

**Hegemony and Resistance as Shown in Critical  
Discourse Analysis of Trainee Interpreters  
from the P.R.C. and Taiwan in Mandarin-English  
Simultaneous Interpreting**

**Pin-ling Chang**

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## **Abstract**

Translation/interpreting has long been one of the media for spreading and (re)shaping ideology in the battlefield of ‘power’. The inextricable relationships between power and translation/interpreting also contribute to hegemony and resistance demonstrated through translation and interpreting or by translators and interpreters. While the link between ideology and translation in unequal power relations has almost been fully disclosed in translation studies, the same issue in interpreting remains much less explored.

To address ideology issue in interpreting, this study chooses to put such research in the setting of the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, with China and Taiwan on either side. China, as an overwhelming hegemony in terms of politics, economy and culture, has always reiterated its One China policy on international occasions, insisting that Taiwan, an island off southeast China, has long been part of it. Yet, it is undeniable that Taiwan and China, in both of which Mandarin is used as the official language and Chinese culture is practiced and developed, are two separate political and economic entities at present. In light of the power inequality and linguistic resemblance between the two entities, this study uses ‘hegemony’ and ‘resistance to hegemony’ as two analytical dimensions in examining whether signs of hegemony or resistance to hegemony are embodied in simultaneous interpreting renditions of the student interpreters from China and from Taiwan through critical discourse analysis (CDA). By uncovering the embodiment of political ideologies in simultaneous renditions of Mandarin-speaking student interpreters and how national identities are discursively constructed through SI, this study hopes to raise awareness of interpreting as a site for different ideologies and identities to compete against one another in relations between hegemony and resistance and provide some constructive thoughts of investigating the relationship between ideology and interpreting in a scientific and systematic manner.

## Table of Contents

Acknowledgement .....	i
Abstract .....	ii
Table of Contents.....	iii
List of Tables, Figures, and Diagrams .....	ix
Chapter 1 Introduction .....	1
1.1 Aims and Objectives of the Thesis .....	1
1.2 Ideology Research in Translation and Interpreting Studies .....	3
1.3 Ideologies and Identities in Discourse .....	6
1.4 Geopolitical Situation and Background of Interpreter Subjects .....	8
1.5 The Reflexivity and Positionality of the Researcher in This Study.....	10
1.6 Organization of the Thesis.....	14
Chapter 2 Literature Review .....	16
2.1 Ideology, Power, Identity and Discourse: Definitions and Inextricable Relationships.....	17
2.1.1 Ideology .....	18
2.1.2 Power .....	22
2.1.3 Identity.....	23
2.1.4 Ideology, Power, and Identity in Discourse.....	27
2.2 Hegemony and Resistance.....	30
2.2.1 Concepts of Hegemony and Resistance .....	30
2.2.2 Chinese Hegemony and Resistance.....	34

2.3 Power, Ideology and Translation/Interpreting .....	38
2.3.1 The Link among Power, Ideology and Translation .....	38
2.3.2 Hegemony and Resistance in Translation.....	45
2.3.3 Simultaneous Interpreting: Norms, Roles and Strategies of Interpreters .....	48
2.3.3.1 Norms of Interpreters .....	48
2.3.3.2 Roles of Interpreters .....	49
2.3.3.3 Strategies of Interpreters.....	52
2.3.3.4 Differences between Novices and Professionals in Interpreting Studies .....	57
2.3.3.5 Importance of Investigating Ideology Impact on SI Renditions.....	60
2.3.4 Identity in Interpreting.....	62
2.4 Chinese Hegemony in the One China Policy/Taiwan Issue.....	65
2.4.1 Chinese Translation Development in the Early Period of the P.R.C.....	66
2.4.2 The Link among Ideology, Education and Translation in the P.R.C .....	68
2.4.3 The Hegemonic Implications of China English.....	69
2.4.4 Translation/Interpreting under the One China Policy.....	72
2.5 Identity Crisis in Taiwan .....	78
2.5.1 Identity Shifting and Ideology Shaping in Pre-1945 Taiwan.....	80
2.5.2 Ideology Shaping and Manipulation in Post-1945 Taiwan .....	83
2.5.2.1 Language and Education Policy .....	85
2.5.2.2 Religion and Deification.....	86
2.5.2.3 Control of Mass Media and Publication .....	88

2.5.2.4 The Social Reality in Taiwan .....	89
2.6 Summary of Chapter 2 .....	93
Chapter 3 Methodology .....	95
3.1 Research Design.....	95
3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis .....	98
3.2.1 The Origin of CDA .....	99
3.2.2 The Content of CDA .....	103
3.2.3 How Is CDA Applied in This Study? .....	112
3.3 Simultaneous Interpreting Data Collection .....	116
3.3.1 Subjects .....	117
3.3.1.1 The Advantages and Disadvantages of Using Trainee Interpreters..	117
3.3.2 SI Source Text.....	120
3.3.2.1 Speech 1 (C) by Hu Jintao .....	122
3.3.2.2 Speech 2 (T) by Chen Shui-bian .....	129
3.3.2.3 Speech 3 (T) by Chen Shui-bian .....	134
3.3.2.4 Speech 4 (C) by Jia Qinglin .....	137
3.3.2.5 Speech 5 (T) by Annette Lu.....	143
3.3.2.6 A Comparison of Source Speeches .....	150
3.4 Survey Questionnaires.....	151
3.4.1 Student Interpreter Background Questionnaire .....	152
3.4.2 Retrospective Questionnaire .....	153
3.4.3 National Identity Questionnaire .....	154

3.4.4 Post-Experiment Questionnaire .....	155
3.5 In-Depth Interview .....	157
3.6 Overview of the CDA Filter Process Results .....	158
Chapter 4 Results of Survey Questionnaires and Interviews .....	161
4.1 Results of Student Interpreter Background Questionnaire.....	161
4.2 Results of Retrospective Questionnaires.....	162
4.2.1 General Description.....	162
4.2.2 Results of Speech 1 (C) Retrospective Questionnaire.....	163
4.2.3 Results of Speech 2 (T) Retrospective Questionnaire.....	163
4.2.4 Results of Speech 3 (T) Retrospective Questionnaire.....	164
4.2.5 Results of Speech 4 (C) Retrospective Questionnaire.....	164
4.2.6 Results of Speech 5 (T) Retrospective Questionnaire.....	165
4.2.7 Conclusion of the Retrospective Questionnaire Results.....	166
4.3 Results of Post-Experiment Questionnaire.....	166
4.4 Results of National Identity Scale Questionnaire .....	170
4.5 Results of Individual In-Depth Interview.....	171
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion of Survey Results .....	172
Chapter 5 CDA Analysis and Discussion .....	175
5.1 General Description of the CDA Analysis in the Present Study .....	175
5.2 CDA Analysis – the China Group .....	177
5.2.1 Substitution .....	177
5.2.2 Addition .....	180

5.2.3 Omission .....	181
5.2.4 Compression.....	183
5.2.5 Mitigation.....	184
5.2.6 Overstatement/Intensification .....	185
5.2.7 Distortion .....	187
5.2.8 Prioritizing Personal Cognition.....	188
5.2.9 Specification.....	190
5.3 CDA Analysis – the Taiwan Group .....	192
5.3.1 Substitution .....	192
5.3.2 Addition .....	194
5.3.3 Omission .....	195
5.3.4 Compression.....	196
5.3.5 Mitigation.....	198
5.3.6 Overstatement/Intensification .....	199
5.3.7 Distortion .....	200
5.3.8 Prioritizing Personal Cognition.....	202
5.3.9 Specification.....	204
5.4 CDA Analysis – Special Cases.....	205
5.4.1 Special Cases – the China Group.....	205
5.4.1.1 Chinese Hegemony towards the Others .....	205
5.4.1.2 Chinese Resistance .....	207
5.4.2 Special Cases – the Taiwan Group.....	210

5.5 Discursive Overview of Chinese Hegemony vs. Taiwanese Resistance .....	212
5.6 Statistical Representation of CDA Analysis Results .....	218
5.6.1 Overview of Ideological Signs on a Group Basis .....	218
5.6.2 The CDA Chi-Square Statistical Results .....	221
5.7 Conclusion of Chapter 5.....	222
Chapter 6 Conclusion.....	223
6.1 Synopsis.....	223
6.2 Research Findings.....	228
6.2.1 The Discursive Construction of National Identity and Others in Simultaneous Interpreting.....	229
6.2.1.1 The China Group .....	230
6.2.1.2 The Taiwan Group.....	232
6.2.1.3 The Special Cases .....	235
6.2.2 Influence of Ideology and Identity on Simultaneous Interpreting .....	236
6.2.3 Hegemony and Resistance in Simultaneous Interpreting .....	239
6.3 Research Limitations.....	243
6.4 Further Implications for Future Studies .....	248
Bibliography .....	251
Appendix A Student Interpreter Background Questionnaire .....	282
Appendix B Retrospective Questionnaire .....	286
Appendix C National Identity Scale Questionnaire.....	288
Appendix D Post-Experiment Questionnaire - The China Group.....	292

Appendix E Post-Experiment Questionnaire - The Taiwan Group.....	296
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### **List of Tables, Figures, and Diagrams**

Table 1 The External Powers as the Ruler of Taiwan .....	80
Figure 2 The Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the People of Taiwan between 1992 and 2012 .....	83
Diagram 3 Data Collection Procedure .....	97
Table 4 A Selection of Discursive Strategies.....	106
Diagram 5 CDA Filter Process.....	114
Table 6 Macro- and Mesostructure of Speech 1 (C).....	123
Table 7 Macro- and Mesostructure of Speech 2 (T).....	130
Table 8 Macro- and Mesostructure of Speech 3 (T).....	134
Table 9 Macro- and Mesostructure of Speech 4 (C).....	138
Table 10 Macro- and Mesostructure of Speech 5 (T).....	144
Table 11 Discursive Strategies and Linguistic Devices in Chinese Hegemonic Signs .....	213
Table 12 Discursive Strategies and Linguistic Devices in Taiwanese Resistance Signs .....	215
Table 13 Overview of Ideological Signs - the China Group.....	218
Table 14 Overview of Ideological Signs - the Taiwan Group .....	219
Table 15 Chi-Square Results of the Five Speech Renditions on a Subject Basis .....	221

# Chapter 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Aims and Objectives of the Thesis

Translation/interpreting has long been one of the media for spreading and (re)shaping ideology and identity. The term ‘ideology’, since it was first coined in 1796 by French Enlightenment aristocrat and philosopher Destutt de Tracy to refer to his “science of ideas” (Kennedy, 1978: 47), has been variously defined and given both positive and negative connotations. Ideology, according to van Dijk (1998), does not exclusively serve as a tool of the domination or contain inherent negative attributes; instead, it is the set of factual and evaluative social beliefs shared by a group and it can “control or organize the more specific knowledge and opinions (attitudes) of a group (ibid: 48-49)”. A group of people who share certain ideologies may also develop and share certain identities as identity, or self-definition, is developed through interpersonal and intergroup interactions (Vignoles, et al., 2011: 2). And both ideologies and identities are developed, maintained or reinforced through discourse (speech in writing and speaking). The ideologies and identities that one holds can control or organize the way in which s/he thinks, interprets, and acts, which is why the dominant tend to consolidate their domination and obtain subordination by manipulating ideologies and identities of the dominated and why translation/interpreting, as a form of discourse bridging one culture with the *Others*, has been particularly used as an instrument for power struggles. Since ideologies and identities are constructed through discourse, an analysis of discourse of a certain group of people should disclose the ideologies and identities held by this group of people as well as the power struggles behind the discourse. The critical discourse analysis (CDA), which emerged in the early 1990s and becomes one of the most widely used methods to uncover hidden ideologies, identities and power relations

in discourse, is (has been) particularly suitable for studying the relationships among translation/interpreting, ideology, identity, and power. While the link among ideology, identity and translation in unequal power relations has almost been fully disclosed in translation studies, the same issue in interpreting, especially simultaneous interpreting, remains much less explored.

To address ideology issue in interpreting, this study chooses to put such research in the setting of the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, with China and Taiwan on either side. The special status quo across the Taiwan Strait may be argued to be one of the most suitable sites for the research of ideology in interpreting studies. China regards Taiwan as part of its territory and insists on the One China policy, while Taiwan, which strives to be widely recognized as a country and in fact is a 'nation' according to Smith's definition of a nation (1991: 14; see Chapter 2.1.3), has never been in effect governed by China. Despite the fact that Taiwan is a small but independent nation, Chinese hegemony has made many other countries in the world acknowledged Taiwan as part of China by exercising its "ascendancy...not only in the economic sphere, but through all social, political and ideological spheres, and its ability thereby to persuade [others] to see the world in terms favourable to its own ascendancy" (Scruton's definition of hegemony, 2007: 295; see also Chapter 2.2). The different political and social development in both nations of unequal power relations as hegemony and resistance has led to the formation of different ideologies and identities among both peoples although Mandarin Chinese has been adopted as the official language and Chinese culture is developed and practiced in both regions. As a result, the aim of this study is to investigate whether the conflicts of ideologies and identities between interpreters of two nations of unequal power in relations as hegemony versus resistance may be embodied in simultaneous interpreting (SI) renditions. The objectives are listed as follows:

1. To investigate whether the relations between two nations in unequal power relations as hegemony versus resistance may be embodied in SI renditions produced by interpreters from either nation.
2. To investigate how national identities of both groups of interpreters are discursively constructed through SI renditions.
3. To investigate how both groups of interpreters discursively construct the image of the *Other* nation.
4. To investigate whether an interpreter's national identity may influence his/her feelings towards the speakers of either nation.
5. To investigate whether deviant SI renditions are caused by the conflicts of ideologies and identities of both groups of interpreters.
6. To investigate what interpreting and discursive strategies are used to produce ideologically deviant renditions.

## **1.2 Ideology Research in Translation and Interpreting Studies**

Translation has long been one of the media for spreading and (re)shaping ideology in the battlefield of 'power'. In fact, translation by nature is a political act, cultural bound, and "has to do with the production and ostentation of power and with the strategies used by this power in order to represent the other culture" (Alvarez & Vidal, 1996: 2). Translation, on micro-level, involves ideologies of different agents who create, produce, edit, revise, review or appreciate translated texts (Tahir-Gürçağlar, 2003: 113), while on macro-level, translation is usually sponsored or controlled by the ruling authorities, whose attitudes towards the *Others* tend to play a decisive role in translation development. The link between translation and power is made manifest in what Alvarez & Vidal maintain:

Translation is not the production of one text equivalent to another text, but rather a complex process of rewriting that runs parallel both to the overall view of language and of the ‘Other’ people have throughout history; and to the influences and the balance of power that exist between one culture and another (1996: 4; *original emphasis*).

Also, ideology remains one of the most essential elements that trigger power struggles in that ideology, or socially-shared ideas and beliefs, helps “legitimate the interest of a ruling group or class by distortion or dissimulation (Eagleton, 1991: 30)”. Therefore, translation may be promoted under the influence of ‘patronage’ (Lefevere, 1992) and/or hindered by ‘censorship (Schäffner, 2007: 138-40).

In recent decades, the link between ideology and translation on micro-level has one of the main research foci in translation studies. Bassnett (1996: 22) suggests the need for reassessing the role of the translator, whose intervention in the process of linguistic transfer is “crucial” as translated texts are hardly free from adulteration. More specifically, every decision or choice translators make in the process of translating is under the influence of their surrounding “socio-political milieu”, which in other words is their own “culture” (Alvarez & Vidal, 1996: 5). Therefore, translators may be ‘partisan’, steering ideologically-motivated translation movement towards their desired geopolitical results. Translators may help reviving or boosting hegemony; they may also make their translations as resistance against oppression. Yet, translation on micro-level involves not only ideology of the translator but also ideologies of authors, critics, publishers, editors, and readers (Tahir-Gürçağlar, 2003: 113) as well as the power relations in society. More precisely, although translators shoulder the responsibility of producing translated texts, ideologies of other agents, such as publishers, readers or those in power, may be put ahead of the translator’s ideology or taken into consideration before the finalization of a translation. The idea that a translator’s behaviour is governed

by their ideology (Robinson, cited from Calzada-Pérez, 2003: 7) has been confirmed by various studies; Toury (1999: 19) even argues that “it is always the translator herself or himself, as an autonomous individual, who decides how to behave, be that decision fully conscious or not”. Yet, given the increasingly strong power of world hegemony in the form of various agents or patrons of translation (Venuti, 1995, 1998; see also Chapter 2.3.2), the freedom of the translator to exercise his/her discretion seems to be inevitably restricted. In other words, the translator’s ideology may not play the most decisive role in the finalized version of his/her translation. What may need to be more aware are the power struggle behind translation and the ideologies behind that power struggle. The link among power, ideology and translation has been disclosed fully in the field of translation studies. Yet, the link among power, ideology and interpreting, which may be seen as the oral counterpart of translation, remains much less explored. Previous interpreting studies have investigated the reasons why interpreters choose what not to interpret or how to interpret source texts at their discretion but few have addressed the link between an interpreter’s ideology and his/her renditions.

Translations in written form frequently come under ideological influences of various agents. By contrast, interpreting is characteristic of evanescence. People do not know exactly how they are going to express themselves until they open their mouths; once spoken, words are fading and only meanings may stay in the minds of the listener (Seleskovitch, 1994: 12-18). Therefore, little prior censorship could apply to interpreting. Arguably, simultaneous interpreting, which is supposed to synchronize source delivery, may be most likely to escape censorship compared with the other interpreting modes. In light of the extensive employment of SI at international settings and the relative lack of SI ideology research, an investigation into the effect of an interpreter’s ideology on his/her SI renditions may provide valuable information for those who would like to ensure the legitimization of their side of stories in the SI mode.

### 1.3 Ideologies and Identities in Discourse

It has been widely recognized that ideology, identity and discourse are inextricably intertwined. Fairclough's definition of ideology may fully demonstrate such close link among these elements:

Ideologies are representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation. They may be enacted in ways of interaction (and therefore in genres) and inculcated in ways of being identities (and therefore styles). Analysis of texts [discourse]...is an important aspect of ideological analysis and critique...(2003: 218)

Seeing discourse as a form of social practice that develops, sustains, strengthens and reflects ideologies and identities, practitioners of the critical discourse analysis (CDA) strive to uncover 'hidden' and 'seemingly neutral' ideologies of dominant powers embodied in discourse in order to raise public awareness of the negative effects of these hidden ideologies and in turn eliminate inequality that is reproduced and reinforced through discourse. According to Fairclough (1989: 20), "CDA is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of discourse which views language as a form of social practice and focuses on the ways social and political domination are reproduced by text and talk." CDA, as a highly-flexible discursive analysis tool, has been widely used by many famous scholars across Europe, such as Ruth Wodak and Gunther Kress based in the U.K., Teun van Dijk based in the Netherlands, or Utz Maas and Siegfried Jäger based in Germany, to name but a few.

To deal with the multiple ideologies and identities that may be embodied in the SI renditions of this study, the discourse-historical approach (DHA) within CDA will be adopted as the main research method in this study. Elaborated by Ruth Wodak in collaboration with some other researchers in the 1990s, DHA focuses on 'the change of

discursive practices over time and in various genres<sup>1</sup>. However, in light of the lack of the interpreting renditions of different times, it is difficult to examine the change of discursive practices in interpreting. Just as Bowen et al. (1995: 245) note,

The spoken word is evanescent. Our knowledge of the past performance of interpreters tends to be derived from such sources as letters, diaries, memoirs and biographies of interpreters themselves, along with a variety of other documents, many of which were only marginally or incidentally concerned with interpreting.

Therefore, in this study, a ‘historical’ approach is adopted in the literature review, where a review of the post-1945 Chinese translation development may unmask the relationship among ideology, discourse and translation in China, and the reasons behind the current identity crisis in Taiwan may be sought by discussing the development of the identities and ideologies held by the people of Taiwan particularly since 1945, which in turn may enable the collected SI renditions to be analyzed as ‘discourse’ within particular historical, social, political and cultural contexts. Just as Schleiermacher (2004: 51) observes, “For just as language is a historical entity, so too is it impossible to appreciate it rightly without an appreciation of its history”.

Meanwhile, to avoid common criticism of CDA as subjectively and ideologically interpreting discourse, a CDA Filter Process is specially designed, which involves the cross-referencing of the results of several questionnaires and/or in-depth interviews given by the interpreter subjects, in order to seek solid evidence for confirming the existence of ideological signs and to determine whether the signs are those of hegemony or resistance to hegemony. More specifically, the researcher incorporates other research methods, both qualitative and quantitative, into the CDA method in order to enhance the validity of the CDA results. The ideologically deviant renditions produced by either

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<sup>1</sup> Information retrieved 9 September 2012 on the website of the Department of Linguistics and English language, Lancaster University from <http://www.ling.lancs.ac.uk/profiles/265>.

group of interpreter subjects in this study will be examined collectively, which may disclose how ideologies and identities of the interpreter subjects are discursively constructed through simultaneous interpreting. The CDA qualitative results will be also represented through the Chi-square statistical analysis, which may not only demonstrate power struggles between China and Taiwan as hegemony and resistance but also provide clear insights into the issue of ideology in simultaneous interpreting. It is the researcher's belief that with survey questionnaires and statistical instruments, the application of the CDA method in the present study can adequately investigate the influence of one's ideology and identity on his/her SI renditions.

#### **1.4 Geo-political Situation and Background of Interpreter Subjects**

China, since ancient times, has generally remained a unified and totalitarian country with a strong sense of Sinocentrism and cultural superiority. The use of language in China has been under the control of the ruling authorities, which in turn strengthens political sensitivity and shapes collective ideologies. By contrast, Taiwan, a place of linguistic and cultural diversity on the other side of the Taiwan Strait, was not made subject to a single ruler until the Dutch arrived in the seventeenth century, which inaugurated the long-lasting colonial history of Taiwan. The colonial fate of Taiwan left the ideologies and identities of the people of Taiwan (re)shaped constantly with the change of ruling regimes. In 1949, the R.O.C. (the Republic of China) Nationalist (Kuomintang, KMT) government, which had overthrown Qing China and became the main ruling power of China proper since 1912, lost a civil war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and fled to Taiwan. Since then, the Chinese mainland has been taken over by the People's Republic of China (the P.R.C. or 'China' hereinafter), and Taiwan has become the base of the R.O.C., starting the situation where both sides

compete to be the only legitimate China. China regards Taiwan as part of its territory, while Taiwan has never been in effect governed by China and enjoys its autonomy despite not being recognized widely as a country.

In light of the difference in political and social reality between China and Taiwan, it is very likely that the people of China may not see eye to eye with the people of Taiwan on whether Taiwan is part of China. As Sapir suggests, “the network of cultural patterns of a civilization is indexed in the language which expresses that civilization...the ‘real world’ is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group (1929: 209; *original emphasis*)”. The language use of both peoples may reflect different social realities of their own nations. In order to investigate this situation, forty-two trainee interpreters who registered with the Mandarin-English simultaneous interpreting program in the U.K., half from China and the other half from Taiwan, are recruited as the subjects of the present study. All but two of the subjects are aged between 20 and 30 at the time of participating in the data collection. Two of the subjects are male, and the others female. As the main aim of this study is to observe whether there is an ideological tug of war between hegemony and resistance among the interpreters across the Taiwan Strait, the study needs to recruit from either side a relatively large and equal number of interpreters who are willing to have their renditions analyzed in order to confirm the existence of such ideological war. Given the lack of funding and professional connections, it would be more feasible and cost-efficient to use trainee interpreters in this study.

## **1.5 The Reflexivity and Positionality of the Researcher in This Study**

Reflexivity, which is one of the issues that face ethnography since the 1960s, concerns some fundamental problems and solutions to the difficulties of ethnography as a methodology for collecting, interpret and present data of human life (Brewer, 2003). One of the most criticized problems of ethnography is that researchers as observers may tend to neglect their social involvement in their ethnographic fieldwork and in the real world, the power relations behind the fieldwork and between researchers and the researched, and the hermeneutic subjectivity of the ethnographic representation of reality (Inghilleri, 2005: 130-131). The presence of researchers in their fieldwork as well as the relationship between researchers and the researched has raised doubt on whether the collected data can remain ‘uncontaminated’. Also, like the researched, researchers are socially situated and interpret the world around them through their own ideologies and identities, which makes it possible that the reality represented through ethnographic data is “partial, partisan and selective (Brewer, 2003: 259)”. In consequence, reflexivity may generally involve two crises: the crisis of representation and the crisis of legitimation (ibid: 259). To solve the crises, some measures are proposed. For instance, the textual construction of ethnographic data may be presented in its original form, such as notebook entries or quotations, which suggests the possibility of other more versions of reality and interpretation (Sperber, 1985; cited from Inghilleri, 2005: 132). Reflexivity itself also offers solutions to the crises as long as one acknowledges that reflexivity

requires a critical attitude towards data, and recognition of the influence on the research of such factors as the location of the setting, the sensitivity of the topic, power relations in the field and the nature of the social interaction between researcher and researched (Brewer, 2003: 259).

In other words, researchers should make clear their social positions and positioning while presenting their version of reality obtained from their fieldwork. Reflexivity has already drawn attention from translation and interpreting studies, as not only acts of translation may be seen as “ethnographic encounters” (Inghilleri, 2005: 139) but also translators and interpreters are social actors in specific historical, social, and cultural context and inevitably need to interact with other agents involved in the translation or interpreting process. Jones (2004) has particularly focused on this issue in his study of a literary translator acting as a participant-interpreter in the ex-Yugoslavia context. Acknowledging the difficulty of claiming his objectivity as both researcher and the researched in his study, Jones explicates how a literary translator, who possesses divided or conflicting loyalties to the country, culture and source texts and is faced with ethical and ideological dilemmas of being fully faithful to the writer or translating with social factors taken into consideration, makes less harm decisions and serves as a cultural gatekeeper in the translation process. The self-analysis of researchers in specific context of their fieldwork can indeed help achieve a greater degree of scientific objectivity of the studies concerned. Given the significance of reflexivity issue, I shall articulate my own positionality as the researcher of this study and discuss the measures I take to reduce bias because of my ideological involvement.

The selection of the research topic concerning the status quo across the Taiwan Strait is mainly attributed to my background as a citizen of Taiwan (the R.O.C.). The experience of growing up and receiving ‘Chinese’ education and culture in a forbidden nation under the threat and pressure from the neighbouring Chinese hegemony makes me sensitive to the unequal power relations between China and Taiwan, the mentalities of the ruling power on either side, and the difficulties of the dominated to resist the dominant. The points or measures I take to deal with this sensitive topic are discussed below:

1. Power relations in and behind the field:

The topic on (Chinese) hegemony and (Taiwanese) resistance may be highly sensitive in both nations. Conducting such research in either nation may inevitably raise doubt over the issue of whether one's hegemonic or resistance tendency may be strengthened or reduced because of his/her relations and interaction with the surrounding world. The interpreter subjects recruited in this study are students from three SI programs offered by two UK universities. Those from the same program are classmates and attend the experiment as a group. The previous in-group power relations among the subjects are unknown to the researcher, but it should be reasonable to presume these subjects are studying in the U.K. on an equal footing and in competing and/or cooperative relationships at their class. The researcher has never had any contact or private relationships with the first two groups of interpreter subjects before this study. The researcher and the third group of interpreter subjects are in a teacher-student relationship. The recruitment is on a voluntary basis with some monetary rewards. Basically, the relationships between the researcher and the researched are cooperative and equal. Arguably, it should be appropriate to conduct this research in the U.K. where both Chinese and Taiwanese are (presumably) treated equal and both the researcher and the researched are the *Others* in the third nation.

2. The nature of simultaneous interpreting:

Simultaneous (conference) interpreters usually carry out their tasks in a booth without direct contact with the speaker and the listener, which the researcher thinks might let interpreters enjoy greater autonomy and encounter less outside interference. Also, the SI experiment of this study is carried out in the SI labs where the interpreter subjects attend class and do practices, which in turn should not put the subjects under unusual pressure during the experiment. The researcher does not

make any comments on the performance of the subjects but act as an equipment operator and data collector, and the SI data are solely produced by the subjects in individual booths without any interference or assistance from the researcher.

3. The literature review:

In Chapters 2.4 and 2.5, I discuss how ideologies and identities are (re)shaped and spread among the general public of Taiwan and China. Note that my point is to show how the ruling authorities manipulate the public ideologies to consolidate their domination. Both Chinese and Taiwanese general public are objects of ideological manipulation. Also, the literature review that concerns Taiwan and China ranges from the historical records of the ancient times to the most recent news events and survey results, which may contribute to a thorough and less biased representation of the realities in both nations.

4. The research design:

The basic and foremost principle of the research design of this study is to strike a balance in as many aspects as possible. The number of the subjects from either nation, the quantities and genres of the source texts, and the political status of the speakers are equal or balanced across the Taiwan Strait. Each and every subject is asked to fill in the same questionnaires. The SI data are produced solely by the subjects, each in an individual booth. Due to time and space limits, only some of the subjects give an interview after the experiment, but they are only asked to clarify or explain their deviant renditions or their responses in the surveys. None of the subjects know the real research aim until the end of the data collection, which is to prevent the subjects from interpreting awkwardly or purposefully. The subjects are fully briefed afterwards and offered options of withdrawing from the research.

## 5. The reality represented in the findings

In Chapter 5 the CDA analysis of the SI renditions, the researcher strives to demonstrate the SI deviant renditions in their original form and explain them on the basis of the previous literature review and the survey and interview data. In most cases, the research gives descriptive rather than interpretative narratives. The findings generally echo with the literature review and the current status quo across the Taiwan Strait, and the exceptional renditions concerning ‘Chinese resistance’ or ‘Chinese hegemony on Taiwanese side’ are presented as well. The researcher does not attempt to cover any ‘deviant’ results but aims to show how people’s behaviour is controlled or influenced by their ideologies. And after all, these exceptional renditions are not completely unexpected; their possible causes have already been addressed in the literature review.

It should be made clear in this beginning chapter that the researcher views both hegemonic and resistance renditions as ideological, which should not have appeared during SI sessions according to the SI professional norms (see Chapter 2.3.3.1), and this study is mainly aimed at uncovering a certain phenomenon and trying to provide possible explanation instead of encouraging or condemning the act of using interpreting as a tool for power struggles.

### **1.6 Organization of the Thesis**

The organization of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, the relationships among ideology, power, identity and discourse, the conceptions and phenomena of hegemony and resistance, the relationships among power, ideology and translation/interpreting, and some previous studies of simultaneous interpreting will be briefly discussed. Also, how the ruling authorities of China and Taiwan manipulate the ideologies and identities

of their people as well as the status quo across the Taiwan Strait will be presented in the last two sections of Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, the research methods used in this study for investigating whether a trainee interpreter's ideology may be embodied in his/her simultaneous renditions will be discussed. Based on the research aim and literature review, the research methods adopted in the study will include a simultaneous interpreting experiment for collecting renditions, survey questionnaires, post-experiment interview, and critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the renditions. The results of the survey questionnaires and the in-depth interview will be used to obtain the extra-linguistic information related to the experiment, such as the trainee interpreters' retrospective comments on what they have rendered in the experiment, their specific opinions about the cross-strait issues, and their explanations for the possible ideological signs found in their renditions. In Chapter 4, the results of the survey questionnaires and the in-depth interview will be presented and discussed. In Chapter 5, the CDA analysis and discussion will be presented according to the interpreting strategies adopted by the subjects. The extra-linguistic information obtained in the simultaneous interpreting experiment and in the in-depth interview will be used in the process of the CDA analysis in order to increase the validity of the analysis results. The discursive strategies and devices used in the ideological renditions will be analyzed individually and presented collectively in Chapter 5.5. The qualitative results of the CDA analysis will be also presented statistically to highlight the significance of the results. The summary and conclusion of the present study will be presented in Chapter 6, which will be followed by a discussion of the limitations of the study and suggestions for future research.

## Chapter 2. Literature Review

The main aim of this study is to investigate whether ideologies of hegemony or resistance may be embodied in language use (discourse) of simultaneous trainee interpreters of China and Taiwan as two nations in unequal power relations. Evidently, the aim involves several key concepts: ideology, hegemony, resistance, discourse, power, identity and simultaneous interpreting, which should be discussed separately as well as holistically in this chapter.

Translation/interpreting has long been one of the means for intercultural exchanges. That translated texts themselves are the very medium directly gives translation producers the power to (re)shape ideologies of the audience, which is why translation/interpreting has been inextricably linked with power and ideology, in the West and East, in ancient times and modern times. Why translation/interpreting as discourse, which refers to language use in speech and writing, plays an important role in ideology (re)shaping and spreading is that discourse is a form of social practice. By interacting with others, sharing knowledge or experience, and expressing feelings and thoughts through discourse, people are being socialized and socializing one other. They are either consciously or unconsciously developing a system of beliefs in coming to terms with the world around them. It means that in the process of socialization, discourse of a group of people reflects not only real situations of the society where they are being socialized but also the way in which they look at the world around them, namely ideology, which, in a broad sense, is the knowledge and the opinions shared by a group of people (van Dijk, 1998: 48). The link between discourse and ideology has become one of the main research foci in social sciences, particularly the critical discourse analysis (CDA) and translation studies and an emerging one in interpreting studies. A review of previous literature in these research fields may provide a clear

picture of how discourse becomes a site of ideology and power struggle. Also, ideology is highly connected with identity, one's self-definition, as the latter is usually achieved in relation to the surroundings and the people concerned. Those who share the same knowledge and opinions in certain aspects should develop a specific identity. There are various identities and they may not be exclusive to one another. As the setting of this study is the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, which concerns the relations between China and Taiwan as two separate and independent political and economic entities, the 'national identity' of both peoples will be particularly discussed and why the unequal power status of these two nations results in their relations as hegemony versus resistance should also be reviewed. It is hoped that the review and discussion of all of the above key concepts, elements, and previous studies concerned may lay a solid basis for interpreting and explaining the ideological signs of hegemony or resistance that may be found in simultaneous interpreting within the cross-strait context.

## **2.1 Ideology, Power, Identity and Discourse: Definitions and Inextricable Relationships**

It has been widely recognized that ideology, power, identity and discourse are inextricably intertwined. Fairclough's definition of ideology may fully demonstrate such close link among these four:

Ideologies are representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation. They may be enacted in ways of interaction (and therefore in genres) and inculcated in ways of being identities (and therefore styles). Analysis of texts [discourse]...is an important aspect of ideological analysis and critique...(2003: 218)

As the main aim of this present study is to investigate whether political ideologies of unequal powers may be embodied in simultaneous renditions of the interpreters from

Taiwan and China, the four elements will be discussed and previous studies particularly on political ideologies and national identities embodied in discourse will be reviewed in the following sections.

### **2.1.1 Ideology**

The term 'ideology' has been variously defined with time. Coined in 1796 by French Enlightenment aristocrat and philosopher Destutt de Tracy to refer to his "science of ideas", the term 'ideology' is "positive, useful, and susceptible of rigorous exactitude (Kennedy, 1978: 47)" and "would place the moral and political sciences on a firm foundation and cure them of error and 'prejudice' (Thompson, 1990: 30; *original emphasis*)". Soon the term 'ideology' is exploited around the early nineteenth century by Napoleon Bonaparte against the 'idéologues', the metaphysical faction which included de Tracy and his associates connected with republicanism. The negative denotations of ideology are made manifest in Napoleon's speech to the French Council of State in 1812:

We must lay the blame for the ills that our fair France has suffered on ideology, that shadowy metaphysics which subtly searches for first causes on which to base the legislation of peoples, rather than making use of laws known to the human heart and of the lessons of history. These errors must inevitably and did in fact lead to the rule of bloodthirsty men...When someone is summoned to revitalize a state, he must follow exactly the opposite principles (Kennedy, 1978: 215).

After the fall of Napoleon in 1814, the term 'ideology' is no longer used to refer to the science of ideas. Instead, it refers to "the ideas themselves" or more specifically "a body of ideas which are alleged to be erroneous and divorced from the practical realities of political life" (Thompson, 1990: 32). The concepts of ideology are then transformed,

though in an ambiguous and varied way, into a very important part of political assumptions in Karl Marx's writings. Drawing inspiration from Napoleon's use of the term 'ideology', Marx and Engels compare the Young Hegelians to the idéologues and describe the Young Hegelians' viewpoints as 'the German ideology', in which ideology becomes the "polemical conception" and is defined as "a theoretical doctrine and activity which erroneously regards ideas as autonomous and efficacious and which fails to grasp the real conditions and characteristics of social-historical life" (ibid: 34-35). This polemical conception of ideology is renewed (in 1859) as what Thompson calls the "epiphenomenal conception", according to which, ideology is defined as "a system of ideas which expresses the interests of the dominant class but which represents class relations in an illusory form" (ibid: 37). Thompson further suggests another latent conception of ideology in parts of Marx's work and defines it as "a system of representations which serves to sustain existing relations of class domination by orientating individuals towards the past rather than the future, or towards images and ideals which conceal class relations and detract from the collective pursuit of social change (ibid: 40-41)". All of Marx's conceptions of ideology are linked with class power and domination in the Marxist economic base and superstructure model of society. The superstructure develops dominant ideology, or false consciousness, into the economic base of production, and the power of the dominant is consolidated and maintained through control of the ideology of the dominated.

Marx's negative conceptions of ideology are then interpreted and expanded to have varied but more neutralized denotations by his associates and followers, such as Lenin and Lukacs, which have become not only an essential part in Marxism but a theoretical base of some disciplines of social sciences (ibid: 44-61). Lenin maintains that mankind has created two ideologies: bourgeois ideology and socialist ideology. To prevent the domination of bourgeois ideology, it is necessary to combat "the spontaneous

development of the working-class”, or “trade-unionism”, in that the trade-union consciousness is actually leading the working class to be ideologically enslaved by the bourgeoisie (Lenin, 1969: 41). Sharing similar views with Lenin, Lukacs emphasizes the significance of proletarian ideology as “the objective and the weapon itself” for liberating proletarian class (Lukacs, 1971: 70). Both Lenin and Lukacs regard ideology as consciousness of a certain class, which is not exclusively held by the dominant class, and thus give more positive traits to the term ‘ideology’ than Marx (Thompson, 1990: 46).

In later times, ideology continues to be defined variously and becomes a very important element in social sciences. The term ‘ideology’, after its bumping ride in social sciences, is reformulated by Thompson as consisting of two types of conceptions – neutral conceptions of ideology and critical conceptions of ideology. While depicting phenomena as “ideology or ideological”, neutral conceptions do not imply these phenomena are inherently “misleading, illusory or aligned with the interests of any particular group (ibid: 53)” but critical conceptions do and also implicitly criticize or condemn the phenomena characterized as ideology or ideological (ibid: 54). What Thompson also suggests in the early 90s is that to study ideology in particular social and historical contexts is “to study the ways in which meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of domination (ibid: 56)”, which echoes the main objective of the critical discourse analysis (CDA): to study how inequality of power is embodied, reproduced and sustained linguistically.

The term ‘ideology’ continues to be variously defined and studied by the CDA practitioners. For instance, van Dijk (1998) proposes a comprehensive theory of ideology by discussing ideology in the conceptual triangle formed by cognition, society and discourse from perspectives of different disciplines, such as psychology, sociology and political science. As far as van Dijk is concerned, ideology does not exclusively

serve as a tool of the domination or contain inherent negative attributes. There are also “ideologies of opposition or resistance”, “ideologies of competition between equally powerful groups”, “ideologies that only promote the internal cohesion of a group”, or “ideologies about the survival of humankind” (ibid: 11). Also, ideologies are not necessarily “individual” or “only mental”; they are socially shared and involve a set of both factual and evaluative beliefs, or more specifically, the knowledge and opinions (ibid: 48-49). Hence, on the basis of van Dijk’s analysis of the concepts of ideologies, ‘ideology’ in this study is defined as what van Dijk proposes:

[...] an ideology is the set of factual and evaluative beliefs – that is the knowledge and the opinions – of a group [...] In other words, a bit like the axioms of a formal system, ideologies consist of those general and abstract social beliefs, shared by a group, that control or organize the more specific knowledge and opinions (attitudes) of a group (ibid: 48-49).

Van Dijk further points out that not every kind of ideology is ideologically. An ideology, such as political ideology, can be seen as ‘ideologically’ when it determines “how the world is understood” and “where group interests may be involved”, faces challenges from a specific group within a culture or society, or needs to compete with alternatives (ibid: 50-51). In this study, the political ideologies held by trainee interpreters from Taiwan and China in terms of One China policy are thus certainly ideological as Chinese culture and language is practiced in both nations in a broad sense but both peoples generally have conflicting belief of whether Taiwan is part of China.

### **2.1.2 Power**

The definitions of power are multifaceted. The term ‘power’ may be generally defined as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Swedberg, 2005: 205). There is also “counter-power” in bottom-up relations of resistance (van Dijk, 1998: 11). Power is often demonstrated, maintained, and reproduced through discourse, and power inequality may be seen in terms of nation, race, gender, ethnicity, age, social status, and many more. For instance, ‘euro-racism’ spread by European colonial powers to Latin America became a legitimate basis of slavery of and discrimination against the natives as ‘Others’. Even until nowadays, the racist ideologies towards Latin American natives are still prevailing and causing mistreatment of the natives. To raise awareness of racial inequality, some CDA practitioners analyze the structures and strategies of racist text and talk and find that generally ‘we’ group is positively emphasized while ‘others’ are ignored or linked with negative attributions in discourse (van Dijk, 2005). Note that why the CDA practitioners particularly focus on ‘hidden’ and ‘seemingly neutral’ ideologies of dominant powers embodied in discourse is that unmasking these ideologies is the first step before public awareness of the negative effects of these hidden ideologies may be raised and then the elimination of inequality that is reproduced and reinforced through discourse may be achieved. Power inequality between Taiwan and China is one of the main reasons that contribute to ideological conflicts of both peoples over the One China policy (see Chapters 2.4 and 2.5). Therefore, in this study, the researcher will examine the collected simultaneous interpreting (SI) data as discourse and see how power inequality is embodied or maintained in SI.

### **2.1.3 Identity**

When it comes to studying the discursive struggle between unequal powers, ‘identity’ is also one of the key elements. ‘Identity’ may vary with the number of the people involved, such as personal identity (an individual’s self-definition), and vary with interpersonal and intergroup relationships. By reviewing previous studies, Vignoles, et al. (2011: 2) suggest an integrated definition of identity, which is also adopted in this study:

...identity comprises not only “who you think you are” (individually or collectively), but also “who you act as being” in interpersonal and intergroup interactions – and the social recognition or otherwise that these actions receive from other individuals or groups

Identity is being constructed and demonstrated through language choice or language used in the interactions with different people on different occasions. A man may be someone else’s son, father, grandfather, husband, friend, boss, subordinate, and so on. His identity will vary with the person(s) he is addressing or interacting with, and his language choice will therefore vary with his identity within the context(s). In other words, what identity he has or how he is constructing or demonstrating his identity within a specific context should be revealed through analysis of his/her language choice within that specific context.

As this present study is to investigate ideological conflict between peoples of Taiwan and China as two different and independent political entities and that conflict partly or mostly arises from national identities held by these two peoples, it is therefore necessary to define the terms ‘nation’ and ‘national identity’ in this section. Smith (1991: 14) discusses necessary elements of a nation and defines a nation as

a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.

Note that Smith does not give a very specific definition of national identity; instead, he clarifies the nature of national identity by discussing its functions and problems. Based on his definition of a nation, Smith further points out that national identity is multi-faceted, and once developed, it “can never be reduced to a single element, even by particular factions of nationalists, nor can it be easily or swiftly induced in a population by artificial means (ibid: 14)”. National identity is also multi-functionally powerful to both individuals and groups. There are both external and internal functions. The external ones are related to territory, economy and politics. For instance, one of the most important political functions of national identity is “its legitimation of common legal rights and duties of legal institutions, which define the peculiar values and character of the nation and reflect the age-old customs and mores of the people (ibid: 16)”. The internal functions of national identity are intended for individual members of a nation. The most obvious internal function is to socialize these members as “nationals and citizens” by inculcating “national devotion and a distinctive, homogeneous culture” through education systems and mass media, which may shape strong collective beliefs in “cultural authenticity and unity” of the nation (ibid: 16). Therefore, it may follow that one’s strong sense of national identity may indicate his/her relatively strong willingness to promote social solidarity, to truly believe or pride in the common shared values and assets of the nation, to follow what the nation expects him/her to do, or to defend or justify his/her nation in various aspects in the face of outside threats or challenges.

Although Smith provides a very clear explanation of national identity, a more specific definition of national identity suggested by Guibernau (2007: 11) will be adopted in this study, which is:

National identity is a collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same nation and of sharing most of the attributes that make it distinct from other nations. National identity is a modern phenomenon of a fluid and dynamic nature. While consciousness of forming a nation may remain constant for long periods of time, the elements upon which such a feeling is based may vary.

One of the most salient traits of national identity defined by Guibernau – the fluid and dynamic nature of national identity in modern times – indicates that although national identity cannot be developed or (re)shaped easily and quickly, nowadays it can never remain unchanged under the influence of globalization. More specifically, national identity in modern times is “simultaneously more solidly constructed by efficient strategies of nation-building and much more open to alien influences impossible to control and exclude from the national space (ibid: 189). The dynamic conceptualizations of national identity have become one of the complex issues that studies on national identity of modern times often need to deal with. ‘Narrative identity’ in Ricoeur’s identity theory (1992) may be suitable for explaining the dynamic nature of national identity. Ricoeur first distinguishes identity as sameness (Latin *idem*) from identity as selfhood (Latin *ipse*) in his personal identity theory. The former is “a concept of relation and a relation of relations (ibid: 116)”, with three components forming its conceptual articulation: numerical identity, qualitative identity, and uninterrupted continuity. Numerical identity corresponds “the notion of identification, understood in the sense of the reidentification of the same, which makes cognition recognition: the same thing twice, n times (ibid: 116)”. Qualitative identity involves “extreme resemblance” and corresponds the “operation of substitution without semantic loss, *salva veritate*” (ibid:

116). As time may be a factor causing dissemblance, divergence or difference, the uninterrupted continuity functions as “a supplementary or a substitutive criterion to similitude” (ibid: 117). Ricoeur suggests that there should be “an intervention of narrative identity” in the polarity between *idem*-identity and *ipse*-identity (ibid: 118-119). Narrative identity is “by linguistic convention, the identity of the character (ibid: 141)”. The space limit prevents the researcher from giving a detailed explanation of Ricoeur’s concept of narrative identity; instead, the description of narrative identity given by Wodak, et al. (2009: 14) may make it clear why the concept of narrative identity may be used to explain the dynamic nature of national identity:

Narrative identity allows various, different, partly contradictory circumstances and experiences to be integrated into a coherent temporal structure, thus making it possible to sketch a person’s identity against the background of a dynamic constancy model which does justice to the coherence of a human life. Thus the concept of narrative identity can go beyond the one-sided model of an invariant, self-identical thing. It can take into account the idea that the self can never be grasped without the other, without change.

The concept of narrative identity may explain repeated rectification of one’s perception of identity amid changes of the world around him/her and still present one’s identity as a whole. In this study, how national identity is developed or (re)shaped in Taiwan and China will be discussed in Chapters 2.4 and 2.5.

#### **2.1.4 Ideology, power, and identity in discourse**

One of the popular definitions of ‘discourse’ in the CDA field is:

CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of ‘social practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institutions(s) and social structure(s), which frame it: The discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 258).

This definition not only fully explains the aims, viewpoints, and significance of the CDA in studying ‘discourse’ but also points out the inextricable relationships among ideology, power, identity and discourse. The detailed introduction of the CDA history, content, and method will be discussed in Chapter 3 as it will be the main research method in this study. In this section, the researcher would like to look at some previous CDA studies particularly on political ideologies and national identities.

Of all the famous contemporary CDA practitioners, Ruth Wodak may be one of the leading roles in addressing issues of both political ideologies and national identities in the CDA field. As a Europe-based scholar with Austrian roots, Wodak particularly focuses on the discursive construction of Austrian national identity (e.g. Wodak, et al., 2009) and the changes of national and transnational identities with the evolution of the European Union (EU) (e.g. Wodak, 2004). As a landlocked country in Central Europe,

Austria has been susceptible to changes of European political landscape and climate. Once as part of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (962-1806) and one of the great powers of Europe around the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, its ill and bumping fate since the end of World War I, particularly its occupation by Nazi Germany between 1938 and 1945 and its redefinition as a neutral sovereign state in 1955, has caused a great impact on the development of Austrian national identity, which is subject to diverse powerful influence from both inside and outside and suffers constant needs of (re)shaping. To investigate how Austrian national identity is being constructed through discursive strategies and shifts of Austrian national identity amid EU integration, twenty-two public commemorative speeches given by several representative Austrian political leaders on special national days involving identity management and public self-reflection are critically analyzed (Wodak, et al., 2009). Commemorative speeches on special national anniversaries tend to be used to “legitimate ways of dealing with the past, by selecting affirmative elements from the past which seem useful for justifying present interests (Staudinger, 1994: 21; cited from Wodak, et al., 2009: 70). Analyzing commemorative speeches often help identify how politicians express their political values, construct common identities, and promote public consensus. In addition to the political speeches, Wodak et al. (2009) also examine discursive utterances of individuals generated in a semi-public context - from seven focus group interviews on the same topic, each with eight to ten participants and lasting about two hours, in order to investigate attitudes and statements about identities on an individual basis. The analysis of the discursive data shows that some linguistic strategies and devices are used for discursively constructing national identities. For instance, the deictic ‘we’ and its other dialectal forms are frequently used in the focus group discussions to signify inclusiveness as opposed to ‘they’, which is used to referred to ‘others’. Another linguistic means of constituting groups is the use of “anthroponymic generic terms”,

such as ‘Austrian’s’, ‘German’s’, and so on. The participants are also found to link ‘they’ groups with derogatory and negative attributions (ibid: 141-142). Meanwhile, another twenty-four participants are given semi-private interviews in which questions about national identity, such as “What does Austria mean?” and “Who is an Austrian?”, are answered. A review of all the data obtained respectively in public, semi-public, and semi-private settings shows that different linguistic strategies and devices are used to construct Austrian national identity and that in-group power relations may affect how people express themselves. For instance, the “explicit discursive exclusion and ostracism of non-Austrians living in Austria” is deemed as a “taboo” at a public setting, while at the other two settings, the exclusionary usage is frequently employed for identity construction (ibid: 192). Also, the past Austrian history is found to be crucial to constructing a collective identity although the perception of which part of the history is significant varies (ibid: 194). In terms of the content of the public speeches, they mainly focus on narrating a common political past and discursively constructing a common political present and future, while the focus group discussions and interviews focus on the construction of a common culture (ibid: 74). One of the concerns that Wodak et al. would like to address is whether European integration would pose a threat to Austrian identity, and the findings show that at the time of investigation, the majority of the Austrian participants still “favoured EU-membership for economic and security reasons” (ibid: 198). It is also found that “real or perceived power relations in the group seem to have influenced participants towards expressing opinions they believe to be socially desirable and towards avoiding taboo subjects”, and the participants tend to “avoid open conflicts in the group and to work towards achieving group consensus, even in heterogeneous groups” (ibid: 109).

Wodak’s another study (2004) investigating construction of national and translational identities against the background of EU integration may serve as another

good example of how identity shift or construction is embodied discursively. Assuming that “similarity of responses to certain question types may be indexical of orientation to a similar type of identity or identities” and being aware that “even the same person may have multiple contradictions and ‘ideological dilemmas’ in his or her statements” (ibid: 103), Wodak analyzes twenty-eight interviews with fourteen Austrian members of the European Parliament, with a focus on certain discursive strategies used to construct sameness and difference. The study finds that EU organizational identities are being formed as ‘We’ group, especially in contrast with the US and Japan as out-groups, which can be observed from some linguistic strategies, such as the patterns of reference.

The above CDA research results indicate elements of identity, power and ideology may be embodied in discourse. Likewise, translated texts as discourse should reflect the relationships among these elements, which will be discussed further in Chapter 2.3.

## **2.2 Hegemony and Resistance**

### **2.2.1 *Concepts of hegemony and resistance***

The distribution of power has been one of the major issues in human world. A dominant power may lead to hegemony, which may in turn cause resistance to such hegemony. The word ‘hegemony’ derives from the Greek word ἡγεμονία (literally *rule* or *leadership*), which generally means “the pre-eminence or supremacy that a state, a social group, or even an individual may exercise over others (Fontana, 2006: 24)”. It should be noted that ‘hegemony’ in ancient Greece originally involves reciprocal consent between the dominant and the subordinate, which may be exemplified in the Peloponnesian War between the Peloponnesian League organized with Sparta as the hegemon and the Delian League under the leadership of hegemonic Athens. Both rivaling hegemons organize respectively an alliance of neighboring states which freely

give consent to the hegemonic leadership (Thucydides, 1910). Hegemony which is rightfully achieved through consent of free citizens is recognized by Aristotle as a means to prevent slavery and benefit the ruled (Fontana, 2006: 25). In Greek cases, hegemony may be formed to fight against another hegemony and prevent the former from slavery. Thus, hegemony may be a form of resistance to another hegemony and is not inherently negative or harmful, while resistance may not be inherently in bottom-up power relations with hegemony but a rivaling power against hegemony.

At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century, 'hegemony' becomes one of the prominent political terms in the Russian Social-Democratic movement. Plekhanov first urges the Russian working class to fight against the "domination (*gospodstvo*)" of Tsarism and absolutism, and later on his colleague Axelrod emphasizes the pre-eminent role of the proletariat in helping Russian Social-Democracy gain hegemony (*gegemoniya*) in the Russian bourgeois revolution (Anderson, 1976: 15-16). Lenin, in his letter addressing Plekhanov in January of 1901, also proposes achieving "real hegemony" of the Russian working class through establishment of a political newspaper (Lenin, 1974: 56). Clearly, hegemony in Marxism refers particularly to "rule or domination to relations between social classes" (Williams, 1977: 108). Hegemony may not be exclusive to upper classes or the privileged; similar to what has happened in ancient Greek times, gaining hegemony through revolution may be another form of resistance. The concept and purview of hegemony is then redefined by Antonio Gramsci, one of the prominent Marxist theoreticians in the twentieth century, who has drawn inspiration partly from the Russian revolution and Niccolò Machiavelli's ideas of politics and history. Pondering over the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, Gramsci sees the activeness rather than the predetermination of historical events overcome ideologies:

In Russia, Marx's *Capital* was more the book of the bourgeoisie than of the proletariat. It stood as the critical demonstration of how events should follow a

pre-determined course: how in Russia a bourgeoisie had to develop, and a capitalist era had to open, with the setting up of a Western-type civilization, before the proletariat could even think in terms of its own revolt, its own demands, its own revolution. But events have overcome ideologies. Events have exploded the critical schemas determining how the history of Russia would unfold according to the canons of historical materialism (Gramsci, 1977: 34).

