Urbicide and the Question of Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to answer the question of the meaning of the destruction of the urban environment in the 1992-95 Bosnian war. The inquiry begins with the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina. This event constitutes an exemplary instance of the destruction of urban environments. The destruction of the Old Bridge is not, however, an isolated event: urban destruction was widespread during the Bosnian war. It is argued that a clue to the meaning of this destruction lies in the fact that it is *shared spaces* that are destroyed.

The 'logics' of urban destruction are then considered. Such destruction cannot be properly accounted for by either the traditional notion of military necessity or the regimes established to protect cultural heritage. Rather, it is argued that the destruction of urban environment comprises *urbicide*. Urbicide is defined as the destruction of that which characterises the urban: heterogeneity. It is argued that destroying buildings represents the destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity.

The thesis then addresses the relation between shared spatiality and heterogeneity. Drawing on Heidegger's account of Being-in-the-world, it is argued that existence is both spatial and shared. The fundamental sharing of existential spatiality constitutes existence as a heterogeneous Being-with-others. The Heideggerian notion of *Mitsein* (Being-with) is proposed as an initial account of the nature of this heterogeneity. This account of *Mitsein* is developed through a consideration of the work of Jean-Luc Nancy. In particular the implication of Being in community is noted. An account is given of the politics of Being-with at stake in urbicide.

In conclusion it is argued that urbicide comprises an ethno-nationalist attempt to cover over the heterogeneous nature of existence. The proper starting point for a response to ethno-nationalist violence must be a recognition of the heterogeneity and community at stake in urbicide.
Books like this one do not have a proper end. The footnote - the writer’s self-defensive gesture - becomes an exhausting race in which the runner never reaches the finish. Every full stop demands the status of a comma, every sentence fights for a footnote.

The footnote thus becomes a multiple metaphor, for the defeat of the writer and the human being. Everything that the author has written is just a footnote to the long lists of names of people who have lost their lives, families, friends, homes or the homeland which was until recently shared, a footnote to the texts written by the warlords...

Terrible reality carries off the victory and the author aware of her defeat, must willy nilly accept an arbitrary end. The only thing left for her to do is to leave behind her fragile markers...

— Dubravka Ugresic, The Culture of Lies

I am well aware of the fact that all of this does not let itself be conceived of easily. It is not for us, not for our thinking, modelled as it is on the sovereign model; it is not for our warlike thinking. But this is certain: there is nothing on the horizon except for an un-heard-of, inconceivable task - or war. All thinking that still wants to conceive of an “order,” a “world,” a “communication,” a “peace” is absolutely naïve - when it is not simply hypocritical. To appropriate one’s own time has always been unheard of. But everyone can clearly see that it is time: the disaster of sovereignty is sufficiently spread out, and sufficiently common, to steal anyone’s innocence.

— Jean-Luc Nancy, War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal.

— Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law’
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Martin Coward, Newcastle, July 2001
INTRODUCTION

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SHARED SPACES OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Aida Mušanovic... had visited the hospital in Sarajevo and had seen the carnage brought by the war. Yet the burning of the library struck her with a special horror. In the fire of the National Library, she realised that what she was experiencing was not only war but also something else. The centuries of culture that fell back in ash onto the besieged city revealed a secret.¹

'There is no more Old Bridge'²

At around 10.15 am on 9th November 1993, The Old Bridge, or Stari Most, at Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina collapsed into the River Neretva. The bridge had spanned the Neretva for over 400 years linking east Mostar (and the Bosnian hinterlands) to west Mostar (and routes to the Adriatic Coast). Having survived natural disasters and wars, including shelling by the Bosnian Serb army in 1992, the bridge had finally been destroyed by Bosnian Croat forces intent on separating Muslim east Mostar from Croat west Mostar. Despite having previously worked to protect the Stari Most from Bosnian Serb shells, the Croatian Defence Council (HVO, the Bosnian Croat army) subjected the bridge to a sustained bombardment. Beginning on 8th November, the HVO relentlessly shelled the bridge. Sarajevo newspapers
reported that by the time the Stari Most actually collapsed it had been hit by over sixty shells.³

The siege and destruction of the Stari Most became an exemplary event in the 1992-95 Bosnian war. The destruction of this Ottoman bridge epitomised the violence that was consuming the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Images of the siege and destruction of the Stari Most captured the imaginations of observers of the conflict. Pictures of the bridge prior to destruction, clad in rubber tyres and a makeshift wooden roof, served as a metaphor for 'ethnic division'. The notion that the former Yugoslavia was being forcibly 'unmade' found graphic representation in such images of the assault on a bridge literally linking east and west.⁴ The final collapse of the single-span stone bridge into the river it had spanned for over four hundred years, was captured on video by local news media and broadcast around the world. The fleeting image of the end of this outstanding example of cultural heritage became an icon of the savagery and tragedy of the 1992-95 Bosnian war. The footage of crumbling stone represented in a concise and vivid manner the failure of both international and Bosnian attempts to contest nationalism and maintain a 'multi-ethnic' state. Furthermore, for those attempting to contest nationalism in Bosnia, the images of the collapse of the bridge were representative of the violence with which the division of Bosnia was being accomplished.

The destruction of a structure as prominent and photogenic as the Stari Most served to highlight the campaign against the urban fabric of Bosnia that had seemingly become a feature of so-called 'ethnic cleansing'. In Sarajevo, the National Library and the Oriental Institute were destroyed by Bosnian Serb shells. The shells set the National Library alight and as the collections burnt, the people of Sarajevo attempted
to save the books by hand. These events became landmarks in the siege of Sarajevo.

Concerned observers mourned the loss of valuable collections of manuscripts, at a loss to understand the mentality of those who could, at the end of the twentieth century, burn books. In both cases the buildings were targeted deliberately and nearby buildings were left relatively untouched. This deliberate targeting of landmark buildings was confirmed even by those who were shelling Sarajevo:

"In September 1992, BBC reporter Kate Adie interviewed Serbian gunners on the hillsides overlooking Sarajevo and asked them why they had been shelling the Holiday Inn, the hotel where all of the foreign correspondents were known to stay. The officer commanding the guns apologised profusely, explaining they had not meant to hit the hotel, but had been aiming at the roof of the National Museum behind it."

The National Museum was badly damaged, though its collections survived. The apologies of the Bosnian Serb gunners highlighted the manner in which buildings themselves had become the targets of the ethnic cleansers.

Across Bosnia mosques were destroyed by both Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces. Catholic and Orthodox churches were also attacked, though with less vigour. A pattern emerged in the destruction of mosques. Typically a mosque would be targeted for shelling, despite its lack of strategic significance. After occupation of the town the mosque would be dynamited, and in some cases the rubble removed. In this way the urban environment was ethnically cleansed. The physical traces of a multi-cultural history were removed, creating green fields, or car parks, in their wake.

Such was the fate of the Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka. On the 6th May 1993 the Ferhadija mosque was destroyed by an explosion. Witnesses alleged that the
Bosnian Serb army was responsible: the streets around the mosque had been closed off and army trucks were seen in front of the mosque. After the initial explosion the minaret remained standing. However, the Bosnian Serb authorities determined that the minaret would be demolished as it was unsafe. The minaret was demolished after midnight on the 8th May. The remains of the mosque were removed by trucks and the vacant lot turned into a car park. Attempts to rebuild this mosque subsequent to the signing of the Dayton Agreement have been continually stalled by Bosnian Serb nationalists.

However, it is not only symbolic buildings or significant elements of Bosnian cultural heritage that have been targeted for destruction. The urban fabric of Bosnia has come under a relentless assault. As Nicholas Adams notes, along with 'mosques, churches [and] synagogues', 'markets, museums, libraries, cafes, in short, the places where people gather to live out their collective life, have been the focus of...attacks'. In Sarajevo the list of target buildings circumscribed the central post office, apartment buildings, office buildings and markets. In Mostar the old town or Stari Grad, was shelled continuously following the beginning of ethnic cleansing by the HVO in summer 1992. Moreover, in Mostar the Stazi Most was merely the most famous (and the last) of all the bridges to be destroyed. The bridges across the Neretva, as elsewhere, were not simply rendered impassable but razed to the ground. Throughout Bosnia entire villages have been reduced to rubble by either burning or dynamite.

The 1992-95 Bosnian war was, however, characterised by what many observers have argued to be genocide carried out by the Bosnian Serbs against the Bosnian Muslims, or 'Bosniacs'. The violent logics of ethnic cleansing dominated the political imaginaries of those who sought to either intervene or understand the
conflict. The problematics that shaped both understandings of the war itself and concomitant attempts to provide humanitarian assistance or negotiate settlements were predicated upon images and events concerning the destruction of human life, the displacement of individuals or groups or the misery that human hatred can bring about. Thus news reports and academic accounts of the Bosnian war have concerned themselves largely with key events such as the bread queue or market massacres which highlighted the desperate situation of the people of Sarajevo and the failures of western interventions to bring about an end to the siege of the city. Reports such as ITN’s from the concentration camps of Omarska and Trnopolje became iconic of the suffering of the people of Bosnia, images of starved Bosniac men staring out at the camera from behind barbed wire resonated with representations of the Holocaust.  

The dominance of human miseries in our political imaginary has been further reinforced by reports such as that prepared by the United Nations concerning the siege and fall of the Safe Area of Srebrenica. In short, understandings of and interventions into the Bosnian war have been refracted through an anthropocentric political imaginary.

The rubble of Bosnia has been similarly seen through the lens of anthropocentrism. The destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia has been interpreted as a phenomenon contingent to, and thus dependent upon, the violence perpetrated against the people of Bosnia. Thus the rubble of Bosnia is an element of genocide or war, rather than a phenomenon in its own right. And yet, as Kate Adie’s interview with the Bosnian Serb Gunners shows we should be wary of ‘thinking in terms of “collateral damage,” incidental to the general mayhem of warfare’. The urban fabric of Bosnia was targeted deliberately, a fact attested to by the manner in which the
violence against the architecture of Bosnia was disproportionate to the task of killing the people of Bosnia. This is the significance of the number of missiles used to destroy the Stari Most. In hitting a strategically insignificant, impassable, and effectively defaced, bridge with such excessive force the HVO indicated that this violence was intended to destroy the building itself. The bridge was the target and nothing less than its collapse would satisfy the HVO.

'It is the expected thing to say that people come first,' notes Nicholas Adams. 'And they do, but the survival of architecture and urban life are important to the survival of people.'\textsuperscript{14} The destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia poses questions equally as fundamental as those posed by the destruction of human life in Bosnia. Our political imaginaries are dominated by images of politics as the preserve of powerful elites and violent militias. We perceive the political problems of Bosnia to lie in the negotiations between the representatives of governments, in war crimes prosecutions and attempts to encourage the people of Bosnia to enter into (or remain in) a multicultural state. And yet the fundamental question for Bosnia is that of sharing a common space. Insofar as this is the demand made upon all those who observe, intervene in, or live in Bosnia it can only be achieved if a common space exists. The destruction of urban fabric is the destruction of a common space, and the attendant possibility of sharing such space. This is the logic of the destruction that is most dramatically highlighted in the collapse of the Stari Most, the 'secret' that Aida Mu\u00danovic saw revealed in the ashes that fell from the burning National Library.

In the destruction of the Stari Most can be seen the central problematic of the political: the constitution of community. Insofar as it is the condition of possibility for our being with others, the sharing of common space underpins community. Moreover
insofar as this community is constituted in such shared spaces, it is an agonistic, or heterogeneous, coexistence. That is, it is a heterogeneous ensemble of identity\difference gathered in common space(s).\textsuperscript{15} The networks of identity and difference found in such spaces are agonistic insofar as they comprise a constant provocation of identity by difference. In these shared spaces identity is constituted in and through the differences with which it coexists. In these spaces identity and difference are in a mutually constitutive relationship. Insofar as identity can only be differentiated from its others by an exclusion of such otherness (a delineation of the boundaries of self and other), this coexistence comprises a constant relationship of agonistic provocation with difference: a perpetual exclusion/differentiation demanded by the continual and mutually constitutive presence of difference.

This agonism of identity\difference is precisely what constitutes community, or being with others. Community is precisely this experience of being with difference, with others who are distinguishable as such. And this community is what we also call political insofar as the political can be said to comprise the delineation and contestation of the bounds of self and other, identity and difference. As I will note in Chapters 5 and 6, it is precisely this heterogeneous, agonistic community that marks our experience of the political.\textsuperscript{16}

If, therefore, it is in and through shared spaces that the networks of identity and difference that characterise the political are constituted, the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia (and, hence, of such spaces) poses the fundamental question of how ‘we’ (as an agonistic community) are to live together, and what it is that constitutes the possibility of such living together. It is these questions that I intend to address in the following argument. I hope that through an examination of the ‘secret’
revealed in the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia, and the Stari Most in particular, it will be possible to delineate the manner in which common space (or spatiality in general) constitutes the condition of possibility of community, which is, in turn, that in which the experience of the political is possible. In this respect Martin Heidegger’s understanding of Being-in-the-world as a fundamental Being-with-others will be central to my argument. In his account of ‘dwelling’, Heidegger argues that buildings constitute existence as fundamentally shared. Destroying buildings thus comprises an assault on that which constitutes our ‘dwelling’, or existence, as a shared event. I want to commence, however, with a detailed consideration of the destruction of the Stari Most as an exemplar of the destruction of urban fabric.

The Bridge

Source: Encarta Online
Mostar is a small town in western Herzegovina, the southern province of Bosnia-Herzegovina [See Appendix 1, Figure 1]. It lies to the south-west of the capital Sarajevo, straddling the River Neretva (which runs from North to South) at a narrow point in the Neretva canyon. The Neretva has acted historically as an apparently natural barrier to movement from east to west across Bosnia. The river canyon thus divides off eastern Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria and, ultimately Turkey, from western Herzegovina and the Adriatic Coast. Though there is a long history of settlement in the Neretva valley, Mostar itself developed precisely because it was the site of a bridge across the Neretva which provided a route by which traders, travellers, and armies could pass from East to West and vice versa. Thus it is only with the building of a bridge that the town of Mostar really began to develop.

According to historians, there has been a bridge at Mostar since medieval times. The earliest record of a bridge is in 1452. This medieval bridge was wooden, ‘suspended from chains’ and, according to the historian and geographer Katib Çelebi, ‘swayed to such an extent that people feared for their lives in crossing it’. The bridge was constructed to ‘meet the needs of regional traffic’. Such traffic included ‘Turkish troops [who] crossed it when conquering western Herzegovina and Dalmatia’, and presumably traders taking goods to the Adriatic coast to be shipped to ports around the Mediterranean. Jezernik contends that the precarious construction of the wooden bridge conditioned the early development of Mostar. Though settlement occurred on both banks of the river around the ends of the bridge, the town developed on the left, or eastern bank. The development of residential districts and markets on the left bank is attributed to the fact that only those who needed to cross the bridge actually did.
The state of the bridge brought much of the flow of traffic to a halt at the eastern end of the bridge, resulting in the accumulation of settlers. This account would seem to indicate that the flow of traffic in the region was principally from east to west (which is indeed the direction in which the colonising forces of the Ottoman empire flowed at that time). The bridge was both the possibility of such a flow, and yet inhibited it in such a way as to lead to a concentration of settlement on the left, eastern bank.

Mostar came under Ottoman rule from the latter half of the fifteenth century.24 By the middle of the sixteenth century the wooden bridge had become impassable and so the citizens of Mostar asked the Sultan Suleiman (1520-1566) ‘to authorise the building of a better, more substantial bridge across the Neretva’.25 This bridge was built according to the plans of Mimar (architect) Haireddin, and was completed in 1566. The bridge itself was a single span stone structure, measuring 28.7 metres wide.26 The span stood some 19 meters above the river.27 At either end of the bridge were stone towers (which stand to this day). The bridge was referred to as the ‘Great Bridge’, and later, after the building of further bridges over the Neretva, came to be known as the ‘Old Bridge’ (‘Stara Most’). From the eighteenth century to the early twentieth century, Western historians attributed the building of the bridge to the Romans. This attribution is part of a larger, orientalist prejudice against the Turks: a refusal to credit them with building such a magnificent structure.28 However, at the time of the destruction of the bridge it was admired as ‘one of the most beautiful and famous achievements of the Golden Age of Turkish architecture in the Balkans’.29

Ottoman rule changed the urban environment of Bosnia.30 The Stari Most, which carried the main route to the Adriatic coast over the river Neretva, brought about the development of Mostar as a regional centre. Now that the river could be
crossed easily and in safety, the settlement on the left bank of the Neretva spread onto the right bank. The bridge itself was built by a heterogeneous group of craftsmen. The project was overseen by the local representatives of the Ottoman empire but actually executed by ‘engineers and artisans’ from a range of cultural backgrounds. For Sells, the multi-cultural composition of the workforce is symbolic, a portent of the multi-cultural town that Mostar became under Ottoman, and later Austro-Hungarian rule. That the Bridge, which was the condition of possibility for the development of this multi-cultural community was, itself, the product of a heterogeneous workforce, is fittingly symbolic.

The building of the Stari Most was fundamental to the town of Mostar in several ways: as the condition of possibility of its development from a small hamlet into a town in the first place; as a focal point for the everyday life of the town; and in terms of the symbolic presence (to itself and others) of Mostar as a community. It is possible to illustrate the ‘fundamental’ role that the Stari Most played in several examples.

Firstly, the building of the bridge preceded the establishment of a settlement that could truly be called a ‘town’. Jezernik notes that the bridge’s ‘very existence conditioned the gradual concentration of the population’ into a town. ‘Existence’ here can be read as referring both to the (mere) presence of the bridge across the Neretva and to its state of repair. As I have already noted, until the building of the stone bridge the crossing was dangerous, and, as the majority of traffic was from East to West, the settlement of Mostar was established on the Left/Eastern bank of the river. The building of the Stari Most had a profound effect on the settlement on the eastern bank of the Neretva. It made possible the expansion of the settlement onto the
western bank. For the settlement to become a town expansion would need to occur. Moreover, if expansion were to occur it would be because of the increasing importance of the settlement at Mostar. The bridge guaranteed this importance by providing a valuable river crossing over the Neretva. The Stari Most thus ensured the emergence of Mostar as a regional centre. Moreover, as the settlement expanded, the Stari Most made it possible to call this community - effectively divided into two by the Neretva canyon - one, single town.

Secondly, the bridge gave a name to this growing community. Originally it had been thought that the name 'Mostar' was a shortening of 'Most-star', or 'old bridge'. However, two points problematise this explanation of the derivation of Mostar. Firstly, as a name 'Stari Most', or 'Old Bridge', did not come into usage until the eighteenth century (before that the bridge was referred to as the 'Great Bridge'), and secondly the name 'Mostar' predates the building of the Stari Most itself (the bridge being built in 1566, and first recorded mention of the town of Mostar being in 1469). Accounts that attributed the building of the bridge to the Romans explained the derivation of Mostar from Most-star as evidence that there had been an ancient, Roman bridge at this point over the Neretva. These accounts argued that the derivation of Mostar from Most-star was not related to the current usage of Stari Most to refer to the Great Bridge. Rather Most-star was a literal translation of 'Pons vetus', the Roman for old bridge. These derivations of the name Mostar were however challenged by the Russian linguist Gil'ferding. Gil'ferding's account of the origin of the name Mostar is significant insofar as it makes the existence of a bridge the central aspect in the naming of the community of Mostar.
Gil'ferding noted that the derivation of Mostar from Most-star was not in accordance with the patterns followed by Slavic languages for the derivation of place names (if anything the Slavic place name derived from 'old bridge' would have been Starimost). \(^{35}\) Gil'ferding argued that the town of Mostar had evolved around the old bridge and that, in accordance with the patterns of Slavic place-naming, the inhabitants had referred to themselves as 'Mostari', or 'bridge keepers' (the shortening to 'Mostar' is then logical). The use of 'Mostari' to refer to the inhabitants predicates the evolution of the town of Mostar upon the existence of the bridge across the Neretva. Originally this term would have referred to the garrisons that protected and controlled this vital trade route. However, it appears that the use of this term was broadened out to include the inhabitants of the town. The mostari, or inhabitants of Mostar were thus, collectively 'keepers of the bridge'. \(^{36}\) All of these explanations of the derivation of Mostar draw upon the existence of a bridge as the central, constitutive characteristic of the town. This naming thus established the centrality of the bridge over the Neretva in constituting the community of Mostar. \(^{37}\)

Thirdly, it is also possible to note how the bridge became a focus for the everyday life of the town of Mostar. 'A number of customs and practices were...connected with the Old Bridge', most famously that of the young men of the town jumping from the top of the parapet into the river below. \(^{38}\) This was a ritual which developed into a tourist attraction, with children earning money from visitors for their 'daring' jumps. \(^{39}\) This practice continued after the destruction of the bridge, the jumps being made from the temporary bridge constructed by the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR). Other rituals also focused on this structure. One account of the centrality of the bridge to the life of Mostar suggests that it was traditional for
the bridegroom to carry his bride over the bridge.\textsuperscript{40} The bridge itself was originally guarded by a garrison stationed in its towers. This garrison had its own space for religious observance (a mesjid) in the tower on the left bank. Until the occupation of Bosnia by the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1878, The garrison muezzin ‘called worshippers to prayer while standing on the highest point of the bridge’.\textsuperscript{41}

Finally, the Stari Most was fundamental to the symbolic presence of the community of Mostar. The ‘Old Bridge’ as a monumental building that could be visited, seen, or conserved became synonymous with the town of Mostar. One visited Mostar to see or cross this bridge. The bridge itself was taken to represent the essence of Mostar - a town composed of two parts divided by a river canyon, united by this spectacular bridge that in its very construction bore witness to the multi-cultural character of the community of Mostar. The bridge thus spoke to Mostari’s, symbolising the tradition of multi-cultural co-existence that constituted the community in which they lived. The symbolic nature of the Stari Most for the inhabitants of Mostar can be seen in the work of Amir Pasic, a Mostari architect who has campaigned for the rebuilding of the bridge. For Pasic, despite the present condition in which it finds itself, Mostar is a community whose history exemplifies the ideal of multi-cultural life that the Dayton Agreements are supposed to embody. In Pasic’s writing the Stari Most is the symbolic representation of this ideal, and the rebuilding of the bridge represents the resurrection and restoration of multi-culturalism.\textsuperscript{42}

Moreover, the Old Bridge (and by extension the town of Mostar that it had constituted) was taken to circumscribe, and represent, a history and ethos that was characteristically Bosnian. This bridge served as a sign to ‘the world’ of Bosnia’s rich
cultural heritage. The Stari Most, interchangeable with the name 'Mostar', symbolised the achievements of 'Bosnian' culture in a similar manner to the way in which Big Ben (a landmark that is interchangeable with the name 'London') represents Britain and its culture. The Stari Most thus became a prolific sign, circulating in everyday representations of both Mostar and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As an image it appeared on Bosnian postage stamps and bank notes, tourist literature, and book covers. For example, the Old Bridge appears on the Ten Dinara banknote [See Appendix 1, Figure 2]. This image had many meanings, each according to the context in which it appeared. In tourist literature the image of the bridge (an image which referred to a site of historical, cultural, and aesthetic interest) was substituted for the town itself. 'Come and visit Mostar' was enounced as 'Come and see the Stari Most'. On Bosnian postage stamps and bank notes the image of the Stari Most served to indicate to 'Bosnians' the rich (shared) heritage of 'their' nation. The Stari Most stood as an achievement in which it was right to have a certain 'national pride'. The circulation of this symbol with such frequency served to make the Stari Most into the 'soul and mind' - its reason (ratio and cause) - of the 'body' of the town of Mostar. 43

Division(s)

The Stari Most itself had already suffered attacks from the Bosnian Serb army during the early stages of the Bosnian war. The Bosnian Serbs had both shelled the bridge and made it impassable due to sniper fire before they were forced into retreat in late 1992. However, it was the second phase of the war, in which the Bosnian Croats turned on their former Bosnian Muslim allies, that was the most vicious. In a move
sponsored by Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, the HVO became the instrument by which the territory occupied by the Bosnian Croats would become the statelet of 'Herceg-Bosna'. Herceg-Bosna would be a 'homeland' for the Bosnian Croats, eventually joined to the 'homeland' of Croatia itself. Mostar was to be the capital of this entity. But in order for this to be possible, the future capital of Herceg-Bosna had to be cleansed of 'non-Croats'. Thus from May 1993 Bosnian Muslims/Bosniacs were expelled from the west/right bank of Mostar. In effect this meant that most Bosnian Muslims/Bosniacs fled west Mostar fearing for their lives, although a substantial number were murdered, sent to concentration camps, or simply disappeared. This forcing of the town's Bosnian Muslims into the old part of the town effectively created a ghetto. For the next six months this ghetto was subjected to one of the most intense siege bombardments of the Bosnian war.

When the Stari Most itself became impassable due to sniper fire, the town was effectively divided: Bosnian Croats on the western/right bank, Bosnian Muslims/Bosniacs on the eastern/left bank. A framework of wood and tyres had been erected by Bosnian Muslim residents of Mostar around the Stari Most in order to try and save it from destruction. However, the Stari Most was the last structure bearing witness to a unified (and, therefore, 'ethnically mixed') Mostar. Hence, on 8th November 1993 the HVO began shelling the Stari Most. The shelling continued through to 9th November, when, at 10.15 am, the bridge collapsed. In this way the HVO destroyed the last remaining testament to the ethnically mixed character of Mostar and created the conditions under which they could claim an ethnic separateness from the Bosnian Muslims. After the Dayton Agreement, Mostar was so bitterly divided that it was placed under European Union administration, and a plan
was drawn up for its reunification (and the restoration of its pre-war ethnically mixed character). This plan has, up to this point, been thwarted by the Bosnian Croats (who have achieved their aims and have no intention of ceding territory).\textsuperscript{48} The gap left by the Stari Most has been temporarily bridged by SFOR to provide a point of crossing over the Neretva. In late September 1997 a stone from the Stari Most was symbolically raised by an SFOR team. This was supposed to signal the rebuilding of the bridge as part of a plan to reintegrate the town. However, the plan to rebuild the bridge has been contested and, though most of the masonry has been recovered from the Neretva, the bridge has not been rebuilt.\textsuperscript{49}

**The bridge as exemplary event**

The siege and destruction of the Stari Most was, for many of those who observed the unfolding conflict, a symbol of the Bosnian War itself. The collapsing/collapsed Stari Most was an image which immediately communicated to the world the finality with which Bosnia was being divided/partitioned. It was a superlative demonstration of the manner in which ethnic cleansing constituted an erasure of identity from territory. Susan Woodward, for example, used a picture of the beleaguered bridge, clad in a wooden framework and hung with tyres, on the front cover of *Balkan Tragedy*, her study of the disintegration of Yugoslavia [See Appendix 1, Figure 3].\textsuperscript{50} This image is burdened with the representation of both Bosnia and its war. This single image is taken to represent the destruction and division of a country with a rich and diverse cultural heritage.
The Stari Most was taken by many observers to symbolise the history and achievements of Bosnian society. The bridge’s history condensed in one structure the hybridity of Bosnian society. Built by the Ottoman Empire, linking the territories east of the river to those west of the river, the bridge spanned and bound together supposedly heterogeneous cultural communities. The Stari Most thus represented for many people not only the town of Mostar, but the nature of Bosnian society. Bosnia was seen as a bridge between the European West and the Ottoman East where Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim communities co-existed: a meeting place in which these cultures were bound into one multi-cultural society. In being established as that which captured the essence of Bosnian culture, the Stari Most was thus elevated to the status of cultural monument. It was taken to represent the common heritage of all Bosnians. As an example of cultural heritage it was taken to express the highest achievements of Bosnian culture. Moreover, it was acclaimed by many people as an exemplary achievement of human culture. The Stari Most was thus a symbol of the heritage of humanity, an exemplar of the manner in which heterogeneous groups are united into communities. This metaphor of bridging that found concrete form in the Stari Most, exercised a strong grip upon the political imaginaries of those who observed, participated in, and fell victim to the Bosnian conflict. It was hoped that the image of the bridge, spanning, and thus uniting, separate groups could serve as the guiding principle by which the heterogeneous communities of Bosnia could be bound into a multi-cultural state.

The assault on the Stari Most placed such hopes in jeopardy. The images of the eventual destruction of the bridge were taken by observers to constitute a radical problematisation of all that the Stari Most had previously symbolised. As the arch
collapsed, so too it seemed did all that the bridge had represented: a common Bosnian heritage; a united, rather than divided, community; human achievement; and the possibility of multi-cultural co-existence. For observers of the Bosnian war the destruction of the Stari Most thus condensed, in a series of graphic images, the proof that Bosnia was, as the prevalent political imaginary held, a dark and primitive place in which it was no longer possible for supposedly separate ethnic groups to live together peacefully. Images of the siege and destruction of the Stari Most were thus taken to represent all that was at stake in Bosnia: multi-cultural society; continued co-existence; common humanity. In this way images of the collapse of a four hundred year old bridge became exemplary, even iconic, of the Bosnian war.

The act of destruction itself seemed, for observers of the Bosnian war, to exemplify the logics of violence of the Bosnian war. Insofar as the bridge was recognised as an outstanding example of Bosnian cultural heritage it represented the highest achievement of Bosnian society. Its history captured the complexity and multi-ethnicity of Bosnian society. Destruction of the Stari Most epitomised the manner in which the history of co-existence that characterised Bosnian society was being forcibly erased. Moreover, since the bridge was recognised as being part of the common heritage of humanity, the destruction brought about by the HVO gunners was deemed by many observers of the conflict to be an assault upon humanity itself. In destroying a building deemed to express the highest possible achievements of which human society is capable, the HVO were taken to be declaring that humanity and its achievements were no longer of any concern to them in their fight to create the mini-statelet of Herceg-Bosna.
The act of destruction was thus taken by many observers to demonstrate the barbarity of the Bosnian war. The very act of destruction itself resonated with savagery. The destruction of a 400 year old bridge that held little or no strategic value was taken to be excessive. This excess was confirmed in the manner in which the HVO shelled the bridge until it collapsed. The bridge itself had been impassable for some time (due to the damage inflicted by sporadic shells and the continual exposure to sniper fire of those attempting to cross the bridge). There was, therefore, no need to actually destroy it. The HVO action seemed vindictive and cruel and thus bore the hallmarks of savagery.

The destruction was also taken by observers of the conflict to be an exemplary instance of the emerging war on culture that was integral to the process of ethnic cleansing. Ethnic cleansing was not accomplished simply by the killing or displacement of those ethnic groups that threatened the homogeneity of a given ethnic territory. The destruction of cultural property was integral to the campaign to create homogenous ethnic communities. Thus the seemingly savage and wanton destruction of symbolic buildings went hand in hand with massacres and displacement. This led to the destruction of urban fabric on a massive scale in Bosnia, well beyond what might be expected as collateral damage from a campaign to 'cleanse' a territory, or as acceptable damage from the targeting of strategically important structures.

The destruction of symbolic buildings and other cultural artefacts can be understood, following Andras Riedlmayer, as a process of 'killing memory'. In destroying the Stari Most, Riedlmayer argues, the HVO were destroying the historical record, or collective memory, of the co-existence that had characterised Bosnian society for over 400 years. The destruction of the Stari Most is exemplary in this
regard for the clarity with which it displays such destruction of the collective memory of co-existence. The bridge itself had united the town enabling it to develop. All citizens had used the bridge in their daily lives and shared in rituals based around it. As such, the bridge held a rich symbolic position in all of their lives. To destroy the bridge is to deny this shared history. And this co-existence must be violently denied if one wants to build a new history based on the impossibility of co-existence and the demand for separate territories. Once the Neretva gorge stood, unbridged, between the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, the idea of separate communities possessing separate territories, looked much more natural. Nor could this separateness be contended, as the symbols that bore witness to the history of co-existence had disappeared.

However, the deliberate destruction of the urban environment in the Bosnian war was not limited to such symbolic buildings. The destruction of the Stari Most concluded and represented a long campaign by Bosnian Serb and HVO gunners against the urban fabric of Mostar. Such destruction was, as I noted above, repeated in towns and villages across Bosnia. This violence is not easily subsumable, or indeed understandable, under the rubric of 'genocide'. The argument for the inclusion of the destruction of symbolic buildings in the definition of genocide holds only insofar as those buildings provide what might be held to be the symbolic underpinnings of a distinct group. The ruthless onslaught against the common urban property of Bosnia has a different quality. Hotels and public offices, streets and squares were shared spaces, rather than the symbolic underpinnings of a specific national group.55

This violence against urban fabric is the most enigmatic element of the Bosnian war. The siege and destruction of the Stari Most neatly captures the opacity
of such violence. The reason, or logic, behind the wanton destruction of buildings that have no apparent strategic (or symbolic) significance is not immediately apparent (which explains the sense of waste we feel watching such buildings burn). Such violence can of course be taken as an index of, or metaphor for, barbarity. Moreover, insofar as it applies to symbolic buildings, the destruction can be understood as an integral component of genocide. However, such interpretations base their understanding of the reason for destroying a building on only one of the roles it performed: its significance as expression of the achievements of civilisation; or its role in the symbolic underpinnings of a ‘national or ethnical group’. Furthermore, all such interpretations are contestable. The relentless, seemingly excessive destruction of urban fabric captured in the image of the collapsing Stari Most poses a far more fundamental question. Beyond the interpretation of the destruction as either metaphorically representative, or instrumental in achieving an end, the collapse of the Stari Most poses the question of the meaning of the violence directed specifically at the urban fabric, and thus the shared spaces, of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover this violence raises wider questions about the more general meaning of the destruction of shared spaces and the co-existence they make possible.

‘A Mostar Bridge Elegy’

Shortly after its destruction, Croatian writer Slavenka Draculić wrote an ‘obituary’ for Mostar’s Stari Most in the *New Republic*. Draculić’s ‘Elegy’ has exercised a strong grip on the imagination of those who have sought to understand the meaning of the destruction of the Old Bridge. Both Pasic and UNESCO have seen
Draculić’s thoughts as an evocative enunciation of the fundamental issues that lie behind the destruction of the bridge. The article itself is a meditation on the significance of the destruction of the Stari Most. Draculić’s thoughts concerning the disjuncture of memory which occurs when a thing disappears forever are a fascinating reflection on the constitution of identity through heritage. However, the aspect of principle relevance for the present discussion is Draculić’s interpretation of the meaning of the destruction of the Stari Most. In particular, it is Draculić’s consideration of what the Stari Most, as an element of the urban fabric, is, and her comments on the HVO (as those responsible for the eventual destruction of the Stari Most) which are of interest.

Writing about the relation between a photograph of the space left between the two banks of the Neretva by the collapse of the Stari Most and a photograph of a Bosnian Muslim woman with her throat cut (after the massacre at Stupni Dol), Draculić asks, ‘Why do I feel more pain looking at the image of the destroyed bridge than the image of the woman?’ She goes on to reply:

Perhaps it is because I see my own mortality in the collapse of the bridge, not in the death of the woman. We expect people to die. We count on our own lives to end. The destruction of a...[bridge]...is something else. The bridge...was built to outlive us; it was an attempt to grasp eternity. Because it was the product of both individual creativity and collective experience, it transcended our individual destiny. A dead woman is one of us - but the bridge is all of us.

At first glance, this assertion appears counterintuitive: it seems to contradict our most deeply held values. Our immediate reaction is one of scandal. Draculić’s assertion
requires us to accept that it is possible for the destruction of a building to be more significant than the death of a human being. Indeed Draculic’s comments are a radical challenge to the anthropocentric perspective from which destruction in Bosnia has been viewed. Her remarks require an inversion of that understanding of the world which portrays subjects living out their lives centre-stage against an ephemeral background. Instead, Draculic is suggesting that it is ‘life’ which is ephemeral and that the ‘world’ must be understood as being constituted by that which was previously thought to be the mere background for activity: buildings. Thus Draculic is arguing that it is not sufficient to regard the bridge as a part of a material backdrop against which lives are played out, or as equipment instrumental to the pursuance of this ‘life’.

In order to make this argument Draculic focuses on the specificity of the destruction of this bridge, in an attempt to understand its meaning.

For Draculic the Stari Most was more than a simple thing which satisfied a set of needs and calculations. It was more than a response to the logistical problem of how to traverse a canyon. To see the Stari Most as such is to misunderstand what it is. For Draculic the bridge must be understood as something which is experienced collectively. This collective experience of the bridge is the key, for Draculic, to understanding the meaning of the Stari Most and its destruction. That which is experienced collectively is that which offers the collective the possibility of duration as a community: in short, both a future and a past. Draculic is arguing that, without the bridge as a collectively experienced structure, the community of Mostar does not have the possibility of being the particular, multi-cultural community that it had been prior to November 1993. That particular community no longer has any durability and, hence, no future. Of course, when I say ‘that particular community’ I am introducing a
level of discrimination that is seldom utilised in discussions of community. A community is not to be understood as a body with many possibilities (an amorphous potential with many actualities), rather each ‘possibility’, each historically realised community, is a different community. The community of Mostar prior to 1993 is an utterly different one to the one extant in 1994.

Thus when the bridge is destroyed it is the end of the future for that particular community. Now, I am not saying that ‘human life’ (whatever that is) is unimportant. However, existence is only possible as a community (even ‘personal autonomy’ is a mode of community insofar as it is defined as an absence of hindrance by those others with whom we co-exist). The existence of the individual is in community, and the possibility of this community is founded on the structures that give that community its future. And so members of the community come and go within the frame of the durability, the possibility of the future, provided by this built structure. Draculic sums this up in the assertion ‘the bridge is all of us’. Only in this framework of ‘us’ am ‘I’ (‘you’/(s)he/’it’) possible. And, furthermore, the foundation of ‘us’ is not to be found in some form of explicit or implicit contract, but in that which gives this particular ‘us’ (in this case the ‘us’ that comprised Mostar pre-November 1993) durability: the Stari Most (amongst other structures). This understanding of the Stari Most then informs Draculic’s final comments concerning the HVO, the Bosnian Croats paramilitaries who destroyed the bridge.

With respect to this act of destruction Draculic writes,

What kind of people do not need that bridge? The only answer I can come up with is this: people who do not believe in the future - theirs or their children’s - do not need such a bridge...This is why I would say that those
people - whoever they might be - do not belong to...civilisation, civilisation built on the idea of time, civilisation built on the idea of a future.  

In this bold condemnation of the HVO it is possible to see Draculić's attempt to understand the meaning of the destruction itself. Draculić locates the meaning of the destruction through the following argument: if existence is framed by community ('I' by 'us'), and community only comes into being (has duration and thus a future) through building (collective experience), then what does it mean to negate the building which is the foundation of community and, hence, existence?

Draculić concludes that HVO are, quite simply, not capable of such 'existence'. They represent a 'radically other' force - the meaning of which is the negation of existence itself. Again this appears to be counterintuitive and, thus, requires some explanation. How are we to understand the statement that the HVO are not capable of 'existence'? The HVO 'exist' insofar as there were soldiers, mortars, and shells. However, this is to confuse mere presence with 'existence'.

This distinction between 'presence' and 'existence' can be understood as analogous to the way in which Heidegger draws a distinction between Being-in-the-world on the one hand, and deficient modes of Being on the other. Being-in-the-world represents the mode of existence proper to Being whereas deficient modes of Being are those in which one or more aspects of Being-in-the-world are disavowed. 'Existence' in this sense would comprise being in a community that has duration through the buildings it builds. Presence, however would be a disavowal of such duration and, hence community, and would thus be a deficient mode of existing. Presence in this sense would comprise simply living without the duration and
community that constitute existence. Thus I will rephrase Draculić's assertion to say that the actions of the HVO, who were undoubtedly present (even 'living') at Mostar, can only be understood as the negation (or disavowal) of existence.

Through Draculić's 'Elegy' we have arrived at a very particular understanding of 'existence' - one that focuses on the constitution of community as its condition of possibility: one that takes 'existing' to occur only in a collective sense and then only when such a collective has a durability and thus a future. And, insofar as this is the case, this understanding takes building to be the condition of possibility of such 'existence'. In the framework of this understanding, the negation enacted by the HVO is not simply a modality of, or event within, the community of Mostar pre-November 1993 - it is its cessation. Of course, we have arrived at an understanding of existence which separates mere presence from existence, an understanding that argues that 'life' is very much separate from 'existence'. The destruction of a building, that which is the cornerstone of existence, puts 'us' at stake: it challenges (and negates) existence itself. And in negating the 'us' that provides the context of existence it is a radical violence to those who are forced to live through the loss of the future of the community in which they invested their life, and from which they drew their identity.

I would point out that I do not envisage any 'existence' being singular and exclusive of other 'existences'. Obviously in the discussion of Draculic's 'Elegy' I have simplified the case somewhat. 'The world', of course, comprises many existences - just as it comprises many communities, and so it is possible to 'live' through the destruction of any given existence. Most importantly, one can live through the cessation of 'existence', and it is, perhaps, this fact that is the root of Draculić's trauma with regard to the image of the collapsed bridge. In 'living through' the
negation of a particular existence one is not cast into some primordial state of nature. Indeed being a member of one community is in no way exclusive of being part of other communities. As one existence is destroyed those who live through destruction still have the other communities they are members of. Although the multi-cultural community of Mostar pre-November 1993 was destroyed, those who lived through this event on the east bank of the Neretva were still part of a community of Bosnian-Muslims. Moreover, in the destruction of one particular existence there is the possibility for new existences/communities to arise. This is precisely what lies behind the HVO’s actions: the cessation of a multi-cultural/multi-ethnic existence and the inauguration of a separate, wholly Bosnian Croat ethnic existence (Herceg Bosna). It is precisely this violent ending of one existence to inaugurate another that constitutes the heart of Draculić’s trauma with regard to the destruction of the Stari Most.

Moreover, Draculić does not only ascribe the trauma of living through the destruction of the existence of pre-November 1993 Mostar to the inhabitants of the locality of Mostar. Draculić, a Croatian writing in English for an Anglo-American audience, clearly indicates that the destruction of this bridge is also a trauma through which the various international communities of observers must live. In this manner Draculić notes that buildings do not only provide the possibility of community in a particular locality, but also the possibility of the existence of global communities. The communities of observers that crystallised around the image of the collapsing bridge are constituted through the bridge or its destruction. This bridge constituted particular existences such as cultural heritage experts or those that worked for multi-culturalism. The destruction of this building is also the destruction of these communities/existences. Thus the destruction of buildings in Bosnia does not simply
affect Bosnians. The destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia affects all those whose existences are constituted in some relation to Bosnia or the questions (of, for example, violence, ethics, or multi-culturalism) that it raises.

Moreover, the questions raised by the destruction of urban fabric are not confined to Bosnia alone. A diverse number of instances of violence against the urban fabric such as that seen in the case of the Stari Most can be found. From the Roman obliteration of Carthage, through the division of Berlin and the destruction of Palestinian homes by Israeli security forces, to the annihilation of the Chechen capital Grozny by Russian forces in 1999/2000, destruction of the shared spaces that underpin community is evident. The questions raised by urban destruction issue, therefore, from a diverse number of locations. This wider occurrence of urban destruction does not dilute the questions raised by the case of the Stari Most. Indeed, these cases only make the questions raised by the destruction of shared space more insistent. Any account of the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia must, similarly be an account of such instances of destruction And, hence, the questions raised in Draculić's analysis have a wider applicability than Bosnia alone. I hope, therefore, in approaching these questions that my analysis will be productive in relation to such other cases of urban destruction beyond the borders of Bosnia.

The argument

My enquiry into the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia will begin, in Chapter 1, with a consideration of the manner in which this destruction could be said to comprise a campaign of violence against buildings. It is important to note at the
outset that destruction was not confined to specific, symbolic buildings. That is to say, whilst I have developed my argument from the destruction of the Stari Most, we should note that urban destruction is widespread and, hence, deserving of considered analysis. A nascent literature treats this campaign of violence through the concept of ‘urbicide’.

Insofar as I have identified that it is shared spaces that are at stake in such destruction, I will then turn to consider how an analysis of such space should proceed. Space and spatiality have been treated in a number of ways by both philosophy and the social sciences. I will consider these treatments of space in order to identify the manner in which to proceed with an analysis of shared spaces. If it is shared spaces that are destroyed in urban destruction, two questions must be asked: 1) what it is that these shared spaces constitute such that they becomes a target?; and 2) what it is that is lost in the destruction of such spaces? I will suggest that it is in the work of Martin Heidegger that we find a treatment of spatiality that is particularly productive for such an analysis.

I will then turn, in Chapter 2, to a detailed consideration of the concept of urbicide. I will, therefore, undertake a more detailed consideration of the historico-conceptual contours circumscribed by the term ‘urbicide’. The framing of urbicide as a phenomenon distinct from genocide will be set out and the meaning of the collocation of ‘urban’ with the epithet ‘-cide’ will be examined. Then three interpretations of the destruction of buildings will be examined: the strategic; the symbolic; and the metaphorical. These three interpretations will then be refuted - it will be shown in more detail that the destruction in Bosnia exceeds the conceptual
frameworks of each interpretation. Urbicide will be reaffirmed as posing a fundamental question of existence.

Chapter 3 will begin to address the fundamental questions of existence posed by urbicide. I will show how, according to Heidegger, buildings constitute the spatiality of existence as public and, hence, both shared and heterogeneous. I will then elaborate Heidegger's concept of 'dwelling' in order to explain the manner in which building constitutes Being-in-the-world as a series of shared 'locales'. These locales comprise relational networks and, since they are public/shared, are ineluctably open to alterity/heterogeneity. Insofar as this is the case, I will argue that Heidegger's account demonstrates the manner in which buildings are the condition of possibility of an existential spatiality that always already implicates us in a Being-with-others, or heterogeneity. The destruction of buildings is, hence, the destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. This Heideggerian account raises a crucial question. Insofar as urbicide is the destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity we must ask both what the nature of this Being-with-others is and what its loss entails.

In Chapter 4 I will turn, therefore, to the nature of the Being-with-others that comprises an ineluctable feature of Heidegger's concept of the locale. I will suggest that Heidegger is making heterogeneity an existential condition. I will distinguish this approach from what I will call the 'anthropocentric imaginary'. Anthropocentric accounts treat heterogeneity as an ancillary characteristic of existence and, hence, cannot properly get to grips with the destruction of shared space. I will then elaborate the manner in which Heidegger treats heterogeneity, or the 'Being-with' that he takes to be an existential condition. I will note that since Being is always already \textit{with}, it is always already implicated in community. However, at this point Heidegger's account
falters both tragically and unforgivably. Heidegger notes the implication of Being in community and yet identifies this community as a national one. Moreover, Heidegger’s notion of community - of the Volk - is aligned with his avowal of the ideals of National Socialism. I will show, however, that it is not necessary to jettison the entire Heideggerian schema because of his avowal of Nazism. The questions of Being-with raised by Heidegger will be taken as a vital provocation for thinking about the heterogeneity lost in the destruction of buildings.

Chapter 5 will address Jean-Luc Nancy’s reconsideration of the Heideggerian theme of ‘Being-with’. I will examine Nancy’s elaboration of a notion of community radically at odds with anthropocentric understandings of such heterogeneity. I will look at the Nancy’s understanding of the manner in which the western metaphysics of presence (of which anthropocentrism is a variation) is an attempt to found community on a universal substance of being. Nancy refers to this understanding of community as ‘figuration’. Figuration proposes that community is comprised by beings who are substantially the same. Such communities are both exclusive and homogenising insofar as they must distance themselves from, and erase, difference that would contest the substantial basis on which they are founded. In contradistinction to such figured notions of community, Nancy turns to the notion of ‘being-with’ to note that difference is an ineluctable condition of existence. In this sense Nancy argues that figuration is always already contested by alterity. I will then show how Nancy’s understanding of being-with is productive in the consideration of urbicide. More specifically, I will show how the destruction of buildings comprises the attempt by figures to exclude difference and homogenise the figuration of community.
Finally, I will turn to consider the political stakes of urbicide. In the case of Bosnia, I will show how urbicide comprises an exclusionary and homogenising force that is integral to ethno-nationalism. I will look at the manner in which the buildings that constitute existence as a being-with tremble/resonate in multiple discourses. A building is not exhausted by any single figuration. Insofar as this is the case, urbicide attempts to appropriate buildings to one figurative discourse alone, in order to suppress the multiple meanings any given building might have. Where this is not possible urbicide destroys buildings in order to disavow being-with. I will also look at the way in which the destruction of heterogeneity effected in urbicide can be contested by reconstruction. Finally, I will turn to look at the manner in which my analysis of urbicide can provide productive insight into instances of urban destruction beyond the borders of Bosnia.

My conclusion will focus on the manner in which the account I have outlined in the preceding argument offers a vigorous challenge to current, anthropocentric accounts of the 1992-95 Bosnian war. In this manner I hope to be able to provide an account of the politics of urbicide that will cast new light upon the assumptions that political theorists and international relations scholars have made concerning what is at stake in the destruction of urban fabric in Bosnia. Moreover, in linking Heidegger's spatial account of existence, with Nancy's account of community in order to generate a cogent critique of the anthropocentric bias of contemporary attempts to understand conflicts such as the 1992-95 Bosnian war, I hope to offer an original analysis concerning the recasting of the political.
CHAPTER 1

THEORISING SPATIALITY

The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein.¹

A Campaign of Violence

It might appear extravagant to make claims - such as those I made in my account of Dracilić’s ‘Mostar Bridge Elegy’ - concerning ‘existence itself’ on the basis of a single incident.² Such a lengthy meditation on the destruction of the Stari Most might even be seen as something of a luxury. It could be argued that, in the absence of a genuine understanding of the conflict, it is particularly revealing that observers found a focus for their distress in the desecration of an object valued for its aesthetic and historical value. Indeed, it might be argued, had such observers valued ‘life’ above (ill conceived) ideas such as ‘heritage’, or ‘culture’, then responses to the war may not have been so inadequate. Such an argument is, of course, a form of philistinism because it reduces all objects to a level below that of ‘human life’ and regards any valuing of objects (such as paintings, sculptures, books, buildings, and so on) as a luxury whilst there is still ‘human suffering’ in the world.³ Moreover, such an
argument misses the point of Draculić's assertions. The 'Elegy' is a consideration of the meaning of the destruction of the urban environment in this particular case: it is not an appreciation of the Stari Most in terms of its aesthetic or architectural merit (this would indeed have been frivolous and irresponsible). As such, the assertions made in the 'Elegy' could be generalised as claims concerning what is at stake in every such case.

If the Stari Most was believed to be an isolated case - a sort of 'cultural vandalism' perpetrated by an isolated group of rogue soldiers - a short consideration of the destruction wrought on the urban fabric of Bosnia would demonstrate otherwise. Indeed, though Mostar's Stari Most may be one of the most prominent images of the war in Bosnia, this image is, as I have noted above, merely exemplary of a extensive violence which permeated the entire war.

Some observers have chosen to regard this extensive destruction of buildings, monuments, and cultural artefacts, as 'cultural genocide'. These acts of destruction, it is argued, whilst part of a program to intentionally destroy the cultural artefacts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, are to be regarded as separate from genocide itself. This separation of 'cultural' genocide from 'human' genocide is intended to distinguish between the value of human life and the value of the artefacts humans produce. Destruction of mosques, churches, museums, bridges and so on may well be part of an organised program, but this program is separate to (though not necessarily unrelated to) the program of killing and displacement carried out by either the Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Croats.

However, Michael Sells, argues that this destruction should rightly be seen as an integral component of the program of genocide committed against the Bosnian Muslims. Insofar as the 1948 Genocide Convention is used to define the act of
genocide, the destruction of symbolic buildings and cultural artefacts can be construed to be circumscribed by the ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’. Even though such groups consist of the individual persons that comprise it, the sense of being a member of such a group is provided by a shared culture. To destroy the shared culture is a *de facto* destruction of the national group: it deprives individuals of the shared culture that provides the condition of possibility of there being a sense of belonging to a group. The destruction of the Stari Most is, therefore, understood by Sells to be an exemplary event in the genocide against the Bosnian Muslims. When taken together with the destruction of mosques in Mostar, Sarajevo, Banja Luka and elsewhere, the destruction of buildings such as the Stari Most can be held to be an organised attempt to destroy in whole or in part that which makes it possible to speak of Bosnian Muslims as an ‘ethnic group’: their shared culture.

However, both ‘cultural genocide’ and ‘genocide’ are unsatisfactory concepts with which to address the extensive destruction of urban fabric. Cultural genocide is not recognised as a crime against humanity by international legal norms and thus remains a marginalised concept. And accounting for urban destruction under the rubric of genocide means subordinating such destruction to the genocidal aim of destroying a people. That is, if understood as part of genocide, urban destruction is understood merely as a means to the end of the destruction of a group of people (a wholly anthropocentric subordination of the destruction of buildings).

Given this, a nascent literature has addressed urban destruction as, for want of a better term, ‘urbicide’. The concept of ‘urbicide’ is intended redress the fact that assaults on material culture were excluded from the 1948 Genocide Convention. Moreover, ‘urbicide’ is a better term than ‘cultural genocide’ as it indicates an assault
on the fabric of the community - its urbanity: the fabric of community as co-existent
space established in and through buildings. It is 'urbicide' that is being considered in
Draculić's 'Elegy', albeit in the form of a single exemplary episode. Hence, it is
'urbicide' that demands our attention for, if my interpretation Draculić is correct, it is
nothing short of the constitution of 'us' (and, hence, 'I'/'he'/'it', etc.) which is at
stake in this phenomenon.

If my interpretation of Draculić’s 'Elegy' is correct, it is that which is
constitutive of the conditions of possibility of existence which is at stake in urbicide.
Moreover, following my argument, 'existence' must be qualified to mean the specific
configuration of a particular community, an 'us' (which is always the condition of
possibility of the 'I'). And the condition of possibility of existence, that which is
exterminated in urbicide, the buildings or urban fabric of Bosnia, constitute the shared
space within which existence is possible. At stake in an enquiry into urbicide then is
the constitution of shared space. The consideration of shared space is not a simple
account of the spaces into which unitary rational agents are placed. Rather, this
account of the constitution of shared space will be an account of the manner in which
existence comes into being in and through spatialisation. And insofar as such
spatialisation can be both inclusive and exclusive it can be shared in certain ways. At
stake in the urbicide of Bosnia is the extermination of spaces of heterogeneous
coexistence without which a multi-ethnic existence is impossible.

The analysis of urbicide should be seen as a properly political enquiry since it
concerns the conditions of possibility of politics. That is, insofar as buildings
constitute shared space in which specific instances of existence occur, they comprise
the conditions of possibility of the agonistic relations of identity/difference, the
networks of self and other, that we designate as politics. Insofar as the urban
environment is the condition of possibility for the spatialities on which existence is predicated, then it is the constitution of spatiality that lies at the heart of the political. An enquiry into urbicide is then, an enquiry into the constitution of spatiality that lies at the core of the experience of the political. Moreover, such an enquiry reverses the priorities that have governed our understanding of the political demonstrating that the spatiality that was taken to be the backdrop for politics (man being the animal that is taken to posses the attribute of being-political) is in fact that which is constitutive of politics. In order to commence an enquiry into the logics of urbicide it is therefore necessary to outline the specific manner in which I want to consider the constitution of shared space.

From neutral medium to existential condition: theories of spatiality

It has become common-place to talk of a 'spatial turn' in the social sciences. The novelty of this supposed discovery of the importance of space might seem, from the perspective of the disciplines of political theory or international relations, somewhat contestable. For example, the academic study of international relations has been predicated upon spatial concepts, perhaps the most important of which is that of territorial sovereignty. Indeed the category of the 'inter-national' is, insofar as it designates the interstices of a territorial system, explicitly spatial: 'inter' being a spatial designation of the zone that lies beyond and between bounded territorial entities, in this case nation-states. Inter-national relations is thus a discipline that derives its constitutive intellectual assumptions from the spatialities of its primary category. As R.B.J. Walker has shown, the division between political theory and international relations that constrains the latter to the study of that which occurs
outside the territorial boundaries of national-sovereignty ("the domestic"), is constituted in the designation by international relations of the site of the political as *inter-national*.¹¹ Such a designation is explicitly spatial and establishes the zone outside of and between the bounds of the national as the site of politics. Anything that occurs outside of this space is not the proper object of study for the scholar of international relations. Moreover, political theory and international relations have for a long time premised their understandings of the central categories of sovereignty and governance upon the explicitly spatial concept of territory. Definitions of "the state" have held territory to be a defining dimension. Sovereignty likewise, is often taken to consist of the *extension* of government (or in Weber's now classic formulation, the possession of a monopoly of force) within particular territorial limits.

However, neither political theory nor international relations have made any concerted effort to enquire into the assumptions that underpin the spatial categories on which they have been traditionally predicated. In this sense the spatial turn is significant insofar as it enquires into the nature of the spatialities upon which these disciplines have based their conceptual schemas. The concepts of territory and sovereignty as they are traditionally used in either political theory or international relations, rest on the notion that politics occurs in the context of a homogenous, uniform space that is divisible (or naturally divided) into sub-units. This space exists as the *a priori* of political/social existence. Moreover though this space may be said (in somewhat Kantian terms) to establish the conditions of possibility of Being (for example, it allows movement in three dimensions only), it is both exterior to, and neutral in regards to, Being itself. It is the uniform background to, not the medium of, politics. In international relations theory the state is seen as the natural sub-unit of the homogeneous uniform space that comprises the surface of the globe. The territorial
boundaries of the state are set up to divide this uniform space and mark out the
domestic from the inter-national. But the boundaries are not understood as external to
that space, areas of non-uniformity that distort spatial movement. Rather they are
natural barriers (such as oceans and mountain ranges) internal to that space that stop
what would otherwise be potentially limitless movement within the context of this
world-space. Politics is construed as being played out against the backdrop of this
space, exterior to its features. Insofar as spatiality plays a role in politics it is a
constraining exteriority (such as distance) to be overcome by political means. It is
precisely insofar as these notions of spatiality are uncontested, forming a received
common-sense on which conceptual edifices are unquestioningly established, that the
spatial turn is significant. To enquire into the constitution of spatiality is to contest
received understandings of the spaces of politics.

The literature that might be considered to comprise the 'spatial turn' has made
two theoretical challenges to the unquestioning acceptance of conceptual schemas
predicated on spatial categories. Firstly, a body of literature has emerged that
questions the naturalness of the various regimes of spatial division. This literature is
concerned with the manner in which the regimes of spatial division that constitute the
spaces that we share are themselves constituted. Thus the division
domestic/international has been shown to be a fictive division established and
maintained through a complex of material narratives. Cartography, for example,
establishes the so-called natural boundaries of the state, naturalising the idea of
uniform space as the background context in which the world is situated. So-called
'natural features' are set out in a particular non-perspectival, space. This setting out
is then used to present certain features as being natural indicators of the extent of a
territory. Rivers, oceans, mountain ranges are rendered on maps as impassable barriers
beyond which a given territory will not extend. Moreover, cartography removes the contingencies of history from such representations, thus occluding the manner in which such 'natural features' have been historically interpreted as the limit of a territory. For example, though the English Channel is presented as the 'natural feature' that marks the south-eastern limit of British territory, cartography occludes the various historical processes that have contributed to such an interpretation, and effaces the counter-narratives (such as the historical extension of English territory to include parts of France). Other regimes of spatial division can be similarly questioned. The international refugee/migrant regime (an important component of the informal mechanisms of global governance that provide fictive support for the naturalness of the state) can be shown to rely on particular narratives concerning the crossing of borders.

In political theory and international relations, genealogies (in the strictly Foucauldian sense) of such narratives of spatial division effectively challenge the idea that space is naturally divided/dividable into sub-units (such as the nation-state) by showing the contingent manner in which regimes of spatial division have been articulated. The reassertion of contingency brings the politics of spatial division to the foreground. Indeed it shows that the spatial divisions within which existence is lived out are wholly fictive. It is the manner in which such fictions are maintained and the effects they have that is important to such theoretical accounts. On the whole these accounts highlight the manner in which spatial division always occurs in the form of bounding, a drawing of a line between what is to be taken to be included in a given spatial domain (which is often congruent to, though not necessarily identical to, territory) and what is excluded. In this way the primary political point of such work is to demonstrate that insofar as existence is spatial, and spaces are established through
the supposed division of one big uniform space, all regimes of division are, in some form, exclusionary.

Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, a number of writers have demonstrated the manner in which space itself should not be taken to be a backdrop, or neutral medium, for existence. Rather, these writers have been concerned with the manner in which 'space' can be said to be 'socially constructed'. Space, it is argued, is precisely not the external medium in which social/political existence occurs. Rather space is constituted by social/political existence. Such an idea exceeds the genealogical approach taken by those who demonstrate the manner in which regimes of spatial division establish exclusionary politics. Such genealogies can be said to question the manner in which space is divided without questioning space itself. Those who argue that space should properly be seen as a social construction are concerned to show how space itself must be seen as a product of social existence. Thus space cannot be said to exist in anticipation of division. Rather the regimes of division are one of the ways in which space is materialised.

There are four main strands of thought in the literature concerned with the social construction of space. Firstly, and most obviously, there are texts such as Henri Lefebvre's *The Production of Space* which attempt to provide an ontological account of the social construction of space. Insofar as ontology can be said to be the account of the *logos* of that which is, such writing precisely takes social construction to be the *logos* of the existential fact of spatiality. That is to say, though spatiality is taken to be an ineluctable aspect of existence, it is asserted that such spatiality is constituted by, and not external to, such existence.

This argument leads to the necessary conclusion that different forms of existence constitute different forms of spatiality. A particularly sophisticated version
of such an argument can be found in Deleuze and Guattari's ideas of 'smooth' and 'striated' space. For Deleuze and Guattari striated space is that constituted in and through the existence of the state and its apparatus. This space is striated, or clearly marked out in hierarchical patterns, that facilitate the performance of government. Smooth space, on the other hand, is that constituted by the 'war machine' that exists beyond the bounds of the state and in the interstices of its governance. This 'war machine is not a war making entity, but rather a nomadic principle constantly mobile and thus not subordinate to the hierarchies of governance. The political consequence of such constitutions of space are demonstrated by Thom Kuehls in his account of the encounter between the inter-state system (a striated space) and the 'global ecumenical machine' of environmental protest epitomised by Greenpeace (which is constitutive of smooth space). Kuehls shows how Greenpeace constitutes a smooth space in the interstices of state governance and, hence, evades subordination to the hierarchies of striated space. In this manner Greenpeace is, by virtue of its spatialities, a constant challenge to the governance of the state.

A second body of literature develops upon such arguments by showing the specific way in which the constitution of space itself occurs. Walker, for example, shows how developments in Western thought provide the conditions of possibility for the emergence of sovereign, governable global space. According to Walker, Galileo's separation of primary and secondary characteristics provides the intellectual condition of possibility for the social construction of space that is divided between that which is inside the state and that which is outside the state. In other words, by establishing criteria for the distinction between what is to be included as primary and what is to be excluded as secondary, Galileo provides the resources by which exclusionary spaces (such as the state) can be socially constructed. In this way Walker
show that the global spatialities established by the Westphalian order are socially constructed.

A third body of writing in a similar vein can be found in what might be loosely referred to as 'critical geography'. It could be argued that geography is the discipline that studies space. However, it is only relatively recently that geographers have turned their attention to the question of the nature of the space that they have traditionally studied. This work comprises a hybrid analysis that takes elements of sociology and cultural studies in order to complete an analysis of the manner in which space is constituted. Thus critical geographers are able to argue that particular networks of capital, technology and social/cultural resources constitute the space that the discipline had hitherto presupposed as mere backdrop. Moreover this means that it is possible to argue for disjuncture of spaces, non-continuity of spaces and simultaneous overlaying of spaces. Thus for example the geography of the city need not be predicated on the idea that citizens inhabit and move through the same spaces. Networks of capital and social resources can be said to constitute space such that merchant bankers and the homeless exist in separate, though simultaneous spaces with few shared spaces.

Fourthly, and as an extension of this critical geography, Gearóid Ó Tuathail has written about a 'critical geopolitics'. Insofar as a critical geography addresses the manner in geographical spaces are constituted it tends to do so without concern for the political implications of such constitution. Such geographical writing could be said to analyse the constitution of space alone, what Ó Tuathail calls 'geo-graphing' (writing/inscribing the world). To the idea of 'geo-graphy' Ó Tuathail adds the idea of 'geo-politics'. In this concept the idea of the constitution of space is brought together with the idea of the political implications of such constitution. Ó Tuathail is
particularly concerned to demonstrate the exclusion, occlusion, distortion and repression that comprise the geo-politics of geo-graphy.

Both critical geography and critical geopolitics can be said to develop the more ontological analyses of writers such as Lefebvre and Walker into genealogies of the constitution (rather than simple division) of space. All of this work emphasises the manner in which specific networks/regimes constitute their own space, rather than occupying previously vacant space. In this manner the space produced by a regime is its politics. Thus, for example, the constitution of a territory as *terra nullius*, or the frontier, or the constitution of space as impenetrable boundary (bureaucratic or natural) is the politics of the regime. The legitimisation of a policy of denial by the contemporary Australian state regarding the entitlement of Aboriginal peoples to land occupied during the formation of the state rests upon the constitution of this space as an empty space, a *terra nullius*. In this way the Australian state can claim that the land was empty and thus not possessed prior to its occupation during the formation of the Australian state. This constitution of space is remarkably effective insofar as it gives the impression that it was not possible for there to be owners of this space prior to the creation of the Australian state. Thus political analysis must be first and foremost a study of the constitution of the spatialities in which politics becomes possible and the politics made possible, or even necessary, by those spatialities. Of course, if my interpretation of Draculić is to be followed, then it is building that lies at the heart of such spatialisation.
The territorialisation of existence

The above literature could be said to comprise an account of the ontopolitics of space/spatialisation. These accounts demonstrate the political effects of the institution of particular assumptions about the 'necessities and possibilities of human being, about, for instance, the forms into which human beings may be composed and the possible relations humans can establish'. For example, to challenge the Westphalian international order by showing the contingent, historical nature of its various forms, is to challenge that which institutes the assumptions concerning existence enshrined in the notions of territorial sovereignty established at Westphalia. To challenge the Westphalian notion of territorial sovereignty is, moreover, to challenge Newtonian notions of uniform, homogenous space. Such accounts demonstrate the manner in which all forms of spatialisation are the institution of assumptions regarding onta ('that which is/exists'). Moreover, since such an institution occurs only by the suppression of alternatives these ontological assumptions are also political assumptions restricting the possibilities of existence through the institution of one understanding of Being.

Such ontopolitical analysis brings to light precisely the manner in which plural possible forms of existence are occluded in the institution of singular assumptions concerning Being. It is precisely through the re-historicisation of spatial regimes, through the delineation of the contingency of a given understanding/institution of space, that ontopolitical assumptions are delineated. In such a delineation the given institution of space can be recognised as that which serves to suppress alternative possibilities of existence.
Such analyses are crucial to re-opening the political. Indeed, insofar as the Westphalian order represents the hegemony of a specific ontopolitics of spatialisation (an ontopological ontopolitics), we might say that the political has been foreclosed.\textsuperscript{29} It is only through the constestation of such ontopolitics that the political will once again be something that is ‘worthy of thought’.\textsuperscript{30} I want to note, however, that these ontopolitical analyses open up a broader, existential question: the relation of Being and territoriality/spatiality. That is, though the analyses of the ontopolitics (the politics of spatialising assumptions regarding onta - really existing things) address the manner in which assumptions institute specific spatial regimes, the more fundamental question of the manner in which spatiality can be said to properly belong to existence is occluded by questions concerning the manner in which spatiality is constituted/interpreted/instituted. In other words, the conditions of possibility of spatiality are not, therefore, addressed.

The question of the conditions of possibility of spatiality could be said to have been occluded by western philosophy insofar as that tradition has taken space to be an invariable external\textit{ a priori} condition of existence. This conception of space reaches its most sophisticated formulations with Descartes and Kant, though it neither begins with, nor is exhausted by, these thinkers. In Kant’s\textit{ Critique of Pure Reason} especially, one has a powerful account of the manner in which the conditions of possibility of spatiality are placed beyond question.\textsuperscript{31} A powerful idea is at work in Kant’s installation of space as the \textit{a priori} intuition of outer sense. For Kant, space is that which is always already implicated in any existence. Indeed, not merely implicated, but the very possibility of such existence. And in making space this always already present condition of possibility, Kant effectively removes space from political contestation. Standard accounts of Kant’s work assume that his idea of space
as intuition inscribes Newtonian space into the structure of reason.\textsuperscript{32} Such an allegation need not follow from a reading of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}. It is possible to interpret Kant as positing an experience of spatiality (of whatever kind) as the always already present condition of possibility for existence. Which is to say space is never experienced in a pure, true form but that all existence is ineluctably spatial. And yet the nature of space is removed from contestation as it is the simple condition of existence. In a similar manner, the analyses of the ontopolitics of spatial regimes do not in themselves question that space comprises a condition of possibility for existence. Rather they contest the manner in which certain interpretations of space achieve hegemony and therefore are naturalised as the only interpretations of space. That the fundamental nature of space needs investigation is not a question of originality, or primordial primacy (of the which came first, existence or space, type of question), but is central for the question of the relation of shared spaces and existence as I have posed it in my interpretation of Draculić's 'Elegy'.

It is in the work of Martin Heidegger that the ineluctably spatial nature of Being is given its strongest expression.\textsuperscript{33} Briefly put, for Heidegger, Being \textit{is} only insofar as it is in-the-world. Furthermore, for Heidegger the world and Being are copresent phenomena: Being \textit{is} insofar as it is in-the-world, the world is insofar as Being is in it. World, moreover is that which \textit{is} in-and-through-Being. For the later Heidegger the manner in which Being is in the world is \textit{dwelling}. As I noted in the Introduction, dwelling, by which Heidegger means primarily (though not exhaustively) building and cultivation, is the fundamental mode of Being-in-the-world. For Heidegger dwelling is the manner in which (wo)man 'gathers' his/her existence. The gathering of existence into locales is the manner in which the relationality that is the basis of worldliness for Heidegger is established. It is this
relationality that is the basis for space. The locale is thus that in-and-through which
Being comes-to-be, in which Being is gathered, and, therefore, that in and through
which world and Being achieve co-presence. And since the locale is relational and
relationality is constitutive of spatiality, the locale is ineluctably spatial.

It is the synthesis of this idea with the analysis of the ontopolitics of
spatialisation that I want to achieve in the following argument. Though analyses of the
ontopolitics of spatialisation give an account of the manner in which space is socially
constituted, they leave the fundamental relation of existence and space unaccounted
for. The Heideggerian account provides an understanding of the manner in which
spatiality is an ineluctable aspect of existence. From this idea it is possible to make
two important assertions. Firstly, if spatiality is an ineluctable aspect of existence, it
must have existential conditions of possibility. If these conditions of possibility come
under attack, it is not simply spatiality that is at stake, but existence. Secondly, it is
precisely those moments in which existence is at stake (through practices that
problematisetheverypossibilityofspatiality)thatconstitutemomentsofacute crisis
in socially constructed spaces and thus, by extension, in the ontopolitics of the
regimes that constitute those social constructions. Accordingly, if a given practice
(such as dynamiting buildings) destroys the very possibility of existence itself, it
induces acrisisin the ontopolitics that had previously constituted the social space that
that comprised existence.

