Japan Self-Defense Forces’ Overseas Dispatch Operations in
the 1990s:
Effective International Actors?

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Abstract

This thesis investigates Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) overseas deployment operations (ODO) of the 1990s to evaluate whether the JSDF were effective international actors. This study fills a significant gap in extant literature concerning operational effectiveness, most studies having concentrated upon constitutionality and legality. This study places operational evaluations within the context of international actors during the vital decade of the 1990s, and within the broader context of Japanese security policies.

JSDF performance is studied in four mission variants: UN peacekeeping, allied support, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations. A four-stage analytical framework is utilised, evaluating JSDF effectiveness, efficiency, and quality, comparing between missions, mission variants, and with other international actors, thereby cross-referencing evaluations and analyses.

The historical development of the JSDF profoundly affected their configuration and ability to conduct operations, not least the mechanisms of civilian control, the constitution, and mediated passage of ODO-related laws. However, these factors have not prevented the development of significant JSDF ODO-capabilities, and their development is traced through the target decade, and linked to the successful completion of post-2001 operations in Iraq and East Timor.

It is found that although JSDF ODO in the 1990s provided effective, quality services, operational efficiency was frequently compromised by lack of investment in key capabilities and limited scales of dispatch, despite the relative cost-effectiveness of ODO. Compared to other armed forces, JSDF capabilities developed well in the early 1990s but the Forces failed to comprehensively capitalise upon their achievements unlike a diverse range of international ODO actors.

The JSDF during the 1990s thereby developed as an effective, albeit narrow-spectrum, ODO actor, highly capable and well respected, yet compromised by investment, restrictions, and culture. This operational development matched the development of security policies that increasingly attempted to link military, diplomatic, and non-traditional security elements within an emergent Japanese strategy.
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Preface

For their assistance in the completion of this thesis thanks are due to a great many people. The greatest thanks must go to Professor Reinhard Drifte, Professor Emeritus, Newcastle University, not only for the advice and discipline required to complete the thesis, but also for his enthusiasm and belief from the very beginning in both the innate value of the project and my own ability to complete it. His support and enthusiasm never wavered, even when mine did, and continued even after his early retirement from Newcastle University. Without him, this thesis would not have been completed, and yet the errors of fact or analysis herein are only my own. Many people helped with preparation for the *viva* but particular thanks are due to Professor Hartmut Behr and Dr. Marie Lall, while Dr. Jocelyn Mawdsley and Professor Christopher W Hughes provided expert challenges and comments to improve the thesis.

There have been far more people who have helped with this research than it is possible to list, but within universities, academic societies, institutions, ministries, agencies, and armed forces there are a great many people who have stood out by their unerring kindness and generosity. My efforts do not do them justice. These include many members of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, and the degree to which they opened their offices, patiently explained and answered questions, and socialised with me has been a precious experience. Thanks must also be given to the National Institute for Defense Studies and the Research Institute for Peace and Security for their help and advice, and for colleagues at Keio University and Daito Bunka University in Japan.

Such a long and involved project has also been aided by the patience of friends, and family who have understood why I was absent, absent minded, or otherwise engaged at various times during the past decade. Their kindness and patience is greatly appreciated, particularly as a number passed away during this project.
Note on Citations and Translations

Throughout this thesis, Japanese names have been written in ‘standard’ Romanised form, with family name first, with other names cited by fore-name followed by family-name format in the main text. To reduce the possibilities of confusion between Asian and other names, the form of ‘family-name, fore-name’ has been utilised in the footnotes as well as the bibliography, for all names (e.g. Tanaka, Taro and Smith, John).

British spelling has been utilised, unless when quoting from texts that have used alternate spellings. Japanese standard Romanised spelling has been used for place names (e.g. Tokyo), while Japanese titles and names have been translated into English with the Japanese Romanised version italicised in brackets, e.g. “Regional Armies (Houmentai)”; “Ebata, Kensuke, Information and the State (Jouhou to kokka)”. Those Japanese terms and names not in common usage have been italicised.

Where Japanese translations have been provided by the author or publisher, these have been utilised, even when not literal translations of titles. For example: “Hikotani, Takako, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Japan: Past, Present, and Future’ (Shibirian kontrouru no shourai)”: literally, “the future of civilian control.”

Where no translations have been provided, these are cited as direct translations by the author of this thesis. For example: “Miyajima, Shigeki, Ah, Magnificent JSDF (Aa, doudou no jieitai).

This thesis has depended heavily upon interviews with JSDF members and civil servants. Most of these were provided in confidence, upon condition that their names not be released. A full list of interviews is available for confidential confirmation of sources.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ITAG</td>
<td>1st Tactical Airlift Group</td>
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<td>ITF</td>
<td>1st Transport Force</td>
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<td>ADC</td>
<td>Air Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force Base</td>
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<td>AFV</td>
<td>Armoured Fighting Vehicle</td>
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<td>AIFV</td>
<td>Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle</td>
</tr>
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<td>AMDA</td>
<td>Association of Medical Doctors of Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOE</td>
<td>Fast combat-support ship (NATO designation)</td>
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<td>APC</td>
<td>Armoured Personnel Carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARV</td>
<td>Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicle</td>
</tr>
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<td>ASC</td>
<td>Air Support Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Air Self-Defense Force</td>
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<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-Submarine Warfare</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>Command, Control, and Communications</td>
</tr>
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<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>Cabinet Intelligence Committee</td>
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<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>Cabinet Intelligence Research Office</td>
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<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>Civilian Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLB</td>
<td>Cabinet Legislative Bureau</td>
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<td>CRF</td>
<td>Central Readiness Force</td>
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<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>CSF</td>
<td>Coastal Security Force</td>
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<td>DCDC</td>
<td>Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Demobilization, disarming, and reintegration</td>
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<td>Defense Facilities Administration Agency</td>
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<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DG-JDA</td>
<td>Director General Japan Defense Agency</td>
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<td>Defense Intelligence Headquarters</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defence (Australia)</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense (US)</td>
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<td>DPJ</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>JDR Law</td>
<td>Law Concerning Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams</td>
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<td>JDRT</td>
<td>Japan Disaster Relief Teams</td>
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<td>JETRO</td>
<td>Japan External Trade Organization</td>
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<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Committee</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>JOPO</td>
<td>Joint Operations and Planning Office</td>
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<td>JSC</td>
<td>Joint Staff Council</td>
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<td>JSDF</td>
<td>Japan Self-Defence Forces</td>
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<td>JSO</td>
<td>Joint Staff Office</td>
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<td>JSP</td>
<td>Japan Socialist Party</td>
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<td>KPNLF</td>
<td>Khmer People’s National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>KPNLAF</td>
<td>Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Forces</td>
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<td>KR</td>
<td>Khmer Rouge</td>
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<td>LAV</td>
<td>Light Armoured Vehicle</td>
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<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal-Democratic Party</td>
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<td>LOGBATT</td>
<td>Logistics Battalion</td>
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<td>LSD</td>
<td>Landing Ship, Dock</td>
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<td>LST</td>
<td>Landing Ship, Tank</td>
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<td>MI5</td>
<td>Security Service</td>
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<td>MI6</td>
<td>Secret Service</td>
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<td>MBT</td>
<td>Main Battle Tank</td>
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<td>MCU</td>
<td>Movement Control Unit</td>
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<td>MDA</td>
<td>Mutual Defense Assistance</td>
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<td>METI</td>
<td>Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry</td>
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<td>MLRS</td>
<td>Multiple Launcher Rocket System</td>
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<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multinational Force</td>
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<td>Military Observers</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence (UK)</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense (Japan)</td>
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<td>MOF</td>
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<td>MoFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
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<td>MOVECON</td>
<td>Movement Control Contingent</td>
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<td>MSA</td>
<td>Maritime Safety Agency</td>
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<td>MSB</td>
<td>Maritime Safety Board</td>
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<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Maritime Safety Force</td>
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<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
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NADK National Army of Democratic Kampuchea
NAO National Audit Office
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDA National Defense Academy
NDC National Defense Council
NDPO National Defense Policy Outline
NGO Non-governmental Organisations
NHK *Nihon Hosou Kyoku* - Japan Broadcasting Corporation
NIDS National Institute for Defense Studies
NIRT National Incident Response Team
NPA National Police Agency
NPSC National Public Safety Commission
NPR National Police Reserve
NSA National Safety Agency
NSB National Safety Board
NSF National Safety Forces
OA Operational analysis
OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA Official Development Assistance
ODO Overseas Dispatch Operations
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation
OEF-MIO Operation Enduring Freedom-Maritime Interdiction Operation
ONUC UN Operation in the Congo
ONUMOZ UN Mission in Mozambique
OOTP Operations Other Than Peacekeeping
OOTW Operations Other Than War
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OUP Oxford University Press
PBO Peace Building Operation
PEO Peace Enforcing Operation
PfP Partnership for Peace
PKF Peacekeeping Force
PKO Peacekeeping Operation
PM Prime Minister
PMMO Post-Modern Military Operations
PMO Prime Minister’s Office
PMO Peace Making Operation
PRC People’s Republic of China
PSIA Public Security Intelligence Agency
<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
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<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
</tr>
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<td>RCDS</td>
<td>Royal College of Defence Studies</td>
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<td>RDMHQ (UN)</td>
<td>(UN) Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters</td>
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<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Mozambican National Resistance</td>
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<td>RFA</td>
<td>Royal Fleet Auxiliary</td>
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<td>RIIA</td>
<td>Royal Institute of International Affairs</td>
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<td>RIPS</td>
<td>Research Institute for Peace and Security</td>
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<td>RMA</td>
<td>Revolution in Military Affairs</td>
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<td>RN</td>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
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<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China (Taiwan)</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>RoK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>Ro-Ro</td>
<td>Roll-on/Roll-off</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>RRU</td>
<td>Refugee Relief Unit</td>
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<td>RUSI</td>
<td>Royal United Services Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAG</td>
<td>Special Airlift Group</td>
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<td>SALIS</td>
<td>Strategic Airlift Interim Solution</td>
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<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Command Allied Powers</td>
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<td>SFC</td>
<td>Shonan Fujisawa Campus</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals intelligence</td>
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<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
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<td>SNC</td>
<td>Supreme National Council of Cambodia</td>
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<td>SOC</td>
<td>State of Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>SoFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPG</td>
<td>Self-Propelled Gun (artillery)</td>
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<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>STA</td>
<td>Science and Technology Agency</td>
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<td>SVMD</td>
<td>Senior-Vice-Minister for Defense</td>
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<td>TA</td>
<td>Territorial Army</td>
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<td>TMD</td>
<td>Theatre Missile Defence</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>UN Advance Mission in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>UN Disengagement Force</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>UN Department of Peacekeeping</td>
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<td>UNEF</td>
<td>UN Emergency Force,</td>
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<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>UN Force in Cyprus</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>UN General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNGOMAP</td>
<td>UN Group of Observers for Monitoring the Afghan-Pakistan border</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>UN International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>UN Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>UN Mission of Support to East Timor</td>
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<td>UNMO</td>
<td>UN Military Observers</td>
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<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>UNOGIL</td>
<td>UN Observation Group in Lebanon</td>
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<td>UNOMUR</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission for Uganda-Rwanda</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>UN Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNPKO</td>
<td>UN Peacekeeping Operation</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>UN Protection Force</td>
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<td>UN Security Council</td>
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<td>UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>UN Transition Assistance Group</td>
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<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>UN Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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<td>United Nations University</td>
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<td>UN Volunteer</td>
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<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
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<td>US Marine Corps</td>
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<td>US Navy</td>
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<td>Volunteer Reserve</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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<td>WGA</td>
<td>Whole of Government Approach</td>
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Chapter 1  Introduction

1  Aims and Parameters

The commencement of peacekeeping operations by the Japan Self-Defense Forces in 1992 introduced a new element into Japanese security policy. For some observers this signified a break with the past, a shock to the post-war pacifist order, while others saw a degree of continuity, yet the pre- and post-1992 periods are clearly distinctive. Japanese policymakers had finally accepted not only that peacekeeping was a legitimate tool available to Japan, as to other United Nations members, but also that the most appropriate agents to represent Japan in United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) were the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). Perhaps finally the JSDF had emerged from the constitutional shadows to be recognised as legitimate actors. The confluence of the rebirth of UNPKO, the birth of JSDF PKO, and the proliferation of UN nation-building and peace-enforcement operations placed JSDF overseas deployments within a far greater context than domestic politics. While Japan had seemingly ‘opted out’ of international (and many domestic) security responsibilities during the Cold War, JSDF peacekeeping indicated a significant change and assumption of international security responsibilities. This could be characterized as a shift from security ‘cheap-riding’ to ‘burden-sharing’.

This thesis focuses on JSDF Overseas Dispatch Operations (ODO), encompassing UNPKO, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief operations. While the symbolism of JSDF ODO is important, the performance of the Forces has been largely neglected. What tasks did the JSDF perform overseas? Were these operations effective or efficient, what factors contributed to JSDF performance, and how did they compare to ODO of other
national militaries? Most importantly, how effective were the JSDF as national actors in overseas dispatch operations? These are relevant questions which this thesis shall answer while also evaluating JSDF operations in the broader context of evolving Japanese security policy. Overall assessments of mission ‘success’, however, are not within the scope of this thesis, as they are dependent upon myriad factors beyond JSDF control, such as mandates, resources, conflict environments, and leadership issues.

The study of JSDF ODO during the 1990s provides several interesting perspectives on Japan’s foreign and security policies for the researcher. It potentially provides insights into changes in Japan’s assumption of international responsibilities, the evolving boundaries of socio-political tolerances, and the perceptions of risk during the decade. It provides a case study of how multiple factors in Japanese security policy exercise interwoven influences with US alliance, UN-centric policies, and regional interests balanced and complemented by military dispatch and traditional liberal-mercantilist devices of trade and aid. ODO/PKO have also been used to measure how far Japan ‘normalised’, ‘reverted’, or ‘founedered’ during her supposed ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s, all problematic terms by definition. These terms are also inexorably linked with the Japanese constitution, primarily Article 9, the ‘peace clause’, and the notions and norms of identity and policy thus derived. The very existence of the JSDF has been considered problematic, at best, in light of the prohibition of military forces and belligerency in Article 9. The dispatch of those Forces overseas, for potentially hazardous duties, naturally focused minds upon constitutional and legal imperatives, including the Japanese government’s (partial) rejection of the right of collective security. In a multitude of ways, JSDF ODO have been regarded as signifying a ‘litmus test’, ‘red line issue’, or a ‘membership entitlement’ to leading institutions, such as the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC). While this study will focus on the operational performance and capabilities of the JSDF, any meaningful analysis of these matters requires an understanding of the prevailing context of research on Japanese security and international relations.

Most studies of JSDF ODO have focused upon the broader security, political, and legal aspects as previously outlined. The most common approaches have been those regarding developments as indicators of changing policy priorities and the importance of normative factors upon state behaviour (Peter J. Katzenstein, Hugo Dobson), or the increasing importance of bilateralism in Japanese security through the US-Japan alliance (Richard J. Samuels, Kenneth B. Pyle), while others have emphasized particular theoretical points, such as identity theory, in determining the scale of changes (Amy L. Catalinac).  

Glenn D. Hook, Thomas U. Berger, and many Japanese commentators critical of the military establishment have tended to view overseas movements of military forces as potentially indicating signs of ‘reversion’ to militaristic ways. They have been highly critical of the militaristic manner of Japanese ODO/PKO contributions, strongly emphasizing constitutional and legal issues and the anti-militarist, pacifist socio-political norms that have dominated domestic security discourse since the 1950s.

Chris W. Hughes and others have utilized ODO as one element in assessing Japan’s

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re-emergence as a ‘normal’ power, while Reinhard Drifte has examined PKO as one of several factors in Japan’s efforts to secure a permanent seat on the UNSC.\(^3\) Even when research has focused directly upon one of the Forces, ODO has usually formed only a subsidiary element, such as in Peter J. Woolley’s study of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and usually as an indicator of other trends, such as the effect of ODO on the bilateral relationships with the United States and the US Navy (USN).\(^4\)

This thesis focuses upon the operational performance of the JSDF in ODO, but such analysis also sheds light upon broader security policy aspects raised by previous authors. These aspects will be considered primarily in Chapter Seven, in an assessment of how JSDF ODO impacted upon Japan’s relationships, policies, and notions of self-identity, and how these were seen to have been affected from the perspective of external interested parties. ODO will also be examined as how it they have been considered to have contributed towards an emergent Japanese security strategy.

Despite increased interest in the JSDF, their overseas dispatch, and peace operations, there remains little qualitative research, and the extant literature on JSDF ODO is extremely limited in its coverage of operational issues, even among serving or retired JSDF authors. The main variants are the coverage of UNPKO operational matters with reference to JSDF practice, such as Seki Hajime et al., brief surveys of JSDF operations in the 1990s in order to examine 21st century dispatches, such as Isobe Koichi, and journalistic reportage, such as Miyajima Shigeki, providing insight into dispatches but

little on operational effectiveness or efficiency. Maeda Tetsuo has utilised verbatim interviews within a limited operational study, and ODO veterans have further detailed their experiences in occasional papers, such as Watanabe Takashi, or through defence journals, such as Securitarian, while the most detailed single work by the Military History Society of Japan compiled such experiences within a peacekeeping survey.

This thesis aims to provide the first systematic evaluation of JSDF ODO of the 1990s, encompassing all three Forces, and all overseas operations of the period. Due to the chronic lack of public-domain documentation, it has been dependent upon extensive meetings with current and former JSDF members and officials. In this, the author has been assisted by experience in Japan, as well as experience in the British Army. Military experience is extremely rare among Japanese researchers, and JSDF and official personnel have often been put at ease and felt more able to express themselves to an ‘outsider’ without vested or political interest, who may contribute informed comment and comparative examples. Certain issues, highly controversial within Japan, could be examined in interview without fear of the interviewee being exposed to risk, or misunderstood for want of military knowledge. Such matters as recourse to collective security in ODO, relevant security training, and rules and procedures regarding use of weapons were all discussed in this professional context, removed from the usual


pre-occupation with constitutional issues and pacifist norms. This thesis has aimed to provide a unique operational evaluation, and thereby to determine if the JSDF have been able to demonstrate their capabilities to perform as effective international actors.

JSDF ODO has rarely been considered as the case-study demonstration of capabilities by a state actor. Due to the controversial status of the JSDF, and by extension the Japan Defense Agency (JDA)/Ministry of Defense (MOD), in contrast to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) or Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the JSDF has largely existed in the shadows of public acceptance and consciousness, and on the fringes of legitimacy. JSDF operations have therefore often appeared ‘tainted’ and thereby have rarely been analysed for their effectiveness or efficiency. They have reached public consciousness through exceptional circumstances, such as the controversial dispatches to Cambodia and Iraq, or performance in disaster relief, such as following the Hanshin Earthquake. While emotional reactions to military deployments are not unique to Japan, the degree to which JSDF operational performance has been largely neglected by policymakers and sections of the defence establishment is remarkable.

This thesis aims to assess JSDF performance and capabilities and therefore considers the constitutional controversy and related issues only to the degree in which they impact upon the JSDF and operational duties. The constitution continues to exercise a strong ambient influence upon the configuration, culture, and conduct of the JSDF, and these aspects shall be examined as and when relevant. However, the technical and political nature of the constitutional controversy shall not be allowed to encumber a rational operational evaluation. The period selected for this study, the 1990s, encompasses the initial UNPKO, while excluding the range of missions conducted since 2001. These
later operations are worthy of a separate study, yet differ significantly in type, legal basis, and conduct, primarily in being largely non-UN operations, conducted for allied and anti-terrorism support, and with practice based upon experiences in the 1990s.

While much of ODO experience was neglected by government, a combination of valuable field-level operational experience, international relationship-building, and a lessening of ‘civilian control’ tensions regarding JSDF ODO contributed to operational effectiveness in the 21st century. This thesis, while examining the operational progression from UNPKO to later operations does not propose that this represented an obvious and inevitable progression. Experiences in Cambodia did not lead to the Iraq dispatch, but experience in the 1990s provided the base to make possible the effective conduct of later operations. The first ODO also required careful mediation between contrasting political and legal influences, therefore the distinction between operational, political, and legal issues is both apparent and necessary.

The choice of the 1990s is, as outlined above, based upon the emergence of JSDF ODO during the decade. New security norms emerged in Asia in the 1990s, as well as fundamental changes in Japanese society, with significant cultural and political shifts of extant post-war norms. While the 1990s provide a convenient starting point, with the Gulf War controversies leading to the Cambodia dispatch, they do not provide an equally neat conclusion. This study includes the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights, despite continuing beyond the 1990s, while the operations in East Timor from 2002 are considered only as a comparative indicator of later developments. In addition, the non-peacekeeping ODO, such as humanitarian and disaster relief missions that fall within the target decade are included, providing a sufficient body of comparatives.
Significant changes in public opinion concerning the JSDF and Japan’s security status occurred between 1991 and 2001. These were partly due to natural disasters and accidents, as well as North Korean actions, rising Chinese power, and terrorism. What did not, and has not, changed significantly is the widespread view of JSDF ODO as something judged largely in political or legal terms, rather than professional or utilitarian terms. As this study is primarily an examination of the performance of the JSDF operations, to evaluate the capabilities of the Forces criteria are required. The criteria include those utilised by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), PKO training centres, and training and doctrine development institutions, such as the British Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), and from wider research and practice. Operational effectiveness, efficiency, and quality cannot be as readily identified and isolated as in financial and business models. The JSDF have participated in vastly complex multinational, multi-agency operations, where the outcome has been extremely difficult to evaluate. The JSDF and JDA/MOD have also been reticent to release data from their dispatch histories (*hakenshi*), and while media coverage was extensive in Cambodia it was thereafter rather limited. The difficulty of evaluation does not detract from its worth however, for without a process of post-operational analysis there can be no systematic lessons-learned recycling of experience. This study will illustrate just how limited was this lessons-learned process for the JSDF, and how it hampered operational effectiveness. The ability of the JSDF to eventually develop lessons-learned capabilities and apply them to later operations further reinforces the value of the effort.

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7 Until April 2006, the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC) (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/WhatWeDo 12 July 2008).
2 Methodology in the Study of ODO

This study will rely upon a comparison of JSDF UN and non-UN operations, and with the ODO of other militaries providing a triangulation of comparative operational analysis. This predominantly empirical study cannot aim to compare JSDF ODO with all other aspects of JSDF duties, nor with every overseas military operation, but it shall endeavour to provide representative qualitative comparatives through the methodology of an analytical framework.

In assessing the JSDF PKO in the field, a framework is necessary for systematic assessment of each operation, and to provide a comparative element between operational variants. The four elements of the analytical framework are the examination of the mission context, preparation and logistical support, JSDF performance in the mission, and the overall Japanese contribution to the mission.

The mission context relates to mission selection, the degree of Japanese involvement, including peace processes, and the security environment of the host country/region. This represents an examination of mission aspects affecting JSDF operations, beyond their control.

ODO preparation and logistics include the survey and mission selection processes, general and mission-specific training, the lead-in phase, dispatches, logistical support (integral to the JSDF and provided by Japanese and/or foreign, civil and/or military sources), and post-operational return to Japan. This section also includes analyses of the scale and types of JSDF deployment, assessing both quantitative and qualitative contributions.

JSDF performance indicators are naturally complex: difficult to isolate and analyse. In the literature on military operations degrees of success or failure are often ascribed,
yet while considerable effort is placed on operational analysis of ‘success’, such as operational ‘lessons-learned’ (John Nagl), and ‘joining-up’ civilian and military commands (Frank Kitson, and Jennifer Morrison Taw and John Peters), there are few references to qualitative indicators. Corporate studies have identified such qualitative indicators, and these have been incorporated into elements of peacekeeping through civil institutions, such as studies conducted by public aid providers, NGOs, and police contingent providers. R.J. O’Brien has produced one of the few studies utilising such indicators for peacekeeping, in assessing Australian police performance in Cyprus. The indicators applied were effectiveness, efficiency, and quality providing qualitative analysis of mission performance. These indicators shall be used in this section (and Chapter Six) to evaluate JSDF performance in their mandated tasks (assigned prior to dispatch), and how they were able to adapt to changed circumstances and tasks beyond those initially assigned.

The JSDF mission contribution factor is an overall assessment of how the JSDF personnel and units contributed to the completion of the mission. In some missions there may be viable comparisons with non-military bodies, but while useful in a single-mission context uniform inter-mission comparison is not possible.

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Using this analytical framework each mission element will be examined in isolation, and also in comparison with other mission elements, enabling systematic comparisons between JSDF and other militaries’ performance. The limited extant literature in English and Japanese will be utilised, as well as access to unpublished papers, and interviews with civilian and JSDF personnel, aided by the author’s experience of military institutions and cultures.

The interviews, upon which this thesis is largely based, were conducted between mid-1998 and late 2010. The range of over 300 interviewees was broad, including politicians, public officials, serving and retired JSDF personnel, academics and researchers, journalists, business people, and private individuals, with approximately 250 being of direct use in production of this thesis. As the emphasis is upon JSDF operational matters, thus the interviewees selected were those with the greatest contribution to make within this area. Relatively few politicians were able to make significant contributions, hence the emphasis was placed upon those who could, resulting in only a handful of political figures, but including over fifty JSDF members. Likewise, the balance with JSDF interviewees was approximately 15% ASDF, and 25% MSDF, with just over 60% being GSDF, reflecting the larger numbers of ‘land’ personnel engaged in ODO in the 1990s. This was also reflected in the greater numbers of JDA/MOD and Cabinet Office personnel interviewed compared with MoFA, and the large numbers of interviewees from the NDA and NIDS, while the large and prestigious Waseda University provided only one interviewee. The numbers of people able (and willing) to contribute to this thesis was extremely small, with most security specialists being concentrated within a small, informal community.

Most interviews were conducted by prior arrangement, in formal contexts, with
written notes. Some with public officials involved the official recording of minutes by an assistant, and these were almost always conducted in Japanese. Some interviewees preferred to speak in English, particularly when discussing matters of some sensitivity when in the workplace. If possible, the initial interview would be followed up with a second, clarification meeting, most fully achieved with certain NIDS researchers, who agreed to meet four or five times in their offices. However, as access to certain public and uniformed officials was difficult to achieve, not least due to job rotation, some interviews were conducted in informal circumstances. These included between sessions at conferences and research meetings, at embassy receptions, or during public lectures. The Japanese tradition of bonding by social-intercourse, the *nomikai* (drink-meeting), is very strong, and several public servants preferred to speak in such situations, and these informal situations often resulted in the most interesting results, albeit with the potential collateral damage to accurate notation.

Among the most famous subjects, such as Ogata Sadako and Akashi Yasushi, the interviews lasted for less than 10 minutes, and were conducted in opportunistc manner during UN University events in Tokyo. Others, such as with Yamazaki Hiroto, lasted for over two hours, one to one, in private. These interviewees had the confidence to be ‘on the record’ while many public servants and JSDF active personnel, even during minutred interviews, tended to be ‘off the record’ with occasional bursts of ‘on the record’ comments. Many researchers, academics, and retired officers also preferred not to be explicitly named in case their critical comments resulted in damaged relations with current or former colleagues, or hindered promotion prospects within institutions.

The results of interviews were compared with the available textual sources, and with each other to identify trends and aberrations, with these further investigated through
follow-up interviews or by telephone or e-mail communication. This checking process was instituted in order to verify criticisms or compliments easily dispensed during conversation, and to attempt to identify and isolate personal or institutional prejudices, such as the commonly stated JSDF disdain for MoFA pre-dispatch briefings, which through further investigation did not equate with general disdain for the Ministry or its personnel.

The further analysis of interview results through the two stage methodological framework allowed for the maximum utilisation of valuable assets while minimizing the risks of prejudicial contamination. This methodology could then be even further reinforced by the utilisation of appropriate international relations theory for analysis.

3 Theory in the Study of ODO

While this thesis primarily relies upon empirical research reinforced with a two-stage methodological framework, IR theory also shall be utilised to reinforce the utility and accuracy of the research. Naturally, the methodology of security or peacekeeping studies does not depend upon a singular theoretical approach. A.J.R. Groom has indicated how in international security studies theoretical approaches can effectively pre-determine the conclusion of research, not invalidating theory but rendering cognisance of the theoretical underpinning vital for effective evaluation of research.\(^\text{11}\)

Glenn D. Hook \textit{et al} state that in examining Japanese policy it is useful, “to provide a theoretical framework in order to methodically examine the essential factors and motivations,” while also stating that the most valuable examination can be achieved through a blend of Realist, Liberalist, and Constructivist approaches, with the addition

of other approaches as appropriate. In effect, the proposition is to ‘triangulate’ approaches in order to ensure accurate understanding through theory. Similarly, J.S. Gaddis rejects notions that, “…suggest we jettison the scientific approach to the study of international relations; only that we bring it up to date by recognizing that good scientists, like...good historians, make use of all the tools at their disposal.” In this vein, theory shall be utilized when and how it is able to enhance understanding, or provide alternative avenues of analysis.

There have been efforts to create application-specific theories of peacekeeping. Some have focused upon providing theoretical foundations for operational conduct to prevent the repetition of mistakes by practitioners, such as by the adaptation of contingency theory (A.B. Fetherston). Other studies have attempted to place peacekeeping within existing theories, examining PKO through the analytical prism of international relations (IR) theories. The absence of complete success is unsurprising given that peacekeeping has often been, “an ad hoc response to international conflict and as such has little or no conceptual basis.”

Classic IR theoretical approaches provide lessons for the construction of a theoretical framework, even in the event that they may eventually prove inappropriate in application. Realism, based in classical forms upon military ‘hard power’ determining action within an anarchic ‘system’ of states, clearly is of limited utility to UNPKO, as it denies significant variations to the monopoly of state power, and raises the question of why states cooperate for abstract goals? Realism as an IR theory, as expounded by Hans

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Morgenthau, was as much an attempt to understand the onset of World War Two as the Cold War, and has long been considered the ‘standard’ theoretical approach to statecraft from Thucydides through Machiavelli to the present. Its lack of flexibility, particularly in considering influences beyond the state-level, or outside traditional ‘security’, makes it a blunt tool for examining multinational cooperative conflict-containment or humanitarian-assistance operations. The dispatch of forces to areas not of significant national interest, at significant cost and risk, seems to defy Realist norms. For Japan, a perceived international security threat could be countered by investment in the JSDF, but not sending troops to build infrastructure in Cambodia. Neo-Realism (Kenneth Waltz) provided a greater appreciation of the limits of ‘hard power’ through a greater appreciation of international systems and limitations on state action in the post-modern era. The Neo-Realist analysis of JSDF ODO would be either as a quid pro quo to secure advantage in another (more important) sphere, or as an extension of alliance with the United States. That these analyses can be seen as partly valid does not fully validate either approach, but does illustrate the perils of endorsing or dismissing a single theory in entirety. Japan did hope ODO would provide leverage for UNSC membership, and did respond to US pressure in 1990-1992. For a study of JSDF ODO, however, Realism has limited utility.

The main counterpoint to Realism has been provided by Liberalism. This theoretical approach has emphasised the utility of cooperation for mutual benefit, whereby states may not only consort, but also construct systems and institutions constituting meta-bodies of regional or global governance. Liberalism also emphasises the

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non-military aspects of power, including Neo-Liberalism’s ‘soft power’ (Joseph S. Nye) whereby states, cultures, or sub-cultures appeal and exert influence through cultural and communicative means, such as media, arts, and commerce. Thereby, Non-governmental Organisations (NGO), corporations, and other groups may consciously or unconsciously become actors in a trans-national system over which states exert limited control. Liberalism does not envisage the displacement of the nation state as the primary actor, and thus remains ‘Westphalian’ in core principles, with globalization possibly as the panacea of Liberalism, whereby interdependence increases national interest in the maintenance of international peace and security. Peacekeeping blends easily into Liberalism, emphasizing multi-lateral, multi-agency approaches, yet UNPKO remains a phenomenon dominated by uniformed state actors associated with ‘hard-power’, and mission selection, participation, and conduct are dominated by the UN members, particularly the policy ‘gatekeepers’ (the UNSC P5), the largest financial contributors (the P5, plus Japan and Germany), and the largest troop contributors (Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh). Liberalism also struggles to accommodate human agency choosing conflict over cooperation, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, and other forms of ethnic or religious conflict.

For Japanese ODO, Liberalism would reject or lessen the value of JSDF ODO being tied to such imperatives as the US alliance or UNSC permanent membership, despite strong evidence to the contrary. However, Liberalism sits easily with overt Japanese UN-centred policies and broader international peace cooperation approaches promoting human security. It also reflects the importance of ‘national image’ for a number of UNPKO contributor nations, such as Canada, Sweden, and Ireland. Its multi-layered,

\[\text{Nye, Joseph S., } \textit{Soft power: the means to success in world politics} \text{ (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).}\]
multi-agency assumption emphasizes a pluralist core, and in contrast to Realism provides an insight into the factions, interest groups, and ebbing and flowing influences upon Japanese policy, as illustrated by Karel Van Wolferen’s counter to monolithic depictions of Japanese power.\textsuperscript{19} Compared to Realism, Liberalism is also in harmony with the enduring socio-political norms of anti-militarism and non-belligerency in Japanese socio-political studies, and thus is an avenue to Constructivism.

Constructivism offers much that Realism lacks in the understanding of norms, standards, and cognitive processes that frame much of practice and policy. Elements of peacekeeping can be effectively examined through Constructivism, particularly learning processes. It is also, unlike Liberalism, ‘behaviour neutral’, not assigning cooperative, harmonious qualities to human agency, or a quest for domination or power as in Realism. The desires and methods of states are fundamentally complexes of socio-cultural influences, predominantly norms derived from identities that frame perceptions of justice, practice, and product. Within a state, multiple actors and forces influence debate, policy, and doctrine such as the influences exercised over Japanese security policies by ministries, media, political parties, interest groups, and industry.

Compared to Liberalism there is no \textit{a priori} assumption of nation-state primacy, and Constructivism is sometimes regarded as a complement to other theories rather than a unit replacement.

Identity being the core of Constructivism, the hesitancy of countries such as Japan and Germany during the early Cold War to be proactive in security matters is explained by identities formed in the aftermath of war, and under US patronage, focused upon economic recovery and social stability. The drawback of such an exposition is that it has

limited interest identification and forecasting potential, such as the re-emergence of UNPKO amidst post-Cold War flux, countering many well established security, political, and social norms. ODO for Japan, and Germany, challenged some of the strongest socio-political norms, deeply based in identities which if not overtly anti-military were disinclined to sanction military dispatch and potential belligerency. Constructivism does not clearly provide for realising why and how these norms and identities change other than the understandable yet inevitably amorphous ‘shift in the complex of influences’, although it does provide a valuable framework for understanding how norms and identities act as brakes upon change, such as the attempts of ‘revisionists’ and ‘realists’ from Japanese Prime Ministers Kishi through to Nakasone to radically alter the Japanese security norm to accommodate greater ‘burden sharing’.

This thesis shall not assume the superiority of any single theoretical base, nor attempt to create a ‘hybrid’, as Izumikawa Yasuhiro attempts between Realism and Constructivism, and shall draw upon a variety of means most appropriate to the particular subject matter.20 A study of the Cold War Yoshida Doctrine, of economic primacy within the US alliance, for example may resort to Realist views of power (military alliance, husbanding resources), Liberal views of plurality and multilateralism (security debate leading to de facto compromise, forging foreign relations through trade), or Constructivism (democratic, ‘western’, pacifist identity dominating policy discourse). In isolation, each could be critiqued for gaps and flaws, yet a triangulation provides insight not otherwise possible.

Some scholars attempted to find a ‘middle way.’ A.B. Fetherston constructed contingency theory models in an attempt to square the circle of power-norms-human

agency, while C.W. Kegley proposed, “Realism with a human face,” to enable the transition from ‘power’ to justice and broader security.\(^{21}\) Scholars have attempted to navigate such theoretical possibilities and combine or synthesize elements within a single coherent pattern. Hugo Dobson in his study of Japanese PKO utilized elements of traditional IR theory with normative patterns, such as anti-militarism, US bilateralism, and East Asianism, providing a valuable analytical comparative.\(^{22}\) Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, and Glenn D. Hook \textit{et al}, weaved ‘middle paths’ through seemingly competing theories by embracing ‘analytical eclecticism’, and it is this balanced approach that is utilised in this thesis.\(^{23}\) A theoretical eclecticism, as a multi-purpose ‘tool kit’ for the analysis JSDF ODO, shall provide a context of understanding for operational evaluations.

\section{Evaluation Criteria}

JSDF ODO have often been judged as successful or not based upon criteria largely divorced from operational performance. The raising of national profile, loyalty to the United Nations, or to the US alliance have been among the most commonly assumed measures for evaluating Japanese ODO. This study focuses on the overseas operations in the 1990s and assesses if the JSDF have demonstrated effectiveness as national actors in multinational missions, and as agents of Japanese policy.

This naturally entails a degree of comparison with other nations, including those

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similarly emerging into the peacekeeping community, such as Germany and Korea, and veteran actors, such as Austria, Finland, and Canada, as well as ‘natural allies’, such as Australia and the United Kingdom. The United States provides such a contrast in scale, power, and doctrines that comparisons are of limited relevance. In this comparative process the JSDF will be referred to as the *de facto* Japanese military, despite not being so in legal and constitutional terms.\(^{24}\) This does not represent a prescriptive position or judgment regarding the constitution and the JSDF. It is a *de facto* recognition of like-for-like, akin to comparisons between coastguard forces, despite their military-civilian status depending upon the country.\(^{25}\)

In a unilateral form this thesis charts the learning curves of the JSDF from their initial ODO and how they have adapted to the diverse challenges of mission variants within ODO. It will provide answers to whether the JSDF have demonstrated the capacity to perform effectively, efficiently, and with quality as national actors representing Japan overseas.

The definitions of ‘effective, efficient, and quality’ are naturally problematic. The completion of the mandate would be a UN definition, while the minimum cost in ‘blood and gold’ would be a domestic socio-political standard of ‘success’. Politicians would naturally prioritise the political cost, with a lack of criticism almost as valued as indicators of effectiveness. In the 21\(^{\text{st}}\) century, Japanese governments increasingly regarded the inherent value of ‘showing the flag’ as in itself a matter for celebration, often isolated from operational criteria. The most consistent governmental measure of utility for JSDF ODO has been the ability to demonstrate loyalty and burden sharing to

\(^{24}\) JSDF members are designated as ‘special public servants’. There are no military tribunals, or courts martial, and personnel cannot be compelled to serve overseas.

\(^{25}\) The Japan Coastguard (JCG) is civilian, as is that of Canada, while the US Coastguard is a branch of the military.
Japan’s allies. While these standards are related to JSDF performance, they rely only upon the ability to adequately complete certain limited tasks and avoid embarrassing incidents and casualties. This, however, presumes that the JSDF have been conducting operations to non-professional standards, and to a purely domestic audience, which has not been the case. JSDF ODO have demonstrated examples of effectiveness, efficiency, and operational quality that have been valued by other contingents and nations and are worthy of detailed examination. R.J. O’Brien’s models of evaluation shall be adapted and applied in this thesis.\(^{26}\)

In studies of peacekeeping, conflict resolution theories are often utilised. These are of limited application to JSDF operations (concentrating upon infrastructure support rather than peacekeeping or peace-making), but elements can be effectively applied, such as Morton Deutsch’s analysis of basic peacekeeping skills: building working relationships, cultivating group identity, and knowledge of the mission context.\(^{27}\) These skills are rarely taught, and often the JSDF have been ignorant of their existence, reflecting the poverty of Japanese doctrinal development.

Operational experience has demonstrated that despite great progress, there remain significant ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ problems within and affecting the JSDF. These cannot be limited to a default critique based upon Article 9 of the constitution, as important as that is, beyond JSDF control, as are the range of duties they are required to conduct, and the degree to which ‘civilian control’ became an inflexible form of ‘bureaucratic control’, limiting professional military advice.

Other aspects have been, at least partly, within the remit of the JSDF. The JSDF

\(^{26}\) O’Brien, R.J., *Police as peacekeepers*.

remained largely wedded to the concepts of the ‘modern military age’: the notions of an industrial military. One criteria of evaluation for JSDF ODO effectiveness is how the Forces have been able to adapt to the range of ‘new operations’ characterized as Operations Other Than War (OOTW), or Post-Modern Military Operations (PMMO). While Rupert Smith has shown how most military forces remain locked in a traditional mindset the security challenges for Japan since 1990, together with the nature of the JSDF as a professional, well-resourced military, make this Cold War intellectual legacy difficult to understand.28 Territorial and resource claims, and security tensions in East Asia may render a conventional defence continuum appealing, but the regional security challenges are not primarily conventional military threats best countered by ‘industrial’ forces. There are legitimate questions as to what roles the JSDF realistically envisage for themselves other than ODO, and why resources for ODO-supportive ‘hardware’ (equipment, logistics) and ‘software’ (doctrine, training) remain so limited compared to ‘industrial military’ investment? The investments in ‘front heavy’ high-intensity warfare forces seem to suggest that conventional considerations continue to dominate in the JSDF.

Peacekeeping and other overseas deployment operations have provided the main operational arena in which the JSDF are required and able to utilise their professional capabilities. Whether they can be measured as fit for such tasks, depends upon the forms these operations take and the level of urgency required to undertake them. While in the public, and large sections of the political community, ‘PKO’ has been seen as a singularly amorphous blanket term, the reality is a diverse range of missions with varied requirements in hardware and software. To measure utility for such operations, the

'PKO' term requires further examination and definition, as does the degree of preparation provided by the JSDF to perform in such operations.

5 Structure

This thesis commences with an examination of the emergence and maturing of the JSDF in Chapter Two, their origins and constitutional position. Their political and social status will be probed, particularly the general lack of interest in military matters other than constitutional terms. Consequently, their Cold War roles will be examined, including command, control, and intelligence, defence procurement, and the configuration of the Forces into the 1990s. This will provide the context within which UNPKO dispatch was considered and how prepared the JSDF were for ODO, and for the specific missions selected.

Chapter Three provides a context for peacekeeping in terms of concepts and practice, from the nature of operations, the history and variety of definitions, the path towards Japanese participation entailing complex mediation of political, social, and legal factors, and the political and legal developments of Japanese PKO/ODO.

Chapter Four examines the three UN PKO deployments undertaken within the subject decade, in Cambodia, Mozambique, and the Golan Heights. It details the main operational and institutional challenges, and provides preliminary points of analysis within the four-point analytical framework.

Chapter Five examines the ‘Non-UN Operations’ integral to Japanese ‘International Peace Cooperation’ (IPC) policy: humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations, with the first JSDF ODO, the MSDF allied support minesweeping mission. While quite different to UNPKO, they are presented together in policy as constituting a single bloc.
They provide a useful comparative to UNPKO, subject to the same analytical framework, and link JDA IPC efforts with broader governmental human security approaches.

Chapter Six provides the main evaluation of JSDF performance. Critical comparisons are made of JSDF performance, and a cross-mission examination made of each Force’s achievements and weaknesses, as well as more fundamental aspects of the Japanese defence establishment, with a particular reference to the four main framework areas: mission context, preparation and logistics, performance, and contribution to mission. The effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of JSDF contributions will provide constant focal points as the main evaluation criteria.

The final evaluation, in Chapter Seven, will determine whether the JSDF demonstrated sufficient effectiveness, efficiency, and quality in ODO to be considered as effective international actors, with the additional examination of what such findings indicate for Japanese security policy. This final stage shall expand the range of consideration from JSDF ODO in the 1990s to encompass broader political and social issues, up to the present. It shall examine Japanese military tolerances, the factors of normalising and militarising, and the internal and external policy drivers that have led to re-evaluations of Japanese strategy and security.
Chapter 2  The Emergence and Maturing of the JSDF

1 Introduction: Emergence

When analysing the performance of most armed forces it is not usually necessary to investigate their founding. The rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1955 was controversial, but the controversy did not linger, partly, as Karl Deutsch and others indicated, (Western) Germany rearmed within a ‘pluralistic security community’, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), accommodating both norms of armed-defence and peaceful-coexistence. The JSDF, however, have been controversial due to their very existence. Born from para-military forces into a strident war-renouncing, anti-militarist culture, JSDF development and deployments overseas were affected by controversies concerning their status and legitimacy.

This chapter charts the emergence of the JSDF from the roots of post-war demilitarization, Cold War development, and maturation in the 1990s. While the limits imposed by the constitution and laws will be examined in Chapter Three, the ethos of the Forces, their training, management, leadership, and assigned roles are important for understanding ODO performance. Without this understanding it is difficult to evaluate how the JSDF could behave so differently from other armed forces.

A Status

The JSDF have often been utilised as reference points in wider political and diplomatic issues, and have rarely been analysed in terms of operational effectiveness,

efficiency, and quality. While not officially referred to as a military, they have also not been evaluated as such.

The fundamental problems of JSDF status relate to:

1. *De facto* military status and the imperial legacy.
2. Constitutional status in relation to Article 9.
3. Assigned roles: national defence, civil cooperation, and ‘miscellaneous duties’.

The effects of the perceived legacy from the imperial era are pertinent to JSDF ODO. The continuity was limited, but most pronounced between the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and the MSDF, while the GSDF eventually inherited some Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) personnel but little else. Whatever the actual continuity, for many in Japan, China, and Korea, JSDF ODO were disturbing phenomena. The principle that Japan could repeat previous mistakes, compounded by the failure of Japanese leaders to adequately atone for colonial and wartime aggression, and JSDF Cold War military growth, characterised by some as ‘remilitarisation’, disturbed many observers.  

China perceived this as, in Soeya, Welch, and Wang’s words, “an ominous shift toward its nightmare scenario.”  

Reinhard Drifte has described how many Chinese observers have noted that even if there is less fear of Japan’s ‘reversion’, there is concern that the US and Japan will attempt to ‘contain’ China.  

The JSDF and the ‘peace constitution’, will be considered in detail in Chapter Three. At this juncture it is sufficient to indicate that while successive Japanese governments...

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have interpreted Article 9 as allowing the JSDF it remains a significant limiting factor. Constitutional revision has been increasingly touted in the 21st century, yet with little progress.

The roles assigned to the JSDF are clearly linked to the preceding points. Successive Japanese governments have broadened the ‘legitimate’ roles to be played by the JSDF, usually in accordance with the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB), the body responsible for providing supposedly independent advice to political leaders. Initial internal-security roles were expanded to national (and adjacent maritime and aviation) defence, and thence to sea-lane security, regional security, and ODO. Gradually, the notion of purely national defence was diluted, often within the context of UN responsibilities.

While US forces in Japan maintained their impressive military presence, the JSDF avoided overt ‘militarism.’ ‘Belligerent’ weapons (bombers, aircraft carriers) were obviated by ‘defensive defence’ (senshu bouei the minimum for security). The incremental ‘militarisation’ or ‘normalisation’ of the JSDF has proved effective in circumventing domestic resistance but has not altogether increased confidence in the JSDF, nor in their political masters. Investment patterns have also done little to instil confidence, being expensive yet failing to provide many capabilities required for expanding post-Cold War roles.

While a Brookings Institute Visiting Fellow (2000), Sugawa Kiyoshi, a current Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Policy Advisor, presented three rationales concerning Japanese attitudes towards the JSDF. “The first being “anchoring the United States in the Alliance” (Alliance Supremacists); the second, “international contribution” (the

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United Nations Believers); and the third, the “maximization of security options” (New Realists).” He assessed each concerning JSDF UN peace operations:

Alliance Supremacists: “Japan will be willing to participate in UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations when the U.S. is ready to get involved. When the UN is paralyzed by Security Council disagreement, Japan under this rationale would act almost unconditionally with the U.S.”

UN Believers: “Based on a faith in the UN system as a legitimate conflict resolution mechanism and a strong aspiration to make a contribution to the UN, the international contribution rationale would theoretically push Japan to dramatically expand its support for UN operations, both peacekeeping and peace enforcement.”

New Realists: “would support UN peace operations that demand the overt use of force to the extent that such operations would address critical Japanese national interests.” Some would claim that, “Japan should have the option to participate in multilateral military operations even without UN authorization, as long as a Japanese vital interest is at stake.”

While the overt Japanese government position is both ‘UN Believer’ and ‘Alliance Supremacist’, this analysis illustrates the issues facing a rational consideration of JSDF ODO. Not only are the political-constitutional debates significant, but operational duties are often interpreted as signifying something of far greater import than actually stated. In considering JSDF ODO almost nothing is accepted at face value, for almost everything has a symbolic cultural and/or political aspect.

B Japan’s Security Status: Post-War to Cold War

The immediate post-war period was essentially one of abdication of security policy. During the occupation, however, the US shifted its stance from liberalisation to stabilization, and securitisation. The eventual step was independence and the formation of the JSDF under US tutelage within its Cold War communist containment strategy.

The Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP) assumed Japanese foreign and security responsibilities. This limited Japanese roles to host-nation support, and (gradually) police administration. There was little deviation from SCAP policy other than Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru attempting to balance between the PRC and RoC. The new constitution, initially drafted by SCAP, succeeded the Meiji constitution in April 1947. It greatly limited Japanese belligerent potential, and was generally embraced by Yoshida and his successors. This approach, most often referred to as the Yoshida Doctrine, “embracing defeat”, in John Dower’s terms, demonstrated both commitment to democracy and an indivisible loyalty to the US. As Yoshida stated in 1946; “Many recent conflicts have occurred under the guise of self-defense. Thus the recognition of self-defense will only invite war.”

American policy subtly changed during the SCAP-era. The 1947 Truman Doctrine and 1948-1949 Berlin Airlift demonstrated the emergence of Cold War and Secretary of the Army, Kenneth Royall, in 1948 praised Japan’s military-industrial capacity, and

suggested it might be utilised by the US.\(^{39}\) In March 1948, George Kennan, US Policy Planning Chief and architect of ‘containment’, visited Tokyo, known as the ‘Kennan Restoration’ or ‘reverse course’: the change of emphasis from reform, to the utilisation of Japan within US strategy.\(^{40}\) 1948 witnessed the increased use of Japanese police force during the summer of discontent, supported by US troops.\(^{41}\)

This assertiveness contrasted with previous SCAP restraint, demobilizing 6,983,000 personnel, and halving and localising police forces by 1946.\(^{42}\) SCAP refused Yoshida’s requests for police reform in 1947, but even the first Japan Socialist Party (JSP)-Liberal Party government (Katayama Tetsu), appreciated that police reinforcements were required.

Foreign Minister Ashida Hitoshi subsequently produced his ‘memorandum’ on independence, containing the novel idea of a security agreement whereby Japan assumed responsibility for Japanese internal security and the US external security. This discussion paper was, as Qingxin Ken Wang stated, “the first express official Japanese proposal to ask for an American guarantee of Japan’s security”.\(^{43}\) Robert Eldridge highlighted the several scarcely altering versions, and Martin E. Weinstein indicated that the memorandum set the basis for the Japan-US Security Alliance, US guarantees for Japanese security, and Japanese guarantees for internal stability in a ‘mutual security’

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\(^{40}\) Takemae, Eiji, *The Allied Occupation of Japan*: 458-462.


arrangement.\textsuperscript{44}

Tsuchiyama Jitsuo has described the Ashida memorandum as recognising the newly established norm of Article 9 within the discussion of Japan’s peace treaty.\textsuperscript{45} Japan’s independence and yet dependence “was not only a strategically calculated move but also a normatively appropriate option.”\textsuperscript{46} Events from 1948 prompted the emergence of another norm, the ‘Yoshida doctrine’ recognising the constitution as a pre-existing norm, but not the sole security consideration. Japan’s renunciation of force was no longer absolute but conditional, the conditions gradually loosening under US influence.

The conclusion of SCAP was preceded by the September 1951 Security Treaty and February 1952 agreement on US bases in Japan, including the US desire that Japan would, “increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense…always avoiding armament which would be an offensive threat.” Unsurprisingly, the San Francisco peace treaty explicitly stated Japanese rights of collective security.\textsuperscript{47} Japan was being recruited to a Cold War alliance.

The First Demobilization Ministry abolished the IJA, and the Second Demobilization Ministry scrapped the IJN fleet while simultaneously operating over 300 ex-IJN minesweepers, later under the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA).\textsuperscript{48} In 1950, the USN

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Tsuchiyama, Jitsuo, ‘War Renunciation, Article 9, and Security Policy’: 57.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
dispatched MSA armed minesweepers to Korea without consulting the Japanese cabinet.\(^{49}\) Despite Yoshida’s legal misgivings, Japanese ships “manned by the hardworking and loyal enemy aliens” greatly contributed to the Inchon landings.\(^{50}\) A Japanese sailor was killed and \textit{MS14} sunk by December 1950.\(^{51}\) Japan’s first post-war ODO demonstrated that the US regarded Japan as a Cold War asset despite Article 9, and that Yoshida would accede to US demands, contextualised as securing ‘peace for Japan’, with war-renunciation norms providing a fragile barrier to ODO.

A 1947 Police Law, expanded forces under central control, extended during the Korean War.\(^{52}\) Colonel Frank Kowalski, SCAP Deputy-Chief of Civil Affairs, was tasked with developing a National Police Reserve (NPR), US-trained and equipped, under nominal Japanese control.\(^{53}\) Despite dissent, it was obvious that politics had been drastically altered by the North Korean invasion.\(^{54}\) There was significant confusion over what the NPR signified, one founder assuming that it was a constabulary.\(^{55}\) Maeda Tetsuo asserts the August 1950 law defines the NPR as “a peacekeeping force that deals with civil unrest” under prime ministerial control with limited armament.\(^{56}\) The ‘peacekeeping force’ (\textit{heiwaijitai}) expanded into a shadow military for national defence.


\(^{52}\) Takemae, Eiji, \textit{The Allied Occupation of Japan}: 298-299; SCAP: 122,673 police 1948: MacArthur, Douglas, (General) and staff, \textit{Reports of General MacArthur: MacArthur in Japan}: 266.


\(^{54}\) Yamakawa, Kin, \textit{Japan’s Re-armament (Nihon no saigunbi)} (Tokyo: Iwanamishinsho, 1950).


\(^{56}\) Maeda, Tetsuo, \textit{The Hidden Army}: 8.
From 1952 the National Safety Forces (NSF), under a National Safety Board (NSB, later Agency), and expanded from 75,000 to 110,000 personnel, by 1954 it had acquired artillery, aircraft, and tanks (designated ‘special vehicles’: *tokubetsu sharyou*). The Coastal Security Force (CSF *Kaijou keibitai*), later the Maritime Safety Force (MSF *Keibitai*), received 18 US frigates from 1953. The NSF became a small, conventional military, under the NSB and Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). It was a brief interlude before the founding of the JSDF in 1954, with the JDA (*Boueichou*), and Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA *Bouei shisetsuchou*), and independent National Police Agency (NPA).

The three JSDF broke with the imperial past and conformed to US patterns, providing each Force with a ‘senior service’ partner, most fully realized by the ASDF and MSDF, the GSDF struggling to establish an equivalent US partnership. The JSDF were closely integrated into a Cold War relationship generally subordinate to US security priorities.

### C JSDF and Cold War Security Policy

The founding of the JSDF was determined by changing perceptions of the Cold War and the US relationship. Based on the 1948 US Senate Vandenberg Resolution, aiding allied security efforts, the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) Agreement of 8th March 1954 provided Japan access to MDA. Japan’s position was significantly different from that of NATO members which had maintained or re-established military capabilities. In Japan, domestic sentiments hindered security reform, with gradual revisions side-stepping negative public reaction. Despite Dulles and Robertson’s

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demands to expand the JSDF to 325,000 personnel, they grew gradually from 110,000 to 180,000 GSDF personnel, sanctioned as the maximum acceptable to the public and minimum to placate the Americans, in an early example of mediation.\textsuperscript{60} However, Tokyo offered the requested naval and air forces, and increased civilian staff.\textsuperscript{61}

The National Defense Policy Outline (NDPO) of 20\textsuperscript{th} May 1957 was the first attempt to provide strategic direction for security policy and JSDF roles, largely unchanged for 40 years, with four (overtly idealistic) key policies:

1. To support the activities of the United Nations and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to world peace.
2. To promote public welfare and enhance the people's love for the country, thereby establishing the sound basis for Japan's security.
3. To incrementally develop the capabilities necessary for self-defence, with regard to the nation's resources and prevailing domestic situation.
4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations...in deterring and repelling such aggression.\textsuperscript{62}

These themes remained constant: stated ‘UN-centricity’, peace norms within security policy, gradual expansion of JSDF, and reliance upon the US alliance. The inclusion of UN references was a continuation of attempts to ‘sell’ the 1951 Security Treaty to the Japanese public, particularly US bases in Japan. The UN-centric references were used,


as Yoshida remarked, like “a ‘silk hat’ to dress up this unattractive reality.” Reinhard Drifte has illustrated how Yoshida used such UN-centric notions to both win domestic support and to emphasise the restraints on his government when under US pressure. Ann Sherif has illustrated how imperative this became after the Lucky Dragon No.5 (Daigo fukuryou-maru) nuclear-test contamination incident energised ‘peace activism’. From 1957, the JDA, with few policymaking powers, seconded-officials, and rigorous ‘civilian control’, administered rather than governed defence.

The 1957 Outline clearly united military alliance, JSDF, and international peace and cooperation, building upon the 1956 Basic Atomic Energy Law, limiting nuclear power to peaceful purposes. This could be viewed as a pragmatic or cynical Yoshida demonstration that despite re-armament Japan remained dedicated to pacifist norms. This seemingly illogical duality of ‘armed-pacifism’ was the ‘least-worst’ solution for a country critically divided, and from 1955 became embedded with Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) administrations opposed by the JSP.

**D The Defence Build-up Phase: Cold War and the JSDF**

The pattern of the ‘Build-up Phase’ of the JSDF can be seen as continued US leadership in strategy. Strategy and priorities were set by the US, and there was little support either within the US or Japan for overseas operations in support of the UN. The

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US regarded them as peripheral, while Japan didn’t develop an independent strategy beyond the US alliance. The JSDF during the Cold War, like in NATO militaries, became largely embedded in single-scenario alliance missions.

American pressure and encouragement continued for Japan to assume an ever greater share of the ‘western’ burden. The US provided substantial resources, initially surplus but increasingly new, sophisticated equipment, even funding destroyer construction in 1957. Richard J. Samuels has illustrated how even machine-tools and log-books were provided to domestically produce F86F and F104J jet-fighters. The GSDF domestically designed tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APC) from 1960. The emphasis upon domestic production ( kokusan) was logical given Japan’s fragile economy and exchange rates (until 1966 ¥360/$). JSDF strengthening would not impair the ‘dash for growth.’

While each defence build-up plan was significant, there was little sense of a massive ‘remilitarisation’, as defence budgets remained slight, yet developments were remarkable. MSDF tonnage reached 100,000 tonnes in 1961 and 300,000 tonnes by 1990, with 244 GSDF tanks in 1952, 1000 by 1966, and over 1200 by 1992. The qualitative improvement was even more noticeable, particularly in aircraft, though with consequently reduced quantity.

The JSDF resembled a NATO military for ‘hedgehog’ defence: making invasion

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prohibitively expensive. However, despite the Guidelines and build-up, the country still had, in James Auer’s terms, “a non-policy”, on defence planning and strategy in order to avoid domestic conflict, the JSDF being unable to conduct operations, “other than perhaps to sweep mines, which there was a capability for before the SDF.” Togo Kazuhiko has similarly decried the lack of a strategic consideration in Japan, matched by a lack of consideration for ODO.

The tumult prior to the 1960 Japan-United States Treaty of Mutual Peace and Security and ‘economy first’ policies excluded overseas operations, but increasing JSDF capability and post-Vietnam US force reductions brought increasing pressures. Thus the ‘Defense and Security Framework’ discussions began, resulting in the 1976 NDPO, and 1978 ‘Guidelines’. Although based upon a report of the ‘Group to think about defence’ (Bouei wo kangaerukai), as Mike Mochizuki noted, the JDA announced, “a force structure that pretty much reflected the current levels of the Self-Defense Force” with minor reshuffling. There was clearly little original thought in Japanese defence, being politically, in Kent Calder’s phrase, “an orphan”.

