Reactions and responses to the Great Fire: London and England in the later seventeenth century

Jacob F. Field
School of Historical Studies, Newcastle University

Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Newcastle University, July 2008
Abstract

Reactions and responses to the Great Fire: London and England in the later seventeenth century

The Great Fire is an iconic moment in the history of London. It took place in the context of the Restoration, and had major value for any political group that wished to use it. London was the political, social, cultural and economic centre of England, so the Fire had the potential to seriously disrupt the nation.

This thesis has shown that the Fire was a disaster for the Londoners it directly affected. However, it was not a disaster in the long-term. This thesis, using Hearth Tax assessments and records of the Merchant Taylors’ Company and London’s booksellers, has shown the essentially stable nature of London’s demography, society and economy. The Fire only devastated the City - an area that was declining in its importance in the overall structure of the metropolis. The Fire had the effect of speeding population growth outside of the Walls, but this was an ongoing trend in 1666.

This thesis has examined the nationwide response to the Fire, with charitable contributions for London coming from across England, for both ‘distressed’ Londoners and the rebuilding of St Paul’s Cathedral. Urban areas and the South-East tended to be the most generous. The distribution of the donations to Londoners after the Fire was
along existing charitable lines – concentrating mostly on widows and other ‘deserving’ poor.

The long-term impact of the Fire lay in its polemic value. Interpretation of the Fire was highly contested, appearing in all forms of media, and used across the political spectrum – from nonconformists to Anglican Royalists. At key ‘moments’, the memory of the Fire was used - in particular during the Exclusion Crisis. The example of the Fire was utilised by all religious groups, especially to remind of the consequences of divine wrath. This thesis has shown that ultimately, London was resilient to the damage caused by the Great Fire.
For my parents, and in memory of my sister.
Acknowledgments

Without the support of my family, friends and colleagues, the researching and writing of this thesis would have been impossible. Firstly I would like to thank my parents, Ellen and Paul, who have unconditionally supported and inspired me. This has never wavered, and I owe them more than I can express. I would also like to thank their partners, Ian and Pam, as well as the rest of my family from across the world, especially my grandparents – Grandma Billie and Al; Aussie Granddad and Nana.

My friends have kept me from getting too lost in the seventeenth century through their good company and encouragement in the twenty-first. I would like to thank my ‘second family’, the Tomiczeks (Caroline, Isaac and Safiya), as well as the Greenwals (Ava Seave, Bruce and Diana), who have provided generous support throughout my academic life and Mark Ravenhill, who never let me be complacent. I would also like to thank: James, Samir, Ali, Al, Matt and Lily; the Greens (Autumn, Nick, Cora and my goddaughter Isabel); Niheer, Dan, Rich, Neil, Chris, Becca and Josh; and Elly, Corin, David, Toby, Nick and Frances. Finally I must thank my girlfriend Emily, who never stopped believing in me, and I will always be thankful for this.

This thesis could not have been undertaken without the help of the people who care for the records it depends upon. I have relied heavily on the help and advice of those who work at the Guildhall Library, the London Metropolitan Archives and the National
Archives. I have also used the resources of the Robinson Library, the British Library, the London Library and the Wellcome Library.

My greatest academic debt is to my supervisor, Jeremy Boulton, who has been a constant source of knowledge and constructive criticism, and whose expertise and assiduousness has been invaluable. I would also like to thank my second supervisor Helen Berry. This thesis has benefited greatly from conversations and advice from many other historians, including Ian Archer, Sylvia Brown, Rachel Hammersley, Vanessa Harding, Violetta Hionidou, Philippa Hubbard, John Landers, David Marsh, Henry Meier and Joseph Monteyne. I would also like to thank Gervase Rosser and Marc Mulholland, who oversaw my undergraduate studies.

I have been privileged to have received generous financial support from the Arts and Humanities Research Council in the form of a three year doctoral award, without which I could not have undertaken this thesis. I also received kind bursaries to attend conferences - one from the organisers of the ‘London in Text and History, 1400-1700’ conference, and one from the School of Historical Studies at Newcastle University.

