same Inukai faction (Hori 1975:81).

The Nihon Jiyūtō then went on to organize election meetings around the country with entrance fees to collect money for the party (Kōno 1958:184). This may have been the first time a political party asked for entrance fees.

Wealthy party members sometimes donated money to the party, especially after 1947. The Jiyūtō gained from some wealthy party members in the House of Councillors, such as Itaya, Matsushima and Terao (Sakano 1948:108–110).

Hoshijima Jiro, chairman of the Executive Council of the Jiyūtō for much of the period between 1946 and 1950, established his own supporting society, the ‘Hoshijima Fujimura Kai’, voluntarily formed by members of the ‘cooperative society of Middle School Uniforms of all Japan’ (zengoku chuto gakko seifuku kyodō kumiai). This society provided Hoshijima with election funds and political activity funds, estimated at 5–600,000 yen (SCAP Financial Supporters 1947–48, GS(B) 00832–3) but it is unclear whether he distributed money to other party members.

These were Kokusaku Pulp Co, Yamata Steel Work and Japan Steel Pipe Co. (Yanaga 1956:259).

The following analysis relies on a number of lists over membership to factions. Complete lists were found for the Jiyūtō in 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1951, and for the Minshuto in 1949 and 1951 (Sakano 1948; SCAP Miscellaneous Parties and Groups 1949, GS(B) 02683; SCAP Miscellaneous Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674). Later lists are based on newspaper reports and historical material but they are incomplete.

The Shidehara faction had gained four members as it joined the Jiyūtō. One new member had been elected for the Kyodō in 1947, another was a Jiyūtō member, while two new Dietmembers in 1949 joined them (SCAP Miscellaneous Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674–5).

The Yoshida faction in 1951 included the Hirokawa faction.

Of those Ikeda Hayato, Satō Eisaku, Masuda Kaneshichī, Yoshida’s son-in-law Asō Takakichi, Okazaki Katsuo, Kosaka Zentarō and Fukunaga Kenji were most prominent (Tominomori 1994:72).

The Yoshida Gakkō does, however, not feature much in contemporary sources and did rarely feature as a political group.

Aoki Masashi, Kano Hikokichi, Komine Ryūta, Koyama Osanori, Hirai Giichi and Suzuki Zenkō had connections with Yoshida but were also considered to be neutral or connected to Ōno by some observers (SCAP Miscellaneous Parties and Groups 1949, GS(B) 02683; SCAP Miscellaneous Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674; Togawa 1980).

Hatoyama was chosen president of the new party, Miki Bukichi secretary-general, Kōno Ichirō chairman of the Executive Council (sōmuikaicho), Ishibashi chairman of the Policy Deliberation Council (seisakuiincho), and Hirokawa chairman of the Election Polling Committee (senkyotaisakuiincho), (Ishida 1985:86; Tominomori 1994:79).

Seventeen had been in the Bunjūtō and seven had been elected for the Jiyūtō but returned to the Hatoyama faction after Hatoyama’s return in November 1953.

Sources differ on how many left the Minshuto with Shidehara, some say 20 (Masumi 1985), others say 36 incumbents defected (Reed 1988:311). According to my sources 25 joined Jiyūtō, two of whom had been elected as independents in 1947.

However, of the seven candidates for Kishi’s Saiken Renmei in 1952, five ran for Yoshida’s Jiyūtō, and two for Hatoyama’s Bunjūtō in 1953 (Reed 1988:332).

Both the Hatoyama and Yoshida factions tried to appeal to the Neutral faction with promises of financial support following the general election in 1952 (AS 5.10.52; 8.20.52; 6.10.52). The Hatoyama faction formed the Jiyūtō New Dietmembers’ Discussion Group (Shingiin kondankai) in an effort to recruit new Dietmembers (AS 6.10.52). Those central to the formation of the group were Matsuoka Matsuhei, Andō Masazumi, Ōkubo Tomejiro, Makino Raizō, Hiratsuka Tsunejirō, Shigemasa Seiji, Sakomizu Hisatsune, Utsunomiya Tokuma, Tokuyasu Jitsuzō, Kawai Yoshinari and Matsuoka Matsuhei (AS 6.10.52). The
Yoshida faction used similar tactics, inviting Dietmembers returning to Tokyo after the elections to Yoshida's residence (AS 6.10.52).
PART III

Factionalism 1955-1964
4.1. Introduction

Having discussed the characteristics of factionalism within the Jiyūtō and Minshutō, I will now turn to the development of factionalism within the LDP. This chapter will discuss the changes in factionalism in the LDP in 1955–64. As many scholars have pointed out the LDP became characterised by the division into a number of clearly defined factions, with extensive functions of great political importance. The factions became the unofficial basis for the party organisation, distributing funding and posts to party members in exchange for support in presidential elections (Masumi 1967; Baerwald 1986; Kohno 1997; Hrebenar 1986a, Stockwin 1989:161). They became ‘institutionalised, organised factions’ (see Beller and Belloni 1978c:427), much more formal than the factions of the Jiyūtō and Minshutō, their membership cut through the party, and they had clear leadership and formal procedures.

Extensive research has already been done on factionalism in the early years of the LDP, which has focused on the institutionalisation of the factions (Watanabe 1958, 1964; Satō and Matsusaki 1986; Uchida 1983; Thayer 1969; Gotō et al. 1982; Masumi 1995, Curtis 1971, Fukui 1970, Kohno 1997, Stockwin 1970). As seen earlier, the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō were polarised. Similarly, the LDP was divided into two main currents: a mainstream: (shuryū) and anti-mainstream (han shuryū)—the balance between them representing the shifting alliances between the party leaders (Baerwald 1986; Thayer 1968; Leiserson 1968). However, I will argue that after the party’s first year, this polarisation became very different from the polarisation of the early postwar parties. Whereas the divisions within the Jiyūtō and Minshutō were a major source of instability, threatening the political system, the divisions within the LDP were a source of stability, maintaining the political system. It was often pointed out in the first years of the LDP that
a ‘factional system’ (*habatsu kōzō*) emerged where the factions became “parties within parties”. This phrase truly reflected a process whereby the factions had taken on organisational features commonly associated with political parties;—they became stable entities that distributed both collective and selective incentives to their members (see Panebianco 1988). The LDP factions carefully constructed both collective (identity, solidarity or ideology) and selective incentives (power, status and material incentives) to acquire stable membership, which Panebianco (1988:10) argues are necessary for an organisation to acquire ‘organisational continuity and hierarchical stability.’ They were, however, less successful with ideological incentives, as seen in the weak ideological colouring of the LDP factions compared to the earlier factions. As a new factional system was being born, policy became less significant in creating internal divisions which helped create stability (see Babb, unpublished paper). The LDP factions became the basis for cabinet and party appointments, and efforts were made to allow greater balance in power between the factions within the party. Factionalism thus ceased to be destabilising; it came to be widely, though not exclusively, considered a tool to aid party cohesion and political stability by observers and politicians (Shiratori 1988:170; Ward 1969:64–5; Stockwin 1989:162).

4.2. 1956 — A year of fluid factions

Although scholars have noted a greater tendency towards factionalism in parties created out of a merger of two or more parties (Beller and Belloni 1978c:436), it has also been argued that the origin of the LDP factions can be traced back to 1952 and that these divisions were to be prominent within the LDP in its formative years (Tominomori 1994:76; Dower 1979:316; AS 11.10.56). At that time, the Jiyūtō had a bureaucratic faction and a party politician faction, the Kaishintō was split into the left and right factions, and Kishi had just established his own political party, the Saiken Remmei. Tominomori (1994:76) argues that:

after this [1952] the parties and the factions split and merged, they vanished like clouds or went through a process of breaking up, but the origin of today’s factions can be seen in the confrontation between the factions of each of the conservative parties in the last years of Yoshida’s rule.
Chapter 4: Factionalism as a Force of Stability

It is true that the factions found within the LDP at its inception were the groups that had existed within the Jiyūtō and the Kaishintō and had emerged out of the splits and mergers of the conservative parties between 1953 and 1955. However, it is argued here that at the inception of the party, these factions were still the fluid groups they had been within the Jiyūtō and the Kaishintō and that it was not until 1957 that the factions started to take on a clear organisational form (Gōtō, Uchida and Ishikawa 1982:138; Iyasu 1983:110; Leiserson 1968:770).

Soon after the formation of the LDP a few politicians from each of the previous conservative parties became most prominent. These politicians formed three main currents (iro wake), the Jiyūtō, Minshutō, and Kaishintō wings (Watanabe 1958:143). Those most prominent from the Minshutō with a Jiyūtō background were Hatoyama Ichirō, Ishibashi Tanzan, Kishi Nobusuke and Miki Bukichi.¹ A number of powerful politicians came from the Jiyūtō. Of those, Yoshida Shigeru, Ōno Bamboku, and Ogata Taketora were possibly the best known, but Hayashi Jōji, Masutani Shūji, Ishii Mitsujirō, Ikeda Hayato and Satō Eisaku were also well known.² The most prominent politicians with roots in the old Kaishinto and then the Minshutō, were Miki Takeo, Matsumura Kenzō, Ashida Hitoshi, Ōasa Tadao and Kitamura Tokutarō. All these politicians had some personal followings but as seen in previous chapters, these groups were not formal entities. From the factional history of the LDP presented in Table 4–1 it can be seen that there were thirteen factional groups in the party in 1956 before the presidential election.³

In spite of all these factional groups, the LDP was a polarised party as its predecessors had been: the politicians grouped themselves together in various combinations crossing the old party lines, forming two main wings. The leadership issue was a main point of contention and the party seemed largely divided into the ‘traditional’ bureaucratic and party politician groups like the Jiyūtō (Nester 1990:160). After Hatoyama was chosen president in April 1956, the mainstream was led by the party politicians, Hatoyama, Kōno Ichirō and Ōno Bamboku (Table 4–2). Although the mainstream included most of the Minshu and anti-Yoshida forces, Ishibashi stood outside the alliance (Ishida
Table 4-1: Factional divisions within the LDP 1955-1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minshūtō:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
<td>Ishida</td>
<td>Ishida</td>
<td>Ishida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kishi</td>
<td>Kishi</td>
<td>Kishi</td>
<td>Kishi</td>
<td>Kishi</td>
<td>Kishi/Fukuda</td>
<td>Tōgō Sasabun</td>
<td>Fukuda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kawashima</td>
<td>Kawashima</td>
<td>Kawashima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miki B.</td>
<td>Kōno</td>
<td>Kōno</td>
<td>Kōno</td>
<td>Kōno</td>
<td>Kōno</td>
<td>Kōno</td>
<td>Kōno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatoyama</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiyūtō:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Yoshida)</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Satō)</td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Satō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogata</td>
<td>Ishii</td>
<td>Ishii</td>
<td>Ishii</td>
<td>Ishii</td>
<td>Ishii</td>
<td>Ishii</td>
<td>Ishii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaihishintō:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miki Takeo</td>
<td>Miki/Matsumura</td>
<td>Miki/Matsumura</td>
<td>Miki/Matsumura</td>
<td>Miki/Matsumura</td>
<td>Miki/Matsumura</td>
<td>Miki/Matsumura</td>
<td>Miki/Matsumura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsumura</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ōasa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashida</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitamura</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ichinanda</td>
<td>Ichinanda</td>
<td>Ichinanda</td>
<td>Ichinanda</td>
<td>Ichinanda</td>
<td>Ichinanda</td>
<td>Ichinanda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4–2: Mainstream-antimainstream divisions in the LDP 1956-1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mainstream</th>
<th>antimainstream</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956 Hatoyama cabinet</td>
<td>Hatoyama</td>
<td>Yoshida (Ikeda/Satō)</td>
<td>Kishi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kōno</td>
<td>Miki Takeo</td>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Ashida</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ishii</td>
<td>Ōasa</td>
<td>Kitamura</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 Ishibashi cabinet</td>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
<td>Kishi</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Ishii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miki Takeo</td>
<td>Kōno</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 July Kishi cabinet</td>
<td>Kishi</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Ishii</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kōno</td>
<td>Miki-Matsumura</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958 2nd Kishi cabinet</td>
<td>Kishi</td>
<td>Ishii</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Miki-Matsumura</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kōno</td>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959 June Kishi cabinet</td>
<td>Kishi</td>
<td>Kōno</td>
<td>Ishii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Miki-Matsumura</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 July Ikeda cabinet</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Kōno</td>
<td>Ishii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Miki-Matsumura</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kishi</td>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 Dec. Ikeda cabinet</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Kōno</td>
<td>Ōno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>Miki-Matsumura</td>
<td>Ishida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kishi</td>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
<td>Ishii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fujiyama</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Kishi/Fukuda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kōno</td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Fujiyama</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miki</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kawashima</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963 Ikeda cabinet</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Kishi/Fukuda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kōno</td>
<td>Fujiyama</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miki</td>
<td>Ishii</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kawashima</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964 Ikeda cabinet</td>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kōno</td>
<td>Kishi/Fukuda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>Satō</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miki</td>
<td>Ishii</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kawashima</td>
<td>Fujiyama</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Approximated from Watanabe 1958; Masumi 1995, Leiserson 1968; Iseri 1988; Uchida 1983; Fukui 1970; JT.
Chapter 4: Factionalism as a Force of Stability

1985:110). The mainstream was believed to have around 80 members; the Hatoyama faction thirteen members; and the Kōno faction somewhere between 37 and 52 members (JT 16.10.56). This polarisation was further reinforced in the summer of 1956 over the issue of Japan-USSR negotiations (JT 13.7.56).

The ‘anti-Hatoyama faction’ supported Ogata Taketora as president. It was led by the Yoshida faction but also included many who had been against the merger (JT 4.4.56; AS 13.7.56). Ikeda was the de facto leader of the Yoshida group because Yoshida had chosen not to join the new party, but the name and membership was that of the Yoshida faction. Kishi was believed to have around 30 supporters but he was positioned more towards the centre, aligning at different times with each camp (JT 11.12.56). The Ishii faction was also centrally positioned but was more vocal in its opposition to Hatoyama than Kishi was. It was noted in February that 10 factions existed within the party ‘each aspiring for leadership of its own’ (JT 16.2.56) and there were various references to the activities of the factions. However, the general feeling at the time was that the factions were not of primary importance for political developments. More important were the two currents, the mainstream and the anti-mainstream, splitting the party (e.g. JT 22.5.56; Iyasu 1983:110).

Until 1957 it seemed to many observers that the factional manoeuvres within the newly formed LDP were not very different from the struggles taking place within the Jiyūtō. There were two wings fighting over leadership of the party and there were personal antagonisms between individual politicians. Party members moved between groups, many were undecided and stayed outside the groups, and personal leadership as well as the issue of party leadership was important in shaping the factional movements. The Asahi Shimbun noted that ‘the factions do not have solid membership but count a little over 10 in each battle array and thus do not individually hold decisive power. Their influence is scattered …’ (AS 6.4.56). In October 1956 the Japan Times wrote:

Factionalism within the conservative camp (not to mention the leftists) has always existed. But it became especially notable when the question of whether or not Prime Minister Hatoyama should go to Moscow arose. The nature of political factions being what it is, any attempt at listing them would necessarily be arbitrary. There are no
'memberships' of course, to mark them clearly. Besides, the groups in the changing domestic and world conditions have been highly volatile and variable. A faction may be considered to comprise a certain number today, and the figure may have to be revised in a few weeks because of shifting loyalties (16.10.56).

As in the early postwar period, the factions had very limited definable membership and the groups changed from one issue to the next. The party was unable to reach an agreement on the party's leadership and so a leadership committee (sosai daiiko iin sei) was set up with Hatoyama, Ogata Taketora, Miki Bukichi and Ōno Bamboku as representatives (Watanabe 1966:24). Ogata died suddenly in January 1956 and Hatoyama was made president of the LDP in April 1956 (Gotō et al. 1982:141). All the same, until the presidential election in the LDP in December 1956, the LDP factionalism was identical to that of the Jiyūtō and Minshutō, the tendency to polarise was strong and the factions did not have clear membership. However, this fluidity of membership was to decrease greatly following the first presidential election in December 1956.

4.3. Factional reorganisation and the 1956 presidential elections

The first secret ballot presidential elections held in the LDP in December 1956 started a process which was to alter the factional divisions which had existed in the party's first year. First, politicians sought to build alliances between groups to secure victory in the election. Second, smaller groups gravitated towards the most prominent politicians as their power rapidly expanded.

It was tactical thinking amongst the party leaders that led to the adoption of secret ballot elections for the party president. Ogata had believed he could win in spite of the support Hatoyama seemed to have secured, if a secret ballot election was held (Watanabe 1966:24). Hatoyama was against the idea but was forced to accept it after negotiations broke down. The party leader was to be chosen at a party convention attended by around 500 LDP members of both houses of the Diet and representatives of urban and rural prefectures (Gotō et al. 1982:138). However, because of Ogata's death in January 1956, Hatoyama was made president without a rival candidacy. He, however, announced his intention to resign in the autumn of 1956 and the first secret ballot presidential election was scheduled for December. Three candidates ran in the election, Ishii Mitsujirō, Kishi
Nobusuke and Ishibashi Tanzan, and these politicians aligned across the old party lines to create extensive support groups around them. Personal and political preferences as to who should lead the party (see Kohno 1997 chapter 5), mixed with issues relating to bureaucratic and political power, heavily affected the alliances (Watanabe 1958:208).6

The factions surrounding the two Jiyūtō politicians running in the election, Ishibashi and Ishii, grew rapidly following their decision to run in the election. Ishii and Ishibashi’s candidacy largely recreated the polarisation of the Jiyūtō. The Ishii faction was in effect the old Ogata faction, which had come under the new leadership of Ishii Mitsujirō when Ogata died in January 1956. This was the first time that a faction was passed on to a new leader. The only other similar incident was in 1946 when Hatoyama was purged, and Ōno and Ōkubo came to lead the party politicians in the Jiyūtō. That was, however, unofficial leadership over an ill-defined group. The Ishii faction was considered the closest knit before the second presidential election and Uchida noted about the leadership succession in the Ogata faction: ‘this was the first time that I felt that I was coming across a ‘habatsu’ [faction]’ (Goto et al. 1982:142). Ishii’s support came from the Jiyūtō, from his own faction and the Ikeda faction (Gotō et al. 1982:138; Iyasu 1983:110; Watanabe 1966:29; Watanabe 1977:85;). Ishibashi also drew most of his support from the Jiyūtō, mainly from those who had been against Yoshida. Of these, the most influential was the small group around Ishibashi and Ishida, and the old Hatoyama forces led by Ōkubo (Watanabe 1966:29). Many of Ishibashi’s supporters, having fought against Yoshida and with Hatoyama within the Jiyūtō, now strongly disliked Kōno (Watanabe 1966:29; Watanabe 1958:167).7 But Ishibashi also got support from the Kaishintō factions, the Matsumura and Miki factions, who all disliked Kōno (Watanabe 1958:180).

Kishi’s support came from two very different political directions. Kishi, who had built a strong faction while serving as secretary-general in the LDP’s first year, got support from his own faction, as well as from two Jiyūtō factions: the Satō faction, led by Kishi’s brother, Satō Eisaku, and the Kōno faction, in spite of Kōno’s general dislike of bureaucrats. Because of Kishi’s close relations with many of the old Kaishintō groups, he also ensured the support of the Ōasa faction (Watanabe 1966:29; Watanabe 1977:85).
The presidential election led to a split between the two groups of the Yoshida faction as Satō followed Kishi and Ikeda decided to support Ishii (Hori 1975:104; AS 2.2.56, 5.1.58.), but nineteen other members of the Yoshida faction were still undecided which group to follow shortly before the election (AS 11.10.56).

Ōno was indecisive at first as to whom to support. He did not want a Kishi-Satō alliance to win because it would result in a revival of bureaucratic politics. At the same time, Ōno disliked Matsumura Kenzō and Miki Takeo and thought they differed too much from him politically (Watanabe 1958:112; Watanabe 1966:30). However, he disliked Ishii even more, and was against Kōno after a disagreement over personnel decisions (Iyasu 1983:110; Watanabe 1977:85). He thus supported Ishibashi in the end.

The presidential candidates did their best to attract support to ensure victory in the election. But it was not only the presidential candidates who were attracting other smaller groups. Other politicians, and in particular Satō, Ikeda, Ōno and Kōno, were also attracting independent following although the growth of their groups was not as rapid as that of the groups around the presidential candidates (AS 11.10.56). The internal groups varied in nature but in the press, a 'faction' referred to both the small groups around each leader, and also the wider support groups for the presidential candidates. Thus the Japan Times wrote in November 1956 that since Ōno 'is not avowedly running in the current race, his 'faction' as such is necessarily smaller than some others which have formed around the 'candidates' for the Liberal-Democratic president' (27.11.56). Kōno and Miki Bukichi had been political allies, having formed the Nihon Jiyūtō together in 1953, but after the latter's death in July 1956, Kōno became a more independent leader. Many of Hatoyama's followers stayed outside factions until the presidential election, when the members dispersed, moving to either Kōno, or Ishibashi who had decided to run in the election. Some moved over to the Kishi faction. The old Jiyūtō Hirokawa faction also largely joined Kishi (Watanabe 1958:108).

Many of the smaller factional factions conferred closely on the presidential election and tried to strengthen their unity to deal with this event (see Ashida 1986 vol.6). However,
these attempts ended in most cases with a merger with one of the bigger factions. The former Kaishintō forces had split into three main groups, left, centre and conservative groups. Of these, the only groups to remain more or less intact from the Kaishintō were the left wing Miki and Matsumura groups that formed the Miki-Matsumura faction around year end 1956 (Watanabe 1958:183; JT 20.11.56). The Kitamura group gravitated towards Kōno and Kishi (Watanabe 1958:106:183; Hayashi 1957a:34), but Kōno and Kitamura had been on good terms since 1953 because of their mutual interest in ousting Yoshida (Watanabe 1958:207). Kitamura himself, however, voted for Ishibashi in the 1956 election and his faction ceased to exist as a group in 1957 (Watanabe 1958:106; AS 11.10.56). Ōasa Tadao, who had been close to Matsumura until then (Watanabe 1958:100) and a leader of around ten member conservative faction (hoshuha), parted with his old friend late in 1956. His group created the Jūichi nichi kai (11th day Society) as a link with the Kishi faction and came out in support of Kishi in the election (AS 11.10.56; Watanabe 1958:194). Ōasa had been close to Kishi before the war and gravitated towards him in the presidential election in 1956 because of that connection. It is said that Kishi was providing funding for Ōasa by this time (Watanabe 1958:193). It is, however, interesting to note that most members of the Ōasa faction in 1956 were new Diet members, elected in 1955. After Ōasa died in February 1957 the group joined the Kishi faction but led a somewhat separate life there, getting a member appointed in both the Ishibashi cabinet and the first two Kishi cabinets (Watanabe 1958:194). The centre faction of the Kaishintō formed the Sannokai in November 1956. Six of its eight members joined the Kishi faction, while one went to the Miki faction (Watanabe 1958:106; AS 11.10.56). The Ashida faction only had seven members in October (AS 11.10.56) and had disappeared by end of 1956. An entry in Ashida's diary December 11 1956 shows the fluid nature of the factions that had been carried over from the Jiyūtō and Kaishintō and the ease with which they disbanded and joined more influential politicians:

Today at 2 o'clock I went to the Tokyo Club to discuss matters with Kojima Tetsuzō and Chiba Saburō. They asked me if I would ask Shiga [Kenjirō] and Takase [Den] to join the Kishi faction too but I answered that it was not for me to dictate to other people (Ashida 1986 vol.6:253).
Ashida's limited ability and willingness to exert leadership over his faction was clear and the faction dispersed. Some of its members like Chiba Saburō and Kojima Tetsuzō joined the Kishi faction, while others, like Ashida, joined Miki.13

Before the elections, the press referred to the internal groupings as the ‘seven divisions and three regiments’ (*shichika shidan, sanrentai*), using military language to portray the varying strengths and sizes of the groups (Iyasu 1983:109; Watanabe 1958:96; *JT* 11.12.56).14 With the mergers of groups around the election, the number of factions went down from thirteen to eight and their organisational tightness started to increase (see Table 4–1). Most LDP factions opened election offices where supporters would meet weekly to exchange information and form strategies (Watanabe 1958:112; Iyasu 1983:110; *JT* 27.11.56). The Yoshida faction formed the Heishin Kai and met twice weekly at their headquarters (*JT* 10.11.56). The Ishii faction had headquarters in Akasaka, owned by the main strategist of the party, Tanaka Isaji, and met daily (*JT* 6.11.56). Ōasa’s Jūichi nichi kai met once a month (Watanabe 1958:194). The Ōno faction had not yet established headquarters and although one of the leaders, Aoki Masashi, said ‘We only maintain constant contact with other groups toward our aim’ (*JT* 27.11.56), the group was meeting regularly (Gotō et al. 1982:142).

It is true, as Fukui has argued, that the presidential election encouraged the building and maintenance of a bloc of supporters (1978:57). Scholars have argued that this election transformed the fluid factions to established units (Iyasu 1983:110; Uchida 1989:101). However, the Jiyūtō and Minshutō had at times seen the formation of such blocs, and factions had been known to open temporary factional offices to fight in elections, as seen in Chapter 2 (Kōno 1965:150–3). In 1956, the reorganisation of the factional structure was more extensive than ever before and there are indications that party leaders were using financial aid to attract smaller factions, but the smaller factions had still not joined the bigger factions but offered support for the election. The presidential election was, however, an important stepping stone towards factions with clear membership, to which we now turn.
4.4. Consolidation of faction membership

The effects of the new presidential election system on the factions became only gradually clear. Slowly, after the election in 1956, a new pattern of factionalisation started to emerge. Rather than disband the factions after the presidential elections of 1956 or whittle them down to a few core members, as had been the case in the past, faction leaders organised a number of events, for example inviting Diet members to parties, to create a more stable support group (Thayer 1968:23). The formation of membership was a crucial factor changing the factions from the fluid tendencies/patron client groups they had been. Personal relations ceased to be as important as the expansion of the faction, which became a goal in itself. Beller and Belloni (1978c:427) describe the formalisation of membership thus:

Recruitment is ordinarily aggressively prosecuted, the goal being not so much to bring new individuals into a personal relationship with a faction leader as to add sheer number to the ranks of the faction.

With the advent of presidential elections party leaders had a new incentive to attract permanent followers. The factions were going through a process similar to that of a political party trying to attract members through a variety of incentives. Panebianco has described two main kinds of incentives used by parties to attract members: collective incentives distributed to all, such as identity, solidarity and ideology; and selective incentives in form of power, status and other material benefits to individual politicians (Panebianco 1989:9–10; Ware 1996:68–9). As seen later the LDP used selective incentives very effectively, but the use of collective incentives, such as the creation of sense of identity and solidarity, has been underestimated by scholars. The membership formation was incremental and initially very informal as Thayer (1969:23) describes:

Kono’s only factional membership list was the banquet books, and the only yardstick of factional loyalty was the distance the Dietmen were willing to travel to eat and drink with him.

However, in what seemed a chain effect, factions were launched formally, with parties and media attention; faction leaders openly appealed to party members to join; and factions sought to show their influence by opening offices and holding parties (Thayer
1969:22–3). These faction offices did not represent a split in the party, indicating that the group was trying to separate itself from the party leadership as had been the case in the Jiyūtō and Minshutō, but became a symbol of power. Thus, for example, when Ishida Hirohide went ahead to establish his own office in late 1958 this was seen as a direct attempt to establish Ishida as future leadership material (AS 2.10.58). In September 1957 the Kōno faction, along with the old Kitamura faction, had:

formed a society called the ‘Shunju Kai’ and have registered it as a political association. Actually, it is a sort of political party. It almost amounts to a ‘Kono Party’ though it is within the Liberal Democratic Party. In opposition to this, the Ikeda faction has formed a political association called the ‘Kochi Kai’ while the Miki clique plans to create a ‘Sanboku Kai.’ Things having come to this pass, the Liberal-Democratic Party has completely deteriorated into a mere coalition of factions (JT 6.9.57).

The fact that the journalist refers to the Shunjukai as a ‘sort of political party’ (or ‘party within the party’, とうちとう), a term never used about factions before, reveals how the factions had changed. The faction as a ‘political party’ was a group with organisational visibility (habatsu kyōka). Membership was a major feature of the faction as a ‘political party’. For the factions to acquire stability and continuity they needed clear collective incentives to attract members. Factions invited members to training courses to attract membership and nurture a feeling of belonging through a variety of activities (Thayer 1968:23; AS 28.10.63). A variety of factors affected the pattern of membership, friendships, atmosphere of the faction, or ideological incentives like policy (especially the Miki-Matsumura group). However, as seen in the following chapter, financial support and proximity to power played a major role in defining membership. An anonymous article in the Asahi Shimbun in January 1956 tells of a real or fictional Dietmember who joined a faction because of the electoral support received in his first election from the faction leader (AS 6.1.56). Thayer pointed out that the faction could also be a great help to candidates in other ways. Because of the political power the factions were acquiring they became a major player in giving the candidate value as a politician, elevating him 'to the status of a major contender', establishing connections that reached to the core of the party (Thayer 1969:36–7). The Prime Minister’s faction was particularly successful in attracting members in this way because of its proximity to power, and in 1957 when Kishi became prime minister it was reported that ‘the number of Dietmembers situated in
the mainstream and aligning with the Kishi faction that holds power, keeps on increasing day by day’ (Hayashi 1957b:45).

In the following sections I will discuss faction membership in further detail. Three main observations will be made. First, in the party’s first years, certain historical continuity is visible as party members joined factions to which they had some sort of personal connection. Second, in the late 1950s the factions increased in size while the number of neutral party members decreased rapidly. Third, as the factions established themselves diversity in membership increased. These changes reveal a process where the LDP factions were increasingly taking on the characteristics of political parties—stable membership was vital for their survival as power brokers, and recruitment became a goal in itself.

4.4.1. Historical continuity in factional composition

The largest factions in the LDP in 1956 were not the same factions as they had been 2–3 years previously as they were in the process of incorporating many Dietmembers who previously belonged to one of the small factions or had no factional affiliation. However, most factions showed relative continuity, in that most of the faction members in 1956 came from the same party as the faction leader, and a significant portion had been politically close to the leader in the past, indicating that policy issues played some part in forming the factions.17

Of the Ishibashi faction’s eleven members in 1956 all but one had previously been Jiyūtō members, and 6 had been in Mindō (see also Watanabe 1958:164). The 25 members of the Kōno faction in 1956 came in roughly equal numbers from Kaishintō and Jiyūtō, but most, or 23, had been elected for the Minshutō in 1955, two of who were new Dietmembers18, while only two had run for the Jiyūtō. Twelve members had been elected for the Jiyūtō in 1952 and of those ten split in 1953. The Miki faction had 26 members in 1956, 25 of who had come from the Minshutō but one had been a member of the Hatoyama faction in the Jiyūtō. Seven of the former Minshutō members had belonged to the Miki faction in the Minshutō/Kaishintō, four had been members of the Ashida
Chapter 4: Factionalism as a Force of Stability

The 21 member Ishii faction was composed of three new Diet members, three former Kaishintō members, and 15 former Jiyūtō members, the majority of who had been neutral in the party. The Ōno faction’s 20 members all came from the Jiyūtō, but only three had been Ōno faction members in the early 1950s, Kanda Hiroshi, Murakami Isamu and Kano Hikokichi. Murakami and Kanda had become Ōno faction members during Ōno’s stint as secretary-general in the Jiyūtō (Watanabe 1958:119). Two others had been in the Mindōha and thus been situated in the Hatoyama wing, while one had been close to Yoshida. Eight had been neutral in the party while three were former Hirokawa faction members.

The members of the Ikeda and Satō factions had all been elected for the Jiyūtō in the early 1950s. The Ikeda faction members showed closer relations to the Yoshida faction of the Jiyūtō than the Satō faction members. Of the nineteen Ikeda faction members, ten had been in the Yoshida faction in the early 1950s, eight had been neutral and one had been in the Shidehara faction and thus within the Yoshida wing. Of the Satō faction’s 16 members, eleven had been relatively neutral in the Jiyūtō although some had been favourable to the Yoshida faction, two came from the Hirokawa faction, one from Hatoyama and Ōno factions each, and then Satō himself, from the Yoshida faction. Of the nineteen Yoshida faction members who had not aligned with either Satō or Ikeda in 1956 all but one came from Jiyūtō. Five had been neutral in the Jiyūtō, eight had been in the Yoshida faction, while four were of unknown affiliation, and one had been first elected in 1955. One had been a member of the Kaishintō.

The Kishi faction, the largest faction with 34 members, showed most diversity; nine members were elected for the first time in 1955 for the Minshutō, ten had been elected for the Kaishintō in the early 1950s and came from a variety of factions, while fifteen had been members of the Jiyūtō. Of this last group, thirteen had left the Jiyūtō in the split in 1954, but two had been of neutral standing. The faction thus included a considerable group of anti-Yoshida elements and new Diet members.
4.4.2. Faction size

Turning to faction size, as the factions sought to attract new members faction membership fluctuated between 1956 and 1958, but as seen in Figure 4–1, most factions were rapidly growing. Only the Ishii faction stayed at roughly the same. The LDP factions varied in size but ranged between three and 55. They were thus considerably smaller than the biggest factions in the Jiyūtō. The factional membership still showed some resemblance to the Jiyūtō factions as seen in the rapid increase in the size of the Kishi faction after Kishi became prime minister in January 1957, when it was estimated to have around 100 members (Hayashi 1957b:43). This very much resembled the ‘presidential’ Yoshida faction within the Jiyūtō.

It has been widely argued that from the time of the Kishi cabinet in 1957, the factional divisions became visibly entrenched (Iyasu 1983:122; Goto et al. 1982). However, although the factions had acquired considerable membership and organisational visibility at this time, there were still considerable movements between factions. As factions became more important, disagreements started arising within them over individual promotions and political strategies, leading to splits (Watanabe 1958:131). The temporary phenomenon of ‘rising factions’ (shinkō habatsu) in the late 1950s was made possible because of these shifts between the established factions (kisei habatsu) but when membership was stabilised such fissures stopped appearing (see Watanabe 1958:210).

Between 1958 and 1960, all factions decreased in size, apart from the Ikeda and Satō factions which saw their biggest growth spurt in those years. This decrease in membership was largely due to the emergence of a number of new factions, the so-called ‘rising factions,’ raising the number of intraparty factions to twelve—though several of them were short lived (Watanabe 1958:210). For example, the Ichimanda and Kaya factions were small groups that emerged in the end of the 1950s but they had more or less
Fig.4-1 Development of membership - LDP factions 1956-1964

dispersed by 1961. The Ishida faction may also be considered a ‘rising faction’ although it emerged out of the Ishibashi faction in 1957 after internal disagreements, but by 1963 it had disappeared altogether (see Fukui 1970:111). However, the Fujiyama faction, which appeared in the presidential election in July 1960 (Fukui 1970:110; Fujiyama 1976:232), was more resilient—membership of the faction increased after Kishi declared that Fujiyama was to be his successor (Fujiyama 1976:233), and many Kishi faction members joined the faction (Fujiyama 1976:233–4).