It is my contention that far from simply clearing extant space (the supposed
'goal' of the ontopolitics of ethnic cleansing) those that destroyed
architecture/buildings in Bosnia induced a crisis in the constructed shared space of
Bosnia. This was a crisis in a space that had been (prior to the war) a heterogeneous
space, supporting multicultural communities. Through this crisis the space could be
reconstructed as intolerant, separate and monocultural. This is especially clear in Mostar where Croats and Bosniacs fought side by side, and yet subsequently Croats had to destroy such a space of multicultural existence in order to create the space that would permit the formation the Croat statelet of Herceg-Bosna.

In order to begin an enquiry into the manner in which urbicide destroyed the shared spatiality of Bosnia, it is necessary first to address the question of the meaning of urbicide. That is, if I am to flesh out the comments made above regarding the relation between spatiality and urban destruction it is necessary to first of all give an account of the extensive nature of the violence against buildings in Bosnia. Such an account will direct us towards what it is that such violence destroys and what it lost in this destruction. This in turn will suggest what, precisely the spatiality at stake in urbicide comprises.
CHAPTER 2

APPROACHING THE LOGICS OF URBICIDE

New conceptions require new terms.¹

In my introduction, I noted that the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1992-95 war has, commonly, been viewed through an anthropocentric prism, principally as an adjunct to ethnic cleansing. However, I argued that this destruction merits attention in its own right. Through an interpretation of Slavenka Draculic’s Mostar Bridge Elegy, I argued that the destruction of urban fabric - exemplified by the destruction of Mostar’s Stari Most by the Bosnian Croat paramilitary organisation, the HVO - constitutes the destruction of the conditions of possibility of the existence of specific communities. I argued that the destruction of this ‘attempt to grasp eternity’ is the destruction of the possibility of a future for the specific communities brought into being in and through the construction of this bridge. Indeed, I noted that this is the proper meaning of the HVO action: the Bosnian Croats understood themselves to be destroying a heterogeneous community that spanned the Neretva and contained both multiple extant and possible ethnicities, in order to constitute two separate communities and thus provide the condition of possibility of building the so-called ‘ethnically homogeneous’ community of Herceg-Bosna.

As I noted in Chapter 1, some writers have referred to this destruction as ‘urbicide’. This term captures two imperatives in the analysis of the destruction of the
urban fabric of Bosnia. Firstly, 'urbicide' indicates that this destruction is an event in its own right, not simply a mode of, or adjunct to, the violence termed 'ethnic cleansing' (or genocide). Secondly, urbicide points to the fact that this destruction aimed at nothing less than 'the urban' itself. The destruction of 'the urban' comprises the destruction of shared spaces. That is, 'the urban' comprises spaces in which heterogeneous identities, flows and networks co-exist. Indeed, 'the urban' constitutes the possibility of the coexistence of heterogeneous identities, flows and networks in and through the spaces it comprises. The destruction of urban fabric - urbicide - is thus the destruction, and thus also the (re)constitution (albeit in ruins), of such spaces.

In Chapter 1, I argued that since it is this destruction of shared spaces that is at stake in urbicide, an enquiry into the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia, is, therefore, an enquiry into spatiality. After reviewing the principle analyses of spatiality, I argued, following Heidegger, that spatiality is both a condition of possibility of, and is constituted in and through, existence. Destroying spaces, contesting particular spatialities, is, therefore, a way of destroying or contesting certain existences. Spatiality in this sense is the condition for the political, the condition of the relations of identity and difference that constitute politics.

This thesis will, therefore, comprise an analysis of the constitution of spatiality understood as the (fundamentally political) condition of possibility of existence. In order to begin such an inquiry, it is necessary to consider the ways in which the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia has been thematised. I will begin my analysis by outlining the conceptual contours of the notion of 'urbicide' since this term, and the phenomena it names, is central to the identification of the urban destruction with which my argument will be concerned. Interpretations of various instances of violence
against buildings reveal various ways of understanding the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia. I will argue that none of these ways of understanding the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia are sufficient for the purpose of an enquiry into the spatiality that underlies the condition of possibility of (political) existence. In examining these interpretations of instances of urban destruction, I will be able to outline the way in which the concept of urbicide provides a more adequate tool of analysis and guides the way in which my enquiry should proceed.

'Urbicide'

In 1992 the issue of the widespread destruction of buildings in Bosnia was thematised by a group of architects from Mostar in a publication entitled Mostar '92 - Urbicid. The authors of Mostar '92 - Urbicid presented the destruction of buildings, indeed of the urban fabric, in Mostar, as a central aspect of the ongoing war. This collection of pictures and text attempted to demonstrate that the devastation of the urban environment manifest in (though not limited to) the destruction of bridges, mosques and churches, department stores, blocks of apartments, public buildings, hotels and public spaces (such as parks) was more than simple collateral damage. Implicit in this publication is the claim that the destruction has a meaning of its own, rather than being incidental to, or a product of, the 'ethnic cleansing' that characterised the Bosnian war. Mostar '92 - Urbicid thematised the necessity of understanding the meaning of this violence against buildings.

In order to approach such a problematic it is necessary to inquire into the meaning of the term 'urbicide' (the Anglicisation of the Serbo-Croat 'Urbicid').
‘Urbicide’ derives its meaning from the collocation of ‘urban’ with the epithet ‘-cide’. Taken literally, urbicide refers to the ‘killing, slaughter’ or ‘slaying’ of that which is subsumed under the term ‘urban’. At stake in the meaning of ‘urbicide’, therefore, is what is to be understood in the concept of ‘the urban’, what it is that is destroyed in this act of literally ‘killing the urban’. ‘Urban’, derived from the Latin urbanus, refers to that which is ‘characteristic of, occurring or taking place, in a city or town’. Importantly, the term has a dual meaning. Insofar as, ‘urban’ refers to the characteristics that identify towns or cities (originally in opposition to rural villages or estates), it refers both to the material conditions that constitute the town or city as such, and the way of life proper to such material conditions. That is, ‘urban’ refers to the specific building patterns (in particular to the density and size of these patterns) that identify the city as well as to the particular experience of life in such an environment.

The experience of city life, or ‘[f]ollowing the pursuits [and] having the ideas or sentiments...characteristic of town or city life’ comprises urbanity. According to Anton Zijderveld, ‘Urbanity is usually seen as a synonym of suavity: a refined politeness or courtesy...It comes close to civility, derived from the Latin civilitas.’ Just as being humane, or displaying humanity, is taken to comprise the exercise of those virtues (such as compassion or mercy) that express the qualities that distinguish humans from animals, so urbanity, or being urbane, is taken to refer to the characteristics that distinguish city-dwellers. In this sense ‘urban’ or ‘urbane’ has a certain normative connotation. ‘The urban’ is taken to be productive of a way of life that is in some way more civilised.
Whilst I do not want to dwell on this normative connotation, it is important to note the way in which urbanity derives its meaning through an opposition with the rural way of life. Examination of this opposition will reveal the principle distinguishing feature of urbanity (understood as both the material context of urban life and the way of life produced in, and (re)productive of, that context). According to the opposition urban/rural, the city represents modern progress, whilst rural life is taken to exemplify the constraints of tradition that modernity is supposed to sweep away. In order to understand the attachment of normative connotations to the urban experience it is necessary to understand the notion of progress that is implicit in this opposition.

Habermas notes that 'the term “modern”...expresses the consciousness of an epoch that relates itself to the past...in order to view itself as the result of a transition from the old to the new.' Moreover, after the French Enlightenment 'the idea of being “modern” incorporated “the belief, inspired by modern science, in the infinite progress of knowledge and in the infinite advance towards social and moral betterment.”' Modernity, as it is manifest in urbanity, thus represents the idea of a transition, a normative advance on feudal, rural ways of life. The rural way of life is taken to be held in a timeless, feudal hierarchical order from which no progress is possible. In contrast, the city, according to a theorist of modernity such as Max Weber, represented a 'sustained...fundamental challenge to the feudal system which...paved the way for the subsequent development of a rational legal, capitalistic social order.' It is in this way that urbanity is normatively coded as a way of life that offers the prospect of progress toward 'social and moral betterment' (a process that has been subsumed under the idea of ‘civilisation’ or ‘civility’).
Modernity, conceived of as 'the consciousness of an epoch', is characterised by a series of binary oppositions in which one term is valued over the other as a sign of progress towards 'betterment'. It is, of course, precisely this faith in normatively coded binary oppositions that is challenged by the cultural/intellectual strands of thought such as post-structuralism, post-colonialism, post-modernism, environmentalism and feminism.\textsuperscript{12} Notwithstanding these considerable intellectual contestations of the givenness of such oppositions, it is possible to gain some insight into the meaning of 'the urban' through the manner in which it is opposed to 'the rural'. Insofar as is possible, the examination of this opposition should act as if the normative implications of such opposition were in suspension. Which is to say that it should be recognised that the distinction urban/rural is fictive. Notwithstanding this recognition an examination of the distinction is illuminating in regard to the meaning of the concept of 'urbanity'. Thus the question to be asked is as follows: what it is that is taken to be specific to the experience of the urban environment such that it can be illustrated through an opposition with the rural environment?

The opposition of rural and urban echoes with early sociological attempts to grasp the phenomenon of modernity. Such attempts oppose the supposed organic unity of traditional, pre-modern societies, to the heterogeneity that is associated with capitalist modernity. Tönnie's concepts of \textit{Gemeinschaft} and \textit{Gesellschaft}, for example, exemplify this opposition.\textsuperscript{13} Where \textit{Gemeinschaft} represents pre-modern social order, \textit{Gesellschaft} represents the modern, specifically capitalist, social order. \textit{Gemeinschaft} represents a homogeneous feudal order 'bound by shared values and...traditions', \textit{Gesellschaft} refers to a social order characterised by 'heterogeneity of values and traditions'.\textsuperscript{14} And it is precisely the idea of \textit{heterogeneity} that is at stake
in the concept of the urban, or urbanity. In his classic essay 'Urbanism as a Way of Life', Louis Wirth argues that it is the size, density and heterogeneity of the populations of cities that constitute 'those elements of urbanism which mark it as a distinctive mode of life'. Despite naming three factors that characterise urbanity, it is heterogeneity that is its principle aspect according to Wirth. Indeed, the size of an urban population is pertinent insofar as it leads to a greater number of different identities and associations and thus heterogeneity of tradition and belief. Moreover, density of the urban population is important insofar as it is gives rise to a greater frequency of encounters between these heterogeneous traditions and beliefs. Heterogeneity, then, can be said to be the defining characteristic of urbanity.

It is important to briefly note two additional arguments concerning this definition of urbanity before returning to my account of urbicide. Firstly, it should be noted that the heterogeneity that defines urbanity leads to a fundamental ambiguity in the experience of urban life. Whilst this heterogeneity is taken to be the condition for an individual freedom and capitalist development, it is also the root of a variety of anomic 'pathologies'. That is, whilst heterogeneity leads to the dissolution of the constraints of tradition it also leads to isolation and a lack of social cohesion which can be seen as the roots of both social and, in some circumstances, individual pathologies: lawlessness, deception, immorality, mental illness, and suicide are all attributed to the heterogeneity characteristic of urbanity. As such this pathological aspect of urbanity represents a common experience of modernity.

Insofar as modernity signals the dissolution of the constraints of the feudal system it offers the possibility of individual freedom. This individual freedom, conceived of as possessive individualism and developed into the hegemony of liberal-
humanitarian political values, is predicated upon the lack of binding social values and thus the possibility of finding legal-political frameworks that accommodate heterogeneous traditions and expressions of self-interest. However, this lack of hierarchical social order also entails a pathological side of modernity. Freedom becomes the freedom to exploit and the lack of hierarchical order leads to a relativism according to which it is never possible to refuse to accommodate any forms of heterogeneity (thus entailing the acceptance of all forms of difference). Indeed, the relativism that modernists like to foist upon their imagined 'post-modern' interlocutors can be traced to the cornerstone of the experience of modernity: the dissolution of hierarchical (primarily theological) social orders.

Secondly, it is also important to recognise one possible objection to the account of urbanity that I have offered. It might be argued that I have relied upon the opposition of urban and rural, and thus limited the scope of my argument to the destruction of cities. And yet this would be to accept the opposition of urban and rural as a natural and given fact. Instead it is possible, as I noted above, to use this opposition as an abstract model in order to determine what it is that is taken to define the concept of 'urbanity'. Of course, it is impossible to note a factual distinction, an invisible line crossed at the city-limits, between urban and rural. Such an idea rests on the mental image of an imagined rural environment that exists beyond the city. But this is precisely an imagined rural existence, imagined in order to define the experience of the city. Moreover, it is precisely in the context of this imagined distinction that the concept of urbanity was itself defined. Indeed, this imagined distinction is a product of the modern tendency to frame existence as a series of
dualisms. It is instructive therefore, to look at the implications of such a dualism, at what, exactly was conceptually intended in the opposition of urban and rural.

Such an exercise is wholly oriented towards a delineation of the conceptual entailments of the notion of 'urbanity'. This exercise holds in suspension the question of the existence of such a duality and asks what meaning is delineated in this distinction. In this regard it could be argued that the distinction is, in our era, a fiction crafted for the purpose of identifying our present state of heterogeneity through a contrast with a supposed homogeneity. Indeed, it is the experience of heterogeneity that defines urbanity that is precisely the experience that is entailed in what is crudely termed 'globalisation'. It is thus possible to say that 'we are all urban now' insofar as heterogeneity is the mark of our lives. There is, therefore, no simple opposition between a simple feudal rural existence, and a heterogeneous city existence. Rather, since it was through an imagined opposition of urban and rural that the notion of urbanity was fleshed out, such an opposition helps us to identify precisely what it is that is lost in 'urbicide'. If we identify urbanity as entailing, principally, heterogeneous existence, we can say that the destruction of urban life is the destruction of heterogeneity. The destruction of urban fabric, is, therefore, the destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. What is at stake in urbicide, the destruction of the buildings in and around which communities live their lives, is thus the destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity.

Such a definition of urbicide is, however, merely a lexicographic clarification of what might have been an unfamiliar term. This clarification tells us little about urbicide in Bosnia. Moreover, it tells us little about the meaning of the destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. In order to proceed with an examination
of these twin themes, I want to turn to look at the conceptual kinship between ‘urbicide’ on the one hand and ‘genocide’ on the other. By looking at the systematic nature of destruction implied in both concepts it is possible to identify a ‘logic’ of destruction that guides urbicide.

The distinctive character of ‘urbicide’

In using the term ‘urbicide’, the authors of Mostar ‘92-Urbicid noted both a kinship and a distinction between the violence brought to bear on the urban fabric of Bosnia, and genocide: the ‘practice of extermination of…ethnic groups’.20 On one hand, urbicide drew upon a lexical similarity with genocide in order to emphasise the scale and importance of the destruction that was occurring, whilst on the other, urbicide stressed that the destruction of urban fabric in Bosnia was an event that, whilst interrelated with genocide, was nonetheless distinctive and, therefore, deserving of treatment in its own right. In order to flesh out the lexicographic definition of urbicide already provided, it is worth examining both the kinship and differences between urbicide and genocide.

In drawing an analogy with genocide, the authors of Mostar ‘92 - Urbicid were noting a logic of violence at work in the destruction of buildings in Bosnia. When defining genocide in 1944, Raphael Lemkin noted that it was necessary to coin a new word for the violence perpetrated by the Nazi’s. Though there had been various acts of violence throughout history with which one might draw parallels in order to understand Nazi violence (Lemkin cites, amongst others, the example of the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC) it was necessary, argued Lemkin, to coin a new
term that took account of the systematic character of the Holocaust. 'Genocide', argued Lemkin, signified a 'coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.\textsuperscript{21}

And yet in using a separate term, the authors of \textit{Mostar '92 - Urbicid} were indicating that it was not sufficient to understand the destruction of urban fabric as an aspect of the genocide that was more commonly termed 'ethnic cleansing'.\textsuperscript{22} To subsume it in such a manner would essentially limit us to two possible ways of understanding the destruction of buildings: as either acts of symbolic destruction (destruction of the cultural symbols that underpin a national group); or acts of collateral damage attendant to the overall project of the elimination of a national group (things that were hit whilst driving out or killing a particular ethnic group). 'Urbicide' was intended to signify that there was, in the context of the 1992-5 Bosnian war, a 'coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction' of urban fabric: buildings, infrastructure, and monuments in particular. The use of 'urbicide' noted, however, that this coordinated plan, and the violence attendant to it, had a logic that was not subsidiary to genocide. As such, \textit{Mostar '92 - Urbicid} was a plea to observers of the Bosnian war to recognise the distinct logic of violence demonstrated by the phenomenon of the destruction of urban fabric, and buildings in particular.
The 'logic' of urbicide

In referring to a 'logic' of urbicide I am not arguing that urbicide is 'logical' in the sense of the necessary outcome of a particular set of circumstances or decisions. The notion that urbicide has a 'logic' that is not subsidiary to that of genocide is intended to indicate that urbicide is a conceptual term for a set of events that, taken together, amount to a 'coordinated plan of different actions'. The separation of 'logic' and 'logical' is significant in both sociological and political theory as it allows the identification of the co-ordinated combination of a set of elements in order to produce a given phenomenon whilst also recognising the contingency of such a co-ordination. That is, it recognises that this combination was neither inevitable, nor the product of a single will or intent. It is precisely in this regard that Bauman notes that the Holocaust is the contingent combination of a number of otherwise common and everyday elements. Bauman argues that the 'twisted road' to the Holocaust, the contingent combination of otherwise everyday elements, was 'neither conceived in a single vision of a mad monster, nor was a considered choice made at the start of the 'problem solving process' by the ideologically motivated leaders'. This is not to say that there was neither an intent to destroy the European Jews, nor criminal responsibility for that destruction. However it is to argue that one should not, to paraphrase Bauman, confuse the attribution of guilt with the analysis of causes. That is, one should not confuse the delineation of a specific, contingent articulation of elements which produced a specific, and violent, political formation with the attribution of this phenomenon to the perceived idiosyncrasies of its leaders. Arguing that the holocaust represents the mad vision of the Führer is, as Bauman notes, one way to deny the
complex relationship that inheres between such violent political formations and modernity. 25

In this sense we might say that the 'logic' of a political formation such as genocide or urbicide is akin to Deleuze and Guattari's notion of 'the concept'. The logic of genocide, or the logic of urbicide, is a delineation, after the fact, of the specific meaning of the contingent articulation of a set of elements. 'Concepts', as Deleuze and Guattari note, 'are connected to problems without which they would have no meaning and which can themselves only be isolated or understood as their solution emerges...[thus] concepts are...created as a function of problems which are thought to be badly understood or badly posed.' 26 Genocide exists as a concept to name the 'co-ordinated plan' for the destruction of national groups. The Holocaust (or Shoah) exists as a concept to name the destruction of the European Jews. In both cases these events comprise problems that are thought to be badly posed under the concept of, for example, the destruction of civil populations in war time. In both cases these concepts name the contingent articulation of certain elements into a specific political formation. The political formation of genocide is different from international war, or civil war. This is precisely why the definition of the violence in Bosnia was contested: because certain observers and participants did not feel that the events that were occurring could be adequately understood as manifestations of civil-war. The violence and destruction - in particular the manner in which it was carried out - suggested a different type of political formation, one that was not only exclusionary, but exterminatory.

'Concepts', argue Deleuze and Guattari have a certain 'consistency' or 'endoconsistency'. That is, concepts represent the specific conjunction of components
in such a manner that they are rendered inseparable insofar as the concept is concerned. The concept of genocide requires a certain set of interlocking components in order to be recognised as such. When a certain consistent combination of elements occurs, as it was argued to have done in the case of the violence against Bosnian Muslims or Rwandan Tutsis, the concept of genocide is recognised to be manifest. What is important here is the notion that ‘[c]omponents remain distinct, but something passes from one to the other’. Which is to say when ‘radical...anti-Semitism of the Nazi type; transformation of that anti-Semitism into the practical policy of a powerful, centralised state; that state being in command of a huge, efficient bureaucratic apparatus; states of emergency...which allowed the government and the bureaucracy it controlled to get away with things which could, possibly, face more serious obstacles in time of peace; and the non-interference, the passive acceptance of those things by the population at large’ come together, one has what can be recognised as genocide. In this combination, anti-Semitism is not simply an isolated event, but rather gives something to bureaucracy, which, in turn, takes something from the powerful state in order to become radical (that is exterminatory).

Those who argue that urbicide is deserving of attention in its own right argue along similar lines. Urbicide is, according to this perspective, the name of a problem that is inadequately understood as part of the logic, or concept, of genocide. Urbicide is the consistent, though contingent, combination of a number of elements such that together these elements generate a specific phenomenon with its own conceptual logic. The destruction of buildings happens in many contexts. However, it is argued that in the case of the destruction of buildings in the Bosnian war a contingent set of events were articulated together in a consistent manner that cannot be understood
under previously extant conceptual logics. That is, the widespread destruction of the urban fabric is distinct from the destruction of either strategically important or symbolic buildings or the collateral accidents attendant to war or genocide. The destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia suggests a 'co-ordinated plan', a consistent articulation of a number of elements: the destruction of all types of buildings; the destruction of the basis of urbanity; the eradication of shared spaces; and, importantly, the creation of new, homogeneous, communities as a consequence of this destruction.

However, noting a conceptual logic in the destruction of urban fabric in Bosnia is at best an analytic tool. Identifying the concept itself tells us little about the meaning of the particular conjunction of elements that the conceptual logic represents. And it is here that the kinship between urbicide and genocide is particularly productive. The meaning of the logic of genocide, the specific phenomenon that emerges out of the contingent articulation of a number of elements into a form recognisable under the concept of genocide, can be illuminated by reference to Lemkin's original attempt to understand Nazi occupation techniques. Lemkin argues from the outset that Nazi occupation techniques comprised a coordinated practice to destroy the occupied nations. Lemkin argues that this 'practice of extermination of national and ethnic groups' can be understood as consisting of two distinct phases. Firstly, the 'destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group' and secondly, 'imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor', an imposition that may be upon either 'the oppressed population that is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone'.

It is these two phases that provide the key to the meaning of the contingent articulation of elements that are recognisable as genocide. The events that comprise genocide entail both the destruction of a particular national or ethnic culture (this need
not be achieved through extermination since destruction of the conditions under which a culture can exist will be sufficient) and the imposition of another national or ethnic culture. It is precisely the manner in which genocide is directed at the destruction of a national group that defines the concept of genocide. Without this defining feature, manifest in the two phases of genocide, the various elements that combine to give the concept of genocide would be seen merely as a forced relocation or a bloody massacre. This defining feature led Lemkin to conclude that in genocide, violence 'is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group.'

The concept of 'genocide' entails an understanding of destruction in relation to that which is destroyed. It is implicit in our understanding of killing as part of the logic of genocide that we do not simply see the killing of each individual as a means to the end of extermination. In fact it is not extermination - however (in)complete this may be - which defines genocide. Rather, what we understand to be the meaning of 'genocide' is played out in each and every death, each and every time. Since genocide is enacted in each and every death it expresses a relation between what is destroyed and the meaning of destruction that is other than the simple death of the individual - that is why each death is an instance of genocide and not simple homicide. It is integral, therefore, to our understanding of the conceptual logic/consistency of 'genocide' that we recognise what 'it' is that is destroyed, and the meaning of the destruction. In genocide 'it' is a member of a national or ethnic group and the destruction has the meaning of the eradication of this group.
It is precisely here that the simultaneous kinship and difference between urbicide and genocide can be noted. In drawing an analogy between the destruction of urban fabric and the destruction of ethnic groups, the authors of *Mostar '92-Urbicide* noted that the destruction of urban fabric derived its meaning from the relationship between the destruction and what 'it' is that is destroyed. At the same time, they noted that what 'it' is that is destroyed is distinct from that destroyed in genocide. If we draw on the previous lexicographic definition of urbicide, it is possible to outline the relationship of destruction to that which is destroyed that gives urbicide its specific conceptual logic. Put simply, urbicide entails the destruction of buildings and urban fabric as elements of urbanity. Buildings are destroyed because they are the condition of possibility of urbanity. Urbicide is, therefore, the destruction of urbanity for its own sake. The logic of urbicide then is the destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity.

This destruction is, like, genocide a two phase affair. Firstly the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity are destroyed, followed by the imposition of homogeneity. The destruction of the conditions of heterogeneity is, as I have noted before, the destruction of the condition of possibility of the networks of identity and difference that constitute the political. Urbicide then is a fundamentally political matter since it represents the violent foreclosure of the possibility of the political. Such foreclosure is the exemplary totalitarian moment, a violent foreclosure of the heterogeneous political arena that precedes the determination of society according to one single figure. What an understanding of the meaning of urbicide will yield is an opening onto an inquiry into precisely what it is that constitutes this condition of possibility of heterogeneity that I have argued comprises what we understand as political existence.
At this point I want to attempt to demonstrate the above assertions concerning urbicide in the context of the 1992-95 Bosnian war. That is, I want to show how the destruction of buildings and other urban fabric should be understood as manifesting the conceptual logic of urbicide as I have defined it. It is possible to demonstrate this through the examination of three principle interpretations of the destruction of urban fabric. These three interpretations are not self-consciously defined as such. However, within the responses to the destruction of urban fabric in Bosnia, I have identified three common interpretative themes. These three interpretations can be defined as (a) strategic, (b) symbolic, and (c) metaphorical. That is, these interpretations understand urban destruction through notions of (a) military necessity, (b) the protection or loss of cultural heritage, and (c) the metaphor such destruction provides for political analysis.

This examination will, I hope, show that these three interpretations fail to grasp the meaning of the destruction of urban fabric precisely because they fail to see this destruction as the manifestation of urbicide. Which is to say, these interpretations do not understand the urban fabric of Bosnia as the condition of possibility of heterogeneity, and therefore do not see buildings as something that might be destroyed in and of themselves. Thus these interpretations cannot disclose to us what the urban fabric is such that its destruction could effect the destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity.
Interpretations of urbicide

Collateral damage and military necessity

Perhaps the most conventional interpretations of the devastation of the urban environment in Bosnia conceive of the destruction as either collateral damage or as the result of militarily necessary actions. 'Collateral damage', a term that was widely used in the 1990-91 Gulf War, refers to 'incidental casualties and...property damage' that results from military action. On the whole, collateral damage is viewed as an undesirable, and yet possibly unavoidable, consequence of military action. The various laws of war can be interpreted as requiring belligerents in a conflict to restrict all collateral damage to either accidental and unintended events, or to justify such damage according to the rule of proportionality: that the risk of incidental civilian loss of life or damage to civilian property must be in proportion to the military gain expected from such an action. This rule will, of course, mean that some collateral damage is always both sustained and acceptable in military action. Of principle importance in understanding the idea of collateral damage is that it is an unintended (or incidental) consequence of military action. Even where a military action is clearly seen to risk such destruction, in order for any resultant destruction to be classified as 'collateral damage' it must be assumed that a given military action, whilst risking damage, did not intend the resultant destruction.

The destruction of buildings in Bosnia could thus be seen as incidental to the military action undertaken in the 1992-95 war. According to such an interpretation, the bridges, mosques and churches, houses, public buildings and so on, would have
been unintentionally destroyed in the course of legitimate military actions. The simplest interpretation of the idea that urban destruction in Bosnia comprises collateral damage is that it is the consequence of munitions either missing their targets, or hitting other buildings on the way to their legitimate targets. A more complex interpretation might argue that the destruction of the urban environment was incidental to attempts to achieve certain military objectives. That is, given the nature of the combat in the Bosnian War (a large part of which was in urban environments), military action risked the incidental destruction of the urban fabric. Urban destruction could then be explained as the incidental consequence of such risks. This interpretation would depend upon the idea that the military actions in which such incidental damage occurred were seeking legitimate military gains and, whilst risking urban devastation, did not intend this to occur.

Such an idea introduces into the interpretation of urban destruction the idea of legitimate military action, or 'military necessity'. A narrow definition of 'military necessity' is found in the St Petersburg Declaration, which states that 'the only legitimate object which states should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military force of the enemy'. However, such a definition is distinctly problematic in the context of the 1992-95 Bosnian War. The principle problem is that this definition is framed in order to regulate inter-state violence. Whilst some observers and participants claim that the Bosnian war constituted an inter-state war (these claims rest upon the status of the Yugoslav National Army [JNA] and the part it took in the violence), the conflict was, on the whole, seen as an non-international armed conflict. This problem of definition is further compounded by the fact that such conflicts are not the simple 'winner-takes all' meeting of two armed forces. Non-
international armed conflict, or civil war, is motivated by political claims and aims, and thus the objective of armed violence may not be simply the surrender of the opposing force.

A broader definition of military necessity might be 'those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern laws and usages of war.' Military necessity might then be said to be those actions indispensable for achieving the ends of a war. Such a minimal definition can be used in the case of the 1992-95 Bosnian war. In respect of damage to the urban environment, it could be argued that certain buildings had to be destroyed in order to achieve certain military ends. The clearest case in which such an argument might apply is in relation to bridges.

Bridges are often destroyed in military conflict. Bridges are commonly taken to constitute a military (as opposed to civilian) object. A bridge, it is argued, comprises a link in communications, movement and logistics networks. In contemporary warfare such networks are perceived to constitute a legitimate object of military action. That is, in order to weaken the enemy, or achieve the objectives of war, it is legitimate to attack the logistical structure that supports an opponent's war effort. The destruction of a building that might only seem to have incidental military use, can, therefore, be justified as militarily necessary.

Such an argument was prominent during the NATO bombardment of Serbia in 1999. In April 1999, at the beginning of its military action against Serbia, NATO destroyed a number of bridges, including road and rail bridges across the Danube in both Novi Sad and Belgrade. Several observers questioned the logic behind the destruction of these key bridges on the basis that the bridges constituted civilian
objects designed for civilian infrastructural purposes (principally transport and trade) and were only incidentally used by the Serbian military. These observers argued that the bridges did not comprise legitimate targets since the impact of their destruction would fall disproportionately upon the civilian population. However, in reply to such questions at press briefings, Air Commodore Wilby, justified the destruction as militarily necessary, noting that

the targets we go against are military-related facilities...now...the highway bridges that we have been taking down recently. Of course they do interrupt the flow of civilian traffic and for that we are very sorry, but...[w]e are really having to press hard against the Serbian military and special police units. We know that taking those bridges down, whilst it causes some inconvenience to civilians, it is causing immense inconvenience to the units that we are trying to stop resupplying their forces down in...Kosovo with the ammunition, the fuel, and the supplies to keep up their activities.38

Later Wilby clarified this statement, saying:

every target we have struck has been one that has been considered to have great military significance to affect the Serbian military or the MUP [Serbian special police units]...bridges...have been selected because they are major lines of communication and...affect resupply of those troops...So, very firmly, I would say to you that all our targets have been justifiably military targets.39

The destruction of bridges and other buildings in Bosnia could, similarly, be justified according to the logic of military necessity. That is, the argument could be used that
the buildings destroyed represented elements in logistical networks, and, hence, militarily legitimate targets.

Neither of these interpretations seem very satisfactory, however, in the context of the devastation of the urban environment in the 1992-95 Bosnian war. Though they may offer superficial justification for the destruction of certain buildings they do not adequately account for the widespread destruction of urban fabric. The argument that this destruction comprises collateral damage sustained in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives can be easily refuted. For example, we could recall the testimony of the Bosnian Serb gunner interviewed by Kate Adie. As I noted in the Introduction, in an interview, the officer commanding the artillery that was firing towards the Holiday Inn in Sarajevo (where the press were staying) explained to Adie that they had intended to hit the National Museum behind the hotel.\textsuperscript{40} Here we have a clear example of military personnel rejecting the idea that the destruction of civilian buildings such as the National Museum is incidental to the achievement of military objectives. The gunner makes it clear that the National Museum constituted a target in its own right.

The idea that the destruction comprised collateral damages can be further problematised through the findings of the Information Reports on War Damage to the Cultural Heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina delivered to the Council of Europe Committee on Culture and Education by the Parliamentary Assembly Sub-Committee on the Architectural and Artistic Heritage. In respect of the destruction of the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, the fourth Information Report notes:

In view of the location of the Oriental Institute and the force of flame produced, it is fair to presuppose that the shelling was carried out to plan:

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the Institute was directly targeted. This is even more believable in view of
the fact that sources have provided details of how the invaders possessed
remarkably precise military maps, and it is well-known that on the
occasion of sorting through the Yugoslav Army material left in its
building in Sarajevo after it withdrew, maps were found which had
marked on them in precise detail all the targeted objectives in Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{41}

In relation to the destruction of the minarets of mosques in Bosnia, the first
\textit{Information Report} notes that ‘[i]t may have been inevitable that mosques in a
military “front” zone would be hit, but it is highly doubtful that a minaret can be
brought down with a single large calibre shell, which implies a certain amount of
deliberate targeting on these structures.’\textsuperscript{42} That the urban fabric of Bosnia was
deliberately and not incidentally targeted is confirmed by the conclusion of the fourth
\textit{Information Report} that ‘the small historic core of Mostar...was clearly targeted by
the heaviest guns available to the HVO.’\textsuperscript{43}

If the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia cannot be understood as
collateral damage, can it be seen as militarily necessary? This argument is even easier
to refute than that of collateral damage. For the destruction of all of these buildings to
have been militarily necessary, they would have had to have played some form of role
in the communications, transport, and logistics networks of the various armies in
Bosnia. There are instances in which such arguments may be credible. For example,
the destruction of the central post office in Sarajevo, or the modern road bridges over
the Neretva in Mostar, could be seen as attacks on legitimate military targets. The post
office, for example, housed the central telephone exchange for Sarajevo, and thus
comprised a vital element of Bosnian Army communications. In destroying it, the
Bosnian Serb Army could claim it was attacking an object of significant military potential to its adversary. Similarly, some of the bridges in Mostar could be seen as supply or transport routes for military purposes and thus destruction could be legitimised.

However, the destruction of urban fabric is more widespread than these key buildings. In Sarajevo for example, the Bosnian Serb Army shelled the city without any real regard for the military significance of buildings. Moreover, buildings of no military significance were regularly shelled deliberately. And the shelling covered a wide variety of buildings: housing, public institutions, cultural monuments, utility buildings, open spaces. The National Museum, Oriental Institute, National Library and various mosques provide only a few, well known, examples of such targeting. In *Just and Unjust Wars* Waltzer talks about strategy as 'a language of justification'. We could see military necessity in a similar light. Claims that the destruction of a target was militarily necessary are *post hoc* narratives that seek to justify the destruction. In cases such as Sarajevo's central post office, or the Neretva road bridges such narratives are convincing since they can align themselves with the commonly understood meanings of what constitutes a military object or a military objective. However, in the case of the destruction of the urban fabric in which so much damage was done to buildings that could serve no such purposes, such narratives do not really serve to justify or explain the destruction of the urban fabric.

The principal problems with analyses that treat the destruction of urban fabric as a contravention of the various rules/laws of war concerning military necessity and acceptable conduct are, therefore: a) that, in contradistinction to the idea that this destruction was militarily unnecessary, it should be evident that, when considered as a
whole, this destruction was both systematic and had a meaning of its own; and b) arguments that view this destruction as militarily unnecessary simply criminalise acts of destruction and, therefore, result in a total lack of explanation of the meaning of such destruction and what it discloses. In other words, it may appear that the widespread destruction of urban environments (such as occurred in Mostar or Sarajevo) might be satisfactorily analysed as cases of ‘wanton destruction of cites, towns or villages’ (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Statute, Article 3(b)). 45 That is, where the concept of military necessity obviously fails to account for instances of the systematic destruction of urbanity the notion of ‘wanton destruction’ might be satisfactorily used in its place.

However, this notion of ‘wanton destruction’ is problematic in two significant ways. Firstly it rests on an idea of excess that is intimately linked to notions of military necessity. ‘Wanton destruction’ circumscribes all those events that escape being classified as legitimate military actions. Moreover, the notion that such destruction is ‘wanton’ implies a certain irrationality and bloodlust that suggests the destruction occurred for idiosyncratic reasons localisable to a potential indictee (person or group). Secondly, since the destruction is taken to be the wanton action of a person or group it is seen as a deviation from a norm of behaviour implicit in the various codifications of Rules of War and Crimes against Humanity. As such, ‘wanton destruction’ is reduced to the status of immorality, irrationality or evil. Thus, in seeing the destruction of urban environments as instances of ‘wanton destruction’ the targeting of urban fabric is seen merely as a criminal deviation from the norm. 46 In this way such accounts resist the urgent need to inquire into the meaning of such destruction, refusing to see such destruction as following another rationale or logic to
that of the putative norm of protecting civilians and civilian property during events of armed conflict.

To put it another way (and to borrow from Arendt), whereas accounts that take the notion of 'wanton destruction' to satisfactorily explain instances of urban destruction take these events as exceptions to the norm we should perhaps be considering them as instances in conformity with a norm (or logic) of their own. What logic, or rationale do such acts of 'wanton' destruction disclose? My argument would be that in order to pursue this question 'wanton destruction' would be more productively understood as urbicide.

*From ethnic cleansing to cultural cleansing*

The second of the three interpretations of the destruction of urban fabric that I want to examine understands urban destruction as the destruction of symbolic buildings. This understanding arises in relation to the destruction of the cultural heritage of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Cultural heritage is protected under the 1956 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. This convention offers protection for 'moveable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people', a definition taken to include buildings such as museums, libraries and religious buildings as well as monuments or public buildings that are of specific cultural significance. During the drafting of this convention there was some disagreement concerning the protection of religious buildings. There was concern that the Convention would afford protection to all religious buildings that were not used for military purposes. Some parties were keen to
exclude this possibility since it may include buildings that were of little cultural value, whilst other parties were keen to afford protection to all such buildings since they viewed religion as a principle aspect of culture itself.\textsuperscript{49} I am not concerned with the specific extent of protection afforded to religious buildings since this is a matter of legal interpretation. Rather, I am interested in the logic that has been attributed to the destruction of cultural heritage in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Indeed the prevailing interpretation of the Convention seems to indicate that all religious buildings can be afforded protection - although in practice it is those that have a notable position in the heritage of a culture (i.e., those of specific architectural or artistic merit, those of specific significance for a given religion, and those that are especially ancient) that are thought most deserving of protection.\textsuperscript{50}

During the 1992-95 Bosnian war many buildings that would fall under the protection of the Hague Convention were destroyed. The shelling of the National Museum, National Library and Oriental Institute in Sarajevo and the dynamiting of the Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka, to name just four examples, clearly exemplify cases in which cultural heritage that would receive protection under the Hague Convention was deliberately destroyed. The destruction of the Stari Most can also be taken to constitute an instance of the destruction of cultural heritage since the Stari Most has been taken to comprise an ‘immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Interpretations of the widespread destruction of cultural heritage have sought to understand what the buildings represented such that they would become military targets. In attempting to find the logic behind the destruction of cultural property these analyses have tried to place the destruction within the wider context of the 1992-95
Bosnian War. As such they have commonly taken the destruction of buildings to comprise a means for fulfilling certain war aims. That is, it has been proposed that the cultural property represented something that the overall war aims sought to eradicate. Such an analysis shifts the focus of attention towards the overall war aims of the parties responsible for destroying cultural property.

Accounts of the destruction of cultural heritage invariably see it as an element of ethnic cleansing. Ethnic cleansing can be defined as the attempt to remake ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina as a series of small, pure ethnic states’. Insofar as ethnic cleansing is distinct from genocide, it comprises the ethnic homogenisation of territory through displacement or killing. The term was coined to indicate the manner in which the break-up of the former Yugoslavia was characterised by systematic ethnic purification of territory that was militarily gained. Although some interpretations of this term see it as an incidental attribute of territorial gains it is commonly recognised that the destruction or displacement of ethnic populations comprised a military objective in itself. That is, the taking of territory was not sufficient in itself to constitute a war aim, rather the homogenisation of that territory was an integral aspect of the military objectives. This means that the destruction of, for example, the population of Srebrenica in July 1995 was not incidental to the territorial gains of the Bosnian Serb Army. Rather the destruction and displacement of this population was a war aim for the Bosnian Serb Army. Insofar as ethnic populations are, therefore, targeted because of their ethnicity, it is difficult to separate ethnic cleansing from genocide. However ‘ethnic cleansing’ was used to note that ethnicity is the factor that determines the target of military action rather than nationality (since it was widely held that there was no such thing as Bosnian nationality).
Ethnic cleansing as practised in Bosnia is a violent erasure of ethnic heterogeneity and the imposition of homogeneity in a given territory. It is precisely through seeing this violent erasure as the overall war aim (of the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats in particular) that the destruction of cultural heritage has been interpreted. The destruction of buildings that comprise cultural heritage constitutes, it is argued, an integral element of the war aims. That is, these buildings are destroyed because they represent what must be destroyed in order to achieve the aim of the erasure of, and thus purity of, ethnic identity on a particular territory. In order to note the specific targeting of buildings in the 1992-95 Bosnian War, the Council of Europe introduced the distinction between 'ethnic cleansing', or the removal/erasure of ethnic populations, and 'cultural cleansing', or the erasure of heterogeneous cultural artefacts. However, this distinction, though indicating the extent of damage to cultural heritage, is something of a distraction since, as I hope to show, interpretations of the violence against buildings such as museums, libraries and mosques argue that this destruction is integral to the attempt to create ethnic purity/homogeneity.

Interpretations of the destruction of cultural heritage have thus seen this destruction as a means to the achievement of the objective of ethnic/cultural homogeneity. These interpretations argue that certain buildings are destroyed because they represent ethnic/cultural heterogeneity. Such interpretations have been offered in the case of the destruction of the Stari Most. HVO leader Mate Boban’s remark that '[i]t is not enough to cleanse Mostar of the Muslims, the relics must also be destroyed' is cited by Riedlmayer in support of the idea that the Stari Most was destroyed because it represented the ethnic heterogeneity of the community of Mostar. According to this interpretation the destruction of the bridge can be understood if one
understands the actions of the HVO according to the logic of the creation of the ethnically pure statelet of Herceg-Bosna.

Andras Riedlmayer’s work to draw attention to the destruction of the cultural heritage of Bosnia-Herzegovina provides a particularly cogent example of such an interpretation. Riedlmayer argues that although our attention focuses on the people of Bosnia ‘we should also take a look at the rubble.’ This rubble, he argues, ‘signifies more than the ordinary atrocities of war...Rubble in Bosnia and Hercegovina signifies nationalist extremists hard at work to eliminate not only the human beings and living cities, but also the memory of the past.’\textsuperscript{57} This elimination of the memory of the past, argues Riedlmayer, is an integral element of the ethnic cleansing that characterised the Bosnian war. Riedlmayer argues that though ‘[w]e are...told that “ancient hatreds” are what fuel the destruction...this is not true’. That this is not the case is precisely what the buildings that are destroyed attest to. The museums, libraries, mosques, churches and monuments ‘speak eloquently of centuries of pluralism...in Bosnia. It is this evidence of a successfully shared past that the nationalists seek to destroy.’\textsuperscript{58} It is the nature of the nationalist project, the project that gave birth to ethnic cleansing, that drives this destruction.

Ethnic cleansing is an integral part of the violent nationalism that characterised Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat attempts to carve out statelets in Bosnia. This nationalism seeks to naturalise the idea that the so-called ‘ethnic’ groups in Bosnia are fated to live separate existences. The myth of ‘ancient hatreds’ installs the idea that ethnic groups were always distinct and in antagonistic relationships. Nationalist ideas of separation and ethnic purity are the logical outcome of the acceptance of this idea. However, such ideas are simply the myths on which the nationalist edifice is built.
Indeed Bosnia has a long history of pluralism which exhibits a high degree of indistinction (such as inter-marriage) and co-existence between these supposedly distinct and incompatible ethnic groups. It is precisely the built environment that represents this pluralism. The urban environment in cities such as Sarajevo and Mostar are testament to the pluralist character of Bosnia. The co-existence of Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and vernacular buildings is a constant reminder that the nationalist project of ethnic separateness is a present day fiction belied by the past. Thus, to paraphrase Riedlmayer, nationalists sought to destroy evidence of a successfully shared past in order to legitimise a contemporary goal of ethnic separateness. The nationalists sought to naturalise the idea of ethnic separateness by propagating the myth of historical antagonism and difference between ethnic groups. However, ‘before inventing a new past [characterised by the fictional “ethnic hatreds”] the old must be erased’.

The destruction of the buildings that comprise the cultural heritage of Bosnia is thus understood as an integral element of the logic of nationalism: a means to achieve the war aim of ethnic separateness. In one sense this account gets closer to the theme of the destruction of the shared spaces of Bosnia-Herzegovina than the previous account of destruction as the result of either collateral damage or military necessity. Indeed this account understands the destruction of certain buildings as part of the logic of nationalism that has at its heart the destruction of the conditions of possibility of pluralism, key among which is the evidence of co-existence provided by the built environment of Bosnia.

However, this account suffers from its focus upon the symbolic buildings, or the cultural heritage of Bosnia. In other words it focuses upon the buildings whose
loss is judged to be a cultural loss. Analysing the destruction of urban environments on the basis of such examples is, therefore, problematic precisely because the destruction of buildings that are not regarded as being part of the heritage of a distinctive culture is overlooked. Indeed, it is partly the concern that analyses which focus on the destruction of cultural heritage are exclusionary in this manner that motivates the definition of the destruction of the urban environment as 'urbicide'.

Analyses that focus on the destruction of cultural heritage fail to recognise that the act of designating buildings/urban environments as worthy of cultural heritage status is necessarily exclusionary. There exist two understandings on the basis of which such designation can be made, one more narrow and formal than the other. Firstly, buildings or urban environments can be designated as comprising the physical heritage of a particular culture (be that a national/ethnic culture or the more generic culture of humanity) by either national governments and/or international governmental organisations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). These procedures produce the so-called 'heritage lists' that comprise a canonical designation of the cultural heritage of both nations and, in the case of UNESCO, humanity. Secondly, there is a more generic understanding of what comprises cultural heritage that might extend, in principle, to buildings beyond the narrow scope of the 'heritage lists' compiled by national governments and international governmental organisations. It is precisely this generic understanding of what constitutes cultural heritage that was deployed in respect of the destruction of urban fabric during the 1992-95 Bosnian war. Indeed most of the buildings that were destroyed were not listed by official organs of either national governments or international governmental organisations.
It was thus according to a generic notion of what comprised cultural heritage that observers and participants in the 1992-95 war appealed for the protection of buildings taken to represent the cultural heritage of Bosnia from the widespread destruction that was occurring. These appeals were intended to point out the violations of the extant laws of war that were occurring in Bosnia and draw attention to the assault on culturally significant buildings that may have otherwise been overlooked given that most observers of, and participants in, the conflict were, at the time, predominantly concerned with the widespread human rights abuses (and purported genocide) that were taking place. This generic understanding comprises a more general concept of which buildings are representative of the achievements or character of a culture (invariably, however, this comprises religious buildings, monuments, cultural institutions and striking examples of indigenous architecture).

However, the status of 'cultural heritage' is bestowed only upon those buildings/monuments that are taken to either exemplify the achievements of, or typify the development and existence of, a given culture. Thus, as I noted above, during negotiation of the 1954 Hague Convention some of the parties resisted attempts to include all houses of worship in the scope of the treaty arguing (successfully) that it was only exemplary religious buildings that deserved the status of cultural heritage (according to this logic, ancient mosques such as the Ferhadija in Banja Luka are defined as cultural heritage, whilst more modern, and perhaps more modest, mosques are not).64

Moreover, in endorsing either (inter)governmental, or generic, understandings of what constitutes the heritage of a distinctive culture, analyses that concentrate on the destruction of cultural heritage imply that those buildings not defined as such are
in some way dispensable for that culture. Thus the destruction of houses, office blocks, multi-storey car parks, and supermarkets is excluded from analyses of urban destruction that are focused on the violation of the laws of protection of cultural property that comprised one element of the devastation of the urban environment in the 1992-95 Bosnian war. The destruction of buildings not designated as cultural heritage is thus deemed to be the result of either poor targeting, military expediency, or excessive force. Either way, this destruction is not of analytical consequence (it comprises merely the general rubble of war and can be explained as the result of either expediency or excess).

On the whole this means that the buildings for which concern is shown are those that were striking examples of a particular cultural influence upon the pluralist history of Bosnia. Ancient mosques, grand National Library buildings, and 400 year-old bridges are the subject of this account as it is these that are the symbolic reminders of the pluralist culture of Bosnia. According to this account, these buildings were deliberately targeted as a way of achieving the war aims of nationalist political projects. However, the destruction of the urban environment is more widespread than these symbolic buildings. Indeed it encompasses buildings that have no distinctive cultural value, or are of indistinct cultural provenance (the bland modernism of the ‘Unis Co.’ tower blocks in Sarajevo [see Appendix 1, figure 4-1] or the hotels destroyed in Mostar serve as examples). These buildings could not really be said to represent the pluralist heritage of Bosnia. And thus the interpretation of urban destruction as an attack on cultural heritage provides only a partial (though striking) account of the destruction of the urban environment in Bosnia. That is, urbicide comprises a more widespread phenomenon than the destruction of cultural heritage.
and, hence, understandings of the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia will need to substantially elaborate upon this interpretation and extend its narrow focus upon examples of cultural heritage.

*Balkanisation, balkanism, ethnicity and despair*

I have referred to the third and final interpretation of urban destruction that I want to examine as a metaphoric understanding. That is to say, this interpretation of the destruction of the urban environment treats violence against buildings such as the Stari Most as a metaphor for, or symbolic instanciation of, certain political concepts deployed to understand the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. This understanding of urban destruction thus treats the assault on the Stari Most as an exemplary sign of the ideas and values at stake in the 1992-95 Bosnian war. Those who interpret the destruction of cultural heritage as an element of ethnic cleansing see buildings as the material symbols of culture, the concrete presence of a given culture and, thus, given the plurality of heritage in Bosnia, testament to the pluralism of Bosnian culture. However, the metaphoric interpretation (which understands the destruction as a sign of the concepts at stake in the war), do not treat the ruins in themselves, as material symbols of a culture, but, rather, as signs evocative of ideas and values (concepts). This interpretation is, therefore, a *semiotic* understanding that treats buildings as a sign that refers to a concept.68

The Stari Most provides an exemplary instance of such a semiotic understanding of the destruction of the urban environment in Bosnia. As a sign, the collapsing bridge embedded itself in the political imaginaries of those who observed,
participated in, or fell victim to the 1992-95 war. This sign gave graphic representation to the concepts and values that were taken to be at stake in the Bosnian war. Insofar as this event became a sign that provided a convenient shorthand that summarised the tortuous complexities of the conflict, it had profound effects upon understandings of, participation and intervention in, and attempts to negotiate a conclusion to, the war. On the one hand the rubble of the Stari Most was a sign with assumed connotation that could be substituted for a comprehensive understanding of the conflict. On the other hand, this sign precipitated, solidified, or gave expression to, certain conceptual formations that framed the horizons of the political imaginaries of both participants and observers. As such then, this sign, and its interpretation, influenced courses of action taken by those whose political imaginaries it shaped.

As a sign the ruined Stari Most (and the rubble of Bosnia in general) is associated with two specific concepts. Firstly, for observers of the conflict, the destruction of the Stari Most signified in graphic fashion the balkanisation of Bosnia. According to James Der Derian, '[b]alkanisation is generally understood to be the break up of larger political units into smaller, mutually hostile states which are exploited or manipulated by more powerful neighbours.' The destruction of the Stari Most by the HVO gave such an idea exemplary form. That is, the destruction of the last remaining bridge between the two halves of Mostar was performed by a group manipulated by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and effectively sealed the creation of two mutually hostile entities (east and west Mostar). Through such signs, the concept of 'balkanisation' framed the political imaginaries of those that observed, or intervened in, the Bosnian war. However, balkanisation was not simply a technical term for the creation of mutually hostile states, but a more general concept that
referred to the violent fragmentation of territory into ever smaller exclusive communities. This concept found its exemplary signifier in the rubble of Bosnia, the ever proliferating signs of fault lines in a hitherto pluralist community. This elevation of the notion of balkanisation to the position of horizon of understanding, required the concept to be 'transvalued' from a simple term referring to geopolitical machination to a motif capturing the concept of an inexorable, violent fragmentation of political landscapes. Mike Davis, for example, emphasises precisely this motif of violent fragmentation that dominates the concept of 'balkanisation'. In his discussion of the 'power lines' that shape the urban environment in Los Angeles, Davis refers to 'balkanised' cities such as Chicago or Boston. In this manner the specificity of 'balkanisation' to a correlate cartographic/geographic entity (i.e., the 'Balkan' Peninsula) has evaporated. Rather the term connotes simply violent political and social fragmentation.

The division of Bosnia into ever smaller, homogenous ethnic territories was clearly represented in the gulf opened up between the two banks of the Neretva by the destruction of the Stari Most. However, the balkanisation that this sign represented had an additional stratum of meaning. The destruction of the elegant Ottoman bridge not only signified the violent social and political fragmentation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also the truly 'Balkan' character of the violence by which this fragmentation was being achieved. That is, this destruction confirmed the stereotypes that observers held of those who were executing this balkanisation. These stereotypes, are best referred to, in keeping with the conceptual terrain of balkanisation, as 'balkanist'. 'Balkanism' can be seen as a 'variation on orientalism'. Orientalism, as Bakić-Hayden and Hayden note, 'refers to pervasive patterns of representation of
cultures and societies that privilege a self-confidently "progressive", "modern" and "rational" Europe over the putatively "stagnant", "backward", "traditional" and "mystical" societies of the Orient. Bakić-Hayden and Hayden demonstrate 'an orientalist framework of analysis, primarily by Yugoslavs from the north and west parts of the country [Slovenia and Croatia], and by some foreign observers. That is, Slovenes, Croats and foreign observers operated with a 'political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, The West "us") and the strange (the Orient, the East, "them"). Slovene, Croat and foreign political imaginaries assume their naturally progressive, modern, and European nature, whilst also assuming the backward nature of those in the eastern and southern parts of the former Yugoslavia. This orientalism manifests itself in, for example, the hierarchical division of the country according to religion. Croats and Slovenes regard Catholicism as naturally more rational and modern than Orthodox Christianity or Islam. As such this leads to the ascription of further characteristics on the basis of this hierarchy: Serbs are more warlike, Albanians are more traditional (backward), whilst Croats are more deserving of European recognition since they are, after all, Catholics.

In *Imagining the Balkans*, Maria Todorova develops this 'variation on orientalism' into the fully fledged concept of 'balkanism'. Todorova notes that 'orientalism', as originally defined by Said, refers to a representational regime that is intimately connected to colonial structures of domination. Orientalism is a discourse that attempts to define, as an element of colonial domination, a geographical region that does not exist as a naturally pregiven entity. In contrast to this idea, Todorova notes that the Balkan peninsula is both a fairly well defined geographic location and,
though the subject of imperialism, never a truly colonised region. As such then the representational regime concerning the Balkans is not, according to Todorova, an orientalist discourse that circumscribes and classifies a colonial other, but rather a discourse that essentialises the characteristics of a region that forms the ambiguous edge of occidental Europe.

Balkanism views the Balkans as a transitional bridge between occident and orient. The transition that can be observed in the Balkans is not only spatial, but evolutionary: the inhabitants of the Balkans are taken to be in the process of evolving into occidental Europeans. The Balkans are thus taken to be a reversion to a pre-modern stage of civility. Furthermore, balkanist stereotypes view the Balkans as a zone of flux (since all transition involves instability). Balkanism attributes an essential character to the Balkan peninsula that is the logical correlate of balkanisation. The reversion of civility to medieval standards coupled with the state of instability given by the transitional nature of the region entails perpetual and violent struggle, even conditions of mutual hostility and barbarity. Moreover, it is not only western observers that deploy balkanist stereotypes. Balkanism is rife within the Balkans, as each community attempts to characterise its neighbour as in some way less civilised, and themselves as in some sense more European (or Slavic) than Balkan. Thus, as balkanisation proceeds to fragment states into ever smaller entities, so balkanism fragments the cultural landscape into ever more mutually hostile groups who draw conceptual distinctions between themselves.

The fragmentation of the political landscape thus proceeds according to ideas of civility. Wherever the difference between groups is promoted, it is on the basis of being more or less civilised. The interpretation of the destruction of the Stari Most by
some observers of the conflict comprises a classic example of balkanism. The Stari Most was taken to be an exemplary instance of cultural heritage: a striking example of Bosnian culture and part of the universal heritage of humankind. The elevation of this bridge to the status of a monumental exemplar of the cultural heritage of variously, Yugoslavia, Bosnia, the Ottoman Empire, Europe and humanity, served to suggest that visiting, seeing, and conserving this bridge was the duty of those who held the value of human cultural endeavours in high regard. And so the destruction of this exemplar of cultural heritage was, invariably decried as an act of barbarity, savagery, or philistinism. Those who destroyed this bridge, it was argued could not hold human cultural achievement in very high regard. Of course, cultural achievement is only attained over time, as is regard for the artefacts this achievement leaves behind. One has to develop a cultural sensibility, it is the mark of a culture that has attained a degree of sophistication, a culture that has left behind its immature and barbaric past. What the HVO had done was taken to reveal a total lack of comprehension of the value of the artefacts produced by a culture, a comprehension that can only come through a sort of human maturity. The HVO, thus, could only be savages.

Despite being meant as a harsh condemnation of the action of the HVO, a reprimand meant to make the HVO stop and see the value of what was being destroyed, the image of the fallen bridge came to represent the savagery and barbarity of the Bosnian war: the failure of (European) civilisation to extend into the Balkans. This idea framed the political imagination of those observing the conflict. Talk of ‘ancient animosities’ was given new life by this supposed sign of ferocious barbarity. Leaders of western, ‘civilised’ nations threw their hands up in despair: how can we help when these people don’t share even the basic values of civilisation, they
reasoned, we should leave them to fight this conflict out amongst themselves. The Stari Most, as a signifier of the barbarism of the Bosnian Croats (and by extension all Croats and even all Bosnians) thus gave the balkanism of western observers a form with which to associate such concepts.

The second concept which the destruction of the Stari Most is taken to signify is that of the concept of the ‘bridging’ of supposedly distinct ethnic groups. The idea that Bosnia was ‘a bridge’, spanning and linking otherwise foreign cultures captured the political imagination of observers of, and participants in, the conflict. Indeed, the gulf that the collapse of the Stari Most opened up between the left and right banks of the Neretva was for many observers the ideal metaphor to express the prevalent understanding of the Bosnian war as an ‘ethnic’ conflict. The collapse of the bridge neatly summed up the widespread idea that Yugoslavia had been an artificial creation that had forced pre-existent national groups to live side by side. Without the firm hand of Tito it was assumed that these national groups would naturally separate out and, in places where this was not possible, there would be conflict. The crumbling bridge symbolised the death of Tito’s ideal, the collapse of the remnants of a forced co-existence between the three naturally separate ethnic groups that occupied the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina: ‘Serbs’, ‘Croats’ and ‘Muslims’. The rubble left in the river between the banks captured the sense that nothing but destruction would come out of attempts to create a so-called ‘multi-ethnic’ Bosnia.

This motif of bridging, signified by the ruined Stari Most before, during, and after its destruction, thus framed the political imaginaries of both participants and observers in the conflict. For the HVO, the link to Muslim east Mostar provided by the Stari Most threatened the attempt to establish the ‘ethnically pure’ Bosnian Croat
statelet of ‘Herceg-Bosna’. With their political horizon framed by the notion that ethno-national identities were the natural order of things - a natural order which was artificially suppressed by the bridging accomplished under Tito’s programme of ‘brotherhood and unity’ - it was logical for the HVO to destroy that which represented such bridging. The bridge was the link that had artificially bound the otherwise separate ethnic groups in Mostar together. To destroy the bridge was to re-establish the natural separateness of Croatian, Catholic western Bosnia from Muslim, Turkic eastern Bosnia. With their political horizons shaped by the logic of natural primordial ethnicities that was the logical underside of the metaphor provided by the image of the bridge, the HVO set about destroying that which threatened the purity of their ‘homeland’.

In contradistinction to the vision of the HVO, the bridge provided a sign of hope for those who worked to resolve the conflict or to re-build Bosnia in the wake of Dayton. The destruction of the bridge, however, turned this sign of hope into one of despair. Bridge building has been a common theme in the rhetoric of diplomacy for a considerable time. References to the bridging of differences, or to building bridges that cross divides that separate cultures, nations, or ideologies litter the history of attempts to reconcile both global and local divisions. For example, on the occasion of being awarded the 1996 International Democracy Award, chair of the presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic remarked that ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country - a bridge - in which two worlds meet three cultures and four religions. That is why the issue of Bosnia is, here and now, the paramount question of democracy.’

Ironically (or perhaps tragically), the logic by which the bridge was elevated to this mythical status in the rhetoric of post-Dayton multi-ethnic democracy had common
roots with, and shared the same political imaginary as, the HVO. This seemingly conciliatory metaphor rests on the assumption that there are indeed naturally existing and distinct ethnic groups such as ‘Croat’ and ‘Muslim’ who would naturally occupy distinct territories, the gaps between which would, of course, need bridging. This logic can also be seen to frame the political imaginaries of many of the agencies charged with the task of rebuilding Bosnia after the signing of the Dayton Agreement. The idea that the creation of a multi-ethnic polity required establishing links between distinct ethnic groups was prevalent in the rhetoric of bridge building employed by, amongst others, the European Administration of Mostar (EUAM). The end result is that the rubble of Bosnia became a sign of the despair that these agencies expressed regarding the possibility of creating a multi-ethnic community. Of course, part of the problem is that the sign itself, in the way that it constitutes the idea that ethnic communities are naturally occurring separate entities that need artificially linking, leads to the pessimistic conclusion that such artifice is impossible (a conclusion that the HVO would heartily endorse).

The problem with this interpretation of the rubble of Bosnia is that the destruction itself is not treated as an event worthy of attention in its own right. Rather the rubble is taken, appropriated we might say, as a sign connotative of a more general concept. I am not trying to revive a spurious distinction between the real and the sign at this point. Rather, I am trying to note that whilst urbicide may serve as the sign for several concepts this does not get us any closer to understanding the meaning of the destruction of urban fabric. To take an analogy, genocide can be taken as a sign of barbarity, and yet this obscures the question of what is occurring in the event of genocide. Which is to say, the concept drains the sign of its own specificity. If one
sees the Holocaust as a sign of German barbarity, the destruction of the Jews is not taken as something important in its own right, but rather the signifier of something else. This is, I believe precisely the point that Bauman makes when he notes that the exercise in focusing on the Germanness [or the special barbarity of the Germans] of the crime [the Holocaust]...is simultaneously an exercise in exonerating everyone else, and particularly everything else...[and] results not only in the moral comfort of self-exculpation, but also in the dire threat of moral and political disarmament. 86

In a similar manner, accepting the idea that the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia is simply the sign of some sort of barbarism, or the working out of the linkages between naturally separate ethnic communities, the specificity of the destruction itself is ignored. This results in ‘moral and political disarmament’ since it means that the question is not ‘what does the destruction of the shared spaces of Bosnia disclose about the fundamentally political nature of our existence’, but rather ‘how can these aberrant concepts, signified by this destruction, be reversed’.

It is thus my argument, following Bauman’s, that this interpretation of the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia comprises a valuation of the event that is substituted for the far more urgent task of the analysis of the structure and meaning of the event itself. Which is to say that the destruction of shared space may become the sign that frames certain political imaginaries in relation to this war. However, we deny ourselves crucial political possibilities if we simply accept those significatory stories since we accept that this destruction is interesting only insofar as it connotes savagery or attempts to stitch communities back together. We must ask instead what is destroyed when the urban environment is destroyed, and what this reveals about the
political entailments of urbanity. In rather unfashionable terms, one could say that the question is not what the destruction signifies, but what the urban fabric is and what its destruction discloses.

**Urbicide restated**

Having reviewed three common interpretations of the destruction of urban fabric in Bosnia it is possible to restate the necessity of approaching the logics of such destruction through the concept of "urbicide". It is precisely the partial and flawed nature of these interpretations that suggests that the destruction of urban fabric in Bosnia should be treated as a conceptual problematic in its own right. Thus the fact that this destruction cannot be treated as collateral damage (since it is seen to be the outcome of deliberate targeting strategies) demonstrates that we should view the destruction of buildings as an event in its own right rather than an incidental outcome of war. This leads us to ask why urban environments are destroyed. The proposition that they are destroyed out of military necessity is shown to be wanting since the destruction is too widespread and violates the accepted principles of military necessity. Attention then turns to understanding the destruction by understanding what is being destroyed. That is, it is argued that if we can show what is destroyed when buildings are destroyed we can say what the destruction means.

Those that interpret the destruction of buildings in Bosnia as an element of ethnic cleansing begin to approach the question of what it is that is destroyed in urban devastation. This account shows that certain buildings may be destroyed because they are the material manifestation of a given culture, and, in the context of the urban
environment of Bosnia, testament to an ethos of pluralism that must be denied by ethno-nationalist political projects. That is, elements of the urban fabric are destroyed because they manifest a pluralist heritage that must be destroyed in order to naturalise the mythology of mutual hatred on which the ethno-nationalist edifice is constructed. But this only accounts for the instances in which buildings that are recognisable as the manifestation of a given culture are destroyed. It does not account for the scale of the destruction or the targeting of buildings that are not recognisable as such symbols of culture (or are the heritage of non-ethnic cultures). Thus it represents only a partial account of what the urban fabric is and what its destruction means. It should be noted, of course, that the political entailments of this argument do point in the direction that I wish to go since this account intends to point out that the destruction of elements of the urban fabric is aimed at the shared nature of the urban environment. Those that are concerned with the destruction of cultural heritage are thus concerned to point out that the violence aimed against certain symbolic buildings is intended to deny the shared, or heterogeneous, character of urban space in Bosnia. However, this account only recognises certain buildings as evidence of this shared character and thus cannot comprise a full account of urban destruction.

Finally the notion that the destruction is a signifier of the nature of the 1992-95 Bosnian war brings us back to the question of what it is that is destroyed in the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia. That is, these accounts drain the actual destruction of any meaning, displacing this meaning onto the concepts that the destruction is taken to signify. As such this is a neat side-stepping of the issue of what it is that is destroyed in this widespread destruction. Moreover, the full scale and nature of the destruction is rarely grasped by these accounts since they take iconic
instances as exemplary signifiers. It is something of a separate endeavour to ask in what ways the destruction of the urban environment in Bosnia has been appropriated as a sign in the political imaginaries of observers, participants and victims of the war. In place of this question I want to ask, before this destruction is emptied of specificity and taken as an illustration of a general concept, what is the urban environment and what is the meaning of its destruction.

Thus we are brought back to the concept of ‘urbicide’. As I argued before in my lexicographic delineation of urbicide, this concept is intended to turn our attention to the widespread destruction of the urban environment. Urbicide entails the notion that the destruction is meaningful only in relation to that which is destroyed. To paraphrase Lemkin, urbicide is a coordinated set of different actions aimed at destroying the urban environment. This destruction has the aim of annihilating the urban environment itself. Moreover, urbicide targets buildings (as those things that constitute urbanity), not in their individual capacity, but as elements of urbanity. Thus it is necessary to ask what the urban environment is and what its destruction discloses. It has been my argument previously that the urban environment is the basis for urbanity. Moreover, I have argued that urbanity is the condition of possibility of heterogeneity. As the basis of urbanity the urban environment is thus constitutive of shared, or heterogeneous spaces. It is thus this spatiality that is at stake in the destruction of the urban environment. Moreover, destruction of the urban environment discloses the fundamentally political nature of this spatiality and its role as the condition of possibility of the networks of identity\difference that are the basis of politics. In order to demonstrate these contentions, however, it is necessary to frame the problematic posed by urbicide in more specific terms.

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Framing the problematic

Insofar as my argument is concerned with the destruction of the urban environment in the 1992-95 Bosnian war, it is an argument about the logic of urbicide. Buildings are destroyed in urbicide because they are the constitutive conditions of possibility of urbanity. Moreover, if I am correct they are destroyed insofar as they are the conditions of possibility of the heterogeneity that is the characteristic feature of urbanity. Thus buildings are destroyed because they comprise that which is the basis of the heterogeneity of urbanity. This destruction is not directed at buildings in their individual capacities (as strategic targets, symbolic heritage, or as signs of political-sociological concepts) but as the constitutive elements of the heterogeneity that characterises urbanity. I have contended that buildings comprise such a condition of possibility insofar as they are constitutive of shared spaces.

My argument, therefore, will comprise an enquiry into precisely the manner in which buildings are constitutive of the shared spaces, and, hence, heterogeneity, that comprise the conditions of possibility of urbanity. Furthermore, insofar as I am able to provide an account of the manner in which buildings are constitutive of heterogeneity (urbanity) it is necessary to ask what the meaning of their destruction is. That is to say, in destroying buildings what is lost, and what is achieved. Thus there are two questions which will, following from my exegesis of the concept of urbicide, guide my argument. First, I will examine the manner in which buildings (the target of urbicide) are constitutive of the heterogeneity that characterises urbicide. This examination is an enquiry into the spatialities constituted by buildings. Secondly, I
will elaborate upon what I will refer to as the ‘stakes of urbicide’: what is lost and what is accomplished in the destruction of buildings.

That such an enquiry is both relevant and necessary can be seen in the way in which there appears to be an "unquestioned consensus" as to the nature of buildings and their role in socio-political formations that prevents questions such as those above from being posed. The three interpretations of urban destruction outlined above fail to understand the heart of the phenomenon of urbicide. This failure can be attributed to the fact that these interpretations do not treat buildings as constitutive elements of urbanity but as something else: strategic targets; symbolic heritage; or signs of political-sociological concepts. In this sense, these interpretations accept that buildings have a specific role without questioning exactly what place they have in urbanity. Another way of putting this - this time in terms used by both Martin Heidegger and Jean-Luc Nancy - is to say that each of these interpretations "presupposes an interpretation of beings without asking about the truth of Being". In Nancy's terms the interpretations of the destruction of elements of the urban fabric that I discussed above suffer from a problem of 'presumption'. That is they presume their fundamental categories: 'military necessity', 'cultural heritage', 'symbolic buildings', 'cultures', 'ethnic groups' and so on.

In contradistinction to these presumptive interpretations, my argument will approach the question of what buildings are as elements of urbanity. Moreover, it is only insofar as an answer to this question can be sketched out that we can begin to understand the stakes of urbicide. The sketching out of both the manner in which buildings are constitutive of heterogeneity and the stakes of the destruction of such
elements of urbanity is necessary in order to give an account of the logics, or conceptual meaning, of urbicide.