The MSDF had become critical in USN Pacific policy providing ‘niche capabilities’ in minesweeping and anti-submarine warfare (ASW), the Japanese archipelago and MSDF ‘gatekeepers’ penning the Soviet Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok. The ASDF provided air-superiority, while the GSDF provided the holding force, to repel an

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75 Calder, Kent E., *Crisis and Compensation*: 423.
unlikely invasion of Hokkaido. All three Forces were *de facto* supporting arms of the US Pacific Fleet.

The roles of the JSDF, increasingly integrated into US strategies, suited their status. As Ralf Dahrendorf expounded in the late 1950s, status is often a major factor in determining to whom actors see themselves allied and opposed, and the tendency for alliances to also breed mutual enmities.\(^{77}\) The JSDF, through emulating and cooperating with the US, were able to gain an elevation of status unavailable domestically. Karl Deutsch and David Singer illustrated in 1964 that in a multi-polar world, within bipolar relationships, there is a “limited attention capability of each nation in the system” so that relationships rarely maintain a steady degree of engagement.\(^{78}\) As with other US ‘special relationships’ that with Japan experienced fluctuations not always ameliorated by military cooperation.

Japan was chided for its US balance of payments surplus, was criticised by the Reagan Administration regarding defence budgets at the 1981 US-Japan Security Conference, and was called upon to assert an international presence at the Williamsburg Summit of May 1983.\(^{79}\) Congressional criticism continued throughout the 1980s, extending beyond ‘welcome *gaiatsu*’, whereby external pressure allows a ministry to overcome domestic opposition. As John P. Tuman and Jonathan R. Strand comment, “foreign pressure is more likely to succeed in influencing Japanese policy when a key ministerial agency – usually *Gaimusho* – relies on such pressure as a justification for a


policy already favoured.” Miyashita Akitoshi has detailed how Japan has paid particular attention to US wishes, and how these have been represented in policy. This gaiatsu had a cumulative effect and may well have contributed to overcoming domestic opposition to JSDF ODO. However, Japan’s partial compliance underwhelmed Washington, and gave Japan little room for manoeuvre during the Gulf War crisis. Nishihara Masashi estimated that it would require over a decade to meet US expectations under the 1976 NDPO. It would actually take a new security environment, and new security imperatives for ODO ‘burden sharing.’

Expansion of the JSDF was driven by the Cold War, US pressure, increased wealth, and political leadership, particularly Nakasone Yasuhiro. The 1970s in Asia included turmoil in China and Indo-China, US military reductions, and Soviet military expansion. The MSDF developed within the context of increased Soviet Pacific Fleet activity, prompting sea-lane defence to 1000 miles from 1982, affecting ASDF operations, as did ‘scrambles’ fearing Soviet Backfire bombers. GSDF forces concentrated in Hokkaido intended firepower to compensate for manpower shortages.

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85 Conversation, Ebata, Kensuke, Keio University, Shonan Fujisawa Campus (SFC), November 2001.
While some militaries conducted overseas operations, the JSDF had no such alternative operational scenarios, the GSDF being particularly poorly prepared for ODO challenges.

2 Maturing: JSDF Configuration and Roles

It is necessary to appreciate JSDF configuration and roles in order to evaluate how they adapted to and performed in ODO. What major factors drove defence policy, and influenced command, control, and intelligence? How were the forces organised, managed, led, and jointly coordinated? Examining these will provide an appreciation of the tasks facing military and civilian leaders in JSDF ODO in the 1990s.

A Command, Control, and Intelligence

While the military power of the JSDF grew during the Cold War, the command, control, and intelligence capabilities developed more slowly. The normative anti-militarist demands of ‘civilian control’ limited the scope for the defence community to influence its own capabilities and operations.

a JSDF Command and Control

The JSDF have been subject to restrictive command and control procedures due to the overriding need to demonstrate ‘civilian control’. Morris Janowitz defined the democratic civilian control as “Military leaders obey the government because they accept the basic national and political goals of a democracy”. Civilian control in Japan has greatly elevated civilian officials over uniformed servants, with the JDA under the

Hikotani Takako suggests that Japanese ‘civilian control’ (bunmin tousei) compares well with other countries in preventing military dominance of government, but poorly in leadership-accountability. She suggests that the weak positions of ministers, in relation to political parties and ministries, seriously limits their leadership, with collusion between parties and bureaucracy limiting defence transparency.

The effects have been to marginalise the JSDF in advice on defence policy, with conventions and laws providing few opportunities for professional officers to exercise initiative (see Chapter Three). While successful in preventing ‘militaristic reversion’, it has also retarded contingency planning, training, and doctrinal development, and resulted in JSDF officers being forced to retire for protocol breaches, such as GSDF General Kurisu Hiroomi, Joint Staff Council (JSC tougou bakuryou kaigi) Chairman, in 1978. The effects were seen in the slow JSDF response to the 1995 Hanshin Earthquake, and lack of ODO preparation in 1992. However, ASDF Chief of Staff Tamogami Toshio’s outspoken comments in 2008 reinforced perceptions for the need for strict civilian control. Even former Defense Vice-Minister Natsume Haruo commented that a “growing number of Japanese have started supporting the SDF after seeing their activities overseas” resulting in some JSDF officers becoming “excessively

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self-confident” and “arrogant”.93

The basic policy outline and roles of the JSDF were, from 1957, national defence, domestic support, and miscellaneous duties.94 While the first duty appears straightforward, ‘defensive defence’ made certain capabilities controversial. The second duty covered disaster relief and police-support role duties. The third category eventually covered ODO, sporting, and cultural events. The 1996 NDPO, redefined secondary duties as “response to large-scale disasters and various other situations”, third-line duties as “creation of a more stable security environment” without further definition.95 The 1998 defence white paper stated that IPC duties “are characterized as an incidental, not a primary, mission of the SDF” and would remain so until the Ministry of Defense (MOD) was established in 2007 (see Chapter Three).96

Leadership-accountability problems hindered JSDF command and control. Command was exercised by the Prime Minister issuing directives to the DG-JDA, who issued orders to the JSDF through his Senior-Vice-Minister for Defense (SVMD bouei fuku chouchou). The SVMD’s office (and JDA Internal Bureaux (naibu bokyoku)) gained power, with most DG-JDA appointed for a year or less, and the JSC treated merely as an adjunct to, rather than command of, the Forces. The failure to prepare for ODO cannot be blamed on this system, but it contributed to professional military advice and cooperation being marginalised.97

The lack of influence of the JSDF has been aggravated by their separateness, more

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interested in ‘special relationships’ with US services. The JSDF ‘joint approach’ was embodied in the JSC, however, the development of individual Forces was prioritised and only from the 1980s did joint working practices emerge. The Joint Staff College (Tougou bakuryou gakkou) established in 1961 continued education beyond the (joint) National Defense Academy (NDA), but from the 1980s administrative reforms signified a creeping increase of joint considerations.\(^{98}\)

The JSC and Joint Staff Office (JSO Tougou bakuryou mukyoku) were established in 1954, with staff sections (J1-J5).\(^{99}\) The Operational Analysis Office (Bunseki shitsu) was founded within J5 in 1985, the Research Office (Kenkyuu shitsu) within the Joint Staff College in 1988, and two logistics offices (within J4) in 1989. The Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH: Jouhou honbu) replaced J2 (Intelligence), but not until 1999 did J3 receive a Command and Coordination operational groups, and (2002) Foreign Liaison section, with Foreign Plans and Policy in J5. In late March 2004, the Joint Operations and Planning Office (JOPO Tougou bakuryou kanbu) was formed in J5.\(^{100}\) The net effect allowed the JSDF develop plan, command, and control its first joint operation, the Indonesia disaster-relief dispatch, 2005.

Despite this, the OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) situation report indicated JSDF ‘joint’ problems, and NIDS researchers have also found JSDF ‘jointery’ unimpressive, with no effort made to utilise ASDF-MSDF officers in GSDF-led ODO until 2003.\(^{101}\) Contrary views have been expressed by JSDF members,

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\(^{98}\) History of Joint Staff, Joint Staff (http://www.mod.go.jp/jso/e_history.htm, 12 January 2010).
\(^{99}\) NATO ‘Staff Sections’ are denoted as ‘S’ (staff), or ‘J’ (joint staff): 1, General Affairs (accounts/personnel); 2, Intelligence; 3, Operations (exercises/deployments); 4, Logistics; 5, Plans and Policy; 6, Command, Control, Communications, Computers (see Appendix Three, p.408).
\(^{100}\) JSO, MOD, (http://www.mod.go.jp/jso/english/e-organization.htm, 12 January 2010).
\(^{101}\) Disaster Relief Activities by Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) in Indonesia (Jakarta: Embassy of Japan, 23 January 2005), (http://www.id.emb-japan.go.jp/news05_11e.html, 13 August 2007); OCHA Situation Report No. 23 Earthquake and Tsunami Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka (2 February
and also by Alessio Patalano (King’s College) who has stated that the joint NDA provides a unique opportunity for developing working relations.\textsuperscript{102} While valid, there remains limited JSDF joint training and basing.

Confusion between joint (national) and combined (international) training/operations is common, Ebata Keisuke expressing dismay at JSDF officers confusing the terms.\textsuperscript{103} USN officers seconded to NIDS have disappointedly noted that the JSDF suffer from US-like ‘stovepipes’, with services vertically but not laterally connected.\textsuperscript{104}

The first ODO-related Joint Command Post Exercise (\textit{Tougou zujou enshuu}) conducted in February 2008. It was innovative for the participants included Japanese and overseas, military and civilian, official and NGO, with independent observers providing critical comments and suggestions for improvements.\textsuperscript{105} This military-civil-NGO engagement was proposed by Kusano Atsushi in 1998.\textsuperscript{106}

**Conclusion**

In ODO, JSDF commanders have been greatly limited by a highly restrictive civilian control culture with little notion of professional trust, starkly contrasting with British civil-military culture.\textsuperscript{107} This lack of trust entails regular consultations during ODO,

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotesize \textsuperscript{102} Patalano, Alessio, presentations, \textit{From Kaigun to Kaiji: Seapower and National Security in Post-Cold War Japan}, Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo (24 July 2007); \textit{Beyond the Alliance’s Horizon? Japan’s International Security Engagement}, Temple University, Tokyo (2 April 2010).
\footnotesize \textsuperscript{103} Maeda, Tetsuo, \textit{The Hidden Army}: 261; Ebata, Keisuke, presentation, Keio University (November 2001).
\footnotesize \textsuperscript{104} Conversations with USN officers at NIDS, Tokyo (July 2007); presentation, Rann, David, (Colonel, USMC Attaché), Keio University, SFC, (June 2002).
\footnotesize \textsuperscript{106} Conversations with Kusano Atsushi (2002-2003).
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with the JDA/MOD, the IPCH, local Japanese representatives (Ambassador, MoFA/JICA, JDA/MOD), and visiting VIPs, despite contrary UN guidelines. The JSDF is not unique in this, but the lack of operational command experience, the inability of the JSO to command, lack of planning cells, and the restrictions imposed upon commanders greatly complicated ODO in the 1990s.

b Japanese Intelligence

Intelligence gathering has been a longstanding JSDF weakness, with little intrinsic intelligence gathering capability, and limited capacity to utilise US resources compared with Britain, Canada, and Australia. The main intelligence gathering bodies are the JDA, JSDF, the NPA, the MSA, MoFA, and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), under nominal Cabinet Secretariat management. There are no direct equivalents of the British Security or Secret Services, and capabilities, particularly human intelligence (HUMINT), have been weak. Japan particularly lacks African and the Middle Eastern capabilities, and civil resources, such as SOAS and l’Institut du Monde Arabe.108 Japan’s intelligence capabilities have been affected by what Kotani Ken has described as “rampant sectionalism” within ministries/agencies, and poor information security.109 The value of intelligence to ODO has seemingly been little understood and neglected.110

The JDA’s main intelligence division is the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), which reports to the JSC. With 2400 personnel, it is the largest intelligence institution,

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with particular signals intelligence (SIGINT) responsibilities. JSDF ‘military information gathering’, is to, “gather, sort, and analyze military radio waves…reaching Japan from abroad…to obtain information necessary for national defense” with little capacity to support ODO, with extreme Japanese sensitivity over intelligence for ODO. Martin Rudner has illustrated how, “peace support operations require Information and Intelligence capabilities” and that “capabilities for peace support and other OOTW missions must relate to operational situations of far greater complexity and...ambiguity compared to...traditional combat operations”.113

The 46 JSDF Defense Attachés in 35 countries (2002) pass all intelligence-related communications through MoFA, with direct JSDF/JDA/MOD communications prohibited. Their role is ‘information gathering’, and for ODO their responsibilities mainly entail building relations with prospective partners.

Outside of the JDA, the Cabinet Office National Public Safety Commission (NPSC Kokka koan iinkai), supervises the NPA, and under Prime Minister Nakasone the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office (CIRO) (Naikaku jouhou chousa shitsu) was established in 1986, with a Director of Cabinet Intelligence (DCI) from 1997. The Cabinet Information Center (1996) and Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSIC Naikaku eisei jouhou sentaa) (2001) consolidated the Cabinet Office’s coordination role, but despite its many intelligence functions, it cannot effectively manage intelligence,

remaining an intelligence consumer, heavily reliant upon MoFA briefings.

Within MoFA the only dedicated intelligence organ is the Intelligence and Analysis Bureau, but it is limited to matters not covered by regional or specialist bureaux.\footnote{MoFA, Organization and Function (http://www.mofa.go.jp/about/hq/org.html, 10 December 2008).} MoFA Bureaux hoard intelligence, and there is little overall analysis.

Since 1952, the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA \textit{Kouan chosacho}) has supported MoJ anti-subversion activities, but has few resources and many duties, including monitoring international terrorist threats.\footnote{‘Protecting Japan Part III: Sectionalism hampering nation’s espionage’, \textit{The Daily Yomiuri} (5 June 2004): 1; \textit{PSIA 2002 Review and Prospect of Internal and External Situations (Kouan chosachou Heisei15nen saku naigai jousei no kaiko to tenbou)}, December 2002, (http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/021225-1/021225-1-1.html, 17 July 2009).} PSIA support for the JSDF is limited by resources, and has conflicted with the NPA, which shares anti-terrorism roles and also has representatives in Japanese embassies providing useful intelligence resources.\footnote{“Protecting Japan Part III: Sectionalism hampering nation’s espionage”, \textit{The Daily Yomiuri}: Interview, Yamazaki, Hiroto, President, National Police Academy, NPA, Fuchu, Tokyo (31 July 2009).}

The pattern of non-defence intelligence is diverse efforts with little coordination, and jealousy, leading to retention of data within one ministry/agency/bureau. This patchwork is also clear in Japanese satellite intelligence.

JSDF were prohibited from acquiring them, and there was no agreement to access US material. Suzuki Kazuto has stated the JSDF became starkly aware of their lack of capabilities for ODO and monitoring North Korea.\textsuperscript{119} This resulted in the CSIC, the launching of four intelligence satellites (2003-2007), and the partial abandonment of ‘non-military space principles’ in 2008.\textsuperscript{120}

Despite the obvious central functions of the Cabinet Office and PMO, there is no centralized intelligence office, and insufficient use made of gathered intelligence. There was, “no system to integrate intelligence collected by each agency/ministry at the PM’s Official Residence...and...the Cabinet Secretariat has limited access to such information.”\textsuperscript{121} The JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee) lacks the checking and counter-analysis processes of UK JIC, without a permanent staff or specialists found in the UK, so that raw data remains unprocessed.\textsuperscript{122} The British model was found wanting in 2003, as system-management had failed, not the structure.\textsuperscript{123} If such well-balanced intelligence architecture can fail, it prompts questions regarding the effectiveness of Japanese systems.

\textsuperscript{120} Yoshimura, Keisuke, ‘Not registered with the UN: Japan’s spy satellites are an open secret’, \textit{Kyodo News/Japan Times} (15 June 2007) (http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070615f1.html, 17 June 2007); ‘Diet OK's military use of space / Law marks shift toward space strategy’, \textit{Yomiuri Shimbun} (22 May 2008) (http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20080522TDY01305.htm, 26 May 2008).
There are also significant problems in the retention of information, with US AEGIS files passed to Russian and Chinese sources. Yanai Shinsaku, a former intelligence officer commented that, “the authorities try to play it down...[because] they will really be discredited in the eyes of the Americans.” Without courts martial or severe civil sentences, some fear Japan is regarded as a security liability. Richard L. Armitage stated in 2000:

intelligence sharing with Japan contrasts sharply with the increasingly close relationships we have enjoyed with our NATO partners in this area. …peacekeeping and peacemaking require greater cooperation and integration of allied intelligence capabilities...[and] Tokyo has made it clear that existing U.S.-Japan intelligence ties do not meet its needs.

Ebata Keisuke has conjectured that Japan faces being excluded from high-level intelligence, becoming like Denmark in the Iraq War, receiving only intelligence summaries and consequently participating in a war it might have avoided with better intelligence access and analytical capabilities.

**Conclusion**

Due to civilian control priorities, and mediation between ministries, JSDF
command and control systems allowed little of either by uniformed professionals, and an intelligence community that contributed little to ODO. The degree to which operational capabilities were simply not considered valid might seem extraordinary were it not for all the actors in the system having become quite familiar with the constraints and limitations within which they have operated.

B Fundamental Force Posture

Force posture policies have had an enduring effect on the JSDF, fundamentally affecting ‘Force culture’ and therefore ability and willingness to conduct ODO. In 1988, the JSDF numbered 247,191 (156,216 GSDF, 44,410 MSDF, 46,405 ASDF), 25,000 below establishment-strength.\textsuperscript{128} Matching operational requirements with skills was the challenge, and without recourse to reservists, as newly established GSDF Ready and Volunteer Reserves (1998-2001) could not be deployed overseas, despite including vital linguists.\textsuperscript{129} Female personnel increased to 10,000 by 2002, despite career barriers and discrimination, and, in accordance with UN Resolution 1325, JSDF women have participated in ODO, in small numbers, from 2002.\textsuperscript{130} JDA personnel declined to 1994 (18,043), rising thereafter (23,262: 2007), but civilian support to the JSDF remained one-third the proportional establishment of Australia.\textsuperscript{131} JSDF ODO faced extensive

challenges of matching personnel and equipment with tasks, and overcoming institutional norms.

a GSDF

The GSDF have provided most personnel for Japanese ODO, and while with hindsight their abilities may seem natural, confidence was not altogether high prior to 1992. The reasons that interviewees provide are the lack of operational experience and Cold War configuration.

The GSDF has been configured as a conventional army with Infantry, Armour, and Artillery, and since the 1990s the Aviation and Chemical Branches (shokushu) dominating staff ranks. However, the Quartermaster and Transport Corps have seen extensive ODO service.

Table 2.1 GSDF Branches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
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<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>Futsuuka</td>
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<td>Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Field)</td>
<td>Yasentokka</td>
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<td>(Air-Defence)</td>
<td>Koushatokka</td>
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<td>Armour</td>
<td>Kikouka</td>
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<td>Engineers</td>
<td>Shisetsuka</td>
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<td>Aviation</td>
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<td>Signals</td>
<td>Tsushinka</td>
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<td>Chemical</td>
<td>Kagakuka</td>
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<td>Medical</td>
<td>Eiseika</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>Juhinka</td>
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<td>Ordnance</td>
<td>Bukika</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Yusouka</td>
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\[132\] Interviews with GSDF officers.
Among the five GSDF Regional Armies (Houmentai), the Northern Army (Hokkaido) is the largest and best-equipped, and remains the GSDF ‘centre’, partly as its Type-90 main battle tanks (MBT) cannot be easily transported.\textsuperscript{133} Each Army is tasked to repel invasion, provide disaster relief, and supply ODO units on a rotation basis.\textsuperscript{134}

From March 2007, the Central Readiness Force (CRF \textit{Chuuou sokuou shuudan}) has provided a rapid-reaction capability and acted as both ‘force consumer’ and ‘force provider’ for ODO. The CRF acts as a broker, requesting Army forces for the MOD and International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (IPCH \textit{Kokusai Heiwa Kyouryoku Jimukyouku}), preparing and dispatching them for ODO. The previous rotation system prevented the accumulation of ODO ‘lessons-learned’ capabilities, such duties considered temporary burdens rather than primary roles. The foundation of the CRF provided focus for ODO-related training and a ‘home’ for specialist units, such as special and airborne forces, and from 2008 the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit (\textit{Kukokusai katsudou kyouikutai}).\textsuperscript{135} The CRF is a demonstration of the increased attention paid to ODO by the GSDF.

The abilities of all of the Armies to provide quality engineering, medical, sanitation, water treatment, and other units for ODO is notable, with competence based upon domestic disaster relief experience. However, the GSDF and JDA appeared reluctant to

\textsuperscript{134} Innovation 2020, GSDF/MOD: 12.
\textsuperscript{135} Briefing and interviews, Lt-Col. Takano Hiroaki, and Major Sakai Manabu, CRF, Tokyo (29 June 2009).
devote resources to ODO-specific applications, particularly training and doctrinal development, and considering GSDF aviation contributions to ODO, perhaps indicating that ODO were considered more suitable for low-tech ‘supporting’ rather than high-tech ‘frontline’ branches.

b MSDF

The MSDF Districts were reduced from ten to five between 1995 and 2010, greater emphasis being placed upon the Naval Aviation, Fleet Escort, and Submarine Forces administered through the Self-Defense Fleet, with lesser escorts and minesweepers under District control.\(^\text{136}\) The MSDF adheres to Cold War practice of full flotilla anti-submarine warfare (ASW) training.\(^\text{137}\)

Quantitatively escorts have been reduced by approximately 10% since 1995, offset by qualitative improvements, and minesweeping reduced from two flotillas to one, while naval aviation remains remarkably strong.\(^\text{138}\) For this study, the rise of amphibious and expeditionary capabilities were the most significant change in the 1990s, with the 1\(^{\text{st}}\) Transport Force (1TF Daiichi yusoutai), Kure, operating (from 1998) the Oosumi-class amphibious landing vessels, with one at immediate readiness, another in refit, and the third working-up.

The MSDF training cycle has included overseas training or defence diplomacy deployments, interrupted by minesweeping or domestic disaster relief, including island support, such as the evacuation of Miyakejima in 2000.\(^\text{139}\) MSDF ODO usually entailed

\(^\text{137}\) Patalano, Alessio, From Kaigun to Kaiji.
\(^\text{138}\) Defense of Japan 2002: 162.
transport by 1TF, and fast combat-support (AOE) ships detached from ASW flotillas.\textsuperscript{140}

The MSDF ability to support ODO grew after 1998, but from a low base. In 1992 the GSDF partly deployed to Cambodia in two MSDF ships, cramped, slow, and uncomfortable, yet able to complete the tasks required. The AOE provided highly effective support, but was one of only four designated for 62 escorts.\textsuperscript{141} With refits, the MSDF would normally have only two such vessels available, constituting a vital yet slender resource normally, indicative of MSDF emphasis upon combat forces and relative neglect of ‘capability multiplying’ support resources.

c  ASDF

The ASDF maintains three Air Forces, and a Composite Air Division (Okinawa) within the Air Defense Command (ADC \textit{Koukuu soutai}) which oversees the BADGE system of air threat management.\textsuperscript{142} Transport forces reside within Air Support Command (ASC \textit{Koukuu shien shuudan}), particularly the 1\textsuperscript{st} Tactical Airlift Group (1TAG) based at Komaki (Nagoya).\textsuperscript{143} While the transport services of the ASDF have lesser budget priority, they and the search and rescue forces are the only elements to have seen operational deployment. Frustration at being equipped with aircraft ill-suited to JSDF ODO was somewhat relieved by the entry into service of the first strategic freighter-tanker \textit{KC-767} in May 2009.\textsuperscript{144} However, the missions in the 1990s depended upon the medium-range \textit{C-130H}, supplemented by shorter-ranged aircraft and two

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Defense of Japan} 2002: 115-121.
\textsuperscript{142} \textit{Defense of Japan} 2002: 167.
\textsuperscript{143} \textit{ASDF Base Local Information (Koukuujietai kichi shouzaichi)} (http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/about/organization/shouzaichi/, 10 May 2010).
Boeing-747 aircraft operated primarily as VIP transports. The ASC while technically adept proved to be an ODO logistics bottleneck.

C Defence Investment

In all countries, defence budgets are difficult to evaluate for efficiency and effectiveness. Japan is unique for the political value attached to spending at a certain level of GNP, Prime Minister Miki announcing a 1%/GNP ceiling in 1976, partly to balance projected defence budget increases.\textsuperscript{145} This non-legislative ceiling recognized pacifist norms, illustrated by protests when the Nakasone government increased budgets to 1.01%.\textsuperscript{146}

Defence budgeting in Japan has been characterised by John Creighton Campbell as detached from security requirements, but dependent upon internal and external balancing. Campbell identified ‘budget balancing’ between and within ministries/agencies, as a post-war norm, so “that balance is an important value in itself”.\textsuperscript{147} Therefore, budgets have not been based upon need-assessments, but on institutional-balancing and mediation.

Commentators have suggested that the true defence budget is higher than published, particularly if judged by NATO standards. Richard J. Samuels proposed a figure of 2%.


\textsuperscript{146} Interview with Jameson, Sam, Tokyo (29 May 2010).

of GNP for the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{148} Chris Hughes has suggested 1.2-1.3\% throughout the 1990s.\textsuperscript{149} Samuels has included the JCG, “a fourth branch of the Japanese military”, while NATO from 2004 has excluded forces not “realistically deployable”.\textsuperscript{150} The Hughes estimates, with satellite and JCG elements, would appear to provide an equitable basis for research.

The defence budget peaked in 1997 (¥4.94 trillion).\textsuperscript{151} The GSDF spent the lowest proportion on equipment, as it struggled to recruit and retain personnel, while the MSDF struggled to man equipment.\textsuperscript{152} All three Forces also concentrated their procurement budgets on expensive, conventional combat technologies, mainly \textit{kokusan}, even when cost implications have been immense.\textsuperscript{153}

This procurement focus was driven by JSDF commitment to RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) Concepts, and RMA-centered technologies. As the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) \textit{East Asia Strategic Review 2001} stated, Japanese RMA lacked a graduated conflict approach, and wasn’t applied to PKO/ODO, unlike US RMA-concepts.\textsuperscript{154} While RMA has been mainstreamed, doctrine has been neglected, despite developments worldwide, mirrored by limited foreign languages and

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Samuels, Richard J., “\textit{Rich Nation, Strong Army}”: 185.
\item Hughes, Christopher W., \textit{Japan’s Remilitarisation}: 149-150.
\end{thebibliography}
ODO-specific training, with little use made of international PKO training establishments.

a GSDF

Japan produced original armoured vehicle designs, but resources, capabilities, and needs have not been well balanced. As Ebata Kensuke commented, Japan developed three MBTs (Types-61, 74, and 90) each late, costly, and lacking upgrades, despite the importance of upgrading within NATO armoured forces. Modernised Canadian Leopard-1 MBTs, were deployed to Afghanistan (2006) in an effective and efficient use of ‘legacy’ resources for ODO. In 2011, the Type-74 remains un-modernised, while the Type-90 cannot be readily transported outside of Hokkaido. Immediate land-threats, poor civilian control, and legacy systems do not explain the GSDF ‘armourization’, nor the relative MBT-obsession and APC- neglect.

APC proved valuable in ODO for protection and deterrence of ‘spoilers’. However, the logistical effort required to transport them has proved beyond many countries, and political sensitivities have also affected dispatch. The UN has insisted that they be painted white to emphasise non-belligerent roles. The GSDF understood how other

157 Ebata, Kensuke, Weapons that can be used, weapons that can’t be used. Volume Two (Tsukaeru heiki, tsukaenai heiki (gekan)) (Tokyo: Namikishobou, 1997): 358-359.
militaries adapted to ‘unconventional’ operations with shrinking budgets and legacy materiel. The Type-89 armoured infantry fighting vehicle (AIFV 89shiki soukou senntousha) resembles Warrior (UK), which provided a niche asset in Bosnia (1992-1995), as “size...and numbers impress.” 160 The Type-89 has not been operationally deployed overseas, appearing overly combative, 26.5 tonnes being difficult to transport, and tremendously expensive due to drip-feed production.161

The Type-82 six-wheeled armoured command-control vehicle (tsuushinsha) and the Type-87 armoured reconnaissance vehicle (ARV teisatsu keikaisha) have been deployed overseas despite being large and lacking modern sensors.162 The effective Type-96 eight-wheel APC (sourin soukousha) was deployed to Iraq to support the Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) (keisoudou kidousha).163 The LAV is the culmination of limited GSDF APC development for ODO, with 150-200 vehicles per year (2001-2008), each costing only ¥35 million, 28% of the Type-96, and a third of the US M114, and being easily air-portable.164 In a rare case of superior Japanese military design, the LAV was praised by allied personnel in Iraq.165

GSDF niche capabilities have been demonstrated by soft-skinned specialist vehicles, including cranes and bulldozers. Water-purification vehicles developed for domestic disaster relief roles have become among the most valued ODO assets, with air-mobile ‘one piece’ field kitchens, laundries, and water purification trailer-sets.166 Part of the motivation has been the role that pure water played in IJA overseas experience, with

165 Comments by British military attaché (August 2007).
Lt.-General Yamaguchi Noboru commenting on the need to learn from experiences in China.\textsuperscript{167} The 2.5 tonne \textit{High Mobility Vehicle} (HMV \textit{Koukidou kuruma}) from 1994 gave the GSDF a utility vehicle ideal for air-lifted ODO. However, GSDF ODO-related investment, although resulting in effective vehicles, appears not to have been a priority.

The GSDF has also retained much equipment that is of dubious value, with a reluctance to reduce quantity in order to improve quality. Anti-tank weapons (\textit{Type-60}) remained in service despite having no discernible value, while \textit{kokusan} missiles provided high-cost, low-rate replacements.\textsuperscript{168} Even the \textit{Type-89} 5.56mm rifle was too expensive for standardisation.\textsuperscript{169}

\textbf{b MSDF}

MSDF investment has concentrated upon the war-fighting Fleet, such as the \textit{Kongo} and \textit{Atago-class AEGIS} destroyers, for conventional and missile defence roles.\textsuperscript{170} Minesweeping capabilities were not neglected, as the 1991 Persian Gulf deployment demonstrated. Naval forces have generally performed well, and Japan has maintained an impressive Antarctic survey capability, but there have been long-standing deficiencies in transport and ‘underway support’, a serious capability-diminishing factor. It is difficult

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[169] Comments of GSDF Ranger Major, Tokyo (October 2006).
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to avoid the conclusion that combat hull numbers were prioritised over actual operational capability.  

Sea-lift was limited until 1998 to the six Atsumi-class and Miura-class LST (Landing Ship, Tank), small, with poor sea-keeping and speed, even smaller and less capable than the ex-USN Namsemond County (Oosumi) they replaced. The MSDF Designs Office proposed a 5,500 tonne helicopter-capable LST in 1989, without success. The 8,900 tonne Oosumi was ordered in 1993, after the MSDF had designated it as vital to ODO-support. The DDH-16-class, despite a flush flight-deck emerged as a combat vessel, with limited transport-support capabilities. The Oosumi-class have also been utilised for minesweeping helicopters, and MSDF priorities remain unclear.

c ASDF

ASDF procurement similarly reveals devotion to combat forces, with relatively little devoted to ODO requirements. The expensive F-15 and F-2 are respectively outstanding and adequate, but despite the end of the Cold War bringing reductions in ‘scrambles’, there have been few equivalent investment adjustments. The ASDF didn’t purchase a new type of large transport aircraft from the 1980s until 2005, from 1990 to 1996 relying upon a force of 10-12 C-130H aircraft, equivalent to Malaysia or Belgium. From 1991, it had become clear that Japan would be facing the need to

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deploy more personnel, and heavier equipment, further, and faster. The ASDF record up until 2006 was minimal air-lift investment, relying upon 1TAG determination and professionalism to maintain operational support.

d ODO Strategic Capabilities

Most countries attempted to acquire greater air/sea-lift capacity to match operational deployments in the 1990s, through commercial leasing, capital purchase/leasing, or cooperation. Japan undertook little capability augmentation beyond ad hoc commercial charters, and ordering three Oosumi-class between 1994 and 2000. This failure was understandable given the unique nature of ODO in 1992, but considering explicit ODO and US Alliance support within the 1994 Higuchi Report, the first to integrate ODO into overall security concepts, the neglect is problematic.  

The GSDF made efforts to develop some readily-deployable systems but most engineering, medical, and logistical equipment dispatched in the 1990s required heavy lift resources. While the Dutch and Canadians could airlift heavy armoured vehicles to Afghanistan, Japan could not airlift engineering equipment to Cambodia.

The MSDF, due to OEF-MIO, ordered two Mashuu-class AOE. Oosumi had been the logical (if controversial) development of ODO requirements and equivalent to Spanish-Dutch, French, and British vessels. The Royal Navy adopted Dutch designs, and Roll-on/Roll-off (Ro-Ro) vehicle/container ships, including one built in Japan.

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178 ‘Passage to Panjwaii - Canadian Tanks Go to Afghanistan’.
179 JSDF Equipment Yearbook 2004-2005: 267; Designated an LST, Oosumi is an LSD (Landing Ship, Dock).
Denmark and Germany developed four ‘ARK’ Ro-Ro vessels, while NATO coordinated leasing.\textsuperscript{181} Meanwhile, Japan was forced to lease ferries for GSDF domestic training in 2010.\textsuperscript{182}

The ASDF did little to augment air-lift, maintaining 16 \textit{C-130H} by 2000 and the \textit{Boeing KC-767J} transport-tanker aircraft from 2008.\textsuperscript{183} The Special Airlift Group (SAG \textit{tokubetsu koukuu yusoutai}) operates two \textit{Boeing-747}, mainly for the Imperial family and ministers, first dispatched for ODO support in 2003.\textsuperscript{184} Other countries have augmented airlift capabilities, including ‘SALIS’ within NATO.\textsuperscript{185} Canada compared new/used procurement, charters, and multi-lateral/bilateral cooperation.\textsuperscript{186} The US General Accounting Office (GAO) and the MoD and National Audit Office (NAO) in Britain have conducted similar studies.\textsuperscript{187} Japan has augmented existing capacity, ‘balancing’ rather than re-evaluating, and ASDF officers have suggested that the \textit{KC-767J} transport-tankers were procured more for \textit{F-15} aerial-refuelling capabilities than for airlift.\textsuperscript{188}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{181} The ARK project. Admiral Danish Fleet (http://forsvaret.dk/SOK/eng/International/The\%20ARK\%20Project/Pages/default.aspx, 8 April 2010).
\bibitem{182} ‘22\textsuperscript{nd} Infantry Regiment, Move to Higashi Fuji’ (Dai22 futsuuka rentai, higashifuji ni kidou seri), Japan Military Review (Gunji kenkyuu) 45-9 (2010): 24-26.
\bibitem{184} IPCH briefing, Tokyo (February 2010).
\bibitem{185} SALIS (Strategic Airlift Interim Solution) NATO initiative provided members, plus Sweden, with access to strategic airlift capability by commercial contract: SALIS: the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (http://www.sfu.ca/casr/bg-airlift-nato.htm, 11 April 2008); ‘NATO pools resources to buy C-17s’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (20 September 2006): 6.
\bibitem{188} Discussion with ASDF officers, Cabinet Office, Tokyo (18 November 2009).
\end{thebibliography}
Strategic airlift, sealift and naval logistical support act as vital capability multipliers by increasing the range and speed of ODO options, and it is clear that the single Force investment priorities have seriously limited Japanese strategic capabilities in this area.

3 Conclusion

The JSDF have matured from emergency para-military forces to become advanced, professional armed forces, training to high standards, and providing highly effective disaster relief. In contrast to fears concerning ‘reversion’, the Forces have conducted themselves with discipline and dignity with few civilian control ‘incidents’. The constitutionality of the Forces remains doubtful, but few can doubt their professional qualities. For an organisation founded in such unpromising circumstances, the JSDF have developed beyond most expectations.

There remain doubts, however, over whether the Forces have represented effective or efficient capabilities. Despite tremendous defence budgets and limited ODO in the 1990s, logistics and skills were thinly stretched. Conventional RMA-centric procurement policies raise questions concerning strategic and practical considerations given by JSDF personnel, bureaucrats, and politicians. Despite the only operational deployments of JSDF personnel having been ODO and domestic emergencies, much ‘software’ and ‘hardware’ support for ODO appeared to be lacking. The JSDF emulated other militaries in largely ‘making do’ with surplus capacity, while the investments required for ODO were relatively minor.

Crucial capability gaps remained in air-lift, sea-lift, doctrine, languages, ‘jointery’, and intelligence, despite operational experience. From 2007, steps were taken to improve training, and the ability to develop and interpret doctrine. The need for such
ODO-focused training and doctrine is all the more urgent due to the legal, constitutional, and political restrictions within which the JSDF have operated. The development of these constraints is the subject of Chapter Three.
Chapter 3

Background to Japanese deployments:

PKO, ODO, and Article 9

Introduction

Having considered the founding and development of the JSDF Chapter Two, the legal background to Japanese ODO and their political mediation will be considered in this chapter. The three main subjects are the nature of multinational operations termed ‘PKO’, the nature of JSDF ODO relative to these operations, and ODO-related issues which required extensive mediation to enable overseas dispatch. Prominent among these issues are the Japanese constitution and laws. Many studies have taken the constitutional issue to be the central subject for examination, as it has undoubtedly loomed large, dominating narratives and norms since 1947.\(^{189}\) However, this study offers an alternative operational analytical narrative, with JSDF ODO as the central subject, therefore the constitution will be only one of several factors considered, including ODO-related laws. By considering PKO, ODO, the constitution, and laws, as well as political mediation, it is hoped that a comprehensive understanding of the challenges, limitations, and pressures facing the JSDF in the 1990s may be gained. With this understanding it will be possible to fully appreciate and analyse the operational performance of JSDF ODO.

1 The Nature of Peacekeeping: History and Definitions

In considering Japanese Overseas Dispatch Operations it is essential to first consider peacekeeping. Japanese deployments regardless of actual configuration or role have often been characterized as ‘PKO’. It is peacekeeping that has become centrally associated with JSDF overseas deployments, and it is the development of peacekeeping that has been the most radical change in military practice since the Cold War. Although much literature utilizes the term ‘PKO’ to refer to various multinational peace operations, the operations, and the manner of their conduct, contain such diversity that further refinement and definitions are required. There is also a need to understand the historical context of missions and how their form and conduct changed during the period of this study. The most prominent, largest, and longest JSDF ODO have been officially labelled as ‘PKO’, and it must be examined if this label is appropriate, and the relative status of ‘operations other than peacekeeping’.

A What is PKO?

a. Definitions

There is a range of activities or spectrum which is often referred to as ‘peacekeeping’ or ‘PKO’, and differentiating between variants can be problematic. A.B. Fetherston, in her pioneering work on theories of peacekeeping, illustrated how attempts at clean, sequential, and compartmentalized definitions have not married well with operational

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analyses. There have been varied attempts to define the variants of this peacekeeping spectrum. The most famous were produced by UN officers. In June 1992, UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali published *An Agenda For Peace*. Within this plan, five types of peacekeeping activity were implicitly described, and four labelled although not clearly differentiated. His efforts, while laudable, were essentially an effort to build a framework of understanding around the activities that his representatives were developing and conducting in the field. Doctrine, policy, and theory were attempting to keep pace with practice.

The UN was not the only institution attempting to understand the nature of peacekeeping. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, and Western European Union (WEU), were among the bodies attempting to define and plan for peace operations. The NATO North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) noted the complexity of the task in what became known as the 1993 *Athens Report*:

> There is no single, generally accepted definition of peacekeeping. There is a need to develop a common understanding of peacekeeping, proceeding from the definitions and concepts of peacekeeping contained in the relevant UN and CSCE documents, including the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Peace. Traditionally, peacekeeping has been used to describe operations based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Operations similar to those conducted under Chapter VI may be carried out under the authority of the CSCE on the basis of the 1992 Helsinki Document. Operations based on recent extensions of the concept of peacekeeping, aimed at the protection or establishment of peace and based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, have been carried out under the authority of the UN Security Council.

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191 Fetherston, A.B., *Towards a Theory of UN Peacekeeping*.
193 *Report to the Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping*, NATO (11
While the vagueness was apparent, the key elements were clear. The UN Charter was considered the key underpinning document for peacekeeping. The UN and other institutions, such as CSCE, were considered the legitimate providers of PKO authorizations, and that the role of NATO and UN members was to provide means by which the aims of the UN Charter, the securing of international peace, could be realized. It is perhaps surprising that there was so little discussion of the nature of peacekeeping considering how dramatically PKO increased at this time. The UN approach to PKO was established almost by default, based upon practices of the 1940s and 1950s. As PKO ‘existed’, and had become an accepted international security norm, so it was picked-up and adapted as an all-purpose tool when complex international security problems arose.

However, the definition of peacekeeping operations, rather than norms, remained a work of description amidst a process of transformation. The original ‘peacekeeping’ configuration had been ‘peace observing’, small contingents of unarmed military observers (MOs), evaluating ceasefire and peace treaty compliance. They were not primarily military in nature, and have proven the most enduring and least costly and controversial operations. The second category became known as ‘classical peacekeeping’ and were of the intervention type, composed of armed military units and MOs, intended to provide a confidence-building space between conflicting parties where ceasefire violations were common, or where fear of reversion to conflict was heightened. As William J. Durch commented in 1993, “peacekeeping is a confidence building measure, providing a means for nations or factions who are tired of war, but wary of one another,

to live in relative peace and eventual comity.” Such missions as post-1956 Sinai (UNEF), Cyprus (UNFICYP) from the 1960s, and Lebanon (UNIFIL) from the 1970s were classical PKO. They did not participate in conflicts, or impose settlements, but built confidence through local security and stability until political settlements could be realised. That each of the three PKO forces listed remains (in some form) decades after establishment is a testament to the continued value of UNPKO, and to the intrinsic limitations of PKO conflict resolution.

These two forms of peace operation were conducted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the Chapter devoted to peaceful settlement of international conflicts. Only one UNPKO was conducted during the Cold War under Chapter VII, in Congo, 1960-1964, and such was the traumatic effect upon the participants and the UN that the practice wasn’t repeated, although non-binding resolutions were passed under Chapter VII throughout the period. Durch insists that peacekeepers could only use force for self-defence, and only in ways that could not irreparably antagonise parties, and with the almost total consent of the host nation. However, increasingly in the 1990s, host nation consent became regarded as a desirable rather than an essential quality.

PKO during the Cold War had been seen in rather limited terms. It was considered to be a military operation, even though it was usually controlled by a civilian Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), with significant civilian elements. It was a buffer force, and as such was to be neutral to the dispute, only utilizing military force in extreme cases, for self-defence. While seemingly simple, the actual events of

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195 United Nations Emergency Force; UN Force in Cyprus.
196 UN Chapter VII-authorised operations during the Korean and Gulf Wars are termed ‘UN-sanctioned’ operations.
PKO throughout the Cold War were far from clear, and the casualties during ‘classical’ operations demonstrated how complex they had become before ‘new peacekeeping’ emerged in the post-Cold War period.\textsuperscript{198}

Marrack Goulding, a senior UNPKO manager, suggested in 1993 that since peacekeeping had expanded by a factor of five, then peacekeeping ‘evolution’ was highly inaccurate, referring to the “forced development of peacekeeping”.\textsuperscript{199} Goulding viewed UNPKO as distinctive from ‘allied-coalitions’ by being UN-administered under an SRSG, providing “United Nationsness”.\textsuperscript{200} They were impartial, with host nation consent, with volunteer staff, no mechanism for compulsion, and minimal use of force, although with an implicit understanding that force could be used to preserve the mission, rarely utilised.

Goulding’s definition of pre-1988 PKO is:

Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary.\textsuperscript{201}

Goulding defines the operations after 1988 as being within six variants:

1 Preventive Deployment.
2 Traditional Peacekeeping (Cyprus).

\textsuperscript{201} Goulding, Marrack, ‘The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping’: 455.
3 Implementation of a Comprehensive Settlement (Cambodia).
4 Protection of Humanitarian Supplies (Bosnia 1992).
5 Deployments Where the Institutions of States Have Collapsed (Somalia)
6 Ceasefire Enforcement (Bosnia 1995).  

The August 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, the Brahimi Report (panel chairman, Lakhdar Brahimi) identified only three forms of peacekeeping activity: Peace Making, Peacekeeping, and Peace Building. While the Brahimi Report continued much of value regarding mission security, management, and communications, problems result from the reduction of defined variants to three missions. For Japan, diplomatically, ‘Peacekeeping’ was seen as helpful, treating JSDF efforts equally with other nations’, despite being limited capability. However, politically and operationally, ‘Brahimi PKO’ could be troublesome, as the JSDF were specifically barred from conducting most of the tasks, particularly Chapter VII enforcement within ‘Brahimi Peacekeeping’. The definition was later re-clarified as consisting of ‘complex’ and ‘classic’ PKO. The UK was one country that continued to differentiate between the concepts of Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement, with the British parliament recognising that forces configured and equipped for PKO would find it highly problematic to then perform PEO duties. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations in 2008 utilized the term “multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations” in the seminal “United Nations

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Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines”, referred to as the ‘Capstone Doctrine’. This ‘multi-dimensional’ term has received common usage, although perhaps more for the general descriptive value than for specificity.

For these reasons, the Boutros-Ghali definitions, refined in 1995, appear most appropriate for analysis of Japanese ‘PKO’;

- Peacemaking (PMO): peace processes.
- Peacekeeping (PKO): monitoring ceasefire.
- Peace-enforcing (PEO): ensuring compliance.
- Peace-supporting (PSO): non-combative support.

Japan’s ‘PKO’ have been explicitly PSO, with infrastructure and supporting services to the mission and local populations. The Boutros-Ghali variants will be utilised throughout this thesis, with the understanding that these defined variants are neither perfect nor exhaustive. The terms ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘PKO’ will be used in their generally accepted senses (for various peace operations), and also in the more specific sense within the five mission variants. As previously explained, the term ODO will be utilised when referring to the entire range of Japanese operations, with PKO and PSO for specific forms of operational tasks. ‘Japanese PKO’ is often referred to, but shall be accepted as covering a portion of JSDF ODO. Indeed, several JSDF ODO were not UNPKO, but bilateral disaster or humanitarian relief activities.

Peace operations are conducted by a broad range of personnel. PKO, PSO, and PEO

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are usually highly militarised, although (usually) under a civilian SRSG, with civilian support. It is clear that John Hillen’s statement that, “‘Peacekeeping’ is the military technique most often associated with UN military operations”, both correctly explains the widespread perception, and yet also misleads with the notion that peacekeeping is merely a technique and solely military.\textsuperscript{207} It is a complex and multi-agency policy approach, which even when considered solely for its military elements can never be defined as a ‘technique’. Peacekeeping requires training and familiarization with a range of tasks and approaches, and the ability to ‘swing’ between peace-supporting roles and traditional military tasks.

A further element of confusion in the study of JSDF operations has been the widespread Japanese use of the term ‘International Peace Cooperation’ (IPC 派遣自衛隊), covering a broad range of activities. The frequent references to the IPC Law (IPCL), or ‘PKO Law’, are also potentially confusing as the IPCL is actually the “Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations” (国際平和維持活動及び関連活動に関する法律, Kokusai rengou heiwa iji katsudou tou ni taisuru kyouryoku ni kansuru houritsu).\textsuperscript{208} The three basic forms of IPC identified by the Japanese government have been UN Peacekeeping (civilian policing, military observer, infrastructure and medical support, unit security, and military and civilian staff work), International Humanitarian Relief Operations (assistance to refugees and victims of conflict), and International Election Observation Operations (civilian, staff support, aid-in-kind, transport, technical support).\textsuperscript{209} International Disaster Relief Operations (assisting victims of natural

\textsuperscript{207} Hillen, John, \textit{Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations} (Dulles, VA., Brassey’s, 1998): 79.


\textsuperscript{209} Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other
calamities), were enabled by amending the Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams (JDRT), 1987, allowing JSDF participation in and/or support of previously civilian JDRT.\textsuperscript{210} Since the terrorist attacks of 11\textsuperscript{th} September 2001, these missions have been further supplemented by \textit{ad hoc} operations not contained within the previous definitions. The JSDF dispatch to Iraq, the MSDF Indian Ocean support to OEF-MIO, and the MSDF Gulf of Aden anti-piracy mission have been included within IPC, but cannot be included within this study due to being outside the target period. This thesis considers the three forms of IPC conducted by the JSDF during the 1990s, plus the 1991 MSDF minesweeping dispatch, considered in the context of these missions.

\textbf{b. History and Basis of Peacekeeping}

Peacekeeping has been traced back to the 1038 ‘Peace League of Bourges’, a conflict-preventing intervention force based upon normative principles enshrined in canonical law.\textsuperscript{211} The first modern peacekeepers can be traced to 19\textsuperscript{th} century practice of dispatching neutral military observers to ensure treaty compliance, expanded under the League of Nations by administering elections and plebiscites, as in the Saar region in 1935.\textsuperscript{212} Usuki Eiichi convincingly argues that the League of Nations Leticia Commission, 1933-1934, provided the prototype for UNPKO, with a civilian-directed operation assuming control of a disputed area between Peru and Columbia, and allowing for a peaceful withdrawal of forces.\textsuperscript{213}

\textit{Operations}: 1.


\textsuperscript{212} Arnold, Thomas F., and Ruland, Heather R., ‘The “Prehistory” of Peacekeeping’.

\textsuperscript{213} Usuki, Eiichi, ‘Origins of PKO: The League of Nations Leticia Commission (1933-1934)’ \textit{(PKO}
The first UN peacekeeping missions were established as small observer forces in the late 1940s: ‘minimal peacekeeping’ efforts: small, cheap, MO forces, reporting to the UN Secretariat. The first established was UNSCOB, UN Special Committee on the Balkans, reporting on the Greek Civil War, 1947-1951.\(^\text{214}\) However, the UN Consular Commission in Java received its first MO a month before UNSCOB.\(^\text{215}\) These were followed by UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization) monitoring the ceasefire along Israel’s border from 1948, and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) from 1949, setting the standard for minimal peacekeeping, and operational today.\(^\text{216}\)

The second stage came with UN looking for a mechanism to extricate the British, French, and Israeli militaries from Egypt after their 1956 Suez invasion. Lester Pearson, Canada’s Minister of External Affairs, and UNSG Dag Hammarskjold proposed a UN Emergency Force (UNEF) of troops separating the militaries and supervising a peaceful withdrawal.\(^\text{217}\) The details of force membership, codes of conduct, insignia details, indeed practically all of the elements that became standardised, were devised in a few weeks by Ralph Bunche, UN Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, and his small staff. Bunche was aware that UNEF would form the basis of a new genre of international mission, and that the details would need to be carefully considered and

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\(^{217}\) UN General Assembly Resolution 1001(ES-I) (7 November 1956).
rapidly enacted. The deployment of 6000 troops from 10 countries was unprecedented and, “was generally recognized as a remarkable practical success as well as a triumph of innovative improvisation.” As Brian Urquhart commented, UNEF “was the model for all future peacekeeping operations” and only slightly complicated by not being within the UN Charter. Hammarskjold is said to have joked that it was conducted under ‘Chapter Six and a half.’

With the end of the Cold War operations greatly increased in number, scale, and scope. The previous two incarnations were both widely referred to as comprising first and second generation peacekeeping, while the consequent operations, despite their diversity, have been referred to as ‘third generation’ peacekeeping. The first of these ‘new age’ UNPKO was in Namibia, as UNTAG (UN Transition Assistance Group), established by UNSC Resolution 435 in 1978, had 11 years to organize the, mandates, structure, and working practices before assuming its duties in 1989. This mission set the pattern for nation-building, with 4500 troops, and police and civil administration managing an election and transfer of authority from the colonial power (South Africa) to a newly independent nation. Its success was due to years of preparation, and the SRSG, (future Finnish President) Martti Ahtisaari. UNTAG established the principle and provided a role model for the multi-faceted third-generation mission. As Perez de Cuellar stated, it had demonstrated, “the executive ability of the United Nations in successfully managing a complex operation.” However, Steven Ratner and Michael

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223 Model status-of-force agreement for peacekeeping operations: report of the Secretary General,
Williams have detailed how the mission suffered from poor communications with the UN, a troubled military-civilian relationship, and a lack of intelligence, locally and in New York.\textsuperscript{224} In both positive and negative ways UNTAG would set the pattern for UN ‘complex’ peacekeeping throughout the 1990s.

Goulding stated about the highly complex PKO in Cambodia, that, “[I]n concept, it was the child of UNTAG.”\textsuperscript{225} The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was, however, even more complex. The UN not only developed a parallel administration, it also supervised existing government and managed every element of elections, from voter registration, including displaced citizens, through to vote counting.\textsuperscript{226} A major task in any country, Cambodia had been devastated by war, genocide, and invasion. That it did not end in disaster is testament to the hard work of the mission personnel and of the Cambodian people. It has never been regarded as an outstanding success, unlike Namibia, but it was a relative success.

For Japan, it was the litmus test, the watershed. The JSDF deployed to Cambodia and demonstrated that they could perform admirably, receive international praise, and return to greater public praise than they were dispatched with. That the mission had seemed imperilled by resurfacing conflict, that the NPA would never again dispatch police units, and that two Japanese were killed was placed to one side. From 1993 to 2002, Japan’s government would be looking for ‘UNTAC-like’ operations into which it could insert JSDF participation. Interviews with JDA and JSDF personnel are replete with tales of MoFA briefings assuring that a proposed mission would be ‘UNTAC-like’, inferring

\textsuperscript{224} Ratner, Steven R., \textit{The new UN peacekeeping: building peace in lands of conflict after the cold war} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); Williams, Michael C., \textit{Civil-military relations and peacekeeping}: 15-78.


safe, fixed-term, PSO, operating as independent units.\textsuperscript{227} Despite such re-assurances, no such missions were conducted until East Timor in 2002.

While Japan was concentrating upon PSO, peace enforcement operations (PEO) re-emerged within UN operational practice, without well-developed doctrine or substantial operational analysis, indicating significant problems concerning the use of force in pursuit of mandated missions. The main catalysts for the re-emergence of PEO were events in Bosnia, where UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) operated amidst civil war, Somalia, when UNOSOM II (UN Operation in Somalia) became embroiled in factional violence, and Rwanda, where genocide was perpetrated amidst a small, classical UNPKO force, UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda). The international community reacted in disparate, contradictory ways, increasing UNPROFOR use-of-force (incrementally revised mandates: ‘mandate creep’), including air-strikes, and then passing responsibility to a NATO PEO. UNOSOM II was transformed from PSO to PKO, then PEO, and subsequently reduced, and withdrawn. UNAMIR was deprived of resources by UN members while being chided for not preventing genocide, to be replaced by a unilateral French intervention force, and an \textit{ad hoc} non-UN humanitarian relief mission.\textsuperscript{228}

The JSDF (and Japanese NGO) operated in parallel to this latter operation, but did not directly address the issues raised regarding peacekeeping and the use of force. PEO emerged from this period, but not as a new or fully revived mission form, rather as a level of escalation available to deal with ‘spoiling’ forces opposing the UN mandate. One of the most important aspects of the \textit{Brahami Report} was this issue of spoilers, and the use of force to overcome such obstacles. The issue of use of force is problematic not


\textsuperscript{228} Mulloy, Garren, ‘Swords and Ploughshares’: 174, 178.
only due to the sensitivities and legal complications facing states such as Japan, but also as the authority for UN peacekeeping has a vague relationship to the UN Charter.

b.1 UN Charter

Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter deal with conflict management. Chapter VI, Article 33 states:

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Chapter VII, Article 42 states:

... the Security Council ... may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Most peacekeeping operations have existed in this grey zone between Chapter VI and Chapter VII, while authorised under Chapter VI. Many Chapter VII resolutions demand compliance without sanctioning the use of force, such as UNSC Resolution 502 demanding, “an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces”, and a negotiated settlement to the 1982 Falklands conflict.\(^{229}\)

\(^{229}\) Freedman, Sir Lawrence, *The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume II: War and
Many operations have also been undertaken without a UNSC or UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution, including the NATO Kosovo aerial-bombing in 1999, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These cannot be termed peacekeeping, although PKO have been conducted by NATO, the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU), as prescribed within Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. PKO provided a means by which the international community could tangibly act. It is the flexible mechanism by which nation states cooperate to attempt to bring peace to troubled areas, and provides the security mechanism required to allow conflicting parties to desist. One of the more problematic elements within this largely positive picture has naturally been the use of force.

**b.2 Use of Force**

Consent and minimal use of force have been the cornerstones of peacekeeping, but it has been a somewhat unhappy relationship between military forces trained for combat and the operational demands that they almost never utilise such capabilities. The UN Secretariat acknowledged cases where human rights violations had been committed and UN forces considered themselves unable to intervene, dissuaded by the leadership and institutional culture of the UN. Due to the operational nature of UNFICYP established in 1964, there was a very detailed description of use of force ‘in self defence’ by the UNSG. This stated, “the use of force could be deemed to be self-defence if armed persons were attempting by force to prevent UNFICYP personnel from carrying out

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their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders.” After 1973, when Syrian and Israeli forces inflicted casualties among peacekeepers, the UN Secretariat altered the standing nature of ‘force protection’ to ‘defence of the mission,’ thus applying the standard to all missions. Although Findlay and other observers have noted that there was little operational change, there were signs that in missions, certain contingents were prepared to act as deterrents to state or non-state spoilers. UN guidelines were clearly dependent upon interpretation and application as contingents developed modes of operational mediation.

Brian Urquhart, UN Under-Secretary General, described the UN position on the use of force in 1987 as being not only minimal in order to ensure consensus, but also as a matter of security for the peacekeepers themselves. In 1983, he contrasted UNIFIL in Lebanon with the Multinational Force (MNF), which:

is militarily far more powerful...than any UN operation. At this moment it has the support of at least three aircraft carriers. But it also has much less flexibility, less capacity to act, and is far more vulnerable when things go wrong.

By contrast, he asserted that the principles of UN PKO were relatively simple:

They must have broad political support and a broad base in the world community. Force can only be used in self-defense, and therefore our peacekeeping operations are lightly-armed. Our peacekeepers must remain above the conflict; they must never become part of it.

Urquhart did not always find such attitudes among his own contingents, such as the

Goulding, Marrack, Peacemonger, 47-48.


Urquhart, Brian, A Life in Peace and War: 358.
French Colonel referring to Lebanese factions as “the enemy”, but the degree to which limited use of force became an accepted norm is striking.\textsuperscript{234} Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin have characterized “the ‘holy trinity’ of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force”, as the defining characteristics of what they label ‘traditional peacekeeping’.\textsuperscript{235} While it could initially appear that the increased incidence of PEO would have altered the sanctity of this trinity, both UN doctrine and operational practice appear to indicate otherwise. The difference is that no longer are these conditions considered absolute.

One of the reasons why the use of force became such a defining quality for three decades was the seminal experience in Congo, 1960-1964. ONUC (UN Operation in the Congo) attempted to replicate the inter-state conflict management success of UNEF in an intra-state conflict. UN ‘peacekeepers’ employing artillery and bombers against separatists was not welcomed by UN members. As General MacKenzie stated, “few countries are prepared to sacrifice their sons and daughters on the altar of someone else’s human rights.”\textsuperscript{236} Ireland and Sweden found themselves in the unusual position of combatants in (relatively) high-intensity combat. From 1964 to 1992, UNPKO would be (relatively) quiet and low-risk.