A rapid increase in faction membership occurred again between 1961 and 1963, as many of the rising factions failed to establish themselves and the number of factions dropped again to nine. The Miki, Ōno and Kōno factions grew rapidly, while the Ikeda and Satō factions went slightly down. The Kishi faction disbanded in 1962 and split into two groups (Iyasu 1983:117). The group led by Fukuda Takeo went on to form the Tōfū Sasshin Remmei in 1962 which became the Fukuda faction by 1965. The group led by Kawashima Shōjirō was called the Kōyū Kurabu and was jointly led by Kawashima and Akagi Munenori (Fukui 1970:110). The Kōyū Kurabu and the Fukuda factions had their own political funds, political opinions, office and staff, reported the Japan Times. ‘To all intents and purposes, these factions are small-size political parties’ (JT 11.10.63). The Ishii faction, on the other hand, continued to decrease in size after continuing internal disagreements and a failed attempt to seize the leadership of the party in 1960 (see Hayashi 1958; Fukui 1970:117).

In the first year of the party, while the factions were still fluid and in the process of acquiring membership, a significant portion of the party, a total of 31, had not aligned with any faction (AS 11.10.56). In November 1956, it was even speculated in the media that only 150 of the 290 LDP members had joined a faction (JT 13.11.56). Kawashima Shōjirō of the Kishi faction was quoted as saying that: ‘it’s hard to say where the loyalty of the rest belongs. It may shift from day to day, depending upon political developments’ (JT 13.11.56). Moreover, 37 members were said to be connected to more than one faction (AS 11.10.56). This group included Diet members first elected in 1955, former Jiyūtō
members who had been neutral, and Jiyūtō and Kaishintō members who had belonged to one of the factions (see AS 5.1.58).

However, as seen in Figure 4–2, the overall growth in faction membership after the presidential elections in 1956 was accompanied by a rapid decrease in the number of LDP Diet members not belonging to any faction or connected to more than one faction. In 1958, only eight members were not affiliated to factions, according to Watanabe (1958:223). Four of the eight non-affiliated in 1958 had been first elected in 1955 or 1958 and had never been members of any factions. Two had been members of the Hatoyama faction. It is however interesting to note that between 1961 and 1963, the number of unaffiliated members grew again. This was because a number of factions were disappearing around that time. For example, in 1963 the Kishi, Ichimanda, Kaya, Ishida and Ishibashi factions all had ceased to exist, leaving their members without factional affiliation. This group counted for ten of the sixteen unaffiliated members in 1963, while five were new Diet members in 1963. In 1964, ten of these were still unaffiliated and more members of the Kishi faction joined this group. Although there was still a number of LDP members not affiliated with factions, membership to factions was becoming much clearer as double membership had been almost totally eradicated. By 1960, factional fluidity had decreased greatly with most faction members belonging to a faction. Moreover, the exact memberships were known and the members could be named: indeed by 1963 membership had become so explicit that the press presented general election results in terms of factional affiliation.

In 1964–5 the number of factions increased again as a number of faction leaders died. Ōno Bamboku died in May 1964 leading to a split in the Ōno faction into the Funada and Murakami factions. Kōno Ichirō died July 1965, but a split had started to develop within the faction in spring 1964 when three rival groups emerged: the dominant group led by Shigemasa Seishi and Mori Kiyoshi, a dissident group led by, amongst others, Yamaguchi Kikuichirō, and Matsuda Takechiyo, and a neutral group led by Nakasone Yasuhiro and Sakurauchi Yoshio (Fukui 1970:111). The faction eventually split into the
Fig. 4-2 Number of members with double faction membership or no membership - LDP 1956-1964

Nakasone faction and the Shigemasa faction. When Ikeda died in August 1965 the Maeo faction was formed (Watanabe 1977:87; Fukui 1970:111).

4.4.3. Increasing diversity in membership

Not surprisingly, as the factions expanded and took on clearer form, the membership became more diverse and they lost the historical continuity they had shown in 1956. If we look at the composition of the factions in 1963, we see that the historical continuity lessened, primarily because of the influx of new Diet members after the formation of the LDP. The Kôno, Ikeda, Satô, Miki and Ōno factions had the largest groups of new members elected in or after 1958.

The Kishi/Fukuda faction had seventeen members in 1963. Five came from Kaishintô and nine from the Jiyûtô. Of the former Jiyûtô members four had left in 1954, four had been neutral and one had been in the Hatoyama faction. The faction also had one member elected for the Minshutô in 1955 and two members elected after 1958.

The Kawashima faction had nineteen members and had a similar composition to that of the Kishi/Fukuda faction. Three came from Kaishintô but nine from Jiyûtô. Of the Jiyûtô members, five had split in 1954, two had been neutral, one had split in 1953 and formed the Nihon Jiyûtô with Kôno and Miki, and one was a Yoshida supporter. Six members of the faction were first elected in 1955 for the Minshutô. Only one was elected after the formation of the LDP, making it the faction with the least regeneration in terms of membership.

The Fujiyama faction was the only faction in 1963 to have been formed after the formation of the LDP and therefore not surprisingly showed least historical continuity. Of its 21 members nine had come from Jiyûtô and seven from Kaishintô. Of the Jiyûtô members three had left with Kishi in 1954, three had been in the Hatoyama faction in the early 1950s, two had been neutral and one had been in the Yoshida faction. Five faction members in 1963 had been first elected after the formation of the LDP.
Chapter 4: Factionalism as a Force of Stability.

The Kōno faction had 44 members in 1963, and almost half, or 20, had been first elected in or after 1958. Eleven of those had been first elected in 1963 following Kōno’s drive to enlarge his faction (see Chapter 5). Five came from the Kaishintō and 15 from Jiyūtō who all but one had been anti-Yoshida.32

In 1963, a large section of the 31 member Ōno faction, or 22 members, were former Jiyūtō members. Only one came from Kaishintō, but ten had been elected after the formation of the LDP. Nineteen of the former Jiyūtō members may have been connected to Ōno in some way in the Jiyūtō. Two had been in Mindō but did not leave in 1953, four had been Ōno faction members,33 while 13 had been neutral or possibly with some connection with the Ōno faction. One had been in the Hirokawa faction and two were first elected in 1955.

By 1963 both the Satō and Ikeda factions had acquired some former Kaishintō members. Of the Satō faction’s 47 members six had been in Kaishintō and 28 came from Jiyūtō. Of those, eleven had been in the Yoshida faction, three in the anti-Hatoyama camp and fourteen neutral. The Ikeda faction showed a similar pattern. 27 of the 48 faction members had been members of the Jiyūtō, fourteen had been in the Yoshida faction, two had been anti-Yoshida and ran for Bunjítō in 1953, and eleven had been neutral. Four faction members had been in the Kaishintō. Both the Satō and the Ikeda factions had a large number of members first elected after the establishment of the LDP: the Ikeda faction had sixteen new members and the Satō faction thirteen.

The Miki faction was composed of 24 former Kaishintō members, one Jiyūtō member and two people first elected for Minshútō in 1955. In addition, almost half of the faction, or ten members, were first elected after the formation of the LDP. The Ishii faction had fifteen members in 1963, eleven of whom came from a neutral section of the Jiyūtō, one came from Kaishintō, and three were first elected after the formation of the LDP.

As seen from these figures, the factional composition changed as the factions recruited new Diet members and they gradually acquired clear membership. The Asahi thus
declared in 1960, ‘it goes without saying that the factions have acquired a public status’ (AS 12.4.60). Even so, following the presidential election in 1960, the press believed a major rearrangement of the factions possible because of the split in support to the presidential candidates in many factions (JT 13.7.60). But the process towards consolidation continued; the factions were slowly shedding the party colours they had held and were being forged as independent groups.

The LDP factions had by the late 1950s acquired clear membership, which cut through the party. The factions consolidated and the number of neutral party members decreased rapidly. It changed the nature of conservative factionalism considerably that the factions now had members. The conservative factions no longer resembled the ‘tendency’ (Rose 1964; Zariski 1960) or even the ‘patron client group’ described by Beller and Belloni (1978c). They were ‘self-consciously organised’ factions (Rose 1964:37), with a developed structure (Beller and Belloni 1978c:427), that used multiple incentives to attract stable membership which acted collectively (Zariski 1960:33). As the factions took on clear form, historical connections mattered less and expansion of the faction became a goal in itself (see Morris 1989:156). I will now turn to the role ideology played in the formation of membership.

4.5. Factions as Policy Groups
As Panebianco (1989:10) points out, political organisations can use ideology as one form of collective incentive to attract members (see also Ware 1996:70). As seen in Chapter 2, there had been some issue-based cleavages between and within the Minshutō and the Jiyūtō that played a part in accentuating the polarisation of the parties. Within the LDP ideology was less of an incentive to join a faction. The main reason for this is the power politics which drove the factionalisation on and encouraged expansion as an end in itself.

Some conservative politicians, Kurogane Yasumi and Sakata Michita, for example, argued that there were policy differences in the LDP too, and ‘similar patterns of thinking’ within individual factions (Thayer 1969:46). Factions with many bureaucrats, like the Ikeda and Maeo factions, were seen to be more finance and economy oriented,
Chapter 4: Factionalism as a Force of Stability

while the Kōno faction was interested in agriculture. The Ikeda faction was pro-American, while the Ishibashi faction focused on Japan-China trade, and the Miki-Matsumura faction focused on disarmament and Asian diplomacy (Shiratori 1988:174; AS 5.1.58). Some, like Kōno Ichirō, argued that the policy differences ran deeper than that and maintained that the party was split into progressive and reactionary groups, centering on the issue of communism. The progressive stance was that 'the best countermeasure against communism will be an advanced welfare-state program with which to make Japanese soil “infertile for communism,” while the reactionary advocate the curbing of communist activities’ (JT 30.10.56). Iyasu represented a more moderate view, acknowledging the importance of the factional and personal nature of the disagreements, but at the same time arguing that there were clear ideological differences between different politicians (Iyasu 1983:108-9). Indeed, some commentators saw such differences well into the 1960s, arguing that there were two conservative parties within the LDP (Watanabe 1977:140; JT 22.7.60)

On the other hand, Watanabe argued that the factional alliances (gasshō renkō) and the shifts in factional formations in the first two years of the LDP, had nothing to do with ideology and policy but were entirely pragmatic (Watanabe 1958:160). Similarly, Kohno has argued that the death of Ogata in January 1956 caused the old party divisions to vanish, leaving the factions that were subsequently formed out of alliances between groups of politicians from various groups largely untainted by previous ideological and policy differences (Kohno 1997:Chapter 5).

I will argue here that the LDP factions had an ideological basis in the first year of the party, while the old factional divisions remained. As seen in the previous section, there was a relative continuity in terms of party and factional affiliation within the factions in 1956 which indicates that common political views played a part in creating the internal divisions within the party. However, as a new factional system emerged, policy came to play less of a role, with power politics replacing it.
Chapter 4: Factionalism as a Force of Stability.

The politicians who came together in the LDP had different backgrounds and the criticism could be heard from the very start that unification was unnatural because of the basic differences between the bureaucratic and party factions that came together. As discussed earlier there had been clear policy differences within the early conservative parties over foreign policy, economic policy, rearmament, and constitutional revision. These issues affected the factional reorganisation before and just after the presidential election in December 1956. These policy differences coincided with the polarised divide within the party and continued to divide the party as they had done in the early postwar conservative parties. After unification and during the first Hatoyama cabinet, the debate over Japan’s future course was heated, and the differences between Yoshida and Hatoyama over the issue of constitutional revision, restoration of military might and Japan-Soviet relations continued (see Uchida 1983:103). Hatoyama, and his supporters in the ‘progressive faction,’ wanted to make normalisation of relations with the USSR his last major political achievement (AS 2.2.56). This faced most opposition from Ogata, who led the ‘caution faction’, and the Yoshida faction, which was also personally against Hatoyama leading the party in government (Hori 1975:102), and had the support of big business (Iyasu 1983:109). The factions in the first year of the LDP showed a character similar to that within the Minshutō and Jiyūtō. Until the USSR agreement was approved in November 1956, the fight between the mainstream and the anti-mainstream was heavily coloured by the fight between those in favour of pro-USSR relations and rearmament through constitutional revision, and the pro-US faction (JT 10.11.56).

But there were also clear power based issues that largely revolved around the question of succession to Hatoyama as president of the LDP. Such issues also drove on the factional consolidation (see Uchida 1983:103–4). Iyasu argues that Yoshida’s stance on the USSR policy was directly related to the Hatoyama forces’ plans to have Kishi secretary-general succeed Hatoyama (AS 2.2.56). Matsumura Kenzō, of the old Kaishintō, then went ahead to consolidate his own faction in his opposition to these plans, and argued that Shigemitsu Mamoru should be put forward as a candidate (Iyasu 1983:108). The Asahi Shimbun commented: ‘the factional resistance is not built on policy but centers on the party’s personnel and especially the presidential problem. It is bad that it is deriving from
interests and personal feelings and linking up with oyabun-kobun relations within each faction’ (AS 6.4.56).

After the first year of the party, the issue-based divisions within the party were being replaced by factional divisions based on political strategy (see Babb unpublished paper, for a similar argument). Thayer pointed out that moves to establish membership to factions inevitably decreased the importance of ideology (Thayer 1969:48). The need to expand membership could not take too much heed of policy. The ideological divisions that had been visible became blurred as politicians formed strategic alliances across the dividing lines with the result that ‘differences in policies have little to say about factional fusion and fission’ (AS 5.1.58).

The new factional system that was in creation did not allow ideological divisions to the same extent the polarised party environment of the Jiyūtō and Minshutō had. The new factional system rested on permanent factional memberships, and the use of factional politics to distribute positions of power. Under such a system policy considerations had to come second.

Kishi continued Hatoyama’s policies in his cabinets (Gotō et al. 1982) with the Police Duties Act in 1958 and the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty (Anpo), but his political allies included Satō, who had been anti-mainstream during the Hatoyama cabinet, while Kōno had become anti-mainstream. Watanabe points out that the Ōno, Ishibashi, Kōno, Ikeda mainstream of 1956 or the Ōno, Kōno, Satō and Kishi mainstream of 1957, would not have been possible if policy issues had formed the foundation of those alliances, considering the confrontation between Ikeda on one hand and Kōno and Ishibashi on the other, when the latter sought to bring down the Yoshida cabinet in 1952–53, and the long-time antagonisms between Satō and Kōno (Watanabe 1958:160). The way personal and issue-based disagreements were intertwined can be seen in the fact that after the House of Councillors election in June 1959, which ended in a victory for the LDP, Ikeda joined Kishi’s cabinet, the cabinet he had criticised heavily for its plans to
revise the Anpo, while a member of the anti-mainstream (Iyasu 1983:115; Uchida 1989:142).

Observers have sometimes noted the internal policy differences in the LDP and spoken of a right wing and a left wing faction. The former consisted of Ikeda, Satō, Ishii, Kaya and Ōno though they varied in their views on China, in spite of their pro-US stance and anti-USSR stance (JT 31.10.62, translated article from Bungei Shunju). At times some faction-based differences could be seen, such as when the Kōno and Kishi factions opposed the Ishibashi cabinet’s plan for a rise in the consumer rice price. These factions, however, accepted this policy a little later in the Kishi cabinet (AS 5.1.58).

Politicians also sought to create a distance between factions in terms of policy when running for office. Matsumura ran against Kishi in 1959 and his ‘money based politics’ (Watanabe 1977:140), while Fujiyama presented his planned challenge to prime minister Ikeda in 1962 as a challenge to Ikeda’s ‘expansionist economic policy’. His candidacy was though undoubtedly personal as he was trying to ensure the support of the Ōno, Kōno and Kawashima factions, which had all been more distant from the Ikeda administration than the Kishi and Satō factions.

Another major policy difference erupting within the party surrounded the Anpo in 1960. The factions took different stances on the issue. The Matsumura-Miki faction, with its leftist colouring and pro-China approach, took a cautious approach (shinchō ron) and Miki was absent when the bill went through the Diet (Uchida 1989:162; Ashida 1986 vol.7:105). The Ikeda faction argued it was premature to act (jiki shōsō ron), while Ashida wanted the remilitarisation question to be settled first (saigunbi senketsuron). As in the case of the Hatoyama-led negotiations with the USSR, the Japan-US negotiations became intra-LDP negotiations (Iyasu 1983:113). The issue became strongly related to the power struggle within the party as opposition to the Anpo became concentrated in the anti-mainstream factions, which used the issue to attack the Kishi cabinet publicly. 27 members of the anti-mainstream, led by Kōno and Miki Takeo, voted against the bill on May 19, 1960 (Scalapino and Masumi 1962). Masumi has suggested that the
disagreements over diplomacy and foreign policy in the late 1950s and early 1960s were not about issues, but about power and personalities (Masumi 1995:36). As seen in the factional opposition to Anpo, policy had clearly become secondary to considerations of power politics and political alliance building within the party.

It is ironic, that as the factions lost their historical continuity in terms of membership and thereby their common policy outlook, the factions took 'on a formality and major influence over the conservative policy-making process in Japan which they previously had not assumed' (Calder 1988:142). In order to deal with this role, and to aid them in factional conflicts, the factions tried to emphasise policy and sought to consciously educate their members on policy. Many factions had policy themes to their weekly meetings and set up specific study groups. Fujiyama Aiichirō, one of the first faction leaders to establish such a factional study group, admitted that the varying policy views within his faction were making management difficult, especially with old Kishi supporters (Fujiyama 1976:238) and he thus sought to educate his members about his policies in order to unite the faction (Fujiyama 1976:235).

Policy was also used in more basic power struggles. In the autumn of 1957, for example, the anti-mainstream factions: Ishii, Ishibashi, Miki-Matsumura and Ikeda factions, formed a foreign policy issue group (gaikō mondai kenkyūkai) to create a united front against the Kishi administration (Hayashi 1958). Each faction formed a policy research group to fight the administration more effectively. In the controversy over Anpo the factions presented an 'official' policy, formed at policy meetings in their resorts, based on the existing mainstream/anti-mainstream divisions (Iyasu 1996:9–10). These policy fronts were created to more effectively participate in the factional fights within the party and not vice versa.

Policy differences continued to play a prominent role within the party in its first year as they coincided with the polarised division of the party. As membership to factions was established and party expansion became a goal in itself, common policy or ideology ceased to provide the common denominator. However, the factions were becoming
primary actors in forming policy within the party and as a consequence of that role they took up policy studies. However, with the formation of membership the factions' role as distributors of party and cabinet posts became far more important and expansive. The following section will discuss factional promotions.

4.6. Factional distribution of posts

It is widely acknowledged that the LDP factions have developed clearly defined functions for both members and leaders. This involves electoral and financial support to the members in elections, and assistance in promotion within party and cabinet (Stockwin 1983:221). Substantial analyses have been done on the development of factionalism within the LDP focusing on its institutionalisation since the 1970s (Kohno 1992, 1997). Over the five decades of LDP dominance, the factions have changed significantly, becoming formal political entities. A number of interfactional principles developed, with proportionality and separation of powers guiding appointments in cabinet and party (Kohno 1997:92–3).

The LDP took a few years to change into such promotional, electoral and financial bodies. Panebianco's theory of party development (1988) is a useful tool to understand the changes in factional patterns in the first years of the LDP. As scholars have pointed out, the party was a merger of different forces, a party born out of diffusion, which affected leadership cohesion. The weak institutionalisation of the party and the lack of centralised control allowed the factions to acquire members and take on the distribution of organisational incentives. Panebianco (1989:61) notes that in such parties

[M]any groups at the top control important power resources and are thus able to distribute organizational incentives...in order to succeed, one needs to politically define oneself as belonging to a group (a specific faction) which is “opposed” to all the other groups (1989:61).

The party leadership could therefore not prevent the factionalisation of the party executive where promotional rewards were important tools to attract a following.
As seen in Chapter 2, faction leaders within the Jiyūtō and the Kaishintō did not systematically reward their supporters with posts in party or government. However, within the LDP, posts soon came to be a very important tool to buy loyalty in order to form permanent factions. Indeed, Kuraishi Tadao, LDP Dietmember and chairman of one of the organisation committees established to modernise the party in 1961, argued that it was the nexus of party and government posts that lured rank-and-file members into the factions, much more than the promise of financial assistance (Masumi 1967:38). The promise of promotion within party and cabinet became one of the main tools of the leaders of the LDP to attract Dietmembers to their factions. So, two main changes took place in the late 1950s and early 1960s which made the factions politically important entities. First, faction leaders came to be consulted on cabinet formation and factional affiliation became the basis of promotion within cabinet. Second, factions became central to the promotion process within the party. I will now examine these two changes in turn.

4.6.1. Factions and cabinet formation

As seen in Chapter 3, Yoshida had not consulted faction leaders within the Jiyūtō on cabinet formation, and in the Hatoyama cabinets faction leaders were not formally consulted, although, as discussed earlier, cabinet posts in the Hatoyama cabinets were distributed factionally. There were, however, no mechanisms in force for faction leaders to put forward their wishes and posts were distributed to party members by the leaders as a reward for past support. It was only under the Kishi cabinets of 1957–60, when Kishi formally created a ‘cabinet formation staff’ (sokaku sambō), that the practice became established. Thayer (1969:184) argues that the motive behind the cabinet formation staff was to counter factionalism:

Wishing to emphasize the role of the party rather than the factions, he [Kishi] stated that he would meet with the four highest party officials and hold consultations on the election of the cabinet. Each succeeding prime minister has followed this practice.

However, this venue for consultation became dominated by faction leaders, and by 1960, the party president had come to base his selection of cabinet ministers on a list of candidates issued by faction leaders when cabinets were formed (Masumi 1967:35; JT 8.12.60). The factions would make their lists, sometimes through a meeting of faction
members, sometimes through consultation with staff, or in some cases without consultation (Thayer 1969:191). Later on, such decisions came to be taken by faction leaders in accordance with seniority, i.e. how many times elected and whether the person had served previously in cabinets (Satō and Matsuzaki 1986; Kohno 1997). Thayer (1969:184) thus concludes that the cabinet formation staff 'owes its birth to the development of factionalism.' The staff did not recommend particular candidates in their meeting with the prime minister, but commented on nominations made by various factions (Thayer 1969:193; see also Masumi 1967:35). The duties of the cabinet formation staff also included justifying the Prime Minister's choices to other elements of the party. The importance of the staff varied, according to Thayer. One of Ikeda's cabinets was reportedly left to the decisions of the staff although Thayer (1969:185) notes that the prime minister had a much greater role in the Satō cabinets of 1954–72.

After the first presidential election, faction membership consolidated quickly, giving cabinets a stronger factional colour. The third Hatoyama cabinet, formed just after the unification of the LDP in November 1955, was based on a principle of 'distribution of awards' (ronkō kōshō) (AS 20.7.56). The Minshuto got three posts, Kiyose Ichirō was appointed with the recommendation of Kaishinto, Makino Ryōzō was recommended by Hatoyama, and Shōriki Matsutarō was appointed by Miki and Kōno (Hatoyama 1957:173). The old Jiyūtō got eight posts for people mostly connected to Ōno and Ogata, and the following were chosen: Murakami Isamu, Kuraishi Tadao, Ota Seiko, Funada Naka, Baba Motoji, Yoshino, and Kobayashi (Hatoyama 1957:173).

However, as the practice of distributing posts to factional members became established, posts ceased to be given only as a reward for past support (ronkō kōshō), and they formed part of a more complicated pattern of coalition building. Prime ministers tried a variety of coalition formations building on the principle that '[P]osts are given not simply as rewards for supporting a Prime Minister in the past, but also as encouragement to support him in the future' (Leiserson 1968:779).
Two main trends can be identified in cabinets between 1956 and 1964 as factions became the basis for cabinet formation. First, there were trends towards greater inclusion of all factions in cabinets. As seen in Fig.4–3, between 1957 and 1964, the prime minister moved away from the exclusion method that had been used in the past. Faction leaders sought to form wider alliances, and anti-mainstream factions got a bigger share of posts. This was a clear indication of the very different polarisation from that of the Minshutō or Jiyūtō where supporting factions had mainly been rewarded. In the LDP the divide between the two wings had been modified and demands focused on increasing balancing (habatsu kinkō). Second, the president’s faction got significantly greater representation than other factions.

The Ishibashi cabinet was the first to be described as a ‘factional balance cabinet’ (habatsu kinkō naikaku). Factions were clearly the basis for appointments, and posts were distributed as a tool to balance forces rather than to reward supporters of the prime minister (Watanabe 1966:41; Ōno 1964:94). Ishibashi was the first prime minister to have been voted president through open elections where he had to appeal for support by promising rewards (Watanabe 1966:30). Gotō, Uchida and Ishikawa have argued that Ishibashi offered cabinet posts to faction leaders and faction members because he did not have financial aid to offer (Gotō 1982:146). Kishi used similar tactics, although he had more financial ability, using cabinet posts as a bargaining chip to secure support and split the groups participating in the ni-san irengo agreement (Watanabe 1966:34).

In spite of his efforts to balance the factional demands, it proved difficult for Ishibashi to fill all posts in party and cabinet because of factional pressures. Ōno had been promised posts for his faction’s support to Ishibashi in the presidential election, but he moved into opposition to Ishibashi after being refused the post of vice president (Watanabe 1966:43). Ishii also felt shunned in spite of his support (see Watanabe 1958:186; Watanabe 1966:42).

As seen in Figure 4–3, Ishibashi rewarded those factions that had supported him in the election, the Ishibashi, Miki and Ikeda factions but also gave posts to neutral factions.
Fig. 4-3 Division of cabinet posts between mainstream and antimainstream factions - LDP 1956-1963

and all anti-mainstream factions except the Satō faction. The Miki faction got three posts, more than the president’s faction, which got two posts, causing resentment amongst other factions (Watanabe 1958:186). The Ikeda faction also got two posts. Two anti-mainstream factions got posts, the Kishi faction got three posts and the Kōno faction got one. Because of Ishibashi’s efforts to pacify all the main factions while at the same keep his support group, the Asahi Shimbun concluded that ‘The LDP is not a united party but rather there are many examples of factional heterogeneity. The new cabinet is not a united cabinet (kyōtō ittō naikaku) like Ishibashi says, but a “factional balance cabinet’” (AS 30.12.56, 21.12.56). Ishibashi himself said in October 1956 that ‘we don’t appoint the right people in the right place today. We appoint in cabinet and party on the basis of factional relations (habatsu kankei) and think “we must pick one from there’” (AS 29.10.56). Miki (secretary-general) and Ishida (cabinet secretary) also admitted that in the formation of the Ishibashi cabinet, the cabinet posts were a reward for support in the presidential election (AS 30.12.56).

All cabinet formations after this were factional in nature as prime ministers sought to achieve a balance between certain factions (see for example AS 17.7.57; 13.1.59). In a newspaper interview in October 1956, Kishi criticised Hatoyama for isolating forces against him and called for inclusion of all groups (AS 29.10.56). The Kishi cabinets saw a trend towards greater inclusion of factions in cabinets, but throughout Kishi continued, however, the practice of excluding elements considered undesirable. Kishi included all factions apart from the Ōno faction in the cabinet in July 1957. In that reshuffle Kishi was made to promise that he would ‘pay due regard to the opinions of the ‘antimain current’ group’ (JT 7.7.57). The mainstream factions got 11 posts while the anti-mainstream had six posts. The Kishi faction got five posts. Although the mainstream Ōno faction got no posts, Ōno himself held the post of vice president (see Hayashi 1957b:42). Kishi said again in 1958 that he would ‘listen to the opinions of each faction’ (JT 6.6.58), the reason being, observers mused, that the influence of anti-mainstream factions could not be ignored (JT 9.1.59). This strategy was clearly seen in the second Kishi cabinet in June. All factions got represented but the mainstream factions were given greater rewards than had been the case in the past, getting fourteen of seventeen posts (Iyasu
The Kishi faction got five posts, the Satō faction four, and the Kōno faction three, while the Ōno faction only got one. The anti-mainstream factions got one post each.\(^{57}\) In spite of the increasingly balanced appointments, the anti-mainstream factions were not content in the cabinet\(^{48}\) and in December 1958 Ikeda, Miki and Nadao Hirokichi of the Ishibashi faction resigned citing policy differences.\(^{59}\)

The instability caused by mainstream-anti-mainstream divisions and partial coalition building, favouring mainstream factions when forming cabinets, was obvious (Kohno 1997:110; Leiserson 1968:781). It was noted in the *Japan Times* that:

> the rivalry between the ‘main current’ and ‘antimain current’ factions of the Liberal-Democratic Party will become a perennial seesaw game if left unattended. Kishi should take bold steps to eliminate the rivalry between the two factions. In concrete terms, the posts of the Government and party officers should be equally divided between the ‘main current’ and ‘antimain current’ factions (19.12.58).

Although Kishi was including more of the anti-mainstream than had been done in the past, he was still excluding certain elements of the party, causing discontent. The complicated coalition strategies not only caused friction between the two wings of the party, but also within many of the factions. Kishi had, for example, primarily rewarded long-time supporters in the Hatoyama cabinets,\(^{60}\) but by 1957, his intra-faction strategies were changing, including a wider group of past and potential supporters. When the first Kishi cabinet was formed, Kishi did not only reward his closest supporters, but also gave posts to new and more distant supporters such as members of the Ōasa faction, which had moved closer to Kishi since the presidential election of 1956.\(^{61}\) These new strategies caused rifts within the Kishi faction in the summer of 1957 (Watanabe 1958:99)\(^{62}\) and in the Ishii faction in 1956–57.\(^{63}\) This coalition building was therefore unstable, though it was not as destabilising as the divisions and the polarisation within the Jiyūtō had been.

In the reshuffle of his third cabinet in June 1959, Kishi changed his tactics and decided to change his coalition partners. Kishi’s plan was to give key posts to the Satō and Ikeda factions and exclude the party factions, and so he took Ikeda into the mainstream while Kōno moved to anti-mainstream position. All the same, the Kōno faction got two cabinet
posts. The mainstream factions got twelve of the seventeen posts. Two anti-mainstream factions, the Ishii and Ishibashi factions, got no posts.

Although there were calls for greater balance between the two wings of the party, the first Ikeda cabinet in July 1960, like the Kishi cabinet in 1958, left out a number of factions. As seen in Fig. 4–3, the mainstream factions (Ikeda, Satō and Kishi factions, including the Fujiyama faction) held thirteen of seventeen posts and of those the Ikeda faction got seven. Two anti-mainstream factions got posts, the Ōno and Ishii factions. Three anti-mainstream factions, the Kōno, Miki-Matsumura and Ishibashi factions, were left out. This cabinet saw a continuation of the trend from the Kishi cabinet in 1958, whereby the president’s faction got most posts.

Clear moves towards the principle of including all factions in cabinet began in 1960. In Ikeda’s second cabinet in December 1960 the all-round representation of factional groups was first introduced, perhaps because of the failure of the isolation method in keeping discontent in check. Factions were given seats in proportion to size and their closeness to the president. The strategy shifted ‘from the consolidation of the existing coalition to the avoidance of making future enemies’ (Kohno 1997:112) by representing mainstream and anti-mainstream factions in a more regulated manner.

Ikeda appointed central figures from all factions, excepting the actual leaders, in the hope that involvement of all factions would strengthen his cabinet (JT 9.12.60). The mainstream factions got twelve posts, but all other factions, apart from the ailing Ishibashi faction, were also given posts. Kōno and Miki were brought into the cabinet with one post each, and the Ishida faction got one member. The Ishii faction stayed outside the cabinet to begin with because he was unhappy with the allocation of posts and refused to take up the post of Lower House Speaker (JT 9.12.60). The Japan Times commented:

The list is pretty near making everybody happy. Although ex-Foreign Minister Fujiyama and ex-vice president of the party Bamboku Ōno got only one each instead of two. No doubt the factional groupings in the party, in a sense, facilitate the Cabinet formation by
Reducing the process into a seat allocation system. The temptation is strong, therefore, to accept factionalism as an established institution (10.12.60).\textsuperscript{65}

The reshuffle in July 1961 sought to strengthen the cabinet further by appointing faction leaders to the cabinet,\textsuperscript{66} creating the ‘first “all-star cast” cabinet to be formed since the war, in line with the slogan of a united conservative party’ (\textit{JT} 21.7.61). The Ishii faction was brought into the cabinet for the first time. In the reshuffles in 1962 and 1963, all factions were given seats again (Masumi 1967:42).

The third Ikeda cabinet, formed in December 1963, included all factions again apart from the Kishi/Fukuda faction, which was openly criticising the Ikeda administration and had formed Tōfū Sasshin Remmei in 1962. The Ikeda faction held five of the seventeen posts, the mainstream Ōno and Kōno factions got two posts each, but the Satō faction, the main challenge to Ikeda’s reign, was given three posts.\textsuperscript{67} Ikeda’s support from other factions was considered unstable (\textit{JT} 1.1.61), and this may have led him to seek full inclusion of all factions in cabinet. As all factions were given representation the divide between the mainstream and anti-mainstream became blurred although commentators still referred to personal and political animosities between groups.

Ikeda’s attempts to strengthen his cabinet in 1961 by appointing faction leaders rather than faction members, highlighted another major change in the effect of factionalism on cabinets. As seen in Chapter 2, Jiyūtō leaders used factions primarily for their own promotion. However, within the LDP faction leaders chose to stay away from cabinets when they were planning to run in a presidential race. It thus became more commonplace for leaders to put their members in the cabinet but to stay outside and keep their distance from the fate of the administration. This highlighted the role of the LDP factions as distributors of posts to their members. The leaders were able to use their power as faction leaders outside the factions and could influence politics greatly even without holding a cabinet post, which faction leaders in the early postwar parties had not been able to do. Cabinet appointments showed a trend towards the creation of stability between the factions, enabling them to co-exist and dividing the spoils.
4.6.2. Appointments to the three highest party posts

A second major trend making factions important political entities was their role in appointing people not to the cabinet, but to the highest party posts: the secretary-general, the chairman of the Executive Council, and the chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). As in the Jiyūtō and Minshutō, the LDP secretary-general controlled administrative staff and party funds. Within the LDP the latter two posts became factionalised at all levels. The PARC was a complex organ which formally initiated and determined most legislative policy decisions of the party. It was headed by a chairman and a few vice chairmen, a deliberation commission and fifteen divisions. It also had ad hoc ‘special investigation committees’ that steadily rose in number from the original nine in 1955 (Fukui 1970:83; Shiratori 1988:171). The Deliberation Committee was the organ that became most factionalised within the PARC. It consisted of the PARC chairman, ten vice chairmen and eighteen members specially appointed by the chairman from the two houses of the Diet. The number of specially appointed members increased to 25 at the end of the 1950s but was pushed down again to fifteen in 1961 (Fukui 1970:88–9). The vice chairmen met prior to a meeting of the whole Commission and so constituted the more powerful part of the organ. Until 1963, these vice-chairmanships were distributed between the factions, but in an attempt to reduce factionalism within the party it was decided in that year to reduce the number of vice chairmen to four. However, this did not eliminate factionalism from the organ and the specially appointed members of the Deliberation Commission became the ‘interfactional coordinators in the policy making mechanism of the party’ (Fukui 1970:89).