In order to delineate this logic of urbicide, specifically with regard to the destruction of the Stari Most, I propose to consider the two framing questions I have outlined above through Martin Heidegger's discussion of the nature of Being-in-the-world. I will commence with an examination of the manner in which Heidegger argues that Being-in-the-world is characterised by an ineluctably heterogeneous spatiality constituted by the (built) things with which it engages on an everyday basis. I will develop these insights through Heidegger's account of the relationship between 'building' as an aspect of 'dwelling'. Through this philosophical inquiry I hope to demonstrate the manner in which building is the condition of possibility of a specifically heterogeneous spatiality that engenders what we know as urbanity. Moreover, I will argue that building is thus a fundamentally political event, since such heterogeneous spatiality is precisely that which comprises the condition of possibility of the networks of identity\difference on which the political is predicated. I will contend that if we do not understand the manner in which we are-in-the-world through events such as building, then we fail to grasp the fundamental structure of what we call 'the political'.
CHAPTER 3

FROM BEING-IN-THE-WORLD TO DWELLING: THE SPATIALITY OF EXISTENCE

Dasein is essentially... spatial.¹

The interpretation of the Being of space has hitherto been a matter of perplexity, not so much because we have been insufficiently acquainted with the content of space itself as a thing..., as because the possibilities of Being in general have not been in principle transparent, and an Interpretation of them in terms of ontological concepts has been lacking.²

In chapter 2 I argued that during the 1992-95 Bosnian war buildings were destroyed not in their individual capacities but as elements of the urban environment. That is, I argued that those interpretations that explained the destruction of buildings solely in terms of their individual symbolic or strategic capacities failed to provide an adequate account of both what was destroyed and what the destruction disclosed. Instead, I argued that, in order to provide an adequate account of the destruction, it was necessary to note that the buildings which were destroyed were the conditions of possibility of urbanity itself. Moreover, I argued that it is precisely insofar as they are constitutive of shared space that buildings are the conditions of possibility of urbanity. Only if there is such shared space is the heterogeneity that urbanity comprises possible. This is the central assumption on which my argument rests. Only if it can be
shown that buildings are indeed constitutive of shared space is the term ‘urbicide’ (as opposed to ‘cultural cleansing’ or ‘strategic necessity’, for example) appropriate for such destruction.

Given this pivotal assumption, I want to show in this chapter that buildings, as elements of the urban environment, are constitutive of shared space. It is this shared space that is the condition of possibility of the heterogeneity that characterises urbanity. It is the constitution of such heterogeneity that will be, ultimately, my focus of concern. It has been argued that heterogeneity and its closure are the characteristics of the political. That is, ‘the political’ comprises an field of contestation characterised by agonistic networks of identity\difference. Such a conception of the political is captured well by Connolly in his notion of ‘the paradox of difference’. Connolly notes that ‘[i]dentity requires difference in order to be...Identity is thus a slippery, insecure experience, dependent on its ability to define difference and vulnerable to the tendency of entities it would so define to counter, resist, overturn, or subvert definitions applied to them’.  

According to Connolly, for there to be identity there must always already be difference. Heterogeneity - or the existence of difference, or others - is thus a necessary condition of existence. Moreover, it is this heterogeneity and the strategies of identity\difference it fosters that comprises the field of the political. In this sense politics consists of the networks of differentiation that establish identities. Or, rather, it is the consolidation and contestation of such networks that comprises the field of the political. Insofar as they are constitutive of such heterogeneity, the shared spaces constituted by buildings are thus fundamentally political spaces.
In order to demonstrate this pivotal assumption of my argument, I want to turn to Martin Heidegger’s account of the spatiality of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger’s account provides a powerful critical tool for understanding the manner in which buildings are constitutive of a fundamentally shared (and, hence, heterogeneous) spatiality. By setting out Heidegger’s argument it is possible to illuminate the manner in which urbicide comprises the destruction of the shared spaces that constitute existence as both heterogeneous and political. Before commencing my account of Heidegger’s argument, however, I want to briefly re-state the importance of the assumption on which my argument rests: that the destruction of buildings is the destruction of shared space. A preliminary illustration of this contention can be found in the case of attempted refugee returns in Bosnia after the 1992-95 war.

**Urban space is always already shared space**

The 1992-95 Bosnian war was characterised by ‘ethnic cleansing’. That is, the forced displacement of ethnic groups comprised a war aim, rather an incidental consequence, of the conflict.\(^5\) ‘Ethnic cleansing’ in Bosnia followed a typical pattern of depopulation and re-population.\(^6\) A town or village would be ‘cleansed’ of a particular ethnic population and then resettled by members of the ‘cleansing’ group. During the conflict an estimated 200,000 Bosnians were killed, a large number of whom were civilians who died as a consequence of such ethnic cleansing.\(^7\) In addition to the deaths that resulted from ethnic cleansing an estimated 50% of Bosnians were displaced. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), 1.2 million Bosnians sought refuge in host countries other than Bosnia, whilst another 1 million were internally displaced within Bosnia. The re-population of ethnically cleansed towns and villages was facilitated by such large numbers of displaced persons needing re-settlement. The Bosnian Federation town of Drvar provides an exemplary instance of this dynamic. As the International Crisis Group notes,

Before the war, when Drvar was known as Titov Drvar, some 9,000 people lived in the town and some 17,000 in the municipality, of whom 97.3 per cent were Serbs and 2.7 per cent “others”. In 1995, however, Drvar fell to Croat forces and its Serb population fled. The new Croat authorities have since repopulated the municipality with displaced Croats from municipalities in Bosniac and Serb-held areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina... The current civilian population in Drvar municipality numbers between 5,000 and 6,000. Of these, only 79 are Serbs, all elderly people who chose to remain after the Croats took control of the area - 68 in the outlying villages and 11 in town.

After the conflict ended, the large numbers of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) complicated the post-war landscape of Bosnia. The resettlement of IDPs as part of ethnic cleansing had, for example, consolidated the gains made by nationalists. The problematic posed by refugees and IDPs was central to the project of rebuilding Bosnia insofar as the return of refugees to their places of former residence would be an indicator of both the reverse of the gains made by nationalist forces and the restoration of a pre-war ethnic mixing. However, this return
faced many obstacles including, though not restricted to, the war-time destruction of properties, illegal occupation of properties by 're-settled' refugees and IDP's, and nationalist intransigence.

According to the Dayton Agreement, both the Bosnian Federation and Republika Srpska were to facilitate the return of refugees to the place from which they had been displaced. A right of return was thus established that placed a duty upon both entities to ensure that displaced persons were assisted in returning to their former towns and villages. The intent was to reverse the effects of ethnic cleansing and to restore Bosnia's pre-war ethnic heterogeneity. That is, these measures were intended to reverse the consequences of war-time destruction and displacement.

So-called 'minority returns' are particularly interesting in this regard. 'Minority returns' refer to those instances in which the refugees/IDPs returning to their places of former residence will comprise a minority in the towns/villages to which they return. This minority status is a specific consequence of war-time ethnic cleansing. In a majority of cases the returnees in minority returns are returning to places of former residence in which they were part of a pre-war ethnic majority. However, as a consequence of the displacement-resettlement dynamic of ethnic cleansing the places of former residence of such returnees are now almost exclusively populated by another ethnic group. This can be seen in the case of Drvar mentioned above. In pre-war Drvar, Bosnian Serbs comprised 97.3% of the population. However, after ethnic cleansing the town was repopulated as almost exclusively Croat. In this situation, Bosnian Serb returnees will find themselves in a minority when they return to their places of former residence.
However, despite the undertakings made in the Dayton Agreement, returns (and minority returns in particular) have been hindered in the post-war period by both violence against returnees and the destruction of buildings to which displaced persons could be returned. In this sense the ethnic cleansing that was accomplished during war has been consolidated through a continuation of violence in the post-war period.

The town of Drvar provides stark evidence of this violence. In October 1996, thirty five houses were destroyed after Bosnian Serbs displaced during the war returned to see their properties. Then, in May 1997, another twenty five houses were destroyed ‘after an international delegation...met with local authorities...to discuss the return of displaced Serbs to the area’. This violence was not confined to Drvar, however. The International Crisis Group notes that ‘[t]he vandalism in Drvar is sadly not an isolated event but part of a sustained campaign [across Bosnia-Herzegovina] to prevent the return of minorities.’ Indeed the destruction of houses and places of worship across Bosnia after the signing of the Dayton Agreement demonstrates that urbicide is not confined to situations of conflict.

The destruction of buildings intended for returnees is an exemplary instance of the ‘ontological’ assumptions that underlie ethno-nationalist politics. ‘Ontology’, according to Jacques Derrida, refers to an ‘axiomatics linking indissociably the ontological value of present-being [on] to its situation, to the stable and presentable determination of a locality, the topos of territory, native soil, city’. In National Deconstruction, David Campbell demonstrates the ontological nexus of territory and identity on which ethno-nationalist politics rest. Ethno-nationalism seeks to indissociably link identity (what Derrida would call ‘present-being’), and
territory (Derrida's 'situation...the topos of territory'). That is, identity is to be derived from the locality, or territory, it inhabits. Insofar as ethno-nationalist identity must be homogeneous and admit of no heterogeneity, the territory from which it derives value must be similarly homogeneous. This is the motor of ethnic cleansing. Ethno-nationalist groups displace all other ethnic groups from a given locality in order to claim it as a homogeneous territory. In this way their identity can then be gained from the fact that this territory is their sole possession. It is precisely this logic that can be seen in the idea expressed by the common Serbian saying that 'Serbian land is where Serbian bones are'. Since ethno-nationalism derives the value of its being from territory, it must assert that the ground in which Serbian dead are buried is and can only ever be homogeneously Serbian. It follows, therefore, that heterogeneous others must be expelled from such land.

In the case of the destruction of houses and other buildings in order to prevent return an identical logic is at work. Moreover, this logic demonstrates the manner in which such buildings constitute a shared space that is always already the condition of possibility of heterogeneity. Insofar as ethno-nationalism links identity and territory, it derives its identity from ensuring the exclusion of heterogeneity from its territory. Minority returns effectively problematise this linkage of identity and territory by demonstrating the manner in which urban space is always already shared space and thus potentially heterogeneous.

In the case of Drvar, and in the other cases where ethno-nationalist objections to minority returns have spilled over into violence, the destruction of houses intended for returnees discloses more than the simple destruction of the place where that
returnee was to live. Indeed, those who see this destruction as an obstruction through
the elimination of places of residence forget that it is always possible to rebuild a
house, or to refurbish another, and that the destruction of a house itself need in no way
prevent the return of displaced persons. Rather, the destruction of the buildings to
which displaced persons were to return discloses the manner in which those buildings
are constitutive of a shared space that fosters heterogeneity. Indeed, the destruction of
such houses is best understood as an instance of urbicide since the house is destroyed
not simply to intimidate the returnee, but as an element of urbanity. That is, to
reaffirm the account of urbicide I gave in the previous chapter, the houses are
destroyed not in their individual capacities as homes for returnees, but as elements of
urbanity itself.

Minority returns are the return of heterogeneity to territories that were
homogenised through ethnic cleansing. This is possible precisely because the urban
fabric of these towns and villages comprises always already shared spaces, and thus
harbours an ineluctable possibility of heterogeneity. It is only possible to remove this
possibility of heterogeneity by removing the shared spaces of that urbanity. And it is
precisely because they are constitutive of the shared space that it is buildings that are
destroyed. In order to maintain the ontological foundations of ethno-nationalism, it
is necessary to remove the possibility of the (re)emergence of heterogeneity (after the
war) in these localities by destroying precisely that which, insofar as it constitutes the
urban environment as an always already shared space, threatens to allow the return of
difference: the buildings (in this case houses).
This brief examination of the manner in which buildings are destroyed in order to prevent minority returns is significant insofar as it details the lengths to which it is necessary to go to efface the shared character of urban space. The space constituted by the buildings that comprise the elements of towns and cities is always already a shared space. As such, this means that towns and cities such as Drvar are the sites of an ineluctable heterogeneity - even in the wake of sustained 'ethnic cleansing'. This heterogeneity can take the form of antagonisms that generate destructive political forces such as those experienced in Drvar. But such destruction only serves to confirm the assumption that this ineluctable heterogeneity is possible precisely because the buildings that comprise the urban environment are constitutive of shared spaces. If this was not the case it would not be necessary to destroy buildings in order to control who has access to which urban areas. It is only because buildings constitute the urban space as a shared space that their destruction is deemed necessary. The way in which buildings constitute the urban environment as an always already shared space must, therefore, be shown.

In order to show how buildings constitute the urban environment as an always already shared space, it necessary to address two issues. Firstly, and most obviously, the manner in which buildings constitute shared space must be shown. Secondly, however, the 'always already constituted' character of that shared space must be addressed. It must be shown that the space that buildings constitute is, prior to being anything else, shared space. If this cannot be shown then the heterogeneity said to be premised upon such shared spaces is not an ineluctable fact of urbanity. And thus the previous contentions regarding urbicide would begin to collapse. I will refer to this
second issue as the 'pre-theoretical' character of the space constituted by buildings. I hope to show that the space that buildings constitute is always already shared: this 'always already' implying that this space is shared prior to it becoming an issue for theoretical reflection or, indeed, political segregation, regulation or destruction. This will demonstrate that heterogeneity is similarly pre-theoretical, and all attempts to regulate or efface such heterogeneity are a posteriori operations that can never fully destroy the always already shared character of urban space.

I want to address these two issues through the work of Martin Heidegger. It may appear somewhat perverse to address the constitution of shared space through the work of a thinker renowned for his temporo-centrism. However, I will argue that Heidegger's account of the fundamentally spatial character of Being-in-the-world not only provides a vantage point from which to consider the manner in which buildings constitute shared space, but also demonstrates the pre-theoretical nature of such space. Through Heidegger's work, it is thus possible to offer an initial interpretation of the manner in which buildings constitute the shared spaces that are a pre-theoretical feature of Being-in-the-world. Such an interpretation is a vital starting point for an inquiry into what exactly is disclosed by the destruction of the urban environment.

A Heideggerian interpretation

In a seminar in 1969 Heidegger 'maintained that his thinking had traversed three periods, each with its own leading theme: Meaning, Truth, and Place'. For Heidegger, place necessarily implies the associated concepts of space, spatiality, and
location. Thus it would seem that, by his own admission, spatiality came to occupy a central place in Heidegger’s thinking. However, the trajectory of Heidegger’s thinking concerning space is not as simple as this remark might imply. Indeed, the idea that Heidegger’s work comprises a clear path towards a thinking of place and space belies the indirection with which he proceeds along this path. 

In Division 1 of Being and Time Heidegger offers an account of the spatiality of Being-in-the-world. In this account Heidegger notes the centrality of spatiality to any understanding of Being-in-the-world. However, this account is, as Hubert Dreyfus notes, ‘fundamentally confused’ insofar as it does not clearly establish how the public character of the space in which Being-in-the-world comes to be is to be reconciled with the individually centred character of each being’s spatial experience. That is, there is a failure to adequately explicate how the spatiality of Being-in-the-world is simultaneously public and yet individually centred. Given the rigour with which Heidegger usually sets out his concepts in Being and Time, this lack of clarity is somewhat surprising. Moreover, in section 70, Division 2 of Being and Time Heidegger attempts to derive spatiality from temporality. Heidegger thus compounds the confusion by subordinating the supposedly central concept of the spatiality of Being-in-the-world to temporality. This attempt places the centrality of spatiality in question, and thus problematises Heidegger’s earlier assertion that Being-in-the-world is ‘essentially...spatial’. That Heidegger later rejected his own attempt to derive spatiality from temporality as ‘untenable’ would seem to be further evidence of the confused nature of his thinking concerning spatiality in Being and Time.
Heidegger’s later work is characterised by a turning (die Kehre) away from the fundamental ontology of Being and Time. This turning comprises what Casey refers to as ‘a (re)turning to Place and associated notions’ such as spatiality. It is worth noting that commentaries on Heidegger’s later work have focused upon the way in which, after this turning, he is increasingly concerned to locate Being in language. This understanding of Heidegger’s later works as a turning towards language is based upon later essays such as ‘Poetically Man Dwells’, and is in line with the general concern with language fostered by post-structuralism. However, this understanding of Heidegger’s later work tends to play down the centrality of spatiality to his thinking concerning Being. Although language becomes more central to Heidegger’s later work, it is only one of several important themes, one of which is the locatedness of Being. To focus on language in Heidegger’s later work is to lend support to a rather anthropocentric interpretation of his thought that plays down the possibilities that his thinking concerning the concept of ‘dwelling’ opens up.

It is in his writing on ‘dwelling’ that Heidegger’s later thinking concerning spatiality is especially evident. In his later work, dwelling becomes the central concept for understanding Being. This is most clear in the essay ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, in which Heidegger tackles the question of the relationship between building and Being. For Heidegger this relationship is to be understood in terms of the locations which Being constitutes through building. In making such locatedness central to his later work, Heidegger returns to the essentially spatial character of Being-in-the-world. It is precisely this trajectory of thinking concerning spatiality - from Being and Time to ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ - that I wish to trace here in
order to demonstrate that buildings constitute the shared space that underlies heterogeneous urbanity.

**Being-in-the-world**

An exegesis of Heidegger’s thinking concerning spatiality must start with his account in *Being and Time* of the essentially spatial character of Being-in-the-world. Central to this account is the concept of ‘Dasein’. Understanding what Dasein refers to is the key to understanding Heidegger’s account of Being-in-the-world. The concatenation of da (there) and sein (to be) forms Dasein, meaning ‘to be there, present, available, to exist’. As a term ‘Dasein’ was in use in German prior to Heidegger’s usage and ‘can mean “everyday human existence”,’ or ‘the being or life of persons’. For Heidegger, Dasein refers to precisely this everyday human existence. Dasein, however, is more than a term for identifying individual human beings as things that exist in the world. As Heidegger notes, ‘with the term ‘Dasein’, we are expressing not its “what” (as if it were a table, house, or tree) but its Being.’ That is, Dasein does not tell us what individual human existence is (as if ‘it is Being-there’ would suffice as an explanation of what a human being is), but indicates the way in which human beings exist.

Dasein is thus used to refer to the generic features of being-human, or the way human beings are. Heidegger uses Dasein (and its derivatives) to refer to both ‘a way of being that is characteristic of all people’ and to the way of being of individual human beings. However, Heidegger does not want Dasein to be reduced to the
subjective individual consciousness that is the central character of traditional metaphysical ontology. Dasein is, as we shall see, certainly not the Cartesian cogito. And it is precisely for this reason that it is not so much what Dasein is (the individual beings that Dasein can possibly be), but the way in which it is (the essential structures that are the condition of possibility of human existence) that is the central concern of Being and Time.

Division 1 of Being and Time comprises an analysis of this existential structure of Dasein. Heidegger notes that such an analysis must start with the 'average everydayness' of Dasein's existence. That is, Heidegger wants to begin with an enquiry into the pre-theoretical way in which Dasein is (that is prior to theoretical reflection about the way in which it is). Heidegger argues that Dasein is always already in-the-world. Being-in-the-world, then, is the average everyday state of Dasein. The way in which Dasein comprises Being-in-the-world is thus the starting point for Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein.

It is precisely in this explication of Dasein's Being-in-the-world that Heidegger notes the essentially spatial character of such existence. A clue to this spatial character lies in the fact that Dasein is literally Being-there. This 'Being-there' is not the simple fact of taking up a particular position in the world. Dasein is not just another thing (or body) that has as one of its properties being in a particular position in space. Rather, as Heidegger notes, "[the] "There [das 'Da']" is not a place [...] in contrast to an "over there" ['dort']; Dasein means not being here instead of over there, nor here and over there, but is the possibility, the condition of oriented being here and being over there". If Being-there were simply the designation of the location of the
place of an individual Dasein in a three-dimensional space, this would refer only to 
what Dasein is: a thing in a specific location (‘that thing there as opposed to this thing 
here’). But since Dasein refers to the way of Being of Dasein, Being-there must be 
understood as an opening of the place/space of Being. Moreover, this em-placement 
of being-in-a-place) must be seen as constitutive of Being-in-the-world, a condition 
of its way of Being. That is, to be in-the-world is to be placed in that world - the 
world, therefore is to be understood as the space of Being. It is that event of em-
placement that refers to as ‘the condition of oriented being’ that comprises Being-
there (or Dasein).

‘Place’ refers to a ‘particular...[or] definite....situation...with reference to 
other bodies’. A place is a particular locus of a specific set of references to other 
bodies/things. To be ‘in a place’, then, is to be the locus of a set of references to other 
bodies/things. This is precisely what differentiates place from space. A place may be 
located in space but is not defined by the space it occupies. Rather, a place consists of 
the references a specific locus makes to other bodies/things.

The ‘place’ opened by Being-there is thus the constitution of a set of 
references to other bodies and things. It is precisely this referentiality that comprises 
‘oriented being’. Orientation is to be understood as a positioning. This positioning is 
ascertained precisely in relation to other bodies/things. To be oriented is, essentially, 
to be placed or em-placed.

Insofar as Dasein is always already em-placed, s/he is always already oriented 
to the bodies/things around him/her. It is precisely this pre-theoretical orientation that 
comprises worldliness for Heidegger. Worldliness consists of the manner in which the
things that Dasein encounters always already refer to one another in relation to Dasein's own situation. In this sense Being and Time is a primarily pragmatic text. Dasein's world consists of those things that satisfy certain needs. Thus, for example, Dasein's situation might be that of a carpenter. In this situation Dasein is oriented towards those things that satisfy his/her needs: hammer and nails, for example. Moreover, Dasein's world comprises the manner in which hammer, nails and wood refer to each other in the context of the workshop. This is what is meant by the em-placement of Dasein: Dasein is always already the opening of a place through its orientation to the bodies/things that comprise its world.

This is precisely what Heidegger is getting at when he draws a distinction between 'Being in' and 'Being-in'. Though this distinction might appear to be an exercise in philosophical hair-splitting, it is indicative of the always already em-placed character of Dasein. Division 1 of Being and Time comprises a fundamental critique of the tradition of metaphysical ontology that Heidegger sees embodied in Descartes and Newton. For both of these thinkers Being takes place within a universal, objective, three dimensional space that pre-exists any beings. For these thinkers the concept of 'Being in' is to be understood as the placing of an object into a region of space rather in the same way that we put water into a container. The space pre-exists the thing put into it and is unaffected (although it is occupied) by that thing.

For Heidegger this account is somewhat back-to-front. Heidegger argues that a conception of the world as a uniform space into which discrete objects are placed at certain positions is a theoretical construct made possible by the fact that Dasein is always already oriented towards a worldly context. 'Being-in' refers to the way in
which Dasein always already exists in relation to those things that it finds around itself in its everyday life. Those things that Dasein primarily encounters in its everydayness are those things which come in handy for practical tasks. For example, Heidegger argues that I do not see a chair, writing desk, pen, and paper as discrete entities in a particular container-like space. Rather, I see them as an ‘equipmental whole’: things that do a particular task, or a context for accomplishing the task. ‘Being-in’ then, is not simply being in a particular position in space, but is, rather, Being always already in-the-world. If Being-in is Dasein’s basic state it means, moreover, that Dasein is essentially worldly. And this is precisely the meaning of Heidegger’s assertion that Dasein is Being-in-the-world. Any other understanding of itself that Dasein may have is derived from its worldliness.  

This Being-in that the Being-there of Dasein comprises should indicate that spatiality is an essential characteristic of existence. That Heidegger refers to Being-there and not Being-contextualised should indicate that Dasein’s way of Being is emplacement (and that Dasein is thus implicitly spatialised). But it is the characterisation of Being-there as Being-in that seems confirmation of the spatiality of existence. Even given Heidegger’s rejection of the idea that Dasein is a thing in a container-like space, that Dasein is in, rather than out, of the world suggests a spatiality, a withinness. However, it is in his account of the way in which Dasein is oriented towards the place (the there) in which Being-there is present, that Heidegger explicitly turns to the question of spatiality.
The essentially spatial character of existence

Heidegger derives the essential spatiality of existence from an account of the specific manner in which Dasein is in-the-world. As usual in *Being and Time* Heidegger’s account is concerned with the everyday dealings of Dasein. Since Dasein is, first and foremost, a practical being, these everyday dealings comprise an orientation towards the accomplishment of tasks. It is precisely in this sense that Heidegger refers to the Being-in of Dasein as always already being oriented towards the equipmental wholes that enable the accomplishment of tasks. Heidegger is fond of referring to tools needed for the accomplishment of various tasks. According to Heidegger, Dasein has a pre-theoretical understanding of the various ways in which tools relate to one another and materials. The equipmental whole is precisely made up by the various ways in which different things refer to one another. The hammer refers to the nails, whilst the nails refer to the wood, and the whole of hammer-nails-wood refers to the bench on which the work takes place.

For Heidegger it is precisely these equipmental wholes that characterise the basic state of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. The world, Heidegger states, is a unitary whole. Worldliness for Dasein is composed of the various ways in which things that are found in-the-world refer to one another. Dasein’s understanding of the world, moreover, is a pre-theoretical understanding of the various relationships and proper places that the things in the world have in equipmental wholes. And this is the radical meaning of the term ‘Being-in-the-world’: human Being is always already an engagement with a world of which we have a pre-theoretical understanding. This is
what is meant by Dasein’s concernful dealings with, or orientation in, the world. Dasein is always already in, and understands, the various equipmental wholes that comprise the world.

Heidegger derives the spatiality of Being-in-the-world from the equipmental wholes in which Dasein is always already oriented. ‘Equipment’, notes Heidegger, ‘has its place, or else it ‘lies around’; this must be distinguished in principle from just occurring at random in some spatial position.’\(^{38}\) It is this fact that things have a \textit{place} that is the basis of Heidegger’s account of spatiality. Place is determined by the twin concepts of ‘closeness’ and ‘direction’. Closeness refers to the way in which something is ready-to-hand. Closeness in this sense does not refer to a proximity measured in terms of a distance between two points. A given piece of equipment can be closer than another despite the relative proximity of either to Dasein. This closeness is thus an existential concept. That which is close is that which is handy in the context of a particular equipmental whole.

Closeness is achieved through what most English translations of \textit{Being and Time} call de-severance. That is, items of equipment (and, in Heidegger’s examples, other human beings) are made close, and thus given a place in the world of a particular Dasein, by being ‘de-severed’. De-severance refers to the way in which Dasein engages with different elements of the world in different ways (what Heidegger refers to as the ‘circumspective concern’ that Dasein exhibits towards the world). As Heidegger notes, ‘[w]hen for instance, a man wears a pair of spectacles which are so close to him distantly that they are ‘sitting on his nose’, they are environmentally more remote from him than a picture on the opposite wall.’\(^{39}\) The
picture on the wall is what the man is engaging with, and is thus de-severed, whilst the spectacles are not an item with which Dasein is concerned, and, hence, are not de-severed. Heidegger explains this de-severance at more length in an example of a person walking along a street:

One feels the touch of [the street] at every step as one walks; it is seemingly the closest and Realest of all that is ready-to-hand [as 'equipment for walking'], and it slides itself, as it were, along certain portions of one's body - the soles of one's feet. And yet it is farther remote than the acquaintance whom one encounters 'on the street' at a 'remoteness' of twenty paces when one is taking such a walk. Circumspective concern decides as to the closeness and farness of what is proximally ready-to-hand environmentally. Whatever this concern dwells alongside beforehand is what is closest, and this is what regulates our de-severances.  

In addition to being close, equipment also has direction. Direction consists of the relation between the various pieces of equipment in the equipmental whole. These various bits of equipment are not only close, they are also in particular position vis-à-vis each other. It is precisely this directionality that is the source of the essential orientation that characterises Being-in-the-world. Insofar as it is always already in-the-world, Dasein has a pre-theoretical understanding of directionality through its engagement with equipmental wholes. However, it is not the closeness and directionality of equipment alone that gives Dasein its spatiality.

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Although equipment constitutes the basic spatiality of Dasein, it is the way in which equipmental wholes relate to the worldly totality of equipment that completes Heidegger’s sketch of the spatiality of existence. Heidegger notes that although each piece of equipment has its place, this place is not simply defined by its closeness (readiness-to-hand) to Dasein and its directionality vis-à-vis other pieces of equipment. An item of equipment belongs somewhere, in a place. Moreover, this place is somewhere not only in relation to Dasein and other items of equipment. Each place is oriented within a larger context. This orientation of all possible places constitutes what Heidegger calls the ‘whither’ of a place. It is this whither that makes it possible to say where a place is in general, not only in relation to Dasein and the other items in the equipmental whole. The workshop for example is a particular place that is oriented in relation to the house, the garden, the urban district and so on. This orientation ‘makes possible the belonging-somewhere of an equipmental totality as something that can be placed’. 41

For Heidegger this orientation of all possible places occurs in relation to a ‘region’. The concept of region completes the basic sketch of the spatiality of existence. Were things only to have place because of their closeness to Dasein and relation to each other, there would be no account of the place one given equipmental totality had in relation to another. Or, rather, the account would revolve around the constitutive power of Dasein, and we would have effectively arrived at a Husserlian phenomenological position. Instead the concept of region offers a horizon of intelligibility that is external to Dasein which allows the placing of all the various places constituted by items of equipment. Dasein engages in this world in terms of its
closeness to ready-to-hand items and yet understands its overall position in this world in relation to the regional horizon. Thus Heidegger makes clear both the importance of Dasein, in terms of the way in which it interprets its own existence in terms of the closeness or readiness to hand of certain items depending on its everyday needs, and at the same time a certain public horizon that means that Dasein is not a solipsistic constructor of its own world.

Dasein's spatiality is thus constituted by a dual movement. In the first place the possibility of spatiality - of Being-somewhere - is given by the places constituted by equipment. The various places constituted by equipment are themselves oriented within a horizon of intelligibility known as the region. It is only in relation to the region that the designation of a particular place as, for example, behind, above, beyond, or by the side of another place makes sense. However, Dasein has a constitutive role to play. Dasein opens the there from which this world is made intelligible. By bringing items of equipment close to it Dasein is oriented towards certain equipmental wholes and thus em-placed. Essentially Heidegger is noting that there is a certain orientedness in the world, but that without Dasein this orientation cannot become spatiality.

It should be possible to glean from the above account that spatiality is not a question of distance in space and, hence, is something that is constituted, not discovered. The spatiality of Being-in-the-world is constituted jointly by items of equipment (and the regions that orient the entirety of places such equipment can occupy) and Dasein. This constitution occurs in what is best described as a 'from-back to' movement.42 Things are ready-to-hand for Dasein and thus it is Dasein that
effectively constitutes equipmental wholes. Dasein constitutes the items of equipment as ready-to-hand by establishing the closeness and remoteness of certain items. This is precisely the Being-there that is proper to Dasein. The 'there' refers to a place constituted by the relationships that Dasein establishes by being engaged (and thus close to, or de-severed) with certain things and unconcerned with others.

However, this constitutive activity of Dasein is not sufficient for there to be spatiality. It is the things themselves that establish the directionality that spatiality requires. That an item is close to Dasein is not sufficient; this item must have a place within the equipmental totality. And this place can only be constituted if the item has a directionality that indicates its location in relation to other items. It is this directionality that belongs to the items themselves. And it is in this respect that spatiality is constituted by the various items with which Dasein is concerned. In this sense, although Dasein establishes a 'there' in which Being is possible, this 'there' always already contains places for things (and the directionality these things have in potentially referring to one another) that make spatiality possible.

In order for the various places in which equipment can possibly be to have a location vis-à-vis each other, however, the directionality by which all the items in an equipmental whole refer to each other is not sufficient. Rather, a horizon of intelligibility must be established according to which all places can be located. This is 'the region'. It is regionality that makes it possible to say one thing is above another, or behind it, or beyond it. The workshop, for example constitutes a region in which a number of places can exist, and through which the location of each place vis-à-vis another can be understood. The region is both oriented in terms of Dasein's concerns.
(the workshop for example is a region because it is that in which Dasein is engaged, and that according to which Dasein's concern is oriented) and that which orients Dasein.

Thus the constitution of spatiality passes from Dasein, to the items constitutive of the possibility of spatiality, to the region that orients all the places that these items can occupy and back again to Dasein whose concernful Being-in-the-world is oriented in terms of its place in the region.

It should thus be clear that the spatiality with which Heidegger is concerned is very different from the absolute space with which thinkers such as Newton or Euclid are concerned. For Newton, for example, space is an absolute, metaphysical entity, separate from Being, in which beings can be located. This absolute space is a homogeneous, universal entity that is neutral towards Being and merely plays the part of (necessary) backdrop to existence. Moreover, this space has no places, merely locations that any object can occupy, including beings. In this way Newtonian space is indifferent to the kind of relationships that Heidegger is positing as the constitutive features of Dasein's spatiality.43

The contrast between Heidegger and Newton's accounts of spatiality can be seen in the centrality that Heidegger accords to the notion of 'de-severance'. Heidegger explicitly notes that de-severance is not a matter of distance. Indeed, the example of walking along the street cited above makes precisely this point. Spatiality for Heidegger is not the creation of a uniform objective medium in which any thing can appear at any position. Rather spatiality is a matter of the constitution of specific places by specific things and the manner in which these places are both oriented
toward each other and concernfully engaged with by Dasein. That is to say, spatiality is a matter of the relationships that constitute a place: between the things in the place; between those things and the wider worldly context, or 'region'; and the relationship of circumspective concern that Dasein has with the things in the world.

It is in this sense that Heidegger sees physical space - space that could be understood as the volume inside an empty container - as being derived from existential spatiality. The space in a workshop, for example, is derived from the spatiality constituted by the things in the workshop and Dasein’s circumspective concern with these items. This space is derived by the measuring of distance. However, distance does not exist prior to Dasein’s circumspective concern with the world. And it is only because of Dasein’s pre-theoretical understanding of closeness and directionality that it is possible to derive a system of measuring. Distance is a product of reducing the relationship between two points to a measurement. In other words, the relationship between two points is quantified according to a common/standardised, but nonetheless arbitrary, unit.

According to Heidegger, however, it is only because of Dasein’s understanding of its existential spatiality, its engagement with the world, that it is possible for it to relate certain items to each other, and thus arrive at a distance between them through measurement. The space of a town centre, for example, can only be arrived at because Dasein has a pre-theoretical understanding of the directionality that exists between the town centre’s components (pavements, shops, offices, public buildings, and so on). Moreover, Dasein is able to de-sever these components such that they can be brought close and thus made the object of Dasein’s concern (e.g., the office is an object of
concern as Dasein’s workplace). Measuring is accomplished by relating one de-
severed element of the town centre to another. The scale decided upon for quantifying
that measurement is then that which produces the distance between items and
according to which the magnitude of the physical space is determined (e.g.,
centimetres, metres, inches, feet, seconds, minutes, and so on).

Finally, it is important to note that this existential spatiality (and the spaces
that can be derived from it), is fundamentally public. The places established in this
existential spatiality are independent of particular people. Whilst Dasein’s de-
severance is central to Heidegger’s account of spatiality it is only part of the story. The
place orientation effected by regions, and the directionality inherent to equipment,
make this spatiality an essentially public one. The region is not constituted by Dasein,
but exists as a principle of orienting all the possible places (for equipmental wholes)
with which Dasein can be concerned. The workshop is not simply available to one
Dasein, but is that which locates the places of tools that are in principle available to
anyone. Moreover, these tools have a directionality that constitutes relations vis-à-vis
each other that are similarly in principle available to any Dasein that is concerned with
them.

The principle point here is that the spatiality constituted by these objects - the
objects that form the world in which Dasein always already is - is a public spatiality,
or a shared spatiality. Spatiality is neither a product of individual Daseins or a pre-
existent objective fact, but is, rather a public aspect of existence constituted by the
things with which Dasein is concerned. Dasein’s world is therefore a shared world.
And this shared character is established by the fact that the places constituted by the things with which it is concerned are essentially public.

To this point, I have traced out the manner in which Heidegger demonstrates that it is the things with which Being-in-the-world is concerned that constitute that world as a multitude of essentially public, and thus shared, places (and, by derivation, spaces). It is my argument that it is precisely this essentially public, and thus shared, spatiality that is constituted by the buildings that comprise the urban environment. Later in this chapter, I will demonstrate this argument by utilising the preceding conceptual schema to interpret the existential spatiality of an urban environment such as Mostar. First, however, it is necessary to extend the exegesis I have given of Heidegger's account of the spatiality of existence to say something about its implications in relation to urbanity.

The spatiality of the urban environment

An urban environment can be seen as both an equipmental whole and a region. The buildings comprise both the environment that orients all the possible places or things within it, and an ensemble that enables the accomplishment of a certain task, namely urban existence. As an equipmental totality, the urban environment is an ensemble of buildings that refer to each other in various ways. Just as the hammer and nails refer to each other in the workshop so residential houses refer to public buildings (such as shops, banks, libraries, hotels and so on) and to symbolic cultural buildings. Dasein has a pre-theoretical understanding of the directionality that makes
an urban environment into a whole. That is, the town is understood by Dasein *qua* town prior to becoming an object of theoretical reflection. Dasein understands the relationship between, say, the house s/he lives in and the places of worship s/he or others may use, the public buildings that may be places of work or of business, and the other spaces (such as parks and cemeteries) that are also part of the urban environment. That is, Dasein does not understand the role of individual buildings and then, as it were by a process of addition or straight-forward connection, compose them into an holistic ensemble. It is precisely this pre-theoretical understanding of the directionality in an urban environment that means that Dasein understands this environment as a town rather than a random collection of buildings.

Moreover, this sense that Dasein has a pre-theoretical understanding of the town *qua* town is reinforced by the regionality that the town has for Dasein. The ensemble of buildings that comprises the town is a horizon of intelligibility that orients all the possible places that items may occupy within the urban environment. The town orients Dasein's immediate sense of here and there, before and beyond, above and below. It is within this immediate urban environment that Dasein finds its immediate orientation and is able to understand where the place of one item is in relation to another.

The urban environment thus constitutes a basis for Dasein's existential spatiality. In the context of the directionality established by the buildings themselves, it is Dasein's engagement with the urban environment - the manner in which Dasein de-severs certain aspects of that environment - that fully opens out the spatiality of the town. It is in this manner that we can explain individual experiences of the town, or
changing experiences of the town. Dasein may bring certain buildings close to it in certain circumstances. For example, if Dasein has to work, then places of worship may be more remote than the place in which that work is carried out. Furthermore, the town may change, some buildings may disappear and others be built. Dasein changes its de-severances with regard to these additions and its experience of the town changes.

However, two points are vital. Firstly, the ensemble of buildings that comprises the town is a publicly available environment. Whilst individual Daseins may experience the town in different ways, the buildings constitute an environment that is pre-theoretically available to all. The town as region is not a private map, but a public horizon that makes the locations of all the places within it available to all. Moreover, because the buildings and their directional references are available to all, it is precisely in this environment that Dasein meets others. Indeed, Dasein is always already with others in this public environment.

Secondly, since the spatiality that Dasein experiences is constituted by a fundamentally public directionality and regionality, the space that is derived from the various places within the urban environment is always already a shared space. That is, the space that is derived by measuring and quantifying the distances between buildings in a street is not a purely subjective phenomenon (the mental imagining of an individual Dasein). Rather, this space is derived from the fundamentally public directionality of the ensemble of buildings that Dasein experiences. The relationship between buildings is public and pre-theoretically understood by every Dasein. And this means that each and every Dasein can perceive the same spaces because they can
perceive the same points of reference between which measuring will occur. Moreover, when Dasein calculates the space that exists in a certain part of the town, it knows that the buildings that constitute the possibility of measuring are always already available to other Daseins and, hence, there is a pre-theoretical alterity loose in the urban environment. The urban environment is thus ineluctably heterogeneous.

And it is precisely this possibility of heterogeneity that is at stake in urbicide. Urbicide comprises the destruction of that which constitutes the fundamentally public character of the urban environment. Literally, if buildings and their directionality in relation to one another constitute the urban environment in which Being-in-the-world occurs as a fundamentally public environment, then it is these buildings that must be destroyed in order to efface that public or shared character.

It is in precisely this manner that the ethno-nationalist politics of the Bosnian Croat paramilitary organisation, the HVO can be understood. The buildings of the urban environment in Mostar formed an equipmental totality. It was in the context of all of these buildings taken as a town, rather than an aggregate of individual buildings, that urban living was accomplished by the inhabitants of Mostar. This urban environment was the region that oriented all the possible places in which they lived their daily lives. Moreover, the buildings gave directionality to the individual experience of the city. The bridge, for example, referred to both sides of the river, and thus constituted the relational designation of ‘east’ Mostar as on the opposite bank of the Neretva to ‘west’ Mostar. This directional reference was a property of the bridge, not of individual experiences of the bridge. Moreover, since the bridge and the
directional relationship it entailed was in principle available to all, it was a public, shared place.

It is precisely the fact that the bridge was a fundamentally public place that sealed its fate. To leave the bridge standing is to leave intact the possibility of sharing Mostar. And it is this possibility of sharing the urban environment with heterogeneous others, and the alterity attendant to such sharing, that comprises the principal target of ethno-nationalist politics. Urbicide destroys the fundamental possibility of heterogeneity, the always already present alterity that the public character of the spaces constituted by buildings comprises. It is not only that east and west Mostar should be separated, but that any possibility of otherness within west Mostar should be eradicated. And this must start with the condition of possibility of such difference, that which intimates, in its public character, an ineluctable alterity: buildings.

In this way we can demonstrate the manner in which buildings constitute the shared space that is at stake in urbicide. However, such an account is in itself fairly basic. In the first place it treats buildings as found objects. It takes the town to be an already existing thing with a set of directional relationships that individuals understand in the way they understand the relationship between, say a hammer and nails. Heidegger himself complained that this pragmatic focus on the everydayness of Dasein 'was misunderstood' insofar as commentators thought that '[f]or Heidegger the world consists only of cooking-pots, pitchforks and lampshades; he has nothing to say about “higher culture or “nature”.’

Whilst it is not necessarily true that Heidegger failed to engage questions of 'higher culture' or 'nature', it is certainly the case that throughout his work he 'refused
the experience of the city, no doubt seeing in cosmopolitanism and cultural pluralism nothing but a rootlessness'. 46 Heidegger’s work thus contains ‘an element of rural nostalgia’, a preference for a simple and one might say rustic environment. 47 It is thus understandable that some readers of Being and Time (and indeed later work) might think that Heidegger’s work spoke only of cooking-pots and pitchforks. It would also be easy to attribute this natural ruralism to Heidegger’s association with National Socialism. It is certainly the case that Heidegger’s concentration on the simple found objects that satisfy Dasein’s everyday needs gives the impression that human existence is in some way rooted in its natural surroundings. This romantic tendency in Heidegger’s writings might lead one to conclude that Dasein is a being that derives its presence from its territorial location. Indeed, when Heidegger writes about a cottage in the Black Forest in ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, there is certainly the implication that authentic existence is achieved by living close to the earth, without the distractions offered by modern, technological urbanism. 48 This idea points ‘towards the rootedness of dwelling in a soil, a theme which, at the time, was not exempt from ideologically ambiguous connotations’. 49 Whilst ‘in Heidegger’s writings [this theme] was not associated explicitly with the theme of blood or with racism’, we should note the problematic conclusions to which the pragmatic focus of Heidegger’s early work might lead. 50

It is fair to say that Heidegger leaves the question of the urban environment open in Being and Time. Specifically he pays no attention to the role that building (as a constitutive activity) might play in the spatiality of existence. Indeed, my account above rests on the assumption that a building can be treated as a found object.Whilst
our principle everyday experience of buildings is as found objects, this neglects the
fact that they are created objects. Moreover, in being created they constitute their own
spatialities. One of the principal questions that Heidegger passes over in Being and
Time is the manner in which directionality comes into being. There is an assumption
that directionality is merely something that Dasein grasps pre-theoretically through
everyday use. However, if directionality can be seen as the way in which an item
refers to another, this reference surely has some sort of basis. This is particularly
relevant in the case of the urban environment since the references that one building
makes to another change Dasein’s everyday experience of the city. Moreover, the
creation of new buildings and the destruction of others alters the directionalities
inherent to the urban environment. It is necessary, therefore, to enquire further into the
manner in which building constitutes spatiality.

Thinking in the context of the destruction of buildings

In 1951 Heidegger delivered the lecture ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, to the
Darmstadt symposium on Man and Space. World War II left many urban
environments in Germany in ruins. Allied bombing had reduced towns and cites to
rubble. In the period immediately following the war there was, therefore, an urgent
need to tackle questions of reconstruction. The pressing need to reconstruct destroyed
urban environments necessarily raised questions concerning what such building
should achieve. In Being and Time, Heidegger notes that one of the principal ways in
which questions concerning the nature of Being-in-the-world are raised is when a
particular everyday item malfunctions, is lost, or destroyed. The worldliness of Dasein’s world is revealed precisely when that worldliness breaks down or is disturbed. In this situation Dasein must reflect on the world that s/he is always already in so that the problem may be perceived and dealt with.

The implication of this methodological argument is two-fold. Firstly, that in its everyday Being-in-the-world Dasein simply and pre-theoretically understands the worldliness of that which surrounds him/her. In this sense, Being-in-the-world is unavailable for theoretical reflection since it is simply our everyday understanding of that which surrounds us. However, when an element of Dasein’s world becomes unavailable, it is necessary to reflect on what that item is and its place in the world. In this way the worldliness of Dasein’s world is discovered and made an object of reflection. Secondly, that such cases of ‘disturbance’ make us ask questions that are ontological in character. When an element of the world is unavailable it is not simply a matter of making the malfunctioning item work again, or replacing the missing/destroyed thing. Rather, such events necessarily pose questions concerning Dasein’s Being-in-the-world: how is that item part of the worldliness of Dasein’s world?; and what does its loss mean?

It is precisely in the context of such disturbance that Heidegger’s lecture should be understood. Heidegger himself never explicitly thematises the disturbance (or destruction) of the urban environment during World War II. This is, of course, in keeping with the reprehensible silence concerning the Nazi period that characterises his entire thought. That it is reasonable to assume that the destruction of the urban environment comprises the context of Heidegger’s essay can, however, be found in
the brief mention he makes to ‘today’s housing shortages’. Moreover, it is precisely because Heidegger moves directly to pose ontological questions concerning building and dwelling, that we should see the radical disturbance of Dasein’s everyday world as the context for the essay. Heidegger notes that his ‘thinking concerning building does not presume to discover architectural ideas, let alone give rules for building.’ The radical loss of the built elements of Dasein’s world cannot be understood simply by offering guidelines for the reconstruction of the lost elements. Rather this loss must, necessarily lead us to ask the following questions: ‘1. What is it to dwell?'; 2. How does building belong to dwelling?’ In other words, the loss of the buildings that comprised the worldliness of Dasein’s everyday Being-in-the-word, leads us to ask what is it to live in such a world, and in what way does building contribute to the experience of living in that world.

Dwelling, gathering and locales

Heidegger begins his enquiry by reversing the priority that exists in our everyday understanding of the relationship between building and dwelling. Heidegger notes that dwelling has been traditionally understood as a human activity that ‘man performs alongside many other activities. We work here and dwell there.’ Buildings play a key role in this understanding of dwelling. Indeed, Heidegger notes that our traditional understanding of the relationship between building and dwelling has been in terms of a means-end relationship whereby dwelling is an activity performed in and
around certain buildings. For example, we dwell in our houses, not in our places of work. According to this understanding we build certain buildings in order to dwell.\textsuperscript{58}

However, this understanding separates building and dwelling into two activities and subordinates the latter to the former. As long as this separation is maintained, argues Heidegger, we remain unable to see the 'essential relations' between building and dwelling. Indeed, we will be confined to asking technical questions concerning whether a particular architectural design is a good or bad means towards the end of dwelling. In being confined to such technical questions we will overlook the ontological questions that the destruction of urban environments poses.

It is precisely in order to investigate the essential relations between building and dwelling that Heidegger reverses the priority that exists in the traditional understandings of the terms. Thus Heidegger argues, contrary to the traditional understanding that views buildings as a means towards the end of dwelling, that we build precisely because we always already dwell. Building is thus that which embodies the fact that we are dwellers. Or in Heidegger's own words: 'we do not dwell because we have built, but we build and have built because we dwell, that is, because we are dwellers.'\textsuperscript{59}

In order to demonstrate that we build because we are dwellers, Heidegger turns to the etymology of building. Heidegger argues that '[i]t is language that tells us about the essence of a thing, provided that we respect language's own essence.'\textsuperscript{60} With this in mind, Heidegger asks 'what does bauen, to build, mean?'.\textsuperscript{61} Heidegger traces the contemporary German bauen, to the Old High German buan. Buan, Heidegger argues, means 'to dwell'. Because we think of building as an activity that is a means to the
end of dwelling, we forget that it is etymologically rooted in the concept of dwelling itself.

In this manner, Heidegger proposes that within our everyday language there is a covert etymological trace of the fact that building is always already a dwelling and that ‘to build is really to dwell.’ However, this minimal etymological clue does not tell us anything about what the dwelling signified in building actually is. Heidegger, notes that when we think about dwelling we usually think of it as an activity that ‘man performs alongside many other activities.’ No one merely dwells, to do so would be to exist in a state of ‘virtual inactivity’. What kind of activity, then, is dwelling? Again Heidegger turns to the etymology of bauen, arguing that the Old High German words ‘bauen, buan, bhu, beo are [the contemporary German] word bin in the versions: ich bin, I am, du bist, you are’ and so on.

Ich bin, I am, is thus signified by the notion of dwelling. It is Being that is invoked in the concepts of dwelling and building. In some ways this is not surprising since both building and dwelling are ways in which Dasein is in-the-world, modes of Being. However, the direct linkage between bauen - to build as a dweller - and Being, suggests to Heidegger a fundamental relationship between dwelling and Being that is not the case for other modes of Being (such as working, or travelling, for example). Dwelling is thus said by Heidegger to be ‘the manner in which we humans are on the earth’. Building as dwelling is thus what Heidegger now calls ‘being on the earth’. Dwelling is thus precisely Heidegger’s term for Being-in-the-world in his later work.

The derivation of such a central concept through etymology may attract a certain amount of criticism. Indeed the value of etymology and other such linguistic
devices is called into question by Heidegger elsewhere in his work. As Elden notes in relation to Heidegger's translations of certain Greek terms, 'we get our knowledge of words in a foreign language from a dictionary, which is based on a preceding interpretation of linguistic concepts. A dictionary can give us pointers as to how to understand a word, but it is never an absolute authority to which we are bound. All translating must be an interpreting.' Thus what is important in Heidegger's etymology of bauen is precisely the way in which he interprets the significations of the term. Heidegger intends dwelling to be the existential condition of Dasein. That is dwelling is the way in which Dasein is in-the-world (or on-the-earth). And since dwelling is inextricably linked to building (indeed all building is a dwelling), it is building that will exemplify the manner in which we are on-the-earth (since we are never merely on the earth in an inactive state).

Prior to considering the way in which building belongs to dwelling, Heidegger sketches out the way in which dwelling, as the way humans are on the earth, should be understood. Heidegger thus provides an outline of the concept with which he will replace Being-in-the-world in his later work. Through another etymological interpretation, Heidegger argues that the 'old word bauen' is related to the Old Saxon wuon and the Gothic wunian. According to Heidegger, these words all mean 'to remain, to stay in a place'. But more significantly, these words all signify a specific way of remaining: 'Wunian means to be at peace, to be brought to peace, to remain in peace.' Again tracing a web of meaning through etymological association, Heidegger argues that peace, or Friede, actually means 'free...preserved from harm and danger, preserved from something, safeguarded. To free, actually means to
sparing.' Dwelling, argues Heidegger, is thus a 'sparing'. This sparing has a positive connotation however. It does not merely signify allowing something to exist. Rather it means to 'leave something beforehand in its essence', or to 'return it specifically to its essential being'.

As in much of Heidegger's work, this central concept has a somewhat ambiguous definition. How are we to understand this 'sparing' of which dwelling consists? Heidegger indicates that what is spared, or returned to its essential Being in and through dwelling, is the way in which humans are on the earth. Specifically human beings are on the earth as mortals. It is this mortal existence that is returned to its essential Being by dwelling.

Dwelling, or the 'stay of mortals on the earth', consists of a fourfold relationship between earth and sky, man and gods. It is this fourfold relationship, in which the four terms are distinct and yet inseparable, that is spared by dwelling (returned to its essential Being). Man is on the earth and below the sky, which is to say that earth and sky form the horizons of man's worldly existence. Throughout his work Heidegger differentiates between world, or that in and through which Dasein has existence, and earth, the natural realm that is the origin of the items that comprise worldliness. Earth is revealed by world insofar as the objects created by Dasein refer to their earthly components or basis. In 'The Origin of the Work of Art', for example, Heidegger notes that a 'temple reveals the rock on which it rests, the storm that buffets it, and the stone from which it is made...Earth is [thus] revealed as earth by the world.' The sky similarly features throughout Heidegger's work as a point of orientation for human existence.
The pairing of mortals and divinities is harder to fathom, referring not to the physical surroundings in which Dasein exists, but to the existential horizons of human Being. Dasein is, literally, mortal. Existence, or Being-in-the-world, is characterised by the finitude of Dasein (represented most clearly in the fact that Dasein will die). It is precisely the finitude of Dasein that leads to the relationship between man and gods. As a concept, gods remains ambiguous throughout 'Building Dwelling Thinking'. This is not a theistic appeal for piety, nor a reference to specific gods. Rather, it should be seen as a reference to the various social and cultural attempts that are made by mortals to comprehend and overcome their finitude. The fourfold would thus represent the poles according to which existence on the earth was to be understood. Indeed these poles would be the horizons of intelligibility that orient Being on the earth. The world of mortals is constituted on the earth (as that which provides the material out of which a world is built) and under the sky (as that which orients existence, both directionally and temporally, especially in terms of the division of our lives into night and day). And mortals comprehend their existence on the earth as finite only in and through its attempts to overcome that finitude in appeals for communion with the divine.75

The fourfold itself is both enigmatic and unclear as a figure of thought. Perhaps it is best to interpret the fourfold as a drawing together of the poles, or horizons, according to which human existence is understood. If dwelling consists of returning Dasein to its essential state of Being, it is a gathering together of the horizons that make Dasein's existence intelligible as Being-in-the-world (or on-the-earth). Dwelling is thus a making-intelligible of the stay of mortals on-the-earth as
Being-in-the-world. Dwelling should thus be understood as the gathering together of the horizons that constitute worldliness. Rather than refer to the fourfold, therefore, I will refer to the world that is gathered in dwelling.

While it is clear that, for Heidegger, dwelling is the basic existential state of human beings, the manner in which this dwelling occurs has not yet been discussed. Heidegger notes that dwelling is ‘always a staying with things’.76 In this way Heidegger reintroduces the role of things into the argument. Indeed, Heidegger argues that it is things that gather the world together. In other words, it is things that constitute the world in which mortal existence occurs. It is in the things which Dasein encounters, then, that dwelling, or the gathering together of a world, is accomplished. And this is precisely how building belongs to dwelling.

The bridge

In order to demonstrate the way in which building belongs to dwelling, Heidegger examines a specific built thing: a bridge. The bridge, according to Heidegger, exemplifies the way in which built things gather the world together. Heidegger argues that if we see the bridge as a means to an end the fundamental character of the built thing is obscured. In particular, if we see the bridge as a simple means to an end then we presume that it was the answer to an already existing set of questions and circumstances. In this way it is presumed that the landscape preceded the bridge, which was built as a means to solve the problem of the disruption of movement by a river.
However, for Heidegger this obscures the essential character of the bridge. The built thing - the bridge in this case - is not just another object in the world, but is constitutive of that world in the way that it gathers the world together. Thus the bridge ‘does not just connect banks [of the river] that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream.’77 Similarly, ‘[t]he bridge gathers the earth as landscape around the stream.’78 That is, our world exists only after it has been gathered together in various ways by built things. The banks of the river exist as opposing banks only after they have been joined together. The river is only an obstacle to transport or movement after the bridge has created ease of movement. The hinterlands behind each bank are connected together and thus brought into the same world by the bridge. And, if we follow Slavenka Draculić (in her ‘Elegy’ to the Stari Most, discussed in the Introduction), the bridge brings humans together by expressing a durability that in some way transcends our individual finitude.79

The built thing thus constitutes the existential world by being a nodal point around which a gathering occurs. And this is precisely how the directionality that was central to Heidegger’s early account of the spatiality of existence occurs. The bridge refers to either bank, and to the various towns that it joins by creating a route for goods and labour. When Dasein encounters the bridge it is this gathering that is implicitly understood as directionality.

The built thing is thus a locale, a place in which gathering occurs. And it is only because of the built thing that a specific place exists. Indeed, there are many possible positions in which the bridge could have been built. But the particular locale that is created by the building of the bridge in a given position creates a place for that
bridge. The locale, or place, consists of a number of signifying relations constituted by
the building. It is precisely these significations, established by the built thing, that
create the world in which human beings exist.

As a place, a locale could be said to be spatial insofar as the significations
constituted by the building are directional, implying a here and there, right and left and
so on. Moreover, the locale could be said to function in much the same way as
Heidegger's earlier concept of region. The building is precisely that in relation to
which all the other possible places in the world can be understood. In this sense the
building functions as a horizon of intelligibility. 'Horizon' should be understood in
the Greek sense of horismos, not as something at which an entity ends but, rather, as a
point from which something unfolds. It is from the building that the world, as a
series of significations and relations, unfolds.

The space within this spatial world is a secondary and derived feature.
Heidegger again argues that the places in which human beings exist are not simply
arranged in a pre-existent space, but, rather, that space is derived from the spatiality
constituted by the things that make up our everyday world. Space is derived by
measuring the relationship between different elements of the world. These elements
are of interest to us precisely because they are signified by the buildings that constitute
the world. Thus it is that we measure the distance between home and work, or one
home and another. This measurement takes the form of establishing a common unit of
distance to which all measurements can be reduced. Thus spatiality, which may refer
to the relationship between two elements of the world in colloquial terms (i.e., over
yonder) is reduced to space (i.e., sixty kilometres, or an hour's drive).
Thus Heidegger makes building central to his account of the manner in which humans dwell on the earth. In the context of Darmstadt, Heidegger is noting that the destruction caused by allied bombing was more than the destruction of a means to the end of living. Rather, this destruction was an existential blow, destroying the world in which the existence of the citizens of the town had been possible. Moreover, this destruction altered the spatialities of the town, destroyed spaces (since it destroyed those things between which distances had emerged through measurement), and ungathered the world. In order to expand upon this argument, I want to briefly re-view the question of the destruction of the urban environment in Mostar during the 1992-1995 Bosnian war in terms of the conceptual schema Heidegger provides in his account of dwelling.

The locale as a shared/public place

Mostar’s Stari Most provides an exemplary illustration of the manner in which a building constitutes a locale that gathers together the world, and thus comprises dwelling. Moreover, this example also returns us to the question with which this particular chapter is concerned, the always already shared character of the spaces constituted by buildings.

As a building, the Stari Most constitutes a locale. The locale is a place that comes into being in and through the construction of the bridge. There are, of course, many possible locations along the Neretva river where a bridge could have been built. However, the construction of the bridge at that particular position constituted a
specific place. This place is defined by the manner in which the locale gathers together the world. The Stari Most gathers the two sides of the Neretva canyon as opposing banks. In this way the bridge gathers together the hinterlands and routes to distant regions on each side of the Neretva. This gathering together of the landscape around the bridge constitutes an unfolding of a certain directionality from the bridge itself. The settlements on either side of the river are brought near to each other (indeed made into a single town). The hinterlands to which access is now available via the road over the bridge are also directionally and proximally oriented: Croatia and the Adriatic are beyond the edge of the town, and so on.

In addition, the Stari Most gathers together the town and orients it in a particular manner. The old quarter of the town at the foot of the bridge on the eastern side is oriented by the bridge in relation to the newer buildings built both beyond it on the same, eastern bank of the Neretva, and beyond the bridge on the western bank. As a locale the place established by the bridge can be understood as a complex relational network. This complex relational network unfolds from the bridge as the horismos against which orientation can be understood. Moreover, since every building constitutes a locale in this manner, the town consists of an infinitely complex intertwining of networks of relationality. The everyday experience of the town is precisely of such networks of relationality. Any place can be oriented a number of ways according to which locale forms the locus, or horismos, against which one is oriented.

Moreover, the space in which we think the town is located and which comprises the medium in which the buildings are distributed, is actually a derivative
of our everyday understanding of these complex relational networks. Indeed, the space of, for example, the road over the Stari Most, is derived from the reduction of the relationship between the two parapets to a quantifiable distance. The spaces of the town are simply distances, quantified according to an arbitrary but common measure, between nodes in the relational networks. The impression of objectivity that such distance achieves in the modern era can be attributed to the manner in which cartography no longer measures the distance from one locus to another as if it were embedded in the world, but attempts to give the impression that it is possible to measure the distances in the world as if one were not actually in that world. However, all distances are, in the end, simply the quantification of a relationship established by locales.

Finally, the locale is a fundamentally public horizon. The gathering that a building such as the Stari Most constitutes is in principle available to each and every human being. The world gathered together by the bridge is not, therefore, a subjective one, but a public one. And it is precisely in this respect that heterogeneity is ineluctably present in each and every locale. The Stari Most gathers together a set of elements into a relational network. This relational network is in principle available to everyone who encounters the Stari Most. Individual experiences of the Stari Most may comprise an emphasis on certain elements of the relational network and an ignorance of others. Indeed, the bridge may be many things to many different people: a cultural object; an imperial remnant; a transport link between markets; a place to display one’s diving prowess devoid of all cultural or historical significance. And yet no one experience of the bridge can exclude the other possible experiences.
Human experience of locales, of dwelling even, is always already a shared experience. That is, the relational network in which our existence is oriented, the spaces that are given to us always admit of other possible experiences, other possible uses, other possible users. The locale is never mine alone. It is not the human mind that gathers the world around locales, rather these locales are public places at which our shared world is gathered together.

It is precisely this public gathering that is at stake in urbicide. The HVO's destruction of the Stari Most represents an assault on the public gathering that the bridge constitutes. According to the logic of ethno-nationalist politics, ethnic identity is grounded in the place in which it is. Moreover, this logic holds that for the grounding to be secure and uninterrupted, that place cannot simultaneously be the ground of any other identity. Ethnic identity is thus derived from territorial emplacement. The politics of ethnic cleansing draw upon this ethno-nationalist logic to argue that in order for an ethnic identity to be secured the ground upon which it is made present must be cleared of all traces of alterity.

This clearing of the ground of identity is at work in urbicide. However, whereas it is possible to ethnically cleanse a territory by forcing out inhabitants identified as other, or heterogeneous, the buildings that remain, and the ineluctably public gatherings that they constitute, mean that the territory will always retain a trace of the possibility of alterity. It is this trace that urbicide attempts to eradicate. Urbicide is a radical ungathering of the world. This is especially evident in Mostar where the destruction of the Stari Most was the dissolution of the final relational network that gathered the settlements on both banks of the Neretva into the same world: Mostar.
The destruction of the Stari Most is, effectively the destruction of one world to create two: the destruction of Mostar to create east and west Mostar. The gathering that constituted multi-ethnic Mostar is dissolved thus creating two, ethnically distinct Mostars.

It is precisely this ungathering that Andras Riedlmayer refers to when he notes that the urban environment of Bosnia ‘speak[s] eloquently of centuries of pluralism...It is this evidence of a successfully shared past that the nationalists seek to destroy.’ The world gathered by the Stari Most was ineluctably plural, a world shaped by, among others, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Bosnian influences in which the sharing of the places established in this gathering was clearly evident. The HVO sought to destroy this evident plural sharing and to re-gather their world as an ethnically homogenous one.

The principal point to note here is that it is the always already present possibility of alterity (what Derrida might call an ever present promise of an alterity to come) in the gathering that constitutes dwelling. In many cases that possibility is actualised, and the urban environment is a place in whose spaces heterogeneity flourishes (and where, in some cases, the agonism of difference becomes the antagonism of otherness). And it is this ineluctable trace of alterity that ethno-nationalist politics (and indeed all universalising/homogenising politics) must efface. This is precisely the logic of urbicide.
Towards co-ontology

It is thus possible, through a Heideggerian interpretation of the nature of the spatiality constituted in and through buildings, to demonstrate the central proposition of my thesis: that urbicide is the destruction of buildings *qua* that which constitutes public/shared places and spaces. Furthermore, it is possible to assert that since the places and spaces constituted by building(s) are always already public and shared, the urban environment is ineluctably heterogeneous.

The Heideggerian analysis of Being-in-the-world is thus particularly productive for the analysis of urbicide. Heidegger accounts for the way in which buildings are constitutive of an ineluctably heterogeneous, or shared, existential spatiality. This account is distinctive insofar as it treats spatiality as a network of relations constituted through a worldly engagement with (built) things. In this way the Heideggerian understanding, in contradistinction to those understandings that treat space as an absolute medium, can account for the manner in which buildings are constitutive of, and do not simply occupy, the spaces in which we exist. This account thus enables us to say something about what is lost in urbicide. If space is treated as an absolute medium in which buildings are located, the destruction of buildings will have no effect upon that space. Indeed, the space will remain after the destruction of the buildings. If spatiality is constituted by buildings, however, it is possible to say that the this spatiality is lost when the buildings are destroyed.

Moreover, Heidegger’s account stresses the ineluctable presence of others in the spaces constituted by buildings. Heidegger argues that the buildings constitutive of
these spaces are fundamentally public things, available for others. Moreover, it is clear
from Heidegger's account that this public character of the things that constitute
Dasein's world should be taken to imply not merely the possibility of alterity, but the
real and ineluctable sharing of these things with others. Heidegger's account is thus
distinctive insofar as it stresses the way in which Being-in-the-world is, precisely
because of its constitution through an engagement with public/shared things, always
already a Being-with-others. This Being-with-others, as I will argue in Chapter 4 is
precisely what comprises heterogeneity. The destruction of buildings is thus not only
the destruction of space, but the destruction of shared, ineluctably heterogeneous
spaces. It is for this reason that the Heideggerian account will prove particularly
productive in the analysis of urbicide.

Heidegger alludes to the importance of this Being-with-others in his re-
working of the concept of the polis. The polis is the site, the place in which Dasein
comes to be. Although much of Heidegger's interest in the concept of polis falls
under the dark cloud of National Socialist thinking, the principal idea around which
his interpretation of this term revolves is of interest. For Heidegger, polis names the
site where Dasein is always already with others. As such the polis is the site in which
history - which, for Heidegger, is generated from the agonistic relations of human
beings - unfolds. Heidegger attempts to reserve the polis as a site for the deeds of great
and creative men. Despite this, however, it is probably more in keeping with his
designation of the polis as the site of historical Being in which antagonism, or
openness to alterity is the principal motif, to note the co-incidence of the polis and the
urban environment. Urbanity is the name of the site in which an ineluctable openness
to alterity is always already the case. This Being-with-others is precisely that which we understand as politics. And thus, although Heidegger councils against translating *polis* as 'city', it is, I think, correct to note its coincidence with urbanity.\(^8^6\)

Insofar, then, as the destruction of buildings is the destruction of public/shared spaces, it is Being-with-others that is at stake in urbicide. The very conditions of such Being-with-others are destroyed by those that raze towns and cities. And it is precisely to this Being-with-others that I want to turn in the next chapter. In this chapter I have looked at the manner in which, insofar as they constitute the places in which we dwell, (built) things provide the conditions of possibility of Being-with-others. However, this account only sketches out the conditions of possibility of such heterogeneity. This sketch merely demonstrates that Being-in-the-world, insofar as it is constituted by an engagement with buildings is always already a Being-with-others. I have, however, said nothing about this the nature of Being-with-others (or heterogeneity). To return to my initial formulation of Heidegger's project, it is possible to say that I want to turn at this point to the question of the *way in which* Being is with-others. It is this question that will reveal precisely what is lost in urbicide.

This question of Being-with-others is taken up by Heidegger in his work on the concept of *Mitsein*. *Mitsein* represents the Being-with-others that necessarily follows from the public spatiality that characterises the existence of Dasein. I will examine Heidegger's account of the way in which Being-in-the-world is always already a Being-with-others. Moreover, I will look at the manner in which *Mitsein* is not simply a Being-with-other-humans, but is a fundamental Being-with that occurs in the public places established by built things. This Being-with comprises a fundamental
openness to alterity constituted in and through dwelling in locales. Moreover, this openness to alterity, or Being-with-others, always already implicates Being in community. That is, insofar as Being is always already a Being-with-others it is also community (since Being-with-others is the defining characteristic of community). My elaboration of Heidegger's account of Mitsein will thus also be an examination of his (reprehensibly misguided) understanding of community. Ultimately, in Chapters 5 and 6, I will suggest that it is this openness to alterity - or community - that comprises the target of urbicide. This would mean that urbicide is an assault on community/Being-with-others. In order to examine this meaning of urbicide - and its relationship with ethno-nationalism - it is, however, necessary to first of all sketch out the nature of its target: Being-with-others.
CHAPTER 4

THE NATURE OF HETEROGENEITY: FROM BEING-IN-THE-WORLD TO MITSEIN

The world of Dasein is a with-world. Being-in is Being-with Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with.¹

But if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny. This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a people.²

A preliminary analysis of the destruction of urban environments

The urban/built environment in which we dwell is, insofar as it comprises a complex network of locales (or gatherings), a fundamentally heterogeneous space. This fundamental heterogeneity is derived from the manner in which the spatiality constituted in and through the locales that comprise the urban/built environment is essentially public, or shared. This public/shared spatial Being-in-the-world, or dwelling, is precisely what we refer to as the urban experience: an experience whose chief attribute is that of an ineluctable heterogeneity. In this sense a systematic attempt to destroy the constitutive basis of such heterogeneity is best understood as comprising 'urbicide'.
The recognition that the destruction of urban environments comprises a phenomenon in its own right offers a vital insight into the seemingly excessive assault on buildings in conflicts such as the 1992-95 Bosnian war. Moreover, this recognition demands that analyses of such destruction should note the manner in which the urban environment in its entirety is the target of a systematic destruction. That is to say, insofar as buildings are destroyed because they are constitutive of urbanity, it is urbanity in its entirety - and the heterogeneity that characterises it - that is at stake in urbicide. Analyses of urban destruction should, therefore, no longer be confined to those individual cases in which violations of the extant laws of war have been perpetrated. This recognition of the manner in which urbicide is directed at the urban environment as a whole points to the inadequacy of the current juridico-legal framework for treating the destruction of urban environments. In particular it indicates that a focus on either of the two principal violations of the present laws of war - the destruction of cultural heritage (a violation of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict) and militarily unnecessary destruction (a violation of, for example, the Nuremberg Charter 6(b), the 1977 Geneva Protocol I 52(2), and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 2(d), 3(b), (c) & (d)) - is too narrow to properly comprehend the destruction of urban environments.³

It is precisely in this regard that the concept of urbicide has its most significant utility. The publication of Mostar-92 Urbicide by a group of architects from Mostar was an attempt to draw attention to the fact that the destruction of the urban environment in the 1992-95 Bosnian war did not respect the conceptual limitations of
those analyses concerned with violence against cultural heritage. Moreover, this
destruction did not respect the concept of military necessity or the correlate concept of
collateral damage. The concept of urbicide was deployed to note that there was a
systematic assault on the urban fabric throughout Bosnia which made all buildings
targets for destruction. By arguing that buildings are the constitutive elements of the
heterogeneity that comprises urbanity, and demonstrating that this is the case through
an exposition of the manner in which buildings constitute the spatiality in which we
dwell as always already public/shared, I have shown that this deployment of the
concept of urbicide in relation to the destruction of urban fabric in the 1992-95
Bosnian war is indeed more productive than the present juridico-legal concepts
available to analysts of the urban devastation of Bosnia.