The 1990s provided the greatest single challenge to peacekeeping practices and doctrine, and use of force was the most problematic issue. There was a seemingly contradictory trend both to view the use of force by peacekeepers as an option on an inclining scale, while also avoiding deploying contingents to the most dangerous areas,

\textsuperscript{234} Urquhart, Brian, \textit{A Life in Peace and War}: 293.
in a ‘conflict avoiding-coercion considering’ approach. As Aoi Chiyuki has commented, no longer is the use of armed force seen as a taboo, and consent the constant factor:

…rather, consent is a variable that can affect the level of authority of the PSO. Consent is something to be managed and built by a PSO mission through the use of credible force and civilian support activities. The principle of no use of force (in Bosnia, this was minimum force) gave way to minimum force necessary, including coercive force vis-a-vis “spoilers” of peace.\(^ {237}\)

Bellamy and Williams have similarly classified ‘variable consent’, ‘multi-layered consent’, and ‘malleable consent’ within PSO doctrine, whereby fixed lines are avoided by dialogue, actions, and multi-level considerations.\(^ {238}\)

With selective application of force, increased attention has been paid to non-PKO experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, with OOTW and ‘Operations Other Than Peacekeeping’ (OOTP) increasingly converging. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson have noted a gap between actual and required stability and reconstruction resources in Iraq, Kosovo, and Cambodia, connecting both use of force for security and PSO resources for security building.\(^ {239}\) These issues of consent, use of force, and military operations other than national defence were controversial issues, and contributed to uncertainty concerning JSDF ODO in the 1990s.


2 The Path Towards Japanese Peacekeeping

A Characteristics of Japanese ‘PKO’

Definitions, as previously observed, are vital to an understanding of peace operations in a Japanese context. JSDF ‘PKO’, could be most accurately defined as PSO, with other elements gradually attached. Even in their mission in Cambodia, the GSDF gradually incorporated elements of broader PKO practice, but these have been the exceptions. This PSO-centric approach has married well with broader Japanese IPC policies and JSDF operations have been noted for their sympathetic work with and for people in need, continued into non-UNPKO.

One distinctive aspect of the ‘Japanese way’ is the emphasis upon placing ODO within a broader context, as one of the three pillars of human security initiatives: IPC, Official Development Assistance (ODA), and international intellectual contribution. Japan was one of the leading proponents of human security, defining it as “to protect people from critical and pervasive threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity, and to enhance human fulfilment”, emphasizing its posture as a peaceful country with an impressive ODA record. Since Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo’s 1998 ‘Human Security’ speech in Hanoi, Japan has supported the UN Trust Fund on Human Security, proposed the UN Commission on Human Security, and integrated such concepts into its ODA Charter. The 2003 Charter states that, “the objectives of Japan’s ODA are to

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contribute to the peace and development of the international community thereby ensuring Japan’s security and prosperity”. These aims are essentially equivalent for Japanese ODA. Even as Japanese ODA has reduced, as Watanabe Makiko has illustrated, the proportion allocated to human security-related efforts has significantly increased. In this sense, Japan can be seen as ahead of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation) “Whole of Government Approach” (WGA), where, “development and military actors are...aware of the fact that short-term, ad hoc responses in which national and international policies lack coherence and co-ordination will not be successful. As a result, the focus has now shifted to improving state-building capacities through better joined-up working.” This is in keeping with a broad policy approach representing Japanese liberal-internationalist values, and is in contrast with Canada, which “quietly dropped human security as a central theme of foreign policy” in 2000.

Within ‘human security’ the 2005 The Responsibility to Protect, has obvious implications for peacekeeping contingents, with all national bodies mandated to prevent harm to humanity wherever it may be threatened. The Responsibility to Protect and the development and climate action aims of the High Level Panel on Threats,

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Challenges, and Change, place PKO actors to the fore of the most radical human security initiatives to date.\textsuperscript{247} A dilemma facing a contingent commander is to what degree he/she is willing to risk the lives of personnel for the protection of others? For the JSDF, this is particularly poignant, as contingents operate within tight legal restrictions on use of force, and Japan appears to have an exceedingly low threshold for casualties, even while pursuing human security.

Japan’s human security approaches were aided by key UN appointments. In 2001, former UNHCR, Ogata Sadako, expressed her view of militaries as essential for humanitarian operations, as only they could dispatch resources globally, with heavy engineering equipment and logistics support, able to operate in the harshest conditions, for the cause of human security.\textsuperscript{248} She strongly encouraged JSDF dispatch to Cambodia and saw no fundamental contradiction in refugee aid and military involvement. Further weight was provided by the appointment of Akashi Yasushi as UNTAC SRSG. Ogata and Akashi were the highest profile appointments of Japanese nationals to positions of responsibility within the UN. Some regarded Akashi as part of a \textit{quid pro quo} regarding dispatch of the JSDF to Cambodia. Marrack Goulding had an alternative view, that “Boutros-Ghali had decided to abolish Akashi’s existing post as Under-Secretary-General [USG] for disarmament, knew that Japan, as the second largest contributor to the budget, must have at least one USG and wanted Japan to play a larger role in peacekeeping; so sending Akashi to Cambodia was an obvious move.”\textsuperscript{249} This rather contrasts with views in Japan, with one commentator asking if Akashi would

\textsuperscript{248} Ogata, Sadako, Fridtjof Nansen Memorial Lecture, United Nations University (UNU), Tokyo (12 December 2001).
\textsuperscript{249} Goulding, Marrack, \textit{Peacemonger}: 255.
be “Cambodia’s MacArthur”.

The positions granted to Ogata and Akashi, however, cannot be regarded as steps in an inevitable process towards JSDF UNPKO and broader ODO. There were many commentators and even JSDF personnel who lacked confidence in the capabilities of the Forces to conduct these operations. Some commentators have noted that former colonial powers have been able to draw upon their imperial experiences and utilize them for peacekeeping operations. That Japan in 1992 felt itself unable to do so was perhaps inevitable, and there were certainly limited lessons that could be learned from IJA/IJN experiences (other than water purification). Kimberly Marten Zisk has conjectured that practically only such ex-colonial powers have the ability to conduct full-spectrum peacekeeping, for only imperial powers have acquired the military and political skills required for complex peace operations. The JSDF model is one of learning from limited experience, and attempting to execute missions likely to be within the range of their capabilities. That Japan has not attempted to become a full-spectrum peacekeeper is significant, but does not validate Zisk’s point. It merely illustrates the limitations of JSDF practice and aspirations. Among limiting factors, the constitution is one of the most conspicuous.

a. The Constitutional Limits

Article 9 of the constitution is often seen as a defining point in discussions of JSDF ODO and their limitations. It is the oldest extant unaltered constitution, and the only

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constitution of a major nation which outlaws both belligerence and the possession of military forces. This study is not primarily concerned with arguments concerning constitutional wording, translation, or interpretation, but such matters have obviously been important in shaping views of Japanese ODO.\textsuperscript{252} Article 9 has been the main spur to pacifist norms, as it clearly states that Japan shall not possess a military, which it does, by another name: the JSDF.

As Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack have stated, it is Article 9 “which provides the basis for state pacifism”, and for restrictions not explicitly stated in the constitution, such as the self-denial of the right of collective security.\textsuperscript{253} What is also clear though is that the Japanese people largely accept, if not warmly embrace, the JSDF, and do not wish to see them abolished. Although Abe Shinzou became Prime Minister in 2006 with a clear revisionist agenda, he was not forced from office on this point. The contrast with 1993 is stark, when Foreign Minister Watanabe Michio was forced to withdraw comments on constitutional revision, and DG-JDA Nakanishi Keisuke was forced to resign and retract his earlier comment that, “it is wrong to cling with religious zeal to a


document written half a century ago.’”

While the discussion of Article 9 has moved beyond the shadows of taboos, there is little zeal for revision. That would seem to indicate that most Japanese recognise the contradiction of the JSDF, and that they prefer a contradiction to a battle over constitutional revision. As Katahara Eiichi has stated, from the 1980s, Japan experienced “the emergence of a greater public consensus on the fundamentals of Japan’s security policy- namely its maintenance of the SDF and the Japan-US security arrangements” despite widespread respect for Article 9. The 2004 Araki Report, and many Japanese security policy experts, have emphasised the need to concentrate upon policy reform within the bounds of interpretations of the constitution.

While there are many who regard the revision of the constitution as vital to the future success of Japanese ODO, including former Prime Ministers and a leading newspaper, there are scholars who consider the issue as peripheral. Aoi Chiyuki has stated her view of the Five Conditions of PKO participation and Rules of Engagement (ROE) for JSDF ODO as being too restrictive for fully effective peacekeeping, but that these could be reformed, “within the framework of the present constitution.” Many researchers of

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258 Aoi, Chiyuki, Peace Support Operations.
the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), the JDA/MOD research institute, have privately voiced their concerns that constitutional revision is unhelpful, as it threatens politicising security policy, and is not an operational priority. Some have expressed opinions that constitutional reform for effective ODO is a blind alley. There appears to be more concern that legal, rather than constitutional, issues require urgent attention, such as a general law on overseas dispatch, replacing ad hoc legal instruments for each dispatch, with the attendant delays and impact upon preparations.\(^{259}\)

The nature of Article 9 and its normative legacy for Japanese society and policy has profoundly influenced politics, law, and the processes of mediation required to enable the development of JSDF ODO.

\section*{b. Political Development, Utility, and Mediation}

ODO can be seen as a clear demonstration of Japanese burden-sharing and of the end of ‘bandwagonging’ or ‘free riding’. It seemed designed to answer criticisms that Japan was willing to join coalitions only as long as Japanese were not at risk. The prolonged and troublesome emergence of Japanese overseas dispatch was prompted by the Gulf War, when, as US Ambassador Armacost commented, “Japan’s conduct distressed its friends and angered its critics”, being labelled by \textit{The Economist} as “The Scrooge of Asia”.\(^{260}\) Togo Kazuhiko characterised the events as, “Japan’s defeat in 1991” as its closest allies and main oil providers derided the slow and seemingly grudging

\(^{259}\) Shimura, Hisako, ‘Should Japan participate in UN peacekeeping operations?’ \textit{Asia-Pacific Review} 3-1 (1996): 137-144.

offers of financial aid and insistence that it could not dispatch troops.\textsuperscript{261} The critique by US Secretary of State Baker that Japan’s “‘checkbook diplomacy,’ like our ‘dollar diplomacy’ of an earlier era, is clearly too narrow” concerning the $13 billion contribution to the Gulf War allies was keenly felt.\textsuperscript{262} It led to efforts to pass a peacekeeping-enabling bill avoiding JSDF participation (despite Ozawa Ichiro’s efforts), that eventually fell with the Kaifu administration, and the feeling was of Japan “falling short” of Korean and other contributions of non-combat personnel.\textsuperscript{263} The 1991 MSDF minesweeping dispatch and ODO dispatches from 1992 did much to ameliorate criticism. The ultimate political utility towards bilateralism was seen in the deployment of JSDF personnel to Iraq, their first complex non-UN PSO-role.\textsuperscript{264} Despite strong domestic opposition to the Iraq dispatch, there was little doubt that the priority was as a demonstration of allegiance to the US, by the Cabinet and Prime Minister Koizumi personally, rather than specific interests in Iraq.\textsuperscript{265} The political development of Japanese ODO was prolonged, while the operations demonstrated political utility in deflecting criticism of Japan. The degree of mediation required between the conflicting influences of domestic opinion, international criticism, and long-standing norms and interpretations of Japanese law and the constitution, however, was such that there was initially little confidence in success.

\textsuperscript{261} Togo, Kazuhiko, \textit{Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945-2003}: 77.


\textsuperscript{264} Shinoda, Tomohito, \textit{Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs} (Seattle, WA., University of Washington, 2007).

The ODO undertaken in the 1990s, while tracing their immediate origins to the traumatic political consequences of the Gulf War were also part of a much broader and longer continuum of Japanese diplomatic efforts. Japan was not simply dragged from a position of detached pacifism and presented with an unwarranted and surprising demand for military deployments. Japan’s political leaders had agitated to gain acceptance from the United Nations during the 1950s, as stated explicitly in the 1951 San Francisco peace treaty. Membership from 1956, the year UNEF was deployed, brought the immediate issue of participation in UN missions into focus.

Japan was first elected a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 1958, serving a further five two-year terms before being re-elected in 1992. The period from 1952 until 1961 was one when Japan’s foreign policy seemed to reach a peak of ‘UN centricity’, despite the previously stated pragmatism for invoking UN principles in domestic politics. The first issue of Japanese participation in UNPKO arose from a request by UNSG Dag Hammarskjold to send 10 JSDF observers to the new UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), which Japan had helped establish in 1958. DG-JDA Sato Gisen seemed supportive, and suggested personnel could be dispatched for ‘training’ under the SDF Law (as with MSDF cruises), but Foreign Minister Fujiyama stated that Japan would not consider dispatch without a provision for peacekeeping under Article 3 of the SDF Law. A dispatch-supporting Diet member countered that, “to refuse the SDF dispatch to UNOGIL… was to tarnish Japan’s authority as a member of the UN and the Security Council. … To join UNOGIL is not for warfare but for peace and for

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preventive measures.”²⁶⁸ The Kishi government had stated in 1958 that it hoped for Japan to increase its status in the world as an honest broker in disputes, and that the UN provided an opportunity to demonstrate policy independence from the US.²⁶⁹ Japan had advocated UNOGIL as a newly founded international security norm, asserting its liberal credentials as a neutral actor, while also acting as a loyal ally aiding US withdrawal from Lebanon.

The Kishi government feared domestic opposition to JSDF overseas dispatch (even unarmed), and saw it as a controversy potentially imperilling more important matters, primarily the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty.²⁷⁰ The controversy over UNOGIL led to a certain deflation of Japan’s status and ambitions at the UN. This was complicated by the 1961 “Matsudaira Statement”, when Ambassador to the UN Matsudaira Koto was reported to have stated that Japan’s refusal to send observers had compromised his position and Japan’s ‘UN centric foreign policy’. This caused a controversy in the Diet only resolved by his retraction and apology. CLB Director-General Hayashi Shuzo, stated:

If the UN police activities are conducted in an ideal form…when a country that disrupted order within the UN system is to be punished…and if a unitary force under the United Nations is created with the participation of personnel dispatched by member states, then [Japan’s participation in such a force] would not be an act of a sovereign nation. Also there is the possibility of a peaceful police force which does not conduct military activities. These possibilities

²⁷⁰ Murakami, Tomoaki, ‘The UN Foreign Policy of the Kishi Administration: the Lebanon crisis as Japan’s first PKO opportunity’ (Kishi naikaku to kokuren gaikou-PKO genteiken toshite no Lebanon kiki), Journal of International Cooperation Studies (September 2003): 141-163, 155.
would not pose problems relating to the First Clause of Article 9.\textsuperscript{271}

Therefore, Japan began to distinguish between ‘military elements’ of a UN operation that would likely be tasked with duties leading to the potential use of armed force, and ‘other elements’ unlikely ever to be placed in such positions. PKF and PKO became the terms utilised to facilitate potential Japanese participation in PKO, with PKF (Peacekeeping Force) the preserve of countries not so legally and morally encumbered as Japan concerning the use of force. The obvious problem of differentiating between a ‘force’ and an ‘operation’ was not addressed, with the terminology continuing into the 1990s. This perceived need to differentiate between sending forces overseas for ‘military operations’, and those for ‘peace operations’ led to the use of the term \textit{haken}, or dispatch. This neutral term contrasted to \textit{hahei}, dispatch of soldiers that had become associated with the wars in China and the Pacific.\textsuperscript{272}

Japan has taken PKO initiatives and was a founding member of the UNGA ‘Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations’ from 18\textsuperscript{th} February 1965.\textsuperscript{273} When re-elected to the UNSC in 1966 MoFA drew up a ‘United Nations Cooperation Bill’ for JSDF PKO dispatch, but the prevailing socio-political atmosphere in the wake of the anti-US Treaty demonstrations and events in Vietnam made implementation impractical.\textsuperscript{274}

This false start appeared to indicate the end of initial ODO initiatives.


\textsuperscript{273} \textit{Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects}, 1330\textsuperscript{th} plenary meeting (18 February 1965) (http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/211/00/IMG/NR021100.pdf?OpenElement, 28 December 2009).

\textsuperscript{274} MoFA, \textit{Issues Related to UN Peace Cooperation (Kokuren kyoryoku hoan ni tsuite)}, MoFA, (27 January 1966), declassified documents.
The number of MoFA UN Bureau divisions increased thereafter, as Japan became more integrated in UN procedures, and made efforts to promote participation in international missions short of JSDF dispatch. Prime Minister Sato Eisaku referred to such deployments in a potential PKO in South-East Asia in 1969.\footnote{Speech of Prime Minister Sato Eisaku at the National Press Club’ (Nashonaru puresu kurabu ni okeru Sato Eisaku souri-daijin enzetsu) (11 November 1969), Blue Book (Gaikoseisha) (Tokyo: MoFA, 1970): 369-376.} This was part of a MoFA UN Bureau effort as part of the grander plan for the reform of the UNSC, with Japan beginning to pressure for a permanent seat on the Security Council.\footnote{Speech of Foreign Minister Aichi to the 25th Session of the UN General Assembly, 18 September 1970’, Blue Book (Gaikouseisha) (Tokyo: MoFA, 1971): 396-402.} These efforts came to nought as Japan failed to be re-elected to the UNSC. However, there were initiatives reported within MoFA to provide civilian electoral observers to missions, such as UNTAG, to which Japan eventually dispatched 31 staff, and even a proposal to send JSDF officers, ‘temporarily’ on reserve list, as unarmed observers.\footnote{Interview, Policy Advisor, Legislative Office, Cabinet Secretariat, Tokyo (May 2009).}

Reinhard Drifte has indicated how the 1960s marked the point from which Japan’s ‘UN-centric’ foreign policy went into steep decline, displaced by the strengthened alliance with the United States and the increasingly significant diplomatic value of Japanese economic development aid.\footnote{Drifte, Reinhard, Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat: 16-18.} Despite this, MoFA continued to press for a more pro-active stance in the 1970s, including on PKO. As the nature of UNPKO settled into a ‘classical’ pattern and with only three new missions from 1970-1988, there were many who saw limited scope for Japanese participation. It was hoped that UN legitimacy and Japan’s ‘pacifist norms’ would permit a limited reinterpretation of the constitution sufficient for JSDF dispatch within the liberal context of UNPKO. This was aided by the lessening of anti-military activism after the Vietnam War, and the
increasing notion of Japan assuming a world position matching her economy.\textsuperscript{279} Japan, from 1981, proposed initiatives at the UN to improve UN fact-finding capabilities to enhance preventive diplomacy capacities.\textsuperscript{280} Ronald Dore states that the 1985 UN Group of 18 reform panel was established by Japanese initiative, and both he and Watanabe Hirotaka emphasize the importance of Prime Minister Takeshita and MoFA in framing Japan’s preventive diplomacy initiatives of 1988.\textsuperscript{281} A MoFA official in an interview with Reinhard Drifte indicated that in 1989 the MoFA UN Bureau Director decided that Japanese staff should be sent to every civilian UN electoral mission, frustrated by a lack of suitable opportunities.\textsuperscript{282} Despite early enthusiasm, constitutional reinterpretation for ODO was shelved awaiting a clear political imperative. The events of the Gulf War brought such an imperative.

Murakami Tomoaki, however, has posed the question, “how and why did Japanese governments change policy so rapidly, and why when faced with difficult choices did they choose UNPKO?”\textsuperscript{283} This is a question posed all too infrequently but is worthwhile, not least concerning the utility of ODO. UNSC membership was an issue of importance to MoFA and certain Prime Ministers, and ameliorating US criticism of Japan was another motivation. For the JSDF, international cooperation had long been seen as a way to improve skills and status, and cooperation with the US military in particular was

\textsuperscript{279} Observations made by two MoFA diplomats, Fujisawa, Kanagawa, (August 2008).


\textsuperscript{282} Drifte, Reinhard, \textit{Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat}: 41.

\textsuperscript{283} Interview, Murakami Tomoaki, Tokyo (June 2009); Murakami, Tomoaki, ‘The Yoshida Way and PKO Participation Problem’ (\textit{Yoshida rosen to PKO sanka mondai}), \textit{International Politics (Kokusaiseiji)} 151 (2008): 121-139, 121-122.
always seen as a priority. For all agencies of government, however, there were domestic political and social considerations, that the previous purely civilian, mercantilist approach had run its course and been found wanting in the new post-Cold War environment, including the norms associated with Japanese pacifism. However, the option of UNPKO dispatch was first mooted in response to US demands to contribute personnel to Operation Desert Shield. There was no direct logical progression from participation, even as non-combatants, in desert warfare to UNPKO in Cambodia. JSDF ODO provided a mediation device offering utility between domestic and foreign pressures.

Japanese ODO in the 1990s, like those of Germany, were widely seen as enhancing Japanese chances of gaining permanent membership of the UNSC. By demonstrating that both nations were willing to challenge domestic political-security norms and embrace the burdens of UN membership, it was hoped that participation would complement financial largess in gaining permanent membership of a reformed, enlarged UNSC.  

As the British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said to Prime Minister Miyazawa in 1993, “Any permanent member of the Security Council needs to take a full part in UN Peacekeeping Activities.”

UNSG Boutros-Ghali was reported to have stated in December 1993 that Japan needed to increase its efforts to dispatch troops overseas if its UNSC membership application were to be well received. Interviewees in a Nikkei Shimbun article in January 1993, agreed that Japanese plans to revise ODO legislation were “in part intended to help Japan's bid to get a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council as Japan's role is growing on the international political

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284 Drifte, Reinhard, Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat.
scene.\textsuperscript{287} UNPKO was one tangible means of demonstrating Japanese assertiveness on the world stage with consequently less emphasis placed on operational performance than apparent success.

UNPKO can also be seen as one battle in the domestic struggle over the national conscience as overseas dispatch became the ‘proxy battlefield’ for pacifism and revisionism, or between supporters of post-war security norms and the proponents of new post-Cold War security norms. This struggle was closely tied with constitutional controversies, yet the constitution and its revision can be regarded as irrelevant to JSDF ODO in the 1990s if the operations conducted (and JSDF) are accepted as having been within constitutional boundaries.

This thesis aims to illustrate that while Japan’s armed forces operate under restrictive legal structures, as do most armed forces, they have managed to conduct meaningful operations. While legal and constitutional concerns have impinged upon operational effectiveness, this has been a matter of degrees rather than absolutes, connected with the process of mediation. Richard J. Samuels has illustrated how crucial the CLB has been in shaping security-related constitutional interpretations, somewhat at loggerheads with politicians, indicating the key battle was mediating the interpretation, not the letter of the (basic) law, as the most obvious part of the mediation process.\textsuperscript{288} UNPKO as the harbinger of constitutional revision is one of many theses. It is not, however, the main thrust of this thesis, for the matter of the constitution, while significant, is too often a distraction from the primary issue of how Japan can or should contribute to international

\textsuperscript{287} ‘Gov’t to review UN peacekeeping law’, Nikkei Shimbun (5 January 1993) (http://telecom21.nikkei.co.jp/nt21/service/ENGD021/ENGD241?cid=NDJEDB1993010500101029&madr=TOP&kdr=19930105&dk=8ab2414c&reservedtp=ENGD021g6ir2iik&frtnode=ENGD031&hltid=206chh4opa2e0, 7 March 2010).

\textsuperscript{288} Samuels, Richard J, Politics, Security Policy, and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau.
security.

c. Military Utility, Opportunity, and Distraction

ODO provided the JSDF with additional senses of purpose in the post-Cold War period. ODO provide the means to improve institutional and personal skills, both military and civil, expose the JSDF to international best-practice, and provide a variety of tasks and environmental challenges not possible in domestic training regimes.

ODO have boosted JSDF popularity from a low base, one commentator noting “for decades the Self-Defense Forces were considered people who “live under a rock””.

UNTAC and later missions led to a significant improvement in their profile and public opinion ratings in Japan. ODO have become legitimising roles for the JSDF, helping to establish the legitimacy and utility of the JSDF, and possibly the right of Japan to possess a de jure military. The elevation of the JDA to the MOD in January 2007 was considered unacceptable 15 years before, and partly justified by the increased operational tempo of JSDF ODO. As the 2008 defence white paper stated, “these roles [such as] international peace cooperation activities … have increasingly become the focus of defense capability.” Furthermore, the MOD status change was directly linked with the change of the primary mission statement of the JSDF: “The two major steps of making the transition to the MOD and stipulation of international peace cooperation activities as the primary mission of the SDF were carried out in order to respond more precisely to today’s important challenge of coping with the issues of

security and crisis management.”

Watanabe Takashi, the first contingent commander of the JSDF in Cambodia stated “I firmly believe that operations in the field are the most important component in PKOs.” His view is that the interface of the JSDF with international military and civilian personnel provides a vital professional development experiences. This view has been reiterated by a number of JSDF personnel with direct ODO experience, and by JDA/MOD civilian staff.

Some elements of the JSDF have utilised ODO experience to enhance their hardware and software capabilities. MSDF proposals for enhanced amphibious vessels were rejected, yet an even more capable class was approved in the wake of UNTAC. The GSDF developed APCs more suited to ODO, and were unusually able to rapidly procure large numbers, proving successful in operations.

The majority of JSDF personnel interviewed, however, including those who valued their own ODO experiences, have noted how many colleagues viewed ODO in the 1990s as primarily a PR exercise. The overwhelming view was that nothing should be seen to go wrong, so that they could return to ‘real’ (national defence) roles. A GSDF artillery officer, taken from service in Hokkaido, sent to Cambodia, and then returning to Hokkaido, was neither debriefed nor encouraged to consider his experience within a career development pathway. One GSDF armoured specialist serving at the JDA summed up his view of ODO as providing a break from regimental duties, but wondered whether ODO would provoke a down-grading of armoured forces, with

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292 Defense of Japan, 2008: 114
293 Watanabe, Takashi, The PKO in Cambodia-Lessons Learned: 102.
294 The Oosumi-class. Conversations with Rear-Admiral, MSDF, and Captain, MSDF, Tokyo (3 February 2009).
295 Interview with GSDF Lt.-Colonel, Tokyo (June 2009).
subsequent career implications.²⁹⁶

Compared to politicians, it is clear that the view of many JSDF personnel was more ambivalent towards ODO in the 1990s. Many worried that ODO could serve as a distraction from their main missions, and that the controversy may not be worthwhile. The Iraq dispatch was often viewed in this light, as public opposition was a significant obstacle. Even more notable since the Iraq dispatch has been the reluctance of the GSDF to consider further complex ODO without a significant legal review, with a general (dispatch) law (ippanhou). This has been commented on by many sources and seems to be based on both a general dissatisfaction with MoFA security briefings, often contradicted by experience, and the fear that Japanese personnel could be embarrassed and put at risk by legal restrictions.

d. Political and Legal Development of the IPCL

Japanese personnel have been dispatched overseas for operations through four mechanisms: ODA legislation, the founding legislation of each ministry (establishment laws), disaster relief legislation, and IPC legislation. Only the latter allows for the dispatch of formed units and large numbers of personnel, while the ministry establishment laws allow only for dispatch of individuals, for specific purposes, limited in numbers and periods of time. Establishment laws provide for defence attaché staff (bouei chuuzaikan seido) dispatched by the JDA from the 1960s, increasing from 22 in 1979 to 42 personnel in 32 countries by 1998, and the first UN election monitors by MoFA from 1989.²⁹⁷ This has also been the basis for the dispatch of JSDF members for

²⁹⁶ Interview with GSDF Lt-Colonel, Tokyo (March 2002).
training exercises overseas. The reluctance of the Japanese government to consider revising laws to allow for overseas operations is indicative of both the perceived legal and constitutional problems and of the scale of socio-political opposition to JSDF overseas dispatch during the Cold War. While this study is centred upon operational considerations of the JSDF, these must be understood within the context of the development of legal instruments by which ODO were enabled, and how these legal instruments developed and affected operational performance.

Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi stated in 1969, that, with reference to South-East Asia it was clear that “a simple transfer of peace-keeping responsibilities in Asia from the United States to Japan is out of the question.” He continued that “Japanese public opinion is simply not prepared for such an undertaking... [and] any ill-conceived Japanese military contribution to Asian stability would accomplish little except to squander Japan’s security capabilities, and our painstakingly built-up good will in Asian countries, as well as domestic support for the Self-Defense Forces.” The issue was, and has continued to be, whether JSDF personnel are appropriate national actors, whether they should utilise force, and how that might be legally and constitutionally accommodated? This was confirmed by Kudoh Atsuo, CLB Director-General, on 5th December 1991, could not state, “either to affirm or deny the possibility,” of whether JSDF personnel could be dispatched for UN operations. PM Miyazawa stated in

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December 1991 that:

UN peace-keeping operations do not aim to restore international peace by compulsory means. The participation of the SDF in the operations is not considered to involve the use of force. Therefore the dispatch of the SDF abroad on the basis of this bill does not entail any constitutional problem.\(^{301}\)

The 1954 Resolution of the House of Councillors upon the founding of the JSDF stated that, “the dispatch abroad of the SDF should not be put into practice.” PM Miyazawa disregarded the Resolution when it was raised during debates in December 1991, considering the House could reinterpret any House Resolution, an example of mediation through pre-existing norms.\(^{302}\) However, Ogata Sadako has reported that at the 37\(^{th}\) UNGA in 1982, Japan proposed a resolution “to undertake technical studies regarding the expansion and strengthening of United Nations peace-keeping functions.”\(^{303}\) It would seem that the domestic and international tones of Japanese discourse on peacekeeping were somewhat at odds.

Such disharmonies would be intensified after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, as the pressure upon Japan to contribute to allied efforts intensified, primarily measured in Tokyo’s willingness to dispatch Forces. The Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations was submitted to the Diet on 16\(^{th}\) October 1990 by the Kaifu administration. William Heinrich and Murakami Tomoaki have stated that a MoFA


Draft Bill was prepared in the 1960s, but without further progress. Under the 1990 UN Peacekeeping Bill, a 2000 strong Peacekeeping Contingent would have been formed (from JSDF personnel as ‘civilian volunteers’) to undertake PKO duties rather than the more controversial dispatch of JSDF formed units, although there were many politicians who preferred the dispatch of a volunteer force distinct from the JSDF.

During the Gulf War crisis, MoFA Administrative Vice-Minister Kuriyama Shouichi insisted that it would be sufficient to dispatch civilian personnel to UNPKO, while the Head of the Treaty Bureau, Yanai Shunji strongly disagreed, and insisted that the only satisfactory actors were the JSDF.

Yamaguchi Jiro contends that Ozawa Ichiro’s attempts to force the bill through the Diet, despite significant JSP and even LDP opposition, to wake up the “peace-fogged Japanese people”, made matters worse. The proposal was withdrawn and Kaifu fell, replaced by the diplomatic Miyazawa.

Failure to reach agreement with opponents rather than the innate impracticalities of the bill led to its downfall, and the eventual passage of the IPCL under the Miyazawa administration on 15th June 1992, despite sustained JSP opposition, including ‘ox-walk’ delaying tactics. The IPCL had been relabelled during the passage process, from a ‘UNPKO’ bill, as the term was considered tainted by the previous failure. Nobuo Ishihara, Deputy-chief Cabinet Secretary, announced that the new name would be “Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other

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305 ‘SDF officers on leave should work in PKO, Ouchi says’, Nikkei Shimbun (13 May 1991) (http://telecom21.nikkei.co.jp/nt21/service/ENGD021/ENGD241?cid=NDJEDB1991051300101448&madr=TOP&kdt=19910513&dk=e57f3c9&reservedtp=ENGD021g6iskv47&frmode=ENGD031&hltid=206chh4opa2e0, 10 March 2010).
Public opinion during the debate over the Bill reflected the turmoil within political circles. The liberal *Asahi Shimbun* newspaper indicated that 41.6% of those polled favoured the bill, whilst 36.9% were opposed, yet that 50.3% found it constitutionally problematic.\(^{309}\) In contrast, the pro-deployment *Yomiuri Shimbun* in response to “How should Japan contribute to international security?” found PKO ranked fourth, a mere 23.9% compared to 60.4% who favoured “personnel for disaster relief and helping refugees”.\(^{310}\) A survey of Japanese high school students in May 1992 found that less than 19% supported JSDF dispatch with 51% opposed, whereas a March 1993 NHK survey of adults found over 40% support, with 33% opposed.\(^{311}\) The fact that the LDP managed to retrieve upper-house Diet seats in the July 1992 elections was not necessarily indicative of support for the IPCL. However, the ‘piggybacking’ of the IPCL with the Disaster Relief Reform Bill, and the ODA Charter of June 1992 (barring aid for military use, and considering military exports, environmental, and human rights factors for aid disbursement), did provide a liberal context.\(^{312}\) That (retroactive) Diet approval would be required placated some opponents. Additionally, the Disaster Relief Law of 1987 was revised in June 1992 allowing JSDF relief participation at short notice on Prime Minister’s orders, ratified or revoked *post facto* by the Diet. As stated, this linkage of Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief (a popular and long-standing function of the JSDF) helped emphasize (or exaggerate) the liberal hue of the IPCL. According to

\(^{308}\) ‘Japan’s U.N. peacekeeping law has name changed’, *Nikkei Shimbun* (3 July 1992) (http://telecom21.nikkei.co.jp/nt21/service/ENGD021/ENGD241?cid=NDJEDB199207030101577 &madr=TOP&kdt=19920703&dk=7a66a127&reservedtp=ENGD021g6irgpax&ftmode=ENGD031 &htlid=206chh4opa2e0, 7 March 2010).  
Yanai Shunji, the JDA and JSDF were passive observers of the intense debate, merely awaiting orders to dispatch or not.\textsuperscript{313}

The IPCL re-instated the JSDF as the designated representatives, although indirectly, as they were assigned during ODO service to the International Peace Cooperation Corps (IPCC), with IPCC insignia, somewhat diluted by police and public officials, allaying concerns over the militaristic nature of Japan’s efforts.\textsuperscript{314} The IPCC was administered by the IPCH, established by the IPCL within the PMO.\textsuperscript{315} Despite the new roles and responsibilities provided by the IPCL, the Forces would continue to operate within tight limitations, some specifically stated, others of a far more complex and ephemeral nature, based upon socio-political norms associated with Article 9 of the constitution.

e. Legal Limitations

Article 9 has undoubtedly had a great effect upon the drafting and interpretation of ODO-related laws. Fear of being considered to be breaching the spirit of the constitution is also an important consideration, and how this has affected JSDF operations. This is most apparent when examining the SDF and IPC Laws.

e.1 SDF Law

The SDF Law has been the basic instrument for governing the JSDF, and stated clearly from 1954 to 2007 that the JSDF had three main tasks:

\textsuperscript{313} Iokibe, Makoto, \textit{et al}, \textit{Witness of the 90s}: 57-58.
\textsuperscript{314} \textit{International Peace Cooperation Corps} (http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/organization/organization02.html, 6 January 2010).
\textsuperscript{315} From January 2001, the Prime Minister’s Office merged with the Cabinet Office (\textit{naikakufu}), consolidating management of the IPCH and JDA under Prime Ministerial control: Samuels, Richard J., \textit{Securing Japan}: 74.
1 National Defence
2 Support for the civil power, including law and order support roles
3 Miscellaneous duties.

The third tier responsibilities, including preparing the snow for the Nagano Winter Olympics and building Sapporo Ice Festival sculptures was the domicile of Japanese ODO until the January 2007 revision.\(^{316}\) This rather indicates the priority it received within the cabinet and JDA, but also within elements of the JSDF. There was an implicit understanding that the JSDF existed as the smallest possible force to secure national defence. This was institutionalised in the approach of the NDPO of 1976, when the influential JDA official Kubo Takuya circulated a ‘KB’ paper. Kubo’s KB referred to ‘*kibanteki boueiryoku*’, ‘standard defence capability’, as the guiding principle, as opposed to the existing ‘*shoyo boueiryoku*’, ‘required defence capability’. This minimalist interpretation was somewhat called into question by defence estimates, but was symptomatic of the efforts of LDP Yoshida-wing politicians, such as Sakata Michita, DG-JDA 1975-76, and MOF officials who wished to reduce expenditure.\(^{317}\)

As the Araki Report stated, “international peace cooperation has been regarded as an incidental duty of the SDF, but given the growing importance of such cooperative efforts, they should be redefined as one of its primary missions.”\(^{318}\) With the founding of the MOD in 2007, the government simultaneously mainstreamed ODO as a JSDF “primary role”, although the tangible change was less dramatic as national defence remained a “primary mission” while ODO, contingency missions, and civil-support roles were collectively termed “secondary missions”, within the “primary role”.\(^{319}\)

\(^{316}\) *Defense of Japan 1998*: 150.

\(^{317}\) Katahara, Eiichi, ‘Japan from Containment to Normalization’: 78.


Prime Minister Abe stated: “While adhering to the principles of the Constitution, Japanese will no longer shy away from carrying out overseas activities involving the SDF, if it is for the sake of international peace and stability.” However, the 2008 defence white paper stated that MOD status, “does not assign new missions to the SDF nor does it alter the nature... of SDF activities”.

### e.2 IPC Law

JSDF IPCL roles are stipulated under Chapter 8 of the SDF Law governing miscellaneous duties. The IPCL is an umbrella enabling instrument, not a ‘general law’. Diet approval is required for each IPCL dispatch and mission-renewal after two years. Furthermore, conditions for Japanese ODO have been highly restrictive, expressing political caution, desire for civilian control, and the need to avoid casualties. The government strongly differentiated between *Hontai gyomu*, ‘main body’ PKF, and *Kohochiiki shien*, ‘rear-area support’: PSO. The IPCL, therefore, provides specific tasks that may be conducted, drafted with little reference to JSDF professionals. There are five ‘principles’ or ‘conditions’ that must be met, the ‘Five Conditions for PKO Participation’ (*PKO sanka gogensoku*):

1. Ceasefire (peace process with ceasefire)
2. Consent (host nation and parties’ agreement)
3. Impartiality (neutral mission-stance)
4. Self-Defence (minimal force)

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323 Exceptions are for non-JSDF duties, or when the Diet is not in session, approval being provided/withheld for Cabinet Orders (*Seirei*) during subsequent sessions: IPCL, Articles 6, 7.
5 Suspension and termination (if conditions breached)

While the ‘Five Conditions’ can be considered limiting, UNHCR Ogata Sadako stated during the UNTAC dispatch that she did not consider the JSDF’s work to have been affected by them. The ‘frozen activities’ precluded JSDF personnel from participating in ‘core peacekeeping tasks’:

1 Disarmament processes
2 Collection, storage, or disposal of weapons
3 Stationing and patrolling in buffer zones
4 Inspection or monitoring of weapon imports/exports
5 Designation of ceasefire or other conflict boundary lines
6 Assisting prisoner-of-war exchange

In themselves seemingly innocuous to experienced peacekeepers, they were considered too closely linked to combat and thus potentially drawing the JSDF into belligerency. The Japanese government position was that JSDF personnel assigned to PKF could carry out “PKF Logistics Support” but not “Assignments for core units of PKF” until the core activities were ‘unfrozen’ in 2001. The 1992 IPCL stated that the PKF core activities would require that “these assignments are separately prescribed in law.” It was clear that the JSDF were to be specifically prevented from conducting any duties not explicitly listed in statutory instruments, as an overseas extension of ‘civilian control’.

The frozen duties were proscribed activities, not conducted by the JSDF, and as such

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328 Defense of Japan 2002: 224, 255.
not unique in ODO. German and Italian troops may not be used in law-enforcement duties, such as crowd control, while British troops may not use firearms in defending property.\(^{329}\) However, the JSDF were restricted by the extremely detailed provisions of the IPCL stating which tasks they could undertake, certain tasks being solely civilian, others ‘frozen’. Hirano Ryuichi refers to the “Pojiristo” and “Negaristo”: the ‘positive’ and ‘negative list’ activities limiting ODO.\(^{330}\)

“‘International Peace Cooperation Assignments’ shall mean the following tasks…conducted Overseas:

(a) Monitoring the observance of cessation of armed conflict or the implementation of relocation, withdrawal or demobilization of armed forces as agreed upon among the Parties to Armed Conflict;
(b) Stationing and patrol in buffer zones and other areas demarcated for preventing the occurrence of armed conflict;
(c) Inspection or identification of weapons and/or their parts carried in or out by vehicle, by other means of transportation, or by passersby;
(d) Collection, storage or disposal of abandoned weapons and/or their parts;
(e) Assistance in the designation of cease-fire lines or any other similar boundaries by the Parties to Armed Conflict;
(f) Assistance in the exchange of prisoners-of-war among the Parties to Armed Conflict;
(g) Observation or management of fair execution of congressional elections, plebiscites or any other similar election or voting events;
(h) Provision of advice or guidance and supervision related to police administrative matters;
(i) Provision of advice or guidance related to administrative matters not covered by (h) above;


(j) Medical care including sanitation measures;
(k) Search or rescue of Afflicted People or assistance in their repatriation;
(l) Distribution of food, clothing, medical supplies and other daily necessities to Afflicted People;
(m) Installation of facilities or equipment to accommodate Afflicted People;
(n) Measures for the repair or maintenance of facilities or equipment damaged by Conflicts, which are necessary for the daily life of Afflicted People;
(o) Measures for the restoration of natural environment subjected to pollution and other damage by Conflicts;
(p) Transportation, storage or reserve, communication, construction, or installation, inspection or repair of machines and apparatus in addition to what is listed in (a) to (o) above.
(q) Other tasks similar to those listed in (a) to (p) above, as specified by a Cabinet Order.  

Duties (a)-(f) were ‘frozen’, (g)-(i) were civilian, and (j)-(p) were JSDF ODO including International Humanitarian Relief, while (q) provided a catch-all exception, utilised during UNTAC.

One of the most contentious issues, the issuing and use of weapons by the JSDF was strictly limited in the IPCL. Weapons were to be issued only by the IPCH (borrowed from the JSDF, while in practice the JSDF managed them) and in a highly restrictive manner. Article 24 of the IPCL provided for weapons to be stored, and if issued, their use would be under the control of each JSDF member, not superiors. JSDF unit members:

…may use such small arms and light weapons within the limits judged reasonably necessary according to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives or bodies of themselves, [or] other

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Force could only be utilised to the minimum degree required to ensure self-defence, under Articles 36-37, 1907 Penal Code. While all military forces are subject to restrictions on the use of small arms the Japanese rules of 1992 were not only strict, but contradicted the basic premise of armed forces: officers and NCOs providing direction and orders. JSDF senior officers insist that they have no Rules of Engagement (ROE), merely (confidential) guidelines, but interviews have revealed that beyond restrictions was the fear of being considered in violation of rules, and the stigma of being the first Japanese to use force. The IPCL prohibited ‘defence of the mission’ activities, under UN ROE.

Following IPCL passage and SDF Law revision there was something of a hiatus. Revision of the IPCL was due in 1995, but delayed until the 1998 revision allowed local commanders to authorise use of force. As the 1998 white paper stated, “it is expected that members of the SDF contingents will be relieved of their psychological burden which was felt under the previous provisions.” This provided a more manageable system, and JSDF cooperation was also permitted for election monitoring activities, allowing the Law to catch up with UNTAC operational practice in 1993. A more radical revision was permission for JSDF humanitarian missions without requiring confirmation of a ceasefire.

Discussions began for the ‘unfreezing’ of duties after UNTAC yet most senior civil

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servants and politicians were opposed. Prime Minister Obuchi Keizou, speaking before a House of Representatives Committee in December 1998, acknowledged that the reform of the IPCL and the unfreezing of the ‘frozen’ activities would not be prevented by constitutional or other issues.\(^\text{336}\) Hatoyama Yukio, Acting DPJ Secretary-General, added that the issue of frozen activities required an overall revision of security policies. In January 1999, DPJ policy chief Itou Hidenari began discussions on security policy reform.\(^\text{337}\) The duties were not eventually ‘unfrozen’ until November 2001, with opposition DPJ support, indicating the changes in security norms during the 1990s.\(^\text{338}\)

While the events of 9/11 injected a degree of pragmatism into reconsidering the IPCL, there was emerging consensus before September 2001, with JSDF ODO performance enhancement and raising national profile cited as important factors.\(^\text{339}\) This was also the case with revision of the ‘Law on Working Conditions of Defense Agency Officials Dispatched to International Organizations’ in November 2001, with one GSDF officer dispatched to the UNDPKO Military Planning Section.\(^\text{340}\)

Shinoda Tomohito has stated that, “a legal framework has been slowly but surely established and strengthened since the 1990s, with the 1992 International Peace

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\(^{336}\) ‘The Issue of PKF Main Force Frozen Duties: the statement of position and opinions of various parties’ (Iwayuru PKF hontaigyoumu no touketsu kaijo no mondai ni tsukimashite wa...samazamana tachibakara no goiken ga shimesarete oruku to moshouchi wo itashite orimasu); Minutes of the 144th Meeting of the Special Committee on Fiscal Structural Reform of the House of Representatives, 5 (Dai 144kai Shuugiin zaisei kouzou kaikaku ni kansuru tokubetsu iinkaikai giroku dai5gou) (8 December 1998): 7.

\(^{337}\) ‘PKF Frozen Activities, Hatoyama looking positive’ (PKF touketsu kaijo,Yushi ga maemuki), Nikkei Shim bun (9 January 1999): 2.

\(^{338}\) DPJ to back expansion of PKO law: Limits on SDF Arms Use to Ease’, The Japan Times (29 October 2001) (http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin-tn20011029a1.html, 10 March 2010).


Cooperation Law, the 1999 Regional Crisis Law, the 2001 anti-terrorism law, the 2003 emergency law, and the 2003 Iraq law.\textsuperscript{341} While there is no clear legal connection between the Cambodia and Iraq ODO, there is a sense by which the controversies surrounding the first, and the subsequent perception of success, paved the way for the passage of later controversial laws. It is difficult to imagine an Iraq dispatch without a string of successful ODO deployments during the 1990s. Although Bhubhindar Singh’s suggestion that the ODO of the 1990s led directly to the expansion of the JSDF operational area in support of US forces in Asia overstates the case, tolerance for JSDF dispatch was raised by perceptions of operational success, particularly as missions were presented in a liberal, international context.\textsuperscript{342} This is clear from the October 2004 Cabinet Office poll, with 51.9\% of respondents considering ‘contribution to international peace’ as the most important consideration for Japan’s foreign policy. 14 years earlier the figure had been less than 35\%.\textsuperscript{343} In general, the legal changes affecting JSDF ODO appeared to have kept pace with the developments in Japanese public opinion and the changing nature of pacifist norms.

3 Conclusion

It is clear that the complexity and varied development of UN peace operations has been matched by the development of JSDF ODO into a variety of mission types. While Japan did not attempt to become a ‘full spectrum’ peacekeeper, it did engage in a range of mission types, and also gradually learned from UN experience and the

\textsuperscript{341} Shinoda, Tomohito, \textit{Koizumi Diplomacy}: 146.
development of peacekeeping norms, including those related to use of force, and resilience in operational conditions, examined in Chapter Four. UN standards and methodologies aided development of JSDF ODO, but it is also clear that operations were shaped by other influences. While US and allied pressure was a driver to engage in ODO, it dictated little of dispatch or operational forms.

The crisis of confidence during and after the Gulf War provided the first major challenge to Japan’s comfortable Cold War security norms, and as such took time to resolve. The mission types, operational duties, and appointment of the JSDF as national representatives were the result of extended mediation between sometimes conflicting and contradictory influences. The desire to be a full UN member and to assume the concomitant responsibilities was one influence in favour of dispatch. The durable pacifist and anti-militarist norms throughout society acted as a powerful influence against dispatch of combat forces. The nature of the UN, the role it had been ascribed in Japanese policy, and the development of peacekeeping into a liberal international cooperative norm eased the process of mediation considerably. UNPKO provided a policy option with appeal across the fixed lines of dogma, providing an ideal mediation vehicle.

The 1990s were unusual in providing a range of LDP and non-LDP administrations, all of which influenced this mediation, and yet the results did not vary greatly despite the seemingly irreconcilable conflicts of 1990-1992, when navigating between hazards appeared more appropriate than mediating interests. Mediation did entail the imposition of a restrictive legislative framework around ODO, with strict terms for dispatch, ‘frozen’ duties, and ‘permitted’ activities. Such measures, however unusual internationally, were for the JSDF, further restrictions on management and leadership
roles through the ‘civilian control’ culture. Gradually, operational experience, the development of confidence in and trust for the JSDF, and a lessening of political polarization permitted the relaxation of restrictions, and allowed professional operational judgment. At times, the legal instruments lagged behind operational practice, as will be seen in Chapter Four.

The primary influences over security issues remained the US alliance and Article 9. Japanese society felt largely compelled to live with one, while holding closely to the ideals, if not the strict letter, of the other. While not explicitly connected to either, JSDF participation in UNPKO provided a means by which Japan was able to balance between the seemingly disparate demands of military alliance and state pacifism, to navigate around socio-political obstacles, and to mediate disputes.
Chapter 4  ODO Deployments: Peacekeeping

1  Introduction to JSDF Peacekeeping

As previously stated, the aim of this thesis is to examine and evaluate whether the JSDF were effective international actors and representatives of Japan in their overseas deployment operations. As stated in Chapter One, many studies of Japanese peacekeeping have concentrated upon permanent membership of the UN Security Council, or the changing nature of Japan’s political culture and identity. Many early works were naturally concerned with the legal and constitutional implications of overseas dispatch, and fundamental aspects of peacekeeping with which many were unfamiliar.\(^{344}\)

One considerable problem, seemingly at odds with high profile and controversial operations, is the dearth of information. The JSDF conducted their first ODO in 1991 and their first UNPKO in 1992, and although there are official histories of each dispatch (\textit{hakenshi}), they are not in the public domain, and often the defence white papers contained little information.\(^{345}\) Despite being aided by the GSDF Research Division (\textit{Rikujoujieitai kenkyuu honbu}), and making multiple requests to the MOD, almost no information was released.\(^{346}\)

Researchers at NIDS expressed sympathy, and wished for the JSDF to publicise their


\(^{345}\) The 1998, 2000, 2001, and 2004 white papers do not mention UNTAC or ONUMOZ.

\(^{346}\) The JSDF dispatch histories have been briefly seen by the author, but only one section was released upon appeal, Honduras, 1998, 14 pages, with approximately one-third censored. Non-publication is based upon the Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs, Act No. 58 (30 May 2003) (\textit{Gyousei kikan no hoyuusuru kouinjouhou no hogo ni kansuru houritsu}).
own work, or assistance for researchers to do so on their behalf.\textsuperscript{347} From this failure to provide detailed information on Japanese ODO it might be assumed that either the operations have not been held in high regard, or have included embarrassing episodes. However, it appears most likely that there is not considered to be a need to provide detailed operational information, as there is less concern in politics and the media with operational effectiveness than the general principles of whether they were mounted. Despite the professional frustration of some JSDF and JDA/MOD personnel, general notions of ODO ‘success’ have come to be defined as \textit{not} being required to justify operational matters.

\textbf{A \ ODO Mission Range}

As stated in Chapter Three, UNPKO are one of five main ODO categories:

\begin{itemize}
\item[A] UN peace operations (UNTAC, ONUMOZ\textsuperscript{348})
\item[B] Humanitarian Assistance missions (Rwanda/Zaire)
\item[C] Disaster Relief missions (Honduras, Turkey)
\item[D] Allied Support missions (post-Gulf War minesweeping, Iraq)
\item[E] Anti-Terrorism Support missions (OEF-MIO)
\end{itemize}

These categories exclude electoral tasks conducted by Japanese civilians, the dispatch of JSDF attachés, and chemical disposal specialists to China, and some classifications overlap.\textsuperscript{349} The differentiation of D and E are particularly problematic but these missions after the 1990s will only be examined in relation to lessons-learned. The first three categories will provide the main focus, for their emergence, development, and

\textsuperscript{347} Interviews with three NIDS researchers, Tokyo (2004-2010).
\textsuperscript{348} United Nations Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).
execution in the 1990s were closely linked within Japan’s IPC activities. In the 2002 defence white paper, UNPKO were included within, “Response to Disasters and Contribution to Building a More Stable Security Environment: Expanding the Sphere of SDF Activities In and Outside Japan.” Such a categorization represents the ethos and policy stream within which the operations were conducted, reduces potential objections to belligerent deployments, and blends well with non-UNPKO missions, accurately representing actual JSDF ODO tasks. This chapter shall focus upon JSDF UN peace operations.

B UN Peace Operations

The first Japanese participation in a UN peace operation was a single MoFA official dispatched to UNGOMAP (United Nations Group of Observers for Monitoring the Afghan-Pakistan border) in 1988. Up until 1992, 40 civilians would participate in five missions. A slow and hesitant start perhaps, but within the cautious culture of Japanese policymaking an appropriate and uncontroversial one. These missions were conducted under the establishment laws of each ministry, and included training and ‘international exchange’ (kokusai koryu) activities. Within imprecise parameters the establishment laws could be amended by Cabinet Order but the Diet and CLB pressure prevented significant reinterpretation enabling large-scale overseas dispatch.

In particular, the dispatch of ‘formed units’ was considered a ‘red line’ issue for the JSDF, unless this could be considered a purely limited, training venture, such as MSDF international training cruises. Such missions appeared to make the ‘red line’ somewhat

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351 Interview, Hirano, Ryuichi, Director, Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office, Kasumigaseki, Tokyo (11 June 2009).
less clear, commencing with the cruise to Midway Island and Hawaii in 1958, and as such the principle, “that JSDF units should not go abroad was adjusted many times as need and opportunity arose.”  

Cabinet Orders for the JDA Establishment Law were utilised and did provoke some Diet opposition, but little public concern. Such was the case of the expansion of JSDF overseas defence attaché staff (bouei chuzaikan seido) (Chapter Three), and of NPA personnel as de facto police attaché staff.

The deployment of complete units was a step too far for most Japanese. Eto Jun identified the public “respect deficit” following the Gulf War, indicating recognition for reform, with even the UNSG declaring Japan should “participate aggressively, not only in the financial and technical fields but in peacekeeping operations”. While public opinion did not seem eager there was recognition of the need to assume a degree of burden sharing for international security. While JSDF combative roles would be overtly unconstitutional and politically unacceptable, UNPKO had become liberal, international security norms, and in some respects resembled JSDF domestic disaster relief operations, which more than anything had increased JSDF domestic legitimacy.

Japan has participated in five UNPKO with JSDF units:

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Table 4.1 JSDF UNPKO (units)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Troops (x)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1992~93</td>
<td>c.600 (x2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1992~95</td>
<td>c.50 (x3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>Golan Heights</td>
<td>1996~present</td>
<td>c.40 (x28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>2002~2004</td>
<td>c.680 (x3.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2010~present</td>
<td>c.350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The latter two missions were conducted outside the subject decade, but shall be considered within operational development terms (Chapter Six).

C Assessment of Performance

In assessing the JSDF ODO in the field, an analytical framework is necessary for operational analysis and to provide a comparative mechanism between missions. Dobson in his study of Japanese PKO adopted a theoretical approach based upon the utilisation of elements of traditional IR theory as well as normative patterns, including anti-militarism, US bilateralism, and East Asianism, providing a valuable analytical comparative for a study primarily concerned with why Japan embarked upon peacekeeping and what role the UN (or US) played in determining the Japanese policy agenda.356

358 Dobson, Hugo, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping.
Whether constructing or utilizing such innovative frameworks or depending upon conventional empirical methods, there are few analyses that have evaluated the performance of armed forces in a range of peace operations. Those that do exist have tended to be either brief accounts of operations, or on certain aspects of practice. Many studies have tended to focus upon single missions, using them as case studies to determine the utility of PKO or some particular mission aspect. Other scholars have attempted an overall analysis of PKO as a policy of international governance, and have adopted empirical fieldwork approaches with analytical frameworks incorporating elements of political science and sociological theories. The studies of Heinrich et al, and Stern, have benefited from the broad range of their contributors’ skills within largely empirical-based studies.

This study follows a similar empirical pattern, yet aims to include substantial comparative analysis between the three targeted JSDF UNPKO and non-UN missions, and also non-JSDF comparison. Recognising that this could become a cumbersome task, an empirical-base analytical framework focusing on four main elements will be applied to each JSDF mission to aid inter-mission comparison, inter-military comparison, and the understanding of intra-mission operational issues. The main elements of the analytical framework are:

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The mission context relates to selection, Japanese involvement with the host country, including peace processes, and the security environment: the aspects that affected JSDF operations but which were beyond their control.

ODO preparation and logistics include the Japanese survey and processes leading to JSDF dispatch, training, the lead-in phase, dispatches, logistical support (including Japanese and foreign, civil and/or military), and termination of mission. This section also includes analysis of the scale and types of JSDF deployment, assessing both quantitative and qualitative contributions.

As stated in Chapter One, JSDF performance is difficult to isolate and analyse, yet researchers have utilised post-operational analyses to identify performance indicators in operations. R.J. O'Brien’s use of effectiveness, efficiency, and quality to evaluate Australian Civilian Police (CIVPOL) performance in Cyprus is an example of what is possible, and is appropriate for use in this thesis. These indicators shall be used to evaluate the degree to which JSDF personnel and units carried out their mandated tasks, and also the degree to which they were able to adapt to changed circumstances and tasks beyond those originally mandated. These performance indicators will necessarily vary between missions, as roles and resources varied, but they shall be based on both quantitative and qualitative factors. Although far from perfect, and in recognition that O’Brien encountered difficulties isolating target-group indicators from those of other

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362 O’Brien, R.J., *Police as peacekeepers an evaluation of the performance of Australian police peacekeeping on Cyprus.*
national contingents, this approach would appear to be the most appropriate for evaluating JSDF operational performance.

The JSDF mission contribution factor is an assessment of how the JSDF contributed to the mandated mission, additional tasks, and how their contributions compared with those of others. Non-military comparisons exist, but while useful in limited contexts a uniform inter-mission comparison shall form the standard basis of analysis. This analytical framework will evaluate each mission element in isolation, and in comparison with other mission elements, providing comparisons between JSDF and non-JSDF performance.

D Conclusion

The three UNPKO examined in this chapter shall be evaluated by the analytical framework, and within the stated limitations an effective evaluation will be possible. The first mission, UNTAC, shall be evaluated in greater detail than subsequent missions as not only did it set standards for JSDF UNPKO, but also had a decisive influence upon political and public opinion concerning the utility and wisdom of JSDF ODO.

2 Cambodia

Introduction

Japanese participation in UNTAC was noteworthy not only as the first deployment of the JSDF in a UNPKO, but also as it was part of a long-term Japanese government involvement in settling the Cambodian problem. This broader approach to peace operations was as innovative as the JSDF mission, and many, such as Takeda Yasuhiro,
have noted how the Japanese government made extensive efforts to aid the peace process, encourage adherence to the Paris Accords, and sustain UNTAC.\textsuperscript{363} Japanese concern for Cambodia’s peace and stability can be traced to 1970, the extent of efforts possibly indicating that Cambodia had become a test-case for the maturity of Japanese foreign policy.\textsuperscript{364} Furthermore, for the first time it appeared that Japan had implemented a strategic approach, with diplomatic, financial, civil, and military elements coordinated towards a common goal.\textsuperscript{365}

The UNTAC mission was widely regarded as having been a great success for the JSDF, but initial expectations included alarmist language concerning rampaging Japanese soldiery ruining Japan’s reputation. Such sentiments were echoed in Asian countries, not least in China and Korea as Japan’s Ambassador to Thailand, Ikeda Tadashi, described.\textsuperscript{366} Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew referred to JSDF overseas deployments as like handing chocolate liquors to a former alcoholic.\textsuperscript{367} The abiding and enduring images, however, were of diligent personnel doing their best to improve the lives of local people. The murder of a Japanese UN Volunteer (UNV) and a police inspector emphasized the precarious nature of the peace process, and made the JSDF lack of casualties seem all the more noteworthy. Although DG-JDA Nakayama Toshio stated after the murder of UNV Nakata Atsuhito “if it becomes clear that a widespread armed disruption of the election is in force, we must of course think of an

\textsuperscript{366} Ikeda, Tadashi, \textit{The Road to Peace in Cambodia (Kanbojia heiwa e no michi)} (Tokyo: Toshibunpan, 1996): 179-181.
\textsuperscript{367} Berger, Thomas U., \textit{Cultures of Antimilitarism}: 191.
emergency evacuation or a halt in operations” and considerable political pressure was placed upon the government, this was an option resisted despite the potential implications.368

UNTAC is crucial for understanding the development of ODO as it presented a peaceful, liberal, and constructive Japanese military dispatch and provided an operational template for the JSDF. The JDA and MoFA assumed this template represented ‘PKO success’, without clearly defining what operational aspects of the mission equated to successful ODO. Application of the analytical framework will provide a means by which notions of success may be judged, initially by examining the mission context of UNTAC.