After policy recommendations were approved in the PARC they were sent to the Executive Council where they became official party decisions. The Executive Council had members elected from both houses and some who were specially approved by the president. From 1957, ten of the 40 members were approved by the president, 20 were elected from the Lower House, and ten from the Upper House. In 1960 the members were reduced to 30 (eight approved by the president, fifteen chosen from Lower House and seven from Upper House). The Executive Council, like the PARC, became heavily
Chapter 4: Factionalism as a Force of Stability.

influenced by the factional divisions, and posts were distributed between the factions (Fukui 1970:91). All these organs were thus used by factions to ensure their representation and the factional distribution of key party posts. At first, however, as seen in Figure 4–4, the three party posts were not given exclusively to the mainstream factions as had been the norm within the Jiyūtō. For example, in November 1955 the appointments did not reflect a clear mainstream current as members of the Kishi and Ishii factions, both considered ‘middle roaders’ at the time, were appointed as secretary-general and chairman of the Executive Council respectively. The Yoshida forces did not get any posts. A guiding principle may have been to give representation to the different parties that had merged to form the LDP.

A shift towards mainstream representation began late in 1956. When the Ishibashi cabinet was formed, Ishibashi made Miki Takeo of the mainstream Miki faction secretary-general, as a reward for his support in the presidential election, and Sunada Shigemasa, who was affiliated with both the anti-mainstream Kōno and Kishi factions, chairman of the Executive Council. Tsukada Jūichirō, connected to the Ōno faction and the neutral Ishii faction, was made chairman of PARC in February 1957. Ishibashi’s choices were criticised by factional leaders, especially Kishi, who wanted more consideration for bigger factions (AS 21.12.56). In February 1957, when Kishi took over from Ishibashi, Ōno and Kōno put pressure on Kishi to be given these posts but Kishi decided to let Miki Takeo continue (Hayashi 1957b:43).

As seen in Figure 4–4, from the formation of the Kishi cabinet in July 1957 onwards, all the three top posts were drawn from mainstream factions (see Thayer 1969). An exception was made in September 1957 when the Miki faction got the PARC chairman while in the anti-mainstream. After this, all appointments for the three posts adhered to
Fig. 4-4 Distribution of the three party posts to mainstream and antimainstream - LDP 1955-1964

mainstream-antimainstream divisions, where only the mainstream or at least neutral factions were represented. A pattern was visible, similar to that of the Jiyūtō, where the secretary-general was usually drawn from the Prime Minister’s faction. An exception was the appointment of Miki Takeo in December 1956, when Ishibashi was prime minister and again in July 1964 during the Ikeda administration.

The changing institutional and structural environment of the late 1950s made possible the transformation of factions into promotional units providing permanent support to party leaders. Yoshida Shigeru, while leader of the Jiyūtō, was allowed great freedom in his personnel decisions because of a promise made by Hatoyama Ichirō in 1946, that when Yoshida took over the leadership of the party he would be allowed to choose people without interference from the party (Ôno 1964, Kôno 1958; Hatoyama 1957). Yoshida chose to exclude the dissident elements from important posts. This was not possible within the LDP; the political circumstances from the time of the first Hatoyama cabinet did not allow any factional leader to ignore other factional leaders in his appointments. In the first Hatoyama cabinet each of the prominent politicians from each of the parties was given an opportunity to recommend a few members for cabinet posts. The same was done in the LDP. In order to maintain the new distribution of power party leaders needed to reward other faction leaders, to enable them to reward their own supporters. Because of the advent of presidential elections, there was an added incentive to maintain such support, because it would be needed again.

The factions of the LDP acquired clear membership in the first years of the party and established mechanisms for the distribution of spoils within party and government between the factions. This changed the character of factionalism and it became a tool to increase stability within the party, creating a factional system very different from that of the early postwar period.

4.7 From instability to stability
We now turn to the final section in this chapter: the examination of the major differences between factionalism in the LDP and factionalism in 1945–55 and the shift from
Chapter 4: Factionalism as a Force of Stability

instability to stability. The changes in the factionalism of the LDP in the first few years, with formation of membership, and the expanding political roles of factions in distribution of posts in party and cabinet, created a notion of stability but at the same time changed the overall factional character of the conservative politics, away from the polarised politics of the first ten years of the postwar period. Two main stages in this process can be identified. In the first year of the LDP, the divisions were very much in line with those found in the Jiyûtō and the Minshutō with the party polarised between those for and against the leadership. Between the end of 1956 and 1964, a second stage commenced, whereby the two wings of the party moved closer, with growing demands for the inclusion of opposition forces in both cabinet and party. As factional inclusion increased, factional polarisation decreased and factionalism became much less of a threat to political stability in the sense that it no longer threatened basic party unity.

4.7.1. Polarisation and political instability

In the first year of the LDP, the factions continued to be viewed in terms of polarisation, i.e. the way they aligned with or against the leadership of the party. They were involved in power struggles from before the time the party was formally established, lining up in relation to their views on the leadership of the party and the method of choosing party president. The Asahi Shimbun commented in early November 1955, after a Standing Intermediate Committee working for the preparation of establishment of a new party was formed, that

the Committee includes representatives from each faction from within both parties as defined by circumstances within the parties. The so-called ‘influential men/bosses’ (kao yaku) have to deal with factionalism, and in the committee you can see the rise and fall of political influence of each faction. They are acting out a fight over leadership of the new conservative party (1.11.55).

As seen before, the presidential elections in December 1956 weakened the polarisation of the party. In the first year of the LDP, the factions maintained their fluid character as the ‘members’ moved between groups with relative ease, and formed new groups to connect with other factions that were more dominant in order to adapt to a new party
environment. However, the factional infighting in 1956 resulting from the presidential elections was considered highly destabilising:

The big question for Japan's political circles in 1957 is whether or not Prime Minister Ishibashi will be able to unite the rebellious factions within the Liberal-Democratic party and bring political stability to the nation. Political events during the past year were marked by the disgraceful display of factional strife within the Government party. But now the New Year gets under way with a new Prime Minister, and concurrently president of the majority party. As he took office as head of the Liberal-Democratic party, he pledged himself to wipe out the feuding cliques (*JT* 3.1.57).

In the first couple of years of the party the view remained prominent amongst commentators that factions were not groups that worked on the basis of compromise and consensus; they fought each other until one side won. Therefore, in the presidential elections of December 1956, all sides took the view that the factional divisions were dangerous for party unity and that the election would cause a serious split. An entry in Ashida's diary (1986 Vol.6:253) at the time of the presidential elections in December 1956 reveals that worry:

Today, Kōno [Ichirō] and Uehara [Etsujirō] said to me that a vote [for the presidency] would cause much confusion and could result in a split in the party, but Kiyose [Ichirō] and I said that this was a matter for each party member's conscience, and that we must be content through discussions and vote.

A meeting was held between the three candidates at which they agreed, first, that they would accept the result and go wherever the party wanted, second, that they would harden unity after the election and let bygones be bygones (Watanabe 1966:35). Ishibashi said he wanted to abolish factions (*habatsu kaishō*), while Ishii emphasised that it was going to be imperative for the future of the LDP that the election results be accepted by all. Kishi emphasised the historical value of this election (Watanabe 1966:37).

The factional struggles within the LDP were still struggles between two blocs in which one side would come out as winner. However, there were no signs of one side winning the battle. In October 1956, the *Japan Times* asked: '...in view of the already protracted period of party warfare, why has factionalism continued, and why has no winner or winning bloc emerged?' (7.10.56). The formation of mainstream and anti-mainstream
blocs was an attempt to form such two blocs, one with hegemony and the other as the challenger. This was seen in a comment in the *Japan Times* after the presidential election:

> While all sub-factions and cliques will never fully disappear, it may well be that the two-bloc alignment seen in the showdown vote over Hatoyama’s successor may be a portent of what 1957 is capable of producing, a fusing of the existing multiple party blocs into two rather large, but definite groups, paralleling, although not exactly duplicating the divisions of mid-December’s party election. At least that is the challenge for next year (30.12.56).

The presidential elections in December 1956 were, however, a first step towards the abolition of this polarised conflict between two groups vying for leadership. As the eight factions which emerged out of the presidential conflict began to increase their membership, the instability of factionalism started to decrease.

### 4.7.2. Factions as a force of stability

The presidential elections in December 1956 started a second stage in the development of factionalism within the LDP. First, as discussed earlier, the 1956 presidential election signalled a new era in political factionalism since the factions did not disband as they had done largely in the past, but consolidated further. The ‘eight army divisions’ emerged with growing power of the Kishi, Ikeda, Satō, Ōno, Kōno, Miki, Ishii and Ishibashi factions (Iseri 1988:12). Second, the division of the party into two poles for and against the leadership, became mutated as the power centres multiplied and the contest for power became more complicated. Although there were some signs of polarised conflict—as when the Tōfū Sasshin Konwakai and the Ninshin Isshin were established in January 1962 and December 1963 respectively in direct opposition to Prime Minister Ikeda (see Chapter 6)—the factional fights were increasingly multipolar.

Many scholars have pointed out that the decade between 1955 and 1965 was a decade of increasing stability, during which the 1955-system became entrenched. The presidential elections in 1956 shook up the factional divisions of the LDP by encouraging the movement towards fewer power centres. The fluidity in the factional system was such that the party until then could not be described as a coalition of factions as has been maintained by some scholars (see for example Baerwald 1964:224). The presidential
Chapter 4: Factionalism as a Force of Stability

election presented a watershed, as Leiserson (1968:771) argued, because of a new innovation in politics, the ‘skilful coordination of factions into a coalition which was numerically a majority.’ The new LDP factions were not typical, traditional conservative factions, but a new political phenomenon.

The control of a faction became a power tool within the party in a much more extensive sense than it had been in the Jiyūtō and Minshutō. After the 1956 election, vote gathering increased as politicians ‘learned that they needed a faction if they were to gain control of the government’ (Masumi 1995:190), or to participate in the decision making within the party as concerned policy and appointments. Faction formation thus became a primary task for politicians wanting to establish or maintain their prominence. This prompted Fujiyama to form his own faction and run in the presidential election in 1960. He openly admitted that his factional buildup was to realise his rise to president, and that was his aim again in 1963 (Fujiyama 1976:234). The Miki faction’s entrance in the Kishi cabinet in 1958 was also seen as an attempt to keep up the strength of the faction because without tangible rewards the faction would be out of the factional ‘game’ (Watanabe 1958:187).

Because the factions were becoming valuable power players and funding bodies, they could form coalitions that could later be changed. Leiserson described these manoeuvres in his ‘theory of games’ and convincingly argued that the distribution of posts was used strategically for coalition building (Leiserson 1968:779). As the leaders expanded their groups, their leverage in negotiations with other politicians at the time of leadership elections increased, and it became easier for leaders to make strategies, form alliances and majorities within the party. By 1957, the meaning of the terms ‘mainstream’ and ‘anti-mainstream’ had changed, and came to refer to allied factions that had voted for or against the president. As seen earlier, the mainstream was overrepresented in cabinet but more and more factions came to be included as the 1960s progressed, a necessary move to continue the coalition games (Kohno 1997:110; Cox and Rosenbluth 1995:363). Such coalition behaviour was in striking contrast with the behaviour of the factions in the Jiyūtō, where the two wings did not negotiate. In the Jiyūtō, alliances did not easily shift. The polarised factions had aimed to win, and not share their power with groups
contesting their power. The LDP factions, on the other hand, had the cohesiveness to be able to negotiate with other groups and to shift their allegiance and behave as mainstream, neutral or anti-mainstream at different times (see Leiserson 1968:779). Membership gave the factions explicit and measurable power status. As Thayer (1969:35) notes, ‘more members mean more strength for the faction, and particularly more votes in the party presidential election.’ Although coalitions could be unstable, as Cox and Rosenbluth (1995:358) point out, they also provided means to manage such instability through coalition shifts, and thus created a more stable party environment than that of the early postwar period.

While the press criticised factional appointments to party and cabinet posts (*JT* 8.7.57) and urged for a principle of ‘the right man in the right place’, it was also acknowledged that disregarding factions caused instability. In 1958 the *Japan Times* said:

> Unfortunately the Liberal-Democratic party is made up of a number of thinly disguised factions; hence the acute difficulties that attend Cabinet making. Mr. Kishi will find his task far from easy owing to factional strife. Those groups that are not favorable to Mr. Kishi are not strong enough, not numerous enough, to deprive him of the Prime Ministership, but they can give him considerable trouble by making all sorts of demands upon him, more or less under threats of defection (3.6.58).

Well into the 1960s, the view could be heard that factionalism was destabilising. Ike (1964:408) argued that factionalism affected leadership adversely because it was only after infighting that leadership could be chosen, weakening party leadership. However, when the factional fighting had ceased to be so heavily centred around the presidential elections and spread into other areas, factional manoeuvres came to be viewed in a more positive light. The political system was getting more stable the longer the LDP stayed in power, and the factional system of the LDP was also becoming a stabilising attribute, keeping the party together as the party developed techniques to minimise ‘the disruptive nature of factionalism’ (Stockwin 1970:371). Political power came to be measured in the ability to provide party and government posts and political funding. Factionalism did not have to result in a party split as long as disgruntled leaders were granted some important positions (see *JT* 14.11.62). Totten and Kawakami (1965:113) argued that:
Chapter 4: Factionalism as a Force of Stability

As it is, only if the LDP President persistently refused to deal with a sufficient number of factions, would they have reason to bolt the party. By providing ready backing, therefore, for a number of prime ministerial contenders within the framework of a party assured of access to the premiership, the flexibility afforded by factions actually promotes the continuity of the LDP as a single party. In other words, factions in this sense foster party unity.

Scholars studying other political systems have also noted that factionalism may be a means to keep a party together, especially when parties are formed as mergers of smaller parties (Beller and Belloni 1978c:441). In fact, factionalism may thus not only keep the party together, but even contribute to its growth (Beller and Belloni 1978c:441). As the 1960s progressed, the argument was heard more frequently that the factional system was indeed making leadership within the LDP fairly stable (Stockwin 1989:162). The loyalty and hierarchy fostered within the LDP factions, through structured membership, clear internal organisation and structured distribution of awards created internal factional stability that kept the party together (Hoffman 1981:236). Watanabe (1962:103) argued that increased party democracy in the form of factions was a blessing:

"...party splits and dissolutions are past history because of a change in the relations between the factions and so coup d'état-style take-overs do not happen anymore. Under the 'one man' [Yoshida] leadership, dissatisfaction struck inwards until it reached a level of explosion. Under the current factional coexistence system, on the other hand, (...) discontent is usually worked through in each faction and is automatically controlled through a process of opposition and then compromise."

Fukui argued that the 'delicate balance' maintained by 'moderating and unifying' factions meant that the party could be held together. Factions could articulate interests by different sections of the party (Beller and Belloni 1978c:440), and accommodate diverse factions such as the old Matsumura faction, discontented with the constitution and foreign policy, and the Yoshida faction, favouring US cooperation and maintenance of the system established under the Occupation (Fukui 1970:48). Although it was often argued that factions weakened authority and party leadership (Beller and Belloni 1978c:440), factions could also contribute to party democracy and stability by allowing all party members to have their voice heard, smoothing party management and holding the party together (Baerwald 1986:16, 34). It was therefore noted by scholars that although the LDP factions were now active participants in presidential elections and the nomination process for cabinet positions, 'factionalism in the Liberal Democratic Party
Chapter 4: Factionalism as a Force of Stability.

has neither kept it from power nor paralyzed its actions in political crises’ (Maki 1962:161; Shiratori 1988:170–1).

Between 1956–64 demands for the inclusion of the anti-mainstream increased because of the destabilising nature of polarised conflict between the mainstream and anti-mainstream, but it was not until the early 1960s that a clear trend towards greater inclusion of factions in cabinets and chief organs of the party emerged. These steps created a system of factions, which contributed to intra-party stability. Beller and Belloni (1978c:442) suggested that in factional systems ‘dysfunctional divisiveness and functional unity may coexist.’ Although anti-mainstream discontent with the distribution of key posts continued (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995:357; Cox and Rosenbluth 1996:263), the notion of a ‘balance of power’ within cabinet replaced the mainstream–anti-mainstream divide, reducing the instability of factionalism.

4.8. Conclusion

The LDP was not a coalition of factions at its inception in 1955, but a polarised party internally divided into a large number of small fluid groups like the Jiyūtō and Minshutō before it. It was not until 1957, after the adoption of secret ballot elections for the party presidency, that the factionalism started changing significantly with factions consolidating and creating lasting membership. The factions showed some historical continuity in the first year in terms of membership, which slowly decreased as the factions recruited a larger number of new Dietmembers. The factions took on a new role as the primary promotional units for appointments to cabinet and party.

All these changes in the political roles of factions led to a transformation in the factional system. The development of the factional system of the LDP confirmed that factionalism does not have to lead to party splits as Huntington had argued, but could lead to the creation of a factional system capable of generating stability rather than divisiveness (see Stockwin 1980). The LDP was still heavily fragmented, but the factions were fundamentally different from the factions that had existed before in both structure and the functions they served. The factions became politically important entities, the basis for
appointments in both party and cabinet. All these changes transformed the nature of factionalism because the factionalisation of the LDP became means of keeping a big and diverse party together. I will now turn to a discussion of the underlying forces of this change in the nature of factionalism within the LDP.

Notes

1 As seen in Chapter 2, Kishi had formed a faction within the Jiyūtō before splitting in 1954 while Miki Bukichi established himself within the Nihon Jiyūtō formed in 1953. These factional groups established themselves further within the Minshutō between 1954 and 1955 while the party was in government.

2 Watanabe (1958:144) also mentions Matsuno Raizo as one of the eight leaders (shūnō) of the Jiyūtō.

3 This table may imply coherence but was will be clear in the following discussion, the factions presented in this table varied in character in the first years.

4 Yoshida, Satō Eisaku and Hashimoto Tomisaburō refused to join the LDP because of their opposition to Hatoyama (Watanabe 1958:144). However, the Yoshida faction, including Hayashi Jōji and Masutani Shūji, formed the clearest opposition to Hatoyama within the party.

5 Hatoyama was the only candidate. However, 19 votes had the name of other party members, while 76 were invalid. This last group was believed to consist largely of Jiyūtō people protesting Hatoyama’s selection (Gotō et al. 1982:141).

6 This was seen in the various motives of the leading politicians. Many argued that Kōno had plans for Kishi to become the next president and for himself to come after Kishi (see Gotō et al. 1982:145). Mutual distrust had, however, developed between Kōno and Ishibashi, in spite of their cooperation in the Hatoyama cabinet and this helped to lead Kōno to support Kishi in the presidential election (Gotō et al. 1982:145). It noticeably affected the alignments that Kōno had created many enemies who then sought to work against him, even though he was not running for the presidency.

7 When Ishibashi fell ill in January 1957 Ishida became a de facto leader of the group and took part in maneuvers to decide who should take over from Ishibashi (Hayashi 1957b:42–3).

8 Some sources, such as Watanabe (1966:27-8), say that the Ikeda and Satō factions had been formed within the larger Yoshida faction by the first presidential election in spring 1956, although they were still very small. The media generally referred to the Yoshida faction, although Yoshida was not a member of the LDP, but sometimes referred to the Ikeda faction or the Ikeda-Yoshida faction, and of Ikeda as the ‘real leader’ of the Yoshida faction. After the December election Ikeda seems to have clearly emerged as a leader uniting a large portion of the ex-Yoshida forces but Satō, who had also stayed outside the LDP until after the formation of the Ishibashi cabinet (Gotō et al. 1982:143), also had his own following (JT 30.12.56; 14.10.56; 16.10.56).

9 Ōno’s con-committal answer when asked about his support was ‘my state of mind is as white as the snow on mount Fuji’. This became a fashionable phrase and was mirrored in the name chosen for the faction later, Hakuseikai (Watanabe 1958:112).

10 The main Hatoyama followers joining Kishi were Hoshijima, Ōmura, Shutō Shimpachi and Kikuchi Yoshirō (Watanabe 1958:107). Others, such as Okubo, Kita, Seko, Katō Tsunetarō and Yamamoto Katsuji decided to support Ishibashi in the election which made his candidacy possible (Watanabe 1958:167) and later joined the Ishibashi faction. These members split again in the Ishibashi faction after Ishibashi’s retirement in 1957 in two groups, led by Okubo and Ishida (Watanabe 1958:168).

11 As did Nakasone Yasuhiro who was to join the Kōno faction later.

12 The Sannokai had been formed before the presidential elections in 1956 by former centrist Kaishintō forces resentful of Miki Takeo’s increasing influence. Support for Kishi within the group was strong. It was led by Narahashi Wataru, Ogawa Hanji, Kameyama Koichi, Kawazaki Suegoro, Maeda Fusanosuke and Waseda Ryūemon (AS 29.11.56).

13 Three joined the Kishi faction and three the Miki faction. One member moved to the Upper House.

14 According to Watanabe (1958:96), Ishida Hirohide was the first to use the term ‘shichika shidan, sanrentai.’ The divisions, with more than 20 members, were the Kishi, Ishibashi, Kōno, Ōno, Yoshida,
Chapter 4: Factionalism as a Force of Stability.

Ishii and Miki-Matsumura factions, and the regiments, with around ten members each, the Kitamura, Ōasa and Ashida factions.

15 Watanabe relates the story of Kawano Yoshimitsu who became member of the Ōno faction because Ōno was a matchmaker for his daughter but he had been a member of the Hirokawa faction in the Jiyūtō (Watanabe 1958:127).

16 This factor was mentioned particularly in the case of Ōno, Kōno and Ishii factions (Watanabe 1958:114, 137). Nakasone (1999:131) says he joined the Kōno faction because he wanted to learn from Kōno.

17 This analysis uses my database with information from SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups 1949, GS(B) 02683, SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties 1951, GS(B) 02674-5, Asahi Shim bun 1952 (3.10.52, 7.10.52), 1953 (16.3.53) and 1956 (11/10/56), and Watanabe 1958, and only takes into account those with clear affiliation to faction, and not those with double affiliation.

18 One of them had though run for Bunjūtō in 1953 but lost.

19 The high number of unknown affiliations is due to gaps in my database for the Minshutō. Four had unknown affiliation according to my database, indicating that they were either neutral or close to Yoshida, and one was considered close to Hatoyama.

20 Murakami had been close to Ashida when he was first elected in 1946 and did not move close to Ōno until after the Showa Denkō scandal (Watanabe 1958:119).

21 Estimates of membership until the early 1960s varied as it was largely a guessing game practiced mainly by journalists. An observer in 1957 estimated that the Kishi, Kōno and Ōno factions each had around 50 members, the old Kaishintō forces around 50, and the Ikeda, Šatō and Ishibashi factions around 25 each, in addition to a number of neutral politicians (Hayashi 1957b:45, see also Hayashi 1957a:34). Benjamin and Ori (1981) base their analysis on figures published in 1976, which differ slightly from mine, but show similar trends.

22 Watanabe (1958:106) describes such defections from the Kishi faction (Chiba Saburō, Ōmura Seiichi and Shutō Shimbachi left the faction), the Kōno faction (where some members left because of their opposition to Mori Kyōshi and Shigemasa Seishi being made sokkin), and the Ishibashi faction (where opposition to Ishida led to a confrontation between the Ishida group and the Ōkubo group). Nagayama Tadanori left the Ōno faction to join the new Kaya faction, perhaps in the belief that Ōno had reached his political peak and that new leaders had more to offer (Watanabe 1958:58; JT 1.1.60).

23 The Kaya faction appeared in 1958 preparing for the next presidential election (AS 5.1.58) but it only had five members in 1960, two of who were also affiliated with other factions.

24 Disagreements arose within the Ishibashi faction after Ishida's plan to have Kishi succeed Ishibashi, following the latter's resignation in January 1957 came to the surface. The faction was effectively split with some supporting Ōkubo (Kato Tsunetarō, Seko Koichi, Yamamoto Katsuchī, Tsuji Masanobu and Utsunomiya Tokuma) and others aligning with Ishida (Shimamura Ichirō, Fukunaga Isshin and Yanagiya Seisaburō) (Watanabe 1958:171). Ishida became prominent following his time as cabinet secretary in the Ishibashi cabinet and labour minister in January 1957, and, with independent funding, he decided to form a faction in 1960.

25 Amongst the first members were Ezaki Masumi, Endō Saburō and Ozawa Saeki (Fujiyama 1976:232).

26 According to the Japan Times, these two factions had between 30–50 members while my sources indicate membership of 20–30.

27 Eight of the thirty one were new Dietmembers: seven were former members of Jiyūtō who had belonged to the Yoshida, Hirokawa and Ōno factions; six had belonged to various factions in the Kaishintō; six had been neutral Jiyūtō members; and three had been independents since the early 1950s.

28 Again, figures are not totally reliable. According to Benjamin and Ori (1981), the number of LDP members not affiliated with any faction stayed at around 11 until 1962 when it almost disappeared. The pattern Benjamin and Ori present is, however, very similar to that put forward here, with non affiliation almost disappearing but then growing again in the first half of the 1960s, although they time the revival a little later.

29 According to my data, double membership was steadily going down from 1958 and was down to one digit numbers in 1958. Benjamin and Ori argue that double membership stayed at 22 until 1960 when it started to decrease rapidly.

30 The Kōno faction did very well in the 1963 election and gained 11 members, rising from 35 to 46 members. The Šatō faction lost five seats, from 52 to 47. The Ikeda faction lost four seats, from 51 to 47. The Ōno faction lost one and went down to 29. The Fujiyama faction went from 25 to 22 seats and
Chapter 4: Factionalism as a Force of Stability.

Kawashima’s Kōyū Club went from 25 to 20 seats. The Miki faction increased its strength and went from 32 to 36 seats, the Ishii faction stayed at 14 seats and the Fukuda faction went from 20 to 21 seats (JT 23.11.63).

32 Eleven had run for or been elected for Bunjító in 1953, three had been in the Hatoyama faction but did not leave, while one was neutral.

33 They were Ono himself, Murakami Isamu, Kanda Hiroshi and Fukuda Hajime.

34 Various lobbying groups also existed within the LDP which were cross-factional, the most prominent being those on South Korea, Taiwan, Communist China, USSR, national defence, Latin America and overseas economic cooperation (Fukui 1970:250; JT 31.10.62).

35 The Ikeda/Yoshida faction, with support from a third of the Kishi faction, and half of the Ishii faction, formed a ‘Council for Deliberating the Current Political Situation’ (Jikyoku kondankai) before it was decided to send Hatoyama to Moscow. They threatened to cede from the party in the autumn of 1956 but decided against it in early October (JT 16.10.56, 14.10.56). The group was said to have the support of 176 Diet members from both houses (JT 6.10.56).

36 It was approved in spite of 75 members of the LDP absenting themselves from the vote (Iyasu 1983:109).

37 This was a ploy designed by Kōno, but after Miki’s death he became very prominent within the Hatoyama wing and was sometimes called ‘Kōno the regent’ (Kōno shikken) (Iyasu 1983:108).

38 Satô was considered to be in the right wing within the right wing, being anti-China and anti-USSR, while Ikeda was in the left, with some interest in China. Kishi’s stance was unclear. The left wing within the party included men like Ishibashi Tansan, Matsumura Kenzô and Takazaki Tatsunosuke, Kōno Ichirō, Fujiyama Aichiirō and Miki Takeo. At the extreme left of this group were Ishibashi, Matsumura, Furui Yoshimi and Utsunomiya Tokuma (JT 31.10.62).


40 The faction held courses for young people in 1961 chosen from election districts and got 2–3000 participants (Fujiyama 1976:236).

41 The ‘proportionality principle’ secured a faction cabinet posts in correspondence with the strength of the faction. The ‘separation of powers principle’ secured to four different factions the three highest party posts and the presidency (Kohn 1997:95).

42 In the second Hatoyama cabinet, Kawasaki Hideji of the Kitamura faction was, for example, rewarded for his efforts to join the Kōno and Kitamura factions together. He, however, left Kōno after the presidential election in 1956 and joined the Miki-Matsumura faction. Other prominent members of the Kōno faction, such as Utsunomiya Tokuma went to the Ono faction, while Nakasone Yasuhiro came to be central to the Kōno faction (Watanabe 1958:208).

43 Of those recommended by the old Jiyūtō forces, Murakami Isamu, Kuraishi Tadao, Ōta Seikō and Funada Naka, had close connections with Ono Bamboku, while Baba was close to Ogata. Yoshino and Kobayashi were also appointed but they were members of the House of Councilors.

44 In 1958 the anti-mainstream Ishibashi faction was discontent that the Kishi faction was getting disproportionately many posts. The faction formed a group, ‘Shinwakai,’ to fight these appointments and insisted on the resignation of Kōri Yūichi, director general of the Autonomy Agency because of his choice of two Kōno men as party officers (JT 8.8.58).

45 In the nisan’i rengo deal it was decided that the candidate coming second would be made vice prime minister. This deal was, however, not honoured by Ishibashi (Gotô et al. 1982:138, 150).

46 Watanabe (1966:30) argues that Ishida made 60 promises for sixteen cabinet chairs before the election to secure Ishibashi’s election.

47 See Chapter 5 for more detailed discussion of this agreement.

48 Ōno had requested four posts, amongst them the Finance Ministry for Mizuta Mikio (JT 28.7.60; Ōno 1964:94–5) but Ikeda was made Finance Minister in the end. The Ōno faction did, however, get two posts: Mizuta Mikio was made MITI minister and Kanda Hiroshi minister of Health (Ōno 1964:95).

49 Both Ōno and Ishii had believed they would be chosen as vice-president.

50 Ikeda had supported Ishii initially, but was instrumental in securing Ishibashi’s victory through the ni-san irengō agreement.

51 The Miki faction got cabinet posts for Matsura Shūtarō, Uda Kōichi and Ide Ichitarō.

52 The Ōsa faction was given a post which is counted here with the Kishi faction as the two factions were more or less merged.

192
Chapter 4: Factionalism as a Force of Stability.

53 The Ōno faction was in the mainstream but declared that they were happy not to get cabinet posts as long as Ōno was made vice president (AS 17.7.57).

54 When this cabinet was formed, two futsuryokusha had their own plans for a new mainstream composition. Ishida of the Ishibashi faction sought to create an Ikeda, Miki, Ishida, Satō alliance and push Kōno and Ōno out (Watanabe 1958:171). Miki was also interested in pushing Kōno and Ōno out in order to create a mainstream composition of Ikeda, Satō and Miki (Watanabe 1958:182). Both plans failed and Ishibashi became anti-mainstream while the Miki faction only got one post.

55 Three other members of the cabinet did not have clear factional affiliation. Fujiyama Aiichirō, foreign minister, was not a Dietmember at the time but was considered by some to be a member of the Kishi faction. Ichimanda Naoto, finance minister, was by some considered to be a member of the Kōno faction although other sources have him as unaffiliated. Aichi Kiichirō, cabinet secretary, was said to be close to Kishi while others considered him closer to Ikeda and Satō (Togawa 1982; AS 11.10.56).

56 This cabinet is usually called the second cabinet and the reshuffle in July 1957 called the ‘first reformed cabinet’.

57 The Ishii faction was not given a seat when the cabinet was formed but later acquired a post.

58 The Miki faction in particular was not happy with only one post (Watanabe 1958:182).

59 Their declaration read: ‘In light of the police problem, the abnormal Diet sessions and people’s criticism, the LDP should modestly reflect on its responsibility, and speedily reconsider personnel decisions, set up a leadership by the whole party and start anew. And we propose that the Kishi cabinet hold presidential election no later than 7 January. We had requested that a resolute step is taken, but unfortunately there are disagreements on this important issue and so we resign’ (Watanabe 1966:48).

60 Kishi had rewarded long time friends such as Takechi Yūki in the first Hatoyama cabinet, Kawashima Shōjirō in the second, and Nanjō Tokuo in the Ishibashi cabinet and the first Kishi cabinet.

61 Kishi made several of the Ōasa faction ministers: Miyazawa Taneo was transport minister in the Ishibashi cabinet, Karasawa Toshiki was justice minister in the first Kishi reform cabinet, and Miura Kazuo was agriculture minister in Kishi’s second cabinet (Watanabe 1958:100).

62 A group headed by Nanjō Tokuma, one of Kishi’s closest supporters since the days of the Saiken Remmei, was against Kishi’s planned cooperation with Kōno, while another group, led by Kawashima Shōjirō, Akagi Munenori and Ōkura Saburō supported the plans (Watanabe 1958:97–9). The group around Nanjō was also discontent because Nanjō had not been reappointed Construction Minister. They demanded that Nanjō be made Chief Cabinet Advisor but later insisted on Fujieda Sensuke.

63 After the formation of the Ishibashi cabinet, the faction split into a bureaucratic group and a party politician group over the distribution of cabinet posts. Initially, the faction decided to recommend Ishii and Tanaka Isaji for cabinet posts. However, a struggle ensued between the party politicians and the bureaucrats within the faction, which resulted in the withdrawal of Ishii himself and the entrance of Tanaka, as representative of the party politician group, and Nadao Hirokichi, as representative of the bureaucratic faction, in cabinet (AS 24.12.56). The struggle continued as Nadao joined the second Kishi cabinet in 1957 but Tanaka lost his post (Hayashi 1958:82).

64 Thayer described the principle as one where the big factions got two to three seats, small factions one or none, and three seats were given to the Upper House. Factions in opposition to the Prime Minister in the previous presidential election might get 1–2 seats fewer than they were ‘due’ (Thayer 1969:195).

65 Not all factions were happy though. The Ōno and Fujiyama groups were not happy with the number of posts, and the Kōno and Ishii factions felt left out (JT 1.1.61).

66 Satō, Fujiyama, Kōno, Kawashima and Miki all accepted cabinet portfolios.

67 In addition the Fujiyama, Miki and Ishii factions got one post each and the Kawashima faction two.

68 In August 1964, the Satō faction had six members in the Executive Council, the Ōno faction five, the Ikeda, Miki, Kawashima, Kōno and Ishii factions three each, and the Fukuda and Fujiyama factions one each (Fukui 1970:91).

69 However, by 1972 the president’s faction had stopped nominating for the ‘big three’ posts (Kohno 1997:98).

70 The press nicknamed Kishi ‘ryō Kishi’ (or two-faced Kishi) because he seemed to be standing in both camps (JT 11.12.56).

71 Kaya was appointed chairman of PARC in July 1962 but his factional affiliation was unclear. Kaya was prominent and had tried to start a faction in 1960 but was also close to the Satō faction which was moving more into anti-mainstream circles at this time.
Kohno has pointed out, however, that from the 1970s onwards the secretary-general did not generally come from the president's faction (Kohno 1997:98).

This was for example clear in December 1961, when the Japan Times noted that although Satō was interested in becoming the next prime minister, he could not do so until 'a tripartite alliance was formed among his own faction, the Kishi group headed by his brother, former Prime Minister Kishi, and the Ikeda faction' (22.12.61).