From the analysis of urbicide to the question(s) of heterogeneity

However, noting that such destruction comprises urbicide is, in itself, only a
preliminary measure in the analysis of the destruction of buildings in conflicts such as
the 1992-95 Bosnian war. That this definition of violence against the urban fabric as
urbicide is a preliminary measure does not, of course, undermine the utility that the
term possesses. Indeed, I hope that I have shown the utility of this concept both above
and in Chapter 2. However, this preliminary measure largely comprises a vital ground
clearing on which further analysis can be predicated. The concept of urbicide both
notes that the destruction of the urban fabric is of vital concern to analysts of violence
such as that witnessed in the 1992-95 Bosnian war and indicates the characteristics of
such violence (chiefly the assault upon the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity). However, as a preliminary step, the definition of the violence witnessed in Bosnia as urbicide, leaves important questions unanswered.

Most importantly, the preliminary definition of urbicide leaves unanswered the question of what exactly it is that urbicide discloses. Since it is the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity that are attacked in the course of urbicide, it is, I think, safe to say that urbicide discloses something of the heterogeneity that characterises shared/public urban dwelling. That is to say, the observation that the destruction wrought during conflicts such as the 1992-95 Bosnian war comprises urbicide, or the destruction of the conditions of heterogeneity, begs the question both of precisely what is lost when such conditions of possibility are destroyed, and the political purpose/consequence of the loss of such heterogeneity. However, the preliminary definition of urbicide speaks simply of an assault on heterogeneity, sharing, and alterity without offering any further explanation of the nature of the Being-with-others that such terms imply. Thus it is the question of the character of the heterogeneity that was the target of gunners across Bosnia that has been left unanswered at this point in my argument.

In Chapter 3 I argued that Being-in-the-world (or dwelling, Heidegger's later formulation of Being-in-the-world) is an always already shared, or public, spatial experience. Moreover, I demonstrated that this spatiality is constituted in and through that which expresses the fact that we are dwellers: building. Buildings, as that which expresses our Being-in-the-world as dwellers (rather than being a means towards the end of that dwelling), constitute our world as a series of locales or gatherings (which I
characterised as complex relational networks). According to Heidegger the (built) things that constitute such locales are inherently public. That is to say, the world does not appear subjectively for a single Dasein (conceived as an ego-cogito). Rather the world in which we dwell is constituted through things that are in principle available to all those that have the character of Dasein. Thus the spatiality established in locales is, in principle, open to sharing with Others that have the character of Dasein.

It was on this basis that I argued that I had demonstrated that buildings, as that which constitutes the world as a shared/public, spatial experience, are the condition of possibility of an essential heterogeneity. My assertion that 'urbicide' is the correct term for the destruction of urban environments in conflicts such as the 1992-95 Bosnian war rests on this basic proposition. Urbicide refers to the 'killing' (by destroying its conditions of possibility) of that which characterises urbanity: heterogeneity. Since buildings constitute the spatiality of existence as fundamentally shared/public, I argued that I had demonstrated that destroying the buildings that make up the urban fabric, is essentially a destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. Where that destruction has occurred, or is occurring, it is thus possible to say that heterogeneity itself is under assault.

This demonstration of the link between dwelling, building, and heterogeneity rests on two interrelated assumptions: (1) that the shared/public character of the spatiality in and through which Being-in-the-world comes to be entails the possibility of alterity on which heterogeneity is predicated; (2) that the difference that heterogeneity entails is a self-evident matter (i.e., that the heterogeneity referred to - and the difference it implies - requires no further clarification regarding its character).
It is these assumptions that I want to address in the remainder of this chapter. I will turn first to the question of the (at present implicit) relation of sharing to difference (the basis of my claim that buildings constitute the condition of possibility of heterogeneity). By demonstrating that sharing (Being-in-a-world that is public and, hence, always also the world of Others) entails difference (that those with whom the world is shared are Other than me and thus different to, and not identical with, me), I hope to clarify that sharing constitutes the world as heterogeneous. I will then turn to the nature of the heterogeneity - the character of the Being-with that is implicit in Being-in-the-world-with-others - entailed in this concept of sharing.

**Heterogeneity: the difference implicit in sharing**

I want to start, then, by examining the first assumption that my previous exegesis of 'urbicide' has made: that the sharing of essentially public (built) things implies heterogeneity. This examination of the manner in which heterogeneity is implicit in the sharing of existential spatiality will then lead later in this chapter to a consideration of the nature of this heterogeneity.

Sharing is commonly conceived in one of two ways, either as the ([un]even/[un]equal) distribution of goods among individual persons/subjects, or the communal partaking of a substance from which Being derives a certain value or meaning. These two concepts of distribution or communion typically circumscribe the two poles of political thought concerning the manner in which we share. The former position can be identified as that held by liberal political theories that adhere to an
underlying notion of 'possessive individualism'. C.B. Macpherson coined the term 'possessive individualism' to refer to the 'unifying assumption[s]' on which 'liberal democratic thought from John-Stuart Mill to the present' is premised. The 'unifying assumption[s]' that ground 'possessive individualism' are summarised by Macpherson in seven propositions, the most important of which for my present argument are:

'(i) What makes a man human is freedom from dependence on the wills of others';

'(v) Human society consists of a series of market relations'; and

'(vii) Political society is a human contrivance for the protection of the individual's property in his person and goods...'

According to such theories sharing is conceived of as the reconciliation of claims to goods by those that make up the community. In this sense the distribution (or sharing out) of goods is necessary in so far as there is no inherent or originary possession of those goods. This problematic comprises the principle focus of concern for liberal political theories such as Rawls' Theory of Justice.

Such theories are premised upon the assumption that sovereign free individual persons/subjects necessarily co-exist in the same space and, due to the competing claims to goods that arise in this state of co-existence, a system of distribution, or sharing out is thus necessary. According to such theoretical positions sharing can be seen as the distribution of goods to individuals for their sole use (in this sense sharing is a sharing-out, a division of goods amongst, or their assignment to, individuals), or the designation of certain goods to be held in common by two or more individuals or
the political bodies they have chosen to represent them (in this sense sharing is a *sharing-in* or common usage of goods).

The opposite pole of thought concerning sharing (that of a communion with, or partaking of, a substance from which all the members of a community derive the meaning of their Being) can be identified as a broadly Hegelian theme that resonates in, amongst other places, Marxist political theory and notions of Christian community. This theme comprises a teleological dialectic of reconciliation between the particular in the form of the political subject and the universal substance s/he embodies. In this dialectic, the final *Aufhebung* represents a recuperation of the particular to the universal substance from which it derives its Being (be that spirit, the class struggle, or the kingdom of God). Sharing is thus a *partaking-of* a common universal substance held to be that from which any meaning of individual, particular Being is to be derived.

In the terms established in Chapter 3, the liberal conception of the sharing of existential spatiality sees that spatiality as the neutral backdrop for individual existences in which the question of how the things constitutive of that spatiality will be possessed (either solely or in common) is the primary political problematic. In contradistinction, a secular dialectical conception of such sharing would treat the existential spatiality in and through which Being-in-the-world is possible as the common substance from which the meaning of individual lives was to be derived. Theistic variations of such dialectical conceptions might invest the existential spatiality outlined in Chapter 3 with certain divine attributes and thus hold that
existence within this space was a partaking of the divine substance which gives meaning to existence.

And yet neither of these conceptions properly accounts for the heterogeneity that I have argued is implicit in the shared/public character of existential spatiality. For both conceptions sharing is an ancillary action - after the fact of the existence of either free subjects or the substance which particular individuals embody. In contradistinction, however, for Heidegger the point is not that we exist in the same space and then share-out (or share-in) its goods, or partake-of its meaning-giving possibilities. Rather, the things that constitute this spatiality constitute it as always already shared. That is to say, the things that constitute the shared spatiality (in and through which Being-in-the-world is possible) are always already shared. These things (which include, according to my argument in the previous chapter, buildings) are not simply extant in space, waiting to be distributed/assigned. Neither is the existential spatiality constituted by (built) things a substance that is partaken of by particular individuals.

In other words, both of the common place conceptions of sharing fail to grasp the fundamental level on which Heidegger is arguing that the things with which we dwell are always already shared. It is worth, therefore, examining the understanding of sharing that can be found in Heidegger. In this respect, Jean-Luc Nancy’s reflections on the sharing that lies at the heart of Heidegger’s existential analytic (despite also being the basis of a thorough critique of the Heideggerian conception of Being-with-others) are instructive.¹⁰
Nancy concurs with Heidegger’s analysis that existence is a fundamentally shared phenomenon. Although Nancy does not approach the question of the constitution of existence through the analysis of its spatiality, he agrees with Heidegger’s argument that Being-in-the-world is essentially a Being-with-others. It is, therefore, possible to read Nancy’s comments concerning sharing as a commentary on Heidegger’s account of the manner in which essentially public/shared things are constitutive of existential spatiality. Moreover, Nancy argues that sharing is the most fundamental event in the constitution of Being-in-the-world. Nancy’s argument thus essentially concurs with Heidegger’s analysis as it was set out in Chapter 3. For Heidegger, Being-in-the-world is not prior to the shared nature of things. Indeed, Being-in-the-world (or spatial existence) is constituted in and through things that are at the very same time always already shared. Thus the things that are constitutive of existence are fundamentally shared in the very moment of constitution of existence.

This essential sharing that marks the constitutive moment of existence leads Nancy to propose a very different conception of what it means ‘to share’ to those outlined above. It is important to note at this stage that whilst it is premised upon Heidegger’s assertion of the fundamental sharing that is constitutive of the spatiality of existence, Nancy’s conception of sharing is intended to form the basis of a thorough critique of the conclusions to which Heidegger comes concerning the way in which this sharing constitutes a certain way of Being-with-others. That is to say, whilst Nancy’s account of sharing accepts and endorses Heidegger’s basic propositions regarding Being-with-others, he deploys this concept in order to critique the conclusions to which Heidegger comes (especially in Being and Time) concerning
the way in which we share. At this point, however, I want to concentrate on Nancy's explication of the conception of sharing entailed by Heidegger's account of Being-in-the-world. I will turn to the manner in which Nancy deploys this conception of sharing as a critique of Heidegger's conclusions regarding community in *Being and Time* in Chapter 5.

Shared things are, insofar as they are constitutive of existential spatiality, that which establishes a common existential 'world' and that which intimates the presence of Others in that world. It is precisely the manner in which the thing intimates the presence of Others that is central to Nancy's conception of sharing. In one sense, insofar as they are shared/public, the things that are constitutive of existential spatiality are the common property of all who exist. In this sense things establish a relation between an individual Dasein and the Others that inhabit the 'world' whose presence is intimated by the shared/public character of the things that constitute it. This relation is one of Being-in-the-world, Being in the same spatial existence, and having the character of Dasein. That is, these things intimate a relation between an individual Dasein and the other beings that have the character of Dasein for whom things also constitute the spatiality of existence. In this way the things that form Heidegger's favourite examples, such as the cloth made into garments by a tailor, establish a relation of Being-in-the-same-world between an individual Dasein (the tailor perhaps) and other beings that have the same character as that Dasein (such as the prospective wearer of the garment).

However, things also establish a division that is co-extensive with, and equally as important as, the relation they establish. Insofar as things intimate the existence of
other beings with the character of Dasein (i.e., Others), they establish that each being is in some way different to the others and thus divide individuals from one another.\textsuperscript{11} In other words the thing intimates the possible presence of an Other and in constituting the Other \textit{qua} Other, divides a singular Dasein from its Others. Moreover, this division is the genesis of individuality. It is only insofar as the thing divides the self from Others that the self comes to exist as an ‘individual’.\textsuperscript{12} This understanding of the genesis of individuality stands in stark contrast to the two common-place notions of sharing that I discussed above - both of which conceive of the individual as pre-existing the association with Others.

This is the core moment in the constitution of existential spatiality as a fundamentally heterogeneous experience. The Other must be divided from, and thus essentially different to, that for whom it comprises an Other. If this was not the case then there would be no essential difference in Being-in-the-world, and dwelling in the existential spatiality constituted by (built) things would not be a fundamentally heterogeneous experience.

Thus for Nancy the sharing that is a fundamental characteristic of Dasein’s Being-in-the world, is both a relation and a division. Moreover, there is no way of surmounting this relation/division character. That is to say, the thing always both relates and divides and there exists no way to alienate the relation or reconcile the divisions. Which is to say things are never the sole property of an individual (because there is no way of alienating the relation things establish with Others), and a body constituted around things can never overcome the divisions within it that those things
establish (which means that the ideal of coming together to partake in the thing as substance and thus become one body is simply that - an ideal).

Nancy's explication of the conceptual contours of the idea of sharing at work in Heidegger's conception of Being-in-the-world as essentially a Being-with-others leads him to note that since the fundamental experience of existence is a Being-with-others, community is to be taken to be co-extensive with existence itself. Existence is, therefore, always already the experience of community. That is to say, the experience of Being-with-others is fundamental to existence (not, as many political theories argue something contrived after the fact of individual existence). And it is sharing, the relation/division performed by the (built) things with which we dwell, that constitutes Being-in-the-world as co-extensive with the experience of community. As Howard Caygill notes,

the share is the movement of inauguration and dissolution of community, not as a dialectical movement of loss and recovery, but as the folding of both into each other. In the share, the individual is neither master nor slave, neither owner nor owned, but is both divided from and joined with Others. The share violently sunders and brings together community, not in terms of a sacrificial liturgy in which violence is followed by redemption, but as a simultaneous and inseparable experience of founding and destructive violence. In this thought of the share, violence does not assail the community from without, but is ever implicated in it.\textsuperscript{13}
This conception of sharing, derived from Heidegger's argument that Being-in-the-world is essentially a Being-with-others (constituted in and through the way in which we dwell with things) thus establishes that existence is a fundamentally heterogeneous experience. Heterogeneity is always already implicated in the way in which the sharing of things (which is constitutive of existential spatiality) is always already a relation/division that constitutes Being-in-the-world as a Being-with-others. Moreover, since dwelling is an essentially shared experience (insofar as the gathering that constitutes locales is performed around shared things) it always already implicates Being in community. The question of the heterogeneous nature of existence is thus always already the question of community.

In some respects this may appear to be a somewhat obvious statement. After all, the question of the nature of Being-with-others appears to be the question that has dominated the history of political thought. Indeed, concepts such as freedom, equality, justice, and ethics are all formulated against the background of an assumption that politics comprises the regulation of this basic condition of Being-with-others. However, the conception of sharing that Nancy outlines, derived as it is from Heidegger's work (especially in Being and Time), fundamentally reorients the question of Being-with-others as the essential political question. Not only does this conception of the sharing of existential spatiality locate Being-with-others as constitutive of Being-in-the-world, it also demands a re-conceptualisation of the manner in which Being-with-others is understood. That this is the case can be seen though a brief analysis of the manner in which the question of Being-with-others is approached by liberal political theory.
Anthropocentrism and plurality

As I noted above, liberal political theory, premised as it is upon the ontological assumptions of possessive individualism, conceives of Being-with-others as an empirically unavoidable, yet essentially subsidiary, aspect of Being. That is to say, liberal political theory acknowledges that Being-with-others is an empirical fact. However, despite the facticity of this Being-with-others (which is the motivating force behind liberal attempts to reconcile the various competing claims to political entitlement), liberal political theory argues that this empirical situation is not an essential aspect of Being. Indeed, liberal political theory begins with the proposition that individual, sovereign, and free political subjects are the components from which any Being-with-others is contrived. In other words those theories that are based on the assumptions of possessive individualism conceive of Being as the existence in and for themselves of sovereign free individuals. Society, community, or Being-with-others is thus, whilst factually the case, a contrivance that is supplementary to the basic state of human existence.

Liberal political theory’s conception of political subjectivity has a profound effect on its understanding of both Being-with-others and sharing. Firstly, the political subject is conceived of as an essentially free and sovereign individual. This sovereign, free individual precedes Being-with-others (and indeed Being-in-the-world). The world and others, whilst empirical facts of existence are precisely what constrain the realisation of this subject’s essential ontology: sovereign freedom. Many liberal theories consist of a set of abstractive meditations designed to strip away the empirical
constraints which efface the essential ontological properties of political subjectivity. In this way, it is argued the proper conclusions regarding the way in which sovereign, free political subjects should live their lives can be ascertained. For example, in *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls argues that the most fair conception of justice can be arrived at by stripping away the empirical contingencies which shape human existence in order to look at the principles of justice from an 'original position'. The 'veil of ignorance' that shrouds this original position and prevents empirical contingency from perverting the derivation of justice from the basic ontological characteristics of political subjects - sovereignty (choice), freedom, and equality - divides the ontologically primary state of Being - the individual - from the world of empirical contingency in which human existence occurs.\textsuperscript{15} Notwithstanding various attempts to amend this theoretical position, Rawls is essentially arguing that political subjects are first and foremost sovereign, free individuals and secondarily beings in the world.\textsuperscript{16}

This understanding of Being leads liberal political theory to conceive of political subjects as 'unencumbered and antecedently individuated...[and thus] prior to society'.\textsuperscript{17} Liberal political theorists are right of course to protest against the misconception that they are ignorant of the empirical facticity of society.\textsuperscript{18} However, it must be noted that this is not my point. My point here is that the ontology underlying liberal political thought, premised as it on the assumptions of possessive individualism, conceives of Being in terms of a sovereign, free individual existing prior to being in the world - at which point the individual becomes encumbered and constrained by the empirical contingencies of human existence. It is precisely on the basis of this ontological assumption that liberal political theory conceives of Being-
with-others as a secondary characteristic of Being. Being-with-others arises either through the contingencies of empirical circumstance or a voluntaristic association. That is, either it is the case that we must be with Others because contingent empirical circumstance is such that we coexist in the same space as Others or we chose to be with Others (often in a contractual way).

It is this ontological assumption about the nature of the political subject that leads to the liberal conception of sharing. Since individuals exist prior to being in the world with Others, sharing can only be conceived of as an antecedent allocation of goods to these subjects. This allocation is deemed necessary for two reasons: 1) because, although their existential qualities are prior to the contingencies of the world it is an empirical fact that subjects exist in the world with others; and 2) as things are part of the empirical contingency of the world they are not intrinsically related to the subjects that inhabit the world - the subject is, since it is sovereign, existentially unfettered by any relations with things despite its empirical entanglements with questions of allocation of goods. The free, sovereign individual can own goods either solely or jointly, but cannot share in a more fundamental sense. To share in a more fundamental sense would be to violate the principle that the individual is essentially sovereign and free. Indeed, it would entail a constraint of freedom through the establishment of an ontological relation to Others. This is why liberal political theory is satisfied to pursue a fairly narrow range of questions concerning the manner in which individuals who have no essential relation to one another can allocate goods amongst themselves (either sharing them out through a system of market-style
mechanisms of possession, or holding them in common where the good(s) cannot be wholly possessed by an individual).

The problem with such a conception of sharing, and the Being-with-others it entails, is that there can be no essential heterogeneity attendant to it. Heterogeneity may be an empirical fact of existence and yet it is not an ontological aspect of political subjectivity. Thus the heterogeneity that characterises urban environments can only be seen as an empirical contingency. Correspondingly the destruction of buildings cannot be conceived of as the destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. That is, since heterogeneity is only empirically contingent to the urban experience, there is no essential link between the buildings that comprise urbanity and the heterogeneity that is characteristic of this urbanity. Indeed, though it is the case that empirically urbanity is characterised by heterogeneity there is, according to the ontological assumptions of liberal political theory, nothing about the structure of existence that would support the assertion that the destruction of urban environments necessarily comprises a destruction of heterogeneity. Although it might be conceded that, in the majority of empirical cases, heterogeneity might be so destroyed, it is not the case that each and every time a systematic assault on urban fabric occurs it is heterogeneity that is at stake. This is because heterogeneity, or Being-with-others is a contingent and entirely subsidiary aspect of human existence and, hence, has no essential conditions of possibility the destruction of which would, in each and every case, lead to the invocation of the concept of urbicide.

The contingent nature of heterogeneity can be attributed to the essential anthropocentrism of the ontological assumptions that underpin liberal political theory.
And it is this anthropocentrism that bequeaths liberal political theory a particularly thorny problem. As I noted, the problem is that Being-with-others is regarded as an ancillary, subsidiary, and contrived aspect of political subjectivity. Whether one is forced into Being-with-others by contingent circumstance, or one chooses to enter into a Being-with-others, this community is conceived of as a constraining addition to the principal ontological characteristics of political subjects. These political subjects are conceived of as human persons unencumbered by any relationships and thus entirely free, or sovereign with regard to their lives.

Whilst the individual human person may appear to be a common-sense starting point for a political theory, it is also a problematic starting point. Firstly, such theories rest on an idealised vision of the human person. Whilst conceiving of our bodies in isolation as the starting point of politics may flatter our sense of self-worth, it is ultimately something of a fantasy. The notion of sovereignty that such an image implies is, after all demonstrably problematic since our choices are always already legislated by such things as the languages we speak, the social systems we live in, the tastes to which we subscribe, and our kinship and sexual relationships. That is to say the notion of a sovereign human person that is the origin of all political action is highly problematic. However, anthropocentrism has two further problematic consequences.

Firstly, and most significantly, the seemingly innocuous assumption that the human person comprises the subject of politics leads to a central concern with the business of human individuals. The principal consequence of this concern is that ethics and politics concern themselves almost wholly with the conduct of humans
towards other humans (and in some cases the proper human conduct towards animals - though such concerns usually anthropomorphise animals). This means that political problems are identified as being those in which persons are affected. The consequence of this concern is that liberal-anthropocentric political theories devalue the theoretical importance of phenomenon such as the destruction of the urban environment. Indeed, such destruction is only of consequence insofar as it affects human individuals, makes them homeless, and deprives them of their sense of cultural identity through the loss of what is considered to be heritage. Where there is thought to be no direct consequence for human individuals then no political problem arises.

It is for this reason that the destruction of the homes of prospective returnees in Bosnia is conceived of as an act of intimidation rather than as an act against the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. Moreover, it is why the destruction of Dubrovnik (a site listed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List as part of the cultural heritage of humanity) - conceived of as an assault on the sense of cultural identity and civility possessed by persons in both Croatia and the larger world - is more important than the destruction of villages across Bosnia and Kosovo which have no buildings purporting to be of cultural significance. Indeed, in the case of the destruction of cultural heritage the irony is that anthropocentrism reads such destruction not as an assault on buildings but as an attack on individuals (and their collective groupings), as it is an attack on an identity possessed by those individuals through the existence of the buildings. Anthropocentrism thus displaces the meaning of the destruction of urban environments from the loss of those environments to the purported loss of identity suffered as a result by human persons. The destruction of buildings is not seen
as something to be examined in its own right for the meanings it discloses, but rather something that only matters in so far as it is instrumental in causing an injury to the identity of human persons. This means that anthropocentrism cannot admit that in each and every case of destruction of buildings the conditions of heterogeneity are under attack. Rather it is limited to assessing each case of destruction in order to determine whether some person or group has suffered an assault on their identity through the destruction of cherished buildings. It is precisely in this way that no one mourns the loss of ugly buildings, since their loss is not thought of as important for any person's or group's identity.

However, this demand that a political problem have reference to a consequence upon individual human persons (i.e., that a political problem is defined by it being a problem for human persons, not in and of itself), is not the only problem that anthropocentrism bequeaths liberal political theories. Since the basic unit of analysis for such theories is the sovereign individual, the basic motivating force behind political action is taken to be choice. Moreover, such choice is conceived of as the execution of the *intent* to exercise one's freedom to choose in a particular manner. This means that every political problem must be traced back to the *intent to choose* a particular course of action. This seems to me to be the most damaging assumption that anthropocentrism bequeaths liberal theory.

The effect of the centrality of anthropocentric assumptions for such accounts of politics can be seen in the hegemony of the concept of 'intent' in international jurisprudence. The effects of the widespread anthropocentric assumption that political problems can be explained via the intent of sovereign individuals are at their starkest
in the problematic juridical definition of genocide. The 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide clearly states that genocide consists of the ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’.\(^2\) The consequence of such a definition is that for any individual or group to be found guilty of genocide this intent must be demonstrated. Moreover, and more importantly, it means that where intent cannot be demonstrated, genocide cannot be deemed to have occurred. Thus it is conceivable that a state could eradicate ‘a national, ethnical racial or religious group’ as an unintended consequence of another action (e.g., flooding an area to create a dam for the purpose of generating hydroelectricity) without this eradication constituting genocide.

That this problem of intention derives from anthropocentric assumptions should be made clear. It is because an idealised image (or gestalt) of the human person is taken to constitute the political subject that the concept of intent is given such prominence. It is productive to see this notion - or image - of human subjectivity through the Lacanian account of the formation of the self in the mirror phase (the point at which the infant enters into the imaginary order). According to Lacan the infant imagines - through identification with a specular (mirror) image of itself - an ideal image of him/herself in which their dependency upon their parents and Others is denied. In this ideal image the self is located in, and in control of, the unified/total body that the infant sees when it looks in the mirror. It is only later, in accepting the failure of attempts at self-sufficiency/being-unencumbered, and entering the symbolic order (specifically through the entry language), that the subject recognises the
impossibility of such a fantasy (though the imaginary order persists in attempts to realise the ideal of sovereign individuality).\textsuperscript{22}

Intent is the logical corollary of the notion of sovereignty (which holds that the ideal human person is unencumbered by the constraints of Being-with-others and thus free to choose and choice, of course, postulates the existence of an intent to exercise one's freedom in a particular way). Specifically, in the imagined image of the self with which anthropocentric notions of political subjectivity work, it is the control over the unified body of the self that is of particular importance. For the model of unencumbered sovereign agency on which anthropocentrism relies to work, it must be the case that is the subject who causes their body/self to act in the way that it does. And this is only possible if the subject is in some way master of a unified body/self that is pliable and responsive to the instructions of the subject. It is precisely this model that Lacan sketches in his account of the imaginary order. The imaginary ideal is that every action of the self is derived from and ordered by the self. The reality that the derivation of our actions and indeed our capacity to influence the world in the way that a notion of sovereign unencumbrance implies is neither internal nor transparent and within our control, begins to problematise the reliance of liberal political theory and contemporary international jurisprudence on notions of intent. For the purposes of the present argument it is the consequences of such anthropocentric assumptions for analyses of the destruction of urban environments that is of principal concern.

The hegemony of liberal political theory and its embodiment in international jurisprudence means that the destruction of urban environments is conceived only through the prism of anthropocentrism. I have noted that this means that destruction
is only of consequence when it affects human persons (typically through their death or injury, or their loss of identity through the loss of putative heritage). In this respect the concept of urbicide is a direct challenge to such anthropocentrism because it notes that the destruction of urban environments is of consequence in and of itself since it represents the destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity that is an essential aspect of Being-in-the-world.

However, it is the anthropocentric assumption that the destruction of urban environments can only be described as such when it is possible to prove that an intent to destroy such environments existed that is more important at this point in my argument. The ICTY issues indictments for crimes committed against the urban fabric of Bosnia only where it can be shown that the intent to ‘wantonly destroy cities or towns’ existed. This means that it is not possible to assert that in each and every case in which an assault on the urban environment occurred, urbicide (or an assault on the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity) occurred. One can only argue for the consequence of destruction on a case by case basis where intent to destroy can be shown.

Contesting the anthropocentric imaginary: subjectivity and Being-with-others

It is precisely this anthropocentric hegemony of intent that the concept of urbicide contests. Indeed, the argument that the destruction of urban environments constitutes in each and every case an assault on the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity that are a constitutive aspect of Being-in-the-world, is intended to move
beyond arguments concerning the intent behind such destruction. In this manner the concept of urbicide demonstrates that the destruction of urban environments has a certain meaning and purpose in and of itself which must be recognised in order to see the full extent of the political problematic which such destruction poses. Moreover, if we are bound to anthropocentric assumptions concerning the meaning and consequence of such destruction we fail to note the fundamentally ontological problematic that this violence reveals insofar as it destroys the conditions of possibility of a heterogeneity that is a fundamental condition of existence.

This contestation of the hegemony of anthropocentric assumptions can be seen in the conception of sharing which I have derived (via the work of Jean-Luc Nancy) from my preliminary analysis of the meaning of the destruction of urbicide. If my argument holds then urbicide is the destruction of an essential sharing that contests such anthropocentrism on a fundamental level. This should not come as too much of a surprise since Nancy's re-conceptualisation of Heidegger's thought concerning Being-with-others is driven by a fundamental agreement with the latter's project to contest the hegemony of subjectivism in western philosophy. Both Nancy and Heidegger identify the dominance of an anthropocentric conception of subjectivity (principally that conception which gives rise to instrumental modes of life) in our modern condition. The concept of fundamental sharing at stake in urbicide is thus to be seen as a contestation of the political subject bequeathed to political theory by anthropocentric liberal modes of thought.

That this sharing indeed represents such a challenge to anthropocentric subjectivism can be seen in the manner in which it posits a fundamental and
ineluctable alterity which de-centres the traditionally unencumbered subject of political thought. The fundamental sharing that both Nancy and Heidegger perceive to be constitutive of Being-in-the-world consists of an ineluctable relationality that sharply contrasts with the idea of a lone, unencumbered, individual political subject who approaches community as an empirical contrivance that either constrains or regulates the freedom/choice that is the inalienable character of this sovereign subject. Moreover, this relationality means that an ineluctable alterity is a constitutive element of the political subject. And thus the ideas of sovereignty, freedom, and choice on which the idea of the liberal political subject is premised are radically contested.

However, it is not this constitutive relation with alterity (or fundamental community/Being-with-others) that is the most significant challenge to liberal political theory’s vision of the unencumbered, sovereign individual. Liberal political theory conceives of the political subject as an ego-cogito, in principle prior to and distinct from the constraints and contrivances of the empirical world. In contradistinction Nancy’s conception of sharing relies on a variation of Heidegger’s existential ontology of Being-in-the-world. As I noted in Chapter 3, for Heidegger, nothing precedes the world, and the world is all that there is. Being is never prior to, nor distinct from, the world in which it is. This is the fundamental point of the idea of Being-in-the-world. For Heidegger, as well as Nancy, Being-in-the-world is the basis of existence, and existence is all that there is. This is why it is with Descartes and Husserl that Heidegger most often engages in *Being and Time* and later works. For Heidegger the pure philosophies of subjectivity that both of these philosophers develop represents a fundamental misreading of the character of human existence. For
Heidegger, these philosophies of subjectivity represent the corruption of the meaning of Being that has caused the decline of Western philosophy's ability to understand the true meaning of Being.

According to Heidegger, Being is always already in-the-world. As such Being is, moreover, always already with Others. Ideas such as the ego-cogito or the sovereign, free political subject represent *modes* of thinking about Being-in-the-world-with-others. Furthermore, these modes of thinking are essentially *deficient* modes of thinking insofar as they represent attempts to deny the true meaning of Being as Being-in-the-world-with-others. One can conceive of the subject as sovereign and free, but only if one ignores, or disavows the essential community that characterises Being-in-the-world. This existentialism represents the most significant challenge to liberal political theory's conception of Being-in-the-world-with-others as the contrived coexistence of free, sovereign subjects.²⁸

However, this leaves political theory with a distinct problematic: how do we understand the political subject in light of Heidegger and Nancy's contestation of the essentially Cartesian model of political subjectivity? Heidegger recognises this problem (though not in the register of political theory). In *Being and Time*, he notes that his analysis of Dasein as Being-in-the-world has radically challenged the Cartesian and Husserlian philosophies of subjectivity. Moreover, he recognises that the question of subjectivity is an important one, after all Dasein is that which 'I' am, it is the Being that humans possess.²⁹ In common sense terms, Dasein would appear to comprise the kind of individual person on which liberal political theory, or philosophies of subjectivity are premised. In order to resolve this ambiguity,
Heidegger turns his attention to a question that he phrases as that of the ‘who’ of Dasein. This question is one of the most significant and far reaching questions posed in Being and Time (though Heidegger’s conclusions regarding this question may not, as we shall see, be that desirable). Who is Dasein? As that for which Being is a question, and that which represents the kind of Being that humans have, what kind of person is Dasein? Is it an individual subject or something else?

These questions refer to the second assumption that I outlined earlier as being unexplored in my exegesis of ‘urbicide’: that of the nature of heterogeneity. When conceived in Nancy’s terms, the sharing of the existential spatiality characteristic of Being-in-the-world (and constituted by the locales gathered by buildings) entails an ineluctable alterity, or Being-with-others, that justifies referring to urbicide as the destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. However, this leaves open the question of the nature of the heterogeneity that is under attack. That is, the demonstration that the sharing of the existential spatiality that is constitutive of Being-in-the-world shows only that Dasein’s world is characterised by an essential heterogeneity. This bare Being-in-the-world-with-others needs further explication if the political subjectivity implicit in my account of the stakes of urbicide is to be delineated.

The importance of this question of the nature of the heterogeneity implicit in my previous accounts can be seen in relation to the above criticisms of liberal political thought. Liberal political thought has conceptions of sharing, difference and heterogeneity that it regards as being adequate to the task of determining conditions of justice, democracy, equality and so on. In my criticisms above, however, I have
argued that the problem with such accounts are that the anthropocentrism in the liberal account of political subjectivity leads to an inadequate account of the sharing that I take to be under attack in urbicide. It would follow that I see the problem with liberal political theory to be a reliance on an anthropocentric political subject that is inadequate to the task of understanding the fundamental heterogeneity at stake in urbicide. If this political subject - which is conceived of as sovereign first and only secondarily in relations of difference - is inadequate to the task at hand, then this begs two interrelated questions: what is the nature of the political subject implied in the conceptions of sharing and heterogeneity outlined by Heidegger and Nancy?; and what does this political subject tell us about the nature of the heterogeneity that I have asserted to be fundamental to Being-in-the-world?

These questions lead us, I think, to the proper stakes of my argument: the question of what it is precisely that is disclosed in the destruction of urban environments in conflicts such as the 1992-95 Bosnian war. It is insufficient to respond to this question by simply replying ‘heterogeneity’. Such a reply begs the (clearly ontological) question ‘what is this heterogeneity?’. In order, therefore, to set out what it is that is lost in urbicide - and thus answer the question of what urbicide discloses - it is necessary to outline the nature of the heterogeneity under attack. Only by showing precisely what this heterogeneity comprises, and how it is reconfigured by the destruction of urban environments, is it possible to set out what is at stake in urbicide.

It is, therefore, to these questions, and Heidegger’s responses, that I now want to turn. I want to set out Heidegger’s analysis of the ‘who’ of Dasein, in order to
elaborate upon the manner in which as Being-in-the-world we are always already implicated in community, or Being-with-others. By showing how Heidegger conceives of Dasein as always already being in an existentially constitutive relationship with difference (and, hence, as Being-in a heterogeneous existence), it is possible to begin to outline the nature of the heterogeneity at stake in urbicide.

The ‘who’ of Dasein

In Division 1, Chapter 4, of Being and Time Heidegger recognises that his initial demonstration of Dasein’s worldliness (Division 1, Chapters 2 & 3) has been primarily concerned with establishing the manner in which Being-in-the-world is constituted in and through Dasein’s involvement with ready-to-hand things. Indeed, he notes that ‘[i]n our previous analysis, the range of what is encountered within-the-world [by Dasein] was...narrowed down to equipment ready-to-hand or Nature present-at-hand, and thus to entities with a character other than that of Dasein.’ This concentration on Dasein’s involvement with the world of things privileges one of Dasein’s ‘structures of Being’ with the consequence that, at this point in Being and Time, not all of the ‘constitutive items’ that comprise Being-in-the-world stand out ‘with the same phenomenal distinctiveness as the phenomenon of the world itself.’

It is with this in mind that Heidegger turns to consider a phenomenon that he asserts can be approached ‘by asking who it is that Dasein is in its everydayness.’ At first glance the importance of this question to Heidegger’s enquiry into Being-in-the-world may not appear entirely obvious. It is worth, therefore, considering why the
question of ‘who’ Dasein is arises and what phenomenon, or structure of Being, it reveals.

The initial account of worldliness in Being and Time could give the impression that Dasein is to be conceived of in a similar manner to the ego-cogito of Cartesian-Husserlian philosophy. That is, in giving an account of how Being-in-the-world is constituted by Dasein’s situatedness in respect of the things it finds ready-to-hand (or present-at-hand) in the world, Heidegger could be taken to be conforming to an account of Being that asserts the priority of an individual’s encounter with its world. However, Heidegger has already both problematised, and distanced himself from, such a conception. In the first place, Heidegger has shown [through his discussion of ‘Being-in’] that a bare subject without a world never ‘is’ proximally, nor is it ever given. Nevertheless, despite having shown the situatedness of being, and because this account has been given through a consideration of a deliberately narrow range of phenomena, Heidegger’s account of Being-in-the-world might still be seen to be open to the Cartesian-Husserlian idea that the individual self (and its consciousness, or experience of the world) is to be accorded an ontological priority. The problem with this idea is precisely its conception of an individual Dasein’s relation to other beings with the same character as Dasein. The Cartesian-Husserlian conception asserts that the constitution of a world by an individual Dasein through its relation to the things that are within that world is the primary ontological moment. But this leads the Cartesian-Husserlian conception to treat other beings that Dasein encounters in the world in one of two ways. Either they are antecedent to the principal ontological moment in which the individual’s worldliness is constituted, or these other beings are
simply the same as the things ready-to, and present-at, hand that make up Dasein's
world.

But Heidegger has already noted that neither of these possibilities can be the
case. In the first place, Heidegger has already shown the fundamentally shared, or
public, nature of the things, and thus the world, in relation to which Being-in-the-
world is constituted. This means that 'the world is always the one I share with
Others.' More importantly, however, '[t]hese entities [the Others with whom I share
the world] are neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand; on the contrary, they are
like...Dasein'. Which is to say, that although the individual Dasein has been treated
as prior in Heidegger's preliminary account of the worldhood of the world, Dasein co-
exists with Others who have the same ontological characteristics of Dasein. Moreover,
this co-existence is not antecedent to Dasein's worldliness, but a constitutive aspect of
it.

The 'who' of Dasein cannot thus be the individual subject proposed by
Cartesian-Husserlian philosophy. The subject implied by Dasein is a situated Being
which is always already a Being-with-others which cannot thus have the kind of
subjectivity that has traditionally been attributed to it by modern philosophy: namely a
sovereign individuality. The question of the 'who' of Dasein is thus intended to
introduce into Division 1 of Being and Time an account of Dasein's subjectivity. In
asking 'who' Dasein is, Heidegger is approaching the question of the nature of the
subject referred to by Dasein. In particular Heidegger is concerned with the
implications for such an account of Dasein's subjectivity of the relations Dasein
always already has with those others that have the same kind of Being as Dasein. The
question of the ‘who’ of Dasein is, therefore, fundamentally concerned with the phenomenon of heterogeneity and the nature of Being-in-the-world-with-others. And it is in this sense that this question (the ‘who’ of Dasein) is an important one to pursue in an account of the heterogeneity at stake in urbicide.

Heidegger immediately notes that the obvious answer to this question of the ‘who’ of Dasein is that ‘Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself: its Being is in each case mine.’37 However, Heidegger then notes, as I did in chapter 3, that average everyday existence is precisely that state which is the least available for Dasein’s reflection. Dasein understands its everyday existence pre-theoretically and with no reflection. Where there is reflection and understanding about the world this is a product of Dasein turning its attention to its average everyday existence once this existence, and Dasein’s pre-theoretical understanding, has been in some way disturbed.

Following this line of argument, Heidegger notes that ‘[i]t could be that the “who” of everyday Dasein just is not the “I myself”’.38 Heidegger argues that the notion that Dasein is the ‘I’ (the ‘me’ of the ‘mine’ that Dasein is in each case) is in fact not the average everyday existence of Dasein, but rather a mode of Being that covers over the everyday ‘who’ of Dasein. That is, the assumption by Cartesian-Husserlian philosophy that the ‘I’ (or ‘Self’) comprises the subject of Being actually covers over a more fundamental, everyday subject. The relation of the ‘I’ (or Self) to Dasein’s everyday mode of being is analogous to the relation of a hammer-head analysed by a scientist as a present-at-hand quantity of a certain metal to the hammer understood as ready-to-hand equipment within-the-world. That is, it is analogous to
the relationship between a thing reduced to its physical or chemical components and
the thing understood as something which one uses, on an everyday basis, to
accomplish an element of living. Nature considered as a present at hand, quantifiable
ensemble of minerals and substances is a deficient mode of understanding the ready-
to-hand equipmental wholes with which Dasein has an everyday familiarity.
Understanding the hammer as a lump of iron attached to a wooden handle is thus a
deficient mode of understanding it as something with which to accomplish the task of
nailing two pieces of wood together. According to Heidegger, understanding a thing
as a present-at-hand substance is the product of theoretical reflection. Thus conceiving
of Dasein as a substantial 'I', abstracted from its everyday circumspective concern for
the world is a product of theoretical reflection. Moreover, such an understanding
commits one to seeing Dasein as a present-at-hand thing in the same way that
theoretical reflection commits us to seeing the things around us as present-to-hand,
rather then ready-to-hand elements of equipmental wholes that accomplish tasks. And
as Heidegger has already noted this is simply inconsistent with his previous argument
that 'presence-at-hand is the kind of Being which belongs to entities whose character
is not that of Dasein.'39

Heidegger is, of course, arguing here against an imagined interlocutor
identifiable, as I have noted, as a Cartesian-Husserlian hybrid.40 This imagined
interlocutor represents the tradition of subjectivism that has dominated the history of
philosophical thinking concerning ontology (or the question of Being). This tradition
is founded on, and propagates, the assumption that the subject of everyday Being (the
'who' of Dasein) is the 'I'/Self. The problem, according to Heidegger, is that the
history of philosophy has framed the question of the ‘who’ of Dasein as one in which it is necessary to ‘start my marking out and isolating the ‘I’ so that one must then seek some way of getting over to the Others from this isolated subject’. If one starts from such an assumption one is, of course, easily led into the ‘pitfall’ of seeing Dasein as the ‘I’. 

Of course, this is not to suggest that that conceiving of Dasein as an ‘I’ or Self must simply be abandoned. After all, this is the way in which Dasein often proceeds in its activities in the world (which is to say that the history of philosophy has not simply been a flight of fancy, or a grave mistake). Rather this way of answering the question of the ‘who’ of Dasein so beloved of the philosophical tradition (and exemplified by Cartesian-Husserlian thought) represents an account of, as I have noted earlier, a deficient mode of Dasein. Moreover, this is a mode in which Dasein misrecognises its ‘Self’ as something (literally some-thing) that has a character quite other than that already ascribed to Dasein by Heidegger in his explication of Being-in-the-world.

Insofar as it is correct to speak of Dasein being ‘an entity which is in each case I myself’ this is, according to Heidegger an ontical, not an ontological statement. Whilst ontology is concerned with the meaning of Being, the ontic refers to ‘the distinctive nature of particular types of [existent] entity’. The ontic thus denotes the actual ways in which beings exist. Ontic statements, therefore, concern ‘beings, not their [B]eing.’ Heidegger notes that ‘[I]t may well be that it is always ontically correct to say of this entity [Dasein] that “I” am it.’ However, an ‘ontological analytic which makes use of such assertions’ should be cautious. Indeed “[t]he word “I” is to be understood only in the sense of a non-committal formal indicator,
indicating’ that ontically Dasein may be what ‘I’ am, but that this ‘I’ does not necessarily tell us everything of the ontological character of Dasein - specifically ‘who’ Dasein is.48

In order to demonstrate that ontologically the isolated (sovereign) ‘I’ is not the ‘who’ (or subject) of Dasein, Heidegger turns again to look at the structure of Being-in-the-world, the basic, pre-theoretical condition of possibility of existence. In its average everyday Being-in-the-world, Dasein is typically absorbed into the world. This means that Dasein is unreflectively engaged with the ready-to-hand things that are the condition of possibility of the worldliness necessary for existence. However, Dasein is not a lone individual given a context by the things that exist solely for him/her. The things that underlie Dasein’s existence do not exist for a single ‘I’. This is precisely what Heidegger is getting at when he stresses the shared/public nature of the spatiality of existence constituted in and through (built) things.

Heidegger’s explication of this point radically challenges the traditional notion of possessive individualism that underpins much thinking concerning Being-with-others. This thinking has often been framed in terms of the problem of ‘other minds’. Heidegger’s explication of Being-with reverses the priority that this problematic has had within political philosophy, arguing instead that the problem of other minds is a particular, deficient mode of Being-with-others, one that can only be understood if one already understands the ordinary everyday way of Being-with others.49 The deficiency of the problematic of other minds, or understanding Dasein as the ‘I’ can be seen in the way in which it requires that Dasein treat those entities with the character of Dasein as things (the problem of other minds treats others at impenetrable/inscrutable
things present-to-hand in the world, similar to rocks).\textsuperscript{50} As I have already noted, however, the primary characteristic of all entities with the character of Dasein is that they are not things present-at-hand in the world ('Dasein is not such a substance, it is rather existence').\textsuperscript{51} Thus, if the Others with which we exist cannot be treated as things that exist in the subject-world of the individual Dasein (except in deficient modes - just as ready-to-hand rock can be treated as present-at-hand mineral for scientific purposes), how can the subjectivity of Dasein (its ‘who’) be understood?

In order to explicate the ordinary everyday way of Being-with-others, Heidegger returns to the way in which things constitute our average everyday existence/world as fundamentally public/shared. Heidegger notes that Dasein’s average everyday relation to things, Dasein’s ‘staying with things’ as he will put in his later work, always already implies alterity - other beings with the character of Dasein. For example, in ‘the work world of the craftsman...along with the equipment to be found when one is at work...those Others for whom the “work”...is destined are “encountered too”’.\textsuperscript{52} That is to say, in the work-world the thing always implies the person for whom it is destined. Moreover, the thing always implies the person from whom it has originated. As Heidegger puts it, there is an ‘essential assignment or reference’ to Others in the ready-to-hand things with which Dasein is absorbed.\textsuperscript{53} This ‘assignment or reference’ signals that an experience of ineluctable alterity is attendant to Being-in-the-world. Heidegger offers several examples of the ways in which that alterity may be felt. For example, for a tailor, a garment

[has a] reference to possible wearers...for whom it should be ‘cut to the figure’. Similarly, when material is put to use, we encounter its
producer or 'supplier' as one who 'serves' well or badly. When, for example, we walk along the edge of a field...the field...shows itself as belonging to such-and-such person, and decently kept up by him; the book we have used was bought at So-and-so's shop and given by such-and-such a person, and so forth. The boat anchored at the shore is assigned in its Being-in-itself to an acquaintance who undertakes voyages with it; but even if it is a 'boat which is strange to us', it is still indicative of Others.54

The things that constitute the condition of possibility of Dasein's worldliness thus imply a coexistence of entities with the character of Dasein ('Others'). Even where an object does not have such a place in an economic chain (such as the 'boat which is strange to us') there is always the intimation of alterity. Moreover, '[t]he Others who are thus 'encountered' in a ready-to-hand, environmental context of equipment, are not somehow added-on in thought to some Thing which is proximally just present-at-hand; such 'Things' are encountered from out of the world in which they are ready-to-hand for Others - a world which is always mine too in advance.'55 In this way, it is correct to say that '[t]he world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt].56 This is what Heidegger refers to as 'Dasein-with' (Mit-dasein). Dasein-with is a fundamental Being-with that characterises Being-in-the-world. Worldliness consists of the intimation of alterity in all that constitutes the world. And this alterity takes the form of Others who are entities with the same character as Dasein.

Now it could be said that this accords with the Cartesian-Husserlian view that the world is always a with-world, but that the individual encounters the world first and
then others. However, Heidegger argues that the primordiality of Dasein-with reverses the priority of such a formulation. Indeed, the fact that Dasein-with is a fundamental attribute of Being-in-the-world, indicates that Being-with (Mitsein) is a pre-ontological characteristic of Dasein. This Being-with is prior to the Being-alone on which the philosophical tradition has previously grounded ontology (the ‘I’ usually being first and foremost ‘I alone’). Indeed, Heidegger goes on to note that Being-alone (the fundamental predicate of possessive individualism) should be regarded as merely a deficient mode of Being-with:

The phenomenological assertion that “Dasein is essentially Being-with” has an existential-ontological meaning. It does not seek to establish ontically that factically I am not present-at-hand alone, and that Others of my kind occur. If this were what is meant by the proposition that Dasein’s Being-in-the-world is essentially constituted by Being-with, then Being-with would not be an essential attribute which Dasein, of its own accord, has coming to it from its very own kind of Being. It would rather be something which turns up in every case by reason of the occurrence of Others. Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factically no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein’s being-alone is Being-with in the world. The Other can be missing only in and for a Being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with...On the other hand, factual Being-alone is not obviated by the occurrence of a second example of a human being ‘beside’ me...Even if these and more are present-at-hand, Dasein can still be alone. So Being-with and the
facticity of Being with one another are not based on the occurrence
together of several 'subjects'.

It is important to note the point that Heidegger makes here about the implications of the primacy of Being-with over Being-alone. Were this primacy not to be shown (as Heidegger has done through his explication of the assignments and references to alterity inherent to equipmental wholes), Others would only ever be said to be factically/ontically present on a case by case basis. This would mean that the assertion of heterogeneity would rest on being able to show that, in a given factical case, Others were indeed present or implied. However, as Heidegger notes, when we find ourselves alone recognition of that state rests upon our prior knowledge of Being-with. That is to say, alterity is a constitutive attribute of Being because Dasein's world is always already a with-world. Whenever Dasein makes that world into an 'alone-world', this is only possible through a negation of the with that characterises the world. This point resonates with, and provides vital support for, my earlier problematisation of the way in which liberal political theory is confined to assessing heterogeneity on a case by case basis, and thus prevented from recognising the way in which all assaults on buildings of the type seen in the 1992-985 Bosnian war constitute an attack on the conditions of possibility of an ontologically primary heterogeneity.

At this point, however, Heidegger has merely shown, through the demonstration that Dasein-with is a fundamental aspect of Being-in-the-world, that Being-with is a fundamental aspect of existence. Despite problematising accounts that
take the 'I'/Self to be ontologically primary, and Being-with to be ontically secondary, Heidegger has not answered the question 'who is Dasein?'. And in this sense we have still not begun to approach the question of the nature of heterogeneity implied in Being-with-others. The nature of this heterogeneity will only be seen insofar as we can identify the subjectivity attendant to it (the 'who' of the Being - Dasein - that always already finds itself in this heterogeneous existence).

Heidegger looks for the 'who' of Dasein in the problematic of how one knows what a thing is for, and what place it is assigned in the world. As I noted in the previous chapter, Being and Time is an existential analytic insofar as the essence of Being is existence (or Being-in-the-world). That is to say, it makes no sense to look for clues as to the meaning of Being in non-existential realms. As Heidegger argues '[T]he ontologically relevant result of our analysis [in Being and Time] is the insight that the 'subject character' of one's own Dasein and that of Others is to be defined existentially - that is, in terms of certain ways in which one may be [in-the-world].' In this sense Dasein is what it does. As Heidegger remarks, 'proximally and for the most part, everyday Dasein understands itself in terms of that with which it is customarily concerned. 'One is' what one does.' Everyday Dasein is, thus, what it does with the ready-to-hand world. For Heidegger the answer to the question of the 'who' of Dasein lies, therefore, in the manner with which Dasein is constituted in its concern for, or absorption with, the everyday ready-to-hand world (of which Dasein-with is, correspondingly, a constitutive feature).

Heidegger has already noted that, in its average everydayness, Dasein has a pre-theoretical understanding of the position and use of ready-to-hand objects. It is
precisely in this pre-theoretical understanding that Heidegger argues the answer to the question of the 'who' of Dasein lies. In order to demonstrate that this is the case, Heidegger turns to look at the question of how everyday Dasein understands both the position and use for which ready-to-hand things are intended. What Heidegger wants to show at this point is that the 'I' is not the source of such understanding. Heidegger hopes that this will conclusively demonstrate that Dasein, insofar as it is what it does (i.e., it is constituted by the understandings that enable it to do what it does), is not first and foremost an individual 'I'. This represents an attempt to conclusively refute the Cartesian-Husserlian perspective which holds that indubitable knowledge must come from the 'I', with knowledge derived from Others being either worthy of sustained scepticism, or of secondary worth. It will be Heidegger's argument that the way in which everyday Dasein's pre-theoretical understanding of the ready-to-hand things that comprise its world can only be attributed to its fundamentally Being-with-others. Moreover, in making this argument Heidegger hopes to move from a bare assertion that the world is a with-world - that Being-in-the-world is characterised by Dasein-with - to a more comprehensive account of the way in which Being-in-the-world is always already a Being-with.

Heidegger's question at this point is simple: if everyday Dasein has a pre-theoretical understanding of ready-to-hand equipment, then it understands both the location in which that thing is available, and the purpose for which it is intended (or the norm that governs its use). We have already seen how the location of any ready-to-hand thing is essentially public. As Dreyfus notes, '[e]quipment is for "Anybody" - a general user.'62 This public availability does not merely imply the possible use by
Others and, hence, the possibility of the presence of Others in the world (as may have been implied in Heidegger's account of spatiality). Rather it means that things are first and foremost publicly available. Any way in which I make equipment mine is only possible because that thing is publicly available. Equipment is thus generally available as such. Dasein's absorption in the world is an absorption with things that are given to it from a public domain.

However, Heidegger's most important insight is that regarding the way in which everyday Dasein understands the correct way in which to use equipment. As Dreyfus notes, 'there is a normal (appropriate) way to use any piece of equipment.' These norms of appropriate use are expressed in the form of 'what “one” does'. Everyday Dasein has a remarkable and pre-theoretical understanding of 'what “one” does' with the ready-to-hand equipment with which it is absorbed. Examples would include: one sits on a chair, one wears clothes, one eats with a knife and fork, and so on. Everyday Dasein's understanding of the equipmental wholes that constitute its world is composed of these norms of appropriate use.

It is important to remember here that Heidegger is arguing against the solipsism of an individualistic perspective. He is not, therefore, arguing that the individual is either ground down into acceptance of the norms, or that contravention of the norms is not possible. To propose either of these objections is both to misunderstand Heidegger's point and to commit oneself to a resolutely ego-centric perspective such as that exemplified by the Cartesian-Husserlian conception of the ego-cogito. Everyday Dasein is not compelled to submit to these norms of use, but, rather, has a pre-theoretical grasp of them prior to considering whether to accept them.
or not. Such consideration would be a special mode of Being. Moreover, it is always possible, as Dreyfus notes, to stand on a chair. The point is that whether or not anyone does this does not change the fact that ‘one sits on a chair’. Or, as Dreyfus puts it more succinctly, ‘[a]nyone might try to cheat the Internal Revenue Service, but still, one pays one’s taxes’. The point is that any contravention of the norms of use is predicated on an understanding of them. It is only possible to talk of contravention against the backdrop of already having implicitly understood the use to which one puts a thing.

The point is that Dasein’s understanding of the world with which it is absorbed comes not from its ‘I’, or self, but from a diffuse Other, the ‘one’ referred to in the ‘one sits on a chair’. Heidegger’s term for this ‘one’ from which everyday understanding derives is ‘das Man’. In most English translations das Man is rendered as ‘the “they”’. It is important to note, along with Dreyfus, that this term can be misleading if it is interpreted to suggest ‘that I am distinguished from them’. Rather, this “they” is a diffuse Other (Dreyfus refers to it as ‘anyone’) from which Dasein’s everyday understanding derives.

Recognising that Dasein’s understanding of its everyday absorption with the world comes not from an ‘I’/Self, but a “they”, entails a radical reversal of the traditional priority of the individual. If Dasein is what it does, its Being is derived from that which enables it to understand the world in order to do things with the things it finds. Thus the subjectivity of everyday Dasein is, as Heidegger had suspected at the outset, actually not the I, but is derived from the “they”. This is precisely Heidegger’s point when he notes that ‘[b]y ‘Others’ we do not mean
everyone else but me - those over against whom the “I” stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself - those among whom one is too. What is of interest in the enquiry into the ‘who’ of Dasein is not the differentiation of the ‘I’ from Others, but the fact that in its everyday state Dasein does not differentiate itself from Others. We thus arrive at an initial answer to the question of the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein. For Heidegger the ‘who’ of Dasein is the “they” from which the everyday understanding of equipmental wholes constitutive of Being-in-the-world derives.

In this sense Dasein’s average everyday understanding of the world comes not from itself (as the possessive individualists would like to think), but from outside itself. Indeed ‘Dasein…stands in subjection to Others. It itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the Others.’ The “they” is not some universal spirit or aggregate of individuals, but a circulating pre-theoretical understanding that enables Dasein’s average everyday dealings with the world. Dasein can feel more or less distance from the “they”, and yet this distance is not a function of Dasein’s own, self-given subjectivity being out of line with the “they”, but rather is a function of the way in which Dasein can try more or less to accord with the pre-theoretical understandings of the “they”. Indeed Heidegger suggests that we should understand the ontical existence of the ‘I’ as mode in which a deliberate distance from the “they” is created or felt. This distance enables Dasein to consider the “they” as a present-at-hand - and thus different - thing (an ontical ‘them’), rather than that from which it is not differentiated on an everyday basis.
The average experience of the understanding of the “they” is of always already
Being-with-one-another. It is precisely for this reason that Heidegger argues that the
‘who’ of Dasein (its subjectivity) is the ‘they-self’. Insofar as this is the case Being
(the ‘who’ of Dasein) is constituted by an ineluctable Being-with. Not only is Dasein
always already with Others that have the same character (Dasein-with), but its own
being is always already a Being-with (Mitsein). This Being-with is attested to by the
fact that Dasein derives its everyday understanding of the world not from itself but
from the “they” - the condition of possibility of which is a fundamental Being-with.

This means that not only is Being-with an essential characteristic of Dasein,
but, moreover, that Dasein is not, in its everyday averageness, the ‘I’. Rather Dasein is
defined by what is not-I, the “they”. Sovereign individuality and all of the
accoutrements of possessive individualism have to be understood as modes (and
deficient modes at that) of this Being-with.

Thus I have set out the manner in which Being-with-others is a fundamental
feature of Dasein’s everyday existence. This Being-with was hinted at in the previous
chapter insofar as the things that are the condition of possibility of Dasein’s existence
constitute that existence as a shared/public spatiality. However, in the above
explication of Heidegger’s extension of this thought, I have shown how, starting from
the ready-to-hand things that constitute Dasein’s world, we can show that Dasein itself
is, fundamentally a Being-with that is given its character by the “they”. This is vital as
it inverts the possessive individualist theses that accept the public space argument in
chapter 3 and yet see that space as a container waiting to accept pre-existent
individuals. The Heideggerian notion of Being-with strengthens the claim that
existence is constituted by the (built) things that are ready-to-hand and that existence is always already heterogeneous (a Being-with[-others]).

Insofar as I am pursuing here the question of the character of this heterogeneity that is constitutive of Being-in-the-world, it is possible to begin to see its outline emerging. The heterogeneity that shapes Dasein is an essential openness to, orientation towards, and non-differentiation from Others with the same way of Being as Dasein. These others constitute a horizon of intelligibility that frames our understanding of Being-in-the-world. That is, insofar as the world is shared/public it is so because it is always already marked by the presence of such Others (Heidegger's Dasein-with). And insofar as Dasein is in-the-world it is so by virtue of an openness to the Otherness comprised by the "they" from which it derives its average everyday understanding that is the condition of possibility of the constitutive events of Being-in-the-world: understanding equipmental wholes (Heidegger's Being-with).

This heterogeneity is not an aggregation of individuals or the partaking in a universal whole by ontically different particular subjects. Rather, it is an essential openness - a constitutive failure to constitute an individual 'I'/Self - that holds existence open to the voice of otherness, the not-I, the experience of sharing. And, most importantly, this heterogeneity is precisely the kind of relation-division that Nancy outlines in his conception of 'sharing'. Dasein is always in relation to both other Daseins and the "they", and yet is ever divided, or differentiated from these Others (either by recognising their Otherness, or by finding itself distanced from the "they").
The question remains, however, what the existential structure of this heterogeneity is. Or, rather, insofar as I spoke earlier of this heterogeneity being always already a constitution of community, what is this community? After all, the “they” from which Dasein derives its everyday understanding of Being is, at this point, only a diffuse Being-with. Moreover, Heidegger asserts that the understanding that circulates in the form of a normative directions from the “they” about what ‘one’ does are responsible for a continual levelling-down of the understandings available to Dasein. In other words, the “they” holds all the dangers of conformism. And yet the important point is that Dasein does not necessary conform, feeling ever varying degrees of distance from the “they”. What does this tension of levelling-down and distantiality suggest about community? More specifically, how can the constitutive openness of Being-with be balanced against the conformism of the “they”? It is important at this point to turn our attention to precisely these questions.

W(h)ither the individual? Dasein and authenticity

Heidegger’s account of Being-with begins to suggest the character of the heterogeneity/community that is revealed by the destruction of the urban environment that I have referred to as ‘urbicide’. Above all else, it suggests that the anthropocentric possessive individualism most commonly deployed to understand such violence cannot comprehend the stakes of the assault on heterogeneity that urbicide comprises. Possessive individualism fails to grasp that the sharing inherent to the spatiality constituted by buildings is not performed by pre-existing individual subjects who meet
in the locales constituted by buildings. It is not an encounter of pre-existent persons forced to compromise their sovereignty due to the contingent empirical (ontical) presence of other, similarly pre-existent, persons. Rather, this sharing is a fundamental Being-with, an always already existing, with and through, alterity that is constituted by the worldliness brought into being by buildings (and the shared spaces these buildings constitute). In short it is not a contingent, empirical heterogeneity comprised by the ontical existence of a number of individuals in a given space. It is a fundamental and constitutive heterogeneity that comprises a horizon of intelligibility against which any ontical existence of selves is to be understood. It is a heterogeneity that, like sharing, constitutes Being as open to alterity. 73

Understood against the horizon of intelligibility of this constitutive heterogeneity, individual subjects are modes - and deficient (or denuded) modes at that - of Being-with. This means that individuals are not gathered together but are always already together by virtue of the Being-with that is a fundamental feature of Being-in-the-world, the worldliness of which is constituted in and through things and buildings. We must, therefore, see the destruction of this fundamental co-ontology, or community, in urbicide and ask what the political consequences of such an assault on Being-with are.

The Cartesian-Husserlian (possessive individualist) interlocutor has, however, one final argument in opposition to Heidegger's exposition of the fundamental nature of Being-with. Moreover, this objection arises from Heidegger's own argument. This objection concerns Heidegger's indication that the "they" is an inauthentic mode of Being for Dasein. After his exegesis of the "they", Heidegger notes that 'the Self of
everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the authentic Self - that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way. Moreover, Heidegger goes on to argue ‘[a]s they-self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the “they”, and must first find itself.’ As Mulhall indicates, this statement - which seemingly contradicts the effort to instate Being-with as an existential condition of Being-in-the-world - is motivated by a problematic central to the entire project of Being and Time:

For Heidegger needs to explain how a creature to whom (according to his own analysis) an understanding of Being essentially belongs can have misunderstood its own Being so systematically [this must be explained or the task of ‘the destruction of the history of ontology’ is rendered pointless]. But of course, if Dasein typically loses itself in the ‘they’, it will understand both its world and itself in the terms that the ‘they’ make available to it, and so will interpret its own nature in terms of the categories that lie closest to hand in...everyday life; and they will be as inauthentic as their creators.

Heidegger’s seemingly inconsistent argument that the ‘who’ of everyday Dasein, while being essential to the structure of Dasein, is simultaneously inauthentic, is thus motivated by a deeper theoretical concern: to show that everyday Dasein consistently misunderstands its Being by virtue of its being the ‘they-self’. If Dasein has consistently misunderstood its own Being then the project embodied in Being and Time is a necessary one. However, this recognition of the inauthenticity of the ‘they-
self' invites the Cartesian-Husserlian interlocutor back into the argument. Since the argument for the fundamental nature of Being-with is predicated on the notion that the ‘who’ of average everyday Dasein (the primary instance of being) is the ‘they-self’, an admission that this ‘they-self’ is inauthentic invites a rejection of Being-with as similarly inauthentic.

The objection might, therefore, be raised that, as an inauthentic mode of Being, the “they” or Being-with that Heidegger proposes as fundamental to existence is actually derived from individual subjectivity - which should be rightly seen as the authentic mode of Dasein. This objection deserves further consideration since the notion of authenticity is central to Heidegger’s work, and Being and Time in particular. The Cartesian-Husserlian interlocutor is given more succour by Heidegger’s assertion that authentic Dasein is ‘dispersed’ into the ‘they-self’ and must ‘first find itself’ in order that it can be ‘taken hold of in its own way.’ Such statements give sustenance to the idea that the proper ‘who’ of Dasein is an I-self that possesses a sovereign capacity to seize hold of itself, find itself, and determine, through choice, its own position in relation to any alterity that may threaten it with dispersal.

The Cartesian-Husserlian interlocutor’s objection asserts that the authentic mode of Dasein is necessarily the ‘I’ since it is this authentic mode of being that is obscured by Dasein’s everyday submergence in the “they”. Heidegger counters such an objection by arguing that whilst the latter is the case, the former does not necessarily follow. Elaborating upon this counter to the Cartesian-Husserlian objection is hard since Heidegger’s thought concerning the authentic modes of Dasein is often obscure and found mostly in hints and implications. However, at the end of
his exposition of the primordiality of Being-with to the structure of Dasein, Heidegger
does speak directly to the issue of the relationship between authentic Dasein and the
inauthenticity of the 'they-self'.

As I have noted, after concluding that the 'who' of Dasein is the 'they-self',
Heidegger adds that this they-self of everyday Dasein must be inauthentic as it is not
the 'Self which has been taken hold of in its own way', but, rather, the self taken hold
of by the dictates and norms of Others. However Heidegger goes on to note that
‘Authentic Being-one's-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject,
a condition that has been detached from the “they”; it is rather an existentiell
modification of the “they” - of the “they” as an essential existentielle.’77 Heidegger is
pointing to vital distinction between the ontical (or actually existing beings) and the
ontological (or the existential structures of being). For Heidegger, 'existentiell' refers
to ontically existent beings, whilst 'existentiale' refers to the structures that are
ineluctable features of Being (or existential/ontological conditions).

This is a vital distinction that those who wish to assert the primacy of the
individual subject easily forget or cover over by arguing that the existent concept of
the individual person represents an ontological structure. Moreover, this distinction
enables Heidegger to argue that it is possible to hold that Being-with is an existential
condition whilst simultaneously arguing that the ontically existent 'they-self' (which
is what Heidegger bases his argument concerning Being-with upon) comprises an
inauthentic mode of Being. Ontic inauthenticity need not necessarily invalidate the
ontological structure of Being-with.
Furthermore, Heidegger argues that authenticity, whilst not being found in the 'they-self' cannot be found in isolating an 'I' from the "they". Authentic Dasein is an ontical modification of Being-with that rearticulates the conformism and dispersion of the 'they-self'. Such a rearticulation, or authenticity, is only possible, however, against the horizon of intelligibility provided by Being-with. The inauthenticity of Dasein's everyday 'they-self' is not due to the Being-with that the 'they-self' rests upon, but, rather, the manner in which the they-self 'levels down' all attempts to articulate an authentic self in the context of Being-in-the-world-with-others. 78

Heidegger himself does not at this point go on to outline exactly what an authentic Self worked out in the context of Being-in-the-world-with-others would be. He is merely emphatic that inauthenticity is not derived from the primordiality of Being-with. On the contrary, authenticity can only be achieved in the context of Being-with, though it is different from the everyday they-self. The concept of authenticity is thus deployed largely to draw the vital distinction between the ontic and the ontological and to thus hammer the final nail into the coffin of the traditional hegemony of the 'I' as the subject of philosophy.

Both Dreyfus and Mulhall do, however, attempt to indicate what an authentic self might comprise, with the latter's account being perhaps the most persuasive. Mulhall notes the way in which for Heidegger, Others appear to Dasein 'as producers, suppliers, field-owners and farmers, booksellers and sailors - in short as bearers of social roles.' 79 If Dasein is what it does, then it will appear to Others in the form of the social role assigned to what it is doing. These social roles are assigned by the "they": one suppliers or produces goods, one sells books, one is a sailor if one is on a boat,
one is a farmer if one owns a field and so on. These roles are 'defined purely impersonally, by reference to what the relevant task or office requires; given the necessary competence, which individual occupies that office is as irrelevant as are any idiosyncrasies of character or talent which have no bearing on the task at hand.' Just as one sits on any chair, so field-owner is a role pertaining to anyone who owns a field.

Mulhall then goes on to note, however, that 'of course, just because such roles are defined in entirely impersonal terms, the individual who occupies them need not always relate to them purely impersonally.' It is precisely this that Mulhall sees as being the point that Heidegger is trying to make when he talks of the possibility of an authentic self for Dasein. That is to say, Dasein's 'they-self' may be inauthentic insofar as it is assigned impersonal roles, but Dasein can appropriate those roles and interpret them as an element constitutive of a singular individuality, thus generating an authentic self-understanding. However, Dasein necessarily begins this self-interpretation as the 'they-self' and any attempt to achieve authenticity 'must be a modification rather than a transcendence' of the essential Being-with that structures Being-in-the-world. In this sense 'authenticity is always an [existentiell] achievement.'

However, these assertions regarding authenticity and, more importantly, the essential Being-with that characterises being-in-the-world, do not bring us closer to responding to the question of the nature of the community implicit in Heidegger's argument. At the most, Heidegger has demonstrated that the community implicit in being-with is not an aggregation of individual persons (as possessive individualists
would conceive it to be). Having rejected the individual ‘I’ as the basis of such community by arguing that even the achievement of authenticity takes place against a horizon of intelligibility comprised by Being-with, the question of the nature of the community implied by this openness to alterity arises again. After the individual subject has been dismissed as a primary unit of ontological analysis, what does the account of heterogeneity, and the community it implies, put in its place? Such a question leads us, in Heidegger’s case, to the figure of ‘the people’: that heterogeneous ensemble amongst whom Dasein always already is. It is in the figure of ‘the people’ that Heidegger provides his most developed, and yet most problematic, account of the community (and thus the heterogeneity) constitutive of Being-in-the-world.

From Being-with to the destiny of the people

Political theory has traditionally recognised that the co-existence of difference is a, if not the, primary political question. From the very earliest assumption that the polis formed the fundamental unit of the political experience, community (the gathering of difference such that (ant)agonism arises) has formed the basic assumption (or the condition of possibility) for thinking concerning politics. Indeed ‘community’ is the horizon of understanding that is both productive of the possibility of politics in the first place and from which the question of the politics of community arises. That this is the case can be seen in a number of cases. Perhaps most easily in the liberal assumption that it is the contingent existence of individuals together in a shared space
that leads to the fundamental questions of politics: the fair/equal distribution of goods (material or otherwise). Having shown that Heidegger’s notion of Being-with (Mitsein) always already implicates Being-in-the-world in community and yet rejects possessive individualist accounts of Being-with-others, it is necessary to ask what kind of understanding of the co-existence of difference the Heideggerian schema produces.

It is precisely when he comes to the question of community, however, that Heidegger loses his way. Indeed, it is at this point that not only the spectre, but the spirit, of Nazism rears its ugly head. Heidegger’s thinking concerning the community produced by the kind of Mitsein he outlines in Being and Time can be found both in his thought concerning history in Being and Time, and in later work, particularly that written between 1928 and 1935.84 Reading these texts it becomes clear that though Heidegger has enshrined alterity as a constitutive condition of Dasein’s existence, he then sweeps aside this difference in favour of a community that approximates the nationalist notion of a ‘people’ (das Volk).