Jacob F. Field
London and Newcastle, July 2008
## Contents

*Abstract* | page ii
---|---
*Acknowledgments* | v
*List of figures* | viii
*List of tables* | xi
*Abbreviations used in the text* | xvi
*Note on conventions used in the text* | xvii

**Introduction** | 1
1 Household movement and residential structure after the Great Fire | 13
2 London’s economic topography after the Great Fire | 117
3 The national response: Charity and the briefs of 1666 and 1678 | 182
4 Distributing the 1666 brief and post-Fire charity in London: 1666-79 | 255
5 Understanding 1666: popular and cultural reactions to the Great Fire | 304
6 The Great Fire and religion in the later seventeenth century and beyond | 340
**Conclusion** | 367

**Appendix: Statistical methods used in the text** | 378
**Bibliography** | 384
List of figures

1.1 Number of hearths per household in London before the Fire  page 39
1.2 Number of hearths per household in London after the Fire  40
1.3 Ward map of empty houses recorded in Hearth Tax, 1666 and 1675  48
1.4 Comparison of total number of houses in 18 wards, 1666 and 1675  52
1.5 Number of hearths per household in 17 London parishes, 1666 and 1675  54
1.6 Total number of households in 17 parishes, 1666 and 1675  57
1.7 Change in number hearths per household, individuals linked before and after the Fire  78
1.8 Change in relative status of locality of individuals moving household after the Fire, by gender  102
1.9 Location of fired householders with the same location before and after the Fire, 1666-75  106
1.10 Movement after the Fire from St Gregory by St Paul’s and Four Riverside Parishes, 1666-75  109
2.1 Distribution of booksellers in London, 1663-5  132
2.2 Distribution of booksellers in London, 1667-9  133
2.3 Distribution of booksellers in London, 1676-8  134
2.4 Destinations of fired masters, Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, 1666-80  146
2.5 Approximate age range of Merchant Taylors linked before and after the Fire, 1652-66 and 1666-80  164
3.1 Distribution of amount collected for 1666 and St Paul’s briefs, by county, 1666-76 and 1678-86

3.2 Contributions of 25 counties for the 1666 and St Paul’s Briefs, 1666-76 and 1678-86

3.3 Contributions of 25 counties for the 1666 and St Paul’s Briefs, 1666-76 and 1678-86, universities excluded

3.4 Time series of 1666 Brief, 1666-76

3.5 Time series of St Paul’s Brief, 1678-86

3.6 Cumulative proportion of sums collected, 1666 and St Paul’s briefs, 1666-76 and 1678-86

3.7 Contributions of thirteen parishes in Bills of Mortality for the 1666 and St Paul’s Briefs, 1666-76 and 1678-86

3.8 Amount given to the 1666 brief within Bills of Mortality, by parish, 1666-76

3.9 Contributions of 37 parishes in Bills of Mortality for the Vaudois and 1666 briefs, 1655 and 1666-76

3.10 Amount given to the St Paul’s brief within Bills of Mortality, by parish, 1678-86

3.11 Contributions of 41 parishes in Bills of Mortality for the Vaudois and St Paul’s briefs, 1655 and 1678-86

3.12 Contributions of 238 parishes with population information, 1666 and St Paul’s briefs, 1666-76 and 1678-86

3.13 Amounts given to St Paul’s brief from sample with social status information, divided by status, 1676-86
4.1 Breakdown of payment of money collected for 1666 brief, 1666-79 257
4.2 Time series analysis of the collection and distribution of the 1666 brief, 1666-79 258
4.3 Breakdown of money paid out during first two years of 1666 brief, 1666-8 259
4.4 Breakdown of money paid out during years 3 to 4 of 1666 brief, 1668-70 260
4.5 Breakdown of money paid out during final years of 1666 brief, 1670-9 260
4.6 Map of payments made to London parishes from the 1666 brief, 1667-9 275
4.7 Map of payments made to wards from the 1666 brief, 1667-72 279
List of tables