And that activeness of history lies in “not raw economic facts, but man, men in societies, men in relation to one another, reaching agreements with one another, developing through these contacts (civilization) a collective, social will (ibid: 34-5)”. Gramsci’s argument that power is gained and maintained through force and consent is also under the influence of Machiavelli’s masterpiece *The Prince*:

You must know there are two ways of contesting, the one by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. This has been figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other is not durable (Machiavelli, 2006 [1515]: Chapter XVIII).

Bearing the dichotomy of force and consent in mind, Gramsci proposes a State equals political society plus civil society. While political society imposes “authoritarian and forcible interventions”, in civil society all men are “equally rational and moral” and “capable of accepting the law spontaneously, freely, and not through coercion, as imposed by another class, as something external to consciousness” (1971: 263). Here, Gramsci’s idea of civil society has transformed traditional Marxists’ concept of hegemony into something that denotes the ascendancy of a class in every sphere and its ability to obtain subordination of other classes by having them take values and beliefs of

that dominant class and give consent to the domination of that class. Hegemony is not only gained from using force against the disobedient but maintained by the consent of the dominated. Just as Williams (1977: 110) elaborates Gramsci's concept of hegemony:

Hegemony is then not only the articulate upper level of 'ideology', nor are its forms of control only those ordinarily seen as 'manipulation' or 'indoctrination' ...It is a lived system of meanings and values – constitutive and constituting – which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming. It is thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives (*original emphasis*).

Why hegemony becomes powerful and long-lasting lies in its deep-rootedness as a form of ideologies. Once hegemony is ideologically accepted as something natural, neutral, or even beneficial, it is difficult to challenge or resist it. Scott (1985: 236) points out hegemony has the "vital impact of power on the definition of what is practical" so that people are "no longer speaking of justice and legitimacy, but only of the more or less rational understanding of what is achievable in a given situation". Hegemony does not only coerce or persuade people to accept the fact of being dominated but also makes the domination of the ruling power legitimated or justified by those who think it's practical or realistic to do so. Nowadays, the deepening globalization and advancing technology are contributing to overwhelmingly powerful hegemony affecting many aspects of human life in more and more sophisticated and persuasive manners. Hegemony now also represents the "capacity to mobilize consent and cooperation internationally, by acting in such a way as to make at least plausible to others the claim that ...[it is ] acting in the general interest" even when it actually puts its interest first (Arrighi, 2005: 33). The national boundaries can no longer confine the influence of hegemony, particularly in terms of politics, economy, and culture, to certain corners of the world. And the

globalization makes ‘hegemony’ more ideologically powerful than ever. Based on the nature and function of ‘hegemony’ in this modern time and Scruton’s definition of hegemony (2007: 295), ‘hegemony’ may be defined in this study as “the ascendancy of [a power], not only in the economic sphere, but through all social, political and ideological spheres, and its ability thereby to persuade [others] to see the world in terms favourable to its own ascendancy”. Nowadays, the overwhelming power of hegemony has also made a profound impact on the form of resistance. One may resist coercion or force through physical efforts, but to fight against deep-rooted ideological influence of hegemony can never be achieved through force only, especially when the public are not aware that the public consent given to some hegemony has been built on false consciousness. As a result, if one would like to resist or challenge some hegemony nowadays, to break the spell of hidden hegemonic ideologies imposed on the public may be the first and the most significant step, which may be why more and more researchers or scholars call for active ideological resistance from the public against ideological manipulation of whatever form of hegemony (see also Chapter 2.3.2).

### ***2.2.2 Chinese hegemony and resistance***

Nowadays with increasing globalization, global hegemony, particularly in terms of politics, culture or economy, could have a profound impact on most people in the world. It may be argued that China, originally a regional hegemon in the East, is turning (or has turned) into a global hegemon in all of the three aspects mentioned above. ‘Hegemony with Chinese characteristics’ has already aroused global concern. In his article *Hegemony with Chinese characteristics*, Friedberg points out that competing with the U.S. for world power and influence, China has its desire to “reestablish a Sino-centric system” widely regarded as “natural and appropriate” in China (2011: 20). Friedberg, just as many other Westerners, attributes this Chinese sense of superiority to China’s

long and glorious past but does not specify why and how Chinese leaders and people develop such hegemonic attitude.

Similar to what Gramsci holds for his concept of a state and civil society, Chinese hegemony has also been achieved through force and consent, except that the public consent is partly (if not largely) developed and obtained through force. The first emperor to unify ancient China as a centralized empire was Qin Shi-huang 秦始皇 (259-210 BC), who was notorious for his dogmatism and tyranny. Under his rule, the public's freedom of expression was increasingly restricted (Sima, 1981: 236). In 213 BC, Qin ordered across the empire that books be burned, except those held by the imperial court or concerned with such practical subjects as divination, agriculture and medicine, and intellectuals with different ideologies from his be executed (ibid: 255). Since the Qin period, it has become one of the unwritten rules in China that punishment may be imposed on whoever offends emperors or those in power through use of language. The 'use of language' here does not mean only written or oral criticism but also simple, unintentional use of words in writing. The persecutions for wording, known as *literary inquisition* 文字獄, have been occurring on a quite regular basis in China (Hu, 1993). Arguably, by persecuting dissidents, China's literary inquisition serves as a means to achieve a public 'consensus' of opinion, and China's ruling class may manipulate people's thinking, which in turn strengthens political sensitivity and shapes collective ideologies.

While using force to obtain the subordination of the dominated, China develops and maintains its cultural hegemony by spreading its state philosophy - Confucianism. In terms of ruling a state, Confucius gives the top priority to establishing social order by rectifying incorrect wording for different social statuses and having everyone act according to his/her status (1980: 135, 140). Also, Confucius's distinction between the Han people (Chinese) and the non-Han people (barbarians) 華夷之辨 (ibid: 160; Liu,

2000: 128-32) has also been widely adopted as the basis of Sinocentrism and fostering the Chinese sense of cultural superiority (Terrill, 2003). While Confucianism promotes the concept: ‘do as you would be done by 己所不欲，勿施於人’, the Han people hail consumption of barbarian flesh and blood as heroic deeds. For instance, one of the sentences of a Chinese must-read poem Mǎn Jiāng Hóng 滿江紅, which is considered to be written by General Yue Fei 岳飛 (1103-1142) of the South Sòng China, explicitly describes the Han people’s great hostility or hatred towards non-Han ethnicities: “[Our] ambition is to satisfy [our] hunger by eating the flesh of barbarians and quench [our] thirst by drinking the blood of the Xiongnu<sup>1</sup> while laughing and talking 壯志飢餐胡虜肉，笑談渴飲匈奴血 (see Yao, 1995: 547; *my translation*)”. Confucianism has also taught people to ‘emulate those better than themselves 見賢思齊’, which, on the surface, holds a liberal attitude towards learning from *Others*. However, ancient China tended to take those introduced foreign cultures as part of its own invention. For example, the Han people were not keen in inventing musical instruments, which is probably because most music was considered to be lewd and decadent 靡靡之音 under Confucianism (Yu & Sun, 1987: 34). Yet, those musical instruments introduced from foreign cultures, such as Huqin 胡琴(a bowed string instrument), Yangqin 揚琴(a hammered dulcimer) and Suona 嗩吶(similar to oboes), in the end became part of the ‘national’ music instruments of China, which means they are widely thought of as China’s national heritage passed down from ancient times. Arguably, Confucianism, which seems to promote social stability, contains strong hegemonic thinking. On the one hand, Confucian plausible doctrines for obtaining and maintaining social order hold a hegemonic attitude towards the general public and guide them to act ‘properly’ through education and examination systems; on the other hand, Confucianism shapes and develops Confucian identity among Confucian communities by promoting discrimination against the non-Han

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<sup>1</sup> Nomadic tribes near the north of China proper.

people or against those who do not practice Confucianism. Nowadays, Confucius Institutes (CIs) sponsored by the Chinese government for Chinese language(s) and Confucianism learning are mushrooming worldwide as one of China's soft power initiatives. Concerns and controversies about the purpose of Confucius Institutes have arisen outside China. While some countries, such as India, reject the CIs establishment plans for suspecting China of using culture as a tool for propagating Chinese soft power (Marklein, 2009, 7 December), others consider the establishment of CIs to be a sign that China would like to express its good will and promote "harmonious society" - an essential Confucian concept (Paradise, 2009: 648). Yet, when people fear that CIs may (have) become a mouthpiece for China's policies (ibid: 659-62), they may not be aware of the ideological effects of the hegemonic denotations and connotations embedded in the classics of Confucianism.

Notably, Chinese hegemony encounters domestic resistance from time to time. The overthrow of despotic or corrupt rule is not unusual in Chinese history but often ended up with the rise of another hegemonic Chinese empire. In addition to military force, people inside China also show their resistance to Chinese hegemony in more subtle or diverse ways. For instance, resistance through Chinese translation has caused a profound impact on Chinese culture and politics. The 'foreignizing' strategy in Chinese sutra translation between the mid-second century and the early twelfth century has been largely attributed to incompetence of translators, most of whom were of foreign origin (Ma, 2004: 33-6). Yet, the existence of '*biàn wén* 變文,' a kind of vernacular script of religious stories or songs elaborated by Buddhist preachers, who might be translators as well, on the basis of the sutra translations (Song, 1983), indicates the bilingual competence of translators. As the sutra translators were found to have been "extremely sensitive to Chinese norms and practices in order for their work to be correctly positioned (Hung, 2005: 48)", it is likely that the sutra translators may show their

resistance to Chinese hegemony by providing obscure and foreignized texts. While China pursues and safeguards the ‘purity’ of the Chinese language (e.g. Mai, 2011), the foreignized Chinese sutra translation has changed much of Chinese language use (Zhu, 1989; Chu, 1992: 177-178). Centuries later, the Chinese translations even contributed to overthrowing ancient China and modernizing China. More specifically, the Chinese translators in the first half of the twentieth century awaken China to the danger of sticking to its old ways by introducing foreign thinking or bringing a literary and linguistic revolution through ideologically motivated and manipulated translations (e.g. Yang, 2006). The modernization of China in the end gives birth to another totalitarian hegemony – the People’s Republic of China, and the constant domestic resistance to Chinese hegemony, which appealed for freedom and democracy, has led to the Chinese government’s serious violations of human rights, such as the military suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests. At the time of writing, the persecution of Chinese artist Ai Weiwei 艾未未, who is a well-known critic of the Chinese government, has aroused global concern.<sup>2</sup> It is likely that domestic resistance in whatever forms calling for freedom and human rights under the totalitarian Chinese hegemony will hardly cease.

## **2.3 Power, Ideology and Translation/Interpreting**

### ***2.3.1 The link among power, ideology and translation***

Translation has long been one of the media for spreading and (re)shaping ideology in the battlefield of ‘power’. In fact, translation by nature may be seen as a political act. Alvarez & Vidal (1996: 2) consider translation to be a political act as translation is “culture bound” and “has to do with the production and ostentation of power and with

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<sup>2</sup> The information retrieved on 1 September 2012 from the BBC website at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13016289>.

the strategies used by this power in order to represent the other culture”. Translation, on micro-level, involves ideologies of different agents who create, produce, edit, revise, review or appreciate translated texts (Tahir-Gürçağlar, 2003: 113), while on macro-level, translation is usually sponsored or controlled by the ruling authorities, whose attitudes towards the *Others* tend to play a decisive role in translation development. For instance, the Roman Empire destroyed ancient Greece but refined its own literary culture by inheriting and spreading the Greek culture through systematic translation. The Romans were ambivalent about such a contradiction that the powerful Romans bowed to and benefited from the hegemonic Greek culture. Yet, Cicero (106-43BC) a linguist, translator and philosopher of the Roman Empire, recognized the ambivalence and promoted translation of Greek texts, which “creates a place for translation in the Roman curriculum and also in the higher reaches of Latin rhetorical and literary theory (Copland, 1995: 11)”. In the Middle Ages, Christian philosophy rose as a form of hegemony. Religion became the pretext for power struggles. In addition to staging wars against the *Others*, such as the Crusades (1096-1291), the powerful Church monopolized the interpretation of the Bible. Except those recognized and promulgated Bible versions, such as St. Jerome’s Vulgate (Rebenich, 2002: 50-51), other Bible translations as well as their translators were forbidden and persecuted. Martin Luther (1483-1546) of German and William Tyndale (1494-1536) of England could be the most famous of the persecuted Bible translators (O’Sullivan & Herron, 2000). Martin Luther’s German Bible translation was made in the language of the people, which not only made the Bible accessible to the public but also built a solid foundation for the modern German language. Likewise, William Tyndale, under the influence of Martin Luther, first translated the Bible from original Greek and Hebrew into early modern English and contributed a lot to the English reformation. Although both Luther and Tyndale were accused of heresy at the time, their Bible translations made a profound

impact on the language development within their own countries. European translators enriched their vernaculars by translating the Bible from Latin, Greek or Hebrew, which further contributed to the rise of the Renaissance and nationalism that brought the Middle Ages as well as Christian hegemony to an end (Bassnett, 2002: 53-57). Translation in the East is also closely linked with power. For instance, the ups and downs of the sutra translation activity in China, with its peak around the Táng Period (618-907) and significant decline around the late North Sòng Period (960-1127), was subject to whether the ruling class of ancient China used it as a means to control the mind of people and consolidate the ruling power (Ma, 2004: 18). Yet, faced with Chinese Sinocentrism and strong sense of cultural superiority, sutra translators quietly staged their resistance to Chinese hegemony through the use of foreignizing translation strategies (see also Chapter 2.2.2). Note that translation is not necessarily a site of power struggles. For instance, even during the era of the Crusades, a large number of scholars on either side in the Crusades, who were Christians, Jews, or Muslims, gathered in Toledo and engaged in translating scientific and philosophical texts from Arabic to Latin (Grant, 1996: 23-24). Just as Alvarez & Vidal (1996: 4) maintain:

Translation is not the production of one text equivalent to another text, but rather a complex process of rewriting that runs parallel both to the overall view of language and of the ‘Other’ people have throughout history; and to the influences and the balance of power that exist between one culture and another.

Whether it’s nation, race or religion that serves as the pretext for power struggle or alliance through translation, ideology remains one of the most essential elements that drive or trigger such struggle or alliance in that ideology, or a system of socially-shared ideas and beliefs, helps “legitimate the interest of a ruling group or class by distortion or dissimulation (Eagleton, 1991: 30)”. Therefore, translation may be promoted under the

influence of ‘patronage’ (Lefevere, 1992) and/or hindered by ‘censorship (Schäffner 2007: 138-40)’. For instance, to build a common cultural basis and a new literary repertoire for the newly established Turkish nation, a Translation Bureau was set up in Turkey around the mid-twentieth century, where a total of 1,247 ideologically selected Western classics were translated for political mission (Tahir-Gürçağlar, 2003). For another instance, Gonzalez Ruiz’s study (2000; cited from Schäffner, 2007: 139) finds that film titles translation into Spanish under the Franco regime was ideologically manipulated through censorship in order to promote Catholic values. Translation as a medium for spreading and (re)shaping ideology is thus by nature ideological. As Schaffner (2003: 23) maintains, “any translation is ideological since the choice of a source text and the use to which the subsequent target text is put are determined by the interests, aims, and objectives of social agents”.

In recent decades, the link between ideology and translation on micro-level has one of the main research foci in translation studies. Bassnett (1996: 22) suggests the need for reassessing the role of the translator, whose intervention in the process of linguistic transfer is “crucial” as translated texts are hardly free from adulteration. More specifically, every decision or choice translators make in the process of translating is under the influence of their surrounding “socio-political milieu”, which in other words is their own “culture” (Alvarez & Vidal, 1996: 5). Therefore, translators may be ‘partisan’, steering ideologically-motivated translation movement towards their desired geopolitical results. They may help reviving or boosting hegemony. John Denham’s translation entitled *The Destruction of Troy: An Essay upon the Second Book of Virgils Aeneis. Written in the Year, 1636*, which was published in 1656, may be one of the examples. By adopting a neoclassical translation method, which was, by nature, the same as free translation or domesticating translation method, Denham asserted his translation to be representation of truth and asserted himself as part of the aristocratic

literary culture. The deliberate omission of his authorship on the title page was aimed at effacing his identity and concealing his political motivation behind the translation. The time gap between the translation year and the publication year indicated on the title page implied his continual royalist loyalty and support which attempted to arouse nostalgia for those good old days under royal hegemony and to be prepared for the comeback of hegemony. Denham's domesticating translation has indeed shown that translation is not just a form of writing or rewriting but a cultural-political practice (Venuti, 1995: 44-65). Translators may also make their translations as resistance against oppression. For instance, Tymoczko (2000), by focusing on the translation of narratives of medieval Irish hero, Cu Chulainn, demonstrates how the translation of Irish literature into English at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century was manipulated to help boost Irish cultural nationalism. Cu Chulainn, a son of a mortal woman and the God Lug, was originally "a louse-ridden youth, whose battle-rages cause him to become distorted and grotesque" and was found to neglect his duty of guarding the territory border "in pursuit of a woman's backside". Yet, some patriotic Irish translators turned him into a flawless heroic model who desperately resisted oppression (ibid: 29). In a similar vein, to urge Chinese people to stand up against the Qīng China Empire, Su Manshu 蘇曼殊 in his Chinese translation of Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables* left out the original sections that could not serve his patriotic purposes, turned the original benevolent character *Bishop Myriel* into a greedy hypocrite (in order to compound the suffering of the oppressed), added a lot of plots and lines that had not been found in the original and created several characters that did not exist in the original. For instance, the heroic character *Míng Nán Dé* 明男德 (literally *Míng Male Virtue*), who hated injustice and attempted to overthrow the monarchic tyranny, was invented in order to awaken backward China through criticism made by *Nán Dé* (Wong, 2004) and to stimulate a democratic revolution in the Qīng China Empire (Deng, 2010).

Yet, translation on micro-level involves not only ideology of the translator but also ideologies of authors, critics, publishers, editors, and readers (Tahir-Gürçağlar, 2003: 113) as well as the power relations in human world. Lefevere (1992: 59-67) takes Anneliese Schütz's German translation of the *Dagboeken van Anne Frank* (the Anne Frank's diaries) as an example under the influence of a mixture of old-school ideology and commercial ideology. One of the most famous 'mistranslations' in Schütz's version is that she translated the Dutch sentence "er bestaat geen groter vijandschap op de wereld dan tussen Duitsers en Joden [there is no greater enmity in the world than between Germans and Jews]" into "eine grössere Feindschaft als zwischen *diesen* Deutschen und den Juden gibt es nicht auf der Welt! [there is no greater enmity in the world than between *these* Germans and the Jews]. Schütz defends her mistranslation by saying, 'a book you want to sell well in Germany...should not contain any insults directed at Germans" (ibid: 66). The reprinting of Schütz's translation version further indicates that the publisher's commercial deliberations are much more important than the quality of translation. In addition, Chan's study (2007)<sup>3</sup> involves a much-debated event where there are two different Mandarin versions of Hilary Clinton's memoir translated by the same group of the translators, which may serve as another translation example subject to the influence of political and commercial ideologies. Through back translation, Chan finds the Mandarin version published in Taiwan (hereinafter the Taiwan version) quite faithful to the original English version while the other Mandarin version published in China (hereinafter the China version) omits, shortens or changes all the politically sensitive passages. Chan maintains that nowadays "self-censorship has replaced state sanction as the form of information control" in China (ibid: 127), and then attributes the unfaithfulness of the China version to market forces, which drive the

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<sup>3</sup> While discussing Chan's study, the researcher would like to point out that the title of her article, *One Nation Two Translations*, is very likely to mislead those unfamiliar with cross-strait relations into thinking that Taiwan is part of China and is being governed and controlled by China, which is not true of the current status quo across the Taiwan Strait.

publishing company to shorten translation for a quick release and to modify the original content “in the name of readership, or business (ibid: 128)”. However, according to Chan, the China publishing company, Yilin Press, bought the copyright of the Taiwan version for the purpose of a quick release instead of producing its own translation version. It seems strange that instead of directly publishing the Taiwan version in simplified Mandarin for an even quicker release, Yilin Press spent time revising the translation. Furthermore, Chan suggests Yilin Press’s tendency to forsake translation quality for quick release by giving another example of Yilin Press’s simplified Chinese version of *The Lord of the Rings* as evidence (ibid: 128). However, according to Chan’s own back translation analysis, the Taiwan version has stayed close to the source texts. Since the quality of the Taiwan version is good, why did the China publisher still abandon translation quality by making changes to the Taiwan version for the purpose of quick release? As Chan points out, everything in the source texts that is “damning for the Communist regime” has been deleted in the China version. She considers it to be caused by the China publisher’s self-censorship for the sake of readership as nowadays few state-run media companies are subject to advance state censorship in China (ibid: 128). Yet, given the fact that China’s record of human rights is not considered acceptable by many nations, it may be reasonable to assume that the adulterated China version of Hilary Clinton’s memoir is subject to both commercial and political ideologies.

The idea that a translator’s behaviour is governed by their ideology (Robinson, cited from Calzada-Pérez, 2003: 7) has been confirmed by various studies; Toury (1999: 19) even argues that “it is always the translator herself or himself, as an autonomous individual, who decides how to behave, be that decision fully conscious or not”. Yet, given the increasingly strong power of world hegemony in the form of various agents or patrons of translation (Venuti, 1995, 1998; see also Chapter 2.3.2), the freedom of the

translator to exercise his/her discretion seems to be inevitably restricted. In other words, the translator's ideology may not play the most decisive role in the finalized version of his/her translation. What may need to be more aware are the power struggle behind translation and the ideologies behind that power struggle. The link among power, ideology and translation has been disclosed fully in the field of translation studies. By contrast, the link among power, ideology and interpreting, which may be seen as the oral counterpart of translation, remains much less explored. In the following Chapter 2.3.3.3, the researcher will review previous interpreting studies which have found interpreters choose what not to interpret or how to interpret source texts at their discretion and present the difference between translation and interpreting in some aspects before investigating the link among power, ideology and interpreting.

### ***2.3.2 Hegemony and resistance in translation***

Using translation/interpreting as a tool of hegemony or resistance has long existed in human history (see also Chapter 2.3.1). For instance, Cronin has observed the act of translation itself may be a form of resistance:

We are familiar with the figure of loss, infidelity and treason. Less current [...] is the figure of resistance. By resistance, we mean the desire of an individual or group not to translate a language or be translated into another language. The act of translation is consciously or unconsciously resisted. The motivations for this resistance vary, but two dominant forms are what we might call aesthetic translation resistance and political translation resistance, [...] This aesthetic resistance to translation is [...] directed at a re-ordering of the senses to quicken and intensify the experience of the foreign reality. Political translation resistance is an unwillingness to translate or be translated as a means of protecting an identity that is perceived to be under threat from another language group (1998: 39-40).

Political translation resistance may be demonstrated by minority languages which are on the verge of extinction. Cronin (2003) examines minority languages in a global setting and urges people to note the difference between ‘translation-as-assimilation’ and ‘translation-as-diversification’ as he observes:

Minority languages that are under pressure from powerful major languages can succumb at lexical and syntactic levels so that over time they become mirror-images of the dominant language. Through imitation, they lack the specificity that invites imitation. As a result of continuous translation, they can no longer be translated. There is nothing left to translate (2003: 141).

As a result, refusing to translate or be translated may be a means for these minority languages to resist losing their identity to the dominant cultures and languages.

In terms of aesthetic translation resistance, the foreignizing translation strategy advocated by German scholar Friedrich Schleiermacher (2004) and Walter Benjamin’s ‘pure language’ of translation (2004) may be two good examples. The foreignizing translation strategy is to retain as much foreignness of the source work as possible and open a window to the outside world for the target reader, while its opposite strategy, domesticating translation, attempts to make the author speak the target language as fluently as the target readers. Schleiermacher advocates the former in that it can help enrich and refine the target culture and language through proper choice of foreign text and adoption of a specific discursive strategy. In Schleiermacher’s sense, foreignizing translation seems to appreciate otherness and resist dominant culture, but fundamentally it is no more than another means to practice hegemony in that why Schleiermacher, in the nineteenth century, promotes foreignizing translation is to serve his Prussian nationalist purpose of resisting French cultural hegemony and realizing global domination of German culture through absorbing essence of the foreignness provided by translation en masse (Venuti, 1995: 99-147; Schleiermacher, 2004).

Schleiermacher's advocacy of foreignizing translation has been echoed by some renowned translation scholars in favour of retaining the style or spirit of source language in the early twentieth century, such as Walter Benjamin. Benjamin suggests that a translation should represent the original with the pure language instead of rendering it in the way as if the author him/herself had spoken the target language, and that 'fidelity as ensured by literalness' can make a translation reflect 'the great longing for linguistic complementation (2004: 81).' Generally, both Schleiermacher and Benjamin appeal for using translation as a means to resist or challenge domestic cultural values.

However, at the turn of twentieth and twenty-first centuries, translation has turned into a tool for spreading Anglo-American cultural hegemony. Venuti observes the adverse effect of Anglo-American culture on global cultural exchanges through translation in post-colonial context, which is manifest in the dangerous disproportion between English translations and other language translations in a recent world translation publications survey (1995: 14-15). What's worse, Venuti finds that not only has transparency dominated the criteria for evaluating appropriateness of English translation but also domesticating translation has been used to serve ideological purposes of the domestic culture. Perceiving that the domesticating method commonly adopted in English-language translation has contributed to reducing the original values of foreign texts and reinforcing the Anglo-American cultural hegemony, Venuti suggests that the translator be visible by adopting a foreignizing method as 'a strategic cultural intervention' to resist 'the hegemonic English-language nations and the unequal cultural exchanges (ibid: 20)' and that the reader be active in engaging in 'symptomatic reading'<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Symptomatic reading is to look critically at translated texts which are produced through a domesticating method and detect the inconsistent dictions which reveal the interpretative choice of the translator under the influence of social and cultural values of the target culture. In brief, symptomatic reading is to foreignize a domesticating translation and disclose ethnocentric violence embedded in that domesticating translation (Venuti, 1995: 24-39).

to demystify what lies behind the transparency of English-language translation (ibid: 24-29). In his following work *The Scandals of Translation: Towards an Ethics of Difference*, Venuti explicitly points out that due to its ethnocentric nature, translation can never be cultural exchanges between ‘equals’ and that ‘minoritizing translation’, which is to translate marginal foreign texts by adopting a foreignizing method, can release linguistic ‘remainder<sup>5</sup>’ that may subvert, remold or innovate the major form of language, which in turn boost the equal status of language variants and of different cultures (1998: 9-11; *my emphasis*). Looking critically at how English-language translation has contributed to the formation and reinforcement of Anglo-American cultural hegemony and suggesting the visibility of translators and the active interpretation of readers, Venuti aims to address the issue of hegemony and resistance between unequal powers by minoritizing the dominant, promoting equality of cultures, and reducing ethnocentrism within translation.

### ***2.3.3 Simultaneous interpreting: norms, roles and strategies of interpreters***

#### **2.3.3.1 Norms of interpreters**

Interpreting has been used to facilitate intercultural communication since ancient times. Although the status and function of interpreters may vary with time and space, the norms that govern the practices of interpreters seem to remain unchanged. Around the sixteenth century, interpreters in Latin America under the Spanish rule were asked to take an oath that they would “interpret clearly and openly, without omission or addition, without bias (Gargatagli, 1992; cited from Bastin, 2009: 489)”, which seems to be a simplified version of the norm suggested by Brian Harris in the late twentieth century.

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<sup>5</sup> According to Venuti (1998: 10), a variety of language uses form a ‘semiotic regime’, where the major form gains dominance over other linguistic variants, and the latter is referred to as the ‘remainder’ by Lecerle (1990).

Considering interpreters should be an “honest spokesperson”, Harris states the “true interpreter” norm:

This norm requires that people who speak on behalf of others, interpreters among them, re-express the original speakers’ ideas and the manner of expressing them as accurately as possible and without significant omissions, and not mix them up with their own ideas and expressions (1990: 118; *original emphasis*).

Such true interpreter norm, as Harris reiterates, has become an implicit consensus in circles of interpreting practices and studies as well as a foundation for mutual trust between interpreters and their clients. Also, the norms of interpreting do not vary with the modes of interpreting. In Sweden, the dialogue (community) interpreter should interpret “everything said...the way it was said (Wadensjo, 2002[1993]: 355). The norms for conference interpreting (or simultaneous interpreting in conference settings) are more specified. In giving some thoughts on the evaluation of simultaneous interpreting, Dejean le Feal summarised the professional standards for conference interpreters agreed among the members of AIIC (Association Internationale des Interprètes de Conférence):

What our listeners receive through their earphones should produce the same effect on them as the original speech does on the speaker’s audience. It should have the same cognitive content and be presented with equal clarity and precision in the same type of language (1990: 155).

### **2.3.3.2 Roles of interpreters**

As indicated above, one of the common emphases of interpreting norms is on the accuracy of rendition, which may explain why Roy finds that the roles of interpreters have been described as “a machine, a window, a bridge, and a telephone line

(2002[1993]: 347)”, which should convey original messages accurately, when she reviews how the interpreting process and the role of interpreters have been described or defined in previous studies. Historically, interpreters tend to serve as “all-round intermediaries”, which means they not only do interpreting and translating but also perform “a number of variegated and diffuse functions” (Pöchhacker & Shlesinger, 2002: 339). For instance, Malinche, also known as Malintzin and Dona Marina, who contributed a lot to Hernán Cortés’ conquest of Mexico in the sixteenth century, served as not only his interpreter and secretary but also “his companion, advisor, secret agent, and the mother of his child (Bastin, 2009: 487). In modern times, interpreting becomes a profession and the job of an interpreter is generally limited to interpreting. The role of interpreters used to be thought of as mechanic. Solow considers (sign language) interpreters should act as a telephone:

The sign language interpreter acts as a communication link between people, serving only in that capacity. An analogy is in the use of the telephone – the telephone is a link between two people that does not exert a personal influence on either (1980: ix).

Meanwhile, Wadensjo (2002[1993]: 357) points out that according to the common code of conduct for interpreters, the idealized roles of dialogue interpreters may be a copying machine, a telephone, or a cook, all of which should strive to preserve and represent the original without personal involvement. In terms of conference interpreting, the role of conference interpreters, which is mainly “mediators or channels between languages”, has not undergone drastic changes (Roy, 2002[1993]: 348-349). In other words, conference interpreters are still widely seen as a conduit without any personal involvement (Angelelli, 2004: 14), which echoes Kopczynski’s finding (1994) that a conference interpreter is largely expected to play the ‘ghost’ role instead of the intruder

role, especially when the users are diplomats.

However, there have been a number of (non-SI) interpreting studies focusing on how interpreters play their role in the rendering process, or more specifically, how interpreters participate in the interaction among those they provide interpreting services for, and all of them suggest that interpreters are playing their role as a co-participant and hardly remain neutral all the way through such interaction. For instance, while investigating how a Russian-Swedish dialogue interpreter deals with her task between a female police officer and a male Russian speaker who wishes to apply for an extended residence permit in Sweden, Wadensjö finds that dialogue interpreters provide not only service but also control over the interaction on interpreting occasions in that they “takes/is given a unique, and potentially a powerful, middle position (2002[1993]: 367-368)”. The manifestation of such control may be embodied in their “deviations from originals...in specification or despecification relative to the original utterances (ibid: 364)” or in their roles as a co-ordinator or gatekeeper in between the parties concerned. Likewise, Roy maintains that interpreters can hardly remain detached during interpreting:

...the interpreter is an active, third participants with potential to influence both the direction and the outcome of the event, and that the event itself is intercultural and interpersonal rather than simply mechanical and technical (2002[1993]: 352).

There is also discrepancy between users’ expectation of an interpreter and the ‘third party’ role of interpreters under professional norms. More and more studies suggest the participatory or active role of interpreters in the interpreting process. Collados Ais investigates whether a German-Spanish interpreter’s intonation may affect the assessment of the users. 42 legal experts are asked to rate three renditions of the same source text in order to find whether intonation influences end-users’ perception of

simultaneous interpreting quality. It is found that the users prefer lively interpreting intonation even when the speaker delivers with monotonous intonation, which indicates that interpreters may be expected to provide “a certain degree of intrusion or active involvement” during interpreting (2002[1998]: 336).

### **2.3.3.3 Strategies of interpreters**

Not only have the idealized roles of interpreters been proved to be unrealistic but also the ‘accuracy’ of rendition does not necessarily mean word-for-word interpretation. For instance, Stanzl does not hail completeness as one of the most important factors in evaluating quality of interpreting renditions. Instead, she argues that “a clear and intelligible text with some information loss may be more useful to the audience”, which should ease listening burden of the audience as “not every item of information is equally important” to the audience (1983: 29f.). Minor ungrammatical errors may be tolerable, especially in the simultaneous mode. Kurz (1993) investigates the expectations of several user groups towards English-German simultaneous interpreting performance given at a medical conference and finds that as a whole, “sense consistency with original message” is the most emphasised among the quality criteria, and by contrast, correct grammatical usage is not given top priority among the quality criteria as ungrammatical mistakes are not irregular in spoken language and they do not necessarily undermine comprehension of an oral rendition, which also echoes Seleskovitch’s viewpoint that “minor linguistic errors are only perceived on second hearing” and may not be “noticed by those who are listening for substance (1986: 236)”.

The unlikelihood of achieving 100% accuracy or completeness in simultaneous interpreting is also reflected in a large number of previous studies of a variety of interpreting strategies that are used or needed to cope adequately with SI cognitive

demands. For instance, dissimilarities in linguistic structure between different languages are one of the major reasons why SI interpreters fail to keep simultaneity and thus may compromise completeness or accuracy. To carry out SI tasks adequately, interpreters may need to wait longer for a meaningful segmented unit delivered by the speaker, fill the waiting periods with padding expressions, omit, reduce or compress source information, etc (Kirchhoff, 2002 [1976]). Anticipation is another very important strategy to cope with dissimilarities in linguistic structures between the source and the target languages. Linguistically or syntactically, anticipation is usually “used for countering verb-last or Head-noun-last structures (Setton, 1999: 52)”. Anticipation also involves extralinguistic aspects as well, which is “a function of the rhetoric of the discourse and the interpreters’ extralinguistic knowledge” and “varies according to situational and personal factors which have been little explored” (Lederer, 1981; cited from Setton, 1999: 52). Here the extralinguistic knowledge can be seen as part of one’s schema, a detailed definition of which may be given by Taylor and Crocker (1981: 91):

A schema is a cognitive structure that consists in part of the representation of some defined stimulus domain. The schema contains general knowledge about that domain, including a specification of the relationships among its attributes, as well as specific examples or instances of the stimulus domain.

Schema theory, which is widely applied to constructive learning, emphasizes organization of past experiences on which knowledge may be built and expanded. Rumelhart (1980: 34) defines the word ‘schema’ as ‘a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory’. Schemata are results of previous knowledge or experience in every aspect of one’s life. When people need to process information, they trigger their existing schemata. The best situation of simultaneous interpreting is that interpreters faithfully and adequately interpret the source-language speeches into the

target-language ones for target audience. However, Chilton (2004) maintains that people tend to interpret text on the basis of their previous knowledge, interest, or presumptions, or more specifically, schemata. Since schemata vary with individuals, it is likely that interpretation of the same text vary with individuals. Also, as simultaneous interpreting takes place at the same time of the source language speech, interpreters sometimes may produce the surface-oriented rendering (Kohn & Kalina, 1996), which implies that interpreters may utter whatever can be retrieved in the easiest or quickest way from their schemata. Yet, when an idea is commonly accepted and shared by a group of people, it is not just part of their schema but becomes a more deeply rooted ideology, which may exert greater influence on one's interpreting rendition.

An interpreter's previous knowledge, be it schema or ideology, has been found to influence his/her attitude or strategies adopted during interpreting. For instance, by looking at how four Russian-English dialogue interpreters respectively deal with the same English-speaking police interviews with Russian witnesses, Krouglov (1999) finds that interpreters tend to avoid or change colloquialisms and hedges, which are commonly seen in informal Russian, through strategies of mitigation or omission, which means interpreters fail to retain the original stylistic markers. In terms of consecutive interpreting studies, Baker (1997) investigates the effects of psychological and cultural constraints on interpreter performance during a consecutive interpreting of a British televised interview with Saddam Hussein in late 1990. The live interview was recorded in Baghdad around the time between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the start of the Gulf War, with a main interpreter rendering Hussein's words into English<sup>6</sup> and a back-up interpreter nearby, both of whom were possibly hired by the host country. Through a careful review of the rendering process, Baker finds possible 'implications of

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<sup>6</sup> Baker also mentions that in some countries, especially those in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, interpreters often render from their mother tongue into a foreign language as properly understanding source speeches is more emphasized than properly interpreting in the target language (1997: 113), which may also be the case in the Chinese-language world.

the use of certain strategies in terms of reinforcing cultural stereotypes, constructing a convenient image of the enemy, and enabling or obstructing an understanding of the other's points of view and priorities (1997: 112). Baker's another study (2006) looks, through narrative theory, at how translators and interpreters participate in circulating or resisting the narratives which contribute to political conflicts at a global setting, while Pöchhacker (2006), through a review of a few historical examples, finds that interpreters have been made actively involved in, rather than just playing an intermediary role between powerful ideologies.

Although SI interpreters are widely regarded as playing just a conduit role in light of their lack of interaction with the speaker and the listener and their involvement in monologic discourse, SI interpreters in fact have been found not to be as 'neutral' or 'faithful' to the original. Schjoldager (1995) suggests that SI interpreters may produce deviant renditions in order to maintain their output fluency and credibility. Attempting to investigate translational norms in simultaneous interpreting, Schjoldager evaluates performance of interpreters of different levels, particularly on the translation of the Danish word "gravol" into English and finds that her interpreter-subjects may say something irrelevant to source text but "contextually plausible (ibid: 84)", which indicates interpreters may follow operational norms rather than normative norms when rendering something difficult to them. Directionality is also found to have an impact on the choice of SI strategies. In Chang & Schallert's study (2007), ten professional interpreters, who are Mandarin native speakers and freelance conference interpreters mainly working in Taiwan, are asked to simultaneously interpret two speeches from English to Mandarin and two other speeches the other way round in a laboratory setting. All of the speech texts are non-political. It is found that when interpreting into one's B language (from Mandarin to English in their study), professional interpreters tend to generalize, omit or summarize the Mandarin source texts, "express both the explicit and

implicit messages conveyed by the text (ibid: 152)”, employ anticipation strategies based on their “prior knowledge about the speaker or the topic (ibid: 153), and avoid “expressions they were not familiar with or not able to retrieve immediately from memory (ibid: 154)”. It is also found that some interpreters may be critical of source texts and produce negative feelings toward the speaker or the source texts, which Chang & Schallert consider to be “a by-product of the participant’s search for coherence in the source speech (ibid: 159)”. The rendering data provided in their study may also give a general picture of the SI conversion from Mandarin source texts (ST) to English target texts (TT) performed by professional Mandarin interpreters. The following shows one ST with a translation of Chang & Schallert and its corresponding TTs produced by three of the participating interpreters (ibid: 163-165):

ST: 我想年輕朋友在育幼院和老人安養中心從事志工服務，一定會做得更好  
因為年輕朋友較懂得如何與小朋友互動，也更能夠讓老人家窩心  
(I think if young people volunteer in orphanages and nursing homes for the  
elderly, they can definitely do a better job, because they know how to interact  
with children and can warm the hearts of the elderly.)

TT 1: When young people work in orphanages and in elderly homes, they will be able to do a better job *than anyone else*, because the young will know how to interact with children *much better than an adult* and they also know how to connect with elderly (Interpreter S; original emphasis).

TT 2: I believe, for young people, they can do a better job in volunteering works at nursery schools, orphanage or uh in the service for elderly people [pause] (Interpreter R).

TT 3: I believe with your help, we will do a much better job in nursing home and some child-care facilities (Interpreter N).

As indicated by these TT examples, SI rendering from Mandarin to English is usually meaning-based and interpreters may interpret the source meaning based on their prior

knowledge and experience, which is why strategies of addition, omission, compression, syntactic transformation, or use of different pronouns can be found in these renditions. While Chang and Schallert's study focuses on the link between language direction and SI strategies, Beaton's study (2007) may be one of the few that address ideology issue in SI studies in a genuine political setting. Analyzing the renditions of some SI interpreters working from German into English during European Parliament plenary sessions, Beaton finds that EU institutional hegemony is being strengthened by SI interpreters through lexical repetition and metaphor strings and suggests the existence of the ideological struggle between EU institutional hegemony and interpreter axiology. Beaton's study sheds light on the effects of institutionalized ideology in SI practices, but to what extent freelance SI interpreters who work at a non-institutional setting would have their own ideology interfere with their renditions remains uncertain.

#### **2.3.3.4 Differences between novices and professionals in interpreting studies**

The difference between trainee interpreters (or novice interpreters) and professional interpreters in various aspects is also one of the main foci of interpreting studies. Some researchers investigate the difference from physiological or cognitive perspectives. For instance, examining the stressfulness under SI tasks, Kurz (2003) measures the pulse rate and the skin conductance level of two professional interpreters and three trainee interpreters carrying out German/English SI tasks, suggesting that trainee interpreters suffer higher physiological stress. Daro & Fabbro (1994) and Padilla et al. (1995) find that professional interpreters perform better than trainee interpreters in terms of working memory. Yet, Liu et al. (2004: 36) argue that the differences in working memory capacity may not be a reliable distinction between professional and trainee interpreters although in the same study, where 11 professional interpreters and

22 trainee students, all of whom are Mandarin native speakers, are asked to simultaneously interpret source texts from English to Mandarin, it is found that professional interpreters maintain a higher level of performance than the other two trainee interpreter groups, which the researchers conclude may be because professional interpreters are more experienced in selecting essential source messages and making quick adjustments to difficult units of the source texts. Kopke & Nespoulous (2006) also investigate the difference in working memory performance between professional and trainee interpreters and find that trainee interpreters perform better than professionals in such complex memory tasks as free recall with articulatory suppression, the category probe task, and the listening span test.

There are some other interpreting studies investigating the difference between novices and experts from linguistic or pragmatic aspects. For instance, investigating coherence in consecutive interpreting, Peng (2009) compares the Chinese-English consecutive renditions produced by eight trainee interpreters and three professional interpreters and finds that trainee interpreters lay stress on local cohesion while professionals focus on global structure of the discourse. To investigate the phenomenon of verb anticipation in SI from German into English, Jörg (1997) makes six professional interpreters and six trainee interpreters interpret into English simultaneously an abridged version of the German President Roman Herzog's speech marking the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of the Second World War and suggests that professional interpreters generally produce more consistent anticipation performance than trainee interpreters and that "verb anticipation skills were better developed in native speakers of the SL (ibid: 228)". To investigate whether translational norms may be applied to simultaneous interpreting, Schjoldager (1995) has a group of beginner student interpreters and a group of advanced student interpreters simultaneously interpret the same speeches between Danish and English. Through a source-target text comparison,

Schjoldager finds that the former group encounters severe difficulties, particularly in terms of the simultaneity of the task, and therefore omits something tricky in their renditions. By contrast, the advanced student interpreters group performs better, but they are found to produce something irrelevant to source text but “contextually plausible (ibid: 84)”, which makes their output seemingly fluent and credible. The issue of interpreters’ linguistic autonomy is further explored by Setton & Motta in 2007, who investigate quality and reformulation in simultaneous-with-text interpreting by examining the renditions from English into French produced by 11 professional interpreters and 13 trainee interpreters and asking four French professional users of conference interpreting to judge and rate the collected interpreting data. Although experience proves to be a predictor of quality appreciated by the users, professional interpreters are more linguistically autonomous than trainee interpreters only in terms of lexical elaboration and explication. It is found that trainee interpreters are more linguistically autonomous than professional interpreters in terms of restructuring or reformulation. Also, although professional interpreters may generally give a higher level of performance than trainee interpreters, three of the latter group participants “came out ahead of experts (ibid: 221)”, which may indicate that it is not a rule that trainee interpreters always give poorer performance than professional interpreters. What is also worth noting is that one of the professional interpreters is highly praised for her rhythm by the four users and for her word choice and mastery of professional terminology by two of the four users and therefore is rated to be the second best performer of all the interpreters. However, the transcription of her rendition reveals that “she made significantly more errors, solecisms and so on than the other eight top performers, as well as significantly more elaboration and paraphrase than most other user’s favourites (ibid: 221-222)”. This finding indeed echoes Seleskovitch’s comment that linguistic errors may not be of significance to users (1986: 236) and reflects the

discrepancy between users' expectation and professional norms. Pio (2003) makes 10 trainee interpreters and five professional interpreters simultaneously interpret from German into Italian two source speeches which are delivered at different rates and see if the delivery rate of source speeches may have an impact on SI interpreters' performance. It is found that trainee students encounter greater problems than professionals when interpreting a source text delivered at high rate. Similarly, Korpál (2012) finds that the faster speech delivery speed is, the more omissions trainee interpreters make during their simultaneous interpreting task. However, Korpál's study suggests that if the speaker's delivery rate is not taken into consideration, there is no significant difference between the groups of professionals and trainees in terms of the use of the omission strategy.

As indicated above, most of the studies which compare the performance of professional interpreters and trainee interpreters report that the former group outperforms the latter. Yet, the efficacy or validity of these comparison results has generally been discounted by the limited number of the participating subjects, not to mention that trainee interpreters are sometimes found to outperform professional interpreters in certain aspects. It should be also noted that most of such comparison studies aim to improve the quality of interpreting by investigating an interpreter's ability to cope with SI difficulties. In terms of the ideological implications which may be embodied in SI renditions, still few have paid attention in this regard.

#### **2.3.3.5 Importance of investigating ideology impact on SI renditions**

Translations in written form frequently come under ideological influences of 'patronage (Lefevre, 1992)' and/or 'censorship (Schäffner, 2007: 138-40). By contrast, interpreting is characteristic of evanescence. People do not know exactly how they are

going to express themselves until they open their mouths; once spoken, words are fading and only meanings may stay in the minds of listener (Seleskovitch, 1994: 12-18). In consequence, little prior censorship could apply to interpreting. Arguably, simultaneous interpreting, which is supposed to synchronize source delivery, may be most likely to escape censorship compared with the other interpreting modes. In light of the extensive employment of SI at international settings and the relative lack of SI ideology research, an investigation into the effect of an interpreter's ideology on his/her SI renditions may provide valuable information for those who would like to ensure the legitimization of their side of stories in the SI mode.

Although the research interest in the impact of ideology on interpreting is growing, few studies have provided sufficient and strong evidence for how an interpreter's ideology influences his/her renditions especially in terms of simultaneous interpreting of political texts. It may be argued that of all the interpreting modes, simultaneous interpreting may be under the greatest influence of ideology since ideology usually works invisibly especially when simultaneous interpreters, compared with consecutive interpreters or dialogue interpreters, have to work under tighter time constraints and count on their knowledge acquired prior to their interpreting tasks (Gile, 2009: 52). Just as Baker (2006: 1) states, 'In this conflict-ridden and globalized world, translation is central to the ability of all parties to legitimize their version of events, especially in view of the fact that political and other types of conflict today are played out in the international arena and can no longer be resolved by appealing to local constituencies alone.' The increasing importance of translation and interpreting within the political or cultural context is immediately evident. In light of the extensive employment of simultaneous interpreting in international political and economic settings, it is necessary to investigate empirically and scientifically the effects of an individual interpreter's ideology on his/her simultaneous renditions.

### 2.3.4 *Identity in interpreting*

Interpreting, whose development precedes that of translation, has also been used as a tool for power struggles. For instance, interpreters were indispensable for the spreading of Euro-colonialism. Whether the success of the maritime empire of the *Dutch East India Company (VOC)* (e.g. Campbell, 1903) or the Spanish conquest of Latin America (Bastin, 2009) could be partly, if not largely, attributed to the service of interpreters, who had played a significant role in consolidating the ruling power by spreading the ideology of the dominant among the dominated and preventing or pacifying resistance from the dominated. The historical role of interpreters as “all-round intermediaries (Pochhacker & Shlesinger, 2002: 339)” well explains the link between interpreting and power. Meanwhile, just as translation, interpreting development is also subject to the attitudes of the ruling authorities towards the *Others*. The use of interpreting, on the one hand, serves as tool for spreading hegemony; on the other hand, it is a means for the ruling authorities to gain ‘consent’ to their hegemony from the *Others* linguistically rather than forcibly.

The intermediary role of interpreters between one’s own culture and the *Other* used to put interpreters in a precarious situation. For instance, in ancient China, interpreters, who were called *shé rén* 舌人 (literally *tongue man*), were often looked down upon by both elite and general public (Li, 2002: 1-5). Even in the early to mid nineteenth century, interpreters (and translators) were often labelled as traitors or evil-doers due to their connection with foreigners (Wong, 2007: 54). Interpreters are often caught in struggles over divided loyalties, and their identities are often questioned by either side that counts on interpreting service (Cronin, 2006), which may be exemplified by the case of Italian Dominican-turned-interpreter *Victorio Riccio* in the seventeenth century. Having carried out his missionary work around southeast China for seven years, Riccio was first

summoned (by force) to Taiwan by Koxinga<sup>7</sup> in April 1662 and ordered to go to Manila as an envoy with Koxinga's letters requesting the surrender of the Spanish administration to Koxinga. While Riccio's appointment as Koxinga's envoy was viewed as an honour by the Chinese (Lian, 1984: 35-36), Riccio was extremely terrified of working for tyrannical Koxinga, which was manifested in Riccio's talk about his dispatch with Koxinga in Taiwan:

[Koxinga] gave him the open letters..., bidding him never to return if his [Koxinga's] demands were not met. He gave him the money for the trip and the father [i.e., Riccio], unable to say anything, or to protest – for this would mean having his throat cut – departed in tears...(cited from Borao Mateo, 2002: 600)

Since then, because of some unexpected twists and turns, Riccio travelled among Taiwan, Manila and China several times as an envoy negotiating among and on behalf of the three parties separately: the Chinese Cheng regime, the Spanish administration in Manila, and the Dutch who recovered the northern tip of Taiwan and hoped for reclaiming Taiwan from the Cheng regime. Riccio was lucky enough to escape death during his interpreting career. However, his extraordinary experiences drew suspicion from the Qing China authorities of his previous collaboration with the Cheng regime and prevented him from carrying out missionary work in China. When he finally left China for Manila in 1666 in the hope of continuing his mission work there, the Spanish authorities received him with suspicion as well (Borao Mateo, 2002: 598-600; Borao Mateo, 2009: 61-62, 198-199).

Compared with that of translation, resistance of interpreters against hegemony may be arguably more direct or consequential in that interpreting renditions reach the listener almost immediately after they are produced or interpreters tend to be in direct contact

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<sup>7</sup> Koxinga, or Cheng Cheng-kung, was a Ming China loyalist who seized Taiwan from the Dutch in 1662 and established the Cheng regime in Taiwan as a stronghold against Qing China. See also Chapter 2.5.1.

with the listener. Although the evanescent nature of interpreting makes it difficult to study the past performance of interpreters (Bowen et al. 1995: 245), however, “power is everywhere in the definition, context and practice of interpreting (Cronin, 2002: 387)”, and whenever there is hegemony, there may be resistance in whatever forms. There have been some examples in which interpreters show resistance in various manners to hegemony. For instance, Levi in his book *Se questo è un uomo* (1958: 21) describes how a Jew named Flesch in Auschwitz reacted to the humiliating task of interpreting derogatory words from German into Italian:

Parla breve, l'interprete traduce. 'Il maresciallo dice che dovete fare silenzio, perche questa non e una scuola rabbinica.' Si vedono le parole non sue, le parole cattive, torcergli la bocca uscendo, come se sputasse un boccone disgustoso. Lo preghiamo di chiedergli che cosa aspettiamo, quanto tempo ancora staremo qui, delle nostre donne, tutto: ma lui dice che no, che non vuol chiedere. Questo Flesch, chi si adatta molto a malincuore a tradurre in italiano frasi tedesche piene di gelo, e rifiuta di volgere in tedesco le nostre domande perches a che e inutile, e un ebreo tedesco sulla cinquantina.

[He speaks briefly, the interpreter translates, 'The Officer says you should be quiet because this is not a rabbinical school.' The words are not his, bad words, making his mouth writhe in disgust as if he was spitting out a horrible drink. We request him to ask what to expect, how long will we be here, about our wives, everything; but he says no, he does not want to ask. This Flesch, who very reluctantly translates into Italian German sentences full of ice and refuses to translate our questions into German because he knows it is useless, is a German Jew around fifty years old.] (cited from Cronin, 2006: 77).

The German interpreter chose to keep silent when he was asked by his fellow inmates to interpret some questions into his mother language. His refusal is actually a gesture of resistance against hegemonic humiliation. Another example of interpreters' resistance results in more profound consequences. The resistance of Chinese interpreter Pinqua against the Dutch was said to be significant in making the Dutch lose Taiwan to a Míng

China loyalist Koxinga in early 1662 (see also Chapter 2.5.1). Pinqua, who was a Chinese headman in the service of the Dutch authorities, had been relied on heavily by the Dutch in terms of dealing with the Formosans<sup>8</sup> and the Chinese. Yet, he betrayed the trust of the Dutch by instigating and assisting Koxinga's seizure of Taiwan (Campbell, 1903: 475). No matter what drove Pinqua to transfer his loyalty to Koxinga, his betrayal of the Dutch authorities might be seen as resistance to the colonizer. Notably, the two examples of interpreters' resistance may be partly attributed to identity issue. More specifically, while interpreters provide service for the *Other*, their identities may play a significant role in how they undertake their interpreting tasks.

#### **2.4 Chinese Hegemony in the One China Policy/Taiwan Issue**

The Taiwan (independence) issue has always been one of the main concerns for China, which always claims that Taiwan has long been part of China and that China will attack Taiwan by force if Taiwan formally declares independence. Here, the historical relations between Taiwan and China should be clarified first. Originally part of the territory of Qīng China, Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 after the defeat of Qīng China in the First Sino-Japan war. In 1945, the defeat of Japan in the Second Sino-Japan War (part of the Second World War) caused the handover of Taiwan to the Republic of China (the R.O.C.), which had overthrown Qing China in 1911. In 1949, the R.O.C. government lost the civil war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and fled to Taiwan. Since then, the CCP has established the People's Republic of China (the P.R.C.) and claimed that the P.R.C. represents legitimate China. In the 1950s, China made several unsuccessful military attempts at seizing Taiwan. Since that, China has been working to decrease Taiwan's international status. It is presumed in this study that the

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<sup>8</sup> Taiwan was better known to the West as Formosa, a name given by the Portuguese mariners who exclaimed 'Ilha *Formosa* (beautiful island)' when discovering Taiwan in the early sixteenth century (Mackay, 1900: 47). The natives on Taiwan were generally termed Formosans.

political speeches involving the Taiwan issue or the One China policy may have an impact on Mandarin trainee interpreters from Taiwan and China. Before investigating the link between a Chinese or Taiwanese interpreter's political ideology and his/her SI renditions of cross-strait political texts, it should be necessary to discuss the relationship between ideology and language use in either nation especially in the post-1949 period. In this chapter, the researcher will discuss how translation/interpreting has been used as a tool in China for shaping and manipulation of ideology, with a focus on the One China policy.