Heidegger’s thinking about community is located in his account of the temporal structure (or historicality) that he ascribes to Being. This account both refers back to, and develops upon, Heidegger’s earlier thought concerning authenticity and thus is implicitly connected to the question of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world-with-others. As we have seen, according to Heidegger, Dasein always finds itself thrown into the world and lost in the “they”. That is to say, Dasein’s essence is its existence as Being-in-the-world. Insofar as this is the case Dasein never chooses its world, but rather finds itself always already in-the-world. In being thrown into the world Dasein
thus inherits a heritage. This heritage must be seen both as a constraint (Dasein has no control over the world in which it finds itself) and a set of possibilities (in the positive sense of a set of opportunities). It is precisely this dual meaning of heritage that is the basis of Heidegger's previous argument concerning authenticity. In its average everyday existence, Dasein is lost in the "they" and thus inherits a world. It might appear that Dasein is thus always condemned to an inauthentic existence and, thus, that Heidegger's account is marked by an irreducible conservatism that argues one can never escape tradition and the constraints attendant to it. And yet the world in which Dasein always already finds itself is a world which offers Dasein possibility. And this presence of possibility raises the question of whether Dasein can grasp these opportunities in order to modify what it inherits and thus grasp and make for itself something of the circumstance into which it is thrown. This question is precisely the question of authenticity.

Heidegger has already argued that Dasein can take hold of itself and achieve authenticity through an existentiell modification of its circumstances. Heidegger then develops this assertion in his account of the historicality of Dasein. In order to understand the historicality of Dasein, it is necessary to grasp the essential finitude of Being-in-the-world. Finitude refers primarily to the existential-temporal finitude of Dasein: its being-towards-death. Dasein's existence is finite insofar as it must, at some point, die. However, there is a further implicit meaning of finitude that relates to Heidegger's discussion of authenticity. Dasein is finite insofar as it is thrown into a world in which it co-exists with others. That is to say, Dasein is given a world and thus a set of possibilities that whilst they are multiple are certainly finite. Moreover,
Dasein is always already with others in a way that means that Dasein’s ownmost possibilities (its everyday understanding of the world) comes not from itself but from Others. Hence Dasein is limited in the way in which it can assert mastery of itself and its world. Dasein’s Self is existentially finite, a finitude introduced by the constitutive presence of Others and the Mitsein that this presence installs in the essential structure of Being-in-the-world.

For Heidegger, authenticity consists of understanding this finitude and grasping it not as a constraint but as multiple opportunities. In its everyday existence, lost in the “they”, Dasein does not do this. Indeed, Dasein is simply lost into the accident and circumstances into which it is thrown. This loss may well explain Dasein’s most common response to such circumstance: the assertion of the transcendent ‘I’. This assertion denies Dasein’s finitude and misrecognises the Being-with constitutive of Being-in-the-world, but it does offer the illusion of mastery over chance, accident, and heritage. For Heidegger, however, such a response must be inauthentic since it does not grasp the finitude that is proper to Dasein.

Just as Mulhall notes that authenticity in the context of the ‘they-self’ might consist of modifying the necessarily impersonal social roles offered to Dasein in order that individuality (not the individual) emerges, so Heidegger suggests that Dasein can grasp its heritage and choose to actualise certain possibilities rather than others. But to do so, Dasein must accept its finitude. It must accept the temporal horizon of death as that which makes resolute choice intelligible. Only a Being that is temporally finite can properly choose (since temporal finitude means precisely that it is not possible to do everything and thus that some things must be chosen over others). Moreover,
Dasein must accept its existential finitude, the manner in which it inherits, by virtue of Being-with-others (primarily as the ‘they-self’) a world both constraining and pregnant with possibility.

In grasping its finitude and modifying that which it is given, Dasein stands resolute in the face of accident and circumstance. Heidegger refers to this resoluteness as Dasein’s ‘fateful’ existence. ‘Fate’ seems an odd term to choose for Dasein’s authentic existence since it carries connotations of determinism and the constraint of possibility by higher powers (i.e., the assignation of one’s future by intra/extra-worldly design). Fate, however, for Heidegger refers to the positive acceptance of Dasein’s thrownness in the world. That is, it implies Dasein’s self-understanding of itself as a finite being, and the actualisation of the possibilities such existence offers.

Heidegger then goes on to argue that ‘if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny.’85 That is, since Dasein is always constituted by an ineluctable Mitsein, its fateful existence can only ever be a co-existence of fateful Dasein’s. It is this assertion that brings us closest to understanding the character of the heterogeneity that is constitutive of Being-in-the-world. This heterogeneity, the Being-with, is, in its authentic form, destiny. And this destiny is precisely, ‘the historizing of the community [Gemeinschaft], of a people [des Volkes].’86 It is the grasping by Dasein, ‘in and with its “generation” of the finitude, the inherited possibility, of Being-in-the-world.87

Thus we arrive at a certain, if slightly opaque, understanding of the nature of the heterogeneity that marks Being-in-the-world. This heterogeneity, which is a
constitutive finitude, or openness to alterity, is authentically grasped as 'destiny'. Like fate, destiny is not to be understood in a deterministic sense, but rather as a grasping of the possibilities that thrownness presents. And yet this understanding of Being-with-others as destiny tells us little about the actual contours of the community that will share in this destiny. It is this question - the kind of community that shares this destiny - that raises significant problems with Heidegger's account. More specifically, it raises the issues of how Dasein achieves authenticity and what kind of 'people' are envisioned as being the bearers of destiny.

Dasein’s fateful, authentic, historicity can be characterised as an inventiveness. That is, as a grasping of possibility as the basis on which to inventively modify one’s existentiell possibilities. However, the question must be raised as to how such inventiveness is possible. After all, Dasein’s everyday existence is one characterised by being inauthentically lost in the 'they-self'. If Dasein, in its everyday existence, does not know its own possibilities, lost as it is in the “they”, how can it begin to invent? That is, how does Dasein appreciate in the first place that its existence in the “they” is inauthentic, and that authenticity can only be achieved by invention? From where does the call come to Dasein to grasp its finitude and seize its fateful possibilities?

Mulhall tackles this question of the call to authenticity directly in his commentary on Being and Time. He notes that there is a problem with Heidegger's account of fate and destiny since 'if inauthentic Dasein has repressed [or lost] its capacity for authenticity [in its everyday submersion in the ‘they-self’], how can it utter or hear the call...of that repressed capacity?' Mulhall suggests that Dasein
might hear the call of authenticity in the form of the awakening of ‘conscience’ by an external interlocutor. This call to conscience would thus force Dasein into recognising, understanding and grasping its finitude and thus open the way for the achievement of authenticity. Whilst Heidegger seems, in his earlier discussions of fateful Dasein to reject the notion of conscience as Mulhall outlines, his later thoughts on destiny readmit it into consideration.

Specifically, Heidegger argues that the moment in which the call of authenticity is heard constitutes a ‘moment of vision’ in which Dasein may ‘choose its hero’.90 This hero is that which serves as an exemplar which calls Dasein (individually and collectively) to grasp its thrownness and the possibilities this existence holds. This ‘hero’ may be an individual exemplar (a person Dasein recognises as calling it to grasp its authentic possibilities), or an idea (that calls a “generation” to achieve its destiny).

This moment of vision in which Dasein grasps its authentic potentiality by recognising its finitude through the figure of the hero has profound consequences for Heidegger’s conception of community. On an individual level, it appears that Dasein’s moment of vision is a simple explanatory tool that accounts for Dasein’s resolute and authentic emergence (but not separation) from the “they”. But on a collective level the disclosure of the destiny of a people in this moment of vision proves to be a highly problematic concept. Whilst the idea that authentic co-historicity might be achieved by the ‘choosing of a hero’ seems, whilst slightly romantic, in itself inoffensive, it belies a serious, and ultimately ultra-conservative, misrecognition of the heterogeneity constitutive of the community in which Dasein always already finds itself.
The problem lies not in the opaque reference in *Being and Time* to a moment of vision in which the people hear the call of destiny through choosing a hero, but in the way in which Heidegger interprets the destiny of a the German people in his writings between 1928 and 1935. More specifically, it is the way in which Heidegger asserts that the destiny of the German people lies in the revivification of the nation promised by National Socialism and the concept of community that this implies which are particularly problematic.

Heidegger's involvement with Nazism is both well documented and extensively discussed elsewhere. I will not look extensively at Heidegger's involvement with Nazism here since I concur with Derrida's assessment that the "facts" of the matter have been 'long known by those who are seriously interested in Heidegger.' I should add that these "facts" (such as Heidegger's acceptance of the rectorate of Freiburg University) are largely undisputed. No-one would seriously argue against the idea that that Heidegger was a Nazi, or that his thinking contains elements that were crucial in motivating this political decision. The question I want to approach is that of the idea of 'a people' that is revealed in Heidegger's writings of the Nazi period. These ideas are, of course, intimately entwined with Heidegger's avowal of an idealised National Socialism that presumably led to his acceptance of the rectorate and his endorsement of Hitler. But perhaps, more seriously, these ideas show how, despite having argued that heterogeneity was constitutive of Being-in-the-world and, therefore, that Dasein was always already implicated in community, Heidegger effectively disavowed this heterogeneity by characterising community in nationalist terms as a *Gemeinschaft* or 'people'.
In both the *Rectoral Address* and *An introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger refers to the destiny that he argued, in *Being and Time*, characterised the co-historizing of the community. In these later works, however, the destiny referred to is the destiny of the German people. Understanding the destiny of the German people gives us, I believe, an important insight into the kind of community characteristic of the essential co-historizing of Being, and thus the nature of the heterogeneity implicit in Heidegger's work.

The theme of destiny runs throughout the work of the period 1928-35 (indeed it can be found throughout Heidegger's work) and is closely associated with his endorsement of the spiritual renewal of the German nation promised by the Nazis. For Heidegger, the German community is destined to greatness, alone able to halt the decline of the European nations into decadence. Caught between the 'great pincers, squeezed between Russia on one side and America on the other', the destiny of the German people lies in reviving the spirit of European civilisation.\(^9\) Heidegger's alliance of this idea of spiritual mission with the renewal promised by National Socialism is in keeping with his argument that authentic destiny is revealed in the moment of vision in which Dasein (or the community) chooses a hero. The hero on offer here is an ideal National Socialism and the idea of a Germany destined to spiritual greatness.

And it is in this figure of the German people lead by National Socialism and pursuing a vision of cultural greatness that Heidegger finally outlines the kind of community that this co-historizing will effect. For Heidegger, the German destiny is one that will re-constitute the Volk: the people conceived of as a national community.
Moreover, destiny and fate are intertwined as the Volk is to be created by the binding together of individuals into the project of actualising the destiny of the people. In the Rectoral Address Heidegger names three so-called ‘pillars’, or levels on which the fates of individual Germans are to be bound to the destiny of the people. In the first place individuals will be bound to the ‘ethnic and national community...through labor service.’ Secondly, members of the community will be bound to ‘the honor and destiny of the nation in the midst of the other peoples of the world...[through] military service.’ Finally, the ‘third bond is the one that binds the students to the spiritual mission of the German Volk’: knowledge service.95

Community, it transpires, is thus an ethno-national, militarised and spiritualised entity. Moreover, it is clear that this conception of the Volksgemeinschaft is, in all forms, identical to the ontopological conceptions of the ethno-nationalists of Bosnia. This community is rooted in (a homogeneous, singular) ethnic identity. It is a communal identity is supported by the knowledge service that generates the spiritual ideals (the impersonal ‘heroes’) that will call the people to grasp their destiny. And most importantly, this community is exclusionary: defence is a vital component for the realisation of the destiny of the German people. Defence itself is necessary only insofar as an ethno-national community wishes to assert an ontopological claim to sovereignty over the territory from which it draws its spiritual sustenance. This ontopological notion is clear in Heidegger, from his folksy love of the Black Forest, to the idea that it is Germany’s cartographic position in the heart of Europe that assures its destiny.
The problem with such an idea is its disavowal of difference. Indeed, this ontological idea undermines the constitutive role that had previously been assigned to Being-with-others, since it is not Others with which we find ourselves in the community of national destiny but only those who are the same as us (those who share our destiny). Furthermore, for destiny to be achieved and for the leader to guide the community to this destiny the Other, that which would split our efforts to achieve such destiny, must be removed. Somewhere in here we see the alliance that exists at a deep level between much of Heidegger's work and Nazism. This is not to indulge in an *ad hominem* critique, or an attempt to establish a "guilt by association" on the basis of which we should dismiss 'any theoretical approach acknowledging an intellectual lineage that is vaguely Heideggerian'.[96] On the contrary, Heidegger's work poses deep and abiding questions concerning how we think about human existence. However, it is to note that many of the reservations that exist in regard to Heidegger are correct since there is a deep affinity between Heidegger's thought and Nazism.

In Chapter 5 I will consider this affinity further. Without pre-empting my argument, I think it is correct to say that Heidegger held to an idealised version of National Socialism. Moreover, Heidegger saw his work as legitimating such an idealised National Socialism. Thus, in some senses, Heidegger's support for Nazism was a logical extension of his philosophical arguments, particularly those regarding *authenticity* and *destiny*. However, in another sense, Heidegger's own ontic alignment with Nazism (in the form of accepting the Rectorship and expressing support for Hitler) was a decision made in a specific, contingent historico-political juncture. Whilst Heidegger's decision was legitimated by, and the logical extension of, his
philosophical work, it was not necessary, but contingent to the juncture he found himself in. This should not, however, excuse Heidegger of the responsibility for his alignment with, and endorsement of, Nazism. After all, it is because his work has an affinity with an idealised National Socialism (particularly evident in the notion of the destiny of the people) that he aligned himself with Nazism in 1933.

However, this is not to argue that Being-with is not constitutive of Being-in-the-world. Rather, it is to observe that the manner in which it is worked out by Heidegger, and the nature of the community he proposes as the authentic co-historizing of Dasein, is deeply problematic. Community is, of course, equally problematically worked out by possessive individualists (though they have not allied themselves quite so tragically with political regimes that embody such anti-democratic violence). Indeed, Heidegger's eradication of difference is merely the polar opposite of the liberal eradication of difference in so called pluralism. Whether difference is made separate, or subsumed, it is still violently subjugated.

The problem with Heidegger's argument concerning the destiny of the German people is that it represents a rejection of the Being-with that is constitutive of Being-in-the-world. This rejection does not, however, mean that Heidegger's argument concerning Mitsein is incorrect. After all, it is Heidegger himself who notes that all rejections of Being-with-others take place against the background of always already Being-with. It is perhaps very disturbing then, that Heidegger could outline the constitutive heterogeneity of existence, and yet at the same time set out a conception of community that deprives Being of its constitutive difference. The Volksgemeinschaft represents precisely this: an attempt to deny and deprive Being of
its constitutive alterity. In its darkest moments this denial of constitutive alterity can never refute the co-existential nature of Being; instead all it can do is work harder and harder, with more and more violence, to eradicate difference. That is, insofar as it is possible to read Heidegger against himself, we might say that Heidegger’s argument regarding Being-with comprises the horizon against which the rejection of Being-with-others in favour of the \textit{Volksgemeinschaft} can be made. In this sense, despite himself, Heidegger undermines his own affirmation of National Socialism insofar as the thesis concerning Being-with will always undo the argument about the national destiny of Germany by positing an ineluctable openness to alterity as the existential condition of such supposedly homogeneous identities. The insight that Heidegger’s concept of \textit{Mitsein} offers, therefore, is that Being-with is primordial and subjugation of this difference merely denudes modes of Being of such Being-with-others. These denuded modes of Being are, moreover, achieved with considerable violence.

\textbf{Urbicide as the deprivation of Being-with}

That (ethno)nationalism represents precisely such a denudation of Being of its constitutive Being-with can be seen in the two phase nature of urbicide. Urbicide is a deliberate assault on the Being-with that characterises built spaces. It is a deliberate attempt to cover over, by destroying, the Being-with that is a primordial characteristic of Being-in-the-world. If the locale is that which is the condition of possibility of heterogeneity, and such heterogeneity is the basic condition of existence, both exist in a mutually reinforcing manner (this is what I suggested about the structure of Dasein
in chapter 3 - that Dasein and worldliness, existence and the conditions of possibility of existence, are mutually reinforcing). To destroy the locale is not to destroy the co-existence that characterises being-in-the-world, but to cover it over. After all destruction is never complete - ruins, memories and histories always remain. But the destruction covers over the Being-with that the locale constituted. And this covering over effects a denudation of existence of its essential Being-with. If the destruction is successful, sustained, or allowed to go unchallenged over a long period of time (that is if the ruins are simply left to lie), then the denudation of Being-with is accepted. This is the second phase of urbicide, in which the institution of a mode of Dasein that is predicated on the covering over of Being-with results in a mode of existence that suggests that Being-with did not exist in the past and cannot exist in the future.

It is precisely this covering over of Being-with that can be seen in the case of both the destruction of the Stari Most (Old Bridge) and the destruction of the Ferhadija mosque in Banja Luka, Bosnia. In the case of the Old Bridge in Mostar (discussed previously in the Introduction and Chapter 2), the destruction was aimed at reducing the locales that gathered the city to rubble. These locales constituted the city as a heterogeneous, or shared urban environment, opening the west bank of the river to the east bank. The destruction aimed to cover over this sharing of municipal spatiality. The destruction of the Old Bridge was symbolic in this regard, epitomising the covering over of the Being-with constituted by the buildings that gathered Mostar as a single heterogeneous urban environment. Apart from this symbolic act of destruction the built things that effected prominent gatherings such as the remaining bridges, the mosques, churches, department stores, and parks of Mostar were also
destroyed. More dramatically the front-line streets on the west bank of the Neretva were reduced to rubble, marking an attempt to effect a line intended to give the impression of ungathering the urban environment. A similar covering over of Being-with occurred in Banja Luka, where mosques such as the Ferhadija were dynamited and the rubble cleared in order to create open spaces that belied the gathering of existential spatiality that these buildings had formerly effected. 98

In both cases it is possible to see the two phase character of urbicide and the way in which it is an assault on heterogeneity: an attempt to deprive Being-in-the-world of its essential Being-with. This destruction is targeted at removing the things that constitute the locales which gather existential spatiality and constitute it as essentially heterogeneous. The ethnic cleansers operate with the hope that in destroying these locales, Being-with, the heterogeneity constitutive of existence, will be similarly destroyed. The second phase of urbicide is aimed at covering over this heterogeneity with the suggestion that it in the absence of the buildings there can be no Being-with, no co-existence. And yet, as I have shown, co-existence is constitutive of Being-in-the-world. In order to destroy this Being-with, it would be necessary, finally, to destroy the experience of the world. 99

Whilst destroying buildings destroys specific gatherings, it can never destroy Being-with itself. If, as I have argued, Being-in-the-world and the locales of the world mutually constitute each other, what is lost in urbicide is the reinforcement that a specific instance of Being-in-the-world gains from the locales in which it is constituted. The Being-with that is an ineluctable feature of Being-in-the-world is not lost, however, but merely covered over. This is disclosed most clearly in those cases in
which the rubble is removed to create green-field sites. Ethnic cleansers hope to deny the existence of a locale and to thus deny any Being-with it may have embodied. And yet, Being-with persists. The destruction and the rubble that covers it over must continually work to deny this Being-with. Ethno-nationalist programs must continually reinforce, through necessarily violent means, this covering over of Being-with. This is the purpose behind ethno-nationalists continuing to destroy houses intended for returnees, and protesting against the reconstruction of mosques in Bosnia.

If a covering over is left uncontested for long enough, it is, of course, possible that this specific denudation of Being-with will be accepted as a mode of Being-in-the-world. After all, Dasein has accepted the notion of the 'I' as the subject of philosophy precisely because it has been affirmed repetitively throughout the history of western civilisation until it appears natural. The rubble of Bosnia is a different story, however, since it is a visible reminder of an attempt to cover over Being-with. And it discloses an assault on the community in which Being-in-the-world is always implicated. But more importantly, even after the rubble has gone, Being-with will still constitute the horizon of intelligibility of Being. And attempts to denude Being of its Being-with will still have to pursue, and cover over, Being-with with violence.

The importance of Mitsein

It is for this reason that the concept of Being-with, or Mitsein, set out by Heidegger is so important. Mitsein establishes that Being-with-others, or heterogeneity is an existential condition, a horizon against which all other modes of Being are articulated. Insofar as non-heterogeneous modes of Being are articulated, this is only
possible through a disavowal of the Being-with that is constitutive of existence. The importance of the concept of Mitsein lies in noting, contra the conceptions deployed in most attempts to understand the violence of the 1992-95 Bosnian War, that under all of the violence, Being-in-the-world-with-others is the primary condition and that the destruction is meant to cover over this condition in order to make separation and hatred appear natural and even desirable.

The problem that is encountered here is that Heidegger's working out of the question of difference comprises a similarly monological notion to that of the possessive individualists (or anthropocentrists as I have called them). Although it appears (as communitarianism does) that Heidegger's notion is the polar opposite of such possessive individualism, the manner in which both show contempt for the fundamentality of Being-with-others (alterity) mean that neither is, in the end, a satisfactory working out of the question of community. Heidegger is tarred with the Nazi brush, and although possessive individualism cannot be equated with such violence, each of these monologics have their morally reprehensible sides. Liberal, possessive individualist theories should not be allowed to wriggle of the hook simply because they have not instigated, or had affinities with, genocides such as the destruction of the European Jews. Indeed, the logic of possessive individualism could be said to be largely to blame for the violence of the Balkan wars.

David Campbell notes the way in which 'international diplomacy [ostensibly grounded upon liberal principles and the international jurisprudence that stems from them] has been a conduit through which the tension between nationalist projects and the lived experience of [co-existence/Being-with in] Bosnia has been resolved in
favour of the nationalists. This sorry state of affairs has arisen because the 'limited imagination of the international community' is bound by a conception of difference derived from possessive individualist (or liberal) assumptions. According to this conception - and the idea of 'multiculturalism' in which it is embodied - difference is not a constitutive openness to alterity, but rather the identification of distinct groups. These groups are themselves taken to be homogeneous and only contingently (ontically) in contact with Others. The problem this conception admits is merely that of managing competing claims from these essentially closed groups. There is no essential Being-with here, merely the problematic of a contingent (forced/constraining) co-existence.

This conception of difference leads, in its humane form, to an idea of tolerance. According to traditional conceptions of tolerance, difference is not constitutive of Being-in-the-world, but merely a fact about the world that must be left alone. Being is not open to difference but can be disciplined to allow ontical alterity to persist. The problem of course is, as Connolly notes, that tolerant 'liberalism is attentive to [ontical] “difference” as already defined, heterodox identities in an existing network of social relations, but tone deaf to [ontological] “différance”’, the Being-with constitutive of Being-in-the-world. Ultimately liberalism is an ontopolitics like ethno-nationalism. Whereas ethno-nationalism fosters the belief of a homeland, liberalism fosters the idea of the contingent side-by-side existence of many distinct but, ultimately spatially located, different groups within the national civic polis. Whilst liberalism may indeed be more humane in respect of difference than ethno-nationalism, a denudation of Being with regard to its constitutive Being-with is
common to both. Moreover, as I noted at the beginning of this chapter, this disavowal of *Mitsein* that is evident in liberal notions of tolerance is attributable to the anthropocentric underpinnings of such a theoretical position. It is precisely this anthropocentrism, and the manner in which it posits a side-by-side existence of separate, tolerant individuals as its highest recognition of heterogeneity, that the Heideggerian notion of *Mitsein* contests.

The task, then, is to work out the logic of *Mitsein* without eradicating the difference it entails. This, I would say is precisely what Jean-Luc Nancy attempts in his reformulation of Heidegger’s concept of *Mitsein*. The notions of the ‘inoperative community’ and ‘Being singular plural’ that stem from his consideration of the problem of difference in light of the heterogeneity constitutive of Being-in-the-world represent a significant attempt to both effect a co-existential analytic and outline the nature of the heterogeneity at stake in urbicide. The next chapter will outline this notion in order to deepen our awareness of the way in which urbicide is a mechanism for naturalising a deficient mode of existence by covering over the fundamental heterogeneity of communities with the rubble of their buildings.
The analytic of *Mitsein* that appears within the existential analytic [of *Being and Time*] remains nothing more than a sketch; that is, even though *Mitsein* is coessential with *Dasein*, it remains in a subordinate position. As such, the whole existential analytic still harbours some principle by which what it opens up is immediately closed off.¹

[T]here is no "self" except by virtue of a "with," which, in fact, structures it. This would have to be the axiom of any analytic that is to be called coexistential.²

The stakes of the argument

At this point in the argument it is possible to say that the analysis of urban destruction is in one sense complete. That is to say, I have shown over the course of the argument so far what it is that urbicide discloses, what is lost (or covered over) in urbicide, and the (ineluctably political) stakes of such a loss. The destruction of urban fabric can be seen to have logic of its own. This destruction is aimed at destroying the conditions of possibility of urbanity. This urbanity, for which buildings are the condition of possibility, is, precisely, an experience of fundamental heterogeneity.
Buildings are constitutive of such heterogeneity insofar as they constitute the spatiality in which Being-in-the-world is possible as essentially public and shared. I showed that this is the case through an exegesis of the manner in which, according to Heidegger, Being-in-the-world is constituted in locales. These locales comprise relational networks constituted by the built things with which Being-in-the-world engages. It is precisely these relational networks that constitute the spatiality in which Being-in-the-world always already exists. These locales are, moreover, fundamentally public or shared insofar as the buildings that constitute the locales are themselves essentially available to any Dasein (Being-in-the-world). And thus Being-in-the-world is always already an exposure to, or opening onto, alterity. That is to say, the locales are both constitutive of the spatiality in which any singular Being-in-the-world exists and constitutively open to other such singular Being(s)-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world is thus always a Being-with-others. Existence, constituted in and through locales is, thus, heterogeneous, or constitutively open to alterity.

Urbicide is thus an assault on the very conditions that constitute the possibility of this Being-with-others that is an ineluctable characteristic of existence. By tracing the logics of urbicide - by taking it as a phenomenon in its entirety, rather than simply apprehending isolated instances as examples of the violation of the extant rules/laws of war - it is thus possible to see the manner in which each and every attack on urban fabric comprises an assault on the heterogeneity that is constitutive of Being-in-the-world.

It is precisely the constitutive nature of this Being-with-others that urbicide discloses. Indeed, it is this constitutive Being-with that is lost in urbicide and that
comprises the proper target of those perpetrating such destruction. The importance of noting that Being-with is constitutive of Being-in-the-world cannot be overstated. As I demonstrated in Chapter 4, this recognition of the constitutive nature of Being-with, or Mitsein, comprises a comprehensive challenge to the anthropocentric imaginary that has governed attempts by both liberal political theory and international jurisprudence to comprehend the destruction of urban environments. The recognition that Being is always already a Being-with contests the anthropocentric vision of the sovereignty of the unencumbered, pre-existing individual whose experience of heterogeneity is both ancillary to existence and contingent upon empirical circumstance.

Being-with thus constitutes an ontological challenge to the metaphysics of subjectivity that have dominated both the history of philosophy and the various human endeavours influenced by the images that this history has produced (including, though not restricted to, jurisprudence, foreign policy, peace and reconciliation attempts, and (non)governmental efforts to reconstruct communities affected by war). The recognition that existence is always already structured according to a constitutive relation to alterity installs heterogeneity rather than individual sovereignty as the central stake of political violence such as urbicide.

If we follow Heidegger's account of Mitsein it is necessary to recognise that Being-in-the-world is constitutively structured according to an openness to alterity. This constitutive relation to Others (a Being-with) comprises an ineradicable horizon against which Being-in-the-world constitutes itself. The radicality of such an argument - and its most trenchant problematisation of the anthropocentric political imaginary -
lies in asserting that such a horizon can never be destroyed, sublimated, or ignored. Rather, the disappearance of heterogeneity is (and can only ever be) an effacement, covering over, or disavowal of this constitutive relation to alterity (or Being-with), achieved through considerable and continual violence. This is precisely what urbicide is: the covering over, and thus disavowal, of the constitutively heterogeneous character of existence with the rubble of the buildings that constitute and testify to the Being-with (Others) that constitutes Being-in-the-world.

In the previous chapter I noted that, insofar as Being-in-the-world was always already Being-with-others, Being was implicated in community. That is, to speak of this constitutive Being-with (or heterogeneity) is already to speak of community. In this respect urbicide comprises the covering over of a constitutive community. I showed that, whilst Heidegger clearly demonstrates the heterogeneity in which Being is implicated, he disavows this community in favour of a nationalist vision of Being-with-others (or, rather, Being-separate from Others). In this chapter, therefore, I want to complete the analysis that I began with the exposition of Heidegger’s notions of existential spatiality and Mitsein. Specifically I want to sketch out the contours of community at stake in, or covered over by, urbicide. That is, insofar as I have shown that Being is constitutively open to alterity, and that urbicide comprises a disavowal or covering over of such heterogeneity, I want, in this chapter, to outline precisely what this community is, and what such disavowal/covering accomplishes. In this chapter therefore, I will look at Jean-Luc Nancy’s theorisation of community which elaborates upon the Heideggerian notion of Mitsein. Nancy’s attempt to think about Being-with without disavowing the difference it entails provides an account of community that is
particularly productive for understanding the logics of urbicide. Following my account of Nancy's rearticulation of the notion of community, I will sketch out precisely what the logics of urbicide accomplish in their disavowal, or covering over, of heterogeneity/community. Such a sketch is, precisely, an account of what is at stake in urbicide. This delineation of the stakes of urbicide will provide a critical tool with which, in Chapter 6, to assess several prominent cases of urban destruction in order to disclose both what the disavowal of difference achieves and how the exclusion and homogenisation effected in urbicide can be contested in such cases.

It is important to recognise that, insofar as urban destruction comprises a disavowal of Being-with/heterogeneity, nothing less than the political - by which I mean 'the essence of things political' - is at stake in urbicide. In speaking of 'the essence of things political', I am referring to the characteristics that are taken to define the various phenomena that are designated as being 'political'. In this sense 'the political' is much broader than the narrow notion of 'politics' found in extant modern, liberal-democratic societies/states. In such societies/states 'politics' refers simply to the mechanisms of representation and organisation by which liberal-democratic polities are governed. It is, I think, a mistake to confuse the mechanisms of governance extant at a specific historical juncture as being coextensive with, and exhaustive of, all of the characteristics that define what can be said to be properly political.

The question of the essence of 'things political' is itself properly an ontological question. The domain of enquiry of ontology is 'Onta, the really existing things'. Perhaps, insofar as Onta are really existing things, it would not be a mistake
to see ontology and phenomenology as facets of a single project. Indeed, for Heidegger the two coincide: an ontological account can only be given through a phenomenology, by going ‘[t]o the things themselves’. Ontology is thus the enquiry into the essence of that which exists: a positing of the properties and ‘fundamental logic’ of reality beyond appearances, misapprehensions, and illusions. In this sense an ontological enquiry into ‘things political’ aims to delineate the various existential characteristics of the range of events we call ‘political’.

Of course, I should note here that the traditional concept of ontology - the idea of a ‘fundamental ontology’ - is problematic insofar as it asserts a dualism between essence and existence (commonly perceived in the terms I have used as a dualism between essence and appearance, truth and sense apprehension). The domination of this dualism over the history of metaphysical thinking is noted by Heidegger in his *Letter on Humanism*. In the Letter, he argues that such a dualism leads to a privileging of one of the two terms with problematic consequences, not least the subjectivism that stems from positing essence as prior to existence (and thus making existence the domain of the ‘projection’ of a subject). This problematic leads Heidegger to assert in *Being and Time* that ‘[t]he essence of Dasein lies in its existence’. Heidegger is not adopting Sartre’s reversal of the metaphysics of subjectivity (that ‘existence precedes essence’) but rather noting that since Dasein is Being-in-the-world, the essential characteristics of Dasein, its existentials, are always already to be traced in and through the everyday existence of Dasein. In this way Heidegger negates the priority of essence over existence and contests the metaphysics of subjectivity such a priority supports, arguing instead that ontology must always
pursue the question of Being in and through the everyday worldly existence in which Dasein always already is.

Heidegger's contestation of the dualism that defines traditional projects of ontological enquiry does not, however, invalidate the ontological-phenomenological project of enquiry into the logics that underlie that which exists. Which is to say we must ask what common logics underlie things of a similar type: what is it for example that allows us to say of disparate events that they 'are political'; what 'logic' connects all these events that have the characteristic of 'being-political';\(^{12}\) or, more simply, what is this *being-political* that is to be found in 'things political'?

That such an enquiry is relevant to an analysis of urbicide could be said to be 'common-sense' insofar as urban destruction would in everyday parlance be referred to as either 'politically motivated', part of the 'politics' of ethno-nationalism, or 'political' violence. And yet what is it about this destruction that designates it as being a properly political event? After all, the violence itself is exterior to what we would ordinarily, in liberal-democracies, refer to as 'politics'. Indeed, the idea of a 'political settlement' is often counterposed to such violence. The idea operative in attempts to reconcile warring parties is thus precisely an opposition between politics and violence/conflict/war. What is it then, that necessitates speaking of 'the political' being at stake in urbicide?
Agonism and the political

Things political, I would contend, are characterised by an agonism: a struggle, conflict or combat (though not always in the literal sense). Here I am drawing on Foucault’s notion of ‘agonism’ derived from the Greek ἁγωνίσμα meaning combat, contest, struggle or sport. The concept of agonism is further developed by William Connolly in his discussion of ‘agonistic democracy’. ‘Agonistic democracy’, according to Connolly, ‘affirms the indispensability of identity to life, disturbs the dogmatization of identity, and folds care for...diversity...into the strife and interdependence of identity/difference’. This agonism derives precisely from the heterogeneity that characterises existence. The Being-with that constitutes Being-in-the-world structures existence according to a fundamental alterity. As such Being-in-the-world is a network of relations between identity and difference. This constitutes Being-in-the-world as an agonistic experience in which an ineluctable openness to alterity continually contests any possible Self/identity. This is precisely the essence of ‘things political’. Political events are those instances in which attempts to constitute identity are contested by the alterity in relation to which they are always already constituted. Identities may become ossified over time, even naturalised, but they never exist in isolation from a constitutive alterity whose very existence contests their identity, threatens to undo their efforts at self-identity or presence, and thus to open the social field up to an alterity that will ruin the presence any identity has achieved.

In this sense heterogeneity is the essence of the political. Without heterogeneity, and the alterity on which it is predicated, there can be no properly
political events. Of course, this means we should be very sceptical about the restriction of the term 'political' to the narrow range of activities of governance in liberal-democracies. These (party) politics are, as I will show later, more precisely technical refinements and mechanisms of organisation, far removed from the essence of things political.

My analysis of urbicide thus leads us to two conclusions concerning the properly political character of urban destruction. Firstly, insofar as being-in-the-world is always already a Being-with, the conditions of possibility of 'things political' are not supplementary to existence but constitutive of it. If we return to the anthropocentric imaginary that I outlined in the previous chapter, we can see that the heterogeneity which is the condition of possibility of the agonism proper to all things political is posited as an ancillary supplement to the existence of sovereign individuals. In such schemas, therefore, the mechanisms devised for the governance of individuals (such as those set out by Rawls) are not properly 'political' in the sense I have outlined. If heterogeneity is seen as supplementary to existence, the focus of political theory (and politics itself) will become the accomplishment of a state in which that heterogeneity does not constrain the sovereignty proper to individual beings. In many case, therefore, the anthropocentric imaginary (and liberal politics in particular) guides the accomplishment of a state in which the agonism proper to 'things political' is attenuated/effaced. Indeed, the attenuation of the agonism proper to the political characterises much of what we call 'politics' today. But by effacing heterogeneity liberal political theory (and the wider anthropocentric imaginary) effectively denies itself the possibility of being properly political, becoming instead an
abstract, mechanistic schema of governance in which the agonism that characterises ‘things political’ is entirely absent.

Secondly, we can see that the covering over of heterogeneity that occurs in urbicide is a fundamental disavowal of the political. It is an empirical effacement of the constitutive alterity that structures existence. Given that urbicide is primarily the preserve of ethno-nationalism, it is possible to extend this bare statement further and say that ethno-nationalism is, itself, a denial of the agonism that characterises the political.\textsuperscript{16} This denial takes the form of an effacement of heterogeneity that attempts to re-constitute existence as being comprised of separate homogeneous, sovereign individuals/groups. This effacement of heterogeneity in the rubble of war is necessary precisely because ethno-nationalism is founded upon the myth of homogeneity. ‘The millennial identity of the Croatian nation and the continuity of its statehood’ affirmed in the 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia is an example of such a myth.\textsuperscript{17} The preamble to the 1990 Constitution serves to legitimate the ethno-nationalist claim that Croatia is a state for the Croats alone. This fictitious history serves to constitute a unified and homogeneous ethnic body by tracing out the manner in which it has been such a body for 1000 years.\textsuperscript{18} This millennial history thus serves to establish the Croats as an ethnic body, to legitimate their claim to the state of Croatia, and, insofar as their history shows how Croats have been denied a state, to legitimate the violent exclusion of those Others who would deny that claim to a state.\textsuperscript{19}

Ethno-nationalism is, therefore, constituted by a logic that disavows the heterogeneity of existence, trading instead on myths of separateness, self-determination and ancient hatred. For ethno-nationalism to succeed it must deny that it
is constituted by alterity, despite the historical and empirical evidence that it is always in a relation of some kind with others. To do this ethno-nationalism attempts to naturalise the idea that heterogeneity is a contingent fact that can be undone through the creation of homogeneous territorial domains. And yet the rubble this project leaves in its wake is not merely a contingent fact, but rather testimony to the constitutive nature of heterogeneity. Alterity persists as a horizon of existence, returning to haunt the ethno-nationalist project. In Bosnia, the issue of rebuilding mosques and the destruction of houses intended for returnees are merely the most visible face of this way in which heterogeneity haunts ethno-nationalism.

The issue of the rebuilding of mosques destroyed in the 1992-95 war has been prominent in the politics of post-war Bosnia. Some 618 mosques were destroyed in the 1992-95 Bosnian war. Four hundred and fifty of those mosques were in Republika Srpska. The systematic nature of this destruction can be seen in the fact that all of the 15 mosques in the town of Banja Luka (the post-war capital of Republika Srpska) were destroyed. As I discussed in the Introduction, the most prominent mosque to be destroyed was the Ferhadija mosque in Banja Luka. However, this act of destruction was not enough to erase the trace of Bosnian Muslim difference in the Bosnian Serb entity. Indeed, repeated requests to rebuild this mosque have been made and, despite Bosnian Serb intransigence, a foundation stone was finally laid in June 2001. Thus the difference that such a building represents has returned to haunt the ethno-nationalist statelet of Republika Srpska.

Moreover, as I discussed in Chapter 3, the post-war return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to their places of former residence has further
problematised the homogenising politics of ethno-nationalism. The Dayton accords established a right for all refugees and IDPs to return to their places of residence prior to the 1992-95 Bosnian war. It is so-called 'minority returns' in particular that contest the homogeneity on which ethno-nationalism is predicated. As a consequence of ethnic cleansing a large number of returnees were faced with the prospect of returning to areas in which they would comprise an ethnic minority. This situation arose because of the way in which ethnically cleansed towns and villages were repopulated by the cleansers with members of the cleansing ethnic group. In the majority of cases minority returnees had been part of ethnic majorities (or members of an ethnically mixed population) in the places of pre-war residence. But, due to war time killing, displacement, and repopulation, these returnees now comprised minorities. Many saw such minority returns as a test of the Dayton accords' ability to restore Bosnia's ethnic heterogeneity.

Minority returns have been hampered by a lack of will on the part of the so-called 'international community' and intransigence on the part of ethno-nationalist politicians. Indeed 'as of August 1999, minority returns throughout Bosnia numbered a mere 100,714, less than 5 per cent of all the refugees and displaced persons created by the war.' However, this situation has changed radically in the past two years. In 2000 alone, 'some 67,445 minorities returned to their homes...representing a 60% increase compared to 1999'. The upward trend in minority returns has continued in 2001. We should not confuse minority returns with minor, or small returns. Minority returns comprise a substantial contestation of ethno-nationalist homogeneity. The large number of refugees and IDPs returning to the
places from which they were displaced by ethnic cleansing constitute the return of heterogeneity to purportedly homogeneous ethno-nationalist territories. In this way minority returns haunt the ethno-nationalist project across Bosnia.

The urbicide practised by ethno-nationalists is an effacement of the political precisely because the agonism that characterises the political contests the very myth at the heart of nationalist projects: homogeneity. Moreover, urbicide effaces the political in a manner that is entirely congruent with the anthropocentric imaginary that characterises the liberal political theory typically taken to oppose so-called ‘political’ violence. The sovereignty that underpins the anthropocentric vision of subjectivity is similarly a myth of homogeneity. This sovereignty is, as I noted in Chapter 4, a myth of an idealised subject acting according to a unitary rationality. All notions of unitary reason trade on a myth of homogeneity. Just as the infantile gestalt is, according to Lacan, a myth of homogeneous control over the infant body (an idealised notion of overcoming the uncoordination that frustrates the infantile desire to control the body, its surrounding world, the mother and, ultimately, language), so anthropocentrism is a myth of the homogeneous subject acting out their intentions in a world that does not expose them to heterogeneity (contingency, exteriority, alterity). In the case of both ethno-nationalism and liberal political theory the agonism of the political is covered over in favour of technical solutions that do not challenge the myth of homogeneity that founds these projects. Whilst ethno-nationalists look to the technical instruments of diplomacy, cartography, and resettlement to cover over the agonism that festers in the rubble of Bosnia, liberal political theory covers agonism with increasingly elaborate juridical schemas of fairness, justice and equality. It is important to note of
course, that although both liberal political theory and ethno-nationalism share a similar logic, they do not share motivations. Whilst ethno-nationalism seeks to cleanse a territory of difference in order to establish an ethnic statelet, liberal political theory seeks justice, equality and fairness. However, this difference in desires should not obscure the manner in which political theories guided by an anthropocentric imaginary share a logic of homogeneity (albeit the homogeneity of the political subject) with ethno-nationalism (which is predicated upon the homogeneity of ethnic territory).

Mitsein and the question of community

The stakes of urbicide are thus the political and the heterogeneity that comprises the agonism that defines the political. At stake in urbicide is thus the Being-with-others that ethno-nationalism is so determined to cover over in its determination to establish homogeneous ethnic statelets. Insofar as this is the case, the concept of Mitsein, or Being-with, can be seen to be central to any understanding of the stakes of urbicide. If Being-with-others is at stake in urbicide, comprehending this Being-with, through the concept of Mitsein, is central to understanding the stakes of urbicide.

It is precisely in relation to the fundamentally political stakes of urbicide that the importance of the concept of Mitsein, or Being-with, can be seen. According to Heidegger, the importance of the concept of Mitsein lies in noting that alterity, difference, or heterogeneity is constitutive of Being-in-the-world (or existence). Existence is, therefore, always already characterised and structured by heterogeneity. In other words, existence is fundamentally agonistic, comprised of relations of
identity/difference and networks of self and other. Existence is, thus, ineluctably political. All cases where heterogeneity is effaced or covered-over, are, therefore, modes of Being denuded of their properly political character.

Thus by recognising the constitutive nature of Being-with the political is installed as an ineluctable characteristic of existence. This is the central point that distinguishes the argument I have set out from those derived from the anthropocentric imaginary. This distinction is facilitated insofar as my account is derived from Heidegger's understanding of Being-with which is part of his critique of the anthropocentric philosophy of subjectivity. Indeed, it as a contradistinction to anthropocentric/subjectivist accounts, that a Heideggerian account commends itself to the analysis of urbicide.

According to the anthropocentric imaginary, politics is an ancillary phenomenon, secondary to the schema of transcendentally free, sovereign subjects. The political is, according to this schema, a fact contingent to certain empirical circumstances (specifically the constraints placed upon sovereign individuals by their empirical existence alongside others). Politics is thus restricted to a narrow range of transactions between individuals in certain empirical circumstances. It would be instructive to read this restriction of the political to an ancillary, empirical event in light of the historical development of liberal theories of multiculturalism. Such theories have only evolved as a response to the dawning awareness that many western societies are empirically multi-cultural/heterogeneous. Forced to accept the factual existence of such a state of affairs, liberal political theory has to respond by theorising the constraints such a fact places upon sovereign individuals. In other words,
heterogeneity has been seen as resolutely ancillary (both theoretically and historically) to the principal subject matter of liberal political theory: the sovereign individual. The question one might pose to such theorisations of multiculturalism is that of the historical novelty of multiculturalism. Might it not be the case that existence is ineluctably heterogeneous and that this heterogeneity has been effaced by the great projects of nation-building and colonisation/imperialism that characterised the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries? Thus we might say that multiculturalism is not an ancillary factual condition which sovereign individuals must negotiate. Rather sovereign individuality is a mythical notion derived from the effacement of a constitutive heterogeneity.\textsuperscript{25}

The problem with a such a restriction of the political is twofold. Firstly, it demands that all claims concerning the destruction or effacement of heterogeneity be examined on a case-by-case basis. Since heterogeneity is not a constitutive aspect of existence, it is not possible to assert that it is always already at stake in any destruction of the urban environment. Secondly, violence such as that which characterises urbicide, can only be said to be political in cases where heterogeneity empirically exists. And this heterogeneity can only be recognised in the guise of competing demands. That is, since heterogeneity is conceived of as an empirical condition that constrains individuals, it is assumed that it is competing demands which denote the existence of such constraints upon sovereign individuals. And thus, where competing demands do not arise, it is assumed that there are no political stakes.

The depoliticising effects of such an understanding of the nature of heterogeneity can be seen in the diplomatic-cartographic dissection of Bosnia that
characterises the Dayton accords. The Dayton accords are premised upon an idea of heterogeneity derived from the limited understanding of the political offered by the anthropocentric imaginary. The conflict in Bosnia was taken to be evidence of competing claims and thus of a heterogeneity that was constraining the sovereign autonomy of (ethnic) groups (or, rather constraining individuals who were seen as being aggregated in unitary ethnic groups). The anthropocentric imaginary offers only two solutions to this heterogeneity: tolerance and division. Since tolerance requires peaceful circumstances in which a benign neglect of the constraints heterogeneity places upon sovereign, autonomous individuals can be practised, it was ruled out at an early stage of the peace process. War, it was argued, had put paid to the idea that tolerance could rescue this heterogeneous society. It was necessary, argued successive commentators, diplomats and war-lords to create the peace in which the benign neglect of tolerance could be practised by first solving the problem of competing demands due to which the conflict had arisen.

Thus the various plans for the internal division/partition of Bosnia were proposed. All of these plans were motivated by the idea that sovereignty and autonomy could be restored by minimising the empirical condition of heterogeneity that had given rise to such violent competing demands. The proposals that ultimately crystallised in the form of the General Framework Agreement were thus predicated on the idea that if tolerance were to be practised it would only arise through a minimisation of heterogeneity (or, rather, the competing demands that were taken to signify this heterogeneity). By dividing and partitioning it would be possible to minimise the constraints that the irksome heterogeneity of Bosnia had placed on the
sovereign autonomy that is the purported essence of political subjectivity. In this way it would be possible to create a condition of least constraint from which a kind of tolerance might emerge: after all, if no Bosniacs remained in Republika Srpska, then the Bosnian Serbs would be effectively sovereign and able to practice a benign indifference towards those living in the Muslim-Croat federation. 28

However, such an understanding bequeathed Bosnia a specific problem. First, by mis-recognising the constitutive nature of heterogeneity, it failed to see the manner in which the homogenising project of ethno-nationalism would always be haunted by an alterity it felt compelled to eradicate. And thus, despite having minimised the competing demands of heterogeneity through partition, the violence continued - turning to homes belonging to displaced persons, ruined mosques that were scheduled to be rebuilt and so on. Despite having given the ethnic parties quasi-sovereignty, the Dayton accords could not minimise agonistic relations of identity\difference precisely because the heterogeneity on which such agonism is predicated is constitutive of, not contingent to, existence.

Secondly, the partition effected by the Dayton accords depoliticised a range of essentially agonistic phenomena. The assumption that heterogeneity was both only present in cases of competing demands, and that this heterogeneity was a constraint upon the sovereign autonomy essential to political subjectivity and thus to be minimised, has a specific consequence: politics is reduced to only those circumstances in which competing demands arise. The politics of ethno-nationalism and the opposing forces of multiculturalism are restricted to a narrow range of cases in which there are competing demands for recognition. Thus politics in Bosnia has become
crystallised around a number of high profile issues in which there are demands for recognition. More specifically it has become crystallised around competing demands for territorial control and the right to rebuild and resettle. The principal political phenomena in post-Dayton Bosnia are thus, typically, those concerning minority returns and the rebuilding of ruined heritage (mosques and churches in particular).

Minority returns, as I noted earlier, are those instances in which refugees and IDPs return to places of pre-war residence where, as a consequence of ethnic cleansing, they constitute a post-war minority. Minority return is an event constituted by ethnic cleansing since, prior to the war, returnees would have belonged to an ethnic majority (or an ethnically mixed municipality). Minority return is thus an event constituted by the logic of the reduction of heterogeneity in the service of self-determination (sovereignty). Insofar as minority return problematises the homogeneity of ethno-national statelets, it embodies an agonism. According to the anthropocentric imaginary, such agonism is to be understood as competing demands arising from the constraints placed upon sovereign individuals by an empirical multiculturalism. Insofar as the issue of minority return is reduced to a question of competing demands, it is reduced to either a security problem (the management of violence resulting from competing demands) or the assertion of a right (and thus the implicit demand to be free from the kinds of constraints that heterogeneity necessarily places upon individuality).

A similar reduction of the political can be seen in the issue of rebuilding. Rebuilding has been stalled. This stalling has often been rationalised by Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat authorities on the basis that there are competing demands arising
from reconstruction projects. What such claims amount to is an expression of the idea that the rebuilding of mosques, for example, would place constraints upon Bosnian Serb/Croat nationalists (since they would not be able to perform their ethno-nationalist sovereignty unhindered). This problem is similarly reduced to a question of the reconciliation of competing demands and the potential for maximising the sovereignty of parties to the problem.

Thus whilst the letter of the Dayton accords can be understood to provide for the reconstruction of an agonistic polity in Bosnia, the ‘spirit of Dayton’ (its implementation and interpretation by the international community) is rooted in an anthropocentric understanding of multiculturalism. The spirit of Dayton fails to recognise the constitutive agonism of Bosnia, reducing it instead to the competing demands of purportedly sovereign individuals and groups. In this manner the de facto partition of Bosnia is never problematised comprehensively, since it is seen as a natural outcome of the failure to reconcile the competing demands that have arisen out of the constraints placed upon sovereign individuality (and its correlate ethnic groups) by the empirical heterogeneity of Bosnia. In this manner the spirit of Dayton remains resolutely blind to the constitutive heterogeneity of Bosnia. In particular it remains blind to the manner in which claims to self-determination and sovereignty (individual or group) are both constructed upon and efface that constitutive heterogeneity. Insofar as the politics of Bosnia are reduced to the reconciliation of competing demands, the domain of the political in Bosnia is effaced.

Moreover, whilst both minority returns and reconstruction are important, they are certainly not the only phenomena that could be called political in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The effect of this restriction of the meaning of the political to instances of competing demands has been to depoliticise a range of issues concerning the alterity that structures Bosnian society. Moreover, it effaces the urbicide that decisively shaped the post-war terrain of Bosnia and encourages interpretations of urban destruction that concentrate upon ruined cultural heritage (since it is in the case of such heritage that competing demands most often arise). Conflict is likely to emerge around the question of mosque rebuilding, rather than around more mundane questions of reconstructing essential infrastructure (such as water supplies, phone networks, supermarkets and so on).

Furthermore, the anthropocentric imaginary underpinning this depoliticisation of a range of instances in which the agonism proper to the political is evident, has actively encouraged further depoliticisation. The assumption in the wake of the Dayton accords has been that the solution to the conflicts arising from competing demands is to further minimise any such heterogeneity (and thus perpetuate division).\textsuperscript{29} Thus, recent attempts to rebuild mosques (which have given rise to unrest) have been contested on the basis that they are ‘provocative’.\textsuperscript{30} Such claims are an attempt to halt mosque rebuilding programs and perpetuate the division of Bosnia by refusing to compromise the homogeneity of the ethno-national entity of Republika Srpska. In this way the political, already reduced to instances of competing demands, is further threatened by a concerted effort to minimise such instances of ‘politics’. In this way the constitutive heterogeneity of Bosnia - to which ruined mosques are a testament - is disavowed/effaced.
However, it is necessary to recognise that in this way a twin assault on the agonism proper to the political is perpetrated. Firstly, it is assumed that this agonism only exists in a narrow range of circumstances in which conflicting demands for recognition are articulated. And secondly, it is assumed that the proper response to such agonistic outbursts is a minimisation through division. This has the effect of both effacing the constitutive heterogeneity revealed in and through the urbicide to which Bosnia was subjected, and suggesting that the ideal settlement for Bosnia would be one in which politics was reduced to the technical management of a society in which agonism is effaced. Such a situation it is assumed would be indicative of the maximisation of the essential sovereignty of individuals/groups to the point where the heterogeneity that constrains such autonomy is effectively managed.

And yet such depoliticisation is constantly undone by the return in multiple instances of the heterogeneity that is constitutive of existence. The only manner in which such depoliticisation can, thus, succeed is to continually and aggressively partition the places in which agonism arises. And yet this division is never a response to constitutive heterogeneity, merely an attempt to efface it through an increasing number of barriers, boundary lines, checkpoints and enclaves. Reducing politics in this way to the high profile cases of conflict and a response to such competing demands that takes its aim to be the minimisation of difference in order to create the conditions for the technical management of autonomous individuals fundamentally mis-recognises the importance of Mitsein: the constitutive nature of heterogeneity.

Despite recognising the importance of Heidegger's notion of Mitsein, however, a question still remains. What, exactly, is the nature of this heterogeneity
beyond being a constitutive openness to, or structuring by, alterity? Perhaps this question is better posed as the question of community. If, as I said in Chapter 4, the constitutive nature of heterogeneity always already implicates Being-in-the-world in community, then the question must be what is the nature of the community in which we always already are? Such a question is important insofar as this community (agonistic heterogeneity) remains a defuse and ambiguous phenomenon in my argument. That is, in my argument so far I have simply posed a constitutive heterogeneity against the logic of urbicide and noted that the latter is a disavowal of the former. The task must thus be to sketch out in more detail the stakes of urbicide: how is community constitutive of existence?; how exactly does urbicide disavow such community?; and how does community undo the work of urbicide? Such questions are necessary if I am to give an account of both the manner in which urbicide disavows agonism (how, exactly, destruction accomplishes the task of effacing heterogeneity) and the manner in which that agonism returns to contest urbicide.

**Heidegger and the question of community**

In the previous chapter I attempted to outline the nature of the community in which Being-in-the-world is implicated. I followed Heidegger's development of the notion of *Mitsein* from an outline of the constitutive heterogeneity of existence to the destiny of the people in which that heterogeneity is authentically present. I noted that Being-with is a constitutive horizon for Being-in-the-world, one that can be effaced but not eradicated. If this is the case it is because existence is shared in the sense
ascribed by Nancy: any Being-in-the-world is both related to, and divided from, others. That is to say any Dasein is, like other Daseins, in the same world, and yet, insofar as each Dasein is a singular instance of Being-in-the-world, it is divided from, or at least distinct from, the others it finds itself in the world with. Thus the heterogeneity constitutive of existence is an ineradicable exposure that is both constitutive of, and yet contests, the singularity of any Being-in-the-world. This Being-with is a community insofar as 'community' is, minimally, the name of the experience of Being-with-others. Dasein, according to Heidegger and Nancy, shares its world and is thus always already with others. Even when Dasein is alone, it is only so in relation to (by rejection/effacement of) this horizon of Being-with from which existence unfolds.

Heidegger recognises the need to sketch out the nature of the community in which Dasein is always already implicated. And yet, as I showed, Heidegger's account of this community represents an ultimately disturbing retreat from the insight offered by his arguments concerning Mitsein. Heidegger expands his minimal recognition of the constitutive nature of Mitsein into the notion of the destiny of the people. That is, Heidegger argues that since existence is always already a Being-with, or community, Dasein's temporality is always already a co-historizing. However, this co-historizing is, according to Heidegger, only authentic insofar as it takes the form of the assumption of a common destiny. This destiny is chosen in a moment of vision in which individual fates are bound together through the choosing of a hero. The most disturbing aspect of this conceptualisation of the authentic form of community as being the destiny of a people is its explicitly nationalist character. For Heidegger, as
the *Rectoral Address* makes clear, the destiny of the people (the Germans are Heidegger’s specific focus of concern) is to be realised through the creation of a territorially bounded, spiritually unified, nation-state. Despite Heidegger’s possible attempt to distance himself from those who racialised Nazi ideology, the destiny of the German people remained, for him, the creation of an ethno-national polity that shares both a spiritual mission and a territorial homogeneity.

In Heidegger’s vision of the destiny of the people as the authentic realisation of the community (or co-historizing) in which existence is always already implicated, we can see the idealisation of the principles of National Socialism that was ultimately responsible for his involvement with Nazism. Heidegger’s conception of a spiritualised people resisting the inauthenticity of technology is intimately connected to an idealised vision of the National Socialist revolution. Heidegger never rejected or apologised for holding to such an idealisation of the principles of National Socialism (despite resigning the rectorship and purportedly opposing various aspects of the Nazi regime). Moreover, it is precisely the concepts of authenticity, spirit, destiny and vision that formed the cornerstone of Heidegger’s idealisation of National Socialism. These concepts are integral to his account of community as the common destiny of the people.

In the previous chapter I noted that it has been argued that we should reject the Heideggerian corpus on the basis of the idealisation of National Socialism that so clearly haunts it. And yet I suggested (and here I aligned myself with thinkers including Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe and Habermas) that this was not necessarily necessary nor desirable. It is one thing for a thinker to be associated, even intimately,
with an abhorrent regime, it is another to dismiss the entirety of his corpus on these
grounds. As Derrida notes, whilst one should not ignore the entwinment of
Heidegger’s thought with Nazism, one should also recognise that ‘Heidegger’s
“thought” destabilises the deep foundations of philosophy’ and thus demands that we
‘seek to think beyond comfortable and convenient schemas [such as the dismissal of
Heidegger’s work through his association with Nazism], and justly to understand [the
questions Heidegger asks, the responses he outlines and the contestation of philosophy
he effects].’36 Bearing this in mind, I suggested that there were two ways in which we
could understand Heidegger’s development of the insights concerning the constitutive
nature of Mitsein into the notion of the authentic destiny of the German people.

Firstly, as I have already noted, we should see Heidegger’s commitment to an
idealisation of National Socialism (expressed in An Introduction to Metaphysics as
‘the inner truth and greatness of this movement’) as entirely in keeping with, though
not necessarily following from, his thought in Being and Time.37 That is to say the
themes of authenticity, destiny, and fate in Being and Time certainly set a scene in
which the appearance of the (nationalist) Volk, or the theme of ‘the encounter between
modern man and global technology’ (in which there is a sense in which, for Dasein,
authenticity consists of an overcoming of the decadence brought about by the
globalisation of technology) are not out of place.38 Which is to say that one can,
certainly trace a Nazi text in Heidegger’s earlier work (from Being and Time to An
Introduction to Metaphysics). However, as Derrida rightly points out, Heidegger’s
texts are multiple and demanding, never wholly yielding to one over-determined
reading. Whilst the Nazi text exists, so too does one that could equally resist such an (ethno)nationalist politics.

In one sense we enter here into the murky realm of the relation between an author and his/her texts. Which is to say that we are asked to comprehend Heidegger’s acceptance of the Rectorship and membership of the Nazi party in relation to his work. Whilst the question of the relation of author and text is beyond the scope of the present argument, it is possible to make one point in this regard. It is, I think, problematic to argue that a text must be interpreted as both the product of a unitary subject and a unitary statement of intent. That is to say, it is problematic - especially given Heidegger’s avowed opposition in this regard - to read Being and Time retroactively as a statement of intent on the part of Heidegger the Rector of Freiburg University. It is problematic, therefore, to argue that since Heidegger regarded his acceptance of the Rectorship as in some way congruent with his thought, that his thought is, in its entirety, a justification of, or foundation for, Nazi politics.

Rather, given the multiple nature of Heidegger’s texts, and in particular the way in which they continually resist singular interpretations, it might be better to see Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism, and the support drawn from his texts for this engagement, as wholly contingent. Perhaps this contingent entwinment of thought and political engagement is, finally, a properly political decision (in the sense in which such a decision might be understood by Derrida). One could, along with Lacoue-Labarthe, note that though the texts of Heidegger’s early thought offer succour to National Socialist thinking, it is, in the end, the contingent ensemble of events that surround his acceptance of the Rectorship that draw the texts into an intimate
relationship with Nazism.\textsuperscript{40} Of course, we should not excuse Heidegger of responsibility, nor cease to decry his silence on both his involvement with Nazism or the Holocaust, but we should note that the activation of the Nazi text in Heidegger’s writing by his acceptance of the rectorship acts in some ways to efface the other multiple texts at work in \textit{Being and Time}.

Which is to say, finally, that in Heidegger’s case, despite the convergence of text and political involvement in 1933 (and the failure to disavow this nexus) we should not reduce his thought to this singular motif. This brings me to my second point. If my argument is correct, it would follow that we can say that even though Heidegger disavows Mitsein by articulating a profoundly homogeneous conception of community, he has sown the seed of difference in making Being-with a constitutive moment of existence. In this sense Mitsein is the element of the text that resists the National Socialist nexus of thought and political involvement. Moreover, this seed of difference - Mitsein - should not be cast aside by a sort of ‘guilt by association’.\textsuperscript{41} Despite the legacy that haunts Heidegger’s work, we should not fail to see the importance of Mitsein and the manner in which it is precisely disavowed by Heidegger because it represents the element of his work that resists the idealisation of National Socialism that he will, later, pursue.

\textit{Mitsein} is not amenable to Heidegger’s engagement with National Socialism precisely because it represents the installation of an alterity at the centre of Being that notions of blood, soil and Volk cannot recognise. In this sense Heidegger’s engagement with National Socialism should be seen as a disavowal of the principle of difference/alternity that is enshrined in the concept of Mitsein. Despite this however,
we should recognise the way in which Heidegger’s own undoing lies in the way in which Mitsein has been conceived. Mitsein can be disavowed, covered over, or even effaced (in ever more violent ways) and yet it cannot, according to Heidegger’s reasoning, by done away with. Mitsein is a horizon from, and against which, existence unfolds. Disavowals of Mitsein are merely attempts to ignore/disavow this horizon, but are never successful eradictions of this horizon. That is, since Mitsein is a horizon of Being it is not possible to eradicate it, merely to disavow it, to cover it over or to ignore it. But such disavowal does not render the concept/horizon any less important/constitutive.

Heidegger’s disavowal of Mitsein is principally derived from his privileging of Dasein in the analysis of Being and Time. As Nancy notes, Heidegger remains resolutely committed to the priority of Dasein throughout Being and Time. In this way Heidegger subordinates Mitsein to Dasein, alterity to identity and Others to Being. This privileging of Dasein is problematic since it means that ultimately Heidegger fails in his project of destroying the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity. Dasein becomes that which can resolutely grasp hold of itself, that which can disavow Others and be alone, that which can either realise its fate or submerge itself in the destiny of the people. In short Dasein is, as the privileged term of analysis, that which brings itself to presence, has identity, and which can, ultimately disavow its relation to alterity.

This privileging of Dasein is, then a maintenance of the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity in the Heideggerian text. This is probably the clearest way in which to see the relationship between Heidegger’s thought and National Socialism.
Heidegger privileges the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity in his text (though this metaphysics is contested by the alterity installed by *Mitsein*) whilst National Socialism dreams of pure, homogeneous presence. It is understandable, then that a nexus between thought and political engagement emerged in 1933. Furthermore, the privileging of the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity installs an anthropocentrism at the heart of Heidegger's work. Particularly in *Being and Time*, Dasein remains modelled on a sovereign individual, a being that possesses Being, and chooses to resolutely assume its fate.

The question thus remains, in the wake of Heidegger's privileging of Dasein, what the nature of the community to which he gestures with the concept of *Mitsein* is. The task must be, if we heed the directions indicated by the preceding argument, to think Being-with without subordinating it to Being. That is, it must be to think Being-with itself as that which is properly primary in any existential analytic. Only in this way can the community in which we always already find ourselves, against which any subjectivity/presence is traced out, and which constitutes Being-in-the-world as exposed to an ineluctable alterity, be properly delineated. This, I would propose, is what Jean-Luc Nancy has attempted to do in his reconsideration of *Mitsein*.

**Nancy and the question of community**

Jean-Luc Nancy's work is explicitly concerned with the questions raised by the concept of *Mitsein*. For Nancy the task bequeathed philosophy by Heidegger is to think through the implications of the constitutive heterogeneity that structures
existence. That is, for Nancy, after Heidegger (and his retreat from the thought of
difference), the question that remains is to elaborate on the being-with that is
constitutive of being. As Simon Critchley notes, 'Nancy is attempting an existential
ontology of being-with which has the ambition of being a first philosophy'. As I
noted, the task posed by Heidegger's disavowal of Mitsein is to outline an existential
analytic that takes proper account of the constitutive nature of being-with. That is, it is
to sketch out an ontology that does not privilege being over being-with. However, this
is not just a case of finding the right balance, so to speak, between being and being-
with, Dasein and its Others. Rather, being is only insofar as it is constituted through
being-with. And thus it is this being-with that is the central concern of any ontological
enquiry.

It is for this reason that Nancy refers to his most complete sketch of the
meaning of being-with as a 'co-existential analytic'. In this way Nancy indicates that
any existential analytic (such as that set out in Being and Time) that privileges being
will disavow the heterogeneity constitutive of existence. In order to get to grips with
this problematic, therefore, it is necessary to note that any existential analytic is
always already a co-existential analytic. In this way our attention is turned from the
metaphysics of presence/subjectivity to the task of thinking about the heterogeneity
that is the constitutive horizon of any such presence. Moreover, this co-existential
analytic is, according to Nancy, a first philosophy in the strict sense ascribed to this
term by western thought. In a manner similar to, but divergent from, Levinas, Nancy
notes that we must think about the constitutive heterogeneity that structures all
existence if we are to understand that existence in any way. First philosophy refers to
that which must be thought prior to all other thinking. As Nancy notes, 'we cannot understand this task [that remains in the wake of Being and Time] unless we first understand what is most at stake...in philosophy'.

And yet if the foundation for thinking is to be heterogeneity, it would be at odds with this thought to see this first philosophy as the kind of monological ground that first philosophies (all of them ontotheologies) have aspired to be. In this sense then this first philosophy is to be seen much more as an 'ethos', a 'social ontology' (an inquiry into the logic of the heterogeneous socius that really exists), or perhaps a response, finally to the question that hangs in the air in the wake of Being and Time: the Mitseinsfrage (the question of the meaning of being-with).

Nancy's responses to this Mitseinsfrage are multiple and dispersed across his work. Whilst Being Singular Plural represents the fullest attempt he has made to sketch out a co-existential analytic as first philosophy it is not, for my purposes the most eloquent of his responses to the question of the meaning of being-with. In Being Singular Plural Nancy addresses the question of the meaning of being-with out of the context of the social that is said to determine this ontology. That is, to say, Nancy addresses being-with in a formal sense, outlining the principle philosophical contours that a thinking of the constitutive nature of being-with would follow. And yet, this formal thinking of being-with seemingly neglects the manner in which being-with is co-existent with community. That is to say, when we speak of being-with we are always already speaking of (extant) community. In this sense Nancy's most eloquent outline of the constitutivity of being-with is to be found in his most explicit reflection upon community: The Inoperative Community.
For Nancy, thinking about community demands a confrontation with the manner in which community has been thought by the tradition of western philosophy - according to a metaphysics of presence/subjectivity. For Nancy this is explicitly framed as a confrontation with the problems bequeathed to any thinking concerning community by political theories that privilege the individual. The problem faced in such theories is, as I have already noted, the manner in which being-with is taken to be either ancillary to individuality or to be minimised/eradicated in order to grant sovereign autonomy to the individuals that compose the socius or the empirical phenomenon of community.

Neither of these understandings of being-with can grasp the nature of the constitutivity of the ‘with’. If the with is seen as either an ancillary or a contingent (and undesirable) limitation of transcendent autonomy, there can be no meaningful explanation of the manner in which being-with is constitutive of existence. That is to say, such understandings confront heterogeneity as an accidental rather than essential property of being. And in doing so, these understandings deny themselves of a cogent account of the existential fact of community. Indeed, insofar as these understandings account for the sociality of political subjectivity it is not in terms of a constitutive inclination to alterity, but as a grudging acceptance (albeit as a contingent, ancillary, accidental aspect of being) that political subjects appear to co-exist empirically.

Liberal theories of community, for example, can only explain the apparent sociality that frames our empirical existences as an ancillary aspect of being. There is no explanation forthcoming regarding the way in which it appears that individuals are inclined towards one another. Thus social contract theory comprises an ex post
explanation for the seemingly contradictory co-existence of fundamentally autonomous individuals. Or, to put it another way, a theory of sovereign autonomy cannot explain why the Hobbesian state of nature is transcended, why individuals can and do co-exist, and the manner in which this coexistence is constitutive of their existence. In Hobbes, the fictive narrative of the Leviathan thus serves not to explain the constitutive openness to alterity characteristic of political community, but as an ex post facto rationalisation of the fact that, despite the posited sovereignty of individuals, it seems that there is, empirically, some way in which subjects compromise that supposed autonomy for sociality. This is why for many liberal theories abstraction remains preferable to the phenomenological examination of everyday life: if such an examination were undertaken the constitutive nature of the heterogeneous socius characteristic of mundane existence would be laid bare.

Furthermore, those who see being-with as an undeniable, but ultimately regrettable fact of existence see heterogeneity as a similarly accidental (if not necessarily ancillary) aspect of being. Being-with can thus be disavowed in order to give full presence to being (this may well be the drift of the privileging of Dasein in Being and Time). Perhaps the clearest model of such thinking might be Christian asceticism. The ascetic takes the empirical fact of sociality to comprise an accidental property of his/her essential being. Essential being (in which a communion with the divine is fully revealed) can thus only be realised by a strict practice of disavowal of the accidental characteristics of being (such as sociality).

But, as Nancy notes, such understandings neglect the manner in which being-with/community constitutes a horizon from which any understanding of
existence/being unfolds. To put it more clearly both understandings are an attempted negation of the community that is constitutive of existence. And yet this negation is never complete, but only ever a covering over, effacement or destruction (that leaves ruins and memories).\textsuperscript{50} In order to understand Nancy's argument concerning the way in which these conceptions of community cover over or disavow being-with, it is necessary to quickly sketch out his understanding of community.