1.1 Comparison of number of ‘Alchin List’ of households burnt out by the Fire to households recorded in Hearth Tax, by ward, 1666 and 1675  
page 29
1.2 Distribution of number of hearths per household and percentage of widowed householders in Hearth Tax listings before and after the Fire  
33
1.3 Number of uninhabited properties recorded in Hearth Tax, by Ward, 1666 and 1675  
46
1.4 Number of uninhabited properties recorded in Hearth Tax, by region of London, 1666 and 1675  
50
1.5 Empty houses in 17 parishes in the Hearth Tax Listings, 1666 and 1675  
56
1.6 Traceable individuals from taxation records before the Fire  
59
1.7 Movement of nominally linked individuals from taxation assessments before and after the Fire (%)  
71
1.8 Non-movement of individuals linked in taxation assessments before and after the Fire  
73
1.9 Close and medium-range movement amongst linked individuals before and after the Fire (%)  
75
1.10 Change in number of hearths per household amongst individuals linked before and after the Fire (%)  
81
1.11 Change in number of hearths per household, individuals linked before and after the Fire who moved, by direction of movement (%)  
84
1.12 Changing typology of locality before and after the Fire, from taxation assessments (%) 86

1.13 Changing typology of locality before and after the Fire, from taxation assessments, by direction of movement (%) 88

1.14 Socio-occupational groups of individuals assessed in the Ladyday 1666 Hearth Tax assessments for the City of London (%) 93

1.15 Effect of socio-occupational group on geographical direction of residential change of individuals moving after the Fire, 1666-75 (%) 95

1.16 Changing typology of locality before and after the Fire, by socio-occupational group (%) 98

1.17 Movement after the Fire from St Gregory by St Paul’s and Four Riverside Parishes, compared to totals for individuals directly affected by the Fire, 1666-75 (%) 110

2.1 Place of business, Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, 1666-80 (%) 128

2.2 Geographical distribution of booksellers, 1663-5, 1667-9 and 1676-8 (%) 131

2.3 Age of masters in the Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, c. 1665 142

2.4 Type of movement, Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, 1666-80 (%) 144

2.5 Proportion of movers who moved into another region of London, Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, 1666-80 (%) 144

2.6 Long-term movements of London booksellers, 1663-5, 1667-9, 1676-8 (%) 150

2.7 Topographical distribution of ‘new’ booksellers in London after the Fire, 1667-9, 1676-8 (%) 152

2.8 Trade groups, Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, 1666-80 (%) 154
2.9 Proportionate distribution of trade groups by region of London, Merchant Taylors, 1652-66 (%)

2.10 Proportionate distribution of trade groups by region of London, Merchant Taylors, 1666-80 (%)

2.11 Occupation, nominally linked Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, 1666-80 (%)

2.12 Type of occupational movement, nominally linked Merchant Taylors, and proportions from burnt-out areas of London, 1652-66, 1666-80

2.13 Age range of Merchant Taylors linked before and after the Fire, by geographical movement, 1652-66 and 1666-80 (%)

2.14 Direction of movement of Merchant Taylors linked before and after the Fire, by age group, 1652-66 and 1666-80 (%)

2.15 Trade groups in the Merchant Taylors, by age group, 1666-80 (%)

2.16 Place of business, female Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, 1666-80 (%)

2.17 Trade groups, female Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, 1666-80 (%)

3.1 Method of transmission to London, money collected for the 1666 brief, 1666-76

3.2 Reasons given for lack of money collected, St Paul’s brief, 1678-86

3.3 County contributions for 1655 Vaudois Brief, 1666 Brief and 1678 St Paul’s Brief (%)

3.4 Time series analysis of county contributions, 1666 and St Paul’s briefs, number of months taken to reach n% of county total, 1666-76 and 1678-86

3.5 Mean parochial county contributions for the 1655 Vaudois Brief, 1666 Brief and 1678 St Paul’s Brief
3.6 Regional comparison of mean parochial collections for the 1655 Vaudois Brief, 1666 Brief and 1678 St Paul’s Brief 215

3.7 Proportion of parishes contributing, 1655 Vaudois Brief and 1678 St Paul’s Brief 217

3.8 Mean parochial donations of communities that had experienced fires, 1666 Brief and St Paul’s Brief, 1666-76 and 1678-86 220

3.9 Social status of donors to St Paul’s Brief, and proportion of amount donated, by region (%), 1678-86 226

3.10 Mean donation per person (pence), by social status, St Paul’s Brief, 1678-86 227

3.11 Proportion of collection donated by parish priest by region for St Paul’s brief, 1678-86 229

3.12 Donations per 1,000 within Bills of Mortality for parishes with returns for 1666 and St Paul’s briefs, 1666-76 and 1678-86 (£) 231

