A Critical Examination and Analysis of the Processes by which Educational Psychologists constructed themselves as Ethical Professionals:

To Be What I Am Not.

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Abstract

Abstract: The thesis problematized and critiqued Educational Psychologist-Client relations in order to understand and explore the processes by which Educational Psychologists (EPs) constructed themselves as ethical professionals. This was both a personal and professional journey because the thesis critically examined EPs’ professional identities while being an exercise in personal professional identity work. The author was therefore both researcher and researched.

The methodology adopted a post-structuralist bricolage approach that appropriated aspects of Self-Study (S-S), Action Research (AR), and Autoethnography with a Foucauldian approach to data analysis. This was a strategic move intended to disrupt the dominance and authority of methodology. The four research cycles included: (1) an analysis of the write-up of a meeting with a 14 year old pupil (hereafter M), (2) a textual analysis of the Health Care Professions Council’s Standards of Conduct, Performance and Ethics (HPC-SCPE, 2008), (3) an analysis of a Focus Group (FG) discussion with nine EPs working within an Educational Psychology Service (EPS) and (4) a synthesis of the findings from the first and third cycles of research. Only the results of the fourth cycle were presented in the main body of the thesis.

Three discursive themes with relevant subthemes were identified: (1) the problematic ethical relationship with the client, (2) the appropriation of ethical rhetoric and (3) the strategic presentation of the Educational Psychologist. The results suggested that ethics was a useful tool to examine EP-Client relationships and that the trials and dilemmas experienced during these encounters spoke to the discursive formation in which EPs worked. A wide range of ethical traditions and theories were employed rhetorically by EPs to warrant and legitimize positions and practice. The thesis radically challenged both the discourses of choice and the EP as the sole source of ethics in everyday micro-ethical encounters. EPs’ identities were argued to result from micro-processes in Education Psychology practice which entangled standards and ethics in EP-Client relationships. Finally, problematizing the author’s practice opened up a space to have a different relationship to his practice.
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Abbreviations

AR Action Research
AEP Association of Educational Psychologists
BPS British Psychological Society
CA Conversational Analysis
CDA Critical Discourse Analysis
CAMHS Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service
DCSF Department for Children, Schools and Families
DfE Department for Education
DfES Department for Education and Skills
DP Discursive Psychology
EP Educational Psychologist
EPs Educational Psychologists
EP’s Educational Psychologist’s
EP’s Educational Psychologists’
EPS Educational Psychology Service
FG Educational Psychology Service Focus Group
FUP Follow up meeting with M and his mother
HPC Health Professionals Council
Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Specifying the problem

The thesis was partly prompted by a meeting with a client (referred to as “M”). M was a 14 year old male pupil at a local high school. Before meeting M I encountered him as a set of descriptors provided by school staff, some of which are outlined in the text box below:

- Persistent poor attender/school refuser: M’s attendance was just below 50%. When in school M was only attending a small percentage of his lessons and spending the rest of time in the school Learning Support Centre (LSC).
- Having hygiene problems: M was described as having dirty fingernails and hair with persistent knits. M had dirty clothes.
- Confrontational and work refuser: It was claimed that M regularly argued with staff and peers, refused to go to lessons and when in lessons refused to work.
- A loner: I was told that M did not have any friends in school.
- A victim: M’s family had to move to their current house after experiencing bullying in the community and M had been bullied in primary and secondary school.
- Attention seeker: I was warned that M would enjoy talking to me as he sought adult attention and liked talking about himself.
- Pupil with Special Educational Needs: M was in the bottom sets in school and had significant difficulties with literacy and mathematics. I was initially asked to undertake an assessment to establish if M would benefit from special examination arrangements.
- Having Mental Health problems: M had been seen by a Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS) worker for 8 weeks. They met each Monday afternoon but M had not been responsive to the Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT). M had also been referred to the Community Paediatrician establish if he met the criteria for an Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD).
- Belonging to a dysfunctional family: The school’s Family Support Worker had undertaken a visit to school and had reported difficulties with hygiene and parenting. M was the youngest of 3 children in a single parent household.

The adequacy of the above as descriptions of M did not survive the first meeting with him. Meeting M made me question the processes by which clients were
made visible and the role of Educational Psychology in warranting, regulating and fabricating those visibilities. The wager I made was; by analysing my ethical trials, dilemmas and challenges I would be able to examine the processes of individualisation (identification) in Educational Psychology (Araujo & Martuccelli 2010).

In writing and reading for the thesis the nature of the problem changed. I started by asking questions about my practice and ended up asking questions about my professional identity. The original question was; “what can I say about the other that would not be excluding/limiting/reductive?” This ethical question arose from an anxiety about the power relations between Educational Psychologists and clients and the role that Educational Psychologists have in labelling, categorizing and measuring (e.g. Billington 2002; Billington & Pomerantz 2004). As the thesis progressed the question moved to; “what was it about Educational Psychology\(^1\) (Its condition of possibility\(^2\)) that made the relationship with clients problematic?

### 1.2 Justification for Researching Professional Ethics

There were three possible justifications for researching professional ethics. Firstly, it will be argued that there was a long and establish history between applied psychology and ethics. Secondly, that ethical practice was required to achieve good outcomes. Thirdly, it will be argued that applying ethics to EP-Client relations acted as a useful lens to analyse educational psychology practice.

Firstly, Brinkmann & Kvale (2008) noted that the social sciences developed out of moral philosophy where students of social science were expected to develop

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\(^1\) This question would have been easier to formulate if there was an adjective form of educational psychology. This question could then be stated as; what was it about the Educational Psychologist’s educational psychology that made the relationship with clients problematic?

\(^2\) The condition of possibility referred to the creative tensions in the multiplicity of discourses that were present in Educational Psychology that articulated and regulated/warranted the possible ways of being an Educational Psychologist and practicing Educational Psychology.
moral sensibilities as part of their curriculum. Support for this declined because as positivistic attitudes to research “based on experiments tests and questionnaires” increased (Ibid, page, 264). The exclusion of ethics correlated with the desire to become value neutral, an impartial observer and disembodied only to return in the form of concerns about neutrality, impartiality, consent and confidentiality. Research on ethics could therefore be argued to be a continuation of the dialogue between qualitative approaches and Educational Psychology.

Secondly, Allan (1999) argued that inclusion was dependent on Educational Psychologists (EPs) undertaking “ethical work” on themselves and therefore should be the subject of research. Without ethical work EPs could become complicit in the processes that promoted exclusion. For Allan (1999), ethical work involved challenging and questioning the evidence that underpinned our practice, disrupting our everyday professional habits, ways of thinking, praxis, beliefs and adopting a problematising and critical attitude towards the institutions we worked. Ethical work also opened up a critical space between the professional and their practice. Allan (1999) suggested that a critical space could be achieved through problematising professional rhetoric. Finally, Allan (1999) claimed that the largest barrier to working ethically was the professional’s “passion for ignorance” (Ibid, page, 118). The passion for ignorance was described as a desire to ignore or fail to acknowledge the implication of one’s own role in exclusion. This was not the result of a lack of compassion on behalf of the professional. Rather it was a product of the discourses that constructed Special Educational Needs (SEN). For example, the discourse that professionals always acted in the best interests of their clients. Ethical work for professional therefore included “subverting” their “ideology of expertism” (Ibid, page, 119). This was achieved by recognising that they had Professional Thought Disorder (PDT), which included:

- Compulsion to analyse and categorise the experience of others
- Disordered cognition (rigidly held beliefs, delusions of grandeur)
- Negative transfer and projection (not able to distinguish their beliefs and wishes from those they are helping)
This thesis was my attempt to undertake ethical work and could be viewed as a response to Allan (1999).

The third argument was that ethics provided a framework to critically examine practice, i.e. a tool to think with rather than as a set of theories and rules (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008). Using ethics as a frame to examine Educational Psychology practice was a means to surface practices and discourses that posed problems for Educational Psychology. Including an ethical dimension could therefore enable critical reflection on existing models and frameworks. Hoeyer (2006) identified three categories of studies of ethics:

- Category (A) included studies which explored ethics as a subject in its own right
- Category (B) described studies in which ethics was only a device to study something else.
- Category (C) encompassed studies that examined ethics as a technology of power and tended to belong to the discursive tradition.

This thesis included aspects of both Category B and C because ethics was used as a tool to critically examine EP practice and understood as a technology of power.

Therefore, research on ethical practice was relevant because:

- It was part of a (re)turn to an ethically engaged social science.
- Ethical practice was dependant on individuals undertaking ethical work on themselves.
- Using an ethical lens could produce an interestingly critical account of Educational Psychology practice.

1.3 Positional/Theoretical Framework

This section delineated the three ways in which positionality was considered:

1. Position as either insider or outsider researcher
2. Ontological or epistemological position
3. Position towards the construct of identity
1.4 Insider/Outsider

The most obvious position would be as an insider researcher. I was an EP researching practice in the Service where I worked. However, the terms ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ were not mutually exclusive and were contingent on roles and actions (Labaree, 2002). For example, when interviewing M, I was a traditional outsider collecting data on others. However, when discussing with my EP colleagues I was both an insider and an outsider. The insider status was derived from being a member of the team and outsider status because of the need to make the familiar strange, the ordinary extraordinary and to (re)consider the taken-for-granted in my Service. The insider/outsider position occasioned the ever present potential for role confusion by being a work colleague, while providing a service to M and being a researcher. Being both insider and outsider could therefore produce a type of diaspora associated with hybridity\(^3\) (Bhabha, 1990).

Insider research had been criticized because the inherent subjective position made it scientifically invalid (Anderson, 2006; Holt, 2003; Salzman, 2002). However, being an “insider” might have the potential to produce better research. For example, less time needed to establish rapport, participants might be more willing to disclose information to an insider and less time required to develop understanding of the context (Asselin, 2003; Borbasi, Jackson & Wilkes, 2005). However, Dwyer and Buckley (2009) argued that being an insider did not make the research better, rather it was just different. Parker (2002), below, identified an additional tension present in research with individuals:

“There is a continual tension between “personal reactivity” (the attempt by the subject to understand and control research) and “procedural reactivity” (the ways in which the demands of the situation limit their room for manoeuvre) when psychologists agonize about deception or the depersonalization of those they treat like objects, however, they then find themselves faced with the (to them)

\(^3\) I was outsider who was in and an insider who felt outside.
unbearable prospect of being open about the hypothesis and giving the game away” (Parker, 2002, page 5)

This tension was particular important when the participants were colleagues and friends. However, Tillmann-Healy (2003) argued that researching *friends* enabled researchers to adopt attitudes of caring, respect and trust. This acknowledged the levels of investment that people in communities made to each other. This was the antithesis of the detached, neutral, ambivalent researcher of positivistic research (Willig, 2003). Tillmann-Healy (2003) further argued that researching *friends* was only ethical if researchers also turned the research gaze onto themselves. Otherwise the relationship would be too exploitative (one sided). The aim of turning the research onto myself was discussed further below.

1.5 Epistemological and Ontological Positions

While researching, I experienced pressure to *come out* and embrace a category. Was I a realist, critical realist, constructionist, constructivist, etc.? I also experienced others’ attempts to *out me*. These outing attempts seemed to stem from an essentialist perspective which assumed that the epistemological and ontological position said something about me. However, I wanted a more strategic approach to positionality: not to say that I am a Foucauldian inspired “post-structuralist” but rather to state that this thesis will take this position. This adoption of strategic positionality points to the contingent, and partial and situated nature of the research.

Although the thesis appeared to be concerned with the “lived experience” of the EPs the position would be better described as hermeneutic rather than phenomenological because political, historical and sociological contexts were

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4 The thesis frequently used the term tension instead of conflict. This was because it recognized that binary constructs or antagonism could be held in separation without the need to be dialectically resolved. This postponed closure and held out the possibility that the tension could be creative.

5 The idea of contingent positionality had been present in feminist research on identity for some time, for example see Brah (2005) pages 148 - 149
emphasised over experience (Miller and Crabtree, 1999). This was a move away from an ambition to manifest the essence of another's/researcher's lived experience to analysing the context in which that experience was constructed. How people talked about their experiences, trails and challenges was therefore perceived to speak to the context in which these experiences occurred. Hence, I was interested in how:

- The Client was constructed?
- EPs navigated relations with clients?
- EPs came to know their practice?

This was a shift from knowing content/things to examining processes. The aim was not only to identify which ethics were employed but also the work that they undertook. I was therefore concerned with how practitioners talked about ethics, the rationalizations employed, how participants positioned and repositioned themselves in a range of different and conflicting discourses. This was a post-structuralist discursive approach to epistemology and ontology (Baxter, 2002; Billig, 1999). Epistemological because the thesis was interested in what practitioners said about others. Ontological because I was interested both in the processes of speaking about Others and how Others were theorised.

This thesis was influenced by the “relational turn” in research (Hollway, 2008). This suggested that all subjectivity and meaning formation was underpinned by, and expressed through, intersubjectivity. The research was therefore psycho-social. This meant that the intention was not to reduce interpretation to either the level of the individual or the social but as an iterative process (Hollway, 2008).

The thesis also held that there was an entangled relation between power and knowledge (Foucault, 1980, Reason, 1994). Power was:

“... never localised here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or a piece of wealth. Power is excised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and excising this power.
They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its articulation” (Foucault, 1980, page 98).

Power, therefore, not only established relations of dominance and submission but also informed how these relations were established, maintained and regulated by systems of knowledge (Foucault, 1980). This included what could be said about the Client, how the Client was constructed and their Clienthood regulated. The focus on relational ethics therefore already included a political and knowledge dimension.

Foucault (1997) argued that there was a relationship between power and knowledge. Institutional power was achieved through continual examination shaped by normalizing judgements and combined with hierarchical observation. The institutional examination of the Other combined both “the deployment of force and the establishment of truth” (Foucault, 1997, page 184). Examination both fabricated the “truth” about those it examined by producing facts and also identified their capacities and wellbeing. This knowledge was then used to discipline their behaviour by directing the Other to a treatment or pedagogy. The examination was also facilitated by locating the other in a “field of documentation”, which included collecting case histories, demographic data, and reports of assessments and tests (Ibid, page 189). These documents were required to be detailed and exhaustive. These processes of individualisation enabled the other to be categorised, normalised and transformed into a case subject to disciplinary power. The Other was therefore made an example of a category and a target for care. Caring thus provided the opportunity for control and closure. This was because the other was made manageable and bounded within a category and shaped for treatment or intervention.

However, power was not the central object of Foucault’s analysis; rather power was a tool to examine how persons became subjects (Foucault, 1980). Analyzing power meant the examination of relations between individuals and individuals and institutions. This power was productive rather than oppressive:
“We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in generative terms: it excludes, it represses, it censors, it abstracts, it masks, it conceals. In fact power produces; it produces reality. It produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and knowledge that may be gained of him belongs to this production” (Foucault, 1979, page 194).

If power was understood to encompass both prescriptive and productive processes then there was no position external to power (Foucault, 1980). This type of power applied itself to the immediate everyday life and:

“Categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, poses a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him” (Foucault, 1982, page 781).

Power therefore made individuals subjects and objects of knowledge. Foucault (1982) meant subjects both as being subject to someone else’s control and being fixed to an identity through self-knowledge. The subject being both autonomous and subject to a law or rules was therefore both situated and reflexive (Reason, 1984; Shotter, 1993).

The immediacy of power required immediate struggles. The aim was not to find a chief enemy or eventual liberation (Foucault, 1983). Rather the aim was not to “discover who we are but to refuse what we are not” and explore who we could be (Foucault, 1983, page 785).

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6 I preferred Iago’s, in Shakespeare’s Othello, line “I am not what I am” and hence the subtitle of the thesis. Iago’s statement occurred after two rhetorical moves between lines 41 to 66 chapter 1, scene 1. Iago first recognized himself as a servant with duties. Next, Iago made problematic the constructs of service and duty. For example, he talked about servants being unceremoniously dumped after years of service. These moves enabled Iago to rationalize a brake from service and duty while remaining a soldier. These were similar to the rhetorical moves I made. First, to recognise/examine the identity of EPs and then to make it problematic. The aim was also to enable me to have the possibility of being other than what I am, but hopefully without the tragic consequences!
1.6 Position on Identity

Critically examining EPs’ perceptions of their role and identity was important because it influenced how they practiced and the judgments they made (Ashton & Roberts, 2006; Stobie, 2002). The thesis strived for a non-essentialist ontological position on identity which held that identity was contingent, fluid, fragmented, reflexively understood and fabricated by the subject in relation to and with Others (Butler, 2004; St Pierre, 2000a, 2000b). This included both the other as Other and “me” as Other (Butler, 2004; Derrida, 1999). Post-structuralism challenged the ontological certainty of identity by problematizing the foundations of humanism, the transparency of language, the solidity of the self, and notions of knowledge and truth (Gannon, 2006; St Pierre, 2000a, 2000b). St Pierre (2000b) insisted that the self “does not exist ahead of or outside language but is a dynamic unstable effect of language/discourse and cultural practice” (St Pierre, 2000b, page 502). These post-structuralist selves were produced in a “nexus of contradictory subjectivities” in constantly shifting power relations, which enable the speaker to adopt multiple positions (Butler, 2004; Walkerdine, 1990, page 3) The subject was therefore not a thing but positions maintained within relations of power (Arrisbas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2009).

Having self-reflexivity as a core methodology and wanting to hold to a post-structuralist concept of selfhood produced a tension, crudely characterized as: when “I” set out to study myself the use of “I” signalled an internal consistent self. However, post-structural approaches simultaneously attempted to destabilise that fixed “I” (Hall, 1997, 1996). This tension only existed when reflexivity was seen as an unveiling, unmasking, outing or discovery of truth about the self. However, if identity research was an act of becoming (preformation) then the tension dissipated. This acknowledged the difference between problematising agency and denying agency (Butler, 2004). Foucault (1997) argued that his aim was not to exclude the subject but to describe the positions they could occupy.
and show how different subjects in the same discursive practice could speak of
different objects. Furthermore, because power acted on possible actions the
potential to act otherwise remained (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2009). The
potential to act otherwise made professional identity work an ethical project.

An additional solution to the post-structuralist dilemma above was the attempt to
create some tension in the reader by moving between the first and third person.
This move was intended to disrupt the presentation of the unified self and put it
under erasure (Gannon, 2006). For a fuller discussion of the rationale for using
both the first and third person see appendix 5.

1.7 Researching the Event

The overall approach of the thesis was idiographic\textsuperscript{7}. Ethical relations were
argued to be complex and not straightforwardly bounded by general law or
universal principles. These relations can be ambiguous and unpredictable. This
implied that the research was an examination of an unique event and although
the examined practice could share characteristics with other EP’s practice the
research did not necessarily generate knowledge that was easy to generalize.

As suggested above the research was situated at the level of the event. Events
differ from objects. Objects exist whereas events occurred (Hacker, 1982). In
addition, objects were often discussed as having clear spatial and temporal
boundaries whereas events have woolly spatial and temporal boundaries
(Hacker, 1982). Events were also both incorporeal and material. They were
material because they can have material effects but incorporeal because events
were not reducible to the facts of what occurred or a property of the situation in

\textsuperscript{7} That was an attempt to examine the particular, unique, subjective and contingent phenomena.
which they occurred (Foucault, 1997). Events were therefore involved in different games of truth. Explicitly, the event of meeting M was different from the fact that I met M. The difference was between a single statement that can be judged as true or false against the multiple emotional consequences and meanings that occurred in relation to the event. Understanding the encounter with M as an event had a synergy with Foucault’s (1978/2003) attempted eventalization of history. This was described as “breach of self-evidence” and “making visible singularity” (Ibid, page 226). This required establishing the “multiplication or pluralisation of causes” that constituted the event (Foucault, 1978/2003, pages 226-227). Foucault’s (1978/2003) desire to “pose problems in local terms” and to ask “particular and limiting questions” also made a Foucauldian approach extremely applicable to this thesis (Foucault, 1978/2003, pages 286 and 285). This was because this thesis focused on an EP’s particular practice examined at the local level of their Educational Psychology Service. Therefore, the aims to examine the discursive world that EP inhabited, to delineate the ways in which the professional “I” engaged with those discourses and to enable the possible transformation of my practice meant I was a witness, participant and reporter of the event (Willig, 2003). The interpretations were therefore just one possible reading of the event (Billig, 1997).

1.8 Saying and Said

Levinas’ (1981) differentiation between ‘said’, ‘saying’ and ‘unsaying’ provided a novel way to think about the epistemology and ontology of practice. The said can be understood as the literal content of what was being said, whereas saying was what was being expressed. An illustration is given in the text box below:

A loving daughter is beside the bed of her terminally ill mother. Both mother and daughter know that there is not much time left. The daughter is holding her mothers hand and talking about the weather.
In this moment what was being expressed (what the daughter was saying) by being there was much more than what was being said. Levinas (1981) excluded expressive acts from the study of being (ontology).

Levinas (1981) found violence in attempts to make ontology known through analysis, categorisation and thematization. Saying resisted and was betrayed by attempts to categorize it or make it thematic (Levinas, 1981). Processes of amphibiology and apophansis enabled closure and reduced being to the said. Levinas’s (1981) position could be paraphrased as; there was nothing that could be said about the other that was better than saying nothing at all. It was possible to say what the other was not. The other was unknowable, and the other was not me. However, there was paradox here because not knowing was still to know something (I know that I do not know).

1.9 The Preoccupation with Pastoral Modes of Power

Finally, this thesis could also be perceived as a continuation of the postmodern preoccupation with Foucault's (1997) analysis of pastoral modes of power (Schutz, 2004). The emphasis on pastoral modes of power had been criticised for ignoring the more authoritarian disciplinary modes of power. Schutz (2004) argued that focusing on local acts and performances obscured the impacts resulting from the lack of access to social and material goods experienced by marginalised groups. Caughlan (2005) challenged Schutz (2004) and suggested that pastoral power was pervasive and particularly “corrosive” in high poverty settings. In addition, pastoral power and macro modes of power were entangled and mutually reinforcing (Caughlan, 2005). This was evident in States being interested in both populations (reproductive rates, movements, housing, education, etc) and in imposed individual discipline and self-regulation (Foucault, 1983). However, Foucault (1977) argued that only micro bottom up acts of resistance were possible given the individualising and totalising nature of power.
This was because macro acts of resistance could leave in place the operation of micro processes of power. These included combining pastoral and disciplinary regimes to create the discursive space that limited what was allowable or thinkable. Foucault (1983) claimed that pastoral power:

“... cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people’s minds, without exploring their soul, without making them reveal their innermost secrets. It implies knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it” (Ibid, page 214).

The thesis therefore also explored the techniques and processes EPs employed to make clients knowable.

1.10 Aims and Research Questions

The aim of the thesis was to trouble and disturb the tradition I worked in by being open to the voice of the Other (Todd, 2000). The phrase “to trouble” had been chosen carefully to signal that the research was not intended to be a rejection or a refutation of Educational Psychology. To trouble Educational Psychology meant adopting both a problematising and critiquing attitude. Problematization and critique are simultaneously methods of analysis and self-forming activities (Foucault, 1984/1986).

Problematization made problematic that which otherwise goes unchallenged in practice. Adopting a critical attitude involved showing what appeared to be obvious or natural was a historical and social artefact (Foucault 1984/1996). Foucault stated that critique was:

“...at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them,” (Foucault, 1986b, Page 50).

Critique therefore held the possibility of developing my practice by making visible the discourses that regulated EPs’ practice. Critique could be a method to identify the conditions of possibility under which a field of practice appeared (Butler, 1995, 1997). Foucault (19782003), below, was explicit about the aim of
his institutional analyses was not to provide advice or instructions but to create a
dissonance in people who worked in institutions so that:
“…they "no longer know what to do", so that the acts, gestures, discourses which
up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, difficult,
dangerous” (Foucault, 1978/2003, page 235).

Foucault (2003) by placing practitioners in a space where they did not know what
to do incited an ethical relation. The practitioner was called to ask, ‘how should I
behave when I cannot fall back on epistemological certainties?’ In the prior
state, when the practitioner believed that they knew what to do, there was no
need to think. In addition, when I am not sure which way to turn at least I am
looking. Critical analysis therefore did not cause apathy but a “hyper- and
was not that professions like Educational Psychology were bad but that they
were dangerous. This meant that professionals had therefore to do something to
mitigate against that danger.

Following Foucault (1977) an analysis of Educational Psychology was at the
same time an analysis of the EP-Client power relations. The thesis was thus an
experiment to establish if there was a way out from those power relations. This
way out does not mean a complete break but the possibility of doing something
the self’s relation to the self was an ethical practice and described these relations
as the “technologies of the self”. These technologies involved procedures of
taking care of oneself by enabling:

“Individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain
number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way
of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (Foucault, 1983/2003a,
page 146).

Self construction was therefore both an occupation and preoccupation and
occurred through the self reflecting on its behaviour, actions and thoughts. This
reflection had a judicial flavour as the activities of the self were normatively examined from a hierarchical perspective. The individual would reflect on what had been done and what ought to have been done and weighed it in the balance. These processes would not only reflect on who they have been and are but also who they wanted to become. The individual was thus woven into a relation of power but also retained the power to say no through practicing acts of self discipline.

1.11 Possible Traps

There were at least eight possible traps to be avoided in adopting a reflexive approach. Briefly these were:

1. Normative (attempting to establish a new set of universal rules);
2. Sanctimonious/Pharisaic (adopting an inappropriate tone);
3. Instrumental (assuming that experiences can be unproblematically, codified, categorized and made thematic);
4. Narcissistic/vainglorious (reflectivity that just said “look at me”);
5. Monologic (developing knowledge only through self-reflection instead of dialogueic interaction with theory and others);
6. Enabling closure (presuming that there is only one truth and enabling only one reading of the situation);
7. Warranting insider accounts (privileging the knowledge produced just because it has been developed by a practitioner).
8. Slipping into reflectivity as personal therapy.

How well I avoided each of the above traps was reviewed in the reflections section of this thesis.

1.12 Conclusions

The thesis aimed to apply a Foucauldian approach to research that problematized and critiqued Educational Psychology practice in order to seek to understand and explore the processes by which EPs constructed themselves as ethical professionals. There were three axis of the study that was present in both the literature review and in the analysis of results. The first axis was to establish
how EPs came to recognize themselves as EPs. This required a literature review of professional identity in general and EP identity in particular. The analysis of results focused on how EPs were constituted as subjects and objects of knowledge. The second axis was the examination of the normative systems that regulated Educational Psychology. This was achieved through a critical examination of the literature on professional ethics, an analysis of the HPC-SCPE, an analysis of the focus group discussion and my meeting with M. The third axis was an analysis how of EPs defined their ethical practice in their relations with clients. Finally, the thesis was guided by the following two research questions:

1. How do EPs position themselves as ethical professionals in the EP-Client relationship?
2. What do the ethical trials experienced by EPs while working with clients say about the nature of Educational Psychology?
Chapter 2. Orienteering: An Overview of the Thesis

The structure of the thesis followed a traditional format of; introduction, literature review, methodologies, results, discussion, reflections and conclusions. This section included an overview of the substantive chapters.

2.1 Literature Review

The literature review was in two parts that reflected the two main entangled themes of the thesis, professional identity and professional ethics. The literature review explored the means by which professional identity and everyday professional practice had been previously researched. The section on professionals and professionalism examined the difficulties of definition and the conflicting approaches to understanding professionals and professionalism. The different approaches to understanding EPs’ identity were also delineated. The major approaches to professional identity research; individualist/realist/objective and social/relativistic/subjective, were critically examined. Professional identities and roles were argued to be established and regulated through institutional talk as part of identity work. The perennial questioning of EPs’ identity and role was also critically examined as was the constructions of clienthood and asymmetric EP-Client relations.

The ethical approaches that have been applied to everyday practice (microethics) were critically considered. This was followed by an examination of ethical reasoning and critically contrasted the bioethical and particularist approach to ethical thinking. The review then provided a critical outline of Foucault’s (1990, 1994, 2003a) approach to ethics as a relation the self had with itself. The rhetorical nature of ethics was then examined to argue that ethical talk had social functions and challenged the rationalist view of ethics. This was followed by a critical review of the codes of ethics that were intended to inform
EP practice. The thesis then introduced the concept of the “ethical demand” (Levinas 1981). This challenged the view that professionals were the sole source of ethics and acknowledged the intersubjective nature of ethics. The review then critically examined the ethical situations encountered by EPs and related professions.

2.2 Methodologies

The methodology section reviewed the possible research designs and argued for a bricolage approach to methodology (Steinberg, 2006). This was because the thesis appropriated autoethnography, Action Research (AR) and Self-Study (S-S) combined with a Foucauldian approach to data analysis. This strategic move was intended to disrupt the dominance and authority of methodology. The methodology section justified the inclusion of the different methodologies before outlining the four cycles of the research, summarized below:

- An analysis my write up of a meeting with M.
- An analysis of the HPC-SCPE.
- An analysis of a focus group discussion with 9 EPs in the Service.
- A synthesis of the analysis of the above cycles.

The methodology section included a rationalization for and critical examination of Foucauldian approach to data analysis. This section included an extended section on the ethics of undertaking participant research where the participant was also an object of research. Finally, this section also provided information on data collection and methods.

2.3 Results

The results chapter provided both the results and the analysis of results. The results section diagrammatically presented the three overlapping meta-themes and fourteen relevant subthemes. Although the three cycles of research were analysed in detail only the synthesis of the first and third cycles will be presented.
in the main body of the research. This was a strategy to remain within the word limit for this thesis and still be able to undertake an extensive piece of research. The analysis of results critically examined the results from the first and third cycles of research in relation to the relevant reviewed literature.

2.4 Discussion

The discussion, informed by the analysis of results, revisited the research questions. The discussion examined the processes through which EPs constructed and regulated the EP-Client relationship. In addition, the discussion critically examined how EPs constructed themselves as ethical professionals and the extent to which ethics and professionalism was entangled. The discussion also attempted to re-examine the debates and tensions identified in the literature review in the light of the analysis of results. This included the tensions between the:

- Romantic and cynical portrayal of professionalism,
- Scientific practitioner and the socially embedded, emotionally engaged practitioner and
- Principled and particularist approach to ethics.

2.5 Reflections, Limitations. Implication for Practice and Conclusions

The thesis concluded with sections that reflected on both the experience of writing the thesis and the theoretical approaches employed. Next the methodological and epistemological limitations were considered. The thesis then presented the implications for practice with possible suggestions for future research. Finally, the thesis outlined the main conclusions.
Chapter 3. Literature review

This first section of the literature reviewed critically examined the nature of professionalism, professional identity and identity. This was followed by an examination of EP identity. The EP-Client relationship and the construction of Clienthood were then critically examined.

3.1 Professional and Professionalism

Despite extensive research professionalism remained a contested and ill-defined construct (Morrow et al, 2011). Morrow et al (2011) suggested that professionalism could be understood as a set of measurable behaviours, competencies and discrete skills that were teachable. Arnold (2002) found that the concept of professionalism tended to include:

- adherence to ethical practice
- effective interaction with clients and service users
- effective interactions with staff
- reliability
- commitment to improvement

However the above constructs were still very broad. Morrow et al (2011) argued that professionalism was both a holistic concept, doing the job well, and a “multidimensional multi-faceted construct consisting of professional identity, professional attitudes and professional behaviour” (Ibid, page 41). Morrow et al (2011) further suggested that professionalism was “the capacity for judgement” (Ibid, page 45). This capacity for judgment was exercised in relation to contexts and others (e.g. patient, client service user), which introduces ambiguity, specificity, and contingency. Defining whether behaviour was professional was therefore problematic. Morrow et al (2011) argued that professionals needed meta-skills of “situational judgement and contextual awareness” (Ibid, page 45). Nixon (2004) entangled ethical judgment and professionalism stating that ethical judgments were:
“…driven by moral considerations: the desire to educate, to heal, to enlighten, to encourage, to unburden, to enthuse, etc.” and “without that ethical content our various professional occupations become devoid of their professionalism” (Ibid, page 31).

Francis (2009) suggested that the minimum “cardinal” requirement for a profession were a “body of abstract knowledge” that provided an exclusive competence to practice and code of ethics (Ibid, page 9). However, the entanglement of ethics and professionalism also added an additional disciplinary technology to performance management. Hence, working practices were both unsatisfactory and unethical.

Two themes have dominated research into professionalism and professionals (MacDonald 1995). In the first theme, professionals and professionalism were idealised and romanticised. Professionals were seen as ethical, rational, elites who want only to serve others. For example, Arnold (2002) stated that a professional was “a vocation with a body of knowledge and skills put into service for the good of others (Arnold, 2002, page 503).

Arnold (2002) therefore attempted to establish professionalism based on a practice underpinned by a body of knowledge (evidence based) and ethical dimension. Arnold (2002) further entangled ethics with professionalism through using the following adjectives to describe professionalism; “reliability”, “responsibility”, “honesty”, “integrity” and “maturity” (Ibid, pages 503 to 504).

The second theme had a more sceptical attitude towards professionals and was concerned both with the power professionals had and their role as instruments of power for the state (e.g. Evetts 2003; Freidson 1970b, Rose 1999). This approach also questioned the altruism and independence of professionalism (Evetts, 2003; Freidson, 1970; Krause, 1996; Rose, 1999). Evetts (2003) went as far as characterizing professionals as “… powerful, self interested monopolies” (Ibid, page 401). This sceptical approach to professionalism was criticised for being too ideologically driven (Johnson, 1993).
Coulehan (2005) argued that professionals operating within institutions became rule based. Institutions therefore acted as a barrier to traditional professional qualities such as compassion, integrity and fidelity. Gillham (1999) suggested that these traits were also present in Educational Psychology when EPs were “defensive about evaluation and open accountability, jargon-plagued, status-conscious, and sheltering … behind a barricade of mystiques” (Ibid, page 14). Educational Psychologists had also been negatively portrayed as gatekeepers to resources too close to the bureaucratic agenda of Local Authorities (Ashton, 1996; Dessent, 1994; Gillham, 1990, 1999; Miller & Frederickson, 2006). These criticisms of EPs were perhaps too hostile and lacked balance.

In Educational Psychology professionalism has been closely associated with the “scientist-practitioner model” (Holttum & Goble, 2006; Fallon, Woods, Rooney 2011; Lane & Corrie, 2006; Stringer & Miller, 2008). However, Norwich (2000) suggested that EPs employed humanistic and pragmatic approaches to practice. Fallon, Woods & Rooney (2011), in turn, suggested that Norwich (2000) had undervalued the “expert” knowledge underpinning Educational Psychology practice.

This section suggested that professionalism was a contested and complex construct entangled with ethics. Professional identity was explored further below.

### 3.2 Professional Identity

Côté (2006) undertook a survey of identity studies and concluded that there were two broad theoretical approaches which portrayed identity as either individual or social. Within these two approaches identity can be viewed from a realist/objective/individualistic or relativist/subjective/social perspective. This suggested that identity studies could use any combination of the above perspectives and approaches. Côté (2006) suggested that the dominant method employed in
identity studies was a realist/objective approach that focused on the individual.
In contrast, the thesis had a constructionist (social and subjective) interpretative
approach to identity (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000)

Professional identity has been defined in a multiplicity of ways (Denzin & Lincoln,
2000). Connelly and Clandinin (1999) argued that professional identity was an
indication of membership of a profession rather than a particular knowledge set.
Membership of a profession was articulated through categorical statements that
establish roles and speaking rights (Heritage & Greatbatch, 1991). These can be
viewed as identity alignment procedures through the use of role categories.
These categories can be expressed by reference to a job title (e.g. EP) but can
also be present in the use of first person plurals we or us\(^8\) (Drew & Sorjonen,
1997). Roles can also be evident in the use of institutional or specialist
vocabulary (Potter & Hepburn, 2003). In addition, ordinary phrases or questions
can take on specialist meaning when spoken by an institutional
representative. Ordinary phrases such as “I am a little concerned” could have
different significance if spoken by an EP, teacher, child, or parent (Potter &
Hepburn, 2003, page 197). Institutional talk while appearing neutral can be
imbibed with additional meaning, e.g. a question about child’s behaviour could be
perceived as testing by a teacher (questioning the efficacy their practice) rather
than information gathering. These ways of speaking helped regulate the
epistemological asymmetry between professionals and Clients by establishing
who had the right to categorize and whose accounts were warranted (Potter
2005).

Connelly and Clandinin (1999) added that professional identity was born out of
the profession’s response to challenge Wenger (1998) more prosaically
described professional identity as “one’s way of being in the world” (Ibid, page

\(^8\) For example, I noticed that when EPs answered the telephone they would say their name followed by
“…Educational Psychologist” or their name followed by “…from the Educational Psychology Service”.
Some EPs would just say their name and then “…Psychology Service”. This was a small example of
identity alignment that I had not noted before reading for this thesis.
151). Professional identity at its most basic level was considered as “an individual’s self definition as a member of a profession” (Chreim, Williams & Hinings 2007, page 1517). Sachs (1999) described professional identity as: “A shared set of attributes, values and one that enables the differentiation of one group from another.” (Ibid, page 3)

Wenger (1998) also argued for the importance of professionals’ constructions of their identities in shared practices and learning within work settings. For Wenger (1989), identity was “a way of talking about how learning changes who we are in the context of our communities,” (Ibid, 1998, page 5). In Wenger’s (1989) model as professionals move between communities in the work place professionals identity was re-negotiated, integrating forms of individuality and competence through participation in work activities (Ibid, 1998, pages 158-159). While Connelly & Clandinin (1999), Chreim, Williams & Hinings (2007), Sachs (1999) and Wenger (1998) all appeared to have a high face validity and tended to lack any recognition or critique of power. Foucault (2001, page 300) referred to this as “Individualising power” that transformed human beings into subjects through being incited to or choosing to engage in self-work.

This thesis, informed by Wengner’s (1998) research into institutional talk (Heritage & Greatbatch, 1991; Potter & Hepburn, 2003) took the position that professional identities and roles were contingent and emerging and were established and regulated through institutional talk and embodied practice.

This section suggested that professional identities had been examined from a range of binary theoretical positions (e.g. realist/relativist, individual/social and objective/subjective). It was argued that professional identities were both externally and internally contracted. The next section critically examined the processes by which individuals become professionals and sustain and regulate their professionalism.
3.3 Identity Work

Research into professional identity formation has been increasing (e.g. See Alvesson, Aschcraft & Thomas, 2008; Kunda, 1992; Rose, 1996; Thomas, 2009; Watson, 2008, 2009; Ybema, et al, 2009). Snow and Anderson (1987) defined identity work as the:

“Range of activities that individuals engage in to create, present, and sustain personal identities that are congruent with and supportive of the self-concept” (Ibid, page 1348).

Identity work could be automatic and tacit or reflexive and intentional (Reynolds & Wetherell, 2003; Van Langerhove & Harré, 1999). Identity work was therefore interested both in the identities that individuals created and presented and how this occurred in contexts that regulated and produced them. Identities were also both social and personal (Taylor, 2006). Identities were social because the possible identities available to individuals were “resourced and constrained by larger understanding which prevail in the speaker’s social context” (Taylor & Littleton, 2006, page 24). However, identities were also personal as they resulted from individualization work undertaken by the self (Araujo & Martuccelli, 2010).

The complex relationship between the social context and personal identities was evident when members of the same class, social group, generation, gender, ethnic group, subculture or profession did not share the same identities. Increasingly, individuals were claiming themselves to be more than and other to what their social situation dictated (Araujo & Martuccelli, 2010). Araujo & Martuccelli (2010) argued that this resulted from processes of individualisation. At the centre of these processes of individualisation was the trial

9 The word Martuccelli (2006) uses was “épreuve” which can also mean test or ordeal. It is derived from the French word prouver which means to prove in the sense of establishing by testing. As a verb form (éprouver) can mean to undergo a transformation.
characterised social life such as school, work relationships (Araujo & Martuccelli, 2010). Trials provided an opportunity for individuals to challenge measure and test themselves through “confirming, informing or reorienting their self identity” (Pezé, 2011, page 2). The institution did not manufacture the trial. Rather trials were continual possibilities presented by the inconsistencies and conflicts in an institution or professional discourse. In this way a trial spoke to the nature of the professional discourse or institution. This would be a dialogue between the local (micro) and the global (macro) (Hamel, Dufour & Fortin, 1993).

The trial was, therefore, a liminal and ambivalent space where “several contradictory principles are simultaneously valid” (Pezé, 2011, page 7). Some trials were encountered more than once and almost the same questions were asked of us. This provided the subject with a second chance (Pezé, 2011). Alvesson and Willmott (2002) also argued that purposeful self-identity work required “at least a minimal amount of self-doubt and self-openness” and was “typically contingent upon a mix of psychological existential worry and the scepticism or inconsistencies faced in encounters with others or with our images of them” (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002, page 626). This typically occurred when the professional was prompted to ask “who am I?” Alvesson and Willmott (2002) argued that during challenges to professional identity the individual engaged in “informing, repairing, maintaining, strengthening or revising the constructions that are productive of a precarious sense of coherence and distinctiveness.” (Ibid, page 626). Ibarra & Petriglieri (2010) introduced the concept of identity play, defined as “people's engagement in provisional but active trial of possible future selves.” (Ibid page 10). The concept of a creative engagement with professional identity was echoed by Foucault (1996) when asked about sexual identity:

“... The relationships we have to have with ourselves are not ones of identity; rather they must be relationships of differentiation, of creation, of innovation. To be the same is really boring.” (Ibid page 385)

This aspiration linked with Foucault’s (1997) plea to readers not to subject him to the tyranny of identity:
“Don’t ask who I am, or tell me to stay the same: that is the bureaucratic morality, which ensures that our papers are kept in order. It ought to let us be when it comes to writing” (Foucault 1997, page)

The goal was, therefore, to experiment, be curious or playful with my professional identity. The aim was not to test myself against a “true” or ideal EP identity but to open up a space in which my professional identity work was made visible. This, in turn, might facilitate an intentional, creative and innovative relation with my professional identity. However, this meant tolerating and persisting with the experiences of feeling unease with and doubt about my professional identity.

Pezé (2011) argued that there have been two research strategies to examine self-doubt\(^{10}\) in organisations:

1. Examining specific employees who have gone through or are going through role transformations mainly using interviews. This is referred to as “bounded identity work” because it related to specific situations and identities (Ibid page 6);

2. Examining employees who were experiencing more general self-questioning of their occupational roles which combined interviews with participant observations or autobiography. This is referred to as “loose identity work” because it based on broad and diffuse situations and experiences (Ibid page 6).

Pezé (2011) was concerned that “bounded identity work” could have too specific and narrow a focus. However, “loose identity work” could suffer from its inherent complexity. Pezé (2011) concluded that rather than examining identity work directly, researchers should examine the institutional/organisation “identity regulation devices and then look at the identity work they trigger or regulate” (Pezé 2011, page 2). This thesis combined the second of Pezé’s (2011) strategies and recommendation to examine regulatory devices.

\(^{10}\) Pezé (2011) use of “self doubt” could be viewed as pejorative; perhaps the term awakening could be more useful.
As stated above, this thesis hoped for a dialogue between the micro and macro processes. Benwell & Stoke (2010) suggested that there was a tension between a macro focus on structures, contexts and discourses and micro focus on talk in interactions to identity formation research. Schegloff (1992) identified two difficulties in assuming an unproblematic traditional approach to interpreting macro contexts. The first problem concerned establishing which aspects of the context were relevant (e.g. race, genders, social position, status, role, etc). The second problem related to difficulties establishing which aspects of the context are consequential (e.g. set-up of the room, the nature of the organisation, the economic system, etc.). Schegloff (1997) further suggested that because of the inherent complexities in contexts, the choice of which context to include/exclude or privilege might reflect the researchers’ interests or preoccupations rather than those of the participants. Wetherell (1998, 2007), while recognising the possible limitation of discursive macro focused approaches, also argued that a micro focus had significant limitations:

“If the problem with post-structuralist analysts is that they rarely focus on actual social interaction, then the problem with conversation analysts is that they rarely raise their eyes from the next turn in conversation…” (Wetherell, 1998, page 402)

Accepting Wetherell’s (1998) argument this thesis was interested in the micro analysis of talk and attempted to locate it within the wider context of EPs’ practice.

This section argued that there was an increased interested in researching professional identity and critically examined definitions of identity work. Professional identity was argued to result from a combination of automatic, reflexive intentional, social and personal processes. The section delineated and examined the process of individualization resulting from trials (Araujo & Martuccelli, 2010; Pezé, 2011). Following Pezé (2011) researching professional identity was argued to facilitate the critical examination of the context in which EP worked. However, it was recognized that this created a tension between macro
and micro explanations. The next section critically examined aspects of EPs’ identity and role confusion.

3.4 Educational Psychology: An Identity in Question?

This section of the thesis examined how EP’s professional identity has been questioned from both inside and outside the profession. Issues about professional identity were most evident in discussions about role confusion and indistinctiveness. The proposed causes for Educational Psychology’s identity crises, including; ambiguity about who the client is, competing demands from different clients, epistemological variety within Educational Psychology, the gaps between theory and practice, tensions between the statutory and psychology functions was examined.

Almost since the inception of Educational Psychology, EPs have had “perennial obsession with reflecting on their role” (Boyle & Lauchlan, 2009, page 71). Boyle & Lauchlan (2009) claimed that this resulted from the diversity of Educational Psychology practice between countries, within countries, between and within Educational Psychology Services and between EPs. Educational Psychologists also disagreed about what Educational Psychology was or the epistemology that underpinned it (Fox, 2003; Gillham, 1978, 1999; McCaslin & Hickey, 2001; Norwich, 2000). Fox (2003) claimed that EPs could even espouse one epistemological position, e.g. social constructionist, and then practice using another, e.g. positive realist resulting in tensions in their practice. These debates echoed the debates about professional identity discussed previously.

Loss of identity and a call for a return to psychology were also recurring themes (e.g. Boyle & Lauchlan, 2009; Farrell et al, 2006; Love, 2009; Mackay, 2002). Boyle & Lauchlan (2009) also argued that attachment to the “out-dated” and “ill-judged” practices such as IQ testing and gate keeping were undermining the role of Educational Psychology (Ibid, page 73). This was because the professional was at risk of “losing sight of psychology” (Ibid, page 73. This argument was
premised on the assumption that there was something called psychology that did not have a discipline or governing function and was not based on normalization and measurement (Billington & Pomerantz 2004; Rose 1999). Boyle & Lauchlan (2009) emphasized the point that psychology was being lost by supporting the call for “a return” to the “discipline of psychology” (Boyle & Lauchlan, 2009, page 73). This could be a desire for a nostalgic past that never was. Billington & Pomerantz (2004) argued that Educational Psychology had it origins in the need to measure, rank and categorize to assist in the governmental processes of identification of the educable and uneducable. In addition, Love’s (2009) survey of Educational Psychology from the 1950s to the end of the 1980s suggested that EPs had always sought to be other and more than psychometricians and gatekeepers.\footnote{I like the fact that we (EPs) constantly resisted the call (interpellation) to be more than psychometricians and gatekeepers and makes the point that EPs were both objects and subjects of knowledge/power (both instruments of intuitional power and strugglers for human rights and dignity). It would be very disappointing if we gave up this fight. I am not sure that the fight can be won but that is no reason to stop. To give up the war of attrition would concede too much ground.}

MacKay (2002) identified the detrimental effects of prioritizing education over psychology in the EP’s role in order to become a “profession of functionaries and form fillers” (Ibid, page 247). Guiney (2009) argued that this was because EPs lacked the autonomy\footnote{I am reminded of a traditional Jewish joke that goes; In a synagogue there was a poor man sitting when in walked a rich merchant and the Chief Rabbi. The Chief Rabbi threw himself on the floor and said “Lord have mercy on me for I am worthless and nothing. The rich merchant then did the same thing. The poor man having seen the spectacle then threw himself on the floor and said “Lord have mercy on me because I am worthless and nothing”. On seeing this rich merchant turned to the Chief Rabbi and said indignantly “look who says they are worthless and nothing”. The point of this joke, for me, was a reminder that just because someone said that they were powerless did not mean that they were and saying that ‘we are powerless’ could just be another way of confirming our power.} enjoyed by other professionals and that the EP role was dominated by bureaucratic administration. This led Guiney (2009), following Etzioni, 1969 and Clarke and Newman, 1997, to question whether EPs were professionals or just semi-professional or bureaucratic professionals. Mackay (2002) further argued that time spent on bureaucracy (Statutory work) was not time spent practicing Educational Psychology. Mackay (2002) perhaps, failed to consider that, rather than these bureaucratic and governing functions being
additional to Educational Psychology they were a core political function (Nikander, 2003; Rose, 1996, 1999, 2008). Mackay (2002) calling for a return to Educational Psychology also emphasized evidence based practice. However, Fox (2003) argued that there was no unproblematic appeal to an evidence base given the epistemological fluidity in Educational Psychology.

In addition, MacKay (2002, page 250), in claiming that the “present educational psychology is what psychologist have made it or have failed to make it” was not allowing any role of the Government or State in shaping Educational Psychology and the unique statutory functions of EPs. MacKay (2002) was also in danger of presenting Educational Psychology as outside structure, society or discourse. This did not allow for an analysis of why teachers and local authorities asked for IQ scores or why there was a need for gatekeepers. Gersch (2009), locating Educational Psychology in discourse, argued that the role tensions resulted from working in an environment that was subject to continual and radical change. Gersch (2009) also suggested that identity anxiety was not an unexpected response to these changes.

Boyle & Lauchlan (2009), echoing MacKay (2002), suggested that the numerous meetings and copious administration were stopping EPs practicing psychology. Again, this is an interesting presentation of Educational Psychology that did not require meetings or an administrative demand resulting from the statutory function.

The calls for a return to psychology assumed that Psychology was a singularity (Boyle & Lauchlan, 2009; Farrell et al, 2006; Love, 2009 and Mackay, 2002). However, Psychology can also be characterized as a multitude of sub-disciplines that hold differing and often conflicting political, ontological and epistemology positions that resisted simple definition (Fox, 2003; Henriques, 2004: Reber, 1995). Psychology’s complexity was not unique. Badiou (2005) suggested that all
social constructs were inherently unstable. Following Badiou (2005), this multiplicity would not only exist between psychology sub-disciplines and traditions but also within a sub-discipline/tradition. In addition, the elements (e.g. assessment, observation, writing reports, therapeutic work, family work, training, etc) that EPs employed were also complex and difficult to define. Educational Psychology practice could also be considered as a subset of applied psychology, which in turn was a subset of caring professions which was in turn a subset of professional relationships, which was a subset of human relations, etc. Some of the elements of EP practice would also be subsets of the other applied Psychologies (e.g. assessment was not unique to Educational Psychology). Badiou (2005) also argued that constructs contained voids. The void could be understood as the actions, behaviours or practices that EPs undertook but not counted as part of their professional practice. The void (things not counted) caused ontological insecurity while resisting definition and presentation. The void also contained the potential for change when what was not counted (ignored or on the peripheral) became the core function or of central importance. The inherent ambiguity in Badiou’s (2005) construction of the void made the void difficult to theorise. In addition, Badiou (2005) emphasised the positive revolutionary potential of the void rather than regulation of the presentation of the void in order to maintain the status quo. Professional bodies, for example, can function to reduce the amount of excess represented as the void and thus increase consistency in the set. The aim of increased consistency can be seen in the quote below where to count-as-one was phrased as the question:

“Hence EPs and commissioners or contractors should in each case scrutinize the question: ‘what exactly is the psychological contribution we require from the EP and how will that contribution contribute towards better outcomes for the children who are the focus of this work?’ In this way, the distinctive contribution of EPs will become increasingly transparent” (Farrell et al 2006, page 105).

Farrell, et al (2006), through asking the question; “What exactly is the psychological contribution….?” were attempting to establish a truth game where

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13 Badiou (2005) used the analogy of Set Theory to examine epistemology and ontology.
EP’s practice could be tested to establish whether the activity/practice was psychological.

Boyle & Lauchlan (2009) pointedly asked whether Gillham’s (1999) questioning of the methods of Educational Psychology had given “the profession a massive insecurity complex and a crisis of confidence…” (Boyle & Lauchlan, 2009, page 81). However Gillham (1999) suggested that he was merely reflecting the mood of the times. This included confusion about who the Client was and a combination of rapid and prolonged change in the environment in which EPs worked. These factors impacted on the nature of EP’s work and their professional identity (Gillham, 1999). The uncertainty about who was Educational Psychology’s Client has remained (Ashton & Roberts, 2006; MacKay, 2002). Mackay (2002) captured this ambiguity in the quote below:

“Educational psychology is a service that one party (children, parents) receive (often whether they want it or not), usually requested by a second party (teacher or head teachers), but funded by a third party (education authorities) using funds that are not their own, but are provided by a fourth party (the taxpayer), to meet the statutory requirements imposed by a fifth party (the Department for Education and Employment), at the hand of a sixth party (educational psychologist), the availability of whom is largely dependant on the organization, interests and economies of a seventh party (the universities)” (Mackay 2002, page 246).

The above quote suggested that Educational Psychology was made vulnerable by the ambiguity in which it operated and by being buffeted by competing demands (Ashton & Roberts, 2006).

Kelly & Gray (2000) argued that role tension was also caused by the differences between what the EPs wanted to offer and what the school had requested. Ashton & Roberts (2006) survey of twenty-two SENCOs and eight EPs found that there was a difference between what the EP and SENCO valued. SENCOs tended to value assessment but Educational Psychologist valued consultation. However, other research had suggested that SENCOs and other service users
valued a range of services provided by EPs including consultation (Farrell et al 2006) Farrell et al (2006) added, that schools acknowledged that a significant proportion of those functions could be provided by other professionals which suggested role indistinctiveness/confusion.¹⁴

Role indistinctiveness was frequently cited as the cause of Educational Psychology identity anxiety (e.g. Aston and Roberts, 2006; Kelly and Gray, 2000; Cameron, 2006; Cameron & Monsen, 2005). Cameron and Monsen (2005) argued that role confusion, in part, resulted from EP’s Local Authority Officer role. For example, clients and EPs might be uncertain whether an EP was acting in the Clients best interest or to secure the best use of Local Authority resources. Cameron and Monsen (2005) also suggested that role indistinctiveness had been enhanced by questioning the uniqueness of the EPs role by those outside the profession. Role indistinctiveness could therefore have resulted from a attempting to define Educational Psychology by exclusion rather than identifying what practitioner psychologists had in common ¹⁵(Cameron, 2006).