'Community', according to Nancy, is the name given to that in which our 'being-in-common' is revealed. The western philosophical tradition - the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity - understands the 'common' of this being-in-common as a 'substance uniformly laid out "under" supposed "individuals", [or as a substance] uniformly shared out among everyone like a particular ingredient':\textsuperscript{51} an understanding of being-in-common as a common substance of being. Community thus understood is either a sharing in a common substance of Being (from the Christian sacramental figure of communion with the divine, to the Marxist notion of the privileged agent of history), or an aggregation of entities that are substantially/essentially the same (that is, \textit{in essence}, identical - most commonly seen in the notion that humans are 'born free and equal').\textsuperscript{52}

In the schemas of the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity the realisation, or bringing to presence of a common substance of being is taken to be the organising principle of community. That is, community is the realisation of the transcendent substantial essence of being. Hence from Rousseau through to Hegel and Marx, the structure of communal existence is organised around the realisation of a common substance of being (through either the social contract, the dialectic of \textit{Geist}, or the
emancipation that will arise from the proletarian revolution). The important thing to note is that in such accounts the common substance of being is *immanent* to the various communal arrangements of being. One can see this in liberal political theory where community is conceived of in terms of the elimination of those contingent features of existence that obscure or limit the realisation of a sovereign autonomy taken to be the transcendental essence of beings. Similarly, Hegel’s vision of the historical dialectic of Spirit traces out a trajectory in which absolute knowing (the immanent substance of being) is realised through the sublimation of the contingent contradictions of existence. For Hegel it should be noted that the conditions of absolute knowing are immanent to being - the dialectic of Spirit merely traces out the path of realisation of that absolute knowing.

In both cases, the point is that community is the name for the conditions under which a pre-existent, and thus immanent, substance is to be realised. Community thus names the problematic of the conditions under which immanence is to be realised. As such community is, for the modern metaphysics of presence/subjectivity, not an experience in itself but the conduit through which an immanent substantial essence of being is realised. Commonly ‘community’ thus refers to a problematic of overcoming the supposed constraints and limitations that empirical contingency places upon the realisation of such substance.

The problem raised by this conception of community as the name of the conditions under which an immanent substantial essence of being can be realised, is central to Nancy’s understanding of the political. Simply stated, the problem is that, since the essence of being-in-common - the common substance of Being - is taken to
be simply *immanent* to community, what it is to be *in-common* is never questioned. That is, discussions of community focus on the problematic of realising (bringing to full presence) a supposedly pre-existent substantial essence of being. This means that in discussions of community it is only the mechanism of the realisation of this common substance of being that is discussed. The nature, or even desirability, of the posited common substance is not questioned. Thus, for example, liberal political theory tends to concentrate on the question of realising autonomous individuality, rather than questioning the nature of such individuality (and hence is blind to the considerable negative consequences of the individualist vision of the supposed essence of being).

This understanding of community as the realisation of an immanent common substantial being, is rooted in the metaphysical assertion that there is an essential identity which constitutes what it is to *be-in-common*. For example, it might be presupposed that the *being-in-common* of community lies in *being* ‘human’. Hence ‘humanity’ becomes installed as the common substance of being that defines community. The problem that concerns Nancy and other writers who similarly recognise this manner in which community is understood by the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity is that politics becomes reduced to questions concerning how an immanent substance of being (such as ‘humanity’, or ‘individuality’) is to be realised. Questions concerning the meaning of this immanent substance (e.g., ‘humanity’/‘individuality’) are suspended as it becomes consensus that this is simply the essence of being. Community is thus that mechanism which realises this immanent substantial essence of being. To challenge this idea is to contest what is taken to be
'common sense'. After all if the immanent substance of being is understood to be 'humanity' or 'individuality' then alternative understandings of being will be relegated to the level of contingency/accident. That is, once the immanent substance of being is defined, all contrary understandings of being must be taken to be contingent (and thus temporary) confusions or mis-recognitions of being. What sense, it will be argued, does it therefore make to elaborate alternative understandings of being, as the essence of being will, in the end, transcend all such empirical contingencies.

Such understandings of community thus harbour two distinctly pernicious problematics. Firstly, as I noted, in taking a certain concept to be the essence of being, discussion of the meaning of that concept, its contours, and its consequences, is suspended. The installation of a certain concept as the embodiment of the essential identity of being takes the form of a naturalisation of a certain consensus. And in insofar as this concept is taken to be the substance of being it becomes an entirely uncontestable concept. This concept becomes a reiterable marker of the foundation on which a certain ideal system would be constructed. Thus, for example, in discourses about democracy or human rights the concepts of freedom and humanity are reiterated as markers of the common substance of being without any close scrutiny of their meaning or specificity. For to scrutinise them would be to realise that they are historically specific, born of certain historico-conceptual junctures, and thus far from the universal essences that such substances are purported to be.

Secondly, insofar as a concept is taken to be the immanent substance of being all other competing concepts are either marginalised or reduced to the status of contingent impediment to the realisation of that essence. Moreover, questions of what
it is to be-in-common are reduced to discussions not of the nature of being but the technical refinements of empirical contingency that must be accomplished in order to realise the essence of being. In this way the modern metaphysics of presence bequeath modern society a bureaucracy that delivers the most profound depoliticisation. That is to say, the agonism of the political is marginalised in so far as being is given a universal essential identity that admits of no contestation. In the absence of agonistic contestation, community becomes the mere refinement and perfection of the concept taken to embody the essence of being. This is precisely what is proper to bureaucracy: the refinement ad infinitum of a system for the realisation of a supposedly universal essence. Bureaucracy is blind to the consequences of such technical perfection without limits: capable of marginalisation, institutionalisation, or even destruction in order to remove the empirical contingencies that prevent the realisation of the substance of being. The modern metaphysics of presence/subjectivity thus proceed in step with a profound depoliticisation of the question of community and a terror hidden behind the banal face of bureaucracy.55

This definition of community as the bureaucratic/technical realisation of an immanent common substance of being comprises what Nancy refers to as 'the figuration of the political'.56 'Figuration' denotes the manner in which the metaphysics of presence understands community. That is, the metaphysics of presence understands community as the realisation of a figure: a concept taken to be the embodiment of the universal/substantial essence of being the realisation of which both grounds the technical bureaucratic organisation of society and suspends the agonistic question of community (what it is to be-in-common). Figuration is thus that through

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which the metaphysics of presence is able to represent itself to itself: as objective, as
substance, as presence. The figure of, for example, ‘the human’ becomes the image
through which the metaphysics of presence represents its presence to itself. There are,
of course, many such figures: legal person; state; demos; citizen; subject; object;
rationality; and so on.

Figuration, immanentism, totalitarianism

Figuration accomplishes an important function throughout the history of the
metaphysics of presence/subjectivity. Nancy refers to this as the operation of
‘immanentism’.

Immanentism is the foreclosure of the question of community (what it is to be-in-common) that is performed in taking a particular figure as the substance immanent to being and thus the principle according to which society/community is to be organised. Figuration is thus an immanentism, the performance of a closure/presence that represents the presence society/community to itself by positing a figure of the substance immanent to being at the heart of that society/community the realisation of which is that society/community’s technical task. Moreover, the immanentist figuration of the political transforms community into communion (either sharing of common substance, or being of common substance) and makes this communion into a work, something to be accomplished.

How should we understand this immanentism, this community understood as a communion that is properly a work to be accomplished? For the purposes of this discussion there are two key moments to immanentism. Firstly, at the level of
fundamental ontology, the figure of the substance of being that institutes the communion-work must be conceived of as absolute. For the modern metaphysics of presence/subjectivity to come to presence, it must represent itself to itself as the universal (and thus only) substance/essence of being-in-common: the single measure of the common substance of being. The figure must have meaning beyond relation with other figures in order to be the (properly universal) foundation in which the communion-work originates. For if the figure is defined in relation (to anything) then the founding moment is complicated by exteriority. The figure constituted by exteriority is merely a value, dependent on relational definition for its meaning - a meaning, therefore, that cannot be the single (universal) measure of the common substance immanent to being.

The figure/figuration is, therefore, according to Nancy, a resolution of a contradiction central to the modern metaphysics of presence. Specifically it is the resolution of the contradiction raised by the desire for presence, particularly for a fullness of presence. This contradiction is elaborated by Nancy as the paradox of being-alone. The metaphysics of presence offers, insofar as it proffers the possibility of a fullness of presence a vision of the subject of being existing alone. This is precisely the vision offered by liberal conceptions of the pre-existing, unencumbered subject of being. This subject is defined as an embodiment of a universal substance. Universal substance does not derive its meaning (or value) in terms of a differentiation from an Other, but exists, fully present in and for itself. In these terms, figures of full presence offered by the metaphysics of presence must represent presence as the possibility of being-alone. And yet, Nancy notes, the possibility of being-alone is
framed in terms of a relation. That is to say, being-alone is a mode of being-with: a separation from an other defined precisely as a standing apart from, or existing in the absence of, others.

It might be possible to assert that such a separation is possible: that the realisation of a figure might allow the subject of being to enclose itself and thus divide itself from its others. And yet even this enclosing, insofar as it is a closure from others is a relation. To be properly alone (or as Nancy puts it to 'be alone being alone') requires that this relation established by the enclosure of the subject of being be enclosed itself. That is, the enclosure itself must be separate from the others it closes itself off from and thus the relation severed. It is precisely this impossible double enclosure that the immanentist metaphysics of presence attempts through figuration. That this double enclosure is impossible can be seen by noting the manner in which the enclosure must always be a closing off from alterity (a general otherness or specific others). Any enclosure is thus a relation, since if there were truly no alterity with which a relation existed, then there would be no need for enclosure, no need for figuration and the simple existence of presence.

And yet immanentism is precisely this operation of an impossible double enclosure continually asserting/performing representations of the fullness of the subject of being. Moreover, the paradox of the double enclosure that lies at the heart of the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity is both that which necessitates immanentism and that which fuels the desire for the accomplishment of the communion community in which fullness of presence is achieved through the figure. The immanentist metaphysics of presence/subjectivity posits the figure as that with
which all subjects of being have a communion and then organises the society/community as a perpetual work to enclose this community in order to establish being as present in and for itself. That this is an increasingly violent work should be noted. The enclosure on which such immanentism is predicated is, precisely an exclusion: an exclusion of the alterity in relation to which the enclosure that establishes presence is performed. Figuration, this enclosure, is thus a laying out of boundaries, a drawing of a line that encloses a conception of the substance of being that all those in the society/community share. It is a bounding on which the fiction of the substance of being existing in and for itself is based.

Secondly, the supposedly absolute and immanent (and thus ahistorical) figure is in fact a myth that calls into being (that is, institutes/constitutes) the community as a communion-work. Through this myth the communion-community is given presence. Though the figure of, say, 'the citizen' tells a story about the genesis of community whereby sovereign, autonomous individuals predate the community (see Hobbes or Rousseau), this is merely part of the myth itself. 'The citizen' is constituted in the myth (along with its pre-communal past), as is the milieu of the individual (the bounded state/demos). That is, the unencumbered sovereign individual does not pre-exist the community as it proclaims but is constituted qua unencumbered and pre-existent in the mythic figure.

Similarly, the myth that institutes/constitutes the communion-community according to an absolute figure, is co-extensive with the performance of the enclosure on which figuration rests. It is in the reiteration of the mythic figure that the community is enclosed, the individual is enclosed. The enclosure removes the
community and individuals from the possibility that identity could be defined relationally. Identity is defined only as the immanent completion of the absolute figure. And thus this mythic founding of the communion-community is the closure of the political, the closure of the terrain of agonism, of the relational contestation of identity, the alterity and difference that is constitutive of existence. Ultimately, although the immanentist myth performs in the name of community it is, in fact, the closure of this question: the suspension of the question of what it is to be-in-common.

It is in relation to this (en)closure that Nancy talks of immanentism as totalitarianism. By this Nancy does not mean that the mythic figuration is performed by some sort of party who take it upon themselves to exterminate all those who are not included in the figuration. Rather, all communities conceived of according to a mythic figuration are totalitarian in form; atrocities such as the Holocaust are historically specific instances of the extremes of which figured communion-communities are capable. The totalitarianism of the communion-community conceived of as the work demanded by figuration, arises from the manner in which the figure is taken to permeate all being-in-common such that politics is reduced to the technical accomplishment of the realisation of immanence.

The consequence of this totalitarianism of the figure can only be the evaporation of the political into a technicism according to which it is no longer necessary to question being-in-common. According to this technicism a mere calculation of the ways in which to achieve the realisation of immanence is taken to be all that is required. Hence, in our present time the political evaporates into technical discussions concerning the manner in which society can be best engineered to suit to
operation of a supposedly free market, or to correspond to the discursive regimes of
science. Or the political evaporates into legalistic arguments concerning the minutiae
of government. For some, of course (such as Fukuyama), immanence has already been
realised and all that remains is to broaden the geographic reach of that immanence.65

Shared community

It is precisely this immaneatist communion-community that is the target of
Nancy’s critique in The Inoperative Community. In order to appreciate Nancy’s
critique it is necessary to underline the manner in which figuration is a work, a
technical operation to secure the enclosure of the community. Work is, in Nancy’s
terms, an operation that proceeds according to the telos of the figure. That is to say,
the figure establishes a ground for an operation of enclosure. This operation holds the
realisation of the figure as its telos. This telos, or horizon (in the sense of enclosure) is
simultaneously the logos of the communion-community: that which expresses the
horizon of enclosure towards which the technical operation of realisation is orientated,
and the foundation on which the being of the communion-community is grounded.
Insofar as figuration is performed it institutes/inaugurates a technical operation
oriented towards the achievement of the enclosure/bounding given in the figure. A
figured communion-community thus works to secure the enclosure established in the
figure. It is, properly, an operative (in the sense of working) community whose
technical organisations function to secure the enclosure of the figured community.
It is in contradistinction to this operative (working), figured communion-community that Nancy outlines the notion of the 'inoperative' community. This inoperative community is not a dysfunctional or poorly implemented communion-community. Nor is it a principle of disruption of the communion-community. In fact it is not posed strictly in opposition to the communion-communities established by the modern metaphysics of presence/subjectivity. For if it were to be posed in opposition to the communion-community, Nancy would be accepting at least the terrain on which the modern metaphysics of presence/subjectivity operates. In contradistinction, Nancy elaborates a first philosophy that challenges the principle assumptions of the modern metaphysics of presence/subjectivity concerning community. This first philosophy suggests that community itself can never be made operative, can never properly work (in the sense of realising a figure). It suggests, contrary to the modern metaphysics of presence/subjectivity, that community is not a sharing of substance. Indeed it suggests that the very notion of community as a gathering of those who share an essential substance of being is mistaken.

Instead Nancy suggests that community should be understood as the name of an existential condition of inoperability, a constitutive heterogeneity that leaves any enclosure continually unravelling in the loose ends of an exposure to alterity. In this sense Nancy is questioning the very idea of community as a bounded expression of substantial identity that has governed the history of western thought and suggesting another understanding of what it is to be always already implicated in community. And this 'other' understanding is derived in response to the question of what it is to be-in-common. In this sense Nancy is responding to the constitutive heterogeneity of
existence recognised by Heidegger in the concept of *Mitsein*. Moreover, this response directly challenges Heidegger’s subsequent privileging of Dasein over *Mitsein* by asserting that the principle question is not that of being, but that of being-with, or being-in-common (a sharing of the public spatiality of existence that I have previously demonstrated to be constituted in and through buildings and at stake in urbicide).

That the constitution of community according to absolute figures is deeply problematic can be shown by returning to the proposition that community is that in which being-in-common is revealed. Being-*in-common* cannot be a process in which individuals come together to *discover* commonality, for in absolute individuality there is no inclination towards other individuals (as there are, strictly speaking, no other individuals). Such discovered commonality would be a mere contingent fact ancillary to the sovereign autonomy proper to being. In this sense such commonality is not being-in-common but a contingent commonality of beings. Correspondingly the individual understood as only a moment in the totality cannot reveal being-*in-common* as there can be no sense of differentiation (which there must be for the notion of being-*in-common* to have any meaning). Indeed, such individuals are merely particular incarnations of a common (because it is universal) being. Being-in-common, like sharing, thus requires both a constitutive relation of commonality and yet a distinction that establishes the alterity of those with whom we are in-common.

Being-in-common, therefore, can only be seen as being-with: being-separate only makes sense in relation to a being-in-common that is a being-with. That is to say, community is the experience of being-self *by virtue of* being-with: this is the being-in-common that is revealed in community. Such a being is never absolute, it cannot
perform the separation required to bring itself to presence without relation. Community is thus the name of a relation, an originary exposure to alterity, an identity that consists precisely in the impossibility of self-identification but which draws its sense from the being-\textit{with} that is the condition of possibility of being-in-common. Community in this sense is not communion, but communication.

This conception of community radically re-orient our understanding of being-in-common from the enclosed figure (commonly realised in the nation-state or ethno-national group) to an understanding of being-in-common as a constitutive relation with alterity. This constitutive relation - a constitutive heterogeneity since it constitutes existence as always already a relation with others - is a communication in so far as it is an opening to, and receiving of identity from, alterity. Which is to say that this relation is not a crossing over of a pre-existent distance between the self and other. Rather it is a constitution of self and other in and through sharing. And since sharing is at once a distinction and a relation, it is proper to see this relation with alterity occurring precisely at those places where the distinction that makes possible the relation (and thus sharing) takes place.

The relation is, strictly speaking, a surface of contact between self and other that is at the same time both relation (a shared surface is in common) and yet a distinction (the surface separates self from other). It is in this sense, therefore, that the relation is best seen not as a conduit through, or crossing of, a distance separating self and other but a line shared between self and other. The line that separates self and other is thus in-common (it is part of both self and other) and yet is a line of distinction that separates (and thus constitutes) self and other. It is in this sense that
community is a communication since the boundaries the self has in-common with the other are precisely that from which the self derives presence/meaning. The difference of self and other is thus *communicated* in and through this shared boundary. In this sense being is, for Nancy, an ecstatic event, a communication/constitution of self from beyond the self across the boundary of self-other that is both shared and yet separates.

In this sense community is not the name of a distinct, separate territorial domain, space, or association. ‘Community’ is the proper name of the constitutive communication of difference experienced in and through being-in-common. Community is the network of communications (in the sense of exposure to alterity) in which a differentiated articulation of contingent singularities (the social terrain) is constituted. It is in this sense that being is, in Nancy’s phrase ‘singular plural’. Or rather, to give it proper articulation, ‘community’ is the event/experience of ‘being singular plural’. 69

Community is thus a ‘a reticulated multiplicity, which produces no result’: an inoperative network of singularities constituted by the loose ends of a communication of difference constitutive of self and other.70 And yet this communication of difference constitutes a limit that establishes a distinction of self and other that is coexistent with a sharing of a common distinctive boundary. And in this sense the self is always already in-common with the other and thus any attempt to enclose the self and put distance between it and the other are perpetually unworked. The sharing constitutive of this being singular plural continually unworks the attempts of the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity. And thus Nancy places the concept of
community, a being singular plural that is predicated on a being-with in the position of a first philosophy.

This reorientation of our understanding of community is, as any first philosophy should be, profound. It asserts that community is the proper name of the constitutive heterogeneity - the being singular plural that characterises existence - that structures/constitutes Being-in-the-world (to use Heidegger's terminology). In this sense it contests the notion inherent to the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity that community is ancillary to the substantial essence of being, a contingent and wholly secondary aspect of being-in-the-world. That is, it contests the idea that being is a transcendental substance existent prior to the world in which it always finds itself and thus sees community not only as an empirical fact, but also as a fundamental aspect of existence. Moreover, it answers the question of the nature of community by outlining the sense in which community is not the association (forced or voluntary) of individuals, but, rather the name of the being singular plural in which the self is constituted by virtue of being-with others. 71

Agonism, antagonism and community

This conception of community as the being singular plural constitutive of existence is particularly productive in relation to understanding the heterogeneity disclosed by, and lost in, urbicide and the political stakes of this destruction. More specifically, Nancy's understanding of community indicates that the stakes of urbicide, hitherto understood as heterogeneity (or constitutive openness to alterity) is,
properly, agonism. Hence, Nancy’s reorientation of the understanding of community suggests that the target of urbicide is ‘the political’. It is a constitutive agonism, the plurality of singularities, that is at stake in urbicide and, as such, it is the very condition of being-political that is in question. And in this sense we can begin to sketch out a response to the question posed in the wake of Heidegger’s disavowal of Mitsein: what is the nature of this heterogeneity?

Heterogeneity - specifically the constitutive heterogeneity constituted in and through the locales in which Being-in-the-world always already is and for which buildings are the condition of possibility - is co-extensive with the agonism that defines ‘things political’. This agonistic, properly political, heterogeneity is, ultimately, in Nancy’s work nothing more, though nothing less, than the inoperative nature of community. Heterogeneity is thus the properly political (agonistic) unworking (désœuvré) that comprises community. This unworking (désœuvré) is not to be understood as a destruction of the community envisaged in the figurations inspired by the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity. It is a constitutive unravelling of all such attempts to bring to presence a substantial identity for the subject of being. It is the perpetual loose ends at the edge of any figured community that mark the constitutive alterity by virtue of which any identity is present.

These loose ends, this fraying, is constitutive of existence, it marks an agonistic heterogeneity that structures the presence of the self or its collective arrangements - insofar as such presence is achieved - and opens that presence to a continual agonistic contestation. The response to such agonism ranges from a benign neglect of alterity through the indifference practised in tolerance to the violent
assertion of separation, homogeneity and radical difference characteristic of ethno-nationalism. But in all cases the constitutive nature of this agonism and thus the political is undeniable. And even where the political is effaced it remains at stake despite its absence (it remains at stake precisely because of its absence).

It is precisely this agonistic nature of the constitutive heterogeneity at stake in urbicide that I want to outline further at this point to indicate two specific moments visible in the destruction of urban environments: 1) the attempted effacement of the political; 2) the manner in which this effacement is left with/at loose ends, continually unworked by the constitutive agonism which it disavows.

In order to set out the effacement of the political effected by urbicide, it is necessary to sketch out the agonism that underpins Nancy's conceptualisation of community in further detail. This agonism is not simply an openness to alterity, nor the mere unravelling of the best laid plans of figuration, rather it is properly the sharing of divisions. This sharing of divisions is the constitutive moment of existence. It is division, or more properly distinction or differentiation, that is the constitutive moment of the singular networks of identity that characterise existence. That is, it is from the sharing (out and in) of divisions that senses of self, other, nation, ethnos, state and so on are derived. And it is only because the divisions/differentiations are shared that such networks of identity are constituted. In the differentiation of self and other, for example, it is only because the distinction between self and other is shared by both self and other (as a limit of either identity) that either term is given meaning. This sharing of divisions then is both a relation and a division, a distinction (and thus
a line, limit or boundary) that is both common to both self and other and yet divides
self from other (and vice versa).

That this sharing of divisions is agonistic can be seen, as I have argued, in the
manner in which it structures differentiation according to a logic of alterity. That is to
say, there is no self that does not share something (even if it is a limit at which a
distinctive difference is constituted) with its other. It is precisely this commonality of
a line, a distinction, that opens any self to its other, makes a relation with the other
constitutive. And in this sense it installs the other as the constitutive moment of the
self. In this sense, the self cannot gather itself into itself in order to bring itself to
presence only in and for itself. It is always already a self for the other. And in this
sense the self always finds that its efforts at enclosure (specifically the double
enclosure of figuration I spoke of earlier) trail the loose ends of shared divisions
from/with the other that cannot be recuperated, gathered or woven into a figure of
substantial self-identity. The self is always at loose ends in relation to the other,
unable to continue its work of figuration due to the constitutive nature of the other.
And this unworking, or being-at-loose-ends, that characterises the shared divisions of
community (in Nancy's sense) is properly an agonism. It is a constitutive struggle or
contest in which the self attempts to recuperate itself in the work of figuration and yet
finds only loose ends (both a fraying and an idleness that is the simple sharing of
divisions which thwarts all works).

That this agonistic sharing of divisions is the inauguration of the political can
be seen insofar as it constitutes power relations. In talking of the nature of power
Foucault notes that '[p]ower is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as
they are free.\textsuperscript{72} That is, Foucault distinguishes between those situations in which a confrontation ossifies into a situation of domination or a stalemate and those in which an essential freedom to act exists and which thus necessitates practices to modify any resulting actions.\textsuperscript{73} It is these practices that modify actions that constitute power for Foucault.\textsuperscript{74} That is, power is precisely the exercise of a capacity to modify the actions of others. And for such a capacity to be realised the other must be free to act as a condition of possibility of there being modification of such action. In cases where that freedom does not exist (for example, where domination is realised) power is no longer present (and is transformed into violent force).

For Foucault, power is agonistic insofar as it is ‘a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation which paralyses both sides than a permanent provocation.’\textsuperscript{75} Only insofar as there is incitement to government and a provocation of that government is there a field of possibility for practices of modification of the actions of others: the practice of power. In this sense power is an agonistic relation constituted by a ‘provocation’. It is precisely this kind of agonism in which a permanent provocation (the sharing of divisions) exists which constitutes existence. Indeed, Nancy notes that ‘…there would be no power relations…if the political were not the place of community - in other words, the…existence of being-in-common, which gives rise to the existence of being-self [or singularity]’.\textsuperscript{76}

Thus Nancy folds the three central terms of political analysis - community, power and the political - into one statement of first philosophy. The relation of power, community and the political is set out quite simply by Nancy. Community names the
constitutive heterogeneity of existence that comprises a sharing of divisions, or a communication in which the meaning of self is given by, and at, the distinction from the other (a differentiation/division that can be neither recuperated into, nor alienated from, the self). In this sense the 'reticulation' of existence, its constitution as a network of singularities structured by the plurality/heterogeneity of existence, is a mobile mosaic of inclusions and exclusions. The singularities of self, other, state, nation, ethnos and so on constituted at any given juncture are established precisely though the constitution of temporary and contingent limits of differentiation at which self and other are distinguished and thus constituted. These limits include what it is to be part of the identity of the self and other and exclude what is to be taken to be foreign to it. In this sense the division shared by self and other is a mark of both inclusion and exclusion.

This differentiation, inclusion and exclusion, is precisely the operation on which the practice of power (and specifically government) is founded. Government is a classification and disciplining that is productive of particular/singular selves and others. Government constitutes the limits between itself and alterity - thus establishing a communal, or societal, identity - and then exercises power over those 'Other' singularities (the mad, the criminal, the sexually deviant) in order to draw them into, or expel them from, the boundaries of the communal/social. And yet government is constantly provoked by the alterity with which it shares a constitutive division. It can never escape this provocation because it can only ever delimit itself with a shared division. And thus power carries on practising itself, seeking new terrain on which to practice the modification of action (witness psychiatry moving out of the hospital into
the community, or the art of correcting the soul of the criminal or the idle moving from prisons and asylums to workfare programs). And this agonistic inauguration of power that is also community according to Nancy is thus coextensive with the political since it constitutes a contestation in which the distinction of self from other is at stake. This is precisely the characteristic of things political, the (necessarily impossible) struggle to constitute singular presence.

This agonism at the heart of Nancy's conception of community exposes the ineluctably political character of this being-in-common. Moreover, this agonism is the condition of possibility (perhaps of necessity) of power relations (understood in the Foucauldian sense). It is this congruence of power and the political/agonism, and Foucault's understanding of this coincidence in particular, that provides a purchase on the manner in which the political is at stake (and yet perpetually resurgent) in urbicide.

As I have noted, Foucault distinguishes between the exercise of power (coincident with the political) and conditions of domination or confrontation. These latter situations are ones in which either the freedom of action necessary to the exercise of power has evaporated, or ones in which a violent confrontation emerges in which a force is exerted on bodies or things that is no longer the response of power to a provocation but an attempt to eliminate the freedom to act. These latter circumstances either evolve into states of domination or become confrontations in which parties separate from each other refuse to yield to one another. Confrontation is an elimination of the political insofar as it is the face-to-face opposition of one figure to another. The freedom to act is negated by the figuration of either party insofar as the party presents itself not as a provocation to the other but as an essential substance
un-amenable to governance. In this situation each figure presents itself as a thing with a substantial essence and the opposing party is reduced to exerting force upon that thing. In this situation the division shared by both parties is taken to be an unbridgeable gap that thwarts the exercise of governmental power over actions. This is the reduction of provocation or contestation to confrontation. It is, I would argue, the translation of agonism into antagonism.

This translation of agonism into antagonism is a strategy deployed by the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity in its work to secure figuration. It is an attempt to efface the political insofar as it attempts to translate both division into separation and provocation into confrontation. This is a dual event insofar as the translation of division into separation is a necessary precursor to confrontation and to the extent that the constitution of a confrontation is necessary for the establishment of a separation. Antagonism brings a figure to presence insofar as it disavows the shared division between itself and its others by constituting that division as a separation. In constituting the figure and its Others as separate figures confronting each other antagonism is also a depoliticisation. Insofar as agonistic provocation is reduced to antagonistic confrontation the political is reduced to technical management of such oppositions (albeit a technics that is, properly, a violence). The being-in-common of being singular plural is thus effaced.78

It is precisely this effacement of the political through its translation into the politics of confrontation that is at work in the logics of urbicide. Urbicide targets buildings because they are conditions of possibility of the provocation of alterity that constitutes agonism. Insofar as buildings are that which constitute existential spatiality
as fundamentally heterogeneous, they are also that which constitute existence as agonistic. It is in the network of relations constituted by buildings that the shared divisions which give rise to self and other are constituted. The destruction of buildings is thus an attempt to efface the shared division they constitute and the provocation of alterity that any identity is thus constitutively open to.

This destruction shapes the urban terrain into opposing, antagonistic figures. Key front-line zones are destroyed in order to create zones of separation. Heterogeneous buildings (such as mosques in so-called Serb areas) are destroyed in order to render those areas purportedly homogeneous and thus representable as being of a single ethnic substance. Moreover, in the wake of the naturalisation of the antagonisms carved out on the terrain of Bosnia, the implementation of the agreements reached in the Dayton accords reinforce this depoliticisation by establishing literal zones of separation between supposedly antagonistic parties.79

Urbicide thus attacks the political itself, translating the agonistic provocation of heterogeneity into the antagonistic opposition of separate, figured parties. In chapter 6 I will illustrate the manner in which zones of separation were established in the urbicide that characterised the 1992-95 Bosnian war. Indeed, as I will demonstrate, the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar creates a one of separation (the Neretva gorge) between west and east Mostar that is the foundation of an antagonism between Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs that is vital to the performance of the presence of the Bosnian Croat ethnic statelet of Herceg-Bosna. Thus in and through the destruction of the Old Bridge the Bosnian Croats translated the agonistic provocation of heterogeneity that the urban environment of Mostar comprised into the antagonistic
separation of ‘Croat’ west Mostar and ‘Muslim/Bosniac’ east Mostar. This separation and antagonism was achieved by reconfiguring the urban terrain as separate entities, thus lending credence to the claim that these were substantially separate parties opposing one another in a confrontation. The destruction of mosques, front line streets, public places and finally bridges followed this logic, destroying the shared spaces of Mostar in an attempt to establish that Mostar was comprised of two distinct opposing parties who shared nothing, had no being-in common.

And yet as I noted above, this translation of agonism into antagonism is perpetually unworked. The translation of agonism into antagonism is, thus never entirely secured. As agonism is constitutive of existence it can only ever be effaced, disavowed, or cover over, but never replaced or destroyed. In this way it is not an either/or choice between agonism and antagonism, but a reduction of the political through a disavowal of agonism embodied in attempts to constitute an antagonism. Antagonism is predicated on agonism and constitutes a performative disavowal, or ongoing negation, of the provocation issued by the agonism of being-in-common.

In both the rubble of Bosnia and the remaining urban locales this being-in-common remains, unworking the loose ends of the ethno-nationalist project that was embodied in urbicide. The buildings and rubble of Bosnia continually reassert the shared divisions that constitute the networks of singular identity that comprise Bosnia today. And as such they are the provocation that unworks the figures of ethnic antagonism and zones of separation. Mosques in Banja Luka, and Trebinje, bridges in Mostar, and houses for returnees across Republika Srpska are all agonistic provocations in which the political returns to haunt ethno-nationalist antagonisms. In
these remnants and survivors of urbicide we can see precisely what was at stake in such destruction: the disavowal of heterogeneity and the being-in-common it entails. Tragically, of course, the return of the agonistic provocation is greeted with further violence, further attempts to secure the figures of ethno-nationalism: the destruction of houses intended for returnees, and the prevention of mosque rebuilding being the most visible instances.

**Shared spatiality and ethno-national spaces: the territorialisation of antagonism**

This constitution of antagonism in and through urbicide and the concomitant reduction of the political to the violence of ethnic confrontation is particularly important in relation to the central question with which I began this argument: that of the logic behind the targeting of the shared spatiality of Bosnia. This constitution of antagonism through urban destruction discloses, finally, the manner in which it is spatiality that is at stake in urbicide.

In Chapter 3 I demonstrated the manner in which Being-in-the-world, or existence, is ineluctably spatial. I also showed that insofar as this spatiality is constituted by buildings it is fundamentally shared/public. It was on this basis that I argued that existence is constitutively heterogeneous. If it is the conditions of possibility of a shared existential spatiality that are attacked by urbicide, what is the fate of this spatiality?

At this point it is necessary to point to a distinction between *spatiality* on the one hand, and *space* on the other hand. Perhaps we might say (with Edward Casey)
that space has traditionally been conceived of as a homogeneous medium bounded within certain limits. From the earliest Greek origins of the metaphysics of presence to Newton and Kant, space has been conceived of as analogous to the interior of a vessel - a given space, within particular bounds, contained, and finally a medium in which things may be located and through which they may move. It has become possible to speak not only of space as a universal medium, something within which all objects have locations and through which all objects move, but also of spaces. These spaces, different experiences of space in different discursive contexts, may differ in their limits and the locations they offer to objects, but they are essentially identical - a medium existing inside specified limits in which objects are located and which is akin to the interior bounded by the walls of a vessel.

Spatiality, on the other hand, refers to the relationality, dimensionality and orientation that comprises Being-in-the-world. This spatiality is quite unlike the space in which objects are located. Spatiality does not provide an *a priori* set of co-ordinates in relation to which any object can be located. Rather spatiality comprises an engagement with things that is constitutive of the worldliness of Being-in-the-world. That is, spatiality contains no co-ordinates and is not prior to Being-in-the-world. Rather it is, as I discussed in Chapter 3, precisely the complex networks of relations that comprise Being-in-the-world as an everyday engagement with, and an orientation towards, the things with which it is concerned. In this sense spatiality is not an abstract medium, or universal substance, but a set of relations established by the everyday concerns of Being-in-the-world. It is in this sense that Heidegger can say that though the spectacles on someone's nose may be closer in terms of space than the
picture on the opposite wall at which they are looking, the picture is closer in terms of spatiality because it is that with which Dasein is concerned. 81

Space is, as Heidegger notes, derived from spatiality. Space is generated by the establishment of a common measure against which the relations of engagement that constitute existential spatiality can be measured (feet, inches, miles, centimetres, metres, kilometres and so on). This is what Heidegger means when he says that spatiality affords

the possibility of measuring things...according to distances, spans, and directions, and of computing these magnitudes. But the fact that they are universally applicable to everything that has extension can in no case make numerical magnitudes the ground of the essence of spaces and the locales that are measurable with the aid of mathematics. 82

Spatiality is thus the ground of spaces. Space comprises the reduction of the existential spatiality of Being-in-the-world to arbitrary magnitudes.

Moreover, spatiality is, as I have demonstrated in Chapter 3, fundamentally shared/public. That is to say the things in engagement with which spatiality is constituted are available to each and every singular instance of Being-in-the-world. Space, however is a different proposition. Space, however, is a substantial thing providing the co-ordinates of location within given limits (i.e., a thing may be said to be located in the space of the room). It is, therefore, a metaphysical concept, a homogenous substance. In one sense space admits of heterogeneity insofar as any object can be located within it. However space is not shared. Indeed, the fundamental rule of spatiality is that no two objects can occupy the same space. The closest to
sharing possible in space is for two things to be adjacent to, or touching one another. And yet these things are differentiated as having no common border, but rather as touching one exterior surface against the other.

This is precisely the sense in which antagonism presents the confrontation of opposing parties - as the being-adjacent, or touching of two bounded entities in which the surface at which touching occurs is not a common surface, but the meeting of two exterior surfaces and, hence, despite touching, the separation of both entities. It is not hard, therefore, to see that the antagonism constituted in and through urbicide is coextensive with the constitution of spaces of ethno-national homogeneity. That is to say, antagonism is a territorialisation of figuration. Antagonism is the translation of shared existential spatiality into adjoining, but bounded, spaces (or territories). Put simply figuration stakes out a territorial space, bounds it, and admits of no heterogeneity other than that of a confrontation with opposed/antagonistic territorial spaces.

It is precisely this territorialisation of antagonism that can be seen in urbicide. The destruction of the urban environment is a laying waste of the locales whose spatiality cannot be recuperated to ethno-nationalist spaces. The spaces that ethno-nationalism seeks to construct are territorialisations of the figures of ethnic presence on which they are predicated. It is in this sense that mosques (and to a lesser extent churches) are destroyed as reminders within the territories carved out by ethno-nationalists of the heterogeneity on whose disavowal these spaces rest. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it is the residential districts of Bosnian towns, the public squares, parks, shops and so on that are locales whose fundamentally public and,
hence, heterogeneous, spatiality cannot be recuperated to these projects of the territorialisation of figures. And, hence, an assault on these shared locales is an integral part of the campaign by ethno-nationalist forces to bring to presence the figures of ethnic identity. In this way ethno-nationalist forces hope to create the condition of confrontation in which it suggested that figured ethnic groups live in adjacent spaces (touching at, but not sharing, their borders) with no common spaces. Hence, it is necessary, argue the forces of ethno-nationalism, to legitimate ethnic cleansing, partition Bosnia, and deny the heterogeneity constitutive of existence.

And yet as I suggested earlier, the territorialisation of figuration in and through antagonism unravels in a variety of places. Territorialisations have to be continually re-territorialised in order to maintain the spaces of ethno-nationalist figuration. This re-territorialisation takes the form not just of a continuing post-war urbicide, but also of continued expulsions predicated on the antagonistic state of affairs.83 This continuation of what constitutes, in Walker’s words, an ‘unstable dialectic of inclusion and exclusion’, is a perpetual unravelling of territorialisations necessitating their reterritorialisation.84

Finally, the political, agonism and shared spatiality returns perpetually as an ineluctable trace of alterity/heterogeneity necessitating this continual play of reterritorialisation. In the laying (or not) of a foundation stone for a mosque, the raising of the ruins of the Old Bridge from the river Neretva in Mostar, or the refurbishment of the homes of returnees, the traces of the heterogeneity constitutive of existence return to haunt ethno-nationalism. Of course, as long as the antagonistic play of confrontation is allowed (particularly by the so-called ‘international community’) to
remain the status quo, this return of the political will be fleeting. And yet, the point is to note that it is precisely this constitutive heterogeneity glimpsed in brief moments prior to the reterritorialisation of figures of ethnic identity that is at stake in urbicide. It is this heterogeneity that is disavowed in urbicide. And that is the same as saying that the logic of urbicide is the reduction of the agonism of the political to the antagonism of territorial politics.

By way of conclusion of this argument I would like to turn, therefore, to look at several instances in which we can clearly see these stakes of urbicide. In the first place I would like to look at three specific issues in present day Bosnia: the rebuilding of mosques, the return of displaced persons, and the task of urban reconstruction in Mostar. I would then like to turn to look at three further cases which, I think, broaden the scope of the question of urbicide from Bosnia to cases of similar urban destruction thus showing the manner in which this conceptual schema sketched out in relation to Bosnia is analytically productive in relation to wider questions of the destruction of urban environments. In the first case I want to look at questions raised by the de facto partition of the town of Mitrovica in Kosovo after the 1999 Kosovo conflict. I will then look at the destruction of Palestinian homes in the Occupied Territories by the Israeli Defence Force. Finally I will look briefly at the extreme consequences of urbicide as seen in the destruction of the Chechen capital Grozny by Russian forces. I want, in order to conclude this argument, to use these cases to illustrate what I think urbicide both discloses and means and the manner in which, at present, anthropocentrism prevents us from grasping this.
CHAPTER 6

THE STAKES OF URBICIDE

[T]he Yugoslav People’s Army, the bloody cartographer...cut to pieces the structures of the city [Vukovar], so as not merely to conquer it, but to keep it forever...on the map of Greater Serbia.

Such map-illusions murder and rape reality to encircle territory of the imagination...“Ethnic cleansing” means cleaning a city’s contents of unclean substance. But changing the ethnic picture of a city with genocide cannot guarantee that the picture will never take shape again. This is why it was necessary [in Vukovar] to foreclose on resettlement and renewal.¹

Mostar joined the ominous club of divided cities...in which the bridges are replaced by walls...[Mostar was thus] reduced to a battleground of opposing political interests, with its architecture and urban fabric turned into...military targets. The two sides in Mostar...allied along ethnic lines...breach the basic covenant of the city: to be open for all. Thus they engage in the futile game of claiming what they can never get.²

The city and philosophy

In Being Singular Plural Jean-Luc Nancy notes that ‘as long as philosophy is an appeal to the origin, the city, far from being philosophy’s subject or space, is its
problem. Insofar as the western metaphysical tradition of philosophy is a foundationalist project to sketch out the transcendental logos (or universal substance) of community, it can never simply inhabit or regulate the city. The city, as a space of fundamental heterogeneity is precisely that which continually unworks such philosophical articulations of a ground or logos of community, opening this project up to an agonistic alterity. In this sense the city is...the bringing to light of being-in-common as the dis-position (dispersal and disparity) of the community represented as founded in interiority or transcendence.

Figurative representations of the city-community as a universal substance (logos) are unravelled by the agonistic networks of identity-difference constituted by the buildings that comprise the city. Insofar as the city is constituted as public/shared by the buildings that comprise its conditions of possibility and, hence, defined by its heterogeneity, the project of philosophy will always fall idle in its streets, squares and buildings, unable to perform the work of figuration. Despite this, figuration returns again and again to work on the city. It is as if the city offends those who attempt to carve out a logos (or substance) on which to ground a city-community. Mostar, Sarajevo, and Vukovar are only three of the most visible of these offending cities. Urbanity has repeatedly been subjected to the ravages of projects inherently opposed to the agonism harbour by cities. The ravages of this ‘appeal to the origin’ have been seen in diverse locations including, though not limited to, Beirut, Belfast, Hiroshima, The Occupied Territories, Berlin and Grozny. It is in this sense that Nancy notes that ‘philosophy is the problem of the city’. Philosophy, this ‘appeal to the origin’, is a problem for urbanity insofar as it ‘covers over...“community”',
reducing being-in-common to rubble that disavows the heterogeneous co-existence characteristic of the city.

Nancy's framing of the question of the destruction of urbanity by figuration in terms of the relationship that exists between philosophy and the city is characteristic of his concerns in Being Singular Plural: namely, first philosophy. It is appropriate in an enquiry (such as Nancy's) into the very first principles that govern thinking about existence to return to the question that has haunted the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity from its Greek inception. It is precisely the question of the relation of the ruler, or philosopher, and the city that is framed by Plato in the Republic, and taken up by Aristotle in the Politics. That both of these philosophers take the regulation of the city by philosophy as their theme might be attributed to the context in which both thinkers wrote: that of the city-state. And yet, this would miss the point that Nancy makes. For Nancy it is not so much whether a writer speaks explicitly of a/the city, but rather of a relationship between the appeal to an origin that characterises the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity, and a principle of fundamental heterogeneity found in urbanity. 'The city' and 'philosophy' thus name two opposing, and yet inextricably related, principles at work in the history of western thought: alterity and metaphysics. And this relationship recurs persistently throughout western political theory: in, for example, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau and the liberal tradition. Indeed, insofar as modern liberal political theory is concerned with the question of the regulation of the state by an appeal to an origin (of ethics, justice, or equality), it treats the state as the city writ large.

At stake, therefore, in Nancy's elaboration of the relationship between philosophy and the city is the broader question of the relationship between an appeal
to an origin characteristic of the western metaphysics of presence/subjectivity and a fundamental heterogeneity characteristic of urbanity. This is precisely the relationship that I sketched out in Chapter 5 between figuration and community (or being-in-common). Moreover, it is this relationship that is embodied in the disavowal of difference by ethno-nationalism that characterised the 1992-95 Bosnian war. And in this regard Nancy’s account of philosophy’s resentment of the city is productive in understanding the manner in which the relationship between ethno-nationalism and difference generates so much urban destruction. Ethno-nationalism, founded as it is on the western metaphysics of presence/subjectivity, is an appeal to an origin. In this sense ethno-nationalism is what Connolly might call an ‘ontopolitical’ claim.

According to Connolly, an ‘ontopolitical’ claim ‘invokes a set of fundaments about [the] necessities and possibilities of human being, about, for instance, the forms into which human beings may be composed and the possible relations humans can establish’. These are claims concerning the *onta*, ‘the really existing things’, or rather, claims concerning the basis on which such ‘really existing things’ are possible. These claims establish a horizon of understanding of the nature of all that is taken to ‘really exist’. That is, ontopolitical claims articulate the ‘conditions of possibility’ of all that really exists, the limit beyond which what is taken to really exist has no proper grounding. It is precisely the fact that these claims set out the conditions of possibility of really existing things that makes them inherently political. In assuming reality is grounded in a particular manner, a limitation of the possibilities of existing things is imposed. This limitation rules that reality is such and such a way and no other. Which is to say that really existing things have such and such an ontological character and thus certain existential possibilities are ruled out.
It is precisely the establishment of such limitations of the inherently agonistic existential possibilities of reality that constitutes the fundamental political moment. As I noted in Chapter 5, the political must be understood as a fundamentally agonistic moment in which limits are established which include some ‘necessities and possibilities of human being’ and exclude others and through which identity is constituted. And yet the paradox of this political moment is that the agonism is not dispelled, but merely delimited. The ontopolitical claim of ethno-nationalism is an appeal to an origin that might enable a delimitation of the evident heterogeneity of existence into clearly separate ethnic statelets.¹²

Ethno-nationalism’s appeal to an origin takes the form of a claim to territorial sovereignty for supposedly pre-existent and naturally homogenous ethnic groups. In this sense ethno-nationalism attempts to delimit the agonism of heterogeneous existence by appealing to a metaphysical ideal that posits ethnicity as a pre-existent human attribute. Moreover, ethno-nationalism asserts that since ethnicity is a pre-existent attribute of each and every individual, the natural state of affairs is for individuals to aggregate in homogeneous groups. Preventing such aggregation is taken to be an artificial and contingent constraint of the real basis of human existence. It is this ontopolitical claim that legitimates ethno-nationalist claims to self-determination, for the aggregation of the various enclaves they have carved out through violent means into statelets.

It is in this way that we can recognise the problem the city poses for ethno-nationalism (and conversely the problem ethno-nationalism poses for the city). Insofar as urbanity, and in particular the buildings that are its conditions of possibility, reveal the ineluctably shared and heterogeneous nature of existence (our being-in-common),

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it comprises a constant, agonistic provocation to the ontopolitics of ethno-nationalism. It is important to note that urbanity in this sense involves more than that which happens inside a/the city (as if those in rural districts did not experience such heterogeneity). Urbanity, or a fundamental being-in-common, comprises an existential condition that constitutes all existence as always already shared. It is in this sense that Heidegger is right to note that ‘dwelling’ is not merely the act of living in a house, but a more comprehensive existential condition of, as he would put it, ‘staying with things’. This is not to say, in an enthusiastically modern way, that ‘we are all city dwellers today’. But it is to say that the sharing of existential spatiality that always already implicates existence in community is not confined to cities but occurs in all those conditions in which the things with which we engage on an everyday basis intimate an ineluctable alterity in our world. It is also to say that the destruction of villages or farms is no less important than the assault upon the historic core of Sarajevo or Mostar.

In order to assert its appeal to an origin, ethno-nationalism thus strikes at the conditions of possibility of the agonism that constantly provokes it: the (built) things that constitute existence as fundamentally shared (a being-in-common). This assault is a ‘covering-over’ of the heterogeneity that unworks the origins on which ethno-nationalism bases its claim to legitimacy. As I argued in Chapter 5, this assault attempts to naturalise the claim that ethnic groups are naturally distinct and separate by constituting the relationship between groups as an antagonism. This is an attempt to deny the ecstatic communication, the network of identity/difference in and through which these groups are constituted. This naturalisation of separation covers over the
agonism of existence, transforming it into the antagonism of competing interests (what we commonly call 'politics').

As I noted in Chapter 5, this is precisely what Nancy refers to as figuration: an appeal to a figure that is taken to be the origin, or universal/transcendent substance of being. The figure establishes an 'unstable dialectic of inclusion and exclusion' in and through which the fiction of being-separate rather than being-in-common is instituted. In this way the figure is the institution of a community understood as a communion - a sharing (in or out) of a universal substance that is the origin of all those who belong in the community. The communion-community only exists insofar as it is able to clearly delineate those who are included in, and those who are excluded from, the communion: those who either partake, or are the embodiment, of the posited substance of being. When the figure is established, the community can claim to have achieved presence, to be able to exist alone, rather than in relation to others. And this can only be accomplished through the expulsion and then exclusion of that which is other than the figure. Every figure is, after all, defined in and through the agonistic networks of identity/difference, the being-in-common, that characterises existence and must thus suppress/cover over this agonism in order to achieve presence.

Figuration thus denies agonism, closing itself off from the Other(s) in relation to which it is defined, and claiming a separateness predicated on an appeal to an ontological foundation. Moreover, when this separation is effected, the presence of the communion-community can be taken for granted by its members. The universal substance on which the figure is predicated is taken to be the natural origin of the community members, and, hence, never questioned. The communion-community thus becomes a technical-bureaucratic entity that works to refine the figure and never
questions the appeal to origins made in this figuration. In this way the ethnic statelet, once established, never questions its substantial presence but works, with ever increasing ferocity to refine its homogeneity - its separateness from its others. This work is the consolidation of the antagonisms through which the figure covered over the agonism of existence. Thus destroyed buildings are not rebuilt for lack of permits, minority returns fail to happen because of 'security fears', and non-ethnic institutions fail to operate because they are said to lack legitimacy.\textsuperscript{16} These are bureaucratic responses that effect a consolidation of the ethno-nationalist figure whilst never questioning the origin on which this figure is predicated.

These are, as I noted in Chapter 5, the stakes of urbicide. Urbicide is the visible manifestation of the problem philosophy (or ontopolitical thought) poses for the city (or being-in-common). At stake in this problem is the agonism (or being-in-common) that urbicide covers over. The ethno-nationalist/figurative resolution of the problem the city poses for philosophy is the transformation of being-in-common, or agonism, into a being-separate, or antagonism. This transformation, which is the accomplishment of figuration, is effected through the territorialisation of antagonism, the carving out of distinctions upon the terrain of Bosnia: the destruction of shared spatiality and the naturalisation of the separateness this destruction is perceived to establish.

And yet as I also noted, this figuration is perpetually unworked by the agonism proper to existence. Across the borders that set out the antagonisms that shape post-war Bosnia difference communicates itself, insistently. Figures find their work falling idle, or unravelling as alterity makes its constitutive presence felt. And it is for this reason that figured communion-communities relentlessly destroy heterogeneity, expel
difference, and cover over being-in-common in ever increasing territorialisations of the antagonisms that constitute their claim to separateness. However, these continuing post-war violences are also evidence of the manner in which such antagonism is contested and unworked by the agonism of existence.

One can see these stakes of urbicide in a multiplicity of instances of everyday violence, conflict and exclusion. That is, one can see these stakes played out in the everyday territorialisation and reterritorialisation of antagonisms. To demonstrate this I want to outline in this chapter a number of cases where the covering over, or even uncovering, of the being-in-common proper to existence in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be seen. Specifically, I want to look at three instances of post-Dayton politics that reveal the stakes of urbicide: the progress (or lack thereof) of mosque rebuilding; the return of refugees and displaced persons to their former places of residence; and plans for the reconstruction of destroyed urban fabric in Mostar. In this way, I hope to recapitulate the central claims of my argument and consolidate the case I have made for considering the destruction of the urban environment in the 1992-95 Bosnian war as urbicide.

Furthermore, if I am right, the stakes of urbicide are not only played out in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I want to consider, therefore, three further examples beyond the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina in which the logics/stakes of urbicide can also be seen: the Kosovan town of Mitrovica; the demolition of Palestinian homes by Israeli security forces; and the devastation of the Chechen capital Grozny by Russian forces. In this way I hope not only to consolidate my argument but to open up productive avenues for future thought.
Rebuilding Ferhadija

As I noted in Chapter 5, a total of 618 mosques across Bosnia were destroyed during the 1992-92 Bosnian war, 450 of which were in Republika Srpska. In the Banja Luka area 90 mosques were destroyed including all 15 of the mosques in the town of Banja Luka itself. This destruction should be seen as a systematic assault, by ethno-nationalist forces upon heterogeneous cultural heritage. Bosnian Serb forces were not the only ones to engage in this urbicide. For example, Bosnian Croat forces destroyed all of the mosques in the Stolac municipality. However, lest we should think that such destruction was merely the consequence of war, and that all sides engaged in such destruction we should note that there are very few instances in which Bosnian Army (or Bosniac) forces destroyed cultural heritage belonging to either Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Croats.

Such destruction was integral to the kind of ethnic cleansing practised by Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces. These mosques were destroyed ‘not by artillery but by explosives [and in the majority of cases] still remain nothing but a pile of rubble’. In many cases even the rubble was cleared to leave no trace at all of the mosques’ existences. Perhaps the most (in)famous mosque to be destroyed was the Ferhadija in Banja Luka. The Ferhadija was begun in 1567 by Ottoman authorities in Bosnia and ‘was considered one of Yugoslavia’s national monuments’. The mosque was destroyed on 6th May 1993, its remains removed by the Serb authorities, and the empty site turned into a car park.

The fate of the Ferhadija has become a focal point of post-Dayton Bosnian politics. Despite effectively partitioning Bosnia, the General Framework Agreement
(GFA) contains provisions for the restoration of Bosnia’s pre-war heterogeneity.\textsuperscript{23} Within the framework of two effectively autonomous entities, the Dayton accords mandates both the United Nations’ High Representative and the national government institutions to institute programs to uphold human rights, to ensure the return of displaced persons to their place of former residence (or provide compensation for loss of property where this is not possible), and for the rebuilding of urban fabric in order to facilitate this return.\textsuperscript{24} Given such a concern for returns, reconstruction and the upholding of human rights, the rebuilding of mosques is a central issue in post-Dayton Bosnian politics. In order to facilitate the return of displaced Bosnian Muslims to their places of former residence in areas now held by Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Croats, and to uphold the right to the freedom of religion, it is argued that the requisite cultural infrastructure must be restored. Moreover, the rebuilding of mosques is not simply a case of the provision of a cultural infrastructure to support returning communities. The progress of such rebuilding is also taken as a wider indicator of the implementation of the Dayton accords. Insofar as the GFA is intended to diminish the power of ethno-nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is argued that the rebuilding of mosques is a good indicator of progress on this front. Where mosques are rebuilt it will be evidence of a growing acceptance of ethnic diversity.\textsuperscript{25}

Attempts to rebuild mosques in Republika Srpska have been continually stalled by Bosnian Serb nationalist authorities. In June 1999 this intransigence prompted the Human Rights Commission (the body established under the GFA to uphold individual human rights and adjudicate in cases where discrimination was thought to have occurred) to order the Republika Srpska authorities to issue the relevant permits.\textsuperscript{26} The Republika Srpska authorities continued to refuse to issue the
permits and in August 2000 't]he Bosnian Islamic Community announced...it would go ahead with the rebuilding work, with or without the necessary permits from the local authorities. Permits were eventually granted and a ceremony to lay a foundation stone commemorating the rebuilding of the mosque was planned for May 7\textsuperscript{th} 2001 (symbolically eight years to the day after the mosque's destruction). A similar ceremony was planned to commemorate the rebuilding of a mosque in the town of Trebinje on May 5\textsuperscript{th} 2001.

Both ceremonies were halted by violent mobs who assaulted those who had gathered to attend the laying of the foundation stones. Neither the Republika Srpska police nor NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) troops acted to stop the mobs from disrupting the ceremonies. The violence prevented either foundation stone from being laid and attracted strong condemnation from, amongst others, the High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch. Both the Republika Srpska authorities and the President of Yugoslavia argued that although the violence was regrettable, the rebuilding of mosques on Bosnian Serb territory was provocative and, hence, bound to inflame ethno-nationalist passions. The foundation stone for the Ferhadija mosque was finally laid on 18\textsuperscript{th} June 2001. On this occasion Republika Srpska riot police contained Bosnian Serb protesters sufficiently to allow the ceremony (attended this time by Republika Srpska president Mirko Sarovic) to proceed.

The rebuilding of the Ferhadija provides a clear illustration of the stakes of urbicide. The destruction of mosques in Bosnia was particularly intense in those areas claimed as a part of Republika Srpska territory. It is important to see this intense assault on mosques not as a simple attack on cultural heritage but as a integral moment in the logic of urbicide. Indeed, it is in the context of the logics of urbicide
that we can see this destruction, and the subsequent protracted attempts to rebuild mosques such as the Ferhadija, as an integral moment of the figuration of an ethno-nationalist communion-community.

Republika Srpska is a communion-community predicated on the disavowal of the agonistic heterogeneity of existence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnian Serb ethno-nationalism is predicated on a figure that disavows, excludes and destroys difference. This figure is, in Nancy’s terms, both an appeal to a metaphysical origin and the positing of a universal substance of being which disavows agonistic being-in-common. This figure is predicated on a dual logic of ethnicity and exclusion. Interestingly this figure combines a corporate (Hegelian) understanding of the substance of being with a liberal notion of self-determination that legitimates exclusion and homogenisation. Firstly, ethnicity is posited to comprise the universal substance of being. In other words it is claimed that every being is ethnically determined. The problem with this assertion is that although it posits ethnicity as a substance “laid out “under” supposed “individuals”” it also asserts that insofar as two beings may have different ethnicities they are substantially different. Which is to say the figure claims that every being is in the first place marked by an ethnicity, there is no commonality except amongst those of the same ethnicity. This figuration is, thus, clearly an ontopolitical claim in so far as it takes all beings to be intelligible only on the basis of ethnic affiliation. In this sense this figuration excludes all understandings that might claim that beings have some other substantial basis.

Ethno-nationalism is a corporate-Hegelian understanding of being insofar as it asserts that a given ethnicity is a universal substance which particular individuals embody (a universality of which particularity partakes). Individuals are thus particular
embodiments of this substance. Contrary to the liberal notion that beings are substantially the same (that is, each and every being is made of the same substance but has the freedom to shape the possibilities determined by this substance), ethno-nationalism holds that a given ethnicity is a universal teleological principle of which particular beings must partake and which thus determines those beings' existence. In this sense ethno-nationalism does not conceive of being as a substance shared-out amongst beings but something that beings share-in.

Secondly, the ethno-national figure realises itself as a community present to itself through the exclusion of both differing ethnicities and those forms of life that refuse to conform to the understanding of being it proposes (i.e., forms of life that refuse ethnic-identification). In order to become present for and to itself, the ethno-nationalist figure must disavow the relations in and through which its identity is constituted by performing an enclosure around its substantial essence. It is in the accomplishment of this violent exclusion that the logics of urbicide become visible.

As the ethno-nationalist figure must disavow its constitutive relationships with alterity (other ethnicities and other forms of life) it practices a two-fold regime of exclusion. In the first place it lays claim to a logic of self-determination that holds that since ethnicity is the fundamental substance that determines being, beings should be free to pursue their ethnic-affiliations without impediment. Or, rather, it claims that, despite the best efforts of multiculturalism, ethnic affiliation will always claim the primary allegiance of beings and, hence, political regimes should be predicated upon recognising the separate needs of different ethnicities. This claim is consolidated by myths of ancient enmity between different ethnic groups.34
Secondly, in and through urbicide, a separation is effected between ethnic groups. This separation is a territorialisation of boundaries. These are not the shared boundaries constitutive of being-in-common, but dead zones between groups that naturalise the idea that there is no sharing or commonality between different ethnicities. This separation is then consolidated by an urbicidal program of destruction within the territory carved out by the zones of separation. This program achieves a homogeneity that disavows the existence of heterogeneity within the territory controlled by the ethno-nationalist figuration thus giving the fictive appearance of presence to the ethno-nationalist figure. It is in this manner that the agonistic existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina is transformed into the fractured and antagonistic landscape of post-Dayton Bosnia.

The Ferhadija was destroyed as part of the homogenisation of the territorialisation of the figure of Bosnian Serb ethnicity. It was not sufficient to carve out Republika Srpska by establishing zones of separation at the front lines held by the Bosnian Serb Army. Indeed, the creation of front-line zones of separation that marked the extent of Bosnian Serb territory, was ancillary to (and motivated by) a systematic eradication of traces of difference within Republika Srpska. In this way the communion-community could be established: a homogeneous entity, defined by its ethnic substance, existing next to, but separate from, its others (specifically the Muslim-Croat Federation).

As with all such communion-communities, Republika Srpska is a work that is perpetually seeking to refine its homogenisation through the exclusion and destruction of difference. It is for this reason that it was not sufficient to destroy the mosques. The clearing of the rubble constitutes part of the work of ensuring agonism cannot return
to the communion-community and undo/unravel the work it has accomplished. This work is, as I noted in Chapter 5, primarily bureaucratic and technical.\textsuperscript{35} The figure, once territorialised, and thus given presence as an antagonistic entity separate from its others, is naturalised and, hence, suspends questions of its own meaning and legitimacy. Indeed the unquestioning acceptance of the figure is vital to the continuing existence of Bosnian Serb nationalism. In never questioning the meaning and consequence of the figure under which they live Bosnian Serb nationalists are able to maintain the fictive presence of the communion-community named Republika Srpska. This unquestioning simple-mindedness can be seen in the manner in which the ethnic predicates of the Bosnian Serb nationalist figure are reiterated in ever more outrageous claims. In statements that proclaim ‘Srbija do Tokija’ (‘Serbia as far as Tokyo’), the Bosnian Serbs demonstrate that questions concerning the meaning or implications of the claims concerning the substance of being effected in this ethno-nationalist figure have been suspended.\textsuperscript{36} That Serb nationalists think that, because of ethnic kinship and expansionist dreams, they can claim such a territorial expanse demonstrates an unthinking acceptance of the myth of ethnic self-determination on which their nationalist figure rests.

The technical bureaucratic nature of Bosnian Serb ethno-nationalism can be seen in the various efforts made by the Republika Srpska authorities to halt the rebuilding of mosques by refusing to grant the requisite permits. Although seemingly obstinate and relatively petty, it is precisely this kind of bureaucratic obstruction that Nancy is referring to when he talks of the immanentist communion-community accomplishing its work through technical means. The territorialisation and homogenisation of the figured community is performatively maintained by a
proliferation of ordinances and regulations that both prevent the return of agonism to the ethnic statelet and promote the homogenisation of its territory.

Rebuilding comprises a contestation of the antagonisms that the war sought to naturalise through the destruction of urban fabric. It is precisely by rebuilding buildings that are testament to the heterogeneity of existence in Bosnia-Herzegovina that the ethno-nationalist figure can be challenged. These buildings mark the return of the agonism of existence to the territorialised antagonistic statelets. These buildings regenerate networks of identity\difference and are constitutive of a public/shared spatiality that radically unworks the attempt to establish a homogeneous ethnic territory. In the locales reconstituted by rebuilding these destroyed buildings the agonistic constitution of identity is laid bare. Moreover, these locales reveal the ecstatic communication that is constitutive of any sense of self. For it is these buildings that make it clear that any sense of Serbian self is only generated by virtue of being-with Muslims (and Croats and Bosniacs). This is precisely the being-with to which Nancy refers in *Being Singular Plural*, a being-with that is the condition of possibility of the articulation of a being-distinct-from.\(^{37}\) Serbs are *with* Muslims in the sense that being-Serb is only possible insofar as it is articulated as a being-different-from-Muslims and, hence, a relation, a division accomplished at a shared border of distinction.

**Excursus: lest we think rebuilding is simple or sufficient**

Whilst rebuilding is vital to a contestation of the ethno-nationalist figuration that was effected in and through urbicide, it should not be treated as a panacea.
Indeed, we should not think that rebuilding destroyed urban fabric will necessarily reinstate the pre-war locales and networks of identity\difference and, hence, dissipate the ethno-nationalist antagonisms forged in urbicide. That is, whilst it is necessary to rebuild destroyed urban environments in order to contest ethno-nationalism it is not sufficient to simply erect a building and believe that this will necessarily give rise to a renaissance of heterogeneity. Moreover, it would be wrong to interpret my account of urbicide as an argument that ethno-nationalists never build on the ruins they create. Ethno-nationalism is not only a destructive force, it is capable of building monuments to its achievements amidst the rubble of the urban fabric it has destroyed.

Andras Riedlmayer notes that there are ‘a number of examples of the... destruction of [a] non-Serb (or non-Croat) monument, [followed by] erasure of the traces, [and] erection of a triumphalist new Orthodox or Catholic church to signal the new, ‘ethnically cleansed’ status of the community.' It is important to note, however, that Riedlmayer cautions that whilst these new structures are built amidst the rubble of urbicide, ‘they do not necessarily replace [the destroyed building] on the same building site’. Riedlmayer cites examples including: ‘the erection of a gigantic new Orthodox church in the centre of Banja Luka...directly across the main square from the [ruined] Ferhadija’; a new Orthodox church in Trebinje ‘where all 10 of the town’s mosques had been razed’; and a similar church in the ethnically cleansed town of Zvornik. In both Mostar and Srebrenica crosses have been built on the hillsides overlooking the town to assert the primacy of the ethnic cleansers [See Appendix 1, figure 5]. Perhaps the most stark illustration, however, of this program of rebuilding to consolidate ethno-nationalism is the threat made by Bosnian Croats in Stolac who are reported to have told the Mufti of Mostar, ‘if you start building a mosque, we will
build a [Catholic] church on its cornerstone. And it is precisely for this reason that we should note that it is always possible to rebuild after urbicide, but that such rebuilding does not necessarily comprise a contestation of the antagonistic figures that lie at the heart of urbicidal logics.

In this sense we can note an asymmetry in the logics of urbicide. Whilst the destruction of buildings comprises a disavowal of the heterogeneity of existence, rebuilding destroyed urban environments need not comprise a reciprocal avowal of such heterogeneity. This asymmetry reveals an important aspect of the stakes of urbicide. The key to this asymmetry lies in the manner in which buildings constitute the conditions of possibility of the shared/public and, hence, heterogeneous character of existential spatiality. Urbicide destroys buildings because they constitute the conditions of possibility of the heterogeneity that characterises urbanity. Insofar as buildings are the condition of possibility of such heterogeneity, destroying urban fabric will disavow such being-in-common. In urbicide, then, heterogeneity is necessarily disavowed as its conditions of possibility are effaced. And yet, in rebuilding a different event is constituted. Rebuilding is the (re)constitution of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. Rebuilding (re)establishes a locale that is always already fundamentally shared. And yet, this (re)construction of the conditions of possibility need not necessarily give rise to the emergence of an non-antagonistic polity.

How might we explain this asymmetry? After all, if buildings are the condition of possibility of heterogeneity is it not enough to rebuild and thus open up the urban fabric to an ineluctable alterity? This may appear to be the logical extension of my argument and yet I do not believe it to be the case for one important reason. Although
urbicide comprises a devastation of the urban environment, it is only in rare cases total. That is to say, insofar as urbicide is the transformation of agonistic existence into an antagonism of homogeneous and separate figures, it is often sufficient to carve out zones of separation and destroy those buildings that, as either shared spaces or spaces of alterity, comprise a contestation of the homogeneity of the figured communion-community. It might be simplistic, but we should remember that the communion-community still needs housing stock to house its members. And so, urbicide does not - except in rare cases - raze towns and cities in their entirety.

In order to explain this aspect of urbicide, we must return to the character of the locale. Insofar as the locale is a public network of relations of identity\difference it is open in regard to its meaning. It is, in the truest sense, a site of agonism. Which is to say it is a site open to multiple contrasting networks of meaning. It is properly public, or shared. In Mark Wigley’s terms we might say that the locale ‘trembles’. For Wigley, this trembling is a mark of the manner in which a building is constitutive of a number of relational networks of meaning (or discourses). Wigely notes that although a building may appear to be stable it is always already the terrain of a number of discourses that effect a destabilisation of the meaning of the building. That is, the building is a contested ground: a contestation of the meaning of the building, or the primacy of one of the relational networks constituted by the building over the others. In this sense, the buildings that comprise the constitutive condition of locales tremble: being constitutively open to being the condition of possibility of a multiplicity of networks of meaning. In this sense the building is many things for many such networks.
It is precisely this 'trembling' (or what Nancy terms 'dis-position'), that regimes that adhere to the 'appeal to an origin' on which the western metaphysics of presence/subjectivity is founded are opposed to. The appeal to an origin is a claim that intends to arrest this trembling that characterises the very conditions of possibility of our Being-in-the-world. This is exactly what I have called the 'ontopolitical claim'. The ontopolitical claim attempts to refute the trembling multiplicity of existence and impose a single meaning upon existence. It is this dynamic that is, ultimately, at work in urbicide. Urbicide is the final act of frustration at the inability to prevent the buildings that are the condition of possibility of our always already heterogeneous Being-in-the-world from trembling.

As I noted earlier in this chapter, urbicide is perpetuated by bureaucratic means in the absence of conditions of armed conflict. Indeed, every figured community constantly strives to fix the trembling of its buildings. This attempt to arrest an agonistic trembling is an event short of destruction that consolidates urbicide. And it is because figuration can arrest the trembling of buildings that it can both afford not to effect a total destruction of the urban environment and simultaneously rebuild upon the rubble it generates. This is the explanation for the asymmetry that problematises the rebuilding process. It is possible that a building may be rebuilt and yet may not tremble. In such cases, where the building is rebuilt, but where its constitutively heterogeneous character is effaced, rebuilding does not mark a proper return of agonism to the figured community.  

Interestingly, one can see this asymmetrical dynamic at work in the reconstruction of mosques by Saudi aid agencies in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Saudi Wahhabi charities have given both financial and construction aid to

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reconstruct Islamic buildings in, amongst other places, Sarajevo and Djakovica. There has been substantial concern that these reconstruction projects have actually harmed, rather than helped, the reconstruction process. The Wahhabi workers have implemented a strict interpretation of Islamic principles regarding the construction of mosques and have in several cases used this interpretation as legitimisation for the destruction of mosques that survived the war. Indeed Wahhabi workers have promised to ‘rebuild…damaged mosques “twice as big and twice as Islamic”’, but only if they conform to their strict interpretation of Islam. In Vuciturn in Kosovo this has meant the destruction of Ottoman gravestones in the cemetery of the Hadum mosque because the Wahhabis consider them to be idolatrous. Wahhabi workers have also destroyed or whitewashed the interiors of mosques (because they contain representations not in keeping with strict interpretations of the Koran). Finally they have rebuilt in a manner out of keeping with the ottoman style in which Bosnian mosques were built.