3.13 Donations per 1,000 within Bills of Mortality for 1666 Brief (compared to Vaudois Brief), 1666-76 234

3.14 Donations per 1,000 within Bills of Mortality for St Paul’s Brief (compared to Vaudois Brief), 1678-86 238

3.15 Parishes with returns for 1666 and St Paul’s briefs, 1666-76 and 1678-86 243

3.16 Donations per 1,000 by region, 1666 and St Paul’s briefs, 1666-76 and 1678-86 (£) 244

3.17 ‘Bad Money’ returned for 1666 Brief, 1666-76 247

4.1 Breakdown of payment of money from 1666 brief, 1666-79 (%) 257

4.2 Breakdown of payments to parishes from the 1666 brief, 1667-9 271
4.3 Distribution of money from 1666 brief to wards 'for releife of the poore that suffered
by the late sadd fire’, 1667-72

4.4 Occupation of recipients of charity from 1666 brief, 1666-79

6.1 Time period and subject of sermons examined
Abbreviations used in the text

BL   British Library
GL   Guildhall Library


Jour.   Journal of the Court of Common Council

LMA   London Metropolitan Archives


LPL   Lambeth Palace Library

MT. Co.   Merchant Taylors’ Company

Rep.   Repertory of the Court of Aldermen

*St Paul’s*   Parishes contributing towards the rebuilding of St Paul’s Cathedral after the Great Fire

SP   State Papers, Domestic Series

TNA   The National Archives
Note on conventions used in the text

All dates are given in New Style, with the year beginning 1 January.

Where statistical tests are mentioned in the text, the type of test used is specified in the footnotes, with the particulars of the tests. A full explanation of the statistical tests and terms utilised in this thesis can be found in the appendix.
Introduction

The Great Fire of 1666 is an iconic moment in both the history of London and in the popular history of England. London’s destruction by flame, and resurrection through the industry of her citizens is an enduring symbol, retaining its vitality during the twentieth century as a result of the experience of the city during and after the Blitz (1940-4), when the phrase ‘The Second Great Fire’ was frequently used in the contemporary media. The comparison sought to show that destruction and recovery was something London had gone through before, and could do again. The Fire is a ‘transcendent event’ in London history, retaining its relevance to the present day.¹

The Great Fire of 1666 was the greatest catastrophic shock to befall the early modern metropolis. Its impact on London has been extensively studied and documented to an extent – however, its impact on Londoners has been overlooked. This thesis will include the first large-scale quantitative analysis of the resettlement and reconstruction of London after the Fire, utilising an innovative analysis of large bodies of data. For the first time, it will be possible to examine the Great Fire against long-term patterns of change in metropolitan topographic structures. The social, economic and cultural impact of the Fire will be examined in terms of how individuals reacted and responded to it. Using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative sources allows the study of this response to be as comprehensive as the sources allow, and also puts the response to the Fire in the context of existing trends in early modern England. This thesis will also examine the broader

effects of the Fire in the rest of the country, and how England perceived the disaster that befell London. In this thesis the comparative aspects of the Great Fire will be explored, as far as possible drawing out themes and experiences that London in 1666 had in common with other major urban fires.

The Great Fire started on 2 September 1666 in a baker’s shop on Pudding Lane. Over four days it spread across the City, driven by an eastern wind and London’s dry, flammable, closely-packed buildings. By its end, the Fire had devastated most of the traditional core of the metropolis, as well as a large area to the west of the City. However, for the most part, London’s suburban areas were spared. Once the flames had died down, tens of thousands were left homeless, scattered about open spaces around London with the few possessions they had been able to save. 13,200 houses had been destroyed, as well as 44 livery company halls, 87 parish churches and St Paul’s Cathedral.²

The Fire took place at an important moment in London’s development. The city was becoming a major international economic centre. In addition to its increasing global importance, London was the political, economic and social centre of England.³ London was also essential to the English demographic system – it attracted migrants from across the nation, and its high mortality levels checked potentially damaging excess population

growth in the country as a whole. A large destructive blaze had the potential to disrupt metropolitan economic and demographic systems – and in turn, those of the rest of England. The Fire also took place in the context of the Restoration of the Stuarts, just as the lustre of the restored monarchy was beginning to dim. The Fire had major polemic value for any group that wished to use it - a disaster of this magnitude was a potentially powerful political tool.