However, ambiguity or role indistinctiveness in professional identity could facilitate role flexibility. Educational Psychologists practiced in environments where they were required to do a large range of highly varied tasks (Farrell et al, 2006). Role indistinctiveness meant that fewer tasks within the Local Authority would be outside the EP’s job description. Role ambiguity and complexity were also frequently given as rationalizations for an accountable, autonomous practitioner who was able to make rational decisions (e.g. Elman, Illfelder-Kaye & Robiner, 2005; Eraut, 1994; Mamede & Schmidt 2005; 2005; Schön, 1983, 1987 Woolfson et al, 2003). This privileged a positivistic practice that categorised and

¹⁴ Of course some of the EPs’ services could be provided by others, but this was not unique to Educational Psychology. A significant proportion of the services provided by professionals could be and are provided by others except when those services were legally restricted. This seemed to be an appeal by Farrell et al. (2006) for a purer form of Educational Psychology that provided unique services. It also appeared to be polemic because of the implied suggestion of job insecurity to focus the mind on their preferred alternative.

¹⁵ Defining anything by exclusion is unsatisfactory, e.g. red would have to be defined as not white, not black, not a house, Ad nauseam. Defining what construct had in common, e.g. their family resemblance was more productive.
labelled. Role indistinctiveness could also make Educational Psychology vulnerable to external pressures. A possible response would be for the profession to constantly strive to make itself relevant to political agendas (Guiney, 2009). It is also possible that the metaphor of role indistinctiveness could be employed rhetorically to rationalize and justify preferred Educational Psychology epistemologies. It was perhaps no coincidence that claims of role indistinctiveness were frequently combined with a call for a (re)turn to psychology or for a particular type of practice. (e.g. Aston and Roberts, 2006; Boyle & Lauchlan, 2009; Kelly and Gray, 2000; Cameron, 2006; Cameron & Monsen, 2005; Farrell et al, 2006; Gillham, 1990; McCaslin & Hickey, 2001; MacKay, 2002).

The section had critically reviewed the suggested causes for the going debate about EP identity and the call for a return to psychology. The suggested causes of the debates about EP identity included; the lack of perceived autonomy of EPs, the gulf between theory and practices; tension caused by the potentially conflicting roles and the complex relationship with clients. It was argued that EPs’ role distinctiveness also resulted from factors both outside Educational Psychology and internal epistemological issues. It was further argued that the metaphor role indistinctiveness could be polemical and the call for a (re)turn to psychology was critically examined and contested. The next section will explore the EP-Client relationship in more detail.

3.5 Educational Psychologist-Client relations

The hyphen, above, between EP and Client was central to understanding the nature of the relationship. This was because the hyphen set up a series of binaries between; disjunction and conjunction, mutuality and asymmetry, separation and synergy, recognition and colonization, proximity and distance, cooperation and resistance and self and other. The hyphen reminded the reader that meaning was co-constructed. Koocher & Kieth-Spiegal (2008) stated that
mental health professional-clients boundaries issues were at the heart of professional ethics. Koocher & Kieth-Spiegal (2008) argued that boundaries can be problematic and suggested “safe connections” (Ibid, page 47) as an alternative construct. Safe connection would work to keep clients safe but also promote effective practitioner and client relationships.

Boundaries are ways of talking about the limits and forms by which people ought to relate to one another and are presented as classification, categories and definition of relations (Emirbayer, 1997; Lamont & Molnar, 2002; Zur, 2005). It was through these classifications, categories and definitions that relationships and identities were established, maintained and governed (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Zur, 2011b). Boundaries both established the space in which professionals practice and the limits of authority of that profession. These boundaries were sometimes codified. Butler (2005) argued that norms, expressed as codes while simultaneously constructing a collective identity, individualised the subject. This was achieved by the professionals being ranked and classified, both by themselves and others, in relation to their homogeneity to those norms. In making normalising judgments professionals were both held to account and incited to give an account of themselves (Butler, 2005). This double process was central to the conflicted lived experience of professionals (Butler, 2005).

3.6 The Client’s Many Bodies

The literature review suggested that the Client was an ambiguous concept; the product of social and historical constructions and was entangled with constructs such as race, gender, social class and age (Leonard, 1997; Patton & O’Byrne, 2000). Historically, a Client was someone who was under the protection (in need of care) of their superior, who used the services of a professional, and who was assisted by a professional (Rose, 1985, 1990, 1996). Rose (1985, 1990, and
1996) argued that all three senses of Clients were contemporaneously present in modern Psychotherapy and I would suggest in Educational Psychology\(^\text{16}\).

In Educational Psychology practice there was a certain attitude of *innocence* towards the processes of clienthood\(^\text{17}\). For example, the Client’s needs always appeared to be discovered rather than fabricated (Madill, Jordan & Shirley, 2000). Although, this narrative was *innocent* it was also complex. Different Clients were understood to have different needs and characteristics and the possible conflicts between Clients was recognized (e.g. Farrell et al., 2006). Educational Psychologists were frequently asked to obtain Clients views to empower the Client (e.g. Frederickson & Cline, 2002). However, this can be underpinned by a naive realist perspective if it was not recognized that Client’s views were, at best, co-constructed with the EP (Hobbs, Todd & Taylor, 2000). Historically, EPs have employed a medical model that had a “within child focus” (Hobbs, Todd & Taylor, 2000). The child, parent, teacher also became an EP’s Client both through engagement with documents, reports, tests scores, assessment, surveys, referral forms and face to face encounters (Foucault, 1977). Clients were also always, already categorised in terms of age, gender, social group, ethnic origin, etc. in the EP-Client encounter (Stoiber & Wass, 2002).

In encounters with Clients, professionals engaged in acts of formulation where Client identities were offered (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970). This was achieved through making identity categories inferentially available by using specialized or technical language (Hobbs, Todd & Taylor 2000: Jayyusi 1984; Potter 1996).\(^\text{18}\) The formulation of client categories was used to rationalize, legitimize and warrant action using institutional talk (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Hobbs, Todd &

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\(^\text{16}\) Clients needed the assistance and care of the Educational Psychologist, there was an asymmetrical relationship between the EP and client used the services of EPs.

\(^\text{17}\) The term Clienthood was borrowed from Patton & O’Byrne (2000). It was used to signify that being a client was an identity.

\(^\text{18}\) For example, terms such as attention difficulties, concentration difficulties could be a predicate for the category AD/HD.
Taylor, 2000; Jayyusi, 1984; Potter, 1996; Zimmerman & Boden, 1991). Jayyusi (1984) added that because judgements, description and inferences were used to achieve practical tasks that categorization was enmeshed in the “moral order” (Ibid, page 2). The moral order referred to the continual (re)negotiated and (re)constructed local fluid understandings of rights, duties and responsibilities which are intertwined in everyday talk (Kurri & Wahlström, 2001). Moral order was evident in the assignation and appropriation of accountability, culpability and responsibility (Zur, 2005). The right to define the moral order was achieved through processes of categorization that provided participants with the moral adequacy to make categorization or objects of those categories (Kurri, 2005). Some categories such as professional have moral criteria such as obligation and commitment which were cardinal criteria for inclusion in that category (Francis, 2009; Jayyusi, 1984). This implied that to be professional was already to be moral.

The categories offered by professionals reflectively categorized those professionals (Sacks, 1995). For example, offering the category SEN to a child made available the category of educational specialist (e.g. EP) and authorized the speaking rights of the speaker. This included the nature of the advice given or how resources were allocated. The client was therefore a construction of an institution and the discursive practices which regulated the utterances and speaking rights of professionals and clients (Lewis & Miller, 2011; Benwell & Stoke, 2010).

The Client was not always portrayed passive in these encounters and could resist offered categories. This was typically achieved through being silent, offering an alternative category, defining a category to demonstrate their exclusion, changing their tone of voice and explicitly stating that they do not belong to the offered category (Austin & Fitzgerald, 2007; Fitzgerald & Austin, 2008). These types of resistance were different from the concept of unsaying suggested by Levinas (1981). The type of resistance suggested by Levinas’s
(1981) resulted from the ultimate uncategorizability of Others whereas Austin & Fitzgerald (2007) focused on active, often articulated, resistance by Others. Austin & Fitzgerald’s (2007) resistance was therefore at the level of the said.

The EP-Client relationship could also be characterized as a type of confessional relationship (Foucault, 1999). This was because one person was the object of knowledge and the other was the subject that knew. The Client confessed and disclosed while the professional made normative assessments (Zur, 2011b). Bourdieu (1991) asserted that this kind of asymmetrical relationship amounted to “symbolic violence” (e.g. Ibid, page 140).

The pressing concern for theorists of the Other was how to have a relationship with Others which was not colonizing (Benjamin, 2004, 2009; Buber, 1960; Frosh, 2010, Hollway, 2008; Levinas, 1981). Frosh (2010) suggested that the renewed interest in the right way to treat people was a post-holocaust phenomenon and was fed by post-colonial interest in racism and global networks of communication which shaped how the other was problematized. Billington (2002) suggested that attempts to (re)structure EP practice were a consequence of awareness of the asymmetrical EP-Client power. However, Goodman, McElliot and Marks (2003) claimed that professional concerns about the right way to treat Clients pre-dated the Second World War atrocities and an emphasis on ethics rather than practice directed the analytical gaze towards the professional-client relationship and obscured professional-state relationship.

This section argued that both the client and EP were constructed through talk and practices. The processes of clienthood were linked to the moral order with consequential moral implications. Concern about the EP-client relationship was argued to be part of the broader concern about the asymmetrical power in Professional-Client relationships. The EP-Client relationship will be explored further in the next section.
3.7 The EP-Client Encounter

The EP-Client encounter was considered along four dimensions:

- Client-as-functions/client identity
- Client-as-a-person/non-client identity

The role of EP and Client as functions appeared to be a dominant theme in the literature and resonated with the scientific practitioner model of practice (e.g. Lund, 2000; Moore, 2005; Webster, Hingley & Franey, 2000). Taylor (2006) argued that the aim of the scientific practitioner was to achieve self-mastery and a:

“Disengaged self capable of objectifying not only the surrounding world but also his own emotions and inclinations, fears and compulsions and achieving thereby a kind of distance and self possession which also enables him to act rationally” (Taylor, 2006, page 21).

Taylor (2006), above, was suggesting that processes of objectification and distancing privileged and facilitated rational practice.

Billington (2002) characterized the relationship between scientific practitioners and clients as involving, at least, two stories that were in tension called the professional’s and user’s stories. The professional’s story tended to be pathologising, fed from the “deficit model of human development” and reproduced social exclusion (Ibid, page 39). The user’s story tended to be highly subjective, rich and underpinned by emotion. Billington (2002) argued that the epistemological power exercised by the EP facilitated the client to internalize external descriptions of themselves. Molad (2001) argued, or hoped, that the binary relation between professional and client could be mitigated through

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19 By EP-as-function I meant the EP professional role. This would include a focus on functions such as assessment, training, advising, writing reports, etc. EP-as-person was intended to point to the non-professional identity of the EP. This was based on the view that professional was a contingent role and the sense that there was more to me that being an EP. What it meant to be a professional EP and the nature of the relationships it promoted were a major part of the analysis of results.
process whereby we “attune ourselves to the other” (Ibid, page 97). Benjamin (2000) appropriated the term “sanctification” to describe a more appropriate Professional-Client relationship. Sanctification was useful because it captured both an active formative engagement that cherished what it constructs. Benjamin (2000) was aware that creating a space where the Other was cherished while accepting that the Other cannot be fully known is extremely difficult. Benjamin (1997) argued that there was an emotional impact resulting from the professional not being able to fall back on a positivistic knowing “God’s eye view” while remaining responsible for the power subsumed by being the professional and not the client (Benjamin, 1997, page 261).

This concern for the Client as Other facilitated a problematization of what it meant to know the Other. Burber (1959) contrasted the positions as “I-Thou” and “I-it”. In the “I-Thou” the engagement with the Other was with a “full being”, however, in the “I-it” relationship the other was a means to an end. In psychology the other was made knowable through examination and assessment (Rose 1999). Things can be said about the other, such as, they are of below average ability or that they have an impairment of social communication. The Other became instrumentalised through becoming the exemplar of a condition or a target for non-differentiated intervention (Rose, 1999). The role of the professional was therefore to remove the Other’s Otherness and make them understandable, that was, to make the Other a certain type of universal other through categorization. Derrida (1995) found in the relationship between the universal (categorized) other and a particular Other the impossibility of ethics:

“As soon as I enter into a relation with the other, with the gaze, look, request, love, command, or call of the other, I know that I can respond only by sacrificing ethics, that is, by sacrificing whatever obliges me to also respond, in the same way, in the same instant, to all the others” (Derrida, 1995, page 68).

Following Derrida (1995), when EPs responded to the needs of a particular child with reference to needs of pupils in general the same tension between the universality of ethics and the demands of the proximal present Other arose.
Levinas (1981) suggested that the attempt to make what was infinite about the Other finite was the product and aim of reason. However, Foucault (2002) while recognizing the relationship between excessive political power and rationalization thought that a focus on reason as the source of violence was misplaced. Rather, the level of analysis should be “specific rationalities” rather than “rationalization in general” (Ibid, page 329).

Benjamin (2004) utilized of the concept of web of identification20 to examine Professional-Client relations. Figure 1 below represented the possible inter and intra identification using arrows. The arrows suggested that there were intra-relations between the EP’s Educational Psychology and non-Educational Psychology identity and the individual’s Client and non-Client identity. There were also inter-relations between the EP’s EP-identity and individual’s Clients-identity.

**Figure 1. Web of identification**

![Diagram of web of identification]

The above figure suggested that the relations between the EP’s identity and the Clients identity were characterized as object-to-object relations whereas the relations between the non-EP and non-client identities were characterized as

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20 Identification meant a process through which individuals came to see (recognize) themselves and were seen (recognized) by others as inhabiting particular identities. These identities could include; e.g. mother, daughter, sister, student, partner, Human Resources Manager, etc. An individual could therefore be both a mother and have other non-mother identities. Benjamin (2004) argued that there was a possible web of relationships between an individual’s identities and the identities of others. These relationships were shaped by and shaped the individual’s identity.
subject-to-subject relations. Benjamin (1998) argued that the most common form of relations were the alienating object-to-object relations. Benjamin (1998, 2004) further suggested that not only can the EP be alienated from the individual’s non-Client identity they can also be alienated from their own non-EP identity in the clinical encounter. Each half of the dyad experienced themselves as the subject that knows, and the object of knowledge (doer and done to) in the bi-directional and co-created dance of EP-Client relations (Benjamin, 2004, 2009).

However, Foucault (2002), in an interview, claimed that rather than being an oppositional binary the subject who knows and the object of knowledge were interrelated processes. This was because one must make oneself an object of knowledge to become a subject that knows. These processes of objectification and subjectification also multiplied the individuals’ responsibilities to take care of themselves and to responsible21 for their wellbeing (Davidson, 2003; Foucault, 2003a; Foucault, 1965; Zur, 2005, 2011a). Foucault (1989, 2003b) argued that the processes that facilitated responsibilization made the individual culpable for the label(s) they were given. This was partly achieved by accepting a normalised and valorised hierarchical categorization of the self. Foucault (1989) argued that in Eighteenth Century asylums that a “madman’s” guilt was no longer punished but organised:

“... as a consciousness of himself, and a nonreciprocal relation to the keeper; it organized it for the man of reason as an awareness of the other, a therapeutic intervention in the madman’s existence” (Foucault, 1989, page 235).

The patient was therefore made aware of themselves as an object to be known and subject to reason. This objectified the patient while making them vulnerable to themselves and others. To the process of self-recognition and perceptual judgement (by self and others) Foucault (1989) added the “apotheosis of the medical personage” (Ibid, page 256). The status of the medical personage was

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21 The words Foucault used most frequently were “culpabilité” and “culpabilisation”, which translates as guilty and made guilty. The English “culpable” or, when wanting to express a state or action, “culpabilization”, would also be a good alternative.
employed to authorize, legitimize, justify and warrant both the treatment and the doctor’s role. It was not the doctor’s scientific or medical skills that were privileged. Rather, the doctor’s authority derived from their status as a “wise man” that provided judicial and moral guarantees (Ibid, page 257). The doctor’s personality, “great probity”, “utter virtue”, “indefatigable perseverance”, caring, “firm character” and “scruples” assured their domination over patients (Ibid, page 257-259). These processes of apotheosis\textsuperscript{22} provided the doctor with a form of charismatic authority\textsuperscript{23} that worked with their legal authority (Foucault, 1989; Weber, 1964). Foucault’s (1989) analysis of origins, function and power of the medical personage resonated with the romanticised tradition of professionals discussed above.

Foucault (1989) further claimed that as medicine embraced positivism practitioners, while continuing to exercise the power entangled with their medical persona, forgot the source of their power/authority to treat patients. Directing the practitioner’s gaze away from the disciplinary and pastoral power further increased the status and quasi-miraculous power of the doctor to treat and understand madness while increasingly subjugating the patient (Foucault, 1989). However, the doctor’s positivism would not tolerate occultism and therefore the patient was made reasonable for the mystification of the doctor.

This thesis utilized the inter and intra processes in the web of identification as resource to examine and analyze the construction and regulation of EP-Client relations. This included how they were understood (made understandable), made problematic and rationalized by EPs. This section argued that the EPs’ and Clients’ identities provided the opportunities for alienation but also had ethical consequences. Benjamin’s (1998, 2004) construct of the web of identification

\textsuperscript{22} Apotheosis means to glorify or deify. Foucault (1989, page 256) used apotheosis to describe the position of the “medical personage”.

\textsuperscript{23} Weber (1964) described charisma as “a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman or at least specifically exceptional qualities” (Ibid, page 329). Foucault’s significant debt to Weber was not always fully acknowledged. For a good overview of the points of comparison and contrast between Foucault and Weber see Szakolczai (1998).
was suggested as a possible model to understand the possible alienation in the EP-Client relationship. Finally, Foucault’s (1989) entanglement of the doctors (professionals) authority and their personage was delineated.

3.8 Conclusion

This thesis argued that the encounter with a Client was not a straightforward mirror into the wider world of Educational Psychology or a window into the inner life of the Client. Rather the encounter was seen as a performative act speaking a world into being (Dillard, 1982). This approach viewed encounters as interpretive practices. The meanings generated were not only improvised and contextual but also fabricated and constructed (Dillard, 1982). The EP and the Client had simultaneous and sequential roles as performer and audience with blurred boundaries (Butler, 1997). Institutional encounters were argued to be asymmetrical in speaking rights and roles (Mauthner, 1998; Stanley, 1990). This included practices such as “doing rapport” which led Clients to disclose more about themselves than they had perhaps intended (Duncombe & Jessop, 2002; Pudlinski, 2005; Zur, 2001b). The institutional nature of the EP-Client encounter also worked to alienate the EP both from their non-EP identity and the Client’s non-Client identity. Finally, the power of professionals was argued to be linked to their positive personal/professional characteristics.

In the next section the thesis moved on to consider the nature of ethics in everyday practice and introduced the idea of microethics. Ethical reasoning and the debates between principle and particulate approaches to ethics was then considered. Next, Foucault’s (1990) approach to ethics was presented and critically examined. Levinas’s (1981) construct of the ethical demand was then introduced because it provided a decentred ethics based on the Other which balanced Foucault’s (1990), somewhat, egocentric approach. Ethics was further challenged by arguing that it could be employed both to discipline professionals and as a rhetorical tool to be used strategically. The ethical codes that framed
EP’s practice were then critically considered. Finally, the ethically challenging situations experienced by EPs and related international professions were critically reviewed.

### 3.9 Microethics

The literature review suggested that ethics was a highly complex and situated construct (Francis, 2009). This thesis was interested in everyday ethical practice, a microethics of practice as opposed to the more dramatic big ethical dilemmas (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008; Komesaroff, 1995). A range of terms and overlapping approaches have been used to describe and examine everyday ethical practice:

- Situational ethics (e.g. Fletcher, 1997)
- Care ethics (e.g. Benner, 1997)
- Ethics of intersubjectivity (e.g. Popke, 2003)
- Practical ethics (e.g. Singer, 1993)
- Ethics of care (e.g. Tong, 1998)
- Ethics of responsibility (e.g. Tauber, 2005)
- Ethics of ambiguity (e.g. De Beauvoir, 1948)
- Proximity ethics (e.g. Nortvedt & Nordhaug, 2008)

The above microethics negotiated tensions between the binaries of autonomy and dependence, self-determination and paternalism, interference and abandonment, particular and universal, rationality and emotion and between justice and care so as to privilege one of the elements. The microethical approaches also positioned themselves, in varying degrees of proximity, in relation to bioethics (Komesaroff, 1995). There was, in effect, an ongoing dialogueic and formative relationship between the microethics and bioethics.

As suggested above, the negotiations of ethical tensions occurred in discussions about rights, responsibilities and obligations between professionals and Others (Zur, 2005, 2011a & 2011b). This, in turn, took place in a society that privileged independence, self-reliance and self-sufficiency (Benner, 1997; Brinkmann &
Kvale, 2008; Popke, 2003; Tauber, 2005; Tong, 1998). Wendell (1996) argued that a fetishism with independence had adverse consequences for specific groups (e.g. women and individuals with disabilities) and should be replaced with the concept of interdependence where the capacity to make choices was sustained by Others. This challenged myths of the autonomous, independent rational decision making professional. Verkerk (2001), agreeing, argued for practitioners to adopt a position of “compassionate interference”, which involved both care-giver and care-receiver having responsibilities which were colloquially known as ‘being there’, or ‘standing next to me’. Frank (2002) added that the ethical challenge was for professionals to see themselves as characters in others stories.

Unlike the quandary-style of professional ethics, founded on the discourse of the autonomous individual, microethics might not involve questions about the clinically right choices. Rather as Giroux (1997) argued:

“Ethics, in this case, is not a matter of individual choice or relativism but a social discourse grounded in struggles that refuse to accept needless human suffering and exploitation. This ethics is taken up as a struggle against inequality and a discourse for expanding human rights” (Ibid, page 219).

Giroux’s (1997) view of ethics was radically different from that traditional expressed in professional codes (examined further below). Ethically challenging situations therefore arose when professionals might know what do, but were unable to do it because of organisational or resource issues. These dilemmas can often be practical and political. Austin (2007) suggested that that ‘moral distress’ was a more relevant concept than ethical dilemma to characterize the everyday experience of professionals. Austin’s (2007) concept of moral distress echoed the discussion above about the emotional impact on EP-Client relations (e.g. Benjamin, 1998, 2004) During periods of moral distress evidence based practice was less useful and effective resolutions were more likely to be achieved through dialogue (Austin, 2007). Microethics was therefore not about displaying
one’s ethical reasoning skills during a crisis but an expression of commitment to those the professional worked with (Austin, 2007; Giroux, 1997). The next section considered the tensions and debates between principled and particular approaches to ethics.

3.10 Ethical Reasoning (Principlism and Particularism)

There was a spectrum of approaches to ethical reasoning ranging from particularism which included the various forms of casuistry (e.g. narrative ethics, pragmatism and feminist ethics) to principlism of which Beauchamp & Childress (2009) have been the most influential (Arras, 1990). This section of the literature review provided an examination of the debates and tensions between bioethics (principlism) and particularism before delineating significant criticisms of bioethics.

Beauchamp & Childress’s (2001) seminal commission on research bioethics established four supposed universal, prima facie and culturally neutral ethical principles (Gillon, 1994):

- Respect for autonomy
- Beneficence
- Non-malfeasance
- Justice

The four principles articulated a space where there were multiple asymmetrical moves of dominance and submission. Ethical conflicts occurred when two or more principles were in conflict.

The most consistent criticism of the principled position was from the particularist perspective (e.g. Dancy, 1983, 2000, 2004; Dworkin, 1995). Dancy (2006) defined particularism as “the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles” (Ibid, page 7).

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24 See definition section for descriptions of the four principles.
Particularism tended to privilege proximity over distance\textsuperscript{25}, bottom-up induction to top-down deductive thinking, care over justice, particularities of a case over the general principles, cultural/social embeddedness over abstract reason and the messiness of lived experience over ideal abstracted views of how life should be (Arras, 1990; Elliott, 2000; Singer, 2004; Toulmin, 1982). Particularist approaches had, in turn, been criticized for lacking rigour, intellectually dishonest, inconsistency, being over-subtle, overly concerned about political realities and causing the erosion of standards (Francis, 2009). The principled approach, however, failed to acknowledge the normative role of institutional practitioners and the conflicts between the principles and resources or that decisions could be made for casuistic reasons. Principled account also underestimated the role of situational factors such as time and resources available on individual behaviour (Darley & Batson, 1973).

Beauchamp and Childress (2009) responded to criticism and included concepts of bottom-up case based approaches in their framework (Beauchamp, 2005). Beauchamp (2005) have even argued that particularistic approaches such as casuistry and virtue ethics were consistent with principle-based account. However, Lee (2010) and Rauprich (2008) claimed difficulties remained when Beauchamp and Childress (2009) attempted to provide a foundation for moral actions based on common morality. This was based on a distrust of bioethics’ appeal to universalism and justification or explanation of actions from outside the context/situation in which the issue arose and not allowing for cultural diversity (Westra, Willems & Smit, 2009). However, particularistic accounts can lack utility as rhetorical justifications. Educational Psychologists worked in communities where they were accountable to their profession and community. A justification of practice that did not make appeals to ethical codes, values or principles might be unintelligible and court hostility (e.g. Dworkin, 1997; Lance and Little, 2006; Little, 2001). The tensions between particularism and principlism overflowed into their approaches to theory. Principlism claimed to be founded on theory whereas

\textsuperscript{25} The client we are with over strangers or future clients.
particularism appeared to be anti-theoretical (Lance and Little, 2006; Little, 2001). Particularism’s desire to escape theory was problematic. This was because discursive researchers consistently assert the presence of unacknowledged theoretically informed discourses in everyday and professional talk (Potter, 2005; Rachels, 1998).

The conflicting nature of theories used to examine and understand ethical behaviour/judgements can be problematic, e.g., utilitarianism, consequentialism, deontologicism, and pluralsim (Rowson, 2001). The competing nature of theories promoted relativism as different policy decisions can be justified by different theories (Rowson, 2001). This made it difficult for practitioners to appeal to theory. Rather they might find themselves caught between theories. Consequently, many theorists have questioned the utility of ethical theory in everyday ethical practice, which in turn undermined principlism (e.g. Daniels, 2007; Fulklinwider, 2008; Gutmann and Thompson, 1998).

The relationship between particularism and principles was not a simple binary one but a subtle entanglement. Particularism and casuistic approaches to ethics had developed historically, in relation to moral principles (Arras, 1998). The aim of particularism was not necessarily to undermine moral codes but to navigate and negotiate between them (Arras, 1998; Dancy, 2006).

Bioethics was the dominant ethical framework that informed medical and caring professional (e.g. Hoeyer, 2006). Bioethics, however, had also been criticised widely by medical anthropology and sociology for being unable to encompass the complexity, ambiguity, and actual social context in which individuals have to make choices (Hoeyer, 2006). These studies also portrayed patients as vulnerable, passive, weak and dispersed and medical professionals as powerful, active and homogenous (Gabe, et al, 1991; Hoeyer, 2006; Kleijuman, 1999; Laidlaw, 2002). Patients were described having partial, relative and subjective outlooks whereas professionals were portrayed as having universal and objective perspectives (e.g. Gammeltoft, 2001; Kaufert and O’Neil 1991).
Critics of Bioethics tended to adopt a (1) deficit, (2) replacing or (3) dismissal approach to bioethics (Hoeyer 2006) as outlined further below:

1. Deficit approaches tend to emphasize bioethics lack of context or relations.
2. Replacement approaches suggest alternative approaches to ethics.
3. Dismissal approaches tend to see bioethics as so beyond repair and demand that it is abandoned.

Turner (2009) defending bioethics, stated that social scientists made gross generalizations, over simplified, and provided reductive accounts of bioethics that lacked subtlety (e.g. Alderson, 1993; Bosk, 1992; Kaufman, 1997). Bioethicists were accused of engaging in “thin”, “analytic”, “conceptual”, “deductivist”, “abstract”, “formalistic”, “universalistic”, “absolutistic”, “rationalistic logic-chopping” guided by the “mantra” of “principism” (Turner, 2009, Page 90). Whereas social scientists claimed that they were engaging in thick, locally situated, complex, substantively “rich,” highly contextual, “bottom up” moral engagement (Ibid, page 90). Turner (2009) found these characterizations crude and tantamount to statements of prejudice.

Turner (2009) further, perceived a “measure of sanctimony” (Ibid, page 90) in the formulation of binaries between bioethics and other approaches to ethics. Turner (2009), echoing Beauchamp (2005) above, asserted that the bioethics had undergone substantial revision and that modern bioethics has drawn from a range of methods and approaches including casuistry, situation ethics, virtue theory, feminist ethics, hermeneutics and interpretation theory, narrative ethics deliberative democracy, communitarian thought, pragmatism, discourse ethics, utilitarianism and cost benefit analysis, organization ethics and continental philosophy. However, Turner (2009) might have to admit that all of these approaches were developed in resistance to traditional bioethics. Turner (2009) was perhaps correct when arguing that social scientists had under examined the conflict within bioethics to focus on the relations between bioethics and other ethical approaches.
This section critically reviewed the apparently binary principled and particularist approaches to ethics. Although, significant (and possibly irreconcilable) differences were recognized it was also argued that these approaches were entangled dialogueically. The next two sections examined first Foucault’s (1990) and then Levinas’s (1981) approaches to ethics. Foucault’s approach to ethics was included because of his central role in this thesis. Levinas’s approach was included both because it acted as a corrective for some of the potential egocentric tendencies in Foucault’s ethics and because it provided a creative and original way to think about EP-Client relationship.

3.11 Foucault’s Ethics

This section first differentiated between morals codes and ethics before considering Foucault’s (1990) description of ethics as a relation the self has with itself. Foucault’s approached to ethics was then critically examined.

Foucault (1990) differentiated moral codes from ethics. Moral codes were concerned with the observances of rules and regulations. Ethics were processes by which we shape ourselves in relation to an ideal. Foucault (1990) was not overtly critical of moral codes but the argument that moral codes were the foundation of ethical behaviour. What was important was the relationship the individual had with the moral codes in so far they are accepted, rejected, or interpreted in the processes and practices of self formation. Foucault (1990) characterizes ethics as a:

“…process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal. And this requires him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself” (Foucault, 1990, page 28).

This was ethics as reflexive processes in which an individual’s conduct was transformed through attending to their experiences and thoughts. Ethics was more than how individuals regulated themselves according to social, cultural, professional norms it was also an orientation, attitude or position to those norms.
Foucault (1984/1986) suggested that ethics could be perceived as the “aesthetics of existence” (Ibid, page 348). Ethical conduct was not the freedom to express our true selves but the potential to modify the self. The freedom to be other than what I had been called to be required that the discourses that established the ontological and epistemological limits of what I am had to be made problematic (Foucault, 1988a).

Foucault’s (1990, 1984/1986) interest in ethics was part of his larger interest in the care of the self. This was understood as a set of “technologies” through which the self was constructed. The (pre)formation of the self was both an occupation and preoccupation which occurred through the self reflecting on its behaviour, actions and thoughts. This reflection had a judicial flavour as the actions of the self were normatively examined from a hierarchical perspective. The individual would reflect on what had been done and what ought to have been done and be weighted in the balance. During these processes individuals reflected not only on who they had been and are but also who they could become. This ethical relationship with the self had four aspects; ethical substance, mode of subjection, self forming and telos. Davidson (1998) provided a brief description of these aspects below:

“The ethical substance, that part of oneself that is taken to be the relevant domain for ethical judgment; the mode of subjection, the way in which the individual established his relation to moral obligations and rules; the self-forming activity or ethical work that one performs on oneself in order to transform oneself into an ethical subject; and finally, the telos, the mode of being at which one aims in behaving ethically” (Davidson, 1998, pp. 200-201).

Foucault’s ethics has been widely criticised for being “dangerous”, narcissistic, nihilistic, egotistic and, underpinned by “aestheticist cruelty” (Grimshaw, 1993; Longford, 2001, page 569; Taylor & Vintges, 2004). Longford (2001) argued that there was a potential for ethics focused on the self to be indifferent to Others. However, ethics concerned about the self also had the capacity to

26 It was not “I am what I am” more Iago’s statement; “I am what I am not”.

62
engender feelings of curiosity and care for others (Longford 2001). Foucault (1986c) also argued that the technologies of the self were social because they were concerned about the need to take care of the self so that the self could take care of Others. Foucault’s approach to ethics has also been called elitist (Grimshaw, 1993). However, Foucault (1986b) suggested that everybody’s life could become a work of art.

While not accepting that Foucault’s approach to ethics was wholly egocentric the next section critically presented a different, but I feel complementary, decentred position to ethics inspired by Levinas (1981).

3.12 The Ethical Demand

Traditionally, professional ethics argued that knowledge of what would enhance client’s development and well-being should be based on the values of ‘good psychology’ as set out in a code of conduct which acts as the ‘conscience’ of the profession (Webster & Bond, 2002). The arrow of ethics therefore pointed from the professional to the Client. However, rather than seeing “ethics” as something done or facilitated by the Educational Psychologist to the Client this section critically examined ethics as the awareness of the ethical demands imposed on the EP in the face to face encounter with the Client. Here the arrow of ethics pointed from the Client to the professional. The ethical occurred when the EP recognized the Other as a singular Other and not just another other. Awareness of the other as a singular Other engendered the tensions between self-determination (autonomy) and paternalism. This was because it created the potential for EPs to recognize the tension between the fear of abandonment and the danger of colonization in the EP-Client relationship (Ellwood, 2006; Verkerk, 2001).

The Other for Levinas (1981) was radically different from and ultimately unknowable by the self. Symmetry, equality or reciprocity between the self and the Other was impossible (Levinas, 1981; Eagleton, 2009). The experience
between the self and other was one of intense and unbearable alterity in which the self was responsible for the Other (Levinas 1981; Eagleton, 2009). The ethical demand, therefore, originated from an epiphany that the other was unknowable. This epiphany produced a set of obligatory relations between the self and the Other. The Other commanded and the self had duties.

Following Levinas (1981), ethics was something that the EP was called to accept and shaped by. Vetlesen (1994) argued that in the traditional Professional-Client relationship the professional had the following choices:

• How will they use their professional power in this specific relationship?
• How will aspects of the professional’s values enter this relationship?
• How much does the professional disclose of their personal experience?
• When and how will the professional offer or withhold insights, interpretations or specific techniques?
• What were the professional responsibilities to this particular client?

In the above, the arrow of ethics was from the Professional to the Client. In each instance the professional was sovereign and in control of the situation. Paradoxically, if the professional was insensitive to the ethical demand presented by the Other they might not address the concerns that instigated the above questions (Vetlesen, 1994). This required a move by the EP from dominance to passivity. This changed the question from “what am I to do?” to “what does the Other want from me?” (Eagleton, 2009).

In the EP-Client relationship the ethical demand and consequential responsibility were present when the EP became reflexively aware of the processes of inter-subjectivity. It was possible to practice and be unaware of the epistemological and ontological processes of inter-subjectivity. However, when EPs experienced their practice as being present-to-hand this awareness was experienced as an ethical demand where the EP had responsibility to the client. This was because

27 Heidegger (1962) used the metaphor of hammering to illustrate the nature of this disruption and in doing so highlighted a useful difference between “ready-to-hand” and “present-to-hand” (Ibid pages 103-106). When using a hammer it was in the mode of “ready-to-hand”. The hammer was, not reflecting on the nature
engaging with clients when it relates to who they are, how they regard themselves, how they resolve concerns or conflicts, to achieve good ends were ethical issues. Therefore being ethical was not something the EP possessed; rather being ethical resulted from an awareness of the complex and expanding interdependence of interests, persons, actions, and decisions. Therefore the ethical demand preceded freedom to act professionally (Levinas, 1981).

The Client did not literally ask the professional to be ethical. Rather, the Client by resisting the thematic and categorization processes of professional, just by being Other, placed the professional and their practice in question. The Other by being irreducible to a label or category (Other) was unsaying what the professional had said about them. The ethical demand was therefore an unarticulated question and cannot therefore be directly answered. This placed the professional in a web of infinite responsibility.

The ethical demand being relational took place in a social, historical and cultural context (Løgstrup, 1997). The social nature of the ethical demand enabled the demand for infinite responsibility to be resolved because it introduced a third to the Self and Other (Levinas 1981). The third could be understood as recognition of the need for justice that came from acknowledging pre-existing social arrangements (Levinas 1981).

Levinas’s (1981) approach to ethics fundamentally challenged the argument that ethical practice was a product of a psychological approach which framed ethical dilemmas in terms of rational, automatons, emotional distant decision making (e.g. Chevalier & Lyon 1993). Levinas (1981) argued that rational responses to

of a hammer, how it was to be used or the meaning the hammer had to the user. One was just hammering. There was no subjective/objective difference between the hammer, hammering and the one who was hammering. However, this changed if the hammer broke or the person hit their thumb! This disruption changes the nature of the relationship from “ready-to-hand” to “present-to-hand as the hammerer was made to reflect on the process of hammering. This disruption was a move away from being-in the world. The cause of the disruption was not chosen but it placed a demand on the hammerer to be reflexive. In the EP encounter with the client can be analogous to the metaphor of the hammer.
the ethical demand functioned to negate the demand by reducing it to the language of the *said*.

Butler (2005) argued that Levinas’s construction of the opacity of the other could be an ethical resource:

“To acknowledge one’s opacity or that of another does not transform opacity into transparency. To know the limits of acknowledgment is to know even this fact in a limited way; as a result, it is to experience the very limits of knowing. This can, by the way, constitute a disposition of humility and generosity alike.” (Ibid, page 42).

Butler (2005) argued that opacity facilitated a reflexivity that established the conditions for both vulnerability and responsibility. Boucher (2006) while agreeing with Butler’s aspirations was troubled by what he saw as methodological individualism in her work. However, Davis (2006) claimed that Butler’s (2004) ethics of responsibility were opposite to the neoliberal ethics of responsibility where the Self was made responsible for the Self while shedding responsibility for the Other. Neoliberal responsibility aimed to make bodies more governable and useful and increased the difficulty of reflexivity (Davis, 2006). Whereas, Butler’s (2004) responsibility presupposed reflexivity and demanded responsibility for the Other. Acknowledging the inherent opacities in the relations between Self and Others facilitated the question, “Who I was professionally?” and hopefully provide opportunities for *humility and generosity*.

An additional response to Levinas (1981) might be to develop practices that were dialogueic, heteroglossic (multi-voiced), that emphasised difference and embraced multiplicity. The thesis therefore considered whether it was possible to question from below what was imposed from above when the act of questioning can be part of the processes that reinforces what has been imposed (Critchley 2007).

leaving key constructs ambiguous. I have found Levinas perplexing and difficult to read. However, I think that Levinas benefits from persistence. Eagleton (2009) while admiring Levinas (1981) found the asymmetry between the self and other problematic and bordering on the fetishistic. In addition Eagleton (2009) wondered if an ethics based on the dyadic relationship between the Self and Other has much to say about broader political struggles. Zizek (2001) argued that rather than the other being an object of benign positive regard that the Self can find the Other disturbing. In addition, Zizek (2001) argued that the relationship between the Self and Other described by Levinas (1981) was analogous to being in love and that the relationship between the Self and Other should alternatively be founded on justice. Lyotard (1998) found Levinas’s logic and position highly problematic and suggested that Levinas was offering a “discourse of persecution” where the self was being asked to do before it understood (Ibid, page 276). Lyotard (1998) disagreed that it was possible for the Other to make an unthematic injunction arguing that the injunction to do something even if that something was ambiguous was still a theme. Lyotard (1989) also challenged Levinas’ (1981) argument that the Self did not exist until it was called to be by the Other, by pointing out that in order for this call to be answered there must have been something pre-existing to hear that call. Finally, Badiou (2001) provocatively dismissed Levinas’ (1981) approach to ethics as unintelligible and undesirably religious. Badiou (2001) added that the Other as presented by Levinas (1981) was a potential victim and that the Other was required to take on the role of guardian. Badiou (2001) also objected to ethics founded on the “ethics of difference” by arguing that if all Selves were different then difference was a property we all share. This meant that, at one level, there was nothing but the same.

All of the above argument against Levinas (1981) had merit and to varying degrees were plausible. However, because the thesis had adopted a broadly post-structuralist position the “truth” of Levinas’ (1981) description of the ethical demand was secondary to its utility in describing a process and as a rhetorical
device. I was practically interested in how the asymmetry towards the Other inherent in Levinas’ face to face encounter worked against the asymmetry of the professional-client relationship, which was biased towards the professional. This fundamentally challenged the attitude that good/ethical practice was a product of the psychological approach employed by the psychologist.

The previous two sections have critically examined Foucault’s and Levinas’s approaches to ethics. There were number of tensions and differences between Foucault and Levinas accounts. Table 1 below provided a summary of four possible points of contrast:

**Table 1. Foucault & Levinas Contrasted**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foucault’s approach to ethics</th>
<th>Levinas’s approach to ethics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethics was the relation the self had with the self (Foucault, 1983/2003).</td>
<td>Ethics was the non-relation with the Other (Veling, 2009).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics was a historical and cultural construct (Foucault, 1983/2003).</td>
<td>Ethics was an inter and intra process beyond/outside discourse (Levinas 1981).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics was a duty owed to the Self first (Longford, 2001).</td>
<td>Ethics resulted in a duty to Others first. (Tatransky, 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility was an imposed discipline on the Self by Others. Responsibilization of the self was mostly viewed with suspicion. (Foucault, 1983/2003)</td>
<td>Responsibility was demanded in the encounter with the Other. Responsibility was mostly perceived as positive (Levinas, 1981).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These tensions might have suggested that it would was incongruous to attempt to employ the approaches together. However, both approaches were deeply concerned about and committed to the Other (both the other as Other and the Self as Other) and held that the Self was contingent. In addition, the approaches acted as correctives for each other. Levinas’s de-centered approach to ethics
balanced Foucault’s egocentric tendencies and Foucault’s analysis of instructional power balanced Levinas’s intra-psychic approach.

The previous three sections critically presented different understandings of and approaches to ethics. The next section further explored this examination of ethics by making ethics problematic.

3.13 Problematising Ethics.

This section of the thesis examined two overlapping ways to problematize ethics. The first was to explore the discipline function of ethics and the second was to critically examine the rhetoric role of ethics in practitioners’ deliberations.

3.13.1 Ethics as Discipline

To critically examine ethics the first question to ask was; “what is being hidden when using ethics as a tool of analysis”? The first error would be to perceive ethics just as a neutral epistemological concept and be unaware of its normative role in shaping ourselves and Others. This prompted two further questions:

1. When the question was asked; “was this ethical?” What work was being done?
2. What did adding the word ethical to dilemma add to the issues that were presented in practice?

It’s often reported that practitioners need prompting to describe practice issues as ethical²⁸ (e.g. Bennett, 2008; Guiney, 2009, Water, 2008). Water (2008) suggested that practice issues needed to be shaped as ethical, which enabled a particular form of predicatable analysis and produced a particular praxis. The call for increased ethical awareness of practitioners was therefore a call to bring experience into a particular discourse, which provided both possibility of utility and limitations. Applying an ethical framework provided tools for analysis,

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²⁸In fact, Beaver (1996) felt able to write a popular book on Educational Psychology Casework with a single reference to ethics.
principles and strategies for argumentation and disputation. However, Water (2008) argues that resulting discussions can feel “predetermined” where the issues were “already labelled and classified” (Ibid, pages 12 &13). However, what was frequently missing was a discussion about the suffering of participants. For example, what an EP might formulate and sanitise as a conflict of interest the Client might perceive as abandonment or betrayal.

The highly preformative and hegemonic nature of formal ethical thinking was exemplified in Rieman’s (2002) four year longitudinal study, which suggested that the transformation of practitioner ethical judgment and behaviour required a sustained dialogue combined with real world experience. Rieman (2002, 2004) emphasised that talk, teaching or experience alone were insufficient to produce sustained change in thinking or behaviour. Rather, five conditions were necessary; role taking, guided enquiry, discussion about process and content, supervisory challenge and continuity.

The processes whereby professionals make ethical decisions was acknowledged to be complex and contested (Blair, et al., 2006; Cushman, Young & Hauser, 2006; Greene, et al., 2001, 2004; Haidt, 2001, 2007; Koenigs, et al., 2007; Pizarro, Uhlmann & Bloom, 2003; Young, et al., 2007). Traditional approaches to ethical judgments were cognitive, developmentalist and attributionist (e.g. Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1965; Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995). The attributionist and developmental approaches assumed that ethical judgments were rational, deliberative, conscious, cognitive and consistent (between personal theory and action). Recent research has focused on the role of social, unconscious intuition, affective factors and inconsistency (Cottone and Clause, 2000; Cottone, 2001, 2004; Cushman, et al., 2006; Haidt, 2001; Pizarro, et al., 2003; Greene, et al., 2001 2004; Koenigs, et al., 2007; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006).

Several types of decision making matrix have been suggested to assist professionals including EPs (e.g. Monsen et al 1998 & Woolfson et al 2003).
These typically included stages such as: issue/problem identification, establishing several possible actions or choices, implementation of choice or action and evaluation of action (e.g. Forester-Miller & Davis, 1996; Jacob and Hartshorne 2007; Koocher and Keith-Spiegel 2008). These models were sometimes expanded to include the identification of stakeholders, the practitioners' duty to them, the need to consult ethical scholarship and the need for peer and line management supervision (Tymchuk, 1986, Welfed 1998). The contextual factors identified in the decision making processes have included an assessment of the seriousness of the situation, the benefit of intervention/action to the client, the consequence/cost of the intervention/action (Sileo & Kopala 1993). These matrices provided highly instrumental approaches to resolving ethical issues. In addition, ethical decision making models employed by psychologists and mental health professionals tended not to be theoretically grounded and framed the ethical decision making process as individualistic, rational/cognitive or intra-psychic (Cottone & Clause, 2000). This portrayed ethical decisions as the sole responsibility of the decision maker. Cottone (2001) argued that individual and intra-psychic approaches promoted psychological mysticism by frequently failing to describe how choices occurred, how the values or issues are weighed and by excluding the relational and social nature of decisions.

There have been attempts to weave both the social and the emotional into ethical decision making. For example, Betan (1997) suggested a hermeneutical approach which emphasized the relational and intersubjective aspects of decision making. Hill, Gaser and Harden (1995) proposed a framework based on a “feminist” approach that included power as a frame of reference. Cottone (2001) developed a constructivist model of ethical decision making which incorporated and acknowledge social and systemic processes.

Water (2008) suggested framing the issues as ethical obscured the emotional work undertaken by professionals in complex situations, where autonomy was
limited and with no ideal outcome. Professionals therefore found themselves with limited control and were required to be a witness to the suffering of Others (Water 2008). In these situations choice was a fallacy. Water’s (2008) portrayal resonated with the account of EPs experience of working in ethically difficult situations provided by Guiney (2009) and Bennett (2008) above. This emotionally engaged account of practice challenged the discourse that the practitioners sat in a neutral and objective space where they can observe, weigh the costs and benefits and then come to decisions (Critchley & Bernosconi, 2002; Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 2008; Rest & Narvaez, 2009). Rather, in more traditional accounts of professional ethics the emotional work undertaken was seldom discussed and emotions were frequently perceived to be problematic (impairing rational thought) (e.g. Francis, 2009; Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 2008; Rest & Narvaez, 2009). Water (2008) suggested that some practitioners learned to live with the ambiguity. However for others “forgiveness becomes a way of finding peace” and for others the solution was to become “desensitized and inured to the distress of others” (Water, 2008, page 194).

This section suggested that framing issues as ethical could:

- Discipline (govern) how Professionals thought about issues and the solutions they arrived at.
- Facilitate and privilege a rational form of positivistic practice.
- Obscure the emotional work which resulted from working in institutions

The next section argued that ethics could be employed rhetorically to achieve personal and strategic goals.

### 3.13.2 Ethics as Rhetorical Tools

There were two overlapping critiques of ethics as rhetorical tools which differed in the extent to which cognitive deliberation was said to be involved. In the first critique ethics was a way of talking about practice issues designed to achieve a
personal or social goal. In the second, the employment of ethical descriptions was a post hoc rationalization for “non-rational” processes.

Tong (1998) suggested that justification of our actions to us and others was a core function of ethical. Turner (2009) below perhaps unwittingly, pointed the rhetorical nature of medical discourse:

“When bioethicists discuss such topics as truth telling, informed consent, and advance care planning they typically draw upon the language of autonomy and choice. However, when addressing other subjects, such as public health, intergenerational obligations, family obligations, resource allocation, and access to health care, they often draw upon notions of community and relationality” (Ibid, page 98).

The above quote could be read (against) as demonstrating that ethics was a rhetorical device used strategically to achieve a goal rather than a principle position. For example, the strategic use of ethics was suggested by linking the language autonomy and choice to the contexts and the aims to be achieved (Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Potter; 1988, Tong, 1998). When the aim was to produce individual responsibility the rhetoric was of autonomy and choice. However when the aim was social good the rhetoric emphasized social responsibility and obligation. The focus on autonomy, while emphasizing choice and consent29 perpetuated asymmetrical power relations. For example, the Client was expected to consent based on technical information using a specialised vocabulary from an institutional context (Benwell & Stokoe, 2010; Frank & Jones, 2003).

The second related challenge to ethics emphasized emotional, social and cultural influences in ethical decisions and that the rationalizations given for ethical decisions were later constructions (Haidt, 2001). Typically, the practitioner found themselves in a perplexing situation and made intuitive social and culturally informed decisions or actions. Only later when asked (by Self or Others) to speak

29 For a further critical discussion and problematization of consent see appendix 8.
about their decision/action in rational terms did the individual employ formal ethical thinking. Furthermore, Dancy (2006) argued that rationalizations when applied to ethics had a contributory rather than a causal function. Contributory reasons on either side of an argument did not necessarily negate each other, rather contributory reasons are weighed in the balance and the decision was based on the quantity rather than the quality of the reasons (Dancy, 2006). In addition, research frequently found that practitioners' rationalizations were inconsistent (Chevalier & Lyon, 1993; Hundert 1987).

However the content of the ethical justifications were still important to examine because they pointed to culturally important aspects of past decisions (Toulmin 1982). The difference between the rational and Haidt's (2001) approach to ethical judgments was illustrated in Figure 2 below:

**Figure 2. The Realist and Haidt’s (2001) Models of Ethical Decisions.**

This section argued that ethics could be employed as a tool to achieve social and political goals. The section also contrasted the post-rationalization approach with the realist approach. Ethical codes, often informed by a realist approach, were
often intended to inform how professionals think about difficult situations. The role of ethical codes was further critically examined below.

### 3.14 Ethical Codes

Educational Psychologists in the United Kingdom can obtain guidance from HPC, BPS (2006), AEP (2003) and DECP (1997, 2000). However, the role and function of ethical codes was highly contested (Lindsey, 1996). This section explored both negative and positive perceptions of the role and function of ethical codes before exploring the possibility of a post-modern approach to ethics.

The traditional normative role of professional ethics was outlined by Francis (2002) in his emphasis on law, morality and the explicit aims of policing behavioural standards. However codes of ethics also protect and reinforce the power of the practitioner (Lindsey, 1996). Ethical codes were designed to regulate the conduct of behaviour (Francis 2002).

Lindsey (1996) argued that these codes were “social constructions” that resulted from conflicts, compromises and tensions between professional behaviours and societal constraints (Lindsey, 1996). Forsyth & Pope (1984) argued that practitioners could take a principled, relativistic or prima facie approach to ethical guidelines. That was to adhere to them regardless of, time, place and situation. Pope and Vasquez (1998), however, suggested the following limitation of ethical codes:

“Ethical codes cannot do our questioning, thinking, feeling, and responding for us. Such codes can never be a substitute for the active process by which the individual therapist or counselor struggles with the sometimes bewildering, always unique constellation of questions, responsibilities, contexts, and competing demands of helping another person...Ethics must be practical (Ibid, page 57).
The above limitations were recognized by the BPS (2006) and stated that “… no Code can replace the need for psychologists to use their professional and ethical judgement” (Ibid, page xiii).

Brown (1994) further argued that legalistic adherence to ethical guidelines was to misunderstand their more positive function of equalising power within professional relationships to promote ethical thinking. Ethical guidelines have also been described as “something the mental health professional must worry about, confront or simply ignore rather than as a core aspect of the profession (Koocher & Kieth-Spiegal 2008). Koocher & Kieth-Spiegal (2008) added that strictly adhering to ethical guidelines could actually impair the practitioner and client relationship where the primary motivation is to behave in a manner so as not to get sued.

The BPS and HPC codes of ethics were underpinned by utilitarianism and deontological ethics combined with what Talbot (2000, page 9) called liberal moral theory or “contract ethics”. This approach, underpinned by principlism, emphasised autonomy, reason and universality over emotion relatedness and particularity (Lindsey, 1996). Ethical codes asked that we thought about the particular as if it were universal by offering processes through which we established which universal principle(s) applied in a particular case (Koocher & Kieth-Spiegal 2008). As discussed above, to make a maxim universal was to abstract the person from it and enabled Others to become generalized others belonging to a category/label, exemplar of a syndrome or a client (Benhabib, 1987; Mensch, 2003). Categorized and differentiated Others, however, remained entitled to rights. This facilitated discourses of respect, obligation, dignity, rights, duty, entitlement and worthiness which negated the need to relate to an individual Other but enabled professionals to relate to the Client as just another other (Benhabib, 1993).
There have been attempts by “postmodernist” theorists to suggest alternatives to ethics based on codes (Bauman, 1993; Elliot, 2000). Elliot (2000) argued that postmodernists privileged:

“... the debunking of universalism and totality, prizes appeals to instinctual intuition and passion in the formation of judgement, values irony and cynicism as a means for keeping a firm distance from intellectualism and elitism, while all the time remaining committed to self-reflexive subversions in order to give the slip to conceptual closure and thus authoritarian communication and politics” (Ibid, Page 338).