#### ***2.4.1 Chinese translation development in the early period of the P.R.C.***

The fact that translation has been used as a means to develop and diffuse specific ideologies since the very beginning of the birth of the P.R.C. is made manifest in some opinions or instructions of a number of key CCP founding leaders in terms of translation practices. As early as in 1945, Mao Zedong 毛泽东(1893-1976) recognized the contribution of translation to the introduction of Marxism to China and in turn to the birth of the P.R.C. (Chen, 1992: 382). Zhou Enlai 周恩来(1898-1976), the first prime minister of the P.R.C., maintained in late 1970 that one should be necessarily equipped with a strong political sense, a high level of language proficiency, and a variety of cultural knowledge while doing translation (Zhou, 1984: 232). Chen Yi 陈毅 (1901-1972), one of the founders and leaders of China's People's Liberation Army, considered tasks involving foreign languages (or more specifically, translation and interpreting tasks) to be political by nature and viewed foreign languages as an instrument for political struggles (FLTREO, 1962). To use translation in a more effective and organized way for political purposes, Mao Dun 茅盾, then cultural minister of the P.R.C., proclaimed in the first National Conference on Literary

Translation 全国文学翻译工作会议 in 1954 that literary translation in China had to proceed under the leadership and supervision of the CCP and the Chinese government in order to solve the translation-related problems existing in China. For instance, Mao Dun was concerned that publishers, who had the final say in selecting source works, seldom took into consideration whether the selected works were conducive to education in ideology and politics (Mao, 1984 [1954]: 506). Under the political control, China's translation policy during the 1950s was "overall Sovietization 全盘苏化", focusing mainly on translation of Marxist-Leninist, socialist and proletarian literature in order to popularize and reinforce socialism across China (Fang, 2005: 433-76). China's translation practice during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) saw the darkest age in its translation history. Many Chinese writers and translators suffered political persecution, including famous Mandarin-French translator Fu Lei 傅雷 (ibid: 256) and Mandarin-English translators Yang Xianyi 杨宪益 and his wife Gladys Margaret Tayler (Lei, 2007). Also, some literary works of high artistic value were stigmatized just because they did not fit in with the mainstream ideology. For instance, *The Scarlet Letter* by Nathaniel Hawthorne and *Le Rouge et le Noir* by Stendhal were both labelled as pornographic novels (Fang, 2005: 435). Despite a sharp decline in translation activity of the time, the publication of translated texts was not brought to a halt but "launched internally 内部发行" under the manipulation of the Chinese government (Xie, 2009). The selection of source texts was politically motivated in response to the mainstream ideology of the Cultural Revolution leadership that aimed to prevent the comeback of capitalism and to reflect the sour relations between China and the Soviet Union. In consequence, the content of the selected works, the majority of which were still from the Soviet Union, was about the suffering of the working people under the capitalist mentality of the deteriorating Soviet Union leadership or about the dark sides of the hegemonic Soviet Union (ibid). It is clear that right from the beginning of the birth of

the P.R.C., translation has become one of the instruments for power struggles at home and abroad, and translation practices could be manipulated through political control and persecution.

#### ***2.4.2 The link among ideology, education and translation in the P.R.C.***

With the end of the Cultural Revolution and the implementation of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ initiated by Deng Xiaoping 邓小平, which is considered to suit the Chinese social context and facilitate China’s economic reform and opening-up, China’s translation practice became more and more prosperous and diversified, and translation from Mandarin into foreign languages has gradually assumed its prominence in China.

Seemingly granted much more freedom than before, translation practice in China, from translation education to translated text publication, is still under great political influence and control. The Chinese government develops pure and practical ideology that can stimulate an individual’s strong commitment to the country and make him/her know “how to act ‘correctly’ on the basis of his/her commitment (Schurmann, 1968: 39; *original emphasis*)” and uses the inclusive educational and propaganda systems for shaping and instilling such ideology. Students at every level of educational programs, from as young as kindergarten children, are taught and trained to develop a deep sense of patriotic duty (e.g. Zhao, 1995; Wang & Xu, 2011), and almost every subject at school, including physical education, chemistry and English, can be linked with patriotism and socialist education (Li, G., 2011; Li. Y., 2011; Shi, 2011). For instance, specific political ideologies are embedded in English sentences or materials used in English class or tests at every educational level to develop students’ patriotism, such as the English sentence “We love our motherland” at primary school (Li. Y., 2011), the

lesson on “The Great Wall of China” at high school (Tang, 2010), or the test item on ‘yī guó liǎng zhì (one country two systems)’ for senior high school students (Zhang, 1997). Apart from the educational system, every medium that involves transmission or communication of information for Chinese people is subject to the control of the Chinese government (Shambaugh, 2008: 107), which results in the ‘unanimous’ voices of most Chinese media or institutions, whether they use Mandarin or foreign languages. For instance, with the joint effort of a variety of governmental bodies, academic institutions and mainstream news media, the Translators Association of China 中国翻译协会, the only nation-wide translation association in China, has established “权威词库 (literally *authoritative phrase bank*)”, or “Bilingual Terms” on its English version website, where official and standardized English translations of a wide range of Chinese sentences or phrases concerning national policy, diplomacy, or political propaganda are made public. Some of them, if not many, carry explicit ideologies, such as 坚持党总揽全局、协调各方的领导核心作用 *uphold the Party's central role in exercising overall leadership and coordinating work in all sectors*<sup>9</sup> or 我们不能割断民族的文化血脉 *We must never sever the cultural vein of our nation.*<sup>10</sup> As indicated, not only the English translations but also the ideologies embedded in these translations are under clear guidance of the authorities concerned.

### **2.4.3 The hegemonic implications of China English**

In addition to specific translation guidance, Chinese-English translation practice is also under the influence of ‘China English 中国英语’. The concept of China English was first proposed by Ge Chuangui 葛传规 in 1980 (Ge, 1980) and then elaborated by

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<sup>9</sup> Retrieved 8 June 2012 on the website of Translators Association of China from [http://www.tac-online.org.cn/en/tran/2010-12/23/content\\_3917753.htm](http://www.tac-online.org.cn/en/tran/2010-12/23/content_3917753.htm).

<sup>10</sup> Retrieved 8 June 2012 on the website of Translators Association of China from [http://www.tac-online.org.cn/en/tran/2010-12/23/content\\_3917711.htm](http://www.tac-online.org.cn/en/tran/2010-12/23/content_3917711.htm).

Li (1993: 80) into “mainly used as an international language in China, with Chinese borrowings, nativized lexicology as well as unique syntax and discourse structure as its major features, [which] contributes much to the international communication”. In brief, China English is different from Chinese English; the former is deemed as English with Chinese social and cultural characteristics while the latter is similar to pidgin English or known as Chinglish (Jiao, 2009). Since the 1980s, there has been a growing trend towards recognition of China English (e.g. Pan, 2002; Wu, 2008). Although a few Chinese researchers are worried that China English, which is deviant from standard English, may hinder intercultural communication (Qiu & Ning, 2002), it is widely maintained in China that the use of China English can enhance China’s international status, promote Chinese culture to the world, strengthen Chinese national identity and solidarity, contribute to expansion of English vocabulary, and suit China’s social reality (Liu, 2006; Zhou, 2007; Jiao, 2009; Luo, 2010). Some further insist that the English language, which represents the Anglo-American culture, is not appropriate for Chinese society, and that only by using China English can Chinese people adequately express themselves and communicate Chinese culture (Du, 1998; Li, 2010). Chinese translators and interpreters are urged to adopt such translation approaches as transliteration, literal translation, or transliteration/literal translation with explanation when dealing with Chinese-English translation by using China English, which Chinese translation researchers argue can retain complete cultural meanings and characteristics of Chinese words (Jin, 2001: 16; Bao, 2008; Luo, 2010: 54-6), increase China’s cultural status and influence on the international stage (Lin, 1999; Li, 2010), demonstrate the confidence of Chinese translators/interpreters in their domestic culture (Bao, 2008: 322), enable Chinese translators/interpreters to be a competent cultural mediator and make translation from Mandarin into English easier (Liu, 2006; Luo, 2008: 97), and win wide acceptance by foreigners (Li, 2010: 105). The debate over China English may be well

illustrated by the political term ‘*yī guó liǎng zhì* 一国两制’, which was proposed formally by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s and initially aimed at solving the Taiwan issue by wooing Taiwan to become one of China’s special administrative regions that may retain their capitalist system (Li, K., 1995). Also, by promoting an ‘emotional bonding’ between Taiwan and the people of China and emphasizing the link between territorial integrity and national dignity, the Chinese government has made ‘liberating Taiwan’ a general consensus among its people (Wachman, 2007: 122; *original emphasis*). The literal translation of the term in China English, ‘one country two systems’, is widely accepted and used in China. Yuan (1997) suggests that the literal translation of the term be corrected into ‘one country with two systems’ by following the way in which some foreign media translate the term. However, strongly disagreeing with Yuan’s viewpoint, Du (1997: 55) explains why the original China English translation must not be changed:

“一国两制”不是一个词组，而是一句话。它指的是一种作法，是一项意义深远的基本国策，具有极强的感召力。...之所以要把“two systems”后置，是因为它既是对“一个国家”的具体情况和国策的阐述，又是实现中国这样“一个国家”的统一的前提，在此不能不作为话语重心予以特别强调。

(Literal translation. “*Yī guó liǎng zhì*” is not a phrase but a sentence. It refers to a way [of doing something], a basic national policy with profound meanings, and has an extremely strong force of impelling...The reason why “two systems” is post-positioned is that it not only elaborates the specific situation and national policy of “one country” but also realizes the premise of unification of “one country” as China. Here [the phrase ‘one country’] must be specially emphasized as the focus of the sentence.)

Du (1997: 55) further points out that when people outside China adopt the China English translation of ‘*yī guó liǎng zhì*’, which is ‘one country two systems’, it means:

老老实实在地接受了中国人的说法，标志着对中国特有的社会现实和语言现实的承认。

(Literal translation. [They] accept Chinese people's statement without affectation, signifying [their] acknowledgement of China's special social reality and linguistic reality.)

The widespread support for Du's argument within China (e.g. Wang, 2006) indicates that the use of China English is highly associated with China's assertion of its political and cultural superiority. The 'foreignizing' strategy adopted in Chinese-China English translation is actually a means through which hegemonic and ethnocentric China resists foreign cultures, as on the one hand it cannot tolerate the global domination of the Anglo-American culture (Lin, 1999: 80) and on the other hand it claims that China English helps not only promote Chinese culture but also contribute to the world diversity (Kong & Tang, 2008: 95). Nonetheless, to native English speakers, China English may sound very silly and often meaningless or at least ambiguous. Far from presenting China as a superpower, it presents China as a target for ridicule (Valerie Pellatt, personal communication, 8 June 2011).

#### ***2.4.4 Translation/Interpreting under the One China policy***

While China boasts of the positive effects of its Chinese-China English translation, interpreting as a career in China also features 'Chinese' characteristics. With the increasing importance of China in global economic and political arenas, there is a huge demand for interpreters who can help non-Mandarin speakers communicate with the Chinese government and people. Unlike the interpreters in ancient China, who were often looked down upon in Chinese society (Li, 2002), Mandarin interpreters nowadays enjoy high social status and lucrative pay, which in turn promotes the growing trend of interpreting education inside China. From public sectors to academic circles, many people pay attention to and provide their opinions about the code of interpreting ethics,

and one of the basic and foremost principles that should be followed by Chinese interpreters is to be ‘patriotic’. Li Zhaoxing 李肇星, former foreign minister of the P.R.C., explicitly states that Chinese interpreters and translators must develop a strong passion for their motherland and align themselves with the Chinese government. In his speech given to university students in the 2010 CTPC Cup All China Interpreting Contest held in Sichuan University, Li highlighted the importance of being a patriotic interpreter/translator by taking the Taiwan issue as an example. He said:

「有一个现象，有些文件中常常把台湾写成了『第三国』，而译者在翻译的时候不注意，就直接翻译成了『第三方』，这是个很严重的问题，这体现一个译者的政治素养不强。所以我对你们的第一个期望就是政治一定要过硬，要热爱祖国、热爱人民，特别是对搞翻译的人来说。」 (Yu, 2010, 25 October)

[Literal translation. There is a phenomenon: Taiwan is often described as “a third country” in some documents. Some careless translators/interpreters would directly render it into “a third party”. It is a very serious problem as it shows a lack of strong political literacy in a translator/interpreter. Therefore, my first expectation of you all is that you must be tough politically, love your motherland, and love your people. It’s particularly important to those who are engaged in translation/interpreting.]

Well-known for his strong and straightforward political stance on the One China policy, Li Zhaoxing was reiterating to those would-be interpreters/translators that Taiwan is neither a third country nor a third party but part of China. How to act as a patriotic interpreter is also detailed in another article entitled 口译漫谈 *About Oral Interpretation*, which has been widely circulated and posted on many websites, such as the website of the Foreign Affairs Office of People’s Government of Yunnan Province. As suggested in the article, one of the guidelines for competent Chinese interpreters is to develop strong passion and love for their motherland and hold a ‘politically correct’ attitude. For instance, if a foreign client supports the independence of Tibet, a patriotic Chinese interpreter must refute such a ‘wrong’ idea (Chen, 2004). Similar advice on how

patriotic Chinese interpreters should safeguard the interest and dignity of their country are widely provided in academic circles (e.g. Zhong, 2008).

The One China policy, particularly concerning the Taiwan issue, has exerted its great ideological forces on translation/interpreting. Official or recommended English translations on the Taiwan issue are published and discussed widely. A standardized Mandarin-English cross-strait relations terminology (台海关系相关词汇) can be found on not only private English learning and translation/interpreting learning websites, such as 外语教育网 (literally *Foreign Language Education Website*) and MicroMice Translation but also the websites or forums of some educational institutions, such as the College of Foreign Languages, China Three Gorges University (CTGU) 三峡大学外国语学院.<sup>11</sup> The terminology ranges from short bilingual phrases, such as 臭名昭著的分裂主义者 *infamous separatist* and 两岸一中 *Two sides, one China*, to long sentences, such as

世界上只有一个中国，台湾是中国不可分割的一部分。  
*There is only one China, and Taiwan is an integral part of China.*

和平解决台湾问题符合包括台湾同胞在内的全体中国人民的根本利益。  
*A peaceful solution to the Taiwan question serves the interests of all Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan.*

早日实现中国的完全统一是全体中国人民的共同心愿和坚定意志。  
*The complete reunification of China at an early date is the common aspiration and firm resolve of the entire Chinese people.*

Specific guidelines or examples for diplomatic interpreting on cross-strait relations are also highlighted by China's governmental bodies and academic organizations. Shi Yanhua 施燕华, a former Chinese interpreter-turned-diplomat, clearly points out that

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<sup>11</sup> The terminology was retrieved 10 July 2012 on the Foreign Language Education website at <http://www.for68.com/new/2006/8/zh75787132912860021003-0.htm>, the MicroMice Translation website at <http://www.xiaoyishu.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=470>, and the CTGU webpage at <http://210.42.38.214/wgyxy/fyxh/w058.asp>.

when it comes to the Taiwan issue, China should be referred to as “China’s mainland” or “the mainland of China” rather than “the mainland China” in order to avoid an implication of two Chinas (Shi, 2007: 57). Also, as detailed in the book *Wài Jiāo Kǒu Yì 外交口译* (literally *Diplomatic Interpreting*), one of the interpreting textbook series developed under the supervision of China’s National Committee and intended for the Master of *Translation* and Interpreting (MTI) programs in China, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should be referred to as ‘Taiwan and the mainland’ in English in order not to damage China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (He & Li, 2011: 8-9). Arguably, by taking these English equivalences as ‘standard’ translations, one may consciously or subconsciously take the political stance on cross-strait relations manifested in these translation examples.

There are some other ‘specific’ terms or phrases concerning the Taiwan issue frequently used in China. For instance, as China insists that Taiwan be seen as a renegade province of China’s, ‘Taiwan’ is often referred to in China as ‘Taiwan Island’, evidence of which can be found in some English abstracts of Chinese journal articles concerning the Taiwan issue or cross-strait relations (e.g. Zhu, 2005). By reducing Taiwan’s status to an ‘island’, China may fully imply its status as a ‘mother country’. By contrast, in Taiwan, the term ‘Taiwan Island’ is mainly used in a geographical sense in scientific studies (e.g. Chan & Ma, 2004). Jiang Yi-huah 江宜樺, former Minister of Interior and incumbent Vice-Premier of Taiwan, once received severe criticism for asking the people “on Taiwan Island” not to make protests against the cross-strait talks held in Taiwan as the usage of the term ‘Taiwan Island’ within the political context has been widely seen in Taiwan as degrading Taiwan’s sovereign status and flattering China (Huang, 2009, 14 December; *original emphasis*). The adjective ‘so-called’ is also commonly used in China as a disapproval expression in talks or discussions about the Taiwan issue. For instance, Taiwan’s constitutional reform during the Chen Shui-bian

administration is described as “so-called ‘constitutional reform (*original emphasis*)’” in an article entitled *Top advisor reiterates resolute opposition to "Taiwan independence"* on the website of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States 中华人民共和国驻美利坚合众国大使馆<sup>12</sup>. For another instance, Yang Jiemian 杨洁勉, current President and Senior Fellow of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) and Member of Shanghai Committee of People's Political Consultative Conference, in his five-page journal article entitled *Cross-Strait Relations in a New International Setting*, used the adjective ‘so-called’ four times:

The leadership in Taiwan is trying to use the ‘so-called’ democracy issue to achieve its purpose of independence...Owing to a variety of reasons, the ‘so-called’ Taiwan identity is gathering momentum...the Chinese mainland will continue to pursue peaceful unification while firmly opposing ‘so-called’ Taiwan independence...some political forces in the United States are trying to blame the current tense situation concerning the Taiwan Strait on the ‘so-called’ China threat (Yang, 2004; *my emphasis*).

For another extreme example, during a brief newspaper interview on the Taiwan issue with Yang Lixian 杨立宪, a Chinese researcher and expert in Taiwan studies, the adjective ‘so-called’ was used thirteen times (People’s Daily, 2001, 14 December).

The long-lasting emphasis on the patriotic trait within Chinese interpreters and translators and on the ‘politically correct’ translation and interpreting tradition that the Chinese government and people hold dear has been embodied frequently in genuine context, particularly on the One China issue. For instance, in Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao’s joint press conference with then Japanese prime minister Yasuo Fukuda held on 28 December 2007 in Beijing to outline the results of a Sino-Japan summit, a Chinese interpreter misinterpreted Wen’s explanation of Fukuda’s stance on the Taiwan

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<sup>12</sup> The article was published on 9 March 2007. Retrieved 12 August 2012 from <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/t302494.htm>.

issue from “台湾の独立も支持していない(literally [*Prime Minister Fukuda*] *does not support the independence of Taiwan*)” into “福田首相は台湾独立に反対するとの立場を順守(literally *Prime Minister Fukuda will continue to take the stand of opposing the independence of Taiwan*)”. Surprised at the misinterpretation, Fukuda himself at the end of the press conference made a special clarification on Japan’s stance on the Taiwan issue by publicly correcting the phrase “反対する(oppose)” into “支持していない(not support)” (Sakai, 2007, 29 December). Another example took place in a ‘less’ political context. In a 2006 World Baseball Classic pre-game press conference held for the Chinese Taipei team, the Chinese interpreter, who was hired by the host organization, always said ‘zhōng **guó** tái běi (literally *China Taipei*)’ instead of ‘zhōng **huá** tái běi (literally *Chinese Taipei*)’ when interpreting into Mandarin (Luo, 2006, 28 February). Note that due to the pressure from China, Taiwan is allowed to take part in some international events, such as annual APEC economic leaders’ meetings and the Olympics, only under the name of *Chinese Taipei*, which China considers does not imply to the other countries that Taiwan is not part of China (Woods, 1993: 133-6). The Chinese interpreter’s ‘misinterpretation’ provoked a strong protest from the Chinese Taipei team after the press conference in that ‘zhōng **guó** tái běi’ in Mandarin terms explicitly means that Taipei is a city of China and accordingly Taiwan is part of China. The fact that professional Chinese interpreters may give a higher priority to their own political ideology than to faithfulness to source texts when interpreting the One China issues indicates that the One China ideology has become a socially shared belief (at least) in Chinese society and may be produced and reproduced by those who share this belief in the way Fairclough maintains (1989: 85):

...when ideologies are brought to discourse not as explicit elements of the text, but as the background assumptions which on the one hand lead the text producer to ‘textualize’ the world in a particular way, and on the other hand lead the interpreter to interpret the text in a particular way. Texts do not typically spout ideology. They

so position the interpreter through their cues that she brings ideologies to the interpretation of texts - and reproduces them in the process!

## 2.5 Identity Crisis in Taiwan

An independent political entity as Taiwan is, it is not widely recognized as a country on the international stage<sup>13</sup>. The political predicament of Taiwan may be best described by the term invented by Jonathan Manthorpe (2005) -- a forbidden nation. However, while China claims Taiwan to be part of its territory, it is undeniable that Taiwan and China are two separate and different political and economic entities at present. Taiwan adopts a democratic system while China is one of the few entities in the world that practice communism and totalitarianism. Yet, the contradictory attitude that most of the countries in the world hold towards Taiwan – echoing China’s claim that Taiwan is a province of communist China while acknowledging Taiwan’s status as an autonomous democracy – compounds the national identity crisis that the people of Taiwan<sup>14</sup> have long been faced with. Some researchers have explored the identity crisis that Taiwan is being faced with in modern times, but without a review of the history of Taiwan under the rule of different external powers, their attempts might lead to oversimplistic or partial interpretation of the factors that have contributed to the formation of national identity in Taiwan. For instance, Corcuff (2004) investigates the changes of national identity in the Mainlanders<sup>15</sup> in Taiwan against a background of increasing public awareness of Taiwanization and diminishing possibility of the R.O.C.’s comeback in the Chinese mainland. While revealing the economic and cultural

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<sup>13</sup> As of 8 August 2012, Taiwan has diplomatic ties with another twenty-three countries. Information retrieved 22 August 2012 from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the R.O.C. (Taiwan) at <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Official/Regions/AlliesIndex/?opno=777f1778-f578-4148-b22a-b62f81be5f57>

<sup>14</sup> In light of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity in Taiwan, the term ‘the people of Taiwan’ in this chapter refers to the inhabitants of Taiwan in a broad sense.

<sup>15</sup> After 1945, a large number of Chinese people fled to Taiwan with the R.O.C. government and these new Chinese settlers and their next generations are generally termed ‘Mainlanders’. According to the 1956 census data, the number of the Mainlanders in Taiwan was around 1.21 million at the time (Huang, 1995: 430).

predicaments of the Mainlanders who fled to Taiwan and settled down in a new society with cultural and linguistic diversity, Corcuff, however, does not address how the native inhabitants of Taiwan, because of the arrival of these Chinese newcomers, have been treated unfairly and deprived of what had belonged to them. In this chapter, the researcher will seek reasons behind the current identity crisis in Taiwan by discussing briefly the identity shifting in Taiwan since it was first subject to a single ruler in the seventeenth century and how the ideologies and identities of the people of Taiwan has been shaped and manipulated since the R.O.C. rule in 1945 amid the military threats from the neighboring P.R.C.

### 2.5.1 Identity shifting and ideology shaping in pre-1945 Taiwan

It is widely thought that the current identity crisis in Taiwan is highly related to the relations between China and Taiwan. However, while China keeps claiming that Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times (Zhou, 2006), it is the Dutch that came to Taiwan in the seventeenth century and became the first single ruler of this place. The Dutch rule of Taiwan, which lasted nearly forty years, actually inaugurated the history of Taiwan under the rule of different external powers as shown in the following table 1.

<b>Period</b>	<b>External Powers</b>
1624-1662	The Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC)
1626-1642	Spain <sup>16</sup>
1662-1683	The Cheng Regime
1683-1895	Qīng China
1895-1945	Japan
1949-1996	The Republic of China (the R.O.C.): One Party Dictatorship Period

Table 1 The External Powers as the Ruler of Taiwan

Since the Dutch rule, the people of Taiwan have been under the domination of the powers from outside one after another. Under the rule of different foreign powers<sup>17</sup>, the revolt of the people of Taiwan never stopped but usually ended up with military suppression, and the people of Taiwan were forced to deal with drastic and constant

<sup>16</sup> The Spaniards only occupied the northern tip of Taiwan for about sixteen years, and therefore, the Spanish occupation will not be discussed in this chapter. For the detail of the Spanish experience in Taiwan from 1626 till 1642, see Borao Mateo (2009).

<sup>17</sup> Lee Teng-hui, former President of the ROC, explicitly stated that Taiwan has always been under the control of foreign powers, including the KMT (Shiba, 1995: 531). The KMT is also known as the Chinese Nationalist Party. It unified modern China and established the R.O.C. government in the 1920s. In the wake of its defeat in the civil war with the CCP, the KMT-led R.O.C. government fled to Taiwan and started its one-party dictatorial rule of Taiwan until 2000, when the DDP became the ruling party through direct elections.

changes of politics, language and culture. The colonial fate of Taiwan in turn left the ideologies and identities of the people of Taiwan shaped and reshaped constantly, and what ideologies and identities were instilled or reshaped in the people of Taiwan was mainly decided by the mentalities of the rulers.

The Dutch, as the first single ruler of Taiwan, viewed it as a subject nation where they could obtain profits for the VOC maritime empire, and thus they did not aim to build a national identity in the people of Taiwan towards the VOC but to make peace with and among a variety of ethnic groups on this land (Campbell, 1903). At the time, the natives spreading over the island in mutually exclusive and autonomous tribal communities were the majority of the island inhabitants and were generally termed the 'Formosans' by the Dutch (Chiu, 2008: 5). The Dutch were convinced that the Formosans, who had no concept of political hierarchy and couldn't read or write (Campbell, 1903: 89-91), might be susceptible to the shaping of ideology. Therefore, while using force against some disobedient inhabitants, the Dutch set up religious schools, where Formosan students were taught Christian faith in the local languages and learned how to write their native languages in Latin letters (ibid: 179-180, 540). While the Dutch tried to obtain Formosan obedience through evangelization, they also took harsh administration policies and suppressed local revolts by force from time to time (Chiu, 2008: 210-217). The carrot and stick strategies seemed to work. In spite of the short duration and the limited scope<sup>18</sup> of the Dutch rule, some of the people of Taiwan, if not many, had identity shift towards the Dutch at the time (Campbell, 1903: 162-163, 182, 232), and the Hollandiseering of some of the people of Taiwan may have still remained at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century (Pickering, 1898: 117).

When Cheng Cheng-kung, a Míng China loyalist better known to the West as Koxinga, won the victory over the Dutch and established the first Chinese regime in

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<sup>18</sup> For example, some mountainous areas were out of the Dutch's reach.

Taiwan in 1662, he billed his Cheng regime as a continuation of Míng China<sup>19</sup> (Cha, 1961: 74-75). In addition to erasing the Hollandiseering legacy through force (Pickering, 1898: 64), the Cheng regime transplanted the Han Chinese political, cultural, and educational systems from China to Taiwan and had the first temple of Confucius built in Taiwan for the purpose of sinicizing the people of Taiwan (Jiang, 1958). In 1683, Taiwan was seized by Qīng China, which aimed to eliminate the Míng China loyalists and treated Taiwan lightly until Japan's attack on Taiwan in 1874 (Huang, 2006: 79). Although the sinicization policies were expanded and strengthened, the people of Taiwan developed group identity instead of national identity because of being treated unequally in terms of social status, ethnic origin, and degree of civilization under the rule of hegemonic and ethnocentric Qīng China (Hsu, 2000; Wang, 2002: 66-68).

In 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan after the defeat of Qīng China at the First Sino-Japan War. To turn the people of Taiwan into Japanese, assimilation policies were carried out in a carrot and stick way (Chou, 1996). Meanwhile, to sever the relations between Taiwan and China and boost Japanese identity in the people of Taiwan, the Japanese authorities carefully designed the contents of the school textbooks for the people of Taiwan by, among the others, replacing the Chinese history with Japanese culture and history (Nishikawa, 1938, February), enhancing the image of Japan and downgrading that of Taiwan (Sakai, 2010), and speaking highly of specific figures whose stories might help boost the Japanese spirit (Ang, 1986). Japan might be the first external power that developed a strong sense of national identity in at least some of the people of Taiwan (Ching, 2007). During the fifty-year Japanese rule, examples in which people of Taiwan demonstrated their strong identity towards Japan occurred across Taiwan, such as the suicide of Hanaoka Ichiro (Tierney, 2010: 60-61) and the case of the Takasago Volunteer Army (Huang, 2005: 88-92). Nowadays, there is still pro-Japan

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<sup>19</sup> In 1644, Míng China lost its ruling power in China proper to the Manchurians, who then established the Qīng Empire.

sentiment across Taiwan's society<sup>20</sup> (Deans, 2002).

### 2.5.2 Ideology shaping and manipulation in post-1945 Taiwan

While the P.R.C. claims that Taiwan is part of China, some people of Taiwan are regarding themselves as Chinese as well. Figure 2 below, which shows the changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese identity of the people of Taiwan between 1992 and 2012, may serve as an important reference for Taiwan identities studies.




Figure 2. The Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the People of Taiwan between 1992 and 2012. Courtesy of the Election Study Center, NCCU.

The surveys, which investigate the identities of the people of Taiwan, show that in the past two decades, ‘Taiwanese’ identity rose and ‘Chinese’ identity dropped in a steady manner, and the identity of ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese’ remained significant. At first

<sup>20</sup> Also see Wang, 2002: 97-109 for the reasons behind the pro-Japan sentiment across Taiwan.

glance, the results of the 1992 survey and those of the immediate following three years may lead people to think that most of the people of Taiwan originally considered themselves to be Chinese and Taiwanese identity might have been reinforced under the leadership of the Democratic Progressive Party (DDP), which may be further simplified and misinterpreted into another idea that Taiwan is part of China but attempts to obtain its independence. Nonetheless, to look deep into the results shown in figure 2, there are some questions that need to be answered: Are Taiwanese Chinese? Why were there more respondents considering themselves to be Chinese than those who regarded themselves as Taiwanese at the beginning of the surveys? Why did 'Taiwanese' identity go up and down under the eight-year pro-independence DDP administration (mid 2000 - mid 2008) but rise sharply after the pro-unification KMT Party restored its status as the ruling party? The answers to these questions may be made manifest in a brief review of how the ideologies of the people of Taiwan have been shaped and manipulated since the R.O.C. regime started its ruling of Taiwan in the late 1940s.

Although there had been some identity shifts towards Japan across Taiwan, many Taiwanese felt they had been treated as second-class citizens during the Japanese rule, and therefore, they were excited about being freed from the colonization of Japan when Japan was defeated in World War II and looking forward to the coming of the R.O.C. government based in China, which had claimed China as the motherland of Taiwan. Little had they expected that the R.O.C. government treated Taiwan as a colony rather than an ordinary part of its territory, and soon they were increasingly disillusioned by the ethnocentric, hegemonic, and authoritarian mindset of this Han Chinese regime (Wang, 2002: 97-110). The widespread resentment of the people of Taiwan against the KMT-led R.O.C. government as well as the Mainlanders, who generally have enjoyed more social resources and privileges than the native inhabitants of Taiwan even until now (Li, 2007, 4 October), resulted in mass protests and revolts across Taiwan in early

1947, which in turn led to the 228 Incident, a massacre of the people of Taiwan ordered by the KMT-led R.O.C. government<sup>21</sup>. The martial law was imposed across Taiwan from mid 1949 till 1987, during which the KMT consolidated its power and prevented public revolts by every mean. In the following, the researcher will discuss how public ideologies have been shaped and manipulated in post-1945 Taiwan through language, education, religion (including deification of political leaders), and control of mass media and publication.

### **2.5.2.1 Language and education policy**

After the KMT-led R.O.C. government started its rule of Taiwan, the use of Japanese was strictly banned and the use of the local languages of Taiwan in public greatly refrained (Li, H., 1995). To make Mandarin Chinese the national language<sup>22</sup>, the KMT took a lot of harsh measures across Taiwan. For instance, county magistrate elections would not be possible until Mandarin Chinese had been widely used across Taiwan (Hsu, 1991: 96). For another instance, schoolchildren who were caught speaking local languages at school were humiliated by having a red circle drawn around their mouths and a large dog tag that said 'I will speak the national language' hung around their necks (Li, 2004). The drastic change of language use, which was aimed at eliminating the Japanese educational and cultural toxins and increasing the Chinese identity of the people of Taiwan (Li, H., 1995: 180), indirectly limited the freedom of speech of the great majority of the people of Taiwan as they could express themselves in only Japanese and/or local languages at the time (Wang, 1991: 45-51) and directly made

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<sup>21</sup> According to Su (1980: 792), the names of more than one hundred thousand citizens of Taiwan were removed from household registration in 1953 as these people were reported missing, the great majority of whom might have been victims of the 228 Incident.

<sup>22</sup> The KMT authorities explicitly stated that the popularization of Mandarin Chinese was a means of promoting Chinese culture (Li, H., 1995: 177).

a lot of the native inhabitants of Taiwan gradually lose the ability to speak their mother tongue (e.g. Sung, 1995: 98-9). The sinicization policy was extended to the content of education as well. In addition to promoting Chinese culture and Confucianism, the strong Chinese sense of cultural superiority was embedded in school textbooks for primary and secondary school education. For instance, (the Republic of) China was described as more civilized, virtuous, and peace-loving than the other countries in the world (Yang, 1994: 306-9). In fact, before the martial law was lifted in 1987, the themes of the school textbooks for the people of Taiwan were guided by the KMT leadership and mainly included boosting loyalty and obedience<sup>23</sup>, promoting ideas of fighting against Communism and reclaiming the Chinese mainland, and praising political leaders, such as Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek<sup>24</sup> (ibid: 202-318). For instance, to arouse hatred towards the CCP and passion for reclaiming the Chinese mainland, people under the CCP regime were described as living in hell while Taiwan, governed by the R.O.C., was a paradise in the primary school textbooks used between the 1950s and 1980s (ibid: 285-88).

### **2.5.2.2 Religion and deification**

The oppression of the local faiths in Taiwan in the late period of the Japanese rule seemed to end with the defeat of Japan in the Second Sino-Japan War in 1945. Yet, it was not long before the KMT-led R.O.C. government imposed on the people of Taiwan the ‘Regulations on Punishing Acts against Police 違警罰法<sup>25</sup>’ and the ‘Regulations on Banning Harmful Customs 查禁不良風俗辦法’ (Minbao Newspaper, 1947, 10 January),

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<sup>23</sup> Some lessons even encouraged young children to become patriotic martyrs (Yang, 1994: 293-295).

<sup>24</sup> See also the following discussion of the deification of Chiang Kai-shek in 2.5.2.2.

<sup>25</sup> The Regulations on Punishing Acts against Police came into effect in 1943 and were abolished in 1991. The detail may be accessed on the website of the Ministry of the Interior, ROC from <http://glrs.moi.gov.tw/LawContentDetails.aspx?id=FL004513&KeyWordHL=&StyleType=1>.

persecuting believers of the religions which opposed or showed little support for the government policy or which were suspected of conspiracy against the government. During the thirty-eight-year martial law period, religious freedom was restricted and most of the local faiths in Taiwan suffered more or less political persecution (Chü, 2006: 1). The oppression of I-Kuan Tao (IKT)一貫道 may be one of the notorious religious persecution cases in Taiwan. Since the 1950s numerous arrests of the IKT believers had been made as the IKT was labeled as an evil cult and accused of violating good customs, damaging national security and even conspiring with the Chinese Communist Party against the R.O.C. government. The ban on the IKT was finally lifted in 1987 (the same year in which the martial law period ended), which was largely attributed to the fact that the IKT had made much effort to demonstrate its loyalty to the government, built good relationships with some, if not many, high-ranking officials, and even entered into a political alliance with the government (Tsai, 1989: 220-223; Chü, 2006: 147-163). While suppressing the religions which might pose a challenge to the ruling power, the KMT-led R.O.C. government attempted to spread certain ideology among the people of Taiwan through the deification of the KMT political leaders. Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), who remained to be self-appointed President of the R.O.C. in Taiwan from 1948 till 1975, might best demonstrate to what degree a human being could be deified by the KMT. Some stories about the 'greatness' of Chiang in his youth were written in school textbooks for children. For instance, when Chiang was little, he found small fish swimming against the current of a river and realized that he should always strive to conquer challenges as the fish (Chu, 1988: 15). For another instance, Chiang demonstrated a tendency to pursue democracy at the tender age of eleven by saying in front of his class that a president should be as down-to-earth as civilians because they were all human beings (ibid: 20). After Chiang's death, the KMT took a series of measures to highlight the significance of Chiang to the people of Taiwan, such as

building the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and making the days of Chiang's birth and death two national memorial days<sup>26</sup>. Chiang was even referred to as 'the saviour of mankind 人類的救星' and 'a great man of the world 世界的偉人' in the famous *The Late President Lord Chiang Memorial Song 先總統蔣公紀念歌*, which used to be a must-sing song at school or at ceremonies before the 1990s and still remains one of the "practical" songs sung by the R.O.C. military.<sup>27</sup> Nowadays, the KMT still pays tribute to Chiang on every anniversary of his death (Chou, 2011, 2 April).

### 2.5.2.3 Control of mass media and publication

It might be argued that the KMT-led R.O.C. government kept a tighter grip on the communication among the people of Taiwan than the previous foreign regimes in Taiwan. Take the newspaper sector for example. Immediately after the 228 Incident (in 1947), the government sealed up more than a dozen of newspaper offices, seized the publications that were accused of inciting revolts, and arrested or killed some important figures in newspaper circles (Wu, 2002: 255). The freedom of speech and press was much more severely restricted when the martial law period started in mid 1949. Under rigorous and strict rules imposed on the newspaper sector, most of the newspapers became a mouthpiece for the government, and journalists might receive severe punishment anytime. For instance, in 1957 a newspaper editor named Lin Chenting 林振霆 was given a life sentence for being suspected of spying for the Chinese Communist Party just because he witnessed and reported a public protest around the U.S. embassy. Some other journalists were also put to jail because their academic connections with Lin

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<sup>26</sup> In late 2007, the DDP administration proposed canceling the two Chiang's memorial days (Luo, et al., 2007, 30 August), but in late 2008, the KMT administration made Chiang's birthday a national memorial holiday again (Chen, 2008, 8 September).

<sup>27</sup> Information retrieved 23 August 2012 on the website of General Political Warfare Bureau, Ministry of Defense, R.O.C. from [http://gpwd.mnd.gov.tw/onweb.jsp?webno=3333333124&webitem\\_no=467](http://gpwd.mnd.gov.tw/onweb.jsp?webno=3333333124&webitem_no=467).

(Chen, 2003: 67-68). When the political control seemed to be loosened a little in the 1980s, newspaper sector still needed to do self-censorship to avoid punishment (Chen, 2006: 194-195). Nowadays, despite the lifting of the martial law, some newspapers still serve as a political instrument but mostly for financial reasons (ibid: 196-197).

#### **2.5.2.4 The social reality in Taiwan**

During the thirty-eight-year ‘White Terror’ period, Chinese identity was developed into the people of Taiwan through force and consent. While restricting freedom of speech and press through censorship and persecution (Chen, 2006: 190-194) and keeping a tight grip on politics, media, and education across Taiwan, the KMT adopted a lot of sinicization policies, such as making Mandarin Chinese the national language, promoting Chinese cultural tradition (Confucianism in particular) and emphasizing the historical relations between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland (Hsiau, 2010). Under the KMT authoritarian rule, the people of Taiwan were taught or forced to develop Chinese national identity, which, to most of the native inhabitants of Taiwan, was being built amid their resentment against the KMT hegemony and the unequal status and treatment among different ethnic groups in Taiwan, their desire for human rights and freedom, their estrangement from the Chinese mainland, and their disillusion with the KMT’s empty boast about re-seizing the Chinese mainland (Makeham & Hsiau, 2005). As far as the Mainlanders are concerned, not only the social benefits they enjoy but also the Great China complex they hold may be handed down to their next generations in Taiwan (Lin, 2006; Corinus, 2010: 65-66), which may be one of the main reasons that cause conflicts over identity issue and divisions among ethnic groups in Taiwan. However, the appeal for indigenizing Taiwanese culture and politics began to sprout in the early 1970s, and the democratization of Taiwan as well as the development of

Taiwanese nationalism was boosted in the 1980s by some public protests in the wake of the Kaohsiung Incident<sup>28</sup>. Faced with the widespread outcry from the people of Taiwan, the KMT-led R.O.C. government finally lifted the martial law in 1987. It should be noted that the surveys as shown in figure 2 (see p. 83) started in 1992, which was just five years after the lifting of the martial law. Arguably, having been through sinicization process for nearly forty years and suddenly released from the KMT's authoritarian and tyrannical rule, the people of Taiwan might still have a sense of insecurity and uncertainty towards the change of the KMT and towards their national identity.

With the steady progress in democratization and the growing Taiwanese awareness, the DDP won over the KMT in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections. In general, during his two terms, President Chen Shui-bian was preparing Taiwan for formal independence at some time in the future through some de-sinicization policies<sup>29</sup> and attempted to help Taiwan return to the United Nations as a member state (Hsieh, 2007). Yet, his statement in his first inaugural address that he would not declare formal independence of Taiwan if the P.R.C. (China) had “no intention to use military force against Taiwan”<sup>30</sup> greatly disappointed the pro-independence people in Taiwan (Yang, 2005, 2 March). Also, the legitimacy of his winning of the 2004 presidential election in the wake of the 319 Shooting Incident<sup>31</sup> was severely questioned by the opposition parties, which caused protracted power struggle between the ruling party and the opposition parties and might have blurred the focus of Taiwanization. It may be argued

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<sup>28</sup> The Kaohsiung Incident 美麗島事件 was the second largest suppression of the people of Taiwan after the 228 Incident.

<sup>29</sup> For instance, the proportion of teaching of classical Chinese and the history of China in high school curriculum was reduced while that of the history and culture of Taiwan was increased. Also, the teaching of the local languages of Taiwan, including the Hoklo, Hakka, and Formosan languages, was provided in compulsory education.

<sup>30</sup> Information retrieved 23 August 2012 from <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=18907&rmid=2355&sd=2000/05/20&ed=2000/05/20>.

<sup>31</sup> On the eve of the 2004 presidential election, the DDP presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian and his running mate Annette Lu were slightly injured from an assassination attempt while campaigning in southern Taiwan. The assassination was regarded by the opposition parties as well as some people of Taiwan as a trick to win sympathy votes (Chu, 2004).

that the great political power struggle inside Taiwan tired out its people who hoped for peace and prosperity and in turn discouraged them from asserting themselves politically at the time, which may be why there were slight increases or even decreases in the percentage of ‘Taiwanese’ identity under the eight-year DDP administration as shown in figure 2.

Amid the prevailing public thinking that good relations between Taiwan and China might help boost the economy of Taiwan (Rigger, 2006), the KMT staged a comeback with Ma Ying-jeou, a second-generation Mainlander with Great China complex (Fan, 2011, 2 October), winning the 2008 presidential election. Since then, Ma has adopted some sinicization and de-Taiwanization policies, such as increasing the lessons on classical Chinese, the history of China and Confucian thinking (Lin, 2011, 2 February), and officially renaming ‘*Tái Yǔ* 台語 (literally *the Taiwanese language*)’ ‘*Mǐn Nán Yǔ* 閩南語<sup>32</sup> (literally *the language of southern Fujian Province of China*)’ (Chiu, et al., 2011, 24 May). Meanwhile, a series of pro-China policies have been implemented since 2008. For instance, in late June 2010, the Ma administration signed the ‘Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)’ with China, aiming to boost Taiwan’s economy through deep cooperation across the Strait (Hogg, 2010, 29 June). The Ma administration also welcomes tourists by group and by individual from the Chinese mainland in the hope of bringing the people of Taiwan as much economic benefit as possible and promoting direct exchange and communication between the peoples across the Strait (Jennings, 2011, 27 June). Given closer ties and warmer relations between Taiwan and China, why is there a surge of the public’s Taiwanese identity under the Ma administration as shown in figure 2? As it turns out, the direct and frequent contact with the people of China has generally contributed to the public realization in Taiwan that

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<sup>32</sup> ‘Min Nan Yu’ is an alternative invented and imposed by the KMT-led government to ‘Tai Yu’ in order to belittle the language that is used by the majority of the Taiwanese (Wang, 2002: 55) and to emphasize the historic relations between Taiwan and China.

there is much difference between both peoples, not only politically but also culturally (Fan, S., 2010: 259-263; Jacobs, 2011, 10 August), which may in turn strengthen Taiwanese identity across Taiwan. Also, as China never ceases showing its hegemony towards Taiwan through military threats and diplomatic pressure on the premise of the One China policy, many people of Taiwan may have turned their resistance to internal oppression from the past KMT one-party rule to resistance to external oppression from China (Jager, 2007:18).

To readers of figure 2, the people of Taiwan may appear to be in a dilemma of choosing to be Taiwanese or Chinese. However, in light of the colonial history of Taiwan, the results of the surveys (in figure 2) might have neglected the diversity of ethnicity and identity in Taiwan and might even arouse doubts about implications of sinicization. In fact, the meaning of 'Taiwanese' varies with context and so does 'Chinese'. From the Dutch occupation till 1945, the inhabitants of Taiwan were mainly the Formosans and the Chinese settlers who spoke the Hoklo or Hakka languages. After another large group of Chinese people, most of whom spoke Mandarin Chinese, came to settle down in Taiwan after 1945, the early Chinese settlers were referred to as Taiwanese, and the Chinese newcomers as well as their next generations 'Mainlanders'. When it comes to the relations between China and Taiwan, 'Taiwanese' becomes a term referring to the Formosans, the Taiwanese, and the Mainlanders altogether. Likewise, the term 'Chinese' may refer to the people of the P.R.C. (China) in cross-strait context or refer to the Mainlanders as opposed to the Taiwanese in Taiwan. Also, the Mainlanders with Chinese identity consider Taiwan to be part of the Republic of China, which they think should have sovereignty over the Chinese mainland, while the people with Taiwanese identity see 'Taiwan' as a sovereign country (Wu, 1993). Yet, having lived in Taiwan for decades, some of the Mainlanders turn to regard themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese (Fan, Y., 2010). So, are Taiwanese Chinese? Or in other words,

is Taiwan part of China? Having been ruled by different external powers and inhabited by people from different ethnic backgrounds, Taiwan now is an independent political and economic entity, and more and more inhabitants of this place are asserting themselves as 'Taiwanese'.

## **2.6 Summary of Chapter 2**

As the main aim of this study is to investigate whether ideologies of hegemony or resistance may be embodied in language use (discourse) of simultaneous interpreters of China and Taiwan in unequal power relations, the researcher reviews and discusses in this chapter previous studies on the key concepts relevant to the aim of this study.

In Chapter 2.1, the definitions of ideology, power and identity and how these elements are embodied, sustained or strengthened in discourse are briefly discussed. Ideology and identity are not changed or (re)shaped easily and quickly. They are what people obtain and share in the socialization process through discourse. Yet, once developed firmly, ideology and identity will have influence on one's thinking and behaviour, which is why those in power spare no effort in developing into general public certain ideologies and identities that can legitimate and sustain the ruling power. Discourse, which is speech in writing and speaking as a form of social practice, is not only the tool for socialization but also a mirror of ideologies and identities of the discourse producer. As a result, analyzing discourse may disclose how certain ideologies or identities are being constructed and sustained.

Translated/Interpreted texts are also a form of discourse involving elements of ideology, identity, power and so on. The discussion in Chapter 2.3 demonstrates the interaction among these elements in translation/interpreting and the precarious situations that translators and interpreters may need to deal with. Translation and

interpreting are also sites of struggles of ideologies and unequal cultures or powers. While translation/interpreting is used as a tool for spreading ideology and sustaining hegemony, translated texts as well as translators and interpreters may show resistance to hegemony in various manners. The literature review also addresses the difference between translation and interpreting in some aspects, such as the way in which translated texts are produced. Yet, while the influence of ideologies on translation and translators is fully disclosed in translation studies, the link between an interpreter's ideology and his/her rendition remains much less explored. To address ideology issue in interpreting, this study chooses to put such research in the setting of the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, with China and Taiwan on either side.

China, as an overwhelming hegemony in terms of politics, economy and culture, has always reiterated its One China policy on international occasions. It insists that Taiwan, an island off southeast China, has long been part of it. However, democratic Taiwan has its government, land and people, and is recognized as a country by another twenty-something countries in the world. The historical relations between China and Taiwan and their social realities in recent decades are briefly reviewed in Chapters 2.5 and 2.6, which may help give a clear picture of why the relations between China and Taiwan are hegemony versus resistance.

The literature review of the relationships among power, ideology, identity in discourse and translation/interpreting and the status quo between China and Taiwan should make it reasonable to presume in this study that the conflicts of ideologies and identities between peoples of China and Taiwan over the One China policy may be embodied in SI monologic discourse that interpreters produce in response to the speaker. In the following chapters, the researcher will engage in the investigation into this presumption.

## **Chapter 3. Methodology**

### **3.1 Research Design**

In Chapter 2, the definitions of ideology, power and identity and how these elements are embodied, sustained or strengthened through discourse have been briefly discussed. Discourse as a form of social practice, is not only the tool for socialization but also a mirror of ideologies and identities of the discourse producer. Translation/interpreting text as a form of discourse is also closely linked with ideology, identity, and power. That the translator's behaviour is subject to the influence of his/her ideology and identity has been confirmed in translation studies. By contrast, the same issue has not been adequately investigated in interpreting studies. To investigate the relationship among ideology, identity and interpreting, this study chooses to put such research in the setting of the status quo between China and Taiwan, in both of which Mandarin Chinese is adopted as the official language and Chinese culture is practiced. The two nations are in unequal power relations, and both peoples have conflicting ideologies and identities over the One China policy. It is presumed that different political ideologies and national identities between both peoples may cause differences in interpretation and reproduction of source language texts in cross-strait political context between Taiwanese interpreters (interpreters from Taiwan) and Chinese interpreters (interpreters from China). Based on the research aims and objectives specified in Chapter 1 and the previous literature review of ideology and identity research in the CDA, translation and interpreting studies in Chapter 2, the research methods of this study include (1) a simultaneous interpreting (SI) experiment for collecting SI data; (2) survey questionnaires for enhancing the validity of the results of SI rendition analysis to avoid criticism of the CDA analysis for being 'interpretative' or 'subjective'; (3) post-experiment interviews for the purpose of obtaining specific opinions from the subjects. The questionnaire surveys and

interviews are playing a subordinate and preceding role within the methodology of this study. Both of them are designed to complement the CDA analysis and increase the validity of the research findings of ideological signs in simultaneous renditions. More specifically, 42 trainee interpreters are recruited to be experiment subjects. Five Mandarin speeches, divided into six SI sessions, are used as source speeches in the experiment (also referred to as the data collection throughout the study). The data collection is divided into two stages. At the first stage, the subjects are asked to attend four simultaneous interpreting sessions. A student interpreter background questionnaire is filled in at the very beginning of the experiment and a specific retrospective questionnaire after each interpreting session. At the second-stage data collection, the subjects are asked to attend two simultaneous interpreting sessions and fill in the national identity scale questionnaire and the post-experiment questionnaire. Some of the subjects also opt for an individual interview. The overall data collection process is shown in Diagram 3 below.




Diagram 3 Data Collection Procedure

While using the CDA method to analyze the renditions, the researcher also refers to the results of the questionnaires and/or the in-depth interviews. For example, if one rendition produced by a subject in one speech is not evidently ideological but deviant from its source language text to the extent that the source messages are overstated, understated or distorted, the researcher will examine the subject's rendering of the speech as a whole and see if there are other possible or evident ideological signs in the same speech rendering. If so, the subject may have a tendency to bring his/her ideology into his/her interpreting, and that rendition may be viewed as an ideological sign. If not, the researcher will continue to examine the subject's rendering of the other speeches and see if more deviant ideological signs are found. The results of the questionnaires the subject has filled in and/or the data of the individual interview the subject has given will be reviewed in the CDA process in order to find further evidence of whether the deviant rendition can be seen as ideological. Those deviant renditions that may be slips of tongue or are corrected by the subject immediately may not be counted as ideological unless strong evidence, such as the subject's acknowledgement of his/her own ideological signs, is found. The cross-referencing process is called the 'CDA Filter Process' in this study (see Chapter 3.2.4). Detailed explanation of the research design and methods used in the present study is given in the following sections.

### **3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis**

Among a variety of qualitative research methods, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), emerging in the 1990s and 'ideologically' analyzing ideology, gradually assumes its prominence in different academic fields. While criticized as subjective and biased (e.g. Widdowson, 1995; Jones, 2007), CDA has been recognized as a very useful research method in various domains. With combined perspectives of linguistics and neo-Marxist sociology, CDA has become a thriving concept in social sciences as it views text as products of social

structure, examines text within social context, discloses ideologies embedded in discourse, and in some cases analyzes discourse in a broader historical and cultural context.

In order to uncover ideological signs embodied in simultaneous renditions of cross-strait political texts, i.e. signs of hegemony or resistance, the present study conducts SI data collection, questionnaire surveys and interviews, brings extra-linguistic factual considerations to CDA analysis of the renditions within specific social, political and historical contexts, and statistically demonstrates the findings of the ideological signs detected through CDA analysis. The combination of the qualitative (CDA and individual interviews) and quantitative (surveys and statistical analysis) research methods applied in the study is created on the basis of the CDA literature review and features of translation and interpreting practices in the hope of dealing with ideology issue in interpreting studies in a scientific manner.

To ensure the scientism and objectivity of the simultaneous interpreting experiment, all of the subjects are asked to fill in four different kinds of questionnaires given to them at different stages of the experiment. The first questionnaire is to obtain the background information of the subjects. The other three questionnaires are used for the purpose of obtaining concrete and supporting information about the subjects' (political) ideologies as reference for the CDA analysis (see Chapter 3.4). The brief introduction of CDA and why it is the major research method of the present study are presented in the following sections.

### **3.2.1 *The origin of CDA***

CDA is often considered to evolve from Critical Linguistics (CL). The development of CDA and CL was under the profound influence of Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG), also known as Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). The term 'Critical Linguistics' was coined by Roger Fowler and some other researchers at the University of East Anglia in the UK (Simpson & Mayr, 2009: 50) and developed on the basis of systemic functional

linguistics (see Halliday, 1970, 1978 & 1985). Since then, CL has gradually become one of the important schools in the field of linguistics. Renowned CL researchers include Roger Fowler, Gunther Kress, Bob Hodge, and Tony Trew (see Wodak & Meyer, 2009). In addition to following the Hallidayan tradition, according to Threadgold (2003: 17), CL also draws inspiration from the works of Sapir (1921), Barthes (1953), Whorf (1956), and Bernstein (1990), Chomsky's transformational linguistics (1957), early French semiotics, Prague School linguistics and semiotics, British structuralist-functionalist anthropology, and so on. As an interdisciplinary approach, CL combines textual analysis method in linguistics with the political and ideological functions of language specified in the social theory. The analysis of CL puts much focus on grammar and vocabulary of texts, particularly on such aspects as transitivity, modality, transformation, classification, and coherence (Fowler & Kress, 1979). CL aims to interpret specific texts with critical attitude and disclose the embedded ideologies, demonstrating the social meanings of discourse through analyzing linguistic structures within broad social contexts (ibid: 195-196; Fairclough, 1992: 26-27).