The Wahhabi destruction of mosques (in the name of reconstruction) is predicated on claims about the (in)authenticity of Bosnian mosques. One can see these claims as attempts to figure the Bosnian Muslim community as a Wahhabi Muslim community. That is to say the Wahhabis are making a specific claim about the substance that defines an Islamic community (be it Bosnian or Saudi). Such a claim is, properly, a figure that attempts to establish a communion-community. Interestingly, perhaps the most distinctive feature of so-called Bosnian-Muslims is that they consistently contest their figuration as a confessional communion-community. The Wahhabi destruction is, in the face of the heterogeneity of so-called Bosnian-Muslims, an attempt to fix these trembling mosques as ‘properly Islamic’ houses of worship. The mosques of Bosnia present a specific challenge in this regard. They were built by
Ottoman authorities and catered to Slavs who converted to Islam and yet also comprise elements of the heritage of Bosnia (taken as a state) itself. Oscillating between these meanings the mosques tremble in a multitude of networks of identity\'\differenc. And in this context, the Saudi Wahhabi reconstruction means they are destroyed once again in an attempt to halt their trembling. Hence, it might be fair to say in this case that we can see that rebuilding need not automatically lead to the return of agonism but can be as antagonistically figured as destruction itself.

**House burnings and the question(s) of return**

The stakes of urbicide are similarly posed by the question of the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their places of former residence in Bosnia-Herzegovina.\(^{50}\) In the process of minority returns an ongoing logic of urbicide/figuration is visible that clearly illustrates the stakes of urbicide.

Minority returns are those instances in which refugees or IDPs \('[r]eturn to areas controlled by a [sic] ethnic group other than the returnees'\(^{51}\). In this sense minority returnees are those refugees and IDPs who return to places of former residence in which, as a consequence of ethnic cleansing, they are now in an ethnic minority. As I noted in Chapter 3, these returnees would, in the pre-war period, have constituted ethnic majorities (or an element of a mixed ethnicity polity) in their places of former residence. Minority return is thus a direct consequence of the logic of ethno-nationalism. It is important to stress that minority returns are occurring in large numbers (some 67,000 in 2000) and, hence, constitute a significant contestation of ethnic cleansing (and the logics of ethno-nationalism).\(^{52}\)
The progress of minority returns has been taken to a key indicator of the success of the GFA in reversing ethnic cleansing, restoring Bosnia’s pre-war heterogeneity, and establishing conditions for the emergence of a plural (non-nationalist) polity. There are a number of central problems which the minority returns process must confront. Firstly, the logics of urbicide have left much of the housing stock, infrastructure and cultural heritage of minority returnees in ruins. Secondly, many minority returnees find that if their houses have not been destroyed they are occupied by those of the controlling ethnic groups in the area to which they wish to return. Finally, there is an ongoing figuration of the ethno-nationalist communities to which minority returnees wish to return that has given rise to a continuation of urbicide in post-Dayton Bosnia. Specifically, urban fabric intended to provide the conditions of possibility of minority returns has either been destroyed or its rebuilding otherwise impeded.53

The minority returns program must, therefore, solve two problems. In the first place it has to establish a program of reconstruction in and through which the conditions of possibility of the return of an agonistic heterogeneity to ethno-nationalist communities are established. A first step in such a program is the rebuilding of destroyed urban fabric, a reconstruction of locales that open up the possibility of the return of minorities. Secondly, the returns program must confront the legal questions raised by the transfer or occupation of property during the 1992-95 war.54 Minority returnees were, for the most part, expelled from the areas to which they wish to return during the ethnic cleansing of the 1992-95 period. Those expelled in ethnic cleansing were often forced to sign documents transferring ownership of their property to the ethnic cleansers.55 Moreover, after the ethno-nationalist communion-community was
established, part of the homogenisation process consisted of allowing (or even encouraging) the occupation of property belonging to those who had been expelled.\textsuperscript{56} A returns process has to confront these property issues to be successful.

In Bosnia these legal issues have been resolved with the implementation of a number of legal measures to allow the return of property seized from minority returnees (or compensation where return is not possible or desired) and the eviction of occupants who are preventing the return of such property.\textsuperscript{57} This has been a slow process that will not be complete for some time. Needless to say it has been resisted by ethno-nationalist communion-communities.

Both the continued destruction of property and the legal problems impeding the returns process should be seen as intertwined elements of the figuration of community and should both be seen, therefore, as aspects of urbicide. Both constitute aspects of the attempt to exclude difference from, and homogenise, the communion-community. Moreover, the persistence of both the occupation of property and impediments to its return comprise an attempt to foreclose on the openness to alterity that remaining buildings offer. This latter foreclosure of openness is an integral aspect of the homogenisation of the ethno-nationalist territories carved out in and through urbicide.

In this sense a contestation of ethno-nationalist figures in and through minority returns will comprise both a program of reconstruction/rebuilding and the resolution of the legal issues that hinder return. It is precisely this dual approach that has been undertaken by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and those who wish to implement the program of minority returns. Indeed, in 2000, this contestation of ethno-nationalism yielded significant minority returns.\textsuperscript{58} Some 67,000 minority
returns took place in 2000 and figures for 2001 indicate that returns have continued at a high level (with 30,123 returns registered by 31st May 2001). These returns represent a clear return of agonism to antagonistic ethno-nationalist communion-communities. Not surprisingly, these returns have been met with violence and obstruction as the ethno-nationalist figure attempts to re-territorialise the antagonisms through which the communion-community became present to itself. Moreover, the ethno-nationalist figures have worked through typically bureaucratic means to impede those returns that do happen, refusing to issue travel permits, to implement property laws, to evict those found to be in illegal occupation of housing stock, and to provide a secure environment for returnees. This persistence of urbicide and the logics of figuration clearly illustrate the manner in which returnees represent an agonism intolerable to the ontopolitical claims of ethno-nationalism. The agonism that returns comprise can be seen in the remarks made by the president of Yugoslavia, Vojslav Kostunica (after the riots that prevented the laying of the foundation stone for the Ferhadija mosque on 7th May 2001) that the rebuilding of mosques (which is integral to the process of return) constituted a provocation.

As I noted in Chapter 5, agonism is characterised precisely by such 'provocation'. Agonism is that provocation of the other that initiates the operations of power. Or, in other words, agonism is that provocation of the Other that constitutes a shared line of distinction between self and other, that lays bare the being-with that characterises existence and, hence, contests the ethno-nationalist figure. In so far as the Other provokes me, s/he provokes me into making a distinction between self and Other. This is exactly what Nancy means when he speaks of being-self by virtue of being-with. It is for this reason - because it lays bare the fiction of figuration and the
manner in which it is merely a covering over of being-in-common - that the ethno-
nationalist figure resists the agonism of minority returns.

Urban reconstruction: the dominance of anthropocentrism

Urban reconstruction is, then, at the heart of a return of agonism to the ethno-
nationalist communion-communities of Bosnia. That is, it is reconstruction, and an
associated program of returns that will contest the disavowal of heterogeneity that
characterises urbicide (and ethno-nationalist figuration) in Bosnia. Reconstruction,
therefore, reveals the stakes of urbicide (and the figuration to which it is integral).
Insofar as reconstruction reveals the logics of urbicide it also lays bare the being-in-
common that characterises existence. That is, the provocation of reconstruction
exposes both the manner in which urbicide disavows agonism and the manner in
which buildings constitute existential spatiality as fundamentally heterogeneous.

However, reconstruction in Bosnia has not necessarily been recognised in such
terms. Indeed, in many cases reconstruction is taken to be the simple repair of
equipment for living. This might not sound so objectionable insofar as it is important
to house the population of Bosnia and meet their basic needs through infrastructure.
However, the common perception that reconstruction is a technical problem exterior
to the political problems posed by ethno-nationalism means that the role
reconstruction (or lack thereof) plays in post-Dayton Bosnia is poorly understood.
Moreover, this framing of the problem of reconstruction as a technical problem
exterior to political problems is consistent with, and compounds, the failure to
recognise the stakes of urbicide.
This failure can be attributed to the anthropocentric imaginary that has dominated the agencies tasked with implementing the GFA. Moreover, this anthropocentrism has given rise to a figuration of its own that tends to exclude consideration of the role that (the destruction of) urban fabric plays in ethno-nationalism. It is perhaps not surprising that anthropocentrism has dominated the process of post-Dayton reconstruction. After all, implementation of the GFA has in a large number of cases been effected by agencies that construe their mission to be ‘humanitarian’. The European Union Administration of Mostar (EUAM), the Office of the High Representative (OHR), The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and a multitude of non-governmental organisations are in one way or another guided by a logic that is essentially ‘humanitarian’. That is, these organisations take their role to be one of intervening in a (post-)conflict context to ameliorate the life circumstances of fellow human beings (on the basis that as human beings they deserve a better standard of life replete with the individual rights the international community sees as indicating such a ‘better’ standard of life).

As David Campbell notes, such humanitarianism is predicated on a humanist model that conceives of sovereign individuality as the basis of human life.61 This humanism is thus always an intervention to uphold (or implement) rights or entitlements considered to define the conditions of possibility of such sovereign individuality. Humanitarianism is, as Campbell notes, an ontopolitical claim that sets the limits according which we understand what human life comprises by appeal to the sovereign individual as the (epistemological) origin of that humanity. Accounts that understand existence as a material, or worldly, event agonistically constituted in and through locales and, hence, through an ecstatic communication that transgress the
boundaries of sovereign individuality are thus excluded from consideration. This humanitarianism is, therefore, a figuration that effects an exclusion of consideration of the stakes of urbicide.

Though perhaps more benign than ethno-nationalism, humanitarianism is a figuration nonetheless. It is important to note the exclusion of consideration of the stakes of urbicide this figuration effects and the technical work it establishes. Since human life is claimed to comprise sovereign individuality the things with which humans engage are taken to be mere materiel (or equipment) put at the disposal of humans and forming the background against which they live out their lives. Buildings, infrastructure and monuments may be seen as enabling conditions for human life, but are ultimately secondary to that life. Humanitarianism takes the reconstruction of such built things to be important, but ultimately ancillary, to the task of reconciliation amongst human beings. In this way humanitarianism regards reconstruction to be exterior to the task of encouraging diversity. Pluralism is thus the goal of humanitarianism, the fostering of communities of mixed ethnicity. However, this pluralism is a weak form of heterogeneity. It is an understanding of heterogeneity as the admixing of individuals who can, through tolerance, be indifferent to (or even enthusiastic towards) other individuals.

This work to establish the humanitarian figure gives rise to a technical bureaucratic occlusion of the nature of reconstruction. Humanitarian projects reduce reconstruction to mere engineering projects. These projects are removed from all discussion of the political and given over to technicians as a problem to be solved, rather than a condition of possibility of being-in-common to be restored. Indeed, Bosnia has given rise to a number of programs for the reconstruction of urban fabric.
that propose technical formulas by which to replace the urban spaces destroyed in war
time. In this way urban reconstruction has been taken out of its properly political
position and reduced to technical programs. This is an exclusion of urbanity from the
figure of humanitarian reconstruction by removing it from political consideration and
placing it in the hands of technicians that proceed according to a plan that simply
seeks to replace the equipment lost in conflict.

One can see in the humanitarian figure the anthropocentrism of which I spoke
in chapters 4 and 5. The humanitarian figure treats heterogeneity as an ancillary aspect
of the existence of sovereign individuals. Moreover, it treats urbanity (that which is
characterised by heterogeneity) as a secondary aspect of political reconstruction. The
tight grip of this anthropocentrism means that the stakes of urbicide have remained
largely invisible in post-Dayton Bosnia. Since the urban environment is not
considered to be constitutive of existence, but merely that against which sovereign
individuals exist, the manner in which its destruction announces the disavowal of
agonism has not been comprehended. And so long as this is the case, the return of
agonism will be overlooked: projects will not seek to reconstitute fundamentally
shared/public locales, but to merely provide the equipment with which the separate
ethno-nationalist communion-communities can continue to live as they are.

Breaking the anthropocentric grip: proposals for the reconstruction of Mostar

The uncovering of the agonism proper to existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina
rests on a contestation of this anthropocentric-humanist grip on reconstruction. There
are, however, cases in which a contestation of the reduction of reconstruction to a
technical problem exterior to the political project of the implementation of the GFA can be seen. The OHR’s treatment of the rebuilding of the Ferhadija as an event central to reconstruction and return might be construed to be one such occasion. One can see a similar problematisation of the anthropocentric treatment of reconstruction as ancillary to the implementation of the GFA in at least three further cases: the central zone for Mostar proposed by The European Administration of Mostar (EUAM); the reconstruction proposals prepared by students involved in Columbia University’s Master of Science program in Architecture and Urban Design; and the problematic status of the project to rebuild the Old Bridge in Mostar.

The Central Zone

Mostar is one of the most divided cities in Bosnia. In 1994, after the signing of the Washington Agreement between Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Government (‘Muslim’) forces, Mostar was placed under European Union Administration. The EUAM, established in a Memorandum of Understanding, was tasked with reconstruction and reconciliation in Mostar. It is significant to note that when the EUAM began its task in 1994, the Bosnian war had not ended. Although the Washington Agreement brought fighting between Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs to an end, the combined Bosnian Croat and Bosniac forces were still engaged in fighting with the Bosnian Serb Army. The EUAM thus faced the task of beginning its reconstruction of Mostar in a climate of conflict, with attendant insecurities and logistical problems this entails.
When the EUAM arrived in Mostar it was a divided city, cut in two by the Neretva river. The west of Mostar was held by Bosnian Croat nationalists who had expelled Bosniac inhabitants. The Bosnian Croats had established a figured communion-community named 'Herceg Bosna' and claimed west Mostar as its capital. The east had become a Bosniac ghetto, the only area of the city in which they could live. Freedom of movement between these two halves of the city was severely restricted (control of movement was facilitated by the fact that to cross from east to west, or vice versa, one had to use the remaining bridges across the Neretva). The EUAM was mandated to restore freedom of movement to the city and to build multi-ethnic institutions, effectively reversing the gains made by Bosnian Croat ethno-nationalism.

For a variety of reasons the EUAM was unsuccessful in its attempts to contest ethno-nationalism. Multi-ethnic institutions were created, but were constituted in such a manner that they actually consolidated, rather than reversed, ethno-nationalism. Parity between Croat nationalists and Bosniacs representatives on these institutions meant that they were effectively deadlocked from the very beginning. Freedom of movement was restored over time although it was hindered by paramilitaries and the lack of infrastructure (such as bridges) to promote this movement. Moreover, with the city antagonistically divided, there was little point in crossing from one half of the city to another. It appeared that the antagonism was being effectively naturalised. Indeed, it appeared that Mostar had split into two separate cities with few spaces of commonality between them. This would have represented the complete naturalisation of a territorial antagonism disavowing any being-in-common between Bosnian Coats and Bosniacs.
The EUAM set about reconstructing the city, concentrating on the restoration of housing stock and the repair of basic infrastructure.\textsuperscript{66} This project was tasked to engineers who treated it as a technical problem ancillary to the political work being carried out by the European Union Administrator, Hans Koschnick. Koschnick, however, understood fairly clearly that the reversal of ethno-nationalism would depend on innovative solutions to the reconstruction of urban fabric in Mostar. He, therefore, drew up plans to establish a central zone in Mostar in which commerce would be encouraged and the main institutions situated [See Appendix 1, figure 6-1 and figure 6-2].\textsuperscript{67} Freedom of movement would be unrestricted in this central zone. Moreover the zone would be held as a condominium and, hence, would not be controlled by ethno-nationalist forces.\textsuperscript{68} It would, in effect be a neutral urban zone into which both parties would be drawn to make use of the commercial facilities and political institutions sited there.

The proposed situation of the central zone was particularly provocative, and hence hotly contested (in particular by Bosnian-Croats whose ethno-nationalist gains would be rolled back by the central zone). During the war, the Bulevar Nardone Revolucije on the west bank of the Neretva had become the front line of fighting. This street was reduced to rubble and formed a ‘natural’ zone of separation that delineated the two antagonistic halves of the city. Rather than allow the Bulevar to be one of the borders of the central zone, Koschnick proposed that the central zone would straddle this zone of separation effectively refusing to recognise its proposed function as a marker of the limits between the two communities. As Yarwood notes, the ‘central zone would break the confrontation line’.\textsuperscript{69} Had the central zone been fully implemented, the Bulevar would have no longer been a no-mans land between
communities but the centre of a mixed district. It would, therefore, have no longer been that which legitimated the ethno-nationalist assertion of a separateness between the two communities. In addition the central zone would have included part of the east bank of the Neretva thus encouraging Bosnian Croats to cross the Neretva.

However the central zone plans failed to win the requisite support and were not implemented.\(^{70}\) Because of the intransigence of ethno-nationalists and the failure of European Governments to support such a plan to restore an agonistic heterogeneity to Mostar, Koschnick resigned.\(^{71}\) Indeed, although freedom of movement has been restored to Mostar, the EUAM became a *de facto* caretaker of the ethno-nationalist status-quo.\(^{72}\) The fact that the Bosnian Croat nationalist party, the HDZ, maintains its base in Mostar is testament to the ineffectiveness of EUAM attempts to reverse the gains of ethno-nationalism. The central zone project does, however, illustrate the manner in which urban reconstruction must be treated as central to, rather than an ancillary aspect of, the return of the agonistic heterogeneity proper to Bosnia.

*New Urbanisms*

With damage to the urban environment of Mostar widespread (although disproportionately divided between east and west with more extensive and serious damage done to the east), the question of reconstruction was a pressing one.\(^{73}\) The urbicide perpetrated in Mostar (largely by Bosnian Croat forces) left the urban fabric of the city devastated. The damage was not restricted to specific buildings but covered housing stock, public buildings, commercial buildings, public spaces and monuments. In the short term, post-Dayton, the EUAM focused on the reconstruction of housing...
stock, public (institutional) buildings and a select number of monuments. In the context of the insistent demands of post-war reconstruction (such as the provision of shelter in time for the onset of winter), larger questions of urban planning were somewhat neglected. 74

The relative lack of urban planning meant that the question of reversing the gains of ethnic cleansing was not given a comprehensive treatment. Whilst it should be noted that a total plan for the city would have been as violent as the status quo (because of the manner in which it would exclude other competing plans), the lack of consideration of plans to restore Mostar's pre-war heterogeneity was problematic. For example the ad hoc reconstruction of houses meant that no specific plans were considered to build new housing stock that might foster heterogeneity. The rebuilding of houses in both east and west Mostar resolved the demand for shelter and yet in no way problematised the de facto partition of the city.

It is in this light that the plans drawn up by students from Columbia University are particularly interesting. 75 These plans are guided by the aim of restoring, through urban development, the heterogeneity proper to Mostar. All of the projects consider the way in which urban planning can contest the present partition of the city. Two points raised by these projects are worthy of mention. In the first place it is noted that urban development has two options. On the one hand development can continue in a North-South direction. 76 The problem with such development is that the line of antagonism runs North-south through Mostar. Hence development in a North-South direction in no way problematises this line of antagonism. Indeed it encourages the parallel development of two distinct halves of the city without ever transgressing the line of separation. On the other hand East-West development might offer the promise
of contesting the line of fracture and, hence, fostering the uncovering of the heterogeneity of Mostar. That is to say, if west Mostar develops to the east, and east Mostar to the west, the line separating the two will at some point be transgressed and its naturalised status as a line of separation and antagonism will be called into question. In this sense plans to develop the Bulevar and, in particular, to disrupt its function as a line of separation are worthy of consideration. The student plans aimed to disrupt the straight line of separation that the Bulevar presented. By disrupting this line and developing the commercial and residential potential of the area to the east and west, movement across this line would be encouraged thus contesting the antagonistic disavowal of heterogeneity it represents.

In addition the consideration of the networks of identity\difference constituted by the built locales of Mostar is vital to comprehending the way in which agonism might return to this city. In this regard the consideration of pedestrian routes in the city is especially interesting. One of the ways in which antagonism is accomplished is by determining the manner in which networks of movement can or cannot function. By laying waste to areas of the city urbicide accomplishes a hindrance of movement that does not need paramilitary reinforcement. Why would anyone transgress rubble strewn streets if there is either no passage through the rubble or no reason to go there? Reinserting the pedestrian into the urban space by planning the restoration of urban fabric that encourages such movement is a reconstruction of the reticulated networks of singularity (identity\difference) that embody the being-in-common proper to urbanity.
The fate of the Old Bridge

Of course, overshadowing all of these questions is the spectre of the ruined Stari Most (Old Bridge). As I noted in the Introduction, the Old Bridge was, for a variety of reasons emblematic of the antagonistic division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is understandable, therefore, that efforts to reconstruct Bosnia, and to thereby contest ethno-nationalism, should be haunted by the question of the reconstruction of this emblem of division. After the Dayton accords were signed, a project to reconstruct the Old Bridge was begun. Divers were sent to the bottom of the river to recover the masonry with the ultimate aim of using it to rebuild the bridge. Despite recovering this masonry, however, the bridge remains in ruins at present.

Whilst its seems inevitable that the bridge will be rebuilt (although how long this will take is a matter of speculation), the planned reconstruction raises a larger question. Specifically, it raises the question of the meaning of such a reconstruction. For those involved in rebuilding the bridge the project is a vital element of the steps being taken at present to reject the ethno-nationalist division of the city of Mostar. That is to say, the rebuilding of the Old Bridge is taken to constitute an important symbol of an intent to recover the agonism proper to Mostar. In this sense rebuilding the bridge could be said to be a symbol of hope. And yet, in the absence of other plans to foster the recovery of the agonism proper to the city’s locales, such a project, whilst symbolic, may prove to be simply a gesture (though no doubt an important gesture).

This feeling was summed up by an EU official who stated that ‘[t]he bridge should be rebuilt at the end of the reconstruction’. The bridge would thus be the last act of the contestation of ethnic partition, a crowning of this achievement. It would
symbolise the successful restoration of pre-war heterogeneity. Moreover, the EU official cautioned that it would be dangerous to rebuild the bridge at present - as a symbol of hope and intent - as it might encourage the idea that heterogeneity had returned to Mostar. It might, therefore, cause a false sense of accomplishment that might misrecognise a certain symbolism for the actual recovery of the being-in-common proper to Mostar.  

Central to this observation is the contention that the antagonism that divides Mostar must be contested in order for the agonism of existence to be laid bare. The reconstruction of the bridge will not, on its own, bring about the contestation of the divisions that fracture this city. In this respect it is worth briefly mentioning Leo Modrcin’s proposal for the fate of the Old bridge. In 1994 Modrcin won the Membrane architecture competition with a proposal for the temporary bridging of the gap left by the destruction of the Old Bridge [See Appendix 1, figure 7]. Modrcin proposed that two screens be hung in place of the span of the bridge, facing north and south. The screens would be composed of fibre optic threads and would be connected to computer terminals at either end of the span. Communication between these terminals would be displayed on the screens. This membrane would be literally a tissue both connecting and dividing either side of the Neretva river. The membrane would physically connect the two banks, and the terminals would connect those on either side. And yet, at the same time the membrane would prevent actual movement across the space left by the destruction of the bridge (since it would not be constructed to allow the passage of pedestrians). The membrane would thus constitute an interstitial event in which a being-in-common would be revealed. It would be both a connection and a distinction, a moment of ecstatic communication in which being-
with would be revealed. Whilst Modrein’s proposals may seem somewhat idealistic they are, at least, thought provoking. In the end the question is not whether to rebuild the Old Bridge (that rebuilding is necessary is, I think, beyond doubt), but how such rebuilding can play a constitutive role in the contestation of the antagonisms that partition Mostar.

**Beyond the borders of Bosnia**

Throughout my argument I have concentrated on providing an account of urbicide in (and after) the 1992-95 Bosnian war. The antagonisms carved out in this war shaped the terrain of post-Dayton Bosnia. Indeed, these antagonisms are starkly evident in the everyday fractures that divide and partition Bosnia and consolidate the ethno-nationalist communion-communities of Republika Srpska and Herceg Bosna. However, the account I have provided has a wider scope and is applicable to other contexts in which the destruction of urban fabric has accomplished the territorialisation of antagonism or the covering over of agonistic being-in-common. I want, therefore, to briefly indicate three instances in which the account I have given of urbicide might provide productive insights.

**Mitrovica**

The town of Mitrovica in Northern Kosovo has been a focal point for ethno-nationalism in the wake of the 1999 conflict between NATO and Yugoslavia. After the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops and paramilitaries, Mitrovica came under the
jurisdiction of NATO and the United Nations mission in Kosovo (UNMiK). The town was, prior to the conflict, a heterogeneous mixture of Kosovan Albanians and Kosovan Serbs. During the war the town was a victim of urbicide, with Serb paramilitaries burning and bulldozing Kosovan Albanian homes, shops and a mosque. After the war, the town became divided into two ethnic enclaves. In a manner similar to Mostar, Mitrovica is divided by a river (the Ibar) that runs east-west splitting the town into northern and southern districts. The ethnic partition of Mitrovica was consolidated by the division effected by the river Ibar. Central to this consolidation was the role played by the bridge that connected north and south Mitrovica.

NATO forces were instrumental in the division of the town insofar as they established a checkpoint on the bridge that restricted movement from north to south (and vice versa). As the partition of the town proceeded with ethno-nationalists on either side encouraging (via discourses of fear and acts of terrorism) the formation of separate enclaves, NATO placed barricades on the bridge to prevent clashes between rival ethno-nationalist groups. Whilst this may appear to be a logical security response to a situation in which violence was an everyday occurrence, it is a clear example of the manner in which the figurative politics of separation were consolidated in Kosovo.

NATO reinforced, and naturalised the perception that the Kosovan Albanians and Kosovan Serbs comprised distinct and separate groups. The naturalisation of this perception was encouraged by NATO's establishment of a literal zone of separation between these two parties in the form of an un-traversable bridge. This fostered the ethno-nationalist figuration of communion-communities which, not surprisingly, began their work of homogenisation, creating a situation in which
Kosovan Albanians could not return to north Mitrovica without armed guards, and Kosovan Serbs could not return to south Mitrovica without similar protection. 86

Interestingly, the division of Mitrovica by NATO was instrumental in establishing, rather than simply a response to, ethno-nationalism. Protests at the bridge were directed against NATO and those forces of ethno-nationalism that fostered the politics of the enclave. 87 These protests contested the territorialisation of antagonism that had been effected by NATO's closure of the bridge, expressing a desired for freedom of movement. 88 The division of Mitrovica by NATO could, therefore, be seen as a (possibly benign, or at least unintended) act of urbicide. That is to say, this division, whilst not a destruction, represents an assault on a built thing as the condition of possibility of heterogeneity. It represents a delimitation of the networks of identity\difference such that the bridge no longer trembles in many networks of relationality but becomes, effectively a dead zone, a space of separation. Indeed, though the building still stands it can no longer be called such since it is no longer constitutive of a locale that would constitute networks of singularity. And yet, insofar as NATO's occupation of the bridge is contested by protests, the agonism constituted by this built thing insistently returns to contest the antagonism consolidated and naturalised by NATO.

The Occupied Territories

The logics of urbicide can also be seen the Israeli policy of demolishing Palestinian houses (in both the West Bank, and Gaza). B'Tselem (The Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) notes that 'since
1987 till 1998, the Israeli authorities have “administratively” demolished at least 2,200 Palestinian houses in the territories, and hundreds of other structures.\textsuperscript{89} This destruction of the urban environment has continued in the present ‘intifada’.\textsuperscript{90} Israel has implemented a dual program of destroying the houses of Palestinians.\textsuperscript{91} On the one hand it has deployed its defence forces to destroy those houses that are thought to harbour terrorists.\textsuperscript{92} The liberal use of this military force has, however, led some to doubt the military necessity of such destruction arguing instead that it comprises collective punishment.\textsuperscript{93} On the other hand Israel has utilised stringent planning regulations to ensure that Palestinians cannot build on land adjacent to Jewish settlements (that are themselves built on occupied territory and deemed illegal in light of UN resolutions) or in contested areas such as East Jerusalem. These planning regulations have been reinforced by an aggressive policy of demolition where houses are found to have been built without the requisite permission. It is fairly clear that this policy is aimed at securing the territory necessary for the expansion of settlements and at preventing Palestinians from building in areas (such as Jerusalem) deemed to be homogeneously Jewish.

Israeli urbicide exhibits the dual logic detailed in my account above. On the one hand this destruction comprises the establishment of zones of separation which naturalise the perception that Arabs and Jews are distinct and separate.\textsuperscript{94} This consolidates the figuration of the Jewish communion-community as a homogeneous entity predicated on a claim to an origin distinct from that of the Arabs. These zones of separation naturalise the exclusion of Arabs who are regarded as both heterogeneous to, and thus not welcome within, the Israeli-Jewish communion-community. On the other hand this urbicide comprises a homogenisation of the
communion-community established by Israel. The destruction of houses in East Jerusalem is particularly instructive in this regard. Jerusalem is, potentially, a site of agonistic contestation. In order to territorialise the Israeli communion-community such that it encompasses Jerusalem, it is necessary to implement a program (work) of homogenisation and, hence, to destroy those buildings that resonate with the ineluctable alterity that characterises the being-in-common proper to Jerusalem.

Seen as urbicide, the demolition of Palestinian houses is exposed as a covering over of being-in-common and a territorialisation of an (ethno-nationalist) communion-community. Moreover, if this destruction is seen as urbicide, it becomes clear that it is precisely this territorialisation of separation that must be contested if the being-in-common characteristic of existence is to be laid bare.

_Grozny_

In all of the cases above, urbicide comprises an integral element of the logic of ethno-national figuration. In these cases urbicide represents the destruction of buildings insofar as they comprise the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. Moreover, in all of these case buildings are destroyed as a consequence of one of two logics. On the one hand urbicide comprises a disavowal of agonism in and through the territorialisation of antagonism. This territorialisation is accomplished in and through the laying waste of front-line zones, an action that naturalises the figurative claim to being-separate (rather than agonistic being-in-common). On the other hand, urbicide comprises a homogenisation of the territory of the figured communion-community: an erasure of those buildings that tremble with the openness to alterity characteristic of
existence. One might say that in all of the above cases, whilst destruction is widespread, it is nonetheless targeted. The widespread nature of urbicide is evidence of the manner in which heterogeneity is not a contingent, geographically isolated phenomenon, but characteristic of existence itself. That is, it is necessary to destroy buildings on a large scale if one is to establish a figuration of community. However, in all of these cases urban destruction is not total. Indeed, it is only because we can identify those buildings destroyed as those which tremble with an ineluctable alterity that we can speak of a logic of urbicide, a specific conceptual coherence identifiable through scrutiny of the patterns of destruction. That is to say, the destruction is neither random, accidental, nor total and, hence, when analysed can be identified as comprising a specific logic.

The logics of urbicide do, however, entail a far more devastating consequence: urban annihilation. One might say that this consequence is the end point of urbicide, its highest stakes. Moreover, urbicide tends, asymptotically, towards this point despite rarely reaching it. This end point of urbicide can be seen in the destruction of the Chechen capital Grozny by Russian forces in 1999 and 2000. Chechnya can be said to be in an agonistic relation of identity-difference with Russia. Russian identity is both constituted in relation to, and contested by, Chechen ambitions for independence. That this is the case can be seen in the role Chechens play in Russian discourses of security. When bombs destroyed residential buildings in Moscow the blasts were blamed upon Chechen terrorists. Regardless of whether this attribution of blame is correct, this exclusionary distinction comprises an example of the performance of identity in and through the enactment of a distinction which is also a commonality. Insofar as Chechens are *de jure* members of the Russian Federation, there is a
commonality between them and Russians. But insofar as they are designated as terrorists and ethnically other, they are excluded as heterogeneous to Russian identity. This agonism continues insofar as Russian forces sent to reassert Russian control over Chechnya have to determine between Chechen separatists and Chechens/Russians loyal to the Russian Federation. There is a clear agonism in this problematic, one in which Chechnya is seen on the one hand to comprise part of the Russian Federation, and, hence, to be a territory commonly held by both Russians and Chechens, and on the other hand to be a zone which harbours a dangerous heterogeneity that must be excluded if the Russian Federation is to be properly established.

Russian forces failed to make this exclusion in the 1994-96 war. During this war the stakes of urbicide were already evident. The capital Grozny was damaged out of all proportion to military necessity. Moreover, this was not a random act of barbarism. During this campaign it became clear that Russian tactics were to destroy the urban fabric that harboured Chechen resistance. However this destruction was out of all proportion with the number of Chechen fighters actually sheltering in Grozny. Rather it seemed that Russian forces were destroying Grozny because it harboured heterogeneity itself. The buildings of the capital city established a fundamentally public/shared space that harboured an alterity intolerable to the Russian project to exclude difference and homogenise the identity of the Federation.

Ultimately, this fear was proved well founded insofar as the city remained open to Chechen resistance and ungovernable by Russian forces. The fundamentally public/shared character of this urbanity proved both too elusive and too agonistic for the Russian homogenising claim. Despite this, Russian forces returned to Chechnia in 1999 to finish what had been started earlier. In October 1999 the stakes of urbicide
were starkly set out when Russian forces announced their intention to raze Grozny. Russian forces clearly identified Grozny with an ineluctable (and, hence, unpacifiable) alterity. Importantly, the Russian action in Chechnia comprised a figurative ethno-nationalist claim. Specifically it was a reassertion of the ethnic homogeneity and integrity of the Russian Federation. This claim comprised a figuration of the Federation as a communion-community in which difference could, possibly, be tolerated - so long as it was both secondary to, distinct from, and subservient to, Russian identity. Since this was not possible, given resurgent Chechen separatism, a program of separation and homogenisation was the necessary adjunct to figuration. Insofar as it was not possible to establish zones of separation between Russians and Chechens, the logic of urbicide became a program of homogenisation in which all that revealed the agonistic being-in-common proper to the Russian Federation was to be disavowed/effaced.

This is the end point of urbicide: a relentless and total destruction of urban fabric that lays waste to all that can possibly offer testament to the heterogeneity proper to existence. Urbicide will naturally, if left unchecked, tend towards this infinite ruination of the urban fabric. Since the urban fabric always already constitutes existence as being-in-common it always offends the figured communion-community. As we can see in Bosnia, it is possible for figures to exercise power over the provocation of the city such that it becomes domination. However, insofar as this provocation is intractable and insistent, the figured communion-community will always struggle to maintain its domination. And this domination will be effected through a sustained work of urbicide, destroying and controlling those built things that threaten to uncover the agonism disavowed by the figure. In Grozny this provocation
proved too insistent and ineluctable for the Russian army. The logical consequence is a total destruction of the city, a laying waste to the very possibility of heterogeneity. Insofar as there is no city, there can be no provocation of the figured communion-community.

This instance of total devastation of the urban environment is a fitting point at which to bring the argument to a close. In the devastation of Grozny it is possible to see the stakes of urbicide thrown into stark relief. This total devastation comprises an encounter between the agonistic being-in-common characteristic of existence and the figuration of communion-community. This encounter comprises the disavowal of heterogeneity and the constitution of being-separate in and through the territorialisation of antagonism. This territorialisation of being-separate that is accomplished through the ruination of the built things that constitute existence as fundamentally public/shared and, hence heterogeneous, is most clearly seen in the relentless destruction of Grozny. The stakes of urbicide are thus agonistic being-in-common itself. And the logics of urbicide can be seen in every figure that, in laying claim to a substance of being as it origin, attempts to effect a separation and homogenisation through the destruction of buildings.
CONCLUSION

One thing at least is clear: if we do not face up to such questions, the political will soon desert us completely, if it has not already done so. It will abandon us to political and technological economies, if it has not already done so. And this will be the end of our communities, if this has not yet come about. Being-in-common will nonetheless never cease to resist, but its resistance will belong decidedly to another world entirely. Our world, as far as politics is concerned, will be a desert, and we will wither away without a tomb - which is to say, without community, deprived of our finite existence.¹

Coda: contesting antagonism and anthropocentrism

Recapitulation

In the Introduction I argued that the shared spaces of Bosnia are at stake in urban destruction such as that which characterised the 1992-95 Bosnian war. I argued that the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar provides an exemplary instance in and through which to see this assault on shared space.

In Chapter 1 I argued that in order to conduct an enquiry into the destruction of the shared spaces of Bosnia we must turn our attention to the nature of these spaces - their constitution and the meaning of their loss in particular. It is for this reason that I began with a brief discussion of the ways in which space has been analysed in the
western philosophical tradition. I argued that it was not sufficient to demonstrate that
the spaces in which we live our lives are the product of ontopolitical regimes of
spatiality. Such a recognition is enough to re-politicise the ossified spaces on which
regimes of territorial sovereignty are predicated (by suggesting that such regimes are
only one way - and an exclusionary way at that - of interpreting the space in which we
exist). However, this re-politicisation of the space in which we live does not address
the fundamental issue at stake in an enquiry into the nature of the spaces lost in urban
destruction. More specifically, accounts of the ontopolitical regimes of spatialisation
(such as territorial sovereignty) do not question the seemingly intuitive assumption
that space is a necessary adjunct to existence. This assumption, which I argued is best
seen in the work of Kant, forecloses any discussion of the nature of space. We may
politicise various spatial regimes, but we do not question the necessity of space as a
medium of existence. And this means that we cannot fully address the central question
raised by the destruction of shared spaces - how are such spaces constituted and,
hence, what is the meaning of their loss/destruction?

I suggested that it was in the work of Martin Heidegger that we might find a
way to approach such questions. It is Heidegger, I argued, that makes the most
sustained analysis of the manner in which existence is spatialised and, hence, of the
constitutive features of such spatiality. Heidegger argues that buildings constitute
Being-in-the-world (or ‘dwelling’, as he refers to it in his later work) as a
fundamentally shared event. In this manner buildings constitute dwelling as a Being-
with-others. Existence is, therefore, according to Heidegger’s understanding,
fundamentally heterogeneous. In many ways the argument I have set out here is an
exegesis and extension of Heidegger’s insights - an account of the constitutive
features not of space as a necessary medium in which existence takes place, but of spatiality as a fundamental moment (rather than medium) of being.

In chapter 2 I began the analysis of the destruction of shared space by addressing the nature of the violence directed at these spaces. I argued that the nature of this violence - what it was directed towards/what it destroyed - provides a vital starting point for the analysis of the spatiality embodied in shared spaces. Contemporary attempts to understand urban destruction are derived from extant norms of international jurisprudence. In some ways this might seem unobjectionable insofar as the destruction occurred as a result of (non)international armed conflict. Hence it might seem appropriate (indeed pressing) to address the question of whether such destruction can be understood according to the extant norms of international law (in particular whether we should see this destruction as a (punishable) breach of these laws). It is for this reason that urban destruction is primarily understood in terms of military necessity (or the lack thereof) or as an attack upon cultural heritage.

I demonstrated, however, that these understandings of urban destruction are insufficient. Indeed the widespread destruction of the shared spaces of Bosnia cannot be seen as either a military necessity or an attack on cultural heritage alone. The notion of military necessity leaves us with a crude recognition that the destruction of villages, towns and cities in Bosnia was not necessary. However, it gets us no closer to understanding the nature of this destruction. Moreover, it encourages us to attribute the destruction to some excess of barbarity, an evil that is beyond comprehension other than as an individual or collective failing to uphold the values of civilisation. This does not help us in our enquiry into what this destruction accomplished, nor into
what it is that shared spaces comprise such that their destruction might effect this accomplishment.

I argued, therefore, that the widespread urban destruction that characterised the 1992-1995 Bosnian war should be seen to comprise a ‘logic’ of destruction. That is, taken as a whole, this destruction comprises an assault directed at that which is constituted by the buildings that comprise the shared spaces of Bosnia. I argued that this logic of destruction can be productively understood under the name of ‘urbicide’. Urbicide is the destruction of the urban. Or, more specifically, it is the destruction of that which provides the conditions of possibility of the urban: buildings. At stake in ‘the urban’, or in the destruction of the buildings that constitute ‘the urban’, is heterogeneity. Urbicide is an assault on buildings as the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. I suggested that urbicide is a particularly productive concept if we note that it implies that the destruction of buildings is, each and every time, a destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity, and, hence, of heterogeneity itself.

In chapter 3 I noted that outlining the concept of urbicide cannot serve as a conclusive account of the destruction of urban environments in Bosnia, but is, rather, a departure point for the analysis of spatiality that I had previously suggested is necessary in light of the destruction of shared spaces in urbicide. Although urbicide names the logic of destruction at work in urban destruction, it tells us little about the nature of the shared spaces destroyed - specifically their spatiality. In particular we must ask what it is about buildings - what spatiality they are constitutive of - that makes them the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity (and thus the target of urbicide). It is only in addressing this specific issue that we will find the meaning of
urban destruction (specifically what is lost in urban destruction, and what this loss means).

I argued that it is heterogeneity that is at stake in urbicide precisely because urban space is always already shared space. That is to say, it is the always already shared nature of urban space that bequeaths it the heterogeneity at stake in urbicide. I suggested that an understanding of how this is the case, and the relationship between buildings (as the target of urbicide) and heterogeneity (as the stakes of urbicide) can be found in Heidegger's account of the spatiality of existence.

For Heidegger, Being-in-the-world is a mutual constitution of Being and world in and through each other. Without Being there is no world and without the world there is no Being. Heidegger simplifies this as the existence of Dasein. Being-in-the-world is constituted in and through the (built) things with which Dasein engages in everyday activity. These things are constitutive of a spatial existence: a relational network that contains both distance direction and orientation, or, as the later Heidegger would put it, the locales in which we dwell. This is the spatiality of existence. And because this spatiality is constituted in and through things that are fundamentally public, it is an always already shared existence. That is to say, existential spatiality is always already heterogeneous. It is this heterogeneous existential spatiality that is at stake in urbicide. The destruction of buildings is the destruction of things that constitute the spatiality in which we exist. This destruction is a deliberate targeting of these things precisely because they constitute existence as fundamentally heterogeneous. In destroying these things heterogeneous existence is destroyed.
In chapter 4 I noted that although Heidegger's argument provided a productive account of the logic of urbicide, it left the question of the nature of the heterogeneity at stake in the destruction of the shared space of Bosnia unexamined. The account of Being-in-the-world provided in chapter 3 accounts for the manner in which the destruction of buildings is indeed the destruction of the shared spaces, or the heterogeneity constituted in and through the existential spatiality established by (built) things. However, it tells us nothing of the sharing or heterogeneity implied in the Heideggerian account of existence as fundamentally public and thus always already haunted by an ineluctable alterity. Which is to say, I started the argument by noting that it was the shared spaces of Bosnia that were under attack, I then noted that this destruction was aimed at buildings as the condition of possibility of heterogeneity and, finally, showed how buildings constitute existence as always already shared and, hence, heterogeneous. I have thus shown precisely how each and every time a building is destroyed in urbicide shared space (construed broadly) and heterogeneity is at stake. And yet, to that point I had said nothing of the nature of this heterogeneity, or sharing, and the meaning of its destruction in urbicide.

I argued that Heidegger's analysis should be taken to be distinct from those other analyses of politics that are constituted according to an 'anthropocentric imaginary'. That is, the fundamental heterogeneity of existence set out by Heidegger, and the sharing of existential spatiality on which this heterogeneity is predicated, comprises a significant challenge to both liberal political theory and Marxist-Hegelian visions. In such anthropocentric accounts heterogeneity is taken to be ancillary to the essence of Being, contingent upon empirical existence. Through an exposition of the concept of Being-with as it is set out by Heidegger, my account suggests that this
cannot be the case. Rather, Being-in-the-world is, because it is constituted in and though (built) things and the spatiality of which they are constitutive, always already heterogeneous. Being is a fundamental openness to alterity. Moreover, this is to say that Being is always already implicated in community. It is the question of the contours of this community then that are at stake in the analysis of urbicide since it is the heterogeneity coextensive with community that is destroyed by urbicide.

I noted that whilst Heidegger radically contests the anthropocentric imaginary he ultimately subordinates the notion of Being-with to a nationalist vision of community in keeping with his idealised understanding of National Socialism. In order, then to conclude the analysis of the community at stake in urbicide I took up the question of the Being-with that is subordinated to Dasein in Heidegger’s analysis. In chapter 5, I set out Nancy’s understanding of this being-with as the fundamental event of existence. For Nancy, community (or being-in-common) is a reticulated network of exposure to alterity. It is precisely the conditions of possibility of such networks that are at stake in urbicide. I noted that urbicide works to turn the agonism of being-with into the antagonism of being-separate. Moreover, I noted, especially in the case of Bosnia, urbicide works to territorialize this antagonism converting the agonistic spatiality of existence into the separate and distinct spaces of territorial sovereignty.

In Chapter 6, I set out the stakes of urbicide. I argued that urbicide comprises a dual logic insofar as it both constitutes zones of separation through urban destruction and homogenises the ethno-nationalist community through systematic destruction of buildings that testify to the heterogeneity of Bosnia. I illustrated the manner in which urbicide comprises an exclusionary and homogenising figuration of ethno-nationalist community through three examples of post-Dayton politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina:
the rebuilding of mosques; the return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons; and the reconstruction of the urban environment in post-war Mostar. In these instances of urban destruction it is possible to see both the logic of urbicide and the manner in which the constitutive heterogeneity of existence unworks the war-time gains of ethno-nationalist figures. Moreover, I noted that my analysis was not only applicable to Bosnia. I demonstrated the manner in which the stakes of urbicide are also visible beyond the borders of Bosnia: in the Kosovan town of Mitrovica; in the Occupied Territories; and in the Chechen capital Grozny. I argued that these instances of urban destruction demonstrate both that figuration is a pervasive logic at work in global politics and that the constitutive heterogeneity of existence returns inexorably to contest the figuration accomplished in urban destruction.

**Implications**

In light of the argument I have made there are two specific points I would like to emphasise by way of conclusion. I hope that both of these points indicate productive avenues for further thought. Firstly, the account of urbicide that I have presented should alert us to the manner in which the antagonistic politics of territorial sovereignty comprise a covering over of the being-in-common (or heterogeneity) proper to existence. If my argument is correct, the claim to sovereignty in and through territorialisation comprises the central event of the figuration of a communion-community. Such communities are both exclusionary and homogenising insofar as they rest on a disingenuous claim to being-separate and are consolidated through an elimination of difference. My argument should suggest that a sustained questioning of
territorial sovereignty issues as an insistent demand from the heterogeneity disavowed in the institution of such figurative communion-communities. Which is to say we should recognise the way in which figuration destroys the conditions of possibility of the heterogeneity proper to existence in order to represent itself to itself. In particular we should be alert to the manner in which it is the destruction of buildings, or, at the very least, actions to dominate and determine their meaning in networks of identity/difference, that signifies such territorialisation/figuration. We should contest such events and foster an agonism that gives being-in-common its due.

Secondly, we should note that the anthropocentric imaginary serves, rather than contests, such antagonistic, territorial figuration. The anthropocentric imaginary, and its relegation of heterogeneity to a contingent/ancillary condition, forecloses on the political insofar as it disavows the agonism that characterises ‘things political’. The principle problematic such a recognition raises is that of the tight grip that the anthropocentric imaginary exerts upon responses to figuration. In humanitarianism, conflict resolution, liberal theories of multiculturalism and, most importantly, the norms of international jurisprudence, the imprint of anthropocentrism is strong. It is impossible to comprehensively contest figuration, and the politics of ethno-nationalism in particular, if one obeys the precepts of the anthropocentric imaginary. To contest figuration (and ethno-nationalism) one must uncover the being-in-common that characterises existence. And yet this is not possible if such heterogeneity is taken to be ancillary to the existence of sovereign individuals.

This problematic is particularly clear in respect of international jurisprudence. To put it bluntly, urbicide demands justice. As the founding gesture of the exclusionary-homogenising politics of ethno-nationalism that has delivered misery,
suffering and death to people across the world, urbicide must be contested by norms of international conduct. And yet such contestation is not forthcoming. Indeed, it is not possible, as I have shown, to contest urbicide on the basis of contemporary international jurisprudence. At best it is possible to mount a piecemeal contestation of instances that exemplify the destruction of cultural heritage and or so-called ‘wanton destruction’. And yet the anthropocentric tenet of sovereign individuality that underwrites international jurisprudence institutes a demand that justice prove an intent to cause such destruction. This focus upon the supposed interior cognition of an individual lacks the critical power to approach the question of the destruction of the very conditions of singularity (and, hence, individuality) itself. The destruction of buildings is not an intentional act, co-ordinated as a plan implemented with intent. It is a widespread ruination of urbanity that, taken as a whole, comprises a territorialisation of antagonisms and a disavowal of the heterogeneity proper to existence.

In this sense jurisprudence must seek a deeper understanding of the manner in which exclusion, displacement, and liquidation can be effected by an assault on the very conditions of our being-in-common. It must seek to contest such destruction by contesting the manner in which claims to a substantial origin of being are enacted through a disavowal of the being-in-common that is constituted by the (built) things with which we engage on an everyday, mundane basis.

Urbicide calls for a materialist understanding of the constitutive features of existence. At a very minimum such an understanding should recognise and endorse the pain Slavenka Draculić felt in watching the destruction of Mostar’s Old bridge. If we feel no pain when buildings are destroyed it is clear evidence that the agonism proper to existence has been effectively disavowed. In feeling such pain, in defending
the urban environment, and in contesting the destruction of towns, cities and villages, we acknowledge the agonism constitutive of being-in-common. Moreover, we acknowledge the manner in which it is only in and through such being-in-common that the reticulated networks of singularity that comprise our everyday identities emerge. At stake, therefore, in the destruction of buildings in and through urbicide is precisely this agonism, its disavowal, or uncovering. Similarly at stake is the contestation of the exclusions effected by such disavowal or the return of heterogeneity promised by the uncovering of being-in-common. Thus, if we are to understand the ineluctable alterity constitutive of our existence, recognising the logics of urbicide would, I believe, comprise an important and provocative step. Moreover, as Nancy notes, a failure to recognise the logics of urbicide, comprises a failure to recognise the being-in-common (or community) that is constitutive of existence. Such a failure risks both depriving us of the resources necessary to nurture the agonism constitutive of the political and condemning us to ‘wither away’ in the technicism of figuration.⁴
Reference Matter
Note on Sources

In research such as this - where it is important to keep abreast of developments in Bosnia and beyond - the Internet is a valuable tool for scholars. Indeed, a significant number of the sources referred to in the following endnotes and bibliography are derived from Internet sources. It is important to note that all of the information scholars gather is, ultimately, contestable. In this respect I find the Internet no less valuable than libraries, archives and print media. If one applies the same standards one would apply to non-electronic sources, the Internet is a valuable source for a multitude of illuminating and credible resources.

However, the use of Internet sources requires a number of words of clarification. Firstly, as far as I am aware the addresses (URLs) referred to in the endnotes and bibliography are valid at the time of writing. It is, of course, possible that they may not be valid in future. This is regrettable, but unavoidable. In as many cases as possible, therefore, I have given enough bibliographic data to enable these sources to be traced to the organisations that produced them.

Secondly, it is important to point out that the majority of the Internet sources consulted are derived from respected organisations who have a significant off-line presence. In this respect, organisations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Human Rights Watch are not Internet based organisations. Most, if not all, of their reports are also available off-line. In this respect the Internet is a tool for increasing the dissemination of their information. Moreover, whilst there are valid critiques of the quality of information found on the
Internet, the information provided on the Internet by such organisations is of the same quality one would expect to find in libraries and archives.

Thirdly, one of the most important resources for research concerning Bosnia is electronic mail digests. These electronic mail services disseminate news from international and local sources on a daily basis. In this way it is possible to ensure that one keeps abreast of as many events, issues, and debates regarding developments in Bosnia as possible. I have made particular use of two digest services, BosNet and the International Justice Watch Discussion List (JustWatch).

BosNet is a moderated, non-partisan news service that disseminates local and international news concerning Bosnia. It collects news articles from a wide variety of sources and does not discriminate between sources on a political or ethnic basis. JustWatch is a discussion list concerned with questions of international justice in, among other places, the former Yugoslavia. It is a loosely moderated forum for discussion of issues of current concern pertaining to international justice. Members of JustWatch disseminate news and commentary concerning Bosnia on this list. As such it serves as a valuable provider of information regarding sources for research.

The archives for these resources can be found at the following URLs:

- BosNet: http://www.bosnet.org
- JustWatch: http://listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu/archives/justwatch-l.html
Notes to Introduction


3 Traynor ‘Shells destroy Mostar bridge’.


In chapter 6 I will consider the case of the Ferhadija and its reconstruction in more detail. It will suffice to note at this point that after years of waiting a foundation stone for the mosque was laid in a ceremony on 18th June 2001. This stone is, however, the only element of the Ferhadija to have been rebuilt.


Michael Sells' definition of Bosnians (as opposed to Bosnian-Croat, or Bosnian-Serb) as 'all residents of the internationally recognized sovereign nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of their religious affiliation, who consider themselves Bosnian, that is, who remain loyal to a Bosnian state built on the principles of civic society and religious pluralism' captures the meaning of 'Bosniac' (Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, p. xiv). 'Bosniac' is more adequate in describing those who were the victims of the genocidal violence of the Bosnian Serb Army and militias than the somewhat mistaken designation of 'Muslim'. Just as the Jews were not the only victims of the Holocaust, so those who could be identified as 'Muslim' were not the only victims of the Serbs. Indeed, in most discourse 'Muslim' is deployed as a 'catch-all' category for all those who found themselves to be opposed to, victims of, or excluded from, the Bosnian-Serb or Bosnian-Croat nationalist programs. See also in this regard Tone Bringa's comments on the evolution of Bošnjac identity (Tone Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp.34-36).


13 Riedlmayer, ‘Killing Memory’.

14 Adams, ‘Architecture as the Target’.

15 It is important to recognise that it is not by mistake that I have reversed the ‘slash’ that usually divides identity and difference. In writing identity/difference rather than identity/difference, I am following William Connolly’s formulation of the agonism of identity and difference (William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991)). Connolly notes that his ‘reason for the reverse slash was to indicate that identity does not just lean over difference, as people tend to assume. Difference both helps to constitute and recoils back upon identity’ (William E. Connolly, ‘Re: On the “Slash” in Identity/Difference’, Email correspondence with author, 12th July 2001). I would note that the reversed ‘slash’ is distinct in meaning from the forward slash used in either/or binary parings. Either/or binary dualisms (such as inside/outside, domestic/international, self/other, identity/difference) have a semblance of closure. That is, the forward slash gives the impression that the terms of the dualism are independent of one another and, hence, separately constituted. These dualisms both restrict the possible forms that heterogeneous existence might assume (e.g., one must either be inside or outside, but not both, or neither) and give the impression that the two terms in the pairing have a pre-formed and closed identity. In reversing the slash I wanted to note (as Connolly does) that identity and difference are in a mutually constitutive relationship, not a forced opposition. Moreover, this relation is defined by
a shared border of distinction at which identity unravels into difference, not by a
separation that establishes an antagonism between a pre-constituted identity and an
exterior alterity. I will discuss these ideas further in Chapter 5; on the notion of
agonism see my comments in this chapter (Note 16). It is important to note, however,
that this reversal of the 'slash' is not a typographic error, and is motivated by specific
intellectual concerns.

16 I will develop the notion of he agonism of community further in Chapter 5 where I
will draw on Foucault’s notion of ‘agonism’: meaning combat, contest, struggle or
sport (Michel Foucault ‘Afterword: The Subject and Power’ in H L Dreyfus & P
Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Brighton:
Harvester Press, 1982), p.222). Connolly develops Foucault’s understanding of
agonism further in his Identity/Difference.

17 James Hanley/Photo Researchers, Inc, Encarta Online,
(http://encarta.msn.com/index/conciseindex/6E/MediaMax.asp?pg=3&ti=761579796
&idx=461553370).


19 Malcolm for example notes that records of settlements in the Neretva valley exist
from the Roman era (first to third Centuries AD) (Malcom, Bosnia, p.3). See also
Amir Pasic, The Old Bridge (Stari Most) in Mostar: Studies on the history and culture
of Bosnia and Hercegovina; no. 4 (Istanbul: Research Centre For Islamic History, Art,

20 Bozidar Jezernik, ‘Qudret Kemeri: A Bridge between Barbarity and Civilisation’
21 Mustafa ben Abd Allah Hadjidji Khalifa, known as Katib Çelebi, quoted in Jezernik, ‘Qudret Kemeri’, p.472.

22 Jezernik, ‘Qudret Kemeri’, p.481.


24 The Herceg Stephen Vukcic resisted the Turkish army after their 1463 conquest of the majority of Bosnian territory. However by 1482 Herzegovina was conquered by the Turkish army. Malcolm, Bosnia, pp.43-44.


27 Jezernik, ‘Qudret Kemeri’, p.470. Pasic writes that ‘its height in summer when the water is low was about 20 m’, Pasic, The Old Bridge, p.14.


31 Sells characterises the project to build the Stari Most as ‘multireligious’, employing ‘engineers and artisans...from around the region.’ Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, p.94.


33 Jezernik, ‘Qudret Kemeri’, p.482.

34 Jezernik, ‘Qudret Kemeri’, p.482.


36 Jezernik notes that ‘[t]here are some other theories of the origin of the name Mostar.’ Among these other theories are the idea that ‘Mostar derived its name from the towers of the bridge, popularly known as mostare’, and that the ‘name [is derived] from most-tara (tower on the left bank).’ (Jezernik, ‘Qudret Kemeri’, p.483).

38 Pasic, *The Old Bridge*, p.19.

39 Traynor, 'Shells Destroy Mostar Bridge'.


41 Pasic, *The Old Bridge*, p.19.

42 Pasic, 'Why Stari Most?'; Pasic, *The Old Bridge*.


44 It should be noted that this dream of being joined with the 'homeland' of Croatia was actively encouraged by the Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman. Tudjman's death in 1999 prompted general elections in Croatia in which Tudjman's party lost. The incoming Croat government of Stipe Mesic has actively distanced itself from Herceg-Bosna, halting support and indicating that the idea of a 'greater Croatia' has no backing from the Croat government. For a summary of the influence this change of government has had in Mostar, see: International Crisis Group, *Reunifying Mostar: Opportunities for Progress*, Balkans Report No.90 (Sarajevo: ICG, 19 April 2000) p.9).


46 It should not be lost on observers that echoes of Nazi Germany reverberate through these acts. As a final resonance the Stari Most was, coincidentally, destroyed on the 55th 'anniversary' of Reichskristallnacht. The 9th November 1993 was also, and somewhat ironically, 'four years to the day after the tearing down of the Berlin Wall'
47 Traynor ‘Shells destroy Mostar bridge’.

48 It should be noted that although Bosnian Croat nationalists have managed to hamper progress in reunification of the city, two events have led to a more proactive contestation of the ethnic division of Mostar. On the one hand, after the death of Croatia’s President Franjo Tudjman, Herceg Bosna lost the financial, military, and political backing it had formerly received from Croatia. This effectively ended the nationalist dream of a ‘Greater Croatia’. On the other hand the United Nation’s High Representative has become more proactive in his action against the Bosnian Croat nationalist party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). For a summary of the manner in which the HDZ has found itself on the defensive and seen its war-time gains reversed see: International Crisis Group, *Reunifying Mostar*.

49 Ian Traynor, ‘Ottoman Treasure Splits Turks and EU’, *The Guardian*, 24th August 1994, p.8. For accounts of the rebuilding of the Stari Most see the UNESCO Sector for Culture web-site:

(http://www.unesco.org/culture/heritage/tangible/mostar/html_eng/mostar1a.htm)

and the UNESCO DRG web-site:

(http://www.unesco.org/drg/mostar/introduction.htm).


51 In the wake of the conflict it would be possible to say that the bridge united ‘Muslim’ east Mostar and ‘Croat’ west Mostar. However, this was not the case before the conflict. Indeed, as I have already noted, west Mostar only became substantially
‘Croat’ after a prolonged programme of killing and displacement that began in summer 1993. East Mostar, as the old section of town is characterised by buildings in the traditional Ottoman style, whilst west Mostar, being the new section of town, is characterised by modern buildings that might nominally be said to be in a European style. This is, however, an exceptionally broad and generalising division. Modern buildings exist on both sides of the river, and the old town (Stari Grad) spreads out from the Stari Most onto the west bank. The bridge, however, stands as the structure at the heart of all of this mixing, allowing passage across the Neretva gorge.

52 Michael A Sells The Bridge Betrayed, p.113.

53 Although the Stari Most was never listed as a World Heritage Site by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the response to its destruction by a variety of bodies including UNESCO illustrate the manner in which it was regarded as an example of the heritage of humanity. See for example: the ‘Reactions to the destruction of the Old Bridge of Mostar on 9 November 1993’ (especially the declaration by Federico Mayor, Director-General of UNESCO) in the Council of Europe’s Fourth Information Report on War Damage (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Culture and Education, Fourth Information Report on War Damage to the Cultural Heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Council of Europe Doc. no. 6999 (1994)); and the web-site documenting UNESCO’s program to assist in the rebuilding of the bridge: http://www.unesco.org/drg/mostar/introduction.htm).

54 Andras Riedlmayer, ‘Killing Memory’.

55 It should be noted here that I am pointing to the fact that these buildings were constitutive of spaces shared by all Bosnians irrespective of ethnic/religious
designation. This might be construed as saying they underpinned a ‘Bosnian’ culture.

And yet ‘Bosnian’ is a particularly problematic category. This can be seen in the remarks of Judge Elihu Lauterpacht pertaining to Bosnia’s 1993 request to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for provisional measures to prevent Yugoslavia committing genocide in Bosnia. Lauterpacht noted that in order to prove genocide was occurring, Bosnia would have to show that Yugoslavia was intent on destroying, in whole or in part, the Bosnian national group. And yet, Lauterpacht argued, Bosnians are ‘evidently divided...and cannot be said to compose a “national group”’ (For Lauterpacht’s remarks and a discussion of the ICJ case see: David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota press, 1998) pp.107-108). Bosnia’s multicultural composition meant that it was not possible to identify a single overarching group that could be called ‘Bosnian’, and said to possess a ‘Bosnian culture’. It is this heterogeneity that I hope to capture in my argument. A heterogeneous ensemble of identities, rather than a single national polity, can be said to occupy the shared spaces destroyed in urban destruction.


57 Draculid is quoted in Pasic’s The Old Bridge, p.40. The same quotation is also used (though not clearly acknowledged) in Pasic, ‘Why Stari Most?’, p.66; and the UNESCO DRG web-site (http://www.unesco.org/drg/mostar/index.htm).

58 Draculid, ‘Falling Down’, p.15 (my emphasis).

59 Draculid, ‘Falling Down’, p.15 (my emphasis).

60 Heidegger notes that ‘[e]ven Dasein’s being-alone is Being-with [Others, a community]...The Other can be missing only in and for a Being-with. Being-alone is a

61 Draculić, ‘Falling Down’, p.15.

62 Giorgio Agamben’s distinction between ‘sovereign power’ (bios) and ‘bare life’ (zoe) is useful in understanding this differentiation between ‘existence’ and ‘mere presence’. Agamben’s distinction illustrates the centrality in modern thought of a threshold between simply living, and living a qualified life that can be considered ‘political’. Furthermore, Agamben notes, in his discussion of Foucault, that being-human can only fully be realised in the terrain of the political (see Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998)).

63 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.42.

64 ‘Life’ in this sense, is an excessive supplement of ‘existence’ that ensures that when particular communities disappear, the multiplicity of communities to which the living belong, and can possibly belong, provide for a continuation of the terrain of the political, the terrain upon which being-human is possible.
Notes to Chapter 1

1 Michel Foucault, ‘Of Other Spaces’, *Diacritics* 16 (1986), pp.22.


3 Marysia Zalewski identifies as the principle Other of theoretical reflection upon the violences of international relations, the so-called ‘real-worlders’ who assume that empirical suffering (as an element of objective empirical reality) trumps, and makes redundant, the rather abstract pursuit of theoretical reflection (see Marysia Zalewski, “‘All these theories and yet the bodies keep piling up’: theories, theorists, theorising’ in Steve Smith, Ken Booth & Marysia Zalewski, eds., *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

4 Diane Orentlicher notes that cultural genocide was left out of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Diane Orentlicher defines cultural genocide as ‘destroying a group through forcible assimilation into the dominant culture’ (Diane F. Orentlicher, ‘Genocide’ in Roy Guttman & David Rieff, eds., *Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know* (London: WW Norton, 1999) (also at http://www.crimesofwar.org/genocideessay.html)).

5 This comprises a substantial part of the argument of Michael A Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

I have taken the term 'urbicide' from two principle sources: a book published in Bosnia by concerned citizens and architects resident in Mostar entitled *Mostar'92 - Urbicide* (Mostar: Hrvatsko vijece obrane opcine Mostar, 1992) [extracts of this book were published as 'Mostar '92 - Urbicide' *Spazio e Società/Space and Society* Vol. 16 No. 62 (1993), 8-25]; and a photographic exhibition (and its accompanying catalogue) organised in 1993 by the Association of Architects of Bosnia-Herzegovina entitled 'Urbicide Sarajevo'.

I will develop the concept of 'agonism' further in Chapter 5. For my initial comments on the centrality of agonism to the political see Introduction, note 15.


This spatial turn seems to have originated in geography, though it has percolated through to political theory. Insofar as anything has an origin it might be possible to trace this spatial turn to Edward Soja’s *Postmodern Geographies* (London: Verso, 1989). For a collection of essays that that thematises the ‘spatial turn’ and examines the contribution of a variety of theorists to such a ‘turn’, see, Mike Crang & Nigel Thrift, eds., *Thinking Space* (London: Routledge, 2000). For a collection of readings by theorists implicated in this ‘spatial turn see, Neil Leach, ed., *Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory* (London: Routledge, 1997). The novelty of this ‘turn’ is debatable. After all, as Casey shows, space has been the concern of philosophy since the outset (see Edward Casey, *The Fate of Place* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997)).

R.B.J. Walker *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*
12 The relationship between space and politics is best seen in the sub-discipline of Geopolitics which, in its classical form, comprises an unquestioning acceptance of space as the medium in which politics must occur and yet treats the features of this space (distance in particular) as an exteriority. The principle task of politics according to Geopolitics is to either profit from, or overcome, such exteriorities (see: Gearóid Ó Tuathail (Gerard Toal), *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp.21-56).

13 For an example of the unquestioning acceptance of the spatialities of received concepts of territoriality see Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). Though Krasner appears to be critical of the received wisdom regarding sovereignty, he rests his understandings of what sovereignty is upon received spatial schemas without questioning them. Whilst Krasner could not be taken to represent the entire field of international relations scholarship, his unquestioning acceptance of spatiality is representative of the manner in which the discipline has failed to turn a critical eye towards its founding assumption: the territoriality, or spatiality, that both comprises the condition of possibility of the exercise of sovereignty and frames the inter-state order.

14 Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, pp.4-5.


16 The idea that space is a social construction should be rigorously separated from the body of work in the discipline of international relations that has loosely identified itself as ‘social constructivism/constructionism’. Social constructivism, at least as one finds it in international relations theory constitutes a challenge to the simple-minded realism that has traditionally dominated that discipline. However, social constructivism is grounded in relatively superficial accounts of the way in which agents create their worlds through discursive acts similar to performative speech acts. The idea that space is ‘socially constructed’ is a claim about the ontological status of space. On the whole social constructivism lacks a cogent account of ontology (See in this regard David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, revised ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), pp.216-227).


21 Soja, *Postmodern geographies*.
22 A good example in this regard is David Harvey’s *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).


24 Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*.

25 Indeed the introduction to Ó Tuathail’s *Critical Geopolitics* provides an excellent set of tools with which one could proceed with an analysis of the discursive constitution, or writing, of global space.


28 Laclau notes that ‘[t]he moment of the original institution of the social is the point at which its contingency is revealed, since that institution...is only possible through the repression of options that were equally open.’ Ernest Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (London: Verso, 1990), p.34.

29 Derrida defines ontology as an ‘axiomatics linking indissociably the ontological value of present-being [on] to its situation, to the stable and presentable determination of a locality, the *topos* of territory, native soil, city, body in general’. For Derrida, ontology refers to the manner in which the linking of being to situation gives ontological value (presence) to being (Jacques Derrida, *Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International* (London: Routledge,
1994), p.82. Emphasis and square parentheses ([ ]) in original).


34 It should be noted that multiculturalism is what might be called a ‘contested concept’. Common conceptions of multiculturalism revolve around notions of tolerance. However, some writers are unsatisfied with this understanding arguing that it implies a mere co-existence, side-by-side of enclave communities. Such writers would argue for a radicalised understanding of multiculturalism that gives proper attention to the agonism it implies (cf., David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), Chapter 7).
Notes to Chapter 2


2 *Mostar '92 - Urbicide* (Mostar: Hrvatsko vijece obrane opcine Mostar, 1992). Extracts of this publication were published as ‘Mostar '92 - Urbicide’ in *Spazio e Società/Space and Society* Vol. 16 No. 62 (1993), pp.8-25.


7 This opposition is explicit in Louis Wirth’s definition of the urban experience: cf., ‘Just as the beginning of Western civilisation is marked by the permanent settlement of formerly nomadic peoples in the Mediterranean basin, so the beginning of what is distinctively modern in our civilisation is best signalised by the growth of great cities. Nowhere has mankind been further removed from organic nature than under the conditions of life characteristic of great cities...The city and the country may be regarded as two poles in reference to one or the other of which all human settlements tend to arrange themselves.’ (Louis Wirth ‘Urbanism as a Way of Life’ in Richard T LeGates & Frederic Stout eds., *The City Reader* (London: Routledge, 1996), p.190).
8 Durkheim, for example, claims that '[n]owhere have the traditions less sway over minds. Indeed...cities are the uncontested homes of progress; it is in them that ideas, fashions, customs, new needs are elaborated and then spread over the rest of the country...No ground is more favourable to evolutions of all sorts.' (Émile Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society*, (New York: The Free Press, 1933) p.296).


10 Habermas, 'Modernity - An Incomplete Project', p.4.

11 Peter Saunders, *Social Theory and The Urban Question*, Second Edition (London: Routledge, 1986), p.35. Note that Weber is referring to the role of the city in the development of capitalism and is, therefore, not referring to all cities at all times, but, rather, to medieval, occidental cities.


15 Wirth 'Urbanism as a Way of Life', p.190.

16 It should be noted that 'heterogeneity' is, like 'multiculturalism' a contested category. In chapters 4 and 5 I will examine the nature of the heterogeneity implicit to urbanism through an elaboration of the Heideggerian notion of 'Being-with'. I will argue that heterogeneity in this sense comprises a fundamental openness to alterity. This contrasts with an (anthropocentric) understanding of heterogeneity that takes it as comprising the existence, side-by-side, of different but essentially homogeneous
groups.

17 Wirth 'Urbanism as a Way of Life', p.196.


19 This quote is reworking of Dunn's note that 'we are all democrats today': John Dunn quoted in R.B.J. Walker *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.141.


21 Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, p.79.