This was an ethics focused on the Other and, in short, the aim of ethics was to establish ways of living with others. Bauman (1993) criticised ethical codes because they denied “human reality” was messy and ambiguous which meant that “moral decisions, unlike abstract ethical principles, are ambivalent” (Ibid, page 32). Bauman (1993) also challenged ethical codes because they made the practitioner answerable to legislators but not to the “Other and to moral self-conscience and the context in which a moral stand is taken” (Ibid, page 250). A close reading of Bauman (1993) suggested that postmodern ethics remained problematic. For example, Bauman (1993) could be guilty of mystifying ethics by privileging intuition30, reintroducing essentialism and being open to the self-refuting argument. 31 Bauman’s (1993) intuitionist approach was implied in his request that ethics be based on “human moral intuition” and “ability to negotiate the art and usages of living together” without reference to ‘artificially constructed ethical codes’ (Bauman, 1993, pages 33-34). Bauman’s (1993) recommendation, flowing from the intuitional approach, to “consult your conscience” to establish if an action was ethical was perilously close to a traditional deontological position (Bauman, 1993, page. 250). Bauman’s (1993, pages 32-33) frequent references to “truth” opened up the possibility of having a self-refuting proposition. However, if Bauman (1993) replaced truth with fidelity, then the position became one of

30 Intuition was problematic because it was not open to being tested by theory. Intuition also appeared to stand outside of power and discourse.
31 For example, claiming that “it was true that there was no truth”. This statement undermined itself because it cannot be true that there is no truth. That would mean that if the statement was itself true then it would be false.
staying true to the consequences of accepting a postmodern perspective and avoided (or temporally sidestepped) the self refuting argument. Bauman (1993) also found himself in a bind through arguing that modernity was an illusion but also finding merit in modern moral concerns such as “human rights” and “social justice” (Bauman, 1993, page 4).

This section critically reviewed the function of ethical codes and explored postmodern ethics as an alternative. While accepting that ethics based on ethical codes was problematic it was also argued that alternatives were also problematic. The complex relationship between ethical codes and practice was further discussed in the methodology section of the thesis. The next section critically examined the nature of the ethically challenging situation experienced by EPs and related professions.

3.15 Educational Psychology and Ethical Practice

Educational Psychologists’ and analogous professionals’ (e.g. American School Psychologists, Australian School Councellors) attitudes to ethics and experiences of ethically challenging situations have been reviewed internationally and nationally (e.g. Chevalier & Lyon, 1993, and Jacob-Timm, 1999). The majority of these studies had survey designs. Crane (1999) argued that research employing questionnaire designs perpetuated a positivistic, objective and rational approach to ethics. The majority of studies have been North American and therefore not easily transferable (e.g. Canter, et al., 1994; Jacob-Timm, 1999). For example, a significantly higher proportion of School Psychologists were self-employed whereas the majority of EPs worked for Local Authorities (Guiney 2009). This meant that there could have been a greater preponderance of ethical matters relating to managing a business (e.g. payments). However, there had also been two recent significant British studies (Bennett, 2008; Guiney, 2009).
Studies consistently reported that School Psychologists claimed that they found themselves in “difficult situations” (e.g. Canter, et al., 1994, Jacob-Timm, 1999). Jacob-Timm’s (1999) survey of 1025 School Psychologists identified 222 ethically challenging incidents which were grouped into 19 different categories. The three most consistently identified issues were administrative pressures to act unethically, unethical assessment and diagnostic procedures and confidentiality dilemmas.

Concerns about confidentiality were not unique to North America. In a study of Israeli mothers’ attitudes towards seeking help for their children from School and Private psychologists, Raviv et al. (2003) found that mothers had significantly greater concerns about referring their child to a School Psychologist than to a private psychologist. The reasons given included concern about;

- Their child being stigmatized at school for accessing the school psychologist.
- The school psychologist breaching confidentiality.
- Sharing private family issues with other school professionals.

Raviv et al. (2003) concluded that School Psychologists needed to be proactive in educating parents about the confidential nature of their work in schools.

Jacob-Timm (1999) found that the most common ethically challenging situation involved administrative pressure for the School Psychologist to act beyond their professional boundaries. This included a Principal wanting a School Psychologist to discipline students. The pressure to act unethically was often indirect with appeals to teamwork. For example, one School Psychologist was accused of not being a team player for not giving a student a particular diagnosis that would have benefited the school. Kendrick & Chandler (1994) found that psychologists reported that they were being asked to undertake activities that they did not have the time or training to deal with. Glosoff & Pate (2002) described the School Psychologists’ experience as a “complex balancing act” where they endeavour to meet their clients’ needs, the needs of the setting they work within, the needs
and expectation of multiple stakeholders while attempting to maintain professional standards. This echoed the description of EP issues with working with clients described above.

British studies found that EPs frequently experienced similar ethical challenging situations in the work place (Bennett, 2008; Guiney, 2009; Murphy, 1998). Guiney (2009), using structured interviews, argued that there were six areas that consistently presented EP with ethical dilemmas. These included:

- Cases involving abuse of a child by an adult (e.g. parent, teacher etc).
- Cases involving the inclusion of children in mainstream school or special school.
- The location, quality and amount of provision available for SEN provision.
- The tension between the different roles EP’s had (e.g. Local Authority officer, Educational Psychologist, provider of advice to school, supporters of children inclusion, etc).
- Instances where EPs felt that they had received inappropriate supervision from their line management.

Bennett (2008) described nine categories of ethically troubling incidents:

1. Weighing and balancing the rights and best interests of different Clients/Stakeholders
2. Respecting clients’ confidences
3. Challenging other discourses
4. Being between a rock and a hard place (having to navigate between difficult choices with no clear positive outcome)
5. Maleficence/Doing Harm in relation to inappropriate administration or reporting of assessments.
6. Dilemmas of Social Justice (included informed consent)
7. Labelling children so that they can get access to resources
8. Conflicting principles, conflicting roles and responsibilities
9. Challenging competences

Although the ethically difficult situations were varied, the dilemmas were surprising constant. In the majority of situations the EPs knew what to do but felt pressure or experienced barrier in doing what they believed to be right. These included wanting to maintain good working relationship with schools and feelings of duty and responsibilities to their employers. Guiney’s (2008) study suggested that the ethical dilemmas had significant emotional impact on EPs. These

The Lamb Enquiry (2009) described how some EPs could be subtly “fettered” by the Local Authority that employed them. This included some EPs feeling pressure to change advice, not to make specific recommendations or not to recommend provision that the Local Authority did not have. The Lamb Enquiry (2009) argued that the consequence of acquiescing to such fettering was to short change children. The Lamb Enquiry (2009) wondered if the pressure from EPs having multiple roles could be avoided by having EPs work at “arms length” from the Local Authority. This recommendation assumed that there was a neutral space in which EPs could make neutral decisions. This naive position forgot that all decisions were social and in any new contexts there would be a new set of demands, conflicts and pressures. To be social was already to be compromised and to be subject to negotiation.

Interestingly, Bennett (2008) & Guiney (2009) found that even when EPs were aware of professional codes that they infrequently or inconsistently employed them to resolve troubling ethical situations. This supported the argument above that professionals had a problematic and complex relationship with ethical codes (Nash, 1996; Koocher & Kieth-Spiegal, 2008). Guiney (2009) suggested that EPs did not look to codes for the answers but to provide frameworks and broad guidance.
The British EPs experience of the ethical tug\textsuperscript{32} was not unique. For example, Raviv et al. (2003) found that American School Psychologists found themselves caught between different principles, dual roles (advocate, employee, etc.), law and ethical beliefs and between conflicting interests presented by multiple clients. In addition, Campbell (2004) stated that Australian School Counsellors experienced conflict between their role and the demands placed on them by school administrative staff. Davis and Mickelson (1994) also in the Australian context described this ethical tug as:

“A situation in which a counsellor experiences conflict in deciding on an appropriate decision. The counsellor usually feels pulled in several directions, and at times, is confronted with a situation that seems to place professional ethics in direct opposition to the expressed desires of others or with the legal system”.(Ibid, 1994, page 6).

The concept of ethical tugs was relevant to the earlier discussion on the nature of the EP-Client relationship and an argument to incorporate the affective aspects to balance the cognitive and the reframing of ethics based on commitment and resistance (commitment to beliefs, fidelity to clients, resistance to impositions) (Austin 2007).

This section argued that EPs experienced a wide range of ethically challenging situations where the tug was frequently between wanting to do what right and feeling unable to do it. The tug appeared to result from political, resource and situational pressures.

\textbf{3.16 Chapter Summary}

This chapter critically reviewed and identified debates in the two main themes of the thesis, professionals’ identity and professional ethics. The review suggested that professionalism was a contested and ill-defined construct (Morrow et al

\textsuperscript{32} This was the emotional tug experienced by EPs when they negotiated between doing what they felt was right and the barrier that stopped them doing it.
Professionals were portrayed as being on a continuum between romanticized heroes working in the best interests of clients to powerful self-interested monopolies obsessed by rules (Coulehan, 2005; Evetts, 2003; Freidson, 1970; Johnson, 1993; Krause, 1996; MacDonald, 1995; Rose, 1999). Professional identities were argued to be continually emerging and re-negotiated through professional talk (Connelly & Clandin, 1999; Chreim, Williams & Hining, 2007; Wenger, 1998). The challenges experienced during professional identity work pointed to tensions in the discursive formation in which the professional practiced (Araujo & Martuccelli 2010). The review argued that EP’s professional identity confusion partly resulted from the tensions in their roles was a response to the political context in which EP’s practiced and the inherent instability of the construct of psychology. The review of EP experience of ethically challenging situations suggested that some of the same pressures (political, resource, multiple clients with sometimes competing demands, etc.) that were claimed to cause role confusion also resulted in ethical tugs. EP-Client relationships were also critically examined. Clienthood was argued to result from historical and relational, discursive processes that established roles and responsibilities. Finally, the EP-Client relationship was understood as asymmetrical and potentially alienating.

The section on ethics focused on the tensions within microethics and between microethics and bioethics. The review challenged the bioethical portrayal of the rational, autonomous, neutral decision maker (professional) informed by universal ethical principles (Benner, 1997; Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008; Popke, 2003; Tauber, 2005; Tong, 1998; Wendell, 1996). This was balanced with acknowledgement of the emotional work undertaken by professionals in messy, interdependent and particular situations. The rational and theoretical function of ethics as the source of action was contrasted with the employment of ethics as post rationalizations and rhetorical justifications of actions. Ethical codes were argued to be underpinned by utilitarian and deontological ethics that emphasized autonomy, reason and universality or emotional relatedness (Lindsey 1996). This
was claimed to facilitate the abstraction of Clients and their exclusion. The review proposed that rather than professionals being the sole source of ethics that it was the ethical demand offered by the Client that also called the professional to be ethical. Finally, the review suggested that EPs frequently found themselves in ethically difficult situations where they experienced an ethical tug between commitment to their roles, institutional stakeholders and their Client (e.g. Chevalier & Lyon, 1993; DCSF, 2009; and Jacob-Timm, 1999).
Chapter 4. Methodologies

4.1 Practitioner Research into Professional Identity

"Many of the most significant and exciting life events and extraordinary experiences - moments of clarity, illumination, and healing - have been systematically excluded from conventional research" (Braud & Anderson, 1998, page 3).

Braud & Anderson (1998) appeal for research to focus on the everyday practice of practitioners echoed by Dewey’s (1923) call to mine unworked mines of professional practice. This thesis’s focus on the everyday practice of EPs was a response to the above appeals. This section of the methodology first provided definitions of practitioner research before providing an overview of the approaches used by EPs. The type of knowledge practitioner research produced was then critically examined.

In a review of research on practice Higgs, Horsfall & Grace (2009) identified two approaches which they formulated as definitions:

1. "Practice is the enactment of the role of a profession or occupational group in serving or contributing to society”.

2. “Praxis is a form of practice that is ethically informed, committed, and guided by critical reflection of practice traditions and one’s own practice.” (Ibid, pages 3-4).

The above definitions reflected either a descriptive or critical position to practitioner research. This thesis employed the spirit of the second definition. McLeod (1999), further and straightforwardly, defined practitioner research as “research carried out by practitioners for the purpose of advancing their own practice” (Ibid, page 8).

Participant accounts of working in Educational Psychology Services occasionally appeared in professional journals (e.g. Bozic, 1999; Counsell & Court, 2000; Gulliford, 1999; Quicke, 2000). Ashton and Roberts (2006) identified five approaches used by EPs to investigate their role. These included:
• Self-reflection
• EPs asking other EPs
• Asking children
• Asking school staff
• Professional organisation reviews

The thesis made most use of the first two of the above approaches. Although children were not asked for their views, working with M put my practice into question.

Practitioner research frequently suggested that professional practice knowledge was something inside the head of the practitioner (e.g. Eraut, 1994, Higgs, Titchen & Neville 2001). However, Kemmis and McTaggart (2005) have argued for a multi-dimensional understanding of practice that encompasses an individual, social and reflexive-dialectical focus. This thesis was concerned with the situational aspects of practice. That was the practice of a particular individual in a particular place and time (Foucault, 2003). Following Kemmis & McTaggart (2005) a social, discursive and reflexive-dialectical focus was used to critically analyze the situated practice.

Practitioner research had been understood as a type of experiential learning, which reflected on the experience and the processes involved in order to profit subsequently from action (Wood, 2003). This recognized the difference between espoused theories and theories-in-use (Argyris & Schön, 1974). Espoused theories are taught, favoured by professional discourse and are derived from published theory or empirical research. Both espoused and theories-in-use are problematic. The qualified uniqueness of each situation implied that espoused theories cannot be a complete guide to practice. However, because theories-in-use developed out of practice they could become second nature and therefore potentially uncontested. Furthermore, just because a theory has developed through practice does not mean that it will be ethical. In addition, the theories-in-use approach assumed that experience was something to be reflected upon
rather than retrospectively constructed within a discourse (Kerby, 1991). However, Kerby (1991) claimed that we were spoken into being through becoming conscious of, and repeating, existing stories that we “encounter almost every day in novels, plays, and other story media” (Ibid, page 6). This was an outside-in process where the self was a product of its experience despite feeling as if it was the self who was originator of that experience.

This section suggested that practitioner research was intended both to develop practice and produce knowledge about practice. It was argued that the type of knowledge could be problematic. The next sections of the methodology introduced the research design before going on to define, justify and critically examine the methodologies. This was followed a delineation of the research design, procedural issues, information about the research participants and the sources and methods of data collection. The ethical issues relating to the research design were then examined. Finally, the Foucauldian approach to data collection was explained and critically evaluated.

4.2 Introducing the Research Design

This section reviewed the possible research designs and argued for a bricolage approach to methodology (Steinberg, 2006). The thesis appropriated autoethnography, Action Research (AR) and Self-Study (S-S) combined with a Foucauldian approach to data analysis. A bricolage approach was employed to disrupt the dominance and authority of methodology (Curt, 1994). The methodology complexity arose out of wanting to employ a Foucauldian approach and undertaking a real time naturalistic inquiry. I therefore decided to borrow selectively from Foucault’s toolbox and acknowledged this by situating the Foucauldian approach in relation to other methodologies. The methodology section justified the inclusion of the different methodologies before outlining the four cycles of the research, summarized below:

1. Analysis my write up of a meeting with M.
2. Analysis of the HPC-SCPE.
3. Analysis of a focus group discussion with 9 the EPs in the Service.
4. Synthesis of the analysis of the three cycles of research.

This was followed by a description and critical examination of the research methods. There was an extended section on the ethics of undertaking participant research where the participant was also an object of research. A key theme underpinning all the research methods was reflexivity. The methodology section therefore provided a critical examination of reflexivity (see appendix 7 for a fuller examination of reflexivity).

4.3 Research Design

4.3.1 Reflecting the Research Gaze Back Onto the Researcher
To answer the research questions and for the thesis also to be an opportunity for identity work, the research methodologies had to have reflexivity at their core. In qualitative research there was a continuum of reflexivity (Willig, 2003). This ranged from the researcher making themselves briefly visible within the research process to the researcher turning the methodological gaze completely on themselves and becoming the object of research (Willig, 2003). Researching oneself as a practitioner was an example of the latter. Methodologies where the researcher was the object of research included:

1. Narrative (the analysis of the stories told about and by the self)
2. Autoethnography (analysis of self in a wider social and political context) (e.g. Ellis, 2004; McILveen, 2008)
3. Life history (analysis of a particular self over time (e.g. Dhunpath & Samuel, 2009).
4. Action Research: when the aim was to reflect on researchers’ practice (e.g. Carr & Kemmis, 1996; McNiff, 2002; McKernan, 1996)
5. Self-Study (analysis of self in action typically in educational settings) (e.g. Loughran, et al., 2004)
6. Memory work (analysis of a remembered self) (e.g. Stephenson & Kippax, 2009, Willig, 2001)
7. Psychoanalytic work (e.g. Hollway & Jefferson, 2005)
8. Phenomenological (e.g. Quicke, 2000, Moustakas, 1990)
4.3.2 Complexity and Bricolage

The first problem in constructing this section of the thesis was to consider the utility of hierarchy (between AR, S-S and Autoethnography). For example, was the thesis based on an AR methodology which employed methods derived from Autoethnography and S-S? Alternatively, was the thesis based on a S-S methodology that employed an action research framework using methods from autoethnography? Or any other combination of the above. Establishing a hierarchy would have reduced the complexity but could privilege a specific methodology or theory which would undermine the post-structuralist ambitions of the thesis (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Tobin & Kincheloe (2006) further argued that presenting research as complex enabled readers to understand that research was partial, fragmented, biased and ideological. The term used to describe this complexity was “bricolage”33 (Steinberg, 2006). Bricolage involved:

“…taking research strategies from a variety of scholarly disciplines as they are needed in the unfolding context of the research situation. Such an action is pragmatic and strategic, demanding self consciousness and awareness of context from the researcher” (Steinberg, 2006, page 119).

The researcher therefore needs to be an “interpretative bricoleur” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, page 4). The current research made use of Autoethnography, AR and S-S. The next section justified methodologies choices.

4.4 Justification of the Inclusion of Action Research

AR, when characterized as a cyclical process of problem identification, planning, action and reflective evaluation; where the insights obtained from one cycle informed the next, was appropriated because it provide a overall structure to the research (Willig, 2001). The presentation of AR as a particular way of reflexivity

33 Bricolage was preferred to the term Mixed Methods, which was typically used to describe research that combined qualitative and quantitative research methods. However this thesis wove qualitative approaches together (for a description of mixed methods see Burke & Onwueguzie (2004).
examining and evaluating one’s own practice also resonated with general aim of the thesis (Car, 2004, 2006; Carr & Kemmis, 1996; McNiff, 2002; McKernan, 1996). Feldman, Paugh & Mills (2004) have argued that AR, because of its emphasis on reflection, could provide a method for S-S. However Feldman, Paugh & Mills (2004) also recognized that S-S and AR had different goals and theoretical positions. Self-study was primarily concerned with understanding (delineating) the researcher’s experiences\(^{34}\) and how they influenced and were influenced by the system in which they practice; whereas AR emphasized action (Samaras & Freese, 2009). The implication was that, rather than AR and S-S nesting within each other like Russian Dolls, they should be understood as complementary methods. Samaras & Freese (2009) argued that AR could provide the scaffolding and structure for S-S.

Action research was also an appropriate method to explore research as liminality\(^{35}\) (Glavey, 2008). Glavey (2008) outlined how the first stage of liminality resonated with the initial unease experienced by practitioners about their practice. The second betwixt and between phase was likened to the reflexive processes involved in AR. Finally, the transition and re-aggregation phase was held to be similar to the action phase of the AR cycle. Action Research, S-S and autoethnography were also chosen because of their applicability to a qualitative research design intended to research nodal moments or axial points in practice (Bennis & Nanus, 1997; Bullough & Pinnegar, 2001).

These were moments when practitioners experienced dissonance in their practice that turned their critical gaze onto their practice. Whitehead (1993) referred to this as experiencing oneself as a living contradiction. For Capra (2002, page 1088), such moments are moments of ‘uncertainty, fear, confusion, self-doubt’ preceding ‘the emergence of novelty’. Conn (1986) suggested that in

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34 I would prefer to say the way the researcher talks about or came to know their experience rather than their experience.

35 Research as liminality referred to two aspects of research The first, was research as being experienced as being betwixt and between different roles (researcher and participants). The second, referred to research as a process of personal change.
nodal moments practitioners were aware “that our categories do not fit our experience, and throws the intuitive, unconscious self into gear in quest of what the possibilities really are” (Ibid, page 288). The concept of nodal moments was central to the thesis because the research questions were born out of such a moment during my practice.

Action Research, S-S and to a lesser extent Autoethnography all recognized the importance of an ongoing tension between the researcher, researched and critical friends, where interactions tested, reframed and suggested alternative perspectives to hypotheses and interpretation (Bullough & Pinnegar, 2001; LaBoskey, 2004; Loughran, 2004; McNiff & Whitehead, 2006). This was also highly relevant to the collaborative research design of this thesis.

Finally, AR was also applicable to the complexity (swampy lowlands) of Educational Psychology practice which could be resistance to instrumental and technical solutions (Schön, 1995).

4.4.1 Justification of the inclusion of Self-Study

Self-Study was selected because it had been applied to the individual and situational level involving reflexive/reflective practices (Cochran-Smith and Lytle, 1993; Hamilton, 1998; Kosnik, et al., 2006; LaBoskey, 2004; Lassonde, Galman & Kosnik, 2009; Lighthall, 2004; Loughran, et al., 2004; Pinnegar, 1998; Samaras, 2011).

Self-Study had also been employed to examine professional identity (e.g. Muchmore 2008). Self-Study, with its emphasis on making public personal reflection and inquiry was appropriate given my aim to make public how I and colleagues talked about our practice. Self-Study researchers’ use and problematization of their professional practice also made S-S applicable to the Foucauldian approach to data analysis (Feldman, 2002). In addition, some S-S
researchers had aligned themselves with the post-structuralist project through emphasizing the non-linear nature of their research, embracing subjectivity, employing an ontological lens, recognizing power both in practice and research and acknowledging the constructed nature of knowledge (Allender & Allender, 2008; Cochran-Smith & Lytle, 2004; Pinnegar, 1998; Pinnegar & Hamilton, 2007; Wilcox, Watson & Paterson, 2004). However, the frequent acceptance of an unproblematic access to, and privileging of experience opened up S-S to accusations of implicit realism and essentialism. The range of data collection methods were also appropriate to S-S (Samaras, 2011). The recursive nature of S-S, AR and Autoethnography, where it was recognized that research questions, research focus, hypotheses and interpretation do not remain fixed but shift during the research process also resonated with my experience of practitioner self-research.

4.4.2 Justification of the Inclusion of Autoethnography

Autoethnography provided ontological and epistemological underpinning to talking and writing about the self. Autoethnographic researchers’ desire to write themselves into their work both to hold themselves to account and as a performative act made it an appropriate method to undertake research that aimed both to present knowledge and undertake an experiment in identity work (Charmaz & Mitchell, 1997). This was evident in autoethnography resistance to grand narratives that privileged method over subject and perpetuated myths of objectivity and the decontextualized subject (Denzin, 1992, 2006). Autoethnography was therefore an appropriate method to explore EPs both as the object of knowledge and as the subject who knows. Autoethnography also provided a method to investigate my professional identity36 in the discursive formation in which it was produced (Brandes, 1982). This made autoethnography particularly applicable to the first cycle of the research where I wrote a reflective

36 The use of professional identity rather than the more autoethnographic reference to self was intentional and intended to signal a complex and contingent concept of self.
account of the MWM. Autoethnography also aimed to appropriate the researcher’s embodiment as a tool for research to examine their professional self as other (Spry, 2001). This was highly relevant as it was the discomfort with my practice that helped to formulate the research questions.

However, the thesis did not have the exclusive focus on the researcher nor have I included any autobiography. This was both strategic and practical. I felt uncomfortable with the narcissistic flavour of a lot of autoethnographic writing and chose to distance myself from it. In addition, given the requirements of an Educational Doctorate and my desire to produce a particular type of scholarship it would have been very hard to remain within the word count and provide anything but very thin biographical information. Finally, I have to be open to the possibility that, following Foucault (1997) “I am no doubt not the only one who writes in order to have no face” (Ibid, page 17). I also found solace for my contingent engagement with autoethnography in Derrida’s (1995) argument that autobiography, rather than providing a straightforward root to truth was a performance and performative discipline where the author strategically played with masks to manage the presentation of truth.

4.5 Cycles of Research

The cycles of research are illustrated in figure 3 below. The figure showed that the first cycle of research involved the meeting with M and then the detailed write up of the encounter. While reflecting on this account it became evident that it would be necessary to examine ethical codes that were intended to inform my practice. The second cycle was, therefore, a critical review of the Health Professional Councils Standards of Conduct Performance and Ethics (HPC-SCPE). If I was going to locate my practice in relation to the wider practice of EPs it was necessary to triangulate my practice with peers and to examine how a community of EPs talked about their ethical practice. The third cycle, therefore, involved establishing a focus group to discuss my account of the meeting with M
and their views on ethical practice. It became evident during the analysis of results that there were issues and ‘statements’ common to all three cycles of research. A forth cycle was added in which the results from the first and third cycles were synthesised. In each of the four cycles of research the analysis will not be exhaustive but rather will be specific to the research questions.

**Figure 3: The Cycles of Research.**

![Diagram showing the cycles of research](image)

The bi-directional arrows indicated that rather than being linear and straightforwardly sequential the phases of research have been circular and interactive. Creswell (1998) referred to the cyclical oscillating between being
immersed in data, reading literature, interpretation and structuring a narrative as the “data analysis spiral” (Ibid, page 143).

4.6 Classification and Description of Research Methods

4.6.1 Self-study

Self-study can take many forms (Loughran et al 2004). Cochran-Smith and Lytle (1993) described S-S as a systematic and intentional enquiry that located practitioners as generators of knowledge about their professions. Self-Study was very flexible and Loughran (2004) explained that “there is no one way, or correct way, of doing self-study. Rather, “how a self-study might be done depends on what is sought to be better understood” (Ibid, page 15). A wide range of methods have been applied in S-S including: autobiographical, autoethnography, personal history, case work, narrative and memory work (LaBoskey, 2004; Lighthall, 2004, Loughran, et al., 2004). This flexibility and range of methods has made S-S very difficult to define. Attempts had been made to define self-study by the role of the self in the study, practice and purpose. These are outlined below:

- **Self-Study Defined by Role:** Hamilton (1998) defined self-study as “the study of one’s self, one’s actions, one’s ideas, as well as the ‘not self’… Self-study also involves a thoughtful look at texts read, experiences had, people known, and ideas considered” (Ibid, page 236).

- **Self-Study Defined by Situated Practice:** Pinnegar (1998) defined S-S as “a methodology for studying professional practice settings” (Ibid, page 33). Samaras (2002) said that “I use the words Self-Study to mean critical examination of one’s actions and the context of those actions in order to achieve a more conscious mode of professional activity, in contrast to action based on habit, tradition, or impulse” (Ibid p. xiii).

- **Self-Study Defined by Purpose:** Kosnik et al (2006) identified three purposes for practicing S-S: 1) personal renewal, 2) professional renewal, and 3) program renewal. LaBoskey’s (2004) writing emphasises the important moral, ethical, and political purposes of S-S. It was perhaps this aim to confront these issues that makes S-S an appropriate methodology to research ethical practice.
4.6.2 Characteristics of self study

An alternative way to approach S-S was to ask “what it looks like?” Proponents of S-S characterized S-S approaches as including openness, collaboration and reframing (Samaras & Freese, 2009). The openness related to openness to ideas from others. It was through a collaborative dialogue with others that reframing both of practice and problems was made possible. Self-study could therefore be viewed as a dialogueic approach to research (Loughran & Northfield, 1998). In addition, the literature on S-S tended to emphasize the role of critical friends and trusted colleagues (e.g. LaBoskey, 2004; Loughran, 2004, McNiff & Whitehead 2006). This dialogueic approach was, argued to be, required to make S-S valid. The dialogueic approach also made what could have been a personal, private and individualist process a public and social one. The dialogueic nature of S-S recognized that it was not possible to separate the ‘self’ (researcher) from the research process or the practice which they are researching (Cochran-Smith & Lytle, 2004).

This approach accepts the consequence that the knowledge generated was contingent. In S-S researchers took a reflective stance to better empathize with participants and to develop moral and pedagogical implications of their actions (e.g. Loughran et al., 2004, Hamiliton et al., 1998). This included becoming aware of what it felt like to be an object of knowledge. Loughran et al. (2004) further called for a blurring of the private and professional because who we were as people shaped and bled into who we were as practitioners. This perspective has significant overlap with Allan’s (1999) call for professionals to undertake ethical work on themselves and also Frosh and Baraitser’s (2008) call to reflect back the research gaze onto the researcher. It also resonated with Eagleton’s (2009) description of ethics as “the continual questioning from below any attempt to impose order from above” (Ibid, page 251).
4.6.3 Criticism of Self-Study

There has been extensive criticism of S-S not least of which was whether it was a valid form of research (Northfield, 1996). There have also been criticisms about the validity of the findings of S-S (e.g. Bullough & Pinnegar, 2001; Feldman, 2003). This perhaps mirrored the general debate in quantitative research about efficacy of qualitative research (e.g., Morse et al., 2002; Sandelowski & Barrow, 2001). Rather than answering the question, “what made S-S valid?” Bullough & Pinnegar (2001) preferred to ask, “What made self study worth reading?” Other S-S researchers emphasised qualities within their research such as believability, credibility, consensus and coherence (e.g. Eisner, 1991; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested that terms such as ‘quality’, ‘rigor’ and ‘trustworthiness’ were perhaps more appropriate in qualitative research. Northfield (Ibid, 1996, pages 6-9) suggested that in assessing the quality of S-S the following statements could be useful:

- “Self-Study is associated with serious “reframing of situations”
- “Self-Study must be a collaborative activity”
- “The outcomes of Self-Study are effective if they promote dialogue”
- “The uses for Self-Study are meaningful for the person involved”
- “Commitment to action”

Finally, S-S had been criticized for diminishing the role of theory (Clough 2000). However, S-S that recognized that the self was socially constructed and a site for the production of knowledge could identify how theory was produced in practice (Loughran, 2004).

4.7 Autoethnography

Chase (2005) stated that in Autoethnography researchers “turn the analytic lens on themselves and their interactions with others” so as to “write, interpret, and/or

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37 Northfield (1996) did not present his questions as a list but rather as either heading of paragraphs or within paragraphs.
perform their own narratives about culturally significant experiences” (Ibid, page 660). Ellis and Bochner (2000) wrote that:

“Autoethnography is an autobiographical genre of writing and research that displays multiple layers of consciousness, connecting the personal to the cultural. Back and forth autoethnographers gaze, first through an ethnographic wide-angle lens, focusing outward on social and cultural aspects of their personal experience; then, they look inward, exposing a vulnerable self that is moved by and may move through, refract, and resist cultural interpretations” (Ibid, page 739)

It was this turning the research gaze back onto Educational Psychology and myself that drew me to autoethnography as a possible method. Autoethnography has been used to study a wide range of issues and experiences (e.g., Chang, 2007; Ellis, 2009). Autoethnography can be understood as a critical engagement with a socially constructed self so as to reflexively critique the situatedness of the self (Hickey & Austin, 2007; Reed-Danahay, 1997). Autoethnographical research was typically written in first person, contained contextual details, dialogue, emotion, and self-consciousness and an awareness of the historical, social structural and cultural discourses that shape personal accounts (Ellis, 2004; Ellis & Bochner, 2000, 2003; Pratt, 1992).

Autoethnography was self-focused with the researcher at the centre as both subject (the researcher) and object (the researched) of research which differentiated it from straightforward Ethnography (Chang, 2008). Autoethnography made connections between the micro (self) and the macro (cultural/contexts). The intension was to resist and contest preconceived views in those contexts (Jones, 2005). Autoethnography was characterized by an autobiographical style of writing where there was a tension between presenting the self in writing while attempting to hold the self as other (Bullough & Pinnegar, 2001; Ellis, 2004). This tension was frequently used as a resource. Ellis and Bochner (2000) argued that autoethnographers differed on the emphasis they placed in either the cultural (ethno) or self (auto) in their writing (graphy).
However, Anderson (2006) made a distinction between autoethnographers that had evocative (evoked an emotional response) or analytical (systemically examined an issue) aims. However, these were not mutually exclusive. Whether the method was evocative or analytical, the desire was always to make a difference or to be transformative (Denzin, 2006; Renner, 2001). This thesis tended towards the more analytic autoethnography of Anderson (2006), not because of any criticism of the evocative method but more a recognition of the limitation of my writing style and personal preference.

The process of auto ethnography involved the utilization of surprises. Beginning with the surprising or intriguing the aim was to identify of the difference between what I do know and what I need to know so as to understand and/or explain what happened (Agar, 2006; Glesne & Peshkin, 1992) This was abduction. Whereas induction worked from the precondition to the consequences abduction began with the consequences and worked backwards towards the precondition (post hoc ergo propter hoc). Abduction was therefore not a single event but rather a form of recursion.

Autoethnographers tended to resist strict guidelines on the correct way to do research (Ellis 2001, 2004; Ellis & Bochner, 2000). This could lead to confusion and blurring of methodological boundaries between autoethnography and other forms of participant self research. This lack of guidelines extended to information on data analysis. However, Ellis (2004) suggested either thematic or structural analysis of texts would be appropriate. I hoped that providing details on the processes used to analysis data in this thesis negated some of this difficulty.

38 “after this, therefore because of this”
4.7.1 Criticism of Autoethnographic Approaches

Autoethnographic accounts frequently state their aim to reveal or show personal experiences. However, Vance (1986) argued that writing about the self by the self was problematic because:

“The autobiographical undertaken is constituted, by two distinct fictions of preferentiality, that of an “I” of the “present” whose identity derives from circumstances alleged to prevail ‘now’ during this actual moment of writing and the ‘I-as-object’ manifested in the historical statements cast ‘then’ in the network of past tenses where the first and third person are collapsed into one” (Ibid, page 1).

This was linked to a specific game of truth because the truth of the text was dependant on the reader investing in the fiction of the convergences of the “I” of the present and the “I” as object. Gannon (2006), from a post-structuralist perspective, had been highly critical of unproblematic approaches to representing the self in writing about the self, arguing that the self:

“… both is fiction and not fiction; is unified and transcendent and fragmented and always in the process of being constituted, can be spoken of in realist ways and cannot; its voice can be claimed as authentic and there is no guarantee of authenticity” (Ibid, page 474).

Accepting the post-structuralist argument that self was fractured and fragmented and that knowledge about the self was contingent, incomplete, partial and plural had implications about the possibility about writing about the self which has already been extensively discussed earlier.

Harré (1989) further problematized the use of “I” to refer to an inner subject by arguing that this myth of the self is undermined by two mistakes. (1) It treated all things referred to as mental as occurring in some inner substance and (2) this inner substances was what was being referred to by the use of “I”. In addition, Harré (1989) argued that the use of “I” had been appropriated within Judaeo-
Christian cultures to enable the performance of moral acts. This was because “I” enabled the actor to claim responsibility for an act and their choices.

It was important also to recognize the power inherent in autoethnographic research. For example, my attempts to examine my lived experience produced that experience as an object of knowledge. This in turn shaped my subjectification because power regulated and created through an “affirmation of the self” (Foucault, 1979). It was through a reflexive gaze that normalised, classified and tested through micro judgments that the subject comes to be (Foucault, 1979).

Delamont (2007) identified six problems with autoethnography, outlined and responded to below:

(1) Autoethnographers’ desire to make the familiar unfamiliar could be highly problematic from an insider position. While recognizing that this was methodologically difficult, the thesis acknowledged that it was the relation with the Other (Client) that made my practice unfamiliar.

(2) Autoethnography was argued to be almost impossible to publish ethically as it was difficult to maintain anonymity of the research participants as their connection to the researcher meant that they could be identified. I have attempted to make the participants anonymous, made them aware that the research will be published and provided the opportunity for them to withdraw at each stage of the research process.39

(3) Autoethnography privileged experience over analysis. Etherington (2004) added that autoethnography “had been characterized as “self-indulgent, solipsistic and narcissistic” (Etherington, 2004, page, 141). This thesis attempted to balance the personal experience with an analysis of the HPC-SCPE and the focus group.

(4) Autoethnography focused on the powerful rather than on the powerless. Appropriating Foucault’s (2000) intention of producing research that made institutional practitioners less confident about their practice so that “certain phrases can no longer be spoken so lightly, certain acts no longer, or at least no longer so unhesitatingly, performed” (Ibid, page 234) was intended act as a corrective for this thesis’s focus on the EP and not the Client.

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39 For a more detailed account of the thesis’s ethics see the ethics section.
(5) Autoethnography abrogated the duty to collect data. This thesis balance self-reflection with data obtained from a document review and analysis of a focus group transcript.

(6) Researcher and practitioners are not sufficiently interesting enough to warrant research. This ultimately has to be a matter of your opinion dear reader.

The next section critically examined AR practice.

4.8 The What of Action Research

Carr and Kemmis (1986) defined AR as:

“Action research is simply a form of self-reflective inquiry undertaken by participants in social situations in order to improve their own practices, their understanding of these practices, and the situations in which the practices are carried out.” (Ibid, page 162).

It was the potential of AR to be an elaboration of practice-as-inquiry that of particular relevance to this thesis (Schön, 1983; Whitehead, 1989). Lewin (1948), outlined the AR approach involving a series, or spiral of steps including planning, action and fact-finding. McNiff & Whitehead (2000) suggested that there were three approaches to action research; interpretive, critical and living theory, each having a distinctive ontology and epistemology.

4.8.1 Action Research (The How)

This thesis was partly concerned with Whitehead’s (1993) question “How do I improve my practice”? McNiff & Whitehead (2005, page 29) unpacked this question by providing additional questions to be considered:

- What is my concern?
- Why am I concerned?
- What kind of evidence do I produce to show I am concerned?
- What can I do about it?
- What will I do about it?
- What kind of evidence do I produce to show that what I am doing is having an educational influence?
- How do I evaluate that influence?
- How do I ensure that any judgements I make are reasonably fair and accurate?
- How do I modify my practice in the light of my evaluation?40?

40 I have abbreviated McNiff & Whitehead’s (2005) detailed discussion and organized the questions using bullet points.
All of the above were employed to provide structure for the thesis. Action Research was frequently claimed to be emancipatory (Carr & Kemmis, 1986; Parker, 2002; McNiff & Whitehead, 2005.) These authors argue that AR revealed and challenged ideologies, raised consciousness and brought about social change. This sidesteps the rather thorny philosophical question as to whether it was possible to be free or even if it was possible to exist outside of a regime of power (Foucault, 1986c). For many in the AR tradition, AR was inherently collaborative (Kagan, Burton & Siddiquee, 2009). This was problematic because I was a single researcher. However, McNiff & Whitehead (2006) accepted that AR could be carried out by a single researcher.

4.8.2 Action and Commitment

The inclusion of AR in the methodology section of a thesis was not straightforward. Carr (2006) also reminded us that AR during the 1940s and 50s developed in relation to the positivist epistemology of the time with the highly modernist aims of social action and social change. Carr (2006) argued that AR continued to justify the knowledge it generated by constituting its research subject in relation to a particular theory of action. This theory emphasized the personal and contextualized nature of knowledge (Carr 2006, page 6). Action Research could also be seen as part of the professionalization of educationalists and the need to find methods appropriate to educational practitioners (Carr, 2006). This potentially, linked AR to the performance and standards agenda. In the post 1960s revival of AR, the nature of action changed from functional/instrumental techniques or skills to ethically informed action (Carr, 2006; Elliott, 1991). It was this revived view of AR that had synergy with the aim to critically examine Educational Psychology as ethical practice. Carr & Kemmis (2009) held that education, and I would add by association Educational Psychology, was “indissoluble” from ideas about the “good society” (Ibid, page
This made education deeply ethical. Their implication was that for practitioners this blurred the boundaries between the personal, professional and political and that all forms of AR were therefore simultaneously personal, professional and political. Personal and professional because AR aimed to achieve self-transformation and professional development, and political because the location of research was always political.

Carr & Kemmis (2009) argued for a Critical AR. The word ‘critical’ was used to emphasis the inclusion power and the need for AR to be emancipatory. In addition, it was held that there could not be a single universally accepted version of critical practice and that AR had to remain open to debate and contestation. Carr and Kemmis (2009) wanted this debate to be non-political. This meant a debate without a fixed outcome. However, Carr & Kemmis (2009) also asked for the debate to be based on “rational discourse” and be democratic where everyone participates on equal terms (Ibid, page 78). This was obviously privileging a humanistic and liberal approach to dialogue. Ironically, Carr (2006) had already reminded us that there was no neutral viewpoint.

Altrichter, et al. (2008, pages 5-6) outlined six distinguishing features of AR that I have adapted and considered below:

1. AR was performed by individuals who were directly concerned with the social situation that is being researched. This made AR applicable to S-S or participant observation, in particular the study of educational psychology by an EP.
2. AR originated from practical questions arising from everyday work. This thesis was prompted in part an encounter with a pupil in a high school. This encounter was typical of the everyday work of EPs.
3. AR must be compatible with the values of the organization and working practices of the researcher. The formation of AR as enquiry in practice made it compatible with undertaking research while working.
4. AR was characterized by a continuing effort to closely interlink, relate and confront action and reflection, to reflect upon one’s conscious and unconscious actions in order to develop those actions, and to act reflectively in order to develop one’s knowledge. This is highly relevant to the aim of developing my praxis as an EP.
5. AR was flexible. The flexibility of action research was a highly attractive feature because it enabled the methods to be adapted to the complexity involved in studying naturalistic practice.

Action research required both action and commitment (Daloz, et al., 1996; Parker, 2002; Sallis & Jones, 2002; Whitehead & McNiff, 2006). Carr (2004b) argued that AR approaches that privileged action over theory fell into the same dualistic trap that privileged theory over action which assumed that action occurred in the body and theory in the mind. However, post-structural theory has problematized the idea of a decentered and detached subject possessing personal knowledge independent of the history and culture that constructed that subject (Foucault, 2003). The role of knowledge was to engender compliance and useful and docile bodies. The role of practitioners was to manage their compliance in either resistance to or in cooperation with the regimes of knowledge (Carr, 2004b; Foucault, 2003, 1977). The target of this disciplinary power was the thoughts, emotions, desires, dreams, and actions of subjects.

Action research also involved making a commitment to personal and research subjects’ goals (Daloz, et al., 1996; Whitehead & McNiff, 2006). The commitment to research subjects involved mutual both trust and respect (Whitehead & McNiff, 2006). This included a commitment to the research subject’s political and emancipatory goals (Carr and Kemmis, 2009).

4.9 Action Research, Autoethnography and Self-Study:
This section argued that there were significant overlaps between AR, autoethnography and S-S that enable them to be applied together. For example, all three methodologies were:

1. Interested in research phenomena occurring in real time and are therefore methods of naturalistic inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1986).
2. Qualitative research methods that have aligned themselves, in varying degrees to the post-structuralist project.
3. Emphasized emancipation or empowerment of participants as a goal for research.
4. Appropriate for research focused on personal or professional development.
5. Desired to have reflexivity at their core.

There were also however considerable differences that could cause tensions. For example, S-S evolved out of educational research focusing on teachers developing their practice (e.g. Loughran et al., 2004, Hamilton et al., 1998). Autoethnography has roots in sociology and social anthropology (Ellis, 2009). Action research was primarily concerned with action, whereas autoethnography and S-S were concerned with professional/individual development and understanding. All three methods also strove to be ethical both in the approaches they used and the aims they hoped to achieve. The next section of the methodology reviewed the ethics of this thesis.

4.10 Ethics of Research

This section of the thesis delineated the general ethical issues relevant to the research design and the specific ethical issues relevant to the research methods.

“Language can never contain a whole person, so every act of writing a person’s life is inevitably a violation,” (Josselson, 1996, p. 62).

The above quote was a succinct description of my approach to the ethics of research. This was the feeling that research was inherently violent despite the intentions of the researcher to do good, or be emancipatory (Redwood, 2008). The reference to violence was provocative and recognized that there are different types and levels of violence. Violence in research can be very direct, such as, in the Nazi regime but can also be symbolic. Levinas (1981) suggested that the process by which the Other became understandable required an act of ontological violence because to understand the Other, the Other must be categorized, abstracted and made thematic through reason. The project to know the Other was part of the process of constructing the self where the other was
made instrumental by being the means to develop self knowledge (Levinas 1981). It was difficult to imagine research that did not impose meaning, regularities, coherence or order in the form of codes, categories, discourses or themes. Research by its nature seems to find ambiguity problematic. Self-research did not remove the potential of ontological violence. In self-research the researcher was still being asked to give an account of themselves. Butler (2005) argued that giving an account of oneself required a justifying, defensive or confessional practice. Yet, here I am involved in the research process.

There was no way out of the dilemma that absolved conscience nor was there a single solution. Rather, the dilemma was a call to accept responsibility for my judgements. This included acknowledging which themes and meaning I had privileged and attempting to postpone closure and remain open to ambiguity.

As a researcher I was still required to make judgements. Ellis (2001, 2007) implied that good ethical judgment could develop from experience which was both optimistic and problematic. The assertion was optimistic because it argued that I have the potential to develop my ethical practice. However, the assertion did not hold out much hope for the new researcher. It also left open the question of whether relational ethics could be taught or just acquired through experience. In addition, Kant (1956) claimed that general ethical principles could not be developed or inferred from experience or specific case example. However, Badiou (2001, page 28) argued that there was no overarching ethics but just the "ethics of" (e.g. "of politics, of love, of science, of art").

Perhaps Ellis’s (2007) delineation of relation ethics could be interpreted as a call to the new researcher to adopt humility and to perceive themselves to be on a journey where they are a novice. This call to humility might help to moderate some of the excesses of research by emphasizing responsibility and caution. Both Ellis (2007) and Guillemin & Gillam (2004) were echoing Foucault’s (1990) examination of the Greek word “askesis” where the individual was called to have
an ethical relation with themselves (involving practical training or exercises) so that they can take possession of themselves (have agency) (Foucault 1886, page 9).

Guillemin & Gillam (2004) identified two aspects of ethics relevant to this thesis. The first was “procedural ethics”. This was the type of ethics required by ethics committees and focused on issues of informed consent, confidentiality, deception and disclosure, etc. Emanuel, Wendler & Grady (2000), from a procedural perspective suggested seven requirements to ensure ethical research:

1. The research must enhance knowledge;
2. The research must be methodologically rigorous;
3. The benefits from doing the research must exceed the risk/harm;
4. The research must be independently reviewed;
5. Respect for participants (respect for privacy, opportunities to withdraw, monitoring of wellbeing);
6. The subjects should be selected fairly (not because they are convenient or vulnerable);
7. There must be informed consent.

These requirements demanded that the researcher had the necessary skills and expertise to undertake research. The above list also suggested ethics had to be concerned with means, ends and the protection of clients. However, it would be possible to meet all of the above criteria and the research to be unethical. This was because the criteria are innocent of power and did not ask “who benefited?” Researchers from a qualitative perspective, particularly those from a feminist perspective, would add the need for the research to be emancipating for it to be ethical (e.g. Taylor, 2002; Willig, 2001). However, emancipation could also be problematic if it was something that was given by an institutional/professional researcher rather than taken by the oppressed individual.

\footnote{For example, research focused on the social and emotional development of children of ‘working mothers’ might meet all of the above criteria. However, it did not acknowledge that pointing the research gaze at women could be highly political and that the research question could be ideologically informed.}
The second was “ethics in practice” which was concerned with the researcher’s responses to the unpredictable and multiple ethical moments that occurred while in the field (Ibid, page 262). For example, what if a colleague discloses confidential information about themselves or another EP? In practice these decisions were made in ambiguous, messy, uncertain and difficult situations. The ethics of practice was therefore concerned with issues about micro obligations and duties between the researcher and the researched which tended not to be discussed in procedural ethics.

Ellis (2007) suggested that relational ethics could be usefully appropriated for research because relational ethics was concerned with the intersubjective processes between the researcher and the researched and the researcher and the communities in which the research occurred (Ellis, 2007). Relational ethics constantly called the researcher to ask “what should I do now?” rather than the statement “this is what you should do now” (Ellis, 2007, page 4). Here, Ellis (2007) was suggesting that the call to be ethical was derived from the relational context rather than being imposed from outside that context. The ethical question was born out of the specific ethical moment, for example, by asking “how do I respond to what my colleague has disclosed?” rather than remembering procedural ethical guidelines which would be a secondary consideration.

Arguing for a microethical approach was not an argument against procedural ethical guidelines but rather to suggest that they had limitations (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004). Procedural ethics, for example aimed to protect research participants from abuse and provide a basic checklist of the possible risks inherent in research practices (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004, page 267). However, there could still a gap between the macro-ethical approach of procedural ethics and the micro-ethical moments that occurred in practice. The researcher therefore had to be careful that the ethical guidelines did not turn the face of the
other into a mask where the other was merely another to-whom-I-am obligated (Wolcher, 2003).

A second tension between procedural ethics and ethical-in-practice arose from the assumptions in procedural ethics. Procedural ethics provided general and abstract principles and assumed that research was undertaken on strangers whereas in this thesis the research subjects included friends/colleagues and myself. I therefore had to be more aware of the particular ethic issues of disclosure, shared relationships and disengagement given their privileged access and existing relationships (Robert & Labaree, 2002; Taylor, 2011).

Parker (2002) argued that the reflexive nature of psychology produced a moral/political stance and made psychology a moral science. Parker (2002) explained that psychology became political in action. This occurred while the psychologist negotiated boundaries, for example, the boundaries between ethical and unethical research, between treating participants as subjects or objects, between objective and subjective perspectives and between personal reactivity and procedural reactivity. The terms personal and procedural reactivity were attempts to capture the research experience to control and understand the research within demands of the situation that limits their choices. For example, the need to obtain informed consent while worrying about giving the game (true nature of the research) away. Parker (2002) argued that discussing and insisting on the inclusion of informed consent, debriefing and minimising are strategic devices to enable the research to enhance personal reactivity at the expense of the research subject or topic.

This section argued that research had the potential to be violent which in turn emphasized the need for it to be ethical. Both procedural and relational ethics were critically examined. It was argued that ethical research needed to be mindful of both its procedural and relational aspects. The next section examined the ethical consideration specific to focus groups.
4.10.1 Ethical Considerations Specific to Focus Group

All the members of the FG were given a letter that explained the nature of the research and how the data would be used (see appendix 12). The participants were then informed that they did not have to take part and that they could withdraw at any point. This opportunistic group contained 1 Principal EP, 3 Senior Management Team members and 5 mainscale EPs. Three of the mainscale EPs were male. All the other EPs were female. I was mindful of the impact of professional hierarchies in focus groups and the potential for individual to be silenced (Clavering & McLaughlin, 2007; Kitzinger, 1995). I strived to mitigate this difficulty by attempting to include voices that were being resisted. Having members all belonging to the same profession should have given the FG some homogeneity. However issues of gender, ethnicity, age, social class, hierarchical position, prior experience would all have been present.

Following Kitzinger (1995), the setting of the FG was relaxed and the participants sat in a circle. I introduced the purpose and aim of the FG and that it was hoped that the participants would talk to each other as well as to me. My role during the discussion was to be both a structured *eavesdropper* and facilitator of discussions (Kitzinger, 1995, page). This included supporting the FG in discussing inconstancies, differences and elucidating points and clarifying issues. The size of the FG was within the range that was considered conducive to dialogue and reflection (Morgan, 1997; Tang & Davis, 1995).

The researcher had a high degree of control over the process because I chaired and regulated the discussions (McNiff, 1999). This could have enabled me to impose my meanings on the participants as I privileged some responses and not others (Wilkinson, 1998). In addition, I had total control over the analysis of the data and presentation of the results. I attempted to mitigate this asymmetry by sharing the transcripts with the participants, feeding back my interpretations and providing opportunities for the participants to make comments and provide
feedback. The next section delineated and critically examined the methods of data collection.

4.11 Data Collection

The following methods were used to collect data:

- Document analysis
- Participant (self)observation including MWM (see appendix 2
- In-depth discussions with colleagues
- Educational Psychology Service Focus group (see appendix 4 for transcript of FG meeting)
- Keeping a research diary
- Collecting relevant EPS documents, policies and guidance

While implementing the above data collection methods I was aware that the subject matter was sensitive (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007). The research was sensitive because the research questions mattered at a personal level to the participants and explored emotionally evocative issues such as confidentiality and professional practice. This required close attention to the ethical consideration discussed in the Ethics of Research section above and the Ethical considerations specific to Focus Group below. The data collection methods were further described below.

4.11.1 Document Analysis

This was a continuous activity and included an analysis of the HPC-SCPE, the Educational Psychology Services documents that made references to ethics and documents that aimed to hold EPs to account. The relationships between MWM and FG and the HPC-SCPE were not understood as causal linear relations where one was said to be caused by the other; this would be too crude as it was recognized that there would always be a gap between professional codes and professional actions. In fact, all of the participants of the FG stated that they were aware of the HPC-SCPE but had not read it in detail and could not quote it.
Rather, the relations were of resemblance, analogy or equivalence (Foucault, 1989). The HPC-SCPE was therefore understood as a codification of statements presented in the discursive formation in which EPs practice.

4.11.2 Participant Self-observation

This was archived through writing an account of and reflecting on my practice with a client. The account of the MWM was written within 24 hours of my meeting with M in the first person (see appendix 2). I also made notes reflecting on my discussions with colleagues.

4.11.3 In-depth Discussion with Colleagues

This involved an ongoing email conversation about the issues involved in the research with one colleague and several discussions about aspects of the research with two other colleagues. These discussions were very open-ended. This form of colleague interaction was a core feature of autoethnographic research. These discussions were not included directly in the analysis of results.

4.11.4 Focus Group

A focus group\(^{42}\) was held with 9 EPs members of the EPS. The relational nature of the FG method resonated with the ontology and epistemology position of the research. Rather than the researcher just asking questions and the participants responding, the participants could take the lead, share stories, ask questions and provide feedback on each Others’ responses (Bloor, et al., 2001; Kitzinger, 1995). The discussion was recorded and transcribed. The FG was therefore “guided but informal conversation” (Reynolds & Wetherell, 2003, page 493). The

\(^{42}\) I have positioned focus groups as a method rather than a methodology. However given its ambivalent methodological role I have provided an extensive review.
focus group was structured both by providing a vignette and then open ended questions and discussion.

Discussions were initiated by asking the FG to read my encounter with M. Subsequent discussion was structured around seven questions, derived from the literature review, to introduce topics:

1. What ethical issues, if any, were raised in the account of the meeting with M?
2. Do you think about ethics in your everyday practice?
3. Can you say what ethics means to you in your everyday practice?
4. What sort of situations do you encounter in your everyday practice that brings ethics to the forefront?
5. What has influenced your current approach to ethical practice?
6. What barriers do you experience to ethical practice?
7. Has your approach to ethical practice changed over time?