However, Fairclough argues that CL has its limitations and proposes replacing CL with CDA. According to Fairclough (1992: 28-29), the limitations of CL are:

- 1) CL sees text as 'product' but seldom addresses how such product is produced or interpreted.
- 2) CL does not recognize discourse as a domain where social struggle exists or attribute change in discourse to change of social or cultural context; instead, it overemphasizes 'the effects of discourse in social reproduction of existing social relations and structures.'
- 3) CL defines the interface between ideology and language in a narrow sense. Only focusing on grammar and vocabulary, CL neglects ideological significance of texts. In addition, CL mainly discusses ideological aspects of 'written monologue' rather than spoken dialogue. CL also places great stress on the embodiment of ideologies in texts without addressing processes of interpretation.

While Fairclough considers CDA to be more thoroughly rounded than CL, both CDA and CL in a broad sense pay attention to structural relations of domination, discrimination, power, and control that are either obvious or opaque in discourse. Arguably, CDA and CL are closely related, with a considerable overlap of research domain between the two, and both of them deal critically with texts. Whether one of them is a subordinate or successor to the other will not be further discussed here. The present study will adopt CDA as the main research method.

CDA also owes its theoretical origins to some significant Marxist figures and movements, including Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, and the Frankfurt School. Gramsci proposes the concept of 'cultural hegemony' and describes it as the 'spontaneous' consent given by the majority to civil society manipulated by the dominant group (Gramsci, 1971: 12; see also Chapter 2.2.1). More specifically, the general public are manipulated without self awareness by the superstructure through instilment of ideology. As time goes by, a collective ideology is formed among the general public, which in turn encourages more active public participation in preserving and reinforcing such ideology. Althusser provides a more detailed description of the effects of ideology. Pointing out that 'ideology has no history (1971: 160),' Althusser explains the function and power of ideological state apparatuses which overwhelm and manipulate human individuals and mould them into subjects fitting in with social expectations. Gramsci's and Althusser's viewpoints on ideology have influenced many CDA practitioners. The Frankfurt School of Philosophy sees the limitations of traditional Marxist theory and has created neo-Marxist interdisciplinary social theory. Of all the Frankfurt School theorists, Habermas (1984) has given great inspiration to some studies in CDA. He considers that a critical science must be 'self-reflexive' and look at linguistic and social interactions within historical contexts. Also, he believes rational discourse could overcome opaque and ideological discourse (cited from Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 261). In addition, studies of Russian linguist Valentin Volosinov and philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin about linguistic theory of ideology have a profound impact on CDA. Volosinov suggests the materiality of linguistic

signs which ‘becomes an arena of the class struggle (1986: 23)’ and the ideological effects of language use. Bakhtin maintains: ‘Any utterance is a link in a very complexly organized chain of other utterances (1986: 69),’ emphasizing the dialogicality of language. Bakhtin’s concept of ‘intertextuality’ in discourse gives insight into ‘the nature of the process through which discourse is both shaped by language structures yet works them and ultimately transforms them as well as reproducing them (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999: 49)’. French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault’s work on discourse and power (e.g. 1972) is also a very important source of inspiration to some CDA practitioners. Foucault maintains that discourse can reflect power structures (ibid), and therefore, by analyzing discourse, CDA analysts may uncover power struggles and promote equalities.

The initial development of CDA was facilitated by several academic publications, such as van Dijk’s *Prejudice in Discourse* (1984), Fairclough’s *Language and Power* (1989), Wodak’s *Language, Power and Ideology* (1989), and the journal of *Discourse and Society* initiated by van Dijk in 1990. Continuing CL’s critical attitude toward discourse, the CDA network started to take concrete form subsequent to a symposium held in Amsterdam in 1991, where five important scholars, including Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak, exchanged ideas of theoretical and methodological aspects of CDA. Since then, CDA has become more international and heterogeneous (Wodak, 2001a: 4). Nonetheless, whether CDA is an independent methodological discipline remains a much-debated topic. One of the CDA initiators, Teun van Dijk, who prefers to use the term Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), argues on his ‘Discourse in Society’ website that CDA/CDS is not a method of research but “an academic movement of a group of socially and politically committed scholars, or, more individually, a socially critical attitude of doing discourse studies (2007).” It may be argued that CDA can be seen as a branch of discourse analysis (e.g. Fairclough, 1992; van Dijk, 2001:352). Now, more and more scholars or researchers find CDA a very useful research method for furthering understanding of

discursive implications that involve unequal social relations. The research foci or domains of CDA practitioners include political discourse (e.g. Wodak, 1989), racism (e.g. van Dijk, 2005), gender (e.g. Wodak & Benke, 1996), media language (e.g. van Dijk, 1988), ideology (e.g. van Dijk, 1998), strategy (e.g. Vaara, 2010), education (e.g. Rogers, 2004), economics (e.g. Jessop et al., 2008), institutional discourse (e.g. Wodak, 1996), etc.

Although CDA has become a widely-recognized paradigm in linguistics (Wodak, 2001a), it has come under severe criticism for its lack of clarification on how to demarcate the discursive from the non-discursive and how to verify the dialectic relationship between discourse and social practices (Widdowson, 1995; Jørgenson & Phillips, 2002: 89-92). Widdowson (1995, 2004) also considers that CDA uses selective and ideological interpretation to support its belief that discourse as social action is ideological by nature, and therefore, CDA is criticized for being biased. Nevertheless, in providing an overview of CDA, Fairclough and Wodak (1997) maintain that CDA has always taken an explicit position as a socially and politically committed paradigm, and its interpretative and explanatory analysis is always dynamic and open. Also, the CDA practitioners' efforts to call for social action have indeed made a difference in some ways. For example, van Dijk's analysis of Dutch schoolbooks (1993) uncovers hidden racism within and leads to corrections of school textbooks.

### **3.2.2 *The content of CDA***

With the example of Michael Charlton's interview with Margaret Thatcher, former Prime Minister of the U.K., which was broadcast on BBC Radio 3 on 17 December 1985, Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 268-280) demonstrate eight principles of analyzing discourse through use of the CDA method, five of which are shared by all approaches within CDA while the others spark off a heated debate that still continues. The eight principles are

1. CDA addresses social problems:

CDA researchers consider that social and cultural processes and structures have partially linguistic-discursive character. Through analysis of discourse with critical attitude, CDA uncovers social problems and power struggles of the dominated.

2. Power relations are discursive:

Power relations are reproduced, negotiated, or transformed in discourse. CDA recognizes and stresses the linguistic and discursive nature of power relations in society.

3. Discourse constitutes society and culture:

Discourse is part of society and culture, and at the same time it facilitates constitution of identities and reproduction and/or transformation of society and culture.

4. Discourse does ideological work:

Ideology, embedded in discursive practices, can reflect social reality and construct identities, and it is “most effective when its workings are least visible (Fairclough, 1989: 85)”.

5. Discourse is historical:

Discourses are always produced within context and connected to the past; therefore, to understand discourses, one must analyze them within context.

6. The link between text and society is mediated:

It is “orders of discourse” that mainly mediate the link between text and society (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 277). The other views of such mediation include Smith’s ‘practices of social actors’ (1990) and van Dijk’s socio-cognitive processes (e.g. 1984).

7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory:

CDA adopts “a systematic methodology and a thorough investigation of the context” in order to interpret the opaqueness of discourse and display “different implications of different readings” (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 279).

8. Discourse is a form of social action:

CDA practitioners are socially and politically motivated and active in disclosing discrimination in gender, class, race, ethnicity, etc through critical analysis of discourse in the hope of promoting non-discriminatory language use and eliminating inequalities.

According to Fairclough and Wodak's CDA overview (1997), the following features are generally characteristic of the CDA approaches (see also Jørgenson & Phillips, 2002: 60-64):

- 1) CDA addresses social problems by examining the linguistic-discursive aspects, which are partly characteristic of social and cultural processes and structures;
- 2) Discourse is both constitutive of and constituted by society and culture.
- 3) Discourse is a context-based product and should be examined within its social or cultural context.
- 4) Discourse may carry and reinforce ideology that constructs and represents inequalities in society, gender, race, ethnicity, etc.
- 5) With critical attitude, CDA aims to uncover inequalities, raise public awareness and strive for equalities.

CDA draws much inspiration from Halliday's three linguistic functions: ideational, interpersonal, and textual functions (Halliday, 1971; 1978). As Halliday (1971: 332-335) suggests, language is programmed to fulfil ideational, interpersonal, and textual functions, and it is through the ideational function that one's real-world experience and internal consciousness are embodied in his use of language. Here, Halliday's internal consciousness includes reactions, cognitions, perceptions, and linguistic acts of speaking and understanding. Fairclough also recognizes the importance of the ideational function of language, emphasizing that use of language can "signify the world (1992: 64)". Use of language is a deterministic process: language is acquired through socialization, while social reality is constructed through use of language. More specifically, when one acquires a language, he is being instilled with ideologies carried by language, and in turn his linguistic performance tends to conform to

social norms and embody the ideologies (Fowler & Kress, 1979: 194). It can be argued that use of language, in an ideational sense, is ideological and usually reflects the speaker's thoughts or ideology. Even translations, which are supposed to be faithful renditions of source text, are found to be ideologically-embedded practices (Schäffner, 2003) and more and more translation studies provide empirical evidence for the close link between ideology and translation (e.g. Tymoczko & Gentzler, 2002; also see Chapter 2.3.1). Compared with translators, interpreters enjoy much more freedom and discretion in certain aspects. Although both translators and interpreters may be commissioned to do their tasks and may be subject to requirements or opinions of agents or clients, written translation texts are destined to come under greater ideological influences of 'patronage (Lefevere, 1992b)' and/or 'censorship (Schäffner, 2007: 138-140)' in that interpreting is characteristic of evanescence (Seleskovitch, 1994: 12-18) and is often not subject to prior censorship. Once spoken, words are fading and only meanings may stay in the minds of listeners, and people do not know exactly how they are going to express themselves until they open their mouths. In this sense, whether interpreters, who may serve as a communicative role between addressors and addressees, can convey messages in a faithful way with ideology-free use of language or to what extent an interpreter's ideology interferes with his/her rendition remains doubtful and needs further investigation. Only a few researchers started to explore the link between ideology and interpreting in recent decades (e.g. Baker, 2006; Beaton, 2007) but more empirical evidence is still needed to demonstrate to what extent interpreting renditions may be under the influence of ideology, which is why this research addresses ideology issue in simultaneous interpreting on an empirical basis.

Meanwhile, the interpersonal function of language proposed by Halliday is further divided into the identity function and relational function by Fairclough (1992: 64). The identity function is about how social identities are constructed in discourse, while the relational function refers to "how social relationships between discourse participants are

enacted and negotiated (ibid)”. The three functions of language – the ideational, identity, and relational functions – elaborated by Fairclough in his discussion of discourse are indeed closely related to the present study. In terms of the ideational function, it is assumed that the trainee interpreters’ real-world experience and personal ideologies will be embodied in their use of language, i.e. ‘interpreting renditions’ in this research. While social identities are established in discourse, one’s national identity should be embodied in one’s language use in specific political texts involving national identity. As for the relational function, since there are inequalities of power and international status between Taiwan and China, the relationships between discourse participants (e.g. a Chinese speaker and a Taiwanese interpreter) may be enacted and negotiated in the way in which hegemony and resistance interact with each other.

Despite the common features, the CDA approaches differ in research focus, social domains, and theoretical legacy. Fairclough & Wodak (1997) list eight important theoretical approaches to CDA, including French discourse analysis, critical linguistics, social semiotics, sociocultural and discursive change, socio-cognitive studies, discourse-historical method, reading analysis, and Duisburg School. Of the eight approaches, the socio-cognitive approach and the discourse-historical approach within CDA are the main methodological focus of the present study. Acknowledging CDA's failure to give an explicit account of the role of knowledge in discourse comprehension and production, van Dijk draws inspiration from philosophy, linguistics, psychology, sociology and anthropology and proposes a socio-cognitive approach to uncovering inequalities embodied in discursive or interpretative acts (e.g. 1998). The approach, mainly developed on the basis of social representation theory (e.g. Moscovici, 2000), highlights that the production of texts and talks that represents one’s personal experience and consciousness of selecting relevant information to construct discourse is actually built on collective perceptions, namely socially or culturally shared general knowledge (van Dijk, 1997: 189-190). More specifically, van Dijk points out the significance of knowledge in context models that act as a fundamental interface between

social and cognitive dimensions of discourse context lies in its power of controlling discourse meaning and interpretation in many aspects (2003: 97). As a result, an analysis of pragmatic and semantic features of discourse in social and cultural dimensions helps uncover how language users bring their collective knowledge and ideologies to their text processing and production. Van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach within CDA may suggest a strong link between social representations and the choices of translators/interpreters made in the process of rendering.

The discourse-historical approach was developed mainly by Ruth Wodak under the influence of the Bernsteinian tradition and the Frankfurt School. Dealing in a pragmatic sense with discourse, which both the discourse-historical approach and van Dijk's socio-cognitive theory consider to be "structured forms of knowledge (Wodak & Meyer, 2009: 6)", Wodak (1986) developed the approach from the study of anti-Semitic discourse during the Waldheim affair in Austria. In the study, Wodak analyzed the texts and discourses about the Wehrmacht (the unified armed forces of Germany from 1935 to 1945) and Kurt Waldheim (who was accused of his participation or complicity in Nazi crimes against Jewish people while running for presidency of Austria) in different settings, including related historic documents, Waldheim's and his opponents' speeches, international and domestic media coverage of Waldheim, and public opinions in the form of conversations on the street. Analyzing the texts and discourses with historical knowledge, Wodak provided strong and convincing evidence for the anti-Semitic ideologies embodied in texts and discourses.

To employ the DHA, one needs to follow the 'principle of triangulation', which takes into holistic consideration the research data, theoretical base, and background information, and the application of the DHA is three-dimensional, including (1) identification of specific contents or topics of a specific discourse, (2) investigation of discursive strategies, and (3) examination of "linguistic means" and the "specific, context-dependent linguistic realizations" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: 93; see also Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 44). The application of the

DHA may be targeted at the following five questions especially when the discourse under investigation concerns national(ist) rhetoric (Reisigl 2008: 99):

- (1) How are phenomena/events, processes, actions, persons, and objects named and referred to in linguistic terms in a specific discourse?
- (2) What features, qualities, and characteristics are assigned to those named or referred to in the discourse?
- (3) What arguments are specified in the discourse?
- (4) From what perspective are those involved in the above three questions expressed?
- (5) Are any utterances in the discourse intensified or mitigated?

To demystify the ideologies embedded in discourse, the DHA practitioners aim to answer the above five questions by examining specific themes and claims of a specific discourse and investigating the discursive strategies used in a specific discourse. The definition of “strategy” in the DHA is “a more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal (ibid: 94)”. And the discursive strategies that may concern national or ethnic issues in the DHA studies may include referential/nomination strategies, predicational strategies, perspectivation/framing/discourse representation strategies, intensifying/mitigation strategies, and argumentation strategies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 44). More specifically, social actors may be constructed and represented by use of referential or nomination strategies. For instance, if one identifies a group of people by “naming them derogatorily, debasingly or vituperatively (ibid: 45)”, s/he is showing linguistic discrimination against the group through use of referential/nomination strategies. Predicational strategies may involve linguistic devices which explicitly or implicitly express “stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits (ibid: 45)”, while through strategies of perspectivation, framing or discourse representation, speakers demonstrate linguistically their stance on discriminatory issues and their involvement in discourse. Intensifying strategies and mitigation strategies are two opposite

strategies, but both may influence the original illocutionary force of discriminatory utterances. Argumentation strategies, of which topoi (plausible argumentation schemes) and fallacies are two main features, help justify positive and negative attributions of specific persons or groups (ibid: 45). These strategies involve a variety of linguistic devices to achieve certain specific objectives as mostly demonstrated in the following table 4.

Also, this study is to investigate the embodiment of hegemony and resistance ideologies in cross-strait trainee interpreters' renditions, the specific contents or topics of the discourse under scrutiny will be those concerning the One China ideology or the Taiwan independence issue. As Fairclough (1989: 19) maintains, CDA practitioners should focus on not only the texts themselves but also the process of producing and interpreting those texts. Ideologies, especially collective ones, are formed and reinforced in a political-historical context, so texts or discourse should be analyzed in a broad context. By applying the CDA to analysis of interpreting renditions, the research is aimed at not only disclosing the (political) ideologies embedded in simultaneous interpreting renditions produced by Mandarin trainee interpreters but also discussing and presenting the reasons and processes of how the ideologies are formed and changed within social-historical contexts.

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
nomination	discursive construction of social actors, objects/phenomena/ events and processes/actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● membership categorization devices, deictics, anthroponyms, etc.</li> <li>● tropes such as metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches (<i>pars pro toto, totum pro parte</i>)</li> <li>● verbs and nouns used to denote processes and actions, etc.</li> </ul>
predication	discursive qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events/processes and actions (more or less positively or negatively)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits (e.g. in the form of adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctive clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses or groups)</li> <li>● explicit predicates or predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns</li> <li>● collocations</li> <li>● explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures (including metonymies, hyperboles, litotes, euphemisms)</li> <li>● allusions, evocations, presuppositions/implicatures, etc.</li> </ul>
argumentation	justification and questioning of claims of truth and normative rightness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● topoi (formal or more content-related)</li> <li>● fallacies</li> </ul>
perspectivization, framing or discourse representation	positioning speaker's or writer's point of view and expressing involvement or distance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● deictics</li> <li>● direct, indirect or free indirect speech</li> <li>● quotation marks, discourse markers/particles</li> <li>● metaphors</li> <li>● animating prosody, etc.</li> </ul>
intensification, mitigation	modifying (intensifying or mitigating) the illocutionary force and thus the epistemic or deontic status of utterances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● diminutives or augmentatives</li> <li>● (modal) particles, tag questions, subjunctive, hesitations, vague expressions, etc.</li> <li>● hyperboles, litotes</li> <li>● indirect speech acts (e.g. question instead of assertion)</li> <li>● verbs of saying, feeling, thinking, etc.</li> </ul>

Table 4 A Selection of Discursive Strategies (as exactly shown in Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: 94)

### 3.2.3 How is CDA applied in this study?

To address the issue of ideology in simultaneous interpreting, CDA is applied to analysis of simultaneous renditions collected in an experiment specially designed for the purpose of the study. In the experiment, trainee interpreters as subjects perform tasks of simultaneously interpreting, from Mandarin into English, authentic political speeches concerning the relations between Taiwan and China or the status of Taiwan as an independent country. The comparison of source texts and target texts, which is also known as a textual analysis approach, is commonly adopted in translation studies for identifying textual alterations that may be caused by the translator's ideology. In the present study, the political speeches used in the experiment are referred to as source language texts and the trainee interpreters' renditions as target language texts in translation/interpreting terms. Both texts will be analyzed, but simultaneous renditions become the main focus for the critical discourse analysis.

The CDA method in this study will not be used in a conventional way as CDA practitioners usually do. As discussed in Chapter 3.2.2, CDA practitioners tend to be socially or politically committed to addressing the issue of inequalities by linguistic means, and the interpretive nature of CDA has often come under severe attack (e.g. Widdowson 1995, 2004; Jones, 2007). Jones criticises CDA for its failure to “reconcile the use of linguistic methods and constructs with ‘extra-linguistic’ considerations of truth (2007: 365; *original emphasis*)” and disapproves Fairclough's belief that CDA can help determine existence of ideological signs in discourse without taking facts and truth into consideration (*ibid*). In consequence, to avoid criticism about CDA's interpretative nature and lack of factual considerations, the rendition data analysis in this study will begin with a textual analysis by comparing the researcher's literal translations of the source speech texts and the subjects' renditions of the same source texts and see if there is discrepancy at the lexicogrammatical level between the two. The literal translations are converted from the source texts in the plainest and most

complete manner in order to let readers know the complete original messages conveyed by the speakers. As the translations are produced under no time constraints in a written form, it should be reasonable that there is discrepancy in accuracy, completeness, and register between the written translations and the interpreting renditions. The focus of the textual analysis in this study will be on lexicogrammatical choice, disinterpreted messages and the meaning of a rendered text as a whole. In consequence, a ‘deviant’ rendition is defined in this study as a rendition containing misinterpreted or disinterpreted messages which lead to overstatement, understatement, or distortion of the meanings that the source speakers originally expressed. The deviant renditions will be dealt critically with on linguistic level through the CDA method, with a reference to extra-linguistic facts or information obtained in the surveys and/or interview (see the following sections), and will be considered within social, cultural, or historical contexts to seek cause for the existence of deviant renditions and provide evidence for confirming whether the deviant renditions are signs of hegemony or resistance. The process of comparison and cross-referencing within CDA analysis in this study is called the ‘CDA Filter Process’ (see Diagram 5 below).

As shown in Diagram 5, the CDA Filter Process is designed to seek solid evidence for the existence of ideological signs and to determine whether the signs are those of hegemony or resistance to hegemony. To confirm whether a rendition is deviant and ideological, the researcher will first examine the wording of the rendition and see whether the rendition deviates from the source text to the extent that it overstates, understates or distorts the original meaning. The wording of the deviant rendition per se may be obviously ideological when analyzed within specific historic, cultural or social contexts. Then the researcher will move on to determine whether the deviant rendition is a sign of hegemony or resistance to hegemony by referring to the other ideological signs made by the subject in the renditions of the same or other source speeches (where applicable), the survey results, and/or interview data produced by the subject. Evidence for the existence of the ideological sign may be obtained at any stage

of cross-referencing shown in Diagram 5, which means the filter process may stop whenever reasonable grounds for ideological deviancy are found. It is not subjective or biased interpretation but objective comparison and cross-referencing that will determine the existence of ideological signs. Thus, the practice of the CDA method in this research may avoid common criticism of CDA as subjectively and ideologically interpreting discourse.




Diagram 5. CDA Filter Process

By applying the CDA method to analysis of deviant renditions, discursive strategies and linguistic devices through which political ideologies of the interpreter subjects are embodied in their renditions will be carefully investigated. While striving to see if it is possible in this study to find a general trend in how ideologies of hegemony and resistance of cross-strait interpreter subjects are realized linguistically, it should also be kept in mind that Munday (2007) points out that the traditional CDA analysis within monolingual discourse may not always be the most suitable for detecting and classifying textual alterations in translated texts as translators are usually “guided by intuition and previous linguistic experience of the two languages alone” and variants in translated texts are usually not introduced in “systematic” manner (ibid: 204). Yet, despite the non-systematic variations in translated texts, in his analysis of different English translation versions of the same Spanish political speeches given by such revolutionary leaders in Latin America as Castro, Marcos, and Chavez, Munday still finds that “the perspective of the [source] message is blurred by translation choices that affect the transitivity structures, the interpersonal function and the spatio-temporal deixis particularly (ibid: 213)”. In other words, the application of the CDA method in analysis of renditions may help disclose vividly linguistic means through which translated texts become a site for representation of an interpreter’s ideology.

In addition to the CDA Filter Process, an overview of the ideological signs produced by each student interpreter will be presented in two separate tables, one for the China group and the other the Taiwan group, displaying the existence of ideological signs both by individual and by group. Moreover, the Chi-square statistical analysis of the ideological signs of each source speech will be conducted. The statistical analysis of the ideological signs can not only represent power struggles between Taiwan and China but also provide clear insights into the issue of ideology in simultaneous interpreting. It is the researcher’s belief that with survey questionnaires and statistical instruments, the application of the CDA method in the present study can adequately uncover ideologies embodied in simultaneous renditions.

### 3.3 Simultaneous Interpreting Data Collection

In order to obtain sufficient data for CDA analysis and to prevent subjects from tiredness, the SI data collection is conducted on the same subjects at two different stages. The interval between the two stages is around five to six months, with the first conducted by the end of December of a certain academic year and the second by the end of the following April of the same academic year<sup>1</sup>.

The SI data collection procedure begins with a brief introduction of the data collection to the subjects, who are told only that their data will be used in studies of the correlation between cultural background and interpreting performance and that the information they provide will be regarded as strictly confidential<sup>2</sup>. None of them know the actual focus of the research, and thus they are not likely to produce rendition that they think the researcher wants to hear. In advance of each interpreting session, the subjects are given a wordlist relevant to the source speech concerned. The terminology list only provides the names of countries, political parties, etc. in both Mandarin and English, all of which are irrelevant to the research focus and used only to prevent the subjects from being stuck in these proper nouns in the rendering process. Also, the topic of the speech and the speaker's name are written in Mandarin and shown on the wordlist to inform the subjects of whose speech and what topic they are going to interpret. As note-taking skills are irrelevant to the research focus, the subjects are allowed to take anything down on the terminology list during the rendering process. The detail of the elements of the SI data collection is given below.

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<sup>1</sup> As the student subjects were recruited from the one-year Translating & Interpreting MA programs offered by two UK universities, the timing of the data collection had to be at their convenience.

<sup>2</sup> Note that the subjects are informed of the actual research focus at the end of the experiment and have the right to decide whether their data may be used in the present study.

### **3.3.1 Subjects**

Forty-two trainee interpreters are recruited as the subjects of the experiment, who are registered with the simultaneous interpreting module at the time of participating in the experiment. Half of the subjects are from Taiwan (or hereinafter Taiwanese subjects) and the other half from China (or hereinafter Chinese subjects). All but two of the subjects are aged between 20 and 30 at the time of participating in the data collection. Two of the subjects are male, and forty female. In order to preserve the anonymity of the subjects, those from Taiwan are coded and numbered with an initial letter ‘T’, while those from China ‘C’, and the researcher will use the third person singular pronoun ‘she/her/herself’<sup>3</sup> when referring to any one of them. Before attending the interpreting programs, 16 of the 42 subjects have had interpreting or translating experience. During the second-stage data collection, one Taiwanese subject (numbered T016) dropped out, and the renditions of a Chinese subject (numbered C009) are missing due to unknown equipment malfunctions. However, the data that have been obtained from these two subjects remain valid and are used in the research. All of the subjects have given their consent to the researcher for using their data for research purposes.

#### **3.3.1.1 The advantages and disadvantages of using trainee interpreters**

According to Pöchhacker (2011: 317-18), one of the common challenges for SI interpreting studies is the “relatively small number of conference interpreters with the same language combination and professional background in any given location” and “the reluctance of such practitioners to have their work recorded and analysed for research purposes”, which indeed has been reflected in my discussion in Chapter 2.3.3 about some previous studies of interpreting renditions, which often involve a very limited number of professional interpreters.

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<sup>3</sup> Note that the choice of the singular pronoun for referring to the subjects has no feminist implications here. It is just because the great majority of the subjects are female.

It may then follow that the small sample size leads to the failure to generalize findings as there tends to be a “high degree of individual variability in professional performance (ibid: 318)”. Note that the aim of this present study is to observe whether there is an ideological tug of war between hegemony and resistance among the interpreters across the Taiwan Strait, and therefore the study needs to recruit from either side a relatively large and equal number of interpreters who are willing to have their renditions analyzed in order to confirm the existence of such ideological war. Given the lack of funding and professional connections, it would be more feasible and cost-efficient to use trainee interpreters in this study. Also, the location of the study is a key to recruitment of Mandarin interpreters. At present, only a limited number of Chinese people are allowed to study in Taiwan, which makes it not possible to recruit a large number of Chinese trainee interpreters who are studying in Taiwan if the research were to be conducted in Taiwan. Likewise, there seems to be few Taiwanese students studying interpreting in China for the moment. It may be argued that only the interpreting programs offered in English-speaking countries, such as the UK, can attract students from Taiwan and from China at the same time, which is why this study can recruit an equal number of Taiwanese and Chinese trainee interpreters. The use of trainee interpreters may also contribute to the homogeneity of the subjects. Most of the trainee interpreters, after obtaining a bachelor’s degree, enter the interpreting training program in their twenties. Those of similar age should have received similar degree and content of socialization in their host cultures, which might reduce the possibilities of a high degree of individual variability in perceiving the source texts.

The difference between trainee interpreters and professional interpreters, which has been roughly discussed in Chapter 2.3.3.4, mainly involves quality of interpreting. Previous studies show that trainee interpreters may outperform professionals in some aspects, such as working memory (e.g. Kopke & Nespoulous, 2006) or linguistic autonomy in terms of restructuring or reformulation (Setton & Motta, 2007). Although it is widely recognized that accumulated

experience may be why professional interpreters can give a higher level of performance through different strategies than trainees, Korpala's study (2012) finds that there is no significant difference between the groups of professionals and trainees in terms of the use of the omission strategy if the speaker's delivery rate is not taken into consideration, which indicates that trainees may be able to achieve a higher level of accuracy or completeness in their rendition if the source delivery rate is reasonably slow. Therefore, in this present study, all of the source texts used in the SI experiment will be recorded at a reasonably slow rate to reduce the SI difficulties to the trainee subjects.

There are also disadvantages of using trainee interpreters in interpreting studies. One of the major disadvantages is that the results may not be generalized to what would happen to professional interpreters. As mentioned above, accumulated experience may equip professional interpreters with better ability to cope with SI difficulties, and what they utter during an interpreting process, even in a laboratory setting, may be what really takes place in reality. By contrast, trainees may produce immature rendering performance due to lack of experience and interaction with real speakers and/or audience. However, as the aim of this study is to investigate the direct representation of one's ideology in discourse, trainees, who have not worked in institutional settings, may show their ideology instinctively. Some studies have shown that interpreters who work for certain institutions or agencies tend to show strong institutionalized ideology in their rendition (e.g. Beaton, 2007). Also, the two genuine examples given in Chapter 2.4.4, where Chinese interpreters were defending their One China ideology (intentionally or unintentionally), indicate rendition deviancy caused by strong political ideology. Therefore, it would not be likely to confirm whether ideologies signs of trainees will be stronger or weaker than professional interpreters at the end of this experiment.

Some might wonder whether novice interpreting, in which radical summarising, omission, changes from ST meaning, etc may take place, might result in stronger subject-ideology effects than with professionals. Note that interpreting from Mandarin

Chinese into English is mainly on a meaning basis. The genuine SI examples produced by professional Mandarin interpreters based in Taiwan (Chang & Schallert, 2007; see also Chapter 2.3.3.3) have demonstrated this principle very clearly. More specifically, three professional Mandarin interpreters rendered the same source text and produced renditions of various lengths. The Mandarin source text selected as the example contains 59 Mandarin characters. While Chang & Schallert's written translation contains 37 English words, the word counts of the three SI renditions are 47, 27, and 20 English words respectively. (All of the word counts here include punctuation marks.) Generally, these renditions of various lengths are all acceptable, and the length of a rendition is not necessarily correlated with the quality of interpreting. Viezzi (1993) compares the renditions of the same source text interpreted from English into Italian in the consecutive and simultaneous modes in terms of the length, speed, clarity, completeness, etc. and finds simultaneous rendition too wordy as the interpreter tends to render everything heard. Stenzl (1983: 29f) also maintains that completeness should not be achieved "at the cost of clarity and intelligibility", which is confirmed by Kurz's study (1993) of user expectations that sense consistency with original message is much more important than completeness of interpretation. It may be likely that renditions of trainees tend to be meaning and summary-based due to the general principle in interpreting from Mandarin into English and due to trainees' limited experience in coping with SI difficulties. Yet, note that the aim of this study is to observe how ideology is embodied in interpreting rendition. The embodiment of ideology in discourse should be more correlated with choice of words or meaning of sentences than the length of a rendition.

### **3.3.2 *SI source text***

The unequal power relations between China and Taiwan is often manifest in the political speeches made by leaders on both sides. An analysis of the language used in the interpreters'

renditions of the speeches may reveal hegemony or resistance in the interpreter. Hence, five Mandarin speeches are used as source texts in the SI experiment. The speeches were given by the political leaders from Taiwan and from China, where some sensitive issues concerning the relations between Taiwan and China, such as the One China policy maintained by China, the Taiwan independence issue (also known as the Taiwan issue), or the role of Taiwan as a country, are talked of. As Taiwan is geographically divided from China by the Taiwan Strait, the relations between Taiwan and China are often referred to as ‘cross-strait relations’. All of the speeches were made in public, which means the ‘interpretability’ of the speeches has been approved (Napier, 2004). In order to avoid accent problems which might have an impact on the subjects’ understanding the content of the speeches, the speeches were transcribed and all the transcripts of the source speeches were spoken and recorded at a reasonable speed (namely around 155 Chinese characters per minute) by a female Mandarin speaker. According to the results of the retrospective questionnaire surveys, none of the subjects consider the speech rates to be fast (see Chapter 4.2). Therefore, the speech rate has been proved not to be an issue in the SI experiment. The five speeches are numbered according to the sequence in which they are used, with the code (C) attached to those given by the Chinese politicians and (T) the Taiwanese politicians. The first three speeches are used in the first-stage data collection, and the remaining two in the second stage. The structure and genre of each source speech will be analyzed in the following sections. Also, a comparison of the source speeches will be provided in Chapter 3.3.2.6.

Identifying the genre of a talk is important. According to Chilton & Schäffner (2002: 19), genres can be defined as “global linguistic patterns which have historically developed in a linguistic community for fulfilling specific communicative tasks in specific situation” and “reflect the effective, conscious and situationally appropriate choice of linguistic means”. As relatively stable linguistic patterns may be shared as common knowledge of a specific linguistic community, the genre analysis of the source speeches in this study may help

interpret the renditions of the trainee subjects.

### 3.3.2.1 Speech 1 (C) by Hu Jintao

Speech 1 (C): Hu Jintao's speech on the sixtieth anniversary of the victory in the Second Sino-Japan War and the World Anti-Fascism War, 3 September 2005.<sup>4</sup>

Character Count: Original 10,924, edited down to 2,448  
(punctuation marks included)

Length: Part 1: 8.29 min; Part 2: 7.46 min.

Speaker: Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China (PRC)  
since 2003

Throughout the speech in memory of China's victory of the Chinese Anti-Japanese War War, Hu talks about the role of Taiwan in the War. Originally part of the territory of the Chinese State of Qīng, Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 after the defeat of Qīng China in the First Sino-Japan war. In 1945, the defeat of Japan in the Second Sino-Japan War (part of the Second World War) caused the handover of Taiwan to the Republic of China (the R.O.C.). In 1949, the R.O.C. government lost the civil war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and fled to Taiwan. Since then, the CCP has established the People's Republic of China (the P.R.C.) and claimed that the P.R.C. represents legitimate China. Despite the fact that Taiwan has never been under the P.R.C.'s control, the P.R.C. still views Taiwan as part of its territory, which is why Hu uses 'compatriot 同胞' in this speech when referring to the people of Taiwan. Although the Chinese Communist Party also joined the Second Sino-Japan War, which is also known as the '*Zhōng Guó Rén Mín Kàng Rì Zhàn Zhēng* 中國人民抗日戰爭 (Chinese Anti-Japanese War)', the War was officially between Japan and the R.O.C. With the change of the political landscape in the Chinese mainland after 1949, it is not surprising that while the R.O.C. in Taiwan keeps telling its people that the R.O.C. won the Second Sino-Japan War, the P.R.C. (now better known as China) interprets the history of the War differently from the

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<sup>4</sup> Retrieved 09 September 2006 from <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-09-03/17216854040s.shtml>.

R.O.C. and claims to have played the leading role in the War (Ho, 1986). Meanwhile, it should be noted that the anti-Japan events or rallies have taken place in China from time to time in recent decades, which is thought to be the political manipulation of Chinese patriotism (Liu, 2005). By contrast, due to its Japanese colonial history and constant encounters with powers from outside, Taiwan has developed a rapport with Japan<sup>5</sup>. In consequence, the people of China might in general hold a more hostile or unfriendly attitude towards Japan than the people of Taiwan do.

In this SI experiment, Hu's speech is split into two parts in order to ease the burden of the subjects and prevent distraction from tiredness. The researcher does not add any words to the original text but omit much of the description of how the Second Sino-Japan War and the World Anti-Fascism War broke out and proceeded. The abridged speech retains Hu's original tone and style as well as the main historical context of the Second Sino-Japan War which involves the role of Taiwan in the War and the Taiwan independence issue. The analysis of the macro- and mesostructure of this speech is shown in table 6.

Table 6 Macro- and Mesostructure of Speech 1 (C)

	Macro- and mesostructure
Beijing, 3 September 2005	Place and date
A speech to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the victory in the Second Sino-Japan War and the World Anti-Fascism War	Commemorative (sub)genre
Part I 同胞们，同志们，朋友们 Compatriots, comrades, and friends	<u>Addressing an audience</u> – particularly targeted at all Chinese people and members of Chinese Communist Party
Paragraph 1 今天，是中国人民抗日战争胜利纪念日，也是世界反法西斯战争胜利纪念日。我们在这里隆重集会，同世界各国人民一道，纪念中国人民抗日战争暨世界反法西	<u>Section 1:</u> <u>Marking the 60th anniversary of the</u>

<sup>5</sup> For example, Taiwan provided the largest donations in the world in aid of Japan's 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami (Taipei Times, 2011, 17 April).

<p>斯战争胜利 60 周年，纪念这一正义战胜邪恶、光明战胜黑暗、进步战胜反动的伟大胜利。</p> <p>Today is the anniversary of the Chinese Anti-Japanese War and also the anniversary of the World Anti-Fascism War. We gather here in a solemn ceremony with the people all over the world to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the victory against the Chinese Anti-Japanese War and the World Anti-Fascism War, to commemorate the great victory of justice against evil, light against darkness, and progression against conservatism.</p>	<p><u>Wars</u> – the anniversary is commemorated by people all over the world and the winning sides, including China, are representatives of justice.</p>
<p>Paragraph 2</p> <p>中国人民抗日战争的伟大胜利，是中华民族全体同胞团结奋斗的结果，也是中国人民同世界反法西斯同盟国人民并肩战斗的结果。中国人民为取得抗日战争的伟大胜利感到骄傲，也为同世界各国人民一道取得世界反法西斯战争的伟大胜利感到自豪。</p> <p>The great victory against the Chinese Anti-Japanese War was the results of the solidarity and struggle of all of the people of the Chinese race and the results of the joint efforts of the Chinese people and the people of the allied countries against the World Anti-Fascism. Chinese people are proud of winning the great victory against the Chinese Anti-Japanese War and proud of winning with the people all over the world the great victory against the World Anti-Fascism War.</p>	<p><u>Emphasizing the victory was the result of Chinese solidarity</u> – Chinese people are proud of the victory.</p>
<p>Paragraph 3</p> <p>在这个庄严的时刻，我要向为中国人民抗日战争胜利建立了卓著功勋的海内外中华儿女，致以崇高的敬意！向支持和帮助过中国人民抗日战争的外国政府和国际友人，表示衷心的感谢！</p> <p>At this solemn moment, I would like to pay great tribute to the Chinese people at home and abroad who provided meritorious services for the victory against the Chinese Anti-Japanese War! I would like to express heartfelt gratitude for the foreign governments and international friends who offered support and help for the Chinese Anti-Japanese War!</p>	<p><u>Giving credits to everyone that contributed to the victory</u> – specifying the involvement of Chinese people all over the world.</p>
<p>同胞们，同志们，朋友们</p> <p>Compatriots, comrades, and friends</p>	<p><u>Addressing the same audience</u></p>
<p>Paragraph 4</p> <p>中国人民抗日战争是世界反法西斯战争的重要组成部分，是世界反法西斯战争的东方主战场。从 19 世纪后半叶起，日本逐渐走上军国主义道路，发动和参加了一系列侵略战争，其中大多数是侵华战争。日本 1874 年进犯台湾，1894 年挑起甲午战争并侵占台湾，1904 年发动日俄战争侵犯中国东北领土和主权，1931 年策动九一八事变并占领中国东北三省，1935 年制造华北事变，鲸吞中国的野心日益膨胀。以 1937 年 7 月 7 日日军炮轰宛平县城、进攻卢沟桥为标志，日本发动了全面侵华战争。日本侵略者先后践踏了中国大片土地，侵占了中国大部分重要城市，企图把中国变为日本的殖民地，进而吞并亚洲、称霸世界。</p>	<p><u>Section 2: Reviewing the history of Japanese wars against China</u> – specifying Taiwan as part of China’s territory in the wartime context; emphasizing Japan’s ambition to</p>

<p>The Chinese Anti-Japanese War is an important component of the World Anti-Fascism War and the main oriental battlefield of the World Anti-Fascism War. Since the second half of the nineteenth century, Japan gradually walked on the road of militarism, launched and joined a series of invasion wars. Most of the wars were invading China. Japan invaded Taiwan in eighteen seventy-four, started the first Sino-Japan war in eighteen ninety-four and occupied Taiwan, and started the Japan-Russia war in nineteen zero four and invaded the territory and sovereignty of northeast China, in nineteen thirty-one staged the 918 Incident and occupied three provinces in northeast China, in nineteen thirty-five created several incidents in north China, showing growing ambition to swallow China. With Japanese military's bombing Wanping County and attacking the Lugou Bridge on 7 July nineteen thirty-seven as a landmark, Japan launched a full-scale war of invading China. Japanese invaders trampled over a large piece of land of China, occupied most of China's important cities, attempted to turn China into Japan's colony and further annex Asia, dominate the world.</p>	<p>conquer China</p>
<p>Paragraph 5</p> <p>在波澜壮阔的全民族抗战中，全体中华儿女万众一心、众志成城，各党派、各民族、各阶级、各阶层、各团体同仇敌忾，共赴国难。长城内外，大江南北，到处燃起抗日的烽火。广大港澳同胞、台湾同胞、海外侨胞和海外华人，与祖国同呼吸、共命运，以各种方式参加和支持祖国人民抗战，不少同胞为国捐躯。在日本侵占台湾的半个世纪里，台湾同胞不断进行反抗，共有 65 万人壮烈牺牲。1945 年 9 月 2 日，日本政府正式签署投降书，宣告了日本侵略者的彻底失败和世界反法西斯战争的最后一胜利。中国人民抗日战争和世界反法西斯战争以中国人民和世界各国人民的彻底胜利载入了史册！</p> <p>During the magnificent all-[Chinese] race fight, all of the Chinese men and women concentrated on one goal with a unified will. Every party, every ethnicity, every rank, every class, and every group shared the same hatred and fought against the common enemy, made united efforts to save the nation. Inside and outside of the Great Wall, in the south and north of the Yangtze River, everywhere were lit beacon fires against Japan. A lot of Hong Kong and Macau compatriots, Taiwanese compatriots, overseas Chinese compatriots, and Chinese people abroad breathed and shared the fate with the motherland, joined and supported the people in the motherland to fight in the war in a variety of ways. A lot of compatriots died for the country. During the half century when Japan occupied Taiwan, Taiwanese compatriots kept revolting. Six hundred and fifty thousand people in total sacrificed lives. On 2 September 1945 Japan's government officially signed the Instrument of Surrender, proclaimed Japanese invaders' crushing defeat and the final victory against the World Anti-Fascism War. The Chinese Anti-Japanese War and the World Anti-Fascism War ended with Chinese people and all the other country people's great victory being recorded in history!</p>	<p><u>Describing how</u> <u>Chinese people fought</u> <u>against Japan for the</u> <u>final victory</u> – specifying Taiwan as part of China's territory under the invasion of Japan and how Taiwanese people fought against Japan</p>

<p>同胞们，同志们，朋友们</p> <p>Compatriots, comrades, and friends</p>	<p><u>Addressing the same audience</u></p>
<p>Paragraph 6</p> <p>中国人民抗日战争的胜利，彻底打败了日本侵略者，捍卫了中国的国家主权和领土完整，使中华民族避免了遭受殖民奴役的厄运。中华民族在五千多年的历史发展中创造了举世闻名的灿烂文明，曾经长时期走在世界前列。但是，由于封建统治的腐败和束缚，中国渐渐落后了。从1840年起，中国屡遭帝国主义列强的侵略和蹂躏，国家主权和领土完整不断受到侵蚀，中华民族的灾难日益深重。中国人民奋起抗击外敌入侵，又一次次遭到失败。然而，这一次，中国人民彻底粉碎了日本军国主义灭亡中国的企图，彻底改变了中国近代以后饱受外来侵略的屈辱历史，捍卫了中华民族数千年发展的文明成果。抗日战争的胜利，结束了日本在台湾50年的殖民统治，使台湾回到祖国怀抱。中国参与发起成立联合国并成为联合国安理会常任理事国，显著提高了中国的国际地位和国际影响。中国人民抗日战争胜利的历史表明，中华民族有同自己的敌人血战到底的气概，有在自力更生的基础上光复旧物的决心，有自立于世界民族之林的能力。</p> <p>The victory in the Chinese Anti-Japanese War completely defeated Japanese invaders, defended China's national sovereignty and territory integrity, prevented the doom for the Chinese race being colonized and slaved. The Chinese race in the five-thousand-year historical development created a world-famous splendid civilization, for a long time had walked in the front row of the world [countries]. However, due to feudalistic ruling's corruption and restriction, China gradually lagged behind. From eighteen forty onwards, China was repeatedly invaded and trampled over by imperialist powers. The national sovereignty and territory integrity were being eroded. The disasters for the Chinese race were greater and greater. Chinese people rose to fight against enemies from outside but were defeated over and over again. However, this time Chinese people completely shattered Japanese militarism's attempt at destroying China, completely changed China's history of being humiliated by foreign invasion since modern times, and safeguarded the Chinese race's civilization results developed in the past several thousand years. The victory of the Chinese Anti-Japanese War ended Japan's fifty-year colonial rule of Taiwan, made Taiwan return to the motherland's embrace. China participated in founding the United Nations and became one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, [which] noticeably raised China's international status and international influence. The history of the victory of the Chinese Anti-Japanese War shows that the Chinese race has the spirit to fight against enemies to the death, the determination to revive the glorious past through own efforts, and the ability to stand among the world races.</p>	<p><u>Section 3:</u></p> <p><u>Highlighting the impact of the war victory on China and its people</u> –specifying the victory made China win back Taiwan from Japan; specifying the solidarity of Chinese people has brought good results</p>
<p>Part II</p> <p>同胞们，同志们，朋友们</p> <p>Compatriots, comrades, and friends</p>	<p><u>Addressing the same audience</u></p>

<p><b>Paragraph 7</b></p> <p>60年前那场决定世界前途命运的伟大胜利，永远铭记在所有爱好和平与正义的人民心中。我们隆重纪念那场伟大胜利，就是要牢记历史、不忘过去、珍爱和平、开创未来，更好地推进全面建设小康社会、实现中华民族伟大复兴的光辉事业，更好地促进人类和平与发展的崇高事业。</p> <p>The great victory that decided the fate of the world sixty years ago will be always remembered by people who love peace and justice. We commemorate that great victory in a solemn ceremony in order to remember the history, forget not the past, cherish peace, create the future, further move to build a basically well-off society, realize the glorious business of the Chinese race's great rejuvenation, and better promote the noble business of mankind's peace and development.</p>	<p><b>Section 4:</b></p> <p><u>Highlighting the importance of marking the victory</u> – China wants to resume its leading role in the world and has an ability to contribute to the world.</p>
<p><b>Paragraph 8</b></p> <p>我们要坚定不移地巩固中华民族的大团结，弘扬伟大的民族精神。包括港澳同胞、台湾同胞、海外侨胞在内的全国各族人民和衷共济、团结奋斗，是中华民族走向伟大复兴的力量源泉。我们要继续巩固全国各族人民的大团结，巩固海内外中华儿女的大团结，最大限度地把全民族的力量凝聚起来，形成中华民族自强不息、奋勇前进的巨大力量。我们要十分珍惜我国繁荣发展、安定团结的良好局面，共同维护改革发展稳定的大局，万众一心地把改革开放和现代化建设事业不断推向前进。我们要大力弘扬以爱国主义为核心的民族精神，为我国各族人民风雨同舟、开拓进取提供强大精神支柱，鼓舞和激励一代又一代中华儿女为实现国家繁荣富强而团结奋斗。</p> <p>We need to unwaveringly consolidate the the Chinese race's unity, promote great national spirit. Including Hong Kong and Macau compatriots, Taiwanese compatriots, and overseas Chinese, people of every ethnicity all over the country work together with one heart, unite and fight together, [which] is a source of power for the Chinese race to walk towards great rejuvenation. We need to consolidate the great solidarity of every ethnicity all over the country, consolidate the great solidarity of Chinese people at home and abroad, and gather maximum power of all the race to form a giant force to make the Chinese race prosper and move forward. We need to cherish very much our country's prosperous development, stability and solidarity, jointly maintain the stable condition of the reform development, and work together with one heart to move forward the reform, opening-up, and business of modernized construction. We need to greatly promote the national spirit with patriotism at the core to provide people of every ethnicity of our country with strong spiritual support to share a common fate and to pioneer and make progress, and to encourage and inspire generations of Chinese men and women to consolidate and fight for the realization of the country's prosperity and strength.</p>	<p><b>Section 5:</b></p> <p><u>Highlighting the importance of the solidarity of Chinese people</u> – referring to Taiwanese as members of Chinese people; attempting to mobilize people of China through promotion of patriotism</p>

Paragraph 9

我们要坚定不移地维护国家主权和领土完整，积极推进祖国和平统一大业。中国人民热爱自己的国家，始终坚定不移地维护国家主权、领土完整和民族尊严，决不允许任何势力侵犯。我们要加强国防和军队现代化建设，坚持积极防御的军事战略方针，不断推进中国特色军事变革，提高信息化条件下的防卫作战能力，为维护国家主权和领土完整提供坚强的安全保障。我们将坚持“和平统一、一国两制”的基本方针和现阶段发展两岸关系、推进祖国和平统一进程的八项主张，坚持一个中国原则决不动摇，争取和平统一的努力决不放弃，贯彻寄希望于台湾人民的方针决不改变，反对“台独”分裂活动决不妥协。我们将认真落实同中国国民党、亲民党、新党的领导人会谈所达成的各项成果，采取一切积极措施，加强两岸各领域的交流合作，促进人员往来，密切两岸同胞感情，充分照顾台湾同胞利益，促进两岸关系和平稳定发展，维护台海地区和平稳定。我们坚决反对“台独”分裂势力及其活动，绝不允许“台独”分裂势力以任何名义、任何方式把台湾从祖国分裂出去。我们将继续同广大台湾同胞一道，共同承担起反对分裂国家、促进和平统一的神圣使命。

We need to firmly maintain the national sovereignty and territory integrity, actively promote peaceful unification of the motherland. Chinese people love own country, always firmly protect the national sovereignty, territory integrity, and the national dignity, and never allow any force to invade [China]. We need to strengthen the modernization of national defence and military forces, insist on active, defensive military strategies, continuously promote military reform with Chinese characteristics, enhance the defence capability in the information warfare, and provide strong secure protection for maintaining the national sovereignty and territory integrity. We will insist on “peaceful unification, one country two systems” as the basic policy, develop at the current stage the cross-strait relations and push forward the motherland’s peaceful unification according to the eight principles, insist on the one China principle and never sway, never give up fighting for peaceful unification, implement the policy of having expectations of Taiwanese people and never change [this policy], oppose “Taiwan’s independence” separatist activities and never compromise. We will seriously implement with leaders of Kuomintang, People First Party and New Party various results achieved in the meetings, adopt every active measure, strengthen in every field cross-strait exchange and cooperation, boost interaction between people, develop cross-strait compatriot feelings, fully take care of Taiwanese compatriots’ benefit, promote peaceful and stable development of the cross-strait relations, maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We firmly oppose “Taiwan independence” separatist forces and the related activities, never allow “Taiwan independence” separatist forces to separate Taiwan from the motherland in any name or in any way. We will continuously with vast numbers of Taiwanese compatriots together shoulder the sacred mission to oppose division of the country and promote peaceful unification.

Section 6:

Insisting on the One China policy – specifying how China will maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity; reiterating the One China stance and opposing Taiwan independence by emphasizing Chinese patriotism and China’s good will towards Taiwan.

<p>同胞们，同志们，朋友们</p> <p>Compatriots, comrades, and friends</p>	<p><u>Addressing the same audience</u></p>
<p>Paragraph 10</p> <p>回首往事，我们无限感慨；展望未来，我们充满信心。五千多年来，中华民族历经磨难却始终自强不息，为人类文明进步作出了不可磨灭的贡献。今天，中华民族的发展正面临着难得的历史机遇，中华民族伟大复兴的光辉前景已经展现在我们面前。包括大陆同胞、港澳同胞、台湾同胞、海外侨胞在内的全体中华儿女，都应该为自己是中华民族的成员而感到无比自豪，都应该承担起实现中华民族伟大复兴的历史责任，都应该以自己的努力为中华民族发展史续写新的光辉篇章。让我们更加紧密地团结起来，为全面建设小康社会、实现中华民族的伟大复兴而继续努力奋斗！为建设一个和平发展、文明进步的世界而继续努力奋斗！</p> <p>Looking back at the past, we sign with emotion. Looking into the future, we are full of confidence. During the period of more than five thousand years, the Chinese race always strives continually to make progress and makes indelible contributions to the advancement of human civilization. Today, the development of the Chinese race is facing a rare historical opportunity. The prospect of the Chinese race’s great rejuvenation has been displayed in front of us. Including compatriots from China, from Hong Kong and Macao, from Taiwan, and from overseas, all Chinese people should feel proud of being members of the Chinese race, shoulder the historical responsibility to revive the greatness of the Chinese race, and should make effort to write new chapters of glory in the history of the Chinese race development. Let’s be united more closely and keep working hard to build a basically well-off society and fulfil the great rejuvenation of the Chinese race. Let’s keep working hard to build a world of peaceful development and advanced civilization.</p>	<p><u>Section 9:</u></p> <p><u>Conclusion</u> – attempting to mobilize Chinese people to fight for the glory of China; specifying the involvement of Taiwanese as members of Chinese people.</p>

### 3.3.2.2 Speech 2 (T) by Chen Shui-bian

Speech 2 (T): Chen Shui-bian’s speech to the parliament of the Republic of Nauru on his state visit to the Republic of Nauru, 6 September 2006<sup>6</sup>

Character Count: Original 1,514, edited down to 1,334  
(punctuation marks included)

Length: 8.17 min

Speaker: Chen Shui-bian, President of the Republic of China (ROC) from 2000 to 2008

<sup>6</sup> Retrieved 09 September 2006 from the website of the Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) at <http://www.president.gov.tw>

Note that one short paragraph containing many proper nouns referring to the First Taiwan-Pacific Allies Summit in the original source speech is omitted in this abridged text version as it is not only irrelevant to cross-strait relations but also may add to SI difficulties.

The genre of the speech is a speech on the occasion of a state visit, and the field of action involves organization of international/interstate relations (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009: 90-91). This speech content involves no cross-strait issues; however, Taiwan is talked of as an independent country throughout the speech. The macro- and mesostructure of this abridged speech is analyzed in the following table 7.