22 It is, of course, important to note that the status of the violence against ethnic groups in the 1992-95 Bosnian war is a politically contested matter. The deployment of the term 'genocide' in relation to this violence has thus been regarded as a 'political' strategy. The common problem with claims that 'genocide' is a 'political' term is the insinuation that 'political' judgement amounts to subjective opinion. These claims seek to devalue any attempt to show that the violence against ethnic groups (the Bosnian Muslims in particular) constituted a 'coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of national [or ethnic] groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves' (Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, p.79). Such attempts to devalue the claim that genocide occurred in the Bosnian war are, ironically, 'political' in themselves. Thus, for example, the Clinton administration sought repeatedly in 1993 to avoid describing the violence that was occurring in both Bosnia and Rwanda as genocide, referring instead to crimes that
'border on genocide' or are 'acts of genocide' but not genocide itself (David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) p.51). These 'legal gymnastics' are performed in order to efface any responsibility to intervene in such violence that the US administration might have been deemed to have (Diane F. Orentlicher, 'Genocide' in Roy Guttman & David Rieff, eds., Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know (London: WW Norton, 1999); also at http://www.crimesofwar.org/genocideessay.html). Whilst not wishing to counter this position with 'objective' claims, I would note that I am satisfied that the violence against the Bosnian Muslims can be classified as genocide according to both the definition set out in the 1948 Genocide Convention ('intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group') and that outlined by Lemkin: '[g]enocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group.' (Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, p79). As Michael Sells notes, this would make 'ethnic cleansing' a euphemism for genocide (Michael A Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia (Berkeley: University of California, 1996), p.10). I do not wish to talk in euphemisms in this argument.


24 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p.15.


Note that the notion of 'concept' used here is similar to Martin Jay’s notion of the ‘post facto conceptual entity’. (Martin Jay, ‘Of Plots, Witnesses, and Judgements’ in Saul Friedlander, ed., Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the “Final Solution” (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), quoted in Campbell, National Deconstruction, p.40).

Indeed ‘although Lemkin’s conception [of genocide] included the physical extermination of targeted groups [indeed the destruction of the European Jews was a central aspect of Lemkin’s evidence of the genocidal policies of the Nazi’s] this was, in his view, only the most extreme technique of genocide’ (Orentlicher, ‘Genocide’, my emphasis).


Whether or not the 1992-95 Bosnian war comprised an international or non-international armed conflict is significant insofar as it determines whether particular laws of war have been violated. This can be seen in the Tadić case at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (for a summary of the Tadić case see: ‘Trial Information Sheet, Tadić Case (IT-94-1)’, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 15th September 2000, http://www.un.org/icty/glance/tadic.htm). In the judgement handed down by the Tribunal Tadić was found not guilty on a number of charges because the Tribunal had previously ruled that the conflict was, in relation to these charges, internal (non-international). Since the charges referred to grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva conventions, and these convention refer to international conflict, the Tribunal was left with no choice but to rule that the charges were inapplicable and to acquit Tadić. However, following a prosecution appeal, this decision was overruled. The Appeal Chamber ruled that Tadić had participated in an international conflict and was thus guilty of grave breaches of the Geneva convention. These legal oscillations reflect a substantial contestation of the definition of the 1995-95 conflict (as internal or international): a contestation with not insignificant consequences. On this matter see: David Campbell, ‘Atrocity, Memory, Photography: Imaging the Concentration Camps of Bosnia – The Case of ITN versus Living Marxism, Part I’, Human Rights Review, forthcoming; Theodor Meron, ‘Classification of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua’s Fallout’, American Journal of International Law, Vol.92 (1998), pp. 236-42; Christine Gray, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: Civil War or Inter-State


43 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Culture and Education, *Fourth Information Report on War Damage to the Cultural Heritage in Croatia and*
Bosnia-Herzegovina.


45 Roberts & Guelff, eds., *Documents on The Laws of War*, p.569.

46 That militarily unnecessary destruction is criminal is, I think, beyond dispute (indeed the status of the proscription of militarily unnecessary destruction in customary international law testifies to this). However, the questions such destruction should raise - but that analyses focusing on these acts fail to grasp - are: a) what is what the meaning of such destruction?; and b) what does such destruction disclose?

47 Arendt’s comment is made in *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, where she observes that the Israeli prosecutor’s ‘case rested on the assumption that [Eichmann], like all “normal persons,” must have been aware of the criminal nature of his acts, and Eichmann was indeed normal insofar as he was “no exception within the Nazi regime.” However, under conditions of the Third Reich only “exceptions” could be expected to react “normally” [that is according to the norms of conscience to which the Israeli prosecutors were appealing]’. That is, to judge a regime of meaning according to what is ‘normal’ for others is not necessarily to grasp the logics according to which that regime operates. Eichmann was thus normal under the conditions of the Third Reich and to account for his actions one has to understand the regime within which he was so ‘normal’, and within which a sense that his actions involved no moral wrongdoing could be established. See Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (London: Penguin, 1994), pp.26-27.

No. 3511, p. 242 (also in Roberts & Guelff, eds., Documents on The Laws of War, Documents 21 & 22, pp. 371-405).


50 The prevailing interpretation of the Convention can be seen in recent discussions concerning the destruction of cultural property in Kosovo. These discussions have commonly taken any destruction of religious property as an assault on culture. See, for example, Andrew Herscher & Andras Rieldmayer, ‘Monument and Crime: The Destruction of Historic Architecture in Kosovo’, Grey Room, No. 1 (Fall 2000), pp. 108-122.

51 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Culture and Education, Fourth Information Report on War Damage to the Cultural Heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

52 For example, Daryl Press argued that ‘the goal of the combatants in the former Yugoslavia is to drive the enemy from the land, not to capture and kill every man, woman and child.’ Press, quoted in Campbell, National Deconstruction, pp. 100-101, note 82. Campbell provides both a refutation of this position and an account of the systematic character of ethnic cleansing.

53 As I noted above (Note 22), Sells refers to ethnic cleansing as a ‘euphemism’ (Sells, The Bridge Betrayed, p. 10).

54 On the lack of Bosnian nationality see Campbell’s discussion of the remarks of Judge Elihu Lauterpacht in regard to the case against Serbia concerning the prevention and punishment of genocide brought to the International Court of Justice by the

55 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Culture and Education, *Information Report on War Damage to the Cultural Heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*.

56 Boban cited in Andras Riedlmayer, ‘Killing Memory’. Riedlmayer cites Boban with the specific intention of showing that violence was directed against symbolic buildings because of their importance to the ethnic community that was to be cleansed.

57 Andras J Riedlmayer, ‘The War on People and The War on Culture’, *The New Combat* (Autumn 1994), p.16 (This article is substantially the same as Riedlmayer’s ‘Killing Memory’).


60 Riedlmayer, ‘The War on People and The War on Culture’, p.16.

This more generic understanding of which buildings comprise the heritage of a particular culture can be seen in the work of the Kosovo Cultural Heritage Survey which has documented the widespread destruction of cultural heritage in Kosovo between 1998 and 2000. This survey provides a clear example of the exercise of a generic notion of what comprises cultural heritage since it is focused on those buildings whose loss it is thought in some way impoverishes both the culture to which they belong and humanity in general. This survey does not take into account the buildings that are not thought to represent such a loss - shopping malls, tower blocks and so on. The preliminary report of the Kosovo Cultural Heritage Survey 'The Destruction and Reconstruction of Architectural Heritage in Kosovo: A Post-War Report' can be found in both the October 2000 *US-ICOMOS Newsletter* and the Oct-Dec 2000 edition of *Bosnia Report* (http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/default2.cfm?reportid=146). In this report Riedlmayer and Herscher note that '[t]he survey database will be mounted on Archnet, a new on-line resource on architecture, urban design, planning and restoration now being developed at the MIT School of Architecture and Planning. A sample of [the] survey's documentation on the destruction of historical architecture in Kosovo can be viewed at http://archnet.org/calendar/item.tcl?calendar_id=2658'.

It should be noted that UNESCO's World Heritage List contains no sites in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

See above, Note 49 and Gregory M Mose, 'The Destruction of Churches and Mosques in Bosnia-Herzegovina'.

The reverse logic is applied to those who destroy cultural heritage - since these buildings are designated as such, and thus in some way extraordinary, it is assumed
that they must have been deliberately targeted. It is precisely this reversal of logic that gives rise to fierce contests over the definition of buildings and monuments as cultural heritage. That is to say, if one can define a building as cultural heritage, its destruction cannot be explained away as the consequence of expediency or excess. This can be clearly seen in the case of Serbian attempts to characterise NATO's 1999 offensive in Kosovo as an aggression akin to 'genocide'. These attempts paid particular attention to destruction or endangerment of cultural heritage since it was argued that if it could be shown that NATO was destroying the physical basis of Serbian cultural identity, it would, _de facto_, hold that NATO was conducting a campaign aimed at destroying the Serbs (that group in which Serbian identity inheres) themselves.

Two strategies were deployed by Yugoslav authorities and Serb organisation. Firstly, buildings that might otherwise not have been so designated, but had been damaged by NATO munitions, were defined as 'cultural heritage' in order to magnify the damage caused. Thus the Television Tower on Mt. Avala in Belgrade, which was destroyed as part of NATO’s (controversial) strategy of disabling communications and propaganda networks, was defined as cultural heritage by The Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments of Serbia (See http://www.yuheritage.com/nato_list.htm for a full list - with hyperlinks - of the 'cultural heritage' damaged or destroyed by NATO). The tower was built in 1965 and cannot really claim heritage status (though it might be accurate as the Institute claims to see it as an achievement of Serbian engineering). The designation of this destroyed building as cultural heritage was intended to imply a deliberate attempt to destroy Serbian culture on the part of NATO.
Secondly where a building had been reasonably defined as cultural heritage (such as the ancient orthodox monasteries in Kosovo) any damage by NATO munitions was deemed to be a deliberately targeted act of aggression. This is conspicuous in the case of monasteries damaged by the force of nearby detonation of bombs/missiles. Such damage is hard to define as an assault on cultural heritage. In all cases the detonations were from munitions directed at legitimate targets and so the damage appears to comprise an unintended (and possibly unforeseen) consequence of military targeting. Contrary to all claims by Serbian sources, NATO did not target (or directly hit) a single house of worship or building recognised as comprising cultural heritage. For claims concerning the amount of cultural heritage destroyed in Serbia and Kosovo see the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Whitebook (http://www.mfa.gov.yu/bela/) and the SerbiaInfo Article ‘A large number of cultural monuments in Serbia damaged’ (http://www.serbia-info.com/news/1999-06/12/12509.html).

66 Article 2(b) of the statute of the ICTY, provides for the charge of ‘wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages or devastation not justified by military necessity’ (Roberts & Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, p.569) . Indeed, this charge forms part of the indictment of Radoslav Brdjanin and Momir Talic (see ICTY case number IT-99-36-PT; for an information sheet on the Brdjanin & Talic, or “Krajina”, case see http://www.un.org/icty_glance/brdjanin.htm). Though this charge recognises that widespread destruction of the urban environment may be of significance beyond the destruction of cultural property, it still sees the rubble of war as being militarily unnecessary. That is to say, the destruction is not of significance in its own right, but points to the excessive force used by the ‘ethnic cleansers’. The
devastation of the urban environment is thus implicitly reduced to a signifier of brutality without being highlighted as a phenomenon in its own right. Thus, as I noted earlier, the question of what is disclosed in such ‘wanton destruction’ is not raised.

67 The Unis Co. buildings, next to the Holiday Inn in Sarajevo, provide the front cover picture [see Appendix 1, figure 4-2] for Silber and Little’s The Death of Yugoslavia (Laura Silber & Allan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin/BBC Books, 1995)). See also ‘Urbicide - Sarajevo/Sarajevo, Une Ville Blessée’, the catalogue accompanying the exhibition ‘Warchitecture - Sarajevo, a wounded city’ at the Georges Pompidou Centre in Paris (March 1994) for further examples of the modernist buildings destroyed in the siege of Sarajevo.


69 The similarity between the formulation of this section of my argument and Roland Barthes’ argument in Mythologies is not a coincidence. However, this similarity is not a consequence of my endorsement of Barthes’ outline of the workings of mythology (despite its merits, his account has significant flaws), but is, rather, because I think that the interpretation of urban destruction that I am outlining at this point conceives of the ruins of urban Bosnia in a manner comparable to that in which Barthes conceives of images: as forms/signs appropriated as the signifiers of certain concepts (see Roland Barthes, Mythologies (London: Paladin, 1973), pp. 117-142).


71 I take the idea that ‘balkanisation’ is ‘transvalued’ from a term in the lexicon of classical geopolitics to the status of motif for violent fragmentation from Der Derian’s
Antidiplomacy, p.148.


76 Said, *Orientalism*, p.43.

77 Hayden and Bakic-Hayden’s account provides a powerful critical tool for understanding the discursive regimes operative in the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. However, it should be noted that the understanding of the wars in the former Yugoslavia that Robert M Hayden drew from this analysis are distinctly problematic. Hayden argued that, since all parties to the conflict were implicated in discourses distinguishing themselves from their others, all parties evinced an equal propensity towards partition/secession. Hayden deployed this understanding in order to argue that one could not attribute the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia to aggression by Serbian forces, Rather, Hayden argued that, since all parties were engaged in discourses of secession, the Serbian actions were provoked by discourses emanating from Ljubljana, Zagreb and Sarajevo. Hayden acted as an expert witness for the defence in the Tadić trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia. Tadić was accused of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva convention in connection with his alleged role in ethnic cleansing in the Prijedor region of Bosnia. Hayden's testimony was deployed to demonstrate that the Bosnian war was not an aggressive act by Bosnian Serbs. In his testimony, Hayden referred to the various discourses of separation deployed by the peoples of former Yugoslavia (and Slovenia in particular) to argue that the war should be seen as a civil war. This argument was undoubtedly instrumental in persuading the court that the conflict was an internal conflict, a decision that led to Tadić's initial acquittal on a number of charges due to the inapplicability of the Geneva conventions to internal conflict (a decision overturned by the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal). For information on the Tadić Trial see 'Trial Information Sheet, Tadić Case (IT-94-1)', International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 15th September 2000, http://www.un.org/icty/glance/tadic.htm. For Hayden's testimony, see the trial transcripts for 10th and 11th September 1996 (http://www.un.org/icty/transe1/960910ED.txt & http://www.un.org/icty/transel/960910IT.txt).


79 Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, p.130-133. For an illustration of this balkanism, see Erna Rijisdijk's account of the balkanist discourses that circulated during the 1999 Kosovo conflict (Erna Rijisdijk, 'Balkanism and the Kosovo Crisis', http://www.students.ncl.ac.uk/e.a.c.rijsdijk/balkan.htm).

80 This view can be seen in the words of a spokesperson for the American Republican leadership who stated: 'I see no reason to send young men over there to lose their lives
over something we can do nothing about. These people have been fighting for
centuries.’ (‘The Silent Opposition’, *New York Times*, 27th November 1995, quoted in

81 Michael A Sells *The Bridge Betrayed*.

82 Cf. Sells’ claim that the Stari Most is ‘a symbol of Bosnia’s role in bridging
cultures...its destruction is a symbolic separation of Croatia/Herceg-Bosna from “the
“Orient” of Serbs, Muslims, and Jews’ (Michael A Sells *The Bridge Betrayed*, p.113).

83 Remarks made by the chair of the presidency of Bosnia Herzegovina, Alija
Izetbegović, on the occasion of being awarded the 1996 International Democracy
Award by the Centre for Democracy, Washington (25th March 1997). *Bosnet-digest*
Vol.05 No.557, Monday 14 April 1997 (my emphasis).

84 For an exegesis of the manner in which ‘peacemaker and paramilitary’ can share
common assumptions, see Campbell, *National Deconstruction*, Chapter 5. Campbell
argues that a common ‘political anthropology’ underscored both diplomatic efforts to
resolve the conflict and nationalist paramilitary efforts to ethnically cleanse and
partition Bosnia.

85 John Yarwood, *Rebuilding Mostar: Reconstruction in a War Zone*, with
contributions by Andreas Seebacher, Niels Struße and Hedwig Wolfram, forward by
Sir Martin Garrod, TPR (*Town Planning Review*) Special Studies No.3, (Liverpool;


87 The notion of an ‘ethos of pluralism’ is William Connolly’s (William E Connolly,
*The Ethos of Pluralization* (Minneapolis,: university of Minnesota Press, 1995).
88 Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, p.79.

89 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The insufficiency of “values” and the necessity of “sense”’

90 Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’ in David Farrell Krell, ed., *Basic Writings*

91 Nancy, ‘The insufficiency of “values” and the necessity of “sense”’, p.128.
Notes to Chapter 3


5 See Chapter 2, Note 49.

6 Note that I have elsewhere indicated my discontent with the term ‘ethnic cleansing’. As Sells argues, this term is something of a euphemism for genocide (Michael A Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996)). It seems however, despite its euphemistic character, that ‘ethnic cleansing’ is the accepted term for the forced population displacements that occurred during the 1992-95 Bosnian War. On the logic of ethnic cleansing see David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp.99-114; and David Campbell,


11 Note that this does not compel return; it merely places a duty upon the authorities to provide assistance to those displaced persons who wish to return to their former places of residence.

12 International Crisis Group, House Burnings.

13 International Crisis Group, House Burnings. For further documentation of the manner in which minority returns have been prevented see the following International Crisis Group reports: The Konjic Conundrum: Why Minorities Have Failed To Return To Model Open City (June 19 1998, http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/bosnia/reports/bh35main.htm); and The Western Gate Of Central Bosnia: The Politics of Return in Bugojno and Prozor-Rama (July 31, 1998, http://www.crisisweb.org/
projects/bosnia/reports/bh36main.htm).

14 On the concatenation of ‘ethnic’ and ‘nationalist’ (to indicate the manner in which nationalism in Bosnia was predicated on an understanding of the national body as an ethnic body) see: Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia, revised edition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); and Campbell, National Deconstruction, pp.70-71.


16 Campbell, National Deconstruction, pp.80-81.


18 I should note that here I am arguing in fairly general terms. It is clear that intimidation and physical violence against the persons of returnees remains the principle obstacle to minority returns. I would not want, therefore, to suggest that if a house intended for a returnee is destroyed it is simply a matter of finding another one. Indeed the very fact that that house is destroyed may be enough to intimidate returnees and thus halt the minority return process. However, I do want to note that this destruction comprises more than the elimination of the residence of a given returnee. Those who understand house burning to comprise the destruction of the house of such and such a returnee (and, hence, to prevent the return of that specific returnee) miss the point since it is in principle possible for the returnee to be returned to any available property. Instead of seeing the destruction in the very narrow terms of a
given house being destroyed because it could potentially house a specific family, we should ask in generic terms 'why destroy the buildings?'. What is it that these buildings comprise that means they must be destroyed? Indeed, why is it that intimidation is not enough and destruction of the very urban fabric is necessary?

19 This is, of course, a well worn Derridean/Foucauldian groove. The strict enforcement of homogeneity (through destruction or regulation) is taken as confirmation of an irreducible heterogeneity. Moreover, insofar as there are any univocal meanings, or homogeneous entities, it is achieved through the exclusion of the difference that this irreducible heterogeneity necessarily introduces into all states of affairs. Whilst Derrida shows this exclusion at work primarily in the workings of the tradition of metaphysical ontology, Foucault is concerned to show the manner in which such heterogeneity is disciplined in order to produce homogeneous subjects and orders. See, for example, Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) and Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1977).


21 The idea that Heidegger 'proceeds to place by indirection' is Edward Casey's (Casey, The Fate of Place, p.243-244).


23 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p.143.
24 The retraction of section 70 is made in the essay ‘Time and Being’ (Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972)). See also Casey, The Fate of Place, p.256.

25 Casey, The Fate of Place, p.259. Note that though place is not identical to space, its conceptualisation relies upon a theorisation of spatiality. That is, for there to be places there must be spatiality.


31 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.67.


36 For example, Heidegger notes that Dasein's understanding of direction is derived from its orientation in the world: 'One must notice...that...directionality...is founded upon Being-in-the-world. Left and right are not something 'subjective' for which the subject has a feeling; they are directions of one's directedness into a world that is ready-to-hand already' (Being and Time, p. 143). The implication of this argument is that our conception of an objective world space navigable according to the points of the compass (north, south, east, west) is derived from our prior experience of directedness in the ready-to-hand world.

37 See, for example, Heidegger's discussion of the ready-to-handness of hammers in his analysis of the worldhood of the world (Being and Time, p. 98).

38 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 136.

39 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 141.

40 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 142.

41 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 136.

42 Casey, The Fate of Place, p. 258.

43 Casey, The Fate of Place, pp. 142-150.

44 This, it should be stressed, is not akin to the idea evoked by certain aestheticians that a town forms a whole in which different styles complement each other and thus form an aesthetically pleasing unit. At a more fundamental level the town is a whole (whether its styles complement each other, are notable, or even worth preserving, or not). By saying this I am noting that at a very basic level two things occur: 1.
Buildings refer to one another in relation to the task of urban living - I go here to do this and there to do that, this buildings is next to the one that I go into to do something else, and so on; 2. That it is the town that forms a horizon of intelligibility which orients all the places of our everyday life - it is in the context of the town (as a whole entity) that I can say such and such a place is beyond, behind, or in front of another.


47 Stuart Elden, ‘Rethinking the Polis: Implications of Heidegger’s Questioning the Political’, *Political Geography* Vol.19 (2000), p.415. Elden notes, for example, Heidegger’s ‘refusal to move to Berlin for a teaching post in the 1930s, and his eulogising of his Black Forest existence’ (p.415).


49 Maria Villela-Petit, ‘Heidegger’s conception of space’, p.147.

50 Maria Villela-Petit, ‘Heidegger’s conception of space’, p.147. We should note that in ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ Heidegger does note that his ‘reference to the Black Forest farm in no way means that we should or could go back to building such houses’ (Martin Heidegger, ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, p.362). Despite the disclaimer, however, the conclusions to which such a reference could point should not be forgotten, especially in light of Heidegger’s own involvement with National Socialism.


58 This understanding of the relationship between building and dwelling can be clearly seen in the way in which we speak of houses as dwellings. According to this understanding houses are built in order that we may dwell.


64 Heidegger, `Building Dwelling Thinking', p.349.
65 Heidegger, `Building Dwelling Thinking', p.349.
66 Heidegger, `Building Dwelling Thinking', p.349.
67 Stuart Elden, `Rethinking the Polis', p.412.
68 Heidegger, `Building Dwelling Thinking', p.350.
69 Heidegger, `Building Dwelling Thinking', p.351.
70 Heidegger, `Building Dwelling Thinking', p.351.
71 Heidegger, `Building Dwelling Thinking', p.351.
72 Heidegger, `Building Dwelling Thinking', p.351.
74 For example, in Being and Time, Heidegger speaks of the sun as a region. The sun is that which orients all the other places within Dasein’s world. The sun ‘has its own places - sunrise, midday, sunset, midnight’. And these places orient the possible places in Dasein’s world. For example, ‘the house has its sunny side and its shady side; the way it is divided up into rooms is oriented towards these...’ (Heidegger, Being and Time, p.137).
75 As I will note in chapter 5, communion with the divine need not take theistic forms. Many universalist political projects are predicated on the idea of communion, and the attendant overcoming of finitude. Totalitarianism is the name of just one.
76 Heidegger, `Building Dwelling Thinking', p.353.
77 Heidegger, ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, p.354, my emphasis.


81 This is the implication of Heidegger’s comments on p.140 of Being and Time, where he notes that although the spatiality of Dasein can be reduced to measurements, these distances cannot fully capture the spatial relations on which they are based.

82 See Ó Tuathail’s discussion of Cartesian perspectivalism, which documents the evolution within cartographic practice of a God’s eye view separate from the map from which the mapped territory can be surveyed (Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp.39-43).


84 Jacques Derrida, Spectres of Marx, p.64.

85 Elden, ‘Rethinking the Polis’, p.413.

86 Elden, ‘Rethinking the Polis’, p.413.
Notes to Chapter 4


2 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp.436. In the original, the final sentence of this quotation is written as follows: ‘Damit bezeichnen wir das Geschehen der Gemeinschaft, des Volkes’. The significance of Heidegger’s use of ‘*des Volkes*’ to denote the ‘people’ whose co-existence can be said to comprise ‘destiny’ will be discussed later in this chapter.

3 See my discussion of the inadequacy of either understanding of urban destruction in Chapter 2. For the relevant legal texts see, Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, *Documents on The Laws of War*, 3rd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Documents 15 (p.177), 21(pp.374-375), 24 (pp.449-450), and 29 (p.569) contain examples of the principal recognised war crimes/crimes against humanity applicable in cases concerning the destruction of urban environments. The following examples survey the main crimes recognised:

- The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, Article 6(b) includes ‘wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity’ in its list of war crimes.

- The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Article 1, (a) defines ‘cultural property’ as ‘movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people’ including ‘monuments of architecture’ whilst 1(b) extends protection to ‘buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit…movable cultural
property’ and 1(c) notes that ‘centres containing a large amount of cultural property’ will be protected as ‘centres containing monuments’. Article 4(1) calls on all parties to the convention to refrain from ‘use...which [is] likely to expose [cultural property] to destruction or damage’ and to refrain ‘from any act of hostility directed against such property’.

- The 1977 Geneva Protocol I, Article 51 prohibits ‘indiscriminate attacks’ defining these as ‘those not directed at a specific military target’ such as ‘attack by bombardment...which treats as a single military objective...a city town or village’. In addition, Article 53 protects ‘cultural objects and places of worship’.

- The Statute of The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Article 2(d) restates that ‘extensive destruction...of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out wantonly’ constitutes a ‘grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 1949’. Article 3 includes the following in its extensive list of ‘violations of the customs of war’; ‘3(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; [3](c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings; [3](d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion...[and] historic monuments’.


5 Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, pp. 263-264. The 7 assumptions summarised by Macpherson can be said to comprise the ontological
premises of liberal thought on which the idea of sharing as a distribution of goods among always already constituted sovereign and free political subjects is based.

6 For example, Rawls notes that ‘[t]he social system is to be designed so that the resulting distribution is just however things turn out.’ John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.243.

7 Hobbes’ hypothetical state of nature represents the classical formulation of the notion that sovereign free individual person/subjects necessarily co-exist in the same space and that this situation gives rise to competing claims. Indeed, the war of all against all stems from the manner in which political subjects must exercise their sovereignty and freedom in a situation of necessary co-existence. This will necessarily lead, according to the classical, Hobbesian formulation to competition amongst political subjects as each tries to exercise their sovereign freedom without respect for the constraints that co-existence places upon them. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

8 On this sublimation of the particular into the universal see Ernesto Laclau, ‘Universalism, Particularism and the Question of Identity’ in Ernesto Laclau, Emanciaption(s) (Oxford: Verso, 1996), pp.20-35.

9 In International Relations theory this notion of sharing is best seen in Andrew Linklater’s formulation of cosmopolitanism as a broadly Habermasian discourse ethics. According to Linklater, particular subjects, with their attendant (and specifically Habermasian) human interests, partake of a common discursive ethos. It is by partaking in this discursive ethos that the emancipation of particular subjects into a global cosmopolitan community (where diversity/particularity thrives) can occur.
Aufhebung in Linklater’s dialectic is found in the sublimation of particularity into the universal ideal speech community. In this sublimated state particular being is insofar as it partakes of the universal substance of discursivity. The key theme that identifies Linklater’s account as an essentially dialectical account of sharing is the stress on the contestation of exclusivity through partaking in a universal discursive ethos. This appeal for greater inclusivity (that is an admission, in principle, of all to the ideal speech community) comprises an argument for emancipation through partaking-of the universal substance (a cosmopolitan discursive ethos) from which the meaning of individual Being (as a diverse range of differences) is to be derived. See Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).


11 See Nancy, The Inoperative Community, p. 6; Heidegger, Being and Time, p.152.

12 I should note here that I concur with William Connolly in finding the notion of the individual slightly problematic in this context. In The Ethos of Pluralization, Connolly notes the he ‘prefer[s] the language of individuality to that of the individual because the [latter] suggests the uniform standard of the normal individual while the [former] suggests the value diversity across and within selves.’ (William E Connolly The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), p. 200 fn.3 - I have put the terms ‘latter’ and former’ in parentheses here since in the original they have been mistakenly reversed thus inverting Connolly’s intended meaning. Confirmation that this is indeed a mistaken reversal in the original has been provided in correspondence with the author (William E. Connolly, ‘Re: A Brief Question’, Email correspondance with author, 6th April 2001). I think that Connolly is right to retain the notion of individuality (as a concept of singular subjectivity) whilst noting that the individual is problematically associated with the Cartesian ego-cogito. Dasein retains a sense of individuality and yet, insofar as it is constituted as a Being-with-Others, is not an individual in the accepted, Cartesian sense of the term (See also William E Connolly, Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), Ch.3 (‘Liberalism and Difference’) pp. 64-94).

14 Nancy, The Inoperative Community, pp.3-7.


16 On Rawls' reformulation of his position (in Political Liberalism), and the manner in which his later work enables certain responses to critiques of his position in A Theory of Justice, see Stephen Mulhall & Adam Swift, Liberals And Communitarians, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp.167-246. For confirmation that Rawls' later position still holds that political subjects are first and foremost sovereign, free individuals see Richard Rorty's discussion of Rawls in 'The priority of democracy to philosophy' (in Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 175-196). Rorty tries to mitigate Rawls' retention of the sovereign individual by arguing that we should see this individual as merely our own historically situated idea of the democratic subject. In this sense Rorty is able to argue that Rawls has not argued that the sovereign individual is a transcendent ahistorical subject. However, this is a slightly disingenuous argument as Rawls goes on to argue that, since we accept the sovereign individual as the basis of our own historically specific notions of justice and democracy, it should be the minimal condition of possibility of any discussion of justice and democracy (i.e., that this - albeit historically specific - individual is the one found behind the veil of ignorance). This means that Rawls does, contrary to Rorty's protestation, have a political anthropology (albeit one that Rawls thinks is historically specific to our own modern era) on which notions of justice are predicated. The vision of anthropos that
Rawls has is, as I have said, that of the free, sovereign individual who precedes an empirical existence in the world with others.


19 Indeed the idea of persons being located (territorialised) in the unified bodies that they control can be read along Lacanian lines as the primary fantasy responsible for the initial formation of a sense of self. In the Lacanian account of the mirror phase - which marks the emergence of the infant into the imaginary order - the specular, or mirror, image of the body as total, unified and complete is the *gestalt* with which the infant (who lacks motor co-ordination and a unified sense of body or, indeed, self) identifies. As Grosz notes, in identifying with the *gestalt* seen in the mirror image, ‘[t]he child sees itself as a unified totality...The child's identification with its specular image impels it...to seek and anticipatory or desired (ideal or future) identity in the coherence of the totalised specular body.’ (Elizabeth Grosz, *Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction* (London: Routledge, 1990), p.39). It is this anticipation of, or desire for, an imaginary unity that liberal political theory satisfies by identifying the person with the *gestalt* of the human body. In this sense liberal political theory is firmly anchored on a misrecognition necessary if a unified self is to be constituted out of a dispersed, fragmentary, and diverse subject. Whilst the body may indeed have a vital place in political theory, I would contend that it is neither unified, nor the home (territory) of the person conceived of as the agent that comprises the sovereign, free
political subject of liberal political theory. In this regard see Judith Butler's *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”* (London: Routledge, 1993).

20 On the provisions for, and politics of, the return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons after the 1992-95 Bosnian war, see Chapter 3.


24 Of course my principle unstated objection here is the psychologism into which liberal theories are forced. To shown intent one must assume that the human person has executed a series of imagined thought patterns. The problem is that the sovereignty of the political subject gives him/her a logical inscrutability (for sovereign freedom to exist the rationality of the subject must be essentially inscrutable since otherwise the subject could become subject to - and thus not sovereign - another subject who could read their rationality). And hence any purported intent is only an *ex post facto* rationalisation (imagination) or narrativisation of *possible* thought processes exercised by the political subject. The most prevalent, and frankly the weakest, of such *ex post facto* narrativisations is that intent to perpetrate genocide derives from an evil within the political subject that causes him/her to exercise his/her capacity to choose in certain murderous ways.


26 Jean-Luc Nancy, 'The Insufficiency of 'Values' and the Necessity of 'Sense''

Cultural Values 1:1, p. 127.


28 Ansell-Pearson, 'Heidegger's Decline', p. 518

29 'Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself: its Being is in each case mine.'

Heidegger, Being and Time, p.150.


31 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 154.

32 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 149.

33 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 149.

34 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 152.

35 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 155.

36 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 154.

37 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 150.

38 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 150.

39 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 150.


49 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, pp.62-64.

50 Moreover, as Mulhall notes, the problem of other minds must beg the question it seeks to answer. That is, since an argument concerning other minds seeks to show that we are all the same and can know each other by analogy with knowing ourselves, it must assume at the very least that we are actually the same type of being (usually an abstract ‘I’). This presumption of the terms needing to be justified is deeply problematic if one is attempting, as Heidegger is, to discover the ontological structure of beings with the character of Dasein. See Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, p.64.


57 Pre-ontological knowledge represents an ‘implicit understanding of being as a matter of course’ that Dasein has in its everyday absorption with the world. The pre-ontological comprises the structures of Being-in-the-world of which Dasein has a pre-theoretical grasp, prior to any reflection upon them. Since Dasein’s absorption in equipmental wholes is pre-ontological, so must its relation to Others be. See King, *A Guide to Heidegger’s Being and Time*, p. 20.


59 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p.163.


65 Note in relation to this last example, Dreyfus points out that it is possible to open the door to cultural specificity through Heidegger’s account. Indeed Dreyfus argues that cultural specificity would consist in part of differences in the norms that set out the appropriate way to use things and the differences in the referential (equipmental) wholes that thus emerged (meaning also a difference in Dasein’s ‘world’). Or, as Dreyfus puts it, ‘[I]n the west one eats with a knife and fork; in the Far East one eats with chopsticks’. Sweeping as this generalisation might be, the point being made is worthy of consideration. See Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, p.153.

67 Note that neither Heidegger nor Dreyfus address the question of whether there are things for which it is not clear what one does with them, or whether there are periods of emergence in which what one does with a thing is contested.

68 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp.164-165. I will adhere to Heidegger’s practice of placing “they” between quotation marks. I will do this primarily for ease of reading, not to indicate that this term is in some sense to be held in suspension. The reader should however note that the quotation marks should indicate a special sense of “they” - that of the anyone of the injunction ‘one sits on a chair’.


70 cf., ‘It could be said that the “who” of everyday Dasein just is not the “I myself”.’ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 150.


73 Which is to say that individuality is both in relation to, and as a division from, otherness and, hence, is constitutively open to that alterity since this alterity is always already that in relation to, and against which, individuality can inscribe - or exscribe - itself. For an account of the importance of exscription - a writing outwards towards, or exposure to, alterity that properly reflects the sharing essential to Being - see Georges Van Den Abbeele, ‘Lost Horizons and Uncommon Grounds: For a Poetics of Finitude in the Work of Jean-Luc Nancy’, and Francis Fischer ‘Jean-Luc Nancy: The Place of a Thinking’ in Darren Sheppard, Simon Sparks & Colin Thomas, eds., *On Jean-Luc Nancy: the Sense of Philosophy*, (London: Routledge, 1997), p.15 & p.35 respectively.


Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, p. 69.


I do not want to discuss the concept of authenticity itself in this argument. I will therefore suspend intellectual judgement regarding its meaning and usefulness. The point of my present argument (namely that the ontic and ontological represent distinct fields of possibility and enquiry) is just as forceful if the concept of authenticity is held in suspension. Heidegger's deployment of the concept of authenticity is especially useful in making precisely this argument. I should make two points however: 1) as I will discuss, later in this chapter, Heidegger's thinking concerning community is necessary linked to his involvement with Nazi politics and the concept of authenticity is intimately connected to his alignment of community and the people (*das Volk*); 2) there is considerable writing concerning the concept of authenticity in Heidegger's work - see, for example, Theodore Adorno, *The Jargon of Authenticity* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973).

Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, p. 72.

Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, p. 72.

Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, p. 73.

Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, p. 74.

Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, p. 74.

Heidegger, *Being and Time*, ¶ 74, pp. 434-439. With regard to the later work, at this point I will be specifically interested in the infamous *Rectoral Address* (Martin


89 Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, p.178.


93 The one question that seems to be the most consistently debated is that of the extent of Heidegger’s anti-Semitism. See, for example: Sheehan ‘Heidegger and the Nazi’s’, p. 41; and Heidegger, ‘“Only A God Can Save Us”: Der Spiegel’s Interview with Martin Heidegger’, in Wolin., ed., The Heidegger Controversy, p.97-100.


95 Heidegger, ‘The Self-Assertion of the German University’, p.35.


97 On the notion of the contingency of the historico-political juncture that Heidegger found himself in, see his comments on ‘general confusion’ in Germany in 1933: Heidegger, ‘“Only A God Can Save Us”’, p.94.

98 For a discussion of the case of the Ferhadija see the Introduction. As I will discuss in Chapter 6, this covering over has persisted after the cessation of the Bosnian war. Bosnian Serb authorities have consistently refused to issue permits to rebuild this mosque and obstructed attempts to lay foundation tones. See: Branko Peric, ‘Rebuilding Ferhadija’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkans Crisis Report Issue 84, 15th October 1999 (http://www.iwpr.net/balkans/news/bcr151099_5_eng.htm); and ‘Serbs halt Bosnia
mosque building’, BBC News Online, 7th May 2001


99 It might be instructive to read this last comment in light of Russian efforts to level the Chechen capital Grozny. I will discuss the manner in which the assault on Grozny comprised an extreme instance of urbicide in Chapter 6.


101 Campbell, National Deconstruction, p.226.

102 Connolly quoted in Campbell, National Deconstruction, p.205. ‘Différerance’ is a term used by Derrida to refer to the constitutive role of alterity in identity (Being). ‘Différerance as set forth by Derrida...[describes] the relation between self and other - which is not parallel with the relation organism/outer world - as an indissociable synthesis, a structure which is not that of a unity or self-identity but which includes as part of [an] “identity” its own otherness from itself or inability to fill with its own substance all the space of its “being”.’ (Henry Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), p. 154).
Notes to Chapter 5


4 Cf. ‘I use the term ‘the political’ here to translate the Greek ‘ta politika’ and indicate the essence of things political’ (Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p.17).


7 I use the term ‘existential characteristics’ (which I take to also refer to a ‘fundamental logic’ in the sense in which ‘logic’ was defined in Chapter 2) in rough correspondence with Heidegger’s use of the term ‘existential’. Heidegger uses this term to refer to the ‘ontological structure of existence’ that is the condition of possibility of ontic existence. As Boedeker puts it, ‘existentials’ are the ‘essential structures of Dasein’s being.’ See: Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p.33; and Edgar Boedeker, ‘Individual and Community in Early Heidegger: Situating das Man, the


10 Heidegger, Being and Time, p.67. Earlier in ¶9 Heidegger places essence in quotation marks. In the Letter on Humanism he explains this as follows: ‘[t]his indicates that “essence” is now being defined from neither the esse essentiae nor esse existentiae [of traditional metaphysical thought] but rather from the...character of Dasein.’ (Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, p.231).


12 For a discussion of the notion of ‘logic(s)’ in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of ‘the concept’ see Chapter 2.


15 I am drawing here on Ernesto Laclau’s notion of ‘dislocation’. Laclau notes that ‘identity...is merely relational and would therefore not be what it is outside the relationship with the force antagonising it, the latter is also part of the conditions of existence of that identity’. If, following Saussure, identity is defined only in relation to what it is not, the other that an identity is not is both constitutive of, and antagonistic
towards, that identity. That is, the other that an identity is not is both a condition of possibility of that identity and, precisely because it must remain what that identity is not, simultaneously the other that must be excluded if that identity is to achieve presence. The concept of ‘dislocation’ points to this contradictory logic at the heart of identity; ‘every identity is dislocated insofar as it depends on an outside which both denies that identity and provides its condition of possibility [relational definition] at the same time.’ See Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time* (London: Verso, 1990). p.21 & 39, respectively.

16 On the notion of ‘ethno-nationalism’ see Chapter 3, Note 14. As I note in Chapter 3 the linkage of ethnic and nationalist is intended to highlight the manner in which the national body in Bosnia was conceived of as an ethnic body. See also: Bogdan Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*, revised edition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); and Campbell, *National Deconstruction*, pp.70-71.


18 For an excellent discussion of the manner in which historiographical mythologies were deployed to legitimise Croat ethno-nationalism, see: Ivo Goldstein, ‘The Use of History: Croatian Historiography and Politics’, *Helsinki Monitor*, Special Issue (1994), pp.85-97.

19 In this sense ethno-nationalism is an ontopology: it is a constitution of an ethnic body that derives its presence from a claim to a territory. Historiographical myths
serve to legitimise claims to territory. On the notion of ‘ontopology’ see my discussion in Chapter 3.


24 See my discussion in Chapter 4 of the Lacanian account of the formation of the self in the mirror phase.

25 For an example of the dawning awareness of multiculturalism that poses heterogeneity as a distinctly contemporary problem, see Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). In contradistinction to such an understanding - of multiculturalism as the modern emergence of an empirical constraint upon sovereign individuality - see Connolly, *Identity\Difference*, pp.64-94.

26 The accords negotiated at Wright-Patterson Airforce Base in Dayton, Ohio brought a close to the 1992-95 Bosnian war and are known as the General Framework


29 It might be objected that the Office of The High Representative (OHR) - the United Nations’ appointed administrator of Bosnia - has spoken out against such division. The OHR has recently attacked those who actively encourage the stalling of the program of returns or the re-building of mosques (Press Conference of the High Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, Sarajevo, 11th May 2001’ [http://www.ohr.int/press/p20010511a.htm]). Indeed after the 1997 Peace Implementation Council the OHR implemented a number of measure which effectively rejected the anthropocentric politics of self-determination. The OHR thus implemented the design of a common flag, a common currency, and common (non-territorially designated) car license plates (David Campbell, ‘Apartheid Cartography:
the Political and Spatial Effects of International Diplomacy in Bosnia', *Political Geography*, Vol. 18 (1999), p.427). These measures actively contest the de facto partition of Bosnia by the Dayton accords. In this respect such measures might be taken as an acknowledgement of the constitutive heterogeneity of Bosnia. that is, insofar as the OHR’s action comprises a recognition for the need for policies of inclusion, it is a recognition that agonism transcends partition. It is interesting to note the tenacity of the anthropocentric imaginary in so-called ‘left’ critiques of such actions by the OHR David Chandler, for example, sees the OHR’s actions as the imposition of a ‘fake’ democracy upon Bosnia (David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton* (London: Pluto, 1999)). In this sense Chandler reasserts the notion that heterogeneity is an empirical contingency that must be negotiated if we are to give the essentially sovereign individuality of political subjects its due.

30 After riots had halted ceremonies to lay foundation stones that marked the commencement of mosque rebuilding programs in Trebinje and Banja Luka in early May 2001, Yugoslav president Kostunica remarked that he was ‘very concerned and unhappy because of the incident[s] of violence and religious intolerance’ but that some churches and mosques should not be rebuilt because they ‘might provoke these incidents.’ These remarks were later revised in a statement by the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, although the sentiment remained. See Reuters report ‘Kostunica Sees Danger in Restoring Bosnian Mosques’ (9 May 2001) in *JUSTWATCH-L Digest - 15 May 2001 to 16 May 2001 (#2001-144). JUSTWATCH-L archives can be found at http://listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu/archives/justwatch-l.html.

32 Lacoue-Labarthe asserts that Heidegger devoted 'more that four years of his teaching between 1936 and 1941 to “delimiting” Nietzsche’s metaphysics and openly contesting its “diversion” into biologism and the use that is made of it by the official racist ideology' (Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics*, p. 134). Moreover, in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger draws a distinction between ‘'[t]he works that are being peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism...[and] the inner truth and greatness of this movement' (Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 199). It is possible, argues Pattison (following Rockmore) that this distinction also denotes Heidegger’s repudiation of the racialised (anti-Semitic) elements of Nazism. That this is the case is, however, far from clear. Moreover, though this would constitute a rejection of the scientific racism and ethno-nationalism that drove Nazism in Germany, Heidegger nevertheless affirms the principles on which he takes National Socialism to be based (see, Pattison, *The Later Heidegger*, p. 37).

33 See Heidegger’s refutation of accusations of anti-Semitism, his purported resistance to book burning and his allegation that his opposition to the Nazis was such that he was both watched over and victimised by the regime in Martin Heidegger, ““Only A God Can Save Us”: *Der Spiegel’s* Interview with Martin Heidegger”, in Wolin., ed.,
The Heidegger Controversy, p.97-103. Heidegger's comments in the Der Spiegel interview are contested by, amongst others Farias and Sheehan (see: Victor Farias, Heidegger and Nazism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); and Thomas Sheehan 'Heidegger and the Nazis' New York Review of Books (June 16th 1988), pp.38-47). At best Heidegger's purported resistance of elements of Nazism are a piecemeal rejection of those things that he took to be less than ideal in the implementation of National Socialist ideals. At worst they are a post hoc revision of his actions in the period 1933-1945.

34 This, I take it, is the point of Farias' book (Farias, Heidegger and Nazism).


37 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.199.

38 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p.199.

39 See Derrida's comments on the 'moment of decision' in Force of Law (Jacques Derrida, 'Force of Law: the "Mystical Foundation of Authority"', in Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfeld & David Gray Carlson, eds., Deconstruction and the Possibility of

40 See Lacoue-Labarthe, ‘Transcendence Ends in Politics’ in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998). I take it that insofar as Lacoue-Labarthe asks ‘what was it in Heidegger’s thought that...did not forbid...this political commitment’ [my emphasis] he is arguing that the alignment of Heidegger’s thought and the Rectorship is a possible but not necessary one. In this regard Lacoue-Labarthe sees Heidegger’s articulation of the Führung with the question of the German University as the moment in which ‘[Heidegger’s] philosophical text and the [Heideggerian] political text communicate’. Lacoue-Labarthe characterises this ‘communication’ in a manner similar to the Derridean ‘coup de force’, the moment of the decision in an undecidable terrain. That is, Lacoue-Labarthe suggests that the relationship between Heidegger’s philosophical and political texts is undecidable but that the articulation of the one with the other in the Rectoral Address is the decision that, by a coup de force, institutes a determinate relationship between these texts. This is not to say that undecidability is eliminated, nor that Heidegger’s decision cannot be contested.


42 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, p. 93-95.

43 It is important to note in what follows that Nancy (and his translators) follow a different convention to that of Heidegger (and his translators) with regard to the word
‘being’. To this point in the argument I have followed a convention of capitalising ‘Being’. In what follows it will be necessary to mix this convention with that of Nancy’s (where ‘being’ is not capitalised). This has the potential for confusion.

However, despite the orthographic mixture, one should still read the same conceptual questions in both ‘Being’ and ‘being’. The capitalisation is, therefore, something of a rhetorical excess (though not one without purpose). As Pattison notes:

The advantage of giving the lower-case ‘being’ is that it brings out the verbal aspect of the term and avoids misreading it as a hypo-statised metaphysical concept. On the other hand, this could on occasion lead to it being read simply as a present participle and not as a distinctive philosophical term...[we should note that] the German [Sein] is a nominalisation of the infinitive, not the present participle.

It is important, therefore, to note in what follows that the lack of capitalisation does not indicate a conceptual difference between the two understandings of ‘b/Being’.

Rather we should ‘remember to hear to German “Sein”’ in both ‘being’ and ‘Being’.


45 With regards to Levinas’ thought on first philosophy see Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Ethics as First Philosophy’ in Sean Hand, ed., The Levinas Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp.75-87. Nancy seems to take issue with Levinasian first philosophy insofar as he argues that accounts of heterogeneity that locate alterity in
the figure of the ‘capitalised Other’ (attributed to Lacan, but ascribable to Levinas) avoid responding to the Mitseinsfrage insofar as they divide Being from its Others - thus giving Being presence and a certain degree of privilege and autonomy over alterity (see, Nancy, Being Singular Plural, p.11).

46 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, p.22.


50 Or which, in Nietzsche’s understanding, ‘never happened without blood, torments, and sacrifices’ (Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, p.41).

51 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, trans. Lisa Garbus, Peter Connor, Michael Holland, Simona Sawhney (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p.xxxvii. On the western philosophical tradition (from Aristotle to Hegel) and the manner in which its interpretation of the question of being (as a matter of the essence of beings) sets the scene for Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian thought see

52 In relation to the former notion that community is a partaking in a universal substance see Ernesto Laclau’s comment that ‘the privileged agent of History [was] the agent whose particular body was the expression of a universality transcending it’ (Ernesto Laclau, ‘Universalism, Particularism and the Question of Identity’ in Ernesto Laclau, *Emancipation(s)* (Oxford: Verso, 1996), p.23, italics in original). In relation to the latter idea that community is an aggregation of entities that are substantially the same see, for example, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states: ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’ (see http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html).

53 Rawls’ early position, pre- *Political Liberalism*, is characteristic of this understanding (see John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, revised ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)).


55 The use of the term ‘banal’ here resonates of course, with Hannah Arendt’s reports from, and reflections upon, the trail of Adolf Eichmann. Arendt notes that the problem posed by the bureaucrat Eichmann is precisely how he could suspend all judgement regarding the question of community and serve as the technical instrument of the perfection of the supposed essence of being on which the Nazi ‘community’ was predicated. Eichmann’s Nazism is exemplary of the bureaucracy of which I am
speaking - it is an unquestioning technical management of the empirical contingencies (particularly the so-called ‘Jewish question’) that were taken to constrain the realisation of the homogenous (racially pure) Nazi state founded upon the purported Aryan/German essence of being. See Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (London: Penguin, 1994).

56 I have taken the term ‘figuration’ from various points in the work of both Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. It is given partial exegesis by Simon Sparks in his ‘Introduction’ to Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, *Retreating the Political*, edited by Simon Sparks (London: Routledge, 1997), and is elaborated in Nancy’s essay ‘Myth Interrupted’, Chapter 2 of Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*.

57 Presence here is intended to invoke all the various strands of thought concerning being that could be said to be implicated in what Derrida has called the metaphysics of presence. ‘Presence’ could be said to be a regime of representation of being as if it were immune to the effects of difference and contingency.

58 Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, p.3.

59 See Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, p.4.

60 Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, p.4.

61 It is precisely this point that Todd May fails to recognise when he notes that whilst it seems that enclosure is impossible might it not be the case that ‘individuals, while communicating, do so only for strategic reasons, and thus retain a strong form of “personal self-enclosure” while doing so?’ The retention of an individualist mode of thought in this statement is I believe indicative of the manner in which May fundamentally and consistently misreads Nancy’s *Inoperative Community*. See Todd 425

Nancy discusses myth as a figuration in "Myth Interrupted", Chapter 2 of Nancy, The Inoperative Community.

It is worth noting the manner in which throughout his work Nancy, like Claude Lefort, is keen to distinguish the conceptual vocabulary of the political from actually existing political structures. Thus for Nancy communism is not to be confused with actually existing socialisms, just as democracy should not be taken to be congruent with extant liberal democratic polities. Similarly totalitarianism should not be taken to be co-incident with Nazism, Stalinism or Fascism. The relation between actually existing socialisms, democracies and totalitarianisms and the conceptual vocabulary of the political (the proper names which refer to, but are not coincident with, these regimes) is complex. It is the case that, for example, western democratic polities do share some features to which the concept of democracy refers. However, it is not the case that these extant social arrangements are merely poor implementations or pale imitations of the concepts with which they have a lexicographical affinity. As Nancy writes elsewhere the proper name is a site in which there is always a surplus of meaning, no extant regime can ever be coincident with, the proper name (see Nancy 'Eulogy for the Mêlée' in Being Singular Plural, p.146). In this sense actually existing totalitarianisms do share some features captured in Nancy's description of immanentism as totalitarianism. And yet Nancy's deployment of totalitarianism as a proper name is a wider elaboration of the conceptual conditions of the closure of the
political that is proper to totalitarianism. In this sense it is possible to see extant
democracies as totalitarian in Nancy’s sense.

64 Here I am explicitly echoing certain aspects of Heidegger’s thesis concerning
technology. For a thought provoking set of essays discussing the general sense of
exhaustion that accompanies the end of politics implied in the technicisation of Being
see David Campbell and Michael Dillon, eds., *The Political Subject of Violence*
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993).

65 See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Hamish

66 For an understanding of the ‘inoperative’ community as a ‘community at/of loose
ends’ see the collection of essays in The Miami Theory Collective, ed., *Community At

67 I take the notion of an ‘other’ understanding of community from Jean Luc Nancy
and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s invocation of a ‘wholly other politics’. Lacoue-
Labarthe & Nancy, *Retreating the Political*, p.xix. Note that in this case Nancy and
Lacoue-Labarthe are quoted by Sparks in his introduction, the original citation is Jean-


70 Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*, p.9. Note that ‘reticulation’ refers to ‘a division into
a network or into small [spaces] with intersecting lines’, *The Oxford Paperback
71 Cf. ‘It can no longer be a matter of treating sociability as a regrettable and inevitable accident, as a constraint that has to be managed in some way or another. Community is bare, but it is imperative.’ Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*, pp.35-36.

72 Foucault, ‘Afterword: The Subject and Power’, p.221.


74 Cf., ‘what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action...[whereas, on the other hand, a] relationship of violence acts upon a body or things’. Foucault, ‘Afterword: The Subject and Power’, p.220.


76 Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, p.xxxvii.

77 This is what calls for genealogy: a history of the provocations of government and the manner in which the alterity found in these provocations was either drawn into, or expelled from, the *socius*. This I take it is what Foucault means by the ‘*insurrection of subjugated knowledges*’ that genealogy traces. See Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’ in Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, ed., Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p.81 [emphasis in original].

78 It is in this sense that I would read Ernesto Laclau’s notion of antagonism as the realisation of a state of domination. For Laclau antagonism is the realisation of
hegemony by the aggregation of a series of competing claims into a single confrontation. Insofar as hegemony is achieved, power is negated and a state of domination is instituted. However, given the constitutive dislocation of the elements from which hegemony is composed, it is never entirely realised. This constitutive incompleteness echoes with my claim that the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity are perpetually unworked by the heterogeneity/agonism that is constitutive of existence. See Laclau, *New Reflections*, pp.33-36.

79 I am, of course, referring here to the zone or separation established either side of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line which separates the Muslim-Croat Federation from Republika Srpska.

80 Cf., ‘For Aristotle to be in a place [and, by extension in a space] is very much like being in a vessel…’. Edward Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p.54.


Notes to Chapter 6


4 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, p.23 (emphasis in original).

5 This list is not, as I noted, exhaustive. Nor is the violence wrought upon the city by ‘an appeal to the origin’ of community a modern phenomenon. Musabegoviq suggests that we should see both God’s destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah and the Roman sacking of Carthage as instances of this violent conflict between the ‘appeal to origin’ and the agonism inherent to urbanity (Musabegoviq, ‘The Death of Vukovar’, pp.48-49). Whilst modern warfare aids the destruction of the city, it comprises a mere refinement (albeit an important one) of the tools at the disposal of those who would subject urbanity to figuration. Moreover, although the ravages of war make the destruction of urbanity particularly visible, this conflict between philosophy and the city also lies at the heart of essentially logocentric attempts to shape urbanity by planning and zoning (cf., Ghassan Hage, ‘The spatial imaginary of national practices:

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9 See, for example: Machiavelli, *The Prince*; Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, edited by Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, trans. G.D.H. Cole, revised by J.H. Brumfit & John C. Hall, updated by P.D. Jimack (London: Everyman, 1993). In regard to the liberal tradition it would be pertinent to note that liberal political theory approaches the same question as Plato did in *The Republic*: namely, by what principles should we be ruled? This is an explicit appeal to an origin: namely that principle which serves as the foundation for legislative proclamation. In this regard Rawls is exemplary, though not alone (see, John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, revised ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)). For liberals this origin is usually an assertion of an essentially sovereign individuality (what Taylor calls 'a direction in being') on which principles of justice, equality and freedom can be founded (Taylor quoted in William E Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), p.89). Critics of such an appeal to an origin argue that it is incapable of comprehending a fundamental heterogeneity and, hence, will always cover it over in the same manner that Nancy argues philosophy covers over the proper
character of the city (See Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, Ch.3 (‘Liberalism and Difference’) pp. 64-94).


12 Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, pp. 1-9


14 This is, of course, a variation on Dunn’s observation that ‘we are all democrats today’: John Dunn quoted in R.B.J. Walker *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.141.


16 I will discuss both rebuilding and minority returns later in this chapter. For a discussion of minority returns in relation to the persistence of alterity in post-Dayton Bosnia see Chapter 5.


19 For example, Azra Begic finds only one instance in which Bosniac forces destroyed cultural heritage and notes that these forces were, contrary to Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces, instructed not to engage in such destruction. See: Azra Begic, ‘The Fate of Moveable Heritage in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia: An Insider’s Observations’, trans. Marian Wenzel, *Museum Management and Curatorship*, Vol.14 (March 1995), pp.80-83.

20 *Agence France Presse*, ‘Bosnia’s mosques still pay price of war’, *Central Europe Online*, 1st August 2000 (archives containing this report can be found at http://www.centraleurope.com).


22 Peric, ‘Rebuilding Ferhadija’.

23 Although this is not explicitly stated in the General Framework Agreement (GFA) certain provisions could be interpreted to provide the United Nations’ High Representative with powers to foster heterogeneity. It could, of course, be argued that these are not powers to foster tolerance and diversity but, rather, the imposition of a model of liberal democracy upon Bosnia without regard for whether this actually instils a new heterogeneity into the Bosnian polity (cf. David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton* (London: Pluto Press, 1999)). In response to such a cynical assessment it might be worth drawing attention to two provisions of the GFA - Annexes 6 and 7 - which establish conditions (however minimal) for the contestation of ethno-nationalism. Annexe 6 of the GFA establishes protection for human rights and Annexe 7 provides for the return of displaced persons to their former place of
residence. These provisions suggest that the international community at least intended the GFA to serve as a tool for contesting ethno-nationalist antagonisms (which comprise both a denial of human rights and a prevention of return). It is in this sense that it is possible for the GFA to promote heterogeneity. The text of the GFA can be found at http://www.ohr.int/gfa/gfa-home.htm.

24 See, for example, the work of the Reconstruction and Return Task Force (RRTF) established under the auspices of the Office of The High Representative (OHR) to co-ordinate international support for the process of returning displaced persons (details of the work of the RRTF can be found at http://www.ohr.int/rrtf.htm).

25 This logic can be seen in the comments of United Nations’ High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch regarding the riots that halted the ceremony to lay the foundation stone of the Ferhadija in May 2001. Petritsch noted that the riots in Banja Luka were ‘the last attempts of unreformed hard liners, ultra-nationalists and extremists to stem the wave and tide of normalisation and maintain their dream of [a] mono-ethnic, chauvinist, criminal environment in which they thrive by nature.’ Moreover, he demanded that Bosnian Serb authorities ‘initiate a...programme [of] democratisation, reconciliation, education of the... public and particularly of the youth’. These remarks suggest that Petritsch regarded the rebuilding of mosques as an indicator of progress and was concerned by the way in which a failure to lay foundation stones marked a stalling in that progress. (see: ‘Press Conference of the High Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, Sarajevo, 11th May 2001’ [http://www.ohr.int/press/p20010511a.htm]).

26 Peric, ‘Rebuilding Ferhadija’.


‘Serbs scuttle Bosnia mosque-building ceremony’, *Reuters*, 5th May 2001 (JUSTWATCH-L Digest - 4 May 2001 to 5 May 2001 (#2001-133), JUSTWATCH-L archives can be found at http://listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu/archives/justwatch-l.html);


JUSTWATCH-L archives can be found at http://listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu/archives/justwatch-l.html.


33 David Campbell illustrates this logic of ethno-nationalism well in his argument that non-nationalist (civic) alternatives to ethno-nationalism existed in Bosnia but were ignored as avenues for conflict resolution due to the figuration of the war as an ‘ethnic’ conflict. See David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp.236-240.

34 In relation to the centrality of myth to ethno-nationalist figures, see my discussion of the Republic of Croatia’s 1990 Constitution in Chapter 5.

35 Indeed, the minaret of the Ferhadija was still standing after the explosion that destroyed the building. Serb authorities then destroyed the minaret and removed the rubble on the bureaucratic grounds of the building being ‘unsafe’. See: Frank Westermann, *De Brug over de Tara* (Amsterdam: Uitgevrij Atlas, 1994), pp.7-13 (Andras Riedlmayer’s translation of Westermann’s account of rebuilding in Banja Luka can be found at http://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/banjaluka/banjaluka.html).

36 See Andras Riedlmayer ‘Comment’, posting to JUSTWATCH discussion list (JUSTWATCH-L Digest - 5 May 2001 to 6 May 2001 (#2001-134); JUSTWATCH-L archives can be found at http://listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu/archives/justwatch-l.html). Riedlmayer’s comment concerns the BBC story concerning the obstruction of the 5th May 2001 ceremony to lay a mosque foundation stone in Trebinje (‘Serbs block Bosnia mosque ceremony’, *BBC News Online*, 6th May 2001 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1315000/1315262.stm)).
BBC story is accompanied by a photograph ‘which shows a group of remarkably cheerful young people gathered in preparation for the attack on the mosque-rebuilding ceremony...The young people are holding a Serbian flag emblazoned with a large cross [and the slogan]... “Srbija do Tokija” (‘Serbia as far as Tokyo’). Riedlmayer notes that although this slogan may be absurd it ‘carries an implied threat - that everything and everyone that may be an obstacle to such a Greater Serbia will be destroyed.’ In this sense Riedlmayer captures well the homogenisation that lies at the heart of the ethno-nationalist figuration.

37 Or, as Nancy puts it, ‘[T]here is no “self” except by virtue of a “with”’ (Nancy, Being Singular Plural, p.94).


39 Andras Riedlmayer, ‘Re: A Question Concerning Reconstruction’.

40 Andras Riedlmayer, ‘Re: A Question Concerning Reconstruction’. In relation to the case of Banja Luka see Frank Westermann, De Brug over de Tara, pp.7-13 (Riedlmayer’s translation of Westermann’s account of rebuilding in Banja Luka can be found at http://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/banjaluka/banjaluka.html). For an account of the erection of a new Orthodox as a consolidation of the ethnic cleansing of Zvornik, see Roger Cohen, ‘In a town Cleansed of Muslims, Serb church will crown the deed’, New York Times, 7th March 1994, p.1. For claims that Orthodox churches have been built on the foundations of mosques in Divic, Konjevic Polje and Nova Kasaba, see ‘Usurpation of Land’, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina Faxletter No.76, 1st December 1999 (http://www.bhhchr.org/faxlett/1998/no.76.htm).


Wigley notes that the 'stability [of such architecture] is but an effect of...repression' (Wigley, *The Architecture of Deconstruction*, p.55). Figured communion-communities effect an arrest of the trembling of buildings by repressing the multiple possible networks that they intimate.


Naegele, 'Yugoslavia: Saudi Wahhabi Aid Workers Bulldoze Balkan Monuments'.

Naegele, 'Yugoslavia: Saudi Wahhabi Aid Workers Bulldoze Balkan Monuments'; de Roux, 'Benefactors threaten Kosovo's heritage'.
Naegele, notes that '[t]he new mosques are white, boxy structures devoid of detail - a far cry from the centuries-old Ottoman-style mosques that characterize the urban and village landscape in much of the Balkans' (Naegele, 'Yugoslavia: Saudi Wahhabi Aid Workers Bulldoze Balkan Monuments').


Refugees are defined as '[p]ersons originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina, currently hosted in third countries, with refugee status as defined by international law'. Displaced Persons are defined as '[p]ersons having left their place of origin as a result of war or persecutions and currently accommodated in Bosnia and Herzegovina' (Office of the High Representative Reconstruction and Return Task Force, 'RRTF Report March 1998: An Action Plan in Support of the return of refugees and displaced persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina', Annex 1 - Definitions, March 1998 [http://www.ohr.int/rrtf/r9803-a1.htm]).


For example, on 4th April 2001 school in Crni Lug was destroyed by explosives. The school, rebuilt by the Norwegian Refugee Council was to be used to house returning Bosnian Serb families whilst they waited for their homes to be reconstructed. The municipality is predominantly Bosnian Croat. See: 'School in Crni

54 For an example of the manner in which the resolution of legal question is necessary for the returns process see: Human Rights Watch, Bosnia and Herzegovina Unfinished Business: The Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons to Bijeljina, Report D1207, May 2000 (http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/bosnia/).


56 In Foca, for example, the Municipal Authorities claimed they could not allow the return of Bosnian Muslims because they could not find alternative accommodation for the Bosnian Serb war veterans living in the returnees homes (See, ‘Foca Mayor on the Return Process’, Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 18th June 2001 [posted on International Justice Watch Discussion List (JUSTWATCH), 19th June 2001: JUSTWATCH archives can be found at http://listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu/archives/justwatch-l.html]).


60 ‘Kostunica Sees Danger in Restoring Bosnian Mosques’.


62 In this regard it is important to note that the EUAM gave the task of reconstruction to an engineer/town planner, John Yarwood. The department of reconstruction was autonomous and given freedom from parallel departments dealing with the political questions raised by post-war Mostar. Reconstruction was thus seen as a ‘tool to support political goals’, an ancillary element of a project to establish new structures of governance in Mostar (John Yarwood, *Rebuilding Mostar: Reconstruction in a War Zone*, with contributions by Andreas Seebacher, Niels Strufe and Hedwig Wolfram, forward by Sir Martin Garrod, TPR (*Town Planning Review*) Special Studies No.3, (Liverpool; Liverpool University Press, 1999), p.25).

63 See, for example, Yarwood’s diagram of the technical schema for determining extent of destruction and, hence, allocation of resources. Interesting in this regard also are Yarwood’s accounts of the procedures formalised to provide reconstruction aid.
See: Yarwood, *Rebuilding Mostar: Reconstruction in a War Zone*, p.114 & 36-51, respectively.

64 *Memorandum of Understanding on the European Administration of Mostar*, 6th July 1994 (http://law.gonzaga.edu/library/ceedocs/bosnia/mostar94.htm). The former Mayor of Bremen, Hans Koschnick, was appointed as the first European Union Administrator of Mostar.

65 I use ‘Bosniac’ here in the sense intended by Sells: ‘all residents of the internationally recognized sovereign nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of their religious affiliation, who consider themselves Bosnian, that is, who remain loyal to a Bosnian state built on the principles of civic society and religious pluralism’ (Michael A Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p.xiv). Sells’ definition captures the sense in which Bosnian Croat ethno-nationalism excluded all forms of life not considered Croat (the majority of whom were so-called ‘Bosnian Muslims’).


68 In this sense the plan for the central zone prefigured the arbitration decision regarding the town of Brcko which, after the 5th March 1999 ruling of the Brcko Arbitration Tribunal, became ‘Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina’. Brcko is thus ‘held in “condominium” by both the Serb entity and the Croat-Muslim federation simultaneously’ and governed by the ‘District government, subject to coordination with the two entity governments’. In this way Brcko is not held as part of an ethno-nationalist territory. See: Agence France Presse, ‘The Ruling On The Brcko
“Condominium”, *Central Europe Online*, 20th February 2000


70 It should be noted that plans are currently being developed for another central zone project. This project focuses on a similar, though reduced area, to Koschnick’s plan. See Manfredo Romeo, Bernardo Rossi & Carlo Blasi, *Mostar Hypertext v5.0/99* (Firenze: General Engineering, 1999). Details of this work are available online at http://utenti.tripod.it/mostar/.

71 Charles Recknagel, ‘Koschnick’s resignation is a Measure of Mostar’s Problems’, *RFE/RL Online*, 28th February 1996


72 On the return of freedom of movement in Mostar see: Kirsten Young, ‘Going home may be hazardous to your health’, *Refugees Magazine*, Issue 114 (1999) (http://www.unhcr.ch/pubs/rim114/rim11405.htm). On the maintenance of the ethno-nationalist status quo see: International Crisis Group, *Reunifying Mostar*. It should be noted that the functions of the EUAM were transferred to the OHR in 1997. Recently the OHR has taken a more proactive stance against ethno-nationalism, and Bosnian Croat nationalists in particular.

73 The figures quoted by Yarwood are instructive in this regard (Yarwood, *Rebuilding Mostar: Reconstruction in a War Zone*, pp.5-6).
Yarwood observes that 'The EU stressed investment in physical objects but was less concerned with repairing the process of urban management' (Yarwood, *Rebuilding Mostar: Reconstruction in a War Zone*, p.30).


Plunz et al, eds., *New Urbanisms*, p.43.


Indeed, the fear was expressed that '[i]f it [the Old bridge] is rebuilt soon, the international community will walk away saying Mostar's OK, that's the problem solved' (Traynor, 'Ottoman treasure splits Turks and EU').

See 'Membrane competition winner helps to heal Yugoslav war scars', *Architectural Record*, February 1997. Details of the membrane competition can be found at http://www.taiyokogyo.co.jp/compe/96/e_96.html.

Carlotta Gall, 'Albanians Rally to Oust Serbs From a City in Kosovo', *New York Times Online*, 22nd February 2000

There are many ironies to NATO’s preservation of the ethno-nationalist status quo in Mitrovica of which two are particularly worthy of mention:

First; in 1999 Martin Garrod became the international administrator of Mitrovica. As EU administrator of Mostar, Garrod had vowed to ‘unify the city’. Earlier in 1999 he resigned from this post admitting defeat (Lucy Fisher et al, ‘Bridge of sighs’).

Second; Kosovan Serb nationalists have guarded the northern end of the bridge over the Ibar, preventing Kosovan Albanians from returning. These nationalists have styled themselves as ‘bridge keepers’. Ironically ‘bridge keepers’ translates as mostari in Serbo-Croat. It is the term ‘mostari’ that is credited as giving the town of Mostar its name insofar as the first citizens of the town were the keepers of the bridge over the Neretva, housed in the garrisons on either end of the Old Bridge (see: Tim Judah, ‘Dividing Kosovo Won’t Bring Peace’, New York Times op ed section, 15th February 2000; Bozidar Jezernik, ‘Qudret Kemer: A Bridge between Barbarity and Civilisation’ Slavonic and East European Review Vol. 73 No. 3 (1995), p.482).

Agence France Presse, ‘Ethnic Albanians returns To Homes In Serbian Part Of Mitrovica’, Central Europe Online, 12th March 2000 (archived at http://www.centraleurope.com); Steven Erlanger, ‘Torn Mitrovica Reflects West’s


88 Gall, ‘Albanians Rally to Oust Serbs From a City in Kosovo’.

89 For statistics regarding the destruction of Palestinian homes see:
http://www.btselem.org/Files/site/english/edemolitions/Statistics.asp &
http://www.btselem.org/Files/site/english/Planning&Building/Statistics.asp.


92 Jason Burke, ‘Homes razed in new Israeli attack’; Phil reeves, ‘Israelis bulldoze homes, orange groves and cattle’.


94 On the establishment of zones of separation see: Amira Hass & Amos Harel, ‘IDF digs trench to keep 65,000 villagers out of Ramallah’, *Ha'aretz*, 8th March 2001


Farby & Magnusson, ‘The Battle(s) of Grozny’ notes the way in which Grozny remained open to Chechen resistance fighters who eventually retook the city in August 1996.

Notes to Conclusion


Appendix 1: Images

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Figure 1

Figure 2

Source (top): http://members.fortunecity.com/paperm/bosnia/bih-10a_f.jpg
Source (bottom): http://members.fortunecity.com/paperm/bosnia/bih-10a_r.jpg
Figure 3

Figure 5 - west Mostar

(Note the cross on the hill-side overlooking the town. The spire in the picture belongs to the reconstructed Franciscan monastery)

3 Map of Central District boundary agreed at the Rome conference of 18 February 1996 (published in the Official Gazette of the City of Mostar, 20 February 1996)

Figure 6-1

Figure 7

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