The aim of the questions and vignette were to encourage the participants to explore the issues that were important to them in their own language (Kitzinger, 1995). Questions two to seven were perhaps more formal than was usually suggested by proponents of qualitative FG research (Stroh, 2000). However, it was evident during the discussion that the questions were treated as topics rather than strict questions. The questions aimed not to establish the truth but to provide data that could then be analyzed. The first question had two broad functions. The first was to triangulate my reflections on the meeting with M. The second function was to act as vignette to facilitate a more general discussion on ethical practice. Questions two and three were attempting to establish the relevance of ethics in the EPs’ everyday practice. Questions four and five were designed to explore the situations that the EPs identified as ethically problematic and how they responded to them. The sixth and seventh questions were intended to explore how contexts shaped, facilitated and acted as a barrier to ethical practice. It was hoped that by asking questions about their everyday practice that the EPs would be more responsive (Ball, 1991). In addition, asking about specific situations was intended to facilitate talk about specific practice (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000).
The FG discussion was recorded and lasted about an hour. The FG discussion took about ten hours to transcribe verbatim using a simplified version of Gee’s (1986) method.

4.11.5 Research Diary

This was my personal account of the research. It included notes, musing, and reflections and hypothesis. This was not a factual account rather it was the beginning of the interpretation, construction and analysis (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992; Maxwell, 2005). Keeping a diary was analogous to a hypomenemata, which Foucault (1991) described as “books of life” (Ibid, page 364). This recognized that keeping a diary was both a record and technique of self-formation.

4.12 A Foucauldian Approach to Data Analysis

This section of the thesis provided a description and critical examination of Foucault use of the following terms:

- Discourse
- Statements
- Archeology
- Genealogy

This thesis adapted a Foucauldian approach (including aspects of archeology and genealogy) to discourse analysis, which meant remaining open to undecidability, resisting closure derived from systematization and avoiding essentialism (Harwood, 2000). Foucault’s (1997) concept of discourse included not only speaking about a text, an individual utterance or linguistic performance but also discursive formations or disciplines such as medicine, science psychiatry or history. This also included the practices and procedures through which social and historical concepts such as delinquency, sexuality or madness are formed.
and governed. Foucault (1997) admitted that approaches to discourse had lacked clarity but suggested that his approach to discourse was “a discourse about discourse” (Ibid, page 205). Hall (1997, page 72) stated that this was “discourse as a system of representation”. This included the analysis of the rules and practices that regulated and produced what was said and done. This blurred the distinction between acts and talk and acknowledged that talk could do work. These rules and practices did not exist outside or apart from of the episteme\(^{43}\) in which they operated, rather they were historically contingent. This relational construction of discourse challenged the criticism that discourse analysis was reificationistic and anthropomorphist (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2009).

Foucauldian approaches differed from other forms of discourse analysis because the focus was not on moves or strategy\(^{44}\) to achieve a social or personal goal. Rather discourses were perceived to be performative and disciplinary tools (Willig, 2003). Adopting a Foucauldian approach also implied a problematizing engagement with truth that recognized the rhetorical use of truth claims (Edwards & Nicoll 2001). The meaning generated from the data analysis would therefore always be contingent on and produced from a particular epistemological position (Wetherell, 2001).

Unlike purely linguistic approaches Foucault (1997) was interested in how meaning, practices and knowledge were produced through discourse rather than language (Hall, 1997). Foucault was not implying that nothing existed outside discourse rather that nothing had meaning outside discourse (Foucault, 1972). The issue was not whether objects existed but how do they come to exist and have meaning. Therefore, discourse referred to all the statements\(^{45}\), the rules by which statements were formed and the processes by which those statements

\(^{43}\) For some readers episteme could be an unfamiliar construct. Other terms that have some of the same resonances included paradigm and tradition.

\(^{44}\) It should be noted that Foucault (2003) was intensely interested in power as strategy.

\(^{45}\) Statements will disused below but can be understood as authorized utterances.
were circulated or excluded. The thesis selectively incorporated both archeological and genealogical approaches to data analysis (outlined briefly below) by first considering archeology and then genealogy methods.

Archaeology described discourses with the aim to “uncover”, “suspend”, “question”, “disconnect”, “define”, “interrogate”, “break-up” and “replace” local discursive unities, e.g. medicine, psychopathology, etc (Foucault, 1997, pages 15 to 26). Archaeology can be understood as the analysis of the unspoken/unwritten rules that organized, produced and distributed the statements (Foucault, 1997). Kendal & Wickham (1999) described archaeology as:

“Archaeology helps us to explore the networks of what is said, and what can be seen in a set of social arrangements: in the conduct of an archaeology, one finds out something about the visible in “opening up” statements and something about the statement in “opening up visibilities” (Ibid, page 25).

Archaeology thus simultaneously made apparent how statements construct and sustain an object/subject. This type of analysis aimed to describe rather than explain the relation between statements. However, the approach to data analysis was not strictly archaeological because it was not the exhaustive archaeological reading of all texts within the archive\(^{46}\) (Foucault, 1997).

Neither was the method strictly genealogical as it was concerned with the present. The aim of genealogy was to describe how events, rather than being inevitable, were the result of contingent historical turns. Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine (2009) added, that: “Genealogy investigates the specific effects by which objects are constituted in ways that are amenable to technical and governmental intervention” (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2009, page 93). Genealogy, was an “ontology of ourselves”, that was, an analysis of what enabled us to exist (to be) in the way we did (Foucault, 1988b, page 234). This highlighted the contingent nature of selfhood and therefore enabled us to see all

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\(^{46}\) The archive can be understood as including all of texts and statements relevant to a discourse
the possibilities of who we might have been or have not been and could hence be used as a tool for freedom (Kendall & Wickham, 2003). Foucault (1979, page 98-100), outlined four “cautionary prescriptions” when undertaking genealogical research, these are summarised below:

1. Rule of immanence⁴⁷: analysis should be at the level of “local centres of power-knowledge” (Foucault 1979, page 98). This implied that the level of analysis should be the EP and Client relationship.
2. Rule of continual variations: This was the analysis of power as it was disrupted rather than who possessed it (EP) or was deprived of it (Client). This required exploring ways in which EPs were both subjects that exercised power and objects of power. It also required an examination of how the relationship with the client called the practice of the EP into question.
3. Rule of double conditioning: This was the analysis between the local power-knowledge level and an overall strategy. The local power-knowledge centre (the EP-Client relationship) was not a micro version of the macro state-subject relation. The EP could not simply stand for the state.
4. Rule of the tactical polyvalence of discourses. This rule warned against a “world of discourse divided between accepted and excluded discourse, or between dominant discourse and the dominated one” (Foucault, 1979, page 100). Rather one should consider that there were a multiple of discourses that have diverse strategies employed different depending on who was speaking, their position and the institutional context in which they are enunciated. Discourses therefore both transmit and undermine power.

The analysis of data attempted to adhere to the above as an exercise in self-imposed discipline to remain close to the genealogical method.

There was no necessary contradiction between borrowing from both archeology and genealogy as they were mutually compatible (Foucault 2003b). Foucault (1980) explained the relation between the archeology and genealogy as:

“archaeology” would be the appropriate methodology of [the] analysis of local discursivities, and “genealogy” would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were thus released would be brought into play’ (Foucault, 1980, page 85).

⁴⁷ The heading of the four cautionary prescriptions were Foucault’s (1979) and can be found on pages 98-100.
Archaeology was therefore used to describe and analyze the local discursivities of the EP-Client relationship. The de-subjected discourses were then brought into play to oppose and struggle against the coercion of the discourses that disciplined and regulated the local EP-Client relationship.

The thesis, therefore, appropriated and adopted a Foucauldian approach to undertake an examination of how EPs were constituted as subjects of knowledge, subjects acting on others and as ethical agents. Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine (2009) stated that data in the form of personal observation, descriptive ethnographic accounts, field notes, policy documents, official publications and transcripts of focus groups are all suitable for analysis by a Foucauldian approach. In addition, Foucault’s interest in subjectification made a Foucauldian approach highly relevant to psychological research on identity (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008).

It was difficult to be precise about following a Foucauldian method because Foucault (1994) disliked prescription stating, “I take care not to dictate how things should be” and wrote provocatively to disrupt stability and certainty, so that “all those who speak for others or to others no longer know what to do” (Ibid, page 288).

However, there have been a number of attempts to instrumentalize and formulate a Foucauldian approach to discourse. Parker (2002) suggested a twenty step approach to analyzing data. Kendal and Wickham (2003) suggested five steps that focused on the relationship between rules and statements. Willig (20030 recommended six stages to data analysis. However, Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine (2009) suggested a Foucauldian approach to data analysis needed to be flexible. Mills (2003) also suggested that rather than following strict Foucauldian methods researchers should adopt five Foucauldian dispositions or attitudes including:
1. Radical skepticism: this involved suspending judgements and not assuming that events were true.
2. Avoiding second order judgements (judgements about the issues that were not your own).
3. Exploring contingencies not causes: this recognized that events had multiple causes and could have had multiple outcomes.
4. Investigating problems not subjects: this included the relations between subjects and institution.
5. Suspicion about making over-generalizations.

While undertaking this thesis I attempted to adhere to the spirit of the above disposition and attitudes.

The aim of data analysis was to describe statements. Foucault (1997) explained that statements were not to be understood as sentences but as a “function of existence” (Ibid, page 86). They can be understood as groups of verbal performances or performative acts. The analysis of statements was employed both in Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical periods. Statements occurred in either single or multiple discursive formations (e.g. statements about normalization can be found in biology, psychology, economics, medicine, etc). Discursive formations can be understood as sets and statements as members (of that set) that define what can belong to the set and regulate that set. As Butler (1997) said “One ‘exists’ not only by virtue of being recognized, but, in a prior sense, by being recognizable” (Butler, 1997, page 5).

Statements also included graphs, figures, tables, mathematical equations, historical artifacts, etc. Foucault (1997) was very careful to distance statements from “speech acts” and propositions which are a core unit of analysis in discourse analysis. The statements have an “enunciative function” and regulatory function. They interpelated into being, thus positioning a subject and regulating who can speak and what can be said about others (Kendall & Wickham 1999).

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48 The French word that Foucault uses is “énoncé” which has the same etymology as enunciate. Statements not only state they also herald or announce into being.

49 Although they have some similarities, speech act also perform tasks. For example, utterance such as “I pronounce you man and wife” and acts such as oaths can be statements because they perform work.
However, statements did not cause something to be said; rather they make some utterances more likely and regulated the degree of legitimacy that utterance had. Statements therefore named, classified or labelled what was seen by the professional. Statements also included the practices that enabled both the professional and the subject they were speaking about to be seen while warranting those perceptions (Foucault, 1997). Statements enable the formation of both professionals and others as ambiguous doubles. They were objects that were known and subjects that knew (Foucault, 2001). Statements also had the key function to articulate the relations of same and difference. This enabled classification and labelling which formulated how an individual or group became known as the problem (Foucault, 1997). Categorization enabled subjects to be allotted to disciplinary spaces and made subject to subjugating discourse and practices. The relational space between professional and client was therefore demarcated by procedures that established emotional distance, objectivity, and authority (Mellow, 2005; Paternelj-Taylor, 2002).

The analysis of statements was undertaken without reference to a thinking subject (“cogito”) who was revealed; rather it was situated at the level of “it is said” (Foucault 1997, page 122). This was not the same as “communal opinion” or echolalia of a universal discourse (Ibid, page 122). Rather, statements should be analyzed in relation to the “totality of things said” (the discursive formation) so as to identify regularities and transformations (Foucault, 1997, page 122). Finally, statements should be described with reference to their fragmented and incomplete nature.

The task was therefore to describe how statements functioned to establish a discursive framework that enabled a particular and privileged reading of the subject and the practices that flowed from and perpetuated that reading (Graham, 2005). The analysis was therefore always “...interpretive, always contingent, always a version or a reading from some theoretical, epistemological or ethical standpoint” (Wetherell, 2001, 384).
The next section undertook a further critical examination of Foucauldian approaches to discourse analysis.

4.13 Criticism of Foucauldian Approaches

Given the ambiguity associated with a Foucauldian approach it could be asked why more established methods of discourse analysis were not employed. I considered Conversational Analysis (CA), Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Discourse Psychology (DP) and Narrative Inquiry (NI) as alternatives because they have all been employed in identity research.

Discursive Psychology when considered as a critique of psychological topics and explanations could have been appropriate for this thesis (Edwards, 2005). However, because the aim of the research was not a strict examination of “everyday psychological categories used in discourse” or how “psychological business” was managed in talk, but the EP-Client relationship and EP practice and professional identity work, DP would not have been a straightforward choice (Edwards, 2005). However, Wetherell & Edley (1999) argued that a post-structuralist informed approach to DP could incorporate a Foucauldian perspective. Edwards (2005), like Fairclough (2003) remained concerned that a Foucauldian approach to discourse lacked clarity and paid insufficient attention to social interaction. Discursive Psychology would have provided a way to analyze subject talk in everyday contexts and explore how subjects strategically used language resources to manage their interests (Willig, 2003). However, a Foucauldian approach focused on how discourse constructed subjectivity made it more appropriate to the thesis. In addition, a Foucauldian approach enabled a critique of Educational Psychology that was a necessary part of the intended identity work (Parker, 1997).

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50 Edwards (2003) referred to psychological business as “motives and intentions, prejudices, reliability of memory and perception, etc” (Ibid page 259)
Foucault’s intense focus on history and context could have made an ahistorical CA approach problematic (Benwell & Stokoe, 2010). However, Wetherell (1998) has suggested that there could be some compatibility specifically between CA and post-structural approaches in relation to the examination of subject positions. In particular, both CA and Foucauldian discourse analysis shared a bottom-up approach to subject formation. For example, Have (1991) argued that asymmetries in relationship were constructed in those relationship rather than imposed from the outside. This had a great deal of synergy with Foucault’s (1979) assertions that power was “produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another” and that “power comes from below” (Foucault, 1979, pages 93 & 94). However, subject positions were not the exclusive focus of the thesis and the subject positions were located in the discursive practices in which they occurred. In addition, CA exclusively analyzed transcribed real talk interactions (Benwell & Stokoe, 2010; Heritage & Greatbatch, 1991; Have, 1991). However, the thesis included documents and a personal account as well as personal and ethnographic observations. A Foucauldian approach therefore provided a flexibility that was not available in traditional CA. It would have possible to analyze the focus group discussion using CA.

However, my aim to include both micro and macro analysis of discourse (text and context) presented three challenges to using CA. Firstly, CA argued that macro perspectives were unnecessary given that language was a “complete cultural system of description and accountability” (Edwards 2006, page 42). However, Wetherell (2001) argued that too close a focus on text to the exclusion of context risked losing insightful and useful relations between the individual and context. Secondly, ascribing labels (including identifying them as statements) to chunks of discourse has been criticized as being reductive and having no evidential bases to warrant specific attributions of labels (Wooffitt, 2005). If we

51 I had asked M if it would have been possible to tape one of our sessions but he did not want to do this.
accepted that each text could have multiple readings then all readings of text/talk would be selective and reductively focused on the research question(s). In addition, asking for an evidential base for attributing chunks of text to discourses perhaps conceded too much ground to positivism. Consequently, I have avoided phrases such as “a discourse of …” and referring to chunks of text as providing evidence of specific discourses (medical discourse, etc). I also recognized Wooffitt’s (2005) criticism that focusing on the research participants’ response rather than the researchers’ questions, obscured the co-constructed nature of data. I attempted to work against this by emphasizing the relational nature of the research. Thirdly, Foucauldian approaches privileged the researcher’s voice because they shaped how readers understood the data (Wooffitt 2005). However, Riessman (1993) defended this approach arguing that the researcher’s “authorial voice” was required to “knit” together the “desperate elements” within the data. (Ibid, page 27). Riessman (1993) rationalized the privileging of the author’s voice because narrative data, being interpretations, did not “speak for themselves” and thus required the author to give them voice (Ibid, page 22).

CDA’s emphasis on social and political inequalities and how power relations were sustained, reproduced and were manifest in discourse combined with the adoption of a macro approach to bring about social change via critical analysis could have made CDA appropriate (Fairclough, 2003). However, the focus on top-down processes of domination and a frequently unproblematic understanding of emancipation in CDA would have made the desire to have a Foucauldian approach problematic. The differences between CDA and Foucauldian approaches were illustrated in Fairclough’s (2003) unhappiness with Foucault’s lack of “textual analysis”, “confusion” in the definition of discursive practices as rules, passive portrayal of individual’s relation to power, emphasis on structures, non-dialectical position to a “material reality” that “preconstituted social objects” and “resistance to the concept of ideology” (Ibid, page 56-60). Fairclough (2003) however thought that Foucault’s analysis provided valuable insights which should be incorporated into CDA. Ultimately, the targets of Foucauldian approaches and
CDA were different. For example, Foucault was concerned with how subjects became subjects in medicine, psychiatry and institutions whereas CDA examined “conversation, classroom discourse, media discourse and so fourth” (Fairclough, 2003, page 38).

If the data from the focus group and the MWM were framed as stories told by the participants about their experiences embedded in socio-historical and socio-cultural discourses then NI could be considered appropriate. This was because NI would have enabled reflection on my practice as socially and historically situated (Johnson & Golombek, 2002; Georgakopoulou, 2002 Riessman, 2005). Johnson and Golombek (2002) also described teachers’ NI as a “journey of how they are known as a well as what they know” which also resonated with themes in this thesis (Ibid, page 10). Bruner (1990, 2004) added that telling stories about the self reflected how individuals made sense of their lives and shaped the person they became through privileging and legitmising particular subjectivities and excluding others. This included an emphasis on what was said rather than how it was said. Bruner’s (1990, 2004) description would therefore also have resonated with a Foucauldian approach. Narrative approaches have also been employed in identity research both in and outside institutions (e.g. Bruner, 1990, 2004; Schiffrin, 1996)

Although, NI would have provided a useful methodology it would have been difficult to apply it to the analysis of HPC-SCPE or the other ethnographic aspects of the research. In addition, I was not interested in an analysis that encompassed how participants structured or shifted their stories or the narrative devices they selected.

After undertaking a critical comparative examination of Foucauldian approaches to discourse the following examined more general criticisms of Foucauldian approaches. In particular, whether Foucauldian approaches were useful to examine change, too focused at the micro level, lead to opacity, were under
implemented, did not provide clear methodological guidance, were subjective, lacked integrity and rigour, and privileged the author and secretly structuralist.

A persistence criticism of Foucauldian analysis was that it might tell us how things are but not why things change (Henriques, 1998). In addition, that a Foucauldian analysis excluded the “powerful social forces” that exist externally to institutions and local discourses that influence human action (Ibid, page 105). The risk in using a Foucauldian method was that the power and regulatory processes would be overestimated and the agency of participants underestimated.

However, genealogy enabled the examination of discursive practice and conditions of possibility at the micro-level (Henriques, et al., 1998). This level of analysis did not require but did not exclude and may even facilitate an analysis at a more global level (Foucault, 1978/2003; Henriques, 1998). Foucault, bottom up and circulatory approach to power did not exclude the possibility that the micro-technologies could be colonized and supported by global mechanisms and finally the State (Foucault, 2003a). However, the difficulty remained in explaining how the local or individual acts of resistance could be generalized into movements.

An additional challenge was to remain open to contingency and uncertainty without sounding unclear or vague. This involved being very clear about what I was doing without suggesting that it was the (only) “way” to do it (Foucault, 1997). Adopting a Bricolage approach was also a strategy to postpone closure. However, Bricolage’s interdisciplinarity opened up the method to criticism of superficiality (Friedman, 1998). A single methodology would have enabled a more in depth exploration of that methodology. However, this supposed that there was truth in methodology rather than seeing methodologies as tools to be appropriated and adapted (Kellner, 1995). Multiple methodologies also acted as a corrective to the unchallenged assumptions and limitations present in single
methodological studies. This was because multiple methodologies provided multiple ways of seeing (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Kellner, 1995).

There was a relative scarcity of research that applied Foucault’s ethical framework and therefore few texts that provided guidance (e.g. Aycock, 1995; McPhail, 1999; Moisander & Pesonen, 2002; St Pierre, 2004). There have been a few noteworthy attempts to use Foucauldian ethics in research (e.g. Aycock, 1995; McPhil, 1997; Monisander & Pesson, 2002, St Pierre, 2004). However, there have been inconstancies in how researchers applied a Foucauldian approach. The above researchers provided individual readings of Foucault. This was typically evident while attempting to justify and explain the methodological approach that the researchers employed. I have therefore attempted to balance the references of seminal works by Foucault by locating it in a review of the literature.

In any event, making direct appeals to Foucault were problematic because Foucault (1997) described his approach as being at a “rudimentary stage” where he “stumbles” and “gropes” with a “rather shaky hand” (Ibid, pages 208, 113). Furthermore, Foucault’s (1997) methodological project was only an “initial approximation” and not a theory “in the strict sense of the term” (Ibid, 210, 114). In addition, Foucault’s later, so called; turn to genealogy could be seen to undermine the archeological method Lemert & Gillan (1982). However, it would be impossible to do genealogy without archeology, which needed genealogy to connect power to knowledge and subjectivity (Stone, 2011). Ray (1987) contested that the later move to genealogy had not so much diminish the discursive approach as to let go of “the structuralist preoccupation with rules” that characterized the archeological approach (Ray, 1987, page 45). Genealogy, therefore, enabled the description of normative relations in EP practice, how EPs constituted themselves in relation to psychological knowledge and EP-Client relations.
The methodology depended on pre-selected cases. Therefore there was no pretence of objectivity. For example, other focus groups in different services could have developed different themes particular to those services. However, this inherent subjectivity reflects the partial and particular nature of research and a resistance to the fetishism of objectivity in positivist research (Angrosino & Mays de Perez, 2003).

The anti-positive position and “methodological flexibility” could be criticized for lacking methodological rigour or “methodological indifference” (Bryant, 2002, page 25). The claim that qualitative research designs lacked rigour has a long history (e.g. Van Maanen, 1995; Guba & Lincoln, 1981). Rigour was argued to be essential because it legitimised the qualitative research methodologies as scientific and evidence based (Morse, 1999). Morse et al (2002) worried that without rigour qualitative research would have the status of fictional journalism. Calls for rigour could also be a strategy to gain access to policy makers and resource holders in an area dominated by quantitative research (Aroni, et al., 1999).

The accusation of poor rigour could be compounded by having an “insider” position in the research (McCracken, 1988). It would perhaps be easy to try and sidestep the debate by claiming that engaging in a discussion about rigour was to be lured into a positivist and reductive discussion that should be focused on methodological integrity (Aroni, et al., 1999). However, appealing to integrity appeared to swap one normative discipline for another (where integrity became the benchmark rather than rigour). Furthermore, juxtaposition rigour and integrity could be a false dichotomy because it assumed that one can not have both. Rigour could be a means to demonstrate integrity (Aroni et al 1999). Discussions about validity, reliability, and generalizability could, but not necessarily, enable the researcher to facilitate the reader to take a position on what the researcher
said. The issue was not the possibility of rigorous research but the nature of the relationship between researcher and reader and how this was managed.\(^{52}\)

Having a post-structuralist approach to research and to adopting a Foucauldian approach to data analysis was also problematic because the degree to which Foucault escaped structuralism was contested (Dreyfus & Rainbow, 1982; Carrette, 2000). Foucault frequently and consistently stated that he was not a structuralist (i.e. see Foucault, 1979, pages 199-202). However, Foucault (1979) admitted that some of his early works had “frequent recourse to structural analysis” (Ibid, page 16). Foucault’s preoccupation with rules suggested a difficulty with letting go of structuralism as a type of formalism (Carrette 2000). Even sympathetic readers have called Foucault a “counter-structuralist structuralist” (Geertz, 2010, page 29). Foucault (1998) in an interview suggested that he found the term post-structuralism unhelpful as he could not identify a shared problem between authors labeled post-structuralist. Additionally, Foucault (1998) disliked the prefix “post” because it indicated a lack of humility. Post signaled that the author imagined that their period was somehow a “rapture”, “high point”, “completion” of history, and where “everything was completed and begun again” (Ibid, page 449). While acknowledging the above criticisms and arguments I have retained the term post-structuralism because it signaled a move away from meta-narratives explanations and phenomenological understanding of events that solidified meaning.

Foucault’s writing has been criticised for the lack of references and footnotes (Carrette 2000). Foucault (1980, 1984/1986) put forward two defences of this position. Foucault (1980) with references to Marx stated:

“I quote Marx without saying so, without quotation marks, and because people are incapable of recognising Marx’s texts I am thought to be someone who doesn’t quote Marx. When a physicist writes a work of physics, does he feel it

\(^{52}\) For a more detailed discussion about quality, validity and reliability in qualitative research see appendix 6.
necessary to quote Newton and Einstein? He uses them, but he doesn’t need the quotation marks, the footnote and the eulogistic comment to prove how completely he is being faithful to the master’s thought”. (Ibid, page 52).

Foucault above appeared to be trying to resist the authority of the author. However, this move could actually privilege the author because Foucault appeared to be the sole innovator of the theories and constructs. Foucault’s (1984/1986) claim that there was no “we” or “community” to which he belonged or could have “referred to”, could further privilege his role (Ibid, page 385). This claim came perilously close to suggesting that his work was outside discourse. To attempt to both avoid privileging the author and locate this thesis firmly within discourse, this thesis employed extensive references. The inclusion of references was not to signal unproblematic generalizability or transferability between the studies or books quoted and the thesis; rather they had three main functions:

1. Acknowledging the reading and authors that informed the ideas in the thesis. This was respectful, recognized the debts owed to others and accepted that research was collaborative.
2. To locate the discussions and conclusions within a tradition to balance the authorization of the author.
3. To act as contributing to the debates for or against a position, rather than as facts.

4.14 Selecting Statements

The analysis of data and selection of statements was achieved by adapting the methods suggested by Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine (2009) and Willig (2003) as outlined below:

The analysis selected statements relevant to research questions rather than make an exhaustive list of possible statements. This was more than a key word search, not least, because issues not talked about or described differently could be interesting (Willig, 2003). The aim was to identify phrases, sentences, groups
of instances and other artifacts that had a positioning, regulatory or performative function. When analyzing statements I was mindful of how participants:

- Claimed authority
- Rationalized what was said
- Justified what they said
- Formulated issues/events
- Imposed limits on what could be said by participants
- Legitimized what was said

This was because the research was interested in the site from which the professionals spoke. The site was the ground on which they claimed to stand. These sites regulated and warranted practices and establish boundaries which facilitated while circumscribing what could be said about the other (i.e. how they were described, classified, normalised). The analysis of statements was achieved through identifying (1) problematizations, (2) technologies of self, (3) subjectifications, (4) positionings, (5) rhetorical strategies and by (6) reading against the dominant discourses. These six strategies were explained further below.

4.14.1 Problematization

Problematization involved making the familiar strange and the certain uncertain so that they become visible to analysis. Problematization enabled the researcher to “establish a critical relationship with the present” (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2009). The analysis was, therefore, interested in how EP-Client relations were made problematic.

4.14.2 Technologies

Technologies were practical disciplinary regimes aimed at governing the Self and Others (Foucault, 1979, 1986c, 1990). The analysis examined both technologies

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53 For example the clinic, the school, the LA, professionalism, psychology, from an evidence base, from experience, diagnostic manual, developmental disorder categories, conversion tables, etc.
of government and Self. Crudely, the technologies of government sought to govern the subject from the outside whereas technologies of the Self described the disciplinary regimens by which the Self sought to govern itself. These processes occurred simultaneous and were entangled (Foucault, 1979, 1986c, 1990).

4.14.3 Subjectification

The analysis identified the forms by which the EPs sought to fabricate themselves as ethical subjects in relation to ethical goals (Foucault, 1990). This included how EPs identified the ethical substance, their mode of subjection, the self forming activities and the telos.

4.14.4 Positioning

Foucault’s concept of subject position provided a resource to examine professional identity in the thesis. The construct of positioning was closely associated with Davies and Harré (1991). However, Boxer (2004) pointed out that despite Davis and Harré not referencing Foucault directly they did refer to eight Foucauldian influenced authors including Hollway (1984). Benwell & Stokoe (2010) defined positioning as:

“The process through which speakers adopt, resist and offer subject positions that are made available in master narratives or discourses” (Ibid, page 139).

The above quote recognized that positioning was a dynamic interactive process shaped by power. Subjects were both positioned by discourse and were actively involved in positioning themselves and others (Edley, 2001; Edley & Wetherell, 1997). Subjects were also positioned by social status or role (Taylor & Littleton, 2006). Taylor and Littleton (2006) argued that participants could be presented with choices of positions and could adopt conflicting positions. To take a subject
position subjects drew on available positions within the discursive formation (Edley, 2001).

Benwell and Stokoe’s definition resonated with Foucault’s (1997) description of his project:

“I wanted not to exclude the problem of the subject but to define the positions and functions that the subject could occupy in the diversity of discourse”. (Ibid, page 200)

The thesis embraced the aim of both identifying the positions and functions and exploring the relations between the positions and functions of the EPs.

Potter (2001) argued that researchers matching of text/talk to positions frequently appeared arbitrary. Davis and Harré (1991) acknowledged that in participants talk multiple reading and positions were available. Davis and Harré (1991) further argued that individuals would differ in their willingness and capacity to position and be positioned. Therefore, positions were not allocated arbitrarily but were privileged and particular readings of the text/talk.

4.14.5 Rhetorical Strategies

Billig et al (1988) argued that subjects employed rhetorical strategies to warrant and privilege the positions they had taken. This involved adapting a strategic approach to social talk. This included the methods of argumentation, rationalizations employed and the juxtaposition and contrasts made. In identifying rhetoric, I therefore, attended to “the particular story told, the manner and detail of its telling, the points emphasized” and “the morals drawn…” (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, page 35). The discursive choices subjects made therefore revealed both what was privileged and the strategies used to achieve this. The analysis also employed the construct of ideological dilemma (Billig, et
4.14.6 Reading Against

The method of reading against or a resistant reading was employed to analyze the data. This method had its roots in literary criticism and discourse analysis (Mills, 2009; West, 1992). Reading against was frequently contrasted with reading with, which was understood as reading a text in the way the author intended (Mills, 2009). Reading against worked to disrupt the assumptions about texts and required the reader to be unaligned from the author. Reading against had some similarities with Billig’s (1987) construct of ‘talking against’. This suggested that during conversations there were several levels to the interaction. The individuals were not only speaking and responding to the persons present but to past fanaticized or actual encounters and criticisms. Therefore, in taking personal positions individuals were also reflecting and engaging with ongoing political/social debates.

4.15 Research Site and Participants

The participants were chosen because I had access to them, and they provided an “opportunity to learn” (Stokoe, 2000, p. 446). I also think that the participants chose me because the issues captivated me despite me. While accepting that knowledge was co-created I recognized the power imbalances in this process (Butler, 2005; Fontana & Grey, 2000). It might have been possible to involve participants more in the interpretative process or even to go back and check the interpretations. However time and resource constraints worked against this.

54 In the autoethnographic method the requirement to be unaligned with the author produced an interesting tension: I had to read against myself. I have already discussed above how this meant attempting to be what I am not and the need to make problematic my practice. How much this was achieved I leave to readers.
4.16 Chapter Conclusion

The chapter located the research design within the practitioner research tradition. The chapter reviewed the research methodologies that would both enable me to further my own practice and examine the practice of others. Bricolage was employed to capture the complexity inherent in the appropriation of AR, autoethnography and S-S combined with a Foucauldian approach to data analysis. The methodologies were critically examined and their inclusion was justified on their appropriateness for participant research, examining real time phenomena, compatibility with post-structuralist epistemology, professional self-development and their mutual compatibility. It was recognized that tensions remained between the methodologies but it was hoped that these tensions would be creative. The inclusion of a Foucauldian approach to data analysis was rationalized as enabling an examination of how EPs were constituted as subjects of knowledge, subjects acting on others and as ethical agents.

The chapter outlined the four cycles of research. This was a highly iterative process that was constantly informed by reading. The chapter also critically examined and acknowledged the ethical problematics of this research. Including myself as research subject, recognizing the relational nature of the research, adopting epistemological humility were all intended to agitate against the problematics inherent in research. While accepting the difficulties of employing a Foucauldian approach to data analysis the chapter mitigated those difficulties by providing a clear description of constructs and data analysis methods while locating the approach in the literature. In my view, the benefits of a Foucauldian approach outweighed the difficulties. This was because while being, to varying degrees, compatible with the other discursive methods considered (CA, CDA, DP and NI) a Foucauldian approach also enabled a focus on how discourse constructed subjectivity, a critique of Educational Psychology, an engagement between micro and macro and bottom-up and top-down processes of identity formation and flexibility to include an analysis both text and talk.
The chapter also recognized that the evaluation of qualitative research remained highly contested. The debate on rigour and quality assurance was both between quantitative research and qualitative research and within qualitative research. Within qualitative research the debate was about the utility and relevance of quality assurance and the applicability of terms borrowed from quantitative research. This did not imply that rigour and quality should not be sought in qualitative research; rather it was an attempt to demonstrate quality assurance in qualitative research remained problematic regardless of the constructs used. Finally, the chapter provided an outline of how statements would be identified and analyzed. It was recognized that while all the methods used to identify and analyze statements were not strictly Foucauldian they were either inspired by or compatible with a Foucauldian approach.
Chapter 5. Results

5.1 Summary of Results

This chapter presented the findings from the fourth cycle of the research which synthesized the findings from the first and third cycles; the MWM and the FG. The second cycle of research (analysis of the HPC-SCPE) was omitted from the main body of the thesis because of the need to remain within the mandatory word count. The analysis of the HPC-SCPE can be found in Appendix 13. The fourth cycle established three overlapping discursive meta-themes relevant to the research questions:

1. The problematic relationship with the client
2. The appropriation of ethical rhetoric
3. The strategic presentation of the Educational Psychologist

The three figures below show the meta-themes and the related fourteen subthemes:

Figure 4. Problematic relationships with the Client

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55 I am deeply aware of the irony of presenting results in a thematic way when the thesis has consistently attempted to make the processes of thematisation problematic.
56 However it should be noted that the meta themes were also in the second cycle of research.
57 This position was antithetical to approaches that assumed that themes arose from data bottom-up rather than imposed top-down by the researcher or research processes. I was therefore not finding or revealing but constructing meaning.
The analysis of results, below argued that not only did the meta-themes and subthemes overlap they also worked collaboratively to achieve strategic goals. These goals included:

- How EPs legitimized and authorized their role.
- How EPs constructed themselves and were constructed as ethical professionals.

Juxtaposing the analysis of the FG and MWM also acted as a form of triangulation. In keeping with the research design, phrases such as “the analysis found”, “revealed”, or “discovered” were avoided. This was because data, like
truth, was argued to be constructed and not found. Rather words such as “suggested”, “implied” and “argued” were used. The extensive quotes (data) appeared in italics in text boxes. Each quote will have the cycle of research it came from (e.g. MWM or FG), the person who said it (e.g. 01) and the line numbers in the relevant transcript. For example, something said by 01 in the FG occurring between lines 566 and 569 in the transcript will be references as (01, FG, lines 566-569). The next section presented the analysis of results.

5.2 Analysis and Discussion of Results

This section examined each of the three meta-themes with the related subthemes. The way each subtheme was expressed in cycles one and three was critically examined and discussed in relation to relevant literature.

5.2.1. The Problematic Relationships with the Client

This section of the results delineated how the EP-Client relationship was presented as problematic in the first and third phases of the research. There were five discursive subthemes that spoke to a problematic EP-Client relationship:

- Managing and regulating the EP-Client asymmetry
- Anxiety about the EP-Client symmetry
- Objectifying the client
- Categorizing and presenting the client
- Responsiblization/culpilization of the client

The analysis also examined cumulative function of statements. This was evident when the same statements simultaneously presented the Client as a set of institutional categories that provided an objectified clienthood while attempting to make the Client responsible/culpable for positions they were offered. How the EP-Client couple was problematized and their boundaries established and regulated were also examined. The analysis also suggested that the EP and
Client were presented as objects of psychological knowledge which positioned the EP and Client as both a subject that knows and an object of knowledge.

5.2.2 Anxiety about the EP-Client Asymmetry

Although never explicitly stated in the MWM, it was evident that a motivation for the written account of the MWM was concerns about the right way to treat Clients (Benjamin, 2000; Billington, 2002; Buber, 1960; Frosh, 2010; Hollway, 2008). 02, below, appeared to aware of the asymmetry through acknowledging that M had been asked to do something difficult:

“I further explained that there was very little connection between reading and spelling and intelligence. This was to make him feel better (after all I had just made him do something he found difficult in front of a stranger) and also to dispel any unhelpful beliefs that he might have about the meaning of his difficulties with spelling and reading”. (02, MWM lines 24-28).

Awareness of the asymmetry was also evident in the 02’s attempts to make his thinking visible to M. For example, below, during the discussion about M’s hygiene the EP explained why he asked the question about his fingernails.

“I explained that I had asked because sometimes people who had been badly bullied did not always take care of themselves and look after their hygiene, adding if M knew what hygiene meant.” (02, MWM lines 38-40)

Revealing the question’s aim problematized the expert model of therapeutic relationships and attempted to address the asymmetry by making the EP’s thought processes visible (Lazarus & Zur, 2002: Zur, 2011b). This move while acknowledging the asymmetry also, by presuming asymmetry, (re)produced it (Hepburn, 2003). The EP was presenting himself as the expert adult explaining to and protecting a vulnerable Client/child. The above descriptions of the asymmetry supported the widely acknowledged power differentials between
professionals and Clients which was also assumed in ethical codes (BPS, 2006; Evetts, 2003; Freidson, 1970; Rose, 1999). The next section explored the source of this asymmetry and how it was established, regulated and sustained.

In the FG the EPs’ position seemed to oscillate between anxiety about the asymmetrical EP-Client relationship and the need to regulate and maintain the asymmetry. 03 below shared concerns about his authority to speak/write about and make decisions for clients.

“When I meet parents when I write reports it’s always... back of my mind. And little light that keeps flashing. Who am I? What right do I have to make so many different judgements?” (03, FG, lines 377 – 380)

03, above, acknowledged the asymmetry in power between the EP and client, specifically the EP authority to make decisions about clients. 03’s use of the phrase “Who am I, what right do I have...” suggested that that he was unaware of the source of his authority to speak about and make decisions for Clients. The EPs in the quote below suggested that the Client’s “preconceptions” was the source of the EP’s authority:

“Is very diff... they have all have preconceptions about you. Coming into that relationship” (04, FG, lines 293-294).

“So the relation between you and this boy there is a power dynamic. It might be possible that this young guy is looking up to you. He might he might I am not saying he does, he might be looking up to you” (03, FG, lines 307-309).

The Client admiration was suggested through the phrase “… looking up to you...” however, the source of the Client’s “preconceptions” and admiration was not questioned. For example, why and how did the Client come to have those preconceptions and that admiration? Foucault (1990, 1989) argued that source of professional’s authority was cultural and historical rather than the Client’s perceptions. The moral superiority of the EP was inherent in the category of EP
because of its association with professionalism (Jayyusi, 1984). Failing to recognise the source of this authority obscured the role of the EP in producing regulating and managing the EP-Client asymmetry. This was further discussed below.

5.2.3 Managing and Regulating the EP-Client Asymmetry

The EP-Client asymmetry was partly managed and regulated through the acting out of roles made inferentially available through the categories professional and Client (Hobbs, Todd & Taylor, 2000; Jayyusi, 1984; Potter, 1996). In the above quotes (MWM lines 24-28 and 38-40) the EP established the EP-Client asymmetry by positioning himself as the holder and provider of specialised knowledge and M as a receiver of knowledge. This was analogous to the position of host and guest. While welcoming the guest the host simultaneously reminded the guest that they have entered their domain. Hospitality always remains conditional; the host was always master in their home (Derrida & Dufournantelle, 2000; Derrida 1999). Following Derrida (1999) it was the role of the EP to offer hospitality and the Client’s to say yes. However, this also opened up the potential for the Client to say no. The means by which Clients said no was discussed later. However, the EP was still responsible for what, how much, when and how to disclose. The EP was, however, hostage to the Client because without the Client’s compliance the EP did not have a role. M through disclosing/confessing was simultaneously a speaking subject and the object of discussion.

In the FG the EP-Client asymmetry was partly regulated through articulating the boundaries between the participants. For example, below 04 was discussing the issue of disclosure in the account of the MWM:
04’s primary concern appeared to be the potential disclosure by the EP and the difficulties it caused to the professional relationship. These concerns were justified by 04 arguing that disclosure was both risky, ethically, for the EP and the EP-Client relationship. The above quote attempted to establish and discipline the asymmetry between the EP and the client by establishing their roles. As in the MWM, it was the Client who disclosed (confessed/revealed) and the EP that listened (remains hidden); it was the client that was known and the EP that knew. 04 also appeared to suggest that the EP-Client relationship had confessional aspects. Foucault (1999) argued that confession was central to the operation of pastoral power and was a key technique in producing truth. Through the use of the word “professional” The above statement also attempted to categorize and differentiate the relationship between EP and M as different from non-professional relationships. This categorization of professional was essential to the establishment of asymmetrical roles in the relationship because it made them inferentially available (Drew & Sorjonen 1997; Heritage & Greatbatch, 1991; Mauthner, 1998; Potter & Hepburn, 2003; Stanley, 1990). Through appropriating the term ‘Professional’ 04 was enacting identity alignment (Potter, 2005; Potter & Hepburn, 2003). 04 also, simultaneously, linked professional regulation of the EP-Client boundaries to the regulation of professionalism. The above quote, therefore, illustrated how statements were entangled and worked in combination (Foucault, 1990). 04 was saying “I behaved in this way because I am professional” while simultaneously reinforcing the asymmetrical relationship. 04 was quite emphatic about the boundaries of the professional relationship in the quote below:

“I pick put, picked up, on the first page the first page of narrative that he had experienced a lot of bullying and had to move house several times. You said I shared my feeling about this and I wonder (YEA) and I wondered about your self disclosure (right) of the of, the em professional in the situation in a situation like this and the ethical boundary of that is. You don’t actually say what was said. I didn’t quite understand that bit you said that you shared your feeling but I didn’t, didn’t understand quite.” (04, FG, lines 43-49)
04, above, appeared to appeal to the authority of counselling ethics through the use of the phase “person centred counselling training”. Self-disclosure would only be legitimate if it was a strategic move to achieve an aim (“strong effect”) and even then needs to be conditional and partial. Boundaries were also emphasized in relation to the work undertaken:

“This quote suggested that the context established what could be done and the EP-Client roles. The ethical question under consideration was whether it was legitimate for the EP to extend their involvement beyond the assessment for exam concessions given that this was what the meeting was arranged for. This debate pointed to the boundaries between permissible and non-permissible work by EPs. The legitimization of the EP’s work required a (re)formulation of the context (Garfinkel & Scaks, 1970; Jayyusi, 1984; Potter, 1996). This was achieved through arguing that transgression of roles was permissible because consent had been given. The role of consent was discussed further later.”

“Em my view and my practice I admit are probably quite different. My view is that we shouldn’t self disclose and that has probably come form a person centred counselling training … but then there are times that you do and, and it has a very strong effect. In a relationship and it , you know a session. But there are ethical, for the want of a better word ethical parameters to the level of self disclosure. For instance, has he said em, l, my dad beating me up or something like that it would not be within the realms of ethical disclosure to say my dad beat me up as well. Em but then to say… there is a line that one has to establish cause where you are coming from in your personal practice” (04, Fg, lines 55 to 63).

“The first thing that comes to mind that is that you went into do one thing, an exam concession, and it has become a completely different thing, and if you got… And his age comes into play as well because if you have got consent from parents to do something did they realise that it was going to develop into this. But actually do they need to realise is it up to him to use the session as he wants which is actually what I think he did he used it as a space to talk and say what was on his mind, that was the very first thing that stuck out to me” (01, FG, lines 4-10.)
Disclosure was therefore a means of distancing the EP from the Client. In the quote below 02 attempted to establish another form of distance between himself and the Client:

“I don’t, do we, give our number, I don’t give my number to children so it makes it more difficult, I know, that he is at the sort of middle age but I still wouldn’t feel comfortable about giving my number, my mobile to a 14 year old boy” (02, FG, lines 33-34).

02, above, justified the boundary by stating the need for personal space and appealing to a normative about the appropriate relation to have with a young Client. The quote also suggested that different sorts of relations existed with different types of client. The quote below suggested that context also shaped what could be said:

“… because there are times when I go to a case and I want to say to the boy or girl, get yourself together! because that’s the, the thing, but I cannot do that. Because that’s, you know “come on”!, that behaviour you cannot do that, I want to say that I know I can’t say that” (04, FG, lines 569-573).

The above suggested that speaking rights of the participants were regulated by the categorization of the encounter as Educational Psychologist (Benwell & Stokoe, 2010). This balanced the presentation of professionals as powerful by recognizing that EPs were also objects of power (Benjamin 2000, 2004; Evetts, 2003; Foucault, 1979, 1997; Freidson, 1970; Krause, 1996). Specifically there were things the EP wanted to say but was unable to say. This suggested that rather than being straightforwardly autonomous EP suggested that they were heteronomous\(^{58}\).

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\(^{58}\) This term meant being subjected to and influenced by outside forces. This could include laws and the desires of others.
5.2.4 Objectification of the Client

In the MWM the objectification of M was evident in the tension between relation and non-relation/alienation (Benjamin, 2000, 2004; Butler, 2005). The non-relation was between EP-as-function and Client-as-function rather than the relations between “persons”, subject-to-subject (Benjamin 2000, 2004; Emirbayer, 1997; Lamont & Molnar, 2002; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). For example, the EP below expressed concern about noticing particular and personal aspects of M presentation:

“I remember feeling a sense of unease about noticing his (M’s) lack of personal hygiene”. (02, MWM lines 3-4)

Noticing a hygiene problem had a particular problematic when the EP-Client relationship was professional. In professional relationships particular features (ethnicity, gender, social class) about the client were intended to be ignored (HPC, 2008; BPS, 2006). Anxiety about noticing the issues with hygiene resulted from the tension between the demand from the Other to be recognized as a person and the demand for discourses within professionalism to see the Other as just another other, i.e. as a case, a category, a label (Benjamin, 2000; Billington, 2002; Burber, 1959; Rose, 1999).

The processes of objectification attempted to pin M down in his own particularity but also in relation to discursive formations. Derrida (1995) argued in the act of locating a particular Other in a system of general themes was a betrayal of the Other’s uniqueness and closed the possibility of the encounter being ethical. The processes of objectification were therefore entangled with those that categorized and presented M as an object of knowledge.

Positioning M as an object of knowledge was most clearly expressed in the phrase, “I found M very interesting” (02, MWM, line 15). This categorized M as an
object of study and clinical curiosity. Allan (1999) had characterized this type of curiosity as “acts of voyeurism” (Ibid, page 113).

In the MWM the EP, also, endeavoured to make M an object of knowledge by framing M through the lens of Systems Theory and Cognitive Behavioural Theory (Beck, 1996; Broderick, 1993). In the quote below the EP was using a Systemic approach based on each member of the family having roles and functions (Broderik, 1993).

“M changing the subject said that when something was not right or someone was going to make the wrong decision he would let them know. I asked if this was his job in the family but M said that it wasn’t and that he had to let them know. I tried to explain how everybody in a family could have a role and perhaps he saw his as stopping bad things happen”. (02, MWM lines 75-79)

The influence of cognitive behaviour theory was evident in interactions where M was asked to think about his situation in a different way and attempting to establish a relationship between behaviour, feelings and beliefs. In the example below the 02 attempted to get M to make the connections between his beliefs and his behaviour:

“M explained that his brother and sister were not going to CAMHS and were not having the same problems as him. I asked why this was. M explained that his bother and sister did not worry as much as he did and did not think so deeply about thing. I asked which was better worrying or avoiding.” (02, MWM lines 80-86)

02 was again calling M to have agency and attempted to give M responsibility for his actions. This supported arguments that the processes of agency and responsibilization were entangled (Foucault, 1989; Rose, 1999). M was being asked to govern himself and consider himself as an object to be watched (evaluate his thoughts). 02, through asking the question, was calling M to estimate which was “better, worrying or avoiding”. Establishing an economy of
values offered “worrying” and “avoiding” as a moral choice. These were processes of individualization, responsibilization and self formation (Foucault, 1977; Butler, 2005, 2007).

M also became an object of knowledge through an incitement to speak (Foucault, 1979). The EP-Client relations appeared to facilitate M to ‘disclose’ information about himself. The confessional relationship reified (essentialized) stories about M that were constructed while confessing (Foucault, 1979, 1999). This was because disclosure suggested that there were hidden/secret or essential truths to be revealed. Within the asymmetrical relationship M’s disclosures enable him to be assessed and then allocated appropriately. In the quote below M was stating that he was revealing secret information. During the follow up meeting M was asked his view about the EP he had worked with. M said:

“I told you about me, mum being a spiritualist medium. Well at that time I didn’t know what you do. I know that you were something to help me in my exams but nothing. When you informed me that you is a child psychologist. I think I am better off talking and I did … I was a bit nervous at first. I had no idea what he wants, what he was talking about. It is not everyday somebody pull you out of lessons, I had no idea Well its ok to know stuff about that. I felt alright telling you personal stuff. Some people might not, it depends on the person” (FUP, lines 94-101).

M, above, was speaking about the strangeness of the situation and his attempts to make sense of what was going on and how to respond. This suggested that M was exercising agency. M also made a direct link between his understanding of the professional’s role and what was expected of him, i.e. classifying 02 as a Child Psychologist appeared to facilitate his disclosures about his private life (Benwell & Stokoe, 2010; Foucault, 1989; Heritage & Greatbatch 1991; Potter & Hepburn, 2003; Potter, 2005). This was perhaps another example of object-to-object relations (Benjamin, 2004, 2009).
In the FG concerns about objectification were most clearly articulated in discussion related to the Matrix \(^{59}\) (see Appendix 9). For example 05, below, articulated concerns that the Matrix was shaping how he wrote about children:

> “Writing about children speaking about children, how do I do that, that’s intelligible to others. So if speak, if I write in a child in a way demanded of me by the local authority, how am I re-creating this child how am I shaping that child” (05, FG, lines 545-547).

05 suggested that the discursive formation in which he practiced was establishing the possible ways in which a child could be described and categorized and hence privileged the Professional’s story over the Client’s (Billington, 2002; Madill, Jordan & Shirley, 2000; Stoiber & Wass, 2002). The objectification of the client was therefore facilitated through their categorisation (Foucault 1989; Garfinkel & Sacks 1970; Jayyusi, 1984).

M was also presented as a case by the EP. This included providing brief biographical details, clinical descriptions and test scores (MWM lines 1 -133). The inclusion of personal information about M was rationalized as flowing from “psychological thinking” (MWM line 124) which therefore made the topic legitimate for discussion by EPs. The relationship between M’s presentation/objectification and the legitimacy of practice was reinforced in 04’s statement below:

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\(^{59}\)The Matrix was a tool used by the EPs in the EPS to categorize and allocate financial resources to schools to meet the needs of children with special educational needs. For each of the special educational needs (cognition and learning, specific learning difficulties, visual impairment, physical impairment, hearing impairment, speech and language difficulties, social communication and interaction difficulties, social emotional and behavioural difficulties, mental health difficulties and medical health needs) the matrix provided a description of severity ranging from mild to moderate, significant, severe, complex and profound. As part of the statutory assessment process the EP was asked to place the child on the matrix. This meant identifying the nature and level of the special educational needs. The EPs were also asked to use the language of the Matrix so that the panel could allocate resources for a child with special educational needs. The panel, who met once a fortnight, was a group of appointed professionals (a paediatrician, head of EPS, head of the Inclusion Service, a representative of a head teachers from the special schools on rotation, a primary school and secondary school headteacher on rotation and the senior manager from the Local Authority special needs services).
04, above, linked the discussion of M at a meeting and his engagement with CAMHS as enabling to be said what was said. The analysis suggested that, tautologically, EPs presented M as case which in turn legitimized and authorized the EP’s role in the case. This suggested that the ethical substance was, again, the nature of the EP-Client relationship (as opposed to the non-EP-non-Client relationship). Again the non-EP-non-Client relationship appeared to be highly problematic, if not dangerous. This was also evident in the EP’s objectification of M in the MWM and the FG’s desire to formulate and hence legitimize M as a case. This required a positioning of M as a role or function that enabled the privileging of justice/fairness over care (Benner, 1997; Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008; Foucault, 1997; Rose, 1990, 1996). While accepting the legitimacy of this aim the depersonalization/objectification of the client also enabled their potential abandonment and abjectification60 (Verkerk, 2001). Following Hepburn (2003) the EP in the MWM and the discussion in the FG through assuming/acknowledging the asymmetry also solidified and (re)produced that asymmetry. The EPs’ objectification not only of Clients but themselves enabled a kind of distance and self-possession which also enabled them to act rationally (Taylor, 2006).

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60 This is not a spelling mistake and means the reduction of the self to a suffering object.
5.2.5 Categorizing and Presenting the Client

As discussed above presenting M as a case began with a quasi-clinical description of M in the MWM. Firstly, the Client was made anonymous by referring to him as M. Biographical and clinical information was given. This included his family structure and age. Clinical and special terms were also used e.g. “personal hygiene” and “depression”. In addition, M’s gestures and interaction were described clinically using terms such as “non-verbal”. The further construction as client-as-function was suggested by the repeated attempts to present M as understandable through categorization as a set of special educational needs (Allan, 1999; Billington, 2002; Heritage & Greatbatch, 1991). This was despite claiming that M’s gestures were “indefinable” (02, MWM line 21). M was partitioned into behaviours and capacities. M’s talk was examined for articulation and production difficulties. For example, the account of the MWM said; “I noticed that he pronounced his “th” sound as “d”” (02, MWM lines 20 to 21) M’s reading skills were standardized (02, MWM lines12-13). Even M’s smiles were classified as evidence of appropriate social skills (02, MWM lines 10-11). Concerns about M’s attendance were medicalized through reference to M attending CAMHS (02, MWM line 7). This use of technical language established category entitlement, enacted institutional identity while positioning M as a case (Benwell & Stoke, 2010; Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Jayyusi, 1984; Potter, 1996; Sacks, 1995).

M also arrived pre-presented as a case through being described in the Request for Service Involvement 61form (RfSI) and as a set of concerns (see Introduction for a list of those concerns). The RfSI form presented M as demographical details that enabled a file to be opened. It also provided information on the nature of the problem, strengths, difficulties, actions already taken and other services/professionals involved. The process of presenting M as a case,

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61 See appendix 9 for a blank example of the form.
therefore, facilitated the classification of M while the classification of M facilitated his presentation as a case (Foucault, 1977).