Table 7 Macro- and Mesostructure of Speech 2 (T)

	Macro- and mesostructure
The Parliament of the Republic of Nauru, 6 September 2006	Place and date
陳水扁訪問諾魯，對諾魯國會發表演說 Chen Shui-bian visited the Republic of Nauru, giving a speech to the Nauru parliament	State visit speech (sub)genre
Paragraph 1 此次應史可迪總統閣下誠摯的邀請，率團前來貴國訪問，對本人來說意義非常重大，因為終於可以完成夢想，遍訪所有臺灣在太平洋的邦交國，美麗的諾魯為本人成就了太平洋圓夢之旅。 This time in response to His Excellency President Scotty's sincere invitation, [I] lead a delegation to visit your esteemed country. To me, the significance is very great because finally [I] can realize the dream of visiting all of Taiwan's diplomatic allies in the Pacific Ocean. Beautiful Nauru for me completed a trip to realizing the dream in the Pacific.	<u>Section 1:</u> <u>Specifying the significance of visiting Nauru to the speaker</u> – highlighting the speaker as Taiwan's president has completed the mission of visiting Taiwan's diplomatic allies in the Pacific area.
Paragraph 2 本人是中華民國第一位前來貴國訪問的國家元首，非常榮幸能受邀到貴國最高的民主殿堂—諾魯共和國國會發表演說。首先，謹代表我國政府及二千三百萬人民，向各位議員致意，也要向貴國政府與人民表達最誠摯的感謝之意。 I am the Republic of China's first national leader that visits your esteemed country, very honored to be invited to your esteemed country's highest democracy hall - the Parliament of the Republic of Nauru – to give a speech. First, [I] would like to, on behalf of my/our country's government and twenty-three million people, pay tribute to every parliament member, and, to	<u>Giving thanks to Nauru's government and people for the visit invitation</u> – highlighting the speaker as the first Taiwan's president to visit Nauru

<p>your esteemed country's government and people, express sincerest thanks.</p>	
<p>Paragraph 3</p> <p>貴國從一九六八年獨立以來，在過去三十八年當中，國會所展現的成熟民主體制，對貴國的國家發展扮演了極為重要的角色。本人也曾在九九〇年至一九九四年間擔任國會議員，在兩屆立法委員任期內，在我國立法院為人民喉舌、為民主奮鬥。</p> <p>Your esteemed country in nineteen sixty-eight declared independence, over the past thirty-eight years, the mature democratic system demonstrated by the parliament has played an extremely important role to your esteemed country's national development. I also once from nineteen ninety to nineteen ninety-four served as a parliament member. During the two terms in office as a legislator, in our country's Legislative Yuan [I] voiced for people, fought for democracy.</p>	<p><u>Section 2:</u></p> <p><u>Reviewing the similarities and connections between both countries</u> - associating the speaker with the <u>Nauru's MPs</u> and specifying Taiwan as a country has its own parliament and Chen once worked at Taiwan's parliament</p>
<p>Paragraph 4</p> <p>而本人情同手足的好朋友、親密的好兄弟史可迪總統閣下，也曾在九〇年代末期至二〇〇〇年間擔任國會議長，所以，在貴我兩國的民主之路上，總統閣下及本人可說曾經和各位國會議員一樣，都是扮演推手及監督者的角色。</p> <p>And my good friend as close as a sibling, close good brother His Excellency President Ludwig Scotty, also once from the late nineteen nineties to two thousand worked as Speaker of the Parliament. Therefore, on the road to democracy of our both countries, His Excellency President and I were just as every parliament member [here] playing a role as a pusher and supervisor.</p>	<p><u>Associating the speaker with Nauru's president</u> – both of them work for democracy of one's own country</p>
<p>Paragraph 5</p> <p>兩國雖然地理上相距遙遠，但臺灣原住民與諾魯人民同屬南島語系，在文化、血緣、語言及風俗習慣上都有許多相似之處，這也是為什麼臺灣人民對貴國的人民會自然而然的有一份親切感，而且兩國人民很容易就可以搭起友誼的橋樑。</p> <p>Although both countries are far apart geographically, Taiwanese aboriginals and Nauru people both belong to the Austronesian family. In terms of culture, origin, language and customs there are many similarities. This is also why Taiwanese people towards your esteemed country's people naturally feel friendly, and people of both countries very easily build a bridge of friendship.</p>	<p><u>Associating Taiwan's people with Nauru's people</u> – both Taiwan's aboriginals and Nauru's people belong to the Austronesian family</p>
<p>Paragraph 6</p> <p>所以，本人特別邀請了二位原住民的國會議員一起同行，在此跟各位介紹，第一位是代表執政的民主進步黨與卑南族的陳瑩委員，第二位是代表親民黨與阿美族的林正二委員。這二位委員剛好代表臺灣兩個主要政黨與兩個不同的原住民族群，顯示臺灣是一個民主、文化、族群多元的國家，然而在對外拓展外交工作時，我們的意志與聲音都是團結一致的。</p> <p>Therefore, I specially invited two aboriginal parliament members to come with</p>	<p><u>Section 3:</u></p> <p><u>Introducing two Taiwan's MPs who came to Nauru with the speaker</u> – highlighting Taiwan as a democratic, multi-ethnic and cultural country</p>

<p>me. Here [I] introduce [them] to everyone. The first one represents the ruling Democratic Progressive Party and the Puyuma tribe, Legislator Chen Ying. The second one represents the People First Party and the Amis tribe, Legislator Lin Cheng-er. These two legislators represent Taiwan's two major political parties and two different aboriginal tribes, [which] shows that Taiwan is a democratic, culturally and ethnically diverse country. However, while expanding diplomatic affairs to the outside, our wills and voices are united and uniform.</p>	
<p>Paragraph 7</p> <p>於帛琉首府柯羅市舉行的「第一屆臺灣與太平洋友邦元首高峰會議」是臺灣願意貢獻國際社會，致力追求我國和友邦合作共榮目標的具體表現，我們期待以最有效率的方式落實會議結果，逐步提升臺灣及其太平洋友邦的國家實力，並成為於二十一世紀國際社會中，實踐民主、和平、自由、人權等普世價值的模範國家。</p> <p>Held in Koror, the capital of Palau, 'the First Taiwan-Pacific Allies Summit' is a concrete demonstration of Taiwan's willingness to contribute to the international community, to pursue the goal of my/our country and [our] allies' cooperating for common prosperity. We expect to in the most efficient ways implement the Summit's results, gradually enhance Taiwan and [its] Pacific allies' national strength, and become in 21<sup>st</sup>-century international community a model country which puts into practice democracy, peace, freedom, human rights etc common values.</p>	<p><u>Section 4:</u> <u>Specifying Taiwan's effort in maintaining its relations with Asia-Pacific allies -</u> using the First Taiwan-Pacific Allies Summit as an example to highlight Taiwan would like to work with its Pacific allies and become a model country in the world.</p>
<p>Paragraph 8</p> <p>在貴我兩國合作方面，今年二月兩國簽署農技合作協定後，我國駐諾魯技術團已陸續在貴國設立示範農場、水產養殖場及家畜示範飼養場，未來將會陸續生產各項蔬菜、水果、魚類等農漁產品，我國技術團團員也計畫一戶一戶的親身示範教導，相信貴國人民可以從這樣的學習中受益良多。</p> <p>In terms of cooperation between both countries, this February both countries signed the agricultural and technical cooperation agreement. [Since this] my/our country's technical delegation based in Nauru has one after another in your esteemed country set up demonstration farms, fish farms and demonstration domestic animal farms. In the future [ ] will one after another produce a variety of vegetables, fruits, fishes, [and other] agricultural-fishery products. My/our country's technical delegation members also plan to from household to household give demonstrations in person. [I] believe your esteemed country's people can from such learning benefit a lot.</p>	<p><u>Section 5:</u> <u>Specifying cooperation between Taiwan and Nauru – highlighting</u> Taiwan's help for Nauru's agriculture and fishing industry</p>
<p>Paragraph 9</p> <p>此外，為加強與諾魯人才培訓方面的交流，目前我國每年提供全額獎學金予諾魯三位學生赴臺灣就讀大學，並提供多項在職訓練或專業講習，至今已有多人前往，未來也會陸續辦理人才交流活動。相信這些學生學成返國</p>	<p><u>Example of talent exchange between Taiwan and Nauru – highlighting</u> Taiwan's help for training</p>

<p>後，一定可以成為貴國推動各項建設的重要種子。</p> <p>In addition, to strengthen exchange in terms of Nauru talent training, at present my/our country every year provides full scholarships to three students from Nauru to go to Taiwan and study at university, and provide many on-the-job training [programs] or professional lectures. So far many people have gone [there]. In the future, [ ] will one after another hold talent-exchanging activities. [I] believe that these students, after finishing studies and returning to the country can surely become your esteemed country's important seeds of promoting a variety of constructions.</p>	<p>Nauru's talent</p>
<p>Paragraph 10</p> <p>本人也要藉此機會，代表中華民國政府與二千三百萬臺灣人民，感謝貴國政府與國會堅定支持臺灣參與聯合國、世界衛生組織及其它國際組織的努力，貴國的支持與友誼，臺灣全體人民深表感謝與敬意，也期盼貴國未來能夠繼續在國際社會為臺灣主持正義，給予臺灣協助，讓臺灣在國際舞臺善盡責任。</p> <p>I also would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the R.O.C. government and the twenty-three million Taiwanese people, to thank your esteemed country's government and parliament for firmly supporting Taiwan to participate in the United Nations, the World Health Organization and other international organizations. Your esteemed country's support and friendship, all Taiwanese people feel deeply gratitude and respect. [ ] also hope your esteemed country in the future can continuously in the international community uphold for Taiwan justice, offer Taiwan help, let Taiwan on the international stage fulfill responsibility.</p>	<p><u>Section 6:</u> <u>Showing gratitude and appealing for Nauru's continuous support for Taiwan's participation in international community</u>—highlighting Taiwan's political predicament in terms of its international status</p>
<p>Paragraph 11</p> <p>一個國家的偉大與否，不在於國土面積大小，也不在於人口有多少，而是在於這國家人民心中的力量有多大。臺灣和諾魯都是小國，然而兩國人民的力量是無限的，貴我兩國的未來充滿機會與希望。</p> <p>Whether a country is great or not does not lie in the size of territory or how much the population is, but lies in how much this country's people's mental strength is. Taiwan and Nauru are both small countries. However, both countries' people's power is limitless, the future of both countries is full of opportunity and hope.</p>	<p><u>Section 7:</u> <u>Conclusion: Giving wishes to both Taiwan and Nauru</u> – highlighting Taiwan as a small country still has strength and opportunity</p>
<p>Paragraph 12</p> <p>最後，再次感謝史可迪總統閣下、度維友果議長閣下，並祝福貴國國民國運昌隆，史可迪總統與杜維友果議長、各位議員、各位閣員，各位貴賓，以及所有諾魯人民身心健康、萬事如意。At last, [I] would like to thank again His Excellency President Ludwig Scotty and His Distinguished Speaker of the Parliament of Nauru, Mr. Bernard Dowiyogo and wish your esteemed country's</p>	<p><u>Closing remarks</u> - giving thanks and wishes to Nauru's government and people</p>

people a prosperous future of the country. [I] wish His Excellency President Ludwig Scotty, His Distinguished Speaker of the Parliament of Nauru, Mr. Bernard Dowiyogo, every parliament member, every cabinet minister, every distinguished guest, and all of Nauru people good health and happiness.	
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### 3.3.2.3 Speech 3 (T) by Chen Shui-bian

Speech 3 (T): Chen Shui-bian's speech on the flag presentation to Taiwan's delegation to the 2005 World Games, 6 July 2005<sup>7</sup>

Character Count: Original 1,290, edited down to 1,012  
(punctuation marks included)

Length: 6.24 min

Speaker: Chen Shui-bian, President of the Republic of China (ROC) from 2000 to 2008

Two short paragraphs in the original speech are omitted. One concerns historical review of Taiwan's presence in the World Games and the other how Taiwan's government has helped to win the bid to host the World Games 2009. The omission is aimed at reducing renditions of proper nouns. The genre of this speech is a pep talk given by Taiwan's president to Taiwan's athletes who were going to attend the World Games 2005. The macro- and mesostructure of this abridged speech is analyzed in the following table 8.

Table 8 Macro- and Mesostructure of Speech 3 (T)

	Macro- and mesostructure
Taipei, 6 July 2005	Place and date
陳水扁為台灣參加「2005 世界運動會代表團」授旗致詞 Chen Shui-bian's speech on the flag presentation to Taiwan's delegation to the 2005 World Games	Pep talk for sports delegation (sub)genre
Paragraph 1 首先要恭喜所有代表團成員，即將代表台灣遠赴德國杜易斯堡，參加每四年舉辦一次的「世界運動會」，各位都是台灣最優秀的運動員，在高手雲集的	Section 1: <u>Highlighting the honor to represent one's own</u>

<sup>7</sup> Retrieved 10 September 2006 from the website of the Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) at <http://www.president.gov.tw>

<p>國手選拔過程中脫穎而出，獲得成為國家代表團成員的最高殊榮，本人謹代表政府及全體國人，對各位長期在體育運動領域的付出及傑出表現，表達最誠摯的恭賀、嘉勉及肯定之意。</p> <p>First [I] would like to congratulate all of the delegation members that [you] are going on behalf of Taiwan to Duisburg, Germany to attend the once-every-four-year ‘World Games’. Everyone [of you] is Taiwan’s most excellent athlete, standing out [from the others] in the process of selecting national sports delegates among whom there were many experts, winning the highest honor of being the national delegation members. I, on behalf of the government and all the country’s people, for everyone’s long-term effort and excellent performance in the field of sports, express the sincerest congratulations, encouragement and recognition.</p>	<p><u>country in international sports games</u> – congratulations to Taiwanese sports delegation</p>
<p>Paragraph 2</p> <p>今年，即將登場的本屆世運會中，我國代表團參賽的種類包括合氣道、建力、合球、撞球、保齡球、拔河、滑輪溜冰、空手道、原野射箭、龍舟等 11 項運動比賽，計 79 位選手將在世運會的競技舞台一展長才。阿扁有信心，今年大家仍將全力以赴，立志達成最佳競賽成績，為我們國家再次寫下歷史紀錄。</p> <p>This year, in the forthcoming World Games, our country’s delegation will attend such sports events as Aikido, powerlifting, korfbal, billiards, bowling, tug of war, roller sports, karate, field archery, and dragon boat race, eleven sports events (in total). In total seventy-nine athletes will on the contest stage of the World Games show talent. I [A-bian] have confidence this year everyone will still try the best, be determined to achieve the best competition results, and for our country again set historical records.</p>	<p><u>Listing the sports events which Taiwanese athletes will attend in the World Games</u> – encouraging the athletes to glorify Taiwan as a country</p>
<p>Paragraph 3</p> <p>還要特別提到的是，高雄市這次成功取得「2009 年世界運動會」主辦權，不僅帶動了台灣的體育風潮，也讓全國上下沉浸在迎接「高雄世運會」的歡欣氣氛中，預估屆時將有來自世界各地超過一百個國家共襄盛舉，參賽選手人數也將高達三千人。藉由舉辦「2009 年高雄世運會」，台灣將躍升成為國際最大型體育賽事的主辦國，未來也將有一個最佳的機會，向全球展現我國多元文化、以及各方面建設進步與繁榮的成果，並進一步提升台灣的國際地位及能見度。對此，我們有很深的期待，也期盼在未來幾年的準備工作中，大家能夠齊心協力，發揮眾志成城的精神，讓台灣成為世界體壇的最佳主角，為打造我國優質且恢弘的體育新世紀來共同努力。因此，各位選手在本屆世運會的表現，將有機會為四年後的「2009 高雄世運會」打響第一砲，並開創一個最佳的基礎，希望大家好好掌握機會，發揮自我實力，以爭取最高的榮譽！。</p>	<p><u>Section 2: Associating the sports delegation with Kaohsiung City’s winning the bid to host the World Games 2009</u> – highlighting Taiwan’s effort to increase its international visibility and recognition as a country and encouraging the delegates to glorify the country</p>

<p>[I] also need to particularly mention that Kaohsiung City this time succeeded in winning the bid to host ‘the 2009 World Games’, [which] not only promotes Taiwan’s sport trend but also lets the whole country soak in the rejoicing atmosphere of greeting ‘the World Games in Kaohsiung’. It is estimated that at that time there will be from all over the world more than one hundred countries coming to join the games, and the number of participating athletes will be up to three thousand. By hosting ‘World Games 2009 in Kaohsiung’, Taiwan will become the largest international sports event’s host country. In the future, [ ] also will have the best opportunity to show the world our country’s diverse cultures and results of construction progress and prosperity in every aspect, and further enhance Taiwan’s international status and visibility. Towards this, we have high expectations, also hope that during the future several years of preparation everyone can work together and keep up the spirit that unity is strength to let Taiwan become the best leading role in the world sports field, to create our country’s quality and splendid new century of sports with common efforts. Therefore, every athlete’s performance in this World Games will give a first opportunity to advertise the four-year-later ‘World Games 2009 in Kaohsiung’, and create the best foundation. [I] hope everyone seizes well the opportunity and perform well to win the highest honor!</p>	
<p>Paragraph 4</p> <p>過去阿扁也曾經多次為我們國家代表隊參與國際賽會授旗，並參加賽後慶功宴，每次看到中華運動健兒在體壇以淬礪奮發的鬥志，為國爭光、揚名國際，阿扁跟廣大的台灣民眾一樣，都為大家奮鬥的精神及卓越表現感到驕傲。剛才阿扁交到黃主席手中的國旗和團旗，一面是國家榮譽的象徵，另一面則是國家代表團的精神標誌；阿扁衷心希望在這兩面旗幟的導引下，各位能夠旗開得勝、贏得最優異的成績。也希望各位啟程前往「世界運動會」時，能夠不要忘記，大家的行囊中滿載了兩千三百萬國人同胞對各位的無限祝福、最大的支持、和最殷切的期盼。</p> <p>In the past, I [A-bian] also for many times gave our country’s national delegations attending international contests flags and attended after-contest celebration parties. Whenever seeing <i>Zhonghua</i> athletes in the sports field, with endeavoring will to fight, winning honor for the country and becoming famous internationally, I [A-bian] as well as many other Taiwanese people, feel proud of everyone’s fighting spirit and excellent performance. Just now I [A-bian] gave Chairman Huang the national flag and the delegation flag. One is a symbol of the country’s honor. The other is the spiritual sign of the national delegation. I [A-bian] sincerely hope that under the guidance of these two flags everyone can win speedy success and achieve the best results, also hope that when everyone starts the journey to the ‘World Games’, [everyone] may not forget everyone’s</p>	<p><u>Section 3:</u>  <u>Presenting two flags to Taiwan’s sports delegation</u> – highlighting the expectations of Taiwan’s government and people towards the sports delegation</p>

<p>luggage is filled with the twenty-three million countrymen and compatriots' limitless wishes, strongest support and greatest expectation to everyone.</p>	
<p>Paragraph 5          阿扁始終堅信，「努力加自信等於成功」，各位平時汗流浹背、默默苦練的努力，已經是成功的一半了，有付出就有收穫，期盼各位能夠繼續以信心、決心、及旺盛的企圖心，在世運會上朝向「成就自己、光耀台灣」的目標邁進。</p> <p>[I[A-bian] always firmly believe that 'hard work plus self-confidence equals success'. Everyone daily works hard and practices silently and has obtained half of success. Effort will be rewarded. [I] hope everyone can go on with confidence, determination, and high ambition in the World Games to move towards the goal of 'self-fulfilling yourself and glorifying Taiwan'.</p>	<p><u>Section 4:</u>  <u>Conclusion</u> – encouraging Taiwanese athletes to glorify Taiwan</p>
<p>最後，祝福大家身體健康，勝利在望，加油，再加油！          Finally, I wish everyone health and triumph. Go, go, go!</p>	<p><u>Closing remarks</u> – giving wishes to Taiwanese athletes</p>

### 3.3.2.4 Speech 4 (C) by Jia Qinglin

Speech 4(C): Jia Qinglin's speech themed 'Enhancing communication and cooperation and jointly creating a beautiful future' given at a welcoming party held by Indonesian people of all circles on his visit to Indonesia, 26 March 2006<sup>8</sup>

Character Count: Original 3,177, edited down to 1,939

(punctuation marks included)

Length: 12.43 min

Speaker: Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the People's Political Consultative Conference, the People's Republic of China (PRC) since 2003

Four paragraphs in the original speech are omitted in this abridged version. Two of them concern the economic development of China, and the others the connections between China and other Asian countries in terms of trade development. These paragraphs have nothing to do with the cross-strait issues and contain a lot of numbers that are very likely to add to SI difficulties. The abridged speech retains Jia's original tone and style as well as the main historical and political context of the Sino-Indonesian relations. The genre of this speech is a

<sup>8</sup> Retrieved 10 September 2006 from the website of Xinhua News Agency at <http://www.chinaview.cn>

speech on the occasion of a state visit, and the field of action involves organization of international/interstate relations. The macro- and mesostructure of this abridged speech is analyzed in the following table 9:

Table 9 Macro- and Mesostructure of Speech 4 (C)

	Macro- and mesostructure
Jakarta, 26 March 2006	Place and date
<p>中华人民共和国全国政协主席贾庆林 “加强交流合作共创美好未来—在印尼各界人士欢迎活动上的演讲”</p> <p>Jia Qinglin as Chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Conference, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) gave a speech themed ‘enhancing communication and cooperation and jointly creating a beautiful future’ at a welcoming party held by Indonesian people of all circles</p>	State visit speech (sub)genre
<p>尊敬的印尼人民协商会议副主席法特瓦，尊敬的印尼—中国经济、社会、文化合作协会总主席苏坎达尼，尊敬的印尼工商会主席希达亚特，女士们，先生们，朋友们：</p> <p>Respected Mr. Fatwa, Vice President of Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly, Respected Dr. Sukamdani, President of the Association of Indonesia-China Economic, Social and Cultural Cooperation, Respected Mr. Hidayad, President of the Indonesia Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Ladies, Gentlemen, and Friends:</p>	<u>Addressing the Indonesian audience</u> – specifying the important Indonesian politicians present and then the common audience
<p>Paragraph 1</p> <p>在我对美丽的千岛之国——印尼进行正式友好访问之际，有机会与印尼的工商界以及其他各界朋友欢聚一堂，共叙友谊，感到十分高兴。首先，请允许我对印尼各界朋友为我和我的代表团举行如此盛大的欢迎活动，表示由衷的感谢。借此机会，我愿转达中国人民对印尼人民的诚挚问候和良好祝愿！</p> <p>While I am paying official friendly visit to the beautiful country of a thousand islands – Indonesia, [I] have the opportunity to be with friends in the industrial and commercial circles and in other circles of Indonesia gathering together and renew the friendship, [about which] I am extremely glad. First of all, please allow me to express sincere thanks towards friends in every circle of Indonesia who for me and my delegation hold such a grand welcoming activity. With this opportunity, I would like to forward Chinese people’s sincere greetings and good wishes to the people of Indonesia.</p>	<p><u>Section 1:</u></p> <p><u>Giving thanks for the welcoming party held by Indonesia</u> – pointing out the speaker’s role as China’s official representative</p>

<p><b>Paragraph 2</b></p> <p>中国与印尼是友好邻邦，传统友谊源远流长。2000 多年前，中国就曾接待过来自爪哇的特使，开启了两国友好交往的历史。600 多年前，中国明朝航海家郑和七下西洋，多次到过爪哇等地，留下许多至今仍广为传颂的佳话。上个世纪前叶，在争取国家独立和民族解放的斗争中，中印尼人民始终站在一起，相互支持、相互鼓励，共同谱写了抗击侵略者的壮丽诗篇。50 年前，中国与印尼等亚非发展中国家一道，共同确立了以和平共处为基础的万隆精神，并使之成为国际上公认的处理国家间关系的基本准则，为加强发展中国家的团结与合作，作出了历史性的贡献。中印尼两国和两国人民在长期的历史进程中结下的深厚友情，已经成为双方共同拥有的宝贵精神财富。</p> <p>China and Indonesia are friendly neighboring countries. The traditional friendship started a long time ago. More than two thousand years ago, China once received an envoy from Java, [which] started both countries' history of friendly exchange. More than six hundred years ago, Ming China's voyager Zheng He went to the Western Ocean seven times, went to Java many times, left many good stories that have still been told now. In the first half of the last century, during the struggle for national independence and racial liberation, Chinese people and Indonesian people always stood together, supported each other, encouraged each other, and jointly wrote splendid poetry about resistance to and attack on invaders. Fifty years ago, China, Indonesia, and some other Asian and African developing countries jointly established the Bandung spirit on the basis of peaceful coexistence and made it an internationally recognized basic principle for dealing with international relations, [which] made a historical contribution to enhancing solidarity and cooperation among developing countries. Both China and Indonesia as well as both countries' people in the long-term historical development have established deep friendship, [which] has become valuable spiritual treasure shared mutually by both sides.</p>	<p><b>Section 2:</b></p> <p><u>Talking about the development of both countries' relations - specifying the historical relations between China and Indonesia , which may imply the superior status of Ancient China over the other countries in the neighborhood and emphasize the relations between both countries have turned equal in modern times</u></p>
<p><b>Paragraph 3</b></p> <p>印尼是最早与中国建交的国家之一。50 多年来，两国关系取得了长足发展。在两国政府和人民的共同努力下，中国和印尼关系已经进入全面发展的新时期。双方政治互信不断增强，经贸合作成果斐然。两国在能源、资源开发和基础设施等领域启动了一系列大型合作项目，推动了双边经贸关系发展，给两国人民带来了越来越多的实惠。两国在文化、教育、卫生、科技等领域的合作不断深化，在国际和地区事务中保持着密切的协调与配合。在印尼人民遭受的那场罕见的地震海啸灾难中，中国政府和人民感同身受，展开了新中国历史上最大规模的对外救援行动，体现了中国人民与印尼人民互帮互助、同舟共济的深情厚谊。</p> <p>Indonesia is one of the countries that first established diplomatic relations with China. For more than fifty years, both countries' relations have obtained</p>	<p><u>Specifying the development of the relations between Indonesia and the People's Republic of China – speaking of the cooperation between both countries in many aspects and emphasizing the PRC's contribution to soothing Indonesia's suffering from the 2004</u></p>

<p>development. With joint effort of both countries' governments and peoples, the relations between China and Indonesia have entered a new era of full development. Both sides' political mutual trust is continuously deepening, and economic and trade cooperation has achieved great results. Both countries, in the fields of energy, resource development and infrastructure, have launched a series of large-scale cooperation projects, [which] promotes the bilateral economic and trade relations development and brings both peoples more and more benefits. Both countries in the fields of culture, education, hygiene, and technology cooperate deeply, and in terms of international and regional affairs maintain close coordination and cooperation. During the rarely-seen earthquake-tsunami disaster that the Indonesia people suffered, China's government and people felt the same and launched the largest foreign rescue aid in new China's history, [which] shows mutual help and deep friendship between China's and Indonesian people.</p>	<p>Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami</p>
<p>Paragraph 4</p> <p>去年是中印尼关系史上具有重要意义的一年。胡锦涛主席与苏西洛总统签署了关于建立中印尼战略伙伴关系的联合宣言，从战略高度为两国关系的未来发展指明了方向，开启了双边关系一个崭新的历史时期。作为两个重要的发展中国家，中国同印尼建立的战略伙伴关系，是不结盟、不对抗、不针对任何第三方的新型国家关系，宗旨是维护世界和平、促进共同发展。在世界多极化和经济全球化趋势深入发展的新形势下，中国和印尼有着广泛的共同利益，双方发展战略伙伴关系符合两国和两国人民的根本利益，有利于地区的和平、稳定与发展。我相信，在我们双方共同努力下，中印尼关系一定会有更加美好的未来。</p> <p>Last year was in the history of the relations between China and Indonesia a highly significant year. President Hu Jintao and President Susilo signed a joint declaration concerning the establishment of the Sino-Indonesian strategic partnership, [which] from strategic height for the future of both countries' relations clearly points out a direction and starts a brand-new historical period of the bilateral relations. As two important developing countries, the strategic partnership between China and Indonesia is a new type relation between countries, [which is] non-alignment, non-confrontation, and non-targeting at any third party. The purpose is to maintain world peace and promote common development. Under the new circumstances of world multi-polarization and economic globalization that develop deeply, China and Indonesia share extensive mutual interests, and that both parties develop the strategic partnership meet the fundamental interests of both countries and both countries' people, [which] is helpful to the regional peace, stability, and development. I believe with the joint efforts of our both parties, the China-Indonesian relations will have a better future.</p>	<p><u>Specifying the latest strategic cooperation between both countries</u> – pointing out the importance of the strategic partnership between both countries is to promote world peace and common prosperity</p>

<p>女士们、先生们！ Ladies and Gentlemen!</p>	<p>Addressing the common audience – calling for attention from everyone present for the turn of the speech topic</p>
<p>Paragraph 5 我们赞赏印尼政府和人民长期以来在台湾问题上给予中国的宝贵支持。众所周知，台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分，这是关系到 13 亿中国人民民族感情的重大敏感问题。 We appreciate the Indonesian government and people’s long-term valuable support for China in terms of the Taiwan issue. Everyone knows Taiwan is an inseparable part of China’s territory. This is a major and sensitive issue concerning the national feelings of the 1.3 billion Chinese people.</p>	<p><u>Section 3:</u> <u>Raising the topic of the Taiwan issue</u> - giving thanks to Indonesia for the support of the Taiwan issue</p>
<p>Paragraph 6 去年以来，我们采取了一系列积极和建设性的举措，推动两岸关系朝着和平稳定的方向发展，得到台湾同胞的广泛赞同，也受到国际社会的普遍欢迎。但是，台湾当局顽固坚持“台独”分裂立场，加紧从事“台独”分裂活动。今年以来，更是加紧通过“宪政改造”，图谋“台湾法理独立”。特别是不顾岛内外的强烈反对，强行终止“国统会”和“国统纲领”，这是对国际社会普遍坚持一个中国原则和台海和平稳定的严重挑衅。反对“台独”分裂势力及其活动，维护台海和平稳定，是我们坚定不移的意志和决心。我们将继续努力争取和平统一的前景，但绝不允许把台湾从中国分割出去。“台独”分裂势力的行径不仅是对两岸关系的公然挑衅，也直接威胁到亚太地区的和平与稳定。在这一重大问题上，我们希望印尼各界朋友同我们一道，共同反对“台独”，共同维护本地区的和平与安宁。 Since last year, we have adopted a series of active and constructive measures to move the cross-strait relations towards peace and stability, [which] wins Taiwanese compatriots’ extensive agreement and is widely welcomed by the international community. However, Taiwan’s authorities stubbornly insist on ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist stance, step up doing ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist activities. Since this year, [ ] even stepped up passing ‘the constitutional reform’, attempting to achieve ‘Taiwan legal independence’. In particular, [ ] disregarded the strong opposition inside and outside the island, forcibly terminated the ‘National Unification Council’ and the ‘National Unification Guidelines’. This is a severe provocation to the one China principle widely held by the international community and to the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Opposing ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces and [their] activities and maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is our firm will and determination. We will keep working hard for the prospect of peaceful</p>	<p><u>Reiterating the PRC’s stance on the One China policy and appealing for Indonesia’s support</u> – specifying the PRC’s opposition to the recent Taiwan independence activities and emphasizing the Taiwan issue is key to the peace in the Pacific Asia area</p>

<p>unification but never allow Taiwan to be separated from China. The ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces’ actions are not only openly provocative to cross-strait relations but also directly threatening the peace and stability of the Asia Pacific region. In terms of this important issue, we hope Indonesian friends of every circle with us jointly oppose ‘Taiwan independence’ and jointly maintain the peace and quiet of this region.</p>	
<p>女士们、先生们！ Ladies and Gentlemen!</p>	<p><u>Addressing the common audience</u></p>
<p>Paragraph 7</p> <p>坚持和平发展的道路，是中国人民坚定不移的选择。无论是汉唐时期开辟通往西域的“丝绸之路”，还是明朝著名航海家郑和七下西洋，给有关国家和人民带去的都是加强交流与合作的诚意，传递的都是增进友好情谊的心声。中国人民深刻认识到，只有通过和平方式实现的发展才是持久的、牢靠的发展，也才是既有利于中国人民也有利于世界各国人民的发展。中国将始终高举和平、发展、合作的旗帜，始终奉行独立自主的和平外交政策，坚定不移地走和平发展道路。中国的发展不会妨碍任何人，也不会威胁任何人，只会有利于世界的和平稳定、共同繁荣。</p> <p>Insisting on the peaceful development road is Chinese people’s unswerving choice. Either the ‘silk road’ pioneered and led to Xiyu (the Western Regions) during the periods of Han China and Tang China or the Ming China’s famous voyager Zheng He’s seven voyages to the Western Ocean brought the countries and peoples concerned the sincerity in enhancing exchange and cooperation and communicated thoughts of promoting good-willed friendship. Chinese people deeply realize that only the development realized through peaceful means is lasting and firm development, is also the development that benefit not only Chinese people but also the development of the world countries’ peoples. China will always hold high the flag of peace, development and cooperation, always adopt independent peaceful diplomatic policies, and firmly walk on the road of peaceful development. China’s development will not impede anyone, not threaten anyone, only benefit world peace, stability, and common prosperity.</p>	<p><u>Section 4:</u> <u>Reiterating the PRC’s diplomatic policy of peaceful development</u> – emphasizing the policy of peaceful development has been followed by China since ancient times and reassuring the PRC would not be a hegemon to the world</p>
<p>女士们、先生们！ Ladies and Gentlemen!</p>	<p><u>Addressing the common audience</u></p>
<p>Paragraph 8</p> <p>中国与印尼是亚洲两个重要的发展中国家。虽然我们相隔遥远，但浩瀚的海洋阻挡不了我们的友好交往。正如印尼朋友在歌中所唱的：“虽然我们相隔万水千山，可是我们的心紧紧相连。从雅加达到北京，一路悠扬的歌声，歌颂我们两国人民如兄弟一般。”是的，共同的目标把我们联结在一起，共同的挑战需要我们团结在一起。让我们携起手来，为亚洲的和平与发展，为建设一个持久和平、共同繁荣的和谐世界而努力奋斗！谢谢大家。</p>	<p><u>Section 5:</u> <u>Conclusion</u> – emphasizing the close relations between and the mutual goals of China and Indonesia</p>

China and Indonesia are in Asia two important developing countries. Although we are far apart, the vast ocean cannot stop our friendly relations. Just as Indonesian friends sing in a song, ‘ Although we are separated by ten thousands of waters and thousands of mountains, however our hearts are connected closely. From Jakarta to Beijing, the heavenly singing voice all the way praises our two countries’ peoples are like brothers’. Yes, the common goals connect us. The common challenges require us to be united. Let’s hand in hand, for the peace and development of Asia, for constructing a peace-lasting, commonly-prosperous harmonious world, work hard! Thank all of you.	
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### 3.3.2.5 Speech 5 (T) by Annette Lu

Speech 5(T): Annette Lu’s speech themed ‘New Century, New Thinking, and New Cross-Strait Arrangement’ broadcast on the Voice of America, 1 October 2002<sup>9</sup>

Character Count: Original 4,370, edited down to 2,151  
(punctuation marks included)

Length: 14.05 min

Speaker: Annette Lu, Vice President of the Republic of China (ROC) from 2000 to 2008

Several paragraphs of the speech are omitted, which detail the difference between China and Taiwan in economy, culture, and politics. Although these paragraphs concern the cross-strait issues, removing them from the original speech may greatly reduce SI difficulties and the experiment duration without changing Lu’s original tone and style as well as Lu’s appeal for new cross-strait relations. It should be noted that despite her outspokenness, Lu is very careful in her wording of the relations between Taiwan and China. Throughout this speech, she always says ‘*Liǎng àn* 兩岸 (literally *two sides [of the Taiwan Strait]*)’ to refer to both Taiwan and China instead of ‘*Liang Guo* 兩國 (literally *two countries/nations*)’. ‘*Liǎng àn* 兩岸’ may be a noun phrase widely translated into ‘both sides’ or ‘both parties’ or an

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<sup>9</sup> Retrieved 9 September 2006 from the website of the Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan) at <http://www.president.gov.tw>.

adjective rendered into ‘cross-strait’. By using the term ‘both sides’ instead of ‘both countries’, Lu may assert the status of Taiwan in an implicit manner. Although the Mandarin title of this speech uses the word ‘interview’, Lu is actually giving a speech on the radio without being interrupted by questions. Therefore, the genre of this speech is not a radio interview as widely perceived in the West but a speech on the radio appealing for new and peaceful relations between Taiwan and China. The macro- and mesostructure of this abridged speech is analyzed in the following table 10.

Table 10 Macro- and Mesostructure of Speech 5 (T)

	Macro- and mesostructure
Taipei, 1 October 2002	Place and date
<p>新世紀・新思維・新兩岸佈局 副總統接受「美國之音」記者海濤專訪 Vice-President [Annette Lu] was given an interview themed ‘New century, new thinking, and new cross-strait arrangement’ by Haitao, reporter of the Voice of America.</p>	Peace speech (sub)genre
<p>各位中國大陸的聽眾朋友好！ Hello, all the listeners of the Chinese mainland!</p>	<u>Addressing the Chinese mainland’s audience</u>
<p>Paragraph 1 今天是中華人民共和國的國慶日，想必舉國騰歡，億民同慶。隔著台灣海峽，透過美國之音的廣播，本人特此代表台灣人民同申祝賀，祝貴國國運昌隆！中華人民共和國自成立五十三年來，多方面都有長足的發展與進步，特別是在過去二十年的改革開放政策下，經濟、建設和體育等等成果已受到舉世的矚目。隔海的台灣人民也樂見中國的進步繁榮。一百多年前中國飽受內憂外患與天災人禍之苦，使中國人深感挫折。今天，中國逐漸走上富強之路，人民生活日益改善，國際地位日益提升，這是中國政府與人民艱辛奮鬥的成果，令人欽佩。 Today is the People’s Republic of China’s national day. [I] think the whole country must be happy and billions of people must be celebrating [the day]. Across the Taiwan Strait, over the broadcast of the Voice of America, I particularly would like to, on behalf of Taiwan’s people, extend congratulations and wish your esteemed country prosperity! Since the People’s Republic of China was established more than fifty-three years ago, many aspects have seen much development and progress. In particular, under the past-twenty-year’s</p>	<p><u>Section 1:</u> <u>Congratulations on the PRC’s national day</u> – praising the PRC’s achievements since its establishment in 1949</p>

<p>reform and open-up policy, the achievements in economy, construction, and sports have drawn international attention. Taiwan’s people on the other side of the Strait are also glad to see China’s progress and prosperity. More than one hundred years ago, China suffered internal revolt, foreign invasion, natural disasters, and man-made calamities, [which] deeply frustrated Chinese people. Today, China is gradually walking on a path towards prosperity and strength, the life of people is being improved, and the international status is being raised. This is the result of the hard work of the Chinese government and people. It is admiring.</p>	
<p>Paragraph 2</p> <p>本人除了要隔海向各位道賀外，也想在這裡提出一些期許與建議。本人認為，中華人民共和國作為一個大國，在慶祝建國紀念日時，千萬不能遺忘作為大國的責任與風範，應為亞太地區的和平與進步做出貢獻，尤其是，台海兩岸血源相同，既是遠親，也是近鄰，雙方不應武力相向，而應和平共處，合作分享。</p> <p>I, in addition to congratulations to everyone across the Strait, would also like to offer some expectations and suggestions. I think the People's Republic of China as a big country, while celebrating the national day, must not forget a big country’s responsibility and manner and should make contribution to peace and progress of the Asia Pacific area. Particularly, both sides across the Taiwan Strait are of the same blood, are not only distant relatives but also near neighbors. Both sides should not fight against each other by force but coexist peacefully and cooperate and share [with each other].</p>	<p><u>Offering her suggestions to the PRC</u> – pointing out the peace across the Taiwan Strait is down to the PRC.</p>
<p>Paragraph 3</p> <p>一直以來，北京政府主張台灣必須接受「一個中國」原則，並堅持台灣是中國的一部分，而中華人民共和國才能代表中國，這是台灣人民所不能接受，也是目前兩岸關係發展無法正常化的最大障礙。眾所皆知，中華人民共和國自從一九四九年建立以來，從未曾在台灣行使過任何有效主權，而中華民國在台灣有自己的政府、土地和人民，兩邊互不隸屬，各行其是已有半世紀之久，這是不爭的事實。本人認為，兩岸的關係應實事求是，而且高瞻遠矚，才能獲得合理的發展。要台灣接受「一個中國」，等於要台灣全面投降，真是強人所難。</p> <p>For a long time, Beijing government has maintained that Taiwan must accept the ‘One China’ principle and insisted that Taiwan is part of China and only the People’s Republic of China can represent China. This is what Taiwan’s people cannot accept and is also at present the biggest obstacle to the normalization of the cross-strait relations. Everyone knows that the People’s Republic of China, since in 1949 [it] was established, has never exercised in Taiwan any effective sovereignty, and the Republic of China in Taiwan has [its] own government,</p>	<p><u>Section 2:</u></p> <p>Pointing out the infeasibility of the One China policy – specifying Taiwan’s autonomous reality</p>

<p>land, and people. Both sides do not belong to each other and have developed self-autonomy for half a century. This is an undisputed fact. I think the cross-strait relations should be based on facts and look beyond in order to obtain reasonable development. Asking Taiwan to accept ‘One China’ equals asking Taiwan to fully surrender, [which] is against people’s will.</p>	
<p>Paragraph 4</p> <p>台海兩岸系出同源，但為何北京的政權跟台北的政權在政治上如此涇渭分明，甚至緊張對立？原因在於兩岸政府對於人權、民主和自由等價值觀完全不同所致。在台灣人人有思想、言論、宗教和集會結社的自由，政府對任何一個人的生老病死，必須善盡照顧之責，任何人因政府不當行使公權力而遭受損害，國家必須負起賠償責任。人民才是國家的主人，無論中央或地方政府的首長，都是由人民選舉出來，做不好，人民就會在下次選舉讓他下臺。做不對，還有法律對他制裁。請問，中國大陸是不是這樣呢？由於人文價值的殊異，才會出現北京和台北兩個截然不同的政權，儘管經濟利益相同，但在兩岸人文價值趨於一致以前，奢談政治統合是不切實際的，而且與人性的需求背道而馳。</p> <p>Both sides across the Taiwan Strait are of the same origin, but why are the Beijing regime and the Taipei regime so clearly different in politics or are even [full of] tension and confrontation? The reason is that both governments in terms of the values [such as] human rights, democracy, and freedom have completely different [values]. In Taiwan everyone has freedom of thought, speech, religion, assembly and association. The government must take good care of everyone from birth to death. If anyone suffers damage caused by improper use of public power, the country must bear the responsibility of compensation. The people are the master of the country. Whether central or local government leaders are elected by the people. If [ ] does not perform well, the people will let him step down in the next election. If [ ] does something wrong, there are laws punishing him. [I] would like to ask: is it the same in the Chinese mainland? The differences in human values result in the existence of Beijing government and the Taipei government that are totally different [from each other]. Although the economic interests are the same, however before both sides share the same human values, talking about political unification is unrealistic and runs in the direction opposite to human needs.</p>	<p><u>Pointing out the political difference between Taiwan and China</u> – specifying Taiwan’s democratic system and the unrealistic idea of Taiwan’s unification with communist China</p>
<p>Paragraph 5</p> <p>由於北京的無情打壓，台灣完全被排除在國際舞台，這是台灣人最感到不滿的事。很多國家本來都願意跟我們建交，卻因中國的打壓而不敢承認中華民國。尤其在聯合國，中華民國是創始會員國，也是安理會常任理事國，但一九七一年起被中華人民共和國取代，從此北京當局再也不讓台灣參加聯合國，在所有國際場合對台灣極盡阻擾侮辱之能事。聯合國的成立宗旨是會籍</p>	<p><u>Section 3:</u> <u>Accusing the PRC of bullying Taiwan</u> – specifying why Taiwan cannot join the United Nations</p>

<p>普遍化原則，但卻獨獨將台灣排除在外，不是因為台灣不夠好，而是因為北京打壓。請問，中共政府如此欺負台灣，叫台灣人民又怎樣能夠喜歡中國呢？</p> <p>Due to Beijing's ruthless suppression, Taiwan is completely excluded from the international stage. This is what Taiwan's people are most dissatisfied with. Many countries originally would like to establish diplomatic relations with us, but because of China's suppression dare not recognize the Republic of China (ROC). Particularly in the United Nations, the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan) was one of the founding member states and one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. But since 1971 [the ROC] has been replaced by the People's Republic of China (PRC), and since then Beijing authorities have never let Taiwan join the UN, has blocked and insulted Taiwan on all international occasions. The founding philosophy of the United Nations is the principle of universality of membership but [the UN] only excludes Taiwan. [It's] not because Taiwan is not good enough but because of Beijing's suppression. [I] would like to ask: the Chinese communist government bullies Taiwan so much, how can Taiwan's people like China?</p>	
<p>Paragraph 6</p> <p>雖然我們主張中華民國不隸屬於中華人民共和國，但我們認為兩岸人民不僅無冤無仇而且可以友好合作。隨著兩岸交流，近年來台商進入中國大陸的投資領域最多也最廣。台商不僅給中國創造就業機會和外匯存底，也帶去技術與管理，這是近年來中國大陸經濟能夠繁榮的重要動力。不僅傳統產業，台商也積極在中國大陸投資高科技，以積體電路產業為例，這兩年中國大陸已成為全球第三大產品出口國，致使台灣由原來的第三名降為第四名，但是你們知道嗎？大陸積體電路的總產值百分之七十是由台商所生產的，台灣對中國不斷輸入資金、技術與管理，造就了中國經濟的快速成長與品質提升。台灣人竭盡所能協助你們，而你們卻在國際上處處封殺、打壓，並積極在東南沿海部署飛彈，恫嚇與威脅台灣。如此恩將仇報，請問，台灣人作何感想？有血性有良心的中國大陸的朋友們又作何感想？</p> <p>Although we maintain that the Republic of China (ROC) does not belong to the People's Republic of China (PRC), we consider that both sides' people not only have no hatred [towards each other] but also can be friendly and cooperate [with each other]. With the cross-strait exchanges, in recent years Taiwan's businessmen have made the largest and most extensive investments in the Chinese mainland. Taiwan's businessmen have not only created job opportunities and foreign reserve for China but also brought techniques and management. This is an important driving force for recent-year Chinese mainland's economy's prosperity. In addition to traditional industry, Taiwan's businessmen also actively in the Chinese mainland invest in high technology. Take integrated circuits industry for example. In recent two years the Chinese mainland has become the</p>	<p><u>Appealing for Chinese people's conscience</u> - specifying Taiwan's economic contribution to China while accusing China's bully behavior towards Taiwan</p>

<p>third largest exporting country globally, making Taiwan's ranking down from the original third to the fourth. But do you know [that]? Seventy percent of the gross output of the Chinese mainland's integrated circuits is produced by Taiwan's businessmen. Taiwan keeps importing capital, technology, and management into China, contributing to China's fast economic growth and quality improvement. Taiwan's people try the best to help you, whereas you internationally keep blocking and suppressing [Taiwan], and actively along the southeastern coastline deploy missiles to intimidate and threaten Taiwan. Such behavior of returning evil for good. [I] would like to ask: How do Taiwan's people feel? How do the Chinese mainland's friends who have uprightness and conscience feel?</p>	
<p>Paragraph 7</p> <p>著名的北京社科院國情研究中心主任胡鞍鋼教授指出，當前中國大陸事實上已分成四個世界：第一世界-上海、北京與深圳；第二世界-天津、廣東、浙江和江蘇；第三世界-中等收入地區；第四世界-貧困地區。觀察家預測，隨著中共加入世界貿易組織（WTO），貧富差距會繼續擴大，城鄉差距、知識差距也將繼續擴大。</p> <p>Famous director of the Social Survey Center, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Professor Hu Angang, points out that at present the Chinese mainland in fact has been divided into four worlds: First World – Shanghai, Beijing and Shenzhen; Second World – Tianjing, Guangdong, Zhejiang and Jiangsu; Third World – middle income areas; Forth World – poor areas. Observers estimate that with Chinese Communist Party's entry to the WTO, the wealth gap will keep widening. The gap between urban and rural areas and the knowledge gap will keep widening too.</p>	<p><u>Section 4:</u></p> <p>Pointing out China's own domestic problems - specifying the widening wealth gap in China</p>
<p>Paragraph 8</p> <p>當一個國家形成四個天壤之別的世界時，問題實已到了不能不嚴肅面對的地步。歷史指出，嚴重的貧富懸殊往往導致政治動盪，而一旦問題爆發，不僅中國的百姓受苦受難，周邊包括台灣在內的國家都要遭殃。由此看來，北京當務之急應在於如何減低軍備預算，增加社會福利與教育經費，並好好利用兩岸的互助合作，提昇國家生產力，創造更多的就業機會，而非窮兵黷武，擴充軍備，據國際觀察家指出，北京最近幾年每年花在國防武器的費用約在五、六百億美金。想想看，那些錢如果花在人民的生活和地方建設，豈不更能福國利民？四百枚飛彈所花的錢如果用在普及人民教育，改善醫療衛生，相信中國大陸的人民應該更為感激。</p> <p>When a country becomes four totally different worlds, the problem actually has reached a degree that [the problem] needs to be seriously taken. History points out that a serious wealth gap usually leads to political unrest. And once the problem explodes, not only will China's people suffer but also the neighboring countries including Taiwan will suffer. Accordingly, Beijing's urgent priority</p>	<p>Pointing out China's priority should be to solve its domestic problems instead of bullying Taiwan</p>

<p>should be how to reduce military budget, increase social welfare and education expenses, make good use of cross-strait mutual help and cooperation, enhance national productivity, and create more job opportunities rather than engage in military aggression and expand weaponry. According to international observers, Beijing in recent years spent about fifty to sixty billion U.S. dollars each year on defense weaponry. Think about it. If the money had been spent on people's life and local infrastructure, wouldn't [it] have brought welfare to the country and benefited people? If the money that was spent on the four hundred missiles had been used to provide education for people and improve medical care and hygiene, [I] believe the Chinese mainland's people would have been more grateful.</p>	
<p>Paragraph 9  自公元 2000 年 5 月 20 日以來，陳水扁總統曾多次對北京政府表達善意與重啟協商大門的誠意，可惜至今北京當局仍不願面對現實，甚至變本加厲地對台灣的國際生存空間極盡打壓與封殺之能事，同時，也不斷地以「一個中國」為前提，來杯葛兩岸的協商，製造兩岸人民交流的路障，令人遺憾。  Since May twentieth two thousand, President Chen Shui-bian for many times has showed the Beijing government good will and sincerity to reopen the gate of negotiation. Regrettably so far the Beijing authorities have still been reluctant to face the reality and even stepped up efforts to oppress and block Taiwan's international survival space, and at the same time continue to boycott cross-strait negotiations on the 'one China' premise and produce barriers to exchanges between both sides' peoples. [It is] regrettable.</p>	<p><u>Section 5:</u>  <u>Accusing China of bullying Taiwan under the One China policy</u> – specifying China's refusal to negotiate with Taiwan</p>
<p>Paragraph 10  新世紀已經到來。瞻望未來，人權、民主、和平、愛心與科技發展實為 21 世紀的普世價值，兩岸政府及人民均應跳脫歷史窠臼，用嶄新的思維，放眼天下，立足亞太，共同佈建兩岸共存共榮與永續發展的新局。  A new century has arrived. Looking into the future, human rights, democracy, peace, love, and technological development indeed will be the twenty-first century's universal values. Both sides' governments and peoples should jump beyond historically set patterns, use brand-new thinking, take a broad view at the world, stand firm in the Asia Pacific area, and jointly develop a new situation of both sides' mutual prosperity and sustainable development.</p>	<p><u>Section 6:</u>  <u>Conclusion</u> – hoping for the breakthrough in future cross-strait relations</p>

### 3.3.2.6 A comparison of source speeches

The analysis of the genre and structure of the five source speeches shows that there are some differences between the speeches given by Chinese politician (or ‘China speeches’ in this section) and those by Taiwanese politicians (or ‘Taiwan speeches in this section):

- (1) Register: China speeches are in a formal register while Taiwan speeches are in a less formal register and use more emotional phrases.
- (2) Tone: Generally Taiwan’s speakers adopt a more humble position than China’s speakers when addressing audience. For instance, Annette Lu uses interrogative sentences and subjunctive mood in her speech to appeal for the audience’s identification in a less direct manner, while Chen tries connecting Taiwan with Nauru by listing the similarities of both countries. By contrast, China’s speakers may sound dogmatic or even hegemonic. For instance, the main theme of Hu Jintao’s speech is not to mark the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Chinese Anti-Japanese War but to arouse Chinese patriotism, consolidate Chinese people and urge Chinese people to oppose Taiwan independence. In Jia Qinglin’s speech, which addresses Indonesian audience in Speech 4 (C), China sounds like a big brother in Asia – from ancient times till nowadays China has been the main leader and helper to most of its neighboring countries.
- (3) Content: As shown in China’s speeches, ‘history’ plays an important part. China’s politicians seem to be proud of China’s long history and of continuing ancient China’s glory and leading status. By contrast, Taiwan’s speakers mainly focus on current situations.
- (4) Must-say parts: In China’s speeches there seems to be a ‘rule’: the One China policy must be reiterated regardless of the identity of audience and the speech occasion. By contrast, Taiwan’s speeches are more topic-oriented and the Taiwan issue is not necessarily an important or indispensable part.

There are also some similarities among the five source speeches, but most of them are derived from linguistic features of Mandarin Chinese. For instance, there are not very clear boundaries between sentences. In many sentences, the subject and/or the object are not specified. The possessive use is not common in these speeches. By using the five speeches which are of different topics and were originally given on different occasions and to different audience, the present study may prevent the interpreter subjects from knowing the actual research focus and thus producing unnatural response on purpose. Yet, there are still intertextual relationships among these five source speeches; regardless of the main topics, these speeches involve the One China ideology or the Taiwan independence issue. Therefore, these source texts should be suitable for this study, which aims to investigate whether the Chinese subjects may demonstrate their hegemonic thinking, particularly the One China ideology, in their renditions and whether the Taiwanese subjects may show resistance to such hegemonic thinking.

### **3.4 Survey Questionnaires**

To investigate whether there is a link between one's political ideologies and one's attitude towards the content of the source speeches, four kinds of questionnaires are applied in the experiment at different stages. The information obtained in the surveys may serve as reference for confirming existence of ideological signs in the CDA analysis process. Questions that are irrelevant to the research focus are dotted through all of the questionnaires except the national identity scale questionnaire in order to prevent the subjects from detecting the actual research focus and producing purposeful answers that they consider the researcher might prefer. As for the presentation of the results of each questionnaire, only the results relevant to the research focus are to be displayed in the main text of the present study.