A Mission Context

UNTAC, established under Chapter VI of the UN Charter by UNSC Resolution 745 of 28th February 1992, had broad responsibilities to create a stable environment leading to national elections, by civilian, police, and military means within 18 months due to UN financial problems and fear that the elections could be sabotaged by ‘spoiler’ groups.369

Cambodia had failed to avoid involvement in the Vietnam War. Following the 1970 coup deposing Prime Minister Prince Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge (KR) Maoist group battled the pro-American government, seized control of the capital Phnom Penh in 1975, and embarked upon an horrific campaign of de-intellectualisation virtually erasing the educated classes, killing more than a million, and creating an agricultural collective.

368 Pringle, James, ‘Japan threatens to pull out its troops; Cambodia’, The Times (10 April 1993): 11.
Vietnam invaded in 1978, partly to prevent KR border incursions, but the end of the Cold War, Vietnamese occupation fatigue, and Cambodian opposition led to preliminary negotiations, with the US and China as moderators.

The complex domestic politics involved four main political groupings. The pro-Vietnamese SOC (State of Cambodia), led by Hun Sen (Prime Minister), controlled the Cambodian People’s Armed Force. FUNCINPEC (United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Co-operative Cambodia), of Prince Sihanouk and his son Ranariddh, and its National Army for an Independent Kampuchea. The Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) under Son Sann, controlled the Khmer People’s National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF), while the KR controlled the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK).  

Following negotiations in Paris, Jakarta, and Tokyo, a Framework Document was agreed in September 1990, and the Paris Peace Accords (Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict) signed on 23rd October 1991. The Supreme National Council of Cambodia (SNC) became, “the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia are enshrined.” The SNC delegated to the UN, “all powers necessary,” to ensure implementation of the Accords, and UNAMIC (UN Advance Mission in Cambodia), mandated by UNSC Resolution 717 (1991), 16th October 1991, prepared for the deployment of UNTAC.  

The SRSG and military commander were conscious that UNTAC was not an enforcement operation. Despite comments in 1992 by Japan’s non-permanent UNSC

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370 Findlay, Trevor, Cambodia: 1-6.
372 Sanderson, John M., Dabbling in War: The Dilemma in the Use of Force in United Nations
representative, Hatano Yoshio, that, in Reinhard Drifte’s words, “it was thanks to Japan that force was not used in Cambodia”, it is clear that no UNSC member or contingent provider proposed a Chapter VII mission.\textsuperscript{373}

From 15\textsuperscript{th} March 1992, UNTAC absorbed UNAMIC, but mission elements were delayed, including SRSG Akashi Yasushi’s staff, infantry battalions, engineers, and CIVPOL, and non-compliance escalated, particularly from the KR and the SOC. As Berdal and Leifer stated, “the critical problem confronted by UNTAC virtually from the outset of its deployment was how to discharge its responsibility for filling a political vacuum in the face of obstructive violence by contending Cambodian parties.”\textsuperscript{374}

Lt.-General John Sanderson, the Australian UNTAC Force Commander, believed that military contingents “were sent to Cambodia at a rate too slow to seize advantage of the dynamics and goodwill prevailing at the signing in Paris, [which] in itself reflects a profound lack of understanding of the nature of these undertakings.”\textsuperscript{375} Michael Harbottle has emphasized how operational experience and rapid deployment have elsewhere contributed to forces dispatched for UNPKO being able to rapidly and effectively commence duties. The example of UNFICYP peacekeepers being deployed to Egypt (UNEF II) in 1973, establishing ceasefire lines within 36 hours, certainly contrasted with UNTAC.\textsuperscript{376}

UNTAC was unique in the range and depth of its authority. The SRSG was advised by the SNC, but had most agencies/ministries under direct UN supervision or control,

\begin{flushleft}
\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{373} Drifte, Reinhard, \textit{Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat}: 86-87.
\textsuperscript{376} Harbottle, Michael, \textit{‘Lessons for UN Peacekeeping’}, \textit{International Affairs} 50-4 (1974): 544-553.
\end{footnotesize}
\end{flushleft}
established a legal system, including electoral laws and human rights codes, and could strike down existing laws that obstructed UNTAC’s efforts.\textsuperscript{377}

While UNTAC’s civilian effort focused upon the election, de-militarisation was under military control. Combatants were to withdraw to cantonment areas, with weapons under UNTAC supervision. All prisoners and displaced Cambodians would be released, mainly through the Office of the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).\textsuperscript{378}

The work of UNTAC proceeded in an atmosphere of increasing tension with the KR escalating its spoiling campaign, but the election was held in May 1993 with almost 90\% participation, FUNCINPEC winning over 45\% of the vote. While there had been problems with the mission, the overall result was as good as could be expected from a broad-ranging and innovative operation, conducted in such an atmosphere, often by inexperienced personnel.\textsuperscript{379} The 3600 CIVPOL were notorious for uneven quality, with some lacking even basic police skills or any of the UN checklist points, such as driving licence or French/English competency.\textsuperscript{380}

The military force (16,000) main tasks were: (1) verification of the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces (by the Strategic Investigation Teams); (2) verification of the cantonment and disarmament of forces; (3) weapon disposal and control; (4) mine clearing and education.\textsuperscript{381} The force was designed around 12 composite infantry

\textsuperscript{377} Background to UNTAC Mission, UNDPKO (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacbackgr2.html#two, 8 August 2009).
\textsuperscript{378} Background to UNTAC Mission, UNDPKO.
\textsuperscript{379} Cain, K., Postlewait H., Thomson, A., Emergency Sex (and Other Desperate Measures) (London: Ebury Press, 2005).
\textsuperscript{381} Ghosh, Amitav; ‘The Global Reservation: Notes toward an Ethnography of International
battalions, and with enhanced logistical components each should have comprised a highly capable unit of approximately 1000 troops. They were to reinforce the work of 485 unarmed UN military observers (UNMOs), verifying disarmament, withdrawal, weapon-disposal, and mine-clearing. Unfortunately, the 12 battalions, apart from the French and Dutch, generally did not have adequate training, logistics, communications, transport, or in some cases even cooking equipment. Additionally, the engineering units of Thailand, China, and Japan deployed months late.

Training standards were recognised as a problem, not unique to UNTAC, but the size of the mission meant that the most capable units were considerably diluted. It became clear that Cambodia’s infrastructure was so poor that significant military assets would need to be devoted to infrastructure projects. Over 2000 troops provided engineering and logistics support through infrastructure projects, the provision of drinking water and other sanitary support, and ad hoc support to civil components. It was in this supporting role that the JSDF first participated in UNPKO.

B JSDF ODO Preparation and Logistics

JSDF participation in UNTAC was highly dependent upon the mediation of a political and legal dispatch mechanism in the absence of consensus. The involvement of Akashi Yasushi and Ogata Sadako as UNHCR aided this mediation, while the possibility of two such prominent Japanese leading UNTAC and UNHCR without Japanese personnel in support could have been as potentially damaging as the Gulf War chequebook diplomacy debacle. Another major factor encouraging Japanese participation was the

382 Conversation with Sanderson, John, UNU, Tokyo (22 October 1999).
involvement of MoFA in the Cambodian peace process from 1988, with JSDF participation in UNTAC easier to justify than dispatches to Bosnia or Somalia.

Fujiwara Kiichi is adamant that although security deteriorated, the “civil war was brought under control...by multilateral consent...not military intervention” and because of its role in this process “other countries positively welcomed Japan's participation”. Trevor Findlay has noted that if the UNTAC mandate had been transformed (as the military second-in-command desired) “to one of enforcement, the Japanese would have been obliged, constitutionally, to withdraw, and would perhaps have been followed by the Australians”. Akashi attempted to play down the significance of challenges to UNTAC, comparing UNPKO to a shop window, easily broken but attracting attention: “Therefore...it is an easy task to physically break through it, but quite difficult politically and psychologically. Unlike a conventional army, which aims for victory, the PKO is based on the agreement of all the conflicting factions”.

JSDF preparations for UNTAC were complicated by there being no initial legal basis for dispatch. A civilian ‘Cambodia survey team’ (Kanbojia kokusai heiwa kyoryoku chosadan) was dispatched on 1st July 1992, while on 27th July a handful of JSDF officers were dispatched to the Swedish Armed Forces UN School for UNMO training. In August 1992, the DG-JDA, Miyashita Sohei, ordered a second survey team including JSDF and CIVPOL representatives to assess the logistical needs of the Japanese contingent and the condition of Cambodian infrastructure. The JSDF

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385 Findlay, Trevor, Cambodia: 130.
387 Interview, Liefland, Karl, Minister, Embassy of Sweden, Tokyo (April 2001).
388 Interview, Yamazaki, Hiroto, 2009; ‘Gov't to send PKO survey mission to Cambodia’, Nikkei Shimbun (5 August 1992)
dispatch was confirmed as conforming to the IPCL, and instructed by Cabinet Order 165 under the IPCL, from 11th September 1992 until 31st October 1993.\textsuperscript{389}

The JSDF deployed with a 600 man GSDF engineering battalion (\textit{Shisetsuka butai}), under Lt.-Colonel Watanabe Takashi, and eight military observers (MO), with 75 Japanese CIVPOL under NPA Superintendent Yamazaki Hiroto, which operated separately from the JSDF, although both groups were IPCC members.\textsuperscript{390} Additionally, 400 MSDF and 120 ASDF personnel provided logistical support and were included within the IPCC and the 2000 personnel IPCL limit, but were not assessed as part of Japan’s UN contribution, being a national force.\textsuperscript{391}

UNTAC set the pattern for the subsequent GSDF ODO. The commanding officer was assigned by Lieutenant-General Uno Shouji GOC (General-Officer-Commanding) Middle Army (\textit{Chuubu houmentai}), under the rotation system. The 4th Engineering Brigade, and 3rd, 10th, and 13th (infantry) Divisions provided a composite force, with volunteers requested, although interviewees have related how some were selected based upon interviews, while others were not interviewed.\textsuperscript{392} One (then) junior officer, selected commented, “\textit{chuutohanppana iranai monoka}” (“maybe I was just in-between, inessential”).\textsuperscript{393} Two officers were ‘told’ to volunteer by senior officers.\textsuperscript{394}

The first contingent had less than three months between passage of the IPCL and dispatch of forces, mostly spent assembling personnel, equipment, and information.

\textsuperscript{389} \textit{Handbook for Defense 1999}: 615-617.
\textsuperscript{390} \textit{Handbook for Defense 1999}: 617.
\textsuperscript{391} \textit{Handbook for Defense 1999}: 618.
\textsuperscript{393} Interview GSDF Major, Tokyo (May 2004).
\textsuperscript{394} Interviews, GSDF Lt-Colonel, Tokyo (July 2009), and GSDF Lt-Colonel., Tokyo, (August 2007).
UNTAC veterans interviewed explain that there had been time for only the most rudimentary language training, mainly English greetings and radio procedure, and that many struggled to find phrase or guide books for Cambodia, some using guidebooks to Thailand. There was also a lack of knowledge about the local situation, other than that there had been a conflict, there was a peace agreement, and that the JSDF were to conduct engineering and logistical work, mainly road maintenance. One officer supporting the GSDF dispatch relates how a MoFA official provided a short briefing for officers of the first contingent with information related to the conflict, the factions, the nature of the UNTAC structure and mandate, and Cambodian society and culture. When questioned on security and risks to personnel, the official focused almost entirely on heat, disease, and land mines. KR ‘spoiling’ was covered by the statement that all parties had signed-up to the Paris Accords. In light of the security climate in Cambodia at this time such a briefing would certainly appear to have been less than satisfactory.\footnote{Conversation GSDF Major, RIPS, Tokyo (October 2007).}

The climate of Camp Takeo, south-west of the capital, was not dissimilar to late-summer Japan and caused few problems for the first contingent from Kansai. The second contingent, from Hokkaido, would suffer far more, but would inherit a fully equipped camp to limit the worst effects of the climate on troops arriving from a Japanese winter. The main cause of concern was the construction of their camp, part of which had been prepared by civilian contractors, but the main part of which consisted of tents within the operational area of a French infantry battalion. This had been chosen with great care, for JSDF immediate security and as Takeo province was one of the safest areas of Cambodia, with ready access to the capital and port.

The limitations upon JSDF strategic logistical capabilities were clear during UNTAC.
Six ASDF C-130H were utilised for airlift, but with limited load-endurance, staged their journeys through Okinawa, the Philippines, and Thailand. The GSDF contingent commander arrived on 25th September 1992, with a staff of 29, preceded by three C-130H on 23rd and 24th September. As an engineering force, most earth-moving equipment, cranes, and trucks were moved by sea, the C-130H being unable to transport 19 tonne Type-75 bulldozers.396

All vehicles other than Jeep/SUV-types were transported by two MSDF LST (Miura, Ojika), with a fleet replenishment vessel (AOE Towada). Among 300 vehicles, the bulldozers and Type-82 signals vehicles were the only armoured vehicles, and thereby the heaviest. Each LST was small, with shallow draft (leading them to pitch and roll severely), and limited capacity. They were extremely uncomfortable for the equipment specialists attending to machinery and party of journalists, seasickness was common, some requiring medical attention, while life-jacket drills were conducted for extended periods in rough weather.397 The journey was slow, departing Kure on 17th September 1992, and arriving in Cambodia 2nd October.398 The majority of the 376 engineering personnel arrived by chartered JAL Boeing-747 on 13th October 1992.399

The speed of Japan’s dispatch was criticized, not least by Akashi, who, “noted that the effectiveness of UNTAC would have been greatly enhanced if personnel and equipment had arrived more promptly.” However, he was also aware of the limitations of the legal and political situation, and how the UN budget authorization and procurement processes had, “led to delays which affected the perceptions of

397 Miyajima, Shigeki, Ah, Magnificent JSDF: 63-74.
Cambodians regarding UNTAC’s efficiency.”

However, as the engineering battalion did not arrive in the country until 14th October 1992 it is clear that the Japanese dispatch was lacking in alacrity, being among the last major units to fully deploy. Indeed, the US GAO in its 1993 operational analysis report considered the tardy deployment of forces to have allowed dissent and violence to destabilise the peace process.

The placing of the Japanese contingent in Takeo Province was the result of extensive lobbying from Japanese political and bureaucratic sources, but also as SRSG Akashi was highly sensitive to Japanese operational limitations. He stated in 2010 that PM Miyazawa had urged him to take care of the Japanese. As he later asked “what good would it have done to have the JSDF operating in a less safe area? They would have been able to achieve less.”

DG-JDA Miyashita “said he would prefer to avoid areas where land-mine disposal is the primary job, adding that ideally the troops will be where they can go about their duties in calm and quiet.”

As The New York Times reported, Japan was not the only nation that made special demands. French infantry were initially assigned to the jungles of north-eastern Cambodia, but following lobbying from Paris were transferred to Takeo and Kompong

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404 Conversation with Akashi Yasushi, UNU, Tokyo (22 October 1999).
Som, with “palm-fringed white sand beaches nearby.” The French were assisted by being one of the largest and most capable contingents, being in Cambodia for 24 months, and having Brigadier-General Robert Rideau as military second-in-command, until June 1993.

There developed a strong impression among non-Japanese observers that “Japanese military personnel were assigned to relatively safe areas with more luxurious quarters than other UN troops.” The expressions, “luxurious base camp” and “created envy” were common in non-Japanese media descriptions of Camp Takeo, but the JSDF first contingent found it anything but luxurious, with tented accommodation, no air-conditioning, basic plumbing, and few amenities or distractions. When the engineering battalion arrived, Camp Takeo was still incomplete, the temperatures over 40C, and the *Nikkei Shimbun* reporting that the newly arrived JSDF troops would be welcomed by land mines, heatstroke, and homelessness. Judy Ledgerwood reported that the position of the JSDF “led to resentment on the part of other UN forces and affected morale.” This may have been true, but this remains the case with all military missions: front-line troops’ derision towards ‘rear’ personnel. Christopher Daase, of Ludwig-Maximilians University, has commented how Germany’s first peacekeepers in UNTAC were in awe of the JSDF bathing facilities, not with a sense of envy but of high

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409 Shenon, Philip, ‘Actions of Japan Peacekeepers in Cambodia Raise Questions and Criticism’.
410 Correspondent Asami, ‘Unable to operate due to landmines, heatstroke, the main unit also appears to be ‘homeless’: PKO Cambodia Report’ (*Katsudou habamu jirai, mousha, hontai motou men wa ‘yadonashi’* (PKO kanbojia houkoku), *Nikkei Shimbun* (14 October 1992): 17.
The main camp, while eventually well-equipped, was not the only location for Japanese forces. The conditions of UNMOs were often dangerous, while transport units were dispatched for periods to basic Branch Billeting Areas (*hakenchi*) in Kampot (with a French infantry company) and later Sihanoukville, January to September 1993. These Areas were provided as Japanese personnel were not allowed to drive or venture out at night. The emphasis was upon avoiding accidents (traffic accidents being a particular danger in UNTAC) and violent incidents, hence the proximity to French forces.

Given the presence of so many Japanese media personnel to watch over the troops, particularly during the first contingent phase, there were no shortage of images and reports of basic conditions. However, as in any democracy, but particularly one where ODO were so controversial, images of great hardship for uniformed Japanese in South-East Asia would have been unacceptable. Indeed, the Japanese government took such an exception to the negative reporting of the JSDF in *The New York Times* that Suzuki Katsunari, Executive Secretary of the IPCH, responded in an open letter asking, “What is the rationale for criticizing a country’s efforts to provide comfort to its personnel as they carry out their mission?”

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412 Conversation with Daase, Christopher, Sarajevo (October 2007).
414 Yanai, Shunji reports a British officer in UNTAC relying upon NHK’s more extensive coverage of UNTAC compared to the BBC. Yanai, Shunji, ‘UN Peace Operations and the Role of Japan: A Japanese Perspective’, in Morrison, Alex, and Kiras, James, (eds.) *UN Peace Operations and the Role of Japan* (Clemensport, Nova Scotia: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1996); 75-81, 79.
The MSDF and ASDF not only transported but also supported the GSDF in UNTAC. The MSDF provided a regular supply service of fresh water, food, and other stores from Japan, Thailand, and Singapore, via Sihanoukville. The vessels also played an important, but unexpected, role in the provision of medical support services, particularly prior to Camp Takeo becoming fully operational. The Japanese ambassador to Cambodia during UNTAC, Imagawa Yukio, is gushing in his praise of how the MSDF supported the material and morale aspects of operations, providing a mini-Japanese recreation centre, complete with ‘karee-raisu’ (curry-rice). The ASDF provided air-lift support into the Pochentong airbase, with six aircraft providing a minimum of a weekly service, via staging posts in Thailand and the Philippines. Imagawa suggests they were invaluable in maintaining Japan’s presence among UNTAC and Cambodian leaders.

C  JSDF Performance

Despite the controversies regarding the GSDF camp, conditions, and media coverage, perhaps the least controversial aspect of the mission was the mandated operational performance. The engineering battalion was primarily tasked with the repair and maintenance of roads and bridges in Takeo Province, particularly those connecting the capital and main port, Sihanoukville. They won high praise for their professionalism in repairing roads, and replacing or repairing bridges, along Route 2 connecting Takeo with Phnom Penn and Vietnam, and Route 3 connecting Takeo to Kampot and Sihanoukville to the south-west (see Appendix Two). Despite the limitation of returning to base before dusk, which hampered work at distant locations, there was widespread

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418 Imagawa, Yukio, Cambodia and Japan: 188.
praise of their technical abilities, state of equipment, and diligence.

The role of the first contingent was initially of ‘dispatch establishment battalion’ (haken shisetsudaitai), preparing Camp Takeo, assembling equipment, collecting stores and personnel from entry points, and establishing the basic configuration, working practices, and security arrangements of the camp and its contingent, including electric power, from mains and generator sources.\(^{419}\)

Despite the risk-averse nature of the JSDF deployment, the attention to security appears, in hindsight, to be limited. Despite widespread belief to the contrary, each member of the engineering battalion and associated units was allocated a rifle or pistol, although no automatic or heavy weapons.\(^{420}\) These were held in a central storage container behind barbed wire, with ammunition held separately. When the second contingent was dispatched to Cambodia they also brought their own personal weapons, to ensure that within the operational area each JSDF member had a weapon available.\(^{421}\)

Weapons were only to be distributed in the event of contingencies, or as part of the regular camp guard. This guard comprised one infantry squad (12), supplemented by other troops. Use of weapons was regulated by Article 24 of the IPCL (see Chapter Three), with tightly limited ROE.\(^{422}\) Watanabe Takashi has pointed out that the clear differences between UN and JSDF limitations on use of force, and that the JSDF did not officially refer to ‘ROE’, implying a ‘right of belligerency’.\(^{423}\)

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\(^{420}\) Author’s experience of conference questions on JSDF ODO. Even Watanabe Akio, commented that JSDF personnel were dispatched to Cambodia, “practically without any arms”; Watanabe, Akio, ‘Is Now a Good Opportunity for Japan to Show the Flag’, *Asia Perspectives* (Spring 2002): 6-9, 7.


\(^{423}\) Watanabe, Takashi, ‘In the Field of Cambodia-A Recollection of the Japanese Commander in
As GSDF duties were non-combatant, and Takeo was one of the safest provinces in the country, this situation was presumed to be adequate. In the context of subsequent events involving other contingents, and the deaths of Japanese, it appears that the fear of being considered in violation of the IPCL was a stronger force than the desire to maximise security. Camp Takeo possessed no slit trenches, to protect personnel in case of attack, or fire trenches to defend the camp. There was no sandbagging or ‘hardening’ of any kind, despite such steps being taken at other UNTAC locations. In a publication distributed to JSDF families in 1992, the JDA stated that, “there is no possibility of the SDF being drawn into an armed confrontation.” Security planning appeared to be equally faith-based.

Unlike ONUMOZ, the GSDF in UNTAC were an integral unit and although daily duties entailed division into working parties, it retained unit cohesion. The engineering battalion possessed heavy moving and lifting equipment, rollers, cranes and an impressive array of technology. By contrast, some other units arrived without even the minimum UN requirements of tents, cooking and water purification equipment, and 60 days supplies. The Japanese transported large amounts of prefabricated bridging equipment which proved invaluable and saved much time compared with repairing existing structures. They also transported all of the basic equipment required for road repair, such as tarmac layers, being able to operate quite independently of other contingents and the local population, other than for security. General Sanderson

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UNTAC’ (Genba no hokori-UNTAC haken jieitai shikikan no kaisou), in Military History Society of Japan (ed.), Peacekeeping Operations in Historical Perspective: 152-166, 161-162.
424 Interview, GSDF Lt. Col., Tokyo (June 2009).
426 Conahan, Frank C., UN Peacekeeping: 7.
remarked in 1999 upon how technically capable the GSDF had been in UNTAC, and how they shared the ‘can do’ spirit of the best of the other contingents, despite intense media and political pressure to succeed. He wrote that the “success of UNTAC is attributed as much to the retention of the peacekeeping ethos as to any other factor.” It would seem that the GSDF, eventually, demonstrated that ethos.

There was a minor controversy over the role played by three GSDF liaison officers at UNTAC headquarters, based upon lack of appreciation of UN staff work. They provided a link between UNTAC HQ and the Japanese contingent, to coordinate work programmes and changes of duties. While quite innocuous, the controversy in Tokyo was that staff duties undertaken might include the planning of military operations, including PKF beyond IPCL limits. The government denied any legal conflict, and that the officers would not participate in military planning or, “other sensitive activities.”

This episode was indicative of the lack of understanding of operations and the prevalent restrictive atmosphere.

Initially, the GSDF engineering work was focused on replacing or repairing road surfaces, 40 bridges, and drainage, with poor road surfaces contributing to the high rates of traffic accidents in UNTAC. The GSDF repaired 105km of the 202km Route 3, and 70km of the 135km Route 2. Also, approximately 50 unexploded ordnance (UO) items were disposed of during engineering works. As mission and local needs became

427 Conversation with Sanderson, John (1999).
428 Sanderson, John, book review, International Affairs.
432 Watanabe, Takashi, ‘In the Field of Cambodia’: 152-166, 163.
better understood and Japanese capabilities realized, the GSDF were also requested by UNTAC to perform a number of additional duties, such as water purification, delivery of food and water, and sanitation work. These were confirmed by the Cabinet in December 1992. The GSDF provided 80 kiloliters of oil and 800 tonnes of water to UNTAC contingents, regularly delivering meals for over 1500, and after the elections constructed a container yard for processing freight at Sihanoukville. This extension of duties was significant, as although delivery of stores would not overly exert any engineering battalion, the work was large-scale and the container yard construction was complex. The reasons for the extension of duties were the poor state of Cambodian infrastructure, poor logistical planning by UNTAC headquarters, and the limitations of many military contingents. Water purification was a particular niche capability that GSDF officers had ensured was readily available. As a natural extension of sanitation and water purification, the provision of basic medical care became a significant and unexpected mission duty.

Initially tasked with contingent health care, the small medical unit performed admirably in difficult conditions after the decision was made to allow the JSDF to treat locals and other UNTAC personnel, in February 1993. Ronald Dore suggests that a Cabinet Order was required before proceeding with treatment of non-JSDF personnel. The Japanese UNTAC clinical unit, comprising only 17 personnel-per-rotation, dealt with up to 600 patients a day, approximately 7000 in total. The normal anticipated workload for a medical team of that size would be

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436 Shirohama, Tatsuoki, *Knowledge I wish to put in place: ‘Disaster’ seen from a medic’s eyes-preparation, limitation, and then cooperation (shitteokitai ishi no me kara mita ‘saigai’ – sonoe,*
20-40 cases per day, indicating that the units worked in extraordinary conditions.\textsuperscript{437} Almost 10\% of patients suffered from malaria, something expected to affect the contingent’s personnel more than the local population.\textsuperscript{438} No contingent members were actually affected by full malaria, due to preventative medicine and sanitation.\textsuperscript{439} The GSDF water purification teams were considered by General Sanderson to be the best he had encountered, and made vital contributions to the health of the local population and the Japanese and other contingents.

Fujii Tatsuya of the JSDF Central Hospital noted how JSDF clinics were unprepared and lacked training to deal with large numbers of local people suffering from multiple minor ailments with no obvious physical cause. By piecing together patient information it became clear that these ailments were largely the result of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).\textsuperscript{440} UNTAC organized its medical services into three levels, with the JSDF at Level 1, receiving patients. The end point, Level 3, was the Field Hospital operated by the German and Indian armies in Phnom Penn. The GSDF clinic was able to perform only basic medical services and minor operations under local anaesthetic, and concentrated mainly on prevention. More serious cases were transferred to hospital, and cases requiring X-rays were air-lifted to Thailand.

Prior to deployment JSDF staff presumed there would be many deaths among patients, but the diligence of the local people in health issues, cooperation of a Swiss Red Cross group, and the Indo-German Field Hospital, in a former university hospital, ensured this was not the case. The JSDF cooperated with personnel from Australia, India, Holland

\textsuperscript{437} Shirohama, Tatsuoki, \textit{Knowledge I wish to put in place}: 84.
\textsuperscript{439} Fujii, Tatsuya, ‘The facts of PKO medical duties’: 17.
\textsuperscript{440} Fujii, Tatsuya, ‘The facts of PKO medical duties’: 20.
and Canada, and held joint pooling of know-how on dealing with heatstroke and other
tropical maladies, formalizing short training courses for their respective staff.

The weaknesses of JSDF medical capabilities in UNTAC were poor understanding of
PTSD and tropical diseases, and the lack of nursing staff. This was due to being
predominantly a sanitation unit with medical facilities attached, primarily with
preventative medical roles and therefore not usually requiring a large nursing staff. After
UNTAC, the JDA decided to utilize the Tropical Diseases course of Tokyo University to
broaden the skills base of JSDF medical staff.\footnote{Nakayama Taro, ‘International Medical Cooperation’ \textit{(Kokusai iryou kyoryoku)}, in Nakayama, Taro (ed.), \textit{International Medical Cooperation}: 23.}

The GSDF also established a dental clinic in a duckboard-floored tent under a palm
tree, replaced by an air-conditioned pre-fabricated building from December 1992. The
dental staff comprised only four personnel in each contingent, but performed
exceedingly well considering their limited establishment, with the JSDF facilities being
complemented by the dental bay aboard \textit{Tokiwa}.\footnote{Shirohama, Tatsuoki, \textit{Knowledge I wish to put in place}: 76.} The surprise was that most cases
treated were Japanese.\footnote{Fujimoto Atsuhito, ‘The utility of medical origins’ \textit{(Iryou no genten ni tatsu)}, in Nakayama, Taro (ed.), \textit{International Medical Cooperation}: 20-22, 21.}

The greatest single performance degrading factor found by JSDF medical staff in
Cambodia was the effect of living in a tropical climate in a tented encampment. More
than the ‘hard security’ risks of land mines or attacks, it was the physical environment
and its effects upon personnel and equipment performance that degraded mission
effectiveness. This led to a significant investment in pre-fabricated buildings for
accommodation, stores, and operational spaces complete with air-conditioning units
(and generators) from December 1992. This investment was effectively ‘lost’, for the
JSDF realized that they would not have the logistical ‘lift’ to remove it when the final contingent withdrew. Therefore, a virtue was made of the cost by donating the facilities to local bodies, thereby earning great praise in Takeo City.

A more significant change affected JSDF duties with the onset of the Cambodian election campaign. The initial UNTAC mandate had included a process of demobilization, disarming, and reintegration (DDR) in cantonment areas. With the KR rejection of this process and the unwillingness of other factions to comply, levels of violence increased. These included attacks on UNTAC contingents, with 30 Uruguayan troops kidnapped by the KR in December 1992. This led the UNTAC command to utilise the ‘spare’ DDR-tasked infantry forces for security patrols particularly after the KR declared that it would not participate in the election. The elections were to be held between 23rd and 28th May 1993, but the security situation began to deteriorate much earlier, and the UNTAC command was concerned for the safety of the elections and its staff. The UNTAC force commander requested in March 1993 that all engineering units commence patrols to provide enhanced electoral security in their areas. The Japanese were the only unit to decline, as the phrase ‘patrol’ (keibi) denoted a PKF duty, excluded by the IPCL. This provoked an UNTAC HQ staff member to comment that it was based on a meaningless differentiation of an ‘O’ and an ‘F’ when the roads paved by the GSDF were used by UNTAC infantry.

The situation further deteriorated when a District Electoral Supervisor, UNV Nakata

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446 Findlay, Trevor, Cambodia: 75-77.
448 Ooishi, Akatsuki, “JSDF Trial by PKO’ The World and Japan, Part 6’.
Atsuhito, 25, was murdered with his local interpreter on 8th April 1993. Nakata, one of 30 Japanese UNV in UNTAC, was not targeted due to nationality, but by a disgruntled job applicant. However, while his nationality was an unhappy coincidence, for many in Japan it was highly significant that the day before his death the second GSDF UNTAC contingent had been dispatched. It naturally led to speculation that the IPCL five conditions had been breached and that the contingent might be withdrawn, despite comments from UNHCR Ogata Sadako that there was no connection. Australia was also deeply concerned as, in Steven Ratner’s words, “Australia…had made clear its unwillingness to see any of its troops involved in hostile operations.” Furthermore, when Indonesian soldiers were attacked and wounded, “even members of the rubber-stamp Indonesian parliament called for the recall of the Indonesian battalion.” Sensitivities over contingent security were certainly not limited to Japan, despite the critical comments of an UNTAC HQ staff member quoted by the Yomiuri Shimbun that only in Japan was a single death treated as the basis for mission withdrawal discussions, while other countries simply accepted that this was the nature of PKO.

The response of the Japanese government was to continue with the mission, with Cabinet Secretary Kawano Youhei declaring that even though the events were

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450 ‘Second PKO Contingent: first part of the main unit, 300troops, leaves the Chitose Base’, (Kanbojia 2ji PKO, hontai daiichijin ga shuppatsu-300nin, Chitose kichi kara), Nikkei Shimbun (7 April 1993): 17.
452 Findlay, Trevor, Cambodia: 78; Ratner, Steven R., The New UN Peacekeeping: 161-162.
regrettable, the five conditions remained intact, a point emphasised by Foreign Minister Muto Yoshifumi.\textsuperscript{455} The government, after consideration of previous and consequent UNTAC requests eventually broadened GSDF contingent duties. Partly in response to the death of Mr. Nakata and the ensuing controversy, not least concerning the vulnerability of Japanese UNV in polling stations, the Miyazawa cabinet ordered GSDF troops to engage in ‘information gathering’, during the course of their duties, including delivering ballot boxes to polling stations. Ambassador Imagawa states that UNTAC personnel pushed hard for this expansion of duties, and that the decisive point was SRSG Akashi concurring (fearing a Japanese withdrawal), but the extent of cabinet agreement is unclear.\textsuperscript{456}

The details of the expanded duties were coordinated between IPCH Director Yanai Shunji and JDA Administrative Vice-minister Hatakeyama Shigeru, initially limited to two GSDF security specialists visiting each voting station ostensibly to deliver supplies, but actually to reassure staff.\textsuperscript{457} There was reported to have been strong pressure from MoFA that not only UNTAC but also ONUMOZ participation could be jeopardised if the GSDF did not provide enhanced security, not least for other Japanese. This entailed being in the proximity of election staff while delivering food and water as part of their previously expanded duties.\textsuperscript{458} Provision was also made for the JSDF to provide accommodation and facilities for other UNTAC contingents, if required.\textsuperscript{459}

Significantly, these further expanded duties were not for GSDF force protection, but to extend protection to electoral staff, and by the commencement of ‘information

\textsuperscript{455} Kurokawa, Uchitaka, “JSDF Trial by PKO’ The World and Japan, Part 5 of 6 Parts’.
\textsuperscript{456} Imagawa, Yukio, \textit{Cambodia and Japan}: 203-206; ‘Negotiator Akashi’ Bakumon, Gakumon, NHK.
\textsuperscript{457} Iokibe, Makoto, \textit{et al, Witness of the 90s}: 104-105.
\textsuperscript{458} Kurokawa, Uchitaka, “JSDF Trial by PKO’ The World and Japan, Part 5 of 6 Parts’.
\textsuperscript{459} Hook, Glenn D., \textit{Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan}: 97.
gathering’, *de facto* security patrols. Whether these activities were actually primarily intended to relieve the anxieties of the local population is unclear, but that was certainly one consequence. Furthermore, the second GSDF contingent members were also provided with weapons, helmets, and protective vests for expanded duties, in a significant concession to PKO practice and common sense. Also, the GSDF were able to utilise the appearance of their vehicles to good effect, as the *Type 82* which looked like an imposing APC, supported ‘information gathering’ work.\footnote{The *Type 82* is over two meters high: *JSDF Equipment Yearbook 1997*: 74-75.}

Maeda Tetsuo contended that GSDF members, “abandoned road repair work and put on helmets and bulletproof vests and began carrying small arms.”\footnote{Maeda, Tetsuo, *The Hidden Army*: 297.} Maeda does not recognise that it might have been wise to carry out core engineering tasks with such equipment in the context of KR violence. He was also critical of the expansion of GSDF duties for transportation of ballot boxes and the ‘information gathering’, a term he referred to as “camouflage” for patrolling.\footnote{Maeda, Tetsuo, *JSDF and PKO Verification*: 53.} Colonel Ishioroshi, the second contingent commander, directly refuted Maeda’s claims by placing JSDF PSO duties within the overall mission context of supporting the Cambodian election process, initially by engineering work, and later by other duties designated by the government.\footnote{Maeda, Tetsuo, *JSDF and PKO Verification*: 63-64.} GSDF patrols were undertaken as confidence building for UNV, in a restrained and careful manner. It seems that both Maeda and Ishioroshi are correct: patrols were conducted, beyond stated IPCL duties, and they contributed to the peace process.

Kiroku Hanai, of the *Tokyo Shimbun*, was in Cambodia as an election monitor, and stated that although, “French troops were to protect our polling station, they did not protect us. We felt relieved when the SDF visited the station on the pretext of collecting...
information. It may be inappropriate for Japanese to be protected by troops of other countries while the SDF troops are at hand."\textsuperscript{464} One GSDF Captain in UNTAC explained that Japanese troops were very wary, as they not only were nervous of provoking an armed response, but that they were very unsure both of their own country’s response to such an incident, and to their personal abilities in combat.\textsuperscript{465} The latter point is often overlooked. The Japanese had no operational experience, were mainly engineers and technical specialists not infantrymen, with limited local knowledge (most had recently arrived), and were faced by experienced and heavily armed potential adversaries. A GSDF officer engaged in the planning and command of the UNTAC dispatch stated after the operation how he, “had difficulty explaining why the Japanese troops could not engage in guard duty although our troops were regarded the same as others. As for the use of arms, SDF soldiers felt psychologically burdened when told to use their weapons at their own discretion, since the use of weapons is usually controlled by superior officers.”\textsuperscript{466} The IPCL clearly stated that weapons could not be used under the orders of commanders, only by individual troops. The use of weapons was to be “the absolute last resort” as decided by each force member.\textsuperscript{467}

Watanabe Takashi keenly felt the gap between UNPKO practice and JSDF UNTAC practice:

what is basic common sense for the militaries of nations taking part in PKOs is not recognized by Japan. The Japanese military units deployed in Cambodia initially

\textsuperscript{465} Interview, GSDF Captain (1993), Tokyo (June 2009).
\textsuperscript{466} Izumi, Nobumichi, ‘Japanese troops should play full role in U.N. missions’.
confronted the disparity between the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for UNTAC, and the Japanese rules...Japanese PKO personnel were only able to defend themselves and other unit members in the same area of operation as themselves. Moreover, the use of weapons in legitimate defense...was left to the judgment of the individual, and appeared to be outside the standards of conduct for troops operating in...a military unit.468

Watanabe's views on the restrictions of dispatch were echoed by Ooishi Akatsuki of the *Yomiuri Shimbun* who reported that in November 1992 the GSDF battalion had been requested by a Tunisian infantry unit to help them with the construction of their camp. The GSDF felt obliged to refuse the request as it could have been construed as a contribution to the PKF.469 General Sanderson was adamant that defence of UNTAC’s mandated objective was vital: “Self-defense meant not only an individual's defense of himself alone; it also meant collective action.”470

Maeda has indicated that these innovative security efforts by the JSDF constituted a, “substantive change,” and that, “the SDF was free to establish new precedents quite publicly.” In this he is correct, although not in his contention that the unit, “was transformed from an engineering corps into infantry troops.”471 The GSDF did expand their security profile and their security duties far beyond what had been initially anticipated, and with the deteriorating security climate in Cambodia, by the letter, and indeed spirit, of the IPCL, withdrawal should have been considered. The minimal security detail was not intended to extend its work beyond the perimeter wire, or to include non-JSDF personnel within security measures. This changed between the murders of UNV Nakata in April and Police Inspector Takada in May 1993. The manner

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469 Ooishi, Akatsuki, ‘JSDF Trial by PKO’ *The World and Japan, Part 6’.
in which both the GSDF and government reacted was crucial. Home Affairs Minister Murata Keijiro called for the withdrawal of all UNTAC members from dangerous areas, echoing calls for complete withdrawal from UNTAC after the death of Inspector Takada, including from junior minister Koizumi Junichiro.\textsuperscript{472} However, the government realised that complete JSDF mission withdrawal would be disastrous for Japan and UNTAC, and thus modified operational duties and security practices to continue the mission. This flexibility and determination (as well as a degree of good fortune) entailed that UNTAC was the first of several JSDF ODO rather than a single failed attempt, as with Japanese CIVPOL unit dispatch.

\textit{a Military Observers}

The eight JSDF UN military observers (MO) were deployed along the borders of Cambodia, in an integrated manner with their international colleagues. The GSDF MOs were selected from those with international experience and language skills, and were carefully chosen for their tasks, most being specifically requested to accept such duties.\textsuperscript{473} One of the problems however, was the fact that they were essentially left to fend for themselves in a country they hardly knew. Major-General Fukui has related how as an UNTAC MO he was placed in a team with four other MOs of different nationalities in Phnom Penh, given a \textit{Toyota Land Cruiser}, a Motorola radio, a daily allowance of $130, and told to arrange accommodation and domestic affairs. For most this would be a significant shock of working culture, but for a professional soldier used to home and mess life it was a particular challenge.\textsuperscript{474}

\textsuperscript{472}\ 'JSDF Cambodia Dispatch Objection Recited' (\textit{Jieitai kanbojia haken ni igi wo tonaeta}), \textit{Asahi Shimbun} (7 May 1993): 7.
\textsuperscript{473} Takeda, Yasuhiro, \textquote{Japan's Role in the Cambodian Peace Process': 561.
\textsuperscript{474} Seki, Hajime \textit{et al}, \textit{The Truth About PKO}: 73-74.
The life of the Japanese MO was somewhat more complicated than that of battalion personnel. Main contingent members were administered by the JDA, while the IPCH, responsible for the coordination of data collection, surveys, and all manner of pre-dispatch business, had only just been established within the PMO. The Director of the IPCH commented upon how difficult the position of JSDF UNMO was within UNTAC. The MOs were directly responsible to the IPCH, as sources of information on the conduct of the mission, as well as to UNTAC HQ. Furthermore, these MO were also treated as *de facto* representatives of the entire Japanese nation, and thus were often requested to direct the GSDF engineering battalion, or even MoFA ODA disbursements, to areas within their responsibility. This naturally placed strain upon isolated officers. Unwittingly, this was made worse in some cases by the attentions of the JDA and MoFA. Both wished to keep track of ‘their’ personnel: it being seen as imperative that no mistakes were seen to be made by Japanese personnel or any harm come to them. The latter threat was pertinent, as the MOs were unarmed and many were stationed close to the borders with Laos and Vietnam. Heinrich *et al* report one JSDF UNMO being regularly fired upon while investigating ceasefire violations.

The GSDF MOs were distributed in poorly supported locations, with only one of the first contingent assigned to the capital, the remainder posted as single, unsupported observers to the extreme border areas, far from the GSDF battalion and UNTAC HQ. Their positions, reliant upon colleagues they did not initially know, in the most remote and dangerous areas of the country, dependent upon UN logistical support was in sharp contrast to that of the main contingent in Takeo. Japanese participants in other UNMO missions have detailed how challenging the work is, even when well-versed in the

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475 Iokibe, Makoto, *et al*, *Witness of the 90s*: 95.
duties and with language fluency. The Japanese MO in UNTAC had at least been posted to the Swedish Peacekeeping Training Centre for 16 days’ UNMO training, the only JSDF mission-specific training for UNTAC. However, in UNPKO the role of unarmed and often isolated MOs has been detailed as amongst the most difficult. While the situation in Cambodia cannot be compared to that in Rwanda, the roles of MOs in both countries often placed them in direct contact with armed groups.

D Japanese Contribution to Mission

In assessing Japanese contribution to the UNTAC mission preliminary evaluations of effectiveness, efficiency, and quality will be made, but it is also necessary to deal with critical comments regarding JSDF performance. General Sanderson, despite generally praising the JSDF contribution, also commented on how certain contingents had preferred (for domestic reasons) to provide ‘passive’ logistics units, in order to emphasize the humanitarian nature of their work, and to avoid risk, thus burdening other contingents. “In UNTAC’s case this was true of at least the Japanese contingent, which gained a reputation for refusing to take any risks, withdrawing to their base well before sunset, for example, in order to avoid possible contact with the Khmer Rouge.” Kenneth Pyle reports that UN officials were dismayed by the special circumstances of the JSDF in UNTAC, and even Akashi referred to them as ‘maidens’. Marrack Goulding, describes visiting the GSDF engineering contingent in

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477 Interviews, GSDF Major, Tokyo (June 2009), GSDF Captain, Tokyo (November 2009).
478 Interview, Karl Liefland (April 2001).
481 Findlay, Trevor, *Cambodia*: 142.
Cambodia and finding the personnel seemingly “overwhelmed by their responsibility for ensuring that it was a success.”

There was significant pressure on the contingent, and it remains the most media-exposed dispatch, something that provoked jealousy among personnel in Mozambique and Golan. The expectations were perhaps unreasonable, and one of the prime causes of cumulative and traumatic stress disorders is a gap between an individual’s expectations and their own actual experiences. This is further compounded by the stress of the expectations of third parties, and being Japanese seemed to raise the expectations of the local people who viewed Japan as rich and expected commensurate benefits by association. The JSDF were poorly prepared for these forms of stress, and had not been particularly well served by the JDA or MoFA briefings. Of the three Forces, the GSDF also had the lowest proportion of personnel with foreign language skills, and this further complicated the operational ability to contribute to the mission.

Certainly, the JSDF had limited experience of the diversity of standards, languages, customs, and expectations that were found in UNTAC. Watanabe has described how the Japanese personnel struggled to adapt to multinational operational practice:

Takeo province...was the area of a French infantry battalion. The Force Commander of the military component was an Australian Lieutenant General, the Chief of Operations was a Dutch colonel, the Chief of Logistics was a Polish colonel, and the Chief of Engineering was a New Zealand colonel. The Director of Civil Administration for Takeo was an Indonesian civil servant. The SDF had absolutely no experience with this type of multinational framework, and I remember how we were able to learn a lot from the PKO that the military organizations in other countries knew as a matter of course.


483 Goulding, Marrack, Peacemonger: 263.

484 Watanabe, Takashi, The PKO in Cambodia-Lessons Learned: 99.
In assessing the JSDF contribution to the mission the three main elements to be considered are effectiveness, efficiency, and quality. In assessing the JSDF’s ability to conduct the originally mandated tasks, there would appear to be little doubt as to the effectiveness of the work of the engineering battalion. UNTAC was chronically short of engineering units, with only the Japanese, Thais, and Chinese contributing engineering battalions, and among these the Japanese seemed to have the greatest range and scale of equipment, and the most comprehensive skill-set. They also demonstrated a great degree of diligence in their work, were conscious of unit security and the prevention of accidents, particularly involving local people during engineering projects. This latter point is important when considering the numbers of children attracted to work projects and Camp Takeo.

The amount of roads repaired or bridges replaced can be easily measured, but it is the multiplier effect of this work that is more difficult to assess for the UNTAC mission. The roads repaired were mainly those connecting the capital with Sihanoukville and Vietnam. To what degree these road and bridge repairs had upon the ability of UNTAC to effectively conduct its operations remains unclear, and would seem to be almost impossible to accurately assess. It does appear that the local people felt a renewed sense of hope and confidence by the JSDF actions, however, as these were the first large-scale infrastructure projects in the country for decades, and the presence of UN troops provided a greater sense of security for people to travel and trade in this environment. The later expansion of roles by the JSDF, with delivery of goods and services to other UNTAC units and medical services, was certainly highly effective. The Japanese ability to purify vast amounts of water was a unique capability in the mission, and would
become a hallmark of Japanese ODO, and the transportation role was one taken up as a main activity in UNDOF. Despite limited medical resources the JSDF provided a great deal of health care coverage to a great many people, including UNTAC personnel, and won a great deal of praise and trust in the process. These were also the first duties expanded beyond those initially mandated.

This health care work, in addition to the engineering work conducted, may have contributed to the overall security of the contingent, as Robert McNamara stated in 1968, “security is development, and without development there can be no security.”

Nathaniel Fick, in the context of later operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, has argued most persuasively that a failure to interact humanely with the local population can have serious security disadvantages: “When we retreat behind body armor and concrete barriers, it becomes impossible to understand the society we claim to defend.” While the ‘information gathering’ later conducted was not seemingly a grander scheme combining human and traditional security, the effect was nonetheless positive. Both Japanese and non-Japanese electoral staff expressed their sense of security with the JSDF. How effective the overall Japanese mission was in improving the security within Cambodia, or even Takeo Province, is perhaps impossible to assess, but it is clear that despite such tasks not being overtly mandated, the JSDF did contribute to the security of its operational area.

Efficiency within the overall mission is less clear, with peace operations rarely regarded as paragons of efficiency. Contingents shipping thousands of tons of supplies

and equipment into countries only to then remove them upon completion, and failing to make use of local markets would appear to be highly inefficient. However, within the parameters of a UN mission certain aspects of operations can be assessed for their efficiency. As outlined previously, the engineering work of the Japanese was highly effective, and given the appalling state of infrastructure in Cambodia and the difficulty of sourcing local contractors or heavy plant, it would seem that the contingent’s logistical arrangements represented an efficient use of resources, particularly given the time constraints. With a hurried dispatch and immediate operational needs the JSDF were able to contribute to the mission within weeks of their arrival, the immediate task being completion of Camp Takeo.

Whether it was efficient to build such a camp is a major question of efficiency. The time and cost required would appear to indicate it was an inefficient use of resources, driven more by political considerations than operational requirements. However, later experience in Mozambique indicated that prolonged use of tented accommodation significantly affected operational performance. As the prefabricated buildings and air conditioners were later gifted to Takeo City, there was potential for the time and money to have proved worthwhile, although it seems the installation of Japanese-style large bath tubs was certainly an extravagance. Although the main camp building was used as a job training centre, 1993-1996, teaching sewing and mechanic skills, it closed due to the excessive costs.\textsuperscript{487}

Japanese working patterns were certainly less than efficient. Vehicles were not allowed to travel after dusk, and since there were only two locations in which they were permitted to halt overnight work often ended early to ensure that troops were ‘home’

well before nightfall. This is an example of overall mission efficiency being sacrificed for the specific national goal of minimising risk. Working efficiency was also hampered by the poor English skills of contingent members, a constant subject with UNTAC veterans. Even though the force was a self-sustaining unit there were requirements to communicate with other contingents, not least the French infantry. Watanabe has related how on more than one occasion a Japanese NGO in Takeo provided translation assistance. However, for a country with the resources of Japan it is remarkable that a large force was dispatched with such poor communications skills, particularly when considering the efforts of the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (see below).

Until the request to deliver goods and service to other UNTAC contingents there was little cooperation with other national contingents, apart from the French, who provided the de facto security force for the JSDF. There was no consideration made of dispatching infrastructure task forces to parts of the province, and then stay as the guests of local contingents. The one exception when the JSDF did cooperate with other units was in the provision of medical services, particularly the division of responsibilities and dealing with tropical diseases. Also, on a cost-performance basis the JSDF medical team would surely compare well with any in UNTAC, as it treated 11,000 patient cases with a small staff and limited resources. This provided a model for subsequent operations.

In assessing the quality of contributions the JSDF made to UNTAC, the engineering work was of undoubtedly high quality, as was the provision of health care. The transport and supply duties were performed without any difficulties, and satisfaction with JSDF work quality was high. While Japan transported 300 vehicles to Cambodia it did not

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489 Findlay, Trevor, Cambodia: 80.
provide helicopters, despite UNTAC being hindered by the lack of helicopter lift, having at most 24 available. Japan could have provided a quality airlift capability from the more than 500 craft operated by the JSDF, without straining national defence capabilities.\textsuperscript{490} The cargo handling facility at Sihanoukville is a mark of the project management and engineering quality that they contributed to the wider mission, as the task was of little or no direct benefit to the Japanese mission. The work of UNMO was seemingly of high quality, particularly as they were operating in the most difficult circumstances of any JSDF personnel in Cambodia. The MSDF were also able to provide a quality service for the GSDF, and the level of cooperation was high, while the ASDF was limited in what it could contribute simply due to the limitations of its aircraft despite the best efforts of the crews.

Another aspect of the quality of the Japanese contribution can be assessed by the most unmilitary aspects of its work and life in Cambodia. The JSDF personnel like those of other contingents made friends with locals, played sports with children, and generally attempted to make the lives of the local population better. This was done by such enjoyable pursuits as a Takeo \textit{Bon Odori} festival, with soldiers dressing in makeshift versions of traditional summer festival garb and dancing \textit{en masse} to taped music brought from Japan. This and other attempts to provide an insight into Japanese culture were the sort of activity that cannot be trained or written into orders but develops organically. The French forces, by contrast, were characterised as being cold and lacking engagement with locals.\textsuperscript{491} The Pakistani and Bangladeshi contingents by contrast, despite also being infantry forces, provided English classes and sporting events,

\textsuperscript{490} \textit{The Military Balance 1990-1991}: 165.
\textsuperscript{491} Interview, Kawano, Hitoshi, NDA, Yokosuka (June 2001).
with the Pakistanis even establishing an English radio service.\textsuperscript{492}

A further less conventional aspect of quality was the standard of behaviour of Japanese troops in Cambodia. Some contingents, the Bulgarian and Uruguayan in particular, were noted for their poor treatment of locals, including extortion and sexual harassment.\textsuperscript{493} The Bulgarians started a fire on their homeward flight, from which 100 knives, illegal drugs, firearms, and a live snake were removed by police.\textsuperscript{494} The JSDF contingents were notable for their ability to resist the temptations outlined by SRSG Akashi’s explanation of “hot-blooded soldiers” giving chase to “young beautiful beings of the opposite sex.”\textsuperscript{495} Judy Ledgerwood states that although “21 peacekeepers died in Cambodia as a result of hostile action, more than twice that number (47) were diagnosed as being HIV-positive - and UNTAC chief medical officer Dr. Peter Fraps believes the true figure is probably as high as 150. The German field hospital treated more than 5,000 incidents of sexually transmitted diseases.”\textsuperscript{496} While no statistics exist in the public domain, the JSDF seem to have avoided sexual diseases and the mission-wide problems of sexual harassment and increase of prostitution, partly by training and discipline, and partly by the institution of recreation breaks for personnel in Thailand.

E Conclusion

The dispatch of JSDF personnel to Cambodia in 1992 was the most significant

\textsuperscript{492} Krishnasamy, Kabilan, ‘Pakistan Peacekeeping Experiences’: 110-111.
\textsuperscript{493} According to a 31 October 1993 \textit{Washington Post} report, one-quarter of the Bulgarian troops were convicts: Ledgerwood, Judy, L., quoting \textit{Japan Review} (Summer 1993), \textit{UN Peacekeeping Missions}: 8; 56 Bulgarian peacekeepers were repatriated by December 1992: Conahan, Frank C., \textit{UN Peacekeeping}: 7; Findlay, Trevor, \textit{Cambodia}: 141.
\textsuperscript{494} Buckingham, Antony, \textit{RACMP in Cambodia}.
\textsuperscript{495} Pringle, James, ‘Sex and inflation end the UN honeymoon in Cambodia’, \textit{The Times} (26 November 1992): 13.
\textsuperscript{496} Ledgerwood, Judy, L., \textit{UN Peacekeeping Missions}: 7-8.
change in Japan’s security policies and international role in four decades. The dispatch of armed forces to an area where Imperial Japanese forces had previously fought was significant, but the principle that the state was internationally represented by its military was something that many Japanese found deeply unsettling. UNTAC was conducted under a cloud of uncertainty, but also in an environment of increased expectation of Japanese contributions to international society. Every mission detail was judged by criteria determined more by legacies of war and post-war politics than by performance standards of efficiency and effectiveness. The JSDF UNTAC deployment thus became an inverted mission, where what did not occur was often considered more important than operational achievements.

While the JSDF mission was initially limited to a PSO logistics support role, it broadened its role much further into human security and PKO/PKF duties. It became a direct provider of medical and sanitation services, and through its very presence, particularly by its ‘information gathering’ duties, it contributed to providing “freedom from fear” and suffering.497

Watanabe considers the 25 years leading to UNTAC as developing deep, strong bilateral relations with the US, thereby agreeing with Dobson that this provided a bilateral base “enabling the SDF to fulfil its mission in Cambodia in cooperation with other countries.” Watanabe asserts that “it can be argued that the Cambodia PKO opened the door for Japan and the SDF to move from bilateral to multilateral relations.”498 However, it is clear from operational analysis that the JSDF still had significant gaps in its capabilities, of hardware and software, which the US relationship had done little to address, and perhaps the over-arching bilateral relationship had

497 Watanabe, Takashi, *The PKO in Cambodia-Lessons Learned*: 94-95.
stunted greater efforts at multilateral military cooperation.

Domestic media coverage was, for the JSDF, almost wholly positive by summer 1993, aided by Watanabe insisting on openness, admitting even critical media into the JSDF HQ, including an *Asahi TV* crew, with rapid alteration of JDA ‘press club’ rules, and adroit management of over 300 Japanese media personnel.\(^{499}\) The UNTAC head of communications instigated ‘Japan media briefings’ to cope with demand.\(^{500}\) Despite fluctuations in polls, the change in opinion upon final return was evident, when even a Socialist Diet Member who had ‘ox-walked’ in opposition to dispatch greeted and thanked JSDF members for their work.\(^{501}\) However, official follow-up activities and research were poor. Less than one and a half pages was devoted to JSDF UNTAC activities in the 1994 defence white paper, whereas five and a half pages were devoted to MSDF Persian Gulf minesweeping.\(^{502}\) In the 1996 and 1998 White Papers, Cambodia was briefly covered, ‘UNTAC’ not being mentioned.\(^{503}\) Even more telling was the JSDF attitude, with dispatch histories compiled but little used, and very few personnel debriefed or engaged to record, analyse, or utilise their experiences for the benefit of the Forces.

This is an example of how the effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of the JSDF UNTAC dispatch were compromised. The effort expended to mediate the dispatch of the JSDF, to commence operations, and to adjust to mission requirements under intense pressure was a significant feat, and the JSDF performed effectively, to high standards of


\(^{500}\) Ohta, Kiyohiko, ‘A Public Relations Officer’s Experiences in UNTAC’: 173.

\(^{501}\) Ohta, Kiyohiko, ‘A Public Relations Officer’s Experiences in UNTAC’: 168.


quality, and with a significant degree of efficiency. Yet, the failure to follow-through with operational analysis, to ‘learn lessons’, meant that much of value was squandered and expertise and commitment dissipated, as seen in the next JSDF UNPKO in Mozambique.
3 Mozambique

Introduction

The dispatch of JSDF to ONUMOZ was the second JSDF UNPKO, and was dispatched just a month after the second contingent had joined UNTAC. The decision to have two concurrent ODO was not the first choice of the Japanese government, but the opportunity arose, with the UNSG specifically requesting Japanese participation, and MoFA in particular pressing to build upon the momentum gained by UNTAC.\(^{504}\)

Participation in ONUMOZ was, however, initially rejected by Chief Cabinet Secretary and acting-Foreign Minister Kono Yohei in March 1993, leading to surprisingly vociferous denunciations from LDP politicians and MoFA officials, pillorying Kono as “a coward” and his decision “comical”.\(^{505}\) The decision was reversed with the 26\(^{th}\) March dispatch of a survey team, and on 27\(^{th}\) April the cabinet accepted a UN request for participation.\(^{506}\)

ONUMOZ was a continuation in the trend of post-Cold War UNPKO from UNTAG and UNTAC, providing an all embracing civilian-military mission to promote DDR within an electoral process. While the government favoured contributing a contingent it encountered personnel limitations (2000) on ODO within the IPCL. This entailed either reductions in the UNTAC contribution, a controversial step, or the dispatch of a much smaller force to ONUMOZ. In consequence the JSDF ONUMOZ force would be less than one-tenth of that dispatched to UNTAC, with less personnel within Mozambique.


than providing external logistical support, and would be the first non-self-supporting JSDF ODO. The contrast between UNTAC and ONUMOZ is notable for the similarities in mission and the disparities between the Japanese contributions. This is also expressed in the media coverage and research scholarship the missions received.

A Mission Context

After Mozambique gained independence from Portugal in 1975, it was plunged into a debilitating civil war between the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) Government, and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) supported by South Africa. Fortunately, both groups agreed to peace negotiations after the end of the Cold War, as in Namibia, whereas Angolan groups continued their civil war until 1994.

As Richard Synge states, the General Peace Agreement (GPA) reached in October 1992 was the result of over two years of negotiation, “conducted by Italian mediators who managed to combine good understanding of the complexities of Mozambique with extraordinary patience.”\(^\text{507}\) The GPA was the equivalent of the UNTAC Paris Accords, but between the commencement and completion of negotiations the number and scale of UNPKO expanded beyond UN financial and personnel resources. A non-strategically important part of Africa not being the highest priority, ONUMOZ comprised approximately one-third the size and one-quarter the budget of UNTAC, despite being a longer mission.