Kôno Ichirô contemplated leaving the LDP and forming his own party in 1960. The plan was aborted when it became clear that only 27 of the faction's 34 members were prepared to leave. Kôno argued the split was to 'prevent dictatorial tendencies by a single and powerful conservative party' (JT 18.8.60) and it was also argued it was to debate new types of conservatism. However, critics argued that it was largely Kôno's fear of isolation within the Ikeda administration that led him to contemplate a split (JT 12.8.60, 15.7.60, 18.8.60).

Cox and Rosenbluth show that the mainstream faction promoted their own incumbents and protected their incumbents through 1960–90 (1996:265).
5.1. Introduction
The previous chapter established that the LDP factions changed significantly in the first years of the party, as the factions reorganised, consolidated and formed membership. I will now turn to a discussion of what prompted these changes, i.e. the causes of the LDP factionalism.

Scholars have long been interested in the question what causes factionalism (Beller and Belloni 1978a; Panebianco 1988; Sartori 1976; Zariski 1960). On this question the cultural-historical institutional approach and the rational choice approach have shared an intense interest in the wider institutional environment. In the case of Japan a variety of institutional factors have been considered, such as the political dominance of the LDP from 1955 to 1993 (Benjamin and Ori 1981:80; Sartori 1976:85), and the adoption of a secret-ballot election of the party president of the LDP in 1956 (Baerwald 1964:224; Mitchell 1996:116; Seito to habatsu 1968:10; Watanabe 1966:21). These have been widely seen as spurring the growth and expansion of factions in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

However, two main arguments relating to the multimember electoral system have come to dominate scholarly discussion on the causes of factionalism in Japan that have created an important link between the two main institutional approaches to factions. First, the need for political funds has been recognised as a major impetus for factional formation. It is generally acknowledged that the LDP factions serve to channel enormous amounts of money into the party—they generate much more political funding than the party itself. The multimember electoral system, it is argued, plays an important part in creating greater funding needs (Cox and Thies 1998:267; Hrebenar 1986a:61; Kohno 1997:104;
Baerwald 1964). Consequent changes in funding laws have also been identified as major obstacles to the eradication of factions (Curtis 1988; Cox and Thies 1998; Iseri 1988:188; Iwai 1990).

Second, the electoral system has been identified as a major impetus for factional growth and has become the most popular explanation of factionalism in Japan (Baerwald 1986:40-41; Cox and Rosenbluth 1995:355; Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 1999:34; Iseri 1988:58; Kohno 1997:92; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993:59; Shiratori 1988:173; Stockwin 1989:162; Thayer 1969:35; Watanabe 1958:27). It has been argued by both Western and Japanese scholars, that the factions help politicians to maximise gains from the multimember electoral system, and that this type of electoral system is conducive to the growth of and maintenance of factions (Baerwald 1986; Fukui 1970; Kohno 1997; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Thayer 1969).

While this twofold institutional focus on factionalism in Japan is clearly a fruitful way to provide an understanding of factional development, I will argue that the institutional approach needs to be refocused to give a fuller picture of factionalism in earlier periods. Presenting data collected on general elections between 1955 and 1964, I argue that on its own the multimember electoral system did not cause factionalism but that factional fighting spread out to the electoral districts from the party centre. The electoral system, pitting members of the same party against each other, did not cause the factional divisions. Only when factions had emerged as important political and financial groups and had acquired membership, did factional fighting spread to the electoral districts. Furthermore, while the multimember electoral system may have created incentives for LDP candidates to appeal to voters through financial means, as Cox and Thies (1998:267) argue, I argue this did not necessarily foster factionalism. The electoral system did not affect the development of factionalism until after the factions had consolidated significantly in the LDP as a result of increased financial capability of the factions.

The process whereby changes in the structural environment affected party organisation was very complicated and involved two main structural and institutional changes. First,
the presidential elections, introduced in 1956, started a process towards a consolidation of factions. The 1956 presidential election taught the leaders that a more clearly defined support was needed to win open presidential elections (Iyasu 1996:135; Masumi 1995:19). Second, the organisational development of the LDP was affected by a more general structural change, namely the development of stronger relations between politicians and the business community which in turn was taking rapid changes because of economic growth. The power struggles within the party changed factionalism and political leadership significantly as they spread into the electoral districts where they became institutionalised. A part of this development was changes in electioneering and the establishment of personal support groups in the electoral districts, the kōenkai. The process of factionalisation reveals incremental institutional changes in reaction to the organisational environment, and power politics. This, much rather than the macro political environment and efforts by politicians to maximise their gains within that political environment, encouraged factionalism within the LDP.

5.2. Factionalism in the periphery and the electoral system

Scholars of comparative politics have focused on the electoral system as an important factor contributing to political factionalism (Beller and Belloni 1978c:432; Sartori 1976:93; Zariski 1978:24). A variety of electoral systems have been studied and it argued that certain electoral systems, such as highly proportional electoral systems, and systems that use primaries, produce fission within parties and encourage factionalism (Beller and Belloni 1978c:432; Benjamin and Ori 1981:79; Sartori 1976:98). In studies of Japan, the multimember electoral system, in force between 1925 and 1993, apart from the election in 1946, has been considered particularly effective in generating factional divisions. This argument has been echoed in most institutional analyses on factionalism in Japan, and has been particularly well studied after the rational choice approach became popular in the 1990s (Baerwald 1964; Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 1999; Fukui 1970, 1978; Iseri 1988; Kohno 1997; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Sartori 1976; Sims 1991; Stockwin 1983; Thayer 1969; Totten and Kawakami 1965; Uchida 1969, Watanabe 1958).
As indicated above, the multimember district system based on 3–5 member districts with a single non-transferable vote (SNTV), is not a postwar phenomenon but was established in 1925 and used until 1993, apart from the first postwar election in 1946, when a shift was made to a large district system (Iseri 1988:58; Uchida 1983:111). In the postwar period, the House of Representatives had 466 seats divided between 119 districts until 1954 when a one member district was set up in Amami, and the seats thus went up to 467.¹ There were 40 three member districts, 39 four member districts, and 38 five member districts.

Scholars have argued that there are strong links between this type of electoral system and party organisation. Most scholars have been reluctant to argue that the multimember electoral system creates factionalism, and have in most cases only argued that it maintains factionalism or explains its survival (see Baerwald 1964:226; Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 1999:34; Iyasu 1996:135; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993:59; Stockwin 1989:167).² According to this argument, a big party like the LDP which aims for a majority, must put forward a number of candidates in each district who then must compete with each other for nomination and support. Watanabe concluded in 1958 that the competition was becoming more severe within the conservative camp than between conservatives and progressives (Watanabe 1958:28). Most scholars have argued that this situation in the electoral districts is conducive to factionalism. Candidates react to this institutional environment by first, seeking factional backing, electorally and financially (Fukui 1978:50; Kohno 1997:102; Stockwin 1983:221; Stockwin 1982:125; Uchida 1983:109), and second, by creating their own jiban, or local support base, in which other candidates could not enter, forming areas similar to a single member district system (Iseri 1988:58–9). This in turn affected the electoral behaviour of the factions, according to this argument. Because the factions had started behaving like parties in the electoral districts, they avoided putting forward more than one candidate in each district so as to avoid friction within the faction (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995:356; Stockwin 1982:125; Stockwin 1983:221).
Chapter 5: The New Factions: From the Centre to the Periphery

The following sections will discuss each of these arguments in turn, using data collected for all general elections and the factional affiliation of LDP members between 1955 and 1964. I will argue, first, that the size of the LDP is not an adequate explanation as to why factionalism became so pronounced. Second, I argue that a system of factional endorsements took time to develop in the electoral districts and that factional nominations did not become a problem until the late 1950s. Third, I will argue that factionalism in the periphery was encouraged by the development of personal support groups which made factional divisions in electoral districts easier.

5.2.1. Factionalism, party size and organisation

It is only in the last few years, and largely as a response to the rational choice theoretical contribution to the study of factions, that scholars have come to argue that the electoral system may be of less significance in explaining factionalism than previously believed (Curtis 1999; Reed 2003). Curtis (1999:143) argues that the relationship between factionalism and the multimember electoral system is complicated and that two conditions were needed for the multimember electoral system to cause factionalism, namely:

When the party is unable to structure the vote among multiple candidates and when voter support for a particular party is high enough that the party can reasonably expect to elect more than one candidate in a district. There will be no intra-party competition in the absence of either of these conditions.

I will return to the first condition later, but if we look at the latter condition, it is true that between 1958 and 1963 the LDP got more than one candidate elected in most districts, between 35 and 44 districts saw 3 LDP members elected, and 10–12 districts had 4 LDP members elected (Fig.5–1). However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the multimember electoral system was introduced in 1925 and the Jiyūtō and the Kaishintō fought under this system in five elections between 1947 and 1955. Although the Jiyūtō was smaller than the LDP and its size fluctuated between elections, it was big enough to expect to elect more than one candidate in most districts it was running in. In fact, as seen before, between 1949 and 1953, 63–81% of the districts elected more than one Jiyūtō candidate and the number of districts where two candidates were elected was particularly high. Even so, the competition in the electoral districts did get worse after the formation of the
Fig. 5.1 Number of districts electing 2 or more members - LDP 1958-63

Source: Reed 1982.
LDP. In the elections of 1958, 1960 and 1963, the number of districts where three or four members were elected increased greatly, compared to the Jiyūtō in the 1940s, and the number of districts with only one candidate of the same party dropped as well. Only in 1949, did Jiyūtō have a comparable number of districts where 3 members of the party got elected. Nevertheless, both the Jiyūtō and the LDP satisfy Curtis' condition of reasonably expecting to elect more than one candidate, even though the factionalisation of the two parties was very different—in the Jiyūtō it was much less severe and did not seem to reach into electoral districts, indicating that the relationship between factions and the multimember electoral system is complex, and that Jiyūtō candidates used other methods than factional affiliation to secure their election under the multimember electoral system.

This leads us to the first condition Curtis mentions, the issue of party organisation and the party's ability to structure the vote amongst multiple candidates. It has often been argued that because the LDP has no grassroot organisations it cannot support all candidates that run in a district. For example, Kohno (1997:102; see also Thayer 1969:35) claimed that because in the 1947 electoral system these candidates competed for the same pool of conservative voters, it would have been difficult for the party to develop a campaign for any particular candidate. Unable to rely on the party per se, the candidates were better off affiliating with the existing LDP factions for financial support and campaign expertise.

As seen in Chapter 3, the Jiyūtō in particular solved this problem in a very different way from the LDP. Candidates looked to a number of politicians in the party for financial support and, in fact, received added support if the leader of their faction was running in the same district. This indicates that structured factionalism was perhaps not the only option available for the LDP in order to structure the vote among multiple candidates. It is a fact that LDP members came to rely on factions for electoral and financial support, but this does not necessarily mean that the electoral system was a primary causal factor.

It could be argued that the problems the LDP had in structuring the vote were due to the fact that the LDP was created as a merger of two parties, a party born out of diffusion (see Panebianco 1988). However, if that had been the case we should see these problems
present from the outset. It is interesting to note that the electoral behaviour of LDP politicians changes gradually in the first few years. If we look at the behaviour of the factions in the electoral districts between 1958 and 1963, we see a process of factionalism gradually spreading into the districts, but no clear factional divisions. A close look at the behaviour of Diet candidates in electoral districts until the early 1960s shows how factionalism only slowly came to affect electoral politics. First as seen in Figures 5–2 to 5–4, a large number of members of same factions ran against each other in districts in general elections until 1963. Second, the number of Diet members changing their factional affiliation so as not to face members of their own faction, and the emergence of factional candidacy to the Diet, increased very slowly in this period. This strongly indicates that the electoral system did not create the divisions but rather that factionalism spread from the centre into the electoral districts. I will now turn to a more detailed discussion of nomination politics in the electoral districts.

5.2.2. Factional endorsements

Scholars have observed that the LDP factions would rarely sponsor more than one candidate in a district in order to avoid internal factional competition (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995:356; Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 1999:38; Stockwin 1983:125; Shiratori 1988:174). If the multimember district system causes factionalism in big parties, and considering that many LDP candidates were already familiar with the problems caused by many candidates of the same party running in the same district from their time in the Jiyūtō, we would expect to see such factional divisions within the districts in the early years of the LDP. I have analysed election data for the LDP between 1955 and 1964 and what the data tells us (Figure 5–2) is that contrary to what would be expected, the first three elections of the LDP saw quite a high rate of members of the same faction running against each other. Furthermore, there is not a significant reduction in the number of districts with multiple faction candidates between 1958 and 1963 (Fig.5–3 and 5–4). This is in spite of the fact that the factions were extending their activities into the electoral districts from around 1957, and the electoral system was starting to feature in factional activities. The first few elections do not show a trend towards a pattern whereby the factions would avoid having more than one of their members elected in the district.
Fig. 5-2 Factions with one or more member elected to a district - LDP 1958

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>1 member</th>
<th>2 members</th>
<th>3 members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ishibashi</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishii</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sato</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miki</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kono</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kishi</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ono</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of districts

Fig. 5-3 Factions with one or more member elected to a district - LDP 1960

- Kaya: 3 members
- Ichimanda: 5 members
- Ishibashi: 4 members
- Miki: 24 members, 2 additional members
- Ōno: 24 members, 1 additional member
- Satō: 39 members, 5 additional members
- Kōno: 27 members, 3 additional members
- Ishii: 17 members, 1 additional member
- Kishi: 21 members, 7 additional members
- Ikeda: 41 members, 4 additional members
- Ishida: 2 members, 1 additional member
- Fujiyama: 26 members, 2 additional members

Fig. 5-4 Factions with one or more member elected to a district - LDP 1963

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>Number of districts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ishii</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujiyama</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikeda</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satō</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawashima</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miki</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kōno</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kishi</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ōno</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factional endorsements did not become a problem in the LDP until 1957, although there had been instances where factional conflict was said to affect results. This had happened at times between 1954 and 1957. As noted earlier, factionalism became more visible after the formation of the Minshutō in November 1954. The factionalisation of the party was mirrored in the elections in February 1955, and it was noted that factional fighting in the Minshutō was spreading into the electoral districts. The Asahi noted that the Hatoyama faction, the Kishi faction, the old Kaishintō faction and the old Nihon Jiyūtō faction were fighting over nominations. An example of this was Wakayama 1st district where a Kishi faction candidate, a candidate from the former Nihon Jiyūtō and a candidate from the former Kaishintō were running—all for the Minshutō (AS 22.1.55).

In the summer and autumn of 1956, the LDP lost the gubernatorial elections in Miyagi, Toyama, Aomori and Gumma, which was blamed on factional conflict within the LDP. The winning candidate in Aomori had sought party endorsement but entered as an independent when he failed to secure endorsement because of a factional disagreement. Fractional differences also prevented the organisation of a new prefectural organisation in the district until late in the summer of 1956, resulting in the defeat of the conservative candidate. In Miyagi the party candidate came in third because of factional struggle. In Toyama it was noted that the antimainstream Dietmember in the district had supported the Socialist backed candidate when his own factional candidate failed to win party endorsement (JT 30.10.56).

But it was not until 1957 that factional endorsements in the electoral districts were considered a major problem with the party leadership. The conflicts until then mirrored factional conflict at the centre of the party, but the factional divisions had not created divisions at the electoral level. The LDP had set up an electoral strategy committee (senkyo taisaku iinkai) at its establishment in 1955 (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995:357), but in 1957 the party established stricter guidelines on party nominations in order to reduce the number of official LDP candidates and avoid tomodaore (falling down together) (Cox...
and Rosenbluth 1995:363). In September, the party leadership also called for the dissolution of factions, in part because of problems caused by cabinet members and party executive staff campaigning in districts on behalf of candidates belonging to their own faction (AS 19.9.57). However, in the 1958 general election, party leaders openly backed candidates, giving them funding and electioneering on their behalf (AS 18.5.58). Simultaneously, factional fighting was spreading into the election districts leading to dog-eat-dog battles between LDP candidates in the districts (AS 19.5.58).

In spite of these developments, the first few general elections of the LDP showed a continuation of the trend seen before where members of the same faction ran in the same district. As seen in figure 5–2, in the HR elections in 1958 there were 28 instances where two members of the same faction ran and were elected from the same district. The Kishi faction got two of its members elected in nine districts and three members elected in one district. The Ishibashi and the Ishii factions got two of their faction members elected in two districts each. In addition, in Fukuoka third district a candidate was elected who was affiliated with both the Ikeda and Ishii factions, but this district already had one Ishii candidate. The Ōno faction got two of its members elected in three districts, and the Kōno faction did this in two districts. The Satō faction got two members elected in two districts, while in Fukui district an Ikeda/Satō affiliated candidate also got elected along with a Satō candidate. The Ikeda faction got two of its members elected in 3 districts, and faction members in one district. The Miki faction got two members elected in three districts. The Kishi faction, which was the president’s faction in 1958, had the highest number of districts with multiple candidates elected, 9 districts with 2 members, and 1 district with 3 members—characteristics that Prime Minister Ikeda’s faction also showed in 1960 and 1963. It was a characteristic throughout this period that the president’s faction was eager to expand to consolidate its power and at the same time attracted Diet members and candidates because of its power.

By 1960, when most of the incumbent party members had already been drawn into the factions, it became paramount in order to maintain the power of the factions to recruit new members and to compete with other factions for the new Diet members (see Thayer...
Factional nominations were an effective tool to attract new faction members. This accelerated the process whereby new candidates would seek the support of factions to get nomination and electoral and financial support. Faction leadership, by the same token, sought new candidates who had clout and a good possibility of getting elected (Iseri 1988:60). The *Japan Times* reported that the power struggle in the party was forcing old politicians to retire for the factions to ‘see as many new candidates as possible running in the election from their own clique so that they can secure a position of power in the party’ (29.10.63). This process moved the factional competition into the districts, and could only be accelerated as more candidates were recruited into factions as part of the power struggle in the party. The electoral system had, by this time, become strongly related to factionalism in the public’s mind and the press frequently argued that it was the pitting of candidates of the same party against each other in the districts, that caused the factionalism (*JT* 10.12.60; *AS* 31.8.64).

As endorsements became more faction based, it was natural for politicians to seek to avoid running against members of the same faction, as it would limit the resources available. There were a number of examples where candidates sought to change factions to avoid this problem. It was, for example, claimed that Satō Torajirō, who was close to Ishibashi Tanzan in the Jiyūtō and ran in Shizuoka 1st district, approached the Kōno, Ikeda and Ōno factions in 1960 because Ishibashi was a Dietmember for Shizuoka 2nd district (Watanabe 1958:166). However, he joined the Fujiyama faction in 1960. Factions as the locus for electoral support became established. Tsukada Juichirō also left the Ōno faction before the 1958 general elections. Tsukada was against Ōno’s cooperation with Kōno and Miki Bukichi, but he also faced electoral difficulties as he was fighting a Kōno faction member, Tanaka Shōji in Niigata fourth district, which could affect his chances of getting elected and so Tsukada went on to join the Ishii faction (Watanabe 1958:131). Watanabe argues that many Dietmembers had similar motives for changing factional affiliation at this time (Watanabe 1958:131). It revealed the extent to which factional conflict had spread to the electoral districts that by around 1960 LDP members were moving between factions in an effort to increase their chances of getting elected, a trend not seen before.
Chapter 5: The New Factions: From the Centre to the Periphery

Although there were therefore trends towards factional nominations by 1960, there are limited changes visible in the data. In 1960 there were again 28 instances where two members of the same faction were elected in the same district and two districts where three members of the same faction were elected (Figure 5–3). The Fujiyama faction got two candidates elected in two districts; the Ishida faction in one district; the Ikeda faction in four districts; and in two districts it got three of its candidates elected; the Kishi faction got two candidates elected in six districts; the Ishii faction got two candidates elected in two districts; the Kōno faction got two candidates elected in three districts; the Satō faction in five districts; the Ōno faction in three; and the Miki faction in two districts.

It was ironic that in spite of the movement to dissolve factions in 1962–63 (see Chapter 6), the 1963 general elections saw the fiercest factional fighting in the electoral districts yet. Faction leaders were concerned with increasing their power at the party centre and thus put forward a great number of candidates, ignoring the fact in the current climate of factional electoral and financial backing it was affecting their chances of getting elected. In this election 21 districts saw members of the same faction being elected in (Fig.5–4). In the district of Miki Takeo, Tokushima 1st district, five LDP candidates were fighting each other. In this district, as in many others, the aggressive methods used by the mainstream Kōno faction were especially noted, where he supported a new candidate against incumbent LDP candidates (AS 9.11.63). This election spurred a great power struggle between the Kōno and Satō factions in preparation for the party presidency, encouraging both factions to seek to expand their factions by entering as many members in districts as possible, thereby further escalating factional conflict (AS 9.11.63; Masumi 1967:45, and further discussion in Chapter 6). The Satō faction got two members elected in three districts, while the Kōno faction did so in one district but got three members elected in one district. The leading Ikeda faction had two members elected in seven districts.

It took some years before factional politics led to clear factional endorsements and factional elections. As fractionalism spread to the districts, the situation seemed more to
Chapter 5: The New Factions: From the Centre to the Periphery

resemble a mad power scramble where factions tried to get their candidates elected without much heed to real chances of winning. Factionalisation was led by the power struggle at the centre of the party, and not by the electoral system itself.

5.2.3. Kōenkai

Returning to Curtis' observation that factionalism will develop when the party is unable to structure the vote among multiple candidates, it is paramount to look at electioneering in the districts. It has been argued by many scholars that the growth in personal support groups for LDP candidates in electoral districts, the so-called kōenkai, and the building of personal constituencies, the jiban, in the 1950s, facilitated the factional divisions in the electoral districts (Curtis 1988:177; Masumi 1995:5; Benjamin and Ori 1981:116). Many have also pointed out that the establishment of a jiban and then of a kōenkai within an electoral district helped to solve the problem of multiple candidacy in the multimember electoral system (Reed 2003:20).

I will argue that it is more fruitful to look at the development of kōenkai in relation to the power struggles within the party, and not in terms of the electoral system. The timing of their development coincides with a spread in factionalism to districts and was particularly important because they made the spreading of factional conflict to the periphery easier (see Thayer 1969:27–8 for examples of individual LDP politicians setting up offices and staff to serve their electoral district). Factions in the party could more easily function in electoral politics because of the way the districts had been divided (Stockwin 1982:124). Divisions in the districts came to mirror those in the party; candidates had factional labels; and even in the prefectural chapters, members were divided into mainstream and antimainstream factions (Curtis 1971:7).

The composition of local political support groups changed gradually in the early postwar period. The traditional jiban, personal support base, was built on local bosses (meibōka) who would deliver the vote for politicians, a system which Iyasu argues is built on the 'traditional, Japanese groupism society' (dentō tekina nihonteki shūdan shugi shakai) (Iyasu 1984:121; 1996:147). During the Occupation, the process towards a more diverse
system of support groups was accelerated as ‘votes could not longer be gathered only with the support of the bosses’ (Curtis 1971:127; Iyasu 1984:121; Babb unpublished thesis:202). Rather than rely on ‘local bosses,’ politicians sought to organise locally elected officials, medium and small businesses, manufacturers, agriculture, mountain and fishing villages, labour and social welfare groups as well as the mass electorate into formal groups, to more effectively gather enough votes (Benjamin and Ori 1981:116; Curtis 1971; Iyasu 1984; Scalapino and Masumi 1962: 85, 123; Stockwin 1983:210, 224). The kōenkai had regular meetings and engaged in various activities in support of the candidate, and for strengthening of the group itself (Stockwin 1982:122; Shiratori 1988:183; Curtis 1971). The kōenkai were important in moving electioneering and electoral support to candidates away from the party, institutionalising this practice in the election districts. The formation of kōenkai encouraged the decentralisation of the LDP—a development some observers argued was positive (see Chapter 6)—which in turn had important consequences for factionalism, and its possibility to thrive. The kōenkai, more than the old jiban system, created a basis for a system of exclusive political groupings around individual LDP candidates, facilitating factional divisions in the electoral districts.

The institutionalisation of the kōenkai was helped by a favourable external environment. The party system was becoming more stable. Party strength stabilised and the number of Dietmembers with no previous political experience was falling. Incumbent Dietmembers thus were able to both strengthen their jiban and build up kōenkai (Iyasu 1984:120). Furthermore, after the merger of the two major prewar conservative parties, alternation in power ceased to be the norm and the LDP was able to retain a majority in spite of declining vote (Stockwin 1983:213–14). These developments in the electoral districts weakened party control; efforts to move election campaigning towards the party failed, and by the mid–1960s it was decided to let the party’s candidates fight each other freely. The fiercer the battle, the more the candidates would attempt to increase their votes and, in aggregate, the greater the total number of votes the party would receive (Curtis 1971:140).
Attempts by the LDP to change from a parliamentary party (*giin seitō*) to an organised party (*soshiki seitō*) by building up party membership were unsuccessful. Growth in membership in the late 1950s was largely due to the fact that the *kōenkai* were recruiting new membership. The party was not built on a conventional grass root basis, but on party members recruited through the local *kōenkai* where the members identified more with the local candidate than the national party (Benjamin and Ori 1981:35). And thus, by 1961 ‘when *kōenkai* membership surpassed 10 million, the LDP had changed from a party of Diet members into a mass party based on factions and *kōenkai*’ (Masumi 1995:5), with *kōenkai* attracting a membership ranging between 50,000 and 150,000 members (Curtis 1971:130–1). Curtis noted that it was generally accepted that the *kōenkai* emerged as a response to the new factors in the environment within which campaigning strategies operate (Curtis 1971:127).

That the multimember electoral system did not inherently cause factional divisions, can also be seen from the history of the Jiyūtō and the Kaishintō. The Jiyūtō and Kaishintō were able to survive within the same electoral framework without factional conflict spreading to the districts. As Baerwald (1964:226), for example, noted, the electoral system did not cause factionalism as ‘it was not so great an impediment to unity in the Yoshida era’, but rather ‘impedes the abolition of factions.’ It is clear, as Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies (1999:34) point out, that although the multimember electoral system makes it difficult for candidates of the same party to rely on the party label alone in their electoral campaigns, this does not necessarily lead to factional politics, but to some type of ‘atomistic politics’ where candidates pursue a personal vote. This is a much more accurate description of the effect of this type of electoral system. The LDP factions extended from the centre to the periphery with intensification of factional conflict in the party, aided by the establishment of the *kōenkai*, which became another element of the factional struggle—a tool to maintain power in the centre of the party (Masumi 1995:5). The electoral system only came to play a role in encouraging and maintaining factionalism, after the factions as financial and electoral support groups with a defined group of supporters, had established themselves in the party. In the first few years after the formation of the LDP, it was largely in presidential elections that factional activity
was great but in the early 1960s general elections were increasingly characterised by factional manoeuvres. In the 1963 election campaign, for example, all factions were openly trying to expand, and each faction aimed to increase factional membership by 20–30 people (AS 10.9.63). For the factional leaders, the electoral system was only an additional factor helping them to establish their influence within the party. The electoral system did not cause the factional divisions of the LDP, but could be said to have facilitated factional divisions by making it possible for candidates to run as candidates of different factions. As these divisions became manifest locally they in turn encouraged factionalism generally in the party. What was of primary importance in allowing factional conflict to spread to the electoral districts, was the intense power struggles at the heart of the party, to which we now turn.

5.3. Power struggles at the centre

If factionalism spread to the electoral districts because of power struggles at the centre of the party, what caused these power struggles and how did they manifest themselves? Most, if not all, scholars who have researched factionalism within the Liberal Democratic Party have argued that the introduction of a secret ballot election of the party president in December 1956 amongst the party’s Diet members and local representatives had a massive influence on factionalism within the party (Baerwald 1964; Calder 1988, Watanabe 1958; Thayer 1969:21; Masumi 1967:36). Masumi (1967:36) pointed out that ‘the essence of factional fighting is in the presidential elections. From the very beginning of the conservative merger this has been the locus of the struggle. You could say that when presidential elections were adopted the factions developed’ (see also Thayer 1969:21). The vernacular press and politicians such as Kōno Ichirō and Ōno Bamboku frequently argued that it was because of the presidential elections that the factions became fixed entities, a ‘party within the party’ (AS 23.8.62; 30.5.64). Matsuno Raizō, a member of the Satō faction, confirms this in his autobiography:

It was at the time of the Hatoyama and Yoshida party conservative unification that factions started developing clearly. At the time both parties wanted to lead the new party and thus open presidential elections were decided upon. Elections are a logic of numbers. The person who gathers the highest numbers becomes president. And so factions openly followed (Matsuno 1994:203).
Chapter 5: The New Factions: From the Centre to the Periphery

The decision to choose the LDP president by secret ballot elections proved to be an important stimulus to factional politics, as argued in Chapter 4, revealing the importance of the institutional environment of the LDP. They created a basis for factional formation and the hardening of such groups as political manoeuvres to control the votes of the rank-and-file was necessary to ensure victory. As seen in Chapter 4, in 1956 these manoeuvres built on existing groupings but encouraged steps to increase the control of ‘votes’ with the introduction of awards to supporting leaders and their followers. Commentators noted that factions ‘advanced’ with each general election they gained new members, while factions that failed to attract members and funding grew weak (e.g. Iyasu 1984:117). The presidential elections created a new institutional environment within the party, which shaped the power struggles taking place. However, as we will see, it was not the only force changing the internal organisation of the LDP. The relationship between big business and conservative politicians was changing, aiding the factional build-up.

When the LDP was first formed, the party was unable to choose a president from the various leaders in its ranks, where the main competition was between Hatoyama Ichirō and Ogata Taketora. It was thus decided to set up a leadership committee (sosai daiko iin sei), consisting of Hatoyama Ichirō, Ogata Taketora, Miki Bukichi and Ōno Bamboku until the matter could be solved. Such group leadership had been set up several times before in the early postwar period in the Shinpotō, the Minshutō, and the Kaishintō when these parties had been unable to decide on a leader (Quigley and Turner 1956:338; Yanaga 1956:247).

The decision to adopt secret ballot elections for the LDP president was the result of tactical thinking amongst the party leaders. After the committee had been set up the various leaders of the party continued to debate the selection method for the president. Hatoyama seemed to have secured support of many of the most prominent politicians of the Jiyūtō and Kohno thus announced that he would prefer it if the party decided on one candidate before the election and proposed that Hatoyama be chosen leader and Ogata vice-president (Watanabe 1966:25). However, Ogata was confident that he could win if a secret ballot was held (Watanabe 1966:24) and would not accept this proposal unless
Hatoyama agreed to promise to resign after the USSR-Japan treaty, but this failed (Watanabe 1966:25). Hatoyama was eventually forced to accept the idea of a secret ballot because of the pressure within the party. It was therefore decided that the party president and vice president should be chosen at a party convention by secret ballot. If no candidate received a majority, another round should be held to choose between the two candidates who received the most votes (Watanabe 1966:39–40).

The decision to hold secret ballot elections was made with short term tactical goals in mind, but was to affect the intra-party divisions greatly. Although the immediate consequences of such an election were partly foreseen, the long term impact could not be known (see Thelen and Steinmo 1992:21–2). Kawashima Shōjirō, Kishi’s chief of staff, pointed out in November 1956 that unrestrained popular vote would be bad for the party and argued that the result would be internal divisions caused by the opposition to the new leadership by the losing side. More importantly, he argued that because there were no detailed regulations about the intraparty election, ambitious candidates would definitely resort to vote buying. ‘In other words’ Kawashima declared, ‘we are not against the method and principle itself, but we are afraid of its consequences’ (JT 13.11.56).

It has been argued by some observers that factionalism played a major part in presidential nominations in early postwar Japan as well, and that ‘the conferences of both right-wing parties frequently diluted their formal power by giving perfunctory approval to leaders who had already been agreed upon in factional bargaining’ (Quigley and Turner 1956:333; Yanaga 1956:247). To observers at that time, party elders were important in breaking deadlocks between factions:

Conference election of the president of a conservative party, however, has been little more than confirmation of a leader who has already been agreed upon following a behind-the-scenes struggle among factional interests. Occasionally the deadlock has been broken and superficial unity restored by the nod of a trusted party elder or political sage (Quigley and Turner 1956:337).

Although there were certainly factional struggles over leadership, in particular in the Minshutō, the nature of these struggles was very different from the struggles that developed within the LDP. In 1948, when Ashida Hitoshi retired from his post as party
president of the Minshutō, a struggle ensued between Tomabechi Gizō, a right hand man of Ashida, Narahashi Wataru and Inukai Ken. There were, however, no factional agreements made similar to those of the LDP, and the leadership was chosen on the basis of which wing of the party was stronger at the time. The Inukai group proved stronger in 1948, and Inukai was chosen president by the end of the year, despite the opposition of the Ashida faction (NT 29.11.48, 22.2.49).

In the Jiyūtō the situation was slightly different. Matsuno Raizō described the Jiyūtō election system for leadership as 'a family affair and far removed from the open elections where numerical strength is required, making factionalism rampant' (Matsuno 1994:203). The leadership of the Jiyūtō was not contested in elections. Yoshida was chosen prime minister in spring 1946, and a little later leader of the Jiyūtō, through a deal between himself and the leadership of the party (Watanabe 1966:22). Yoshida was not chosen because of factional strength as he did not have a faction at the time but because of decisions taken by the purged leadership (Reed unpublished). Similarly, when Ogata Taketora was chosen as president of the Jiyūtō in November 1954, it was not because of his prominence as factional leader, but because of Yoshida's support (Reed unpublished). He was the handpicked heir of Yoshida himself (Tomioka 1953:104,106; Hori 1975:87; Yanaga 1956:163; Reed unpublished). Ogata distanced himself from Yoshida in 1954, as he was wooed by Kishi to join the movement for a merger of the conservative parties (Kurzman 1960:282) and he publicly declared that unification would be desirable. But, as the discussions with the Kaishintō were divided between the Yoshida and Hatoyama groups, Ogata stayed firmly within the Yoshida wing when the Jiyūtō split again in November 1954. Faction backing was thus not relevant in choice of leadership. Leaders with big factions behind them, such as Ōno and Hirokawa, were never considered for leadership, in spite of factional strength (Reed unpublished). Furthermore, Ōno and Ōkubo, who led the party politician faction following Hatoyama's purge, did not take any active part in picking Hatoyama's successor.

The open elections in the LDP signaled a new period in the history of conservative parties, as the party convention ceased to be a mere rubber stamp and became the battling
ground for the leadership. It also signaled a new era in that the ‘chōrō’ (the elders) lost their ability to affect key decisions of the party, and the factions took over. Thus although the president was now chosen through open and secret elections and the result could not always be foreseen, the ‘secret room deals’ (misshitsu seijī) that traditionally were made in Japanese politics did not disappear. They had continued under the Occupation, and, contrary to the expectation of many observers, continued unabated in spite of the new election rules. However, it was no longer the elders who controlled the backroom deals but the faction leaders themselves who tried to negotiate a deal that would secure the election of their man (Watanabe 1966:21).