In the FG there was also concern about the labelling (categorizing) functional of EPs, for example:

“There is a whole ethics around the Ethics of labelling, now we have moved on our labels but we no longer use retard and goodness knows what but we have found a new set of words meaning the same thing” (04, FG, lines 642-644).

04, above, stated that despite the continual concern about labelling and categorizing persisted in Educational Psychology. The need to invent words perhaps reflected that categorizing was inherent in the EP role (Nikander, 2003). In the EPS the words; ‘mild’, ‘moderate’, ‘severe’, ‘significant’ and ‘profound and complex’ had technical meanings and administrative functions in the allocation of resources. The minimum threshold for additional resources for children with learning difficulties was ‘severe’. However, there was anxiety about using the label of ‘severe’:

“Do you often, I have found that I have a conversation with mum, I am going to write severe but that is so the child gets the money. Is that just me (Lots of Yeas from the team)” (02, FG, lines 646-648).

The EP, above, rationalized the categorization of the Client as being required to obtain resources. The EP was also presenting themselves as a reluctant categorizer. This reluctance was echoed by 04 below when describing warning parents about the deficit language in reports:
“When you get my report it may sound really negative. I will put some positive in about Johnny but it is, you know, in order for the school to get, to do what he needs and...” (04, FG, lines 650-625).

The quotes suggested that EPs were aware of and found problematic their gatekeeper and categorizing functions. It was unclear if the difficulty arose from using the categorical words or the parents reading of those words. Perhaps the full force of categorization became apparent when the reader became visible. Informing parents about the language used in the report could also be seen as asking them to collude in the of processes categorization. The EPs in the quotes, below, further pointed to tensions between their administrative function and the ethical desire not to label:

“...Caught between what we would like to say and what we need to say for resources to be in place (02, FG lines 645-655).

Writing about children speaking about children. How I do that, that’s intelligible to others? So if speak if I write in a child in a way demanded of me by the local authority, how am I recreating this child how am I shaping that child? (05, FG, line 545-547).

The above quotes suggested that EPs’ professional role both limited and structured what was and could be said (Benwell & Stoke, 2003). 05’s quote suggested that it was the identity of the child that was at stake in this epistemological game.

The Matrix was itself a statement. It suggested that children’s’ needs could be taxonomically tabulated, normalized and categorized. The Matrix standardized the categories by providing descriptions of each category. The Matrix also enabled the EPs to avoid using contentious words such as ‘severe’. This was
because the EP could use descriptors (phrases from the Matrix) that Local Authority Officers could use to categorize the child and allocate resources. This move both increased and decreased transparency. The Local Authority Officers would clearly know what the category would be, but the parents, without access to the Matrix would not be able to crack the code. The reductive potential of the Matrix was acknowledged by the EPs below:

“08 once said that she was never going to describe a child as an I4 or whatever the words were” (02, FG, line 549)

“Yes, yes that’s what I think, is that want you’re on about (yeah, yeah)” (08, FG, lines 552)

02, above, suggested that the Matrix provided the possibility for a child to be reduced to a coordinate where the letter specified the category of SEN and the number the severity.

5.2.6 Responsibilization of the EP and Client

The account of the MWM frequently posited the positioning of M as hypothesis framed as suggestions for example:

“I then asked M about his fingernails and M explained that he had a bath every night but that his fingernails, because they were long, got dirty, very quickly. I explained that I had asked because sometimes people who had been badly bullied did not always take care of themselves and look after their hygiene, adding if M knew what hygiene meant” (02, MWM lines 37-40)

The above could be read as a neutral and exploratory dialogue; however this forgot the power inherent in Professional and Client relationships (e.g. Benwell & Stoke, 2010; Butler, 1997; Dillard, 1982; Mauthner, 1998; Stacey, 2002; Stanley, 1990). Following, Butler (1997), the positing of hypothesis can be read as interpellation where M was being called to recognize (identify) himself as a set of deficits and needs that were normalized and valorised. This interpellation was
also located in medical and educational discursive formations which warranted both the categories and the speaker (Billington, 2002). M was therefore being asked to recognize (identify with) his Clienthood (Murry, 2007).

M was not only fractured into a constellation of ‘needs’, those needs were also combined through suggesting causal links. For example, 02 stated:

“I said that it was very common for young people who had persistent Speech and Language difficulties when they were younger to later have problem with reading and spelling.” (02, MWM lines 22-24)

Combining the categories of needs could function to increase their explanatory function while warranting the individual categories (Foucault, 1977). 02’s connection of M’s reading difficulties and his Speech Therapy emphasized the importance of both and wove them into a new narrative that privileged the EP as the expert.

In the FG responsibility was a recurring theme. As noted previously there was a discussion about whether the EP or M was responsible for the wide ranging nature of their discussion. This was resolved by make M responsible through formulating that he had consented to it. A further example of how Clients were made responsible occurred in the discussion about whether, how or when to broach personal hygiene issues with a Client. 02 used the phrase “…children with hygiene problems” (02, FG, Line 105). Using the word “with” suggested that the Client was directly responsible for their hygiene. The possibility that the child might not have a problem and the problem was for the others they came into contact with or that the problem was the problem and not the child was not explored.
5.2.7 Conclusion

The analysis suggested that the EP-Client relationship was characterized by processes that fabricated, formulated, positioned, authorized, justified and regulated the Client’s Clienthood. These processes included categorization, objectification and establishing boundaries. It was argued that while establishing Clienthood the identity of EPs’ was also being constructed and regulated. The processes of clienthood also worked to locate both the EP and Client into a network of responsibility. Despite expressing anxiety about the asymmetrical EP-Client relationship the analysis suggested EPs where actively involved in constructing and justifying that asymmetry. Some EPs suggested that the source of their power and the asymmetry was the preconception of the Client. The thesis argued that the EP, as a professional, was made available and presented as a subject to be admired in the discourses about professionalism (e.g. Arnold, 2002). This was discussed further below. These discourses also provided the EP with moral authority in the EP-Client encounter.

Following Foucault (1989) the aims of the processes of Clienthood were to establish an EP-as-function and Client-as-function relationship. This, in turn alienated the EP from their non-EP identity and the EP’s non-EP identity from the Client’s non-Client identity. However, recognizing the problematics produced in the EP-Client asymmetry facilitated ethical work (Allan, 1999). The EP-Client relationship was the ethical substance that needed to be worked over. In the MWM there were no significant bioethical questions to be answered. Rather there was a distress about the wellbeing of another combined with an anxiety about having noticed particular features of the Client. This prompted the question “what was it about being an EP that made noticing particular features of a Client problematic?” The next section of the analysis of results will delineate how EP employed ethical rhetoric to present and position themselves as ethical professionals.
In line with national and international research the EPs reported that they frequently found themselves in ethically difficult situations (Bennett, 2008; Canter, et al., 1994; Chevalier, 1993; Glossoff & Pate, 2002; Guiney, 2009; Jacob-Timm, 1999; Kindrick & Chandler, 1994; DCSF, 2009; Raviv, et al., 2003). This section analyzed how a range of ethical rhetoric was employed by EPs to position participants and rationalize, justify, authorize and warrant actions. In addition, the EPs descriptions of the emotional work resulting from the ethically difficult situations were also examined. The section focused on biomedical ethics because it was the most frequent rationalization employed. However, other ethical positions such as care, virtue and particularism were also utilized as rationalizations for practice. As in the meta-theme “problematic relationships with the Client” the analysis of statements was made more complex because of the simultaneous and overlapping work done by the statements. For example, confidentiality was entangled with consent and respect; while these bioethical themes worked together to enable the responsibilization, objectification and categorization of the Client and EP.
During the FG I was aware of having introduced the theme of ethics into the discussion by asking the participants to consider their practice in this way. Some EPs stated that they had difficulties using ethics a frame to examine their practice. For example 06, in the quote below suggested that ethics was not a construct that she frequently used:

"No I think you are right, so when you said do you think about ethics in your practice? I think, I never think of the word ethics. It not a word that pops into my head but I am always aware but I never... But I never think that's not ethical but I am aware of what I am doing. (06, FG, lines 793-796)"

However 06 also suggested that although she might not have used the construct that she still evaluated her practice. 01, below, also appeared to have difficulties with disentangling whether the issues were practice or ethical issues:

"… in that respect, but I don’t know whether its ethics or practice. I don’t know whether it is the difference between ethics and practice. This is what I am struggling with. Also when I think about doing a session with children it is always child protection, it could just be in my mind, that what I kept thinking about was child protection procedures. And then I am thinking well there are ethical things within child protection procedures, well is that, the two, two separate things as well and I think that it is all kind of messy in my head. Laugh (01 Lines 21-28)"

01, above was expressing difficulties disentangling ethical issues from child protection procedures. 06 and 01 responses supported the argument that participants did not readily frame work dilemmas as ethical dilemmas and that they had to be structured as ethical (Guiney, 2009; Nash, 1996; Water, 2008). However, 05 said that he thought about ethics “all the time” (05, FG, line 377). This suggested that framing issues as ethical, although not universal, was familiar to some of the EPs. The subsequent discussion in the FG also suggested that even if EPs had not previously framed difficult work situations as ethical that they were able to do so.
The next section analyzed the bioethics subthemes before examining the microethical subthemes and the tensions between principles and contexts.

5.3.1 Confidentiality

Confidentiality was both explicitly referred to and implied in the MWM. Confidentiality was implied in anonymizing the Client using the letter M. The phrase “during the meeting M made several disclosures” (MWM, line 30) positioned the meeting as a professional encounter through the use of technical vocabulary (Potter, 2005). Disclosures in this context were utterances that were bounded by codes of confidentiality. The use of “XXX” to describe the amount of money M’s father had taken very clearly signalled confidentiality. In the exchange below the EP established the formal rules of engagement and the limits of confidentiality:

“M then said he was going to tell me something about his family that no one knows and that he couldn’t believe that he was going to tell me. I said that he did not have to tell me and if there was something that was causing him harm I would have to tell” (02, MWM, lines 56-58).

The above illustrated the complex, entangled and cumulative nature of statements. 02 positioned M as needing of care and protection. This was signalled by the phrase “I would have to tell”. This suggested that the EP role was to protect the Client. Also informing M that he did not have to disclose information was letting him know that he had rights that 02 was protecting those rights. The phrase “you do not have to tell me” also linked confidentiality to consent. This, when combined with the statement that 02 would have to pass on information if 02 believed that the Client was at risk asked M to take some responsibility for the consequences of the disclosures he might make. The statement also presented 02 as being subject to rules and obligations (they

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62 The use of “XXX” to describe the amount because in the follow up meeting with M he requested that the amount not be shared.
would “have to tell”). The next section further explored the relationship between consent and responsibility.

5.3.2 Respect and Consent

In the quote below, 02 attempted to show that the discussion not only took place with M’s consent but that M actively sought it:

“It was lunch-time and my next child was not due until much later in the afternoon. I noted that it was lunch-time and said that he should go for something to eat. M said that he had already eaten and would prefer to talk” (02 MWM, lines 15-18).

The rhetorical move, above, made M culpable/complicit in his objectification while 02 adopted a posture of passivity. The positioned passivity of 02 would need to be viewed in the extensive discussion about asymmetrical EP-Client relationship. 02 also positioned himself as respecting M’s autonomy through presenting interpellations as suggestions (e.g. 02, MWM, lines 37-40). M was being asked to recognize the problems with hygiene as a response to bullying. In the same exchange 02 asked if M knew what hygiene meant. This could be read as an attempt to establish M’s capacity to understand (consent to) the interpellation made to him. In bioethics capacity to understand was considered to be the minimum requirement to autonomously to make an informed choice or consent (Beauchamp & Childress, 1989; Evans, 2000; Wolpoe, 1998). However, it could also be perceived as being paternalistic. In the FG bioethics themes of respect, consent, confidentiality, concern about doing harm dominated and were further examined below.

5.3.3 Respect (Continued)

In the quote below 04 inferred that the EP in the account of the MWM had respected M’s religious beliefs:
01, above, however suggested that respect was contingent and needed to be regulated by the limits on disclosure. This was perhaps an example of the tensions between principles that were played out in practice (Dancy, 1983, 2000, 2004; Dworkin, 1995).

5.3.4. Concern about Doing Harm

The EP presented himself as caring through making explicit his empathy for M. For example:

“That was going to be one of my, my second points about , I though that you were giving him some, reassurance, that you would respect his views em em ah… and that too is another difficult one. Because it is about mutual self regard. Our mutual regard rather. Em but without letting him know that you yourself have any religious beliefs” (04, FG, lines 75-38.)

“I further explained that there was very little connection between reading and spelling and intelligence. This was to make him feel better (after all I had just made him do something he found difficult in front of a stranger) and also to dispel any unhelpful beliefs that he might have about the meaning of his difficulties with spelling and reading.” (02, MWM, lines 24-28)

“M told me that his family had experienced a lot of bullying and had to move house several time. I shared my feelings about this and asked him why he thought this was.” (02, MWM, lines 32-33)

In the quotes above 02’s empathy inferentially made available through the use of the word “feelings”. Other references to feelings included:

“I remember feeling” (02, MWM, line 3)

“I asked M to think of three things that were positive in his life as this would help me after all the sad things we had talked about” (02, MWM, lines 96-97)

Through referencing feelings 02 could have been “doing” (performing) empathy (Duncombe & Jessop, 2002; Pudlinski, 2005). This meant that 02 made readers
aware of his empathy for strategic purposes (to present himself positively). The rationalization given for making M feel better could also be read as paternalistic. 02 appeared to be aware of the ethical concerns around testing. However, 02 also appeared to have already decided that testing was in M’s best interest. This was archived through rationalizing that the tests were necessary to have access to special examination arrangements. Allan (1999) made problematic justifications based on acting in the Client’s best interest. M might have consented to seeing 02 but would he have known in detail what was being asked of him. For example, knowing that the testing would have to be administered until he repeatedly failed. The literature suggested that these difficulties with informed consent were not unique to Educational Psychology (Benwell & Stokoe, 2010; Frank & Jones, 2003).

5.3.5. Care/Particular Ethics

As discussed above, the MWM account attempted to positions 02 as caring by references to his feelings (Pudlinski, 2005). Acknowledgment of feelings and emotions was the antithesis of the biomedical emphasis of reason (Austin, 2007; Benner, 1997; Tong, 2005; Water, 2008). In the MWM account 02 also emphasized contexts, human connectedness and relational aspects.

The MWM emphasized contextual approaches through telling M’s story. This was achieved by presenting particular information about M (Charon 2001). However, it was still 02 telling and editing M’s story rather than M speaking for himself. Contextualising M did not exclude 02 using their “logico-scientific” knowledge instrumentally to gain power over their Client (Tong, 1998, page 133). That is, to be empathic only to better apply the treatment (Duncombe & Jessop, 2002). In addition, the more 02 empathized the more vulnerable the Client was to exploitation (The more someone can see into another’s heart the more they could help or harm them). Emphasizing 02’s emotions also suggested connectedness with M. Connectedness was reinforced through privileging the
relational aspects of the encounter in the attempts to establish rapport. However, connectedness and rapport can be instrumental. Duncombe & Jessop (2002) argued that doing rapport and “faking friendship” could be strategies to achieve therapeutic or research goals. For example, the Clients/Participants would be less resistant and provide more information if they had rapport and felt valued by the professional. 02 did not make any direct reference to virtue ethics. However, it could be argued that 02 was making a virtue of their care for M. 02, therefore, positioned himself as an ethical practitioner through doing empathy. The reader was invited to see this as a rational for 02 behaviour and interaction with M. This made a link between character and behaviour and hence virtue. The rationalization 02 was making available was that to be truly caring one must be a caring person (Tong, 1998). This was founded on 02 presenting that he had feelings for the Client as emotions were considered central to making an action ethical (Tong, 1998; Blum, 1994) Following Foucault (2002), these criticisms of contextualization, connectedness and rapport did not mean that they were bad. Rather, they could be dangerous if they made the professional at ease with their practice and stopped them thinking. The critical engagement with contextualization, connectedness and rapport were calls to remain critical about professional practice (Duncombe & Jessop, 2002; Pudlinski, 2005).

The analysis suggested that, in the MWM, 02 employed a complex mixture of biomedical, care and virtue ethics to justify actions and as tools to present both EP and Client (Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Potter, 1988; Tong, 1998). Through employing biomedical ethics 02 attempted to position his practice within traditional ethical principles of respect for autonomy, consent, concern about doing harm, confidentiality, promoting agency and choice (Beauchamp & Childress, 1989; Evans, 2000; Rose, 1999; Wolpoe, 1998). This was what Tong (1998) picturesquely called “… our public, professional, dress-for-moral-success

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63 This was because positive character traits are often considered to be virtues.
64 By criticism I meant providing the opportunity for reading against how the author perhaps intended the account to be read. I was aware that anything can be described negatively or made to seem sinister. This did not mean that they were. However, purposely reading against provided a metaphorical distance to look again at something that previously resisted challenge.
language” (Ibid, page 132). The appropriation of Care ethics also enabled 02 to portray himself as caring, empathic, virtuous and compassionate. The co-existing of biomedical and virtue and care ethic function like ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988). This enabled both care and biomedical positions to be enacted simultaneously and sequentially to achieve strategic goals.

5.3.6. Ethical Discussion in the Focus Group

The EPs in the FG also employed most of the major themes in ethics including Bioethical issues of consent, respect, causing harm and confidentiality. However, similar to previous research, the EPs’ references to professional codes of ethics were rare (Bennett, 2009; Guiney, 2009; Nash, 1996). The EPs also employed deontological, principled, virtuosic, care and particularist rationalizations to justify and explain their actions.

A deontological approach to ethics was evident when discussing the required duty to a Client in relation to duties to several other ‘stakeholder’ Clients. For example, 05, below, outlined the multiple duties he experienced:

“Can I say about split allegiance in the job? For example the matrix, my duty to whom, my duty to the child, to the family to the school to the Local Authority (LA to psychology), to psychology. So there are different stakeholder and that presents ethical challenges” (05, FG, lines 538-541).

05 suggested that his duties were in tension. This tug between Clients was reflected in the reviewed literature (e.g. Ashton & Roberts, 2006; Gillham, 1999; Mackay, 2002). While recognizing that the complexity derived from having multiple Clients presented additional challenges for EPs it might also have been beneficial. For example, being responsible to everyone might mean being responsible for no one. In addition, framing the issues as conflicts of interests or competing duties avoided viewing the issues as being about commitments. In situations where an EP was be called by a Client to make a commitment to their
wellbeing (stand up for them), reframing these commitments as balancing duties could ease an abandonment of the Client.

The conflicting duties also pointed to the nature of the context (discursive formation) in which EPs worked (Gillham, 1999). The multiple stakeholders pointed to the statutory, gatekeeper, administrative functions of the EP role while making visible how EPs were held accountable (Boyle & Lauchlan, 2009; Cameron & Monsen, 2005; MacKay, 2002; Newman, 1997). These multiple roles also existed in a discourse that emphasized the importance of the EP-Client relationship. The competing roles and discourses challenged the autonomy of EPs and supported Guiney’s (2009) argument that EPs were semi-professionals. Following Araujo & Martuccelli (2010), the tension created between the EPs’ Local Authority Officer role and the discourse that suggested that professionals should be autonomous provided the opportunities for trials in which an EP could work on their professional identity. Each time an EP negotiated between their Local Authority Officer role and their commitments to Clients they were engaging in practices that constructed their professional identity. The FG discussion also suggested that different EP emphasized different aspects of the EP-Client relationship and their relationship with Local Authority. This perhaps explained the differences in interpretation of professional identity between EPs.

The suggested entanglement of the EP role with administrative functions would make the call for a return to psychology problematic. As stated in the literature review I find it difficult to imagine a neutral location for EPs to work from. In each possible location (being employed by school, National Government, Local Authorities or parents) there would always be conflicts of interest and competing duties.
5.3.7. Particularism

The EP’s discussion in the FG suggested a particularist approach to context and strategies. For example; in the quote below 04 was discussing the utility of challenging teacher categorization of issues/children.

“The drop in this morning the first teacher sat down, she sat there. Went, he’s a naughty boy and that gets my back up, I want to say, want to say, I don’t you… want to use that word, or words to that effect. But I couldn’t because the rest of the consultation would have been a right off because I would have got her back up. So I had to king of right, right and kind of move on.” (04, FG, lines 621-625)

In the above, 04 suggested that the contexts shaped what she could say. 04 argued that although she might want to challenge a teacher she had to be strategic to achieve a greater goal.

The subthemes of principles, particulars and consent were entangled. 09, below argued that context (age, gender, originator of the behaviour and Clients’ capacity to understand) was a factor that shaped practice:

“It’s definitely context dependent, I, I’d had conversations with teenage girls about her personal hygiene. I didn’t begin with going to do that but that is where the conversation went. I knew that she had personal hygiene problems because I had been told about them. I didn’t go in thinking that I was going to talk about them but they came up in conversation. I don’t think that there is anything wrong with that. I do think that age plays a part in it. I don’t think I would be having that conversation with 7 year old. But I think a teenage who, maybe or may be not able to understand. The child I had a conversation was able to understand the difficulties it caused her with the personal hygiene” (09, FG, Lines 146-154)

In the above quote 09’s approach was more akin to the casuistic approach described by Toulmin (1982). 09 was privileging particular features of the Client over universal principles (Dancy, 1983, 2000, 2004; Dworkin, 1995). These particular features both qualified practice and the application of principles.
5.3.8 Principles

The tension between particularism and principlism was further explored below. In the exchange below, 02 and 04 were having an exchange about consent.

| LP: “I think that going back to your first em that, em, analogies, think there it is the very basic of ethics is consent (lots of agreement in room). Em and everything must be done with the consent of the, who it is being done to. Obviously the parent in some, in terms of our referral system, but also we must have the consent of the person, of the lit…, young person that it is being done to. |
| 02: “Is that not context specific?...is it context specific or is it or it something bigger. |
| LA: It might be one of the overarching ones”. (04& 02, FG, lines 497-509) |

04, above, suggested that consent was one of the overarching principles. This was emphasized through the use of phrases such as “everything must be done” and “must”. This view resonated with Beauchamp & Childress’ (2001) argument that there were universal, prima facie, culturally neutral ethical, principles. Establishing an action as a principle sets it up as something that cannot be challenged and was therefore a powerful rhetorical move (Dworkin, 1997; Lance & Little, 2006; Little, 2001). The extent to which consent remained an overarching principle in every day practice was further examined below.

5.3.9. Consent

The tension between principles and practice was exemplified in the extended quote below where 01 was discussing the issues of actualizing consent in everyday situations:
"I was working with a child who has been in long-term care and she has seen various professions and she new into the school. And they want me to meet with her and she doesn’t want, wants me, wants to meet with me. And the SENCO is literally trying to lure her into the room. And I was sort of like look I don’t think this is going to work. Like even if we get her in she is not going to talk to me. This is not, you know helpful. And the barrier for me was that the SENCO was so desperate for me to see, she was coercing in. In the end I had a chat with her and her friend. Really informal environment cause I didn’t feel more comfortable and then can she then move. I felt that we, we somehow tricking her into doing it, and I, it wasn’t helpful for her. At that point she was new into the school. So in terms of, I thinking, an initial barrier I thought is, is sometimes pressure on em, from other people and there is a pressure from other people and resources sometimes. You have got to have a certain environment to have an assessment with a child. And often that is not available in schools so sometime is, do, probably compromise my practice to adapt, rather than have to pick a, and have to come back another day and another time. It’s the external pressure on you that push that" (01, FG lines 468-484).

The above account of practice suggested that there were tensions between recognising Client’s right to consent to involvement and the pressures that disavowed the other’s right to consent. 01 suggested that she had to negotiate between her administrative function (to provide a service to schools) and the rights of the individual (Goodman, McElliot and Marks, 2003). 01’s portrayal therefore emphasized the messiness, social embeddedness of and emotional engagement with professional practice (Arras, 1990; Elliott, 1999; Singer, 2004,). This was in contrast to the neutral, rational, distant scientific practitioner model of professional practice in and outside Educational Psychology (Holtum & Gobel, 2006; Fallon, Woods & Rooney, 2011; Lane & Corrie, 2006; Lund, 2000; Moore, 2005; Taylor, 2006 Webster, Hingley & Franey, 2000). 07, below, further illustrated the problematics of consent in everyday practice:
07 (07, FG, Lines 503-511) stating that she “found it difficult” and “it can be quite extreme” pointed to the emotional work offered by practicing in contexts where informed consent was problematic but demanded (Water, 2008; Corrigan, 2003; Jallinoja, 2001; O’Neill, 2004). Phrases such as “lure”, “trick”, “I didn’t…feel more comfortable” and “push” used by 01 (01, FG, lines 468-484) above suggested that she too found the complexity challenging. The emotional work resulted from working in a situation there was no “ideal” outcome and then having to live with
the consequences of decisions. The emotional work included being required to witness the suffering of Others (Water, 2008). The emotional impact of working in messy contexts was also discussed by 05, below:

| I would sometimes say that part of the time we sometimes have an awareness of certain big structural issues how we feel pretty powerless to do anything about that impact on our practice. In on our preferred practice, and discussing them going on and go on and on discussing them we may feel they don’t feel they don’t get us anywhere so we may feel that we just need to the best we can within the context. Even if not how we feel be ethically perfect. Because we feel we feel we have no other choice. Does that make sense? (05, FG, Lines 798-804) |

The phrase, above, “And discussing them going on and go on and on discussing them we may feel they don’t feel they don’t get us anywhere so we may feel that we just need to the best we can within the context” suggested that 05 had adopted, what Water (2008, page 194) referred to as “learning to live with” the ambiguity approach. The EP’s accounts, above, had passive and submissive tones. For example, 05 above stated that he felt “pretty powerless to do anything about it” and that discussion did not “get us anywhere”. 01 had also suggested that she felt pressure from others. The feeling that circumstances were beyond the control of a professional was identified by Water (2008) and Critchley & Bernosconi (2002) as common to practitioners and a source of distress. The socially embedded and emotionally engaged accounts presented by the EPs supported Water’s (2008) argument that rational neutral choice was a fallacy in healthcare professional-Client relationships. However, passivity perhaps helped to mitigate 01’s responsibility.

The analysis did not resolve the principle and particular debate. Rather, EPs appeared to make strategic rhetorical appeals to both principles and particulars. Constructs such as consent were both held to be absolute principles and mitigated and made problematic by contexts. The emphasis should not be on outing inconsistencies (about whether an EP says one thing here and another
there) so as to catch an individual out. Rather, it could be argued that the inconsistencies pointed to the flexible employment of discursive resources to justify, rationalize and legitimise positions.

5.3.10 Care Ethics

In the quote below 06 discussed the difficulties of competing loyalties.

“In think that links in, I have a tribunal coming up. And I am really caught, I have been discussing, discussing this with LA I think that the parent and the child, I’m on their side, well I think. Well yeah I am on their side. But when I sit in that tribunal I work for the local authority. And like I said to you I am really caught (ND caught between ) yeah. I am really struggling.” (06, FG, lines 593-597)

In the quote above 06 was describing the (ethical) tug of being between two commitments. The tensions were between the responsibilities and obligations the EP owed to each party. This included whether to commit to or abandon the Client and the emotional consequences of those decisions. Verkerk (2001) described the choice as deciding whether or not to be there for the Client. The quandary in that situation was not just a rational choice but one of emotional commitment and ethico-political action (Austin, 2007; Giroux, 1997). 04 stated the ethico-political action required an EP to “stand up and be counted” (04, FG, line 812). This was ethics at the micro level because it was about personal commitment, particular situations and local engagements (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008; Komesaroff, 1995). 02 added that it was important to “pick you fights” otherwise “you would fight everything to the dead” (02, FG line 815). 02’s intercession suggested that working as an EP could not only be compromising but also that there were lots of opportunities for “fights”. 
5.3.11. **Virtue Ethics**

The recourse to virtue ethics was inferred when explaining ethics as a product of personal character. In the discussion, there was debate about the extent to which ethical judgement was constant or adapted and grew with experience. For example, during a discussion on the source of ethics 03, see below, suggested that the ultimate ethical arbiter was the individual EP.

*We have a saying at home which links to the first point, the personal thing and probable to contextual thing as well. “It's yourself you have to sleep with at night”* (03, FG, lines 740-741).

In the above quote 03 appeared to be adopting a highly individualistic position. This position did not recognize that the Client had as much, if not more than, the EP to lose. After all, the work of the EP could help determine the type of educational provision a child could attend and the amount and type resources that could be allocated to a child. 03’s rhetorical moved might both have made EPs accountable while sustaining the processes that required the EP to be accountable. The EP being the ultimate arbiter facilitated EP’s seeing their problems as emanating from themselves and their individual processes. This directed the critical gaze away from issues such as the equity of the allocation of resources which required processes of categorization. The processes of categorization required the EP to engage in practices for which they would be accountable to the Local authority and their Client. This individualism was echoed by 04’s in the quote below;

*I think even before you come into psychology training your ethics are being formed from your upbringing. And how much that can change is variable. I think you can change in terms of seeing things and thinking that I need to alter my practice in that way but I'm, I don’t think you can move massively from where you are”* (general agreement) (04, FG, lines 669-673)
04 appeared, through emphasizing biography, to suggest experience rather than ethical codes were the source of ethics. 04 also appeared to suggest that ethics was something individualistic, constant and immutable to change. 03, below, while supported the individualist approach attempted to reconcile this internal individual approach with ethical guidelines:

“I must say that I have set of beliefs or values which is part of me that inform me but within that I look at the guidelines you know. But in a way my journey is the opposite way to you. I have got a very strong moral, I shouldn’t say that shouldn’t I. We shouldn’t have that in this job. I have a strong belief system in what is right and what is not. In my own little box. The guides that 08 allows me or 04 allows me or 09 allows me. To travel … some protection from Senior Management Team… You know what I mean within the organisation. Within the organisation how much I can do you know (MK then wiggles his whole body—some laughter)” (03, FG, lines 669-676)

In the above quote, 03 expressed both anxiety about his beliefs and also that they were tempered by the Senior Management Team (SMT). The discipline and governance of the SMT appeared to be balanced with the organisational protection he received from the SMT. For 03 it appeared that ethical practice was therefore navigated between personal beliefs and professional requirements. 03 was therefore asking both for metaphorical and physical ‘wriggle room’.

However 05, below, suggested that ethical practice was something that changed with practice:
05 was asserting that through exploring ethics that his experience of being reflexive had increased the need for him to take personal responsibility for his practice. 05 positioned himself as a rational actor. This position also privileged the autonomous professional (Turner, 2009). 05’s description could also be read as a description of identity work. 05 suggested that his past resolutions to difficult ethical situations had shaped his current practice. 05’s identity work appeared to be shaped by both his biography, the nature of the issues and informed by theory. The themes of vulnerability, responsibilities and flexibility were also discussed by 02 in the quote below:

“The above quote also positioned the EP as a rational actor making important decisions. It also suggests that being empowered to make decision was combined with an increased sense of responsibility for those decisions. The EP
was once again simultaneously the subject that knows and the object that was known (Benjamin, 2004, 2009). The EPs (03, 05 and 02) were all privileging the individual decision maker who weighed up the costs and benefits before coming to a decision (Critchley & Bernosconi, 2002).

In the above examples the EP’s utilization of their biographies to explain their current ethical positions had some resonances with Araujo & Martuccelli’s (2010) and Pezé’s (2011) account of individualization work. Individualization occurred as each EP worked on or resolved each of trials that Educational Psychology and other institutions presented. For example, the trial for 02 might have been “what can I say about a child that is ethical?” The EPs’ solutions would have been individual or unique solutions because their biographies (resolutions to, or work on, past trials) would have been unique. This enabled the EPs to position themselves as more than, and additional to their, EP role. The processes of individualization explained why EPs did not share identical professional identities. However, following Foucault (1979), the EPs might have only come to see themselves as individuals through engaging with individualizing practices. These individualizing practices (e.g. normalizing self-examination) help individuals to understand themselves as individuals. The difference between Araujo & Martuccelli (2010), Pezé (2011) and Foucault (1979) was that Foucault’s account included an additional emphasis on power that shaped the individual.

5.3.12 Summary

The analysis suggested that EPs regularly found themselves in difficult and problematic situation. The EPs, although with some hesitancy, were able to understand these difficult situations as ethical situations. These situations provided opportunities for emotional, ethical and identity work. The EP account of emotional work challenged the model of the neutral, rational and distant scientific practitioner. Rather the EPs’ accounts suggested that their practice was socially embedded and emotionally engaged. The EPs, through the utilization of their
biographies also suggested that engagement with past difficult situations shaped their current ethical identity. The analysis of the ethical rhetoric employed by EPs suggested that the EPs utilized a highly eclectic, and unacknowledged, range of ethical themes and rationalizations. This pointed to a strategic use of ethics (Tong, 1998; Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Potter, 1988). Different formulation of ethics appeared to be employed depending on the aims of the speaker and context. For example, when discussing the source of their ethical behaviours some EPs emphasized personal virtues and experiences but when discussing the proper relation with Clients the EP’s tended to employ biomedical ethics. In addition, principles tended to be privileged when speaking in the abstract about Clients but context and particulars were stressed when describing everyday practice. Ethics was therefore a flexible tool used strategically by the EP rather than just a regime imposed on the EP. The next section further examined how the research participants were both presented by others and presented themselves.

5.4 The Strategic Presentation of the EP

Figure 6. Strategic Presentation of the EP

This section of the results analyzed how EPs were both presented and positioned and how they positioned and presented themselves. These positions...
and presentations were argued to privileged a rational practice and alienated the EP from their non-professional identity and the EP from the non-client identity of the Client. Professionalism was the main rationalization employed to justify, legitimize and regulate practice. The term apotheosis was used to describe talk where EPs privileged the positive aspects of their professional character, ethics or role. The processes of apotheosis appeared to both sustain and construct the EP-as-Professional while warranting and authorizing modes of practice and EP-Client relations. These processes articulated the charismatic authority of the EP which complemented their statutory authority. However, it was already suggested that EPs could not sustain this apotheosis in their own eye and attempted to locate its origin in the eyes of the Client. The EPs also balanced the theme of apotheosistic (hero) psychologist with a more anti-heroic (feet of clay) portrayal of their role.

5.4.1 Meeting with M

5.4.2 The Professional Rationalization of EP Practice

In the account of the MWM the EP did not refer to himself as an EP or professional. However, this was not necessary as the professional identity was made inferentially available through the use of professional specific jargon, technical language and formulating M’s story psychologically (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970: Jayyusi, 1982; Potter, 2005; Potter & Hepburn, 2003) As described above this professional identity was appropriated to warrant and justify the judgements made and advice given (e.g. 02, MWM, lines 20-28 and lines 37-43). In the FG the EP referred to this formulation as doing the “psychology job” and employing psychological thinking (02, FG, line 121 & 124).

65 During the write up of the analysis I constantly vacillated between the terms hero and apotheosis. In the end I settled for using apotheosis in homage to Foucault (1989) use of the term in Madness and Civilization.
In the FG the term ‘professional’ was frequently used and performed both regulatory and categorical functions, examples of which are provided below:

- To regulate the talk between the EP and Client (04, FG, lines 45-47)
- As a means to discipline practice (03, FG, line 185 and lines 377-388).
- To sustain an emotional distance between the EP and Client (04, FG, lines 232 also 337 uses the word “distance” to describe the relationship).
- To establish EP-Client boundaries (02, FG, lines 445-448).
- A legitimization of behaviour in lines. For example, 06 legitimized her hug by saying it was done professionally (06, FG, lines 456-458).
- As source of power (01, FG, lines 520-523).
- Belonging to a larger family of Professionals (01, FG lines 478-481). This could be seen as a form of profession alignment where the EP was making the category of professional available to them (Potter, 2005). This alignment could then be used to establish speaking rights (Drew & Sorjonen, 1997).
- To establish a binary between a professional and human relationships (line 304 and 317-319)
- Alienating the Client from the non-professional identity of the EP (04, FG, lines 325-332).
- Professional relationship as powerfully asymmetrical (03, FG, lines 307-309).
- Professional as a means to manage the emotional work involved in the role (06, FG, lines 321-323 also 09, FG, lines 334-338).
- Professionals as emotional cold and clinical (03, FG, line 382-388).

The analysis suggested that EPs made appeals to professionalism to justify and legitimize a wide range of positions or actions. EPs also used the constructs of professional/professionalism to regulate their practice. The analysis argued that the term professional was formulated as the source of the EPs’ authority and also disciplined and regulated EPs’ conduct and the EP-Client relationship. This was evident in the above examples of the types of recommended EP-Client relationship. The binary between human and professional relational was particularly interesting and pointed to the alienation present in the relationship (Benjamin, 2002, 2004; Foucault, 1989). This included what they could say, how much they could say and who they could say it to. Following, Wagner (2000) that while the EP’s were talking about their roles they were also actively involved in constructing that role. In the FG this was a communal practice where the EPs negotiated and shared their professional identities with each other.
**Betwixt and Between**

In the MWM 02 does not explicitly articulate that he was working within competing demands/stakeholders. However the demands had left a trace. The trace was manifest in the unease felt in 02. The tensions were between M's demand to be recognized as more than a Client and the demands of the other stakeholders. For example, 02 placed himself betwixt and between M's demand for care and the demands from others for test scores, clinical description and professional relations.

The FUP\(^{66}\) meeting reminded us that as well as Clients being characters in the professional stories of EPs that EPs were also characters in the life stories of Clients, if sometimes only very minor character. During the FUP M was asked what he recalled about the meeting, M replied:

> “To be honest I had forgot. It was only when you rang I remembered, lots of stuff happens to me.” (FUP, lines 97-98)

In the FG the EPs discussed being betwixt and between parents and school and the Local Authority (LA) and the client.

### 5.4.3 Betwixt and between Parents and Schools

In the quote below 03 described frequently working with conflicting accounts suggested by school and parents.

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\(^{66}\) See appendix 3 for notes on follow-up meeting with M and his mother.
In the quote below 06 was explaining feeling pulled between her Local Authority role and duty to Clients:

“In most cases, in any case we get conflicting narrative for different actors in the same, same kind of line. I certainly come across cases where parents might say one thing but school might say, report something different” (03, FG, lines 206-208).

5.4.4 Betwixt and Between the Local Authority and Clients.

In the quote below 06 was explaining feeling pulled between her Local Authority role and duty to Clients:

I think that links in, I have a tribunal coming up. And I am really caught, I have been discussing, discussing this with LA. I think that the parent and the child, I'm on their side, well I think. Well yes I am on their side. But when I sit in that tribunal I work for the local authority. And like I said to you I am really caught (06. FG. Lines 593-596)

The locating of the EP as being betwixt and between works to provide a space in which the options are the autonomous, rational and the neutral professional and the caring practitioner. 06 was suggesting that being betwixt and between felt like having to take sides and challenges the supposedly neutral space inhabited by EPs. The above quote echoed the finding from the DCSF Lamb Enquiry (2009) which argued that EPs’ were fettered by their Local Authority role.

The EPs’ descriptions of the ethical tugs resulting from be caught betwixt and between resonated with the finding from the national and international research. (Bennett, 2008; Guiney, 2009; Jacob-Timm, 1999; DCSF, 2009) The EPs in the FG presented themselves are working in complex situations (Schön, 1987). These ‘swampy lowlands’ were comprised of uncertainty, risk, interdependence and multiple interconnecting parts. This complexity was shaped by working in situations where there was multiple demands for multiple and sometimes multidisciplinary Clients (Carter et al., 1994; Chevalier & Lyon, 1993; Jacob-Timm, 1999). While managing these human relationships EPs were expected to perform varied tasks. Fairchild (2010) argued that complexity resulted in
decreased work motivation and increased ethical dissonance in practice. However, complexity also demanded personal, individualized, responsibility. This privileged the rational decision maker who was expected to negotiate the complexity while making judgements for which they were accountable (Turner, 2009).

The next section analysed how the authority of the EP was enmeshed in the privileging of the character of the Professional.

5.5.6 Apotheosis of the Psychologist

In the MWM, 02 gave an account of his efforts to care, listen, reflect, be balanced, considerate, ethical, to weigh in the balance the competing demands, show patience (when discussing beliefs). For example, 02 presented himself as:

- Caring (MWM, line 26) and where the EP asked M to reflect on what was positive in his life (MWM, lines 96-99),
- Rational (MWM, lines 37-40),
- Empathic (awareness of M feelings, how he looked and sounded, noticing details (MWM, lines 20-28),
- Respectful (MWM, lines 62-64),
- Evidence based (MWM, lines 25-26)
- Keeper of secrets (MWM, lines 45-46: 56-58)
- Ethical through obtaining consent (MWM, lines 17-18)
- Hardworking (giving up lunch-time to speak to a Client (MWM, lines 15-19),
- Holder of special/technical knowledge (MWM, lines 20-28).

02’s self-presentation resonated with the romantic characterization of professionals (Arnold, 2002; Francis, 2009; MacDonald, 1995). The inclusion of personal characteristics such as caring emphasized the ethical nature of the work. However, the above examples of apotheosis (self-aggrandisement) needed to be balanced against the more critical account of the EP-Client encounter given above. In the FG the participants also presented themselves positively. EPs were:
The above statements again resonated with the romanticized view of professionals (MacDonald, 1995; Arnold, 2002). The above positive characterization of the EPs amounted to apotheosis of EPs’ personage because it privileged the EPs’ personality and character. This emphasis of the character and personality of EPs established their ethical superiority. Foucault (1989) argued that it was this apotheosis that the practitioner derived their authority/power. However, EPs also presented themselves negatively, see below:

- struggling with the asymmetry (03, FG, lines 304-309)
- Having limited capacity to solve problems (06, FG, lines 135-136).
- Empathy having to be tempered with reason (03, FG, 263- 264)
- Being unable to know Clients sufficiently (01, FG, lines 285-286)
- Being moved by the stories of others (01, FG, lines 325-332)
- In need of protection (04, FG, Lines 334-338)
- User of deficit and reductive language (05, FG, lines 545-547)
- Governed by ethical guidelines (03, FG, lines 385-388)
• Limited by time (01, FG, 563-565)
• Limited in what can be said (04, FG, lines 575-577)
• Limited by bureaucratic thresholds and procedures (05, FG, Lines 528-536)
• Subject to pressure from others (01, FG, lines 477-495)
• Someone clients might not want to work with (04, FG lines 477-495)
• Requiring clients to do difficult things (02, FG, lines 514-523)

The analysis suggested that the EPs acknowledged that they had power but also felt powerless. This challenged the crude argument that Professionals were straightforwardly powerful and Clients were vulnerable (Gabe et al., 1991; Hoeyer, 2006; Kleiman, 1999; Laidlaw, 2002). The analysis suggested the more subtle argument that the EPs were both subjects that knew and objects of knowledge (Benjamin, 2004, 2009; Foucault, 2001). The power flowed from the epistemological site (Educational Psychology) from which they spoke. However this was not power that they possessed and were equally influenced by it (Foucault, 1979).

Foucault (1989) argued that the apotheosis of the professional alienated the professional from the client or as Benjamin (2004, 2009) argued the professional’s non-professional identity from the Clients, non-client identity. Evidence for this alienation was perhaps seen in the discussion about what sort of relationship EPs should and could have with Clients. The discussion was started by the question “Why can we not have that human relationship with, with the people we work with, the children and the parents” (02, FG, 280-281). The reply was:

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67 It was noted that the questioner’s use of the phrase “human relationship” already established a binary between human and professional relationships.
“We haven’t got the background relationship with you friends, with some friends you say “you stink” to, they would be completely up in arms. It’s who you say things, even if you met them two or three times. You cannot presume to know them enough to how to (you haven’t got that history with them have you RJ)” (01, FG, lines 283-286)

01 was clear above that the Professional and non-Professional relationships were different not least because the EP did not, and could not, presume to know Clients. 01 (line 292-294) further suggested that the power asymmetry in the relationship already made it different. 06 was very clear about the differences between personal and professional relationships:

“One is personal and one is professional. It our job isn’t it. When it come down to it you are supposed to leave your work at work because if we took home every single case every single parent, every single parent we worked with…” (06, FG, Lines 321-323)

06, above, suggested that Clients were intentionally alienated from the non-professional identity of the EP because it was “our job”. The rationalization given appeared to be the need for self-preservation. 01 added to this by saying:

“Well.. if you walk into a room with somebody else you can’t not bring some of you own personal stuff is there but I think that part of our, our training is skills should be about knowing what is appropriate to bring forwards and be, you know what would, be keep back if something touches or provokes in you and not to be emotionless at all in, in saying that at all, but I don’t want to use the word usurp, because it bring that thing about sitting there very stern, it ,, a child tell you about being hit, well I was like that as a child , da de da de da da. the difference between that and say You tell me some more about being empathic and listening” (01, FG, lines 325-332).

01 suggested the reason for alienating the Client from the non-professional identity of the EP was to enable the EP to perform their role. 04 added that the EP-Client relationship was different because it occurred in an ethical framework:

“I have, I was thinking around that a professional relationship is a human relationship with ethical boundaries. But human relationship don’t necessarily have to be professional ones. They’re greater” (04, FG, lines 350-352)
As discussed above, the processes that fabricated the Client’s clienthood also alienated the EP from the non-Client identity of the Client. This suggested that the EP-Client relation was the location of multiple alienations (Benjamin, 2004, 2009).

5.6 Independent and Autonomous

In the MWM 02’s frequent use of ‘I’ could point to the utilization of the myth of independence and autonomy (Harré, 1989). Using ‘I’ enabled 02 to perform the ethical act of claiming responsibility for the choices he made (Harré, 1989). By appropriating the myths of independence and autonomy 02 did not discover their independence and autonomy but produced it. Following Foucault, (1979, page 123) this was an ‘affirmation’ of an aspect of the EP’s professional identity. The myth of independence and autonomy needed to be balanced with the numerous micro-processes in the EPS that held the EP accountable (see appendix 11). Not all of the micro-process came immediately to mind and were collected over several months. This suggested that the micro systems largely went unchallenged as disciplinary tools; however, they were also frequently useful. The next section examined the strategies employed by the Client (M) to resist the epistemological power and normative processes of categorization in the EP-Client relationship.

5.7 The Impossible Profession

The impossibility of 02’s agenda, in the MWM, was played out in the interaction between the Said and Saying (Levinas, 1981). The tension between the Said and Saying can be perceived as a type of tension, agitation or resistance. M’s resistance took three forms. The first was to verbally suggest an alternative hypothesis, the second, was not to respond and the third was to unsay what was being said about him by being a living contradiction.

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68 This is perhaps an example of the ethnographic nature of the study.
5.7.1. Resisting by Providing an Alternate Category/Story

During the discussion there were several examples of M resisting categorization by offering alternative categorizations. This form of resistance had been recognized by Austin & Fitzgerald 2007. For example, M resisted 02’s medical categorization of his appearance by suggesting that it resulted from poverty and having a coal fire (MWM line 42-43). In the discussion about attendance 02 had framed the problem as poor attendance. However, for M the problem was one of bullying. M also refused the family System Theory approach to understanding his situation and the EPs’ formulations by pointing out that:

“…although his brother had difficulties with spelling and reading he did not have a problem with his speech and that his sister was good at reading.” (02, MWM, lines 91-92)

M further challenged the Systems Theory formulation by suggesting that his actions were simply “something that needed to be done” (MWM, line 80). Therefore, M was offering common sense as an alternative explanation for his behaviour. M’s re-authoring of his account was akin to what Billington (2002) called user’s stories. M’s common sense presentation normalized (as opposed to pathologized) the account and challenged the deficit story suggested by 02.

5.7.2 Resisting by Not Engaging

The second form of resistance offered by M was non-responding to questions or changing the subject. For example the account of the MWM stated:

“I asked M why he had said “we” instead of “his mother” but he did not want to answer” (02, MWM lines 50-51).

and

“M did not answer directly and changed the subject” (02, MWM, line 94).
The above examples of non-compliance could be seen as attempts to refuse their categorization by a dominant other (Austin and Fitzgerald, 2007). M was resisting the professional’s story (Billington 2002). The analysis therefore challenged the passive description of Clients (Gabe et al., 1991; Hoeyer, 2006; Kleiuman, 1999; Laidlaw, 2002)

5.7.3 Unsaying by Being a Living Contradiction

The phrase ‘living contradiction’

referred to M resistance of being made thematic or labelled by being beyond (not reducible to) labels and themes (Critchley & Bernosconi, 2002; Benjamin, 2000; Buber, 1959; Levinas, 1981). M presented 02 with a dilemma. This was not a dilemma in the classic sense where the professional had to choose between interventions, weighing the needs of M against other children or even a clash of traditional ethical principles. Rather, the dilemma was, “was my practice ethical?” M did not explicitly question the ethicality of EP’s practice. However, the consequence of encountering M was a prolonged period of ethical reflection by 02. The ethical reflection was a response to the way M’s vulnerability was both acknowledged and avoided in the MWM. M’s vulnerability was continually pointed to in the account of the MWM. For example, the quote below suggested that M needed care by referring to his appearance:

“M is 14 years old. I noticed that M was unkempt and that his long finger nails were dirty, his hair looked unwashed and there was a slight smell.” (02, MWM lines 2-3)

M’s vulnerability was even more explicit in the use of the story of the canaries used by miners was used as a metaphor to understand M’s behaviour as a consequence of being particularly vulnerability to the stress his family had experienced. (MWM line 87-94).

69 The term was borrowed from Whitehead (1989). In Whitehead (1989) living contradiction referred to a contradiction between values and practice.
The account of the MWM attempted to present 02 as an ethical practitioner where the arrow of ethics flowed from the EP to M. The EP’s role was to respect and M’s role to be respected, the EP provided opportunities to consent and M consented, the EP cared and M was cared for and it was M who needed empowering/liberating and it was the EP who liberated/empowered. However, reading with Levinas (1981) challenged the above asymmetry. In the MWM and in the subsequent FG, 02 claimed that the encounter with M had had a significant impact on him. For example, in response to 03 question “why has this case raised such a strong feeling in you?” (03, FG, lines 99-100). 02 said:

I don’t know, that is one of my puzzles, I just know that I found him very evocative he was dirty, that was the first thing I noticed about him, that I was ashamed to admit. I noticed how filthy he was and how much he smelt, I am sure I cannot be the only one who comes across children with hygiene problems. The dilemma is what do you do. So what do you do? If you are sitting beside a 14 year old boy whose fingers are black, his hair was unwashed. He actually smells very bad. What do we do?” (02, FG, lines 102-108).

02, above, rationalized his continual engagement with M as resulting from the, almost visceral, impact M had on him. Later in the same discussion 02’s described M’s story as “tragic”, “very powerful” and “provocative” (02, FG lines 226-230). It was, as if, M had haunted him. Following Levinas (1981) it was M’s vulnerability that touched 02. M’s vulnerability had asked previously unarticulated, questions of the 02’s practice. 02 framed this question as “what do we do?” (FG line 108). M’s vulnerability had reversed the asymmetry. The arrow of ethics was no longer from the EP but from M because it was M that was calling 02 to be ethical. Rather than accepting that call 02 continually attempted to (re)write what M was saying using the language of the Said. That is, the bioethical/classical ethical language (of competency, confidentiality, respect of autonomy and consent) and to make M understandable through framing M as a case, as having special educational needs and as a subject of knowledge. Positioning M in the language of the Said attempted closure and avoided the
relenting experience resulting from the ethical demand that recognizes the radical otherness of the other in their vulnerability (Levinas, 1981). The number of stories provided by the FG participants about troubling encounters with Clients, above, suggested that this was not an uncommon event. The MWM had been hazardous to 02’s understanding of their practice and made him uncomfortable in that practice. This was achieved by making 02 aware of the tensions between ontology and epistemology of Educational Psychology and the experience of enacting/living that practice. This was a tension between ontology and epistemology informed by bioethics and the infinite ethical demand presented by the impossible to know Other (Derrida, 1995).

Analysis of the FG also suggested that it was the Otherness of the Client that unsettled EP’s practice. For example, below 03 told a story about how a toddler disrupted the EP-Client relationship:

“...In fact. that helped me a lot last Thursday because I was doing a parent drop in session at (deleted) and prior to those I know that one of the parents is going to be a very tough meeting she was coming in and she was, brought her toddler with her. And all the staff warn me be careful this is a very difficult thing, when they came in the toddle rush at me because I am very attractive to kids. Don't know why though, how come on it happen outside as well. (lots if laughter). So he sat on my knee, (RJ, clarify that MK) Ho I don't mean it like that, The toddler sat, I was pulling my face and all like this,...” (03, FG, lines 402-414)

03, above, emphasized the intervention of the child and how his response to the child “humanised” him and therefore facilitated a more productive relationship with the child’s parent. The tension expressed in humour around 03’s story could point to the recognition of the transgression of boundaries. A similar transgression of boundaries was recalled by 06 below:
In the quote above it was another young client that disrupted the Professional-Client boundaries. The above quote suggested that professional's touching of Others required a confessional tone or needed to be excused or explained. Both 03 and 06 emphasized that they did not invite the touch. In addition, 06 apologies for hugging the pupil back. The confessional tone was reinforced by the inclusion of the phrase “I put my hands up” highlighted in the quote below:

“I think that it is also about personalities I'm like you I am very tactile, and I have got people that I work with, I put my hands up, professionally, I will give. if I have not seen then after the hol..., after the summer holidays  they will give me a hug and I will give them a hug back. I, I know of other people in the room who are similar” (06, FG, lines 447-450)

The confessional tone pointed to the transgression of boundaries. However, acknowledging those boundaries also reinforced them (Hepburn 2003). The tension was between a relational space that was demarcated by procedures that establish emotional distance, objectivity, and authority and the collapsing of the space by the present of the Other (Levinas, 1981; Mellow, 2005; Paternelj-Taylor, 2002). It was interesting that the arrow of ethics was again pointed back towards the EP as they felt compelled to given an account of themselves.
5.8 Conclusions from the Third Cycle of Research

The analysis suggested that the research participants both were positioned and positioned themselves using the rationalization of professionalism. These positionings were entangled and facilitated by with the presentation of a complex work environment where EP’s constantly were caught betwixt and between competing agenda and Clients. These positionings and presentations also privileged rational individualistic practice which alienated both EP and Client. The positioning of EP-as-professional was sustained and fabricated through emphasizing the EP’s moral and charismatic authority, which warranted and authorized modes of practice and EP-Client relations. However, these positive positionings of EP’s simultaneously existed with more negative statements that limited and made the EP’s authority problematic. The analysis rather than settling the romanticised/sceptical debate about professional roles suggested a more subtle argument. That is, that both the romanticised and sceptical positions were available to the EPs and that the positions functioned liked the binaries in ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988). This enabled EPs to engage in acts of categorization and objectification while continuing to present themselves as progressive. The FG members did not state that they experienced identity crises or role ambiguity (Boyle & Lauchlan, 2009). However, the analysis suggested EPs’ practice was frequently challenged by Clients and the complex and challenging situation they worked in. This resonated with research that identified EP’s complex relations with Clients (Ashton & Roberts, 2006; Farrell et al., 2006; Fox, 2003; Love, 2009; Mackay, 2002). The analysis therefore added weight to Gersch’s (2009) arguments that EP’s tensions were a consequence of tension in the environment in which they practiced, and challenged Boyle & Lauchlan’s (2009) assertion that role confusion resulted from a narcissistic questioning of EPs’ methods by EPs.
5.9 Summary of Results

The analysis argued that EP practice was complex, socially embedded and emotional engaged. This challenged the emotional, neutral, distant, abstract and rational portrayal of Professional-Client relationships (Arras, 1990; Elliott, 1999; Singer, 2004). The EPs’ and Clients’ identities were argued to be constructed using processes that objectified and categorized both EPs and Clients. These processes also wove the participants into a web of responsibilities. While expressing anxiety about the asymmetry the EPs also fabricated and regulated it.