### 3.4.1 *Student interpreter background questionnaire*

The student interpreter background questionnaire includes 22 items divided into three parts, which are explained below:

Part I items: concerning the general and language background of the subjects. The most important focus is to investigate the nationality and the native language of the subjects. Since the research focus is on the power struggle between Taiwan and China, the subjects should come from either Taiwan or China. Also, as the experiment involves simultaneous interpreting from Mandarin to English, it is important to make sure that the subjects are native or near-native Mandarin speakers and have no difficulty comprehending the source texts used in the experiment.

Part II items: concerning educational background and work experience, mainly used to investigate the homogeneity of the subjects as novice interpreters. In other words, if all or most of the subjects are novice interpreters, the level of accuracy of their interpreting renditions and the way the subjects deal with simultaneous interpreting should be similar.

Part III items: concerning political and social participation, which mainly investigates how much the subjects are concerned about international affairs and the affairs related to Taiwan and China (also described as *cross-strait* affairs), whether the subjects are political party members, and what attitude they hold towards the future relations between Taiwan and China. It is likely that if the subjects pay much attention to cross-strait affairs, they may have a better understanding of the source political texts used in the experiment. Also, one's party membership and attitude towards Taiwan-China future relations may indicate the level of her involvement in politics.

Item C-6, which concerns the subjects' attitude towards Taiwan-China future relations, will serve as one of the references for determining whether one's ideological signs in simultaneous renditions are signs of hegemony or resistance. According to the literature review in Chapters 2.3.3.3, 2.4 and 2.5, it may be possible that if the subjects are dissatisfied with the status quo of the relations between Taiwan and China (for example, when a Taiwanese student interpreter hopes for 'independence' of Taiwan in the future, or when a Chinese student interpreter favors 'unification' of China and Taiwan), they may have negative feelings or reaction towards something against their political ideology and the negative feelings may contribute to signs of hegemony or resistance in their simultaneous rendering of the source speeches used in the experiment. For a complete version of the questionnaire, see Appendix A.

### ***3.4.2 Retrospective questionnaire***

The retrospective questionnaire, consisting of 16 items, is used after each of the six rendering sessions. Apart from the first source speech, which is divided into two interpreting sessions, the other four source speeches are on a one-speech-one-session basis. The first four items investigate whether the speech rate is appropriate for interpreting and whether the subjects have difficulty understanding the source text. Item 13 and 14 are the main focus of the retrospective questionnaire, both of which are meant to obtain the subjects' opinions about the source text they have just interpreted. More specifically, these two items investigate whether the subjects agree or disagree with the content of the source speech and advise them to specify which part of the source speech they most agree or disagree with. It is likely that the clashing political ideologies between the speaker and the subject might contribute to the subject's disagreement with the speech content, which may lead to production of deviant and ideological signs in the SI renditions. And the open-ended question that requests the subjects

to specify their opinions about the speech content may make clear the subjects' political ideologies, which can help determine in the CDA analysis whether the deviant renditions produced in the SI experiment are signs of hegemony or resistance to hegemony. For a complete version of the questionnaire, see Appendix B.

### ***3.4.3 National identity scale questionnaire***

This study is to investigate the ideological conflicts of trainee interpreters from Taiwan and from China. Although Taiwan is not widely recognized as a country at present, it has every element that Smith refers to in his definition of a nation (see Chapter 2.1.3). It should be reasonable to treat it as a nation in this study and accordingly the national identity scale questionnaires may be administered on the trainee subjects of Taiwan.

The national identity scale questionnaire (NIS questionnaire), which consists of 20 questions, was developed by Waldemar Lilli, Professor of Social Psychology at the University of Mannheim, and Michael Diehl, Professor of Social, Organisational and Personal Psychology at the University of Tuebingen (1999). They devoted themselves to the research on social identity for several years at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES) and conducted the study of 'measuring national identity' under the financial support of the German National Science Foundation.

Lilli & Diehl created a measure of national identity by modifying Luhtanen & Crocker's Collective Self-esteem Scale (CSES). While most previous studies aimed to evaluate personal identity, Luhtanen & Crocker first developed a reliable and valid measure to assess one's collective identity on the theoretical basis of social identity theory originally developed for investigating the psychological factors of intergroup discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). To focus on measuring 'national identity,' which was not included in the CSES scale, Lilli & Diehl replaced the word 'group' with 'nation' in the original CSES scale and added four new

items, thus producing a 20-item scale divided into five subscales: membership, private, public, identity, and comparison subscales.

In the present study, the subjects are advised to make judgements on a 7-choice national identity scale (1st choice = strongly agree, 7<sup>th</sup> choice = strongly disagree). The twenty items on the scale are arranged in the same order as they appear in Lilli & Diehl's research. As Lilli & Diehl (1999: 8) concluded that the national identity scale may serve for 'a more global distinction between subjects high or low in their basic national identity,' the present study is aimed at investigating the strength of national identity in each subject and also in each group by using the national identity scale as one of the survey questionnaires in this study. It may be possible that if one has a strong sense of national identity, one is likely to feel uncomfortable or even have negative reaction when hearing something against his country or against his previous belief concerning his country. The results of this questionnaire may serve as reference for verifying the existence of ideological renditions and further determining whether the ideological renditions are signs of hegemony or signs of resistance to hegemony. For a complete version of the questionnaire, see Appendix C.

#### ***3.4.4 Post-experiment questionnaire***

The post-experiment questionnaire, consisting of 18 items, is developed by the researcher based on the research focus on the possible link between interpreters' political ideology and their feelings about the source speeches/speakers. As the questionnaire is given to the subjects at the end of the data collection and will have no influence on the subjects' interpreting performance, some of the questionnaire items, namely Items 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10, request the subjects in an explicit and straightforward manner to state their attitude towards the issue of objectivity in interpreting, their feelings about interpreting for those they agree or disagree with, their attitude towards the relations between Taiwan and China, and

self-evaluation of their interpreting performance in terms of objectivity. The results of the questionnaire may provide concrete evidence for the link between interpreters' ideologies and their reactions to the source speeches they interpret.

The questionnaire items specified above investigate the link between interpreters' ideologies and their reactions to the source speeches/speakers from different aspects. Item 1 explores the subjects' attitude towards the objectivity issue in interpreting. If a subject does not take remaining neutral as one of the important priorities for interpreters, the objectivity of her renditions may vary. Items 4 and 10 ask the subjects whether they are comfortable about interpreting for speakers on either side across the Taiwan Strait. Items 5 and 7, concerning the issue of Taiwan independence, investigate whether the subjects are proponents of the One China policy or of Taiwan's formal independence. It may be possible that if a Taiwanese subject rejects the One China policy or even supports Taiwan's formal independence, he may feel uncomfortable about interpreting for speakers who claim that Taiwan is part of China or that China may seek reunification with Taiwan by force if necessary. Similarly, if a Chinese subject is intolerant of the idea that Taiwan is not part of China, he may feel uncomfortable about interpreting for speakers who assert that Taiwan is a country. Items 8 and 9 ask the subjects to evaluate the strength of their national identity awareness shown in the interpreting process and to judge whether their own renditions are objective. It may be possible that if a subject is aware of her national identity while interpreting for speakers whose opinions are against the subject's political ideologies, particularly concerning one's national identity, the subject may have negative feelings towards the speakers or the source speeches. Also, if a subject acknowledges her renditions to be culturally biased, it is very likely that she has produced ideological renditions during interpreting.

The results of the specified questionnaire items will serve as direct reference for confirming existence of ideological renditions in the CDA analysis and further determining whether the ideological renditions are signs of hegemony or resistance to hegemony. For a

complete version of the questionnaire, see Appendix D and Appendix E.

### **3.5 In-Depth Interview**

The individual in-depth interview is one of the common qualitative research methods adopted for exploring human beings' ideas, concepts, feelings, opinions, and so on. One of its benefits is that it provides an opportunity for interviewees to analyze their 'motivations for a particular action (Kaar, 2009: 2).' Compared with a questionnaire survey, which restricts its respondents to specific questions and limited space of expression, an individual interview allows its respondents much more freedom to express themselves. However, the individual in-depth interview is often criticized for its interpretative nature (ibid: 4). A in-depth interview may generate a huge amount of data, and the interviewer may interpret the data on a subjective basis to serve their needs.

With the above benefit and possible drawback of individual in-depth interviews taken into consideration, the researcher will not interpret the interview data by herself but request the interviewed subjects to provide appropriate clarifications regarding deviant but ambiguous wording of their renditions. It is likely that even with the supporting information from the survey questionnaires, some deviant renditions cannot be judged undoubtedly as ideological signs, and therefore, further inquiry about the motivations for producing these deviant renditions is necessary. The purpose of the in-depth interview is to obtain specific information as reference for the CDA analysis. The interview is conducted on a voluntary basis, which means not all of the subjects will be interviewed.

### 3.6 Overview of the CDA Filter Process Results

The preliminary results under the application of the CDA filter process show that the political struggle and inequality between Taiwan and China contributed to many signs of hegemony or resistance in the trainee interpreters' SI renditions. The great majority of the hegemonic signs are produced by the China group, while the great majority of the ideological signs produced by the Taiwanese subjects are categorized into signs of resistance to the Chinese hegemony. The signs of hegemony or resistance are generally embodied through nine interpreting strategies, including

#### (1) Substitution

Some of the subjects, most of whom are from China, replace the source term 'country' with other terms, such as 'region' or 'area' when rendering the Taiwan's speeches, through which the subjects may avoid recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign country. By contrast, in the Taiwan group, some of the subjects use the term 'nation' or 'country' instead of 'party' or 'side' when the Taiwanese speakers refer to Taiwan, which may create an impression that the speakers are explicitly asserting Taiwan's status as a country.

#### (2) Addition

Some of the Chinese subjects add the word 'China' or 'Chinese' to the source texts, which may 'invent' an emotional bonding between China and Taiwan or give an impression that Taiwan is part of China, while some of the Taiwanese subjects add the word 'Taiwan' or 'Taiwanese' to the renditions whereas the speaker did not mention Taiwan, which may highlight the status of Taiwan or emphasize the role of Taiwan in international events.

#### (3) Omission

Some of the source texts that involve assertion of Taiwan's sovereignty or bitter accusation of China's bullying behaviour are not rendered by some of the Chinese subjects. By contrast, when the Chinese speakers refer to China as the 'motherland' of

Taiwan, some of the Taiwanese subjects remain silent.

(4) Compression

Some unusual compression cases are found in the results. Such compressed renditions are not 'opposite' to the reality or to what the speakers originally meant and seem plausible within the speech context, but these cases, most of which involve the Taiwan independence issue, actually blur the focus of what the speakers say.

(5) Mitigation

Some of the subjects render some of the source texts in a less assertive or less direct manner than the speakers. More specifically, those in the China group may mitigate the criticism about China or the statement which indicates Taiwan is a country, while the Taiwanese subjects may use the mitigation strategy to downplay what the Chinese speakers say by using a less affirmative tense or structure or by using the wording that does not distort the source meaning but may downplay the original statement or implication that Taiwan is part of China.

(6) Overstatement/Intensification

Overstatement/intensification cases are found in both groups. For instance, while the Chinese speakers express their stance on the One China policy, some of the Chinese subjects may explicitly show their contempt for or opposition to the Taiwan independence issue by using deviant wording. Similarly, some of the Taiwanese subjects may render what the Taiwanese speakers say in a more assertive or emotional manner to reinforce the speakers' original resistance to hegemony.

(7) Distortion

A distorted rendition in this study means the rendered meaning is opposite to or greatly deviates from what the speakers say or is very likely to be untrue to the reality. For instance, a few of the Taiwanese subjects produce renditions which are contradictory to the Chinese speakers say to show strong resistance to the Chinese hegemony.

#### (8) Prioritizing personal cognition

Some of the subjects are found to have rendered the source texts according to their previous knowledge. More specifically, the cases produced by the Chinese subjects may lead listeners to think that Taiwan is part of China or may show the Chinese hegemony towards Taiwan, while those produced by the Taiwanese subjects may unmask the Chinese hegemony in the source texts or convey more resistance messages than what the speakers say.

#### (9) Specification

When the speakers talk of ‘cross-strait relations’, some of the Chinese subjects specify who is or which place is involved in the relations by using the phrase ‘mainland and Taiwan’ or ‘the two sides of China’. The former cases may downgrade the autonomous status of Taiwan to a province of China or giving rather ambiguous renditions that may lead to an impression that Taiwan is part of China, while in the latter cases the subjects are explicitly asserting their stance that Taiwan is part of China. By contrast, some of the Taiwanese subjects specify Taiwan’s status as a ‘country’ when the Taiwanese speakers do not explicitly say so.

Notably, some special cases are found in both groups, which will be discussed separately in another section. For instance, two of the Taiwanese subjects produce three of the ‘hegemonic’ signs through the ‘substitution’ strategy while some of the Chinese subjects show resistance to the Chinese hegemony in their renditions by prioritizing their personal cognition or feelings. Also, as Speech 1 (C) and Speech 4 (C) involve some other countries, such as Japan and Indonesia, some of the Chinese subjects are found to have produced hegemonic signs towards these countries. In Chapter 5, the CDA method will be used to investigate what discursive strategies and linguistic devices are used in these ideologically deviant renditions.

## **Chapter 4. Results of Survey Questionnaires and Interviews**

The survey questionnaires used in the study include a student interpreter background questionnaire, six retrospective questionnaires, a national identity scale questionnaire, and a post-experiment questionnaire. Meanwhile, 14 of the subjects were interviewed separately by the researcher after the completion of the SI experiment. The results of the surveys and interviews, as a whole, indicate a link between a subject's ideology and identity and her perception of the cross-strait political speeches. Whether the link may contribute to the emergence of ideological signs in one's simultaneous renditions will be investigated in the next chapter of the CDA analysis. In this chapter, the researcher will present and discuss the questionnaire and interview results that concern the research focus and may be used in the CDA analysis in Chapter 5.

### **4.1 Results of Student Interpreter Background Questionnaire**

The results of the student interpreter background questionnaire (the SIB questionnaire) indicate high homogeneity of the subjects' background information in terms of age, language, education, and work experience. Only two of the subjects are male, and all but two of the subjects are aged between 20 and 30 at the time of completing this questionnaire. Half of the 42 subjects are from China and the other half from Taiwan. Almost every subject speaks Mandarin as their mother tongue. The majority of the subjects started learning English before reaching fifteen and have a first degree in English. In addition to the English learning experience, the subjects' admission to the simultaneous interpreting program indicates the subjects should have similar levels of proficiency in English. Half of the subjects have limited experience in translating and/or interpreting, and therefore, in this study, all of the subjects may be described as trainee interpreters, which means the interpreting performance of these trainee interpreters may be of similar level in terms of accuracy and delivery.

Most of the subjects pay attention to cross-strait political issues so the source speeches used in this study should not be quite strange to them. In terms of the attitude toward the future relations between China and Taiwan, five of the Taiwanese subjects hope for Taiwan's formal independence and no subjects from the Taiwan group favour 'reunification.' It may imply that none of them see Taiwan as part of China or would like Taiwan to be part of China and that they may feel uncomfortable about the talks that promote reunification of Taiwan and China. By contrast, ten of the Chinese subjects

prefer reunification of Taiwan and China, and none of the Chinese subjects favour Taiwan's formal independence. The results show that there is an apparent discrepancy in attitude towards future cross-strait relations between the two groups. The attitude of the subjects towards the future relations between Taiwan and China may be one of the useful references for confirming existence of ideological renditions in the CDA analysis and helping determine whether the ideological renditions are signs of hegemony or resistance to hegemony.

## **4.2 Results of Retrospective Questionnaires**

### **4.2.1 *General description***

Each of the six rendering sessions is accompanied by one retrospective questionnaire (Retro questionnaire). The main purposes of the Retro questionnaire are: exploring whether the subjects have difficulty comprehending and interpreting the source speeches and investigating the subjects' opinions about the content of the source speeches.

According to the results of the Retro questionnaires, none of the subjects consider the speech rate of the source texts to be fast. The great majority of the subjects have no difficulty comprehending the source content, which is also reflected in the fact that most of the subjects produce a similar amount of interpreting output despite different levels of accuracy in the renditions. Hence, the interpreting data collected in the experiment may be sufficient for the CDA analysis.

In terms of the opinions of the subjects about the content of the source speeches, the questionnaire results indicate that the clashing political ideologies between the speakers and the subjects may arouse uncomfortable feelings of the subjects during the interpreting sessions. The majority of the Taiwanese subjects explicitly or implicitly provide negative opinions about Chinese hegemony and disagree with the statement of the Chinese speakers that Taiwan is part of China and cannot be separated from China by any means. Compared with the Chinese subjects, the Taiwanese subjects feel more uncomfortable while interpreting for the Chinese political figures. More specifically, only three of the Taiwanese subjects do not explicitly or implicitly express their negative feelings towards Speech 1 (C), and 16 of the Taiwanese subjects express their disagreement with some of the content of Speech 4 (C). Similarly, most of the Chinese subjects feel uncomfortable while interpreting for the Taiwanese political figures. Seven

Chinese subjects explicitly or implicitly express their disagreement with the idea that Taiwan is a country after interpreting Speech 2 (T) and Speech 3 (T). Speech 5 (T) by Annette Lu, who asserts Taiwan's sovereignty in an even more straightforward manner as Vice-President of the R.O.C. in Taiwan, provokes much resentment among the Chinese subjects. All but seven of the Chinese subjects explicitly produce negative response to the content of Speech 5 (T).

#### ***4.2.2 Results of Speech 1 (C) retrospective questionnaire***

Speech 1 (C) is divided into two parts (two interpreting sessions) and therefore accompanied by two retrospective questionnaires. As a whole, none of the subjects consider the speech rate of Speech 1 (C) to be fast, and the great majority of the subjects have little difficulty understanding the speech content. It implies that the subjects should be able to grasp much of the speech content. 11 of the Taiwanese subjects and one of the Chinese subjects disagree with the speech content. More precisely, the focus of the positive opinions given by most of the Chinese subjects is on the history of the Second Sino-Japan war, which may imply that there is little political ideological conflict between the Chinese subjects and the Chinese speaker (Hu Jintao). By contrast, only three of the Taiwanese subjects do not oppose the speaker's statement of the One China policy or hold negative attitude towards Chinese hegemony, which may imply that there is conflict over political ideologies between the Taiwanese subjects and the Chinese speaker.

#### ***4.2.3 Results of Speech 2 (T) retrospective questionnaire***

According to the results of Speech 2 (T) Retro questionnaire, none of the subjects consider the speech rate to be fast, and the great majority of them have little difficulty understanding the speech content. It implies that the subjects should be able to grasp much of the speech content. As the Taiwanese speaker, Chen Shui-bian, does not talk about the Taiwan issue towards Chinese people or Taiwanese people but pays tribute to a third party, namely the Nauru government, the speech does not arouse much negative reaction in the subjects. One Taiwanese subject and seven Chinese subjects disagree with the speech content. Why the Taiwanese subject disagrees with the speech content is that she 'dislikes the speaker & his political tendencies', while the major reason for the disagreement of the Chinese subjects with the speech is that they do not think of Taiwan

as a country and therefore produce negative response to the speaker's assertion of Taiwan's sovereignty.

#### ***4.2.4 Results of Speech 3 (T) retrospective questionnaire***

According to the results of Speech 3 (T) Retro questionnaire, none of the subjects consider the speech rate to be fast. The great majority of the subjects have little difficulty understanding the speech content. 17 of the 21 Taiwanese subjects fully agree or quite agree with the speech content, which may indicate that the speech, whose speaker and addressees are Taiwanese people, involves little conflict over national identity as far as the Taiwanese subjects are concerned. By contrast, only four of the 21 Chinese subjects quite agree with the speech content, and another four Chinese subjects disagree with the speech content. More specifically, Subjects C008 and C016 express their stance on the One China policy and do not see Taiwan as a country. Evidently, even though the speech content involves few sensitive wording or issues about cross-strait relations, some of the Chinese subjects still feel uncomfortable about interpreting for Taiwanese political figures. The negative feelings may be attributed to the conflict over national identity between the Taiwanese speaker and the Chinese student interpreters. Whether the psychological conflict inside the Chinese subjects will contribute to ideological signs in their renditions needs to be investigated further through the CDA method in the next chapter.

#### ***4.2.5 Results of Speech 4 (C) retrospective questionnaire***

At the second stage of the data collection, Subject C009's rendering data is missing due to an equipment malfunction, but the results of her completed questionnaires, including Speech 4 (C) and Speech 5 (T) Retro questionnaires, the national identity scale questionnaire, and the post-experiment questionnaire, are counted in. Also, Subject T016 drops out of the second stage of the data collection so the total number of the subjects shown in the results of Speech 4 (C) Retro questionnaire is 41. According to the results of Speech 4 (C) Retro questionnaire, none of the subjects consider the speech rate to be fast. The majority of them have little difficulty understanding the speech content. Although two subjects report that they are completely lost in the speech, they still produce as much output as they can. 16 of the Taiwanese subjects express their negative feelings towards the source speech in which the Chinese speaker explicitly

states the One China policy, and 14 of the Taiwanese subjects clearly express their disagreement with the speech content, particularly with the Taiwan issue. By contrast, none of the Chinese subjects disagree with the speech content, and 14 of them fully or quite agree with what the speaker says.

#### ***4.2.6 Results of Speech 5 (T) retrospective questionnaire***

According to the results of Speech 5 (T) Retro questionnaire, none of the subjects consider the speech rate of Speech 5 (T) to be fast. Generally, most of the subjects have little difficulty understanding the speech content. The speech, given by Annette Lu, Vice-President of the ROC in Taiwan, is found very provocative to the Chinese subjects as Lu addresses her comments about the cross-strait relations to a Chinese audience in a straightforward tone. Two of the Taiwanese subjects, T013 and T015, also find Lu's expressions too strong and aggressive. 10 of the Chinese subjects quite disagree or fully disagree with the speech content. More specifically, three of the Chinese subjects explicitly defend the Chinese government against Lu's criticism while another eight of the Chinese subjects show explicit or implicit opposition to Lu's statement that Taiwan is a country. By contrast, only one of the Taiwanese subjects, namely T015, quite disagrees with the speech content and considers the speaker's tone to be too aggressive. It should be noted here that T015, during the in-depth interview conducted after the SI experiment, clearly expresses that she totally identifies with what Lu says about how China oppresses Taiwan and Lu's speech did arouse her patriotic feeling towards Taiwan. Therefore, it is evident that T015 disagrees with Lu's provocative tone rather than the content of Speech 5. Meanwhile, 12 of the Taiwanese subjects echo Lu's resentment against China's hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan on the international stage. The results of Speech 5 (T) Retro questionnaire indicate that if Taiwanese speakers assert the status of Taiwan as an independent country in a straightforward manner, Chinese interpreters are likely to feel uncomfortable. The results also show that the Taiwan group generally agree with Lu's speech, which may be attributed to little conflict over political ideologies between the Taiwanese subjects and the Taiwanese speaker.

#### ***4.2.7 Conclusion of the retrospective questionnaire results***

As shown above, the Taiwanese subjects tend to feel uncomfortable while interpreting for the Chinese political figures, and the Chinese subjects tend to feel uncomfortable while interpreting for the Taiwanese political figures. The results indicate that the subjects tend to agree with the speakers from the same side of the Strait as them. The immediate investigation into the subjects' feelings about the source speeches after the interpreting shows that most of the subjects do not remain neutral on a psychological basis while interpreting. Instead, they, as interpreters, judge the speech content (or even the speakers) and choose to like or dislike what they need to interpret. The major reason behind the subjects' negative feelings in the SI experiment is the One China policy. Whether ideological signs exist in the collected renditions will be analyzed and shown in the CDA analysis later on, but the results of the Retro questionnaires indicate a general trend that the subjects tend to show negative response to the political speeches made by the leaders from the other side of the Strait, especially when the speech content involves the One China policy.

#### **4.3 Results of Post-Experiment Questionnaire (PE Questionnaire)**

One Taiwanese subject (T016) dropped out of the second stage of the data collection so the total number of the subjects that filled in this questionnaire is 41. The present research focus is to investigate whether there is a link between an interpreter's ideology and identity and her feelings about the source speeches/speakers. Only the results of those items that concern the research focus will be presented and discussed. As mentioned in Chapter 3.4.4, Items 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10 are specially designed to request explicitly the subjects to state their attitude towards the objectivity issue in interpreting, their feelings about interpreting for those they agree or disagree with, their attitude towards the relations between Taiwan and China, and self-evaluation of their interpreting performance in terms of objectivity.

Item 1 requests the subjects to rethink whether 'interpreters should provide objective and professional service for any client regardless of race, ethnicity, nationality, or gender' and express their attitude towards the objectivity issue in interpreting. The great majority of the subjects agree that interpreters should remain neutral and provide professional service for any client. However, three of the Chinese subjects (namely C002, C009, and C018) and two of the Taiwanese subjects (namely T005 and T006)

disagree with this ethic of remaining objectivity and treating clients on an equal basis.

Items 4 and 10 ask the subjects whether they are comfortable about interpreting for political leaders on both sides. The great majority of the subjects feel comfortable about interpreting for leaders from the same side as them. One Chinese subject and two Taiwanese subjects are reserved about this item. Four of the Chinese subjects give negative response to this item, while none of the Taiwanese subjects feel uncomfortable about interpreting for leaders from Taiwan. When it comes to interpreting for leaders from the *opposite* side, more than half of the subjects feel uncomfortable, and another seven of the subjects are reserved about this item. More specifically, 14 of the Chinese subjects and nine of the Taiwanese subjects explicitly express their negative feelings about this item.

As discussed in the previous section about the results of the Retro questionnaires, each of the subjects is asked to specify whether they disagree or agree with the content of each source speech, and the results of the Retro questionnaires indicate a general trend that the subjects tend to produce negative response to the speakers from the *opposite* side and positive response to the speakers from the *same* side. Here in the PE questionnaire, the purpose of Items 4 and 10 is to request the subjects to give a general evaluation of their feelings about interpreting for the political leaders from both sides at the end of the SI experiment, and the results of these two items seem to echo those obtained from the Retro questionnaires. In consequence, it may be argued that conflicts over political ideologies or national identity between speakers and interpreters may arouse negative feelings in interpreters.

Items 5 and 7 focus on the issue of Taiwan independence, investigating the subjects' attitude towards the cross-strait relations. More specifically, Item 5 asks whether the subjects will support the Chinese government to attack Taiwan by force if Taiwan declares its independence formally. None of the Taiwanese subjects agree with the possible military attack launched by China on Taiwan, and only one of the Taiwanese subjects, namely T004, remains reserved about this item. By contrast, three of the Chinese subjects, namely C004, C016, and C018, support their government to attack Taiwan if necessary, while another nine of the Chinese subjects neither agree nor disagree with the possible attack of China on Taiwan. In other words, less than half of the Chinese subjects disagree with China's possible attack on Taiwan. The results may indicate that most of the Chinese subjects hold a hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan just as the Chinese government does.

Item 7 investigates whether the subjects consider Taiwan to be part of China and disagree with Taiwan's separation from China. 18 of the 20 Taiwanese subjects oppose the One China policy, while only one of the Chinese subjects, namely C006, somewhat disagrees with the inseparability of Taiwan and China. Although nine of the Chinese subjects remain reserved about this item, still nearly more than half of the Chinese subjects explicitly support the One China policy and view Taiwan as part of China. The only one Taiwanese subject that agrees somewhat with inseparability of Taiwan and China is T004, who actually has expressed negative opinions about the speeches given by the Chinese leaders and echoed Lu's resentment against China's oppression of Taiwan. The combined results of T004's questionnaires indicate that T004 may identify with 'the Republic of China (the ROC)' rather than 'Taiwan' and consider Taiwan to be part of the ROC rather than part of the People's Republic of China (the PRC). As a whole, the results of Items 5 and 7 show that there is a huge cognitive difference in the cross-strait relations between the Taiwan group and the China group.

Item 8 asks the subjects to evaluate the strength of their national identity awareness shown in the interpreting process. 16 of the Chinese subjects and 10 of the Taiwanese subjects agree that they are aware of their own national identity when interpreting for the speakers from the opposite side. Four of the Chinese subjects and five of the Taiwanese subjects consider themselves to have interpreted for the leaders from the opposite side without being aware of their own national identity. Cross-referencing the results of the Retro questionnaires, the researcher finds that nine of the ten Taiwanese subjects who are aware of their national identity when interpreting for the leaders from the opposite side have explicitly expressed their opposition to the One China policy, while 10 of the 16 Chinese subjects with national identity awareness during the interpreting explicitly express their opposition to Taiwan's sovereign status. Meanwhile, as far as those subjects who claim to be unaware of their own national identity during the interpreting are concerned, none of the four Chinese subjects have shown negative feelings about the Taiwanese speakers' statement that Taiwan is a country, while three of the five Taiwanese subjects have given explicit opposition to the One China policy stated by the Chinese leaders.

Only one of the Chinese subjects, C016, remains reserved about Item 8; however, a review of C016's Retro questionnaire results shows that C016 has expressed strong opposition to the statement of the Taiwanese speakers that Taiwan is a country. Furthermore, as for the five of the Taiwanese subjects who remain reserved about this item, all of them have in their Retro questionnaires explicitly expressed negative

response to the One China policy or the Chinese hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan. The results of Item 8, as a whole, show that when one subject claims to have been aware of one's own national identity during the interpreting for the leaders from the opposite side, it does not follow that the subject will produce negative response to the source speeches concerned. It may also be argued that those subjects who claim themselves to be unaware of their own national identity or do not show specific attitude towards Item 8 may still produce negative reaction to the source speeches concerned. In other words, the results of Item 8 generally echo what previous studies of ideology have found: ideology may work invisibly and subconsciously. Although one's self report of national identity awareness during the interpreting may not be highly correlated with one's factual reaction or response to what has been interpreted, the results of Item 8 can still serve as one of the useful references for exploring the influence of an interpreter's political ideology over her/his simultaneous renditions.

Item 9 asks the subjects to judge whether their own renditions are objective. Seven of the Chinese subjects and none of the Taiwanese subjects feel that their own renditions in the data collection are not objective but culturally biased. Cross-referencing the results of the Retro questionnaires completed by these seven Chinese subjects, the researcher finds that six of them explicitly express their opposition to Taiwan's sovereign status or show negative reaction to the speeches made by the Taiwanese leaders. Five of the Taiwanese subjects remain reserved about this item, and the cross-referencing of their Retro questionnaire results show that all of them explicitly express their opposition to the One China policy or show their resentment about China's hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan. As for those who consider their renditions to be objective, nine of the fourteen Chinese subjects have explicitly showed their support of the One China policy or expressed their disagreement with the content of the speeches made by the Taiwanese leaders; eleven of the fifteen Taiwanese subjects have explicitly showed their resentment about the One China policy or expressed their disagreement with the content of the speeches made by the Chinese leaders. As the cross-referenced results indicate, nearly all of the subjects who think of their renditions as culturally biased or are not positively sure of the objectivity of their renditions have shown their disagreement with the political stance of the leaders from the *opposite* side on the One China policy, which may imply that these subjects have perceived the influence of their political ideologies on their simultaneous interpreting for the leaders from the opposite side. Meanwhile, still the majority of the subjects who consider themselves to have produced objective renditions have shown disagreement with the content of the

speeches given by the leaders from the opposite side. Whether the subjects will bring their ideologies to their renditions and produce ideological signs will be investigated through the CDA analysis.

#### **4.4 Results of National Identity Scale Questionnaire (NIS Questionnaire)**

As one of the Taiwanese subjects, T016, drops out of the second stage of the data collection, the total number of the subjects who have filled in this questionnaire is 41. The number of the subjects is large in terms of a qualitative research but the data generated by these 41 subjects may not be sufficient for complex statistical analysis. In consequence, instead of conducting a t-test analysis to find the difference in strength of national identity between the Taiwan group and the China group or a factor analysis to determine significance of subscales, the researcher chooses to focus on the strength of each subject's national identity and present each subject's score ranking compared with the other subjects within the same group. The more scores one obtains on the national identity scale, the higher ranking one has among the subjects. One's high ranking on the scale indicates her relatively stronger sense of national identity compared with the other subjects. 14 of the Chinese subjects and six of the Taiwanese subjects score higher than the mean (approximately 107). It seems that the China group as a whole has a stronger sense of national identity than the Taiwan group, which may echo the previous literature review of the identity shaping in China and in Taiwan. When cross-referencing the results of the Retro questionnaires, the researcher finds that those who score higher than the mean on the national identity scale tend to show disagreement with the content of the speeches given by the leaders from the *opposite* side; more specifically, only four Chinese subjects of those high scorers have not produced explicit disagreement with the content of the political speeches made by the leaders from the *opposite* side. Meanwhile, as far as the subjects who rank bottom 10 on the scale are concerned, only two of them have not produced negative reaction to the speeches made by the leaders from the *opposite* side. The results of cross-referencing the Retro questionnaires and the national identity scale questionnaire imply that one's strength of national identity is not highly correlated with one's negative reaction to the speeches made by the leaders from the opposite side.

With cross-referencing the results of the post-experiment questionnaire, seven of the Chinese subjects who rank top 10 within the China group on the national identity scale produce negative response to Item 4 regarding whether the subjects feel

comfortable about interpreting for the leaders from the *opposite* side, while four of their Taiwanese counterparts give negative response to the same item. As far as those who rank bottom ten within their own group on the scale, only three of the Chinese subjects and two of the Taiwanese subjects have not produced negative response to Item 4. As it shows on a group basis, there is no link between one's strength of national identity and one's feelings towards the speeches made by the leaders from the *opposite* side.

As the results of Item 7 in the post-experiment questionnaire regarding the attitude towards the 'inseparability' of Taiwan and China show that there is sharp contrast between the two groups, it may not be meaningful to check if there is a link between the results of Item 7 and one's strength of national identity.

With the cross-referencing of the results of Item 8 in the post-experiment questionnaire regarding the subjects' awareness of their national identity while interpreting for the leaders from the *opposite* side, only two of the Chinese subjects who rank top 10 within the China group on the national identity scale report being unaware of their national identity; by contrast, only five of their Taiwanese counterparts express that they are aware of their national identity. As far as those who rank bottom 10 within their own group are concerned, three of the Chinese subjects and five of the Taiwanese subjects do not report their national identity awareness during interpreting. As it shows on a group basis, there is no link between one's strength of national identity and one's national identity awareness during interpreting for the leaders from the *opposite* side.

As a whole, the national identity scale questionnaire results only indicate a general trend that the China group has a stronger sense of national identity than the Taiwan group. Cross-referencing the results of the other questionnaires does not show any other general trend on a group basis. As it is likely that one's strong sense of national identity may contribute to his/her negative feelings towards something against his/her country, the results of the national identity scale questionnaire may be used as a reference on an individual basis for helping confirm whether one has produced deviant renditions and whether one's deviant renditions are signs of hegemony or resistance to hegemony.

#### **4.5 Results of Individual In-Depth Interview**

The purpose of the in-depth interview in this study is to obtain concrete information and help with the confirmation of ideological signs in a situation where a deviant rendition is too ambiguous to be categorized as an ideological sign just through the use of the CDA method. If a subject can recall in the interview what she has been

thinking about some specific source texts or how she has come up with some ambiguous renditions, the data of the interview may be a testimony of the ideological signs in her renditions. The following is the general description of the in-depth interview conducted for this study.

Three of the Chinese subjects and nine of the Taiwanese subjects opted independently for the in-depth interview, during which each of them was requested to clarify their own ambiguously deviant renditions. Some of the subjects felt surprised at their own deviant renditions and did not know why they themselves had produced such deviancy. However, most of the subjects could vividly recall how they had come up with their deviant renditions in response to the speeches. More precisely, during the individual in-depth interview, all of the nine Taiwanese subjects explicitly stated that some of their deviant renditions had been attributed to their disagreement with the One China policy. By contrast, two of the three Chinese subjects admitted that their Chinese identity had directly influenced their objectivity while they interpreted for the Taiwanese speakers. The interview data that appear as strong evidence for existence of ideological signs will be used in the CDA analysis. With clear statement or clarification of the subjects themselves, the confirmation of the ideological signs may be well-grounded and reasonable.

#### **4.6 Discussion and Conclusion of Survey Results**

The purpose of the survey questionnaires used in this study is to obtain the opinions of the subjects about the source speeches and investigate the link between an interpreter's political ideology and his/her personal feelings about the cross-strait political source speeches. On the whole, the survey results suggest that the conflict over political ideologies between a speaker and an interpreter may arouse negative psychological reaction of the interpreter during interpreting.

In terms of the subjects' opinions about the future relations between Taiwan and China, ten Chinese subjects support 'reunification' between Taiwan and China while there are five pro-independence Taiwanese subjects. Further review of the retrospective questionnaire results produced by these fifteen subjects shows that six of the ten Chinese subjects disagree with the content of at least one of the source speeches produced by the Taiwanese political figures, and none of these ten Chinese subjects disagree with any one of the source speeches produced by the Chinese political figures. As for the five pro-independence Taiwanese subjects, four of them show disagreement

with the content of at least one of the source speeches given by the Chinese political figures, and only one of the five pro-independence Taiwanese subjects disagrees with the content of one of the source speeches made by the Taiwanese political figures<sup>1</sup>. The above-mentioned results may imply that if the subjects are dissatisfied with the status quo of the relations between Taiwan and China (more precisely, when a Taiwanese student interpreter hopes for ‘independence’ of Taiwan in the future, or when a Chinese student interpreter favors ‘reunification’ of China and Taiwan), they may have negative feelings or reaction towards a source speech which contains something against their political ideology. The responses of these fifteen subjects indeed suggest a link between a Mandarin interpreter’s political ideology and his/her feelings about the cross-strait political speeches.

According to the results of the post-experiment questionnaire survey, fourteen Chinese subjects and nine Taiwanese subjects explicitly state that they feel uncomfortable when interpreting for political figures from the other side of the Taiwan Strait. Further review of the retrospective questionnaire results produced by these twenty-three subjects, ten of the fourteen Chinese subjects explicitly disagree with the content of at least one of the source speeches made by the Taiwanese political figures, while all of the nine Taiwanese subjects disagree with the content of at least one of the source speeches made by the Chinese political figures. This shows that in some interpreters conflicting ideologies do give rise to uncomfortable feelings during interpreting. Meanwhile, most of the Taiwanese subjects report their disagreement with the statement of the Chinese speakers that Taiwan is part of China. Their negative responses to the One China policy will be very important references for the CDA confirmation of existence of ideological signs in simultaneous renditions shown as resistance to China’s hegemony. By contrast, most of the Chinese subjects express their disagreement with the idea that Taiwan is a sovereign country. Their hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan has already been manifested in the results of the questionnaire surveys.

In terms of the national identity scale questionnaire results, the China group as a whole has a much stronger sense of national identity than the Taiwan group. Fourteen of the Chinese subjects and six of the Taiwanese subjects score higher than the mean (approximately 107) on the national identity scale. Further review of the results of the post-experiment questionnaire, twelve of these fourteen Chinese subjects and four of these six Taiwanese subjects report that they are aware of their national identity during

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<sup>1</sup> Only one of the five pro-independence Taiwanese subjects, namely T015, ‘disagrees’ with Lu’s speech as she considers the language use of that speech to be aggressive. However, in her in-depth interview, T015 explicitly states that she strongly identifies with what Lu said about how China oppresses Taiwan.

their interpreting for the political leaders from the other side of the Strait, which may indicate that an interpreter with a strong sense of nationality tends to be aware of her national identity when interpreting for those whose political ideologies are contradictory to hers. Therefore, the results of the national identity scale questionnaire may be a useful reference for helping confirm the existence of ideological signs in the collected simultaneous renditions. However, it should be noted that some of the Taiwanese subjects, in spite of having a relatively weak sense of nationality, are among those who explicitly report their negative feelings about the Chinese hegemony, which may be attributed to the fact that the people of Taiwan are faced with an identity crisis but they may still feel resistant to the Chinese hegemony that threatens the survival of Taiwan in diplomatic terms (see also Chapter 2.5.2.4). Also, some of the Chinese subjects who are aware of their national identity during interpreting state that they do not feel uncomfortable about interpreting for the Taiwanese political figures. All of the above results indicate that although there may be a link between one's political ideologies and one's feelings about the cross-strait political figures and the speeches they make, not every subject reacts in the same way. And even some of the subjects may not have consistent reactions throughout the experiment. Therefore, the results of the questionnaire surveys are very useful but cannot be counted on as the main means to explore how an interpreter's ideology works in simultaneous renditions. It is the renditions that are the main product of a simultaneous interpreting activity. Only by analyzing the renditions can one possibly find ideological signs that are produced either consciously or subconsciously.

## **Chapter 5. CDA Analysis and Discussion**

As discussed in Chapter 3, critical discourse analysis is used as the main research method of this study to detect ideological signs embodied in simultaneous (SI) renditions. To prevent the common criticism of CDA for being subjective and biased, a CDA Filter Process is created, in which a subject's renditions, survey questionnaire results, and/or interview data will be reviewed as a whole in order to find evidence for the embodiment of ideological signs in her SI renditions (see Chapter 3.2.3 for the detail of the CDA Filter Process).

In addition to the CDA Filter Process, statistical analysis of the CDA qualitative results will be conducted for the purposes of increasing the validity of the research findings and presenting sharp contrasts between the Taiwan group and the China group in terms of producing signs of hegemony or resistance. The overall statistical results displayed in two separate tables (see Chapter 5.6) will show an overview of the type of ideological signs (i.e. hegemony or resistance signs) on a group basis. The statistical analysis of ideological signs may demonstrate not only the qualitative analysis results in a scientifically quantitative manner but also power struggles between Taiwan and China embodied in political SI renditions.

### **5.1 General Description of the CDA Analysis in the Present Study**

As mentioned in Chapter 3.6, the preliminary results under the application of the CDA filter process show that the political struggle and inequality between Taiwan and China contributed to many signs of hegemony or resistance in the trainee interpreters' SI renditions. The great majority of the hegemonic signs are produced by the China group, while the great majority of the ideological signs produced by the Taiwanese

subjects are categorized into signs of resistance to the Chinese hegemony. The signs of hegemony or resistance are generally embodied through nine interpreting strategies, including substitution, addition, omission, compression, mitigation, overstatement or intensification, distortion, prioritizing personal cognition, and specification. Note that the way in which some of the deviant renditions are produced may be easily to be categorized into one of the interpreting strategies while the categorization of some others may not be so definite. In the following sections, the CDA method will be used to investigate what discursive strategies and linguistic devices are used by the trainee interpreters to show their ideology and identity in the renditions under the categorization of the above nine interpreting strategies, and the discussion will be divided into the China group, the Taiwan group, and the Special Case. Meanwhile, the results of the survey questionnaires and/or interviews will be referenced in the analysis process and may serve as evidence for confirming the existence of ideological renditions or explaining why these ideological renditions are produced. After the discussion of the discursive strategies under the interpreting strategies categorization, the researcher will, by answering the five most frequently asked questions in the DHA analysis (see Chapter 3.2.2), provide a detailed table specifying the discursive strategies through which Chinese hegemonic ideology towards Taiwan is embodied and those through which Taiwanese resistance to Chinese hegemony is demonstrated, which may give a general picture of how Chinese hegemony and Taiwanese resistance are confronting each other in SI renditions. At the end of Chapter 5, a statistical analysis of the CDA qualitative results will be conducted for the purposes of increasing the validity of the research findings and presenting sharp contrasts between the Taiwan group and the China group in terms of producing signs of hegemony or resistance. The overall statistical results, displayed in two separate tables (see Chapter 5.6), will show an overview of the type of ideological signs (i.e. hegemony or resistance signs) on a group

basis. It should also be noted that as the tradition of the CDA method applied to analysis of political speeches or rhetoric involves monolingual texts, the analysis of the discursive strategies or linguistic devices used in the selected source texts in this study should be focused on and conducted in the Mandarin source texts. Although a near literal written translation will be attached to the source texts for reference, any translation of the source texts may fail to represent the discursive strategies that the speakers originally used and thus reduce the validity of the political rhetoric analysis.

## **5.2 CDA Analysis – the China Group**

### **5.2.1 *Substitution***

Substitution is found to be the most frequently used interpreting strategy by the Chinese (and Taiwanese) trainee subjects to have their ideology embodied in the renditions. Some of the Chinese subjects replace the source term ‘country’ with other terms, such as ‘region’ or ‘area’ when rendering the Taiwan’s speeches, through which the subjects may avoid recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign country. In some other cases, the word ‘Taiwan’, Taiwan’s national title ‘the Republic of China’ is even replaced with the word ‘China’. In still some other cases, when Annette Lu, then Taiwan’s Vice-President, says ‘the Chinese mainland/mainland China’ or ‘the People’s Republic of China’, some of the Chinese subjects use the word ‘mainland’ instead. The following are Examples 1 and 2 under this category.

### Example 1:

#### Speech 2 (T)

本人是中華民國第一位前來貴國訪問的國家元首，非常榮幸能受邀到貴國最高的民主殿堂—諾魯共和國國會發表演說。

I am the Republic of China's first national leader that visits your esteemed country, very honored to be invited to your esteemed country's highest democracy hall - the Parliament of the Republic of Nauru – to give a speech.

C008: I am the first to come to visit Nauru of all people from China, of all people from China. And it is an honor to me to address the parliament of the Republic of Nauru.

The comparison of the source text and C008's rendition in Example 1 shows that the subject replaced Taiwan's national title with "China", which may leave audience mistaking the speaker as a Chinese representative. Linguistically, C008 was expressing her stance on the One China policy by using the referential/nomination strategy. Her repetition of the prepositional phrase "of all people from China" while referring to the speaker may give an impression that she was categorizing the Taiwanese speaker as a member of Chinese people and thus declaring Taiwan is part of China. Also, C008 did not render the term '*Guó Jiā Yuán Shǒu* 國家元首 (president/national leader)', which may imply her contempt for the speaker's status or her unwillingness to recognize Taiwan as a country (and therefore Chen was never a 'national leader' to the subject). In the corresponding Retro questionnaire, C008 expressed her disagreement with the content of Speech 2 (T) and gave the reason: "the One China policy instilled by the China government". She also 'strongly agreed' that she had been quite aware of her Chinese national identity while interpreting for the Taiwanese leaders. In light of the evidence presented above, this example is very likely to be a sign of C008's hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan.

## Example 2:

### Speech 5 (T)

歷史指出，嚴重的貧富懸殊往往導致政治動盪，而一旦問題爆發，不僅中國的百姓受苦受難，周邊包括台灣在內的國家都要遭殃。

History points out that a serious wealth gap usually leads to political unrest. And once the problem explodes, not only will China's people suffer but also the neighboring countries including Taiwan will suffer.

C021: We know from history that large income gap will lead to political turmoil. If that happens, Chinese people will suffer a lot. The surrounding area including Taiwan will also suffer.

By replacing the noun “country” with another noun “area”, C021 is using the referential/nomination strategy in linguistic terms to define Taiwan's status as part of China. In her in-depth interview, C021 gave an explanation for such replacement:

...the speaker said ‘Taiwan is a country’, which is strange to me. I was a little confused at hearing the sentence because I seldom hear people say ‘Taiwan is a county.’ Therefore, when I interpreted this part, I stopped to think whether there's something wrong with my listening, as the sentence is opposite to my previous concept. I used the word ‘area’ instead of ‘country’ mainly because I was afraid to make mistakes. Taiwanese speakers use the word ‘country’ but in China, Chinese use the word ‘area’ when referring to Taiwan.

In rendering Speech 3 (T), C021 also used the word ‘area’ when the Taiwanese speaker referred to Taiwan as a ‘country/nation’. C021's use of the referential/nomination strategy also echoes what Li Zhaoxing, former foreign minister of the P.R.C., has emphasized in his talk about the translation of Taiwan's status (see Chapter 2.4.4). It is clear that C021 did bring her Chinese hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan to her renditions.

### 5.2.2 Addition

Previous studies suggest that SI interpreters use “neutral padding expressions” before a workable delivery unit is obtained or make additions to “fill hesitation pauses” to enhance interpreter performance (Kirchhoff 2002[1976]: 116). Yet, this study finds that some of the Chinese subjects add ‘non-neutral’ expressions to their renditions, which may lead the listener to think that Taiwan is part of China.

#### Example 3:

Speech 3 (T)

...也希望各位啟程前往「世界運動會」時，能夠不要忘記，大家的行囊中滿載了兩千三百萬國人同胞對各位的無限祝福、最大的支持、和最殷切的期盼。

...also hope that when everyone starts the journey to the ‘World Games’, [everyone] may not forget everyone’s luggage is filled with the twenty-three million countrymen and compatriots’ limitless wishes, strongest support and greatest expectation to everyone.

C011: I hope when you perform on the sports games, you will remember our best wishes from Chinese people and hope from Taiwanese people in your luggage and keep them in your heart when you perform on the stage.

By adding the noun phrase ‘Chinese people’ to her rendition, C011 was using the referential/nomination strategies to include the Taiwanese speaker as a member of Chinese people, which may further imply that Taiwan is part of China. In her another deviant rendition produced in rendering the same speech, she replaced the noun phrase “Taiwanese people” with “Chinese people”, showing an even stronger attempt to imply that Taiwan is part of China. C011 ‘agreed somewhat’ that she had been quite aware of her Chinese national identity when interpreting for the Taiwanese leaders, and she also ‘agreed somewhat’ that Taiwan is part of China and cannot be separated from China. Her One China ideology is clearly embodied through the referential/nomination strategy

in her rendition.

### 5.2.3 Omission

This study finds that some of the Chinese participants omit part of a source sentence or even a much longer source text that may be contradictory to their One China ideology. More specifically, they use the omission strategy to avoid recognizing Taiwan as a country when interpreting for Taiwanese politicians, which may be exemplified by Examples 4 & 5.

#### **Example 4:**

Speech 3 (T)

剛才阿扁交到黃主席手中的國旗和團旗，一面是國家榮譽的象徵，另一面則是國家代表團的精神標誌；阿扁衷心希望在這兩面旗幟的導引下，各位能夠旗開得勝、贏得最優異的成績。

Just now I [A-bian] gave Chairman Huang the national flag and the delegation flag. One is a symbol of the country's honor. The other is the spiritual sign of the national delegation.

C015: Just right now, the flag I gave to the chairman is a symbol of our reputation. On the one side is the honour and other side is the spirit of the people. Under two flags I hope that you can achieve the best results.

The comparison of the source text and C015's rendition shows that C015 added vagueness to what the speaker had said by omitting such words as "national" or "country". Apparently, the omission mitigates the original illocutionary force. The speaker had meant to encourage the Taiwanese athletes to glorify Taiwan as a country, but the vagueness of the rendered text reduced the illocutionary force of the words of the speaker as Taiwan's President. In addition to this example, it is also found that when rendering Speech 5 (T), C015 omitted a sentence where the Taiwanese speaker

explicitly declared that Taiwan does not belong to China. Compared with the other Chinese subjects, C015 had a relatively strong sense of national identity (ranked 3<sup>rd</sup> in her group). Although she ‘moderately disagreed’ that she had been aware of her Chinese identity when interpreting for the Taiwanese leaders, she was found to produce hegemonic signs in rendering four of the five speeches in the SI experiment. It may be argued that C015 was demonstrating her One China ideology by using the mitigation strategy on linguistic level in Example 4.

### **Example 5:**

#### Speech 5 (T)

自公元 2000 年 5 月 20 日以來，陳水扁總統曾多次對北京政府表達善意與重啟協商大門的誠意，可惜至今北京當局仍不願面對現實，甚至變本加厲地對台灣的國際生存空間極盡打壓與封殺之能事，同時，也不斷地以「一個中國」為前提，來杯葛兩岸的協商，製造兩岸人民交流的路障，令人遺憾。

Since May twentieth two thousand, President Chen Shui-bian for many times has showed the Beijing government good will and sincerity to reopen the gate of negotiation. Regrettably so far the Beijing authorities have still been reluctant to face the reality and even stepped up efforts to oppress and block Taiwan’s international survival space, and at the same time continue to boycott cross-strait negotiations on the ‘one China’ premise and produce barriers to exchanges between both sides’ peoples. [It is] regrettable.

C004: Since twenty-first to May two thousand, China, Chinese government reject our friendship.

Note that the extremely-shortened rendered text had nothing to do with the malfunction of the recording facilities as the sound of C004’s breathing as well as the speaker’s voice was being recorded clearly and also later on C004 continued to interpret the next paragraph. While the Taiwanese speaker accused China of bullying Taiwan under the One China policy, C004 remained silent and did not render most part of the source text. The severe omission has greatly mitigated the original resentful tone. In the corresponding Retro questionnaire, C004 ‘fully disagreed’ with all of the content of this

speech, which may be the reason for this severe omission. Her strong stance on the One China policy was made manifest in her moderately support for the Chinese government's attack on Taiwan by force if Taiwan declares independence formally. Also, since she 'moderately agreed' that she had been quite aware of her Chinese national identity when interpreting for the Taiwanese leaders, it is very likely that she was dealing with what clashed with her hegemonic ideology by using the mitigation strategy on linguistic level intentionally.

#### **5.2.4 Compression**

Some unusual compression cases are found in the CDA analysis results. Such compressed renditions are not 'opposite' to the reality or to what the speakers originally meant and seem plausible within the speech context (cf. Schjoldager, 1995; see also Chapter 2.3.3.4) but these cases, most of which involve the Taiwan issue, actually blur the focus of what the speakers have said or even bring vagueness to the source texts.

#### **Example 6:**

Speech 5 (T)

歷史指出，嚴重的貧富懸殊往往導致政治動盪，而一旦問題爆發，不僅中國的百姓受苦受難，周邊包括台灣在內的國家都要遭殃。

History points out that a serious wealth gap usually leads to political unrest. And once the problem explodes, not only will China's people suffer but also the neighboring countries including Taiwan will suffer.

C003: The history tell us that the gap between the poor and the rich would led to the, would lead to the political upheaval, and Chinese people would suffer from it, including Taiwanese.

By omitting the noun phrase "the neighboring countries" and turning the noun "Taiwan" into another noun "Taiwanese", C003 was compressing the source text into

another sentence whose meaning deviated from what the speaker had said. On linguistic level, C003 was using the referential/nomination strategy to categorize Taiwanese people as members of Chinese people. According to the survey results, C003 ‘strongly agreed’ that she had been quite aware of her Chinese national identity when interpreting for the Taiwanese leaders. Also, while rendering Speech 1 (C), she referred to the “cross-strait” development as development of “two part[s] of China, which explicitly indicates her One China ideology (see also Chapter 2.4.4). It may be argued that C003 was showing her hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan intentionally through the referential/nomination strategy in Example 6.

### **5.2.5 Mitigation**

Some of the subjects produce their rendition in a less assertive or less direct manner than the speakers. More specifically, those in the China group may mitigate the criticism about China or the statement which indicates Taiwan is a country.

#### **Example 7:**

Speech 5 (T)

一直以來，北京政府主張台灣必須接受「一個中國」原則，並堅持台灣是中國的一部分，而中華人民共和國才能代表中國，這是台灣人民所不能接受，也是目前兩岸關係發展無法正常化的最大障礙。

For a long time, Beijing government has maintained that Taiwan must accept the ‘One China’ principle and insisted that Taiwan is part of China and only the People’s Republic of China can represent China. This is what Taiwan’s people cannot accept and is also at present the biggest obstacle to the normalization of the cross-strait relations.