The Fire’s importance is reflected in the length, if not the breadth, of writing on this topic in the past century. For the most part, modern texts on the Fire concentrate on general narratives of the event and accounts of the rebuilding. Most of these accounts view the Fire and subsequent events almost wholly through a metropolitan prism, and devote very little to the impact of the Fire in England outside London. The doyen of modern historians of the Fire is undoubtedly Walter Bell, who produced the authoritative modern narrative account of the Fire in 1920. He announced in the preface: ‘here is a substantial contribution to the history of London. For two and a half centuries the Great Fire of London has awaited a historian.’ Such hyperbole was justified. Bell wove together a succinct narrative account of the Fire using a wide range of manuscript and printed sources; including diaries, sermons, news-sheets and poems. He also dealt with the rebuilding effort, and some aspects of contemporary reaction to the Fire.

3 Ibid., p. v.
4 Ibid., c. 2-9.
5 Including a short account of charitable reactions. Ibid., pp. 218-22.
Later narratives of the Fire all proclaimed their historical debt to Bell, but very few matched the utility of his work for the historian. Gustav Milne’s account of the Fire is succinct and fairly comprehensive, and included a summary of archaeological research on the Fire. Stephen Porter’s 1996 work on the Fire is also useful, especially as its exposition of the aftermath of the Fire extends to the 1670s and 1680s, examining its long-term effects on insurance, topography and popular politics. There are numerous other accounts of the Fire, many of which were produced to mark the Fire’s tercentenary, or which combined an account of the Fire with the other metropolitan disaster of the 1660s - the Plague of 1665. Most of these accounts are fairly similar; all include the same anecdotes and make use of the same sources. Considering this body of work, there is no need for another narrative account of the Fire, and arguably there has not been since 1920.

The rebuilding of London after the Fire has received a great deal of attention in the secondary sources, which is unsurprising given its importance and the wide range and number of sources available for its study. T. F. Reddaway provided the most useful account of the rebuilding. Reddaway produced an account of the various plans for the new city, the legislation, administration, fabric, financing and progress of the Rebuilding. He appreciated the complexity of the various jurisdictions and strata of property

---

12 Reddaway, *Rebuilding of London*. 
ownership, and the legal difficulties in the reconstruction of the devastated areas of the metropolis. He also took a long-term view of the new London, and realised the limitations of the rebuilding - London was ‘restored, rather than replanned’. Tantalisingly, he briefly mentioned that the poor were ‘crowded out’ of the rebuilt City, but does not provide any quantitative evidence for this statement. Similarly, Vanessa Harding’s article on the changing shape of seventeenth-century London persuasively argued that although the Fire may have created a more open and clear City, this would have simultaneously forced many poorer Londoners into already overcrowded suburbs, furthering the contrast between disorderly periphery and orderly centre. Further examination of Harding’s argument that the Fire marked an important sea change in London’s topographical structure will be made utilising quantitative analysis of change in London’s residential structure after the Fire, which thus far has remained relatively unexplored in the secondary literature.

The most visible aspect of London’s new landscape was the rebuilt St Paul’s Cathedral. Jane Lang’s account of the construction of the new cathedral detailed the process of design and construction. This authoritative work gave an indication of the practical difficulties of the project, and detailed the often overlooked experiences of the craftsmen involved in the construction. A shorter account of the building of the new cathedral is

---

13 Ibid., c. 10, p. 284.
14 Ibid., p. 300.
included in the collection marking the 1400th anniversary of St Paul’s, although it lacks the depth of Lang’s earlier work.