The presidential elections called for more complicated manoeuvres between politicians than ever before because of the secret ballot voting. The dealings between the various politicians show a process of consolidation of factions as the leaders acquired support to be able to do deals, securing a certain number of votes. Such deals in presidential elections continued (see Hori 1975:103–4; Watanabe 1966:35–36). In 1957, Kishi was made prime minister without an election, but with secret deals between the Miki, Ikeda and Satō factions (Watanabe 1966:44). Coalition building was practised again in the presidential elections of January 1959, when the anti-Kishi forces united around Matsumura Kenzō against the ‘degradation’ of the LDP (JT 24.1.59). Again, in the presidential elections of July 1960, coalition building was rife as the bureaucratic and party politician factions came head-to-head (see JT 15.7.60). The Ōno faction made a deal with the Ishii faction similar to that made in 1956 (nisan’i rengō), as Ōno believed he was going to get Kishi’s support for the presidency (Ōno 1964:102–4). Kishi did not honour his promise and it transpired that Kishi had made at least three deals with other faction leaders during his cabinets, promising to pass leadership on to them in return for their support. The Ishii faction also failed to honour the deal and Ōno was forced to withdraw his candidacy (Watanabe 1966:31–32). When Ikeda announced his intention to resign due to bad health in October 1964, he said he wanted the successor to be picked ‘through peaceful talks at the party’s official organs’ (JT 28.10.64). But that was proving difficult because of the manoeuvres of the factions that had already started. The party
Chapter 5: The New Factions: From the Centre to the Periphery

seemed split in their support of Satō and Kōno but eventually the former was elected president.

The presidential elections, first held in December 1956, affected the internal politics of the LDP. They pitted candidates against each other, making coalition building important to secure victory. This in turn led politicians to recruit as many candidates as possible and to seek to maintain that support. This build-up in the party inevitably led to factional struggles in the electoral districts as faction leaders fought for new and incumbent Diet members. Thelen and Steinmo’s dynamic constraint model captures well the changes taking place in the LDP factions. The institutional changes were producing changes in the functioning of the factions which furthered the political struggles and drove their development forward. The development of kōenkai as personal support groups allowing divided electoral districts, aided this development further. In this way the electoral system was important in helping to spread factionalism in the periphery but it did not create it. At the same time, the financial environment and the political funding arrangements were changing so as to make continuing factional support possible. I will turn to political finance now.

5.4. Factions and political finance

It has been claimed in a number of studies that factions serve a very powerful role in providing financial backing for candidates to the Diet (Baerwald 1986; Fukui 1970:130; Goto et al. 1982:140; Hrebenar 1986a; Iseri 1988 72; Shiratori 1988:174; Stockwin 1982:125; Totton and Kawakami 1965; Watanabe 1958). Kohno states that: ‘[b]ecause LDP factions, rather than the party itself, financed the campaigns of individual members under the 1947 electoral system, factional leaders were responsible for soliciting political funding from corporations and business associations.’ (Kohno 1997:104). It has also been widely argued that the multi-member district electoral system encourages money politics, because it encourages the forging of close ties between factions and business interests, and it leads to heavy campaign expenditures as LDP candidates seek to out compete each other (Cox and Thies 1998; Hrebenar 1986a, Curtis 1988; Iwai 1990). However, it should be clear from Chapter 3, that the relationship between politicians and
business has not always been the same in the postwar period. Financial backing has not always been clearly faction-based and the relationship between business and conservative politicians has not been static. The diverse financial routes into the LDP cannot simply be explained by the merger in 1955 of two distinct parties (see for example Sartori 1976:93). Although the Jiyūtō, like the LDP, faced intra-party competition in the electoral districts, political fundraising was fairly centralised. Funding routes were relatively few, small and personal in nature. In my view, the development of factions as fundamentally financial groups had less to do with electoral politics and more to do with the process of institutionalisation of the LDP and with power politics within the party centre which prevented the establishment of centralised party control.

A number of changes took place in the late 1950s that transformed the relationship between business and conservative politicians, which in turn changed the functions and political importance of the factions. First, the relationship between big business and the LDP became much closer than before. Second, the factions established political associations on the basis of their increasing political power, thereby transforming their political roles (Watanabe 1958:13–15). Third, the relationship between big business and factions was further strengthened through common study groups set up between factions and individual businessmen to discuss policy, establishing the factions further as major political actors. The LDP factions that were emerging were multifaceted financial groups that acted as political fundraisers, distributors of funds, as well as groups that gave leaders and faction members a formal venue to meet with the business community and industry. The groups became centres of considerable political importance. Panebianco pointed out that the weaker the institutionalisation of the party, the less diversified its financial sources (1988:59), and that a party born out of territorial diffusion, like the LDP, showed greater dependency on the external environment (1988:50–52). These factors hindered the institutionalisation of the party but political strategies and power politics pushed the party further towards less centralised control and greater factionalisation. As will become clear, the steps taken to make the factions the political and financial groups they became, were made with immediate power related issues in mind, and not long term goals such as the manipulation of the electoral system.
5.4.1 Business and conservative politics

It has often been argued that the dissolution of the *zaibatsu* during the Occupation affected conservative politics by creating multiple channels of funding (Iyasu 1996:144). Fukui (1970:44) claims that the stability that was acquired between parties and the business community was largely due to the fact that the role of industrial associations and their national federations was steadily growing. As seen in Chapter 3 the four main business organisations were formed in the first few years after the end of the war and Fukui argues that these business organisations became a substitute for the *zaibatsu*. But Fukui (1970:44) asserts:

> Whatever monetary contributions were made during this period by these business groups to a party came almost invariably from individual firms or, more frequently, a particular director or directors of a firm. It was not until party politics was freed from the legal and psychological restrictions of the Occupation period that the large business organisations began to play a decisive role as the *de facto* representatives of the nation's business interests and principal providers of political funds for the conservative parties.

After the economic rubble in which Japan found herself after the end of the war, the economy started growing rapidly in the mid-1950s, leading to expanding functions of both government and business (Masumi 1967:34). The rapid growth ‘intensified the intimate political interdependence of the Japanese state and Japanese industrial society’ (Calder 1988:19). More specifically, the growth affected the relationship between the business community and conservative politicians (Johnson 1982; Masumi 1967), as financial contributions moved from individual entrepreneurs to various employer associations after the Occupation (Fukui 1970:51–2). At this time, the economic bureaucracy began sharing its powers with big business through consultations and *amakudari*, the hiring of ex-bureaucrats into industries (Johnson 1982:196). This signalled the end of state control and the birth of “Japanese style corporatism” (Johnson 1982:197). Watanabe (1962:98; see also Iyasu 1996) describes this development thus:

> After the war the *zaibatsu* were dismantled and tax and political funding laws were introduced. The big political funding source that the conservative parties had had before the war had been dismantled and in its stead individual businesses created various routes of funding to leaders within the conservative parties. Those who achieved control of this funding absorbing route became the party’s *jitsuryokusha* [powerful politicians] and 30–40 member groups of rank-and-file Dietmembers emerged around them. There was
overlapping between these factions in terms of funding and each jitsuryokusha had links to tens or hundreds of businesses.

Scholars have debated whether big business was instrumental in the conservative merger in 1955 (Kohno 1997:76; Masumi 1985:249), but it is clear that the relationship between business and political parties had consolidated at this time, affecting the future development of the factions. It should be noted that the system whereby financial channels to politicians became visible and powerful took about ten years to emerge. This is not to say that business did not influence party politics in the first decade of the postwar period. Financial interests intervened in the struggles taking place within the Jiyūtō at various times, and tried to influence politics to increase stability (Fukui 1970:50).18

As discussed in Chapter 3, the big business organisations had not been closely connected to the conservative parties until this time in spite of some political interference, as in the calls for unification in 1952–54. Such interventions by big business and business organisations increased in the mid–1950s. Another significant step in this direction came in January 1955, before the formation of the LDP, when the economic community, led by Ishikawa Ichirō, president of the Federation of Economic Organisations, and Fujiyama Aiichirō, president of the Chamber of Commerce, created an organisation known as the Economic Reconstruction Council (Keizai saiken kondankai) (ERC) (Katō 1963; Uchida 1969:88; Fukui 1970:146). The Shipbuilding Scandal had partly prompted the establishment of the council, and Uemura Kōgorō, vice chair of Keidanren and leader of the ERC, said it was necessary, in order to avoid corruption in relation to donations, to

Put them in a blender to remove their colouring, so to speak, consolidate them, and then make contributions focused on the general objective of implementing appropriate policies for the reconstruction of the Japanese economy and the stabilization of the people’s livelihood (Masumi 1985:306).

Estimates for LDP spending varied from 20–80 million yen per month. The government gave 20,000 yen per Diet seat (see JT 11.2.61; 14.2.61). The ERC was to be independent, gathering contributions from companies and federations to all parties, and distributing them to all the parties in the name of the Council, although over 90% of the funds seem
to have gone to the conservative parties (Masumi 1985:306–7; Thayer 1969:77–8)). The
council donated 100 million yen to all major parties in February 1955, and between 2500
and 3700 million yen in 1955 and 1960 (Masumi 1985:307; Thayer 1969). However, in
spite of the great success in the 1960 election, when the council gathered 800 million yen,
mainly for the LDP, the organisation was disbanded in March 1961 (JT 11.2.61). Both
sides had become disillusioned with the ERC. Business leaders had complained that in
spite of increasing financial demands by politicians, the LDP was not maintaining its
political strength. Business leaders were also complaining that the factions were not
weakening in spite of the centralisation of funding but were in fact asking for funds for
themselves (Thayer 1969:78). The Japan Times reported in December 1959 that in spite
of the 20 million yen donated monthly to the LDP, ‘[T]he council serves as a channel
through which only official donations are made. Privately businessmen have been asked
by the various factions of the Tory party to make other donations’ (28.12.59). For their
part, politicians complained that they were like ‘errand boys of the economic community’
(Thayer 1969:79). Kōno Ichirō (1958:199) was very critical of business intervention and
argued that

Of course the relations between business and politics should be close but there should be
a mutual firm understanding that each does their part. If not, then politics will deteriorate
and the business world will become corrupt. If we look at this historically, we see that
Hatoyama and other prewar politicians trusted in this distinction. Recently, however, it
has become blurred, and the nation’s trust in conservative politics has fallen as a result.

Kōno was infuriated by the business world’s meddling in the issue of Hatoyama’s
resignation as prime minister in 1956 when it proposed that Hatoyama should quickly
retire as he was in ill health and not able to do his duties (Kōno 1958:192). A meeting
was held with business leaders and business organisations where Kōno spoke strongly
against business interference in political matters (Kōno 1958:193).

In response to these problems of the ERC, the LDP decided in December 1959 to form a
committee, Jiyū Kokumin Rengō (National Union of Liberals), within the party to gather
funds for LDP members through monthly donations (JT 28.12.59). The committee had 40
members who sought contributions from industry. A major criticism of this arrangement
was that it was not very different from the ERC, apart from the fact that politicians rather than business were gathering the money—from the same sources—and thus did not reduce the danger of mismanagement (Thayer 1969:80).

After the dissolution of the ERC, the Kokumin Kyōkai (The People's Association) was formed in July 1961 as a body to 'collect operational funds of the Liberal-Democratic Party from every stratum of the people' (*JT* 22.11.61). The Kokumin Kyōkai had established local offices in all prefectures by the mid–1960s (Thayer 1969:81) with the purpose to 'remove the direct links and interest hunting between politicians and enterprises' (Katō 1963:41). The Kokumin Kyōkai was very different from the ERC in that first, it was directly linked to the LDP; second, for the first time, funding effort included the public as well as business; and third, it was based on monthly dues rather than voluntary donations (Thayer 1969:80). The idea was that individual members could pay between 100 and 10,000 yen per month, and organizations and companies up to 100,000 yen, which would go into the coffers of the party (*JT* 11.61). 'The whole idea is to have grass-roots support for the party, as it were, instead of the financial backing of only the big business' (*JT* 14.2.62). The Kokumin Kyōkai became the most important fundraiser for the party, coordinating donations and providing 90% of the LDP funds by the mid–1960s (Fukui 1970:146). It was meant to curb the increasing power of the factions and was designed to minimize, if not entirely eliminate overnight, private contributions going to individual leaders within the party, by channelizing the funds into the party treasury. If this plan proves successful, it would mean one effective way of eradicating factions, for factional leaders cannot exist without a solid financial basis' (*JT* 13.1.63).

Observers at this time were not oblivious to the fact that the establishment of such funding channels, meant to make financial contributions more visible and thus less liable to corruption, could actually strengthen and nurture the factions (Katō 1963:42). However, creating closer relations between business and politicians was mutually beneficial. The business community had greater opportunities to influence the political processes, while political leaders used business connections and their funding to strengthen their position within the party. The development of organised links between
business and politics in the early 1960s was strongly related to the struggle between those fighting to keep Ikeda in the Prime Minister chair for another term, and those aiming to replace him, a struggle that divided the business community as well (Katō 1963:43).

However, it soon became clear that the Kokumin Kyōkai suffered from fundamental weaknesses. First, the organisation was not preventing factional contributions. Business gave enough to the organisation to 'maintain a formal relationship' with the party, while a large portion of the contributions went to factions and individual politicians (Thayer 1969:73; JT 6.10.62). Second, the drive to increase contributions from individual party members did not succeed, and by 1965 it was clear that such contributions only amounted to 10% of all contributions (Thayer 1969:80-1). Third, although funds to the Kokumin Kyōkai did cover around 70% of the daily expenditures of the party, it did not suffice to run regional party chapters. Some observers pointed out that if all factions were abolished the party would have to distribute at least 1 million yen to each party member, at least twice a year, to reach the funding levels that the factions had reached by 1963 (JT 14.12.63; see also Watanabe 1958:20 for an estimate of amounts needed to be amassed by the party). Thus some politicians argued that if factions were abolished, total funds available would decrease, threatening the party's dominating status (Thayer 1969:54).

Views on the close relationship between business and politics were diverse. An observer argued that the close ties developing between politicians and the business community were an inevitable consequence of changing times saying: 'We are now in a situation where businessmen have to have an interest in politics and act politically' (Katō 1963:41). Many businessmen argued that collaboration was necessary for economic policy making and general political stability. Others, like Ishizaka Taizō, chairman of Keidanren, were against the forging of such close relations (Katō 1963:41).

In spite of differing views on the close relationship between the LDP and the business community it became clear that all moves to change funding routes after the formation of the ERC were calculated in terms of the power struggle within the party. The formation of the Jiyū Kokumin Rengō (National Union of Liberals) was said by some to be a tool to
prolong the life of the Kishi cabinet (*JT* 28.12.59) when it was first formed, while the
dissolution of the ERC in 1961 was said to benefit Kishi and Ikeda and disadvantage
smaller factions (*JT* 11.2.61). In the finance committee of the LDP in 1961, factional
balance had to be achieved to stop claims that the financial arrangements were benefiting
certain factions over others (Thayer 1969:79). In 1962, when Prime Minister Ikeda
wanted to appoint Ishida as director to strengthen the Kokumin Kyōkai the move was
seen as a political move by Ikeda to isolate Kōno financially (*JT* 14.2.62). During the
dissolution debate in the LDP in 1963, it also proved difficult to get the faction leaders to
follow the recommendation made that funding be centralised, because, it was argued,
other factions would still find a way to get private funding (Masumi 1967:44). All
tries at changes revealed the faction leaders’ determination to preserve their source of
funds to be able to maintain a following (*JT* 13.1.63). What made that possible was the
establishment of financial associations, the *seiji kessha*, around the factions in 1957–59 to
which I now turn.

5.4.2 Seiji kessha

The growth of the Japanese economy and the close relationship that was developing
between conservative politicians and big business contributed greatly to a
decentralisation of power within the party, financially and politically. Research has
shown that state funding of political parties serves to strengthen party headquarters *vis-à-
vis* the sub-units of the party (Müller 1993:422). This fits the LDP organisational history
well. Within the LDP, the factions became involved in political fundraising to a much
greater extent than had the factions of the Jiyūtō and Minshutō, raising much more from
private industries than the state provided. This led to decentralisation of the LDP—it was
no longer the party leadership, and in particular the secretary-general, who gathered and
distributed funding; the factions adopted this role. However, the factions could not
become viable financial units without political power. Sartori argues that money will start
to go to intra-party factions rather than the central party when the former have become a
‘more profitable investment’ (Sartori 1977:95). This was clearly seen in the LDP. As
seen when the Ishibashi cabinet was formed in December 1956, the factions were
emerging as groups with considerable political clout, with more autonomy than before, which weakened the party leadership.

This is when faction leaders started forming political associations (seiji kessha)—political groups around influential politicians, that gathered independent political funds. It had been observed in the presidential elections in 1956 that the faction leaders had acquired great financial power which they were using at their own discretion. Ishibashi’s pleas to the party to dissolve the factions were seen by the press as an opportunity to halt this development and ‘prevent Kishi, Ishii, Ōno and other party leaders from distributing election funds among their supporters’ (JT 24.1.57; see Fukui 1970:138). The Japan Times said about this:

A proposal was made in the LDP that in order to increase unity within the party the factions must be dissolved. All groups centering around individual leaders should be dissolved apart from the two groups coming from the LP and the DP. This proposal though had the disadvantage that it was taken by some as a method to ‘earmark the “outsider” Kishi, who belonged to neither of the two major parties, and make him a stranger among the other party members’ (24.1.57).

These calls were ignored. Independent political funds made it possible to assemble a faction and through it gain power within the new institutional environment of the LDP with its presidential elections and struggle between various politicians. By forming political associations, the factions could make larger political donations legal and avoid taxation. Factions were transforming themselves from the informal funding groups they had been into a new type of faction with twin features. One feature was the factions as political groups and ‘friendship societies’ creating a forum for fellow Dietmembers to meet, the other feature was the factions as financial associations with the main goal of getting political funding to and distribute it to members (JT 11.10.63).

The close links that were being forged between the jitsuryokusha and the business community deeply affected the nature of factional organisation. Most factions formed political associations in 1957. The Kishi faction formed the Kizankai in 1957; The Kōno faction formed the Shunjūkai; the Ikeda faction formed the Kōchikai; the Satō faction the
Shūzankai; the Ishibashi faction the Tanzankai; and the Ōno faction formed the Bokuseikai in 1958 (Fukui 1970:118).

Businessmen were likened to ‘cormorant fishermen’ as they were drawn to the factions by faction leaders eager to ‘enlarge their own support organisations’ (Katō 1963:40). Factions convinced businesses to give them funding by arguing that sufficient funding was the key to winning (AS 28.10.63). The factions created financial connections through a variety of links. Some of these connections had been created before the war and in the early postwar period, but the links grew markedly, based largely on connections through bureaucracy and school ties (Iyasu 1984:131). For example, Kishi had business connections dating back to his days in the wartime Ministry of Commerce and Industry, but was primarily in the steel and iron business, and got lot of money from Sumitomo (Katō 1963:40; Kurzman 1960:378; Babb 2001). The Satō faction built its funding on connections Satō had built up in the transport, maritime, and shipbuilding business during his time in the Transport Ministry. The Ikeda faction was in securities, automobile, and spinning. The Kôno faction was more influential amongst estate, sugar, fishing and water companies. The Ōno faction was in construction (like the Kôno faction) but its support was not as clearly tied to specific industries as that of the other factions (Watanabe 1958:128–9). The Ishii faction had financial connections through former Jiyūtō members in the petrol, spinning, and rubber industries. The Miki-Matsumura and Ishibashi factions built up links with individual businessmen (Watanabe 1958:128). A fundamental factor in the rise of the Fujiyama faction was the fact that Fujiyama himself had extensive business connections.

Fundraising ability was recognised in the late 1950s as fundamental for factional buildup, and this changed the parameters defining effective faction size (see Watanabe 1958:166). The Fujiyama and Ishida factions could only enter the factional race in the end of the 1950s when they achieved independent financial ability (Watanabe 1958:170). Those, like Ashida Hitoshi, who, in spite of a long political career, did not have financial ability to support a faction on par with the strongest factions, had to withdraw from the race (Watanabe 1958:195). The LDP factional system did not allow small patron-client groups.
like those that were found in the Jiyūtō and Minshutō. Factions had to have at least a dozen members to be viable, and there was an upper limit to their size as well, which again made them different from the old factions. In the early 1960s a faction leader was not considered able to support more than around 40 members financially (see Watanabe 1964:2–3). The early factions, because of their very different functions, were not perceived as having such limits to membership and many Jiyūtō factions had between 70 and 100 members.

In the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō, those controlling the secretary-generalship, the main conduit for political funds, often acquired a faction. In the LDP, these conduits of funds multiplied, and included not only the secretary-general and those in charge of finance committees, but also new organisations like the Kokumin Kyōkai and all the routes being set up by individual faction leaders (see JT 14.2.62). The power of the secretary-general was being rivaled by the rapidly increasing ability by other prominent politicians to gather funding.

Observers in the late 1950s forecast that the LDP factions could not continue to strengthen because of their size, lack of unity and limited access to funds, and that they would vanish when the money dried up as had been the case with the Jiyūtō (Watanabe 1958:108). This proved to be a miscalculation as the factions in the LDP went on to forge direct links with the business community. After the formation of the first Kishi cabinet, and even more so after the formation of the second cabinet, the factions had acquired the political power necessary to make them, rather than the party leadership, profitable financial recipients. The news brought to Kawashima, secretary-general, by the business community that they were being approached by individual politicians for funds (Watanabe 1958; Iseri 1988:184), prompted Prime Minister Kishi to call for the dissolution of factions in the autumn of 1957 (AS 7.9.57; Watanabe 1958:21). By autumn 1957, six factions had reported as political associations (AS 7.9.57).

Observers debated whether Kishi’s attempts to restore the power of the party leader were effective or not (Watanabe 1958; Iseri 1988:73). Prime Minister Kishi acknowledged in September 1957 that it might prove difficult to dissolve factions as they had started to report as
political associations and were also serving as a meeting point for ‘likeminded people’ (AS 19.9.57). Although factions had served as financial tools for a long time, the formalisation of the factions as financial recipients changed radically the image of factions. Kishi said about this change in early September 1957: ‘the factions have become quite different from the time of the presidential elections’ (AS 2.9.57). A few days later at a press conference, he made clear his worries and explained that dissolution was necessary to stop the development whereby politicians created new groups that they then reported as political associations and sought to gather funding through them. This, he warned, had made the factions ‘a party within the party’ (AS 7.9.57).

Many scholars have argued that it was under the Kishi administration that the factions started to consolidate. Masumi (1995:2; see also Goto et al. 1982:148) argued that:

The basic organizational structure of the LDP was established while Kishi Nobusuke was party president and prime minister in 1957–60. Its most important element was the habatsu, or faction, a unit central to the distribution of party and governmental posts.

This was largely due to the fact that the factions became seiji kessha in this period. In spite of Kishi’s attempts to curb the growing political and financial influence of the factions, they continued to grow and their relations to big business expanded. While contributions in the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō had been very personal in character, the connections in the LDP became formalised. Although many businesses gave to a number of factions and would attend the meetings of many factions (Thayer 1969:74), their connections to individual factions became very close, in particular with the establishment of common study groups, to which I turn now.

5.4.3. Forging links between factions and business

After the factions had established seiji kessha, and forged close links with big business, another step towards even closer relations between factions and business came in the early 1960s as factions formed study groups with leading businessmen. These changes revealed clearly the increasing role of money in politics. To many commentators, the early 1960s were in fact ‘the peak of informal business influence’ (Babb 2001:26; Katō 1963).
At the end of 1962, Satō Eisaku formed a group called Chōeikai based on the close relations Satō had built with Anzai Hiroshi, vice chairman of Tokyo Gas. It included many influential businessmen such as the chairmen of Yawata Iron Manufacture and Nikkyo Securities and the president of Fuji Bank. The Kōno faction established a similar organisation in April 1962, called the Tokyo Shunjūkai as a ‘venue for businessmen and political leaders to discuss matters’ (Katō 1963:40). Around 200 businessmen were connected to the club, among them the chairmen of Showa Denkō and Komatsu. At the same time, Miki Takeo formed the Chūō Seisaku Kenkyusho (Central Policy Research Club) which included many well known businesses and business organisations such as Nihon Boeikai and the Japan Committee for Economic Development (Keizai Dōyūkai). Prime Minister Ikeda’s Köchikai arranged meetings for discussion between the faction members and business, and also arranged smaller meetings between the leaders of his faction and business groups, in the so-called Suehirokai (Thayer 1969:66). Ikeda was particularly well connected in the business world and worked closely with the so-called ‘four samurai’, Kobayashi Ataru (former banker and influential member of the business community), Nagano Shigeo (vice president of Japan Chamber of Commerce and before that, Nippon Steel), Sakurada Takeshi (Executive director of Nikkeiren), and Mizuno Shigeo (Katō 1963:41; Thayer 1969:166; Calder 1988:96). These groups were not exclusive and some businessmen would attend meetings with more than one faction or move from one to another.

Fukui argued that there were indications that the Kokumin Kyōkai would curb factional ability to raise funds (1970:158, 169). However, it became clear that the close relationship between the LDP and big business, which had started to consolidate in the late 1950s, continued to be concentrated within the confines of the factions and that attempts to establish centralised fundraising bodies could not curb that development.

5.4.4. The financial relations between leaders and followers

The close relationship between faction leaders and business leaders greatly facilitated a stable financial relationship between faction leaders and faction members. It became clear
in December 1956 that factional leaders used money from business to ensure the support of Diet members in presidential elections. Their appeal to Diet members was ‘look for a big tree when you seek shelter’ and a faction executive was quoted as saying: ‘in our faction we are making a big reliable tree with money’ (AS 28.10.63). Scholars have argued that the electoral system played a central role in transferring financial power from the party headquarters to the factions (Cox and Thies 1998; Hrebenar 1986a, Curtis 1988; Iwai 1990). Developments in the late 1950s, however, indicate that power relations within the party were much more instrumental than concerns about factional competition in electoral districts in driving this development.

As Kawashima had feared, the 1956 presidential election saw a mad scramble for votes as the three candidates sought to buy the support of regional representatives and Diet members (see JT 17.12.58). Local representatives attending the party conference were provided with housing, money, women and banquets after arriving at Tokyo airports and railway stations (Watanabe 1966:31; JT 11.12.56). It was estimated that the three candidates used up to 300 million yen, but in 1960 Ikeda alone was reported as having spent 700 million yen to ensure his election, while Ōno blamed his defeat on the lack of money (Watanabe 1966:64).

Diet members needed considerable funding to, first, tend to the perceived needs of the electorate, including bon kure gifts (gifts given at the Bon festival and at year end), gifts for weddings and funerals and for purchases of equipment (Watanabe 1958:6). Money was needed to give to local politicians in the prefecture, city and towns and to influential men (yūryokusha) in villages, as well as to voters who came to Tokyo for sightseeing (Watanabe 1958:6). Second, Diet members needed to pay for the ever more expensive election campaigns. A common ‘quote’ was ‘nitori, ichiraku’ (with two you are in, with one you are out), according to the Japan Times, where ‘two’ meant 20 million yen and ‘one’ meant 10 million yen. In the summer of 1956 it was claimed that election costs had gone up and that the slogan was now ‘santō, niraku’ (with three you are in, with two you are out) (JT 30.6.56). However, some estimated that the party was only giving a third to one tenth of the real cost of an election to a Diet member (Thayer 1969:29; JT 10.12.60).
The rest had to be gathered through other means, such as friends and relatives, business firms, personal funds and factions (Thayer 1969:29-30). After the formation of the LDP, the factions became a major provider of these funds.

The cost of elections had always been a source of concern for Dietmembers. In the first years of the postwar period, the cost of elections was lower, but the main difference from the LDP was to be found in the structure of political funding. The LDP factions developed threefold functions as a funding aid, both for elections and for daily expenses: a faction leader would give funding to members; he would put members into contact with business leaders; and in some factions, well connected members would help other members with funding (Thayer 1969:30). Political expenditure and the ability to provide these funds rose steadily, and especially under the Kishi administration (Tominomori 1994:146). According to Watanabe, factions were distributing around 1–2 million yen to each member and around 500,000 yen for o-chūgen (mid-summer presents) in 1958. The abilities of the factions varied with size and financial connections (Watanabe 1958:169-70; Fujiyama 1976:245). In the 1958 elections, each faction leader as well as a number of individual politicians supported a number of candidates and sought to give them nearly as much as the party headquarters’ contribution (AS 18.5.58).30 The system was still very loose and nearly 200 candidates were receiving funding from more than one faction according to the Asahi Shimbun (AS 18.5.58).

By the February 1960 general election, the amount of funding had doubled or even tripled as candidates got 2–3 million yen from the faction in addition to the 1 million yen from the party. Faction leaders gave in addition 100,000 yen monthly in summer ochūgen and in ‘mochidai’ (general expenses) (Iyasu 1984:125; Fujiyama 1976:245). In the 1960s, a seniority rule developed in some factions and those elected many times would get more funds than junior Dietmembers. Other factions would distribute a basic sum with the possibility of a supplement later (Thayer 1969:30). This change was made possible because of the cultivation of relations between influential politicians and business.
Many scholars argued that the multimember electoral system made elections in Japan very expensive, forcing LDP candidates to use money to distinguish between themselves and other LDP candidates in the districts, and that this was 'the main reason why almost all candidates in the LDP belong to a particular faction' (Shiratori 1988:174; Cox and Thies 1998:268; Fukui 1978:50; Baerwald 1986:40-1). It became clear in the presidential elections in December 1956 that the factions' financial capability had grown considerably, and before the general elections in May 1958, it was clear that all the LDP factions were supporting their 'own' candidates (AS 18.5.58). However, my data suggests that this support came about as a result of power struggles at the party centre and not because of the electoral system as such. As seen in the development of membership of factions, party members moved between factions and were affiliated with more than one faction in many cases in the early years of the party, similar to the Jiyūtō and Minshutō. As a result, the financial support was not exclusive; and there is much to suggest that party members did not seek 'shelter under a big tree' but looked to a number of politicians. The reason for the factionalisation was that the options available to party members in relation to financial support were changing, irrespective of the electoral system. The weak leadership structure of the party allowed party leaders to build up their own financial power and thus allowed them to keep continuous pressure on the leadership. This created incentives for candidates to look to one faction only for support in return for their allegiance.

There can be no doubt that the wider structural economic environment affected party development in Japan in the early postwar period. For example, the dissolution of the zaibatsu during the Occupation and the reorganisation of the business community in Japan helped to create factionalism, reshuffling political funding routes and eventually leading to a diversified system which allowed politicians to acquire political power (Watanabe 1958:15; Baerwald 1964:225). However, it is important to note that the relationship between this structural environment and political organisation is not one-sided. Politicians were also active in creating this system. The political environment within the party changed to such an extent that financial power became the main criteria for political leadership, not only of the party, but also of the factions. This led a number
Chapter 5: The New Factions: From the Centre to the Periphery

... of prominent politicians to lose their status within the LDP because of their inability to acquire the financial power needed for leadership (see Watanabe 1958:196, 158). Before the presidential elections in the summer of 1960 Ikeda is said to have boasted that he was the second best fundraiser after Kishi, and that ‘Ishii has practically no ability in this respect. Therefore, Ikeda argues that Ishii is not qualified to become the party’s next president’ (JT 1.6.60).

5.5. Conclusion

It has been argued in this chapter that the institutional approach to factionalism in Japan is flawed because of the excessive importance attributed to broad structural factors like the multimember electoral system. A comparison of factionalism in the first decade of the postwar period with factionalism in the first years of the LDP shows that the electoral system did not cause factionalisation. The fight in electoral districts was a reflection of power struggles at the centre of the party. As seen in Chapter 3, factional fighting had not dominated electoral politics in the Jiyūtō and Minshutō. In the early years of the LDP, factional fighting started to spread to electoral districts, but it took time before it affected electoral politics to the extent that nominations reflected the factional divisions of the party clearly. In the period under study here, it was very common for factions to get more than one of their candidates elected in a district. This indicates that, although factional politics in the LDP had become entrenched within the multimember electoral system, the electoral system did not create the factional divisions. Rather, after factional conflict had consolidated at the centre, not only dominating presidential elections, but also cabinet formations and party appointments, factional conflict spread to the electoral districts. The multimember electoral system made factional divisions locally possible, especially with the emergence of the kōenkai, and thus allowed the expansion of factional divisions.

Similarly, the electoral system did not create the factions as financial groups. Again, the formation of seiji kessha was due to power conflicts at the centre, which encouraged politicians to forge independent links with business, thereby contributing to the decentralisation of the party. The economic development of the latter half of the 1950s led to an expansion in the functions of both politics and business. As Masumi (1967:34)
noted, this led to problems in LDP organisation and leadership power, and 'at the core of the problem was fierce factional fight centering on the presidential election.' The ability of the LDP executive to control the party decreased greatly as individual politicians forged relations with big business, and in the process strengthened their position within the party to challenge the party leadership.

The electoral system came to be an integral part of this factional system, but, as I have argued, it did not form a decisive role in forming the factions. Rather, factional struggles at the centre of the party based on leadership fights and competition over rank-and-file support, spread out to the electoral districts, where candidates were being recruited into factions before being elected, and they in turn sought factional, rather than party, support. The organisational environment affected factional development, as seen in the changes in funding, electioneering and leadership selection within the LDP. The following chapter will focus further on the creation of this new factional structure, the debate about the positive and negative effects of factionalism, and how public discourse reveals the emergence of 'traditional' factionalism.

Notes

1 See Stockwin 1983 for an excellent discussion on the electoral system for both houses of the Diet.
2 All the same, the underlying assumption has been common that the multimember electoral system actually created factional politics. Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993:63), for example, argued that because the Jiyūtō and the Shinpotō chose a multimember electoral system in 1947, it 'left them with the problem of intra-party factions.' But Ramseyer and Rosenbluth do not provide supporting evidence for their claim.
3 In the 1949 general elections the Jiyūtō did though get 264 seats which comes close to the seats obtained by the LDP until 1963, which fluctuated between 283 and 296.
4 My data builds on Reed (1992) and only shows candidates elected from the same districts, not those running but losing. I left out the 1955 election because of lack of faction data at the time of the cabinet formation.
5 This could be seen in many other districts, the Asahi Shimbun mentions Hokkaidō 5th district, Aomori 2nd district, Gunma 2nd, Niigata 3rd, Ishikawa 2nd, Aichi 1st, Nara, Okayama 1st and 2nd districts, Fukuoka 4th, Kumamoto 2nd, and Kagoshima 1st district (AS 9.11.63).
6 Ishii boasted for example after the election in 1958 that all the candidates that he had supported had been elected and that his faction had gained four members through his strong support (AS 25.5.58).
7 Iyasu noted that the Ōno, Fujiyama, Matsumura, Ishii and Ikeda factions all 'advanced' by running in the presidential election of 1960 (Iyasu 1984:117; see also Watanabe 1966:59). The Ishibashi faction on the other hand did not grow into a solid group (kyōkōna shūdan) like the other factions and thus 'failed' (Iyasu 1984:117).
8 When Ogata died Matsuno Raizō took his place on the committee (Watanabe 1966:24).
Chapter 5: The New Factions: From the Centre to the Periphery

9 The Shinpotō later appointed Machida as president but when he was purged the seat was left empty. Shidehara was made president on 3 May 1946.