ONUMOZ was established by Security Council Resolution 797 (1992) of 16\(^\text{th}\)

December 1992 to implement the GPA. The mandate of ONUMOZ was based upon ceasefire and force withdrawal monitoring, DDR, human rights monitoring, refugee assistance, and support for the electoral process. It also included, “security arrangements for vital infrastructures and to provide security for United Nations and other international activities in support of the peace process” which related to JSDF activities.

In early 1993, 6500 troops and over 100 CIVPOL were deployed under SRSG Aldo Ajello, to implement the GPA through a Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, chaired by the SRSG, with FRELIMO, RENAMO, six major powers, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). While it was designed to ease the transition to peaceful elections, the main work of the mission became humanitarian assistance to 3.7 million displaced people, and a DDR programme overseen by 354 UNMOs. UNHCR aided the repatriation of 1.3 million refugees, and by mid-1994 some 75% of internally displaced people had been resettled and most refugees had returned to Mozambique.

The main military roles for ONUMOZ were patrolling transport and energy facilities, and the provision of humanitarian, logistical, and medical assistance, in addition to DDR. The UN did not consider it a dangerous mission, but INTERPOL estimated that 1.5 million AK-47 rifles were imported during the war by armed groups. The DDR programme recorded only 46,193 small arms surrendered, with less than 60,000 further weapons registered but held by groups, with most surrendered arms being the least

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valuable.⁵¹¹ Most contingent members believed that disarmament was not their responsibility, a Uruguayan soldier commenting that, “active disarming is dangerous…ONUMOZ’s mandate is not to send bodybags to Montevideo.”⁵¹² Unlike in Cambodia, there were no specific ‘spoiler’ groups that rejected the GPA, and demobilization continued more successfully than disarmament. One area of particularly slow progress was the civilian SRSG National Mine Clearance Plan.⁵¹³

By the time of the elections a new Mozambique Defence Force of former FRELIMO and RENAMO troops had been trained with foreign assistance. The elections were held in October 1994, with FRELIMO winning the parliamentary and presidential elections, the new government and president being inaugurated in December 1994. ONUMOZ’s mandate ended on ⁹th December 1994 with most personnel departing by January 1995.⁵¹⁴

Despite the sense of partial mission failure due to DDR and demining problems, the UNSG reported in April 1998 that “the United Nations experience in Mozambique showed that, in the right circumstances, peacekeeping operations can offer a flexible and uniquely adapted means to confront conflict in Africa. Its success testifies to the contribution that the United Nations can make as an impartial and legitimate actor for peace.”⁵¹⁵

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⁵¹² Vines, Alex, ‘Disarmament in Mozambique’: 195.
B JSDF ODO Preparation and Logistics

Despite government approval of an ONUMOZ contribution the ceiling of 2000 personnel within the IPCL was a severe limitation. This was interpreted as all personnel, including those who assisted dispatch, even if not directly joining missions. The conclusion reached was that only 50 troops per ONUMOZ rotation would be possible, based upon the calculation of 1220 personnel (total) within UNTAC, plus MSDF and ASDF support. The choice of Mozambique suited the desire for an ‘UNTAC-like’ mission, and was preferable to Somalia or Bosnia. While many governments provided both large contingents and voluntary contributions, the Japanese profile was low, contrasting with the largesse in UNTAC. Sweden donated food supplies to quell riots, while Italy, Portugal, and Britain contributed additional personnel and money to speed DDR and de-mining.\(^5\) Japan’s contribution was made upon UN request to boost the power of one radio transmitter, while Germany donated an entire radio station.\(^5\)

Compared with UNTAC, ONUMOZ was clearly the less-favoured ODO sibling.

The problems experienced by JSDF personnel in ONUMOZ were basically derived from their small, non-independent contingent status, and local conditions. These were exacerbated by the rush to deploy, which hampered the learning of lessons from UNTAC. Indeed, many of the deployed personnel were given a series of 10 vaccination injections in the space of less than a month, and had little time to mentally or physically prepare for deployment, a situation made worse by a lack of information. There were

only basic briefings provided to the JSDF, and while the commanding officer sought out Portuguese and English instructors, his men were provided with only rudimentary language classes. Pre-departure training comprised three elements: basic skills to operate as Movement Control Units (MCU), team-work development carried out by working and social events to bond a group of disparate volunteers, and language training. The contingent commander attended the JSDF Kodaira Foreign Language School for some weeks, on his own volition, and worked on simple English and Portuguese expressions in his free time. Most of his men had only 2-3 weeks of basic training in languages and other related matters, starting from a low base, but local knowledge was complemented by briefings provided by trading companies with experience of Mozambique. 100 volunteers were trained for the ONUMOZ dispatch only the best 48 being selected for the first contingent, unusually composed of a mix of GSDF and ASDF personnel. In addition to the MCU, the JSDF also deployed five staff officers to act in liaison roles with the ONUMOZ military component headquarters in Maputo, the Central Region HQ in Beira, and the Southern Region HQ in Matola.

The transport of the contingent was by commercial charter container vessel for heavy equipment, and by chartered Antonov aircraft for vehicles and personnel. The force commander, Major Nakano Shigenori, and five HQ staff flew to Maputo via London and Johannesburg on scheduled flights, arriving on 13th May.518 Additional personnel were flown in on chartered airlines, with all unit members assembled in Mozambique by 17th May.519 One problem was that those who packed and shipped the equipment were not the actual users, so that there was a degree of confusion as to what had been packed where.

The ASDF flew airlift support missions for the ONUMOZ contingent. They were hampered, as in UNTAC, by the capabilities of their C-130H aircraft, so that the approximately 7,200km one-way flight required four-five days, via five transit countries.\textsuperscript{520} Thereafter, civilian scheduled flights were used to transport most supplies, with the ASDF being used for sensitive equipment, VIPs, and New Year presents, such as sake and raamen noodles.\textsuperscript{521} The ASDF used Nairobi as a transport hub, as it would for the Rwanda/Zaire dispatch, for two aircraft and 50 personnel (more than the ONMUOZ JSDF total). The equipment taken to Mozambique included 20 vehicles, specialist loading equipment, and personal weapons (seven rifles, 46 pistols), which as in UNTAC were only issued when the security situation was deemed to require it.\textsuperscript{522} Unlike UNTAC, subsequent contingents arrived in Mozambique in November 1993 and June 1994 without weapons, treating them as other equipment, passed from one contingent to the next.

The UN had vetoed the original Japanese suggestion of being housed in a hotel in Maputo, not only for the effect upon ONUMOZ morale, but also due to operational readiness and security concerns. The UN proposed billeting the JSDF with their ‘host’ unit, the Bangladeshi logistics battalion. This was coolly received by the GSDF who preferred a ‘western’ host, resulting in their being based with, and dependent upon, Portuguese Army ‘hosts’ for most basic services and infrastructure, beyond JSDF vehicles, machinery, and tents.\textsuperscript{523}

The problems of tented accommodation were clear from UNTAC experiences, but the

\textsuperscript{520} Handbook for Defense 1999: 641.
\textsuperscript{521} ‘Mozambique PKO unit members sent New Year goods by air from Komaki Base (Nagoya)’, (Mozambiiku PKO no taïin ni shougatsu youhin kuuyu Komakikichi (Nagoya)), Asahi Shimbun (29 December 1993): 2.
\textsuperscript{523} Interview, Colonel Nakano, Shigenori, GSDF Research Headquarters, Camp Asaka, (20 August 2007).
lesson was not learned. While the importance of providing pre-fabricated buildings in a country with tropical climate and poor infrastructure would result in extensive investments in East Timor, the mission to Mozambique was expected to camp. The MCU were in tented accommodation, and no pre-fabricated units were provided even after UNTAC when more resources could have been provided. Water and electricity were rationed, but it seems from interviews that the first contingent had quite basic expectations, which were met. The second contingent members apparently expected to walk into a fully-functioning African Camp Takeo, and were rudely shocked. This difference of expectation seems to have had an effect upon morale, exacerbated by the failure to continue ‘vacation’ breaks for troops from UNTAC experience, with only a few personnel able to visit Nairobi.

C  JSDF Performance

The main duty was Movement Control (MOVECON), the processing of passengers and loading and unloading of freight, and disbursement to the next echelon of transport units, working within the operational control of the Bangladeshi Army logistics battalion. This entailed the small MOVECON contingent of 48 being split into two MCU, between the two main air transport centres of Matola in the south and Beira and Dondo in the central region (see Appendix Two). Beira was the main port of the country, and for countries to the west of Mozambique, such as Zimbabwe, which had patrolled the railway during the civil war.\textsuperscript{524} Beira also had an airport to the north, within the neighbouring Dondo province. This meant the Japanese working in very small numbers, with the central region MCU in Beira/Dondo having only a 10 man ‘platoon’ (squad

\textsuperscript{524} Synge, Richard, \textit{Mozambique}: 16.
size), with two JSDF staff officers despite being tasked with port and airport movements for the central region. The lack of numbers also entailed that they could not provide any credible self-defence capability while in transit. The main Japanese MCU based at Matola, south of Maputo, consisted of a headquarters platoon (18), and two MOVECON Platoons (10 each), and a staff officer in the southern region force HQ. The remaining two staff officers were based in the main HQ in Maputo. While structured as a company the Japanese contingent had less than half the usual manpower.

The Japanese HQ contained a small medical team, based upon UNTAC practice, comprised of three-four medical and two dental staff per rotation who treated approximately 600 patients.\footnote{Shirohama, Tatsuoki, \textit{Knowledge I wish to put in place}: 76.} A unit the size of the Japanese in ONUMOZ would normally not be provided with a medical team comprising approximately 10\% of personnel.\footnote{Shirohama, Tatsuoki, \textit{Knowledge I wish to put in place}: 83.}

The Beira/Dondo duty was rotated so that troops could return to the main Japanese contingent area on a regular basis. However, this required a long journey through unsafe areas, the JSDF depending upon Italian or Portuguese escorts, particularly as bandit attacks increased during 1994.\footnote{Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique, UN Document S/1994/1002 (26 August 1994): 4.} This ‘collective security’ was considered highly sensitive, in light of developments in Cambodia and accusations that JSDF PKO were breaching legal and constitutional prohibitions, but it quickly became an established operational norm that benefited the mission.\footnote{Interviews, Colonel Nakano, Shigenori, and JDA officials supporting ONUMOZ.}

The security condition within the country deteriorated as the elections drew close. As the UNSC Mission to Mozambique stated:
The country will be going into the elections without a fully constituted and properly equipped army. The police are weak, poorly trained and lack the right equipment. On the other hand, thousands of soldiers, whose only skill is the use of weapons, have been demobilized and are without alternative employment. Armed banditry is spreading, especially in the countryside, and the situation may become critical.\footnote{Report of the Security Council Mission Established Pursuant to the Statement Made by the President of the Security Council at the 3406th Meeting (S/PRST/1994/35), UN Document S/1994/1009 (29 August 1994) (http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/343/60/PDF/N9434360.pdf?OpenElement, 1 August 2009).}

During the mission, 26 ONUMOZ members died, and it is fortunate that the JSDF contingent was able to depend so closely upon the Portuguese, Italian, and other contingents for security assistance, to a greater extent than the JSDF depended on the French in UNTAC.

The language and general communications situation in ONUMOZ was as poor as in Cambodia, but the contingent commander discovered that his younger personnel more easily and more enthusiastically learned languages and communicated by non-verbal means, easily adapting to challenging environments. He therefore rotated younger members in the roles which required the greatest degree of external communications, and attempted to utilise the skills of more experienced older men in less exposed ways. His frustration was that due to military hierarchies there were always middle-aged personnel who were less useful to the mission, exacerbated by the relatively high average-age of the JSDF.

The JSDF staff officers were tasked with providing liaison and communications with the two main JSDF units, and to the IPCH. The general impression is that these staff
officers were under-utilised at times, and overworked at others, hampered by a lack of transport, and also felt unable to take a more pro-active mission approach due to the limited Japanese contribution. The staff officers were, however, able to relieve some of the strain of English communication from the MOVECON HQ, particularly by providing précis of ONUMOZ documents and technical information, such as security alerts and weather reports.

The staff officers were in stressful roles, in position for one year (first rotation), or eight months (second rotation), whereas other personnel rotated every six months. They were billeted in private accommodation responsible for their own domestic services, and also were on constant call, carrying radios even when off-duty in case of contingencies. They were, in addition to their ONUMOZ duties, also required to draft situation reports on the state of the mission for the IPCH and JDA. Colonel Sawada, a staff officer in Mozambique, stated that the significance of these reports was that if a clear breach of any of the five conditions as proscribed by the IPCL were to be detailed, then the entire Japanese mission could be in jeopardy. In that case, the GSDF would be required to abandon their duties, including their Portuguese and Bangladeshi hosts, and the staff officers were tasked with drafting contingency plans for assembly and withdrawal of personnel. This was a heavy responsible for relatively junior officers, with the JSDF policy being to place Captains and Majors in such positions.

One significant aid to both staff officers and contingent members was the formation of a ‘support team’ within the PMO that communicated effectively with the JDA.

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530 Maeda, Tetsuo, *JSDF and PKO Verification*: 136-137.
complimented by MoFA in Tokyo and Maputo, and officers felt confidence in being able to request information and/or guidance from either of these sources, a particularly great help given the limited JSDF resources.\textsuperscript{534}

\section*{D Japanese Contribution to Mission}

In assessing the effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of JSDF work in ONUMOZ there would appear to be little doubt as to the effectiveness of the work of the MCU, and ability to conduct mandated duties. Many duties were routine and administrative, such as the processing of air-passengers, while aircraft loading required skill and use of specialised equipment. The effectiveness of the work can be judged by the continued use of JSDF MCU within the mission, and the length of their dispatch, being responsible for the processing of 119,000 passengers and 12,100 tonnes of cargo.\textsuperscript{535} Many developed countries reduced their forces before the elections, with the Italians largely withdrawing by early 1994, being replaced by African units.\textsuperscript{536} JSDF MOVECON was the only developed-country contingent to remain constant.

While the JSDF arrived six months after the commencement of the mission, this was not considered as great a problem for mission effectiveness as in UNTAC. The whole mission was delayed in commencing its duties by UN processing delays, particularly over the mission budget, described by the SRSG as “pure nonsense”.\textsuperscript{537} The MCU appeared to experience no capability gaps, as all freight loads could be processed, and although the volume of traffic varied, there was no sense of the units being regarded as bottlenecks in the supply chain. On the contrary, as a small unit, the JSDF were

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{534} Maeda, Tetsuo, \textit{JSDF and PKO Verification}: 138-139.
\textsuperscript{536} Synge, Richard, \textit{Mozambique}: 92.
\textsuperscript{537} Synge, Richard, \textit{Mozambique}: 38.
\end{flushleft}
dependent upon the schedules of arriving and departing ships and aircraft for their 
loading and processing work, and upon the logistical contingents of Bangladesh and 
India to provide trans-shipment. Participants expressed continued frustration with this 
work, as late arrivals would have serious consequences for JSDF work, not least in 
delaying return to camp, and the resulting dangers of night-travel.\textsuperscript{538} This was a serious 
issue not only for safety but also in the effectiveness and efficiency of MOVECON, but 
as a very minor actor within the mission the JSDF had little control over this situation.

Similarly, the roles of staff officers were not outside of the range of the personnel 
dispatched, but as liaison officers for the smallest contingent there was little they could 
effectively contribute to the overall mission outside of making arrangements for the 
MCU, and aiding communications. While their quality was never in doubt, the roles 
assigned, outside the command, control, and communications functions of regular staff 
work, resulted in them being less effectively utilised than their capabilities warranted.

The JSDF contingent worked efficiently, but the commander acknowledged that 
many of their duties could have been completed by civilian personnel, and that the 
JSDF did indeed cooperate closely with civilian units.\textsuperscript{539} They did however illustrate 
their versatility in dealing with arrange of aircraft and vehicle types unfamiliar to 
Japanese personnel, from \textit{Mil-8} helicopters to steam trains.\textsuperscript{540} Balanced against this 
were the additional costs of civilian personnel hired under UN contracts, which 
increased far more than had been anticipated.\textsuperscript{541} JSDF forces were (to the UN) a cheap, 
high-quality capability for 18 months. The footprint of the MCU was certainly light

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\textsuperscript{538} Maeda, Tetsuo, \textit{JSDF and PKO Verification}: 137.
\textsuperscript{539} Maeda, Tetsuo, \textit{JSDF and PKO Verification}: 140-141.
\textsuperscript{540} Nakano, Shiginori, ‘Mozambique Duty Roster’ (\textit{Mozanbiiku doumuban}, \textit{Securitarian} (October 
\textsuperscript{541} \textit{Financing of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique: Report of the Secretary-General}, 
\end{flushleft}
compared to UNTAC, with relatively light equipment, and Japanese ‘bathing’ restricted to a three-man folding, canvas tub. With limited ASDF and no MSDF support, the contingent provided a high quality service while imposing few logistical strains on either the mission or the JSDF, despite being ‘hosted’ units. The medical services were also able to sustain JSDF operations and to assist members of other contingents to a high standard.

The JSDF contribution to the electoral role of the mission was purely supportive. Unlike in UNTAC there was no contact with any electoral element, and very little contact with local communities other than the usual playing with children near the camp areas. Despite the UNSG stating in August 1994 that all ONUMOZ military contingents would be requested to make greater contributions to the security of Mozambique, particularly with patrolling of roads and vital points, the JSDF duties did not expand. The JSDF units were simply too small to even contribute to the regular security patrols or gate guards at their camp areas.

E Conclusion

The lack of learning from the UNTAC experience marks ONUMOZ as an example of what can happen when operational analysis is neglected, with inadequate language skills, pre-dispatch training, and accommodation. Yet the Mozambique case provides an alternative example of how the JSDF could participate in ODO, with a niche capability, light-footprint force, able to conduct technical operations in close cooperation with other contingents and civilians, in a far more integrated manner than UNTAC, for longer. That this was initially forced upon the government and JSDF by legal restrictions is

542 ‘Mozambique Note’ (Mozanbiiku tayori), Securitarian (September 1993): 34.
clear, but it was continued after the restrictive phase had passed, albeit at the cost of hardship to JSDF participants. OUNOMOZ provided an example that could be seen later in the dispatches to UNDOF and Honduras, acting as a compact ‘force capability multiplier’. Although the mission was seen by the Japanese government as resembling UNTAC, for the JSDF it was a new form of ODO, making quite different demands on personnel, with constant exposure to foreign practice and languages, and not altogether a comfortable experience. The JSDF did not appear to suffer from lack of operational effectiveness or quality in their work, but whether the ‘light-footprint’ approach was as efficient, as it was relatively cheap and simple, is unclear. The efficiency of units was affected by their size, inability to subsist independently, and escorting requirements. This dependency could have been resource and time consuming for both escorts and hosts, and potentially a drain upon the mission. As in UNTAC, while the JSDF could certainly claim their operation was a success, good fortune and the cooperation of allies played a significant part in achieving this without casualties, and by the nature of contingent configuration, OUNOMOZ was inevitably dependent upon collective security.
4 Golan

Introduction

The contribution to the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights of Syria and Israel is one of the least known and most remarkable Japanese ODO. It attracts little attention, and many UNDOF veterans have complained that it is the ‘forgotten outpost.’ As such, it could be seen to demonstrate the determination of Japan to make a meaningful contribution to UNPKO largely divorced from ‘showing the flag’ in the media or narrow national interests. It is unusual in that it is not a nation-building, ‘UNTAC-type’ mission, but a classical ‘blue helmet’ mission. The JDA stated in 2002 that, “Japan’s participation in UNDOF marks its first undertaking as part of a UN PKO in a zone set up to separate the opposing troops of sovereign states that have agreed a ceasefire. It thus carries significance as Japan’s human resources contribution toward international efforts to build peace in the Middle East.”

While undoubtedly true, interviewees and commentators have conjectured that UNDOF provides a convenient example for MoFA to illustrate its commitment to UN burden-sharing. The JSDF and JDA/MOD have valued the small but high-value mission as a “PKO School”.

The Yomiuri Shimbun reported in the months leading up to the deployment of the JSDF to UNDOF that 44% of those polled believed that the dispatch of forces to Golan was essential, whereas 34% thought that it was not. Certainly it proved much less

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545 Sato, Masahisa, ‘From the Golan Heights to Iraq: a JGSDF Commander’s Experience in the Middle East’ (Golan kougen kara Iraku he shikikan no chuutou keiken), in Military History Society of Japan (ed.), Peacekeeping Operations in Historical Perspective: 308-325, 320.
546 ‘Opinion poll on the view after 50 years since the end of the war, defence sense also changes’ (Youronchosa ni miru sengou 50nen reisen shuuketsu, boueikan no henka), Yomiuri Shimbun (11 August 1995) (http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01257/contents/350.htm, 14 April 2008).
controversial than UNTAC, and the absence of incidents have made it a model JSDF mission. The only media attention has been the six-monthly mission extensions in the Diet, and the dispatch and return ceremonies for the JSDF participants. UNDOF represents quiet and comfortable ODO. As Marrack Goulding stated, “UNDOF showed me how effective peacekeeping can be if certain conditions are met.”

A Mission Context

The UNDOF deployment resulted from the Arab-Israeli ‘Yom Kippur’ War from 6th October 1973, when Syrian and Egyptian forces launched a coordinated attack upon Israel and Israeli-held territory. To Israel’s west, Egyptian forces made initial gains, but soon outran their missile shields that balanced Israeli qualitative superiority. In Israel’s north-east, the fighting was intense, with Syrian helicopter assaults capturing Mount Hermon in the Golan Heights. Control of the Heights was vital for control of the Sea of Galilee, water resources, and to prevent Syrian artillery reaching Israeli cities. After intense fighting, the UNSC called for a ceasefire on 22nd October 1973, which the Israelis and Egyptians accepted. President Assad of Syria eventually accepted a truce the next day.

On 24th October, the UNSC adopted Resolution 339, deploying elements of UNEF II as a Disengagement Force, stabilizing the western front. On the northern front, the US negotiated an “Agreement on Disengagement” between Israel and Syria, with an ‘Area of Separation’, a de-militarized buffer zone under Syrian administration, and two equal ‘Areas of Limitation of Forces and Armaments’, de-militarized areas, administered by

547 Goulding, Marrack, _Peacemonger_: 41.
national civil agencies, including police.\textsuperscript{550} The Agreement and the Protocols for withdrawal of forces and establishment of UNDOF were signed on 31\textsuperscript{st} May 1974, with UNSC Resolution 350 (1974). The mandate was designed to “Use its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syria and to supervise the Agreement and Protocol to the Agreement with respect to the Area of Separation and Areas of Limitation.”\textsuperscript{551}

To save time, personnel were transferred from UNEF II in Sinai, UNDOF headquarters being established in Damascus.\textsuperscript{552} It has been one of the most stable PKO, with low costs, far less controversies than the neighbouring UNIFIL mission, and without significant dissent concerning its continuation or mandate.\textsuperscript{553} There were naturally changes in contingents, with the Austrian and Polish infantry battalions a constant presence until 2009, often also providing the Mission Head and Force Commander, UNDOF being one of the few missions with combined roles.

The UNDOF Area of Separation is 80 km long north-south, and between approximately 10 km to less than one km across (see Appendix Two). The terrain is mountainous, with Mount Hermon being the highest UN position at 2,814 meters. UNDOF has two camps, one in Israel and one in Syria, 20 permanently-manned positions, and 11 partly-manned observation posts, in addition to a representative office in Damascus. UNDOF also provides logistical support for UNTSO which monitors the borders of Israel. The UNDOF mandate has remained unchanged, to maintain the ceasefire, and supervise the disengagement of forces and Areas of Separation and

\textsuperscript{552} UNSC Resolution 350 (1974).
\textsuperscript{553} Urquart, Brian, Life in Peace and War.
Limitation.  

UNDOF has had 1342-1047 military personnel, with 39-50 UN and approximately 100 local staff. Despite UNDOF being characterized by host consent, impartiality, and the minimal use of force, 43 mission personnel died up to June 2010. It was designed to prevent a resumption of hostilities, to build local trust, and to support peace-building. It has succeeded in its first two duties, while the third has been outside its control. Mona Ghali has noted that, “UNDOF’s unambiguous mandate has not imposed unrealistic demands on the force. Its functions are important…and relatively detached from higher politics.” While the mandate appears simple, the peace has been carefully managed. Iranian troops (until withdrawal in 1979), and Polish troops (until Poland recognized Israel in 1990) suffered from Israeli restrictions on their movements. The Syrian approach has been less restrictive, but sensitivities, such as the seizure of Hebrew inscribed articles, caused incidents, particularly as most UNDOF fire extinguishers have been serviced in Israel.

The two main units of the Force have been the infantry battalions of Austria and Poland, tasked with complex de-mining and mine-management tasks, patrolling, including ski-patrols, and field-liaison activities. From the earliest days, the duties of

554 UNDOF Mandate, UNDPKO
555 Report of the Secretary General on the UN Disengagement Observer Force, S/21950 (23 November 1990)
556 UNDOF Facts and Figures, UNDPKO
558 Goulding, Marrack, Peacemonger: 41.
UNDOF have included a surprising degree of support activities for the population resident within the operational area. The Force provides assistance to the ICRC in the passing of mail and people through the area and in the provision of medical services within the means available. It has also provided a base for UN humanitarian relief work, including in conflict affected parts of Lebanon. The animosity felt for UNIFIL among many Israeli troops is not seen as relevant to UNDOF, although numbers of UNDOF personnel have been injured by Israeli action. Brigadier-General Yuill has pointed out that UNDOF provides a small, yet important, means of conveying goods and individuals between Israel and Syria, and for liaison officers to build relations. Anniversaries provide a focal point for meetings of ambassadors, defence attachés, and officials. While characterized as a truce monitoring force, it is no small coincidence that its presence and its actions have coincided with the approximately doubling of the population from the 1973 level.

Regular courses are held in civic education, especially the danger of landmines, especially as most mines are over 35 years old and potentially unstable, and Syrian demining teams have cooperated with UNDOF. Medical consultations and treatments have also been freely provided to local children and mothers, with UNDOF approval, and the mission has proved a very flexible one. The small numbers of women serving

in key positions in UNDOF, as medical, dental, and administrative staff, seem to have helped such efforts.

UNDOF cooperation on postal services with the ICRC is important as communications are extremely difficult, with much work going into UNDOF securing passage for Druze families. Until the late 1990s there was the phenomenon of ‘family shouting’ whereby divided Druze families would gather at points negotiated between UNDOF and the IDF, and communicate using loudspeaker systems, which declined with the proliferation of mobile phones.\textsuperscript{570} The UNDOF staff must negotiate with various offices of both Israel and Syria, ensure that roads are clear, and often transport individuals themselves. The nature of this bizarrely complex process has featured in a film by director Eran Riklis, \textit{The Syrian Bride}.\textsuperscript{571} A somehow less obvious development in 2005 was ‘Operation Apple’, by which the fruit growers of the region were able, thanks to UNDOF and ICRC negotiations, to ‘import’ freshly picked apples into Syria, via the UNDOF crossing points, in trucks driven by ‘neutrals’.\textsuperscript{572}

Second and third-line logistics support plays an important role in ensuring that UNDOF continues to function. First-line logistics of daily supplies are conducted integrally by units, whereas second-line logistics move larger items or numbers of personnel within the Operational Area. The third line is the connection of supplies and communications from outside the Operational Area, especially ports and airports. Damascus international airport is the main entry point for UNDOF personnel, supplemented by Tel Aviv international airport, air movements directed from force HQ, with an UNTSO aircraft available. The main supply ports have been Latakia and

\textsuperscript{570} Sato, Masahisa, ‘From the Golan Heights to Iraq’: 319.
\textsuperscript{571} Movie, \textit{The Syrian Bride}, Director Eran Riklis (2004).
Tartous in Syria, although that entails a long and arduous road journey, while the JSDF have utilised Haifa Port.\textsuperscript{573} It is in second and third-line logistical and engineering roles that the JSDF has contributed to UNDOF.

\section*{B ODO Preparation and Logistics}

The first Japanese contingent (J-CON) to UNDOF in 1996 was the first dispatch to a standing rather than \textit{ad hoc} mission. J-CON worked within the larger Canadian unit, replaced from 2006 by an Indian unit, sharing duties and many facilities with J-CON.

The Japanese government studied the possibilities to send the JSDF to other missions, but after a significant time spent studying options, decided that following a survey team report in April 1995 that UNDOF would be feasible and not violate the IPCL.\textsuperscript{574} This was the first UNPKO dispatch for the Murayama coalition cabinet. Izumi Nobumichi of the \textit{Nikkei Shim bun} suggested in 1995 that the LDP had pressed Prime Minister Murayama to participate in the ‘main force’ of a UNPKO, possibly even with infantry, thereby requiring the ‘unfreezing’ of IPCL restricted activities, within an overall legal review, while Murayama’s Socialists would only accept PKO/PSO missions.\textsuperscript{575}

While JSDF deployment to UNDOF was first raised under Prime Minister Hata in 1994, and received in a positive manner, the actual deployment took 18 months to eventuate, partly due political turmoil and the caution of Murayama.\textsuperscript{576}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{573} \textit{Report of the Secretary General on the UN Disengagement Observer Force}, UN Doc. S/21950 (23 November 1990).
\item \textsuperscript{574} \textit{SDF may go to Golan: Mission}, \textit{Nikkei Shim bun} (20 April 1995).
\item \textsuperscript{575} Izumi, Nobumichi, ‘Japanese troops should play full role in U.N. missions’.
\item \textsuperscript{576} ‘The practical terms of forceful cooperation’ (PKO sekkyoku kyouryoku no yuugen jikkou wo),
\end{itemize}
was approved by Cabinet Order 421 in August 1995, from when the IPCH dispatched survey teams and commenced discussions with Canada and the UNDPKO. The JSDF contingent deployed in January 1996, commencing duties from 1st February 1996, with two staff officers, a J-CON headquarters, and transport and logistics units totalling 43 personnel. The initial force deployment was by ASDF C-130H of two GSDF staff officers and a vehicle, and later the main force, six trucks, six buses, and associated equipment, with 60 ASDF personnel in support (outside UN assessments). The Japanese arrived with 11 pistols, 32 rifles, and two general-purpose machine-guns (GPMG). J-CON supplementary equipment was consequently transported by air and sea, mainly by commercial means, but JSDF C-130H aircraft provided air-lift of light-weight supplies. The regular air-support element is a C-130H or U-4 transport aircraft every six months, providing a supply link via Damascus, and the U-4 has also transported Japanese dignitaries within the region. Most personnel transit on commercial airlines via Damascus, with most GSDF UNDOF participants stating that they preferred the speed and comfort to ASDF flights.

As a regularly constituted mission, there has been less logistical strain on the JSDF as unlike UNTAC and ONUMOZ the heavy plant required for operational duties was mainly in position and has only required gradual renewal. Most transport vehicles have been European left-hand drive designs provided by the UN. As the Japanese were only required to provide their own basic unit equipment for their small force, such as small-arms, communications equipment, and 12 unit transports, the logistical load was

light.

J-CON has been small in proportion to the mission. UNDOF averaged 1050 personnel in 1997, with the Japanese constituting just over 4% of the force, or 2.89% of UN-assessed force, due to 12-15 supporting troops being nationally funded.\(^{580}\) Japan chose to contribute a small contingent to a small mission with integral infantry battalions present, UNDOF being one of the smallest such missions.\(^{581}\) MoFA and JDA staff have indicated they were lucky to get the opportunity, as Canada wished to reduce its commitments and was happy to have a capable partner.\(^{582}\) The mission met the minimum conditions as outlined in the IPCL, but also the optimum mission profile of safety, stability, organic mission security forces (including for the JSDF), and the minimal logistical ‘burden’. UNDOF met these requirements, with two infantry battalions, and a supporting logistics battalion (LOGBATT), which J-CON could ‘plug into’ with little additional equipment.

Preparation for UNDOF dispatch was unlike that for UNTAC or ONUMOZ, as the time available was greater, and the local conditions and roles were far more certain than in previous missions. UNDOF was the first operation which aimed to make use of some of the experience of previous ODO experience, and the pre-dispatch training had the voices of ‘veterans’ included within the curriculum.\(^{583}\) Major Sato Masahisa was selected as the first J-CON commander having been involved in UNTAC planning and dispatched survey groups. His knowledge of planning and training proved invaluable,

\(^{580}\) Japan wished to dispatch a larger force than the Canadian unit replaced. The UN refused to increase the budget: Heinrich L. William, Jr. \textit{et al}, \textit{United Nations Peace-keeping Operations}: 82.


\(^{582}\) ‘Choose a Different PKO: JSDF Golan Transport Duties Commence’ (\textit{Katte chigau PKO Goran no jieitai, yusougyoumu hajimeru}), \textit{Asahi Shimbun} (24 February 1996): 3.

later gaining fame as ‘hige no Sato’ (moustache Sato), commanding the first GSDF contingent in Iraq.\textsuperscript{584} The main focus of preparation was on the core transport and engineering tasks that J-CON would carry out, volunteers were plentiful, and respondents of a survey conducted by Kawano Hitoshi illustrated their high motivation.\textsuperscript{585} The first contingent was from the Western Army, with the second from the Eastern Army, dispatched on six-month rotations, with staff officers in position for one year.

Training was initially focused upon operating heavy plant, such as dozers, diggers, and rollers, for as in UNTAC, road repair would be a significant J-CON duty, but the range of engineering skills required would be greater, and with so few members each would be required to multi-task. To this end, multiple-skills training was instituted, as well as the driving of unfamiliar, left-hand drive vehicles. Seki \textit{et al} have illustrated that from the end of the 1990s the emphasis on pre-deployment training was systemized into three strands: specialist training (engineering/transport), developing team work and a group ethos (from disparate volunteers), and the study of language and culture. All members were given English and Arabic language training, while lectures explained the complexities of the area, particularly about Islam and Judaism.\textsuperscript{586}

Unlike in previous missions, each member trained with the \textit{Type-64} rifle, and ROE were carefully explained and rehearsed. This would appear to be the first such systemized contingency training for a UN mission, even though the basic assumption was that the infantry battalions would protect them. The rules of engagement have naturally never been made public, but former participants have related how the

\textsuperscript{585} Interview, Kawano, Hitoshi, NDA (June 2001).
assumption was that J-CON troops would withdraw to bunkers in the event of hostilities, only defending their immediate area within the overall base defence plan. Fire-arms, as in previous missions, would not be regularly issued, but stored in a secure armoury.

Most officers were requested to apply for UNDOF service, or were chosen. Other members were volunteers, with the main motivations including the desires for operational experience, foreign travel, and the chance to represent Japan in an international setting. Few accepted that the daily allowance (teate) was a motivating factor, but suggested it could be for lower ranks with families.

C  JSDF Performance

The division of responsibilities in J-CON was clear, with two, later three, officers assigned to the HQ staff for coordination and public relations duties, and the Transportation Platoon (27-30 troops), including engineering support. The Detachment Section (12-15 troops) were ‘national force support personnel’ (jitai kanri youin), providing external third-tier logistical support.\(^{587}\) The Japanese contingent formed the Transportation Platoon (PLT) of the LOGBATT. The J-CON PLT included the Camp Ziouani J-CON HQ, the Transportation Section in Camp Ziouani, and Detachment Section at Camp Faouar (see Appendix Two). The J-CON HQ section coordinates with UNDOF HQ, LOGBATT HQ, and the IPCH and JDA/MOD, as well as contributing to Golan: The UNDOF Journal. The J-CON Transportation Section has conducted UNDOF's second-line logistics transportation requirements, utilizing 21 vehicles, from cars through to 8 tonne trucks, transporting food, water, laundry, and other supplies, the movement of heavy engineering vehicles, as well as providing in-Area staff bus

\(^{587}\) UNDOF Comments (Kokuren heiryoku hikihanashikan shitai UNDOF) (Tokyo: MoFA, 2007).
services.

The Japanese have provided approximately one-quarter of the LOGBATT by capability, although assurances were sought that the JSDF would not be required to transport arms, ammunition, or armed troops. The work has been constant and unglamorous, the climate harsh, and the living conditions basic, with shared Japanese-Canadian accommodation that was a source of some stress for the J-CON during the early part of the mission.\textsuperscript{588} Partly this was due to the Canadians rotating every three months, but commanders describe the stress being relieved by parties.\textsuperscript{589} This was resolved as part of the UNDOF Force Modernization Programme 2001-2006, providing separate accommodation for all contingents.\textsuperscript{590} As the security situation has been stable, the mission is lacking in controversy, and has been a low-cost, constant reminder of Japan’s UN commitment.

J-CON also possessed ‘swing capabilities’ with snow removal, an unglamorous task, but the failure to clear snow had previously resulted in broken communications, damaged assets, and local hardship. The Austrian Army stated that for their UNDOF battalion “the greatest problems for personnel are related to snow and ice” during winter patrols.\textsuperscript{591} The GSDF had an advantage as most personnel had served in Hokkaido where snow removal duties were a regular task, and the second contingent contained members fresh from Nagano Olympic duties.\textsuperscript{592} The Detachment Section handled this task, as well as the other duties requiring specialist, heavy-lifting plant, such as fork-lift

\textsuperscript{588} Interviewees mention culinary stresses, and communication difficulties.

\textsuperscript{589} Karube, Masakazu, ‘UNDOF Round Table Discussion’:27.


\textsuperscript{591} Moderne Alpinausrüstung für die höchste UN-Position der Welt, Austrian Army, 2007 (http://www.bmlv.gv.at/ausle/undof/artikel.php?id=1815, 12 August 2007).

trucks, cranes, and heavy trailers. Another ‘swing capability’ was fire-fighting, as not only is fire an immediate hazard to UNDOF, but during the summer the area is so dry, and winds so prevalent, that any failure to quickly extinguish fire could have serious consequences for local communities, with little prospect of external fire-fighting. LOGBATT has the primary responsibility and specialized fire-fighting equipment. Other roles include road development and maintenance, and emergency vehicle recovery and maintenance. It was estimated in 2006 that J-CON had covered approximately 2.62 million km, and transported approximately 23,000 tonnes, at a daily average of almost 800 km and 48 tonnes of goods transported.\(^593\)

The Detachment Section must be highly adaptable to changing seasonal and force requirements. Detachment Leader Captain Hirayama Yoshito commented in 2009 that, “J-CON stands proudly behind the scene, supporting the UNDOF mission for peace and stability on the Golan Heights.” The Japanese experience in UNDOF has been mainly that, standing behind the scenes. It has attracted little media attention, little scrutiny, and little interest among most Japanese, a point of contention with not only JSDF personnel, but also Cabinet Office staff posted in support functions.\(^594\) Visiting Japanese students in 2006 were surprised to meet JSDF troops in Golan. J-CON personnel invited them to visit their camp, and ‘Club Fuji’ as honoured guests, and to relieve the frustrations of what they considered to be a neglected outpost.\(^595\) The lack of detailed interest can be gauged by the description of UNDOF in a brief report of troops returning to Japan: the Asahi Shimbun reported that UNDOF had two main PKF elements, one Polish, the other


\(^594\) UNDOF and Japan’s Contribution (Kokuren heiryoku hikihanashikantai (UNDOF) to Nihon no kouken), Shinohara, Kenji, (27 August 2004), MoFA (http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/undof_040827.html, 19 August 2009).

\(^595\) Interview, Arai, Mayu, Daito Bunka University, Higashi Matsuyama, Saitama (22 October 2008).
The IPCH has attempted to counter this ignorance with an impressive bilingual online video presentation of the JSDF in UNDOF.\textsuperscript{597}

The tasks listed have been conducted by small numbers of personnel, and it is clear that the adaptability and multiple capabilities of J-CON have greatly contributed to the mission. The lack of scale appears to have been balanced by the utilisation of equipment to the most effective and efficient means possible, even when some has not been of the highest standards. The first J-CON commander has contrasted how the limited budgets and operational requirements of UNDOF dictated ‘quick-patching’ of roads compared to building and sealing of roads in Iraq.\textsuperscript{598} In 1997, the government shipped vehicles via Haifa to replace obsolete UN types for road maintenance and transport duties, as ‘contributions in kind’ for the mission, primarily to ensure J-CON would be able to work as effectively and efficiently as possible.\textsuperscript{599} The range of equipment that 40 personnel have to be proficient in the use of is quite extraordinary, as the mission owns and operates 438 vehicles, most of which the JSDF must be able to operate, and all of which it must be prepared to support, including APC, trucks, engineering vehicles, ambulances, and 50 buses.\textsuperscript{600} Staff officers and contingent commanders received comments from their UNDOF peers that the Japanese focused upon tasks to be completed, rather than the time taken, particularly with engineering and vehicle maintenance tasks.\textsuperscript{601} While this was initially considered a criticism, it was praise for

\textsuperscript{596} First element of the Middle-East Golan PKO Contingent Returns (Chuutou Goran kougen no PKO hakentai, daiichijin ga kikoku), Asahi Shimbun (4 August 1999): 28.
\textsuperscript{598} Sato, Masahisa, ‘From the Golan Heights to Iraq’: 313-314.
\textsuperscript{599} Defense of Japan 2008: 152.
\textsuperscript{601} Kojima, Nobuyoshi, ‘Self-Defense Force in the Middle East: An Observation by a Defense Attaché’ (Boueichuzaikan kara mita chuutou to jieitai), in Military History Society of Japan (ed.), Peacekeeping Operations in Historical Perspective: 184-204, 186.
dedication, with other troops leaving unfinished tasks until the next day in order to dine or drink.  

There have been cases where the J-CON has been called upon to cooperate in small numbers, fully-integrated into multinational taskforces. One example was ‘Team Radome’ in 2004, tasked with the construction of a radome tower (a strong shell housing sensitive antennae). J-CON heavy trucks transported containers from Haifa, with a heavy lifting crane through mountain roads to Mount Hermon. The need for a strong structure was due to the harsh winter conditions, with heavy snow and gale-force winds. This was part of the high quality force modernization programme with most UNDOF facilities renewed.

The Japanese contingents have continued this integrated good practice through medical work, with three medical and one dental staff per contingent rotation, treating an average of 184 cases per rotation, including non-Japanese. This represents a large medical team, approximately 9% of the total contingent strength, based upon UNTAC and ONUMOZ practice.

The IPCH, JDA/MOD, and MoFA have been reluctant to discuss security concerns in UNDOF, particularly during the Iraq dispatch. However, UNDOF veterans have commented that they were dependent upon others to protect them, despite the official denial of collective security. J-CON itself has organic defensive capabilities, as previously stated. As in UNTAC and ONUMOZ, there was de facto recognition that

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602 Karube, Masakazu, ‘UNDOF Round Table Discussion’: 29.
603 IPCH (http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/result/undof_e.html, 18 August 2009).
604 Shirohama, Tatsuoki, Knowledge I wish to put in place: 76.
605 Shirohama, Tatsuoki, Knowledge I wish to put in place: 83.
J-CON simply did not have the firepower, manpower, or training required to defend itself effectively against more than minor incursions. Therefore, as in previous missions, it has depended upon the infantry battalions for security, and to act as a contingency extraction force. From 1996 the Austrian infantry battalion have played this role, like the French in UNTAC, but J-CON has enjoyed the double protection of both infantry and its host LOGBATT. In 2002, following a report in the *Tokyo Shimbun* that the JDA was planning to dispatch 10 GSDF troops to form a ‘ready-reserve’ capability, the Chief Cabinet-Secretary Fukuda Yasuo denied the reports. As *Kyodo* reported “40-50 Canadians form a ready reserve group in UNDOF charged with rescuing UNDOF logistic forces in case of a battle.”608 The scale of the matter was clear: the LOGBATT’s small, integral contingency reserve force was larger than the entire J-CON. After the controversy had subsided, all rotations included a military police officer and NCO, presumably to provide a moderate degree of enhanced security, although security drills mainly entail retreating to ‘Stand-Firm’ bunkers (see Appendix Three).

Most LOGBATT units have been engineering units. Since March 2006, the first Indian contingent, INDCON, in 2006 was formed around the Poona Horse, a famous cavalry regiment, with signalling, engineering, and other specialists seconded.609 In 2009, INDCON rotated to 169 Field Regiment, the first Indian artillery unit to serve in UNPKO, with specialists attached. The INDCON is therefore a far ‘harder’ military force than the J-CON, or preceding Canadian units, and provides an auxiliary combat capability to that of the infantry battalions. There have been no known cases in which J-CON performance has been compromised by security concerns.

While there have never been major incursions into the UNDOF area, the territory upon which it operates is among the most strategically vital in the Middle East. In May 1997, two Austrian soldiers were shot and killed while on patrol in the UNDOF area, with little media attention.\textsuperscript{610} Four UNDOF military personnel died, 2005-2008, from various causes.\textsuperscript{611} One Japanese staff member raised the issue of Israeli bombing of Syria on 5\textsuperscript{th} October 2003 over-flying the UNDOF Area.\textsuperscript{612} Even in off-the-record conversations with UNDOF veterans, there is a reluctance to discuss such matters, beyond the clear statements that UNDOF contingents were dependable in an emergency. However, former contingent commanders have stated their concerns over the possibility of becoming targets for terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{613}

It would seem that compared to some other contingents, the J-CON have been able to maintain good relations with Israeli personnel. The reason is unclear, as Japan provides ODA to Syria and began significant ODA projects with Lebanon and the Palestinian authority from 1996, but may be due to an uncritical approach to Israel’s security policies.\textsuperscript{614} Japan has maintained air links between Tel Aviv and Damascus, and sea and land links between the UNDOF area and Israel. One consequence is that the J-CON send their mail through Israel, while other contingents utilise Syria.\textsuperscript{615} Although not significant, this illustrates that the J-CON is not only impartial, but also is perceived as impartial.

The younger generation of JSDF UNDOF member appeared to be more focused on

\textsuperscript{610} ‘2 Austrian members of the Golan PKO shot dead on patrol’ (Goran PKO no ousutorijin taiin, patorouruchuu ni shasatsu), Asahi Shimbun (31 May 1995): 3.
\textsuperscript{612} UNDOF and Japan’s Contribution, MoFA.
\textsuperscript{613} Karube, Masakazu, ‘UNDOF Round Table Discussion’: 26.
\textsuperscript{614} Sato, Masahisa, ‘From the Golan Heights to Iraq’ 317.
building language skills, and often undertook activities that brought them into greatest contact with other contingents and civilians. Examples included the J-CON pages of the *Golan* journal, cultural events, such as tea ceremony, calligraphy, origami, and Japanese *matsuri* (festivals). There have also been demonstrations of *kendo*, *judo*, *karate*, *kyudo*, and even *sumo*, particularly impressive for local children, assisted by the JICA mission in Damascus, and one UNDOF civilian commented upon the surprising degree Japan had such a distinctive profile in UNDOF.\(^{616}\) As a standing mission, rather than the short-term ODO, the feeling of UNDOF personnel is very much one of making a home for the Japanese members, with *Club Fuji*, and inter-contingent activities. Although the rotation is usually six months, there is a sense of permanence, enhanced by the construction projects that have benefited J-CON and other contingents. J-CON has performed well in the unofficial UNDOF duties, to form good relations within the mission, and friendly and trusting relations with the local population.

Personnel policy has evolved with the mission. Major Tokunaga Katsuhiko appointed as commander of J-CON in 2004 perhaps epitomized the new generation of JSDF ODO personnel. Unusually for UNDOF, he was an infantry officer, completed both Ranger training and the GSDF Command and General Staff Course, and the “Humanitarian Challenge” and “Human Rights” peacekeeping courses at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada.\(^{617}\) Previously, very few officers had received any specialist let alone PKO training.

Women joined J-CON since 2004, but have not been a constant presence, mainly undertaking administrative and medical duties. Although Sabine Fruhsuck claimed the first women joined J-CON in 1996, the first female JSDF members in ODO were

\(^{616}\) *UNDOF and Japan’s Contribution.*

dispatched to East Timor in 2002. ASDF and MSDF officers have also served in staff roles, as part of a ‘joint’ approach to ODO, the first (MSDF) member being dispatched from February 2003.

The IPCH also provides liaison staff in Tel Aviv and Damascus. These personnel are tasked with civil liaison with Israeli and Syrian authorities to assist the JSDF personnel in their work. The staff selected for these tasks are also usually those who have a significant degree of international experience and good language skills, to complement JSDF personnel who may be more limited on these points.

D Japanese Contribution to Mission

As previously stated, J-CON has performed well in its duties with UNDOF, has operated effectively, and provided high quality logistical, engineering, and other supporting services out of proportion to its size. During the seven month deployment of the 14th contingent (2002) the JSDF transported 3700 people and 900 tonnes of freight, and covered 110,000 km. It has joined integrated team projects, and its skills, capabilities, and diligence have been acknowledged during almost 15 years of deployment. There have been problems, however, with troops reporting major problems with their English ability, explaining that they had to communicate in gestures, and being unable to understand simple comments. Many felt embarrassed at their lack of abilities, and some wished that they had younger personnel with them to make up for their inadequacies. A staff officer in UNDOF in 1997 stated that he felt the staff

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618 Fruhstuck, Sabine, Uneasy Warriors: 90; NHK report, 7pm television news bulletin (14 January 2002).
620 Interview, Harada, Ryuichi.
622 Four GSDF personnel from Kawauchi City report on their return from Middle-East PKO
meetings and such gatherings were difficult for JSDF officers, as they were not proficient in English, and poor compared with other non-native speakers, such as Austrians, while the Canadians could set the agenda through their native English skills. Japanese were often ashamed of their shortcomings, and therefore were not vocal in the first half of their tours, but the feeling was that with time this situation improved, not only through improved English skill, but also increased understanding of UNDOF staff roles. \(^{623}\)

Despite limits on transporting weapons, J-CON has regularly transported UNDOF APC for repairs at the UN facility in Lebanon, involving a 10 hour drive over 250 km. \(^{624}\) There has been no overt comment that Japanese performance and contribution to the mission has been compromised by legal or other restrictions. \(^{625}\) With the JSDF being such a long-term presence, it was felt by many that the other contingents understood the limitations upon the Japanese, and arranged duties to match the (considerable) JSDF capabilities. To a greater degree than in any other mission, the JSDF contingent has been vital to the functioning of the mission. In ONUMOZ there were other military and civilian units capable of covering JSDF duties, but this has not been the case in UNDOF. The UNDOF force commander, Wolfgang Jilke, stated in 2009 that the role of J-CON was invaluable and that if the JSDF were to withdraw the mission would suffer severely as a result. \(^{626}\)

The first UNDOF contingent commander stated in his report upon returning to Japan,
“I have the feeling that we tried hard to continue to provide steady logistical support to middle-east peace. I think that the outcome has been sufficient.”  

It would appear from the later UNDOF commander’s comments that JSDF contributions to the mission have been beyond “sufficient”. A tangible reward was made to five J-CON members invited to participate in the Paris Bastille Day parade of 2007, partly in recognition of services provided to the mission.

E Conclusions

While UNDOF has been a small-scale JSDF ODO, the initial media attention rapidly faded, and has rarely caught the public’s imagination, it has been in many ways the most successful ODO. It has demonstrated JSDF competences in a range of diverse PSO skills, in harsh climates, and provided significant capabilities to the mission that couldn’t otherwise be covered by the small UNDOF budget. The achievement of completing the heavy logistical and engineering work of the contingent with the minimum of incidents is also no small feat. It has maintained cordial relations with Syria and Israel, and helped the development of trust and communications. Perhaps most of all the JSDF have built trust among other contingents, and developed self-confidence. As Ambassador Kunieda Masaki commented:

629 Sato, Masahisa, ‘From the Golan Heights to Iraq: 322.
Japan has sent more than 1000 personnel to UNDOF. Some of them, benefiting from their valuable experience...have subsequently served in peacekeeping missions in other parts of the world. The relevance of Japan’s experience with UNDOF cannot be overstated. When the Japanese Government considers dispatching members of its Self Defense Forces...its experience with UNDOF is invariably brought up. Indeed, UNDOF is Japan’s point of reference in terms of its participation in any UN peacekeeping operation.631

The success of UNDOF has indeed somewhat displaced the notion that UNTAC was the ideal form of UN ODO mission, as UNDOF has provided a long-term, deeply embedded, high-capability alternative model. The mission has also provided a secure environment, yet the de facto security arrangements rather raise questions as to the sustainability and legitimacy of the de jure restrictions placed on JSDF ODO.

5 Conclusion

The progression in JSDF UN peace missions is clear. UNTAC provided the grounding through nation-building PSO tasks, with large unit and significant logistical support. ONUMOZ provided a compact ‘light footprint’ multinational-integrated PSO-support role, with substantial logistical train. UNDOF built upon both experiences, and developed a high-capability engineering and transport PSO role, with a ‘light-footprint’ and ‘light-logistics’ load. During four years, the degree of lessons-learned was (eventually) significant, and Japan was able to conduct effective, high quality, and meaningful operations in diverse environments and missions. Different niche skills were demonstrated in each mission, with only medical services being constant. The JSDF almost accidentally acquired a diverse mission-range capability but not without difficulties.

The common problem of language skills was only partly overcome, with external help (NGO, MoFA, JICA), and reliance upon younger personnel, UNTAC benefiting from its low average age among participants. Conflicts between unity and exclusivity of UN command and national priorities were unresolved, but the UN appeared to acknowledge Japanese legal requirements concerning ‘control’. This national ‘control’ despite ‘real time’ communications, did not equate to ‘real time’ information or decisions, with significant delays in receiving orders and authorisations. There were also significant differences between UN and JSDF ROE requirements which were only resolved by mediation and accommodation at the operational level among professionals (see Chapter Six).

That the JSDF were able to perform professionally within highly restrictive legal and political constraints is all the more remarkable, particularly given the expansion of duties in UNTAC, yet questions remain concerning the efficiency of certain operational points, such as logistical support from Japan, and security issues. The JSDF have relied upon ‘practical interpretations’ of legal and political limitations, particularly regarding their expanded duties in UNTAC, and collective security restrictions in all operations. While such pragmatic flexibility is praiseworthy, it contains the inherent risk of practice outstripping policy. The JSDF have been cautious in their approach but also fortunate to have avoided casualties.

Reliance upon de facto collective security agreements will be one issue examined in non-UN missions, but further mission-variant diversity and its evaluation in such ODO will be the main focus of Chapter Five.

632 Ohta, Kiyohiko, ‘A Public Relations Officer’s Experiences in UNTAC’: 177.
633 Watanabe, Takashi, ‘In the Field of Cambodia’: 158-159.
634 Watanabe, Takashi, ‘In the Field of Cambodia’: 164.
635 Watanabe, Takashi, ‘In the Field of Cambodia’: 161-162.
Chapter 5 ODO Deployments:
Operations Other Than Peacekeeping

Introduction

Japan’s ODO have encompassed five mission variants. The UNPKO of the 1990s have been previously analysed, while anti-terrorism support missions developed in the 21st century. In the 1990s, the JSDF undertook three non-UNPKO ODO variants:

Allied Support (post-Gulf War minesweeping)
Humanitarian Assistance (Jindou shien: Rwanda/Zaire, West Timor)
Disaster Relief (Kinkyuu enjo: Honduras, Turkey)

While the same analytical framework shall be applied to these missions as UNPKO, there are naturally differences. The most significant is of duration, as the shortest UN mission was approximately one year, while the longest non-UNPKO ODO in the 1990s was of approximately six months, but with three months spent in transit to the operational area (Persian Gulf). The activities of maritime minesweeping in particular cannot be easily equated with those of disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, or PSO, and therefore the Allied Support mission shall be briefly analysed, as relevant to evaluating JSDF ODO capabilities. Similarly, the Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance missions can be divided into major and minor. The respective missions to Zaire and Honduras involved significant personnel and the treatment of thousands. By contrast, the Disaster Relief mission to Turkey entailed the delivery of aid-in-kind, while the Humanitarian Assistance mission to West Timor was an ASDF air-shuttle service. The emphasis of the operational analysis shall therefore be placed upon the
larger missions.

One non-UN mission that the JSDF prepared for was the evacuation of Japanese nationals from areas of potential conflict. The Gulf War provided an example of the associated difficulties, and former Ambassador Katakura Kunio has commented on the obstacles to evacuating Japanese nationals from Kuwait and Iraq. A Special Cabinet Order was implemented on 29 January 1991 to use ASDF aircraft for evacuations, but was not utilised and therefore annulled, but it set a precedent for potential ODO without parliamentary legislation. The ASDF thereafter trained with MoFA in March 1995 to prepare for an emergency evacuation from South-East Asia. The first operational attempt was far from successful, as Prime Minister Hashimoto dispatched three ASDF C-130H aircraft to Thailand on 12th July 1997 (Clause 8, Article 100, SDF Law) in anticipation of a potential evacuation of Japanese from Cambodia during civil unrest. However, since the aircraft were dispatched after the unrest had subsided they remained in Bangkok, Cambodia resented the action and refused the ASDF entry. The mission ended in confusion.

The other non-UN missions, however, have been widely seen as successful examples of JSDF ODO. In fact, although of little relevance for the specific duties of the mission itself, the first such ODO conducted by the JSDF provided an example of JSDF capabilities that could be consolidated in UNPKO.

637 Hook, Glenn D., Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan: 89.
1 Allied Support Mission: Persian Gulf

Introduction

As previously outlined, the dispatch of MSDF vessels to the Persian Gulf in April 1991 was seen as the minimum contribution Japan could make under US pressure. Its effectiveness was largely overlooked, despite being the first ODO since the Korean War. Unlike 1950, the minesweeping group was escorted by destroyers and aircraft as it departed, with enormous media coverage. Despite this, many scholars continue to state that the dispatch to Cambodia more than a year later was the first JSDF ODO.640

A Mission Context

The Japanese had been under pressure to contribute forces to Gulf coalition efforts in 1990-1991. Having failed to pass dispatch legislation or reinterpret existing instruments by the spring of 1991, the Japanese government reverted to the option of minesweeping forces. The MSDF Maritime Staff Office had prepared contingency plans following 1987-1988 Gulf dispatch discussions, and as the US had largely delegated minesweeping to the MSDF and its NATO allies, the post-Gulf War effort would be largely provided by these navies, including Germany in its first military dispatch outside the NATO area.641 The MSDF were able to contribute a niche capability and possessed extensive overseas experience due to cooperation with the USN.

The dispatch was authorised under JSDF Law, Article 99 on 24th April, to ensure the safety of the nation’s shipping in international waters, and was made possible by a

641 Woolley, Peter J., Japan’s Navy: 31-32.
subtle yet important shift in the government’s interpretation of the law. Legal revision 
had been cited by Foreign Minister Fujiyama in 1958 as to why JSDF personnel could 
not be deployed overseas for operations (see Chapter Three).

B  JSDF ODO Preparation and Logistics

The MSDF force had been prepared according to MSDF staff plans, and was ready to 
sail within two days of authorisation. The vessels departed on 26th April 1991 on their 
32 day, 13,000 km voyage, consisting of four Hatsushima-class minesweepers, the 
minesweeping support-ship Hayase, and AOE Tokiwa. The transit included visits to the 
Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, before arriving in Dubai on 
27th May, suggesting that there was no particular urgency in assembling the eight-nation 
minesweeping force. The MSDF role also included provision of services and goods, 
such as fuel, food, and water, to allied ships, an understated yet important precedent.

C  JSDF Performance

The MSDF group began its first box-pattern search routine on 5th June 1991, 
discovering its first mine on 19th June. Thereafter the pace quickened, with 16 mines 
disposed of on 1st July, with 34 cleared in total. The missions were completed without 
loss, injury, or damage to the group. The MSDF vessels departed from the Gulf, 
returned via the same route, arriving in Kure on 30th October 1991 to a fanfare.

644 Woolley, Peter J., Japan’s Navy: 31.
D  Japanese Contribution to Mission

The MSDF supported allied forces during their mission, providing medical treatment for a German sailor before transferring him to a US helicopter, refuelling allied vessels and aircraft, as well as visiting Italian and German minesweepers to consult on certain munitions. Glenn D. Hook has suggested that as the MSDF cleared only 34 of approximately 1200 mines, the dispatch “was of greater symbolic importance than the task performed.” 647 While the basic facts are clear, naval minesweeping ‘success’ depends greatly on the assigned sweep-area and chance, and the MSDF also provided mission-enhancing support activities. However, Hook’s emphasis upon the symbolic value is valid.