C006: The Beijing government has imposed us to accept the idea that China, there’s only one China which should be represented by P.R.C. I’m afraid this is probably the biggest obstacle between Chinese and Taiwanese.

The phrase “I’m afraid” and the adverb “probably” have added hesitations to what the Taiwanese speaker said. Obviously, C006 was modifying the original illocutionary force by using the mitigation strategy on linguistic level. While the speaker explicitly and firmly gave her negative comment on the One China policy, the deviant rendition, which was added by C006, made the speaker sound less affirmative. Also, by turning the obstacles in the “cross-strait relations” into the obstacles between “Chinese and Taiwanese”, C006 might reduce the Taiwan issue from international level to a domestic problem. Although C006 had the weakest sense of national identity among her group members and she ‘strongly disagreed’ that she had been aware of her Chinese identity when interpreting for the Taiwanese leaders, however, it is found that when rendering Speech 5 (T), C006 omitted the official title of Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan’s President and referred to China as the “mainland government” in relation to Taiwan. As a result, it is likely that in Example 7, C006 was unintentionally disclosing her One China ideology through the mitigation strategy.

### **5.2.6 Overstatement/Intensification**

It is found that while the Chinese speakers express their stance on the One China policy, some of the Chinese subjects may explicitly show their contempt for or opposition to the Taiwan independence issue by using deviant wording.

#### **Example 8:**

Speech 4 (C)

但是，台湾当局顽固坚持“台独”分裂立场，加紧从事“台独”分裂活动。今年以来更是加紧通过“宪政改造”，图谋“台湾法理独立”。特别是不顾岛内外强烈反对，强行终止“国统会”和“国统纲领”，这是对国际社会普遍坚持一个中国原则和台海和平稳定的严重挑衅。

However, Taiwan’s authorities stubbornly insist on ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist stance, step up doing ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist activities. Since this year, [ ]

even stepped up passing ‘the constitutional reform’, attempting to achieve ‘Taiwan legal independence’. In particular, [ ] disregarded the strong opposition inside and outside the island, forcibly terminated the ‘National Unification Council’ and the ‘National Unification Guidelines’. This is a severe provocation to the one China principle widely held by the international community and to the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

C003: However, the Taiwan, Taiwan stick to the independence, the so-called independence. And this year they have the constitution reform and want to achieve the so-called independence, without regard to the opposition in both part, both area. So the international community support our peaceful cooperation.

As discussed in Chapter 2.4.4, the adjective “so-called” is widely used in China to give negative traits to Taiwan independence. It is therefore very clear that C003 is using the predication strategy in linguistic terms to show her contempt for the Taiwan independence issue. Meanwhile, the prepositional phrase “in both area[s]” also indicates that C003 was rendering cross-strait issues according to the principles that a ‘patriotic’ Chinese interpreter/translator should follow (see Chapter 2.4.4). C003’s active sentence “the international community support...” at the last of the rendered text also intensified the international legitimacy of the One China policy. Also, C003 had a relatively strong sense of national identity toward China (ranked 10<sup>th</sup> out of the 41 subjects). It may be argued that C003 demonstrated strong Chinese hegemonic thinking towards Taiwan in Example 8.

### 5.2.7 Distortion

A distorted rendition in this study means the rendered meaning is opposite to or greatly deviates from what the speakers say or is very likely to be untrue to the reality. Example 9 shows a slight change of wording may lead to fabrication of reality.

#### **Example 9:**

Source Text:

我们赞赏印尼政府和人民长期以来在台湾问题上给予中国的宝贵支持。众所周知，台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分，这是关系到 13 亿中国人民民族感情的重大敏感问题。

We appreciate the Indonesian government and people's long-term valuable support for China in terms of the Taiwan issue. Everyone knows Taiwan is an inseparable part of China's territory. This is a major and sensitive issue concerning the national feelings of the 1.3 billion Chinese people.

C011: We, we appreciate the stand point of Indonesia government on the matter of Taiwan and China issue. It is known to all that Taiwan is in our sovereignty. This is an important emotion issue to Chinese people.

What the Chinese speaker said, "Everyone knows Taiwan is an inseparable art of China's territory" was a topoi or fallacy of the cross-strait relations. Yet, by using the prepositional phrase "in our sovereignty", C011 was linguistically distorting the status quo of cross-strait relations through the predication strategy and misleading the listener into thinking that Taiwan has been part of China and governed by the Chinese government, while as a matter of fact Taiwan has never been under the control of the P.R.C. (see Chapter 2.5.2.4). Given her relatively strong sense of national identity (ranked 7<sup>th</sup> out of 41) and her support for the One China policy indicated by her post-experiment questionnaire results, it is very likely that C011 had brought her hegemonic thinking into Example 9.

### 5.2.8 *Prioritizing personal cognition*

Some of the subjects are found to have rendered the source texts according to their previous knowledge. More specifically, the cases produced by the Chinese subjects may lead listeners to think that Taiwan is part of China or may show the Chinese hegemony towards Taiwan.

#### **Example 10:**

##### Speech 1 (C)

我们坚决反对“台独”分裂势力及其活动，绝不允许“台独”分裂势力以任何名义、任何方式把台湾从祖国分裂出去。我们将继续同广大台湾同胞一道，共同承担起反对分裂国家、促进和平统一的神圣使命。

We firmly oppose “Taiwan independence” separatist forces and the related activities, never allow “Taiwan independence” separatist forces to separate Taiwan from the motherland in any name or in any way. We will continuously with vast numbers of Taiwanese compatriots together shoulder the sacred mission to oppose division of the country and promote peaceful unification.

C015: We oppose the separate activity. We don't allow this kind of activities in the name of people interest. With Taiwanese compatriot we will undergo, we undertake this task of reunification.

As mentioned in Chapter 2.4.4, one of the cross-strait fallacies that Chinese authorities have created is:

和平解决台湾问题符合包括台湾同胞在内的全体中国人民的根本利益。  
A peaceful solution to the Taiwan question serves the interests of all Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan.

Clearly, the phrase “in the name of people interest” produced by C015 in Example 10 may indicate that the above fallacy may have become part of the common knowledge

shared by Chinese people. More specifically, by reproducing such fallacy in a spontaneous manner in her rendition, C015 was using the argumentation strategy on linguistic level to justify China's attempt at seizing Taiwan. Compared with the other subjects, C015 had a relatively strong sense of national identity (ranked 4<sup>th</sup> out of the 41 subjects) and was found to have produced other hegemonic signs in rendering another three speeches, including Speech 1 (C), Speech 3 (T) and Speech 5 (T). As a result, it should be reasonable to see Example 10 as an embodiment of C015's hegemonic thinking.

### **Example 11:**

#### **Speech 4 (C)**

反对“台独”分裂势力及其活动，维护台海和平稳定，是我们坚定不移的意志和决心。我们将继续努力争取和平统一的前景，但绝不允许把台湾从中国分割出去。“台独”分裂势力的行径不仅是对两岸关系的公然挑衅，也直接威胁到亚太地区的和平与稳定。

Opposing 'Taiwan independence' separatist forces and [their] activities and maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is our firm will and determination. We will keep working hard for the prospect of peaceful unification but never allow Taiwan to be separated from China. The 'Taiwan independence' separatist forces' actions are not only openly provocative to cross-strait relations but also directly threatening the peace and stability of the Asia Pacific region.

C007: We are determined and continue to try our best for unification of country.

However, we do not want to lose Taiwan. And separatist behaviour is not only a threat to our country but also a threat to Asia Pacific area.

The fallacy that Taiwan independence will pose a threat to the peace across the Taiwan Strait has been widely circulated in China (see Chapter 2.4.4). As a matter of fact, China has maintained that it will attack Taiwan by force if Taiwan overtly defies the One China policy through formal independence, which is perhaps why C007 explicitly referred to Taiwan independence as “a threat” to China. It may be argued that C007's deviant rendition is another fallacy which is expressed in a more blatant and

direct manner than the Chinese speaker. Accordingly, C007 was using the argumentation strategy on linguistic level to show her hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan. C007 did not have a relatively strong sense of national identity (ranked 13<sup>th</sup> in her group) compared with her group members. Yet, she ‘strongly disagreed’ in the post-experiment questionnaire that her rendition in the SI experiment was objective. Perhaps she was aware of having producing some ideologically deviant signs. For instance, when interpreting Speech 2 (T), she referred to the Taiwanese speaker as a leader from “China” and representing “China” to show gratitude for Nauru’s help. For another instance, she omitted the phrase “President Chen Shui-bain” when interpreting Speech 5 (T). It may be likely that at least some of her ideologically deviant renditions were produced intentionally.

### **5.2.9 Specification**

#### **Example 12:**

眾所皆知，中華人民共和國自從一九四九年建立以來，從未曾在台灣行使過任何有效主權，而中華民國在台灣有自己的政府、土地和人民，兩邊互不隸屬，各行其是已有半世紀之久，這是不爭的事實。

Everyone knows that the People’s Republic of China, since in 1949 [it] was established, has never exercised in Taiwan any effective sovereignty, and the Republic of China in Taiwan has [its] own government, land, and people. Both sides do not belong to each other and have developed self-autonomy for half a century. This is an undisputed fact.

C017: As you all know, since nineteen forty-nine, People’s Republic of China hasn’t exercised any sovereignty over the Taiwan island. Taiwan has its own land, people and it didn’t belong to mainland. And it has their own policy. This is an established fact.

As discussed in Chapter 2.4.4, from public sectors to academic circles, many people in China, especially the authorities concerned, provide their opinions about the

code of ethics for Chinese interpreters and give specific instructions for translations. For instance, Shi Yanhua 施燕華, a former Chinese interpreter-turned-diplomat, explicitly points out that when it comes to 'Taiwan', China should be referred to as 'China's mainland' or 'the mainland of China' rather than 'the mainland China' in order to avoid an implication of two Chinas (Shi, 2007). Still some other people in China think the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should be referred to as 'Taiwan and the mainland' in English in order not to damage China's sovereignty and territorial integrity (He & Li, 2011: 8-9). In Chapter 2.4.4, the researcher has also discussed the hegemonic implications of the phrase 'Taiwan island' within political context. Therefore, it is very likely that C017 was using the referential/nomination strategy to downgrade Taiwan's status and imply that Taiwan is part of China. C017 also 'strongly agreed' that she had been quite aware of her Chinese national identity when interpreting for the Taiwanese leaders and 'moderately agreed' that Taiwan can never be separated from China, both of which may indicate her firm stance on the One China policy.

### 5.3 CDA Analysis – the Taiwan Group

#### 5.3.1 Substitution

In the Taiwan group, some of the subjects use the term ‘nation’ or ‘country’ instead of ‘party’ or ‘side’ when the speakers refer to Taiwan, which may create an impression that the speakers are explicitly asserting Taiwan’s status as a country. When they interpret the China speeches, some of them avoid repeating the source phrases, which refer to China as Taiwan’s motherland, by using other more detached or neutral phrases.

#### **Example 13:**

##### Speech 1 (C)

我们要坚定不移地维护国家主权和领土完整，积极推进祖国和平统一大业。中国人民热爱自己的国家，始终坚定不移地维护国家主权、领土完整和民族尊严，决不允许任何势力侵犯。

We need to firmly maintain the national sovereignty and territory integrity, actively promote peaceful unification of the motherland. Chinese people love own country, always firmly protect the national sovereignty, territory integrity, and the national dignity, and never allow any force to invade [China].

T007: We have to maintain this territory unification and wish to unify this nation one day. This country will still insist to obtain our territory, territory and we will not allow any force to invade.

T007 used the noun phrase “this nation” instead of repeating the Chinese speaker’s phrase “the motherland” in Example 13. In her corresponding retro questionnaire, T007 explicitly expressed her disagreement with the *One Country Two Systems* mentioned by the Chinese speaker. In her another retro questionnaire after interpreting Speech 4 (C), she explicitly wrote, “Taiwan does not belong to China”, obviously showing her

opposition to the One China policy. It is very likely that T007 was using the referential/nomination strategy on linguistic level in Example 13 to resist referring to China as “motherland”. Since she thought “Taiwan does not belong to China”, it would be against her will to recognize China as the motherland of Taiwan. To deal with her ideological conflict with what the Chinese speaker said, she referred to China as “this nation” instead.

**Example 14:**

Speech 1 (C)

抗日战争的胜利，结束了日本在台湾 50 年的殖民统治，使台湾回到祖国怀抱。

The victory of the Chinese Anti-Japanese War ended Japan’s fifty-year colonial rule of Taiwan, made Taiwan return to the motherland’s embrace.

T011: The victory of the war finish the fifty years of occupation by Japan so that Taiwan can return to the original country.

T011 expressed her strong disagreement with the speaker’s statement that Taiwan is part of China by writing “Taiwan is not part of China, what the hell of unification!!!” in her corresponding retro questionnaire. In the in-depth interview, T011 further explained why she had rendered ‘*zǔ guó* 祖国 (motherland/mother country)’ into ‘the original country’:

When I hear the term *zǔ guó*, I kind of resisted it. I didn’t want to interpret it but I couldn’t skip it. Originally, I should have interpreted it into ‘motherland’ or ‘mother country,’ but I didn’t agree with the idea. So I invented another strange term ‘the original country’ instead (*my underlined emphasis*).

Obviously, T011 was quite aware of her resistance to the Chinese hegemony during the SI process. It is also surprising that under tight time constraints she could ‘invent’ another term to replace the commonly used one. As a result, it is clear that in this

example T011 was using the referential/nomination strategy to show her resistance to the Chinese hegemony.

### **5.3.2 Addition**

Some of the Taiwanese subjects add the word 'Taiwan' or 'Taiwanese' to the renditions whereas the speaker did not mention Taiwan, which may highlight the status of Taiwan or emphasize the role of Taiwan in international events.

#### **Example 15:**

##### Speech 1 (C)

1945年9月2日，日本政府正式签署投降书，宣告了日本侵略者的彻底失败和世界反法西斯战争的最后胜利。中国人民抗日战争和世界反法西斯战争以中国人民和世界各国人民的彻底胜利载入了史册！

On 2 September 1945 Japan's government officially signed the Instrument of Surrender, proclaimed Japanese invaders' crushing defeat and the final victory against the World Anti-Fascism War. The Chinese Anti-Japanese War and the World Anti-Fascism War ended with Chinese people and all the other country people's great victory being recorded in history!

T017: In nineteen sixty-five, Japanese government they signed an agreement that shows they have been defeated in the war and also for fascism. That is the total victory for Chinese and Taiwanese people in Anti-fascism war.

The fact that Taiwan's version of the Chinese Anti-Japanese War is different from China's has been discussed in Chapter 3.3.2.1. People in Taiwan have been educated that the victory of the war was won by the R.O.C., which is now based in Taiwan. It may be likely that T017 would like to specify Taiwan's contribution to the victory. As the Chinese speaker always referred to Taiwan's people as Chinese compatriots, it may be likely that T017 would like to make clear that Taiwanese people are not members of

Chinese people by using the referential/nomination strategy on linguistic level to distinguish Taiwanese from Chinese. Although in the corresponding retro questionnaires, T017 did not show resentment against the Chinese hegemony. Also, in her post-experiment questionnaire, she ‘moderately disagreed’ that she had been aware of her Taiwanese national identity in the process of interpreting for the Chinese leaders, and she ‘moderately agreed’ that her renditions in the SI experiment were objective. However, in the in-depth interview, T017 explicitly said, “in my opinion, Taiwan’s motherland is Taiwan”, which indicates T017’s opposition to the One China policy.

### **5.3.3 Omission**

It is found in this study that when the Chinese speakers refer to China as the ‘motherland’ of Taiwan, some of the Taiwanese subjects remain silent, and some of them who have given an interview after the SI experiment admit their awareness of omitting something clashing with their ideology.

#### **Example 16:**

Speech 1 (C)

抗日战争的胜利，结束了日本在台湾 50 年的殖民统治，使台湾回到祖国怀抱。

The victory of the Chinese Anti-Japanese War ended Japan’s fifty-year colonial rule of Taiwan, made Taiwan return to the motherland’s embrace.

T010: The victory ended the colonism of fifty years in Taiwan.

The Chinese speaker used ‘zǔ guó 祖国(motherland/mother country)’ in Example 16 to describe the relations between China and Taiwan; however, T010 did not render the part concerning the ‘motherland’. The omission mitigated the speaker’s intention to state that Taiwan is part of China, leaving the rendered text a neutral sentence depicting

the commonly known fact that the defeated Japan stopped ruling Taiwan after the war. In her in-depth interview, T010 gave an explanation for this omission. She said, ‘Partly because I didn’t know how to express it [motherland] and partly because I didn’t agree with the speaker’. She also explicitly stated that she was ‘kind of confined to’ her own [Taiwanese] identity when interpreting for the Chinese leaders. Evidently, this example is very likely to be a sign of her resistance to the Chinese hegemony.

#### **5.3.4 Compression**

The compression strategy is usually used to cope with high-density information. The following example shows compression may lead to an interpreter’s assertion of his/her political ideology.

#### **Example 17:**

Speech 5 (T)

人民才是國家的主人，無論中央或地方政府的首長，都是由人民選舉出來，做不好，人民就會在下次選舉讓他下臺。做不對，還有法律對他制裁。請問，中國大陸是不是這樣呢？

The people are the master of the country. Whether central or local government leaders are elected by the people. If [ ] does not perform well, the people will let him step down in the next election. If [ ] does something wrong, there are laws punishing him. [I] would like to ask: is it the same in the Chinese mainland?

T004: In Taiwan people are the boss of the nation. And all the gov, official governments are public servants. It’s a democratic country. So if they do not do well in the government, they will, the laws, regulations, and if they don’t do well people won’t let them, vote them next time. Will it the same situation in China?

While the Taiwanese speaker explained the voting system in a democracy, T004 explicitly specified what the speaker said was about the democratic system in Taiwan.

T004 also compressed the source text by referring to Taiwan as a “democratic country”. Linguistically, T004 was attaching the positive adjective “democratic” to Taiwan through the predication strategy and defined Taiwan as a country through the referential/nomination strategy. Notably, T004 had the weakest sense of national identity among all of the subjects (ranked 41 out of 41), and she “agreed somewhat” that Taiwan is part of China in the post-experiment questionnaire. Of all the Taiwanese subjects, only T004 agreed with the idea that Taiwan is part of China. Yet, in her retro questionnaire for Speech 5 (T), she explicitly agreed that the Taiwanese speaker accused China of threatening Taiwan with missiles and replacing Taiwan in the United Nations. In her retro questionnaires for Speech 1 (C), she expressed her negative feelings towards the speech content by specifying that China’s victory over Japan in the war was not that splendid and that China as a communist country was not different from fascism. And in her retro questionnaire for Speech 4 (C), she disagreed about the Chinese speaker’s negative description of Taiwan independence. Her wish that the cross-strait relations remain the status quo was also made clear in her student interpreter background questionnaire. According to the above evidence, her idea that Taiwan is part of China may result from the sinicization policy that the KMT-led R.O.C. government has implemented in Taiwan for several decades, which emphasizes Taiwan is part of the Republic of China rather than the People’s Republic of China (see Chapter 2.5.2). Therefore, when confronted with Chinese hegemony, she, as a member of Taiwan’s people, still showed resistance.

### 5.3.5 Mitigation

Some of the Taiwanese subjects, by using a less affirmative tense or structure, downplay the Chinese speakers' statement or implication that Taiwan is part of China.

#### Example 18:

##### Speech 1 (C)

我们将坚持“和平统一、一国两制”的基本方针和现阶段发展两岸关系、推进祖国和平统一进程的八项主张，坚持一个中国原则决不动摇，争取和平统一的努力决不放弃，贯彻寄希望于台湾人民的方针决不改变，反对“台独”分裂活动决不妥协。

We will insist on “peaceful unification, one country two systems” as the basic policy, develop at the current stage the cross-strait relations and push forward the motherland's peaceful unification according to the eight principles, insist on the one China principle and never sway, never give up fighting for peaceful unification, implement the policy of having expectations of Taiwanese people and never change [this policy], oppose “Taiwan's independence” separatist activities and never compromise.

T005: One system and peaceful reunification and remaining the principle are important.

These, there are eight principles to improve our reunification. We insist on one China policy and we hope Chi, Taiwan will become our province and we would never negotiate with people who support Taiwan independence.

China always insists that Taiwan be part of China and views Taiwan as a renegade province. By using the verb ‘hope’ and the modal verb ‘will’, T005 greatly mitigated the hegemonic tone of the Chinese speaker. In the two corresponding retro questionnaires, she explicitly voiced her negative feelings towards Speech 1 (C). In terms of Part I, Speech 1 (C), she said:

The topic is for the celebration of victory but it sounds like speaker takes a hostile attitude towards Japan. Moreover, the message was 誇飾了 [exaggerated]. It sounds very unnatural to me.

In terms of Part II, Speech 1 (C), she said:

Again the register and tone are praising China's hardworking but actually it claims that Taiwan should be part of China which is not comfortable for me to listen to. It's a threatening article in disguise.

Obviously, while interpreting for the Chinese speaker, T005 was quite aware of Chinese hegemony, whether towards *Others* or Taiwan, throughout the speech. Her strong opposition to the One China policy was also made clear in the results of her post-experiment questionnaire. Accordingly, it is very likely that she used the mitigation strategy on linguistic level in Example 18 to show her resistance to Chinese hegemony.

### **5.3.6 Overstatement/Intensification**

Some of the Taiwanese subjects may render what the Taiwanese speakers say in a more assertive or emotional manner to reinforce the speakers' original resistance to hegemony.

#### **Example 19:**

Speech 5 (T)

台灣人竭盡所能協助你們，而你們卻在國際上處處封殺、打壓，並積極在東南沿海部署飛彈，恫嚇與威脅台灣。如此恩將仇報，請問，台灣人作何感想？

Taiwan's people try the best to help you, whereas you internationally keep blocking and suppressing [Taiwan], and actively along the southeastern coastline deploy missiles to intimidate and threaten Taiwan. Such behavior of returning evil for good. [I] would like to ask: How do Taiwan's people feel?

T006: People from Taiwan have assisted as possible as they can to. However, the Chinese government has bullied Taiwan and threatens Taiwan and deploys many missiles. Of course Taiwanese people will feel very betrayed.

By turning the Taiwanese speaker's question into an outspoken assertion, T006 was using the intensification strategy on linguistic level to show her resistance to Chinese hegemony. T006's direct and resentful tone may result from her strong opposition to the One China policy. In the Speech 4 (C) retro questionnaire, T006 explicitly expressed her disagreement with the Chinese speaker's statement that Taiwan is part of China, while in her post-experiment questionnaire, she 'strongly disagreed' that Taiwan is part of China. Therefore, it is very likely that she had her resistance ideology embodied in this example.

### **5.3.7 Distortion**

A distorted rendition in this study means the rendered meaning is opposite to or greatly deviates from what the speakers say or is very likely to be untrue to the reality. For instance, a few of the Taiwanese subjects produce renditions which are contradictory to what the Chinese speakers say to show strong resistance to the Chinese hegemony.

#### **Example 20:**

Speech 4 (C)

在这一重大问题上，我们希望印尼各界朋友同我们一道，共同反对“台独”，共同维护本地区的和平与安宁。

In terms of this important issue, we hope Indonesian friends of every circle with us jointly oppose 'Taiwan independence' and jointly maintain the peace and quiet of this region.

T018: In this issue we hope Indonesian government and people will help us to

maintain a peaceful relation with Taiwan.

As shown above, the underlined rendition has greatly deviated from the source text. The Chinese speaker originally appealed for the Indonesian support for the One China policy, but T018 distorted the source text and greatly mitigated the Chinese hegemonic tone. In her in-depth interview, T018 explained why she gave such a distorted rendition:

I remember that when I interpreted this paragraph, I fully disagreed with what Jia [Jia Qinglin] said. He stated that China's policy of the Taiwan issue was supported by Taiwanese people, which I think was totally untrue. Probably I didn't want to render what he said so I sort of changed his original wording.

T018's use of the mitigation strategy in linguistic terms was also found in her rendering of another sentence in the same speech, in which she distorted the Chinese speaker's fallacy that Taiwan independence activities are provocative to the cross-strait relations into "The act has violated our hope on remaining peaceful relation with Taiwan". It seems that T018 may tend to use the mitigation strategy to show her resistance to Chinese hegemony.

### 5.3.8 *Prioritizing personal cognition*

Some of the subjects are found to have rendered the source texts according to their previous knowledge. More specifically, such renditions produced by the Taiwanese subjects may unmask the Chinese hegemony in the source texts or convey more resistance messages than what the Taiwanese speakers express.

#### **Example 21:**

Speech 1 (C)

[中华民族]曾经长时期走在世界前列。但是，由于封建统治的腐败和束缚，中国渐渐落后了。

[The Chinese race] for a long time had walked in the front row of the world [countries]. However, due to feudalistic ruling's corruption and restriction, China gradually lagged behind.

T007: For many years, China has been in the leading place in the world. But because of some policies, it become the very closed, uncommunicated country.

By describing China as a “closed, uncommunicated country”, T007 was linguistically using the predication strategy to express her previous negative impression about China. Although the specific predicative phrase used by T007 deviated from the wording of the Chinese speaker, the former was not opposite or completely untrue to the reality, or more precisely, to the reality about the Chinese mainland that people of Taiwan have been told by the KMT-led R.O.C. government for decades (see Chapter 2.5.2.1). Also, T007's strong opposition to the One China policy was made clear in her retro questionnaire for Speech 4 (C) and in her post-experiment questionnaire. Accordingly, it is very likely that T007 was showing her resistance to Chinese hegemony through the predication strategy in this example.

## Example 22:

### Speech 5 (T)

...為何北京的政權跟台北的政權在政治上如此涇渭分明，甚至緊張對立？原因在於兩岸政府對於人權、民主和自由等價值觀完全不同所致。

...why are the Beijing regime and the Taipei regime so clearly different in politics or are even [full of] tension and confrontation? The reason is that both governments in terms of the values [such as] human rights, democracy, and freedom have completely different [values].

T018: Taiwanese people and Chinese people have share similar views. How come we have such intense relation? This is, this results from different nations about sovereignty and identity.

In her in-depth interview, T018 gave an explanation for the above underlined deviancy:

Probably I used to think that the differences between both sides lie in sovereignty and identity so I slipped them out.

This may indicate that “sovereignty” and “identity” were what concerned her most in terms of the cross-strait issues. Also note that T018 explicitly referred to Taiwan as a “nation” in this example. Clearly, T018 was using the referential/nomination strategy to define Taiwan as a nation. In fact, in her in-depth interview, T018 said, “I do not consider China to be the motherland of Taiwan” and she further described how she felt when the Chinese speakers mentioned the Taiwan issue/One China policy in the speeches:

I was thinking ‘Come on! What are you talking about? This is not true!’ But I could only shout in silence in my mind and still tried to render the source text.

Given her negative feelings towards Chinese hegemony and her awareness of Chinese hegemony during interpreting, it is not surprising that she used the referential/nomination strategy to show her resistance to Chinese hegemony in this example

### **5.3.9 Specification**

It is found that some of the Taiwanese subjects specify the ‘cross-strait relations’ as the relations between ‘countries’. In addition, when the Taiwanese speakers do not explicitly refer to Taiwan as a country, some of the Taiwanese subjects make the status of Taiwan as a sovereign country in their renditions.

#### **Example 23:**

Speech 3 (T)

...期盼各位能夠繼續以信心、決心、及旺盛的企圖心，在世運會上朝向「成就自己、光耀台灣」的目標邁進。

[I] hope everyone can go on with confidence, determination, and high ambition in the World Games to move towards the goal of ‘self-fulfilling yourself and glorifying Taiwan’.

T005: I hope with your ambition you will, you are on the way to make Taiwan a good nation.

As shown in this example, T005 used the adjective “good” to describe Taiwan, highlighting positive traits of Taiwan. Also, she explicitly referred to Taiwan as a “nation” when the Taiwanese speaker did not say so. T005’s identification with the Taiwanese speakers was made clear in her post-experiment questionnaire, in which she expressed that she “moderately” felt comfortable about interpreting for the Taiwanese speakers but “strongly” uncomfortable about interpreting for the Chinese speakers and that she disagreed with the idea that Taiwan is part of China. It may be likely that T005

was using linguistically the predication strategy in this example to show her recognition of Taiwan as a country and her resistance to the One China policy.

## 5.4 CDA Analysis – Special Cases

### 5.4.1 *Special cases – the China group*

In addition to expressing a hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan, some of the Chinese subjects also show Chinese hegemony towards the *Others*, which in this SI experiment involve Japan and Indonesia. There are also some resistance signs found in the China group during the interpreting of Speech 5 (T).

#### 5.4.1.1 Chinese hegemony towards the *others*

Some of the deviant renditions produced by the Chinese subjects demonstrated Chinese ethnocentrism or a Chinese sense of cultural superiority towards the *Others*.

#### **Example 24:**

Speech 4 (C)

上个世纪前叶，在争取国家独立和民族解放的斗争中，中印尼人民始终站在一起，相互支持、相互鼓励，共同谱写了抗击侵略者的壮丽诗篇。

In the first half of the last century, during the struggle for national independence and racial liberation, Chinese people and Indonesian people always stood together, supported each other, encouraged each other, and jointly wrote splendid poetry about resistance to and attack on invaders.

C002: In the fight for freedom of your country, we Chinese always support your people and support each other, making the history of grand magnitude.

In the source text, the Chinese speaker emphasized the friendship between China and Indonesia was partly derived from the mutual support and encouragement between both countries in the past. Yet, by using the deictic words as *your* and *we* in her rendition, C002 turned the mutual relations into unequal ones, making China a patronizing big brother to Indonesia. It may be likely that C002 was not familiar with the historical relations between China and Indonesia specified in this example and therefore she may have thought, according to Sinocentrism or Chinese sense of cultural superiority, that it should have been Indonesia alone to fight for national independence and that China should have been in a superior position to help those inferior to China. Arguably, C002 was using the referential/nomination strategy to show her Chinese hegemony towards the *Others* in this example.

**Example 25:**

Speech 1 (C)

然而，这一次，中国人民彻底粉碎了日本军国主义灭亡中国的企图

However, this time Chinese people completely shattered Japanese militarism's attempt at destroying China...

C011: And this, this, and this time China completely damage Japanese evil intention to occupy China...

As shown in the underlined deviancy, Japanese intention was predicated with a negative trait “evil” by C011. She also used the adjective “evil” to describe the 918 Incident, in which Japan occupied part of northeast China, while rendering the same speech. As discussed in Chapter 3.3.2.1, the anti-Japan events or rallies have taken place in China from time to time in recent decades, which is thought to be the political manipulation of Chinese patriotism (Liu, 2005). The negative predicative adjective used by C011 to describe Japan may indicate that the Chinese government's manipulation of public ideology has worked. By accusing Japan of being evil through

the predication strategy, C011 was asserting China as a representative of justice and justifying Chinese hatred towards Japan.

#### 5.4.1.2 Chinese resistance

Although the China group as a whole has a tendency to show Chinese hegemony in the SI renditions, seven of the Chinese subjects also showed resistance to the Chinese hegemony, which may be attributed to the following two reasons:

##### (1) Prioritizing personal cognition:

Some of the Chinese subjects explicitly referred to Taiwan as a country or nation when interpreting Speech 5 (T). It may be argued that these subjects, although instilled with Chinese collective ideology, perceive the fact that Taiwan enjoys its autonomy instead of being governed by China. It should be noted that only in rendering Speech 5 (T), which was given by then Taiwan's Vice-President, did these Chinese subjects produce resistance signs, which may indicate that they considered it appropriate to refer to Taiwan as a country when the speaker was from Taiwan.

#### **Example 26:**

Speech 5 (T)

兩岸政府及人民均應跳脫歷史巢臼，用嶄新的思維，放眼天下，立足亞太，共同佈建兩岸共存共榮與永續發展的新局。

Both sides' governments and peoples should jump beyond historically set patterns, use brand-new thinking, take a broad view at the world, stand firm in the Asia Pacific area, and jointly develop a new situation of both sides' mutual prosperity and sustainable development.

C013: I hope the two countries between the two sides should cooperate with each other and contribute to the prosperity in Asia and the world.

C013 was the only Chinese subject that did not produce any hegemonic signs in the SI experiment. In her retro questionnaires, C013, compared with the other Chinese subjects, showed more sympathy for Taiwan (independence). For instance, in terms of Speech 1 (C), she pointed out that it should be the KMT rather than the Chinese Communist Party had functioned greatly in the war against Japan, while in terms of Speech 5 (T), she agreed with what the Taiwanese speaker said about how the Chinese government isolated Taiwan from the world. She also remained reserved about the idea that Taiwan is part of China as indicated in her post-experiment questionnaire. Judging from the evidence, C013 may not hold Chinese hegemonic attitude towards Taiwan. As a result, it may not be surprising that she perceived Taiwan as a country in reality and referred to Taiwan as a country (the referential/nomination strategy) when interpreting for the Taiwanese speaker.

## (2) Resistance to Chinese totalitarianism

When the Taiwanese speaker made comparison between Taiwan's democracy and China's totalitarianism in Speech 5 (T), some of the Chinese subjects seemed to show their support for democracy by intensifying the speaker's resistance tone, which may further indicate that they were dissatisfied about or even despised Chinese totalitarianism.

### **Example 27:**

#### Speech 5 (T)

無論中央或地方政府的首長，都是由人民選舉出來，做不好，人民就會在下次選舉讓他下臺。做不對，還有法律對他制裁。請問，中國大陸是不是這樣呢？

Whether central or local government leaders are elected by the people. If [ ] does not perform well, the people will let him step down in the next election. If [ ] does something wrong, there are laws punishing him. [I] would like to ask: is it the same in the Chinese mainland?

C010: No matter the leader in the central or local, they were elected by the people. If the officials did wrong, they will be punished by law. However, in the mainland China the situation is totally different.

By replacing the speaker's question with an assertion as shown in the above underlined rendition, C010 intensified the speaker's disagreement with China's political system. It is likely that C010 was communicating her opinion about the totalitarian political system implemented in China. Previous literature about domestic resistance to Chinese hegemony has been addressed in Chapter 2.2.2. Therefore, the deviancy of the above underlined rendition may be the embodiment of C010's resentment against China's political system and thus be regarded as a resistance sign. It should be noted that the Chinese people who have a strong sense of national identity may not fully agree with the communist regime and long for democracy. *The Epoch Times* 大紀元 could be a typical example<sup>1</sup>. On the other hand, the Chinese people who enjoy democracy abroad as Chinese emigrants may still feel greatly attached to China and oppose the 'interference' of foreign countries in China's 'domestic' affairs. For instance, some overseas Chinese living in Madrid sent an open letter to the U.S. President Barack Obama in February 2010, expressing their anger at the U.S.'s attempt to 'internationalize' the Tibet issue and to ruin the integrity of Chinese territory<sup>2</sup>. In a word, there is no absolute correlation between one's patriotic feeling and one's political ideology. Take C010 for example. She had a relatively weak sense of national identity toward her country (ranked 14<sup>th</sup> out of 21). While C010 showed resistance to Chinese hegemony in this example, her support for the One China policy was made clear in her post-experiment questionnaire. Given the evidence presented here, it is likely that

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<sup>1</sup> The Epoch Times is famous for its anti-CCP (the Chinese Communist Party) reports; yet, it pays great attention to everything concerning China. See its website at <http://www.epochtimes.com/>.

<sup>2</sup> English news report retrieved 10 September 2012 from the website of Xinhua News Agency at [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-02/21/c\\_13181321.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-02/21/c_13181321.htm); the Chinese news report retrieved 10 September 2012 at <http://chinese.people.com.cn/GB/10982464.html>.

C010's resistance sign was a manifestation of acknowledgement of or disagreement with China's totalitarian regime rather than an act of defiance against her own country.

#### ***5.4.2 Special cases – the Taiwan group***

As discussed in Chapter 2.5, the shaping and reshaping of ideologies and identities causes a national identity crisis among people of Taiwan. For those Mainlanders who fled with Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan after the Chinese Communist Party seized the Chinese mainland, they and their immediate descendants tend to regard Taiwan as a province of the Republic of China (the R.O.C.) and hope one day both sides across the Taiwan Strait may be reunited. By contrast, those who are native inhabitants of Taiwan tend to identify with 'Taiwan' rather than 'the R.O.C.' and resist the idea of being governed by Communist China if Taiwan is taken over by China. The national identity crisis has been further compounded by the KMT's attempt to resinize the people of Taiwan. The KMT's measures to shape Sinocentrist ideology through educational and media systems have made some, if not many, people of Taiwan stuck at the idea of whether they should see 'China' as their motherland. As a result, despite a growing trend in Taiwan in opposing the reunification with China at present, some Mainlanders and native Taiwanese still hold the KMT's Sinocentrist ideology or suffer from its influence without self awareness, which may be why Sinocentrist ideology was embodied in some of the renditions produced by two of the Taiwanese subjects.

### Example 28:

#### Speech 3 (T)

這二位委員剛好代表臺灣兩個主要政黨與兩個不同的原住民族群，顯示臺灣是一個民主、文化、族群多元的國家，然而在對外拓展外交工作時，我們的意志與聲音都是團結一致的。

These two legislators represent Taiwan's two major political parties and two different aboriginal tribes, [which] shows that Taiwan is a democratic, culturally and ethnically diverse country. However, while expanding diplomatic affairs to the outside, our wills and voices are united and uniform.

T012: They represent two major parties in Taiwan and two major groups. It shows that Taiwan is a democratic and diverse society. However, our voice and determination is reunified in foreign affairs.

By replacing the word 'country/nation' with 'society', T012 was using the referential/nomination strategy to define Taiwan as a region rather than a country. In her in-depth interview, she gave the following explanation for this deviancy:

Probably I didn't follow the speaker closely. I missed the last part of the source sentence. So I used the word 'society' to fill the gap. I think 'society' is a neutral word.

That T012 considered 'society' to be a neutral word for describing the status of Taiwan may imply that she did not see Taiwan as a country. Yet, when she further elaborated why she might in the future turn down a request for providing interpreting service for someone she did not agree with, she said:

As long as the cases do not exceed my limit, I will take them. For example, I don't feel uncomfortable about interpreting for Chinese leaders when they talk about the Taiwan issue. Their political stance on the unification of Taiwan and China has always been clear. It is not surprising to me that they always make that kind of political statement. But, if a KMT official flatters China in his talks, I won't be able to accept it and thus will refuse to take the case. (*my underlined emphasis*)

It seems that T012 felt resistant to the idea that Taiwan is part of China. The contradictory behaviour of T012 – not acknowledging Taiwan as a country while not favouring the One China policy – may indicate that what she identified was the Republic of China, whose territory should have covered the Chinese mainland, and that she might possess Chinese identity, which she might have obtained from her previous generations or from the Chinese culture education imposed by the KMT (see Chapter 2.5). As suggested by Wodak (2004: 103), that T012 produced contradictory statements and faced ideological dilemmas is not unusual in identity studies. Judging her statements as a whole, the narrative identity held by T012 may indicate that although her deviant rendition in this example is categorized as a Chinese hegemonic sign, there is difference between T012's Chinese identity and the Chinese identity possessed by the people of China.

### **5.5 Discursive Overview of Chinese Hegemony vs. Taiwanese Resistance**

As mentioned in Chapter 3.2.2, to demystify the ideologies embedded in discourse, the DHA practitioners aim to answer the following five questions by examining specific themes and claims of a specific discourse and investigating the discursive strategies used in a specific discourse (Reisigl, 2008: 99):

- (1) How are phenomena/events, processes, actions, persons, and objects named and referred to in linguistic terms in a specific discourse?
- (2) What features, qualities, and characteristics are assigned to those named or referred to in the discourse?
- (3) What arguments are specified in the discourse?
- (4) From what perspective are those involved in the above three questions expressed?
- (5) Are any utterances in the discourse intensified or mitigated?

In this section, the research will examine all of the ideological signs found in this study, the special cases excluded, and answer these questions by presenting tables 11 and 12, which shows a general picture of what discursive strategies and linguistic devices are used by both groups to linguistically represent their ideology and identity about the One China policy or the Taiwan independence issue. More specifically, table 11 will show how the Chinese subjects linguistically demonstrate their One China ideology towards Taiwan and how they discursively construct the image of the *Others* in their deviant renditions, while table 12 will display how the Taiwanese subjects linguistically resist the One China policy, demonstrate their national identity in their deviant renditions and construct the image of the *Others*.

Table 11 Discursive Strategies and Linguistic Devices in Chinese Hegemonic Signs

Questions	Discursive Strategies	Purpose
How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processed and actions related to the Taiwan issue named and referred to linguistically?	referential/nomination strategy	<p><b>discursive construction of China:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● metaphors: motherland</li> <li>● referents: Chinese mainland and Taiwan, mainland and Taiwan, the country, the central government, mainland government, the mainland</li> </ul> <p><b>discursive construction of Taiwan/ Taiwanese:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● referents of Taiwan: Taiwan island, island, region, area, city, (part of) China</li> <li>● referents of Taiwanese: Chinese, Chinese people, people from China</li> <li>● omitting Taiwanese leaders' official title shown in square brackets: [President] Chen Shui-bian</li> </ul> <p><b>discursive construction of both Taiwan and China:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● referents: the country, the whole China, the two sides of China, two parts of China</li> </ul> <p><b>discursive construction of processes and actions of making Taiwan part of China:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● nouns : liberation, (China's) right</li> <li>● verbs: protect (people in Taiwan), fight</li> </ul>

		against (Taiwan independence), not allow to give Taiwan away, not want to lose Taiwan
What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to Taiwan/Taiwanese/Taiwan independence, China/Chinese/One China policy, or <i>Others</i> ?	predication strategies	<p><b>discursive characterization/qualification of Taiwan (more or less positively or negatively)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● adjectives: dependent, suffered</li> </ul> <p><b>discursive characterization/qualification of China (more or less positively or negatively)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● adjectives: great</li> <li>● nouns: faith in maintaining world peace and globalization</li> <li>● verbs: support (<i>Others</i>)</li> </ul> <p><b>discursive characterization/qualification of Others (more or less positively or negatively)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● adjectives: evil (Japan)</li> </ul>
Which arguments are employed in discourses about the Taiwan issue?	argumentation strategies	<p><b>persuading addressees of the truth and normative rightness of claims</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● fallacy/topos: Taiwan separatist activities are against the interest of mainland China/against the will of the people, we don't allow this kind of activities [Taiwan independence] in the name of people interest, [Taiwan independence] disregard opposition from both island and mainland, Taiwan independence is harmful/a threat to China, Taiwan authority won't accept unification</li> </ul>
Are the respective utterances articulated overtly, are they intensified or mitigated?	mitigation and intensification strategies	<p><b>modifying the illocutionary force of utterances</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ mitigation</li> <li>● omitting identity parts shown in square brackets: the first president [from Taiwan], [Taiwanese] people are happy, the honor [of national glory], [Taiwan is a country], [ROC doesn't belong to PRC]</li> <li>● vague expressions: looking forward to more cooperation/hope Nauru will take part in UN to support the relationship of us (original: the speaker asked Nauru to support Taiwan to be recognized widely), still have a lot of problems/the governments have many disputes with each other (original: the unification of Taiwan and China is unrealistic)</li> <li>● omitting or downplaying criticism of</li> </ul>

		<p>China: Chinese government is not very friendly (original: Chinese government refused to negotiate), [omitting how Taiwan was replaced by China in the UN]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● (modal) verbs and hesitations: I'm afraid this, probably, want to (original: will be able to), want to help (the original: have helped)</li> <li>➤ intensification</li> <li>● verbs or adjectives with negative emotion: <i>never forgive</i> Taiwan independence, independence, <i>so-called</i> independence</li> </ul>
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Table 12 Discursive Strategies and Linguistic Devices in Taiwanese Resistance Signs

Questions	Discursive Strategies	Purpose
How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processed and actions related to the One China policy/Chinese hegemony named and referred to linguistically?	referential/nomination strategy	<p><b>discursive construction of China:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● referents: the <i>original</i> country/this nation/this country/nation/China (original: motherland)</li> </ul> <p><b>discursive construction of Taiwan/ Taiwanese:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● distinguishing Taiwanese from Chinese: the victory for Chinese and <i>Taiwanese</i> people in the war</li> <li>● distinguishing Taiwan from China: prevent <i>Taiwan</i> from being a colony, Japanese gave up the rule of <i>Taiwan</i>/Japanese signed to give up <i>Taiwan</i>/Japanese said <i>Taiwan</i> win the war</li> <li>● referents of Taiwan: country, nation</li> </ul> <p><b>discursive construction of cross-strait relations:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● referents: cross-countries, between two nations, cross nations, both nations, both countries, countries across the strait</li> </ul> <p><b>discursive construction of objects/phenomena/events of Taiwan independence:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● ideological matters: diplomatic, independence, sovereignty, identity</li> </ul> <p><b>discursive construction of processes and actions of Taiwan independence:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● verbs: <i>fight</i> for (independence)</li> </ul> <p><b>discursive construction of processes and</b></p>

		<p><b>actions of One China policy:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● verbs: <i>force</i> Taiwan, <i>isolate</i> Taiwan, Taiwan <i>was kicked out</i>, <i>ignore</i> Taiwan, <i>threaten</i> Taiwan, deploy a lot of missiles</li> </ul>
What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to Taiwan/Taiwanese/Taiwan independence?	predication strategies	<p><b>discursive characterization/qualification of Taiwan (more or less positively or negatively)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● adjectives: good, democratic, independent</li> </ul> <p><b>discursive characterization/qualification of China (more or less positively or negatively)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● adjectives: closed, uncommunicated</li> <li>● verb phrases: ignore human rights</li> </ul> <p><b>discursive characterization/qualification of One China policy (more or less positively or negatively)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● adjectives: unfair, controversial, contradictory</li> </ul>
From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed?	perspectivization strategies	<p><b>Positioning interpreter's point of view and expressing involvement or distance</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● deictics: <i>their</i> motherland/<i>their</i> mother nation (original: motherland)</li> <li>● pointing out Taiwan independence challenges China only, which implies Taiwanese interpreters' disagreement with the Chinese speaker: against China's interest/affect China's influence on the Taiwan Strait (original: Taiwan independence is a severe provocation to the peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait), ignore opposition from China/ignore people from China/ignore China's disapproval (original: disregarded the strong opposition inside and outside the island), provoking to China/a challenge to China/a challenge to the Chinese government/provoke relations with China/a threat to China (original: Taiwan independence actions are not only openly provocative to cross-strait relations but also directly threatening the peace and stability of the Asia Pacific region)</li> <li>● directly expressing interpreter's own opinion: the Chinese authorities were not glad to see this situation because they think Taiwan wants to be divided from China (original: Taiwan's authorities stubbornly insist on 'Taiwan independence' separatist stance, step</li> </ul>

		<p>up doing ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist activities), only if us use the name of China can we become part of the international society (original: China has insisted that Taiwan is part of China and only the People’s Republic of China can represent China), Taiwan’s government hasn’t performed any exact sovereignty in international society (original: the People’s Republic of China has never exercised in Taiwan any effective sovereignty)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● giving interpreter’s own answer to the question raised by the Taiwanese speaker: do you have the same thing in China? No/Is it the same in China? I don’t think so.</li> </ul>
<p>Are the respective utterances articulated overtly, are they intensified or mitigated?</p>	<p>mitigation and intensification strategies</p>	<p><b>modifying the illocutionary force of utterances</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➤ mitigation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● omitting the parts where China is referred to as Taiwan’s motherland</li> <li>● vague expressions: to cooperate with Taiwan (original: to move the cross-strait relations towards peace and stability)</li> <li>● omitting or downplaying Chinese hegemony: Taiwan government did not accept our <i>support</i>, has violated China’s <i>hope on remaining peaceful relation</i> with Taiwan, Taiwan never spares their efforts to help us (original: Taiwan is an inseparable part of China), help us to maintain a peaceful relation with Taiwan (original: join us to oppose Taiwan independence)</li> <li>● (modal) verbs and hesitations: China <i>want/try to</i> be part of the UN (original: have become), <i>hope</i> Taiwan <i>will</i> become China’s province, <i>not encourage</i> the division, <i>hope</i> people in Taiwan can <i>support and agree</i> with the One China policy, <i>should not</i> separate Taiwan from China, <i>this is possible</i> to ruin regional peace</li> </ul> </li> <li>➤ intensification <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● verb or adjective phrases with negative denotation: to <i>sacrifice everything</i> towards China, this is <i>impossible</i> to accept the One China policy, we [Taiwan] <i>turn to nothing</i></li> <li>● direct speech acts (instead of questions): Taiwanese people are really hard to adore China/it’s unacceptable that</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

		Taiwanese people will welcome China, of course Taiwanese people will feel very betrayed, it [democracy] is not the case in China
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## 5.6 Statistical Representation of CDA Analysis Results

### 5.6.1 Overview of ideological signs on a group basis

The following two tables may give a general picture of the distribution of the hegemonic and resistance signs on a group basis found in this study.

Table 13 Overview of Ideological Signs - the China Group

Speech	1(C)		2(T)		3(T)		4(C)		5(T)	
Sign Category	H	R	H	R	H	R	H	R	H	R
Subject No.										
C001	⊙		⊙		⊙		⊙		⊙	
C002							⊙			
C003	⊙		⊙				⊙		⊙	
C004			⊙				⊙		⊙	
C005			⊙		⊙		⊙		⊙	
C006									⊙	⊙
C007	⊙		⊙				⊙		⊙	⊙
C008			⊙				⊙			
C009	⊙						×	×	×	×
C010	⊙								⊙	⊙
C011	⊙				⊙		⊙		⊙	⊙
C012							⊙			

C013										⊙
C014	⊙						⊙			⊙
C015	⊙				⊙		⊙		⊙	⊙
C016			⊙		⊙		⊙			
C017			⊙				⊙		⊙	
C018					⊙		⊙		⊙	
C019	⊙		⊙						⊙	
C020							⊙			
C021			⊙						⊙	
Sum of Subjects with Signs	9	0	10	0	6	0	15	0	13	7

Note:

Speech 1(C) = Hu Jintao's speech

Speech 2(T) = Chen Shui-bian's Nauru speech

Speech 3(T) = Chen Shui-bian's World Games speech

Speech 4(C) = Jia Qinglin's speech

Speech 5(T) = Annette Lu's speech

Sign Category: H- hegemony R – resistance to hegemony

⊙= Sign(s) found ×= Data missing

Table 14 Overview of Ideological Signs - the Taiwan Group

Speech	1(C)		2(T)		3(T)		4(C)		5(T)	
Sign Category	H	R	H	R	H	R	H	R	H	R
Subject No.										
T001								⊙		
T002								⊙		⊙
T003			⊙					⊙		⊙
T004		⊙								⊙

T005		⊙				⊙		⊙		⊙
T006		⊙						⊙		⊙
T007		⊙						⊙		⊙
T008		⊙								
T009								⊙		⊙
T010		⊙						⊙		⊙
T011		⊙						⊙		
T012			⊙							
T013		⊙						⊙		⊙
T014		⊙						⊙		⊙
T015		⊙						⊙		⊙
T016							×	×	×	×
T017		⊙						⊙		⊙
T018		⊙						⊙		⊙
T019										
T020		⊙						⊙		⊙
T021		⊙						⊙		⊙
Sum of Subjects with Signs	0	14	2	0	0	1	0	16	0	15

Note:

Speech 1(C) = Hu Jintao's speech

Speech 2(T) = Chen Shui-bian's Nauru speech

Speech 3(T) = Chen Shui-bian's World Games speech

Speech 4(C) = Jia Qinglin's speech

Speech 5(T) = Annette Lu's speech

Sign Category: H- hegemony R – resistance to hegemony

⊙= Sign(s) found ×= Data missing

### 5.6.2 The CDA Chi-square statistical results

In order to show the tug of war between hegemony and resistance in the SI political renditions of trainee interpreters across the Taiwan Strait, the Chi-square statistical results of each speech in terms of the number of the subjects who showed either hegemony or resistance in their renditions are displayed. The total number of the subjects is 42, with one half from China and the other half from Taiwan. Note that it is the subjects rather than the renditions that are the unit of the statistic calculation; in other words, the data shown in tables 13 and 14 are used for running Chi-square statistics. The variables associated include (1) hegemony and (2) resistance to hegemony. The results are demonstrated in table 15.

Table 15 Chi-Square Results of the Five Speech Renditions on a Subject Basis

Speech	Hegemony		Resistance	
	$\chi^2$	<i>p</i> value	$\chi^2$	<i>p</i> value
1 (C)	11.182	0.001	20.500	0.000
2 (T)	7.289	0.007	--	--
3 (T)	6.833	0.009	1.000	0.317
4 (C)	23.400	0.000	26.000	0.000
5 (T)	18.778	0.000	6.500	0.011

The statistical results show that all but Speech 2(T) and Speech 3(T) see significance in both two variables. As Speech 2(T) does not involve the One China policy and Speech 3(T) is given to Taiwanese audience at home only and no cross-strait issues are involved, the Taiwanese speaker shows little resistance to hegemony. Therefore, it should be reasonable that few Taiwanese trainee interpreters produce

resistance signs when interpreting these two speeches. In general, the Chi-square results indicate the ideological conflict between hegemony and resistance has been largely embodied in SI renditions given by the student interpreters from either side of the Taiwan Strait.

## **5.7 Conclusion of Chapter 5**

The CDA analysis of the collected SI data, with reference to the results of the survey questionnaires and/or in-depth interviews, shows that the ideology and identity conflicts between trainee interpreters of Taiwan and China have contributed to ideological renditions in the SI mode, and these renditions may be generally divided into signs of hegemony and signs of resistance to hegemony, which does reflect the status quo across the Taiwan Strait – the unequal power struggle between China and Taiwan. The signs of hegemony or resistance are generally embodied through nine interpreting strategies, including substitution, addition, omission, compression, mitigation, overstatement or intensification, distortion, prioritizing personal cognition, and specification. Also, the discursive strategies used in producing these ideological renditions include strategies of referential/nomination, predication, argumentation, mitigation, intensification and perspectivization. Meanwhile, special cases, such as Chinese hegemony on the Taiwan side and Chinese resistance against Chinese totalitarianism, are also found in this study. The Chi-square statistical analysis of the CDA qualitative results demonstrates the contrasting tendency between the Taiwan group and the China group in terms of producing signs of hegemony or resistance. To sum up, one's SI rendition may be under a profound influence of his/her own ideology and identity.

## Chapter 6. Conclusion

### 6.1 Synopsis

The link among ideology, power, and identity and how the three are developed and represented through discourse have been made aware particularly in the CDA studies as well as translation and interpreting studies. Ideologies and identities, which are shaped, sustained, or strengthened through discourse, tend to have a profound influence on the behavior of their holders, which is why those in power often legitimate and consolidate their domination by manipulating ideologies and identities of the dominated. Translation/interpreting as a form of discourse has long been one of the media for ideology and identity re(shaping) and spreading. The link between power and ideology/identity makes translation/interpreting by nature a political act, cultural bound, and thus ideological.