The secondary literature on the popular reaction to the Fire is far more nebulous than the writing on the rebuilding. The changes in London’s residential patterns and social construction after the Fire were significant, particularly given the strong metropolitan trend towards continuity in its social structures in the early modern period. One of the most ambitious efforts to examine change after the Fire was Cynthia Wall’s work on the social topography of Restoration London. Wall argued that after the Fire Londoners reconstructed their city not only physically and structurally, but also conceptually, reinvesting their city ‘with meaning and significance’. Narratives, sermons and poems attempted to find some kind of explanation for the disaster, and played an important role in giving meaning to London’s rebuilt streets and structures. Wall’s argument sees the literary remapping as part of the literal remapping, and just as vital in creating a new London. Wall relied wholly on qualitative literary sources, and did not quantify how the social spaces of London changed.

There is a significant body of work on the cultural response to the Fire in addition to Wall’s work. A collection of verses edited by R. A. Aubin included numerous poems on the Fire and the rebuilding effort. He provided editorial detail about the poet and the

---

20 Ibid., p. 76, c. 1-4.
language used in each verse.\textsuperscript{21} Frances Dolan examined the ‘contest’ in the cultural perception of the Fire in the long run from the perspective of anti-popery, and also examined how the Fire was depicted and displayed in the most visible symbol of the event in London’s built environment – the Monument.\textsuperscript{22} Joseph Monteyne placed the Fire in the context of how it was represented in the visual arts. Oils of the burning city tended to portray the Fire as a night-time phenomenon – they resonated because the night was linked to threats from unknown external powers. These depictions of the Fire formed part of a long-term artistic trend since the sixteenth century - the genre of \textit{paysage en flammes}, characterised by a high degree of realism and luminous atmospheric effects. The Fire created anxiety about the place of the City in relation to the suburbs. Many prints produced of the post-Fire metropolis showed a void at the centre. They display the disruptive passage between two different types of space: void and full; chaotic and stable. Ultimately, the portrayal of the Fire marked a transition and transformation in how London was viewed. After the Fire, the city was more easily conceptualised as a scientific diagram, smooth and ordered.\textsuperscript{23}

In this thesis, comparative approaches to the Great Fire of London will be used wherever possible. It represents a conscious attempt to broaden our perspective on the Fire. Comparisons between London in 1666 and other major urban fires allow common areas and themes to be explored, and an examination of what – if anything – was unique about the Great Fire. Drawing comparisons allows the historian to ‘escape from the complexity

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{df} London in flames.
\bibitem{mont} J. Monteyne, \textit{The printed image in early modern London: urban space, visual representation, and social exchange} (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), c. 3.
\end{thebibliography}
and diversity of local detail', and enables a more balanced, less parochial, view of the problem at hand. The 1666 Fire could be compared to other ‘Great Fires’ in London’s history. Derek Keene made the point that fires have occurred throughout the history of London, and that the 1666 fire was, in relative terms, not the worst of the fires to afflict the city. However, although other fires may have destroyed higher proportions of the city, none would match the absolute scale of destruction of 1666 until the Blitz. Of all the fires in London’s history, the 1666 blaze has attracted the most scholarly interest and had the most significant long-term impact.

All early modern English towns were vulnerable to fire for the same reasons London was: highly flammable building materials, close-packed housing, domestic and trade use of hearths and limited fire-fighting technology. There are numerous studies of the experience of individual towns. Most concentrate on narratives of a particular fire, its immediate effects and the rebuilding effort. However, none of these fires was anywhere near the scale of the London Fire, so any comparison would be limited. A more useful

---

comparison is between the 1666 Fire and other ‘Great Fires’ which devastated major early modern cities - the best seventeenth-century examples are the Great Fires of Edo (1657) and Istanbul (1660). The Edo Fire ruined three-quarters of the city, and killed about one-seventh of its population of 600,000. The Istanbul Fire destroyed two-thirds of the city, razing 280,000 houses and killing as many as 40,000. Later, the Great Fire of Copenhagen in 1728 was proportionally as devastating as the 1666 London Fire, destroying 80 per cent of the medieval city. New York suffered from two ‘Great Fires’ in its development in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The first occurred on 21 September 1776, and destroyed one quarter of the city’s households. The second ‘Great Fire of New York’ happened on 16-17 December 1835, destroying up to $26 million in property, and devastating a 13 acre area. The Chicago Fire of 1871 destroyed four square miles of the city. It also provoked a great mass of commemorative literature, some of which included accounts of the 1666 London Fire.