While not of operational value, the defence diplomacy activities undertaken by the MSDF were well received, during port calls, and professional and social events amongst the minesweeping groups. One interesting episode was a visit to an Iranian naval base, where the MSDF crews were warmly received, and perhaps contributed something to lessening tensions. 648

E  Conclusion

The MSDF provided an example of how, with forward planning, a small but effective force could be dispatched for complex, multinational duties, positively contributing to the overall mission. It was clear that the minesweepers were not the ideal vessels to send on long ocean voyages, but without minesweeping helicopters (being introduced at the time of the dispatch) there was little option. 649 For the Japanese people and

647 Hook, Glenn D., Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan: 90.
government it provided the first tangible evidence that the JSDF was a professional force that could operate effectively under civilian control as a representative in multinational security efforts. While not building a bridge to Japanese UNPKO, the first ODO was an important step towards establishing JSDF credentials as legitimate and effective international actors.

2 Humanitarian Assistance Missions: Rwanda/Zaire and West Timor

A Rwanda/Zaire

Introduction

The dispatch of JSDF personnel to Zaire arose from the horror of genocide that overtook the country in 1994. While Japan, like most countries, had done little to prevent the slaughter, the government was eager to help the estimated two million refugees flooding into the surrounding countries. While money was provided, it was also considered appropriate to capitalise upon the achievements of UNTAC and ONUMOZ (the latter still on-going), and set a dispatch precedent for Humanitarian Assistance duties within the IPCL. The main features of the operation would be the difficulty of dispatch, the need for a rapid establishment of services, the brevity of mission, the unilateral nature outside of UN control, and security concerns for Japanese personnel, given the local security environment. Compared with ONUMOZ, media coverage was extensive, and the government seemed particularly keen to emphasise the ‘non-military’ humanitarian nature of the mission.
a Mission Context

Conflict in Rwanda was driven by ethnic divisions between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi ethnic groups through years of civil strife that had led to civil war. The 1993 Arusha peace process had been signed by the warring parties, and a UN Observer Mission for Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) had been established that year to ease the path to elections in both countries. The victory of the largely Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in the elections led to a period of peace and transition from UNOMUR to UNAMIR, a small Chapter VI UNPKO.

On 6th April 1994, the aircraft carrying the Hutu presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down while approaching the Rwandan capital, Kigali, killing all on board. It is suspected that Hutu extremists carried out the act, as within hours Hutu troops and militia began to murder and detain Tutsis and moderate Hutus in systematic fashion. UNAMIR, under Brig-Gen. Romeo Dallaire, was overwhelmed and under-supported by the UN, with the result that the murders escalated into genocide. Estimates of the casualties are approximately 800,000.650 The slaughter was brought to an end by the military success of the RPF, but this prompted the flight of approximately two million refugees, including Hutu militia forces, into Zaire, Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda, creating the Great Lakes Refugee Crisis, with cholera and other diseases claiming thousands of lives.651

b JSDF ODO Preparation and Logistics

The Japanese government had changed tremendously between the 1992 and 1994. The LDP had been replaced by a coalition of opposition parties under Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro, then Hata Tsutomu, before being displaced by a ‘grand coalition’ of LDP, JSP, and New Party Sakigake under Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi (JSP). While the government had rejected suggestions that it might contribute forces to the UN preventative deployment mission in Macedonia, it approved the dispatch of the JSDF to Goma in Zaire, to support the efforts dealing with the massive refugee crisis that had engulfed eastern Zaire. The Japanese were, unusually, directly requested to lend assistance by Ogata Sadako, UNHCR.

The Japanese government chose to dispatch the JSDF to Goma, Zaire, rather than Rwanda, due to the UNHCR request and as the US, French, Dutch, and even Israeli militaries had chosen Goma as their centre for operations. Interviewees have commented on the desire to be close to the US as a request had been made for USAF logistical assistance, and the French in order to repeat the security ‘cooperation’ of UNTAC. The survey team saw these factors, as much as the refugee arrangements, as vital for selecting Goma, and the position of the GSDF Billeting Area was dictated by both convenience and security, next to the Goma airport runway, protected by wire, and convenient for ASDF supply flights (if noisy). It was also close to Zairean Army barracks, the Goma General Hospital, the UNHCR office, and the Rwandan border (see Appendix Two). Goma had tangible need for assistance, with hundreds of thousands

\[652\] Murayama had strongly protested against the JSDF dispatch to UNTAC. See, Hook, Glenn D., et al, Japan’s International Relations: 382-384.

of refugees, without the same landmine threat and instability of Rwanda. Ishizuka stated in 2002 that Japan, participated in UNPKO through UNAMIR, but this is clearly not the case, as the JSDF, like the Israeli and US militaries remained outside UN command.\footnote{Ishizuka, Katsumi, \textit{Peacekeeping and National Interests: Positive Factors Influencing Potential Contributing States}, Kyoei University Research Report Collection (\textit{Kyoei daigaku kenkyuu ronshuu}) (2002): 11.}

The Japanese mission was dispatched under Cabinet Order 295, following reports of a survey team in August 1994.\footnote{\textit{Handbook for Defense 1999}: 644; ‘Socialist party OKs sending SDF personnel to Rwanda’, \textit{Nikkei Shimbun} (17 August 1994) (http://telecom21.nikkei.co.jp/nt21/service/ENGD021/ENGD241?cid=NDJEDB1994081700101372&madr=TOP&kdt=19940817&dk=5dfc7af4&reservedtp=ENGD025g6iqtov6&frmode=ENG031&hltid=206chh4opa2e0, 10 March 2010); ‘Gov’t mulls beefing up PKO mission to Rwanda’, \textit{Nikkei Shimbun} (1 September 1994) (http://telecom21.nikkei.co.jp/nt21/service/ENGD021/ENGD241?cid=NDJEDB1994090100101045&madr=TOP&kdt=19940901&dk=d444c582&reservedtp=ENGD025g6iqtov6&frmode=ENG031&hltid=206chh4opa2e0, 10 March 2010).} The 290 GSDF personnel were supported by 180 ASDF personnel, with four \textit{C-130H} transport aircraft. The requirements for heavy equipment, such as water purification systems, refrigeration, bathing, and washing equipment, and a full field surgery hospital, as well as 80 vehicles, including dozers, trucks, and Type-82 AFV, entailed commercial airlift provided by an \textit{ad hoc} ‘wet lease’ of \textit{Antonov} aircraft.\footnote{‘Wet leasing’ contracts include crew and fuel.} This was a cause for concern, as Cold War fears persisted and providing landing rights to former Soviet Air Force craft and crews did not come naturally to the ASDF in Hokkaido.\footnote{Interviews: JDA officials, GSDF Lt.-General, ASDF Lt.-Colonel.} The GSDF commander was also concerned as he had been informed that USAF aircraft had been requested by the JDA (and refused by the USAF). The \textit{An-124s} provided seemed ‘jinxed’ by operating problems.\footnote{Kamimoto, Mitsunobu, \textit{Rwanda Refugee Relief Unit: 80 Days in Goma, Zaire (Ruwanda nanmin kyuuuentai Zaiiru, Goma no 80nichi)} (Tokyo: Uchisotoshuppan, 2007): 6.}

Despite the survey team having reported that the situation in Goma was insecure and deteriorating, the recommendation to increase the GSDF component from almost 300 to
350, with additional security personnel was rejected by the Murayama government.\textsuperscript{659}

Also, despite GSDF requests to transport two-three machine guns, a political debate up to cabinet level was conducted for several nights on Japanese television until a decision was made to allow one such weapon, plus a sidearm (76 pistols, 163 rifles) for non-medical personnel.\textsuperscript{660} The spirits of the GSDF Rwanda Refugee Relief Unit (RRU) were hardly lifted by newspaper articles on the murder of two Zairean soldiers prior to dispatch.\textsuperscript{661} Yanai Shunji, has stated that one of the most difficult aspects of pre-deployment preparation was negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) with the Zairean government. Based upon UNPKO experience and JSDF unilateral status in an unstable region, the SoFA was considered vital for security.\textsuperscript{662}

The first ASDF aircraft departed on 16\textsuperscript{th} September 1994, travelling via Thailand, the Maldives, and the Seychelles, for Nairobi, Kenya, where the ASDF and 10 MoFA, JDA, and JICA staff had established a coordinating office, assisted by the Japanese Ambassador, Sato Ginko, and her staff. The coordinating office worked in close cooperation with the British who established a command, control, and communications (C3) cell to coordinate all aid efforts, essential given the poor infrastructure of Zaire and Rwanda, and the numbers of aid aircraft.\textsuperscript{663} From Nairobi, ASDF aircraft flew to Goma International Airport.\textsuperscript{664}

The GSDF RRU advance party with 23 members was dispatched on 21\textsuperscript{st} September (by An-124), followed on 22\textsuperscript{nd} by the ASDF support team and three aircraft, the main RRU following from 30\textsuperscript{th} September. The Unit commander flew commercially via

\textsuperscript{659} ‘Gov't mulls beefing up PKO mission to Rwanda’, Nikkei Shimbun.
\textsuperscript{661} Kamimoto, Mitsunobu, Rwanda Refugee Relief Unit: 9.
\textsuperscript{662} Yanai, Shunji, ‘UN Peace Operations and the Role of Japan’: 79.
\textsuperscript{663} Interviews with two JDA officials who served in Nairobi, 1994.
London and Nairobi, while others flew directly to Nairobi.\textsuperscript{665} They did not deploy as one complete unit, but rather as an advance unit to prepare the Japanese camp, and in three subsequent ‘waves’, the final ‘wave’ members not arriving until 27\textsuperscript{th} October, more than five weeks after first deployment.\textsuperscript{666}

\textit{c JSDF Performance}

41 RRU clinical and surgical staff treated patients on a ‘turn-up’ basis and on transfer from refugee camps, with over 200 support staff. The RRU provided medical care, worked to control infectious diseases by disinfecting facilities and providing supplements and preventative medicine, as well as approximately 70,000 tonnes of filtered water in an exceptional display of Japanese niche capabilities.\textsuperscript{667} However, the GSDF purification plant was supplemented by equipment provided by a Swedish NGO, both in recognition of the RRU’s skills and as a scale-efficiency: the GSDF possessing greater pumping and distribution capabilities.\textsuperscript{668}

\textsuperscript{665} Kamimoto, Mitsunobu, \textit{Rwanda Refugee Relief Unit}: 20.
\textsuperscript{667} \textit{Handbook for Defense 1999}: 656.
\textsuperscript{668} \textit{Japanese Contributions to International Humanitarian Relief Operations, Rwanda: International Relief Cooperation Assignments for Rwandan refugees}, MoFA (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pamph96/03.html, 17 July 2009); Interview, Karl Liefland (April 2001); Kamimoto, Mitsunobu, \textit{Rwanda Refugee Relief Unit}: 84-88.
Table 5.1 RRU Staff

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As during UNTAC, the conditions in tented accommodation in the heat of Zaire were harsh, and staff had to adapt to treating rarely encountered ailments. Specialist advice was sought in Japan, research was conducted in the field into cholera and malaria, and new ways developed to mitigate the risks from HIV. The GSDF also provided basic infrastructure support, through infrastructure maintenance around the refugee camps, and supported the work of the civil Goma hospital, despite having only basic engineering equipment, as well as transport services through their large vehicle fleet.

The ASDF operated a shuttle service between Nairobi and Goma, with some flights into Bukavu south of Goma, for the RRU, UNHCR, and NGO, including evacuating sick staff. It was the first case of such direct cooperation between the JSDF, a UN agency, and NGOs. Between 2nd October and 20th December almost 100 1000 km flights were made, transporting approximately 3,400 passengers (900 NGO) and 510

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669 Kamimoto, Mitsunobu, *Rwanda Refugee Relief Unit*: 16.
670 Kamimoto, Mitsunobu, *Rwanda Refugee Relief Unit*: 144-158.
tonnes of supplies (210 tonnes UNHCR).  

A total of 22 civilian personnel were dispatched to ensure that at least 10 coordination personnel were available, and the relationship between JDA and British staff in Nairobi blossomed, directly leading to the first JDA civilian, a Nairobi veteran, being invited to the Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS) course.

The first ‘wave’ (120) of the RRU departed Zaire on 15\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, the second ‘wave’ (140) on 20\textsuperscript{th} December, and the third on Christmas Day.\textsuperscript{673} Lt.-Colonel Kamimoto Mitsunobu stated that “the efforts of 260 JSDF members when faced with a million refugees can be explained, that we inexperienced people did what we had to do for international cooperation”, indicating how overwhelming many aspects of the mission had been for most RRU members.\textsuperscript{674}

\textbf{d Japanese Contribution to Mission}

The contribution to the mission of refugee relief was undoubtedly successful by its own standards, and of high quality, but it is difficult to gauge either its effectiveness or efficiency. The medical and disease prevention work was of a high level, and the provision of fresh water appears to have been highly effective, but the number of cases treated for the size of the force does not compare well with UNTAC or the later effort in Honduras. The difference is that full surgery was being conducted in Goma, as opposed to minor clinical and dental work elsewhere. The difficulty of assessment contribution is also due to the ‘mission’ being so large and diffuse, being a number of overlapping, simultaneous efforts by national and transnational bodies. The GSDF cooperated with

\textsuperscript{672} Handbook for Defense 1999: 656.
\textsuperscript{673} Kamimoto, Mitsunobu, Rwanda Refugee Relief Unit: 24.
\textsuperscript{674} ‘First of 120 GSDF Rwanda Refugee Relief Unit members strike camp’ (\textit{Dai1jin 120nin ga Goma wo tesshuu, rikuji Ruwanda nanmin kyuuentai}), \textit{Asahi Shimbun} (16 December 1994): 1.
various bodies, including Japanese NGO, most notably through the Association of Medical Doctors of Asia (AMDA). Takahara Takao has stated that opinions of the mission were not altogether flattering:

There was great scepticism about the relevance and effectiveness of sending the SDF to a refugee camp for just three months. There were also anxieties over whether SDF personnel might be put in a situation where the single machine-gun which they brought with them had to be used.\(^{675}\)

One GSDF participant who had previously served in UNTAC admitted that in Cambodia ‘success’ was measured most basically by Japanese personnel not becoming casualties, while in Goma the medical staff determined their success by saving lives. Another, who worked as part of the translation team of the GSDF, found the difference to be greatest in cooperating with the various agencies and NGOs in the immediate vicinity, and their very different notions of security. This was brought home to one UNTAC veteran who saw Zairean soldiers with their legs blown off at the Goma hospital.\(^{676}\)

One incident certainly indicated that JSDF contributions were unlike those of other units. A British aid worker disappeared in the vicinity of the Goma refugee camps, a suspected kidnap victim of Hutu militia. The JDA refused a UNHCR request to search for him, as this was considered beyond the parameters of the JSDF mission.\(^{677}\)


\(^{676}\) ‘Cambodia was ‘Protect’, Goma was ‘Get stuck in’: five people who experienced two PKO’ (*Kanbojiawa ‘mamori’, Gomawa ‘seme’: futatsu no PKO taikenshita 5nin*), *Asahi Shimbun* (30 December 1994): 26.

\(^{677}\) ‘JSDF shall not search for missing Briton: JDA insists it is the principle of service in Zaire’ (*Eikokujin no fumeisha sousaku ni jietai hakensezu: boweichou ga houshin Zairu*), *Asahi Shimbun* (1 December 1994): 34.
the Japanese terms of a successful mission, risking JSDF lives for the sake of such an activity would be neither an effective nor efficient use of resources, but the view from the aid community was somewhat different. The RRU force commander did quietly lend assistance to NGO and UNHCR in their attempts to locate the missing man, in rather similar ways to how the GSDF aided UNTAC electoral workers.\textsuperscript{678} Perhaps with this controversy in mind, a GSDF soldier risked his life to rescue a Zairean who had fallen into a crevice and been badly injured, in what developed into a dramatic if minor incident. His commander was initially worried by physical danger, but later was more concerned with longer-term Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).\textsuperscript{679} The RRU commander was naturally aware of the ROE by which personnel were bound, and became concerned that working in such close proximity to international NGO and UN staff that strict adherence to the ROE could prove dangerously impractical and a potential PR disaster.\textsuperscript{680}

Media coverage was extensive, with many TV and print journalists vying to present images of the GSDF personnel aiding refugees, eating in the canteen, and even bathing in the RRU rotenburo (open-air spa-bath), as well as showing the one AFV with the single machine gun.\textsuperscript{681} This certainly represented a PR achievement for the JDA however, the media mood changed with the deaths of the Chief Correspondents of the Kyodo News Nairobi Office, Fuji TV Cairo office, and three others when their plane crashed between Goma and Nairobi.\textsuperscript{682}

The GSDF had only one French speaker in their entire mission, despite local people

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{678} Kamimoto, Mitsunobu, \textit{Rwanda Refugee Relief Unit}: 209-211.
\bibitem{679} Kamimoto, Mitsunobu, \textit{Rwanda Refugee Relief Unit}: 90-105.
\bibitem{680} Kamimoto, Mitsunobu, \textit{Rwanda Refugee Relief Unit}: 278-279.
\bibitem{681} Kamimoto, Mitsunobu, \textit{Rwanda Refugee Relief Unit}: 212-215.
\bibitem{682} ‘5 dead in plane crash chartered from Nairobi, journalists from Kyodo and Fuji TV covering Goma among the dead’ (\textit{Goma shuzai Šnin tsuirakushi Kyodo, FujiTVkisharanairobi dechaattaaki}, \textit{Asahi Shimbun} (7 December 1994): 1.
\end{thebibliography}
speaking both native languages and French. The force commander rapidly became
aware of how this limited RRU efficiency, translation requiring Japanese to English, to
French, to Swahili, and then reversed, with all the attendant risks of misunderstanding.
In this regard the NGOs complemented the work of the GSDF and compensated for
some of their deficiencies.

There were more fundamental problems with military relief contributions, as these
were intended to be provided through Government Service Packages (GSPs) to the
UNHCR, but in Goma, many GSP standards were ignored. The water purification
provision was conducted by more than a dozen groups, including the JSDF and their
unlikely Swedish NGO partner. As the Overseas Development Institute stated, although
“Considerable additional capacity was obtained...the fact that a number of organisations
were involved...substantially increased the coordination burden upon UNHCR, and
created confusion that may have reduced the effectiveness of the response.” Oxfam’s
water purification service, for example, was considered better suited to local conditions
than the massive US Army system. It was estimated that 100 NGO/GRO operated in
Goma in 1994, producing a highly complex web of organisations, not all with
sympathetic aims, and not all competent. The Care Deutschland aid effort was
particularly noted for being well-resourced yet inefficient and ineffective.

Of even more fundamental concern of mission efficiency and effectiveness is the
blanket critique of the entire relief mission. Dennis C. Jett has illustrated how the

683 Interview, Morioka, Takashi, Head of General Affairs, NDA (June 2001).
684 ‘Services packages: the role of military contingents in emergencies’, *Humanitarian Exchange
687 Maull, Hans W., ‘The Future of UN Peacekeeping and the Roles of Germany and Japan’, in
Morrison, Alex, and Kiras, James, *UN Peace Operations and the Role of Japan*: 49-60, 58;
UNHCR and other bodies that attempted to relieve the plight of refugees in Zaire may have actually exacerbated the effects of the Rwandan conflict, leading in many ways to the conflicts throughout the Great Lakes region that claimed millions of lives in subsequent years. While beyond the consideration of this study, this is an issue that is pertinent to such assistance missions in all environments.

**Conclusion**

The first JSDF Humanitarian Assistance mission was well conducted in a harsh natural and security environment. It does seem, however, to have been dependent upon cooperation, the good services of others, and a degree of luck in having avoided casualties. Goma in 1994 became one of the least secure places on earth, and the deaths from disease and violence were appalling, with the JSDF having only limited influence over either. Indeed, so lightly-armed was the RRU that it is questionable if they could have defended themselves, let alone anyone else, and the commander was all too well aware of the legal limitations on ROE and ‘collective security’.

**B West Timor**

The Indonesian-occupied former-Portuguese province of East Timor selected independence in a referendum on 30th August 1999 following a period of civil unrest. Violent revolt by pro-Jakarta militias resulted in the September 1999 intervention of the multinational INTERFET (International Force for East Timor), and the flight of many residents to West Timor, within Indonesia, to escape the conflict. UNHCR requested

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governments to assist these refugees who were largely without supplies and shelter.\textsuperscript{689}

The Japanese government initially considered a contribution in mid-October 1999, and dispatched a civilian study mission, but issued only a discussion paper with further IPCH studies from 5\textsuperscript{th} November.\textsuperscript{690} UNHCR made a formal assistance request on 12\textsuperscript{th} November, a dispatch plan was formulated by 19\textsuperscript{th} November, and a preparatory group dispatched on 22\textsuperscript{nd} November, with the main force two days later.\textsuperscript{691} 113 ASDF personnel were assigned to Indonesia from 22\textsuperscript{nd} November 1999 to 21\textsuperscript{st} February 2000 airlifting relief supplies from Surabaya, Java, to Kupang, West Timor, using four C-130H and one U-4 aircraft, delivering 400 tonnes of supplies on 47 flights at an average of five flights per week. This was a simple, low-risk logistical support operation well within ASDF capabilities, and yet highly effective and much appreciated. The only weapons carried were two pistols, issued among the 11 (later eight) ASDF personnel based in Kupang, West Timor, while the 102 (later 105) in Surabaya were unarmed.\textsuperscript{692}

Considering the urgent humanitarian requirements and media coverage of the situation it does seem that the government took an inordinate time to order the deployment, particularly considering the speed with which INTERFET and UNHCR deployed.\textsuperscript{693} The mission was effective, and met with the approval of the UNHCR while being uncontroversial within Japan.

\textsuperscript{689} International Peace Cooperation Assignment for East Timorese Displaced Persons, IPCH (http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/result/e_timorese/e_timor05.html, 12 August 2009).
\textsuperscript{691} Handbook for Defense 2002: 690.
\textsuperscript{692} Handbook for Defense 2002: 682.
\textsuperscript{693} ‘Saving East Timor: Nations in the region must take the lead’, The Guardian (3 September 1999): 19.
3 Disaster Relief Missions: Honduras and Turkey

A Honduras

Introduction

The JSDF disaster relief mission to Honduras was highly unusual. It was a distant mission, of very brief duration, with very light equipment, providing a medical service usually associated with Japanese civilian groups, and without the engineering capabilities associated with the GSDF. It was also an even further extension of the range of missions conducted by the ASDF, albeit in the familiar role of providing shuttle services. It was also the first ODO to be completely unarmed and as such raised issues of security. Until the mission to Haiti in 2010, the mission to Honduras was also the most rapid deployment of JSDF units for ODO, and as such deserves close study.

a Mission Context

Hurricane Mitch caused devastation across Central America between 27th October and 1st November 1998, causing the deaths of at least 7000 Hondurans and rendering almost 200,000 homeless. Following a world-wide appeal from the Honduran government for aid on 5th November, MoFA consulted with the Cabinet Office and JDA and made a formal request to the DG-JDA on 9th November to lend assistance.

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b JSDF ODO Preparation and Logistics

The JDA and MoFA that day dispatched a survey team to Honduras and began assembling a unit to be dispatched under the provisions of the 1987 Law Concerning Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams (JDR Law), as amended in 1992.\(^{696}\) The JDR Law provides for international relief from natural and man-made disasters other than those arising from conflict, but is less restrictive than the IPCL, as JSDF or civilian JDRT can be dispatched within 24 hours of a request, and medical teams within 48 hours.\(^{697}\) One reason for this rapid response is that dispatched personnel are not members of the IPCC, or coordinated by the IPCH.\(^{698}\) The survey team reported on 12\(^{th}\) November and on the 13\(^{th}\) DG-JDA Nukaga Fukushiro consulted with MoFA and the PMO, and issued dispatch orders to the JSDF.\(^{699}\)

Various interviewees have commented on the eagerness of the JSDF and JDA to participate in JDR operations. The reasons are not altogether clear, with suggestions that the JSDF didn’t want to be ‘left behind’, while Sato Yuuji of the *Asahi Shimbun* reported an officer stating that the JDA had “a chance to dispense with its shame” for not having conducted a JDR mission in the six years following the legal amendment.\(^{700}\) The Forces were perhaps motivated by 39 civilian JDRT having been dispatched during the preceding decade.\(^{701}\) The day before the order was given for the JSDF dispatch to

\(^{696}\) *Defense of Japan 2002*: 234-235.
\(^{698}\) Interview, Hirano Ryuichi (2009).
\(^{700}\) Sato, Yuuji, ‘Strong Expression of International Aid by the JSDF, First Honduras Dispatch is completed’ (*Kokusai enjo ni tsuyomi hakki jieitai, Honjurasa e shinhaken shuryou*), *Asahi Shimbun* (4 December 1998: Nagoya): 30.
\(^{701}\) *Japan Disaster Relief Team (Kokusai kinkyuu enjotai JDR)*, JICA (http://www.jica.go.jp/jdr/about.html, 11 July 2010).
Honduras, a 16 member JDRT was dispatched to Nicaragua by scheduled JAL flight. The scale of damage in Nicaragua was not as bad, with approximately 30% of the deaths and displaced as in Honduras, but the government’s financial aid was slightly greater than that for Honduras. Perhaps with half the ASDF C-130H force engaged in the support mission for Honduras a parallel JSDF mission in Nicaragua was considered unsustainable.

The six C-130H (five operational, one reserve) departed from Komaki on 13th November 1998 to deploy GSDF equipment and to provide a shuttle service between Honduras and the US. The route flown was via Andersen Air Force Base (AFB) Guam, Bucholz Army Airfield Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, Hickam AFB Hawaii, Travis AFB California, and Kelly/Lackland AFB, Texas (16th November), before departing US airspace for Honduras. The USAF provided full refuelling and services en route, as well as detailed information on the situation in Honduras, while GSDF personnel rendezvoused with the ASDF contingent in Honduras, having arrived on JAL flights from Narita on 15th November. The ASDF flew into Toncontin Airport near the capital Tegucigalpa on 17th November, from where the GSDF offloaded their 20 tonnes of equipment.

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704 International Emergency Assistance Implementation Plan for the Republic of Honduras: 4; Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Team (SDF Units) to Honduras.

c JSDF Performance

The ASDF commander, Colonel Fujikawa, had 105 personnel, including an unarmed security complement.\textsuperscript{706} The ASDF established their shuttle service between Toncontín Airport/Soto Cano airbase and Kelly/Lackland AFB.

By contrast, the GSDF contingent had only 80 personnel (Middle Army), but was able to commence duties from 17\textsuperscript{th} November, aided by 20 MoFA and JICA staff.\textsuperscript{707} These duties were emergency medical assistance, and disease-prevention work through disinfectant spraying, the provision of medicine, and distribution of sanitary supplies, rehearsed by Middle Army for over a year.\textsuperscript{708} The GSDF continued this work for two weeks until 30\textsuperscript{th} November.\textsuperscript{709} The equipment they transported was required to be as light as possible, due to the need for rapid dispatch, precluding sealift, and the limited load-endurance abilities of ASDF aircraft. Only one light truck was dispatched, with two field medical equipment sets, and six disease-prevention spraying sets, as well as medical supplies and communications equipment. As the ASDF unit only transported the minimum amount of their own equipment, for communications and base preparation equipment, such as tents and food, it was a ‘logistics-light’ force, which nonetheless treated huge numbers of patients.\textsuperscript{710}

The GSDF contingent comprised a medical treatment unit (\textit{chiryoutai}), a disease prevention unit (\textit{boueikitai}), and supporting units.\textsuperscript{711} The GSDF medical treatment team

\textsuperscript{706} International Emergency Assistance Implementation Plan for the Republic of Honduras: 12; Sato, Yuuji, ‘Strong Expression of International Aid by the JSDF, First Honduras Dispatch is completed’.
\textsuperscript{707} Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Team (SDF Units) to Honduras; Honduras International Disaster Relief Medical Unit (Honjurasu kokusai kinkyuu iroyou enjotai), GSDF Middle Army (http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/mae/MAkatudou/kokusai/honjyurasu/index.html, 12 August 2010).
\textsuperscript{708} The 1990s, GSDF Middle Army (http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/mae/50univ/MA/50th_90yphoto.html, 12 August 2010).
\textsuperscript{709} Handbook for Defense 1999: 678.
\textsuperscript{711} Sato, Yuuji, ‘Strong Expression of International Aid by the JSDF, First Honduras Dispatch is
had three specialists in internal medicine (*naika*), two in surgery (*gaika*), and one in paediatrics (*shounika*), mainly dealing with airway obstructions, digestive disorders, and other internal maladies, while cuts, fractures, and injuries were less common and less serious.\(^{712}\) It is estimated that approximately 70% of patients treated were women and children with minor external injuries but significant internal illnesses, resulting in the single paediatrician being overloaded with cases.\(^{713}\)

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One way in which the GSDF were able to augment their capabilities and overcome shortages of personnel was by using their advanced communications equipment to cooperate with the JSDF Central Hospital and the GSDF School of Field Medicine. This became known as ‘Tele-medicine’ (*tere-medisu*), with approximately three hours required between referral and receipt of diagnosis and suggestions for treatment based upon video examination.\(^{715}\) The GSDF personnel were also able to rely upon MoFA and JICA staff for translation assistance, as well as local medical students who had been attempting to provide basic assistance to local people with ‘appropriated’ medicines and completed’.\(^{712}\) Shirohama, Tatsuoki, *Knowledge I wish to put in place: 75-77*. *Asahi Shimbun* reported there were four GSDF Internal Medicine specialists in Honduras: ‘JSDF Dispatched to Honduras Disaster, Groping for the Path to Disaster Relief’ (*Saigai Honjurasu haken norikuji, kinkyuu enjo ni aratana michi mo saku*), *Asahi Shimbun* (24 November 1998): 3.

\(^{713}\) Shirohama, Tatsuoki, *Knowledge I wish to put in place: 77*.  
\(^{715}\) Shirohama, Tatsuoki, *Knowledge I wish to put in place: 77*.  

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Evaluating the quality and efficiency of the JSDF contribution to the mission in Honduras is not as difficult as evaluating the effectiveness of the unilateral mission. For such a small force so lightly deployed for such a short time, the numbers of patients treated was certainly impressive. There also seems to have been a genuine appreciation among the local population, despite the fleeting nature of the Japanese involvement.\textsuperscript{717}

Certain operational problems can be identified, however. The lack of vehicles was one, with the single light truck being pressed into service as an ambulance, despite having no medical or siren equipment.\textsuperscript{718} JICA and MoFA staff assisting with the JSDF operations were housed in hotels but had to travel in requisitioned school buses or other vehicles.\textsuperscript{719} There are also suggestions that the security situation was not as calm as the JSDF had expected from MoFA briefings, a situation repeated in other missions, and the JSDF had to rely upon the Honduran military to assist them, despite being busy with their own disaster relief duties.\textsuperscript{720} An \textit{Asahi Shimbun} report stated that armed Honduran troops and unarmed GSDF personnel were conducting combined night-time patrols, only partially denied by MoFA representative Sakaba Mitsuo.\textsuperscript{721}

The mission was completed by 9\textsuperscript{th} December 1998, with JSDF personnel and equipment returning to Japan via the same routes as the original dispatch. Despite their

\textsuperscript{716} Record of Experience in the International Disaster Relief Team, Honduras’ (\textit{Hondurasu kokusai kinkyuu enjotai taikenki}), 	extit{Securitarian} (May 1999): 46-48.
\textsuperscript{717} Interview, Mendez, Ruben, Tsukuba University (12 March 2001).
\textsuperscript{718} Record of Experience in the International Disaster Relief Team, Honduras’, \textit{Securitarian}.
\textsuperscript{719} JSDF Dispatched to Honduras Disaster’, \textit{Asahi Shimbun}.
\textsuperscript{720} Sato, Yuji, ‘Strong Expression of International Aid by the JSDF, First Honduras Dispatch is completed’.
\textsuperscript{721} JSDF Dispatched to Honduras Disaster’, \textit{Asahi Shimbun}.
good work, there were suggestions that by the time the JSDF had arrived the real priority had passed from emergency medical relief to the rebuilding phase, and that construction was the more desirable Japanese asset.\footnote{JSDF Dispatched to Honduras Disaster, Asahi Shimbun.} Without heavy airlift, or the much slower option of sealift, it is difficult to see what more significant contribution the JSDF could have made to the post-disaster recovery efforts.

\textit{Conclusion}

As a demonstration of a capability for rapid deployment in a disaster relief role the Honduras dispatch would appear to have been a successful mission. The former head of the GSDF Research Division has commented on how the mission was wisely kept short, as the effectiveness of such small forces, operating at a high tempo rapidly deteriorates in the operational area, while the natural inclination of force commanders is to stay as long as possible and do as much as possible.\footnote{Interview, Lt.-Gen. Yamaguchi (2007).} The command and conduct of the force were obviously of a high quality, even if the logistical, rather than technical, ability of the ASDF to support such operations with \textit{C-130H} aircraft is questionable. For the JSDF, it seems the most significant lesson of this ODO was to demonstrate a disaster relief mission capability.

\textbf{B Turkey}

A large earthquake struck Turkey on 17\textsuperscript{th} August 1999 near the northern city of Izmit, thought to have killed at least 18,000 people, leaving many more homeless and lacking in basic supplies.\footnote{Marza, Vasile I., \textit{On the Death Toll of the 1999 Izmit (Turkey) Major Earthquake}, European Seismological Commission (2004) (\url{http://www.esc-web.org/papers/potsdam_2004/ss_1_marza.pdf}).} The response of the Japanese government was extremely swift,
dispatching two mixed DRT of Fire, Coastguard, MoFA, and JICA officials scheduled to arrive on 18th August.\textsuperscript{725}

Upon receiving a request from the Turkish government for aid on 3rd September, MoFA requested the JDA to prepare a JDR implementation plan on 10th September.\textsuperscript{726} The MSDF dispatched three ships, the \textit{Oosumi} and the minesweeper support-ship \textit{Bungo} carrying relief supplies and 500 prefabricated accommodation units, with the AOE \textit{Tokiwa} providing force replenishment. The force departed Kobe on 23rd September, arrived off Istanbul on 19th October, departed 23rd October, returning to Japan on 22nd November 1999.\textsuperscript{727}

While the speed and generosity of the Japanese government’s response are not in question, the dispatch of the MSDF may be challenged. For efficiency, a chartered merchant vessel would have been able to travel as fast, as far, and without the need for support vessels. A conventional container ship would also have been more suited to the load than the two MSDF ships, which piled it up on their flight decks, and had difficulty in loading and preventing their damage in transit.\textsuperscript{728} As a defence diplomacy and training exercise it was doubtless effective, being the longest journey by the MSDF, and perhaps replaced scheduled training exercises, but it does not appear to have been an efficient use of resources, no matter how ultimately effective.\textsuperscript{729}

4 Conclusion

The five operations detailed and analysed in this chapter illustrate the degree to which

\textsuperscript{726} Handbook for Defense 2002: 705.
\textsuperscript{729} Defense of Japan 2000: 171.
JSDF ODO developed through the 1990s. The initial ODO to the Persian Gulf was specific and seemingly limited to clearly defined military tasks, but was actually a broader multilateral cooperative exercise than many Japanese realised. The ODO to Zaire and Honduras provide examples of cooperation between the ASDF and GSDF for distant operations with a less specifically military character, aimed at assisting civilians recover from conflict and natural disaster. These missions also entailed a great deal of multilateral cooperation, with other militaries, UNHCR, and NGOs, which brought their own problems as well as learning opportunities. In each case, the Forces had to plan carefully, and also innovate in the operational area, and in each case they proved highly professional and adaptable.

The missions supported by the ASDF have demonstrated how limited is Japan’s airlift capability and how this forces the ODO units to be either as small and light as possible (Honduras) or to rely on mixed Japanese and foreign, including commercial, airlift (Zaire). The former option limits mission capabilities and endurance, while the latter increases reliability and availability concerns, and probably cost. ASDF airlift proved to be a significant bottleneck, despite the best efforts of the ASC. The missions in Zaire and Honduras also illustrate the somewhat tenuous security situations of JSDF units in ODO, and the degree to which they have depended upon the good offices of others and good fortune to prevent them being compromised. The airlift bottleneck, combined with restrictive security capabilities could have led to a significant problem if any mission had been compelled to withdraw from its mission, due to conflict in the operational area. With weak airlift, no ‘extraction force’ to relieve and allow a withdrawal of dispatched forces, and little self-defence capability, the JSDF were placed in potentially highly exposed positions.
While the missions were successful in performing professionally and effectively, there are question marks over some aspects of efficiency and the approaches towards force security. The non-UN ODO of the 1990s did, however, provide invaluable unilateral and multilateral experience in a wide variety of missions which the JSDF were able to build upon in the 21st century.
Chapter 6 Evaluation of Performance

Introduction

In evaluating JSDF ODO in the 1990s, the fundamental question to be answered is “were the JSDF effective international actors?” This is an evaluation of operational performance, yet it is also clear that in wider society operational details are deemed less significant than general assessments of ‘success.’ Such appreciations are common, and should be addressed, but cannot be allowed to deflect attention towards overall assessments of entire missions, beyond JSDF responsibility, and dependent upon a range of institutional, environmental, and psychological factors.

As previously stated, effectiveness, efficiency, and quality have been the focus points for ODO assessment in the target decade and in this chapter shall be analysed in a comparison of missions. The analytical framework of mission context, preparation and logistics, operational performance, and contribution to mission provides the means to assess these three qualities, with comparisons between ODO and the JSDF and other actors.

In evaluating performance, there will also be reference to non-JSDF comparisons. These shall be of forces in the same or similar missions, performing similar roles, except where the variation of roles and missions can aid understanding.

1 Evaluating ‘Success’

What makes for a successful ODO or PKO? It is clear that the answers greatly vary due to the respective positions of mission actors and observers. The UN intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s is widely seen as being a failure, but such images are
dominated by US and US-media perceptions of the operation in which US troops were murdered and humiliated, while elsewhere, other contingents and NGO conducted successful human security work. As noted, Japanese governments have often identified successful ODO as being without incident, demonstrating burden sharing yet avoiding risk, which became one indictment of the JSDF in UNTAC. Performance and ‘success’ in ODO have received mixed coverage of evaluation. There is a body of scholarship focused on this area, and the UN has developed criteria for evaluating performance and success in missions.

A Academic Literature

Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman have evaluated definitions and analyses of success in PKO. They have been highly critical of “largely atheoretical” operational analysis (OA), regarding most efforts as little more than ‘what works’ lists for future practitioners, rather than scientific analysis of causes and variations.730 As such, they have also been critical of OA efforts, such as “units in the United Nations and national armies dedicated to “lessons learned,” as if what occurred in one conflict is automatically portable to others.”731 They have been particularly critical of the neglect of the operational conflict environment, as “scholars have provided little help, distinguishing conflict environments only by the types of participants in the conflict (e.g., civil v. interstate wars) and without regard to a range of other elements.”732

While no doubt valid, these are criticisms of leading scholars almost two decades

beyond the first JSDF ODO. They have been able to use these decades’ OA experiences as the foundations for complex analyses. Institutions in the early 1990s simply did not have the operational experience upon which to build ‘theoretical learning’, nor usually the capabilities, being overburdened with operational imperatives. Diehl’s own assessment of peacekeeping success in 1988 was limited to preventing a renewal of hostilities and facilitating peaceful resolution, illustrating the importance of experience. 733 Diehl and Druckman also focus upon ‘mission success’ rather than ‘actor performance’, with consequently limited application to the evaluation of a military’s effectiveness, efficiency, or quality in operations.

Virginia Page Fortna has attempted to analyse how mission characteristics and policies affect operational effectiveness, utilising a causal theory of peacekeeping to evaluate task-effectiveness, such as the value of engineering tasks to both ‘peacekeepers’ and ‘peacekept’. 734 However, although aiding understanding of certain factors, this analysis remains above the level of individual actors, and is of limited value in evaluating JSDF performance.

Thomas Szayna, Preston Niblack, and William O’Malley, have analysed military PKO-capability based upon seven categories: education, proficiency, discipline, leadership, equipment, language-proficiency, and PKO-training. 735 These are useful for improving training, but are less relevant to the specific study of one military within operations, and some categories have little relevance, such as PKO-training for relief or minesweeping missions. Duane Bratt similarly proposed four measures of “operational

success”: mandate performance, conflict resolution, conflict containment, and limiting casualties.\(^{736}\) Only the first and last would be directly relevant to JSDF ODO, and limiting casualties is a contentious measure of operational performance.

Evaluation of performance leads to assessing ‘professional capacity’, outlined by Samuel P. Huntington as encompassing expertise, responsibility, and ‘corporateness’.\(^{737}\) Huntington contends that military professionals share common skills and sensibilities, yet the diversity of responses in PKO would appear to contradict such assertions. Muthiah Alagappa has contended that Huntington over-emphasises the effects of military professionalism on civilian control and operations.\(^{738}\)

While scholarship has much to offer, no single model is sufficient for this thesis, or preferable to the examples presented in Chapters One and Four, focused directly upon individual force performance in PKO, particularly the work of R.J. O’Brien.\(^{739}\)

B UN Standards

Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, stated that UNPKO in the 1990s had proved to be such great achievements that the UN “seemed to be the panacea for resolving the scourge of internal conflict.”\(^{740}\) As the main PKO management institution, the UN develops guidelines, doctrine, best practice, and evaluation criteria, aided by establishment of the UNDPKO in 1993, and its later


\(^{739}\) O’Brien, R.J., *Police as peacekeepers*.

expansion. The 2008 “Capstone Doctrine” denoted success as maintaining “the basic principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self defense and defense of the mandate.” Also that “operations must also be perceived as legitimate and credible...[with] the need...to promote national and local ownership, in order to contribute to the achievement of a sustainable peace.” 741

One standard constant since the 1970s has been of unified mission command and control, not least for security. The 1980 UN Field Security Handbook stipulated that “with respect to United Nations peacekeeping operations, military and civilian personnel are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and/or Force Commander or Chief of Staff, as applicable.” 742 The UNDPKO 2001 Command and Control policy states that “operational authority over such forces and personnel is...transferred to the United Nations” with “full authority to issue operational directives.” 743 Furthermore, the UNSG reported in 1994 that “it is impermissible for contingent commanders to be instructed by the national authorities to depart from United Nations policies, or to refuse to carry out orders”. 744 Restated in 2003, failure to meet such standards would be considered a mark of degraded performance. This situation has persisted in ODO, and a UNDPKO official stated that “[W]e bend over backwards for Japan” but that “rules are halfway met”, concluding that in practice “reality has to adapt to Japan, and not the other way round.” 745

745 Drifte, Reinhard, Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat: 93.
A further Japanese deviation from UN standards was ROE. The UN position is that “mission-wide ROE...will clarify the different levels of force that can be used in various circumstances...and any authorizations that must be obtained by commanders”\(^{746}\). ROE, as stated in Chapter Three, are complicated by not only significant national and institutional variations, but by differences of definition of what constitute ROE. UN ROE are long, complex, detailed, and flexible tactical outlines (including weapon use), with GSDF senior officers claiming that, by comparison, the JSDF does not possess such ROE.\(^{747}\) UK ROE by contrast are brief, clear, and with direct legal implications.\(^{748}\) They correspond to NATO concepts of ROE as “Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.”\(^{749}\) JSDF rules in the 1990s, despite explanations to SRSG prior to dispatch, remained in breach of UN General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations, for “an attack on any one of its members or subunits engages the right of self-defence of the operation as a whole.”\(^{750}\) Japan has failed to square the circle of its \textit{de jure} legal limitations, despite its \textit{de facto} operational efforts.

The UNDPKO states that after security, “logistics is the area of activity where the military component makes its greatest contribution to peacekeeping operations.”\(^{751}\) Also, that, “units, such as engineer squadrons or companies, transport units, hospitals and evacuation units, aircraft loading and movement control teams, supply units,

\(^{746}\) \textit{United Nations Peacekeeping Operations}: 35.


\(^{750}\) Drifte, Reinhard, \textit{Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat}: 92-93.

maintenance units and others are expected to integrate their work with UN personnel and private contractors to make the best use of resources available to support all components of the mission.”\textsuperscript{752} JSDF contributions are closely linked with these points. The UNDPKO clearly states that expectations of unit performance exceed basic competence, also including integration with similar and dissimilar units and broader mission contribution. In contrast to practice in the 1990s, the 2003 UNDPKO Handbook lists “the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance” as a “civilian task”, with implications for JSDF ODO.\textsuperscript{753}

After the Brahimi Report and Capstone Doctrine, standards for evaluating performance and ‘success’ have naturally changed. Benchmarks were proposed in 2009 to guide and measure unit performance, although with the recognition of the need to “distinguish the core benchmarks for which peacekeepers are responsible from broader targets which reflect wider progress in peace consolidation and rely on the performance of others” while distinguishing between short, medium and long-term targets.\textsuperscript{754} More fundamental, was the perception that “a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation must be informed by the need to support...national capacity. Accordingly, any displacement of national or local capacity should be avoided wherever possible.”\textsuperscript{755} The JSDF in Cambodia did not displace local capacity, while in other missions they complimented capacities, and increasingly integrated into multinational and multi-agency efforts. A further UN innovation was the recognition that “gender mainstreaming is a crucial element of a successful peacekeeping operation with

\textsuperscript{752} Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations: 84.
\textsuperscript{753} Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations: 64.
\textsuperscript{755} United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: 40.
sustainable results” and that “targeted efforts may need to address gender inequalities.”

While UNDPKO has been actively developing mission guidelines, doctrine, and standards, these have not been universal views. Stuart Gordon states that UNDPKO has downplayed the “military encroachment upon humanitarian space”, with OCHA and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) often more critical of military involvement in operations. Andrew Collins has commented how development professionals often regard military relief efforts as counter-productive.

C Wider Recognition

a Domestic

Military dispatches can be driven by significant domestic forces. JSDF ODO were clearly driven by external pressures, with the government being required to mediate legal reform through complex domestic opposition, yet one unintended consequence was the increased support for and acceptance of the Forces, and their ODO roles. Opinion polls conducted in 1993 and 2002 illustrate that while support for JSDF UNPKO increased from 48% to 70%. After UNTAC, there was no significant domestic opposition to JSDF ODO until the Iraq dispatch, largely due to Iraq’s security environment and the operational morality and legality, rather than the principle of JSDF

758 Interview, Collins, Andrew, Director, Disaster and Development Centre, Northumbria University (3 September 2007).
ODO.

Unusually, many JSDF personnel have themselves neglected operational details in the definitions of success, particularly in early missions, with Kawano’s survey of JSDF ODO veterans providing insights into how personnel perceived their own performances, and also how they were perceived by their JSDF peers.\textsuperscript{760}

\textit{b Foreign}

Recognition for peacekeeping efforts is a strong motivator for contributing nations, such recognition can be considered ‘successful’ detached from operational considerations. For some, this recognition can take diffuse forms, such as the building of reputations, or as a \textit{quid pro quo}, such as membership of an institution. Ishizuka Katsumi has illustrated the range of motivations that affected Irish peacekeeping dispatch policies, while concluding that the desire to bolster UN authority outweighed reputation or recognition.\textsuperscript{761} Other nations have often had overtly neo-realist or utilitarian motivations, with Japan’s ODO efforts often linked to the desire for UNSC permanent membership, partly in parallel to German efforts.\textsuperscript{762}

Kabilan Krishnasamy has differentiated between ‘declared’ and ‘actual’ recognition, the former being largely praise while the latter constitutes tangible gain, such as UN appointments, with great disparities between those who provide most funding and most personnel for UNPKO.\textsuperscript{763} Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin contend the Brahimi Report

\begin{footnotes}
\item[762] Drifte, Reinhard, \textit{Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Seat}: 79-82.
\end{footnotes}
supported professionalism divorced from national recognition, but this remains an unrealised goal.764

Japan seems to be particularly sensitive to overseas views and comparisons of its ODO. A 2009 MoFA presentation compared Japanese contributions with those of Germany, China, and Korea, but by all indices Japan’s contribution was small.765 A former Japanese ambassador expressed “84 shock” at Japan’s lowly 84th position in UNPKO national personnel-contribution rankings, while a former GSDF General stated Japan was failing to “equal China” on a 10:1 population ratio.766 It is clear that while the Japanese troop levels of 1998 were slightly higher by 2009, Japan’s ranking had dropped 40 places.767

While troop numbers relatively declined, Japan’s financial contributions were particularly conspicuous, being the second greatest provider throughout the 1990s for the UN peacekeeping budget, and, unlike the US, was a relatively prompt payee, despite being regularly cited as a ‘debtor’ due to Japanese budgetary processes (see Appendix One, Graph 3).768 MoFA contributions to UNPKO increased from $26.8 million in 1990 to $484.1 million by 1994, and Japan’s overall UN assessment from 11.4% in 1989 to 20.57% by 2000.769 Japan also provided great amounts of voluntary contributions to missions, as noted in Chapter Four for UNTAC, in 1993 comprising over 60% of

766 Drifte, Reinhard, Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Seat: 91 (Table 2.3).
Cambodia’s total aid income, and extending to cancellation of foreign debts (with France).\textsuperscript{770} MoFA has been forthright in its assertion that the scale of contributions is evidence for the need for UNSC reform, and has particularly highlighted that Japan’s assessed UNPKO contribution for 2004 (Appendix One, Graph 1) was significantly greater than the combined totals of Britain, France, China, and Russia.\textsuperscript{771}

Binyam Solomon has estimated that in 2003, Bangladeshi UNPKO receipts outweighed contributions by $31.3 million compared to net losses for developed countries.\textsuperscript{772} By 1999, JSDF monthly basic salaries varied from ¥155,600 (trainee, private), to almost ¥500,000 (Major), plus extensive allowances and bonuses, including ODO specific ‘daily allowances’ (teate) (see Table 6.1).\textsuperscript{773} UNPKO disbursements of $1000 per month, per-assessed-person have covered little of the actual cost, and JSDF supporting personnel were not included within UN assessments. In UNDOF, approximately 30% of JSDF personnel are unilateral, ‘non-assessed’. UNPKO reimbursements have been estimated by JSDF personnel as covering approximately one-third of Japan’s costs, while in Finland the estimate is 50%.\textsuperscript{774}

Table 6.1: ODO Daily Allowance (Yen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Monthly (Max.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>480,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>360,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Timor</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the idealist goals of UN-commitment are accepted, then Japan’s ODO in the 1990s are best viewed as a partial success. While appreciated, tangible recognition through numbers and status of appointees is unclear (Akashi and Ogata’s appointments pre-dating ODO). A utilitarian stance on JSDF ODO would ultimately be recognised by the achievement of UNSC permanent membership, but that seems unlikely, and for reasons unrelated to ODO.

While attempting to evaluate success in this manner, there is a natural tendency to view lack of success as failure, but this is not the case. Partial success, in achieving recognition for JSDF ODO provided Japan with both idealist and utilitarian advantages. It was increasingly seen as a loyal UN-member, and a loyal US-ally, with ODO providing evidence of Japan’s liberal, internationalist soft-power, and its willingness to utilise hard-power devices to demonstrate commitment to international security norms, despite the limitations of its domestic security norms. In Hugo Dobson’s terms, it demonstrated both US-Japan bilateralism, and UN-centric liberalism.\(^{775}\)

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2 Evaluation of JSDF ODO: Comparison of Missions

Introduction

The analytical framework utilised in this thesis allows for the comparison of operational elements in UN and non-UN JSDF ODO, as well as with non-JSDF operations. The basic elements of evaluation are the four sections of mission context, preparation and logistics, performance, and contribution to mission, while the basic criteria are effectiveness, efficiency, and quality.

As stated, few studies have evaluated performance in ODO, R.J. O’Brien’s 2001 study being unusual in focusing upon the effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of a single force’s contributions. O’Brien denotes effectiveness in UNPKO as whether the force achieved its objectives, in terms of resources devoted (inputs) to tasks, and in terms of the completed tasks (outputs) resulting in the projected ‘outcomes’ (results). This could be characterised as the JSDF repairing roads, building bridges and supporting polling stations (inputs and outputs), with effectiveness based on whether the local population felt secure using the facilities (outcomes). In Cambodia, they did, and thus the JSDF mission could be termed a ‘success’ in input, output, and outcomes, and thereby effective.

Efficiency in O’Brien’s study is based upon the ratio of inputs to outputs (and by extension, outcomes), with the additional factor of time required to achieve the outputs and outcomes. Continuing the UNTAC example, did the building of bridges involve an inordinate amount of personnel, resources, or time for the given outcome of allowing people to travel to the polling station? To this should also be added resources, primarily

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776 O’Brien, R.J., Police as peacekeepers: 177.
cost. It would seem the GSDF managed to cover many tasks, fairly quickly, with great
effect, and therefore with a degree of efficiency. Furthermore, O’Brien acknowledges
the interplay of efficiency and effectiveness, and how they have an effect upon each
other and are affected by, and affect upon, quality.

Quality is determined by how much the work satisfies the client, and how the force
works beyond minimum client requirements.\textsuperscript{778} For the JSDF, ‘clients’ could include the
UN, local population, host government, and IPCH (the ‘dispatcher’). If force members
were instructed to repair a road, and did so but failed to ensure that road-side ditches
were clear of landmines, then some clients could be dissatisfied, despite the task having
been completed.

Effectiveness, efficiency, and quality shall be evaluated within the analytical
framework, and it is the framework that provides the contextual base by which JSDF
ODO can be most effectively judged, as the context of operations, as Diehl and
Druckman assert, is a vital factor in operational performance.\textsuperscript{779}

\section*{Mission Context}

Comparison of the mission contexts of JSDF ODO provides an insight into the
challenges faced. Those missions with the least stability were undoubtedly the most
challenging, with UNTAC, ONUMOZ, and Zaire all having stability problems, with
socio-political tensions and firearm proliferation. A significant Japanese civilian
presence in Cambodia aided the JSDF, as well as the long-term engagement by the
Japanese government and a large and relatively well-resourced mission. Mozambique
provided a contrast, with minimal Japanese presence and commitment, and a relatively

\textsuperscript{778} O’Brien, R.J., \textit{Police as peacekeepers: 183-184.}
\textsuperscript{779} Diehl, Paul F., and Druckman, Daniel, \textit{Evaluating Peace Operations: 6-10.}
poorly-resourced mission, but the election process was not affected by ‘spoiler’ groups. Zaire had more instability factors, lacking the relative stability that a UN mission provides, with most refugees in insecure and barely sanitary conditions.

UNDOF provided possibly the most stable environment of any JSDF ODO, despite the latent mission dangers. Honduras was the most devastated mission host, but as a stable civil-society posed no significant threats to personnel, and the JSDF were received with genuine warmth by the local people.

B Preparation and Logistics

All JSDF ODO were dispatched following survey missions and consultations with relevant groups, delaying dispatch, this should have provided a sound base upon which to assess needs, requirements and roles, and the security environment. The main factors to assess were pre-dispatch training, dispatch, and logistical support.

The first two UNPKO were affected by a lack of pre-dispatch training, with language training and familiarization with local conditions being the most obvious aspects of compromised operational effectiveness. The compressed periods between decision to dispatch and departure entailed that little more could have been done for the first contingents, but did not explain the general poverty of GSDF language training. The relative lack of training invested in subsequent contingents is more difficult to understand, unless training facilities were unavailable, or authorities considered such training as either unnecessary or distracting from ‘mainstream’ duties. While facilities existed for training, the latter points of reluctance may be valid. The degree to which the UNDOF mission was enhanced by extensive training in languages, background, and technical aspects, and how that training evolved during contingent dispatches, illustrates
what could be achieved.

While units were not provided with mission-specific training, it was provided for JSDF UNTAC MO, in Sweden, and in observer duties during a 1991 study-tour of Cyprus.\textsuperscript{780} Observer duties were considered to be so atypical of JSDF service that such training was essential, although the Swedish suggestion that civilians could be equally effective was not taken up.\textsuperscript{781}

For UNTAC and ONUMOZ, the initially mandated duties were familiar to the JSDF, and there was little need for ‘mission-specific’ technical training, despite being composite units. The technical nature of ONUMOZ is illustrated by the far higher proportion of officers dispatched, compared with other operations.\textsuperscript{782} The only major compromises were the cautious security approach limiting working times and locations. The UNDOF mission tasks were certainly within JSDF capabilities, but the diversity of equipment and duties for such a small group necessitated technical training. The extended duties within UNTAC were mainly of familiar types, such as food and water provision, but the ‘information gathering’ (patrolling) activities were not skills that most personnel had conducted since basic training, nor were they particularly confident in their abilities.

In the non-UN missions, the minesweeping skills of the MSDF were clear, and it is difficult to imagine how these could have been further enhanced. The same could be said of sanitation and medical staff in all missions, apart from the degree to which

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paediatrics and tropical disease specialisation would have been valuable, yet these were scarcely envisaged pre-1992. The Zaire mission should have benefitted from a greater emphasis upon lessons-learned from UNTAC and ONUMOZ, regarding PTSD and malaria treatment. By 1998, however, the Honduras contingent had been training for a year, rehearsing disaster relief roles, and had established a highly innovative ‘telemedicine’ facility to augment their capabilities prior to dispatch.

Rehearsal is a form of training that has seen widespread application becoming more intricate during the Second World War, with life-size replicas of emplacements constructed in the Egyptian desert as an expanded version of ‘sand-box’ training, still used in academies and training centres. PKO centres across the world progress from sandbox to ‘as-real-as-possible’ rehearsals, from checkpoint and command-post exercises, through to conflict reduction with local population exercises. The ICRC conducts similar exercises in unarmed negotiation and conflict resolution with armed groups, while the British Army standardised its pre-dispatch training for Northern Ireland with ROE-specific exercises, including cars approaching checkpoints, and civilian crowds throwing petrol bombs. British forces had ‘Ulster specific’ training grounds constructed in the UK, Germany, and Gibraltar (yet not for UNPKO in the 1990s). The JSDF did not utilize such rehearsal training for ODO until 1997, with the sanitation and medical units for disaster relief, and did not construct model training facilities until the dispatch to Iraq in 2004, with ‘mini-Samawah’ facilities constructed for mission-specific pre-dispatch training. However, UNDOF personnel in the late

784 Interview, Farnoudi, Bijan, ICRC Communications Co-ordinator, Kabul: Tokyo (14 October 2010); author’s experience of pre-dispatch training (1990).
785 NHK, ‘Evidence: 900 days of GSDF Iraq Dispatch’, *Close-up Gendai*.
1990s were rehearsing not only their technical skills but also security drills for response to contingencies, an example of lessons-learned albeit from a low base.

The greatest degree of comprehensive pre-dispatch training was provided for UNDOF, based upon unique mission requirements (multi-tasking with unfamiliar equipment), extended pre-dispatch lead-in period, and long-term mission commitment. This was based upon operational experience in the 1990s and has become the model for JSDF ODO training.

Since 1994, the UN has reported on members’ contributions to the Standby Arrangements for Peacekeeping, based on UNSC request S/PRST/1994/22. By 2000, 87 states had pledged 147,500 personnel to UNPKO deployment “in principle”. The Arrangements assisted the UNDPKO in matching resources to missions, aiding rapid-deployments, but remained an imbalance between pledged infantry and “force multiplier” engineering and logistical units. While “Japan supports the concept of the Standby Arrangements...it is unable to join...under the present legal framework which necessitates thorough scrutiny of legal requirements...before it decides to contribute its personnel to a peace-keeping operation.” Similarly, although PM Hashimoto supported the concept of the UN Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ) in 1996, MoFA subsequently stated that “Japan is not prepared to hold a position in the Headquarters at the moment”.