The analysis suggested that EPs employed a range of ethical constructs rhetorically to justify, authorize, legitimatize and discipline how they were positioned. This thesis argued for a socially embedded and emotionally engaged depiction of Educational Psychology. The ethically challenging situations encountered by EPs also provided opportunities for emotional and identity work.

The analysis suggested that the EPs’ positively positioned themselves as professionals working in complex situations negotiating betwixt and between Clients. However, the positive presentation of EP was balanced by talk that positioned the EP as being subject to power. The construct of professional was employed to authorize, legitimize, justify, and regulate EP’s practice. The analysis challenged the portrayal of the passive client by suggesting that Clients resisted and challenged EP practice. This was achieved by transgressing the boundaries, challenging categorizations, refusing to engage with categorisation and by being a living contradiction. Finally, it was argued that the processes that fabricated and sustained Clienthood, the ethical rhetoric used and the presentation of the EP, were entangled. The next chapter discussed the themes further with reference to the research questions.
Chapter 6. Discussion of Research Questions

This chapter discussed the research findings in relation to the research questions. The discussion, building on the analysis of results, critically examined how EPs were positioned and positioned themselves as ethical professionals. The processes that enabled these positionings were argued to be entangled and provided opportunities for ethical, emotional and identity work. Foucault’s (1990) concepts of ethical substance, mode of subjection, self-forming activities and telos were also employed to examine how EPs constructed themselves as ethical subjects. The chapter also explored what the ethically difficult situations experienced by EPs said about the nature of Educational Psychology.

6.1 First Research Question

How do EPs position themselves as ethical professionals in the EP-Client relationship?

The analysis suggested that EPs employed a range of rhetorical resources to position themselves and Clients in the EP-Client relationship. Professionalism was used to justify, authorize, regulate, and rationalize what was said and what could be said by EPs about EPs and Clients. To position themselves as ethical, the EPs employed a varied and sometimes conflicting range of ethical rationalizations and justifications. The opportunities provided by this verity were also examined. The discussion argued that the relationship between ethics and professionalism was entangled so that to be professional was to be already ethical and to be ethical was to be professional. Finally, the discussion argued that EPs, both constructed and regulated, the EP and Client asymmetrical
relationship and identities. The positions given and received were therefore argued to be fluid rather than fixed. How the EPs positioned themselves in the EP-Client relationship, how they constructed themselves as ethical and ethical professionals was further delineated below.

6.1.1. The EP-Client Asymmetrical Relationship

Not lonely did asymmetry appear to be a given of the EP-Client encounter it was also something that was achieved through the EPs’ practices (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Kurri & Wahlström, 2001; Sacks, 1995; Have, 1991). The analysis suggested that 02 in the MWM and the EPs in the FG also worked to regulate and resist the possibility of a Non-EP and Non-Client identity relationship. This was evident in the FG discussions about the difference between professional and other relationships and the need for the relationship between the EP and Client to be professional.

The analysis suggested that processes of Clienthood began before the EP-Client encounter; M arrived as a set of quasi clinical descriptions. The EPs continued to construct Clienthood by producing more documents and through processes of formulation, objectification and categorization. These processes occurred in an institutional setting that was underpinned by normalization (e.g. the Matrix).

The processes that fabricated clienthood and sustained the EP-Client relationship attempted to objectify the Client while making them responsible for the categorizations offered to them. While worrying about the asymmetry in the EP-Client encounter, the EPs also continued to establish and maintain boundaries between the EP and client. The boundaries work between the EP and Client were evident in the utterance used to maintain a clinical distance. For example, in the discussions of whether it was appropriate to give a Client a work
mobile phone number, the utility or appropriateness of EP’s disclosure and risks of becoming emotionally involved in clients stories.

The EP-Client boundaries did not just regulate and discipline their relations they defined the relationship. This was because the practices that were used to formulate and construct clienthood also inferentially made available EPs’ identities (Jayyusi, 1984; Potter, 1996). It was important to remember that the presentation of asymmetry was not a hidden truth revealed by the analysis. The HPC (2010) Standards of Proficiency recognized Professional-Service User asymmetry and stated that the practitioner psychologists should “understand the power imbalance between practitioners and service users and how this can be managed appropriately” (HPC, 2010, page 6). Rather the analysis of result was an intensive engagement and critical examination with that asymmetry. It was interesting that resistance to the asymmetry or the EP-Client relationship did not always originate from the EP. Educational Psychologists however worried about labelling and attempted to collude with parents to mitigate the power of labels (e.g. 01, FG, lines 634-641). Colluding with parents could be read as an attempt to position themselves as progressive. Resistance also originated in encounters with Others (often a child, occasionally a teacher or parent). The possibility of ethical practice therefore developed from a combination of EP’s attempts to be ethical and being called to be ethical by the Other.

The analysis suggested that EPs presented themselves as making difficult decisions in complex situations with multiple clients and competing relationships. This was something that was present in the literature (e.g. Bennett, 2008; Guiney 2009). The EPs recognized that these conflicts of interest were problematic. From the Client’s perspective these conflicts of interest might become something even more troubling. The Client might even perceive balancing their rights and best interests against others as acts of abandonment or betrayal. In addition, directing the EP’s gaze towards conflicts of interest could divert it from the
governance and disciplinary function of the EP (Goodman, McElliot & Marks, 2003).

While finding Benjamin’s (1998, 2004, 2009) Web of Identification a persuasive framework for examining the EP-Client encounter I did not utilise the explanatory concepts of transferences and projection. Rather, taking a genealogical perspective the multiple alienations suggested by Benjamin were seen as flowing from cultural and historical processes (Foucault 1989). The EP-Client asymmetry was a possibility presented by the clinical encounter. Benjamin (1998, 2004, and 2009) and Levinas (1981) described the relation with Others as a non-relation. However, they both referred to different aspects of relationships. Benjamin (1998, 2004, and 2009) focused on the tendency for Professional-Client relations to be object-to-object relations rather than subject-to-subject. Benjamin (1997, 2004, and 2009) hoped that a non-alienating space could be created in Professional-Client relations to enable subject-to-subject relations. Whereas, Levinas (1981) argued that the relation between the self and the Other always remained a non-relation. This was because the Other was unknowable and always remained radically Other. In keeping with the post-structuralism sensibilities of the thesis it was not necessary to say whether Benjamin or Levinas was correct. Rather, I would emphasize the theories rhetorical utility. Benjamin’s construct provided a useful tool to examine the EP-Client professional relationships. Whereas, Levinas (1981) provided a useful construct to establish professional ethics and to examine non-cognitive resistance. I think it was possible to maintain Benjamin’s hope for a less exploitative relation with Clients while recognising that this aim was problematic. However, just because something was difficult and problematic did not mean that it should not be attempted and even if something was ultimately achievable the journey to that goal can be very worthwhile.  

70 An example would be a friendship. It is perhaps not possible to have a perfect friendship. People, are after all, not perfect. However, if two people strive and work towards this unachievable goal the effort can be worthwhile because it can produce a good friendship. In the same way, no one can be a perfect parent but trying hard to be a parent can produce parenting that is good enough.
6.1.2 How EPs Constructed Themselves as Professionals

The analysis suggested that both the romantic and cynical portrayal of the professional was available in the three cycles of research. This enabled the individual EPs to position themselves fluidly towards professionalism. The apotheosis of the EP in the form of the hero psychologist provided an ethical location through which the participants could produce and sustain the moral order of the situation. However, the vacillation between apotheosis and ‘feet-of-clay’ discourses made available an ambivalent professional identity (Billig et al, 1988; Bhabha, 1994). For example, the EPs could position themselves as both subjects who had power and objects of power. This created instability in the authoritative function of Educational Psychology and created the potential for multiple EP-Client relations. The instability in the authoritative function suggested an additional source of EPs’ role confusion. The accountability of EPs perhaps supported Guiney’s (2009) argument that EPs were semi-professionals. However, this would require detailed research to establish if other ‘professionals’ were any more autonomous than EPs or if autonomy was a universal myth.

The EPs’ vacillation between the discourses also suggested that they were actively articulating/navigating the extent to which they both identify and distanced themselves from the dominate discourses of professionalism. This was another in-between (liminal) space not completely or straightforwardly subjected to the professional discourse. The vacillation meant that EPs positioned themselves as both the subject that knows and the object that was known. For example, this was suggested in talk about being subject to regulation and administrative demands and in anxiety about the EP-Client asymmetry (e.g., 03 & ND, FG, lines 559-566).

71 The opposite of apotheosis is damnatio memoriae which literally means ‘condemnation of memory’. In ancient Rome this involved attempting to wipe away all official record of a person so that they become a non-person. I do not think that the EPs were attempting to obliterate their EP identity and that damnation memoriae was too strong. I have therefore chosen instead to use the phrase ‘feet-of-clay’. This phrase has connotations of a flawed hero which seemed to fit better.
The EPs did not seem to be aware of the source of the power they exercised. Several of the EPs attempted to make the Client responsible for the EP’s charismatic authority (e.g. LA, FG lines 304-309). It was almost as if the EP could not sustain the myth of the hero psychologist in their own eyes and needed to make the Client responsible for it. Following, Foucault (1989) it was argued that the Client was able to admire the EP because this had been made available through the discourses that emphasized the moral authority of professionals (e.g. HPC, 2008). The apotheosis of the EP was therefore facilitated by professional discourses and (re)produced in the encounter through talk. The client was in effect reflecting back what the situation had made available.

6.1.3 How EPs Constructed Themselves as Ethical Professionals

The analysis of results suggested that EPs found themselves in difficult situations. Not all of the EPs in FG readily saw these difficulties as ethical challenges. This finding was similar to previous research into EPs’ perceptions (Bennett, 2008; Guiney 2009). Three possible causes of the EPs’ difficulties perceiving the challenges as ethical were considered. Firstly, ethics as an explanatory construct was inappropriate and was externally imposed for normative reasons. Secondly, ethics was considered by the participants to be about large ethical dilemmas rather than the microethical challenges encounter by professionals. Thirdly, the concept of ethical choice appeared to be problematic in the EP’s practice. The choices EPs most frequently made tended not to be about large ethical dilemmas but about micro commitments. The question was often how do I respond in the situation where I know what the right thing to do is but doing it will have a high cost? This question was (re)framed as taking sides and might not have readily presented itself as an ethical dilemma. This suggested that further research was required to explore these options. Regardless of the reasons why some participants did not readily consider issues as ethical, they were able to employ the language of ethics to talk about difficulties they encountered. Furthermore, presenting the issues to the EPs was
a double edged sword; framing issues as ethical, provided a new and creative way to examine issues but it also had the potential to facilitate reductive, predictable and instrumental discussions (Allan, 1999; Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008; Water, 2002).

Some of the ethically difficult situations appeared to result from having to negotiate between the demands of different clients (e.g. schools, parents, children, Local Authority). This finding echoed similar arguments in the literature review (Ashton & Roberts, 2006; Bennett, 2008; Guiney, 2009; MacKay, 2002) These conflicting demands occurred within discourses that positioned the EP as an autonomous professional and emphasized the importance of the EP-Client ethical relationship. The simultaneous demands from stakeholders, the call to be autonomous and demand for an ethical relationship with Clients created tensions.

Ethical rationalizations were employed rhetorically to establish, warrant, justify, regulate and legitimize positions. Bioethics was a significant source of rationalizations (interpretative repertoires). However, the EPs also employed deontological, virtue, consequential, particularist, and care ethics. The literature review suggested that there was a tension between principlism and particularism (Benner, 1997; Brinkmann & Kvale 2008; Popke, 2003; Tauber, 2005; Tong, 1998; Wendell, 1996). However, the analysis argued in EP talk that this tension did not appear to exist. The EPs appeared able to move freely between principled and other ethical rationalizations. Rather the binary functioned more like an ideological dilemma which provided the participants with rhetorical resources they could use strategically Billig et al., (1988).

The next section employed Foucault’s constructs of ethical substance, mode of subjection, self-forming activities and telos to critically examine how EPs constructed themselves as ethical subjects.
6.1.4 Ethical substance

The analysis suggested that the ethical substance (the aspect to be worked on) was the EP-Client relationship, specifically, the problematization and regulation of the EP-Client relations. This was manifested in the awareness of the asymmetrical power relations and the desire to make the relationship professional, while regulating and managing the EP-Client asymmetry.

6.1.5 Mode of Subjection

The action and practices of the EPs were rationalized by EPs being appropriate because they were professionals (e.g. LA, FG, lines 43-49). This established professionalism as both an aesthetic and political practice. Aesthetic, because it was rationalized as 'people like me behave in this way' or 'to be a good professional I have to behave in this way'. In addition participants rationalized their behaviour in the form of 'if I want people to accept me as a professional I have to behave in this way' (ND, FG, lines 182-190). The practice was political because the exercise of power was linked to being a professional. That was, to have authority (to be listened to/be worthy of being listened to) I must behave professionally. The effect was that the aesthetic and political were therefore entangled in a moment. ND also invited the reader to recognize the EP’s moral obligations as mode of subjection arising out of M’s special educational needs by privileging descriptions of strangeness and deficit. The EP was in effect saying, ‘I can work with M because he was a legitimate subject of educational psychology practice because of his bizarre behaviour, learning needs, communication and interaction needs and emotional wellbeing needs’.

6.1.6 Self-forming Practices

Elaboration and deciphering of Self were the two main processes of self-formation. The practices of elaboration involved problematizing the relationships
and reflecting on how EPs regulated and disciplined themselves in the relationships with clients. This was a relationship that the EPs both established and regulated in their talk and practices. The EPs were both subject to a normative gaze and were incited to put themselves within a normative gaze. The analysis suggested that EPs involved themselves and were incited to be involved in acts of purification (Foucault, 2001). This included EPs being tested and testing themselves against an ideal of professionalism. To facilitate this EPs problematized their relationships with clients. This could be considered a masochistic practice where the EPs held themselves to account (Butler, 2005). EPs presented themselves as working in complex/messy contexts caught betwixt and between clients. This rhetoric functioned to privilege a rational account of practice.

The EPs in the FG did not appear to readily turn to ethical codes to provide support in navigating the complexity. The relationship the EPs had with ethical codes appeared to be complex. The EPs were aware of the existence ethical codes but did not appear to be overly familiar with their contents. The regulative and disciplinary function of ethical codes was therefore not straightforwardly linear. This provided the opportunity for ethical work where the EPs adopted positions of accepting, resisting and/or interpreting ethical codes. This ethical work was part of the processes of individualization (Foucault, 1990). Foucault (1986c) called the process by which subjects came to recognize themselves deciphering practices. This included trying to establish the type of EP one was in relation to the context (discursive formation) in which they worked. This included an examination of being an EP as a subject of ethical actions.

6.1.7 Telos

The aim of ethics appeared to be the formation of a rational, autonomous, independent decision maker. The relation was to have power over others one must regulate the self (Foucault, 1986c)
Although the above modes were independent there were also relations between them. For example:

- There was a desire to make the relationship professional,
- Professionalism was provided as the rationalization of action,
- Professionalism acted as a normalizing ideal and
- The telos was to become an ethical professional.

The literature review suggested that ethics and professionalism were entangled (e.g. Nixon, 2004; Marrow, et al., 2011). The entanglement between ethics and professionalism resulted in the moralization of EP practice. The entanglement between professional practice and morality was not self evident or necessary (Foucault, 1986c, 1990). Other forms of rationalization could be possible. For example, there is no mention of ethics in the core professional standards for teachers (TDA, 2007). The association between behaviour and ethics established a set of disciplinary relations and provided a set of normative judgements for governing and regulating performance and development. For example, the HPC-SCPE (2008) included guidance on the correct and ethical way to file information. The second research question was considered below.

6.2 Second Research Question

What do the ethical trials experienced by EPs while working with clients say about the nature of Educational Psychology?

The introduction argued that examining the EP-Client relationship provided insights into the nature of Educational Psychology. The analysis of results argued that EPs’ work provided frequent *ethically* troubling situations. The thesis suggested that these troubling situations could be analogous to trials (Araujo & Martuccelli, 2010). The trials appeared to provide opportunities for emotional, identity and ethical work. For example, in the trials the EPs were concerned with
how to manage the emotional work of making commitments to Clients, keeping professional distances and managing the ethical tugs in workplaces where there never appeared to be enough time and too much work. The thesis argued that these trials were a response to the discursive formation in which EPs worked. Clienthood was argued to result from processes of objectification, categorization, rationalization, responsibilization and case formulation. However, these processes also inferentially objectified, categorized, formulated and rationalized the EP. The processes of clienthood therefore acted like a reflexive epistemological and ontological mirror in which the EPs constructed their professional selves. The FG discussion suggested that different EPs emphasized different aspects of the EP-Client relation and their relationship with Local Authority. This, perhaps partly, explained the differences in professional identity between EPs. That was, although the discursive formation of Educational Psychology provided opportunities for trials how each EP resolved, failed to resolve or avoided those trials individually shaped their professional identity.

As discussed above, the EPs were also concerned with the EP-Client asymmetry, promoting inclusion, working correctly, doing the right thing and defending the rights of the vulnerable. Resistance to asymmetry also appeared to come from the Client, for example, by offering alternative formulation of issues. The processes of clienthood fabrication and regulation when combined with the apotheosis of the EP, worked to establish a set of alienations between the EP and Client. Therefore, tautologically, Educational Psychology invited questions about power because power was problematic in the EP-Client relationship. In addition to the rational, neutral, scientific practitioner the analysis of results also suggested the possibility of a socially embedded, partisan and emotional involved Educational Psychology. This thesis could be guilty of suggesting that scientific, rational, neutral, socially abstract and emotionally disengaged practice was inherently unethical. This would be making a truth statement and was too simplistic and strongly polemic an argument. Rather, this thesis attempted to agitate against, trouble and act as a corrective for that dominant discourse.
The analysis therefore suggested that the relationship between Educational Psychology, EP and Client was not straightforwardly hierarchal or linear. Rather they were complex and recursive. This was suggested using the examples of apotheosis (relating to professional identity) and categorization (relating to practice). The romanticized professional identity was available in the discourse (Arnold, 2002; MacDonald, 1995). The apotheosis of the personage of the EP was also constructed in the EP-Client relationship. However, this apotheosis was not sustainable in the eyes of EPs. Similarly, categories were available in the discourse (e.g. SEN, Autism, etc) and were (re)produced in the EP-Client encounter. However, categorization was also resisted by both EP and Clients. This suggested that Educational Psychology practice was in tension caused by the collision of theory and practice. The multiple and micro acts of resistance and collusion in the EP-Client relationship appeared to both sustain and undermine the epistemology of Educational Psychology. This suggested an additional source of EP role confusion.

The analysis of results provided support for the descriptions of Educational Psychology outlined in the literature review. This included ambiguity about who the client was, competing demands from different clients, epistemological variety within Educational Psychology, gaps between theory and practice, tensions between the statutory and psychology functions (Ashton & Roberts, 2006; Boyle & Lauchlan, 2009; Cameron, 2006; Cameron & Monsen, 2005; Farrell, et al, 2006; Fox, 2003; Gersch, 2009; Gillham, 1978; Kelly & Gray, 2000; Love, 2009; MacKay, 2002; McCaslin & Hickey, 2001). Educational Psychology rather than being a fixed construct was therefore argued to be fluid. This fluidity provided a range of, often conflicting and inconsistent rhetorical tools, positions and rationalizations that EPs could employ strategically. The fluid nature of Educational Psychology resonated with Foucault’s (1997) description of the lack of unity in discursive formations. This was not the same as saying that the constellation of practices and theories of Educational Psychology were arbitrary.
or random. Rather they were the result of historical and current relations between discursive formations and EPs practices. Further research on the relations between Educational Psychology and other educational, medical and legal discursive formations would therefore be interesting.

The analysis of results also suggested that Educational Psychology acted like a site from which EP’s justified, disciplined and warranted their formulations of cases and Clients. This included establishing the speaking rights of the participants and regulating and permitting what could be said (Benwell & Stoke, 2010). Educational Psychology therefore had a normative function acting as a benchmark of legitimization and verification of practices and decisions.

6.3 Chapter Summary

This section argued that EPs were positioned and positioned themselves as ethical professionals in EP-Client relationships. The EPs employed a range of ethical positions to position themselves as ethical professionals. The relationship between ethical and professional rationalizations was entangled so that to be professional was to be ethical and to be ethical was to be professional. Finally, the analysis argued that EPs both constructed and regulated the EP-Client asymmetrical relationship and identities. The ethically challenging situations experienced by EPs were argued to be analogous to trials that provided opportunities for emotional, ethical and identity work. The analysis argued that Educational Psychology was a highly fluid construct that provided authority to EPs. However, the fluidity also enabled a multiplicity of inconsistent and conflicting positions which, in turn, provided opportunities for resistance. Educational Psychology also appeared to be concerned with pastoral power with its aims of categorization, normalization, standardization and discipline. However these processes appeared to apply both to EP and Clients. Finally, the analysis suggested three additional sources for EPs’ role confusion:
1. Instability of the authoritative function enacted in the vacillation between the apotheosis and feet-of-clay discourses.
2. The resistance and unsaying of EP practice that occurred in EP-Client encounters
3. The fluidity of discourses and practices within Educational Psychology that facilitated both pastoral powers and allowed EPs to present themselves as progressive.

The next section reflected on the impact of the research on my professional identity, the research process and the post-structural epistemology.
Chapter 7. Reflections

I began this thesis with a description of M. However, at the end of this thesis I no longer felt confident in writing about M. I no longer believed that I understood M or that M was reducible to a set of categories or labels no matter how complex. Therefore, when ‘understanding’ meant applying preconceived categories/labels to a particular client, resistance was always to be on the way to co-understanding but never ultimately understanding. Resistance also meant postponing, suspending or deferring knowing. Permanently deferring knowing was not possible because even not knowing was knowing that I did not know.

The initial impact of the face to face encounter with M had reduced me to silence. How could I speak when speaking was an act of violence? However, there was also the paradox that silence perceived as abandonment could also have enabled violence or injustice. The tensions in the MWM were therefore between abandonment and commitment and curiosity and knowing. M’s impossibility also reminded me of the impossibility of all the children I worked with. I was painfully aware that even saying this was making M instrumental.

In the MWM I was aware\footnote{I am also, only too aware that I have reintroduced the thinking and feeling subject that I have worked so hard to postpone and defer.}, retrospectively, of an event or nodal moment. The event did not empower the Other but was a (re)realisation of my responsibilities. Ethics manifested itself in how I could respond to the event. It was M’s ability to unsay what my professional practice had said about him that facilitated this responsibility (Levinas, 1981). M’s unsaying was not only a rational argumentative engagement but also resulted from the inability of my professional discourse to bind him. Before M I had always thought that empowerment was a product of the methods employed by the psychologist, e.g., the non-expert

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\footnote{I am also, only too aware that I have reintroduced the thinking and feeling subject that I have worked so hard to postpone and defer.}
professional model. However, it was not the psychologist or the approach that resisted categorization in the MWM. Rather, it was the Client as Other.

The disruptive event was singular because it occurred in a specific context with particular individuals and hence the ethical response also needed to be singular. To apply ready made solutions or categories would negate the event and make it part of everyday practice and changed the unique encounter with M to just another encounter. Ethical practice in response to a disruptive event was therefore always a unique response to a particular situation (Badiou, 2001, 2005). This made providing general ethical advice problematic. The demand placed on the EP by the Other enabled the potential for a shifted praxis. The analysis of results had not produced a truth but raised the question “How do I have fidelity to the preliminary understandings I had arrived at?”

I frequently wondered why my dilemmas and concerns were not shared in the same way with all of my colleagues. Following Araujo & Martuccelli (2010), the thesis suggested that the processes of individualization were just that individual and that the processes of recognition, disposition towards the normative systems and relation with oneself as an ethical subject would have different relevance for each EP. In Short, Educational Psychology provided the opportunities for identity work but how EPs responded to these opportunities was highly contingent and unique.

In this thesis I was both the subject of what I am saying while being the one who said it. I therefore established my legitimacy by belonging to a community. However, I was also aware that being critical about my community could have presented a risk to my professional identity. This, in part, arose out of belonging to two communities (researcher and researched) and produced a type of diaspora associated with hybridity (Bhabha, 1990). Undertaking the research required splitting myself between the roles of researcher, EP practitioner and
work colleague. These roles were separate and interconnected and occurred simultaneously. For example, in peer supervision I could be discussing an issue a colleague was having and come to realize that it had resonances with the issues I was examining in the research. Compartmentalizing the roles was, at times, confusing and perplexing. For example:

- “Was I seeing M because of his needs or because he was a case study in the research?”
- Should I tell my colleagues during the conversation that our conversation has veered into an area relevant to the research and risk stifling the discussion or should I wait to the end.

However this temporary displacement provided the creative opportunity to experiment with my professional identity. The aim was not to renounce or achieve a permanent detachment from Educational Psychology but to establish a new relationship and full engagement with Educational Psychology. Critical approaches to Psychology tended to treat the discipline of Psychology as part of the problem and being complicit in the continued domination and exclusion of groups and individuals (Hepburn, 2003). I may have been guilty of perpetuating of this perception. However, I also acknowledge that Psychology can be part of the solution. Educational Psychology was open to critique by being ‘critiqueable’. This was self evident given the large amount of literature which manifested Psychology’s individual and cognitive bias (Hepburn, 2003). In addition, I was able to hold a position in the discipline of Educational Psychology and take a critical stance.

There was also a danger that the position of insider researcher meant that I could have presented myself as someone who spoke the truth regardless of the risk. I was not suggesting that I had produced the truth or that the interpretation was the only possible one. Rather the aim was a local reading of and reading against the EPs’ accounts (Friedman, 2000).

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73 I could have added the binaries of researcher and father and partner because undertaking research involved sacrificing time (weekends and holidays) and trying to balance these roles.
The second research question presented the potential trap of essentializing Educational Psychology in order to out Educational Psychology. This would have meant that somehow I had managed to discover and delineate the true nature of Educational Psychology. This would have been highly problematic given the post-structuralist aspirations of this thesis which assumed a difference between essence and existence. Following Levinas (1981) all I would have exposed was my exposing of Educational Psychology and aspects of my relationship to Educational Psychology. Educational Psychology like the Other would always remain more than, and other to, what could be said about it. I have attempted to mitigate against this trap by making my language highly contingent and recognizing that I have constructed what I might have claimed to have found. However, I argued that the constructions were available and my reading (against) of Educational Psychology was a defendable reading.

My concern (and perhaps guilt) about the power of Educational Psychology and attempts to formulate a resistance could be also seen as a continued conversation with Educational Psychology. Furthermore, resisting or submitting, acknowledges, reiterates, (re)invokes, and confirms that there was something to resist or submit to (Butler, 1995). This was not an argument for pessimistic determinism. Rather, Butler (1995) argued agency was not only possible but necessary for the operation of conditioning power. By resisting a particular discourse, e.g. labelling, I therefore both did and did not escape the games of power. This is very much a Foucauldian critique of power which argued that resistance was a device used by power to increase its hold on subjects but also recognized that power could only be exercised on the free (Foucault, 2001). This dynamic description of identity work suggested that identity work provided opportunities for both agency and submission. Each act of resistance provided opportunities for disciplinary power to adapt and develop new strategies. This did not mean that it is useless to revolt (Foucault, 2002) Revolts might not lead to the final liberation but could lead to something different. Hence, “against
power it is always necessary to oppose unbreakable laws and unabridgeable rights” (Foucault, 1999, page 134).

As disused in the introduction, this thesis was also intended to be a response to Allen’s (1999) call for professionals to undertake ethical work on themselves. I undertook ethical work on myself through problematizing my practice. This included problematizing the rhetoric that EPs used, the processes through which they categorized clients and the apotheosis of the EP. In critically engaging with Educational Psychology and how it constructed those that both practice and were practiced on, there was an opportunity to “expose and account for the inhuman ways in which the human continues to be done and undone” (Butler, 2005, page 133). Critically, engagement therefore required undertaking a reflexive process.

Outing myself to work colleagues as a researcher was a first move that enabled the reflexive process. This was done at a team meeting where I explained, as best I could at the time, my research ideas and methods. I said that I would be making notes on my practice and of conversations with colleagues. However, it would be insufficient to assume that it was enough to forewarn my colleagues and after each conversation in which I discussed the research with a colleague I asked them if it would be OK to make notes. Even though I have attempted to give my colleagues anonymity I knew that if they read the research they might recognize themselves and others. They would then be able to read what I said about what they had said. In the EPS there was an expectation that EPs presented their thesis to the team. This helped to engender a respectful approach to what others have said but it could also have been censorious. However, the fear remained that my colleagues would discover what I “really” thought. This discomfort was caused by the knowledge that the personal would be made public (Parker, 2002).
A key aim of the research was to improve my practice but this was neither a neutral or unproblematic aim. Butler (1995) argued that “The more a practice is mastered, the more fully subjection is achieved” (Ibid, page 45). This was because of the paradoxical way in which the process of subjecthood (subjection) was achieved. For example, the subject must work (engage in acts of self-discipline) to obtain mastery in a practice. In this thesis this included obtaining knowledge about how EPs practiced and experimented with their EP identity. Therefore, while I was mastering the disciplines of Educational Psychology I also risked becoming subjected to those disciplines.

The introduction identified eight possible traps to be avoided in this thesis. This section reflected on whether I have been successful in avoiding those traps. I had attempted to avoid being normative by not generating a new set of meta-rules or guidelines that would deliver ethical professionals. Rather, the thesis explored how EP’s constructed themselves as ethical professionals. However, there was a large gulf between dictating universal rules and saying nothing. Future research on the attitudes, dispositions, relationships, capacities, contexts or support mechanisms that supported ethical practice could be useful in providing support to EPs. I had also made some specific suggestions below. I had attempted to avoid sounding to sanctimonious. I was aware that when discussing bioethics that I perhaps came close to falling into this trap. However, there could also be a place for indignation as long as it was not too righteous. The narcissistic and vainglorious traps have been mitigated through adapting a dialogueic approach to research and triangulating the individualist account of the MWM with the results of the FG. I was also aware that there was still a lot of “I” in the thesis. I endeavoured to postpone closure by avoiding simple descriptions of the research participants and processes. The complexity might have made the thesis frustrating to read at times. Through the use of qualifying language (could, might, suggest, perhaps, etc.) I have attempted to work against the warranting of my “insider account”. On reflection, I was perhaps too quick and perhaps too pejorative to consider personal therapy as a trap. Personal therapy could well be
a legitimate aim for a thesis. However, in my opinion, a thesis should be more than just personal therapy. I would not call the journey I was on therapeutic rather I would call it useful.

The next chapter examined the both the methodological and epistemological limitation of this thesis.
Chapter 8. Limitations

This chapter focused on the limitations that flowed from employing a post-structuralist (Foucauldian) epistemology and a bricolage approach to methodology.

The ancient paradox of whether an eye could see itself was relevant to and a possible limitation of this thesis’ methodology (Plato, 2001). Specifically, could I be both researcher and researched. The solution was to see oneself in he eyes of another. This made having a relational ontology important because it was through the call of the Other that I was able to observe Educational Psychology.

The thesis employed a bricolage approach to methodology so as not to privilege a particular methodology. It could be argued that Foucauldian approaches had a privileged position in this thesis. However, I hoped by positioning the Foucauldian approach as a method of data analysis, in relation to the other methodologies (AR, S-S and autoethnography) and employing constructs from other discursive approaches that this agitated against the privileging of the Foucauldian approach.

I was aware that in what was ostensibly an exercise in professional identity work, which borrowed from autoethnography, that my biography was absent. In addition, I have managed to hide behind erudition and grammatical convinces of the third person past tense. This was only partly intentional and it was something that I came to realise rather than being fully planned. This perhaps worked against the propensity for narcissism but also kept me hidden\textsuperscript{74}. The process of professional identity work therefore occurred through employing writing as a tool to reflect on my and colleagues’ practice (Delgado-Gaitan, 1993; Grafanki, 1996; Richardson, 2000).

\textsuperscript{74} It was perhaps more like a game of hide and seek or a series of strategic and contingent revealing.
It was possible that the aim of professional self-development was just another example of the romantic and narcissistic myth of self-fulfilment (Taylor, 2006). However, to ask “who am I?” was also to ask “where I stand?” The critical examination of positions I took, the commitments and identifications I made provided the opportunity for an analysis of the grounding from which I made judgements. The review of self was therefore embedded in the community in which I worked.

The self-imposed Foucauldian discipline was very difficult because I continually wanted to internalize my experience and reintroduce the thinking and feeling subject who stood outside of discourse. However, the methodologically and metaphorical distance facilitated by the Foucauldian approach was useful. After all, “the spectator can sometimes see more of the game”. Conversely, like all good metaphors it’s opposite, “standing on the sidelines” also had truth. The erasure of the emotional self also presented an ontological problem. The research could not account for the emotional investment or attachment I or the other participants had with their subject positions (Willig, 2003). Foucault (1997) was aware of this issue but did not feel the need to invoke emotion as a cause but was rather attempting to “define the positions and functions that a subject could occupy in the diversity of discourse” (Foucault, 1997, page 200). The extent to which a subject adopted a position depended on how they resolved the dilemma or trial. Presenting the results as discourses that could be described and analyzed had the risk of reifying those discourses and statements (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2009). However, I attempted to make clear that the discourses are not things but rules and procedures. Foucauldian approaches are often argued to be deterministic and engendering compliance (Schutz, 2004) However, I attempted to show that resistance was present, for example M’s resistance of the categorization offered by the EP. In addition, the Foucauldian approach to discourse suggested that participants frequently presented inconsistent positions suggesting, at least, partial agency.
Balanced against the Foucauldian epistemological discipline was flexibility inherent in Foucauldian data analysis. This flexibility provided the opportunity to develop creative insights. However it was also very time consuming when compared to some quantitative methods. The findings produced by a Foucauldian approach to data analysis were messy and overlapping. It was therefore difficult to reduce the results to a set of neat bullet points. However, this messiness reflected the complexity inherent in the EP role and of being an “insider” researcher.

I have attempted to challenge Foucault but I am aware that this has frequently appeared like a defence. However, I do not consider the question; “did Foucault speak the truth?” relevant. Foucault (2002, page 242) had already described his work as a “fiction”. I was more interested in the work that Foucault enabled me to do. This was to trouble power and asks challenging questions. Perhaps even to ask questions about the questions I was asking. As Derrida (1995) below stated that asking questions can be part of a political and ethical engagement:

“Asking oneself questions, including ones about the questions that are imposed on us or taught to us as being the right questions to ask, even questioning the question from critique, and not only questioning, but thinking through commitments, the stake, through which a given question is engaged perhaps this is a proper responsibility, and a precondition of commitment. On its own not enough of course, but it has never impeded or retarded commitment – quite the reverse” (Derrida, 1995. Cited in Hepburn, 2003, page 212).

My reading of Foucault did not provide a set of truth statements about the nature of human relations or reality but a set of attitudes, strategies and approaches. The strength of a Foucauldian approach was that it enabled analytical attention not just to be given to the problem but also the type of discourse and practices that made the problem possible and continued to make it problematic.

The inclusion of extensive analytical and explanatory constructs from other branches of discourse could point to a weakness in a Foucauldian methodology.
However, I was not striving for purity in method and hence adopted a bricolage approach which encouraged this magpie strategy. Employing a bricolage approach also created a tension between adhering to the values, perspectives, and techniques of a particular methodology and utility of being able to selectively appropriate strategies from those methodologies while recognizing that this selective appropriation modifies the methodologies (Bazeley, 2004). The reader can decide whether the bricolage methodology provided data that could answer the research questions (Howe & Eisenhardt, 1990).

To analysis the data I borrowed constructs from more than one discursive tradition such as positioning (Foucauldian, Psychoanalytic and NI) and categorization (Foucauldian, DP, CDA, and CA). Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine (2009) argued that Foucauldian approaches would benefit from “importing the linguistic tools from conversation, rhetorical, or positional analysis so long as analysts never take their genealogical eye of the problem” (Ibid, page 106). Foucauldian approaches have also informed other approaches to discourse I have borrowed from and I took a Foucauldian reading of those alternative discursive approaches.

I found the results difficult to write up because of the dislocated but essential relations between sentences and a statement. This was because several sentences constituted a statement. For example, in the FG analysis chunks of texts were provided as examples of statements. However in these chunks of text multiple simultaneous positions could be presented. In addition one utterance could make several statements (Foucault, 1979, page 83).

The thesis was open to the challenge that it was not EP practice that was analyzed but how EP talked about practice. In addition, there can be a gap between practice and how one talked about practice (Savage, 2000).
During the data analysis I sensed that employing a Foucauldian approach involved adopting a perversely cynical and overly suspicious attitude towards what was being researched. This included describing what could be considered appropriate actions (e.g. seeking consent) in a negative way. There are two arguments that could be employed to support this apparently negative approach. Firstly, adopting a suspicious disposition was necessary if the familiar was to be made unfamiliar and to challenge the taken for granted in my practice. Secondly, describing something considered positive in a negative way enabled possible dangers to be shown. This did not mean that confidentiality, respect, or consent were bad. However, following Foucault (1983/2003), they had the potential to be dangerous. Accepting that these constructs could be dangerous meant that had I to be vigilant and presented “ethico-political” choices (Ibid, page 343).

In keeping with a post-structuralist epistemology I did not use structures such as class or economic systems as explanatory constructs. It was therefore possible that I was missing the opportunity to employ useful analytic tools. After all, there was evidence of a relationship between Special Educational Needs and social deprivation (e.g. Croll, 2002). In addition, Fairclough (2003) had demonstrated that it was possible to undertake interesting discursive research that included structures as explanatory constructs. However, following Foucault (2003) I did not consider the EP-Client relationship as a straightforward representation of the State-Subject relationship where the EP represented the State. This did not exclude the possibility that State structures had a role to play or that the EP had a State function. Rather the thesis was interested in the micro relations between EP and Client and how power was exercised in that relation. Foucault (1977) had called this the analysis of the ‘micro-physics’ of power.

The area for research and research questions were not neutral. Staying within relational research I could have examined the EP relations with school staff, parents, and Local Authority officers, other professionals in and out of the Local Authority, the Trade Union, and other EPs. Choosing to focus on the EP-Client
relationship could be critiqued for privileging one form of practice and presenting Educational Psychology as clinical discipline. However by locating the EP-Client relation in the broader discipline of Educational Psychology and using the trials in this relationship to illuminate the nature of Educational Psychology I hoped to mitigate this criticism.

There was also a possible tension between attempting to work with what Foucault (2003, page 6) had called “subjugated knowledges” while applying meticulous scholarly methods. This included “insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naïve knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificticy” (Foucault, 2003, page 7). For Foucault (2003) these knowledges were singular, particular, and different from common sense. In essence it was what people knew at a local level. However tension could be creative and was, to a degree, required to facilitate thinking and consideration of experience.

This thesis has been ambitious, and possibly over ambitious, in scope. For example I was unable to include the analysis of the HPC-SCPE in the main body of the research. It might have been desirable to further reduce the amount of data by only including results from the FG or the MWM. This could have enabled a more detailed and possibly richer analysis of the results. However, there would not have been the possibility of triangulation provided by including both cycles of research. In addition, the aim of the thesis was to reflect on personal practice while enlisting my colleagues as an epistemological and ontological mirror. The amount of data therefore flowed from the research design; in particular AR. It would have been possible to employ alternative research designs that did not include a cyclical approach. However, the research design was chosen because of its appropriateness to the way this thesis developed out of actual practice.

The next chapter outlined the implication for practice that arose from the analysis of results and suggested areas for possible future research.
Chapter 9. Implication for Practice and Future Research

This thesis examined how EPs talked about and reflected on their practice. It would be interesting to analyse EP-Client encounters more directly through videoing or recording EP-Client meetings. The analysis of the MWM was based on a written account. It would be useful to record EP-Client interactions to further explore the regulation and production of asymmetry. Future research into the complexities of making particular judgments would also be of interest. Although it would not be possible to repeat this study in the strict positivist sense, it would be interesting to read future accounts of EP’s practice by EP. It would be particularly interesting to read a history of the problemization in Educational Psychology.

This thesis has been exploratory. In addition, researching issues at the micro (local) level in relation to an individual EP’s practice and at the level of a single and particular EPS meant that making generalization would be problematic. However, Foucault (2002) argued that the problems examined at a local level were just as general as those analyzed at the macro level. After all, the asymmetry in Professional-Client relations was a general problem. Foucault (2002) said that his role was not to provide solutions but to “raise questions” (Ibid, page 288). The type of problems Foucault was interested in did not have easy solutions. Foucault (2002) added that “Critique doesn’t have to have the premise of a deduction that concludes this is what has to be done”; rather it was an “instrument for those who fight those who resist and refuse what is” (Ibid page 236). Whilst this thesis could not confidentially identify specific solutions, it was suggested that the solutions were not:

- A return to psychology. This is just a continuation of a desire for a psychology that never was. It also fails to sufficiently acknowledge the relationship between Heath Care Professionals and the State and the normalization functions of EPs. EP practice was born out of the need to assess and categorize children (Mackay, 2002)
- To find a neutral place from where EP can practice (e.g. working directly for the State, working for schools, working directly for parents, etc). There
was no neutral place (Foucault, 2002). Each new context would present new tensions and conflicts.

- Liberation from the Local Authority. This is because the charismatic power, process of alienation, authority to categorize would all still be present.

The emphasis on negatives could be seen as pessimistic and perhaps engendering apathy. Foucault (1983/2003) suggested that the aim of his approach was to inculcate a “hyper- and pessimistic activism” (Ibid page 343). If EPs after reading this thesis “don’t know which way to turn, this just goes to show that they’re looking and, hence, are not anesthetized or sterilized at all” (Foucault, 2002, page 236).

The analysis suggested that ethics was not just a personal issue for EPs but that there were implications for psychology services in terms of ethical training and supervision. Although, I was unable to provide universal solution I do feel able to make some particular suggestions, outlined below.

Existing EPs could benefit from training that provided awareness of the wide range of ethical approaches that they appropriated in their practice. Regular training that enabled opportunities to collectively discuss and explore challenging situations could also be beneficial for existing EPs. It would be interesting to explore the extent to which relational and microethics issues were incorporated into the Doctoral training programmes for EPs.

Clinical supervision could have a crucial role to play in developing ethical practice. This would include:

- Supporting individuals in navigating between worrying about practice and getting on with the job.
- Providing a space for ongoing personal ethical reflection.
- Identifying the ethical dimension of troubling situations.
• Providing a safe space to engage with and resolve ethically challenging situations.

The analysis implied that, as well as a set of overarching and universal guidelines, a set of dispositions was required for ethical practice. These included humility, respect, reflexivity and being open to the ethical demand of the Client. However, the emphasis on the personage of the EP had the potential to further the apotheosis of the EP\textsuperscript{75}. To agitate against this apotheosis there would also need to be an emphasis on the relational aspects of practice.

This could have implications for recruitment. Universities and Educational Psychology Services might need to consider the kinds of persons and experiences conducive to ethical practice.

Educational Psychologists would benefit from debating the ethical frameworks which inform their practice. The aim would be to construct a more coherent and unified narrative of ethical practice in order to critically challenge, where appropriate, institutional processes which work against Client’s wellbeing.

This thesis argued that examining how EPs made sense of their practice, their ethical tensions and their Clients lives, provided access to the institutional rationality of Educational Psychology. This type of analysis could therefore suggest a possible basis to build future policies and guidelines for practice to accommodate and extend the heterogeneity of clienthood.

\textsuperscript{75} While writing this thesis I was struck by the high number of paradoxical binaries. The example above was a case in point. The steps in the paradox were:

1. The apotheosis personage of the professional was a source of authority and asymmetry.
2. Rebalancing of the asymmetry required the professional to adopt particular dispositions and attitudes.
3. These attitudes could be perceived as being positive and could therefore further the apotheosis of the EP and hence the asymmetry.
4. The relational solution was to be open to the ethical demand of the other.
5. This could enable the EP to position themselves as being progressive and therefore provided further potential for the reinforcement of the apotheosis of the EP.

I do not think that there was a way out of the paradox but I hope that engaging with it provided the opportunity for creative tension. Furthermore, awareness of the paradox could become a source for change.
The thesis showed how abstract and theoretical concepts such as professional and professionalism can be studied in action. Studying specific practice could provide insights into how decisions are made and actions taken. This in turn could provide both understanding of EPs practice and theoretical models.

The analysis of results argued that ethical tensions in practice provided opportunities for ethical work (Water, 2008). Water (2008) suggested three possible responses to this emotional work:

1. Learned to live with the ambiguity
2. Seek forgiveness to finding peace
3. Become desensitized and inured to the distress of others

The first two responses could be achievable. However, while recognising that there was a possibility for the third to occur it appeared too cold and clinical. Rather, I would suggest the following aphorism:

“If you are going to survive as an Educational Psychologist you have to learn to accept that there are things you cannot change but if you are going to survive as a person then you cannot stop trying to change things that you cannot accept” (Anonymous EP).

The literature review argued that the EP-Client relationship was located in a web of alienations. There was therefore scope for future research on the possibility of protected but less alienating relations between professional and clients. If alienation proved to be a fixed feature of the EP-Client relationships then perhaps research might explore how alienation could be employed as resource, e.g., something to be acknowledged and agitated against.

The transcript (and tape recording) of the FG and the account of MWM were rich sources of data that could be mined using other research methodologies or tested using different research questions. For example, the FG transcript could be used to answer the research questions:

- During speaking turns how did the EP in the FG negotiate their identities?
• How did EPs narrate and understand their identity work?

This thesis emphasis towards problems rather than solutions might be an additional limitation of the thesis because it could create the negative impression that Educational Psychology was just an ethically problematic area. Shifting the research focus to how EPs resolved ethically troubling situations could have facilitated the examination of EPs’ problem solving strategies, support mechanism and provided a more balanced picture of Educational Psychology. Future research could therefore focus on what was in place in the EPS to support EPs in ethically troubling situations?
Chapter 10. Conclusions

The purpose of this thesis was twofold: to critically examine how EPs constructed themselves as ethical professionals and to examine what it was about Educational Psychology that made EP-Client’s relations problematic. This thesis challenged the emotional, neutral, distant, abstract and rational portrayal of Professional-Client relationships (Arras, 1990; Elliott, 1999; Singer, 2004). Rather, the analysis argued that EP practice was complex, socially embedded and emotional engaged. The analysis of results suggested that EPs frequently found themselves in ethically difficult situations that produced ethical tensions. The most common tension was the tug between wanting to do what was right and experiencing barriers to doing it. These ethically challenging situations, acting like trials, therefore provided opportunities for emotional, identity and ethical work. These three processes were entangled. For example, emotional work appeared to result from the processes by which EPs constructed themselves as ethical professionals. The processes by which EPs constructed Clienthood (e.g. processes of objectification, categorization, responsibilization, normalization and formulation of cases) inferentially also positioned and constructed EPs identity. This suggested, tautologically, that EPs’ professional identities were problematic because the processes by which professional identities were made available were problematic. The emotional work offered by the ethically troubling situations was another potential source of role insecurity. This was because it made the EP uncomfortable or diasporic about their practice. However, this uncomfortableness provided opportunities for hybridity and new relations with their practice (Bhabha, 1990).

Clients were argued to provide an epistemological and ontological mirror for EPs. This suggested that rather than the power in the EP-Client relationship being straightforwardly hierarchically and linear that it was complex and recursive. Therefore, EPs and Clients were both objects of knowledge and subject who were known (doers and done to). In addition, both the EPs and Clients appeared
to resist the offered identities to be more than and other to what they were being called to be. This thesis took the position that there was no unproblematic escape from the power; however EPs’ awareness of this power provided the opportunity for an ethical-political responsibility.

The thesis challenged the view of the EP as the sole source of ethics. Rather the EP was also argued to be called to be ethical by the Client, as Other. The good news was that EPs’ work seemed to provide multiple and frequent opportunities to be critical. Each time EPs worked with a Client the Client demanded that the EP was both what they were and more and other than what they were. To hear this call it was necessary to use embodiment as a resource. This included questions such as, “Why am I feeling uneasy?”, “Why am I persisting with this line of questioning when the Other was not interested?”, “Why am persisting with this categorization when the Other does accept it?” “Why am I becoming frustrated?”

This thesis did not resolve the debates about whether:

- EPs were scientific practitioners or more humanist pragmatic practitioners,
- The romanticized or sceptical of professional was more appropriate, or
- EPs employed bioethical principles or particularist ethics.

Rather, the analysis suggested that EPs vacillated between, and rhetorically employed, a wide variety of theoretical traditions and positions strategically.

Foucauldian studies by EPs that examined Educational Psychology were still quite rare and this thesis has added to them. This thesis also appeared to be the first to have employed Levinas’s (1981) ethical approach to Educational Psychology Practice in Britain. In addition, no other published study in Britain was located that employed Araujo & Martuccelli’s (2010) construct of trials to examine Educational Psychology practice.
Finally, was I the same EP that began this process? I believed that I had a better understanding of the nature of ethically challenging situations experienced by EPs and I obtained a new perspective on the pastoral power of EPs. In addition, I think I had achieved Foucault’s goal of no longer being secure about my role while still loving my job. However, by critically engaging with, and making my practice problematic, I have opened a space for me to be not what I was. This thesis therefore had changed the relationship I had to my practice.


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Appendix.1 Definitions and Key Concepts

**Amphibology:** Levinas (1981) used the term amphibology to describe the rational effort to determine what things were, through the neutralization of the ambiguity of the other.

**Apophansis:** The term apophansis was used by Levinas (1981) to describe the disruptive refutation of amphibology through the presence of the other and their inability to be reduced to a set of statements. Apophansis was not a rational refutation but a kind of sceptical unravelling of the said.

**Apotheosis:** this was a term used by Foucault (1989). It means to make divine. This included the glorification of a subject to the divine level. It was associated with hero worship.

**Autonomy:** Originally this principle was phrased as respect for persons (Beauchamp & Childress, 1979). Respect for autonomy places a duty on the practitioner to both preserve and promote the autonomy of the client. This duty usually applied to clients who already had autonomy based on capacity to think, decide and act freely and independently (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). This was a very individualist and cognitive approach to autonomy and the person that privileges autonomy over cooperation and interdependence. Respect for autonomy required disclosure by the practitioner because withholding information or providing false information could impair the capacity of the client to choose. This extended to the practitioner making their values transparent so that the client could be aware of bias.

**Beneficence and Non-malfeasance:** Beneficence meant taking steps to promote the best interests and wellbeing of a client so that they were better off than they were before the action was taken or more crudely to “do good”. This term has feudal and religious entomology. It means both a good act and a positive act or gift by a lord to their vessel. Non-malfeasance was a negative requirement not to take steps or refrain from actions that would harm the client. Non-malfeasance was more commonly articulated as “first do no harm”. In fact, both Beneficence and non-malfeasance were frequently conflated into the single phrase “do no harm” (Sim, 1997). Beneficence and non-malfeasance could be achieved though acts of commission or omissions. Sometimes not intervening could cause harm and at other times intervening caused harm.

**Bricolage:** Bricolage typically meant to put things together in a haphazard fashion. In research it meant employing, non-hierarchical, sometimes diverse methodologies and methods to disrupt the authority of methodology (Steinberg, 2006). Bricolage was employed in post-structuralist research designs that were nonlinear, complex and utilized a range of theoretical approaches (Berry, 2006).
**Casuistic:** This is a method of applied ethics that attempts to evaluate each ethical dilemma case by case. Casuistry emphasizes the unique nature of particular cases over general principles.

**Consequential ethics:** Consequentialism was a branch of normative ethics that actions should be evaluated on their outcomes rather than what happened before the action or the nature of the action. Crudely, the ends justified the means. More subtle versions of consequentialism added that for an action to be ethical the consequences must also be good and the action must not cause unnecessary harm (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2011).

**Deontological ethics:** Deontological ethics was a branch of normative ethics that held that action should be guided by duty. Action cannot therefore be judged by their effects. It is the adherence to a moral norm that makes an action right. Therefore the rightness of an action had priority over its goodness. Again crudely, the means outweighed the ends (Alexander & Moore, 2008).

**Diaspora:** The concept was borrowed from Bhabha (1990) and was intended to encompass the feeling of unease, displacement and strangeness for living and working in a community but not be a part of it. It is sometimes employed in cultural studies to examine the experiences of minority ethnic groups living in communities. Diaspora is associated with challenges to existing boundaries and divided loyalties.

**Educational Psychologist:** The Educational Psychologist role has been the subject of a great deal of debate both within and from outside Educational Psychology. This was examined in the Literature review. However, it was possible that this thesis could be read by Non-Educational Psychologists. A description of how the Department for Education understood the EP role was included below:

“Educational psychologists work in a variety of different ways to address the problems experienced by children and young people in education. They have a central role in the statutory assessment and statementing procedures for children with special educational needs (SEN). They work directly with children and young people individually or in groups and with a wide range of other professionals to deliver their work.

Part of the educational psychology role is to work at a strategic level, carrying out research and advising on educational policy development. Other areas of work include delivering training on issues such as behaviour and stress management.

Direct work with children and young people includes assessing their learning and emotional needs using methods such as interviews, observation and test materials. Interventions are then developed to support the child or young person with the problems they are experiencing.” (DfE
Ethical substance: This was the aspect of the self or behaviour that required ethical work. In this thesis the ethical substance could be understood as the relationship with the client. Specifically, how the EP negotiated the EP-Client asymmetry.