10 The Minshutō, established on 31 March 1947, started with the group leadership of five people, but Ashida and Shidehara later vied for the post. Ashida was elected. When he fell from grace over the Showa Denkō scandal, Inukai Ken was made president in a secret election. The opposition between the renritsuha and the yatoha ended with the latter winning, choosing Tomabechi Gizō party president and then uniting in February 1952 with the Kokukyōtō to form a political club that later became Kaishintō (Watanabe 1966:23-4; Rōyama 1954:156-7).

11 Quigley and Turner notes that 'a selection committee of twenty party lieutenants was authorized to weigh the respective claims of the various factions and to decide upon a suitable leader for the presidency' (Quigley and Turner 1956:338). The Kaishinto later brought Shigemitsu in from the diplomatic service and made him president.

12 Prior to the first presidential election in December 1956 the chōrō attempted to reach an agreement on a nomination before the convention. Those attending were Masutani Shūji, Ōno Bamboku, Hayashi Jōji, Sunada Shigemasa, Kōno Ichirō, Ōasa Tadao, Mizuta Mikio, Katō Ryōgorō, Kitamura Tokutaro, Hoshijima Jirō, Matsumura Kenzō, Uehara Etsujirō, and Matsuno Tsuruhei (Watanabe 1966:40). However, their efforts were fruitless.

13 Quigley and Turner notes that 'a selection committee of twenty party lieutenants was authorized to weigh the respective claims of the various factions and to decide upon a suitable leader for the presidency' (Quigley and Turner 1956:338). The Kaishinto later brought Shigemitsu in from the diplomatic service and made him president.

12 Prior to the first presidential election in December 1956 the chōrō attempted to reach an agreement on a nomination before the convention. Those attending were Masutani Shūji, Ōno Bamboku, Hayashi Jōji, Sunada Shigemasa, Kōno Ichirō, Ōasa Tadao, Mizuta Mikio, Katō Ryōgorō, Kitamura Tokutaro, Hoshijima Jirō, Matsumura Kenzō, Uehara Etsujirō, and Matsuno Tsuruhei (Watanabe 1966:40). However, their efforts were fruitless.

14 The Ishii and Ishibashi factions and their followers made a so-called nisan'i rengō [second and third place coalition] agreement before the presidential elections in 1956 ensuring that the candidate landing in the third place would support the candidate in the second place after the first round, if necessary. The qualified votes at the convention were 299 LDP members in the HR, 126 members in the HC and 92 representatives from the districts, a total of 517. Six were absent and did not vote. The result after the first round was Kishi 223 votes, Ishibashi 151 and Ishii 137 votes. After the second round Ishibashi came first with 7 votes over Kishi, 251 against 258 (Iyasu 1984:110). One vote was invalid. 28 votes therefore went from the Ishii-Ishibashi camp to Kishi in the second round (Watanabe 1966:38).

15 On January 16 1959, just before the fourth presidential election in the LDP, a secret meeting was held in a hotel in Hibiya. It was a Pledge to Cooperate, detailing transfers of power, signed by Satō, Kōno, Ōno, and Kishi. The pledge was that the administration should go to Ōno, then Kōno, and then to Satō (Watanabe 1966:46).

16 Many politicians also acknowledged the use of money to manipulate politicians in the early days of the LDP. Miyazawa Kiichi said in an interview in 1998: 'We've made clear progress in the sense that the factions simply don't have the money anymore. It's a sad state of affairs in a way, but also very desirable in that the curious type of control that once distinguished the LDP has ceased to exist. The younger politicians can't be controlled by money anymore' (Shinohara 1998:24). Others refuted this view. Kuraishi Tadao said: It is said that factional leaders give money to those Diet members that belong to their factions in the traditional money giving seasons, but this amount is tiny and only etiquette. When we look closely at the matter it emerges that it is the feeling of Diet members that it is not money but appointments that attract them (Masumi 1967:38). Tamura Hajime, a member of the Ōno faction, also said he did not enter the Ōno faction for funding reasons, as he was the son of a wealthy man (Tamura 1994:27).

17 Sartori (1976:93) argues that although the LDP resulted from successive fusions 'the allocation of resources has not been "fused"' and points out that the discontinuity between prewar and postwar parties in Italy is much greater in comparison.

18 For example, late in 1952, Nagano Mamoru, a financial leader, acted as a mediator between the Yoshida and Hatoyama forces, calling for peace within the party. It was argued that business donations to the party were made on the condition that the party would remain intact and stable (NT 27.10.52). There were also attempts to affect party policy, as seen in the debates on the anti-monopoly law in 1949 and 1953 when Keidanren set up a committee on the issue and worked closely with the government, and on the issue of defence production in the mid-1950s (Fukui 1970:51).

19 As seen in the following chapter, the Kokumin Kyōkai featured strongly in the movement to abolish factions in 1963. Following the Miki report in October 1963, Ikeda pledged 'greater effort' to decrease the importance of money in politics. The report recommended that all financial support be channeled
through the Kokumin Kyōkai; that a rigid ceiling be set on contributions to individuals; and that a watchdog committee be set up to ‘curb and penalize any deviation from the rules’ (JT 19.10.63).

20 The tax law stipulated that business firms keep records of political contributions and that individuals must declare the receipt of such a gift in their income tax returns. If the money was, however, given to a ‘political organisation’ it had nothing to do with the politician’s income tax. The Japan Times thus argued that this caused the establishment of ‘political organisations’ to channel the political donations (25.7.63).

21 The Ōno faction did not form a seiji kessha until after most other factions had done so. This was believed to be because of Ōno’s clout as fundraiser, and the financial independence of many of his faction members, who did not have to rely as much on Ōno as many other faction members did (Watanabe 1958:113–115).

22 Ōno considered this his strength in the 1960 presidential elections. He says in his memoirs: ‘I had no links with business. I had no money. But on the other hand if I had no links I had no strings with business either. There would be no restrictions on me in politics, I would be able engage in politics for the benefit of the people and would in turn get their support’ (Ōno 1964:106).

23 He had connections with a variety of industries and was said to be close to Mizuno Shigeo, president of Fuji Steel Manufacturers, Adachi Tadashi, president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and of Radio Tokyo, Iwase Eiichirō, president of Mitsukoshi department store, and Shōji Takeo president of Asahi Denka Kogyo (Kurzman 1960:378).

24 Ishibashi was the first to report his Tanzankai as a political association, followed by Kishi’s Kizankai. Others were Sunada’s group, Kōno’s Shunjūkai, Satō’s Shūzankai and Ikeda’s Kōchikai (AS 7.9.57; Watanabe 1958:22).

25 Watanabe (1958:21–22) argued that if Kishi’s plans had succeeded, this would have strengthened the party leadership and weakened party democracy. In his view, Kishi’s attempts to dissolve factions were similar to the methods used in Tokugawa Japan to weaken the daimyō (1958:22). This was an argument he also made during the calls for abolition of factions in 1963 (see Chapter 6).

26 Kōno is also reported to have two other groups for liaison between business and his faction. The Azabudai Club was a general meeting of all faction members with the economic community while the Sankin Society was for monthly meetings of the faction’s leaders and a smaller number of businessmen. It was headed by Nagata Masaichi from Daiei Motion Pictures, Hagiwara Kichitarō of Hokkaidō Mining and Shipping, and Kawai Yoshinari of Komatsu Manufacturing Co. (Thayer 1969:67)

27 The Ekonomisuto noted that Anzai Hiroshi of Tokyo Gas was a member of Satō’s Chōeikai, while his younger brother, Anzai Masao of Showa Denkō, was a member of the rival Kōno faction’s Tokyo Shunjūkai (1963:40).

28 There are no confirmed numbers available. Some sources estimated that Kishi used 300 million yen, Ishihashi 150 million, and Ishii 80 million yen while other sources estimate that the expenditures were 100 million yen, 60 million yen and 40 million yen respectively (see Iyasu 1984:110; Watanabe 1966:30).

29 Fujiyama (1976) gave an account of his sources in his memoirs, but he also had much personal wealth to build his faction on in the early years although it dried up in the mid-1960s.

30 The individual politicians supporting candidates included Fujiyama Aiichirō, Ichimanda Hisato, Kaya Okinori and Ishida Hirohide, but they were all eager to establish their own factions (AS 18.5.58).
CHAPTER 6:

TRADITION, MODERNISATION AND ATTEMPTS TO ABOLISH FACTIONS

6.1. Introduction

As factionalism became entrenched in the LDP and started to affect politics more, calls for the abolition of factions increased. As discussed earlier, the factionalism of the early postwar period was seen to be highly destabilising for the political system and there were periodic calls in the media, from both political analysts and politicians, for a stop to factional infighting. It was not, however, until the late 1950s that calls for ‘dissolution’ of factions (habatsu kaisan) were made. The first calls for dissolution of factions were made after the formation of the first Ishibashi cabinet in December 1956. In the autumn of 1957 factions were officially dissolved but were revived unofficially shortly afterwards. The second and much more influential movement for dissolution started in 1960 and reached its peak in late 1963. Factionalism however survived. Some detailed historical analyses have been done on the movement for dissolution of factions (Masumi 1967; Watanabe 1966; Iseri 1988; Uchida 1983). The movement has often been dismissed as a cynical political strategy. It was used, it was argued, in inter-factional battles to gain the upper hand in the battle for leadership of the party (Masumi 1995; Watanabe 1962; Fukui 1970; Iseri 1988) and perhaps to pacify the public, increasingly critical of the factional maneuvers in the LDP. Masumi argues, for example, that ‘probably no one, not even those who were calling for the elimination of the factions, really believed that they could be dissolved’ (Masumi 1995:3). Scholars have come to the conclusion that the efforts to dissolve the factions yielded no results and that the whole movement did not affect the development of factionalism.

This chapter will discuss the most significant movement for dissolution of factionalism— that occurring between 1962 and 1964. Although all the attempts to uproot factionalism failed, I will argue that the movement for factional dissolution in 1962–64 had a much
greater influence on the development of factionalism than is usually acknowledged. Taking my cue from Dryzek (1997), I seek to identify different discourses on factionalism in the early 1960s and different ways of understanding factions and their political effects. The debate that ensued within and outside the LDP on the positive and negative effects of factionalism, I argue, was strongly linked to the social movement on democracy and modernisation which was very active in the early 1960s, spurred by both internal and foreign efforts to realise 'true' democratisation in Japan. I argue that two main discourses can be identified during the early 1960s which portrayed factionalism as traditional. I argue that the development from informal tendencies and patron client groups into highly institutionalised groups was not a natural or predictable part of the modernisation of Japan and that the view of the LDP factions as 'traditional' was akin to an 'invented tradition.' The debate on traditions and modernisation in Japan helped to reinforce a factional discourse which saw the LDP factions as 'traditional' and Japanese, emphasising continuity in Japan's development as 'indigenous norms' reasserted themselves (see Stockwin 1983:209), while at the same time working against too much Westernisation. In this sense, both main discourses on factions in the early 1960s served to give factions history and tradition to fall back upon, making them a more accepted aspect of Japanese political life.

6.2. Democratising Japan: uprooting the traditional
Within the LDP, the early 1960s were dominated by a debate on the future of the party, and the need for it to modernise. To many observers, the LDP was not a modern party, it lacked a modern structure and focus on policy. Factionalism was considered a cause, as well as a symptom of this problem (see e.g. Masumi 1967; AS 2.6.58; JT 9.6.59).

Although the concept of modernisation only emerged in Japanese studies in the early 1960s (Kersten 2000), it was closely related to the ongoing debate on Japan's democratisation that had commenced following Japan's defeat in the Second World War. The view that Japan and Japanese politics were not modern, but governed by traditional thought and values, had been prevalent in Western analyses of Japan since before the end of the war. The idea was promoted in the United States during the Pacific War that they
were fighting an enemy nurtured by traditional and undemocratic values. The US State Department noted in a report written shortly before the end of the war, that ‘Despite the drastic economic changes of the past 30 years, the social structure retains many features of Tokugawa feudal days’ (OSS/State Reports, Japan Social Relations in Japan 1945). Not only that, US authorities promoted an image of their enemy as inherently inferior, primitive, childish and suffering from mental and emotional deficiency (Dower 1986:9, 270). The Japanese were often depicted as subhuman and propaganda pictures showed them as animals: monkeys, dogs, sheep or vermin (Dower 1986:37).

Through the ‘national character’ studies that were popular before and during the war in the US, the Japanese people and their war behaviour was explained through culture and personality. Militarism arose out of Japan’s history, culture and collective psychology, the story went (Dower 1986:29). The Japanese were fanatically loyal and conformist, filial and devoid of individualistic attributes. They were also considered devoid of logic and rationality. The analogue with sheep pointed out the perceived ‘herd mentality’ of the Japanese (Dower 1986:84).

After the war, the SCAP Government Section, many of its staff having been involved with Roosevelt’s New Deal, became very enthusiastic for the ‘uprooting of the injustices and traditional attitudes which, it was plausibly argued, had nurtured Japanese ultranationalism’ (Sims 2000:241; Dower 1986:23; Baerwald 1977:9; Ward 1968a:482). To achieve this objective, Japan needed to shed its feudal character and to be thoroughly democratised. SCAP said about the wartime leaders of Japan:

It was these very persons, born and bred as feudalistic overlords, who held the lives and destiny of the majority of Japan’s people in virtual slavery, and who, working in closest affiliation with its military, geared the country with both the tools and the will to wage aggressive war (SCAP Review of Government and Politics, Feb. 1951, 02558-60).

In the first two decades after the end of the war, Western analyses of the Japanese were dominated by the view that Japan was essentially premodern and feudalistic. Those involved with Japan’s recovery argued that ‘there was something fundamentally unhealthy and undemocratic about Japan’s whole process of modernisation since 1868’
Chapter 6: Tradition, Modernisation and Attempts to Abolish Factions

and thus needed to be 'cured' (Sims 2000:240). This made 'rooting out feudalism in a hurry' a major task for the Occupation authorities (Wildes 1954:67; Dower 1986:306; Baerwald 1977; Hall 1965; Ishida 1968). Japanese intellectuals took a similar stance, arguing that the war had been caused by the lack of autonomy by society from the state (Kersten 2000:1; Maruyama 1963:258). After the end of the war, Dower has argued, the deep racism of the war years subsided somewhat but in its place 'benign racism' appeared. This racism was discernible in reports written by SCAP, and also in literature on Japan in the 1950s as well as the English speaking media, such as the Nippon Times. Japan was immature in terms of culture, personality and institutions (see Dower 1986:124). The Japanese were like children to be educated and 'guided toward maturity' (Dower 1986:303, 122). This view was not only expressed by US experts but also by UK specialists, who referred to the 'present immaturity' of Japanese development (Dower 1986:134).

Said's (1978) groundbreaking work on Orientalism showed how the West had constructed images of the Orient as totally different from and opposed to the West, while at the same time reducing the Orient 'to a timeless essence that pervades, shapes and defines the significance of the people and events that constitute it' (Carrier 1995:2). The American government and foreign scholars revealed interesting images of the Orient and of the West itself in the views they expressed about Japan during and after the war. During the war foreign governments and scholars had viewed Japan as 'us' against 'them,' creating an Orient that was different and often inferior to the West. Other scholars have since come forward and pointed to the existence of an 'Occident'—implicit assumptions made about the West itself that contrasted with the non-West. Scholars and observers, not to mention SCAP, used opposed essentialisations to create an image of the West as well as of Japan which were in contrast (see Carrier 1995). From the images conjured of the Japanese, the West was rational, individualistic, modern, mature. Both images were, of course, imagined (Carrier 1995:28; Spencer 1995:237).

The dichotomy between the traditional and the modern in Japanese politics was marked throughout the early postwar period. Democratisation meant reform of the Japanese and
Chapter 6: Tradition, Modernisation and Attempts to Abolish Factions

their institutions to make them 'conform more or less with Western democratic norms' (Stockwin 1982:44; Ward 1968a:486). Factionalism featured in this debate on Japanese institutions and Japanese ways of thinking and was considered a feudal heritage. Although the Occupation authorities used the word 'faction' with little consistency, to refer to both parties and intra-party groups, the general view was that Japan was factionalised; that this was a premodern characteristic; and thus bad. The US State Department had noted in the last stage of the war that a variety of cliques (batsu) existed at different levels of Japanese society, zaibatsu (financial cliques), gunbatsu (military cliques), monbatsu (lineage or pedigree) and kanbatsu (bureaucracy), which the public distrusted. US leaders were encouraged to play upon this distrust of faction to attack Japan (OSS/State Reports, Part I, R&A Report 117, 1945). The SCAP said about the prewar political parties 'Thoroughly unrepresentative and unresponsive to the popular will, boss-dominated and venal, these old political factions had never inspired the respect or trust of the Japanese people' (SCAP Political Orientation of Japan 1949:338). As early as 1942 the US State Department reported that

throughout the Far East, family connections and traditional relationships of other sorts still have a very strong hold on the people. Throughout this area, therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to personal groupings which are frequently more significant than formal political organizations (OSS/State Reports, 1942 Survey of Japan).

The idea of 'democratising' a society on all levels linked up with the view that Japan was less developed than Western societies. Images of wartime kokutai ideology, fanatic loyalty to the emperor, and other images of cultural uniqueness and backwardness fed into this discourse.² There was a close relationship between SCAP and many of the most prominent Western scholars writing about Japan at this time as some of the scholars worked for SCAP or the US authorities, creating a convergence between scholarly and SCAP views.³

The emphasis on the faction as a traditional entity—a feudal heritage, resting on personal relations between bosses and followers—continued in the postwar period. Social groups, such as factions, were ‘still dominated by traditional social norms of cohesiveness and
cooperation and still distinguished for their hierarchical structure' (Burks 1964:69). An article in the *Nippon Times* in 1946 described the Jiyūtō and the Shinpotō thus:

Mainly backed up, as they are, both by parasitic big landowners and by financial zaibatsu, these parties possess something of a factional nature in that their members are bound together in a relationship of the kind such as we see existent between bosses and their followers, though they bear the high-sounding appellations [sic] of "Liberals" and "Progressives." In view of the fact that there still largely prevails in the agrarian districts, a relationship of master and servant farmers and that there is accordingly still room for the illegal practice of the purchase of peasant votes through the influence of landowning bosses, these parties will probably be able to collect a large number of agrarian votes, especially as they will be supplied with enormous election funds by the financial zaibatsu (17.2.46).

Historians argued that the prewar political party system, with its factions and machine politics, still influenced postwar politics greatly in spite of attempts to democratise it. Ike (1958:277–8) argued that

for all its modernity, the culture still pays its homage to the past, and tradition and custom make their influence felt in a myriad of ways. The weight of the past seems particularly heavy in that facet of the culture which has to do with social behavior.

Political parties were dominated by the traditional dualistic social organisation, which encouraged factionalism. Quigley and Turner (1956:330) argued that:

In Western society the visible structure of political parties is modified by an intricate network of personal relations and informal organization. The oligarchical and dualistic tendencies of most party organization are, of course, intensified in the Japanese cultural setting. This is to be expected in a culture where dualism characterizes so much of the social behavior and where hierarchical control has not been tempered by broad experience with democratic institutions. But effective political power often is wielded behind the scenes by experienced and dominant leaders whose prestige commands greater allegiance than do party regulations and formal structures. The persistence of long-established cultural traditions is illustrated by the tendency of the parties in postwar Japan to follow the organizational patterns established by their prewar ancestors.

Underlying all these analyses was an assumption that factions were a 'symptom' of an underdeveloped political system—a sign of backwardness. Factions, and in fact the whole Japanese political system, was said to be based on personal relations, making Japan less modern and less institutionalised than the West (Ike 1958:277; Yanaga 1956; Quigley and Turner 1956; Vinacke 1956:441). Political parties were yet to develop into
this more modern form in Japan, it was argued, because of the strong influence of ‘feudal traditions’ which fuelled factionalism (Ike 1958:76). Sakano (1948:75) claimed that the Fudai (party politician) forces within the Jiyūtō in the late 1940s had ‘few modern political characteristics’ and that ‘their unity is fairly tight and flavoured with half feudalistic friendships’ while the newcomers to the political scene were considered more ‘modern.’

Patronage groups were viewed with much greater negativity than any other groups in the political parties. This was because the patronage faction was strongly related to ‘old fashioned’ politics in both Japanese and Western literature. Ōno Bamboku, one of the most prominent politicians of the early postwar period, was considered by many to be such an ‘old fashioned’ political boss. Sakano (1948:99), in his early analysis of factionalism in the Jiyūtō written in 1948, says Ōno was an ‘old fashioned’ tactician who only thought about ‘the party or the faction, and not about policy but political strategy.’ Sakano continues: ‘rather than promoting policies and fighting fair and square, there is with Ōno scheming and constant coming together and parting of politicians’ (1948:101). This type of politician was considered to be the basis of conservative politics and was characterised in feudal terminology and oyabun-kobun relations in the discourse of the time (see Sakano 1948:99).

Bossism was considered ‘imbedded in Japan’s political mores’ and often seen as emanating from the underground world, yakuza relations and oyabun-kobun relations (Dull 1957). These characteristics of Japanese politics were claimed to have survived through the Occupation reforms and the development of the new postwar political system. Maki (1962:158) comments that

Japanese and foreign observers alike have been concerned by the continued presence in Japanese political activity of such things as bloc voting in villages, dictated by a local political boss or by influential families; the existence of bossism, both in local politics and on the level of the national parties; the failure of women to exercise the suffrage independently; corruption, especially vote buying; and the tendency of the Japanese voter to cast his ballot on the basis of personality rather than of issues.
To many observers, both Western and Japanese, prewar undemocratic political practices thus continued on both local and national level, especially in conservative politics.

In spite of this scholarly attention paid to the factional characteristics of Japan, it can hardly be said that a public discourse on political factions existed. Surprisingly, in the 10 years from the end of the war till the formation of the LDP the term faction, or ‘habatsu’, is rarely mentioned in newspapers. A computer aided search for the word in the *Asahi Shimbun*, a major daily newspaper with leftist leanings, reveals that of the 108 entries for this word in the period 1945–1959, only 14, or 13%, appear before the merger of the Jişitō and Kaishinto in November 1955. The rest, 87%, are in the period 1956–59.\(^4\) The bulk of the articles between 1945 and 1955 are concentrated in 1952 and 1953, when there were major disruptions in the party over personnel decisions. From this fact alone it seems that during 1945–55, ‘factions’ were not considered to have much political relevance.

Not only is the word ‘faction’ used sparingly in the *Asahi Shimbun* until 1955, but it is only used in relation to discussion about internal fighting and internal competition in the party. Most of the articles between 1951 and 1953 on factions have to do with disagreements over appointments, and the factional rivalries are situated within that frame. The strength or weakness of factions is discussed in relation to their struggles with other factions, such as the predominance of the Yoshida faction in the leadership struggle with Hatoyama within the Jişitō, or the Ōno faction’s strength and its attempts to destroy the Hirokawa faction. The word ‘faction’ is thus not used in general terms to refer to party politics. We are never told that the Yoshida faction is considering this or that action for the party—in those instances there are only references to PM Yoshida and ‘the party leadership.’ The image is given that factions have very limited importance for national politics, and that either factions argue all the time, or (or maybe also) factions exist only because of personal feuds over power.

Moreover, in the newspapers at this time, there is no explicit discourse on factionalism—there is no discourse on what a faction is, how it functions, what reason there is for a
membership of a faction, or how widespread they are. The very limited discourse on factions until 1955 gives prominence to the polarisation within the parties and pays little attention to other large factions. Although the word ‘habatsu’ is used to include groups with leaders and followers, it refers much more frequently to the wider network of support that the two poles within the parties were able to amass in their wrangle over the leadership of the party. From this discourse, we understand that there is an entity within the party called a faction because we hear the names of factions occasionally and even names of a few faction members, but the discourse does not explain what this entity is. It was not until the early 1960s that a distinctive discourse on factions came to the surface in relation to the emergence of the societal debate about modernity, taking many of its themes from the early postwar debates on the traditional characteristics of Japanese society. I will now briefly discuss the scholarly debate on modernisation that ensued in Japan in the early 1960s.

6.3. The Modernisation theory: the traditional and the modern

Ever since the end of the war ‘[p]ostwar Japanese society, especially in the period between 1945 and 1960, was obsessed with the democratic idea’ (Kersten 2000:1). However, modernisation theory only started appearing in Western scholarly publications in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Randall and Theobald 1985:1). This theory, characterised by the ‘evolutionary optimism’ that societies would develop from the traditional towards the modern, was widely applied to Japanese society. The theory was embraced by many in Japan and by the early 1960s the intelligentsia in Japan was hotly debating whether Japan was modernising and had in fact achieved democratisation. The feeling had grown strong at that time amongst Japanese intellectuals that democracy was in crisis and that autonomy, personal and social, had not been achieved (Kersten 2000:1–4). A variety of paradigms were involved in the debate on modernisation: ‘tradition versus modernity, East versus West, internally-generated versus externally-generated change, a modern versus feudal’ (Kersten 2000:109). The central issue was how to reconcile Western ideas of modernisation with traditional, indigenous culture. Should Japan strive to modernise through ‘Westernisation’, or could Japanese traditions be integrated with ideas of democracy and modernity? Through this debate, ‘modernisation’
Chapter 6: Tradition, Modernisation and Attempts to Abolish Factions

and ‘democratisation’ came to be seen as interchangeable processes in Japan (Kersten 2000:109).

A number of US and Japanese scholars organised five annual seminars, Conference on Modern Japan, in the first half of the 1960s to discuss aspects of Japan’s modernisation, successes and problems. These seminars reflected the development within modernisation scholarship in the West in the 1960s – the emergence of ‘modernisation revision’ which showed growing interest in the survival of traditions (Randall and Theobald 1985:34). For most scholars, the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ elements of Japanese society were seen as representing opposing poles. However, some scholars were proposing that tradition and modernity were not opposite poles but could co-exist as seen in the history of post-Restoration Japan to confine Japan’s modernisation (Burks 1968:568; Hall 1965:37; Ward 1969:78, 80). According to this view, Japanese society was a peculiar fusion of the traditional and the modern and it was unclear to what extent Japan could thus modernise (see Ward 1968a:3; Hall 1965:16; Burks 1968:541; Richardson and Flanagan 1984:159). Scholars also debated whether traditional culture could in fact bring about modernisation. Scholars identified a number of traits that showed the perseverance and continuity in traditional attitudes, in particular the lack of autonomy amongst political actors, the preference for group rather than individual decision making, and the view of politics as a ‘personalized process’, where personal relations are deemed more important than issue oriented loyalties (Ward 1969:68–70).

It characterised this debate, that traditional culture was usually viewed as a static phenomenon, something transferred in its entirety from feudal times into present Japan. Nakane criticised this view and said that through such an approach ‘any phenomena which seem peculiar to Japan, not having been found in western society, can be labeled as “feudal” or “pre-modern” elements, and are to be regarded as contradictory or obstructive to modernization’ (Nakane 1970:i.x).

It was in the middle of this debate about traditions and modernisation that the movement emerged within the LDP for a modern and faction-free party. The scholars involved in
Chapter 6: Tradition, Modernisation and Attempts to Abolish Factions

the debate on modernisation were in many cases focusing on the late Tokugawa and Meiji periods, seeking to identify changes towards modern society and democracy. Others focused more on problems facing modernisation and democracy in the postwar period. But in both perspectives the scholarship focused on identifying moves away from feudal traditions towards more modern and democratic characteristics. The debate in the LDP about the factions and their ‘traditional’ features took on a similar form as the advocates of change argued that Japan needed to move away from factionalism towards modernisation.

6.4. The movement for dissolution of factions
Against this growing dialogue on democracy and modernity, and questions about the role of traditions in modernisation, the movement for the modernisation of the LDP, and in particular the dissolution of factions, emerged. While the discourse on factions throughout the first ten years of the postwar period had been very limited, as seen before, there had been intermittent calls for a stop to factional fighting and the solving of factional disputes (habatsu kaishō). After 1957, there were increasing calls for ‘disbanding’ (kaisan) of factions, reflecting the more extensive organisation of the LDP. Two major movements for dissolution of factionalism emerged in the period under study in this thesis, one in 1956 and the other in 1960. I will discuss each in turn.

6.4.1. The first movement for dissolution
The first call for dissolution of factions came from Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan after he formed his cabinet in December 1956 (JT 15.12.56; Masumi 1995:20; Iseri 1988:184). However, the factions did not respond to this call and factional activity continued. The first real movement for the dissolution of factions commenced in September 1957, when Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Kawashima Shōjirō, secretary general, and Ōno Bamboku, vice president, made an appeal for the dissolution of factions (habatsu no kaishō). This included the political associations (seiji kessha) that leading politicians in the LDP had recently established (Masumi 1967:37; Iyasu 1984:111).
In September 1957 the party executive, Kishi, Sunada Shigemasa and Ōno started dissolving their factions. The Ōno faction’s Hakuseikai was dissolved; Kōno disbanded the Shunjukai; and the Yoshida faction dissolved the Heigokai (Masumi 1995:212; Iseri 1988:184; Okano 1963:35-36; AS 20.9.57). Miki’s Sannōkai was also disbanded, while Sunada Shigemasa’s Senkenkai, Kōno’s Shunjūkai and Kishi’s Kizankai withdrew their applications for official registration as political associations to the Autonomy Agency (Fukui 1970:138; AS 27.9.57). However, a number of political associations such as the Ikeda faction’s Köchikai, Satō’s Shūzankai, Ishibashi’s Tanzankai and Ishii’s Suiyō kurabu refused to comply (Fukui 1970:138; AS 27.9.57). Calls for dissolution became embroiled in power issues and were unavoidably seen as directed against any antagonists of the party leadership with the result that many factions refused to comply (Iyasu 1984:112).

The publicly declared motive for the dissolution of factions at this time was that they were highly destabilising and affected the efficiency of the LDP as a political party. Kishi was eager to halt the development, described in Chapter 5, whereby the factions were gaining financial and political influence by establishing their own private funding channels to big business (Iyasu 1984:111-112). He wanted to increase the power of the leadership and thus weaken his adversaries (Iseri 1988 185).

It proved difficult to reverse the factional development (AS 7.9.57). The factions resisted these efforts by Kishi to gain firmer control over the party and factional activities were again apparent six months later. Before the general elections in May 1958, Kishi appealed to party members to accept financial help from the party only, and not from factions, but it was clear that all factions, including the Kishi faction itself, were supporting candidates on a factional basis (AS 18.5.58). Factionalism thus continued unabated.

6.4.2. The second attempt at dissolution

The second attempt to abolish factions started in 1960 but reached its climax in 1963. This movement differed fundamentally from the first one in that the primary motive was
no longer only to achieve greater stability and centralisation of power, but to modernise the LDP and shed it of its ‘traditional’ cloak. Politicians and observers alike started analysing the deeper sources of factionalism in Japanese politics and the issue brought to the surface a debate about party democracy, Japan as a democratic nation, modernisation and tradition.

The origins of this second movement can be traced to the autumn of 1960 when an organisation, Seisaku Dōshikai, was formed by 69 former and present LDP Diet members, ‘to eliminate factional strife’. As seen in Chapter 4, the factions had by this time become structured units, easily identifiable as groups with clear membership, playing a central role within the party. The JT commented that

Conflicts between different factions in the Liberal-Democratic Party have not only weakened the party and the Government in the past but also have led to severe criticism by the general public. Although we are inclined to doubt the desirability of political clubs in general, this new body, to be known as the Seisaku Doshikai, has definite objectives in view. It will launch a campaign for the coming general election in support of Prime Minister Ikeda, and after the election, it proposes to call on the various factions within the party to join it for the purpose of strengthening party unity (25.10.60).

The aim to modernise the LDP became party policy at the party convention in January 1961, when an organisation research committee (tōsōshiki chōsakai) was set up to achieve ‘reorganisation reform for a modern party’ (Masumi 1967:37; Iseri 1988:185). This committee, chaired by Masutani Hideji, researched a variety of reform issues but did not focus on factions specifically. Although in this attempt to modernise the LDP, the factions were not directly discussed, they later became central to the movement and were to become a prime example of the lack of modernisation (see e.g. Thayer 1969:53).
personnel agency should be set up within the party, headed by the vice president or the secretary general, to handle appointments; fifth, the election system should be reformed so that members of the same party would not have to fight each other (Masumi 1967:37).

The work of this committee was important for the debate on factionalism in that it linked for the first time factions and modernisation, and it further identified a number of factors contributing to or causing factionalism. First, it argued that the party was too decentralised and that the president did not have enough power to act independently, being too involved in the inner struggle to be unbiased. Kuraishi said that:

the political power of the person elected party president is limited and he builds management of the party on balance of the influence of each faction leader, and so appointments are not in accordance with the president’s will but according to each faction leader’s nomination (Masumi 1967:38).

He argued that it was primarily the distribution of posts that lured rank-and-file members into the factions, and thus, if party leadership was strengthened and the party management made more centralised, the factions would disappear (Masumi 1967:38).\(^8\) The phrase ‘strengthening of leadership’ (*shidōryoku kyōka*) became fashionable (Masumi 1967:36).

Second, the committee argued that the medium sized electoral system was to blame for factionalism. This was a new emphasis which had not featured much in the discussion on factionalism before but was to remain the focus point until the electoral reform in 1994 (see Curtis 1999:chapter 4).\(^9\)

The move for dissolution of factions received another boost on 30 January 1962, when 24 people representing the eight factions established the Tōfū Sasshin Konwakai (Party Moral Reform Meeting), with Kuraishi Tadao and Fukuda Takeo at the forefront. The group said in a prospectus that the LDP ‘had betrayed the people with endless factional fighting over the government’ (Masumi 1967:38). At their inaugural meeting in May, 65 members of both houses of the Diet attended and called for:
Chapter 6: Tradition, Modernisation and Attempts to Abolish Factions

1. party unification, modernisation and the destruction of the factional system (habatsu taisei) with the establishment of strong leadership with democracy as its basis.
2. Rejection of favouritism and factional restrictions in presidential elections and in its stead a free vote based on individuals.
3. Reform of the electoral system that makes party members fight each other and makes factional rivalry fierce. An election system based on political parties should be established (Masumi 1967:38).

Shortly before the presidential election 14 July 1962, before it was known that no one would challenge Ikeda as party president, the Party Reform Council met to ‘urge influential party leaders to forego factional strife and to cast votes independently in the July 14 presidential election’ (JT 3.7.62). This call was, however, ignored as the factions had by this time taken on such a variety of roles for their members that it was not realistic to expect faction members to ignore faction discipline completely.