The quickest dispatch was Honduras, requiring one week from request to arrival, whereas the RRU required six weeks, which constitutes ‘rapid-dispatch’ compared to

787 Progress Report of Secretary-General on Standby Arrangements for Peacekeeping: 2.
UNPKO, delayed due to political mediation requirements. The JSDF contributed to the delay by assembling composite ‘volunteer’ Regional Army units, with only the minesweeping and Honduras dispatches conforming to prepared contingency plans. The danger of contingencies planning not provided for by law was demonstrated by the leaking of MSDF plans for Indonesia relief prior to dispatch in 2005.  

The obvious logistical problems in dispatch were moving personnel and heavy equipment great distances. Sea-lift was barely adequate until 1998, and airlift depended upon chartered, particularly Russian, aircraft, a point of contention. The need for multiple-staging for ASDF flights, even to Cambodia, was a significant handicap, and the JSDF were fortunate in being able to utilise allied base facilities in the Philippines, Kenya, the US, and elsewhere. If rapid reinforcement, evacuation or other contingency needs had arisen the field forces could easily have been compromised. Only UNDOF and the missions to Turkey and West Timor were not affected by these strategic weaknesses.

Logistical support in UNTAC was greatly enhanced by the provision of the MSDF AOE, and it is significant that this was not provided for ONUMOZ nor any other MSDF resource, despite operating in port areas. In UNDOF and UNTAC the JSDF were, or became, providers of logistical support to other contingents, and did not have significant problems in securing or transporting supplies.

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C Performance

As noted, JSDF personnel tended to perform up to or beyond mission expectations in ODO, and their diligence has become a recognisable characteristic of missions. However, there were problems with aspects of performance. These included the ability to travel and work beyond dusk, prohibited in UNTAC and avoided in ONUMOZ, limited by security concerns, accentuated by the legal restrictions, and fear of constitutional infringements. UNMO and ONUMOZ staff officers were limited by their lack of support. ONUMOZ staff officers and the Honduras medical team were severely limited by their lack of transport, inadequate for such a high-intensity mission as Honduras.

In UNTAC, the GSDF repaired roads and bridges at an average rate of one bridge and over 4km of road per week, with 22 tonnes of water and over 2 kiloliters of oil delivered each week from December 1992. This is without the additional duties of food delivery and electoral support, container yard construction, or medical services, illustrating that its capacity was high despite limiting factors. Similar performance indicator figures can be taken from ONUMOZ and UNDOF, with similar results, but the scale of the UNTAC dispatch and the ‘heaviness’ of its engineering work made it exceptional in the 1990s. It was also the only JSDF ODO to experience greatly expanded duties, and in ways that few envisaged. Extended engineering-logistical duties were well within their scope, but patrolling duties, even though moderate by international standards, were a potential hazard that they coped with professionally and without incident.

The medical performance of all JSDF dispatches was impressive. Even the smallest

missions included disproportionately large medical establishments which performed well. The UNTAC dispatch was particularly impressive as the scale of medical service demand was so unexpected, while the Honduras dispatch provided an example of a ‘light force’ treating almost 300 patients a day. The Zaire dispatch treated one-tenth of that daily figure, but was in-country for longer, with problems of sustaining high-intensity operations, and performing complex medical procedures, including major surgery.

D Contribution to Mission

The previous details of performance would suggest that the JSDF contribution to mission was a given, with high quality work diligently conducted. While largely accurate, such a depiction fails to appreciate exactly how contributions succeeded or failed in improving mission performance.

The overall effect JSDF dispatch on each mission is difficult to evaluate, but certain results are clear. The MSDF contributed significantly to the minesweeping operation, and assisted the navies of other countries in their work. The ONUMOZ and UNDOF contingents contributed technical niche skills not readily available to the UN from other members. In UNTAC, the JSDF contributed greatly to mission capabilities, and directly to the electoral process, as well as providing impetus to the rebuilding efforts of Cambodian people. The Honduras and Zaire dispatches are less easily evaluated, not being within allied force structures, although the RRU did contribute to water-purification efforts by cooperating with NGO, and indirectly with other military forces.

Question marks, however, remain, over net contributions, as JSDF personnel have
been dependent upon others for their general security, and in ONUMOZ for most services, the JSDF contingent diverting security resources from other tasks by its escort requirements. UNDOF and UNTAC security dependency did not significantly impose additional daily duties on other contingents. The JSDF have also been reluctant to conduct certain tasks beyond those originally mandated particularly when suggesting association with the ‘PKF’, such as assisting infantry camp construction, transporting foreign troops, or searching for missing personnel. While duties were expanded in UNTAC, this was all the more surprising given the rather inflexible attitude towards ‘extensions’ in other missions.

E Effectiveness

Based upon the four sections of the analytical framework the effectiveness of JSDF ODO can be evaluated in context. As stated, effectiveness is measured by how the force achieved its objectives, by resources devoted (inputs) to tasks, and completed tasks (outputs) resulting in projected outcomes. It might be considered that the more limited the objectives the greater prospects of achieving effectiveness. Although a logical supposition, this does not seem to have necessarily been the result.

The objectives of the JSDF in ONUMOZ were for a second contribution to UNPKO to build upon the success of UNTAC, yet at significantly lower cost and risk. The objectives set for the mission were therefore much more limited, being based upon regular tasks of movement control, within the capabilities of personnel, in designated locations, in relative security. While the ‘inputs’ were indeed limited, with a half-sized ‘company’ little and small budget, it also was a low-profile mission, and the personnel,

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792 O'Brien, R.J., *Police as peacekeepers*: 177.
although avoiding any negative incidents were also unable to make greater contributions to the mission, or to operate independently. By contrast, UNTAC had been expected to provide strong and reliable engineering support for the mission, in a large-scale, high-cost dispatch, but which expanded beyond those minimal standards, providing greater logistical support than envisaged, with electoral-support and even security-enhancement duties. While welcome for the UN, these developments were also highly valued by a Japanese government anxious about security following Japanese casualties in Cambodia. By providing greater ‘inputs’ Japan was able to not only produce more ‘outputs’, but also to have a greater influence upon ‘outcomes’. The ONUMOZ contingent had little influence over mission ‘outcomes’.

The UNDOF contingent combined qualities of both UNTAC and ONUMOZ. It is small-scale and low-cost, but has an immense range of capabilities for its scale, and contributes so many mission capabilities that it is highly valued within the mission and the UN, a welcome non-operational ‘outcome’ for the government. By supporting a stable mission in this way effectiveness is also ensured, as long as the mission remains effective.

The Honduras and Zaire dispatches were set different objectives and their effectiveness must be evaluated accordingly. Being non-UN missions, for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief they were ostensibly pro-idealist missions directly contributing to human security, by the saving of life and prevention of suffering. Even with minimal ‘outcomes’, the objectives would appear to indicate effectiveness (if not efficiency), but the operational results appear to have been highly effective. There were critical comments regarding the timing of the dispatches, and concerning an unsustainable refugee policy in Zaire. Thus ‘time’ factors have a potentially great
variable influence on evaluating effectiveness, for at what stage is the outcome to be assessed? The same criticism could be levelled at UNTAC, for the Japanese contributed to a mission that failed to provide a thoroughly stable democratic Cambodia, as seen in later political crises. For this thesis, however, overall mission success is not an evaluation factor, and time reference shall be taken as immediately adjacent to JSDF ODO.

F Efficiency

Efficiency in O’Brien’s study is based upon the ratio of inputs to outputs (and by extension, outcomes), with the additional factor of time required to achieve outputs and outcomes. As O’Brien states efficiency “occurs when fewer inputs produce the same number of outputs or the same amounts of inputs produces more outputs.” 793 There is also an inevitable relationship between efficiency and effectiveness, and both influence quality.

Evaluating efficiency in military operations is inexact, but certain results can be determined, particularly whether the results (‘outcomes’) of operations match expectations and the resources (‘inputs’) applied. In ODO, the resources are those of personnel, equipment, services, institutional support, and budget. Personnel and equipment are tangible assets, easily counted and compared between missions and countries, but requiring further qualitative evaluation, while other resources are less easily assessed. Budgets should be easily evaluated, but few countries compile and publish detailed figures relating to overseas dispatch. JDA budget allocation figures have been published, but certain missions have been provided with additional funding.

793 O’Brien, R.J., Police as peacekeepers: 87.
particularly in initial stages through individual mission enabling bills, while disaster relief operations have had little information released. Rosalie Arcala Hall contends that, “it is considered taboo in government circles to discuss cost effectiveness of such operations” as they may compare unfavourably with JDR civilian efforts. Few governments provide such operational cost-analysis, with UK efforts, balancing cost-benefits of civilian-military resources, proving an exception.

Budget for ODO is provided by three main sources: extraordinary supplementary budgets, the IPCH, drawing upon budget reserves (yobihi), and the JDA/MOD which initially utilised annual budget allocations, with supplementary budgets requests appended the following year. The IPCH ODO budgets have included dispatch of IPCH staff, and establishment of support and communications offices within operational areas, with JSDF-specific items limited to dispatch of UNMO to PKO training centres, and initial survey team costs. Most JSDF training, mission-specific procurement, transport, logistical support, ODO bonuses, and insurance costs have been met from defence budgets, with adjustments made by MoF for extraordinary expenses.

IPCH ODO expenditure was far less than JDA:

Table 6.2  
IPCH ODO Disbursements (¥million)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission/Year</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>740</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3  
JDA ODO Budgets (¥million)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>7518</td>
<td>2929</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>1000*</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>(74)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>246</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>223</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(72)</td>
<td>(59)</td>
<td>(59)</td>
<td>(72)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (billion)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>4551</td>
<td>4640</td>
<td>4683</td>
<td>4723</td>
<td>4845</td>
<td>4941</td>
<td>4929</td>
<td>4920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (billion)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amounts in parentheses are additional non-operational expenditures on training, tropical medicine research, and preparations.  

The cost for the Zaire/Rwanda dispatch (¥5.7 billion) despite chartered air-lift appears high for a much smaller force than UNTAC, dispatched for only 80 days.  

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The French text is a direct translation of the English text. No additional information was added or removed. The text is formatted as a natural reading representation of the document.
ASDF operation in West Timor was budgeted at ¥8 million which appears surprisingly low.\textsuperscript{799} The Honduras JDR dispatch budget is not available, yet based upon the brevity and scale of the mission it would probably have cost less than UNDOF, yet significantly more than the West Timor mission, with ¥100 million an appropriate estimate. For comparison, the 2001 defence diplomacy budget was six times that for UNDOF.\textsuperscript{800}

While there are hidden costs of JSDF ODO, such as equipment degradation, there are also hidden benefits, such as training value and capability-multiplying effects. Nonetheless, it is clear that the costs of ODO in the 1990s were intrinsically low, but particularly so when considered as below 0.16% of defence budgets. They also did not depend upon an extensive infrastructure of PKO training centres or mission-specific training (prior to UNDOF), being constituted from existing force capabilities. The costs are also significantly smaller than those incurred for government contributions to international missions, Japan’s UNTAC UN-assessed contribution being $240 million with a further $630 million voluntary contribution.\textsuperscript{801} The defence budget costs of UNTAC, by comparison, were less than $100 million.

As stated, the Honduras dispatch was able to treat a great many patients, in an effective manner, and was much appreciated by the local population. Being a ‘light’ dispatch with a small footprint, it could be seen as highly efficient. However, R.A. Hall has contended that the JSDF tends to have “a disproportionate distribution (80%-20% rule) of support versus actual responders in its contingent” and that as they “need to be independently housed and fed, the logistical requirements...makes any kind of

\textsuperscript{799} JSDF Equipment Yearbook 2001: 574.
\textsuperscript{801} ‘Japan’s PKO help to top one bln dollars’, Nikkei Shimbun (22 February 1992)
deployment preparation complex and lengthy.”

This could be seen in the Zaire dispatch, with surgical ‘output’ requiring extensive ‘input’ of supporting personnel and equipment, but the quality of the work performed must be taken into account. Honduras, by contrast, provides an example of how relatively low-cost and rapid dispatch could rapidly result in a large volume ‘output’ of satisfied clients. While of high quality, it was high-intensity, high-volume work that lends itself to efficiency studies.

Context must be appreciated when evaluating the efficiency of the JSDF in UNTAC, for it was a large mission with long and heavy logistical support train, and the most expensive ODO of the 1990s. In terms of time required for ‘outputs’, the late dispatch and construction of Camp Takeo would degrade its efficiency, but the condition of Cambodian infrastructure, and the political environment and degree of mediation required to enable the dispatch entailed a cautious and logistics-heavy approach. Also, the expansion of duties and deterioration in security both impacted upon contingent efficiency in its original tasks. While the scale and speed of the contingent would appear to cast doubt upon its efficiency, it must be wondered what alternatives were available? It is highly unlikely that civilian contractors would have been able or willing to conduct equivalent project work for the cost, or that other nations would have provided equivalent forces. Although the JSDF demonstrated their effectiveness in UNTAC primarily by their engineering ‘outputs’, it was perhaps the non-engineering ‘swing-capabilities’ that clearly demonstrated their efficiency, as high quality flexibility is a prized asset in any operation. The JSDF were able to greatly increase their range of ‘outputs’ with the same degree of ‘inputs’.

The UNDOF contingents clearly possessed the ‘efficiency of flexibility’ through

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extensive multi-tasking and role as core force-multipliers. For minimal ‘inputs’ the mission was able to maximise ‘outputs’ and ‘outcomes’. As with effectiveness, the relatively low-cost, small-scale model of JSDF ONUMOZ contingents does not appear particularly efficient compared with UNDOF. ‘Inputs’ were fixed, as were ‘outputs’, as the unit was lacking in sufficient scale to independently affect its output. The limited ‘input’ in ONUMOZ also affected their working efficiency, as working from tents in tropical conditions, while cheap, was not necessarily efficient.

One limiting factor on flexibility and therefore efficiency was the ability to communicate. Veterans have stated how they relied upon basic phrases and gestures, and while this may have been immediately sufficient it raises questions about overall operational efficiency. Few translators were dispatched, and mission personnel were fortunate that NGO, JICA, and JSDF staff officers were occasionally available to facilitate communications. One lesson would appear to be to increase the proportion of young, enthusiastic members of contingents to help bridge this communication gap.

The most obvious input-output disparity in JSDF ODO has been in the provision of airlift support, with half the ASDF C-130H fleet required to support some missions. The range-payload problems detailed ensured that a large number of aircraft and personnel were utilised for limited end-effect. The shuttle services provided between Thailand and Cambodia, and Honduras and Texas, were effective roles for such aircraft, but the multiple-stages and resources required to transit into theatre suggests a disparity of output to input. Chartered aircraft resources would probably have provided more efficiency, while helicopters would have provided a more flexible aviation resource within Cambodia, and could easily have been transported by ship or air-freighter, as they were, twice, to Pakistan.
G Quality

Quality in ODO is determined by how the force satisfies the client, and how the force is able to work beyond the client’s minimum requirements. ODO ‘clients’ refer to the UN, host governments, the local population, and the Japanese government. Criticisms of UNTAC were mainly due to slow JSDF dispatch, Camp Takeo, and refusal to conduct certain duties, extenuated by a lack of understanding of JSDF operational legal restrictions. However, quality also has reference to the details of effectiveness and efficiency, as clients are impressed by them, but may accept lesser efficiency resulting from greater effectiveness.

Host governments and populations have appreciated Japanese engineering and logistical contributions in UNDOF and UNTAC, as they were tangible tasks performed in public, as were JSDF medical services. Duties conducted far from media and public attention received correspondingly less appreciation. The mission SRSG, however, would have a different view, with the JSDF in ONUMOZ and particularly UNDOF regarded as important force capability-multipliers.

The UN has appreciated Japanese participation in UNPKO, and pressed hard for Japan to join missions in 1992-1993. This appreciation was driven not only by operational considerations for what the JSDF could contribute, but also the political and financial contributions the Japanese government could make to UNPKO. Despite Japanese pressure during UNTAC, this appreciation has largely been enhanced by operational experience.

For the Japanese government, as both client and provider, the most important issues of appreciation and satisfaction have been the avoidance of embarrassments and risks,
and support for Japan’s IPC goals. That no JSDF have been killed or seriously injured in operations conducted in challenging natural and security environments is certainly a matter for great satisfaction, and the problems that arose in Cambodia with the deaths of two Japanese further emphasised the quality of JSDF efforts.

3 Comparative Evaluation of JSDF and non-JSDF ODO

A Non-Japanese Operations

Comparisons between national militaries are natural but not always instructive. Qualitative comparisons are difficult, while quantitative comparisons provide little substantial understanding. For the examination of JSDF ODO, military performance in overseas operations would be the main focus of any comparison, and mainly of a qualitative nature. The most useful comparisons would be of similar forces in the same or similar missions, and also of militaries that emerged as ODO participants during the 1990s, as well as with countries with more extensive operational experience. Operational performance is the obvious area of comparison, but preparation of forces for dispatch is also of obvious value.

a Operational Comparison

UNTAC provides the most obvious operational comparison for JSDF ODO, as it was large and has been the subject of extensive media and academic coverage. The Thai and Chinese engineering battalions conducted similar work to the GSDF, but NIDS researchers have stated that neither was as effective as the GSDF. Trevor Findlay
comments that the Thai battalion were alleged to have opened a (profitable) restaurant in Battambang. 803 The Chinese appeared to have been unlucky in being targeted by KR forces, with two troops killed in May 1993, yet were otherwise unremarkable. Neither force offered the capabilities of the JSDF.

Among other contingents, performance seemed variable, as was morale. Normally dependable peacekeepers (Irish, Australians) withdrew their labour over bonus disparities. 804 Attitudes towards ‘spoilers’ varied, as Pakistani and Bangladeshi contingents strongly defended their bases, Indonesian and Uruguayan troops did not, while the French, and Dutch, were particularly ‘robust’. 805 UNTAC was the first large-scale dispatch of Pakistani forces for 30 years. They demonstrated a keen understanding of PKO roles through community relations, establishing English classes, and a radio service. 806 Kabilan Krishnasamy claims that Pakistani commitment was motivated to, “exert an influence in the international system in competition with India”, a more overtly utilitarian approach than Japan’s comparisons with China, but not explaining operational effectiveness. 807

A contrast of the JSDF with their ‘neighbours’ was the French tendency to operate as if in “a French fiefdom, rather than as part of a multinational operation.” 808 They used force to evict Cambodians from their camp surroundings, in sharp contrast with Japanese attitudes, where small huts were established by locals near the gate selling food and drink, providing an international meeting place. Despite some of these establishments being run by attractive women, their role much more closely resembled

\[\text{footnotes}\]

803 Findlay, Trevor, *Cambodia*: 140.
804 Findlay, Trevor, *Cambodia*: 141.
805 Findlay, Trevor, *Cambodia*: 132-133.
806 Krishnasamy, Kabilan, ‘Pakistan Peacekeeping Experiences’: 110-111.
807 Krishnasamy, Kabilan, ‘Pakistan Peacekeeping Experiences’: 114.
808 Findlay, Trevor, *Cambodia*: 141.
that of the Japanese ‘mama’ bar-owner than the more insidious establishments frequented by many UNTAC personnel.\textsuperscript{809} One incident involved the French shooting in the air to disperse Cambodians ‘stealing’ discarded French plastic water bottles. The GSDF noticed this phenomenon and decided to wash and collect them for distribution to local people.\textsuperscript{810} Kurashina Yuko has suggested that the JSDF, despite having, “failed to increase legitimacy,” through ODO activities, nonetheless, “developed highly constabulary, less masculine, and civilianized identities.”\textsuperscript{811} Although the “failure” could be challenged, Kurashina may have identified a trait that made the GSDF appear weak to some and yet apparently appealed to Cambodians with whom they interacted. Like the Pakistanis, the JSDF arrived in Cambodia with notions of roles and behaviour somewhat at odds to certain contingents.

The JSDF contingent in UNDOF can only be compared with its host logistics battalions from Canada and India. The differences of security considerations has been noted, the Canadians providing dedicated contingency units, while the Indian forces have been non-engineering specialist and relatively ‘hard’ formations ideally configured to support Japanese security. However, it is worth also noting that 30 Canadian troops were replaced by 43 Japanese, with 12-15 of these being funded nationally in a small but significant augmentation of mission resources, particularly considering the multiple-skill capabilities of each JSDF member.

In Zaire, the JSDF unit cooperated closely with allied militaries, and provided the most effective water purification facilities. In both Zaire and Honduras the ODO forces

\textsuperscript{809} Miyajima, Shigeki, \textit{Ah, Magnificent JSDF}: 128-142.
\textsuperscript{811} Kurashina, Yuko, \textit{Peacekeeping Participation and Identity Changes in the Japan Self Defense Forces}: 2.
relied upon host militaries for security assistance, and the cooperation appeared to work successfully. The medical elements of all missions worked closely with their military peers, and Japan certainly contributed to enhancing medical care, through cooperation and the airlifting of serious cases to third countries. Even the MSDF minesweeping involved allied medical assistance. However, a direct comparison between the JSDF RRU and the British dispatch to Rwanda (UNAMIR) provides a less positive impression. The British deployed a month earlier, with far more equipment, and 595 troops, conducted similar medical and water-supply duties, as well as infrastructure repairs and infantry patrols, treating over 125,000 (out-) patients in three months. Quality, effectiveness, and efficiency appear to have been significantly greater than the JSDF, with contingent scale, homogenous-training (5 Airborne Brigade), and logistics important contributory factors, and with an extraction force on stand-by for contingencies.\footnote{812}

Comparing early JSDF ODO with the UK may appear unfair. Germany and Korea more closely resembled Japan, cautiously commencing ODO, albeit with differing results. Korea joined the UN in 1991, and three times (1991-1993) was requested to contribute forces to operations in Somalia, each time the government stating that due to the need for Parliamentary approval dispatch was not possible. The first dispatch came with an engineering ‘Evergreen Unit’ to Somalia, 1993-1994, with another to Angola, 1995-1996.\footnote{813} Kyudok Hong is critical of performance due to slow deployments despite 800 troops being assigned to the UNSAS standby system since 1995, and as civilians have played little operational role. Korea also lacked ODO legislation with operations

\footnote{812}{The United Kingdom’s Role in UN Peacekeeping Operations (London: MoD/FCO, 1995): 18-19.}
conducted on an ad hoc basis.\textsuperscript{814} There was opposition to Korean ODO due to left-wing opposition to supporting US wars, and nationalist feeling that Koreans should focus more on Koreans, north and south.\textsuperscript{815} One significant dispatch was October 1999-October 2003, when over 3500 troops were dispatched to East Timor, with the first infantry ODO since Vietnam.\textsuperscript{816} Korean mission performance appears to have been highly effective, and in East Timor there was the first cooperative effort with the JSDF, the Japanese dispatching two Korean speakers.

Korean operational progress would appear to outstrip Japanese, but Korea had less legal and social restrictions on military overseas dispatch. The case of Germany is closer to that of Japan and illustrates similarities and disparities in the 1990s. Germany dispatched forces to the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East in 1990, despite significant legal and social obstacles, including strong anti-militarist norms (despite conscription). German forces flew aid into northern Iraq and joined MSDF minesweepers in the Gulf in 1991. Hartwig Hummel has illustrated how the German constitution and political environment were less restrictive for overseas deployments than in Japan.\textsuperscript{817}

Thereafter, 150 German military medical personnel were dispatched to Cambodia supporting, but separate from, UNTAC, and provided high quality medical work, despite first media impressions being somewhat negative.\textsuperscript{818} The death of one UNTAC member came during the unhappy German Somalia dispatch, a 1700 force including infantry, prompting opposition that culminated in the 1994 Federal Constitutional Court

\begin{footnotes}
\item[814] Hong, Kyudok, ‘South Korean Experiences in Peacekeeping and Plan for the Future’: 186
\item[815] Hong, Kyudok, ‘South Korean Experiences in Peacekeeping and Plan for the Future’: 174, 182.
\item[816] Hong, Kyudok, ‘South Korean Experiences in Peacekeeping and Plan for the Future’: 177.
\item[818] Von Terzani, Tiziano, ‘UNTAC is the new God’ (Untac ist der neue Gott), Der Spiegel (1 June 1992) (http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13688669.html, 17 August 2008).
\end{footnotes}
ruling. This stated that Article 24 of the German constitution allowed German participation in collective military activities of U.N., CSCE, and NATO, provided that the government gained parliamentary approval.\textsuperscript{819} German ODO rapidly expanded through air-monitoring missions over Bosnia, and from July 1995, 2000 troops with naval and air forces, which conducted air-strikes from August.\textsuperscript{820} This was repeated over Serbia and Kosovo in 1999, with the German Defence Minister stating that “with Tornados the \textit{Bundeswehr} went into combat for the first time” despite significant minority opposition.\textsuperscript{821} By 2005, German forces had engaged in combat with insurgent forces in Afghanistan, sustained casualties, and provided commanders for ISAF and in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{822}

Germany has been held up as an example of what Japan has failed to achieve, but as stated previously, German efforts have been within strong multilateral institutions, with less inherent distrust of German forces. Also, the anti-war and pacifist norms present in German society were somewhat less rigid than those in Japan, partly due to institutional security architecture and ‘NATO-militarisation’ within Germany during the Cold War. The submission to the Constitutional Court provided moral and legal legitimacy that the Japanese government has avoided seeking. While not matching the strategic expeditionary capabilities of Britain and France, Germany’s evolution as a broad-spectrum ODO actor was developed from the flawed operations of the 1990s.

While Korea, Germany, and Japan were embarking on ODO during the 1990s, other

\textsuperscript{820} Hummel, Hartwig, \textit{The PKO-Debate in Japan and Germany in Comparison}: 11.
\textsuperscript{822} Koelbl, Susanne, ‘Germany’s Bundeswehr Steps out on the Global Stage’, \textit{Der Spiegel} (17 June 2005) (http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,360869,00.html, 17 August 2008).
countries were consolidating, withdrawing, or pausing. Canada in the 1990s faced stringent defence spending cuts, and crises of confidence in traditional peacekeeping roles. In Bosnia, traditional PKO doctrine and practice had proved unsuitable and dangerous, while in Somalia Canadian Airborne forces tortured and murdered a Somali boy, leading to battalion disbandment and disgrace. ODO did not meet expectations, and the forces, public, and government were dissatisfied in an example of critically reduced efficiency, effectiveness, and quality. Canada reduced its UNPKO commitments, devoting more resources to NATO-led operations, a path also followed by Dutch forces, where the failure at Srebrenica became an issue of national shame, and of dispute for where responsibility lay. Of veteran peacekeepers, Finland is a high quality, low-budget, relatively low-profile provider of stand-by and operational forces (over 10,000 within UNFICYP) and training facilities (since 1969), within a 2000 person legal ODO-limit, which has also commanded UNPKO.

The JSDF have not assumed command or control duties in ODO. By contrast Britain and Australia have developed niche capabilities for commanding and coordinating multilateral operations (Kenya, 1994, East Timor, 1999). Germany has commanded large-scale operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, and Austria, Finland, and the Philippines have commanded UNDOF. JSDF capabilities in this high-prestige task seem limited by insufficient operational command experience, and a lack of confidence based upon the narrow spectrum of JSDF duties and (possibly) competences.

826 *UN Training Centre*, Peace-keeping Division (Helsinki: Ministry of Defence, 1994); *Finland in Peace-keeping Activities; Interview, Mattila, Satu, Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of Finland, Tokyo* (1 August 2001).
It is clear that basic military and UNPKO competences are not sufficient for effective ODO, but a flexible approach to operations and constant innovation and reference to developing hardware and software is required, with both experienced and ‘new’ peacekeeping nations facing daunting challenges. One of these was suitably preparing forces for ODO.

**b Force Preparation Comparison**

Force preparation for ODO relies upon the development of clear guidelines for personnel, usually through doctrinal publications, providing bases for mission/role-specific training.

Doctrine can be defined as “a framework of principles, practices, and procedures, understanding of which provides a basis for action”, or as a “formal expression of military knowledge and thought …which covers the nature of current and future conflicts…and the methods of engaging in them to achieve success”.

The JSDF entered into peacekeeping without any explicit PKO doctrine or Field Manual. While it is easy to criticize, in this respect Japan was typical with only the most experienced and dedicated of peacekeepers having developed such resources. The countries which devoted resources to PKO training centres were those which developed accompanying doctrines, although there were many countries which later developed doctrines without dedicated centres, such as the UK. In 1973, Michael Harbottle decried the lack of a ‘PKO manual’:

> There is no UN handbook or guide to peacekeeping; the policy of the

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Secretariat has never been to publish evaluations or commentaries based on past experience of peacekeeping operations and missions. It is difficult to see, therefore, how the small member states can acquire the information they seek.

As Richard Connaughton and Rod Thornton have pointed out, British difficulty in developing general and ODO-specific defence doctrine continued throughout the 1990s, as the evolution of doctrine through debate, decision, and execution became trapped by personal and institutional jealousies, and as the debate struggled to keep pace with operational events, although eventually succeeding.

The increasing scale and complexity of operations and the emergence of a new generation of peacekeeping nations necessitated doctrinal innovations by international and national institutions. The *US Army Field Manual FM 100-5, 1993*, was the first US manual to include PKO doctrine, just one page within Chapter 13 “Operations Other Than War” but was significant as the first official indication that ‘PKO’ and OOTW doctrine would be of importance. Japan based much of its ODO preparation upon hearsay from other peacekeepers, such as US forces’ experience in the Sinai Multinational Force.

Aoi Chiyuki has stated that understanding “the doctrinal perspective of peace support operations today is critical for Japan, particularly given that the country is at a crossroads regarding its future involvement in international peace support and

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831 Interviews, GSDF Research Office (July 2007).
reconstruction operations. NATO militaries have the advantage of multilateral institutions able to take advantage of the niche skills and experiences of peacekeeping veteran nations, examples including NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine. However, there is also danger in attempting to adapt doctrine for ODO, as using classic counter-insurgency doctrine, ‘take, hold, develop’, would be inappropriate for most missions. Such ‘cherry picking’ does not produce cohesive doctrine, as the British discovered in Malaya and Northern Ireland, with cogent British PKO-specific doctrine not emerging until frustrations in Bosnia, the British developing doctrine by force of failure.

Development of Japanese doctrine was greatly hampered by the absence of dedicated lessons-learned institutions, until the establishment of the GSDF Research Headquarters in 2001, providing a single-service development resource. The Research Office was not, however, a PKO/ODO training centre, such a facility only established in 2008. Even in 2010 Japan is not associated with the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC), and has no facilities listed. Germany has four institutions listed, Hungary three, and the DPRK one.

In 1997, MoFA stated that:

Proper training is indispensable to ensure a uniform level of personnel quality. The effectiveness and cost of cooperation in training...should be carefully

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832 Aoi, Chiyuki, Peace Support Operations.
836 IAPTC Membership [http://www.iaptc.org/membership.htm, 2 September 2010].
At this stage, it would be useful, in addition to utilizing existing PKO training centers, to urge the establishment of training centers and to send UN training assistance teams to various countries.\textsuperscript{837}

It seems that MoFA’s wishes and defence policy were not quite unified as investment in such training was limited. However, gradually JSDF and JDA/MOD personnel were increasingly encouraged to study with official support, and opportunities for foreign study were increased.\textsuperscript{838} Yamaguchi Noboru has stated that from the late 1990s, JSDF officers were increasingly encouraged to study overseas and at Japanese universities, and to undertake foreign language studies.\textsuperscript{839} However, Japan has no equivalent of a standardized PKO training programme, other than mission-specific training for UNDOF, unlike the Austrian “FIOP” (Forces for International Operations) arrangement of regular and reserve units trained for ODO tasks as a ‘dispatch contingency capability’.\textsuperscript{840} Japan also lacks the degree of integration that provides performance and capability goals for militaries. NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, and the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), have provided doctrinal, educational, and training support to achieve such goals, and have been identified as critical in building capability and PKO performance in large and small militaries.\textsuperscript{841} The GSDF rotation system and ODO as non-primary missions effectively stunted development of training in the 1990s, but the UNDOF and Honduras preparations demonstrate what could have been achieved.

\textsuperscript{837} Current Issues Surrounding UN Peace-keeping Operations and Japanese Perspective.
\textsuperscript{838} Defense of Japan 2003: 265.
While other countries have developed joint practices for ODO, this has been weak in the JSDF, and Japanese progress in 2010 remains limited. The UK, Australia, and Canada have closely integrated forces within ODO as cost-saving and capability-enhancing measures. Less prominent countries have also developed niche capabilities, such as the Argentine Air Force, which with limited resources, and a small, old fleet of C-130s, has dispatched a containerised civilian-military field-hospital for ODO, and was the only hospital operating after the 2010 Haiti earthquake.\footnote{Non-JSDF Factors in Performance} Furthermore, despite limited resources, Argentina added KC-130 tankers as a ‘capability-multiplier’ and was thus able to deploy the hospital to ONUMOZ and other distant operations.\footnote{North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Military Medical Commanding Officer (MMC), Hospital Reubicable, Argentine Air Force (http://www.fuerzaaerea.mil.ar/services/hospital_reubicable.html, 8 September 2010).} The Royal Air Force operates similar joint medical and evacuation assets, British military helicopters have since 1999 operated under a Joint Helicopter Command, and most British military medical personnel are reservists in joint-operational facilities.\footnote{RAF Lyneham: Tactical Medical Wing, RAF (http://wwwraf.mod.uk/raflyneham/aboutus/tacmedwg.cfm, 8 September 2010); Joint Medical Doctrine, Joint Warfare Publication 4-03, MoD (http://ids.nic.in/UK%20Doctrine/UK%20(12).pdf, 8 September 2010).} Japanese concepts of ‘joint operations’ effectively constitute \textit{ad hoc} short-term operational cooperation, with single-service ‘stovepipes’ degrading training and operations and no equivalent of the UK JDCC/DCDC.

## 4 Non-JSDF Factors in Performance

JSDF operational performance was affected by UN administrative mechanisms,
mandates, and the actions of local actors beyond the control of the Japanese government and JSDF. However, institutional support had a significant effect upon ODO performance and should be considered in detail, in addition to the previously stated legal limitations and restrictions.

A Institutional Support

JSDF ODO have been supported by a broad range of institutions, the primary bodies being the PMO, the Cabinet Office and Secretariat, the IPCH, initially within the PMO, later the Cabinet Secretariat, the JDA/MOD, and MoFA.

The IPCH has been the main coordinating office for ODO (other than JDR), dispatching survey teams, compiling reports, and managing dispatches. In UNTAC, some IPCC personnel dealt directly with the PMO, and PMO staff were considered well-connected and helpful, but the IPCH has a greater scale and range of specialists to support ODO.845

The IPCH has greatly expanded, with career and seconded (mainly MoFA) staff, and short-term Project Assistants, usually young researchers with overseas experience. The role of the IPCH includes the provision of goods and services required for ODO, and usually IPCH staff are either attached to the contingent liaison office (Zaire), or with the local Japanese embassy (UNDOF). The work of the IPCH has been important but limited by its role as a coordinating and liaison agency. It is not a command and control body, and has no authority over JSDF personnel, only responsibility for their IPCC service. The diversity of IPCH staff, seen as a weakness in some agencies, appears to be

845 Interviews, Yamazaki, Hiroto (2009); JDA official, Tokyo (July 2008).
an advantage as there are multiple informal lines of communication with ministries and agencies.\textsuperscript{846} It has attempted to interact more with external researchers and JSDF personnel to establish greater ODO analysis capabilities, and to improve contingent mission briefings, partly to make them less MoFA-dependent.\textsuperscript{847}

MoFA provided most of the pre-dispatch information for JSDF ODO, and despite the excellent work of MoFA personnel in host countries, it is the nature of mission briefings that interviewees regularly reiterate, with overly optimistic portrayals of security and local conditions as the main criticism. MoFA briefings assured JSDF UNTAC and Haiti contingents that weapons would not be required, with no significant problems envisaged. Cambodian threats were downplayed, while Haitian police capabilities were emphasised, despite being practically non-operational. Taoka Junji of the Asahi group characterised the government in the wake of UNTAC as “an unsettled JDA and PMO, compared with a lively MoFA.”\textsuperscript{848} The impression is that dispatch itself was the prime MoFA motivating factor, demonstrating international burden sharing. Few bodies have sufficient local knowledge to challenge MoFA statements, but there is a widespread feeling that the Ministry’s agenda is to promote dispatch for a utilitarian agenda almost regardless of actual conditions. MoFA embassy staff, however, have proved highly supportive, not least in UNTAC where Japan, Germany, and veteran UNPKO countries’ missions formed an ‘extended UNSC-P5’ (EP5) that provided invaluable political support.\textsuperscript{849}

The JDA/MOD has limited intelligence capabilities, few personnel overseas, and

\textsuperscript{846} Interview, Hirano, Ryuichi (2009).
\textsuperscript{847} IPCH seminars, Tokyo (2009-2010).
\textsuperscript{848} Taoka, Junji, ‘JDA in Denial, Compared with the Prime Minister’s Office, MoFA’s Cheerfulness’ (Hiteitekina boueichou, sourifukanbu to kurabe, gaimushou no genkinoyosa), Aera (20 December 1993): 13.
\textsuperscript{849} Sanderson, John M., ‘Dabbling in War’: 162.
defence attaché staff restricted in their abilities to directly communicate. This does not indicate that MoFA-JDA/MOD relations are chronically impaired, as they cooperated closely through the Nairobi coordination centre. However, the JDA/MOD has often felt that it has provided ODO forces on false premises, and that preparation of such forces has been consequently compromised.

In addition to public bodies, there have been a number of other groups which have supported JSDF ODO. These include construction and trading companies preparing camps and shipping equipment, airlines transporting personnel, and companies with local knowledge have even been invited to brief contingents on local conditions. NGO have not played a prominent role in supporting ODO, as they have had a minor profile in overseas missions with many staff being opposed to military dispatch. However, the experience of JICA and the JSDF cooperating with NGO in UNTAC, and particularly Zaire, prompted establishment of the ‘Japan Platform’ (tokutei hieirkatsudou houjin) from 2000. Japan Platform is an information and concepts exchange process between NGOs and MoFA, incorporating the JSDF and JDA/MOD, and providing a unique channel for cooperation. In Cambodia, one of the most successful civil projects was ‘Radio UNTAC’, established by MoFA, JICA, and Japanese NGO, broadcasting and distributing thousands of free radios that became the primary Cambodian news and election information source, greatly helping UNTAC achieve its goals and overcome political propaganda. As Trevor Findlay stated, “Voters’ education was critically dependent upon Radio UNTAC.”

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852 Findlay, Trevor, Cambodia: 38.
between ODO, ODA, and NGO has been within Mark Duffield’s characterization of merging development and security issues in the 1990s.853

Japan has a limited voluntary sector, and a small think-tank community, with such bodies as RIPS, the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS), and foundations providing the few institutions for security-related research and discussion. Many universities shunned security studies, and the few Japanese equivalent bodies to RUSI, IISS, or RIIA in the UK that exist, such as RIPS, are small and starved of funds, thus limiting specialist support for JSDF ODO.854

B Legal Issues

The JSDF have conducted ODO within a highly restrictive legal framework. Certain normative peacekeeping tasks were not allowed, certainly until 2001, with restrictive ROE. The IPCL provided limited leeway for the government to interpret and sanction additional duties. There was the additional fear that JSDF actions could be interpreted as being unconstitutional, rather than illegal: being considered as breaching the pacific intent of the constitution and its associated norms. Captain Goto stated that service in UNDOF “made me proud to serve as an SDF officer…but it also put me on my guard as a representative of Japan not to engage in any activity that might bring disgrace to our flag.”855 Watanabe Akio is one of the few specialists to suggest that it might be “high time for Japan to make a more “fruitful” use of its peace constitution for the furtherance of peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacemaking through the UN?”856 Watanabe

854 Royal United Services Institute, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Royal Institute of International Affairs.
856 Matthews, Ron, and Matsuyama, Keisuke (eds.), Japan’s Military Renaissance? (New York: St.
has frequently stated that rather than being a restrictive and inhibitive force, the constitution should be used as a unifying principle in the rejection of war, and thereby promoting pro-active efforts for securing peace, such as JSDF ODO.\textsuperscript{857}

The JSDF were fortunate that the government chose to reinterpret the IPCL and assign additional duties during the UNTAC dispatch, as previous refusals to conduct tasks associated with the PKF had produced negative impressions. However, the refusal to reinterpret the rejection of the right to collective-defence has placed JSDF ODO practice in a precarious position. In each operation in the 1990s, the JSDF were dependent upon other contingents to provide security in the Japanese base area, in ONUMOZ even extending to armed escorts. The JSDF were not permitted to conform to UN practice (mission defence), and yet JSDF commanders were not allowed to manage unit defence until 1998. This double restriction of collective-security and ROE severely compromised security, and, as previously stated, the Forces were fortunate that they were not directly challenged. The danger in the 1990s was that practice was moving ahead of law.

5 After the 1990s: Building Upon Experience

A Continuity and Improvement: 21\textsuperscript{st} Century ODO

From 2002, the largest JSDF ODO was dispatched to East Timor. UNMISET was a highly innovative mission despite repeating much of the UNTAC/UNDOF high-quality engineering and logistics duties. It was the first to include female JSDF members from inception, it included a much bolstered security detachment, 17 personnel for the

\textsuperscript{857} Conversations with Watanabe, Akio (2002-2010).
UNHQ staff, and interpreters to build relations with the Korean engineering contingent. The JSDF trained locals to use engineering vehicles many of which were donated upon withdrawal.\(^\text{858}\) In many ways, UNMISET provided a model for the dispatch to Iraq in 2004.

It also faced unusual challenges. There were anti-Japanese demonstrations in Dili based upon war-legacy issues and NGO activities. Also, despite the excellent record of personal behaviour, amid the imperfections of UNTAC, there were allegations during UNMISET of sexual harassment by JSDF personnel towards local orphans, resulting in strict curfews.\(^\text{859}\) While no official confirmation has been published, and seemingly little evidence, the accusation remains. As previously stated, attitudes to women in the JSDF have been mixed, a 1999 report stated that 18% of JSDF and JDA female personnel had experienced sexual harassment.\(^\text{860}\)

UNMISET, despite these negative aspects, developed into the culmination of JSDF ODO experience. It was the first UNPKO mission launched since the unfreezing of ‘six tasks’ and the 1998 IPCL reform, and the confidence in contingent abilities was obvious, based upon a decade of experience. It also was such a large mission that there was significant recycling of personnel from previous ODO. Among the most striking differences from UNTAC was the attention to security matters, with a company-strength infantry presence actively patrolling the JSDF camp and operational areas. Based upon Japan Platform experience, Japanese NGO and JICA projects were supported, and there was a greater degree of cooperation with other contingents, not least the Koreans.

\(^{858}\) *Defense of Japan 2004*: 288-289.


UNMISET was based upon learning from the ODO practice of the 1990s, and, in modified form, would be taken as the basis for the 2004 Iraq dispatch, with the obvious enhancement of security personnel and armoured vehicles, and concomitant reduction of PSO capacity. This was an evolution of practice, a lessons-learned process of operational performance, but could not be considered an inevitable policy process of escalation of military dispatch.

B New practice:

The experience of the 1990s and new security challenges of the 21st century led to the development of new JSDF ODO practices, such as the GSDF Research Office and Iraq pre-dispatch rehearsal training. UNMISET, the Iraq dispatch, OEF-MIO, and the JSDF joint disaster relief operation in Indonesia in 2005 are examples of development and innovation at the operational end-point.

To complement such developments, from 2002, JSDF officers were dispatched to US Central Command, Tampa, Florida, as Liaison Officers, for OEF-MIO and Iraq related duties. Officers have stated their sense of honour and duty in their role as representatives, and that they have been a little surprised in how well they have bonded with overseas colleagues.\textsuperscript{861} This provides further evidence that JSDF ODO were supportive of and complimentary to US-Japan bilateralism, and broader multilateral cooperation. The GSDF attempted to publicise its ODO roles through its Public Relations Center (Rikujoujieitai kouhou sentaa) from 2002.\textsuperscript{862}

One of the most important innovations was the systematic assessment of JSDF

\textsuperscript{861} Defense of Japan 2004: 281-284.
\textsuperscript{862} ‘The Opening of GSDF Public Relations Centre’ (Rikujoujieitai kouhou sentaa ga oopun), Securitarian 5 (2002): 37-39.
personnel mental health before, during, and after operations. This was a badly neglected field in most militaries, despite PTSD being first diagnosed in 1974 among US Vietnam veterans, and was not accepted by the UK MoD during the Falkland or Gulf Wars. The first UNPKO-specific mental health research was in 1979, based upon Norwegian experience in UNIFIL, and despite slow progress the 1990s brought the issue into the mainstream of training considerations. The reported incidences of PTSD in UNPKO have ranged from 11.4% of US forces in UNOSOM I, to 8% of Canadian troops and 2% of Norwegians in UNROFOR. The UNPROFOR figures cannot be reconciled by single-cause explanations, but PTSD awareness training appears to have proved vital in reducing incidences.

US studies indicated fear of the unknown in UNPKO as a stress elevating factor, while JSDF personnel found pre-UNDOF dispatch training to be highly stressful, with less apparent stress during operations, with a strong link between hurried dispatch and high stress levels. Lars Weisaeth suggests that NATO-PKO produced less anxiety among personnel than UNPKO possibly due to perceptions of NATO as a ‘natural’ leader. Indeed, most studies have found the greatest stress is produced not only by

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proximity to traumatic incidents, but in the perceptions of subjects’ ‘natural roles’: ‘warrior’ perceptions leading to greatest trauma.\textsuperscript{868} The JSDF have been unwittingly well-protected, having relatively ‘soft’ perceptions of their power and ODO roles, well-embedded in human security policies and rhetoric. By contrast, a US Army officer in Bosnia stated, “We were taught how to sneak around these tanks quietly, surprise the enemy and destroy...But here we are supposed to stay out of combat by being obvious. To me, it's like teaching a dog to walk backwards.”\textsuperscript{869}

JSDF ODO missions have not included atrocities as in Rwanda or Bosnia, but Japanese personnel have had to deal with other stress issues. One UNDOF officer described “the ‘weight of the flag’ that hangs heavily on the SDF” as a positive motivating point, yet it is also a potential stress inducer.\textsuperscript{870} Marrack Goulding’s comments regarding GSDF troops appearing “overwhelmed” by their responsibilities (Chapter Four) is related to such stress indument. Studies of UNPROFOR and other UNPKO with significant landmine threats also suggest that these ambient threats elevated stress more than gun and shell-fire, all JSDF UNPKO in the 1990s having taken place in heavily mined areas. Perhaps the nature of JSDF units, as logistical support forces, helped them cope with mission stresses, as Thomas Britt has suggested, as they were able to immediately see the human benefits of their actions.\textsuperscript{871}

The initial measures that may have relieved PTSD among JSDF personnel, such as leave periods (UNTAC) and a range of sporting and cultural events (UNDOF), were not designed for such purposes. The UNMISET dispatch was the first to have a psychiatric

\textsuperscript{868}Shigemura, Jun, and Nomura, Soichiro, ‘Mental health issues of peacekeeping workers’: 488.
\textsuperscript{870}\textit{Defense of Japan 2005}: 305-306.
nurse attached, and for Iraq psychiatric health staff were dispatched, and ‘de-compression’ pre-repatriation leave (two weeks in Kuwait) was instituted to allow personnel to talk through their experiences with their peers before being confronted by families and other ‘uninitiated’. Sawamura has suggested that the Japanese in UNDOF remained very stable, despite stress, most likely due to the pre-dispatch mental health awareness training conducted since 2002.

The by now ‘traditional’ roles of JSDF ODO in the 1990s have continued, with engineering, logistics, water purification, and medical services, but they have been complemented by a range of measures designed to enhance their performance. Investments in hardware, such as APC and ships, are tangible measures but it is investment and innovation in software, such as mental health provision, enhanced language training, and overseas education opportunities that act as more enduring capability-multipliers in JSDF ODO.

Conclusion

As this chapter initially stated, the fundamental question is “were the JSDF effective international actors?” By an examination of the four factors within the analytical framework, and the consequent application of the criteria of efficiency, effectiveness, and quality, this question can be answered.

The JSDF were effective international actors in ODO, considering the constraints of laws, constitution, and socio-political norms within which they operated. The effectiveness of the missions was directly related to the scale of dispatch, the duties

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872 Interviews, GSDF Research Headquarters (July 2007).
assigned, and the restrictions imposed. In UNTAC, the JSDF had the greater scale, range of duties, and the greatest expectation to contribute to human security and the operational range of the mission, while in UNDOF theirs was a specialist niche role with slender resources. The UNTAC contingent performed to the required mission standards, but when requirements changed and further duties were requested, it was able to perform up to the increased standards by having both the scale and loosening of restrictions to allow it to effectively perform its duties. The ONU MOZ contingent could not extend its operational range as its effectiveness was restricted by its scale.

The ability of the UNTAC unit to extend its range of outputs, results of work, without any increase in resources (inputs) increased its efficiency. Likewise, UNDOF and the Honduras dispatch were both compact, light ODO, but were able to demonstrate tremendous efficiency. Overall efficiency was certainly impaired by the strategic abilities of the Forces, particularly the ASDF, with ill-suited resources devoted en masse to operations, but the overall cost-performance of JSDF ODO appears to have been efficient.

The quality of JSDF ODO was clear, as mission clients appeared satisfied. The UN and those working closely with the Forces appreciated the quality of the work completed, and in the larger missions, the local population could not have hoped for much greater provision of services. UNDOF provided an example of a small but highly capable contingent providing such a broad range of capability-enhancing services that its performance has been considered vital to the mission.

It is also clear that in wider society the operations were regarded as successful, regardless of whether government motives are regarded as utilitarian or idealist. The ODO were compared favourably with those of other nations, within the same mission or
elsewhere. UNTAC produced such a variation of actor performance that it was perhaps not surprising that the JSDF efforts were so well received. Other operations have been better balanced, and yet JSDF ODO have been seen as a benchmark of high operational performance, albeit within a relatively narrow range.

JSDF performance degrading issues have been noted, such as strategic lift, language skills, and pre-dispatch preparation. Also, the lack of investment in training centres and doctrine meant that a great deal of responsibility was shifted onto individual contingent commanders, most of whom had little or no overseas experience, and only modest core staffs to assist them. That the training and preparation proceeded smoothly says much for their professionalism and foresight. Civilian support was forthcoming, but briefings and language-study support proved far from satisfactory, and led to efforts by the JSDF and IPCH to develop and enhance their own capacities to complement those of MoFA.

ODO in the 1990s provided not only legal and political precedents for the expansion of operations in the 21st century, but also proved invaluable for operational experience. Without the experience of diverse missions in varied security environments, dealing with actual and imagined restrictions, while conducting PSO activities, the deployments to East Timor, Iraq, and Aceh would have been far more hazardous and much less effective. Dirk Nabers has illustrated how the Japanese government’s response to 9/11 was to emphasize the unity of the international community, and to increasingly place Japanese security within a “single international community with the same values,”874 Shinoda Tomohito illustrates how Prime Minister Koizumi acted with startling alacrity in response to the events of 9/11, but that the “swift response was inspired largely by

lessons Japan had learned during the 1990s.\textsuperscript{875} By 2001, the kudos accruing from demonstrating its capabilities in ODO had also resulted in the JSDF being more trusted and less shackled within ‘civilian control’. The Defense Policy Bureau and the Air, Ground, and Maritime Staff Offices of the JSDF were able to offer professional advice based upon operational experience, and influence the operations selected for dispatch. Without significant further legal reform, constitutional revision, or political mediation, the ODO of the 1990s had produced a settled notion of JSDF performance, professionalism, and effectiveness as an international actor.

\textsuperscript{875} Shinoda, Tomohito, \textit{Koizumi Diplomacy}: 91.
Chapter 7  Conclusion

Introduction

This thesis has focused on Japanese ODO, and whether the JSDF proved themselves to be effective international actors. In order to answer that question, other questions also require addressing, carefully avoiding entanglement in the much broader issues related to overall utility and ‘success’ of each multinational operation, well beyond JSDF control. Other relevant questions are what tasks did the JSDF perform overseas? Were these operations conducted effectively, efficiently, and to high quality standards? What factors contributed to JSDF performance? Were the JSDF immediately able to perform to the required standards, despite their lack of operational experience? Also, how did JSDF ODO performance compare to that of other national militaries? By answering these questions it shall also be possible to provide insight into what JSDF performance in the ODO of the 1990s signified for national security policy, and for alternate academic studies of Japan in international relations. In essence, what were the broader implications of JSDF ODO in the 1990s?

This thesis has thus far provided answers to the initial range of questions while also providing a unique evaluation of JSDF operations in the broader context of evolving Japanese security policy. No other study has provided a comprehensive overview of JSDF operational effectiveness, or considered operational efficiency and quality in systematic terms. As stated in Chapter One, most studies of JSDF ODO have concentrated upon the strategic, multinational levels, or the domestic Japanese socio-political levels. Despite the great controversies of 1990-1992 regarding the advisability or utility of dispatching the JSDF overseas, there was little follow-through
research on those very points, apart from minor single-operation reports. That opponents of dispatch were less than flattering in praising the Forces is perhaps natural, but the systematic failure of the JSDF and JDA to complete post-operational analyses highlighting achievements while learning from short-comings is quite extraordinary. Since the 1990s, the JSDF have failed to adequately publicise their own considerable achievements, and place material in the public domain for researchers. Thereby, this thesis is the first systematic evaluation of JSDF ODO of the 1990s ever undertaken, despite a lack of basic material, and dependent upon extensive meetings with current and former JSDF members and officials. In this, the author was, counter-intuitively, aided by being non-Japanese, thus seen as largely neutral (or ignorant) regarding contentious political issues, and by having British Army experience. The latter point, seemingly irrelevant to a study of the JSDF, proved vitally important. JSDF personnel often seem more comfortable when talking of operational or training issues with people who ‘speak the same language’ and can understand implied criticisms, faint praise, or omissions of comment. This development of relations extended into the broader public and private security-related communities, of officials, think-tanks, and academic societies. This thesis was written without recourse to the as yet restricted ODO ‘dispatch histories’, but would have been quite impossible to complete without the time spent with JSDF, JDA, MOD, IPCH, and MoFA personnel, and the small security-studies academic community.

The following sections shall re-examine the findings of each chapter and evaluate how they answer the primary and secondary research questions, what we can learn from this evaluation, and what implications these findings have had for Japan and the JSDF beyond the subject decade.
1 Effective Actors?

Chapter Two provided the context of the origins of the JSDF and their maturation from limited police-support and ordnance-disposal forces to technically accomplished, highly professional armed forces. They developed, however, within a socio-political environment dominated by anti-militarist norms, yet dependent upon US military guarantees, and struggled to gain legitimacy amidst “two mutually incompatible spheres on Japan’s political scene.” The effects of this context of socio-political incompatibility were to ensure that the Forces were tightly restricted in their roles, communications, and responsibilities as national actors, with a profile so low that it negated public consciousness of their duties and characteristics. Despite their expansion and increasing sophistication during the Cold War, when they became more appreciated by the United States than their own population, the fundamental position of the JSDF changed little. Despite operating complex equipment and training to high standards the greatest priority appeared to be strict civilian control to prevent ‘reversion’ to martial ways, dragging democratic, liberal, pacifist Japan back to Imperial belligerency.

The first ways in which the effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of the Forces was demonstrated was through civil support in domestic disaster relief operations, conducting themselves with discipline and dignity as national actors. Doubts concerning the constitutionality of the Forces continued, but few doubted their professional qualities in such roles, the GSDF alone annually conducting an average of 380 such

With time, increased realisation of Japan’s security relationships and problems, and the increased codification of state-pacifism as restraints upon militarisation, through GDP-budget limit, arms export ban, and policies for peaceful use of space and nuclear power, the JSDF came to be viewed in less negative terms. They constituted the most tangible and effective contribution to Japan’s other prevalent norm, national security attached to the axis of the US alliance, which uncomfortably coexisted with the pacifist norm. JSDF capabilities as effective international actors within the supposedly crucial international commitment to the United Nations would be shaped by these formative experiences, in both negative and positive ways. Their opportunity to perform in UN missions would require global security transformation and consequent internal and external pressure upon Japan’s security norms.

Quite apart from the significant domestic socio-political obstacles to dispatching the JSDF overseas, there were also significant questions regarding core capabilities. The Forces had no operational experience other than emergency relief, rescue tasks, and ordnance disposal. They had no significant joint-working experience, in contrast to combined-working experience with US forces, and no joint command structure, in fact, little command structure at all, with civilian control resulting in extensive bureaucratisation of the JSDF and JDA. Intelligence resources were limited, few force members possessed language skills, and those with overseas experience were concentrated in the MSDF, while the GSDF would conduct most operations. The ASDF and MSDF had slender resources by which to deploy and support the GSDF due to concentration upon ‘defensive defence’ and cutting-edge combat forces, and the Forces

877 GSDF (Rikujoujietai), GSDF Public Relations Centre (2008) (http://giken.org/Documents%E9%99%B8%E4%B8%8A%E8%87%AA%E8%A1%9B%E9%9A%8A.pdf, 17 September 2010): 7.
were under-strength, with a small civil support staff, and no usable reserve. It is clear that these capability gaps in ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ would affect the ability of the JSDF to undertake ODO.

There is no sense in which JSDF ODO in the 1990s were a natural progression from previous duties or relationships, and it would take a dislocation of Japan’s stable security environment during the Gulf War for overseas dispatch to be given serious consideration. The faults of the Forces were largely overcome during these first operations in the Persian Gulf and Cambodia but not eradicated, as became more obvious in later ODO. It was clear in the decade, however, that limited resources were being devoted to ODO capabilities in both ‘software’ and ‘hardware’ support. Capability gaps in air and sea-lift were gradually filled, if at all, and doctrine and intelligence were neglected well into the 21st century despite ODO providing the only operational arena in which the JSDF could act as Japan’s primary international actors.

From 2007, steps were taken to improve training in the skills most likely to be utilised in ODO, including language skills, and the ability to at least interpret doctrine in operational situations, if not actually to develop doctrine. The need for such ODO-focused training and doctrine was all the more urgent due to the political, legal, and constitutional restrictions within which the JSDF have operated, requiring flexible and imaginative responses to stressful operational situations.

Japan in the 1990s was a ‘narrow spectrum’ actor, able and willing to undertake only a limited range of the operations characterized as UNPKO and OOTW, but it was equally a multi-role actor. The JSDF conducted PSO functions within UNPKO, and also allied support, disaster relief, and humanitarian operations in distant regions with little supporting infrastructure or narrow national interest. While Japanese IPC and human
security policies provided the context for ODO, the dispatches were initially directed by stronger influences of alliance pressure and cooperation. UN commitments provided both an apt forum for and a convenient means by which to advertise the liberal-internationalist character of such policies, despite being undertaken primarily to placate criticism and strengthen the military and political alliance with the US. As Chris Hughes states “Japan often appears to be borrowing the language and concomitant legitimacy of UN PKO, and precedents for dispatch of the JSDF established under UN mandates, as a means to push forward incrementally enhanced US-Japan alliance cooperation.”

The crisis of confidence triggered by the Gulf War provided the first major challenge to Japan’s Cold War security norms. With little strategic direction, mediation between competing interests and aims became the political imperative as external drivers, primarily US pressure to assume part of the ‘international burden’, gradually began to outweigh the domestic resistance provided by latent pacifism and natural caution. UNPKO provided the requisite balance of ‘hard-power’ commitment to international security, and ‘soft-power’ liberal appeal to a population with deep pacifist sentiment. The operations, roles, and designated representative actors were the result of this extended mediation. The ‘harder’ aspects of UNPKO were softened by the inclusion of police and civilians within the IPCC, the restricted PSO nature of JSDF ODO, the combination with international relief and support duties, and potential parliamentary veto. The image of the UN in Japan, the seemingly central role it occupied in policy, and the emergence of UNPKO as a liberal-international security cooperation norm

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878 Hughes, Christopher W., Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power: 126.
eased the mediation process between the previously fixed lines of Cold War ideology. Despite stone-wall opposition up to 1992, after UNTAC, resistance to JSDF ODO ebbed, but the range of policy and operational issues requiring mediation transformed rather than vanished.