Ethical Work: This was understood as the reflexive relation the self had with itself and/or Others in which the aim was to construct and understand the Self as an ethical subject/professional.

Ethics of responsibility: Levinas (1981) argued that the opacity of the Other and their vulnerability was troubling and disrupting to the Self. How the Self responded (consciously or unconsciously) to the opacity of the Other Levinas (1981) referred to as the “ethics of responsibility”. This responsibility was inescapable and demanded a response even if that response was ‘no’. The Self was not only responsible to the Other but also for oneself. Self responsibility was a product of having to give an account of oneself in the face of the demand from the Other.

Institutional talk: Institutional talk was typically characterized as having goals, agenda, being predictable, generic and being less open ended than ordinary talk.

Justice: Justice was understood as the processes in which the needs of a specific client are weighted against the competing claims of clients in general or the needs of society. Justice implies that clients were treated fairly and that similar clients are treated similarly.

Hybridity: The concept of hybridity was borrowed from Bhabha (1990). Hybridity pointed to a heterogeneous identity composed of incongruous elements. It also suggested the possibility of identity neither being one thing nor another but a process.

Hypomenemata: This was a way of preserving the memory of things that were read, thought, or heard... It could be a type of dairy. However, it was also more than a record it was also a technique by which the individual grew through reflecting on and assimilating what they had preserved (Foucault, 1986).

Liminality: Derived from the Latin word limen, meaning "a threshold", liminality refers to the experience of being betwixt or between. It was developed by Turner (1969, 1992) who used liminality to examine the unstable and renewing experiences that occurred during rites of passage.

Mode of subjection: This was the rationalisation which underpinned ethical behaviour and could be framed as, ‘I behave in such and such a way because I
am a rational being’, ‘human beings are all the same under the skills’, etc. Modes of subjection function like rules of conduct and justifications for conduct. The mode of subjectification can be established by examining the reasons individuals give for their action.

‘Other’, ‘other’ and ‘just another other’: In the thesis the term “other” was spelt with either a capital or lower case “o”. This was to signify different ontological positions towards the other. The capital letter “O” was used to acknowledge that the Other was unique and beyond crude classification. This Other was transcendent and ultimately unknowable. The lower case letter “o” was used to signify that the other was not seen as unique but as an example of a category or label. The phrase ‘just another other’ signified that the Other had been reduced to and considered as a faceless object.

Self forming activities: These are acts of self regulation and discipline designed to transform the individual so that their behaviour matched their identity aspirations (Hofmeyr, 2006). The self engaged in activities/exercises designed to train and shape itself. These exercises were not designed to make the individual free from power but to achieve freedom through power (Hofmeyr, 2006) The individual was not free from their contexts, this would be an anathema for Foucault, but could recognise the limits and forces in their contexts. In the last analysis, even if someone was defining themselves in opposition to their prevailing milieu they were still being shaped by that milieu. Self forming activities were therefore both enabling and constraining (Taylor, 2003). Foucault (1984) suggested that self forming activities were social because:

“Care of the self requires a relationship with the other insofar as proper care of the self requires listening to the lessons of the master. One needs a guide, a counsellor, a friend, someone who will be truthful with you” (Foucault, 1984/2003, page 30).

Said: Levinas (1981) used the term “said” to describe the theme that was intended to be understood in a dialogue. This included rational acts such as naming, describing, comprehending, analyzing, rationalizing and thematizing

Saying: Levinas (1981) used the term “saying” to describe what was meaningfully expressed in a dialogue and was therefore concerned with the non-semantic dimensions of meaning. Saying was not present in the words but the intention behind them. For example if I said “hello” this addressed myself to the other and acknowledged their proximity. Hello as well as addressing the other also says “here I am”. Saying reminded us that there was always more than can be said by a word or proposition.

Telos: This was the ultimate aim of the self forming activities and could understood as the type of subject the individual aspired to be. The telos was
historically and culturally shaped by the possible available identities in that culture or period.

**Unsaying:** This was central to the relation between the said and saying. Levinas (1981) introducing the concept of unsaying was resisting the western rational tradition to know, understand, categorize, synthesize, thematize, analyze, utilize and be reductive (Hutchens, 2008). The aim of the western tradition was to make everything transparently intelligible so that any form of difference or uniqueness could be reduced to the same. This relentless drive to know what things were (their essence) and that they are (exist) had been applied to the self leaving no aspect of the self (emotions, beliefs, attitudes, hopes dreams etc.) that has not been colonized by a totalizing rationalism (Levinas, 1981). However, there was also an irresolvable tension between the above totalizing reason that sought to illuminate and the Other which remained foreign and opaque. The Other person was always more and other than what was said about them. In this sense the Other unsays what reason said about them thematically without the Other offering its own themes. This antagonism between the said and unsaying was continuous because the self continually tried to make the other thematic while the Other continually resisted thematization by being Other.

**Utilitarianism:** Utilitarianism can be understood as the view that the right action was the action that produced the most good. Utilitarianism was therefore a form of consequentialism (Driver, 2009)

**Virtue Ethics:** Virtue could be understood as an approach to normative ethics that emphasized the virtues or moral character of the individual rather than duties and rules (Deontology) or consequences (consequentialism). Virtues can include wisdom, honesty, generosity (Hursthouse, 2003).
Appendix.2 Meeting with M
I had a meeting with a boy (hereafter M) which was ostensibly to do an exam concession. M is 14 years old. I noticed that M was unkempt and that his long finger nails were dirty, his hair look unwashed and there was a slight smell. I remember feeling a sense of unease about noticing his lack of personal hygiene.

I was aware of M through JCM (Multi-agency meeting in the school). M was finding school attendance difficult so he was attending school part-time and was seeing CAMHS. M described himself as having depression and very low self-esteem. M lived at home with his mother, an older brother who is 15 and a younger sister who is 12. I noted that M mostly had appropriate eye contact, demonstrated appropriate non-verbal gestures such as nodding and smiling. M’s mother had been seeing adult mental health services but had not found it useful and stopped attending. On the reading and spelling tests M’s performances were below the 2nd centile.

M started a lot of conversations and it was very clear that he wanted to talk so we had a wide ranging conversation. It was lunch-time and my next child was not due until much later in the afternoon. I noted that it was lunch-time and said that he should go for something to eat. M said that he had already eaten and would prefer to talk.

I found M very interesting. M spoke in a soft whisper and I noticed that he pronounced his “th” sound as “d”. There was also an indefinable affectedness to his gestures. I asked M if he ever had Speech and Language Therapy. M explained that he had. I said that it was very common for young people who had persistent Speech and Language difficulties when they were younger to later have problem with reading and spelling. I further explained that there was very little connection between reading and spelling and intelligence. This was to make him feel better (after all I had just made him do something he found difficult in front of a stranger) and also to dispel any unhelpful beliefs that he might have about the meaning of his difficulties with spelling and reading.

During the meeting M made several disclosures.

M told me that his family had experienced a lot of bullying and had to move house several times. I shared my feelings about this and asked him why he thought this was. M said that he did not know but that people did not seem to like them. I wondered if M had taken on the mantel of victimhood.

I then asked M about his fingernails and M explained that he had a bath every night but that his fingernails, because they were long got dirty, very quickly. I explained that I had asked because sometimes people who had been badly bullied did not always take care of themselves and look after their hygiene, adding if M knew what hygiene meant. M added that of course he did as his sister had been bullied by being called smelly. M said that his family was poor
and had a coal fire and that this could make someone’s hair and cloths smell.

Again I shared my empathy with him.

M then added that his father had “walked out on us” and had taken £XXX pounds that was to going to be used to pay a bill. His father now lived miles ways and did not contact the family very often. M then said that things had moved on as “we now have a fiancée” and that his father did not know about the fiancée. M said that the fiancée was a professional boxer but that he was really nice. I asked M why he had said “we” instead of “his mother” but he did not want to answer.

I noted that when M talked about his father that he appeared conflicted. He would be angry that is father had walked out and also angry that his father had not been in contact. M both missed and was angry at his father. I reflected this back to him.

M then said he was going to tell me something about his family that no one knows and that he couldn’t believe that he was going to tell me. I said that he did not have to tell me and if there was something that was causing him harm I would have to tell. M said that he and his family were spiritualists. M then proceeded to explain his beliefs in an afterlife the ability to talk to people that had died and that we have all had past lives. During the conversation I explained that I tried to adopt a respectful approach to faith traditions and that I would try to be respectful of his beliefs and asked if he could respect my disbelief. M said that “we are all entitled to our beliefs”. I added that we were as long as they did not cause harm to ourselves or others. M told me the story about a friend of the family who had died and how his mother had spoken to the dead person in the after life who had told the family that they would soon be visited by someone who needed consultation so they would soon have some money. I asked M why it was a secret that his family were spiritualist and he explained that people would not understand and bully the family more. M explained that because he had a past life he would have chosen this present life, he would have chosen to be depressed and poor to see what the experience was like. I said that it sounded as if he was saying that all the bad stuff that had happened was his fault. Again M did not answer. I said that I found this too difficult to believe and that he was not responsible for his poverty or the bullying.

M changing the subject said that when something was not right or someone was going to make the wrong decision he would let them know. I asked if this was his job in the family but M said that it wasn’t and that he had to let them know. I tried to explain how everybody in a family could have a role and perhaps he saw his as stopping bad things happen. M did not get this idea at all. M did not see what he did as a role or a job but something that needed to be done (common sense).

M explained that his brother and sister were not going to CAMHS and were not having the same problems as him. I asked why this was. M explained that his bother and sister did not worry as much as he did and did not think so deeply
about things. I asked which was better worrying or avoiding. M explained that
avoiding problems was pointless because they will always be there. Perusing
this line of thought and knowing that M had a pet Finch I used the analogy of the
canary. I explained that how miners would take the birds down the pit to warn
them of the presence of poisonous gas. I explained the view that there was a
theory that sometimes children with difficulties were thought of as canaries which
showed that there was problem in a family and asked him for his view. M did not
like this idea and said that although his brother had difficulties with spelling and
reading he did not have a problem with his speech and that his sister was good
at reading. I tried again and explained that the more difficulties a young person
had then this could make it harder to cope. M did not answer direct and changed
the subject.

As the meeting was coming to an end I asked M to think of three things that were
positive in his life as this would help me after all the sad things we had talked
about. M said that there was nothing positive in his life. After another long
discussion where I attempted to get M to reflect on positive things we came up
with the following:

- His pet Finch
- M’s relationship with his mother
- The two dogs
- His faith

I ended the meeting by saying that if M wanted to chat again that he should
contact school.
Appendix 3. Notes on Follow-Up meeting with M and his Mother
Follow up meeting With M and his Mother

I had a follow meeting with M and his mother. Neither M nor his mother wanted the meeting recorded. I was allowed to make detailed notes about the conversation which I read back to them after the meeting. I gave M and his mother a copy of my write up of my first meeting with M and then asked them for thoughts. Did they think it was fair and accurate?

M said that it was a fairly accurate account of our meeting adding “I am going to say things without getting angry”. M did not remember telling me about how much money his dad had taken with him and he wanted the amount removed. The majority of the talk is about the accuracy of the detail, age of his sister and him. M said that it was a good description of him and that he thought that I was being very positive.

I wasn’t angry with my father,
Right about the bullying
Right about CAMHS
“God, you go on about concerns don’t you”

M had remembered the reading assessment and our talk about life about telling me about him and his mother being a spiritualist medium.

I asked M what he thought about me.

“Well at the time I didn’t know what you do. I knew that you were something to help me about exams but nothing. When you informed me that you is a child psychologist. I think I am better off talking and I did. To be honest I had forgotten. It was only when you rang that I remembered, lots of stuff happens to me.
I was a bit nervous at first. I had no idea what he wants, what he was talking about…it is not everyday somebody pulls you out of lessons, I had no idea”

Well it’s Ok to know personal stuff about that. I felt alright telling you personal stuff, some people might not it depends on the person.

I asked if I could discuss M with other people. It would be fine to talk to somebody else. I felt confident to talk to you. You said that it was confidential as long as nobody finds out my stuff I’m all right.

I asked if I could write about M: If you did and it was anonymous then it would be “alright” I would prefer no name. If it helps other people as long as my name is not on it, it will be all private and confidential.

I said that the meeting was about Exams but we talked about other stuff: M said “that is just the way I am about things”
M’s Mother

“I was reading it with interest to see what you had to say. I felt that you understood some things but …M is so complicated, it would take you years and years to work out anything, analyze him. I have been with him from birth, I don’t even know.”

After M told me about an incident in which the family was being harassed by the community M’s mother says

“It doesn’t seem to worry V or J but I have seen M rocking and crying and getting extremely upset and uptight about it”

On my account of M

“I would say that you didn’t get anything wrong and that it was very accurate about the family.”

When I discussed sharing M’s information and writing about him and the possibility of having it published: it would be OK if they don’t know who he was.

On the discussion being wide ranging:

It was good to say and let him speak, not stop. M speaks as things come into his mind. He cannot always concentrate on any two things, you know what I mean. He’s an extremely friendly little chap, Simple answers cannot explain M.

I don’t know what Educational Psychologists are supposed to do so I don’t know if it was OK… I assume that your job would be to find out ways to help M to learn in the way he thinks… sort of, find ways, how can I say it without it sounding awful … M feels and sees things differently from all other people in the family. Your job would be to say the type of education and job that he wants and needs, Am I right.

What would working ethically with M Look like?

Respect for individuals, try and understand what he is saying, not just hear the half of it, people do not always listen to what he is saying.
Appendix 4. Transcript of the Focus Group Discussion

The data analysis adopted a Foucauldian approach; however, I was unable to turn to Foucault for any guidance on transcription because he never addressed this issue in his work (Fairclough, 2003). As stated in the Methodology Chapter the transcription was produced using a simplified version of Gee’s (1986) method. Transcribing the talk in the FG was difficult because I often had to make subjective decisions about the appropriateness of punctuation. This was made more complex because of the high number of pauses, non-words, incomplete sentences and repetitions in natural speech. I have endeavoured to keep these aspects of the talk in the transcript. In the transcript commas, full-stops, question marks and semi-colons were all used according to standard punctuation practice. I have generally not overlapped the speakers and each new speaker was started at a new line. The only exception was when a secondary speaker or speakers interjected while someone was speaking. In these instances their comments were put in parentheses.

The transcription of the FG could therefore be characterized as ‘denaturalized’ and, as such, included only a minimum of intonation, non-verbal communication, laughter, emotion, etc. (Oliver, Serovich & Mason, 2005). This meant that a rich source of data was possibly absent. However, the intention was not to do a fine-grained naturalized analysis focusing on the mechanics of the conversation (Oliver, Serovich & Mason, 2005). Rather, the aim was to focus on what was said (the statements) rather than how it was said. In addition, Fairclough (2003) reminded us that “no system could conceivably show everything, and it is always a matter of judgement, given the nature of research questions, what sort of features to show and in how much detail” (Ibid, page 229). Furthermore, Roberts (2007) suggested that if the focus was on the “overall structure or grammar of discourse” then “getting the words down on the page, with some fairly basic intonation features noted may be enough” (Roberts, 2007, page 4). The denaturalized transcript was therefore perceived to be appropriate for the research questions. Table 2 below provides guidance on the transcript notation.

Table 2. Transcription Notation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>…...</td>
<td>Nonverbal pause or disruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bold</strong></td>
<td>The speaker gave extra emphasis to what they were saying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f()</td>
<td>Text inside parentheses states that someone spoke while the main speaker was speaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Em</td>
<td>Short verbal pause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmm</td>
<td>Longer verbal pause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>This was used instead of a person or name of a school</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The first question is what ethical issues were raised by the account of the meeting with M, if any?

The first thing that comes to mind is that you went into do one thing, an exam concession and it has become a completely different thing, and if you got...???. And his age comes into play as well because if you have got consent from parents to do something did they realise that it was going to develop into this. But actually do they need to realise, is it up to him to use the session as he wants? Which is actually what I think he did, he used it as a space to talk and say what was on his mind, that was the very first thing that stuck out to me.

OK I'll do another one the other thing that is sort of missing out the whole middle section. But almost at the end. Emmm you have put, obviously you have had this very in-depth talk with this child and then said if you want to talk again you know, contact school emmm, and I just wondered whether, I don't know if you open up the ... how personal that was to him something seems, it is very personal he has never told an adult some of the things he told you em and it has just sort of be left on the, it up to him to do something, next and I almost thought for myself in my practice that of that had happened, perhaps, if for you to offer and to be turned down, you know, em at another point if you offered another appointment as such, maybe it is up to him to come along or not em, in that respect, but I don't know whether its ethics or practice I don’t know whether it is the difference between ethics and practice. This is what I am struggling with. Also when I think about a doing session with children it is always child protection, it could just be in my mind, that what I kept thinking about child protection procedures. And then I am thinking well there are ethical things within child protection procedures, well is that, the two, two separate things as well and I think that it is all kind of messy in my head.

He has to go through the sch... Not only does he need to contact you he has to contact school... school to get to you.

I don’t, Do we give our number, I don’t give my number to children so it makes it more difficult, I know, that he is at the sort of middle age but I still wouldn’t feel comfortable about giving my number my mobile to a 14 year old boy.

But is that what L .., you have another appoint for him to turn down.

Emmm that would have been good. I wish I had thought of it.

That’s great, laugh.

I pick put, picked up, on the first page the first page of narrative that he had experienced a lot of bullying and had to move house several times. You said I shared my feeling about this and I wonder (YEAY) and I wondered about your self disclosure (right) of the of, the em professional in the situation in a situation like
this and the ethical boundary of that is. You don’t actually say what was said. I
didn’t quite understand that bit you said that you shared your feeling but I didn’t,
didn’t understand quite.

I shared that I thought that it was very unfair, for those awful things to have
happened (your judgements). Do you have a view on self disclosure 04

Em my view and my practice I admit are probably quite different. My view is that
we shouldn’t self disclose and that has probably come from a person centred
counselling training that we shouldn’t self disclose but then there are times that
you do and, and it has a very strong effect. In a relationship and it’s you know a
session. But there are ethical for the want of a better word ethical parameters to
the level of self disclosure. For instance has he said em I my dad beating me up
or something like that it would not be within the realms of ethical disclosure to
say my dad beat me up as well. Em but then to say… there is a line that one has
to establish cause where you are coming form in your personal practice. We
exactable how much you disclose.

Interesting it is interesting cause in some of the parenting groups, they, they tell
you, suggest that you do disclose.

I think you and I have had that discus… (Yea) in some of your supervision where
I, I felt (Yea) that, that is …. Em (em)

Did you, did you have any comment, thoughts about his em … religious
disclosures.

That was going to be one of my, my second points about, I though that you were
giving him some, reassurance , that you would respect his views em, em ah…
and that too is another difficult one. Because it is about mutual self regard. Our
mutual regard rather. Em but without letting him know that you yourself have any
religious beliefs

I found the most difficult thing was to hide my incredulity.

Right, in this, because of it was spiritualism em.

Yea I and I found, find that I had to fight very hard not to want to undermine his
beliefs, I am not sure in my account I disclosed how far I went down the line, it is
a long time since I read and I tried not to read it before today session. About
asking him about his beliefs, because you could, you could, say that it wasn’t
relevant, or you could say, I wanted to know whether or not he was delusional,
or whether or not it was his faith system. Or I just have been intrigued because it
is an unusual thing for people to say to say I see… talk with dead people.

You did, though, didn’t you, you asked him to respect my disbelief.
Em that assumes that there is a power equal there, (em) and as 05 said to me before it was OK me coming in being clever being a university educated boffin arguing with a 14 year old boy with learning difficulties. About who is right about their faith 03

I just wanted to know, one ethics that comes into, through for me, is that why has this case raised such a strong feeling in you.

I don't know, that is one of my puzzles, I just know that I found him very evocative he was dirty, that was the first thing I noticed about him, that I was ashamed to admit. I noticed how filthy he was and how much he smelt, I am sure I cannot be the only one who comes across children with hygiene problems. The dilemma is what you do. So what do you do? If you are sitting beside a 14 year old boy whose fingers are black, his hair was unwashed. He actually smells very bad. What do we do? Do we mention that, do we let it go, do we leave it to someone else. We, we carry on with our reading assessment or whatever, we were doing, it's a genuine question. There is now a brief pause

Em rightly or wrongly I don’t address it, or I would address it outside the, but yes he is a young person and in that sense, one should address it with him rather than talking about it to somebody else. I think that is probably what I would do. I would try to gather more information. Em and see what school may have done about it. Because that is the context he is in every day. Em so actually, you know I would em maybe would you have addressed it if you hadn’t went on to have your wide ranging conversation? If you were just doing his reading and his numeracy testing and that sort of stuff. And you didn’t talk more or not.

I don’t know. We started with him being bullied. I started do the psychology job I started thinking is it a presentation thing that stops him, it is it a defence mechanism. Is this smelliness a way of him saying ‘world go away’? Exploring, so I am using that sort of psychological thinking to see, so I feel empowered to ask him about it. Then I go away and I do exactly what you did. Should I have brought it up? Would he have been embarrassed? Should I have gone through a different channel…?

But you do say in your second paragraph I was aware of M through the JCM (that right?) so you, you didn’t actually come to this case without any background knowledge. (Knew that he had been with CAMHS for a while) Yea em it may be that there was a subconscious part of yourself saying well people are dealing with (Yea).

Isn’t there a point were we cannot, not fix everything can we? Our role is not to go in and fix things. Do you know what I mean? We support people don’t we? We sort of try and empower them. To, em. so if you’re a complete stranger going to, to talk to a 14 year old boy would he have been embarrassed, like you
said and less likely to speak to you, if you had commented on it? It’s a judgment
call isn’t it?

Em, if you, maybe if you had known him before and had a relationship then
that’s a different sort of relationship, different scenario. I think I would be like 09,
I’d address it out of the meeting, with somebody like the SENCO, or head of
house or something like that rather than.

It’s definitely context dependent, I, I’d had conversations with teenage girls about
her personal hygiene. I didn’t begin with going to do that but is where the
conversation went. I knew that she had personal hygiene problems because I
had been told about them. I didn’t go in thinking that I was going to talk about
them but they came up in conversation. I don’t think that there is anything wrong
with that. I do think that age plays a part in it. I don’t think I would be having that
conversation with 7 years old. But I think a teenager who, maybe or may be not
able to understand. The child I had a conversation was able to understand the
difficulties it caused her with the personal hygiene.

Em, with the issue about gender, the adult and child would have play (01 AW I
see).

It is likely that gender would have influenced the whole conversation. Because
maybe would not have that, that sort of relation with this very clearly very, very
softly spoken middle aged man.

Where do we stand on the issue of belief? In believing in what he is telling.
That’s the other thing. I found it difficult to, I found that thing where I choose to
say, Well I am listening to what you are saying I am nodding but I am
wondering ‘is it true?’

Look at that point that doesn’t matter I would say. It doesn’t matter because he is
talking to you because he has, kind of, developed a rapport or that, a kind of
sympathy and you just have to kind of accept what he is saying.

I’ll take 03’s view, it doesn’t really matter whether you believe him or not or
whether you approve of what he is saying or whether you find it credible or not.
That’s the point, the point is that he is a boy, a boy who is, has some difficulties in
his life. I can see that from of the stuff you have written. Em and he is talking to
someone, that someone being you and I think that is the important element here.

My ethical point is that it almost feels at times that you don’t accept you find it
difficult that you are finding it difficult writing his story (Yep).

I admit this. I admit that I had difficulty with his story. I had difficulty accepting his
story was factually accurate. Because school had said something different, then
I recognise that everybody has a different perspective. So I have to say, what’s
my point, what is the professional way to behave? When you are presentenced
by someone who is telling you a story, like, it’s like you know, a mum who’s
telling you that they put the child to bed every night at 6:30 (lots of yeses from
the team) So how do you behave in that situation. Situation if a parent is sitting
there in front of you, do you challenge their story or do you accept their story as
being what is reality and that is what you work with. Well what do we do?

I think it depends what you are there for. If you are there to collect information in
a medical history sort of way. I would accept that there behaviour would be
important you would be more challenging in that situation. So again its context
specific, dependant. I think.

How relevant is it to what you want to do?

Do you think that there are no big rules it is all dependant on what happens in a
particular context?

Definitely.

In most cases, in any cases we get conflicting narrative for different actors in the
same, same kind of line. I certainly come across cases where parents might say
one thing but school might say, report something different.

One last point before we move on to the more general questions. How do you
respond when someone tells you a very tragic story. This idea that we have
emotional work to do. Someone comes in and tells you a very, very sad story…
and then you go away with it. How do you respond to that when someone tells
you a sad story?

In the session or when you walk away from it?

No, no either, how much empathy do you show someone when they tell you a
sad story and when you go away how does that impact on you? I think that is an
ethical question.

I think that I am slightly confused by your definition of empathy meaning you
shared your empathy with him. Was it necessary does it have to be shared for it
to be empathy?

Well that me being telegraphic in my interview with him. Basically I am letting
him, him know that I am acknowledging that his story is tragic his dad steals the
last few 100 pounds he has in the house. Runs away and doesn’t tell any body
he’s coming back and his mum is left without any money, he is constantly being
bullied, having stones through his window. I could sit there and be all cold and
say nothing or I try to show him in either speech or gesture that I am recognising
that is a very powerful provocative story so I am asking what would, what would
be practice, would you, stay very professional and say thank you yes or be more, would you let him know that you thought his story moved you?

You mean you are defining professional as detached as cold?

I'm not, I saying that that is the option.

No you said would you be professional.

Did I?

Yea

Didn't notice that.

I think a way of feed back to heard he said is to paraphrase what he said and leave it almost at that and not to rescue and in term of that...

If something has touched you and you are telling him it has it's touched you for a particular reason for your background or whatever. Well I don’t think that that child needs to know that. That doesn’t mean that you cannot be empathic and listen. And then reflect back like, like LA was saying, but to go as far as saying your story has touched me or that kind of terminology. I don’t think that that is appropriate and I think that if you walk away and he has touched you in some way that is what we have supervision for... to reflect on, you do, everyone. You certain children particularly here and there is something about him that has touched something raw in you. And that's something to go away and reflect on and you may never get to the bottom of it but that is something for you to take away and not to leave with him.

I think that is a mixture. I think empathy is really important and a powerful tool and in counselling they call it reflection feeding back but if, in my practice anyway you have to show empathy but not to such extend that you stop you from making other action.

Would you treat your friends like this would, would you, if your friend came along and told you a sad story or told you something, would you behave in the same way if you were working with them, with a client in a school.

No me because, I have a different relationship with my friends. My relationship with my friends is very personal and I much more personal than my work.

If this were your friend you would probably say, beginning by saying you stink.

Go on and have a shower.
For god sake where have you been with your finger nails? The relationship from the very beginning is very different. You cannot actually...

Why can we not have that human relationship with, with the people we work with, the children and the parents

We haven’t got the background relationship with your friends; with some friends you say you stink to they would be completely up in arms. It’s who you say things to, even if you met them two or three times. You cannot presume to know them enough to how to (you haven’t got that history with them have you 06?).

Just to add, just to add to what 01 was saying I think there will be ethical issues. If your relation to that boy was similar to that boy was similar to your relation with you friend. Because the shared history is not the same.

And that power dynamic that 05 mentioned earlier was very different, an adult and a child, even an adult and a parent. Is very diff... they have all have preconceptions about you coming into that relationship

And the levels of trust will be different, with a friend well hopefully well establish so you have, have different sorts of conversations, whereas in this situation I assume that was at the same level that you had with your friends. I think that that, that is a difference.

So this persona, this, I use the name again a professional persona, is it that what we are describing, how we are professional with people?

It doesn't have to be professional it is about human relationships that is why I say a while ago that , professional is part of it, human relationship, even in certain circumstances that I don’t know well enough that I , have, a relationship with them that I have with my close friends. So the relation between you and this boy there is a power dynamic, it might be possible that this young guy is looking up to you, he might he might I am not saying he does, he might be looking up to you.

As I said the soft spoke middle age man is, is....

What is the idea of this human relationship, is the, is the difference between, between, i.e. the difference between a human relationship and, and professional relationship.

There is and there isn’t. I think there is and there is isn’t. There is a yes and no in both. Cause we have a human relationship which is different from the human relationship we have with close friends.
One is personal and one is professional. It our job isn’t it. When it comes down to it you are supposed to leave your work at work because if we took home every single case every single parent, every single parent we worked with...

Well... if you walk into a room with somebody else you can’t not bring some of your own personal stuff in there but I think that part of our, our training is skills should be about knowing what is appropriate to bring forwards and be, you know what would, be keep back if something touches or provokes in you and not to be emotionless at all in, in saying that at all, but I don’t want to use the word usurp, because it brings that thing about sitting there very stern, it, a child tell you about being hit, well I was like that as a child, da de da de da. The difference between that and say ‘you tell me some more’ about being empathic and listening.

I think the other thing is the element, the element, em that you mitigate against self disclosure is actually protecting yourself for anything that you might share with a child or young person which could then be misconstrued em so I think that the distance you, that you maintain is, is for your own protection as well as for the protection of the young person.

Very good that first bit was excellent.

Can I just say that the professional and the personal I wouldn’t make that, I would define the two different types of relationship that way. I would define the relationship I have at work as personal and I would describe the relationships I have outside in my home life as personal. But the one in work where I relate as a psychologist have certain characteristic which places certain ethical duties on me. They are characterised by a certain power dynamic in which I have to take responsibility for but they are both personal.

I have, I was thinking around that a professional relationship is a human relationship with ethical boundaries. But human relationship doesn’t necessarily have to be professional ones. They’re greater, does that make sense.

You have just given me a quote that is brilliant. So on to the questions. Do you think about, it’s more a general thing, do you think about ethics in your everyday practice? Is that something that you actually think about. You’re nodding you can go first.

All the time. I cannot think about a time when I don’t if I am doing a WISC (general laughter) I thinking is there an ethical way to do this. When I am writing a report, when I am behind with my report, I am thinking is it ethical to keep... to be doing that and so on.

It is a very unfair question because I would have difficulty saying what, can you say what ethics mean to you mean in your everyday practice. I know that it is a
horrible question. But when you are thinking about it other people can be
thinking about giving answers.

Long pause

It links strongly; it certainly has a very strong link to what is moral, to what is
correct … em … what within the law but also within. Not just the law in terms of
legitimacy but a moral code I think. A moral code. It’s just off the top of my head
I could work on that if you want.

Does anyone else think about ethics in their everyday work?

All the time, all the time yea, in fact that’s the whole point of my, I would say.
When I meet parents when I write report it’s always at the back of my mind. A
little light that keeps flashing. Who am I? What right do I have to make so many
different judgements? Just in terms of what ethics means to me I see it as a set
of guidelines. But guidelines sound very officious very formal well I don’t mean
it like that the guideline for me, my own personal human personal guidelines
and my own professional, using professional in a cold way, guideline, so I have
my own guideline. As a human being I also have a set of guideline as an
educational psychologist. And the two always mesh together. There are certain
things I know that I can’t do because the job doesn’t allow me to do. But there
are certain things I won’t do because emotionally or culturally I will not be able to
do.

Anybody else?

I just think 03 put that very well. Wouldn’t have put it as well myself. But I can
totally identify with what he has said.

What I was thinking about in the earlier part of the conversation, it was 01 said
that she was very, everything was context specific. And I think we all agreed with
that. and then 04 said things to do with like moral, Laws those things tend to be
very de-contextual in that you apply, there is a law where you apply to the
context, where the context, where you assume, where you see what is right in
this condition. So is that connection between the moral, the guideline and the
principals and the context I am interested if any body has any views on that.

One of the things that comes to mind that is contextual is touch (02 right)
practically, we don’t touch. But there are times when we all, well I certainly do, its
not beyond the thing a parent who I have been working with for a long time would
embrace me and I would reciprocate that embrace. That is a particular ethical
thing that we change in the context …. Of the situation.

In fact, that helped me a lot last Thursday because I was doing a parent drop in
session at XXX and prior to those I know that one of the parents is going to be a
very tough meeting she was coming in and she was, brought her toddler with her.
And all the staff warn me be careful this is a very difficult thing, when they came
in the toddler rush at me because I am very attractive to kids. Don’t know why
thought, he come on it happen outside as well. (lots if laughter) so he sat on my
knee, (06, clarify that 03) Ho I don’t mean it like that, The toddler sat, I was
pulling my face and all like this, it was amazing how my relationship with the mum
changed and afterwards the social worker who is the daughter of XXX, she came
to be said I don’t know what you did. But you really pacified her and, and what I
didn’t say anything to her, that was pacifying her I think it was the whole …. I
am careful with who I do it with and who I can do it with. Sorry to everybody here
if you every see me do that to you, it just me it me, I need to do something like
that (lots of understanding no’s) just that me it helps me.

We also know that, that was nice touch. (03, Yea, Yea) but we all, we all, there is
something within our code that allows us to know what is good touch and, and
what is, it is a procedural thing given...

But I had a situation where, this year 7 I had worked with recently run up to me in
a corridor in a high school and flung his arms around me. He forgot that he was
in a middle of a corridor in a high school. Em in that case .... Sorry but I did give
him a hug back. Because I had just of kind of done this (gestures to show she
was withdrawing) he would have thought that he would have done something to
upset me and it was just so nice, to have that relationship, he has not done it
before. It just that he had seen me and he had done that.

It is an issue but if we are going to tell stories, yesterday I was interviewing this
kid with autism and his mum was sat over there and the kid was sat with and I
am doing some drawing and talk. And next thing he knows, I have a head on my
shoulder and his arm on the other shoulder. And I’m thinking HO that feels a bit
uncomfortable. So I am sitting there going, so I had to say, well you need to be
there

It’s about being the recipient of a touch that you know is not right.

It seems to be that part of the boundaries when people, you are not going to like
this, when people impinge your professional boundaries. And treat, treat us,
maybe coming in a giving us a hug. Or somebody touches us. Because that is
not normally something we encounter in our everyday professional life … no…?

Yea but, no, it depends on, its contextual one of our colleagues was going
through a difficult time last week and I gave her a hug, it was very relevant,
because the person, that person, person was having a really difficult time and I, it
was very contextual from you know what you were saying 06. Which was very
nice.

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I think that it is also about personalities. I’m like you I am very tactile, and I have got people that I work with, I put my hands up, professionally, I will give… if I have not seen them after the hol…, after the summer holidays they will give me a hug and I will give them a hug back. I, I know of other people in the room who are similar.

That’s individual difference isn’t it (06 yea). Some of us wouldn’t do it. I don’t find anything uncomfortable about people who, that do, but it just would be me, not my practice (06 yea it about personalities isn’t it).

When people are leaning sometimes (gestures someone coming in for a hug), O my god what am I supposed to do? (Lots of loud laughter).

Like MT hated anyone touching him, it was weird he didn’t like it. Did he? Even if you did that he would be …

That’s a person thing isn’t it. (Lots of verbal agreement)

What about the next one is eh... what barrier do you experience to your actual practice? What do you think stops you being ethical in your everyday practice?

When you were talking earlier about do you think about ethics in your everyday practice I was thinking, I was working with a child who has been in long term care and she has seen various professions and she is new into the school. You know they are very concerned about her. And they want me to meet with her and she doesn’t want, wants me, wants to meet with me. And the SENCO is literally trying to lure her into the room. And I was sort of like look I don’t think this is going to work. Like even if we get her in her she is not going to talk to me. This is now, you know not helpful. And the barrier for me was that the SENCO was so desperate for me to see, she was coercing her in. in the end I had a chat with her and her friend. Really informal environment cause I didn’t feel more comfortable and then can she then move. I felt that we, we somehow tricking her into doing it, and I, it wasn’t helpful for her. At that point she was new into the school. So in terms of, I thinking, an initial barrier I thought is, is sometimes pressure on em, from other people and there is a pressure for other people and resources sometimes. You have got to have a certain environment to have an assessment with a child. And often that is not available in schools so sometime is, do, probably compromise my practice to adapt, rather than have to pick a, and have to come back another day and another time. It the external pressure on you that push that.

I think that going back to your first em that, em, analogies, think there it is the, very basic of ethics is consent (lots of agreement in room). Em and everything must be done with the consent of the, who it is being done to. Obviously the parent in some, in terms of our referral system, but also we must have the consent of the person, of the lit…. young person that it is being done to.
Is that not context specific?

Silence

Is it context specific or is it or is something bigger.

It might be one of the overarching ones

Where you use the word ethics in medical ethics or em what have you, think, you know, the overarching thing is the consent.

And that's difficult because sometimes they feel that they have got to see use because we are, we are the sort of special person who is coming to see them. And another area where I find difficult were I find difficult and where ethics is brought in, is when you are administering tests. And they are actually finding them quite hard, especially in something like reading tests. And that I find difficult when they are struggling and they are coming, coming well quite distressed. And it can be quite extreme and again consent you know, would they consent to doing that if they knew they would become distressed but we as professionals (increased tone), the special person coming in to see them, they have to see. I find that quite hard sometimes. Can we ever get full consent?

The ethics is always to let people know that we can that they can withdraw. (Lots of agreement)

Another barrier em to ethical practice, I have another example of that was doing yesterday, is thresholds. I was at a meeting where, where, an, an, extremely high level of anxiety about a young child and, and yet the threshold for going to child protection was so high em that I felt that the kind of view of most of the people present were not being adequately expressed because of the threshold. Em social worker wanted to see reach. That sort of left big questions for me, but fortunately it was only one I was em stepping in for. It was Child protection case and I know that there are Child protection anxieties. Em, about actually stating your case and then what to do about it if thresholds are em are proposing a barrier to you.

Can I say about split allegiance in the job? For example the Matrix, my duty to whom, my duty to the child, to the family to the school to the Local Authority (04 to psychology), to psychology. So there are different stakeholders and that presents ethical challenges.

Like what 05?
Writing about children, speaking about children, how I do that, that’s intelligible to
others. So if speak if I write in a child in a way demanded of me by the local
authority, how am I re-creating this child how am I shaping that child?

08 once said that she was never going to describe a child as an I4 or whatever
the words were.

Yes, yes that what I think, is that want you’re on about (yea, yea).

What about time, do you feel squeezed by time?

Yea yes

Because you can define ethics as a quality relationship between you and the
child, between you and the parent. Do you find that time stops you providing,
being in, the sort of relationship with a child or parent that you would like to have?

Yea, I was going to say that. Was going to bring time to the table. Sometimes
going back to writing reports we see children or we get exposed to the family
only two or three times but we write such a huge report as if we know them.

Sometimes less!

Yes if it’s like pre-5 so that, that creates a huge challenge. The other thing is our
own personal prejudice because there are times when I go a case and I want to
say to the boy or girl, get yourself together! Because that’s the, the thing, but I
cannot do that. Because that’s, you know “come on”!, that behaving you cannot
do that; I want to say that I know I can’t say that.

But I feel that it is ethical to challenge and challenge is apart some of the work
we do, we do it in a very careful way with teacher, we, we, we, might not say get
yourself together but we might say, you really do need to get this… we do, do it.

When we were training we did this whole thing on elegant challenging. It was
what you were saying it was and that was the phrase we would use and that, how
you phrase it, it’s OK to say, it how you say it isn’t it. Rather than going and
saying “your rubbish” and you have got to be doing it in a slightly….

I am talking about inelegant challenging, I don’t mean. The challenging where I
frustrated, where I know look if you don’t, you know, look I know, I find, if I get
clip round my ear. I were your age, I, I did it, I won’t say that.

Do you ever find yourself caught between? I’m constantly caught between,
captured between my local authority role and my EP role. My relationship with the
SENCO and what the parent might want. Caught between what I think I need to
do for this child and what I think I need to do if I had more time.
I think that links in, I have a tribunal coming up. And I am really caught, I have been discussing, discussing this with 04. I think that the parent and the child, I'm on their side, well I think. Well yes I am on their side. But when I sit in that tribunal I work for the local authority. And like I said to you I am really caught (ND caught between) yea. I am really struggling.

Yea, do you every find yourself ( I agree) Do you every find yourself caught between you and your SENCO, like you can know someone, like know the SENCO very well and you can feel friendly with them and you find yourself, I wonder if I collude you see. If I didn't know this person as well, hence why I am looking forward to working in a cluster. No, is that just me.

Colluding in what way 02, colluding to get, get something you want or get out of something you don't want to do.

A SENCO might say something about a parent, it's a horrible thing to be admitting isn't it, or about a child rather than challenging them on it. I have a longer term view of what I want to achieve in that relationship so I let it go.

See I am the opposite. See if I knew them long enough. If I knew them pretty well I will challenge them more than when I have only just met them,

I was about to make exactly the same point, comment you made. I'm finding it easier to work with SENCOs that I have a good relationship with. Because I am much more able to say to them come one you can't or you can't say that. But the ones that I don't have a relationship, colluding because I don't have a relationship.

The drop in this morning the first teacher sit down, she sat there. Went he's a naughty boy and that gets my back up, I want to say, want to say, I don't you to use that word, or words to that effect. But I couldn't because the rest of the consultation would have been a right off because I would have got her back up. So I had to kind of right, right and kind of move on. But yea, yea it is hard in that respect.

What about when we are writing statements, any ethics issues when were are involved, when we write statements. That good I think we are relaxed about it.

Well I have voiced my thought on that.

I think that sometimes to get the wording on the matrix. It almost like, your report is slightly skewed because the wording is, the words you have to use (08 your right) and I struggle, I struggle with that, sometimes. I just think, it the whole thing about significance, de, da, de, da, and you have to put it down (02 what have you) so they get the right kind of support. But then for a parent to read that. So
the child has made some good progress with all the interventions they are having and for them to see SEVERE. It’s a slap in the face. I think sometimes. It a shame we have to use them.

There a whole ethics around the Ethics of labelling, now we have moved on our labels but we no longer use retard and goodness know what but we have found a new set of words mean the same thing.

Do you often, I have found that I have a conversation with mum, I am going to write severe but that is so the child gets the money. Is that just me (Lots of Yeas from the team).

No. When you get my report it may sound really negative I will put some positive in about Johnny but it you know in order for the school to get, to do what he needs and..

Do you think we are caught between what we would like to say and what we need to say for resources to be put in place

Definitely (lots of nodding and agreement)

Where do your views of ethics come from. I think 04 comes form a sense of morality, a sense of what legal what do you think, for example has anybody read the, or recently taken on board the HPC’s views on ethics, or the BPS view on ethics or AEP view?

Some laughter.

I want to know if that’s at the forefront of our thinking or if it’s something more subtle going on. Like how useful do we find them?

I think even before you come into psychology training your ethics are being formed from your upbringing. And how much that can change is variable. I think you can change in terms of seeing things and thinking that I need to alter my practice in that way but I’m, I don’t think you can move massively from where you are. (General agreement)

I would say my ethical practice or how I think about my ethical practice has changed, well over the last 5 years since becoming a psychologist em I think that part of that is because I wrote in my doctorate. And initially and as a child and growing up and pre psychology I was sort of indoctrinated into having a moral, moral and coming to psychology, into training I was quite happy to BPS guidelines and the quite loosely based on Kant’s imperatives and feeling safe to know My practice within that framework. I could think of as ethical. I think that through writing my thesis and considering the more detailed ethics have become more and more aware to take personal responsibility for my actions. That goes
beyond those basic frameworks; it’s made me, made my practice much more uncomfortable. You know I find every case a challenge a difficulty, perplexing and confusing. You know and the, that has become heightened through the doctorate and being exposed to conversation like this.

I am opposite 06, on this point. I must say that I have set of beliefs or values which is part of me that inform me but within that I look at the guidelines. You know but in a way my journey is opposite way to you I have got a very strong moral, I shouldn’t say that shouldn’t I. We shouldn’t have that in this job. I have a strong belief system in what is right and what is not in my own little box. The guides that 08 allows me or 04 allows me or 09 allows me to travel.

Some protects from Seniors Management Team,

You know what I mean within the organisation, within the organisation how much I can do you know. (03 then wiggles his whole body-some laughter)

I think I am more like that (pointing to the wiggling). I Think I have become increasingly flexible. In that more pragmatic, so I think, your right it more a morally vulnerable position. Then I have to say if I am saying that then I have to taken on the consequences, that is not going to happen or that is going to happen. Then I have to accept it so I used to write in the beginning things like vague statements about children and then it is some bodies else’s job to say if they go to special school. Right but now I am , or I would do, now I am more prepared to say what my opinion is and say what that child needs or another example if were I would have followed rules strictly I’m more likely to say let see how that works out in this situation. I would be more flexible. Then If I thought about it I would think about it afterwards and then think why I behaved like that. Whereas when I was starting I wanted to be very prim and proper.

So 06 going back to what you were saying just now 02 has just given some example of how it actually changed his practice. Form your comment I was thinking was it sounds like what you’re taking away more internally and thinking have you also seen changes in you practice as well because of, because of the kinds of reflection you have made since doing you thesis. Or is you are just personally struggling with it more.

I think yes I would say that there have been changes in practice I suppose and its, its making sense of why I have always found practice so difficult. I, I have always found certain kind of practice so difficult. And I think the at I probably did my thesis was to try and really think why am I finding , so times I even look up and wonder maybe they are or they don’t seem to. Maybe I’m just a freak, maybe I’m just trying to make sense of that. I think that it is impacting on my practice. I only practice only 50% of the time now for example. So I think it has some real effects on my, on what I do for my job and how I do it.
Are some types of practice more ethical than others, like if someone's a 
behaviourist or someone's a cognitivist or someone's a psychoanalyst or some 
amore eclectic, is there, are one type of practice more ethical than others. Like 
some say ABA is unethical because it is behaviourist or.

No because it depends on how you are applying it doesn’t it. If you’re tying to 
apply it in the completely wrong situation then it can be unethical. But in other 
situations it can be ethical if that child needs. Breaking down into small steps but 
if you are trying to use one thing and apply it to everything that when it becomes.

We have a saying at home which links to the first point, the personal thing and 
probable to contextual thing as well. “Its yourself you have to sleep with at night”.

And I think that that can be one of the biggest massive barrier as well. Its draining 
I get a letter sometimes from a doctor saying something and I think right, I could 
just file that and give in but I know that it will go though my head and I will, I will 
have to make a phone call and follow up just to rectify what they have put. One 
just particular example that 09 knows about then I think that is part of my morals 
though, I could just leave it, put a quick note to say actually, school say da,de,da, 
well actually school can do that. But I can’t do it.

I see it as a car journey you are travelling down this road there are some traffic 
lights, you have got to stop when it is red. That’s the law of the land, that’s what 
you do, but within that, in the car you can, can be on gear number 2, gear 
number 3, it may wrong, you might be driving the clutch too much you might drive 
a bit faster when orange goes to red. Or but you make you make those 
judgments, but within that there are certain things that, like the traffic light you 
stop even if there are no other cars going by because if you don’t what will 
happen the system will break… that’s the system we have created for us .

Why don’t we have more discussion about ethics?

We haven’t got time.

This feels like a luxury, doing this.

I’m wondering, whenever I have supervision we really discuss ethics. Or I have 
lately because of this boy with anybody that will listen to me. But I think normally, 
I think we normally tend to talk about other things. But maybe they are ethics.

Perhaps that’s what I am trying to get at. Maybe it is about ethics if ethical is 
about having a quality relationship about someone or if it’s about having a quality 
relationship or it’s about having a relationship that’s effective. One that does no 
harm or one that is beneficial, one that does good then maybe then we are 
having them all the time.
And examining your own belief systems does that come into it? Which can be part of supervision; does that come into it as part of the broad umbrella of ethics? Examining your own belief systems?

And being challenged. Because you are challenged in supervision aren’t you and that that can link to the ethics can’t it?

We don’t call it ethics do we?

No you’re right.

No we tend to call it something else, in my view it is all ethics, what I should do in this situation. If the SENCO saying this and the mum is saying this what should I do? Or I am saying I need to writing something in this report and how do I write it and feel good about it and its ok I have written it? How do I describe a child as not SLD which I know bugs 06 all the time. So I think those are ethics. So why don’t we call it ethics or am I just being semantic?

No I think you are right, so when you said do you think about ethics in your practice. I’m thinking I never think of the word ethics. It not a word that pops in my head but I am always aware but I never... But I never think ‘that not ethical’ but I am aware of what I am doing.

I would sometime say that part of the time we sometimes have an awareness of certain big structural issues how we feel pretty powerless to do anything about that impact on our practice. In our preferred practice. And discussing them going on and go on and on discussing them we may feel they don’t get us anywhere so we may feel that we just need to the best we can within the context. Even if not how we feel be ethically perfect. Because we feel we feel we have no other choice. Does that make sense? So I know I picked up on the Matrix and I know I bug FL about going on about it but I try not go on about it too much. Because what can FL do, FL is part of a chain and someone else and someone else is there. So there is certain pragmatic realities that to discuss it further just because I feel it’s an ethics issue probable isn’t doing anybody any good. So I chose not to.

But, I think it probably fits in with my ethical code as well there are times when you know you just have to stand up and be counted. So you stand up and say this is wrong and em, em, em,

Would you pick you fights? … You would fight everything to the death!

No because you want to survive, it about survival isn’t, which is probably inherent in some of the questions you asked because we do.

OK thank you very much.
Appendix 5. Do Personal Pronouns Matter?

As discussed in the introduction I found the issues of tense problematic. Qualitative research tended to be in the first person while quantitative research tended to be in the third person past-tense. The use of the first person appeared to be almost a defining feature of qualitative. However post-structuralist theorists had made the concept of ‘Self’ problematic. This section of the appendix presented argument for and against the use of the first and third person.

Nietzsche (1998) argued that the self-determining “I” was analogous to “the ruling class” who “identifies itself with the successes of the commonwealth” (Ibid page 49). The establishment of the synthetic “I” was an expression of pleasure of mastery by recognizing oneself as the source of the command to resist but not the call for obedience. This was tantamount to an act of ontological violence by the self to the self.

However, Billington (2009) asked that practitioners not hide behind the anonymity of the third person and become accountable symbolically through making themselves present through using “I”. Billington (2009) explained this position below:

“The elision or indeed denial of the ‘I’ will be resisted in this paper, however, for all such rhetorical ploys constitute a deceit, both scientific and pragmatic. There can surely no longer be any pretence that the author, of whatever ideological persuasion, does not exist.” (Billington, 2009 page 5)

For Billington (2009) the use of “I” was a corrective to the dehumanizing and pathologizing language of science in which the author writes in the third person as a rhetorical device to claim political neutrality and objectivity. Billington was asking for an outing of the EP to make them accountable. Billington’s (2009) arguments were intriguing and challenging especially to someone who enjoyed the incomplete anonymity that writing provided.
However, the third person had been used in a different way in Memory Work and Narrative Therapy. In Memory Work writing in the third person was argued to be an opportunity for the researcher to “observe aspects of themselves” and to “release people from the tendencies towards self-justification” and “enable the researcher to embrace the possibility that the experiences could be lived or experienced differently” (Stephenson & Kippax, 2008, page 132). Using the third person was also analogous to the Narrative Therapy practice of externalizing conversations. In Narrative Therapy externalizing conversations were used to create a disruption or separation between the person and the problem that facilitated creative thinking (White & Epston, 1990). Following White & Epston (1990) it was hoped that the process of externalization would separate the professional practice from the dominant stories that have been shaping practice.

For Foucault (1969/2003) there was not a binary between presence and absence of an author but an analysis of the different ways authors were present and the work/functions that the presence did. The author function enabled a discursive practice that had rules about status, the right to speak and who should be heard. Barthes (1986) suggested that the author played a strategic game of hide and seek and was present even when the author was adopting an objective, realistic style to persuade the reader of the text’s truth and independence. Use of third person past tense was therefore an example of a game in which the author pretends not to be present so that discourses were able to speak for themselves. However, it was a rhetorical device that was laid bare by the balancing emphasis on plagiarism. This served to highlight the judicial right of the author and illustrated how the author was woven into a system of rights and obligations.

Writing was therefore not innocent but had a rhetorical function both to interpolate and persuade the reader to believe the writers account (Barthes, 1986; Billington, 2009; Foucault, 1969/2003; MacLure, 2003). Insider accounts could be particularly seductive because they appeared “straightforward” and
plausible (MacLure, 2003). However, readers need not be passive and had the capacity to interpret. As Stanley (2002) pointed out, “We may be textually persuaded, cajoled, led and misled; but we can, and we do, also scrutinize and analyze, puzzle and ponder, resist and reject’ (Stanley, 1992, p.131).

The call for a general appearance of the author could also have the effect of privileging particular authors (Foucault, 1969/2003). This reinforced the ranking of authors and evaluating texts by asking who was speaking. The truth of what was being said was therefore derived from who was speaking (Foucault 1969.2003).

Following Foucault (1969/2003) the “I” in texts was never unproblematically present and there were multiple selves present in texts. In addition, the act of writing was the accumulation of the interactions between the “I” and discourse (Aldridge, 1993; Rosenwald & Ochberg, 1991). I was very aware that as I wrote, new ideas and ways of seeing emerged that did not exist before the dialogue with writing. However, the writing Self was always already compromised because “The subject of the speech-act can never be the same as the one who acted yesterday: the I of the discourse can no longer be the site where a previously stored-up person is innocently restored” (Barthes, 1986, p. 17). Derrida and Ewald (1995) further argued that:

“There is not a constituted subject who engages itself in writing at a given moment for some reason or another. It exists through writing, given [donné] by the other: born [né] . . . through being given [donné], delivered, offered and betrayed all at one and the same time”. (ibid page 279)

This section of the appendix argued that the use of the first person was problematic because it could suggest an oversimplified and non–contingent construction of the self. However, it was also accepted that the use of the third person could suggest and reproduce an emotional disengagement and abdication of responsibility. The solution to this dilemma was not to adapt an
either or approach but an also approach. Therefore the choice to use either the first or third person will be strategic. A reader may find this disconcerting. However this mild discomfort might point a reader to the author’s function in the text and make them more reflective.
Appendix 6. Quality Research (Validity and Reliability)

Positivist research was frequently grounded on validity, reliability and objectivity. There has been considerable debate about the utility of quality assurance in qualitative research and disagreement about what would produce quality qualitative research amongst the proponents of the different qualitative research methodologies (Seale, 2002; Wainwright, 1997). Alternative to “validity”, “reliability” and “generalizability” have been widely suggested including:

- Trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 1981)
- Goodness (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000)
- Dependability, Transferability and Confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985)
- Soundness (Marchell & Rossman, 1989)
- Triangulation (Creswell, 2002)
- Authenticity (Ariminio & Hultgren, 2002)
- Dependability, Credibility, Transferability and Confirmability (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000)

The above review suggested that Lincoln had been responsible for the development of a significant number of concepts. These frequent attempts to find increasing nuanced ways of saying the same thing or to establish a position perhaps reflects the problematic nature of validity in qualitative research (Tobin & Begley, 2004). This could be summed up as the desire to make truth and the real, problematic but also wanting to be read has having said something true or real. In addition, the multiplication of terms could be seen as yet another symptom of the “consumerism of methodology” (Tobin & Begley, 2004). This section of the appendix critically examined the above evaluative constructs.