In August 1962, the Tōfū Sasshin Konwakai group decided at a meeting attended by 78 people, incumbents and former Dietmembers of both houses, to develop an ‘active party modernisation drive’ (Masumi 1967:39; JT 10.8.62). In order to achieve their aim, the Council reconfirmed its basic objectives to structurally modernise the party and to dissolve the factions. They also decided to change their name to Tōfū Sasshin Renmei (Moral Reform League). A call was made to start a promotion for a small election constituency system ‘as a step to dissolve the Tory factions.’ Twelve members were elected to act as representatives and monthly meetings were planned (JT 10.8.62).

However, it was argued from early on that the Tōfū Sasshin Renmei was in fact a factional plot to replace Ikeda—a claim that seemed confirmed when the group became inactive after his successful reelection in 1962. It was common knowledge that most of the Konwakai group were members of the Kishi/Fukuda faction (Masumi 1967:39) who sought to overthrow Ikeda.¹⁰ Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Tōfū Sasshin Renmei was dismissed by Ikeda as a ‘sectarian group’ and he argued that an official party organ should take on these matters (JT 8.6.63). As the group established itself as an anti-leadership force, it caused divisions within the party, and in April the Ikeda, Ōno and Kōno factions banned their members from joining the group. Within the Kishi faction,
the Kawashima group which was close to Ōno and Kōno, was critical of the club. The Fujiyama faction shared with the Konwakai a critical attitude to Ikeda but was reluctant to align with them because of the strong support to Satō in the group (Masumi 1967:39). Watanabe Tsuneo dismissed the Konwakai as a group acting to grasp power themselves in the name of factional dissolution and modernisation. In a journal article Watanabe (1962:101) said:

The motives for the group’s leaders’ actions is to remove the current leaders and give power to the rising leaders. It could be said that this is the revolt of the upper level of the regiment against the divisional commander group... The established leaders of the LDP are eight: Ikeda, Kishi, Ōno, Kōno, Fujiyama, Miki and Ishii. Even if they rotated power it would take at least 10 years. They want to destroy the system of co-existence of the general officer level jitsuryokusha in the party and hasten the arrival of their period of power.

Although the Konwakai did become embroiled in the factional fight it said it was fighting against, it was a notable movement because of the emphasis it put on the reform of the electoral system and the introduction of a single member system. Its leader, Fukuda, said:

I wanted modernisation of the LDP built on the basic principle of electoral reform but it does not seem to appeal to the public and they don’t react to the discussion about the election system. So factional dissolution rather than electoral reform has become the central issue but I still think we must change the election system (Masumi 1967:39).

Moreover, although the Tōfū Sasshin Renmei was viewed unfavourably by the party mainstream, it did influence the party executive. This coincided with another development. The point was frequently made by the media that the LDP could only afford the ‘luxury’ of factionalism if they were sure they could hold on to their majority and the reigns of government. Simultaneously the point was made that it was quite possible that the JSP might catch up with them (JT 6.10.62, 14.11.62, 20.12.62). The fear of the left was strengthened further when an article by Ishida Hirohide called ‘A Vision of the Conservative Party’ was published in Chūō Kōron (January 1963), where he argued that the LDP would lose power in the near future if votes for the party kept decreasing. The Japan Times commented on the dwindling conservative vote, and said:

This trend in turn is due to the changing social and economic structure of the electorate, brought about by the modernization of Japanese society. The increasing proportion of the non-agrarian population, for instance, seems to compel the conservative party which has
relied heavily on the farming population for support, to readjust its policies and programs and perhaps even practices. It is, therefore, somewhat ironical that the conservative party that has steered the nation on its course toward modernization during the last decade or more is now being forced to modernize itself (13.1.63).

This fear of losing power, combined with the need to respond to the suggestions put forward by the Tōfū Sasshin in order to weaken the attacks on Ikeda and his administration, prompted the establishment of a third committee—the Party Organisation Research Council (soshiki chōsakai), created in autumn 1962 (Masumi 1967:40; JT 20.12.62). The Research Council had five subcommittees, one of which dealt with the electoral system, one with party organisation, one with funding, and one with party unity (Masumi 1995). Factions were discussed by the last sub-committee, which was chaired by Nadao Hirokichi (Iseri 1988:185). It seemed that those involved believed that the greatest contributing factor to factionalism was the presidential elections (see Masumi 1967:40; JT 8.6.63).

The committee was to work till October 1963, but an interim report was submitted to Ikeda as a guideline to coincide with the cabinet reshuffle in July 1963 (Baerwald 1964:226; Iseri 1988:185–6). The report argued that it was paramount for the LDP to increase unity and party leadership (Iseri 1988 186). In the report, Miki declared that ‘First of all, outmoded factionalism must be crushed’ (JT 9.7.63), because factions weakened leadership and solidarity and discipline (Masumi 1995:76). The report further said: ‘We cannot be blind to the fact that factional struggle weakens the (party) president’s power of control and disturbs party solidarity and discipline. The present factional situation must be eliminated at all cost’ (JT 5.7.63). The report recommended that new party structures be established to take care of appointments; that a limit be set on the number of candidates running for party presidency; and that all political contributions be made to the party (Baerwald 1964:226).

The Party Unity subcommittee of Miki’s Organisation Research Council put forward its final report on party modernisation in October 1963 calling for the disbanding of factions in accordance with the wishes of the public (Iseri 1988:186; JT 27.10.63, 29.10.63). The
report recommended the principle of 'right person in right place' to guide the Prime Minister in his appointments, rather than the principle of factional balance. It was suggested that an open election of the president should be replaced with advance consultation by a specially appointed committee composed of those who had held the post of president or Speaker of the House together with other party members who had served the party for a long time. This resembled the chōrō status held by senior party members in the early postwar parties. It was also deemed necessary to extend the president's terms to three years. A personnel department would also merit-rate party members (Masumi 1967:43; JT 8.6.63).

The findings of the Organisation Research Council's finance subcommittee were that party funds should be centralised to eliminate factionalism. The electoral system subcommittee blamed the electoral system for the factionalisation of the party and recommended that the electoral system be reformed so as to minimize factional rivalry (Masumi 1967:43; JT 8.6.63).

Following the report, Ikeda called upon the factional leaders—the 'shidancho'—to reach a consensus on the Miki report. After much debate, the party approved 'in principle' the Miki committee report but failed to reach agreement on the timing for elimination of factions. It was well known that most factions were against the dissolution (Masumi 1995:77). Although the Satō, Miki and Ishii factions expressed readiness to disband, the Kōno, Ōno and Kawashima groups had not shown much willingness. Ōno argued that it was unrealistic to disband altogether, while Kōno claimed that if factions were disbanded, 'sokkin seiji' [comrade politics] would take over (Kuraishi 1987:434). Kōno was quoted in the media as saying that the factions 'serve as a "check and balance" mechanism and that without factions, the Liberal-Democratic Party would come under the dictatorship of the party president' (JT 25.10.63; Masumi 1995:78; Iseri 1988:187). Similar arguments were put forward by various politicians in both houses of the Diet (Thayer 1969:55). Although Ikeda asked Kōno to 'refrain from publicly defending factionalism', there are indications that Ikeda himself never believed that it would be possible to realise any of the suggestions made by the Miki committee although he publicly continued to support
dissolution (Masumi 1995:77; 1967:45; Iseri 1988:187). He was quoted as saying that ‘factions are not bad. What’s bad is factional struggle’ (JT 25.7.63) and that ‘it is quite natural for human being to have likes and dislikes and for the likeminded to flock together’ (JT 6.10.62).

Observers were not optimistic that the report would or could be taken seriously. The *Yomiuri Shimbun* commented:

> It is problematic whether the party as a whole has approved and is supporting the committee’s recommendation for disbanding its factions. Only the Ikeda and Miki groups have shown any inclination to comply. Lukewarm and perfunctory as the reform plan is it appears likely to be ineffective. This is considered evidence that the ruling party lacks ability to reform (*Yomiuri Shimbun* in JT 29.10.63).

It was also widely acknowledged that the financial aspect of the factions created a major obstacle to their removal. Maeo Shigesaburō had suggested that the grant to individual candidates be raised from the current 1–2 million yen, as it seemed that a more realistic estimate of the financial needs of candidates in elections was between 10 and 30 million yen. The *JT* commented: ‘[F]actional followers have counted upon their leaders for the bulk of funds for their political activities, as well as for election expenditures. This fact alone stands in the way of an antifactionalist movement’ (27.10.63). This was undoubtedly a major obstacle. The factions paid lip service to their dissolution but none were keen to lose their financial independence and the power that came with it (Iseri 1988:73–4).

The movement to abolish factionalism was thus fraught with difficulties. Ikeda was the main spokesman for ‘modernisation’ but at the same time was desperately in need of factional support to keep him in power. Faction leaders feared that dissolution would only mean that other factions got ahead. Kōno complained that if all factions were dissolved at a stroke, the Ikeda faction would get an unfair advantage by being in power (*JT* 10.12.63; 19.10.63). Satō, on the other hand, feared the aggressiveness with which the Kōno faction had been expanding. Ikeda had wanted the report to boost the support for the party in the Lower House elections scheduled for November, but instead it caused much resistance within the party.
Chapter 6: Tradition, Modernisation and Attempts to Abolish Factions

The short time available before the elections made it even more difficult for the factions to respond. However, in order to show the public that the party was reacting to the Miki report, Ikeda decided to dissolve his faction’s Dietmember group, the *Iseikai*, in late October, and many other factions followed (Masumi 1967:45). To show its support for dissolution of factions, the business community decided to donate a billion yen to the *Kokumin kyōkai*, i.e. to the party itself (Masumi 1967:45). However, it was debated whether all units of the factions needed to be disbanded or not. The *JT* reported that there was a ‘body of opinion’ within the party which believed that even if the political associations were disbanded, the factions as friendship societies should not necessarily be disbanded (11.10.63). In spite of Miki Takeo’s insistence, the *seiji kessha* were not dissolved simultaneously.

In spite of the apparent agreement within the party to abolish factions, the HR elections in November 1963 were ‘exceptionally factional’ with factions collecting one billion yen and running unendorsed candidates against endorsed candidates of other factions (Masumi 1967:45). Satō’s fears about the Kōno faction were confirmed. Kōno was openly working to expand his faction before the election by amassing new candidates and collected election campaign funds earlier than other factions. The Japan Times’ analysis was that ‘Kōno, a realist, believes that the shortcut to the party presidency lies in building up the largest faction. He is aiming at organizing a faction larger than the one under Satō, his major rival’ (*JT* 25.10.63). Kōno openly argued for the good use of factions (*habatsu yūyōron*) on his electioneering tours (Masumi 1967:45). This strategy paid off, and the Kōno faction gained 12 new members while the Satō faction lost eight members (Masumi 1967:45).

After the HR election in November 1963 Ikeda commented that ‘things have improved. The general election was not as characterized by factional strife as reported in some newspapers’. He said the problem should be tackled ‘from a long-range point of view’ and that he would adopt the Miki recommendations step by step (*JT* 23.11.63). The media, however, saw this election as marked by more factional struggles than any
previous election and pointed out that factional dissolution seemed more remote than ever (IT 22.12.63).

The Tōfū Sasshin Konwakai, infuriated by the Kōno faction’s conduct in the election, formed the Jinshin Isshin Tō Kindaika Suishin Honbu (Headquarters to Promote the Transformation of People’s Minds and Party Modernisation) in December in cooperation with the Satō faction. The group continued to rock the Ikeda administration and set about to prevent Ikeda’s third reelection as prime minister (Kuraishi 1987:435). A total of 117 members from both houses of the Diet attended the group’s meeting on December 3, and they attacked Kōno fiercely (AS 4.12.63; Masumi 1967:46). Their resolution was that

Kōno is the only one to disregard the factional dissolution and argues that factions are good. He is using the construction ministry post for profit and what is more, he aims to strengthen his faction. We are now creating a new cabinet and should exclude Kōno from it. We lead the thought of the people to new channels (jinshin o isshin shi) and believe this is one step to respond to the wishes of the people. We have therefore organised in this group and ask for Ikeda’s resolute decision (Masumi 1967:46).

The group was increasingly critical of the Prime Minister and in the general elections in November 1963, 20 candidates were elected with Tōfū Sasshin endorsement. It had thus, in effect, become the Fukuda faction (1970: 113). It did, though, reorganise yet again, in July 1964, as Tō kindaika giin renmei—a joint anti-Ikeda front with the participation of Fukuda, Satō, Fujiyama, Ishii, Ōno and Miki faction members (Fukui 1970:114).

Shortly after Satō had joined the Tōfū Sasshin in the Ninshin Isshin group he dissolved the Satō faction’s Mokuyokai but decided to create a new ‘friendship group’ (shinboku dantai) called Takeike kurabu (Masumi 1967:46). Under increasing pressure, Kōno finally dissolved his funding collection group, the Daiichi Kokusei Kenkyūkai. Satō responded by dissolving his financial group too, the Shūzankai (Masumi 1967:46). The Miki faction then followed, disbanding its financial group the Shin seiki keizai kenkyūsho and the Ikeda faction’s Köchikai was dissolved too. Despite this, there were signs that the factions were still retaining their function as ‘private supporting organisations’ (JT 10.12.63). Ikeda acknowledged the possibility of this happening. At a press meeting on 9 December, he said he was convinced factionalism could be
eliminated, 'but warned that other groups of a social nature, which would be difficult to prevent, may come into being after the factions are disbanded.' He went on to say that he thought factions linked with money and position ‘and which exert pressure on others’ should be disbanded (JT 10.12.63).

The mood in the media following the factional dissolutions in November and December 1963 was generally skeptical and negative. Citing the failure of the first movement under Kishi to disband factions, this second movement seemed doomed as a failure too. Political activities during and after the electoral campaign supported this view. Ironically, throughout this dissolution process, all factions seem to have been involved in recruitment of new members. Indeed, the planned dissolution of the Tōfū Sasshin Renmei was expected to fuel the battle between the factions for those members (JT 10.12.63).

All major factions had been dissolved by early 1964 and by the end of the year discussion on factions had decreased greatly in the press. However, Asahi Shimbun reported that factional maneuvers were taking place informally (Masumi 1967:46). The JT commented that ‘a very sensible effort for “party modernization” is now off the agenda for some time to come, at least’ (JT 13.6.64). The cries for party modernisation had subsided but the presidential election of July 1964 was factional as before and the factions were openly revived again later that year (Masumi 1995:79; AS 30.5.64).

6.5. The premodern factions and modernisation
In the domain of social discourses, there are frequently struggles between discourse types where attempts are made to make one discourse the dominant one in the social domain (Fairclough 1989:90; Dryzek 1997:12, 20). The guiding light of the movement for dissolution of factions in the early 1960s was modernisation. However, in this debate, I argue, there were two main discourses which contended for dominance. On the one hand were those in favour of factional dissolution, who argued first, that party organisation needed to be modernised so as not to rest on factions, but on grass root membership with centralised control; and second, that political interaction within the party needed to be modernised so that policy issues could prevail over personal
Chapter 6: Tradition, Modernisation and Attempts to Abolish Factions

allegiance. These are all criticisms that had been voiced over factionalism in many political systems (Beller and Belloni 1978c:440). Factionalism was considered dysfunctional, weakening authority and legitimacy of party leadership and preventing advancement based on merit. On the other hand, an opposing discourse emerged which argued that factionalism actually had positive attributes. Those who argued in favour of factionalism within the LDP successfully used the issue of party democracy to challenge the ‘abolitionists’. Such arguments have also been made in comparative studies and it has been argued that factionalism can allow representation of varied interests, especially in big parties, and limit conflict (Beller and Belloni 1978c:441).

Although these discourses were opposed to each other, they had in common the underlying and largely undisputed assumption that the LDP factionalism was traditional and had its roots in Japan’s history and culture. I will now look at these two contending discourses in turn.

6.5.1. Factionalism as hindrance to democracy

Although the concept of modernisation was never well defined within the party, what the party focused on in the drive for party modernisation was a European model of what is modern, an idea which had been deemed desirable ever since the Taisho era. It seemed to include both institutional modernisation which scholars at the Hakone conferences had emphasised (Kersten 2000:110–11), and the social modernisation of people. The participants at the Hakone conference had defined modernisation as the widespread participation of members of society in political affairs, and a ‘secular, and increasingly scientific, orientation of the individual to his environment’ (Hall 1965:19), as well as social modernisation resulting in ‘a lessening tendency for individuals to identify their interests with and feel loyalty towards small face-to-face groups’ (Hall 1965:21).

The LDP’s concern with the first of these issues, that of institutional modernisation, was seen in arguments made to the effect that the LDP should change into a mass party with a grass roots base and centralised organs—a policy oriented party rather than a candidate oriented one (Curtis 1999:163). In the movement to abolish the factions in the early
Chapter 6: Tradition, Modernisation and Attempts to Abolish Factions

1960s, it was argued that at the heart of the problem was the fact that the powers of the president had been diminished to the point where he could not control the party (see Iseri 1988:186; Stockwin 1970:367; Masumi 1967), a point which had been made ever since the Hatoyama cabinets (JT 15.12.56) and was clearly emphasised in both the Tōfū Sasshin Renmei, and in Miki’s party organisation committee. It became accepted wisdom that the weak leadership of the leaders of the LDP, whereby ‘in practice…there is a form of collective factional leadership amongst six officials’ (Burks 1964:80), caused factionalism within the party, and that by contrast the strong leadership of Yoshida had prevented factionalism to flourish within the Jiyūtō. Factionalism was related to corruption, bargaining and behind-the-scenes politics—the antithesis of strong and transparent leadership (see Stockwin 1982:125).

Moreover, to those in favour of factional dissolution, factional conflict was undemocratic because it was not fought in the public arena, but in the ‘backrooms of politics’. In a newspaper article called ‘The test of democracy’, Kuroda Kazuo argued that factionalism was a serious threat to democratic rule and warned that

We must not forget that the end of prewar democracy in Japan was spelled by the degeneration of democracy into cliquism. Though the prewar Constitution also assured the democratic rights of the people, actual politics became an arena for rival cliques striving for supremacy. And it just so happened that a military clique led by Gen. Hideki Tojo came to dominate Japan. The fate of Japan’s postwar democracy will be determined by the outcome of the effort to overcome illogical emotionalism and corrupt factionalism’ (JT 8.3.58).

Prime Minister Kishi based his call for the abolition of factions in 1958 on the same argument. ‘Factional activity within the Conservative Party is threatening to derail democratic politics,’ he said, ‘and we must use all our strength to remove this evil’ (AS 2.6.58). His call for abolition of factions was an obvious attempt to centralise control of the party and prevent the development of devolved power to factions (Watanabe 1958:21).

The second aspect of the modernisation debate within the LDP, concerned autonomy in social relations linked to policy issues. Factionalism was seen as the antithesis of the idea of personal autonomy that Maruyama Masao and others of the Japanese intelligentsia
argued for. To many scholars, individualism was needed for modernisation (Bellah 1965:411). Therefore it was considered important to uproot traditional Japanese morality built on loyalty (chō), filial piety (kō) and personal obligation (giri) (Bellah 1965:408). To observers in the early 1960s, the LDP epitomized old traditional moral values and traditional Japanese attitudes towards politics. The LDP was described as a 'party based not on distinct policies but on personal allegiance to certain leaders, and held together more by the pursuit of political power than by common ideals or ideologies. And the role of a party leader and Prime Minister... was to keep the factions sufficiently in check to be able to govern' (JT 9.6.59; see also 19.1.59). A party based on the pursuit of power rather than policy was politically immature. Politicians driven by political loyalty to leaders rather than political ideals lacked autonomy. Factional dissolution was essential to remove the dominance of traditional personal, hierarchical relationships and to allow impersonal relationships based on policy issues to flourish.

Although this discourse on centralised power, transparency, rationality and concern with policy was very strong, a contending discourse used aspects of the idea of modernisation to argue that factionalism was a positive feature of modern politics.

6.5.2. Factionalism as a protector of democracy

While the movement for dissolution of factions received much support in the political world and—it seemed—amongst the public, a number of observers and politicians argued that factionalism could have positive effects as well. Central to this discourse was party democracy. To some the open (i.e. factional) elections of the party president were an important element of party democracy (Gotō et al. 1982:141–2). It was argued that factionalism contributed to intraparty democracy by allowing greater participation of the rank-and-file in decision making. The intraparty situation of the LDP was compared to that of the prewar Seiyūkai which was considered highly undemocratic because of the power of the party leadership and the requirement that the rest of the party follow it blindly (Iwasaki 1921:81), and to the early postwar Jiyūtō under Yoshida’s leadership, but the Jiyūtō leadership had frequently been criticised for undemocratic practices while under Yoshida’s control. The Nippon Times wrote late in 1952:
Chapter 6: Tradition, Modernisation and Attempts to Abolish Factions

To a great extent the trouble among the Liberals has stemmed from the fact that the party leaders seldom took the rank-and-file members into their confidence. This could be remedied by permitting the individual members to enjoy a louder voice in party affairs. And if the opinion of the majority of the party members could be obtained on key issues, it could prevent factions such as the Hatoyama group from applying the squeeze and even threatening to play ball with the Opposition parties (17.12.52).

Those against the dissolution movement within the LDP argued that centralisation had allowed Yoshida to cultivate his 'autocratic rule' and to take vital political decisions, such as the dissolution of the Diet in 1952 and 1953 as well as important personnel decisions, without consulting the party executive, relying instead on close associates (Watanabe 1962:97; Thayer 1969:55; Stockwin 1970:367, 1982:125). The establishment of the Mindōha in 1952 was a reaction to this autocratic rule. Factional struggles had been repressed during this time, but because of that party politics had been highly undemocratic, it was argued. In the LDP the factions allowed politicians to solve their differences rather than split the party (Watanabe 1962:99). Factionalism, it was argued, made political inclusion possible and prevented the monopoly of the party by the president’s sokkin and thus contributed to the party democracy that the Mindōha had fought for within the Jiyūtō (Masumi 1967:41; Stockwin 1970:367). Watanabe wrote a harshly worded journal article arguing that to dissolve factions and go back to increased presidential power, akin to that of Yoshida in the Jiyūtō, would be going against all democratic and modernising principles (Watanabe 1962). These were precisely the arguments used by Kōno Ichirō and Ōno Bamboku, the most vocal oppositionists to the dissolution of factions amongst politicians. Ōno is quoted as saying that

Many Dietmembers have argued lately that factions are an obstacle to modernisation and are bad. But looking at the political situation, can we deny that factions have assisted in realising modernisation?...The bureaucratic elements of the party have argued for centralised leadership and argue that we should create a powerful one-man Prime Minister and a system of subordination of a few hundreds of rank-and-file who will have no power to speak (hatsugenken). We should not accept this argument for factional abolition. We cannot ignore the fact that the factions have increased the influence (hatsugenryoku) of the rank-and-file. I would accept it if the argument for modernisation and dissolution led to real democratisation and modernisation, and not to a camouflaged strong government. I will not be duped by this flowery prose of modernisation (Masumi 1967:41).
According to this line of argument, factions were therefore important in giving rank-and-file Diet members influence (*hatsugenken*) (AS 23.11.63; Watanabe 1966: 40–41). As seen before, during the Hakone conferences, liberal Japanese scholars had been adamant that the modernisation process had to be identified with democratic political culture (Kersten 2000: 111; Hall 1965: 27–9). However, even if factionalism was not considered part of modern political culture, it could be justified if it promoted party democracy and thereby in fact aided the emergence of, and protected, a democratic political culture.

This discourse, although much less powerful than that of the dissolutionists, used the issue of party democracy to challenge the view that factional abolition was necessary. They used the same issues, democracy and modernisation, to argue for their cause.

**6.6. Factions as traditional entities**

In the debate about factional dissolution, party modernisation and intra-party democracy, multiple discourses emerged about the relationship between democracy and modernisation, and the role of tradition in modernisation. This debate highlighted the way the factions were increasingly seen as traditional entities, described with reference to history. The two main discourses on factions in the early 1960s used similar rhetorical devices, arguing that the LDP factions were traditional groups.

As seen earlier, those criticising factionalism and calling for its abolition stressed the need to move away from tradition toward modernity. The *Japan Times* asked in 1957: ‘From where does this factionalism come? Are there some factors which are inherent in the Japanese? These are questions which must be asked and probed with all sincerity by our political leaders if factionalism is to be eliminated from our political scene’ (20.3.57; see also 22.12.63). These were questions asked by many observers and scholars and the answer resembled that given in the early postwar period when the ‘pre-modern’ features of Japanese society were blamed for the relative backwardness of Japanese politics. While in the early postwar period such theories were mainly used to describe the Imperial system, Japanese society in general and the characteristics of the Japanese (see Nakane 1970; Ishida 1985; Fukui 1978), they now became a set theoretical framework for the
institutional development of political phenomena like factions. The LDP factions existed and acquired their organisational features because of Japanese culture and ‘feudal’ traditions which were obstructive to modernisation (see Nakane 1970; Ward 1969; Ishida 1968; Yun 1994:552; Ike 1958). The LDP factions were based on loyalty of followers to leaders and vice versa, the argument went—a cultural trait traced back to the Tokugawa era. Ishida argued that ‘non-functional in-group solidarity’ was a cultural and historical trait common to all social organisation in Japan (Ishida 1968:334). The LDP factions rested on a traditional understanding of loyalty, a cultural pattern which seemed to have survived into contemporary Japan (see Richardson and Flanagan 1984:132; Ward 1969:72–3).

Maruyama contrasted modernity to feudalism (1963:258). Similarly, within the LDP the factions were measured against this definition of feudalism and seen as a reminder of Japan’s feudal past. As seen earlier, personalism was considered a problem in Japan, preventing the development of personal autonomy (Kersten 2000:213; Maruyama 1963:258; Ward 1969). But this also featured as an explanation as to why factionalism existed in political parties and interest groups as factionalism was considered the basic unit of organisation for personalistic politics (Ward 1969:71). Ward (1969:71) argued that traditions still persevered which made people join someone rather than something, to select a protector and leader rather than a cause. The bond thus established is apt to be close, durable, and usually dependable, requiring loyalty and trust.

While those advocating the dissolution of factions had stressed that the LDP needed to move away from the ‘traditional’ way of doing politics, it was often argued that factionalism was ‘natural’ because it was traditional. This view was compatible with the growing view that traditional factionalism could survive in and actually aid modernisation (Randall and Theobald 1985:50–1; Burks 1968; Hall 1965). In his autobiography, Ōno Bamboku (1964:180) argued that factionalism was inevitable in large groups:

The newspapers like to use the word ‘faction’ (habatsu). To me as an LDP politician listening to the news, there seem to be various factions. They say that there are only
factions in our conservative party that fight and distort politics. Recently when the Socialist Party's Kawakami and Asanuma fought over the chairmanship, someone said with surprise 'there are factions in the JSP too' as if it was some new revelation. It is inevitable that when three people meet there are likes and dislikes and therefore factions appear. That is only human nature and inevitable whatever the social group. Because we cannot escape factionalism in human groups we should concentrate on how we can best deal with factions for good group life. I acknowledge the existence of factions but it is useless to call for the dissolution of factions.

Kōno also argued in his election campaign in 1963, just after the party had resolved to disband all factions, that factions had existed for a long time and that to his knowledge his senpai (elders, mentors) had not used them in a bad way (Masumi 1967:46; see also AS 14.12.63). Many scholars and observers started also to focus on the positive functions of factions in the 1960s: Totten and Kawakami's article in 1965 'The Functions of Factionalism in Japanese Politics' epitomizes this new focus.

These views should not be dismissed as mere excuses for continuing factionalism. They resonated with the debate on modernisation and traditions taking place in Japanese society at the time, and with the Japan Theory (Nihonjinron) explanations that were becoming popular at this time. Scholars were moving away from the self-critical view of Japanese society that could be detected in the early postwar period, when factions were portrayed as in direct opposition to 'modernity' and when traditions had been 'relegated to a negative, shamed past' (Kersten 2000:113; Sakano 1948; Bellah 1965). The late 1950s and early 1960s saw a move away from these views and towards an increased self-confidence, where Japanese traditions and history became a new source of pride, playing a role in modernisation (Davis 1992:255; Kersten 2000:117; Hall 1965:37; JT 31.11.62). Out of this new self-confidence the Japan Theory emerged, viewing negative images of Japanese uniqueness as positive cultural assets (Davis 1992:255; Kersten 2000:50). Factionalism could therefore be viewed as a step forward from autocratic politics of the early postwar period, a sign of greater democratisation, a traditional Japanese feature which should not, and could not, be eradicated.

From these changing views on modernisation the argument was sometimes made that factions could be separated into modern and premodern components. The 'modern
component,’ the political associations (seiji kessha) that served the functional purpose to
gather funding and control party members, was considered compatible with democracy,
while the ‘old fashioned’ component, i.e. the friendships and patronage, needed to be
eradicated. The JT wrote:

various problems still remain to be settled as to the way the 436 Liberal-Democratic
members of the Diet should be controlled after the factions are disbanded. The way
political funds and important Cabinet and party posts are distributed poses difficult
questions. Shigesaburo Maeo, secretary general of the party, who has been spearheading
the move to disband factions, said it would be sufficient if old-fashioned factions were
dissolved (14.12.63).

And patronage factions were considered less modern than factions caused by policy
differences. This view formed the basis of the argument that LDP factions needed to be
transformed into policy groups (Sumitomo 1959:124). Scalapino and Masumi (1962:101)
argued that

Perhaps the quotient of modernity in Socialist factionalism is higher than that in Liberal
Democratic Factionalism – that is, factors such as ideology, policies, and political tactics
may play a larger role in producing socialist divisions, and factors of personal allegiance
or provincialism a smaller role.

Although people debated whether factions could be part of modernisation or not, the
basic assumption that factions had their roots in tradition was hardly debated. But it was
questionable to what extent the LDP factions could be said to be traditional, considering
that the Jiyūtō and Minshutō factions were so different. I will now discuss the creation of
the myth of traditional factions in more detail.

6.7. Inventing ‘traditional’ factions
It is an interesting paradox that although the LDP factions were showing new structural
characteristics and had taken on new roles not served by conservative factions before,
they were described as traditional and typical Japanese entities. This was evident in the
Japanese press and in contemporary writings. As seen before, until the formation of the
LDP, a discourse on factions can hardly be said to have existed in the public domain in
Japan. But by the end of the 1950s, a powerful discourse on factions was emerging which
was heavily imbued with tradition and culture. The word ‘habatsu’ started to appear with
more frequency in the *Asahi Shim bun* in the late 1950s and discussion on factions increased from year to year till 1960.\(^\text{20}\) I would like to argue that the language of tradition in relation to factionalism is best understood against the background of the growing pride in Japanese traditions and culture, and the emergence of *Nihonjinron* explanations in the 1960s.

The LDP factions, it was commonly argued in the press and by commentators, were an example of the tenacity of tradition over modernisation. It was argued that the LDP factions were a feudal heritage, based on personal relationships and a strong sense of obligation, loyalty, and compromise, rather than institutionalised relationships (Ward 1969:71; Lane 1992:372). Many scholars argued that these cultural values, or ‘code of behaviour,’ were important for an understanding of Japanese factions (Hoffman 1981:249; Stockwin 1970:365). Observers noted that the loyalty seen within the LDP factions was a prime example of the perseverance of Confucian values and the way that old cultural values had survived the democratisation of Japanese society (Curtis 1988, Ward 1969). Although Thayer (1969:41) acknowledged that the LDP factions were new in a sense, he argued that Japan was ‘ensnarled in the old, pre-modern factions…’ because factionalism was essentially pre-modern and that such a ‘feudal’ heritage still had its hold on politics. The LDP, he argued, ‘concentrates on burnishing a modern image. But the Dietman feels a little uncomfortable in its glare; he talks new but thinks old, and continues to look to his faction for both comfort and support’ (Thayer 1969:41).

All these characteristics were in many ways a continuation of the discourse on Japanese society as it was during and first after the war (Brines 1948:303; OSS/State Department Reports *1942 Survey of Japan*). As seen before, early postwar analysts focused on traditionalism in Japanese society in general. Burks referred to the Tokugawa value pattern as one which emphasised ‘group loyalty, group coherence, and inherent duties (more than rights)’ (Burks 1968:546), and this value pattern was said to have persevered into the postwar era. Yanaga argued that at the basis of bossism in postwar Japan lay the ‘Confucian precepts of loyalty to one’s parents, superiors, masters, teachers, employers, and benefactors’ (Yanaga 1956:110–11). As discussion on factionalism specifically was
very limited in the early postwar period, however, it is difficult to ascertain to what extent factions were considered traditional, although the assumption seems implicit in the early discourse that factionalism, as other aspects of Japanese society, was traditional.

However, if we compare more closely the way the press and contemporary observers depicted factionalism in the first ten years of the postwar period to the way the LDP factions were presented, important differences emerge. This was particularly noticeable in discussion about the importance of loyalty, and consensus and avoidance of conflict, played in conservative politics.

Loyalty has been considered one of the traditional features of LDP factionalism that has its roots in Japanese traditions and feudal heritage. The LDP factions were characterised by clear relationships between leaders and followers, where loyalty was enforced and cultivated as a clear collective incentive to bind the faction together and create stability. The discourse at the time took its cues from Japanese tradition and culture, creating strong connections with feudal Japan. Thayer (1969:41) noted the use of traditional language in commentary on factions which was not limited to observers, but was used by politicians themselves. As seen in Chapter 4, the relationship between faction leaders and their members in the LDP was described, by both observers and politicians, as a relationship between patrons and clients, oyabun and kobun. There are references to the seemingly feudal-like loyalty (chūsei) of followers to leaders, and of hierarchy and mutual loyalty, evoking images of familial relations between leaders and followers (see Watanabe 1958). Politicians spoke about 'duty and humanity' (giri ninjō) and commentators used metaphors from Tokugawa Japan to describe the bonds of loyalty between faction leaders and members (Watanabe 1962:91; Iyasu 1996:158). It was noted by both journalists and politicians that factional activity, leaders amassing followers around them (torimaki), and the formation of factional groups (habatsu dōshi), were all well known practices historically, and that traditional patron-client considerations played a part in luring Dietmembers into factions. To Thayer, traditional language gave Japanese politicians some psychological 'fulfillment'. He argued: '[T]his vocabulary is particularly apt in describing the factions. The old concepts of loyalty, hierarchy, and duty hold sway
in them. And the Dietman (or any other Japanese) feels very comfortable when he steps into this world' (Thayer 1969:41).  

If we look at the way factions were presented in the first decade of the postwar era, however, loyalty seemed to have been understood very differently. As seen in Chapters 2 and 3 the early factions had vague membership which shifted easily and frequently and both conservative parties suffered from major splits. While scholars in this period often argued that loyalty was primary in personal relations in Japan, observing the political events of the time they also argued that opportunism was rampant. Brines (1948:303) argued that:

...the Japanese have many inbred weaknesses, which their extreme insularity has exaggerated. The rigidity of their social code attests to that. They are people, for instance, who exalt loyalty above all other attributes, because instinctively they are opportunists.