It is widely recognized that the translator's behavior is influenced or controlled by his/her ideology. Every decision or choice the translator makes in the process of translating is under the influence of their surrounding "socio-political milieu" (Alvarez & Vidal, 1996: 5). Therefore, the translator may be 'partisan', steering ideologically-motivated translation movement towards his/her desired geopolitical results. The translator may help reviving or maintaining hegemony; they may also make their translations as resistance against oppression. There have been many examples of how translation is used as a tool for maintaining or challenging hegemony. Yet, translation on micro-level involves not only ideology of the translator but also ideologies of authors, critics, publishers, editors, and readers (Tahir-Gürçağlar, 2003: 113), while on macro-level, translation serves as an instrument for power struggle between one culture and another or between the dominant and the dominated. The freedom of translators to

exercise their discretion over their translations or the possibility that translators may have the final say in the finalized version of their translations seems to have been inevitably restricted with the increasingly strong power of world hegemony in the form of various agents or patrons of translation (Venuti, 1995, 1998; see also Chapter 2.3.3.1). The link among power, ideology and translation has been disclosed fully in the field of translation studies. Yet, the link among power, ideology and interpreting remains much less explored. Previous interpreting studies have found that interpreters may choose what not to interpret or interpret at their discretion but few have addressed the link between an interpreter's ideology and his/her renditions. More specifically, although since ancient times interpreting has served as an instrument for power struggle, the lack of past interpreting rendition records has made it difficult to observe how power relations, ideologies and identities are interacting with one another and embodied in interpreting renditions.

Interpreting renditions may be described as an interpreter's monologue that is not created freely but produced to convey faithfully what the speaker says, but previous studies have found that interpreters do exercise their discretion to some extent over their renditions (see Chapter 2.3.3.3). Indeed, although interpreters are supposed to use target languages on behalf of speakers, it is not possible that interpreters can always 'interpret' source texts in the same way as speakers do. Mason (1994: 23) explicitly maintains that translators as text users 'bring their own assumptions, predispositions and general world-views to bear on their processing of texts at all levels' consciously or subconsciously. In a similar vein, an interpreter's real-world experience, internal consciousness, or ideologies may also be embodied in his/her use of language at the time of processing source speech texts. Simultaneous interpreters, who have to perform their tasks within the limits of source language speeches and under severe time constraints, are very likely to count on their previous knowledge for quick

comprehension and reproduction of source texts. Fairclough emphasizes that the analysis focus of CDA should not be put just on texts themselves but also on the processes of text production and interpretation and how these cognitive processes are shaped within social contexts and by social conventions (1989: 19) as ideologies are produced and reproduced in the way he maintains (1989: 85):

...when ideologies are brought to discourse not as explicit elements of the text, but as the background assumptions which on the one hand lead the text producer to 'textualize' the world in a particular way, and on the other hand lead the interpreter to interpret the text in a particular way. Texts do not typically spout ideology. They so position the interpreter through their cues that she brings ideologies to the interpretation of texts - and reproduces them in the process!

Translations in written form frequently come under ideological influences of patronage and/or censorship, while interpreting, because of its evanescent and volatile nature, is not subject to prior censorship. And of all the interpreting modes, simultaneous interpreting, which is supposed to synchronize source delivery, may be most likely to escape censorship and win trust from the listener when it is being performed. In light of the extensive employment of SI at international settings and the relative lack of SI ideology research, an investigation into the effect of an interpreter's ideology on his/her SI renditions may provide valuable information for those who would like to ensure the legitimization of their side of stories in the SI mode. To address ideology issue in interpreting, this study chooses to put such research in the setting of the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, with China and Taiwan on either side. The entangled historical relations between Taiwan and China and the rise of China as a regional or even global hegemon have compounded power struggles and unequal relations across the Taiwan Strait. China has long regarded Taiwan as its renegade province and appealed to the world for supporting the integration of Taiwan and China.

Having experienced a long period of colonial rule, the people of Taiwan are walking slowly but steadily on their democratic path to building a collective national identity and asserting its sovereignty on the international stage. Despite close ties with China in historical and economic senses, the majority of the people of Taiwan reject the possibility of being governed by totalitarian China. Clearly, both nations, where Mandarin Chinese is the most widely used language and Chinese culture is practiced, have different political and social realities. Since language use may reflect “social reality (Sapir, 1929: 209; *original emphasis*)”, the simultaneous renditions produced by Mandarin interpreters from either nation may reflect the difference in their political ideologies and national identities, especially towards the One China issue.

To investigate whether the conflicts of ideologies and identities between trainee interpreters of two nations of unequal power in relations as hegemony versus resistance may be embodied in simultaneous interpreting (SI) renditions, a special CDA Filter Process is created for the methodology with reference to the previous literature review. More precisely, in the CDA Filter Process, this study analyzes the collected SI data produced by the twenty-one trainee interpreters from China and another twenty-one trainee interpreters from Taiwan when they simultaneously interpret three speeches given by Taiwanese political leaders and two speeches by Chinese political leaders, with the data obtained from the survey questionnaires and/or in-depth interviews being used as reference and evidence for the CDA analysis and interpretation of the SI renditions. The survey questionnaires are aimed at obtaining the information on the trainee interpreters’ background, political stance particularly on the cross-strait relations, opinions about the rendered source texts, strength of national identity and the self-report and evaluation of his/her feelings and thinking during and after the SI sessions. In the interviews, the participating trainee interpreters are asked to clarify or explain the deviant renditions they have produced or the responses they have given in their

questionnaires.

The CDA results of this study show that the SI trainee interpreters, under the severe time constraints, produce ideological renditions which are mainly triggered by the conflicts of ideologies and identities between peoples of both nations particularly on the One China policy. While the Chinese trainee interpreters intensify Chinese hegemony embedded in the China speeches or mitigate Taiwanese resistance expressed in the Taiwan speeches, the Taiwanese trainee interpreters are acting the other way round, which proves there is indeed a tug of ideological war between Chinese hegemony and resistance among the SI trainee interpreters from either nation. Also, the majority of the trainee interpreters report that they are aware of their national identity when interpreting for the political leaders of the other nation, and only 11 of the 41 trainee interpreters report that they feel comfortable about interpreting for the political leaders of the other nation. It indicates that an interpreter's identity does have an impact on his/her feelings towards the speaker, especially when there is conflict of identities between the interpreter and the speakers.

The special status quo across the Taiwan Strait may be described as one of the most suitable contexts for the research into the effects of an interpreter's ideology and identity on his/her renditions as China and Taiwan share language and culture (in a broad sense) on an unequal footing and in an entangled but antagonistic relationship. There are still many other corners of the world where people may use the same language but possess different or even clashing ideologies and identities, such as Quebec within Canada or some countries in the Arabic world. While people may assume that interpreting is just a mechanism for facilitating oral communication, it may also be a site for different ideologies and identities to compete against one another in relations between hegemony and resistance. It is hoped that the present research may cast some light on how to explore the direct link between ideology and simultaneous

interpreting and raise public awareness of the power struggles behind interpreting practice.

## **6.2 Research Findings**

The CDA analysis of the simultaneous renditions of the trainee interpreters from China and from Taiwan, with the use of the extra-linguistic information obtained from the survey questionnaires and the in-depth interviews, shows that the ideological conflicts over the One China/Taiwan independence issue are generally embodied through some linguistic devices and strategies in simultaneous interpreting renditions as hegemony versus resistance. More specifically, the great majority of the ideological hegemonic signs were produced by the Chinese trainee interpreters while the majority of the resistance signs were given by the Taiwanese trainee interpreters. And these ideological signs were mainly generated within the context of the One China policy or the Taiwan independence issue. Also, the link between one's feelings or opinions towards what the speaker says and the occurrence of ideological renditions is confirmed. The Taiwanese trainee interpreters who have reported negative feelings towards the One China policy reiterated by the Chinese speakers tend to show resistance in their SI renditions, while the Chinese trainee interpreters who cannot accept the Taiwanese speakers' statement that Taiwan is a country tend to show Chinese hegemony in their SI renditions.

The results of the national identity scale questionnaires show that the Taiwan group as a whole has a weaker sense of national identity than the China group, and the special cases in which two of the Taiwanese trainee interpreters produce ideological signs of Chinese hegemony are indeed indicative of the national identity crisis facing Taiwan's society. Yet, the resistance renditions produced by the Taiwanese subjects, the

answers provided by all of the Taiwanese trainee interpreters for the open-ended questions in the surveys, and the interview data given by nine of them allow the researcher to piece together and interpret the narrative identity of these Taiwanese subjects and present how they discursively construct their Taiwanese national identity. The study also finds that the Chinese trainee interpreters, by using some linguistic devices and strategies, discursively construct the image of their country, highlight Sinocentrism by distinguishing Chinese from others, and demonstrate the Chinese sense of superiority in their SI renditions as well as the data obtained from the surveys and interviews.

Some of the ideological renditions found in this study were obviously deviant from the source texts, while some of them might be too subtle to be detected if without the confirmation of the producers themselves. Yet, the wide range of the ideological renditions detected in this study indicate that ideology, whether it works consciously or subconsciously, may have great effects on approaches to interpreting, and simultaneous interpreting as discourse may be a site of struggles among identity, power, and ideology. In the following sections, the researcher will give more detailed discussions about the findings.

### ***6.2.1 The discursive construction of national identity and others in simultaneous interpreting***

It has been widely recognized that of all the interpreting modes, simultaneous interpreting allows the least time for interpreters to ponder source texts and produce target texts; yet, this study finds that SI trainee interpreters exercise their discretion and discursively construct their concept or image of their own nation and of the others through some linguistic devices and strategies. In the following sections, the researcher

will present how national identity and image of *Others* are linguistically constructed in SI by piecing together the deviant renditions found in this study and interpreting them as a whole.

### **6.2.1.1 The China group**

In terms of the China group, the data obtained from the surveys and interviews generally indicate their strong loyalty to and identification with their own nation. The history of China's glorious past, which Chinese people commonly share and take pride in, proves to a very important element of the formation of Chinese national identity. Speech 1 (C), a commemorative speech given by China's president to mark China's victory over the Second Sino-Japan War, wins great identification and recognition from the Chinese subjects. As what Wodak, et al. (2009) suggest, commemorative speeches tend to be used to construct common identities and promote public consensus. The Chinese speaker of Speech 1 (C) indeed creates a bonding among Chinese people by praising their past courage and strength to ward off foreign invasion and safeguard China's sovereignty and appealing for their continuous contribution to the rise of modern China for the sake of the interests of China and the world. China as a nation has been hailed as a strong nation that can withstand any test and lead the world with its splendid civilization, which is widely identified with by Chinese people. Also, by promoting an 'emotional bonding' between Taiwan and the people of China and emphasizing the link between territorial integrity and national dignity, the Chinese speaker has made 'liberating Taiwan' a general consensus among its people (Wachman, 2007: 122; *original emphasis*).

The survey results of this study show that the Chinese subjects as a whole have a strong sense of national identity and achieve a strong consensus on the One China

policy, which may be attributed to the long-lasting totalitarian system implemented in China since ancient times. As discussed in Chapters 2.2.2 and 2.4, China, as a country with a very long history, has maintained the political systems of totalitarianism and centralization, which in turn causes the economic and social structures in China to remain in a generally 'stable' condition. It may be argued that 'national identity' is thus multi-functionally powerful to both individuals and groups of China. The 'stable' and 'long-practiced' totalitarian system legitimates the state control over Chinese territory, economy and politics, while socialization through education and media systems successfully develops a relatively homogeneous Chinese culture that Chinese people think is highly distinctive and should be protected from the *Others*. Chinese hegemony is being gained, maintained, or even strengthened through state force and public consent in a form of strong national identity. As discussed in Chapter 2.1.3, one's strong sense of national identity may indicate his/her relatively strong willingness to promote social solidarity, to truly believe or pride in the common shared values and assets of the nation, to follow what the nation expects his/her to do, or to defend or justify his/her nation in various aspects in the face of outside threats or challenges, which has been fully exemplified by the SI deviant renditions produced by the Chinese subjects.

As shown in the SI deviant renditions produced by the Chinese subjects, different linguistic devices and strategies are employed to construct their national image of China and distinguish their own nation from the *Others*. By using the referential/nomination strategy, China is the 'motherland' of all the Chinese people. The Chinese government is the 'mainland' or 'central' government in relation to Taiwan 'island' or 'region'. Through the predication strategy, China is a 'great' nation which aims to 'support' poor nations and shoulders the responsibility of 'maintaining world peace and globalization'. But the top priority for China and Chinese people is to recognize that the wholeness of the nation has been safeguarded against whatever invasion from outside and cannot be

damaged by any separatist activities from inside, thus justifying the One China policy as well as all the mitigation and intensification strategies the Chinese subjects use to legitimate China's goal to seize Taiwan (see Chapter 6.2.3), which they think is inherently part of China. To the Chinese subjects, Taiwan is both part of China and the *Other*. Taiwan is an 'island', a 'region', an 'area', or even a 'city' of China through Chinese use of the referential/nomination strategy. The Chinese subjects also use the predication strategy to describe Taiwan as 'dependent', 'suffered' and in need of 'protection' from China as its 'motherland'. *Others* who pose a threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity are 'evil', 'harmful', and 'against the will/interest of Chinese people'. Also, the Chinese sense of superiority is embodied in some deviant renditions in which Indonesia is described as subordinate to China, China is portrayed as the center of the world, and an Indonesian song is mistaken as being created by Chinese. These deviant renditions further prove the Chinese collective beliefs in their "cultural authenticity and unity" of the nation (Smith, 1991: 16) and the internalization of Sinocentrism and Chinese sense of cultural superiority. It may be argued that the SI deviant renditions produced by the Chinese subjects demonstrate a strong sense of Chinese national identity as a whole, which is being built on the glorious past of ancient China, the current powerful status of China on the international stage, and the common faith that China will play a significant role in world peace and prosperity.

#### **6.2.1.2 The Taiwan group**

In terms of the Taiwan group, the data obtained from the surveys and interviews indicate that the development of Taiwanese national identity generally corresponds to the results of the identity surveys conducted by the Election Study Center, NCCU between 1992 and 2012 (see Figure 1 in Chapter 2.5.2), which means although 'Chinese'

nationalism can still be found in Taiwan, the public awareness of and support for the independent status of Taiwan as a nation is growing.

It may be argued that Taiwanese national identity is more like ‘narrative identity’, which often oscillates between sameness and selfhood under the political manipulation but allows “various, different, partly contradictory circumstances and experiences to be integrated into a coherent temporal structure (Wodak, et al., 2009: 14)”. As a colony of different external powers, Taiwan used to encounter drastic cultural, social and linguistic changes, which in turn caused constant (re)shaping of ideologies and identities of Taiwan’s people. In addition to the identities and ideologies imposed on by outside forces, the multi-ethnic and linguistic groups of Taiwan further compounds the difficulties of uniting people of Taiwan as a whole. Since 1945, people of Taiwan have not only been forced to give up part of their resource to Chinese newcomers from the Chinese mainland but to learn to be ‘Chinese’ in many aspects. Taiwan becomes a province of the Republic of China even though it has remained the major part of the territory under the ROC rule. The native inhabitants of Taiwan, namely the Formosans and the early Chinese settlers, account for the great majority of the ROC population but become the dominated and oppressive under the rule of the minority Chinese Mainlanders. Having been educated to be ‘Chinese’ and to love ‘China’ as their nation for decades, people of Taiwan now need to face the reality that there is only one China widely recognized by the world, which is the People’s Republic of China, not the Republic of China. They need to fight for their freedom and survival amid the pressure and threat from the PRC. Just as what Wodak (2004) finds in her study on the formation of EU identities, in-group identities may get stronger in the face of out-groups. Taiwanese national identity is not strong among the in-group of the Taiwanese subjects as shown in the national identity survey results of this study, but when these subjects are confronted with China’s coercion or oppression on linguistic level during the SI

sessions, the distinction between Taiwanese and the *Others* is instantly clear, which is why a review of the deviant renditions produced by the Taiwanese subjects discloses how they discursively construct their Taiwanese national identity and depict the image of the *Others*, particularly China in this study.

As shown in the SI deviant renditions produced by the Taiwanese subjects, different linguistic devices and strategies are employed to construct their national image of Taiwan and distinguish their own nation from China as the *Other*. By using the referential/nomination and predication strategies, Taiwan is described as a ‘good’, ‘democratic’, and ‘independent’ ‘country’ or ‘nation’ on the one side of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan also plays a significant role in ‘winning’ the victory of the Second Sino-Japan War, which prevents Taiwan from being a colony. Under the pressure and military threat from China, Taiwan is ‘isolated’, ‘ignored’, or ‘kicked out’ from international community but it ‘fights for’ its independence and struggles over the issues of ‘diplomacy, sovereignty, and identity’. The Taiwanese subjects are also proud of Taiwan’s democracy especially when compared with China’s totalitarianism, which prompts them to explicitly boast of Taiwan’s democracy during the SI sessions. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese subjects are found to use third person pronouns, anthroponymic generic terms, or determiners, such as ‘this’, when referring to China, which is a commonly seen referential/nomination strategy to make distinction between in-groups and out-groups (e.g. Wodak, et al, 2009). Also, China, as the *Other* to the Taiwanese subjects, is described as a ‘closed’ and ‘uncommunicated’ nation which ‘ignores human rights’, and it is likely that such negative opinions of China may be partly attributed to the brainwashing education policy imposed by the KMT-led ROC government (see Chapter 2.5.2.1).

As indicated above, Taiwanese national identity is not mainly built on its past colonial history but on the democratization of Taiwan that has taken place in recent

decades. The pressure and threat from China, which squeezes the international space for Taiwan and affects Taiwan's domestic politics and economy, actually arouses resentment and resistance of people of Taiwan against China, which in turn strengthens Taiwanese national identity and shrinks China's hope for unification of Taiwan and China.

### **6.2.1.3 The special cases**

As discussed in Chapter 5, there are deviant renditions showing Chinese resistance. Some of the Chinese subjects explicitly refer to Taiwan as a country or nation when interpreting Speech 5 (T). It may be argued that these subjects, although sharing the social belief in China that Taiwan is part of China, perceive the fact that Taiwan enjoys its autonomy instead of being governed by China. It should be noted that only in rendering Speech 5 (T), which was given by then Taiwan's Vice-President, did these Chinese subjects produce resistance signs, which may indicate that they considered it appropriate to refer to Taiwan as a country when the speaker was from Taiwan. Meanwhile, when the Taiwanese speaker makes comparison between Taiwan's democracy and China's totalitarianism in Speech 5 (T), some of the Chinese subjects seem to show their support for democracy by intensifying the speaker's resistance tone, which may further indicate that they are dissatisfied about Chinese totalitarianism or longing for democracy. According to these 'Chinese resistance' renditions produced by the Chinese subjects through referential/nomination and intensification strategies, people are the host of Taiwan as a 'country', while the situation is 'totally different' in China. There are also deviant renditions showing Chinese hegemony on the Taiwan side. As discussed in Chapter 2.5, the shaping and reshaping of ideologies and identities causes a national identity crisis among people of Taiwan. For those Mainlanders who

fled with Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan after the Chinese Communist Party seized the Chinese mainland, they and their immediate descendants tend to regard Taiwan as a province of the Republic of China (the R.O.C.) and hope one day both sides across the Taiwan Strait may be reunited. By contrast, those who are native inhabitants of Taiwan tend to identify with 'Taiwan' rather than 'the R.O.C.' and resist the idea of being governed by Communist China if Taiwan is taken over by China. The national identity crisis has been further compounded by the KMT's attempt to resinize the people of Taiwan, strengthen the historical relations between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland, and make Taiwan only a province of the Republic of China. The KMT's measures to shape Sinocentrist ideology through educational and media systems have made some, if not many, people of Taiwan stuck at the idea of whether they should see 'China' as their motherland or whether Taiwan is a nation instead of a province. According to the Chinese hegemony renditions produced by some Taiwanese subjects, the status of Taiwan is not a nation but a 'society', which indeed reflects the national identity crisis facing Taiwan at present.

### ***6.2.2 Influence of ideology and identity on simultaneous interpreting***

The concept of ideology in this study is defined as "general and abstract social beliefs, shared by a group, that control or organize the more specific knowledge and opinions (attitudes) of a group" (van Dijk, 1998: 49; see also Chapter 2.1.1). As indicated by the SI experiment results and the data of the surveys and interviews, the great majority of the subjects is susceptible to influence of their own ideology and tends to have their ideology embodied in their SI renditions.

How the Chinese government and the Taiwanese government have developed and (re)shaped ideologies of their people in the post-1945 period is discussed separately in

Chapters 2.4 and 2.5. While both governments attempt to destroy each other, both peoples are educated to view the opposite government as an enemy and to consider the people across the other side of the Taiwan Strait to be suffering and longing for rescue. As a result, some of the Chinese subjects describe Taiwan as being 'suffering' and making Taiwan part of China is 'liberating' or 'protecting' Taiwan, while China is 'closed' and 'uncommunicated' and 'ignores human rights' to some Taiwanese subjects. Also, the One China policy, which is widely accepted and supported by Chinese people, prevents the Chinese subjects from faithfully rendering the Taiwan issue from perspectives of the Taiwanese speakers. Therefore, when Chinese subjects interpret for the Taiwanese speakers, Taiwan becomes an 'island', a 'region' or an 'area, the official titles of the Taiwanese speakers are omitted, and any other source text that states or implies the sovereign status of Taiwan may be omitted or distorted. The Chinese subjects also cast doubts or disapproval on the Taiwan independence issue in their renditions, referring to it as 'so-called' independence which would undermine the interest of and go against the will of China and Chinese people. By contrast, many people of Taiwan regard Taiwan or the ROC as a country, which is why the Taiwanese subjects tend to refer to Taiwan as a nation or country even when they interpret for the Chinese speakers. Also, as the One China policy is contradictory to the social and political cognition of the Taiwanese subjects, they not only express explicit opposition to the One China policy in the surveys and/or interviews but also resist interpreting faithfully the One China ideology held and expressed by the Chinese speakers. For instance, when the Chinese speakers refer to China as the 'motherland' of Taiwan, the Taiwanese subjects turn to say 'China' instead. The One China policy is also described as 'unfair' or 'controversial', while the Taiwan independence issue, according to the Taiwanese subjects, only provokes and challenges China instead of damaging peace and stability of the Asia Pacific region.

It is also found that when the speakers mention an event or topic that the subjects have known or familiarized themselves with, the subjects tend to exercise greater discretion over what to interpret or how to interpret it. For instance, when the Taiwanese speaker mentions how Taiwan was forced out of the United Nations because of China's entry, several Chinese subjects stick to their previous knowledge that (the People's Republic of) China has always been one of the founding members of the UN. By contrast, people of Taiwan have been educated that Taiwan (or more precisely the Republic of China) won the Second Sino-Japan War. Therefore, when the Chinese speaker mentions the history of the War, some Taiwanese subjects make Taiwan the central focus of the War.

As discussed in Chapter 2.3.3, simultaneous interpreters are generally expected to play the 'ghost' role and give accurate and complete renditions, but previous studies have found that interpreters may not faithfully render source texts due to various reasons, such as maintaining fluency or credibility, dealing with high information density, coping with dissimilarities in linguistic structure, or following institutionalized ideology. Few have found the direct link between an interpreter's ideology and his/her renditions. More specifically, this present study finds that trainee interpreters, who work on a freelance basis, do have their own ideology interfere with their SI renditions, intentionally or unintentionally. The interview data show that some of them acknowledge the inappropriateness of intentional ideological manipulation of target texts, attributing it to reluctance to repeat something conflicting with their ideology or to emotional resonance with what the speakers say. Some of them are surprised to see their own ideological renditions and offer possible reasons for the renditions or consider them to be honest mistakes. Still some of them, when their own ideological renditions are pointed out and presented before them, try to justify or legitimate the deviancy. The results of the SI experiment of this study indeed indicate how powerfully and invisibly

ideology may work and once ideology becomes commonly shared knowledge and opinions, biased attitudes may be reproduced and maintained through discourse without being noticed. The increasing global demand for SI interpreters, the widely-assumed ghost or bridge roles of SI interpreters, the evanescent nature of interpreting, and the infeasibility of prior censorship on simultaneous renditions all make SI users heavily rely on the competence and professionalism of SI interpreters. Compared with ideological manipulation of translated texts (see Chapter 2.3.1), the effects of an interpreter's ideology on his/her renditions tend to be more direct and more difficult to prevent or rectify. Why the two genuine consecutive interpreting examples in which some Chinese interpreters 'misinterpreted' the Taiwan issue on international occasion can be detected on the spot (see Chapter 2.4.4) is mainly because the CI mode allows both the speaker and the listener, some of whom can understand bilingual texts, to access both source text and target text. While in the SI mode, the speaker usually does not know how his/her speech is interpreted and it would be difficult for the listener to listen closely and critically to both source text and target text at the same time. Therefore, how a SI interpreter's ideology may affect his/her neutrality and faithfulness to source text and in turn affect the results of communication is indeed worth thinking deeply now.

### ***6.2.3 Hegemony and resistance in simultaneous interpreting***

The results of this study find that the conflicts of national identity and political ideologies at the setting of the status quo relations between China and Taiwan as hegemony versus resistance may be embodied in simultaneous interpreting renditions. The large quantity of the deviant renditions found in this study indeed provides sufficient evidence for the discursive struggles between hegemony and resistance.

Analyzed from perspectives of interpreting profession, these deviant renditions may be demonstrated through strategies of substitution, addition, omission, compression, mitigation, overstatement and intensification, distortion, prioritizing personal cognition, specification, and so on, which are separately exemplified in Chapter 5. For instance, some Chinese subjects use the term 'region' or 'area' instead when the Taiwanese speakers refer to Taiwan as a country. Some even create an impression that the Taiwanese speakers are members of Chinese people, which may in turn imply Taiwan is part of China. By contrast, the Taiwanese subjects may explicitly specify Taiwan's status as a country/nation when the speakers, either from China or Taiwan, use vague terms. They may also omit to interpret part of the One China policy that the Chinese speakers reiterate in the speeches. Analyzed from the CDA perspectives, these hegemonic or resistance renditions are often linguistically realized through strategies of referential/ nomination, predication, argumentation, and mitigation/intensification. Take argumentation strategies for instance. Some of the Chinese subjects give One China fallacies/topoi in their renditions by emphasizing Taiwan separatist activities are against the will of the people or disguised in the name of people's interest. The statistical representation of CDA analysis results in Chapter 5.6 demonstrates that simultaneous interpreting may be a site of conflicts and struggles of ideologies in a relationship of hegemony versus resistance.

That translation or interpreting is used as a tool of hegemony or resistance has long existed in human history. The act of translation itself may be a form of resistance, and politically-motivated translations may be a powerful instrument for shaping and spreading certain ideologies, whether hegemonic or resistant. In Chapter 2.4.4, the researcher has discussed how Chinese hegemony, particularly in terms of the One China ideology, has been spread and reinforced through translations and translation education, while in Chapter 2.2.2, how translation is used to resist Chinese hegemony is

exemplified by the foreignizing strategy adopted in the Chinese sutra translation and the patriotically-motivated translations of foreign cultural texts in the period of late Qing and early republic China. With the deepening globalization and advancing technology, hegemony or resistance in translation is no longer limited to certain space and time. Anglo-American cultural hegemony, which Venuti observes by examining the world publication industry and reviewing the canonized translation principles that have lasted for centuries, has been overwhelmingly sweeping the world. In fact, not only does Venuti propose resisting Anglo-American cultural hegemony through foreignizing translation and critical reading, but also China is developing and using 'China English' to counterattack Anglo-American cultural hegemony. And the latter may be argued to be another hegemony in the form of resistance to Anglo-American hegemony. All these examples have shown translation indeed is a site of power struggles and ideological conflicts. Note that hegemony or resistance embodied in translations is generally not under the sole control of translators. Translation by nature involves many factors before it's finished and presented to the receiver, especially in modern times, and thus it can be highly manipulative and the receiver may be alerted to such manipulation beforehand or afterwards. That translated texts can be kept, spread, and re-examined may be said to have stronger ideological influence on the receiver than interpreting renditions. Yet, the fact that the manipulative elements of translated texts may be fully disclosed through re-examination may be reducing that ideological influence on the receiver at the same time.

By contrast, the ideological power of oral renditions on the receiver may not be as strong as that of translated texts, but there are some reasons why the ideological influence, whether hegemonic or resistant, of simultaneous interpreting deserves attention and caution. The SI mode usually requires interpreters to react instantly and allows little room for any clarification or explanation of source text from the speaker.

Under severe time constraints, interpreters count mainly on their previous knowledge, and that's where and when ideology creeps in and works. While translation is usually a product of careful deliberation, interpreting focuses on the fast and clear conveyance of meanings, which tends to be instantly accepted by the receiver. And that's how ideology may be spread invisibly. Some previous interpreting studies find that interpreters may hold institutionalized ideology and act in favor of their agencies. What may not have been made aware is that ideologies are internalized and deeply rooted and institutionalized ideology is only one of the ideologies that an interpreter may hold. Ideology, just as identity, cannot be developed or eliminated easily or swiftly. When interpreters accept and internalize certain hegemonic ideology, they may tend to give 'consent' to that hegemony and spontaneously become hegemonic ideology carriers as well as distributors. They then are equipped with an ability to "persuade others to see the world in terms favourable to the ascendancy of that hegemony'. And arguably, simultaneous interpreting, as a form of monologic professional discourse may be powerful in maintaining or strengthening hegemony. In this study, resistance as a form of "counter-power" is also embodied as deviant renditions in the SI mode. Faced with China as an overwhelmingly powerful hegemony, the Taiwanese subjects resist interpreting faithfully the One China policy, which they think is unreasonable and unrealistic to Taiwan, by producing ideologically motivated deviant renditions. The Taiwanese subjects' resistance to Chinese hegemony is also spontaneously embodied in simultaneous interpreting as discourse responding to the speakers. Yet, ideology of resistance embodied in SI may also be seen as a form of hegemony to the receiver, who are generally incapable of challenging what interpreters provide for them. The findings of the study not only disclose how conflicting ideologies and identities of peoples of two political entities in power relations as hegemony versus resistance are embodied in simultaneous interpreting but also hope to raise awareness of the importance of an

interpreter's neutrality to rendition receivers.

### **6.3 Research Limitations**

There may be at least six limitations in terms of the research design for the present study, which are listed and explained below:

- (1) The subjects are trainee interpreters; therefore, whether the findings of the study can be generalized to professional interpreters needs further investigation.

Due to lack of funding and resources, the researcher can only afford to recruit trainee interpreters. Special thanks must be given to these subjects, who participate in the experiment for little remuneration and strive to provide as accurate renditions as possible. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the subjects may have performed differently if paid generously. Professional interpreters who undertake interpreting cases for a living may pay special attention to work ethics and neutrality issue or may follow the instructions of clients and work on the side of clients (e.g. Beaton, 2007). It is likely that the present study may come under criticism for being unable to make generalizations about whether professional interpreters will bring their ideologies to their renditions, to what extent their renditions deviate from source language texts, or how much impact the deviant renditions will have on listeners.

One should note that ideologies are formed in the process of socialization through language use and often work invisibly. Whether a professional interpreter can work neutrally beyond the influence of his/her own ideologies, especially under severe time constraints in a simultaneous interpreting setting, in which s/he has no time to weigh the wording, needs further empirical investigation. However, it should be noted that the SI

experiment is divided into two stages with a five-to-six-month interval in between, and as shown in the following CDA analysis results, the frequency and density of ideological signs appearing during the SI sessions are more strongly correlated with the content of the source speech texts than with the timing of assigning interpreting tasks. Also, many trainee interpreters go straight into professional work after graduation, or even before graduation. It is not unreasonable to recruit would-be professional interpreters as the subjects of the SI experiment.

(2) The subjects are not performing their interpreting tasks in a genuine setting, where they may have performed differently.

The SI experiment may draw criticism for collecting renditions in a simulated setting. Indeed, it is likely that with the presence of genuine speakers and audience, the subjects might have performed differently. However, a genuine SI setting involves careful planning of SI events and high costs of preparing conference venues and facilities and recruiting audience. Note that it would be extremely difficult to have 'genuine' political leaders across the Strait deliver specific speeches for this study. Taking all of the possible factors for consideration, the researcher finds a SI experiment a more feasible way of collecting a large amount of SI data. To add authenticity, genuine source speech texts are used in the experiment. Also, compared with consecutive interpreting or dialogue interpreting, simultaneous interpreting requires much less interaction among speakers, interpreters, and/or listeners. A lack of interaction with speakers and listeners in an experimental setting should not be an influential factor in the subjects' interpreting performance. The experiment is actually conducted in the SI labs where these subjects learn and practice simultaneous interpreting, which enables the subjects to do the interpreting at ease. The main advantage of the experimental

setting is that it provides a level playing field – conditions are exactly the same for all subjects – this would not be the case in an authentic situation, where researchers would have to rely on a case study of one interpreter, and have no adequate means of comparison. In the SI experiment of this study, more than forty trainee interpreters render the same source language texts at a time, contributing to a rendition transcript of more than 100,000 words. The sufficient quantities of subjects and renditions greatly increase validity of the research findings. Also, 11 of the 14 subjects who gave an in-depth interview after the SI experiment were asked about their opinion of the difference between working in an experimental setting and in a genuine setting. Six of them thought they might have performed in the same way in a genuine setting as simultaneous interpreters were supposed to sit in a booth and to have little interaction with the speaker and the listener. The remaining five subjects thought they might have felt more nervous and performed ‘differently’. Surprisingly, some of them thought they might have paid attention to the response of the listener and tried not to ‘offend’ audience.

(3) The ‘energy-intensive’ data collection procedure may exhaust the subjects and influence their performance.

Each stage of the SI data collection is completed within one to two hours, during which the subjects need to undertake several tasks of doing simultaneous interpreting and answering questionnaires. The accuracy of the renditions may decrease with fatigue. It should be noted that all of the subjects are postgraduate students with a tight schooling schedule, and a lengthened process of data collection may reduce their willingness to attend the experiment. To address the concern over interpreting fatigue, the SI data collection is divided into two stages, and the length of each recording of the

source speeches is no more than fifteen minutes. This way, the researcher may collect as many renditions as possible and the subjects' tiredness from intensive interpreting sessions may be reduced.

(4) Only a few of the subjects give in-depth interviews. If every subject had joined the interview session, more solid evidence might have been found.

As most of the subjects are preoccupied with their finals and dissertation writing after the second-stage data collection, it is difficult to ask all of them to give an in-depth interview, which is conducted on a voluntary basis. The aim of the interview is to ask the subjects to clarify some ambiguous renditions and see if these renditions are ideological signs produced on purpose. Note that ideological signs are very likely to be embodied in SI renditions in an invisible and subconscious manner, and therefore, interview data should play a supportive role in the CDA process, during which the renditions themselves as well as the questionnaire survey results may be adequately sufficient for the application of the CDA method.

(5) There is no interpreter control group that is made up of native English speakers.

It might have been more scientific if a group of native English interpreters participated in the experiment for comparison. However, native English speakers who master Mandarin and pursue an interpreter career are rarely seen. At the time of the experiment, the postgraduate programs where the subjects are being trained as interpreters have no students whose mother tongue is English. Also, the research design is to see how power struggles and unequal relations between Taiwan and China are embodied as ideological signs in the subjects' simultaneous renditions. It would not be

practical to include native English-speaking interpreters in the experiment.

(6) The use of the CDA method may come under criticism for being ideological or subjectively interpretative.

Some criticize CDA practitioners for selecting specific texts that may suit their political purposes and bringing their ideologies to the interpretation of the texts (e.g., Widdowson, 1995, 2004; Jones, 2007). The present study does select 'specific' speeches as the source language texts for simultaneous interpreting. But the selection is a necessary means of investigating the power struggles between Taiwan and China. To strive for objectivity of the research, the amount of the source language text produced by political figures from Taiwan and from China, the political status of the speechmakers and the number of subjects from both regions are dealt with on equal terms, and each subject needs to interpret all of the source language texts. Although the content of the genuine source language texts may not be perfectly suitable for the present study, it adds authenticity and validity to the SI experiment. The large quantity of the ideological signs uncovered in the CDA analysis in the study also indicates that the researcher is not selective about the 'texts' for the CDA analysis. Furthermore, thanks to the nature of interpreting, the source speech texts serve as a solid basis for 'objective' judgment about deviant renditions that are possibly ideological signs. The interpretation of the deviant renditions is supported by the use of the quantitative research method – questionnaire surveys- to increase credibility of the results. The statistical analysis of the CDA analysis results not only contributes to a clear picture of the subjects' tendency to bring their ideologies to their renditions but also demonstrates how language use reflects social realities, i.e. the existence of power struggles and unequal relations between Taiwan and China. In a word, the combination of qualitative

and quantitative research methods in the study should be able to reduce to the greatest degree the subjectivity of the researcher's interpretation of the results.

In conclusion, the present study is faced with at least six limitations mentioned above, for which the explanations of the researcher's concerns are provided as thoroughly as possible. The issue of ideology is an emerging focus in interpreting studies. Although more research of the link between ideology and interpreting needs to be conducted, it is hoped that the present study can provide insights into how simultaneous interpreters may deal with their ideologies in the rendering process.

#### **6.4 Further Implications for Future Studies**

Many people consider that both interpreting and translation basically perform the same function (Gile, 2009: 52), which actually reflects the common misconception of language. Saussure distinguishes *langue* from *langage* by saying:

But what is language [*langue*]? It is not to be confused with human speech [*langage*], of which it is only a definite part, though certainly an essential one. It is both a social product of the faculty of speech and a collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty. Taken as a whole, speech is many-sided and heterogeneous; straddling several areas simultaneously - physical, physiological, and psychological - it belongs both to the individual and to society...(1966: 9; *original brackets and italics*).

Saussure further suggests that the spoken forms of language alone constitute the object of language and the existence of writing is solely for representing language (ibid: 23-24), which explicitly points out the significance and importance of spoken language. The literature review in Chapters 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 of this present study shows that interpreting practices usually preceded translation practices and have played a significant role in

communication among different peoples. Yet, due to the evanescence of speech, what used to be preserved throughout history about interpreting were usually reported events that involved interpreting rather than the detail of interpreting practices, which made it difficult to observe the changes of interpreting practices over time or to investigate the effects of renditions on the results of a task. By contrast, written texts are regarded as 'permanent' and 'stable' by people and thus given more importance than oral language (Saussure, 1966: 25; *my emphasis*), which may be why translation has assumed the prominence and taken the leading role in academic research.

Some, if not many, emphasize the communicative function of interpreting and translation; however, the communicative 'nature' of interpreting is different from that of translation. As Ricoeur (1981: 146-147) maintains, a text "produces a double eclipse of the reader and the writer" in that these two are absent from each other when the former performs an act of reading and the latter writing. By contrast, interpreting usually involves a 'dialogue' with the presence of both the addresser and the addressee (and an interpreter). In other words, interpreting bridges the linguistic gap directly and instantly, which may further suggest that interpreting may have greater power and efficacy than translation. Although ideological signs embodied in the simultaneous renditions are evanescent, they would surely spread among the listener without any prior censorship, which is often not the case in translation. Just as Venuti observes, it is often publishers or clients that decide the final version of a translated text (1998: 31-66). It is very likely that any ideological sign produced by the translator may have been detected and revised by any one of those involved in the process of creating the translated text. Translators themselves are allowed time to revise and polish their translation. Editors and publishers have their say in the final appearance of a translation. Therefore, the influence of a translator's ideology on his/her translation may be minimized to subtlety (which is also what Venuti terms: translator's invisibility). By sharp contrast, interpreters, especially

simultaneous interpreters, are not allowed time to ponder over their renditions, and therefore, their ideologies may play a significant role during the interpreting. The findings of the present study not only disclose the link between ideology and interpreting but also highlight the essential difference between interpreting and translation. Whether professional interpreters may bring their ideology to their renditions and the effects of the ideological renditions on the listener will need to be further investigated in the future. There are many other corners of the world where people may use the same language but possess different or conflicting ideologies and identities. The research methods used in this present study may be employed to investigate the link between ideology and interpreting in such places.

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## Appendix A. Student Interpreter Background Questionnaire

Dear interpreter

The information you provide will be regarded as strictly confidential, which shall be used in studies of the correlation between cultural background and interpreting performance. Your participation in this survey is extremely important and valuable. Please answer the following questions as honestly and accurately as you can.

Thank you for your co-operation.

**Note: If you complete the questionnaire electronically, which is difficult for you to tick the boxes, you may delete those options that are not your answers.**

A	<b>General and Language Background</b> Please fill in your answers and tick where applicable.
A-1	Your Age: _____
A-2	Your sex: <input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female
A-3	Your place of birth: County/Province: _____ Country: _____
A-4	Your place of upbringing: County/Province: _____ Country: _____
A-5	Have you ever lived <b>outside</b> your country before studying at this University? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No  If yes, please specify <b>where</b> and <b>how long</b> you have lived outside your country. Where: _____ Duration: _____
A-6	What language or languages were usually spoken in your home before? _____ _____
A-7	What language or languages did you speak before starting school? _____ _____

A-8	What language did you first learn to read and write? _____
A-9	How old were you when you started to learn English? <input type="checkbox"/> 1-4 years old <input type="checkbox"/> 5-10 years old <input type="checkbox"/> 11-15 years old  <input type="checkbox"/> 16-20 years old <input type="checkbox"/> 21 years or older
A-10	What was your previous IELTS result? Reading: _____ Listening: _____ Writing: _____ Speaking: _____ Overall Band: _____ Year of the Results: _____
	If never taking any IELTS test, please specify the result of your previous language test and when you took the test. (e.g. TOFEL CBT 250) _____

<b>B</b>	<b>Educational Background and Work Experience</b> <b>Please fill in your answers and tick where applicable.</b>
B-1	What was the <b>highest</b> level of education you completed before studying interpreting and translating here? (e.g. BA in Law, MA in English Literature, etc.) _____
	If your highest level of education was MA, what was your major as an undergraduate? _____
B-2	Have you ever studied <b>outside</b> your country <b>before</b> studying interpreting and translating here? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No  If yes, please specify where and how long. Where: _____ Duration: _____
B-3	Have you ever worked as an <b>interpreter</b> before studying here?  <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No  If yes, please specify how many times you have done interpreting jobs or how long you have worked as an interpreter. _____

B-4	<p>Have you ever worked as a <b>translator</b> before studying here?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Yes   <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>If yes, please specify how many times you have done translating jobs or how long you have worked as a translator.</p> <p>_____</p>
B-5	<p>If you have <b>never</b> been engaged in translating or interpreting, please specify your previous job or work experience. (e.g. high school English teacher, business executive, full-time undergraduate, etc.) _____</p>
B-6	<p>What kinds of organisation have you worked for:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Multi-national</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Local firm</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Local government</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> National government</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> NGO</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Other</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Never worked before</p>
<b>C</b>	<p><b>Political and Social Participation</b></p> <p><b>Please fill in your answers and tick where applicable.</b></p>
C-1	<p>How do you obtain political information or news? Please tick all that apply.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Newspapers   <input type="checkbox"/> Magazines   <input type="checkbox"/> Internet   <input type="checkbox"/> Radio and TV</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Books or brochures   <input type="checkbox"/> Family, friends, or co-workers</p>
C-2	<p>How often did you pay attention to political issues at <b><i>domestic</i></b> level before studying here?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Never   <input type="checkbox"/> Seldom   <input type="checkbox"/> Sometimes   <input type="checkbox"/> Often   <input type="checkbox"/> Always</p>
C-3	<p>How often did you pay attention to political issues at <b><i>international</i></b> level before studying here?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Never   <input type="checkbox"/> Seldom   <input type="checkbox"/> Sometimes   <input type="checkbox"/> Often   <input type="checkbox"/> Always</p>
C-4	<p>How often did you pay attention to <b><i>cross-strait</i></b> political issues (those regarding the relations between China and Taiwan) before studying here?</p>

	<input type="checkbox"/> Never <input type="checkbox"/> Seldom <input type="checkbox"/> Sometimes <input type="checkbox"/> Often <input type="checkbox"/> Always
C-5	Have you joined any political party? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No If yes, please specify: _____
C-6	What is your attitude toward the future relation between China and Taiwan? <input type="checkbox"/> Remain the status quo <input type="checkbox"/> Reunification <input type="checkbox"/> Independence

End of the Questionnaire! Thank you very much for your effort!

## Appendix B. Retrospective Questionnaire

Topic of the Speech:

Please tick where applicable or give your comments as honestly and accurately as you can.

1	<p>The speed of the speech is</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Very slow   <input type="checkbox"/> Quite slow   <input type="checkbox"/> Neither slow nor fast   <input type="checkbox"/> Quite fast   <input type="checkbox"/> Very fast</p>
2	<p>How difficult do you find interpreting the speech?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Very easy   <input type="checkbox"/> Quite easy   <input type="checkbox"/> Neither easy nor difficult   <input type="checkbox"/> Quite difficult <input type="checkbox"/> Very difficult</p>
3	<p>If it is difficult to you, which part do you consider the most difficult? (You may tick more than one box.)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Understanding the content   <input type="checkbox"/> Interpreting names   <input type="checkbox"/> Interpreting numbers <input type="checkbox"/> Producing proper sentence structure   <input type="checkbox"/> Lack of terminology   <input type="checkbox"/> Keeping up the pace   <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Please specify: _____ )</p>
4	<p>How much do you understand the content of the speech?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Fully understand   <input type="checkbox"/> Mostly understand   <input type="checkbox"/> Partly understand   <input type="checkbox"/> Completely lost in the speech</p>
5	<p>How difficult do you find interpreting proper nouns? (for instance, names of persons, countries, or titles)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Very easy   <input type="checkbox"/> Quite easy   <input type="checkbox"/> Neither easy nor difficult   <input type="checkbox"/> Quite difficult <input type="checkbox"/> Very difficult</p>
6	<p>How difficult do you find putting the proper nouns in a proper place of a grammatical sentence?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Very easy   <input type="checkbox"/> Quite easy   <input type="checkbox"/> Neither easy nor difficult   <input type="checkbox"/> Quite difficult <input type="checkbox"/> Very difficult</p>
7	<p>How difficult do you find interpreting numbers?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Very easy   <input type="checkbox"/> Quite easy   <input type="checkbox"/> Neither easy nor difficult   <input type="checkbox"/> Quite difficult <input type="checkbox"/> Very difficult</p>
8	<p>Which kind of numbers do you find the most difficult for you to interpret? (You may tick more than one box.)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Ordinal number   <input type="checkbox"/> Quantity of people   <input type="checkbox"/> Year   <input type="checkbox"/> Month   <input type="checkbox"/> All of the above <input type="checkbox"/> None of the above   <input type="checkbox"/> Other : _____</p>
9	<p>How useful do you find the word/phrase list provided for you in advance of interpreting the speech?</p>

	<input type="checkbox"/> Very useful <input type="checkbox"/> Quite useful <input type="checkbox"/> Neither useful nor useless <input type="checkbox"/> Quite useless <input type="checkbox"/> Very useless
10	<p>If the word/phrase is useless to you, why? (You may write in English or Mandarin.)</p> <p>(Please state the reason(s) as specifically as you can. For instance, you were too nervous to use the word/phrase list, etc.)</p>
11	<p>How difficult do you find interpreting Chinese idioms into English equivalents?</p> <input type="checkbox"/> Very easy <input type="checkbox"/> Quite easy <input type="checkbox"/> Neither easy nor difficult <input type="checkbox"/> Quite difficult <input type="checkbox"/> Very difficult
12	<p>If it is difficult to you, which part do you consider the most difficult? (You may tick more than one box.)</p> <input type="checkbox"/> Fully understanding the original meaning of the Chinese idioms <input type="checkbox"/> Failing to find English equivalents <input type="checkbox"/> Using too long expressions, which caused lagging behind the speaker <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Please specify: _____)
13	<p>How much do you agree/disagree with the content of the speech?</p> <input type="checkbox"/> Fully agree <input type="checkbox"/> Quite agree <input type="checkbox"/> Neither agree nor disagree <input type="checkbox"/> Quite disagree <input type="checkbox"/> Fully disagree
14	<p>Which part of the speech do you most agree or disagree? (You may write in English or Mandarin.)</p>
15	<p>Please give your overall impression/feelings about your interpreting.</p> <p>(You may write in English or Mandarin.)</p>
16	<p>Please can you give your suggestions, comments, or opinions about this questionnaire.</p>

Thank you very much for answering these questions!

## Appendix C. National Identity Scale Questionnaire

1. The nation I belong to is an important reflection of who I am.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

2. In general, others respect the nation that I am a member of.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

3. I am a cooperative participant in the nation I belong to.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

4. Overall, I often feel that the nation of which I am a member is not worthwhile.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

5. I often feel I'm a useless member of the nation I belong to.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

6. The nation I belong to is superior to other nations in many respects.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

7. All in all, my nation becomes less important in the world.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

8. Overall, my nation is considered good by others.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

9. In general, belonging to this nation is an important part of my self-image.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

10. I am a worthy member of the nation I belong to.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

11. I often regret that I belong to this nation.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

12. Overall, my nation has very little to do with how I feel about myself.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

13. In general, I'm glad to be a member of the nation I belong to.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

14. The nation I belong to is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

15. Overall, the nation I belong to plays a more important role than other nations.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

16. I feel good about the nation I belong to.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

17. I feel I don't have much to offer to the nation I belong to.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

18. Most people consider my nation to be more ineffective than other nations.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

19. In competition with others my nation comes off worse.

Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree

Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

20. In general, others think that the nation I am a member of is unworthy.

Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree

Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

## Appendix D. Post-Experiment Questionnaire – The China Group

1. Interpreters should provide objective and professional service for any client regardless of race, ethnicity, nationality, or gender.  
 Strongly Agree    Moderately Agree    Agree Somewhat    Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree    Moderately Disagree    Strongly Disagree
  
2. I will turn down a request for providing interpreting service for someone I do not agree with.  
 Strongly Agree    Moderately Agree    Agree Somewhat    Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree    Moderately Disagree    Strongly Disagree
  
3. If offered opportunities, I would like to provide interpreting service for political figures from Taiwan.  
 Strongly Agree    Moderately Agree    Agree Somewhat    Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree    Moderately Disagree    Strongly Disagree
  
4. I feel comfortable when I interpret the speeches given by leaders from Taiwan.  
 Strongly Agree    Moderately Agree    Agree Somewhat    Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree    Moderately Disagree    Strongly Disagree
  
5. If Taiwan declares its independence formally, I will support my government to attack Taiwan by force.  
 Strongly Agree    Moderately Agree    Agree Somewhat    Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree    Moderately Disagree    Strongly Disagree

6. I prefer maintaining the status quo of the cross-strait relations to reunification of China and Taiwan by all means.
- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree
7. No matter what, Taiwan is definitely part of China and cannot be separated from China.
- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree
8. I am quite aware of my Chinese national identity when I interpret the speeches by the leaders from Taiwan.
- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree
9. I consider my interpreting (rendition) in the two data collection is not culturally biased but objective.
- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree
10. I feel comfortable when I interpret the speeches by leaders from China.
- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

11. If offered opportunities, I would like to provide interpreting service for political figures from China.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

12. When I simultaneously interpret a speech, I always pretend to be the speaker.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

13. When I simultaneously interpret a speech, I focus only on how to give exact rendition for every moment without thinking about the content as a whole.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

14. After graduation, I would like to work for the following organizations in my country. (Please indicate your preference order. "1" means the most preferred choice, and "6" the least preferred choice.)

- Central government organizations  Local government organizations  In-house Interpreters for private companies  Non-government organizations  Non-benefit charity organizations  Local translation & interpreting agencies

15. Objectivity has been the main emphasis and focus throughout the interpreting program in the U.K.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

16. The training I have received in the U.K. helps me provide objective interpreting service.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

17. I have changed some language use due to the influence of my Taiwanese classmates.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

18. Because of my Taiwanese classmates, I have a clearer picture of the cross-strait situation.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

## Appendix E. Post-Experiment Questionnaire – The Taiwan Group

1. Interpreters should provide objective and professional service for any client regardless of race, ethnicity, nationality, or gender.  
 Strongly Agree    Moderately Agree    Agree Somewhat    Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree    Moderately Disagree    Strongly Disagree
  
2. I will turn down a request for providing interpreting service for someone I do not agree with.  
 Strongly Agree    Moderately Agree    Agree Somewhat    Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree    Moderately Disagree    Strongly Disagree
  
3. If offered opportunities, I would like to provide interpreting service for political figures from China.  
 Strongly Agree    Moderately Agree    Agree Somewhat    Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree    Moderately Disagree    Strongly Disagree
  
4. I feel comfortable when I interpret the speeches given by leaders from China.  
 Strongly Agree    Moderately Agree    Agree Somewhat    Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree    Moderately Disagree    Strongly Disagree
  
5. If Taiwan declares its independence formally, I will support China's government to attack Taiwan by force.  
 Strongly Agree    Moderately Agree    Agree Somewhat    Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree    Moderately Disagree    Strongly Disagree

6. I prefer maintaining the status quo of the cross-strait relations to reunification of China and Taiwan by all means.
- Strongly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Somewhat Neither Agree Nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree Moderately Disagree Strongly Disagree
7. No matter what, Taiwan is definitely part of China and cannot be separated from China.
- Strongly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Somewhat Neither Agree Nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree Moderately Disagree Strongly Disagree
8. I am quite aware of my Taiwanese national identity when I interpret the speeches by the leaders from China.
- Strongly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Somewhat Neither Agree Nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree Moderately Disagree Strongly Disagree
9. I consider my interpreting (rendition) in the two data collection is not culturally biased but objective.
- Strongly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Somewhat Neither Agree Nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree Moderately Disagree Strongly Disagree
10. I feel comfortable when I interpret the speeches by leaders from Taiwan.
- Strongly Agree Moderately Agree Agree Somewhat Neither Agree Nor Disagree
- Somewhat Disagree Moderately Disagree Strongly Disagree

11. If offered opportunities, I would like to provide interpreting service for political figures from Taiwan.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

12. When I simultaneously interpret a speech, I always pretend to be the speaker.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

13. When I simultaneously interpret a speech, I focus only on how to give exact rendition for every moment without thinking about the content as a whole.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

14. After graduation, I would like to work for the following organizations in my country.

(Please indicate your preference order. "1" means the most preferred choice, and "6" the least preferred choice.)

- Central government organizations  Local government organizations  In-house  
Interpreters for private companies  Non-government organizations  Non-benefit charity  
organizations  Local translation & interpreting agencies

15. Objectivity has been the main emphasis and focus throughout the interpreting program in the U.K.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

16. The training I have received in the U.K. helps me provide objective interpreting service.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

17. I have changed some language use due to the influence of my Chinese classmates.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree

18. Because of my Chinese classmates, I have a clearer picture of the cross-strait situation.

- Strongly Agree  Moderately Agree  Agree Somewhat  Neither Agree Nor Disagree  
 Somewhat Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Strongly Disagree