This thesis intends to examine how a community responded to disaster, integrating qualitative and quantitative sources to examine both empirically and theoretically how London and the nation reacted to the Fire. In chapters 1 and 2, for the first time, a large highly useful, containing details of the severity of the various fires in English provincial towns between 1500 and 1900.

number of individual physical movements after the Fire will be analysed. These will be based on nominal linkage of large systematic sources from before and after the Fire. Nominal linkage in the metropolitan context, which had a wide sample of names, will make the exercise less problematic. There will be limits to this technique. For nominal linkage to be worthwhile, the initial sample populations must be sufficiently large to allow for the high rate of 'attrition' as a result of repeated names or insufficient information provided in the records. Conversely, the technique is useful if the sample population is drawn from a smaller group where other information is provided – for example, occupation or trading sign.

Chapter 1 will examine the response in terms of household movement and residential structure. It will use the Hearth Tax assessment records and nominal linkage techniques to determine what the topographic effects of the Fire were, and how it affected individual Londoners. The degree of continuity in London’s social landscape will also be examined, and to what extent the Fire affected longer term shifts in the topographic structure of the metropolis. It will also include a case study of two London neighbourhoods to show how their inhabitants responded to the Fire, and what differences there were between these two neighbourhoods. Chapter 2 will examine the economic response to the Fire in terms of the reactions of two trade groups: London’s booksellers and the Merchant Taylors’ Livery Company. This will show how these two distinct groups reacted to the economic disruption caused by the Fire, and where they resettled in the post-disaster metropolis. It will also examine the effect of occupation, age, gender and locality on the recovery after the Fire.
Chapter 3 will examine the Fire in terms of its national impact; utilising records of two major charitable collections undertaken for the recovery of London after the Fire: a 1666 brief for Londoners 'distressed' by the Fire and a 1678 brief to raise funds for the rebuilding of St Paul's Cathedral. This will show what the determinants of generosity towards the metropolis were, and which areas and social groups were most likely to donate money to London. Chapter 4 will study how the money raised by the 1666 brief was distributed across London by the city's central authorities. It will show the charitable priorities of the metropolitan government and which social groups were most likely to receive money from the charitable fund. It will also examine what other means were used in London to support those who suffered as a result of the Fire.

'Fire' provokes strongly-loaded emotional and physical reactions. The French philosopher Gaston Bachelard argues that man's view of fire is charged with fallacies from the past, causing people to see it as a sign of sin and evil but also a purifying force. Fire is identified with radical change. David Cressy views bonfires in particular as an important part of early modern celebration in England. Fires were particularly important in the anti-Catholic 'pageant season' of early November, which began with bonfires, bells and sermons on the 5 November, and ended with Pope-burnings on the 17 November. Nigel Smith argues that fire was viewed as an apocalyptic event, a precursor of internal division or foreign invasion. Providential beliefs helped to shape popular reactions to fire. Alexandra Walsham's work on providence in early modern England shows that it

---

was believed that fires were a means for God to chastise ungodly communities.37

Chapters 5 and 6 will examine the Great Fire in these contexts, using qualitative data to assess the reaction to the Fire in London and England. Chapter 5 will examine the Fire in the context of the reaction of printed media such as poems, histories and broadsides. It will also show how the perception of the Fire changed over time, and to what polemical ends its memory was used, in particular at the time of the Exclusion Crisis. The chapter will also review various diary, letter and memoir sources to investigate the popular reaction to the Fire. Chapter 6 will examine the religious impact of the Fire. Fires were important providential events, and were frequently mentioned in sermons. The chapter will use a large sample of sermons about fire from before and after 1666 to show how religious figures explained disasters such as fires to their congregations. The chapter will also show how England’s nonconformists viewed the Fire.

This thesis aims to place the Great Fire of London in several new and unexplored contexts. The comparatively neglected economic reaction to the Fire and the patterns of movement of individuals burnt out by the Fire will be empirically examined. This thesis will show that the Great Fire did not occur in isolation. Rather, it took place against the background of a period of significant social, economic, political and cultural change in London and England. It is the intention of this thesis to place the Great Fire at the centre of these changes, and show the immediate and long-term effects of the Fire in a multi-dimensional perspective.