The 1990s, often described as a ‘lost decade’, were years of great political opportunities. Coalition administrations exchanged power affecting ODO mediation but with little of the rancour of 1990-1992. As a highly restrictive ODO framework was in place, with the ‘five conditions’, six ‘frozen’ duties, and permitted activities, the issues at stake were of relative scale, degree, and cost rather than fundamental principle. UNPKO were dispatched by different governments, but as with UNEF, the first dispatch, UNTAC, set the general principles for those that followed, with differences of scale and timing requiring relatively mild mediation.

These highly restrictive practices, management, and leadership of Japanese ‘civilian control’ appeared unusual to other peacekeeping nations, but had become common practice since the post-war period. Operational and alliance requirements during the Cold War had slightly loosened the control restrictions, but JSDF performance in ODO would provide for a greater and more rapid transformation of the civil-military relationship. The perceptions of success and responsibility of the JSDF in overseas operations, and a lessening of domestic political polarization, allowed for the incremental relaxation of restrictions, expansion of duties, and professionalization of operational command. However, it was and remains a cause for concern that legal conditions were exceeded by operational practice. The military and political reliance upon collective security within operations, juxtaposed with the political rejection of the right of collective security, placed JSDF ODO in a potentially hazardous position,
where they remain. This is a powerful example of the legacy of pacifist norms overriding operational and legal concerns.

The primary influences over security issues in the 1990s remained Article 9 and the Japan-US alliance. Most Japanese respected the principles and ideals of Article 9, but also desired the security provided by the US alliance. Rather than ‘hedging’ or ‘balancing’ this seeming contradiction constituted a natural desire to retain core principles through processes of political mediation to also consolidate security. JSDF ODO was initially embarked upon as a mediation device between the demands of state pacifism and military alliance.

The demands of state pacifism and the mediation process for the IPCL entailed that JSDF ODO were defined by their limitations, and it is these that many observers have focused upon. This thesis has focused upon what was achieved within those limitations, and how operational practice developed through experience, the main subject of Chapters Four and Five. The three UNPKO undertaken have not usually been analysed as very different missions, even within JSDF studies, but the diversity within a short time-frame is striking.

The prototype, UNTAC, was a nation-building, PSO mission, with large contingent and significant logistical support, in an area of significant Japanese interest with civilian support present. ONUMOZ provided a compact ‘light footprint’ multinational-integrated PSO-support role, with substantial logistical train, with limited civilian support, in an area of limited Japanese interest. UNDOF built upon both experiences, developing as a high-capability engineering and transport PSO role, with a ‘light-footprint’ and ‘light-external-logistics’ load, in an area of great strategic concern, but little immediate Japanese interest. These three operations demanded diverse skills
and resources, even though all were PSO within UNPKO. The later missions particularly demanded a degree of intimate, daily multinational working that the JSDF had not experienced prior to the 1990s. The lessons-learned capability gaps were obvious, particularly between UNTAC and ONUMOZ, but these were later remedied, and the Forces were able to conduct effective and meaningful operations in diverse environments, with only medical services as a constant capability. The JSDF, seemingly by chance and driven by political imperatives, began to acquire diverse (if narrow) multi-national mission capabilities.

The achievements accomplished within highly restrictive legal and political constraints were commendable, and the expansion of duties for the UNTAC contingent, with little prior notice or training, provided an apt demonstration of the latent professional capabilities of the JSDF. The Forces were able to rapidly respond to political directives, adapt to new roles and an evolving security environment, provide a great range of operational capabilities to the UN mission, and contribute to the human security of the local people at a time of significant stress. This was achieved without any force increase or significant adjustment of resources. The extremely small numbers of personnel in ONUMOZ contributed to the mission with niche capabilities, acting as ‘capability multipliers’ at potentially problematic logistical ‘choke points’, contributing to the UN mission out of proportion to their numbers or media profile. The UNDOF contingents have provided a broader ranging niche ‘capability multiplier’ role, providing an extensive range of logistical support services than in either UNTAC or ONUMOZ, and integrated closely within the UN mission to a far greater degree than in UNTAC.

Despite the obvious achievements questions remain concerning the efficiency of
certain operational points, such as logistical support, and security issues. The logistical ‘bottlenecks’ of sea and particularly air-lift became obvious capability limiting factors, partly ameliorated by MSDF and ASDF efforts, by commercial means, and by limiting the ‘footprint’ and ‘load’ of dispatches. The JSDF have relied upon ‘practical interpretations’ of legal and political limitations, particularly regarding their expanded duties and five conditions in UNTAC, and collective security restrictions in all operations. While operational pragmatism is praiseworthy, it risks practice outpacing policy, and this has contributed to GSDF reluctance to contribute large units to UNPKO since the 1990s without a clear exposition of roles and security standards in a ‘general law’ of dispatch. In UNPKO, the Japanese have been generally cautious regarding missions selected, tasks undertaken, and rules imposed upon personnel. The disregard of certain operational standards for security, such as the scale of ONUMOZ forces, divided between locations, travelling on insecure roads, and incapable of providing even immediate self-defence, was based upon a political imperative, to rapidly participate in a second UNPKO, and an interpretation of IPCL personnel limits. The optimistic briefings provided prior to ONUMOZ dispatch were evidently adhered to in various parts of the Japanese government. However, the GSDF also demonstrated a relaxed attitude to security at Camp Takeo, despite the worsening security conditions and stringent limitations upon working hours and evening travel, which seemed to indicate either a disbelief in the dangers, or an implicit reliance upon the French infantry to provide for Japanese security.

The GSDF were both fortunate and judicious in avoiding casualties in UNTAC. The Japanese UNV and CIVPOL were neither as fortunate, nor as able to judiciously avoid the dangers of certain locations, and such hazardous duties as establishing voting
stations or patrolling. Their roles dictated their exposure and relative isolation. The JSDF were far more easily able to benefit from their association with non-Japanese contingents and from their role as the most prominent Japanese international representatives in Cambodia. In Mozambique, the degree of reliance on non-Japanese contingents was almost complete, and this can be seen as both a positive aspect, to be fully integrated into the UN-multi-national mission, and as a negative consequence of neglect of operational requirements in order to satisfy political desires and legal requirements. UNDOF, as in other matters, appears to have distilled experience into a well-balanced synthesis of reliance and independence, as distinct Japanese units, operating closely within the multi-national mission. In security terms, the JSDF UNDOF contingent is much ‘harder’ and more unified than in ONUMOZ, while relying upon a greater number of more concentrated non-Japanese security providers.

Reliance upon *de facto* collective security agreements was also an issue examined in non-UN missions, but further mission-variant diversity and the evaluation of effectiveness, efficiency, and quality in such ODO was the main substance of Chapter Five, with reiteration of previous logistical concerns. The initial MSDF ODO while seemingly limited to narrow military tasks encompassed a broad range of multilateral cooperative tasks, from minesweeping to defence diplomacy and regional security building. The Zaire and Honduras missions provided examples of cooperation between the ASDF and GSDF for distant operations with a largely non-military operational focus for relief missions. These missions also involved broader and deeper multilateral and multi-agency cooperation with militaries, UN agencies, and NGOs. Despite some interface during UNTAC, these were the first significant cases of the JSDF cooperating with such non-military groups. The experience was neither as daunting as might be
imagined from the lack of operational experience, nor as discomforting as the experience of many other militaries when faced with multi-agency partners in the 1990s. In this, the JSDF were aided by their several decades experience in domestic civilian support tasks, and possibly by their perceptions of identity as less ‘elite warriors’ than specialised public servants, as previously illustrated by Kurashina. Also, the largely medical nature of the missions provided a professional level of communication not always easily achieved by personnel with more military-specific specialisations.

These missions also reiterated the limitations of Japan’s airlift capability and how the ODO units were required to be configured as ‘lightly’ as possible, as in Honduras, or to rely on commercial resources. Either option had its limitations, but the ASDF did not seek to provide a more innovative solution, such as the procurement or leasing of airlift resources, or seeking cooperation with allies, other than the US. ASDF airlift continued to represent a ‘capability reducing’ factor, despite the best efforts of the ASC. The missions in Zaire and Honduras also illustrated the reliance upon host nations to provide security for the JSDF in non-UN ODO, highlighting the importance of SOFA and good communications. Airlift problems, combined with limited on-site security capabilities, and the lack of an ‘extraction force’ to facilitate a potential withdrawal of dispatched forces, could have placed JSDF personnel in positions of greater risk than in any UNPKO.

The non-UN operations did, however, provide invaluable unilateral and multilateral experience in a range of missions the JSDF could perform effectively and efficiently, to high standards. These would be integrated into joint operations in Indonesia in 2005, and into UNPKO practice with the dispatch to Haiti in 2010. The non-UN missions of

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879 Mulloy, Garren, ‘Swords and Ploughshares’.
the 1990s provided an alternative and complementary base of operational performance in which the JSDF were able to demonstrate proficiency and build upon the experience into the next century, not least in an understanding of the operational imperative for joint planning.

By examining the four factors of the analytical framework, and applying the criteria of efficiency, effectiveness, and quality, the evaluation of JSDF operational performance was finalised in Chapter Six. The JSDF proved to be highly effective international actors in ODO, within their operational constraints. The effectiveness of the missions was directly related to the scale of dispatch, the duties assigned, and the restrictions imposed. In UNTAC and ONUMOZ, the former mission had the greater scale and range of duties, and the greatest expectation, to contribute to the human security of the country and operational range of the mission, while the latter dispatch was a specialist niche role with slender resources. The UNTAC contingent was able to perform up to the required standards for the mission, but when requirements changed and further duties were requested, the large force was able to complete its tasks to the revised standards due to its scale and loosening of restrictions. The ONUMOZ mission could not extend its operational range, as it lacked scale, and also could not provide unilateral security to complete its core tasks. As such, its effectiveness was restrained. The UNTAC contingent, conversely, could be regarded as having performed more effectively when the security environment worsened, as the range of tasks it successfully completed was expanded.

Furthermore, the ability of the UNTAC unit to extend its range of ‘outputs’, without a concomitant increase in resources (‘inputs’) significantly increased its efficiency. The other missions, with more stable task assignments, cannot claim such a degree of
‘efficiency escalation’, with the possible exception of the use of ‘telemedicine’ in Honduras to greatly expand its level of expertise beyond that possessed by members of the contingent. The UNDOF and Honduras dispatches were both compact and relatively ‘logistics-light’, but were able to demonstrate tremendous efficiency by the sheer number of cases or roles covered by limited personnel. Overall efficiency was certainly impaired by the strategic capabilities of the Forces, particularly the ASDF application of large numbers of ill-suited aircraft resources requiring a large infrastructure outside the operational area, and highly dependent upon foreign basing and refuelling facilities. In ONUMOZ, the ASDF detachment significantly outnumbered the operational contingent. Despite such operational-logistical imbalances, the overall conduct of JSDF ODO would be characterised as efficient, and the cost-performance, within the context of the overall defence budget, and the amount spent on procuring combat systems, despite incomplete data, would seem to reinforce this finding.

The quality of JSDF ODO as measured by the satisfaction of mission clients would seem to have been assured, despite some critical comments. Both UN and non-UN missions, large scale and small, those working with the JSDF appreciated the quality of their work, as niche service providers, and as highly capable multi-tasked units. The engineering work appears to have been up to the highest standards, as were the logistical, medical, sanitation, and election-support tasks completed. In UNTAC and the relief missions, the scale and quality of medical services provided was in many ways beyond what the local population could have expected, given the condition of the local infrastructure. The unexpected nature of the medical service provision in UNTAC marks that out as a further extension of duties during the mission which met with the satisfaction of locals and made a significant contribution to human security. UNDOF
provided an example of a small but highly capable contingent providing such a broad range of capability-enhancing services that its performance was considered vital to the mission in the eyes of its commander.

It is also clear that in the media and wider society the operations were regarded as successful, regardless of whether the motivations of the Japanese government are regarded as pro-idealistic or pro-realist. This broader perception of success for UNTAC would appear to be less widespread, as there were foreign media critical of the JSDF mission, particularly related to the state of Camp Takeo and safety of Takeo province, contrasted with conditions for most Cambodians and contingents. This image was further denigrated by Japanese reluctance to commit resources to the ‘main body’ of the mission, the PKF, even in supporting roles, while benefiting from the security provided by French PKF troops. Even the Force Commander had some critical comments for countries that preferred to offer ‘supporting forces’, but the clear evidence from UNTAC is that the mission was short of engineers, logisticians, medical staff, and well trained police, not infantry. The media coverage of the JSDF in Cambodia was replicated to some extent in Zaire, Indonesia, and Iraq, but most other missions were neglected. The smaller and further removed a mission from core Japanese national interests, the less exposure it received, with the result that the ONUMOZ, UNDOF, and Honduran missions were perhaps regarded as less ‘successful’. In political terms, despite being high quality missions, one client, the Japanese government, could reap less political goodwill from them, even though the host nation client (and UN mission) needs had been well met. The UNDOF contingent, uniquely, provides a low-media profile of great value to the government. As a standing force of 14 years it demonstrates a high capability, long-term commitment to the UN, while being low-cost,
low-maintenance, and low-risk.

JSDF ODO in the narrow operational sphere compare favourably with those of other nations. UNTAC included uneven military actors even among usually dependable countries, and engineering and other PSO capabilities were so few that it is not surprising that JSDF efforts were well received. Although later operations were better balanced JSDF ODO remain as a benchmark of high operational performance. UNDOF is the clearest example of a small contingent providing a significant mission contribution, and the Honduras dispatch contrasts as a brief, high-intensity operation, with the expensive, longer-term naval taskforce contribution of the UK, although in Rwanda/Zaire British performance outshone Japanese.  

What is clear, however, is that other nations which began peacekeeping and other ODO at the same time as Japan have been seen to have ‘moved on’ to more mission variants, more varied duties, and, critically, more dangerous deployments. This is the case with Germany, China, Korea, and Slovakia, both in UN and non-UN missions. While the European countries have the support of NATO and the EU, the cases of China and Korea are perhaps more relevant to Japan, particularly the latter as a neighbour and US ally. The JSDF have learned from the lessons of the 1990s and developed their ODO into the 21st century, but not as dramatically as these other countries. The pace of development has been retarded by socio-political factors, legal and constitutional issues, and by JSDF unwillingness to undertake extended tasks without resolution of these wider issues, as well as a strong residual Force commitment to US-alliance centric

880 45 Commando Royal Marines
(http://www.hmforces.co.uk/Join_The_Forces/articles/106-45-commando-royal-marines-45-cdo-rm, 8 September 2010); Ministry of Defence Performance Report 1998-99
RMA-roles. The JSDF, particularly the GSDF, remain surprisingly committed to ‘defensive defence’, mirroring the general risk-aversion of the Japanese government and people. This parallel risk-aversion and ODO development expresses the broader character of Japanese security policy development, and has proved puzzling to researchers looking for signs of ‘normalisation’, ‘remilitarisation’, or of reversion to a pacifist norm, and is an issue that shall be addressed below.

JSDF performance degrading issues have been stated, such as strategic lift, language skills, lack of doctrine, and hurried dispatch. Contingent commanders and their supporting JSDF, JDA, and IPCH colleagues managed well in the circumstances, displaying professionalism and dedication, although pre-dispatch briefings were inadequate, prompting efforts to develop independent research capabilities. Gradually, operational experience emphasised the importance of joint working practices, and the requirement for a professionalization of ODO training which came to fruition in following decade.

2 Effective Experience

JSDF ODO in the 1990s proved decisive in prompting change in the post-war and Cold War security norms of Japan. Despite pacifist norms remaining defining elements in security discourse, neither the norms nor the pacifism would be regarded as absolute standards, rather as guiding principles. While Japan did not ‘remilitarise’, in the sense of a great expansion of military power or of inflated military consciousness within society, the ODO changed perceptions of Japan, its role in the world, and the JSDF. Chris Hughes asserts that this process of extending the JSDF ‘operational reach’ in the 1990s
did indeed contribute to Japanese ‘remilitarisation’. By contrast, Takao Yasuo in his study of remilitarisation makes few references to operations in the 1990s, inferring that the earlier ODO experiences were, in terms of considering socio-political considerations, quite different from later Indian Ocean and Iraq dispatches.

This thesis examines the issue of remilitarisation in Section 4 of this chapter, ‘Implications for Studies of Japanese Security’, but it contends that the experiences of the 1990s provided the precedent for the expansion of ODO in the 21st century. However, it also maintains that the global security environment changed more rapidly than Japan’s policies, practices, and norms, thereby proving frustrating for those who had expected the actuality of dispatch to have sated appetites and reduced external demands for further action. Having overcome obstacles to dispatch based upon the Gulf War prompting fundamental revision of past practices and standards, Japan found itself in 2001 faced with further turmoil and change and, vitally for the JSDF, raised expectations.

Progress in the 1990s had been dramatic, within a Japanese context, but limited in comparison to that of other ‘emergent peacekeepers’. There was a palpable sense that most Japanese, including political and military leaders, considered that they had completed the bulk of the hard work in gaining acceptance for the principle as well as the actuality of JSDF overseas dispatch operations. The realisation, after a decade of ODO experience, that further external pressures were being placed upon Japan to act in ways ever further removed from the Cold War pacifist norms came as a rude shock that few were willing to directly address. However, unusually for Japan it had a leader who

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was actually eager to seize upon such challenges. Nabers, Shinoda, and Hughes have separately illustrated how PM Koizumi did not so much mediate between domestic and foreign pressures as navigate a new, direct course for the ship of state with little reference to passengers or crew, utilising the reformed, centralised powers of the PMO and Cabinet Office. Nabers, Dirk, ‘Culture and Collective Action: Japan, Germany, and the United States After September 11, 2001’; Shinoda, Tomohito, Koizumi Diplomacy; Hughes, Christopher W., Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power.

Thus, JSDF deployments to the Indian Ocean, East Timor, and Iraq were authorised, and ‘steamrollered’ through cabinet, the Diet, and the country by the force of Koizumi and despite clear opposition. However, they were only operationally possible due to the experiences and clear demonstrations of effectiveness during the 1990s. Without PMO reforms, these missions could have been possible, but without UNTAC, ONUMOZ, UNDOF, and the non-UN mission experiences and perceptions of success it is unlikely that they would have eventuated in the forms they took, nor have been conducted with such limited operational problems. The experiences of the 1990s allowed Japan to participate in ‘second generation JSDF ODO’, characterised by US rather than UN leadership within ‘coalitions of the willing’. While this development may well be regarded as a significant security policy shift, it required relatively little operational change from the previous decade’s operational patterns. The tasks performed were expanded, but in technical breadth rather than significant depth, such as maritime and air logistics in the Indian Ocean and Middle East. The particular ‘character’ of JSDF ODO and most of the legal limitations remained unchanged from 1999 and the Forces were able to be characterised as being less belligerent and more constabulary than many of their allies’ contributions. Indeed, in the absence of ODO doctrine, it could be said that the legal limitations came to assume a guiding role for
JSDF modes of operational deployment.

One of the ways in which the missions of the 1990s proved valuable for the JSDF was in the way they altered the self-perceptions of the Forces. Kawano Hitoshi has stated how JSDF personnel felt energised by ODO, and many younger members had a sense of personal fulfilment, providing an example of post-modern or self-oriented motivation, in contrast to value/institutional or money-oriented feelings.884 There was a clear generation gap, with older members of higher rank having a stronger ‘corporate’ loyalty to the institutions and aims of the JSDF, and, as Yamaguchi Noboru has pointed out, the JSDF reflect Japanese society in being older than most militaries.885 Kawano discovered that many JSDF members viewed UNPKO as an ‘Olympic meeting’ of militaries, and that despite initial anxieties, particularly for UNTAC, most members gained great satisfaction from having participated, even those initially unenthusiastic. In contrast with combat troops of other nations exposed to wider-ranging operational deployments, for the JSDF these missions constituted the ultimate operational experience and proving ground of their capabilities, with the highest figures of wishing to repeat ODO experience registered by UNDOF veterans.886 It would appear that the “constabulary ethic” of minimal use of force, and caring for ‘community’ members, has been “embodied in the Japanese armed forces”.887

The increased confidence and professional satisfaction also had significant institutional consequences. The JSDF, first under Prime Minister Hashimoto, and later Koizumi, were given greater scope for directly advising political leaders. The JSO and

885 Yamaguchi compares GSDF (59% NCOs) with the US Army (32%). Yamaguchi, Noboru, Japan: Completing Military Professionalism: 41.
Force Staff Offices could proffer professional advice based upon operational experience, and begin to gain enhanced influence over ODO selections and roles. From 2002, US-Japan bilateral cooperation through the ‘two-plus-two’ meetings of the respective defence and foreign affairs officials, provided the JDA and JSDF with equal status to MoFA countering some fundamental assumptions of tight ‘civilian control’ practice. Yamaguchi Jiro, writing in 1992, saw the progression towards UNPKO and an increasing professional role for the JSDF as unsatisfactory as the “problem of how to arrive at the compatibility between an army and democratic principles remains unresolved. In that sense, we must call modern-day Japanese democracy incomplete.”

While incomplete, the process had advanced during the 1990s due to demonstrable operational effectiveness.

While the JSDF and JDA/MOD gained increased influence over certain aspects of operations, this does not indicate that Japanese foreign policy became increasingly militarised. While the range of missions completed was impressive, Japan remained a ‘narrow spectrum’ actor, and the scale and intensity of dispatch budgets, personnel levels, and operational stresses remained far lower than in many other countries. The numbers of personnel engaged in UNPKO declined after 1995 and only grew significantly from 2002. For its dispatches to East Timor, New Zealand used its entire C-130H, helicopter, infantry, and armoured forces, and relied heavily upon reservists for later operations. The British armed forces, smaller than the JSDF, in April 1999 experienced a relative lull in operational deployment (between Bosnia and Kosovo), and yet, 36% of the army, 20% of the navy and 9% of the air force were training for,

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889 Interview, Dickens, David, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University, New Zealand (February 2002).
deployed on, or recovering from operations, equalling over 30,000 army personnel alone.\textsuperscript{890} At this time, JSDF ODO commitment was 43 personnel in UNDOF, and Shimizu Hirofumi and Todd Sandler are dismissive of Japanese efforts, with a sharp decline in JSDF contributions after 1995.\textsuperscript{891} Even the resumption of large-scale multi-mission dispatches from 2002 with UNIMSET, OEF-MIO, Iraq, and Indonesia dispatches rarely approached the 2000 personnel ceiling. Despite the modest scale and intensity, MSDF and ASDF resources were seen to be stretched by the ‘unexpected’ operational tempo.\textsuperscript{892} Also, despite the seemingly combative appearance of the GSDF in a highly unstable Iraq, their roles were strictly PSO, with \textit{de facto} collective security provided by allies, and with the norm-driven restrictive practices still in place. As domestic support for the Iraq dispatch deteriorated during 2004-2005, PM Koizumi was forced to admit that the JSDF would not transport arms or ammunition for other forces, and that they would withdraw if local security deteriorated.\textsuperscript{893} While much had changed since UNTAC, the degree of continuity was also striking.

This continuity is also evident in the investment patterns in hardware and software of the JSDF. While evidence was provided in Chapter Two for the investments made by the GSDF and MSDF in resources easily usable in ODO, these constituted minimal efforts at the periphery of significant budgets, while the ASDF efforts in this regard have been even more frugal. In the negotiations undertaken in Washington for the revision of the US-Japan Guidelines, the Japanese JSDF and JDA representatives strongly pressed the US side for inclusion of US assistance for Japanese IPC efforts,

\textsuperscript{892} Interview, MSDF Captain (July 2006).
\textsuperscript{893} Takao, Yasuo, \textit{Is Japan remilitarising?}: 117, 140.
particularly in logistics, to help make up for the ASDF capability gaps. The US had performed such air-lift provider roles for peacekeepers in Rwanda and East Timor, but in 2004 when the JSDF requested assistance in the air-lift to Iraq, USAF quoted a price double that of a JAL charter service, itself double that of the winning tender for the service, to the disappointment of many Japanese. The GSDF flew into Kuwait by Phuket Air, much to the confusion of allied officers.

While such commercial means have been found to bridge the ‘air gap’ they continue to present operational problems, such as the effects upon rapid deployment capabilities, the contingency of urgent operational requirements, and the limitations of rapidly extracting forces. The latter point is most poignant, as the JSDF have operated under supposedly strict conditions of dispatch, entailing a withdrawal if conflict escalates and the JSDF contingents are in danger of belligerent action. While other countries such as Britain and France would deal with such situations by the rapid introduction of forces to stabilise the mission, as the British did in Sierra Leone in 2000, the Japanese would surely be forced to withdraw. The air-lift capability gap would be a major obstacle, not only for provision of rapid force retrieval lift, but also as withdrawal from hostile contact is an extremely difficult and dangerous procedure. The safe completion of the procedure would entail insertion of an ‘extraction force’, designed to hold a perimeter, regulate traffic, and provide local intelligence to the extraction commander. With limited intelligence and air-lift capabilities, such an operation would have proved difficult to mount in the 1990s, compounded by the fact that the first unit designated as possible extraction force providers were the airborne forces within the CRF from 2007. Hence, Japan had no capability to undertake one of the main provisions of the IPCL,

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894 Interviews, GSDF Major-General (August 2004), and PMO Policy Adviser, (March 2005).
895 Interview, reporter-translator, Fuji Television, Berlin (July 2006).
entailing *de facto* JSDF reliance upon collective security and allied cooperation in the event of such contingencies.

The use of aviation in ODO has also been uneven in the provision of helicopter resources, with the GSDF utilising their extensive helicopter fleet in disaster relief missions in Pakistan (twice) and Indonesia, but despite UN requests, and clear operational needs, they have not been dispatched to UN missions. The UNSG twice requested Japanese helicopters in 2010, but a proposed dispatch to Sudan was rejected on logistical grounds.\(^{896}\) Takao has suggested that “Japan appears to have acted as a self-interested cost-minimiser” in defence budget terms, and this could also be applied to certain aspects of ODO.\(^{897}\) It is certainly the case that the Japanese government does not see any inherent dilemma in the provision of JSDF assets for humanitarian aid, as the helicopter dispatches demonstrate. This is despite the increasing doctrinal shift within the UN towards the ‘de-militarisation’ of such aid, and a growing body of opinion among aid and development specialists.\(^{898}\) The place of the JSDF within such missions is seen as legitimate within Japan, based upon the evolution of Force roles, and the development of IPC duties. The character of the Forces was strongly influenced by roles in direct and immediate service of civilians affected by natural disaster, developing institutional, technical, and cultural means by which to accommodate and effectively complete such duties in parallel with ‘conventional’ defence tasks. As Kawano and Kurashina have demonstrated, this has led to the JSDF being able to undertake ODO with a sympathetic human face, not always the case of militaries in ‘unconventional’

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\(^{896}\) 'Ban seeks SDF copter dispatch’, *Kyodo/The Japan Times* (26 September 2010) (http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/mn20100926a6.html, 26 September 2010).

\(^{897}\) Takao, Yasuo, *Is Japan remilitarising?:* 19.

roles.  

3 Summary of Evaluation

In answering the primary research question, whether the JSDF proved to be effective international actors, the answer is positive. The professional qualities of the Forces overcame the lack of specific training and experience, resource and logistical obstacles, and surmounted the real and imagined restrictions and pressures of undertaking prominent missions without national or international consensus. That the JSDF were so capable in familiar tasks is of little surprise, but the way in which the Forces contended so well with expanded duties, new pressures, and diversified mission roles is worthy of note.

In examining what tasks the JSDF performed overseas, they were not confined to the ‘UNTAC pattern’ assumed to be the operational panacea for JSDF ODO even within official circles. They ranged from highly complex, technical support duties closely integrated into UN missions to largely ‘unmilitary’, unarmed human security aid roles directly dealing with local people. The latter roles were familiar due to domestic disaster relief duties, although not the attendant environmental and linguistic novelties of overseas operations. The former roles were not unfamiliar, but such intense multi-national integrated working was certainly new to the JSDF, and prompted a review of Force structures and working patterns, leading to an eventual, if seemingly marginal, increase in JSDF ‘jointery’.

The effectiveness, efficiency, and quality of JSDF ODO were clearly demonstrated in

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all missions, with some, such as UNTAC, providing a broad dynamic range of capabilities, due to the resources allocated and the nature of the evolution of the mission. Others were from inception efficient and capable, and delivered high quality ‘end-products’, as in Honduras, Zaire, and UNDOF, while even the limited deployments, such as ONUMOZ, Turkey, and West Timor were able to fulfil their mission requirements to the fullest extent without reinforcements or enhancements. Efficiency and effectiveness were compromised by logistical support and pre-dispatch preparation, but the personnel in operations found ways to overcome such handicaps.

The scale of these missions made a contribution to their performance, with greater resources naturally leading to greater effectiveness, but not always efficiency, as seen by the comparison of medical services in Zaire and Honduras. The ability of the JSDF to depend upon other mission contingents proved vital, for all support services in ONUMOZ, and for security in other operations. The Japanese units could not be seen in isolation, regardless of their size, as they depended upon allied, and often commercial, assistance. Civilian assistance to the JSDF was critical in many operations, from NGO assistance in aid missions, to commercial air and sea lift. Despite criticism of pre-dispatch briefings, the personnel of the IPCH and MoFA, as well as JDA and JICA staff performed capability-enhancing field roles in support of JSDF ODO despite their small numbers and limited resources.

In comparing JSDF performance with that of other national militaries, the Forces generally compare well to operational comparisons in similar and dissimilar roles, particularly in PSO tasks in contact with civilians, but tend to compare poorly when judged by broader criteria. Japan devoted few personnel and relatively slender resources to its ODO, and the JSDF invested little during the 1990s to enhance its performance in
such operations. The JSDF were able to develop their capabilities, but as they developed within national socio-political and legal restrictions they could not match the developments being undertaken by equivalent nations. Japan may be regarded by such countries as an ‘under-performer’ in ODO, but the JSDF should be more correctly regarded as a ‘narrow spectrum’ yet ‘deep capability’ actor. Criticisms of Japan have often been expressed within comparisons, particularly in relation to German ODO, and the breadth and depth of German experiences throughout and beyond the 1990s indicates what standards the JSDF will be judged by. It is highly unlikely that the JSDF will match such performance, particularly in assuming multinational command roles, and for all its resources this remains the most significant remaining capability gap for their role as an effective international actor.

Critical commentators, such as Gavan McCormack, have noted that the JSDF appears to be a richly resourced military, and thereby conclude that Japan has ‘remilitarised’ and thus is likely to behave as other such ‘military states’. Such comments do not readily withstand scrutiny, for ‘military states’ have performed all manner of operations since 1990, with the UK and US being cast among the more belligerent, but Sweden, Italy, and Germany, as noted have also greatly expanding their security responsibilities through multinational military operations. The evidence of this thesis is that the resources provided for the JSDF are not so vast, the martial nature of the JSDF is far less than might be imagined from afar, and that the operations conducted in the 1990s can be characterised by their cautious, diligent approach, aptly embedded within the International Peace Cooperation policies of Japan.

One troubling aspect of this cautious approach has been what Peter Woolley has

termed “incremental interpretavism” by the government to circumvent opposition and mediate competing interests, thereby allowing increased freedom of dispatch and operational action. While this thesis has clearly stated that the constitutional limits on military forces and their actions has only been considered among many factors affecting JSDF ODO performance, the overall effect of pacifist norms in society, founded upon war experiences and the constitution, have proved an effective restraint upon further expansion of JSDF roles. This is one significant way in which Japanese and German experience has diverged.

What is perhaps unsettling is the nature in which reinterpretation, of the constitution, laws, and norms, has been used as a utilitarian mediation device by government to allow for JSDF ODO to move closer to standard operational procedures found in UNPKO and other multinational operations. While laudable in many ways, it has been utilised as a risk reduction device to avoid domestic political controversy which has conversely placed the JSDF in positions of potentially increased operational risk with little apparent legal, political, or operational support. Reliance upon *de facto* collective security, by dependence upon non-Japanese forces and tight restrictions upon national forces, while publicly denying this right does not provide a stable base for future operational developments, and helps explain GSDF reluctance to embark upon further large-scale UNTAC or Iraq-type missions. What is also apparent from this thesis, however, is that despite these challenges and restrictions, the JSDF has proven its adaptability in new roles and expanded duties when required to do so.

Despite such continuing socio-political problems, and resource deficiencies, the experience of the JSDF as national representatives has been far more positive than could

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have been imagined during the volatile debates of 1990-1992. The ‘ox-walking’
opponents of JSDF dispatch have been partly calmed by the actuality of operational
performance. The experience of the 1990s has demonstrated that the character of JSDF
members is well-suited to the limited peace support tasks they have effectively
undertaken as international actors.

4 Implications for Studies of Japanese Security

Setting the operational performance of the JSDF within the ODO context answers
one array of questions, but naturally raises others within broader contextual patterns.
What do the missions of the 1990s indicate about the trajectory of Japan and its security
beyond 2000? What do JSDF ODO indicate about the nature of the JSDF, the
government, and Japanese society, and should Japan’s neighbours and allies be
concerned about the implications for global security? Did the experiences of JSDF
ODO help ‘militarise’ Japan? Indeed, do Japanese citizens see their country as one that
has become a ‘military power’, and do they recognise that Japan has been
fundamentally changed by the experiences of the 1990s?

These questions shall be addressed by examining Japanese military tolerances, the
factors of normalising and militarising, and the internal and external policy drivers that
have led to re-evaluations of Japanese strategy and security.

A Japanese Military Tolerance

Paul Midford, in a recent, thorough study of Japanese public opinion on security
issues, has contended that the supposed Japanese adherence to or observance of
pacifism has been greatly exaggerated, and that “many of the public’s security attitudes
were not necessarily inconsistent with some forms of realism, especially defensive realism.\textsuperscript{902} In his definitions of pacifism, Midford, like Thomas Berger, clarifies the differences between latent anti-militarism due to the excesses of the Imperial period and the disdain for or complete rejection of the notion of use of arms for any purpose.\textsuperscript{903} Almost a decade earlier, Michael J Green had referred to Japan’s ‘reluctant realism’ in a similar vein.\textsuperscript{904}

This thesis has clearly identified that it agrees with Midford’s contention that Japanese public opinion has been both tolerant of, and increasingly demanding, effective national defence provision. While this ‘military tolerance’ could be characterised as ‘defensive realism’, it could also be characterised as one of the risk-averse qualities of broader Japanese liberalism, as expressed by Yoshida. It was also a feature of Ashida’s liberalism prior to Yoshida and the subsequent normative institutionalisation of the Yoshida Doctrine, as outlined in Chapter Two.\textsuperscript{905} This broadly liberal approach aimed to reduce threats, lessen tensions, and mediate a path between outright pacifism and an embrace of re-militarisation in Cold War alliance with the US.

The Yoshida approach was a delicate balancing act, with a realisation that Japanese society’s ‘military tolerance’ was fragile, and only gradually strengthened. Midford states that if Japanese public opinion had been tolerant of “attitudinal offensive realism” then Cold War commitments would have been made to the defence of Korea, Taiwan, and possibly even Vietnam, which it clearly was not.\textsuperscript{906} However, true ‘defensive realism’ would also surely have been far more tolerant of higher defence spending,

\textsuperscript{903} Berger, Thomas U., \textit{Cultures of Anti-militarism}.
\textsuperscript{904} Green, Michael J., \textit{Japan’s Reluctant Realism}.
which it was not.

In Japan, there was an increasing appreciation of the need to both develop minimal military capability for defensive duties and to develop alliance relations with the US, limited by the prevalent social norm of ‘pacifism’. Thereby, any notion of Japanese ‘defensive realism’ was, and has continued to be, highly conditional and nuanced, and would surely be more accurately depicted as ‘limited defensive pragmatism’.

JSDF ODO in the 1990s did much to provoke a public re-evaluation of the JSDF, with a greater appreciation of their capabilities and identity separate from that of the imperial-era military, much as domestic disaster relief missions had done. However, unlike domestic disaster relief and other civil support operations, there was a possibility that success of JSDF ODO could have led to an increasing ‘militarisation’ of Japanese security policy, such as that experienced by the UK after the intense military deployments of the 1990s. However, domestic and overseas operations have re-emphasised the strongly ‘constabulary’ identity of the JSDF, and have, if anything, improved the JSDF image by making them appear less militaristic. Despite massive investment in war-fighting technology, the only operational deployments have been largely non-military in character and completely non-combative in execution, even including the most ‘military’ appearing ODO thus far, in Iraq. The counter-intuitive and counter-Realist result of increased prominence of military aspects within Japanese security and foreign policies has therefore been a re-affirmation of the ‘not-quite-military’ character of the JSDF.
B Normalising and Militarising

Such detailed evaluations of JSDF ODO characteristics have not prevented commentators from deducing that ODO activity has equated to overt expressions of ‘normalisation’ or ‘(re)militarisation’. As noted in Chapter One, Hook, Berger, and Maeda have been among the most prominent critics of JSDF overseas missions, not for their avowed purposes of supporting UN nation-building, or humanitarian relief, but as unwelcome symptoms of the increasing military character of Japan. In this context, JSDF ODO have been occasionally considered to be inherently or potentially insidious developments in an emergent strategy that has consciously or otherwise reconnected Japanese foreign policy to military policy. The implicit subtext is often indicated to be that this ‘normalisation’ is equivalent to ‘remilitarisation’ and is therefore a significant step towards ‘reversion’ and the imperial-era implications thus represented.

There is little consensus on what ‘normalisation’ comprises or represents, and thus the concept is difficult to evaluate against policy developments. Eyal Ben-Ari has identified five forms of ‘normalisation’ of militaries within societies, and these provide a comprehensive focal point for such an evaluation, while acknowledging numerous alternative definitions. The first involves legalising and formalising the actions of the armed forces. The second stresses the indispensability of the military as ‘guardians’ of national security. The third involves returning from a condition of abnormality. The fourth relates to a ‘ritual cycle’ of connecting ceremonies and rites with wider social ritual structures. The fifth form of normalisation entails conforming to a socially constructed standard, such as an internationally accepted military model.\(^\text{907}\)

It will be clear from this thesis that while the initial two forms could be identified

within Japan, the latter three could not. The ‘abnormal’ position of the JSDF within the constitution is something that most Japanese, in Chapter Three, indicated they preferred to maintain, and thus no other international military model would suite the Japanese case. There is also little sense of the ceremonial rituals of the JSDF having been embraced by society, despite the widespread, deep appreciation of JSDF assistance following the March 2011 triple crisis of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accidents.

Chris Hughes, as already indicated, has tended towards such concepts in his analyses of the JSDF and broader Japanese security, but his perspective of gradual ‘normalisation’ of Japanese policy, while remaining highly critical of creeping militarisation, has a less universally negative approach to the dispatch of the JSDF. His work does, however, retain much of the scepticism of previous authors’ studies regarding Japan’s military and the drivers of many aspects of military policy (see below, for an assessment of such drivers).  

Hughes has also been somewhat overly critical in the analysis of JSDF ODO within the broader frame of Japanese policy, tending towards a view of ODO as equating to a post-modern form ‘expansion of power’ by expansion of military reach, regardless of the benign form, limited size, brief duration, and international liberal character of the operations undertaken. Even the expanded operations, 2001-2009, would be difficult to portray in such Realist terms.

Sugawa Kiyoshi, as noted in Chapter Two, identified three approaches among politicians and researchers regarding the JSDF in Japanese security policy: Alliance Supremacists, United Nations Believers, and New Realists. The Alliance Supremacists could well point to the JSDF Iraq and Indian Ocean dispatches, as well as ODO

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908 Hughes, Christopher W., Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power; Hughes, Christopher W., Japan’s Remilitarisation.
909 Hughes, Christopher W., Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power: 10-14.
throughout the 1990s, to validate their position, and certainly the Japanese and Korean
dispatches to Iraq were seen as demonstrations of loyalty, bolstering respective US
alliances for East Asian security. However, such views have been tempered by the
acknowledgement that such loyalty has provided little beneficial result for other US
allies, such as the UK, as well as illustrating the obvious US-dependency of such an
approach. There is also an inherent risk that US alliance dependency could hinder
development of East Asian security relations, as occasionally expressed by Japanese
politicians, such as Hatoyama’s 2009 Yuuaigaikou (‘fraternal diplomacy’).\(^9\)

UN Believers are naturally handicapped by the institutional problems of the UN and
the fickle allegiance of the US and other UNSC members. They are perhaps further
limited by the vociferous exposition of UN-Centricity by Ozawa Ichiro as an alternative
to US Alliance dependency.\(^9\)

Sugawa regards the New Realists as probably having the greatest likelihood of
 gaining advantage, for they can hedge between other external policy drivers, such as the
predominant US alliance ‘pragmatic-realism’ and the UN-loyalist ‘liberal-idealism’. At
the same time, he sees the desirability for Japanese leaders to identify specifically
Japanese “enlightened national interests”, including those related to international liberal
cooperation, and thus predicts the emergence of “selective engagement” with UN and
US military operations.\(^9\) Without explicitly stating it, Sugawa advocates an emergence
of Japanese strategy.

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\(^9\) Sugawa, Kiyoshi, *Time to Pop the Cork*. 318
C Policy Drivers: The Search for ‘Normal’ Strategy

Samuels, Pyle, Woolley, and Dobson, as previously stated, have all utilised JSDF ODO within varied studies related to issues of the US-Japan bilateral relationship, and have tended to be less judgemental as to issues of normalisation as relating to JSDF ODO. They have, however, stressed the increasing role of military issues in policy considerations, and the emergence of what has been termed ‘Japanese Strategy’. Samuels explains that most Japanese doubt that Japan has ever had effective national strategy, often describing it as “naive” and “sterile”, while Korean and Chinese scholars tend to see Japan as having ‘stealthy strategy’, with a hidden, military-revisionist agenda.\(^9_{13}\) Samuels identifies the emergence of ‘strategic convergence’ as the ‘ideal’ for many Japanese strategic thinkers, whereby Japan can participate in an East Asian economic and political community with security elements, while also becoming a key element in a global US security system. In this, however, he acknowledges that the attitudes of Korea and China toward Japan would seem to make this little more than an Alliance-alternate fantasy. Neither country appears willing to cooperate more actively with Japan in overseas politics and military operations.\(^9_{14}\)

Pyle has gone so far as to assert that the Koizumi-LDP administration’s emerging strategy initiated “a steady incremental remilitarization” in response to the post-9/11 security situation. This subsequently altered alliance demands of the US administration, as Japan “began to remilitarize and become a stronger and more engaged ally, and in this way carved out a new activist foreign policy.”\(^9_{15}\) As part of this assumed strategy, non-UN PKO military operations assumed a vital role, both as part of the bilateral

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commitment to the alliance and as part of a broader commitment to international security interests. Hence, the Iraq, Indian Ocean, and Gulf of Aden operations in the first decade of the 21st century assumed great prominence being considered to be part of a more conventional, as some would state ‘normal’, and potentially ‘security realist’ strategic approach. The ODO of the 1990s had set the precedent for such dispatches, had allowed prevalent norms to be partly overcome and partly circumvented, and had provided JSDF operational experience.

Pyle has identified four institutional changes that have been part of this process: constitutional revision, political leadership and control of policy, the raft of security-related legislation from 2001, and the creation of the MOD.916 However, in assessing policy drivers, as opposed to policy effects, only increased political control over policy would appear to be of great significance. As previously identified, under Hashimoto and Koizumi, Japanese politicians increasingly influenced and controlled policy, aided by the concentration of key functions within the Prime Minister’s Office and Cabinet Secretariat. The creation of the MOD has the potential to provide an alternative policy driver for ODO, and possibly to assert greater influence over Japanese strategy, with attendant implications for civilian control, but there have been few such signs.

The suggested institutional drivers of JSDF ODO policy within this thesis are clearly both external (primarily the US) and internal. Of the latter, the efforts of MoFA and other agency and ministry pressure to participate in missions have primarily aimed to raise national profile, particularly with respect of the efforts directed towards the long-term goal of securing permanent UNSC membership. Internal drivers for ODO

efforts were thereby directly related to external calls for increased Japanese burden sharing.

Within a supposed pattern of ‘remilitarisation’ it would be assumed that the military itself would be pressing hard for increased overseas dispatch. The fact that the GSDF in particular has been so reluctant to become engaged in such efforts is one indication of the lack of substance behind such remilitarisation concerns. In addition, the ASDF and MSDF have been limited in their eagerness, with the MSDF regarding the dispatches to the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden primarily as valuable allied cooperation and training opportunities, and to re-establish MSDF primacy after a decade of ‘responsibility conflicts’ with the JCG. It has been noted, in Chapter Two, that ODO had been seen to have not only bolstered the confidence of the JSDF, and the public’s perception of the Forces, but also have to helped foster a degree of “excessively self-confident” and “arrogant” attitudes.\(^{917}\) This may be so, but with defence budgets being reduced since 1998, there appears little military drive for expansive overseas operations.

Other than Maeda, most Japanese researchers who have studied the detail of JSDF operations have tended to be largely sympathetic, and at times perhaps overly enthusiastic of Japanese military performance.\(^{918}\) Criticism, so prevalent prior to the UNTAC dispatches became noticeably muted and nuanced. This has also occasionally been the case with non-Japanese researchers who have perhaps not been as critical as they might otherwise be with their own nation’s armed forces.\(^{919}\)

Among Japanese researchers, Sebata Takao has contended that normalisation of Japanese civil-military relations, with an increasingly ambitious and confident civilian

\(^{917}\) ‘SDF’s rise in ’90s behind Tamogami’s challenge’, *Kyodo News/The Japan Times*.

\(^{918}\) Miyajima, Shigeki, *Ah, Magnificent JSDF*.

\(^{919}\) Patalano, Alessio, ‘Shielding the Hot Gates’. 
and military defence administration, depended not only upon the enhancements to JSDF and JDA/MOD images provided by ODO, but also was due to the enhancement of JSDF-USFJ and JDA-Pentagon relations in the 1990s. Sebata regards the willingness to join US-led military operations since 2001 as indicating one aspect of ‘normalisation’, and as being intrinsically tied to the centrality of the US-Japan alliance in Japanese strategy. Furthermore, Sebata asserts that ‘Japan might even become a major player in Asian security to supplement United States forces since the United States-Japan Security Treaty now covers the entire Asia-Pacific region’ and that passing “a permanent law that could dispatch the SDF overseas at any time, Japan might not need to change Article 9 since such a law in itself would enable Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense”. He acknowledges that such a ‘normalised’ Japan “might cause instability in East Asian security, particularly with China and both Koreas. In the future, Japan might...threaten to use the SDF to defend national interests over territorial issues or natural resources with China or South Korea as other states use armed forces to defend their national interests.”

Such regional issues and the search for security will be addressed in examining Japan’s search for security.

D Policy Drivers: The Search for Security

Japan's ODO in the 1990s were initially driven by the results of post-Gulf War criticisms and fear of international isolation, combining both UN Believer and Alliance Supremacist priorities to mollify international partners. However, the search for strategy was also driven by a post-Cold War sense of uncertainty regarding previous policies, and increasingly during the 1990s and beyond by the two emergent regional security

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threats seemingly posed by China and North Korea.

Reinhard Drifte has illustrated how the 1996 US-Japan Security Guidelines, and the muddled approach of both parties to the issues of Taiwan and missile defence, helped sour Sino-Japanese relations, and how Japanese efforts to redefine policies or build bridges largely failed. Increasingly, China came to be seen as a threat to the Japan-US alliance, and China came to regard alliance enhancement efforts as de facto containment policies. Japanese Liberal and Realist perspectives of strategy could coalesce around the attempt to develop a “soft containment” approach to China, whereby regional and extra-regional partners could be cultivated in order to engender a sense of responsible action in Chinese policymakers.\textsuperscript{921} The connection between such a policy and ODO can be seen through Japanese efforts to develop comprehensive security relations with Australia, and JSDF, JCG, and police bilateral efforts towards India, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other Asian states.

Michael J Green has been a leading critic of Japanese security policy, and particularly its somewhat ambiguous attitude towards the US. He has identified ‘five rings’ as the key determinants of future security stability in East Asia, and while nationalism, democracy, proliferation, and economic interdependence involve most of the region’s actors, it is the first ring, Japan-China relations, that is most immediately relevant. Green, like Samuels, Pyle, Scalapino and many other specialists, by the end of the first decade of the 21st century had predicted that Japan had developed a sense of strategic purpose and was developing an increasingly coherent strategic pattern of security policies.\textsuperscript{922} However, unlike Drifte, Green and many other ‘strategic’ commentators

\textsuperscript{921} Drifte, Reinhard, \textit{Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989}: 101.
have tended to focus on military ‘hard’ security issues while failing to appreciate the value of ‘softer’ issues, such as trade, maritime relations, historical legacies, and human interaction. Among these could also be placed the failure to develop functional relations during ODO.

Pyle has stated “the Chinese have no wish to see Japan embark on a strategically independent course or deviate from long-established limits on its defense policy.”\footnote{Pyle, Kenneth B., \textit{Japan Rising}: 339.} Japan equally wishes to avoid China becoming a major naval power able to threaten Japanese sea-lanes. Both parties have regarded each other’s ODO efforts with suspicion, mainly for what precedents they may set for the future. Chinese military analysts are concerned that Japan’s defence is shifting from a local to a regional basis and “from passive to active defense”, and that anti-Japanese sentiment in the PLA “at all levels is palpable.”\footnote{Shambaugh, David, \textit{Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects} (Berkeley: University of California, 2002): 300-301.} This combines fears that Japanese strategy is focused upon both unilateral regional power projection \textit{and} bilateral global power projection with the US, and has deepened mistrust of any unilateral or multilateral JSDF ODO efforts. In this ‘strategic’ context, water purification in UN PKO and Iraq appear inextricably linked with missile defence and Taiwan issues, and the future global balance of power.

North Korean security issues are less directly connected with JSDF ODO, but both Japanese and Korean Iraq dispatches were seemingly partly driven by a desire to prove loyalty to the US at a time when there was speculation regarding US military commitments to Korean defence. Concerns over the DPRK have helped lower Japanese sensitivities regarding defence-technology exports for missile defence, and have contributed to a somewhat more emollient attitude towards the controversial Okinawa
base issue, despite the initial blundering electioneering efforts of Hatoyama Yukio in 2009.

It is disappointing that ODO have not resulted in greater levels of unit cooperation among Japan, China, and Korea, and have even resulted in a mild form of competitive dispatch. Perhaps UNTAC was too early in the respective JSDF and PLA learning cycles for cooperation in Cambodia, but this does not explain the failure to cooperate in East Timor or Haiti. The example of Korea is even more easily characterised as a wasted opportunity, for Japan did make efforts to cooperate with RoK forces in UNMISET, but these were limited, and were not followed through beyond 2004. Both countries dispatched similar types (if not sizes) of units to Iraq, but they were posted to opposite ends of the country. Similarly, RoK naval vessels have cooperated in the allied anti-piracy task force in the Gulf of Aden, but without any particular ‘East Asian’ common identification.

The possibilities of such functional cooperation with East Asian neighbours have been neglected, yet at the same time the equivalent cooperation with British and Australian forces in second generation JSDF ODO has contributed to burgeoning security relationships with both countries, particularly Australia. Both Canberra and Tokyo appear to share the enthusiasm of smaller US allies broadening their functional cooperative scope beyond UN and US-centric operations. As yet the logical inclusion of the RoK has been resisted.

This thesis has aimed to contribute to understanding of JSDF ODO performance, and what this indicates for Japanese and international security. While the competing claims of renowned scholars may seem dissonant, they have contributed to this enhanced understanding, even while some assertions, such as Japanese ‘remilitarisation’, have
been declined. This examination has clearly indicated the need for further companion studies of related issues by other scholars.

5 Opportunities for Further Research

With such a study as this, there naturally remain outstanding questions, and this thesis has aimed to provide a base upon which scholars may conduct further research projects. These can be largely categorised as operational-functional types, or policy-strategic types.

This thesis provides numerous opportunities for further research on the effectiveness of the JSDF as national armed forces, taking the ODO of the 1990s as an operational case study to be compared with how the JSDF have adapted to changing security demands in the post-Cold War period. This could examine efficiency of resource allocation, or ‘transformation’ and how adaptive the JSDF and JDA/MOD have proven. As Nishihara Masashi has stated of the 1990s, looking “at Japanese defense issues from year to year, it doesn't change much; it's pretty boring,” but “if you look at it over a five-year period, there's a big difference” and an examination of this incremental change would be most instructive. This could be further expanded with a broader examination of the US-Japan defence relationship, particularly in light of ‘Operation Tomodachi’, the combined US-Japan military relief effort following the 11th March earthquake and tsunami.

In assessing the 2011 JSDF relief and recovery efforts, there would naturally be an

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examination of civil-military relations, and how the Forces appear to have become
closer to the civilian population than at any other time, intensified by the use of
reservists and the stationing of 100,000 personnel in affected areas. There are significant
opportunities for comparison of JSDF ODO with non-military actors, particularly
Japanese CIVPOL in UNTAC. There are also opportunities to compare specific PSO
and human-security work conducted by the JSDF and civilian bodies, such as UNHCR,
JICA, ICRC, and NGO. The Japanese government has avoided direct comparisons, but
an evaluation based upon effectiveness, efficiency, and quality would appear to be of
great interest and utility in a period of shrinking budgets and increased domestic and
overseas human security prioritisation.

There are many possible operational comparisons with ‘new peacekeepers’ (Germany,
Korea, China), focusing upon their respective operational performance, and measuring
Japanese, and other nations’ performance in meeting international operational standards.
Within this context, the Japanese partial ‘abdication’ from UN command and control
and ROE standards could be closely examined.

As international actors, effectiveness is also dependent upon how the JSDF have
represented Japanese policy and broader values embodied therein. Researchers could
examine Japanese abilities to utilise functional ODO cooperation to build broader
multilateral and bilateral security relationships, such as with Australia, the UK, Korea,
and India. This could be founded upon the premise of security ‘hedging’ for multiple
and unpredictable security challenges, or the absence of strong security institutions
within Asia, beyond the US alliance. A study of Japanese efforts to widen its
international security options would certainly be of value, and could be assessed within
emergent Japanese strategy.
Such a study would naturally lead to the development of alternatives to bilateralism, and an evaluation of whether such options are either viable or desirable to the Japanese and other governments. This would also entail studying the degree to which the US may wish for Japan to develop such alternative relationships and strategies, with Samuels having commented that elements of JSDF ODO development in the 1990s were encouraged by Washington, while others provoked consternation. The JSDF operations of the 1990s could be used as a base to study the OEF-MIO and Iraq dispatches within this context, and to what degree bilateralism was a powerful driver?

This thesis has filled a gap in the understanding of JSDF overseas dispatch operational issues, and as such has made a unique contribution to knowledge in international relations and Japan studies. It is for other scholars to utilise the opportunities provided and extend the possibilities raised by this body of work. It is hoped that many will rise to the challenge.

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Mamo

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The Scotsman
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Institutions

United Nations

Japanese Government

Cabinet Office
Council on Security and Defense Capabilities
House of Representatives
International Peace Cooperation Headquarters
Japan Coast Guard
Japan Defense Agency
Japan International Cooperation Agency
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency
Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
National Police Agency
National Institute for Defense Studies
Prime Minister’s Office

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Austrian Army
British Army
Department for International Development
Department of Defence (Australia)
Department of Defense (US)
Department of the Army (US)
Department of the Interior (US)
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
House of Commons (Canada)
House of Commons (UK)
Ministry of Defence (Finland)
Ministry of Defence (UK)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (France)
National Audit Office (UK)
Royal Air Force (UK)
Royal Australian Air Force
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Audio-Visual


Appendix One: Graphs

Graph 1: Scale of Assessments for UNPKO Budget (2004)

Graph 2: Voluntary Trust Fund Contributions for Assistance in Mine Action (1994-2004)

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MoFA (http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/reform/address0410.html, 15 October 2010);
Graph 3: UN Debtors (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Payments Owed to the UN by All UN Member States: 2007 (in US$ Million)</th>
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<td>Regular Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current Year's Debt</td>
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<td>Prior years' Debt</td>
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<td>Total Debt</td>
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<td>Country</td>
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<td>Owed by Top 15 Debtors</td>
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<td>United States</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>France</td>
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Appendix Two: Maps and Charts

UNTAC\textsuperscript{929}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{untac_diagram.png}
\caption{Outline of UNTAC}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{929} IPCH, \url{(http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/result/cambo/cambo02.html}, 15 July 2010).
UNMO/CIVPOL Deployments

Engineering Unit Deployments
NUMOZ\textsuperscript{930}

\textbf{Outline of NUMOZ}

- UN Headquarters
  - Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali

- Special Representative Akiho Akiba

- Office of Special Representative

- Military Component
  - Electoral Component
    - Headquarters
    - Cease-fire observers
    - Headquarters units
    - Infantry units
    - Engineer units
    - Communications units
    - Medical care units
    - Aviation units
    - Logistics units
    - Movement control units
    - Civilian technical units

- Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance

- Civilian Police Component

\textit{Activities in which Japan participated}

\textsuperscript{930} IPCH (http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/result/mozan/mozan02.html 15 July 2010).
JSDF Deployments
UNDOF

Outline of UNDOF

UN Headquarters
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
UNDOF Force Commander
Major General Natalie G. ESARAA

Activities in which Japan participates

Infantry units
(Austria, Croatia)
Logistics units
(Indie, Japan)
Infantry units
(Philippine)

Transport units

Supply units

Other units

Communications units

Engineer units


Golan Heights

931
UNDOF Deployments
RRU Billeting Area
Appendix Three: Photographs and Illustrations

National Police Reserve

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The Sun Pictorial Daily-Mainichi Shimbun (26 August 1950).
GSDF Reservist Recruitment Poster
Disaster Relief Activities

Water supply: Niigata, 2004
Hanshin Rescue, 1995

Photographs, MOD and Mainichi Shimbun.
Hanshin Water Supply 1995
Hanshin Rescue 1995

Thanks for earthquake relief, Kobe 1995
Iwate Disaster Relief 2007

UO Disposal, Osaka
Minesweeping, Persian Gulf, 1991

Insignia of IPCC (CIVPOL)

Sources: IPCH, MOD, UN.
UNTAC

JSDF Road Repairs

Cambodians listening to a Japanese NGO-donated radio
Newly arrived JSDF officers, September 1992

Japanese reporter interviews JSDF member
MSDF *Miura*, Sihanoukville

Camp Takeo, 1992
JSDF Road Repairs
SRSG Akashi Yasushi  

Repairing Route 3 Bridge  

Clearing UO  

JSDF saluting Akashi  

Repairing Route 2
JSDF UNTAC ‘portrait’

UNTAC Mission Completion Certificate
JSDF UNTAC ‘colours’
The late UNV Nakata Atsuhito, and Memorial
Returning refugees

JSDF MCU

JSDF Staff Officer

JSDF MCU
UNDOF

J-CON 2010

Rotation, 23rd-24th J-CON
J-CON Training, Lecture by Sato Masahisa at CRF

J-CON Transporting APC
J-CON repairing UNDOF vehicles

J-CON Snow-clearing

J-CON Transport for ICRC
J-CON Exchange and Relaxation
J-CON Road Repairs
J-CON fire-fighters
J-CON in UNDOF Training Competition
Rwanda/Zaire

RRU Sanitation

ASDF Transport for NGOs

RRU Surgery

Type-82 AFV

JSDF personnel (Nairobi)
Honduras
JSDF Sanitation and Clinical Activities
After 2000

UNMISET

JSDF in UNMISET, including the first JSDF women in ODO
Receiving UNMISET standard

New face of JSDF ODO, UNMISET
UNMISET water purification

Iraq/Kuwait

ASDF C-130H in Kuwait
JSDF, Iraq
Indonesia 2005

Iraq 2004

MSDF *Oumi* refuels *HMCS Charlottetown*  Nepal 2007

JSDF, Haiti, 2010
Equipment

LAV

Type-89 AIFV
MSDF Oosumi\textsuperscript{935}

\textsuperscript{935} Source: (http://blog.goo.ne.jp/misky730/e/9ab34d9f41e9e50b2a262b902e0bcd43, 17 October 2010)
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Tokyo Shimbun cartoon illustrating the vulnerability of JSDF in UNDOF.\(^{936}\)

\(^{936}\) *Tokyo Shimbun* (8 August 2006)
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