While loyalty was considered the backbone of Japanese society and politics, commentators also pointed out that it was very difficult to enforce discipline in political parties and preserve party unity. Frequent shifts in party allegiance were seen as emanating from loyalty to leaders being much stronger than loyalties to parties in early postwar Japan (Wildes 1954:104; *Political Reorientation* 1949:340; Ward 1968b:482; Totten and Kawakami 1965:111). For one thing, political ambition often strained party loyalty—e.g. some argued that Japanese politicians were infected with a 'ministerial disease' arising 'from the inordinate desire, an obsession, of every Diet member to become a cabinet minister' (Yanaga 1956:255; Watanabe 1962:99). But this 'obsession' did not create a rigid factional system but rather led Dietmembers into 'shifting and transferring their loyalties whenever they are offered an opportunity for advancement' (Yanaga 1956:256).

Although the discourse on traditions is extensive in the early postwar period, there is a marked absence of direct discussion on loyalty within factions in the early postwar factions. The terms *oyabun* and *kobun*, terms frequently used to describe factional relations within the LDP, were not used much in discussion about the Jiyūtō and Minshutō.  

As seen in Chapters 2 and 3, loyalty to factions seemed inferior to political
expediency in the Jiyūtō and Minshutō; factional membership was ill defined; and politicians moved between groups. Because factional membership was ill defined, there were few direct ways of enforcing loyalty. Politicians evaluated their own political strength and on that basis took decisions on whether to defect or stay when factional conflict intensified. Thus, for example, a large number of Hatoyama faction members decided not to leave the party in 1953 and 1954, because, in Wildes’ words: ‘while loyal in their thoughts to Hatoyama [they] foresaw his defeat looming’ (Wildes 1954:147).

Loyalty could not be enforced in the absence of well defined membership to groups.

Loyalty within the LDP, on the other hand, seems best understood in terms of organisational theory. Within the LDP faction membership had acquired a very different meaning, and thus loyalty, carefully counterbalanced with selective incentives, was needed to achieve organisational continuity (see Panebianco 1988:10). A feeling of belonging was cultivated because it was necessary for the groups to maintain themselves as active players within the LDP. Faction leaders made it clear that Dietmembers were required to show loyalty to these new groups (Thayer 1969:15). A system of ‘factional exchange’ emerged (Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 1999:37) where faction leaders got support in exchange for help with funding, endorsements and posts. Loyalty could be induced through this mutually beneficial relationship. Faction leaders could withdraw support to faction members to enforce discipline (see Masumi 1995:63). There were also rumours that faction leaders kept a check on faction members with so-called ‘loyalty blacklists’ (chūseishin no enmachō) to enforce loyalty for favours given (AS 6.1.56).

Faction leaders had difficulties making sure their factions voted the right way and there were discussions within the party about making votes of Dietmembers in presidential elections public in order to enforce factional discipline (Ôno 1964:109). Factionalism changed significantly in the first few years of the LDP’s existence, as Watanabe (1958:145) noted:

the era of the small oyabun who had two to three people under his command was over (shuhei shika nai shō oyabun) and in its place rose a new generation that successfully created the big powerful factions we see today. The factions that they own (karera no shoyu suru habatsu) are a product of their political labour won with hardship and great financial investment.
In the late 1950s observers referred to Diet members approaching faction (ha ni chikazuku), which did not indicate much bonding; others affiliated with factions (ha ni zoku suru, ha ni gatchiri to musubitsuku), indicating a bit more involvement. Others approached factions with more closeness (ha ni sekkin) or were engrossed in a faction (ha ni fukairi) (Watanabe 1958:150). These factions had organisational characteristics not seen before in conservative factions. All the same, they were considered ‘traditional’, emanating from Japanese culture.

Turning to the emphasis on consensus and the avoidance of conflict, we see similar differences between the early postwar and the LDP factions. The LDP factions had, by the late 1950s, become central to decision making on cabinet and party appointments. To some, this was another ancient cultural trend, in the importance given to consensus in political decision making and the view that conflict ought to be avoided (Ward 1969:62; Hoffman 1981:241). However, as seen earlier, the Jiyūtō and Minshutō factions had not been consulted on appointments or policy decision making, and were in many ways based on conflict within the polarised atmosphere of the parties, where factions did not seek compromise. Factional conflict was uncompromising and splits frequent. This understanding could still be seen in the early years of the LDP. The *Japan Times* commented in 1957:

> Another important factor is the tendency of the Japanese to avoid a compromise. A classic example of this is Japan’s walkout from the old League of Nations. Thus if one group within a party cannot have its way, it will pick up its marbles and form a new group. If one should look into history he will find another example in the struggle for power between the Heike and the Genji clans, when the winner tried to wipe out the loser (20.3.57).

However, as factionalism entrenched itself within the LDP and came to stabilise the party, the factions came to be increasingly seen as traditional forces based on the ancient principles of compromise and unity. Fractional and inter-factional unity was to be understood in relation to the ‘traditional self-enclosed village’ and the ‘large ie family structure’ (Hoffman 1981:241) where manoeuvring was done ‘implicitly and tactfully’ and conflict avoided or at least postponed (Hoffman 1981:241).
Yet another problem with the idea of the LDP factions as traditional was the total disregard by observers and scholars of outside influence on the development of LDP factionalism. The relationship between Washington and conservative politics in the 1960s was very different from that of the early postwar days when the SCAP was critical of the conservative parties, their traditional thinking and backward politics. It became clear in 1951, as seen in Chapter 2, that it was actually the conservatives, the political forces the US had mistrusted most, who were supportive of US foreign policy, embracing the security and peace treaties (see Igarashi 1985: 355). The US had supported progressive political forces in order to democratise Japan but after the end of the Occupation the political ties between conservatives and the US strengthened.

The LDP factions were not born wholly out of an indigenous political culture of personalism, hierarchy and feudalism. The reverse course in the late 1940s diverted US attention from Japan's democratisation to Japan's economic and military buildup as an ally to the USA and not a neutral country. US intervention in Japanese politics after the reverse course in 1948, with political payoffs by US authorities to the LDP between 1955 and 1972, the M-Fund being handed over to individuals within the LDP in the late 1950s, helped create internal divisions within the party abetting factional infighting (see Johnson 2000: 83–5). In 1958 Eisenhower authorised the CIA to provide funds to Prime Minister Kishi and selected members of the LDP (Schlei 2000: 94), affecting political competition within the party. Kishi had in fact been supported by a number of influential but private Americans between 1947 and 1952 who sought to push Kishi to the front line of politics with it in view to change Occupation policy. Once Kishi had been made Prime Minister in 1957, the CIA began in earnest to influence LDP politics with the aim to strengthen Kishi's hold on power, channeling money to 'Kishi's circle within the LDP' (Schlei 2000: 99). Although Western scholars approached the study of Japan's modernisation as outsiders, studying the foreign Orient, the US had a great influence on Japan's social and political development—its modernisation—(Johnson 2000: 82) an influence which is often ignored.
Chapter 6: Tradition, Modernisation and Attempts to Abolish Factions

The LDP factions were engulfed in a discourse that saw them as an institution handed down from the past although many of those practices considered traditional had not been a part of early postwar factionalism. This discourse did not emerge suddenly and decontextualised—it was based on previous discourses about Japan as premodern, and as a society based on feudal relations. However, as Dirks et al. point out, the notion of cultural durability often proves to be a misperception when a historical perspective is adopted (1994:3; see also Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983). Vlastos (1998:3) argues that

Tradition is not the sum of actual practices that have perdured into the present; rather, tradition is a modern trope, a prescriptive representation of socially desirable (or sometimes undesirable) institutions and ideas thought to have been handed down from generation to generation.

Although many of the supposedly traditional characteristics of the LDP factions were not directly inherited from their predecessors, the discourse of tradition—although more like an invented tradition—was very powerful in creating a notion of continuity and a constant influence of ancient cultural values on political life. The LDP factions, it was argued, were derived from a factional history spanning from Tokugawa times to the present. Through the incessant comparisons of the modern and the traditional, the dichotomy of the West and Japan, one could see Orientalist attitudes reducing Japan to a set of cultural and behavioural trends as opposed to the West. But at the same time these comparisons may have helped in constructing a Japanese self-image built on comparisons and the dichotomy with the West which allowed the recognition of indigenous traditions that were not Western (Carrier 1997:7). This self-image was consequently used to support the claim that Japan was a unique society, and that its traditions were in fact 'one of the secrets behind the country's industrial success' (Davis 1992:255).

But the idea of LDP factions as reflective of "time-honoured" beliefs and practices' (Vlastos 1998:7) had both positive and negative connotations as seen in the movement for the dissolution of factions. Indeed, LDP factions as 'feudal remnants' had a very negative connotation—journalistic discussion on factions between 1955 and 1964 was very critical. The discussion about factionalism, modernisation and tradition that surrounded the drive to abolish factionalism in the LDP, gave an image of failure to
accomplish the victory of modernisation over traditions dating back to feudal times (Stockwin 1983:210). Despite this negativity, however, in relation to the rising confidence that the Japanese were acquiring after the Occupation, ‘time-honoured practices’ were also of positive value, not least in conservative politics. The most effective cleavage in Japan was caused by different value systems, and not economic or status differences. The LDP, as a conservative party, had ‘vast psychological resources of traditional values’ which it has rested its political strategies on, and which have often been dominant over anti-traditional value systems found in higher education and the labour movement (Watanuki 1967:457–8). Watanuki argues that promoting and preserving traditional society, such as hierarchical interpersonal relationships, has had deep political consequences in Japan, solidifying conservative support in society (1967:459). By the same token it could be argued that promoting the image of tradition in factional politics served to establish factionalism as a part of LDP politics.

Practicing Occidentalism while pointing out the dichotomy between the traditional and the Japanese, and the modern and the Western, helped to construct a Japanese self image in opposition to the West (see Carrier 1995:7). So, although factions were often represented as a socially undesirable institution, they were also a specifically Japanese entity, a tradition that has persevered into the present (see Vlastos 1998:43). This discourse made factions not only ‘traditional’ but also ‘normal’ in the Japanese setting. With the language of tradition, the transition whereby the LDP became a party divided into distinctive factions became more natural and less visible. The construction of a ‘traditional’ image and the use of traditional vocabulary in the factional politics of the LDP, whether within negative or positive discourses on factions, thus contributed to the strengthening of the LDP factionalism rather than to its weakening.

6.8. Conclusion

I have argued here that the evolution of factional politics within the LDP cannot be understood without comprehending the debate on tradition and culture between scholars, politicians and observers that took place in the 1960s, and the contending discourses on factionalism, and how they affected factional development. The movements for
dissolution of factions signaled a much more pronounced presence of factions; the factions had established themselves to the extent that there was something to be dissolved, very unlike the early postwar factions. The movement to dissolve factions in the early 1960s was closely related to the debates taking place in some quarters of Japanese society on whether democracy in Japan was failing (Kersten 2000). The modernisation of the LDP became a part of the overall modernisation of Japanese society, and the factions were perceived as the greatest obstacle to a true modernisation of the party. The factions were closely related to the feudal past of Japan, the opposite to democracy and modernity. This was done explicitly with references to Tokugawa Japan and implicitly with the ‘language of tradition’.

What was overlooked in the drive for modernisation and the dissolution of factions, was that the LDP factions were in fact a modern creation, very different from the factions that had existed within the conservative parties until then. The LDP factions were closely knit entities, they deliberately used traditional terms to refer to the relations between leaders and followers, and they sought to invoke loyalty amongst the Diet members. All this gave the LDP factions stronger ‘traditional’ characteristics than were visible within the Minshutō and Jiyūtō factions, and that made them the opposite of the ‘modernity’ that Japan sought to achieve. The traditional norms that the LDP factions rested on did not have real historical continuity in conservative politics. But they were concepts with traditional connotations, terms much used to refer to feudal Japan and premodern Japan and were invoked from the late 1950s in much of the discourse on LDP factions.

At the same time, the traditional characteristics gave the factions certain legitimacy to work against too much ‘modernity’ in the sense of too much Westernisation. Terms such as ‘loyalty’, ‘groupism’, and ‘leaders-followers’ were a reminder of the Japanese heritage. Politicians, journalists and observers often pointed out in the early 1960s that factionalism had been a feature of Japanese society for a long time. Factions were a socially undesirable institution but they were also seen as a specifically Japanese entity. Factions thus become not only ‘traditional’ but also ‘normal’ in the Japanese setting, making it seem more difficult or less desirable to uproot them. With the inroad of the
language of tradition, the transition whereby the LDP became a party divided into distinctive factions became more natural and less visible. This gave the LDP factions legitimacy, a tradition to fall back on, that allowed them to survive within the party to serve the institutional needs that had been created in the past decade.

Notes

1 A number of studies were done that varied greatly in their approach to Japan. As Dower (1986:118-122) shows, many were done by people who had no first hand experience of Japan but were hostile to Japan, such as Gorer, while others were made by researchers, though with little more first-hand knowledge of the country, more sympathetic to Japan and Japanese culture, such as Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead. However, the view was widespread that the Japanese people were homogenous in terms of cultural influence: lacking in individuality and culturally primitive.

2 The kokutai was a 'unique national polity as a family nation with the emperor as its father...Japanese culture was praised as spiritual, harmonious, and based on justice and collective welfare' (Shillony 1991:142).

3 Harry Wildes and Kenneth E. Colton who both wrote extensively about Japan worked for SCAP, while Yanaga Chitoshi worked for the US government during the war.

4 Between 1960 and 1969 there were 213 entries for ‘habatsu’, twice as many as in the 15 year period before it.

5 Many factions had already reported as ‘political associations’ (seiji kessha) and continued to work as such (Iyasu 1984:111).

6 The main reforms of this committee were the establishment of a financial committee (zaimuinkai) and the kokumin kyōkai (discussed in Chapter 5) (Masumi 1967:37).

7 There had been calls for the reversal of factional appointments at least since 1960 (AS 12.4.60; Masumi 1967:36). Scholars and observers generally agreed that factionalism worked against promotions based on ability (see Stockwin 1970:366).

8 The view seemed quite widespread that the conservative party had suffered from weak leadership ever since the formation of the first LDP cabinet headed by Hatoyama (AS 13.7.56; Watanabe 1958; Watanabe 1964)

9 Curtis argues that the view that the electoral system caused candidate-centered rather than party-centered campaigns, encouraged factionalism and corruption, discouraged policy debates and stood in the way of a competitive party system, was accepted without qualifications (Curtis 1999:150).

10 Of the 18 members in 1964, eleven had been in the Kishi faction (some with double affiliation with other factions) in 1961. Two came from Ikeda and Satō factions and three from the Ichimanda faction. According to Masumi, there were also many Satō faction members in the group in the early years of the movement (Masumi 1967:39).

11 It was telling that an Asahi poll in June 1963 showed that 59% of those asked ‘can we eradicate factions’ said ‘no’ and only 9% ‘yes’. (Masumi 1967:47fn), despite the fact that the public and local LDP leaders seemed overwhelmingly to wish for factional reform (Masumi 1967:47fn; Okano 1963:38).

12 The committee seemed to be considering both proportional systems as well as single member systems (JT 17.8.63).

13 Satō’s Mokuyokai decided to dissolve on October 22, followed by the Miki faction’s Seisaku Doshikai and the Ishii faction’s Suiyo kurabu. The Tōfū Sasshin decided to dissolve on the 25th. The Ōno, Kōno and Fujiyama factions however refused to dissolve (Masumi 1967:45; JT 10.12.63).

14 It was said that each faction managed to raise one billion yen, the same amount the party as a whole had been given (Masumi 1967:45).

15 Of the Ikeda faction’s 60 candidates, four had no endorsement; of Ōno’s 49 candidates seven had none; of the Miki faction’s 58 candidates, six had no endorsement. In total twelve unendorsed candidates were elected (Masumi 1967 from Yomiuri 7.11.63).

16 My discussion here on discourses has been influenced by Dryzek’s (1997) study of environmental discourses and the way different discourses construct different stories.
Chapter 6: Tradition, Modernisation and Attempts to Abolish Factions

17 Burks (1968:554) discusses leader-follower relationships as a prime example of the undemocratic characteristics of the Tokugawa bureaucracy.

18 Amongst the participants, Kawashima argued that democracy was a 'motive power' for changes and modernisation while Schwartz argued that modernisation could be achieved under a variety of regimes: including fascism, militarism and communism, and he pointed out that signs of modernisation could be seen late in the Tokugawa era under oligarchic rule (Burks 1968:19).

19 There is a wealth of examples of these arguments, see JT 17.10.62 and 6.10.62 when it was stated that the LDP was under the 'feudalistic control' of the factions).

20 I counted how many times the word 'habatsu' and names of individual factions appeared in headlines. 'Habatsu' are mentioned 3 times in 1955 but in 1956 it jumps to 20 times, 21 times in 1957, 27 times in 1958, 25 times in 1959 and 20 times in 1960. Throughout the 1960s, the frequency fluctuates much more with 'habatsu' only mentioned 4 times in 1961, 17 times in 1962, 41 times in 1963, 15 times in 1964, 24 times in 1965, 26 times in 1966, 17 times in 1967, 39 times in 1968 and 9 times in 1969. It is interesting to note that the great jump in frequency in 1963 happens at a time when there were major efforts to abolish factions but in that year general elections were held which were extremely factional in nature (see Masumi 1995).

21 Johnson (1982:81) noted a similarly widespread use of traditional language within the bureaucracy, in which feudal terminology was used to describe internal independence and sectionalism, which led to great rivalry between ministries.

22 Newspapers referred to the 'close associates' (sokkin) of Yoshida and 'close associate politics' (sokkin seiji) rather than factional politics based on oyabun-kobun relations.

23 Of these, Ōno Bamboku, Matsuno Tsuruhei and Andō Masazumi were best known.

24 Johnson (1982:239, 313) made a similar observation about the bureaucracy. He noted that the principle of 'consensus' did not appear within the bureaucracy until the 1950s, and argues that is was based on changes in historical circumstances and political consciousness rather than Japanese values.

25 The M-Fund was named after the chief of the Economic and Scientific Section of SCAP, General William Frederic Marquat. It was formed after the end of the Occupation, comprising of several funds which had been used by SCAP during the Occupation to influence political and foreign policy operations like the formation of the SDF as well as for economic rebuilding (Schlei 2000:89; Johnson 2000:85). It was initially administered by the US but after the Security Treaty of 1952 it was jointly controlled until the late 1950s when it was handed to the Japanese (Johnson 2000).

278
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Three main aims for this research were set out in the Introduction. First, to fill in gaps in the history of factionalism in Japan by analysing the character of the factionalism within the early postwar conservative parties, the Jiyūtō (Liberal Party) and the Minshutō (Democratic Party), over a 19 year period, between 1945 and 1964. Second, to seek to clarify how and why factionalism has changed in this period. Third, to look at discursive practices in relation to factionalism and how discourse contributes to the maintenance of factionalism.

The LDP factions have been very important and powerful political institutions within the party for many decades, and although not part of the formal organisation of the party, have ‘provided the primary political community for Japan’s political elite’ (Curtis 1988:80-81). Because of the political importance of the factions to the research material on the LDP is to be found in abundance. Scholars have sought to explain why the LDP factions exist, how they are maintained, and what role they play in the party’s power structure and policy making. However, detailed analyses on early postwar factionalism are surprisingly few. My research is intended to show postwar Japanese factionalism in an extended historical light with a detailed comparative analysis of factionalism within the conservative parties in Japan in the early postwar period and that of the LDP. It is my hope that with a historical perspective, made possible with the presentation of more extensive data on factionalism within the Jiyūtō and Minshutō than has heretofore been published in Western publications, we can more fully understand the nature of factionalism in Japan.

I have argued that in this period Japanese factionalism changed more than is usually acknowledged. Most studies have assumed strong historical continuity between LDP factionalism and early postwar and prewar factionalism, and have tended to look at the
unfolding of conservative factionalism as a progressive and natural development. To some scholars this continuity is due to the political culture of Japan, emanating from traditional feudal values and Confucianism. To others, the multimember electoral system, first introduced in 1925 was paramount in creating political factionalism. I have sought to demonstrate here that this notion of continuity is problematic on many levels. A basic observation discussed here is that the early Jiyūtō and Minshutō factions did not fit the definitional template that scholars have built from the extensive research already done on the LDP factions. From the example of the LDP factions scholars have tended to view conservative factions in Japan as organised groups, based on clear patron-client relations, fostering close relations between leaders and followers based on loyalty. These groups have been considered to be of great political significance, the de facto political actors within the parties, funnelling money to members and supporting them in electoral campaigns (see Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993:60-63; Scalapino and Masumi 1962:89). The main features of early postwar conservative factionalism were established in Chapters 2 and 3, showing important differences in the structure and functions of the intra-party factions from the factions of the LDP.

From those differences it was argued that rather than focus on continuity in factionalism in Japan, we should focus on change and seek to identify the forces that instigate and shape factional changes. Chapter 2 showed that early postwar factions had different organisational qualities from the LDP factions. The factions had characteristics of tendencies and clientelist groups but, although their structure varied significantly, they all had in common a much looser structure, a much lower level of organisation and a much vaguer idea of membership than any of the LDP factions. It is also highly significant that early factionalism was also considered highly destabilising for the political system. This was clearly seen in the vernacular press and in analyses by observers at the time. Factionalism was dangerous to the party system as it destroyed party unity and led to splits.

As mentioned earlier, most of the existing research on LDP factions indicates that the wider institutional environment has played an important part in creating factionalism in
Japan and certainly in maintaining it. This refers in particular to the multimember electoral system. The factions, it is argued, serve an 'election-enhancing' function by dividing the vote under the multimember electoral system where members of a large party are forced to compete with each other in electoral districts (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993:60; Cox and Thies 1998:267; Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 1999:33). The idea that the creation and maintenance of conservative factionalism in Japan is best understood in terms of the multimember electoral system has existed for a long time, but has become particularly influential in the last ten years or so with the multiplication of rational-choice approaches to Japan. My approach is in essence institutional, and draws on a lengthy list of studies already done on factionalism. However, my approach is more of a micro approach than most approaches to Japanese factions, looking at incremental changes in the organisational parameters of the party which affected the power politics within the party. My research aims to show that the importance given to the multimember electoral system is problematic when studied in a historical light.

In the first part of the thesis it was seen that although the Jiyūtō and the Minshutō competed under the same multimember electoral system as the LDP, factionalism within these parties was significantly different from that of the factionalism which developed later within the LDP. In spite of the great emphasis being put on the part the multimember electoral system plays in producing and/or maintaining factionalism in Japan, few studies have researched prewar and early postwar factionalism and the way it affected electoral politics. This thesis has tried to provide a first step towards a greater understanding of the relationship between these two factors. My study of the electoral districts between 1947 and 1964 shows that the relationship may not be as straightforward as is usually assumed. Chapter 3 expanded on the different characteristics of the early postwar factions within the multimember electoral system from those believed to characterise the LDP factions. Two important differences emerge. First, the early conservative factions were not effective ladders for advancement within party or government. Being a member of a faction was not an effective way to be promoted unless the faction was that of the party leader. Within the polarised atmosphere of the parties, both parties tended to exclude dissident elements from important posts. After the
formation of the LDP, on the other hand, dissident elements were increasingly being included in the party hierarchy. Within the LDP, being a member of a faction became an essential prerequisite for being promoted within party or government. Second, within the Jiyūtō and Minshutō, factional conflict did not habitually reach out to the electoral districts. In Chapter 3 it was seen that the Jiyūtō was large enough to face the same electoral problems the LDP later had: it had to put forward multiple candidates in districts who then had to fight each other as well as candidates of other parties. All the same, Jiyūtō candidates did not fight their campaigns on the basis of factional affiliation and did not receive exclusive financial aid from one faction, like LDP candidates came to do. Quite the contrary, there were a number of examples where Jiyūtō members fighting in the same district belonged to the same faction, and sought to assist each other on that basis. In Chapter 5 it was also seen that although LDP factionalism came to manifest itself in the electoral districts, it was not so from the outset. My data indicates that factional conflict spread from the party centre into electoral districts but took a number of years to establish itself. In the party's early years, factional conflict continued to be concentrated in the party centre. However, because of changes in the inner organisational dynamics of the party, the factions were driven by the perceived need to expand and consolidate to get the upper hand in the power struggles at the party centre, which led them to spread their activities into electoral districts. However, as factionalism was spreading to the electoral districts, the factions were not used to minimise the negative effects of the multimember electoral system on the party. In the party's early years the factions would often put multiple candidates forward in the electoral districts, which increased intra-factional struggles. This indicates that it was not electoral politics that was the driving force behind electoral factionalism but power politics at the centre.

My critique of the existing approaches is that they have focused too much on macro institutional factors like the multimember electoral system, and not paid enough attention to the incremental changes that took place within the LDP in reaction to immediate power concerns. I argued that Panebianco's organisational theory of the 'genetic models' of parties is helpful as a first step in establishing how party organisation relates to the environment in which the LDP emerged (Panebianco 1988:50). The Jiyūtō and Minshutō
Chapter 7: Conclusion

were created through penetration into the electoral districts while the LDP emerged out of
diffusion, being formed out of the two existing conservative parties and their local
organisations. This pre-conditioned their inner organisation, the cohesion of the elite and
the institutionalisation possible. However, I also argued that this model is not sufficient to
explain the history of these parties because it pays so little attention to later time
organisational changes which could alter this 'genetic model'. The organisational
environment of the LDP changed dramatically in the party's first years as a result of
power struggles and these were to affect the nature of factionalism. Rothstein argued that
'at certain moments in history....institutions are created with the object of giving the
agent (or the interests the agent wants to further) an advantage in the future game of
power' (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:21). Most of the structural changes that affected the
organisational environment of the LDP factions in the early years, such as the adoption of
presidential elections and the establishment of seiji kessha, were made with such power
gains in mind. The presidential elections were adopted in a power struggle between the
old Jiyūtō forces and their opponents. Chapter 4 traces these rapid changes in
factionalism after the formation of the LDP. After the first presidential elections,
factional membership started consolidating, and factions became increasingly important
in distributing posts in party and cabinet. At the same time policy became less important
in separating factional groups. The cumulative effects of this system could not be known
at the time. As seen in Chapter 5, political associations (seiji kessha) then appeared a few
months later as a result of links that were being forged between business and politicians
and as a way to manipulate the electoral laws. Individual politicians acquired the ability
to gather their own funding to increase their independence and ability to fight other
groups within the party for power. These changes were fundamental to the factional
system as it developed. The changing institutional environment led LDP politicians to use
this new financial power to encourage rank-and-file politicians to stay with them in return
for LDP support and nomination, support in Diet, money, posts and influence (Iyasu
1984:126). They thus used the financial power they had acquired to form a permanent
following. The cumulative result of these changes in the institutional framework was the
establishment of a factional system based on the power of jitsuryokusha, replacing the
polarised party environment of the immediate postwar years. These micro organisational
and institutional factors affected the institutional setup incrementally, creating a new kind of factionalism.

Looking at the way factionalism was presented and understood in both Japanese and Western publications between 1945 and 1964 we also see discontinuity. In the early postwar period, political factionalism was considered destabilising for political parties and the political system. In the press and in contemporary analyses, factions were seen as constantly changing groups with very limited recognisable membership. Their instability for the political system was caused by the fact that these groups changed rapidly; they could inflate and deflate very quickly in response to specific circumstances. There was no visible role for them in politics. My analysis shows that although these factions had a very limited political role to play, their influence on political processes was considerable in terms of a polarised conflict between the two main factions within the parties, the presidential group and those contesting its leadership. These groups fought bitterly over control of the party and showed readiness to split from the party if they failed. As seen in Chapter 4, there is a distinct change visible after the formation of the LDP in the way factionalism is perceived and understood. As the factions acquired membership and visible political roles they came to be seen as less of a destabilising force. The discourse on instability started giving way to another way of thinking about LDP factions. They became part of the ‘system’: they were visible, with membership and clear political functions. Although factionalism was heavily criticised these groups came to be viewed as political entities which could also contribute to political stability and keep the party together.

Attempts to abolish the LDP factions between 1962 and 1963 show further changes in the way factions were perceived, which related to the wider societal debate on modernisation and traditions. Although these attempts to eradicate factionalism failed and factionalism continued unabated, they paved the way for the emergence of new discourses about factionalism. Politicians and observers debated factionalism and its effect on politics. Factionalism became closely connected to concurrent debates about modernisation, Japanese traditions and culture, democracy and Westernisation. At the same time
factionalism came to be increasingly related to traditions. This was not only due to a 'cultural' approach to factionalism in political science. Scholars and observers had explained Japanese politics and society in terms of culture and behaviour ever since the war but factionalism and traditional society were not clearly connected until after the formation of the LDP. Chapter 6 delved further into how factionalism evolved in the 1960s in relation to the debate on modernisation and tradition in Japan. I argued that although attempts to abolish factions within the LDP failed the debate that ensued raised wider questions about the place of tradition in political development in Japan. Politicians and many commentators relied on the language of tradition to enhance understanding of factionalism, which was used to both argue for the eradication of factions and to justify their continuing existence within the LDP.

Scholars have come to the conclusion that the efforts to dissolve the factions yielded no results and that the whole movement did not affect the development of factionalism. But looking at the dissolution movement we unveil important issues connected to tradition and modernisation which shaped the debate on factionalism. The factions were legitimised and maintained by ascribing to them features seen as 'traditional'. I argue that these features were, however, recent inventions when it comes to factionalism in Japan. The factions were engulfed in a discourse describing them as familiar and normal, and many of their functions were decreed 'traditional' but had not been served by factions in the past. Some of the functions the LDP factions served were being connected to 'traditional values', and the tight membership structure and the loyalty enforced, never seen in conservative factions before, was considered Confucian or feudal. The debate on traditions and modernisation in Japan in the early 1960s concealed the discontinuity in factionalism and the changes in the structure and functions of conservative factions. It helped to reinforce a factional discourse which saw the LDP factions as 'conventional', emphasising continuity in Japan's development as 'indigenous norms' reasserted themselves (see Stockwin 1983:209). Ironically, both the critics and proponents of factionalism may thus have contributed to the continuance of factionalism through their extensive use of cultural referencing in this atmosphere of Nihonjinron.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Factionalism is a particularly important subject of study in Japan in light of the fact that since the late 1950s it has been a central part of LDP politics and an integrated part of Japanese politics in general. Had factionalism not developed the way it did within the LDP, the political landscape of Japan might be very different. It is likely that the party would not have been able to hold the reins of power for 38 years had intra-party factionalism not been institutionalised. Understanding factionalism, its underlying causes and effects, is thus paramount to our understanding of Japanese politics. After the period under study in this thesis, LDP factionalism continued to develop along the lines already set out in the early 1960s. The factions introduced measures to avoid overendorsement of LDP candidates in elections, to give non-mainstream factional members access to party resources to avoid schism and splits, and to equalise the allocation of cabinet posts (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995:363). The 1970s saw some changes in factional politics as the party’s fortune seemed to be turning and the economic situation got worse following the oil shock. Some of the biggest factions, and the Tanaka faction in particular (successor of the Satō faction), started aggressively to expand to bolster its position within the party and to forge links with opposition party members, thereby indicating its willingness to split from the party if the need arose (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995:364). The 1980s saw a stronger LDP in electoral terms. Fundraising had decentralised following the new fundraising laws in 1976 (Curtis 1988:163), leaving faction leaders with less fundraising responsibilities for their members (Cox and Rosenbluth 1995:365). However, the LDP was implicated in a number of bribery scandals which involved top LDP politicians. This, combined with continuing power struggles within the LDP led the party to split in 1993 and lose its electoral majority in the Lower House. The LDP’s 38 year continuous reign thereby ended. Following complicated political manoeuvres large scale political reform was undertaken in Japan with a change in the electoral system in 1994 to a system of proportional representation and single member electoral districts introduced (see Reed 1999:177).1

Scholars have debated whether the LDP factions will disappear, now that the multimember electoral system, which had been widely blamed for factionalism, has been abolished. It is still unclear what the overall trend is. There are some indications that the
new electoral system has started to change the factional exchange between leaders and follower, with leaders playing less of a role in nominations and followers less willing to follow their faction (Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies 1999:33). However, as Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies (1999:56) themselves point out, these changes coincided with the LDP’s loss of power and it is therefore difficult to determine to what extent the electoral system has produced changes. As seen earlier, my research indicates that the relationship between factionalism and the multimember electoral system is not as simple as scholars have indicated. Although the LDP factions took up extensive electoral functions, these were not the reason for their establishment. The LDP factions may therefore not disappear or become the ‘fluid groupings’ that Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies (1999:56) envisage, simply because of a change in the electoral system. The factions as historical institutions adapt to changing organisational environments, as seen in the LDP’s first years. They may thus yet again take on a different structure and a new meaning to react to a new institutional environment. My research indicates that we cannot gain full understanding of factionalism in Japan without looking at political factions in a historical light, continuously putting into question ideas of continuity, and paying closer attention to incremental changes that may change the course of development.

Notes

1 The 130 old multimember districts have been made into 300 new single-member districts while 180 seats are allocated by proportional representation in 11 districts.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary sources


OSS/State Department Intelligence and Research Reports Part I. 1942 Survey of Japan.


SCAP Political Parties in Japan, October 1945–April 1946, GS(B) 02519–22.


SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties and Groups, March 1949–June 1951, GS(B) 02683.

SCAP Concerning the Recent Political Situation, April 1951, GS(B) 02683.

SCAP History of Political Parties in Japan, GS(A) 02519.
SCAP Conservative Parties, February–September 1951, GS(B) 04352–3.
SCAP Miscellaneous Political Parties 1951, March–May 1951, GS(B) 02674–02675.

Secondary sources


Bibliography


Hayashi, Kaan (1957a) ‘Omosugita habatsu kaishô no kanban’ [The Fractional Dissolution Sign that is too Heavy], Keizai Ôrai 9(3) pp.33–37.


Ishii, Mitsujirō et al. (1963) ‘Waga habatsu o kataru’ (ankēto) [Talking About Our Factions (questionnaire)], *Chūō Kōron* 78(9), pp.146–151.


‘Kaijo gumi to sengoha gumi no aiirezaru tatakai—Jiyutō o chūshin ni’ [The Incompatible Warfare of the Depurgee Group and the Postwar Group—Focusing on the Jiyutō], *Keizai Orai* 4(4) April 1952.


McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (1997) ‘Toward and Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolution’ in Mark I. Lichbach and Alan


Okano, Kaoru (1963) ‘Habatsu seiji no susume—tatōsei seiji no tekisei’ [The advancing of factional politics—the appropriateness of multiparty system politics], *Jiyū* 5(7) pp.32–41.


Shiraki, Masayuki (1949) ‘Seitō bureen monogatari—kakutō o meguru sengōha no hitobito’ [Story of Political Party Brains—the Postwar Faction Members in Each Party], Kaizō 30(6), June, pp.37–42.
Bibliography


Sumitomo, Kenichirō (1959) ‘Ōno Bamboku to Ōno ha no seitai’ [Ōno Bamboku and the Mode of Life of the Ōno Faction], Nihon oyobi Nihonjin 10(6) pp.118–126.


Bibliography


Watanabe, Tsuneo (1962) 'Habatsu wa hitsuyō de aru' [Factions are Necessary], Ronso 4(9) October, pp.97–108.