Lincoln & Guba’s (1985) constructs of credibility, dependability, transferability and confirmability perhaps deserve special mention as seminal and frequently appear in the qualitative research literature. Dependability, credibility, transferability and confirmability developed from the earlier constructs of “trustworthiness” and established whether the research was “worth paying attention to” (ibid page 290). The concept of trustworthiness and it underpinning
concepts of credibility, dependability, transferability and confirmability have been criticised for too closely overlapping the quantitative research concepts of validity, reliability and objectivity (Tobin & Begley, 2004). In response to criticism about the utility of trustworthiness as a construct, Lincoln (1995) introduced the concept of “authenticity”. Schwandt (2001) argued that unlike the underpinning concepts of trustworthiness, authenticity was unique to qualitative research. Authenticity was strongly associated with ethical research and can be shown if the researcher demonstrated fairness in the representation of different realities including their issues, values and concerns. Lincoln & Guba (1994) suggested that there were four different elements to authenticity which are listed below:

- Ontological authenticity – showed by the researcher having had developed an in-depth understanding of the constructs being researched.
- Educatively authenticity – demonstrated by the research having had developed an understanding and appreciation of the constructs of the participants.
- Catalytic authenticity – achieved when the research is prompted to take some form of action.
- Tactical authenticity – achieved by establishing that the research has empowered the other.

All the above elements of authenticity were established by the reader. Ontological and educative authenticity were related to theory whereas catalytic and tactical authenticity were related to action. Ontological and educative authenticity were related to the skill of the research to describe, analyze and explain the constructs in the research. Whereas catalytic and tactical authenticity related to how the research impacted on the reader. For research to be authentic it had to be transformative. The aim of authenticity was to engage the reader in action and self development. This suggested that research could be part of the technologies of self formation, discipline and control (Foucault, 1988a). Morse et al. (2002) were critical of both trustworthiness and authenticity and suggested that they were post hoc strategies for evaluating research rather than concurrent with the research. This meant that rigour was something that could be imposed after rather than during the research.
Credibility refers to processes to establish whether the results of the qualitative research are credible from the perspectives of the research participants. That was, whether the statements, views, feelings and meanings inferred by the researcher were recognized by the research participants. This was typically achieved by sharing the results with the participants so that they could confirm, approve or validate them. Credibility was perhaps analogous to internal validity.

Could validation of this thesis results been achieved by sharing data, and results with participants? As part of the research process M and his mother were both shown the account of the original meeting I had with M and their views on it sought. The account of the meeting with M was also shared with my EP colleagues in the Service. A transcript of the focus group meeting was emailed to all of the EPs who took part and their comments sought. I also have had discussion with colleagues, who were interested in the services about my interpretations of the transcripts of our focus group discussion. Sharing transcripts and description was done because it was respectful.

Although, participant checking cannot ensure authenticity it could privilege individual accounts of truth. This was because asking the speaker if a particular interpretation was what they meant when they said something assumed that there was a fixed, modernist self that had unproblematic access and insight into their motives, action and attitudes. Tobin & Begley (2004) also noted that asking participants to check the data or results did not address the problem of multiple realities.

Asking the participants to check the results could also have been an example of a type of ontological realism. Ontological realism when combined with epistemological post-structuralism could be problematic and lead to criticism that the study was self-refuting (Aamodt, 1982).
Lincoln & Guba (1985) suggested that credibility could be demonstrated through peer debriefing, and prolonged engagement. As common with most self-study this thesis’ research had involved detailed discussion with peers about the nature of the research and the meanings generated. Notes of these discussions have been kept in the research dairy. The research has occurred over two years and during this time I have remained involved with M and his family.

Dependability was concerned with the rigour by which the data was interpreted by the researcher. Dependable implies that the interpretation made and conclusions drawn were permissible and could have been legitimately inferred and extrapolated from the data. This was a type of epistemological discipline as it was concerned with the limits of what could be said. Dependability therefore involved a type of truth game that was concerned with fidelity (being true to). This depended both on the quality of the description of the data analysis methods and the richness of the data presented (Nikander, 2008). Dependability was therefore analogous to reliability.

In the thesis, the transcript of the Focus Group and the account of the meeting with M both provide rich descriptions of the data and are available in Appendices 2 and 4. In the literature on validity and reliability in qualitative research there is still a strong desire for authenticity (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Lincoln & Guba, 1981). For example to verify that the research actually took place and that the participants really said what they were transcribed as having had said. The reader had a strong desire to feel that what they were reading happened, that the research occurred and that the account was not a fiction. This thesis contained information on methods of data collection, analysis and interpretation. This, in theory, enabled reader to establish if the results and interpretation of results were dependable (Flick, 2002). Although, it would be possible for the reader to audit the interpretations and conclusions in this way it would require a significant amount of work by the reader to do this. The arduousness of auditing for
dependability perhaps means that it was only exercised by a limited number of readers.

Arimino & Hultgren (2002) have suggested a more totalising approach to rigour in qualitative research by suggesting that rigour should apply to all of the research and not just the methodological section. This included providing rich, detailed or thick descriptions of: the epistemology that underpinned the research; the methodological approach; the data collection methods; the reflexive position of the researcher. In this thesis I have attempted to delineate the post-structural epistemology undertaken, provided guidance on how text was selected and interpreted.

Confirmability attempts to evaluate research in relation to external sources to establish the “trustworthiness” of the research (Flick, 2002). Confirmability was therefore analogous to triangulation. The interpretation and conclusions made in the thesis were located in the reviewed literature. While offering some triangulation this tended to privilege what has already been said over the possibility of saying something which has not been said before. Triangulation was further attempted by juxtaposing the findings from the Focus group with those from the meeting with M.

Haryana (1979) suggested that the validity of data could be assessed by “assessing the characteristics, interests, and origin of the person who did the fieldwork” (Haryana, 1979, pages 99-100). This was akin to a medieval exegesis that validates the test based on who is speaking (Foucault 1969/2003)

Lincoln and Guba (1985) used the word Transferability to mean how far the results could be generalized or transferred to other studies or contexts. This was perhaps most analogous to external validity. While holding that it was not possible to generalize from a case study in the “traditional sense”, Flyvbjerg
(2006) seemed to suggest that a case-study could be used rhetorically to persuade the reader of a more general theme and could be used to argue that a statement was not universally true (e.g. there was a poverty of aspiration in the working class). This was because case-studies could find exceptions (falsify) and therefore promotes complexity, ambiguity, particularism and contingency. Flyvbjerg (2006) would also want there to be room for a “purely descriptive, phenomenological case study without any attempt to generalise” (ibid page 227). Case-studies can be used both to test and develop theory (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Flyvbjerg (2006) challenged the tendency towards verifaction in case studies, which was the tendency for the research to work towards confirming their “preconceived notions” in two moves (ibid page 234). The first move was to suggest that verifaction was inherent in all research. In the second move, Flyvbjerg (2006) challenged verifaction by listing research where the researcher found that their preconceived ideas were incorrect. Flyvbjerg (2006) second move was perhaps too close to the analogy of the null-hypothesis; that was if you can disprove the null-hypothesis then the hypothesis can stand.

Zeicher (2007), also concerned about transferability in participant research, identified problems with making connections between studies including inconsistencies in how researchers defining concepts (e.g. Professional development), different data collection methods and research instruments employed. In addition, researchers tended to undertake unique research with personal research questions rather than attempting to build on the research of others. However, Zeicher (2007) laments the failure of Self-Study to be used in policy reviews or to inform policy debates. Zeicher made a plea for research to attempt to establish more consistent definition of concepts and descriptions of method, using instruments from previous research and attempts to build on the research of others. Zeicher (2007) suggested concerns could just reflect the relative newness of self-study as a method. Zeicher (2007) also recognised that

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76 Flyvjerb (2006) was writing specifically about case studies but I think that his arguments also applied to other types of small scale and naturalist research (including this thesis).
“introspective self-studies focusing on ones own growth... may be difficult to link to other work because of its focus on the self” (Ibid page 41).

This section of the appendix critically examined the constructed used to evaluate qualitative research. It was argued that the concepts used in qualitative research were problematic and frequently analogous to the evaluative constructs used in quantitative research. Although, the evaluative strategies employed in qualitative research might not guarantee high quality research they at least represent a desire to produce quality research. With in mind this section also outlined the steps taken by this thesis to produce quality research. Finally, it was argued that the small scale nature thesis and the focus on self-developing made generalising the results problematic. This issue was further explored in the ‘Implication for Practice and Future Research’ section of this thesis.
Appendix 7. Reflexivity

Researching oneself as a practitioner was inexorably linked to the processes of reflexivity, which had been a theme in education research since, at least, the publication of Schön’s (1983) influential book “The Reflective Practitioner”. Reflexivity was also a defining aspect of qualitative research (Banister et al., 2002; Bourdieu, 1999; Willig, 2001). In qualitative research reflexivity was perceived as a way of ensuring rigor (Finlay, 1998; Koch & Harrington, 1998; Rice & Ezzy, 1999). Reflexivity involved critical reflection on how the researcher constructs knowledge from the research process, what sorts of factors influence the researcher’s construction of knowledge and how these influences are revealed in the planning, conduct, and writing up of the research (Willig, 2001). This section of the appendix further critically examined aspects of the construct of reflexivity relevant to this thesis. This was achieved by (1) identifying the tensions between modern and post-structuralist approaches to reflexivity, (2) critically examining the function of reflection in post-structuralist research and (3) examining the strategies used to establish reflexivity. The overall aim of this section of the appendix was to make the concept of reflexivity problematic. This was part of the, self-imposed, ongoing task of challenging and testing constructs that I predisposed towards. Testing reflexivity was also believed to be a necessary step in developing a critical disposition because of the core role of reflexivity in the research methodologies.

There was a well recognized tension in reflexive practices between post-structuralist and modernist agendas (Ellwood, 2006; Machbeth, 2001; Pillow, 2003; Usher, 1996). This tension was derived from the desire for the researcher to identify/and name their biases, positions, construction in relation to the research and the post-structuralist problematization of modernist concepts such as self-knowledge, transparency and the capacity of the subject to name their discourses (Ellwood, 2006; Machbeth, 2001; Pillow, 2003; Usher, 1996). Pillow (2003) warned against the allure of reflexivity as a means to reduce anxiety about the ethnocentric or voyeuristic nature of research. Ellwood (2006)
suggested that rather than attempting the impossible of “knowing and naming” her subjectivity as researcher that she would “forego instead what I did not, nor could not, know at the time” (Ellwood, 2006, page 69). This move reminded the reader of the complexities of undertaking qualitative research. A post-structuralist approach to reflexivity was therefore an examination of memories, which are always partial and selective; influenced by values, attitudes and beliefs; rewritten by experience; and constructed by language (Bonjione, 2001; Conway, 1990;

Reflexivity has been argued as a necessary condition for ethical research (Bourdieu, 1999; Guillemin & Gillam, 2004; McGraw, Zvonkovic and Walker, 2000). McGraw, Zvonkovic and Walker (2000), in the quote below, suggested that reflexivity facilitated ethical research through:

“... a process whereby researchers place themselves and their practices under scrutiny, acknowledging the ethical dilemmas that permeate the research process and impinge on the creation of knowledge”. (ibid, page 68)

McGraw, Zvonkovic and Walker (2000) suggested that researchers, by making their practices and knowledge generation visible, were able to be held to account by enabling self-monitoring, self-evaluation and self-regulation processes (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004). The psychology of self-awareness and self-focused attention was extensively investigated during the 1970s and 1980s (Beaman et al., 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Gibbons, 1978; Hull et al., 1983; Ickes, Wicklund & Ferris, 1973; and Scheier & Carver, 1983). These studies suggested that the consequence of induced self-awareness was an increased awareness of any discrepancies between what they were doing at the moment and their idealised view of how they should be acting. This suggested that self-awareness promotes self-consistency. Reflexivity was therefore a tool to ameliorate the power of and objectify the researcher Bourdieu (1999). Habermas (1970) claimed that reflexivity being social remained ideological and therefore entangled with power.
Frosh & Baraitser (2008) were also interested in this transformative potential of reflexivity and argued that research transformed both the researcher and the researched. For example in interviews, what a subject `knows' shifted as a result of the co-constructed interchanges with the researcher. This thesis was interested in the shifts in what the researcher knew as they interacted with the research subjects. The implication for Frosh and Baraitser (2008) was that all knowledge was therefore temporally and interpersonally positioned which made knowledge (and truth) contingent, strategic and provisional. The reflexive researcher did not merely report the “facts” of the research but also actively constructed interpretations (“What do I know?”), while at the same time questioning how those interpretations came about (“How do I know what I know?”) (Bourdieu, 1999; Hertz, 1997).

Brookfield (1995) suggested that a dialogueic reflexive practice could be achieved through encouraging the use of four complementary activities which would function as lenses through which to view practice. These lenses were:

- Practitioners autobiography;
- Professional colleagues;
- Clients;
- Literature and theory.

The thesis made use of all of the above lenses while appropriating Van Manen’s (1977), three distinct and hierarchical stages of the reflective process;

- Analyzing and reflecting on the impact of technical aspects of practice;
- Reflecting on actions and beliefs of the practitioner;
- Questioning the moral and ethical dimension of practice.

However, the thesis applied Van Manen’s (1997) stages as constructs rather than hierarchies. This was informed by a personal ambiguity towards the utility of hieratical systems.

The different levels of hierarchies/categories/constructs of reflectivity outlined above can be considered as belonging to two different but overlapping
dimensions of reflexivity which can be characterized as “personal reflexivity” and “epistemological reflexivity” (Willig, 2001).

Personal reflexivity was a personal reflection on the researcher’s stake in the topic being researched. “It involves reflecting upon the ways our own values, experiences, interests, beliefs, political commitments, wider aims in life and social identities have shaped the research” (Willig, 2001, p. 10). Hepburn (2003) has called this type of reflexivity “confessional”.

Epistemological reflexivity was a reflection on how “what can be known” was produced by the practices and processes of the chosen research methodology. Banister et al. (2002) preferred the term “functional reflexivity” to epistemological reflexivity and argued that the researcher was continuously present in epistemological processes.

Reflectivity revealed the doxological values of the researcher but did not provide an escape from the power relations that the practitioners work between and construct and may further entangle the practitioner in relations of power (Butler, 2003; Foucault, 2003; Habermas, 1970; Maton, 2003; McNiff, 2000). Reflexivity was understood as a positioning practice that made the researcher apparently visible; however this visibility can be very localised and managed by the researcher. Foucault (2003) argued that directed self-reflection within an organisation, rather than being an act of resistance and liberation was necessary for the operation of regimes of power, in the organisation. The assumption that problematic visibility ceased when the researched and the researcher were the same person/people was also problematic. It made the positivist assumption that the “I” that undertook the research was the same “I” that interpreted, analyzed and wrote up the research, rather than acknowledging a more contingent and partial view of the self.
Maton (2003) challenged the utility of reflexivity and argued that enacted reflectivity can be an individualistic, narcissistic and a form of authorship denial. Narcissism resulted from a reaction to the researchers objectifying gaze which reduces the researcher to speaking only about themselves. Narcissistic reflexivity was an individualizing, humanistic process as the researcher attempted to overcome their biases and transcend their own social positioning. If narcissistic reflexivity was at one end of a continuum, authorship denial was at the other end. Authorship denial occurred when the author attempted to position themselves as neutral and present only to give a voice to the other. Maton (2003) argued that researchers have to find a space between these two binary approaches. Maton (2003) suggested that difficulties with reflexivity could be mediated by accepting that each participant only had a partial view and that their view had been shaped by the participant’s social position. The aim of reflexivity would therefore, not only, be to make the researcher’s biases visible but also to make the epistemological and ontological biases visible. Turning the reflexive gaze onto ourselves may be the lesser of two evils; doing violence onto oneself to lessen the violence we do to others. However, following Derrida (1978) we have to be very careful about theorizing difference and systematizing statements in their relation to their virtue. Butler (2003) added that knowing oneself did not make practice ethical because complete knowledge of the self or other was impossible because of the intrinsic opacity of the self. However, this opacity could however be a source of an ethical relation resulting from realizing that neither oneself nor the other is completely knowable.

This section of the thesis argued that reflexivity was a highly complex and problematic construct. Reflexivity was suggested to be both necessary, if insufficient, for ethical research and held the potential to discipline the researcher. Reflexivity was also argued to be a dynamic process that shaped what it found. This section provided an outline of the frameworks suggested by Brookfield (1995) and Van Manen’s (1977) and how these were employed and adapted in the this thesis. Although, it was argued that reflexivity wove the
researcher into a web of power it was also suggested that employing reflexivity as a tool to critically examine the ontology and epistemology of this thesis could still be useful.
Appendix 8. Informed Consent

By critically examining consent this section continued the work of making problematic constructs that I was predisposed towards. The problematization of informed consent was undertaken by (1) considering consent as a fluid construct, (2) challenging the dominate narrative about origins consent, (3) arguing that consent could function to individualize Professional-Client relationships and obscure the role of the State in those relationships, and (4) that consent privileged a rational, autonomous, individualistic construction of clients.

Alderson and Goodey (1998) suggested that there are differences between positivistic, constructed, functional, critical and postmodern understandings of consent. See table 2 below:

Table 3. Types of Consent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of consent</th>
<th>Understanding of consent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positivistic</td>
<td>Consent was a real ‘thing’ and limited only by the knowledge and cognitive skills of the participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructed</td>
<td>Consent was contingent and specific and constructed through historical and social processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional</td>
<td>Consent was a ceremonial ritual with the aim of transferring responsibility from professional to client.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>Consent was protective corrective to medical power and discusses?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmodern</td>
<td>Consent was an expression of preferences and desires that facilitate identity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above suggested that rather than be a fixed construct that the understanding of consent was shaped by the epistemological position.

The conventional narrative was that informed consent arose from the horrors of Nazi experimentation and that informed consent can be used as a tool to evaluate and make research ethical and as a corrective for informed consent was also argued to be a corrective for autocratic and paternalistic research practices (Corrigan, 2003; Goodman, McElliot and Marks, 2003). However, Goodman, McElliot and Marks (2003) argued that there was concern about consent in experimentation since at least the 1860s that continued up until, during and after WWII. In fact, Goodman, McElliot and Marks (2003), noted that human experimentation significantly increased after WWII.

Goodman, McElliot and Marks (2003) argued that a focus on consent directed the analytical gaze to ethics rather than practice (praxis). They were very much of the opinion that practice was the more appropriate level of analysis. The central issue for Goodman, McElliot and Marks (2003) was the nature of the practices and the role they have in relation to the State. I am not sure that I fully agree with the binary of ethics or action and would want to suggest phronesis as a possible counter and corrective. Indeed, if I understand Aristotle in his discussion of continence, ethics is dependent on commitment and resistance (action).

What I found very useful about Goodman, McElliot and Marks’s (2003) argument was that they inferred that the important relationship would not be between the EP and Client but between EP and the state. Or perhaps it was more accurate to say the most obscured relationship was the relationship between the EP and the State. The focus on informed consent points the research gaze towards the EP and Client relationship and away from the EP and State relationship. Informed consent has a secondary obscurest function in that it could disguise power as it
positions the client and EP as equal. The focus in research or EP practice needs to be more than was it ethical but also a critical examination of the practices and their functions.

The relationship between the EP (as professional) and the State hinged around the concept of usefulness. Usefulness in education can be thought of as achievement, standards, the skills need to find employment, making students useful to employers (Goodman, McElliot & Marks, 2003). The role of EPs’ in producing useful bodies was little explored in the literature. However I would argue that it was present in EP practice. For example, inclusion can be framed as a binary between the identified child with the 'problem' and the rest of the class/school. Usefulness was a core construct in this. The child with SEN can be included so long as they do not impact on the efficacious education of their peers. For example the DfES (2001) stated that could not be placed in a mainstream school if “the child’s attendance at the school would be incompatible with the efficient education of other pupils or the efficient use of resources”. (DfES, 2001, page 10).

The EP relationship with the state placed them between and betwixt the particular other and general pupil body, between the needs, rights, desires of a particular child and the efficient education of children. The EPs were not only gatekeepers but also psychological/educational engineers; they had a role in both specifying provision but also in increasing the usefulness of particular pupils. However, rather than focus on this instrumental and function role of EPs, the focus was on whether a consent form was signed or how we obtained agreement to undertake work. This suggested a further double function of consent. Firstly, O’Neill (2004) argued that informed consent both held professionals accountable but also protected them. The type of accountability was managerial accountability with its requirements of setting targets and measuring performance. Secondly, informed consent transfers some of the responsibility from the professional to the client (O’Neill, 2004)
In the professional/client relationship there are multiple and ill-defined conceptions of autonomy which seemed to make the relationship obscure. There was also dispute about the degree of informed consent that was necessary and the need for it to be explicit and specific as opposed to tacit and general (O’Neill, 2004).

Locating the child in an economy of usefulness made identification with children as individuals difficult. This was because the individual was already presented in terms of utility, situated in an economy of usefulness. The child with SEN was only seen when they were presented/constructed as lacking in relation to the general pupil body (slow progress, inappropriate behaviour etc). The EP encountered the child in a situation that was (pre)formed so that the child could become an object of intervention or assessment. Others have to be made docile before they can be made useful (Foucault, 1977). The referred child has been (pre)categorised and constructed and therefore to see the child as otherwise becomes an act of resistance and required commitment. It is an act of resistance because it required the EP to challenge and disrupt the dominate discourse.

The relationships in human subject research were ambiguous and the focus on informed consent was an attempt to manage this ambiguity by obfuscating the discursive practices that instigate and regulate it (O’Neill, 2002). Traditional approaches tended not to focus on the complexity of choice and the processes of decision-making. (Jallinoja, 2001; O’Neill, 2002). A dichotomy was presented between the paternalistic researcher and the active and autonomous decision-making participant. The respect for autonomy that underpinned informed consent developed out of bioethics which privileged individualism, self-governance, and rational choice (Beauchamp & Childress, 1989; Evans, 2000; Rose, 1999; Wolpoe, 1998). However, Corrigan (2003) argued that individualization “reify the process of consent by stripping it away from its context and reducing it to a rational choice model of action” (Ibid, page 770) and
obscured the role of power in the process. O’Neill (2002) added that consent had to be more than the option of refusing what is offered.

O’Neill (2002) highlighted the irony that consent appeared to be motivated by a desire to focus on public health rather than individual care but that “… many public health measures have to be compulsory if they are to be effective, and all compulsion ultimately relies on sanction, hence the possible use of some sorts of coercion” (Ibid, page 37). In other words, informed consent was the price willing to be paid when the needs of the many outweighed the needs of the few.

This section made the construct of informed consent problematic by first acknowledging that rather than being a fixed and universally understood construct that it was understood differently by different epistemological positions. After loosening up the construct of consent the origins of consent as a response to Nazism was then questioned. Instead of accepting that informed consent was a bulwark against oppression and evil it was suggested that consent could obscure the problematic role of the State in Professional-Client relationships. However, I am not convinced that the solution would be to abandon informed consent. Research without the informed consent of the participant would be abusive and unethical. Rather the critical examination of consent suggested that although informed consent was necessary for ethical research it was not only insufficient to ensure ethical research, by itself but also potentially problematic. This realization placed an obligation on the researcher to continue to strive to make the research ethical. This included not assuming that because a consent form had been signed or the participants’ continual involvement was sought that this meant that the research was ethical. It also called me not to keep the research gaze focused solely on Professional-Client relationships but to seek to include the wider context.
Appendix 9. Request for Service Involvement Form
## REQUEST FOR SERVICE INVOLVEMENT

**EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY** [ ] **SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS SERVICE** [ ] **SUPPORT SERVICE** [ ]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Child's Surname:</th>
<th>Any other family name:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Child's Forename:</td>
<td>Date of Birth:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity:</td>
<td>UPN Number:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Looked after child:</td>
<td>YES / NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child's Address (including Postcode):</td>
<td>Tel Number:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postcode:</td>
<td>Mobile Number:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**School Information:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School:</th>
<th>Tel Number:</th>
<th>Yr Group:</th>
<th>Admission date:</th>
<th>Admission number:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of EP/SENSS Advisory Teacher who has agreed to become involved:</td>
<td>Date School Action began:</td>
<td>Date School Action Plus began:</td>
<td>Statemented:</td>
<td>Yes / No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of meeting when this referral was agreed:</th>
<th>Who knows the child best (in school):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signature of Headteacher/SENCo:</td>
<td>Date:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Family Information**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Parent/Carer (including forename)</th>
<th>Name of Parent/Carer (including forename)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Address (including Postcode) if different from above: | Address (including Postcode) if different from above:
---|---
Tel Number: | Tel Number:

**FOR OFFICE USE ONLY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Need:</th>
<th>1A</th>
<th>1B</th>
<th>1C</th>
<th>1D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreed Action:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CURRENT LEVELS OF ATTAINMENT (Including P Levels)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literacy:</th>
<th>Mathematics:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any other relevant school test scores:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**WHAT ARE THE CHILD’S STRENGTHS**
(Please describe)

**THE SCHOOL’S DESCRIPTION OF THE NEED**
(Please describe)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C&amp;L</th>
<th>ESBD</th>
<th>C&amp;I</th>
<th>S/PN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**STEPS TAKEN TO PROMOTE INCLUSION AND PROGRESS:**
(What has been done in school)

Three IEPs attached or relevant/appropriate evidence
WHAT ARE THE SCHOOL’S EXPECTATIONS OF SERVICE INVOLVEMENT?  
(Please refer to the EPS/SENSS menu)

OTHER PROFESSIONAL AGENCIES INVOLVED

In accordance with the Data Protection Act information provided to the Service is used in order to assist Wakefield MDC meet the statutory responsibilities for the provision of education to children. This is in accordance with requirements of the Education Act 1996 and School Standards Framework Act 1998. Data may be shared with other agencies involved in the health and welfare of school children. When involving any third party we will take all reasonable steps to ensure your data is securely and confidentially kept. If you are worried about giving personal details or us sharing them with others please discuss this with the member of staff working with you.

PARENTAL/CARER AGREEMENT AND ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

This form has been discussed with me.

Signed …………………………………………………………………………… Date

……………………………………………………………
### Appendix 10. The Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>5</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Profound and multiple learning difficulties</td>
<td>Severe and complex learning difficulties</td>
<td>Significant learning difficulties</td>
<td>Moderate learning difficulties</td>
<td>Mild learning difficulties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Special school</td>
<td>18.5 – 27.5 hrs</td>
<td>Up to 18 hrs</td>
<td>Delegated School Budget</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Severe and pervasive difficulties in acquiring skills preventing access to the academic curriculum. Up to 20 hrs</td>
<td>Severe difficulties in acquiring Literacy/Numera cy skills despite having had access to appropriate learning opportunities taking into account age and developmental level</td>
<td>Significant difficulties in acquiring Literacy/Numera cy skills despite having had access to appropriate learning opportunities taking into account age and developmental level</td>
<td>Delegated School Budget</td>
<td>Persistent difficulties in acquiring Literacy/Numera cy skills despite having had access to appropriate learning opportunities taking into account age and developmental level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Educationally blind and requires a tactile mode of communication.  27.5 hrs Plus Or Specialist Resourced Provision</td>
<td>A severe functional visual impairment and/or severe field loss. May need a tactile mode of communication. 16 – 27.5 hrs</td>
<td>A significant functional visual impairment and/or field loss Up to 15 hrs</td>
<td>A moderate functional visual impairment and/or field loss</td>
<td>A mild functional visual impairment and/or field loss.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Profound deafness/HI (BSL, SSE).  27.5 hrs or Specialist Resourced Provision</td>
<td>Severe functional deafness/HI Uses aids technology and may use visual communication (BSL,SSE). 16 – 27.5 hrs</td>
<td>Significant functional deafness /HI uses aids/technology Up to 15 hrs</td>
<td>Moderate functional deafness/HI likely to use aids/technology</td>
<td>A mild functional deafness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Multiple and complex physical difficulties</td>
<td>Severe physical difficulties. Likely to have severely impaired mobility</td>
<td>Significant physical difficulties May have impaired</td>
<td>Moderate physical difficulties related to</td>
<td>A minimal physical difficulty related to fine/gross motor,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Severe and complex difficulties with the understanding of receptive and/or expressive language. 21 – 27.5 hrs Or Specialist Resourced Provision</td>
<td>Severe difficulty with receptive and/or expressive language. 10 – 20 hrs</td>
<td>Significant difficulty with receptive and/or expressive language. Up to 9 hrs</td>
<td>Moderate difficulty with receptive and/or expressive language.</td>
<td>Mild difficulty with receptive and/or expressive language</td>
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<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Profound difficulty with social interactions, literal interpretation, inference and social use of language, sensory triggers and rigid thought processes and routines. 27.5 hrs or Specialist Resourced Provision</td>
<td>Severe and consistent difficulty with social interactions, literal interpretation, inference and social use of language, sensory triggers and has rigid thought processes and routines. 16 – 27.5 hrs</td>
<td>Significant and consistent difficulty with social interactions. literal interpretation, inference and social use of language, sensory triggers and thought processes. Up to 15 hrs</td>
<td>Frequent moderate difficulty with social interactions and/or literal interpretation, inference and social use of language, sensory triggers and thought processes.</td>
<td>Mild difficulty with one or more of: social interactions, literal interpretation, inference and social use of language, sensory triggers and thought processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Constant and/or high intensity extreme and demanding and/or disturbing behaviour</td>
<td>Constant and/or demanding and/or disturbing behaviour which is of high frequency,</td>
<td>Difficult or demanding and/or disturbing behaviour is of limited duration.</td>
<td>Frequent difficult or demanding and/or disturbing behaviour of</td>
<td>Occasional difficult or demanding and/or disturbing behaviour of</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disturbing behaviour which always affects safety of self and others. Up to 27.5 hrs or Specialist Resourced Provision</td>
<td>Affects own safety and that of others. Up to 27.5 hrs</td>
<td>Intensity and duration. Delegated School Budget</td>
<td>Limited duration.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I</strong> Displays symptoms of a mental health difficulty likely to endanger themselves or others. In Secure Accommodation / Hospital</td>
<td>Displays symptoms of a severe mental health difficulty In Specialist Resourced Provision</td>
<td>Frequently displays symptoms of mental health difficulty. Up to 27.5 hrs</td>
<td>Occasionally displays symptoms of mental health difficulties.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>J</strong> A constant and severe medical condition, which has profound effects on day-to-day functioning. The condition may be life threatening or life limiting. Specialist intervention, e.g. Jig-saw</td>
<td>A constant and severe medical condition, which has effects on day-to-day functioning, requiring specialist intervention. – 27.5 hrs</td>
<td>A diagnosed established medical condition which is not yet fully controlled Up to 12.5 hrs</td>
<td>A diagnosed established and controlled medical condition.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A minor diagnosed medical condition.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 11. Micro Processes of Accountability

1. Supervision records. After the monthly supervision EPs completed a form that detailed the date and topic of supervision;
2. Monthly audits were undertaken by administrators on the training provided/received, annual reviews, children seen from the waiting list and the date and colleague with whom peer supervision took place;
3. TME form (to be completed with a teacher, recording agreed outcome and evaluation of EPs' work);
4. Flexi time card (recording of weekly hours worked during the week).
5. Signing in/out book;
6. Record of visit (Record of EP’s work retained by the school);
7. Time in school sheet (Weekly account of time spent in a named school);
8. Electronic diaries (Completed in advance so that Managers and colleagues can know the location of an EP);
9. School signing in/out books recording the time EPs arrived and left a school;
10. File audits (Every 6 months a sample of each EPs’ files were audited with the Senior Management Team (SMT) to ensure quality);
11. Specialism audit goals (Each EP has a specialism. Every 6 months the progress towards achieving the specialist goals of the EP are reviewed by a member of the SMT);
12. HPC record of Continuing Professional Development (CPD) identifying the training and professional development undertaken;
13. Performance reviews held ever 6 months with a member of SMT;
14. All statutory Advice was read and authorized by a senior manager;
15. Leave cards;
16. Mileage forms recording the school attended, distance travelled, reason for the journey and how long the business took;
17. Deadlines for Statutory Advice;
18. At weekly team meetings EPs were given a piece of paper that reminded them of the deadline for Statutory Advice and asked if there are any problems with the deadlines;
19. Peer discussion records; recording discussions between EPs and colleagues. The nature of the concern and the agreed action was noted and filed appropriately;
20. Three supervisions with SMT during the year;
21. Team and cluster meeting minutes;
22. Fire registers signed when arriving and leaving the building;
23. Internet use book; a record was made of the site visited, length of time at site and reason site was accessed;

Statutory Advice as a substantial report written by EPs at the request of the Local Authority. The aim of the Statutory Advice is to identify the special educational needs of a Client and to make recommendations about modification, accommodation, structure of the school day, teaching approaches and resources required to meet the Client’s special educational needs.
24. Internet usage tracking nature and frequency by the Local Authorities’ ICT team;
25. Photocopying usage monitored by the local Authority
Appendix 12. Participant Consent Forms
Title of Project: A Critical Examination and Analysis of the Processes by which Educational Psychologists Constructed themselves as Ethical Professionals: To be what I am not.

Name of Researcher: Niall Devlin  Contact number: 01924 307403

Please initial box

- I confirm that I have read and understand the information letter dated [insert date] for the above project and have had the opportunity to ask questions.

- I understand that my child’s participation is voluntary and that they are free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason.

- I understand that what my child’s responses will be recorded and will be anonymised before analysis.

This means that when the recordings of the child’s responses are written down, no names of children will be used. Examples of what my child has said may be used in the write up of the research, however my child name will not be written instead it will may say “Here are examples of pupils views which were sought from a secondary school in West Yorkshire.

- I agree for my child to take part in the above research project.

Name of Participant ___________________________ Date ________________ Parental Signature ____________________
(or legal representative)

Lead Researcher ___________________________ Date ________________ Signature ________________
To be signed and dated in presence of the participant

Copies:

Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed and dated participant consent form and information sheet. A copy for the signed and dated consent form will be placed in the project’s main record, which is kept in a secure location.
Title of Project: A Critical Examination and Analysis of the Processes by which Educational Psychologists Constructed themselves as Ethical Professionals: To be what I am not.

Name of Researcher: Niall Devlin
Contact number: 01924 307403

Please initial box

• I confirm that I have read and understand the information letter dated [insert date] for the above project and have had the opportunity to ask questions.

• I understand that taking part in the research is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason.

• I understand that what I say will be recorded and will be anonymised before analysis.

This means that when the recordings of my responses are written down, no names will be used. Examples of what I have said may be used in the write up of the research, however my name will not be written instead it will may say “Here are examples of pupils views from a secondary school in West Yorkshire”.

I agree to take part in the above research project.

________________________ ________________         ___________________
Name of Participant Date Pupil Signature
(or legal representative)

_________________________ ________________         ____________________
Lead Researcher Date Signature
To be signed and dated in presence of the participant

Copies:

Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed and dated participant consent form and information sheet. A copy for the signed and dated consent form will be placed in the project’s main record, which is kept in a secure location.
Title of Project: A Critical Examination and Analysis of the Processes by which Educational Psychologists Constructed themselves as Ethical Professionals: To be what I am not.

Name of Researcher: Niall Devlin Contact number: 01924 307403

Please initial box

- I confirm that I have read and understand the information letter dated [insert date] for the above project and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
- I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason.
- I understand that what I say will be recorded and will be anonymised before analysis.

This means that when the recordings of my responses are written down, no names will be used. Examples of what I have said may be used in the write up of the research, however my name will not be written instead it will may say “Here are examples of staff views which were sought from a secondary school in West Yorkshire.

- I agree for my child to take part in the above research project.

Name of Participant
(or legal representative)

Date

Staff Signature

Lead Researcher

Date

Signature

To be signed and dated in presence of the participant

Copies:
Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed and dated participant consent form and information sheet. A copy for the signed and dated consent form will be placed in the project’s main record, which is kept in a secure location.
Appendix 13. Analysis of the HPC-SCPE

13.1. The problematic relationships with the client

13.1.1 Anxiety about the EP-Client asymmetry

A defining aspect of the HPC-SCPE was anxiety about the professional-SU’s asymmetrical relationship. This was evident in the frequency of the words ‘protect’ and ‘care’ in the document. The words ‘protect’ or protecting appeared at least ten times and the word ‘care’ was used about nine times. The HPC-SCPE clearly stated that professional-SU relationships should be based on respect, specifically:

“You must treat service users with respect and dignity” (Ibid, page 8).

Respect was rationalized as being necessary for the protection of SUs, which was clearly stated below:

“You must protect service users if you believe that any situation puts them in danger.” (Ibid, page 8)

The above suggested that there was potential for danger in the Professional-SU relationship.

13.1.2 Managing and Regulating the EP-Client asymmetry

The HPC SCPE regulated the Professional-SU relationship through requiring the professional to hold themselves to account through examining their practice, see below:
The professional, while monitoring themselves in their institution also had to be mindful of their behaviour outside that institution:

“As soon as you become aware of a situation that puts a service user in danger, you should discuss the matter with a senior colleague or another appropriate person.” (Ibid, page 8)

“\textit{You must keep high standards of personal conduct, as well as professional conduct. You should be aware that poor conduct outside of your professional life may still affect someone’s confidence in you and your profession.}” (Ibid, page 9)

This extension of regulation outside the institution further privileged the personage of the professional (Foucault, 1989). The professional’s moral authority had to be beyond challenge. This moralistic view of the professional echoed the portrayal of professional proposed by Arnold (2002). The above quote explicitly linked the profession’s and professional's authority through rationalizing the professional’s regulation as a means to maintain SU’s confidence in the profession. The professional was invited to recognize their ethical obligations both as the correct way to behave in order to be considered professional and for the good of the profession. The professional consequently had authority over Others because they had authority over themselves (Foucault, 1990). The regulation of the EP both legitimized and warranted their authority in the EP-Client relation. Characteristically of pastoral power, the professional was both a subject that exercised power and an object of power; “one is always the ruler and the ruled” (Foucault, 1990 page 87). This privileging of the moral authority partially answers an EP’s question about the source of their power to “make so may judgments” (FG line 380). Explicitly, Foucault (1990, 1989) might have suggested that the EP, as a professional, was made available as an object of admiration through constructing the professional as being morally
superior. In addition, the EP had authority to make judgments about others because of the same moral authority.

Following Foucault (1979) it would be difficult to present the HPC-SCPE as strictly repressive. However, the Professional-SU was highly codified and policed the possibility of a relationship with the SU-as-Other (as opposed to just another other). The SU-as-Other was present as the relationship to be worked against. Therefore SU-as-Other was not strictly silenced; rather they were present in the multiple attempts to direct the professional gaze otherwise and the need to be constantly aware of the disruptive demand of the Other. If the SU-as-Other had been silenced I would have been unable to point to him/her. The SU-as-Other was not outside of discourse but entangled in double discourse (Foucault, 1979). A secret to be discovered, “a thing abusively reduced to silence, and at the same time difficult and necessary, dangerous and precious to divulge” (Foucault, 1979, page 35).

The conclusion was that Professionals had to be on their guard against the demand of the SU-as-Other to be engaged with uniquely. Professionals had, therefore, to locate themselves and their colleagues within a web of examination, observation and obligation. The professional had to observe and examine their own and colleagues’ behaviour and then confess any infringements. The boundary was therefore not between what could and could not be said but how things should be said, who could say them and how it was authorized/rationalized (Foucault, 1979).

13.1.3 Objectification of the client

The HPC-SCPE’s use of the term “SU” reinforced these alienations by suggesting that the professional was not accountable to a particular immanent Other (SU-as-Other) but a universal transcendent SU (client-as-function). For
example, the professional was instructed not to take account of the SUs’ race, age, gender etc:

“You must not allow your views about a service user’s sex, age, colour, race, disability, sexuality, social or economic status, lifestyle, culture, religion or beliefs to affect the way you treat them or the professional advice you give.”
(Ibid, page 8)

The above suggested, in the meeting with SU, by taking account of their particularity, that professionals would either give a SU preferential or unfavourable treatment. The tension was caused by the possibility of an engagement with the other as Other and not just another other. There appeared to be concerns that being in proximity with Clients that the dispassionate, neutral, distant, coldly rational scientific practitioner was challenged. This pointed to, although indirectly, the emotional work undertaken by professionals (Critchley & Bernosconi, 2002; Water, 2008). This emotional entanglement perhaps was an example of a void (that which was not counted) and functioned as a continual potential of creative instability (Badiou, 2005). The analysis suggested that the HPC-SCPE was, therefore, directly concerned with regulating professionals’ relations with SU’s to sanitise and neutralize them (Rose, 1999). The above quote also suggested that it was the role and function of the SU that the professional was accountable to rather than SU-as-person/non-SU identity (Benjamin 2004, 2009).

The use of the word “views”, above, (with its subjective connotations) made a distinction between attitude/bias and objective knowledge while privileging objectivity. The word “view” also worked to include the possibility that some “treatments” could be gender, race, disability, lifestyle, age, etc. sensitive. This type of individuation would be based on objective knowledge (evidence based research) on which type of treatments was most appropriate for a category of client. The above statement, therefore, simultaneously enabled the SU to be both made transcendent and individualized in relation to pre-established categories.
This was achieved while presenting professionalism as neutral to and distant from the Client.

13.1.4 Categorizing and Presenting the Client

The HPC-SCPE located the SU in the Professional-SU’s asymmetrical relationship, for example on pages 2-12, professionals:

- provided and the SUs received care
- provided services and SUs used services
- provided protection and SUs required protection
- respected and the SUs were respected
- kept confidentialities and SUs had sensitive histories
- obtained consent and SUs gave consent
- explained and SUs received information

The above therefore simultaneously presented and positioned the professional and SU in dominant and submissive roles.

13.1.5 Responsibilization of the EP and Client

Although, the HPC-SCPE did not explicitly state the responsibilities of the SU it located the Professional-SU relation in a web of responsibilities. There were seven sentences in the HPS-SCPE that identify the responsibility of the professional towards the SU and eight sentences where the professional was asked to be accountable to, or “take account” of, the needs of the SU or legislation. The HPC-SCPE was very clear on the responsibility of the professional and for example said:

“You are personally responsible for making sure that you promote and protect the best interests of your SUs” (Ibid, page 8).

HPC-SCPE added:
The above quote suggested that the HPC-SCPE demanded that the professional took responsibility for things that they did and things that they failed to do. This demand was therefore totalizing. Asking professionals to be able to justify their decisions to others was asking the professional to locate themselves in the (all-be-it imagined) normalizing and evaluative gaze of others (Foucault, 1977). Professionals also had to make themselves directly accountable to others in their institution:

“As soon as you become aware of a situation that puts a service user in danger, you should discuss the matter with a senior colleague or another appropriate person.” (ibid page 8)

Professionals were therefore asked to be able to give an account of themselves (Butler, 2005). The professional was unable to delegate their responsibility by delegating work and was required to “effectively supervise tasks” they “have asked other people to carry out” (HPC-SCPE page 12). Professionals were also required to “keep”, “update” and make “easy to read” prompt “accurate records” that were signed with dates (HPC-SCPE, page 12). The processes of professional accountable/responsibilization and clienthood visibility were therefore also entangled. Finally, the HPC-SCPE demanded that professionals “must get informed consent” for the SU’s treatment (HPC-SCPE, page 12). The rhetorical use of consent to obligate and make the SU complicit in their treatment had already been discussed (Foucault, 1980; Tong, 1998; Rose, 1999; Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell and Potter, 1988).
13.2 The appropriation of ethical rhetoric

13.2.1 HPC-SCPE

The HPC-SCPE was overtly underpinned by biomedical ethics. This was evident in the references to best interests, confidentiality, informed consent, respect and instructions not to cause harm (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). The HPC-SCPE’s medical bias could be seen in the instruction that the professional “…must deal fairly with the risk of infection” (ibid page 3). The HPC-SCPE acknowledged that the standards were written in “broad terms and designed to apply to all registrants as far as possible” (ibid page 4). Furthermore, it acknowledges that not all standards apply directly to all registrants and make particular reference to the standard on medical infections. The HPC-SCPE, see below, only indirectly and briefly alluded to contexts, how the principles should be tempered by specific situations and what to do if the principles are in conflict:

If you make informed, reasonable and professional judgements about your practice, with the best interests of your service users as your prime concern, and you can justify your decisions if you are asked to, it is very unlikely that you will not meet our standards. By ‘informed’, we mean that you have enough information to make a decision. This would include reading these standards and taking account of any other relevant guidance or laws. By ‘reasonable’, we mean that you need to make sensible, practical decisions about your practice, taking account of all relevant information and the best interests of the people who use or are affected by your services.” (Ibid, pages 5-6)

The above guidance while attempting to be clear left a great deal of ambiguity. For example phrase such as “best interests”, “reasonable”, “sensible” and “relevant” were all subjective. However, the instruction to take account of “all relevant information and the best interests of the people who use or are affected by your services” (ibid, page 6) was the closest the HPC-SCPE came to recognizing that context and the particularities of a SU had a role in shaping ethical decisions. The HPC-SCPE’s emphasis on decisions based on enough information suggested a rational and cognitive approach that did not recognize the role of emotions in ethical decisions (Haidt, 2001). The words “sensible” and
“practical” in the above quote further suggested a privileging of pragmatic (non-political) approaches to decision making. The regulatory gaze in the HPC-SPCE was exclusively targeted at the professional-SU relationship rather than the Professional-State relationships and specifically, professional’s role in the allocation or distribution of resources or enacting government policy (Goodman, McElliot and Marks, 2003). This was surprising given that the majority of professionals in the HPC would work for State funded institutions where there might have been a tension between acting in the best interest of clients and demands placed on the professional to manage (ration) resources.

The HPC-SCPE also employed deontological and consequential ethics that underpinned traditional bioethics (Rowson, 2001). The deontological underpinning was evident from the title pages which included the phrase; “your duties as a registrant”. The influence of consequential ethics could be seen using the best interests of the SU as the benchmark for all decisions/actions. However, this was not unfettered consequentialism because the Professional was required to take account of “relevant guidance or laws” when making decisions (HPC-SCPE, 2008, page 6)

13.2.2 Virtue Ethics and Care

HPC-SCPE also pointed to virtue ethics. This was evident in the guidance on the expected character of the professional. The professional not only had to fulfill their duty to the SU they also had to be of good character. For example section 13 of the HPC-SCPE stated:
This connection between personal character and the governance of others has a long history (Foucault, 1989). An analysis of the function and role of the professional’s character was discussed further below.

13.3 Presentation of the EP

13.3.1 The Professional Rationalization of EP practice

The HPC-SCPE referenced not only the performance, behaviour and decisions of the practitioner but also the character of the professional. The behaviour of the individual EP was not, just to protect the practicing EP but to protect the profession of Educational Psychology. For example:

“… you must behave with honesty and integrity and make sure that your behaviour does not damage the public’s confidence in you or your profession” (Ibid, page 3).

This statement works to entangle ethics and professionalism and to further the apotheosis of the professional (Foucault, 1989). The inclusion of character suggested that the HPC-SCPE had a totalizing and normalizing aim where the guidance was interested both in the behaviour and the soul (psyche) of the practitioner.
The above quote suggested that the ethical substance to be worked on included “skills, knowledge, character and health. The professional is not only responsible for their conduct while at work but at all times:

“You must keep high standards of personal conduct, as well as professional conduct. You should be aware that poor conduct outside of your professional life may still affect someone’s confidence in you and your profession.” (Ibid, page 9)

In making the above demand HPC-SCPE was perhaps mindful of the criticism of professionals as “self interested monopolies” (Evetts, 2003, page 401). This suggested that both the idealized and cynical approaches to understanding professionalism suggested by Macdonald (1995) were present in the HPC guidance. This is what Billig (1988) referred to as an ‘ideological dilemma’. These inconsistencies enabled the HPC-SCPE to achieve different tasks (the apotheoses and regulation of health professionals) simultaneously.

Meeting the ethical standards was rationalized as means to establish public confidence and protect the profession;

“We also want to make sure that you maintain high standards of personal conduct and do not do anything which might affect the public’s confidence in you or your profession. However, we do not dictate how you should meet our standards.” (Ibid page 5)

The above quote was clear that it was the profession and not the professional that HPC-SCPE was designed to protect.
The appropriation of bioethics to achieve a managerial and disciplinary function was suggested in the HPC-SCPE. This was made explicit in the title of the document “Standards of Conduct Performance and Ethics”. There was a conflation between ethics and performance where inefficiency, not engaging with professional development, meeting targets are presented as moral failures rather than managerial issues. The code of ethics was not just about providing a framework for thinking through ethical dilemmas, not just an addendum to the role to be applied at particular times but also a micro management tool.

13.3.2 Betwixt and Between

The HPC-SCPE established a set of binaries and hence located the professional between universal principles:

- Autonomy and accountability
- Deontological (personal duties) and utilitarian (universal responsibilities) ethics

However, HPC-SCPE was not explicit about how these binaries should be negotiated. The HPC-SCPE (page 8) states that the professional has fourteen personal duties. These included duties to:

- Service users
- Relevant regulators including the HPC
- Professional colleagues
- Their profession
- Those that the professional supervised
- Their professional knowledge (developing and acting within the limits of)
- Themselves in relation to there professional and non-professional life. This included the professional’s health and moral character

However the HPC-SCPE only identified two possible tensions;

- Between the professional’s duty to a colleague and a SU (page 8)
- Between the professional’s personal views and the clients best interest (page 8)

In both of the above examples the protection and best interest of the SU must come first. It is interesting to note that the HPC-SCPE did not explicitly speak of
the professional’s duties to their employer or the function they provide for the State. Employers were referred to as a source of information for professionals (Ibid, page 5), a possible restrictor of practice (Ibid, page 9), a provider of additional procedures (Ibid, page 13) and a source of complaint to the HPC (Ibid, page 15).

13.3.3 Apotheosis of the Psychologist

In the HPC-SCPE the professional was simultaneously autonomous, independent, responsible and accountable because they were professional. Accountability and autonomy defined what it was to be professional:

“As an autonomous and accountable professional, you need to make informed and reasonable decisions about your practice to make sure that you meet the standards that are relevant to your practice. This might include getting advice and support from education providers, employers, professional bodies, colleagues and other people to make sure that you protect the wellbeing of service users at all times” (Ibid, page 5).

The juxtaposition of “autonomous” and “accountable” seemed oxymoronic. After all, how could one be simultaneously autonomous from accountability and be accountable. However, the inherent contradictions between autonomous and accountable could be functional if considered as another example of an “ideological dilemma” (Billig et al., 1988). The presence of multiple discourses provided professionals with a range of rhetorical resources that they could use strategically. The dilemma also articulated the space in which practitioners had to navigate, that is, a subject that knows and an object that is known or doer and done to (Benjamin, 2004, 2009).

Professionals were only autonomous if they made reasonable decisions. The autonomy of the professional was therefore highly contingent, see below:
References to “informed” and “reasonable” above, called the practitioner to a rational practice. The next line of the above quote, further limited the autonomy of the EP (see below):

“If you make informed, reasonable and professional judgements about your practice, with the best interests of your service users as your prime concern, and you can justify your decisions if you are asked to, it is very unlikely that you will not meet our standards” (Ibid, page 5).

The above suggested that the autonomous professional was located in a community with whom they have an accountable relationship. The professional was individualized to make them accountable. The quote below makes it very clear that the professional was individually accountable for their actions:

“This might include getting advice and support from education providers, employers, professional bodies, colleagues and other people to make sure that you protect the wellbeing of service users at all times.” (Ibid, page 5)

Having the test of a decision being one that the professional could defend to another placed the professional in a social context within an imagined set of surveillances. This call only to do actions that could not be justified to an unseen other established a relationship between the practitioner and a transcendent examining, judging and normalizing context. The professional was therefore called in to being (made visible) as a rational practitioner within a normalizing context (Foucault, 2003). The professional was simultaneously assigned their
autonomy, given their duties and made aware that they were accountable (Rose, 1999).

The HPC-SCPE standards were “written in broad terms” and required the professional to make “informed and reasonable decisions” as an “autonomous and accountable professional” (HPC-SCPE, page 4-5). Reason therefore disciplined the professional and hence regulated the Professional-Client relationship. Whether a decision was informed and reasonable was within the professional’s ability to “justify” if asked (ibid page 6). A professional must be prepared to give an account of themselves to others by first establishing if they can give an account to themselves. This call for a retreat inside the self rather than set of professional techniques established the regulation of the Professional-SU relationship as ethical work. Although the retreat within oneself was individualistic it was also had a social dimension (Foucault, 1986). In the Educational Psychology Service the social dimension arose from the self-examination occurring in a institution that hierarchically formalized supervision. Educational Psychologists had to have supervision at least once a month with six of these sessions being with a senior member of the management team. The retreat within oneself could also establish conducive working relationships as EPs were encouraged to have peer supervision where colleagues supported each other.

The HPC-SCPE did not explicitly articulate a negative portrayal of professionals. However, recognizing that professionals needed to be regulated suggested that SUs needed protecting from professionals. For example, the HPC-SCPE stated “we set these standards at a level we think is necessary to protect members of the public” (Ibid page 4). This suggested that, although not bad, Professional-SU’s relations could at least be hazardous to SUs.
13.4 Resistance

The HPC-SCPE did not refer to resistance but made reference to the SU’s right to refuse treatment:

“A person who is capable of giving their consent has the right to refuse treatment. You must respect this right. You must also make sure that they are fully aware of the risks of refusing treatment, particularly if you think that there is a significant or immediate risk to their life.” (HPC-SCPE page12)

The above suggested refusal of treatment was dependent on cognitive capacity. This was because a discourse based on individual rights required rational individuals able to make choices. By insisting that the SU had to be made aware of the risks of refusal protected the professional by making the SU responsible for their fully informed decision (Rose, 1999). The quote pointed to a tension between the belief that professional acted in the best interest of the client and the rights of a capable client. If the professional was acting in the best interest of the client then the Client’s refusal of treatment became irrational. Therefore the Professional had to ensure the Client understood the risks (Rose, 1999). The HPC-SCPE did not make reference to the difficulties SU’s could have in enacting refusal in clinical decisions (Benwell and Stokoe, 2010; Frank and Jones, 2003; Rose, 1999).