Chapter 1: Household movement and residential structure after the Great Fire

The Great Fire destroyed approximately 13,200 houses in London.¹ This chapter aims to examine how this restructuring occurred after the Fire, and the extent to which the disaster changed individual housing choices. This will be accomplished by examining the residential movement of individual Londoners, both in fired and non-fired areas, after the Fire. In doing so, this will illuminate patterns of early modern metropolitan neighbourhood migration. The study will be conducted empirically, on a London-wide scale. As far as possible, it will be socially comprehensive, and encompass the experience of a wide range of Londoners from across the socio-economic spectrum. This chapter will show how London reacted to the disruption caused by the Fire in terms of the residential changes associated with it.

Mobility was a key feature of the population structure of seventeenth-century London. Most Londoners, in particular those lower down the social scale,² moved several times over their life. Some of these moves would have been as a result of lifecycle events; for example, the start of an apprenticeship or marriage. However, many would have been a decision based on economic considerations - the desire for larger trading premises perhaps. Jeremy Boulton’s study of seventeenth-century Southwark shows that 20 per cent of householders moved within a one year sample, and only 24 per cent stayed in the same house for ten years.³ There does, however, seem to have been a tendency to move

³ J. P. Boulton, ‘Neighbourhood migration in early modern London’, in Migration and society in early
locally, with people moving within the same neighbourhood.\(^4\) Mobility was socially selective. As both Boulton and Robert Shoemaker have argued, poorer Londoners tended to be more mobile, whilst tradesmen and master craftsmen tended to be more stable, as they needed to be in the same location for customers to find them.\(^5\)

The manner in which a house was held affected mobility. Very few Londoners owned their own freehold. Most properties were held by lease or rented 'at will' from a person or institution. Better quality housing tended to be leased (Boulton calculated the average length to be around 21 years, and Peter Earle calculated that the average length remaining on a lease for the 'middling sort' at death was 27 years.), while poorer tenements, for example, tended to be held 'at will'.\(^6\) The ownership of a house frequently had many levels, tied together in a series of leases, as many leaseholders were able to sublet freely, without recourse to the actual owner of the property.\(^7\) These complicated networks were one of the reasons the Fire Court had to be established to settle disputes about rebuilding, in order to cut through the various levels of ownership and ensure that London could be rebuilt more quickly. Ostensibly, it was the responsibility of the tenant to rebuild their property after it was destroyed in the Fire as part of their 'covenant to maintain'.\(^8\)

---


\(^8\) The Fire Court: calendar to the judgments and decrees of the Court of Judicature appointed to determine differences between landlords and tenants as to rebuilding after the Great Fire, ed. P. E. Jones. 2 vols. (London: The Corporation of London. 1966-70), i. xvi.
Not all tenants would have been able to afford to rebuild. Stephen Porter, using the judgments of the Fire Court, estimated that the average cost of rebuilding a house was £516, a substantial sum. Even if an individual did not take on the rebuilding themselves, they would have still had to pay a fine upon starting a lease at a new property. The value of a fine varied considerably, depending on the lessor's need for cash. A new house would have to be furnished. Roger Kempe, who moved from Walbrook to Goate Alley in Cordwainer Ward after the Fire claimed on 17 July 1667 before the Fire Court that he was unable to rebuild because he had already spent £200 'settling in another place'. Kempe was allowed to surrender his lease upon payment of arrears in rent.

If a tenant was unable to rebuild, the Fire Court would usually demand the surrender of the lease, usually with some kind of payment to the landlord. Occasionally if the lease was recent or a large fine had been received, or some improvement had been made to the property, the landlord made a payment to the lessee. However, if no interested parties in rebuilding a property could be found then the Fire Court cleared the site by decreeing surrenders or even declaring leases void so the site could be rebuilt. Ultimately, the Court was not concerned who rebuilt, as long as there was something rebuilt, but it did give preference to the person in occupation at the time of the Fire. The working of the Fire Court was based on the maxim that 'London could not be allowed to lie waste' – disputes had to be resolved quickly and definitively, taking into account the relative

---

losses suffered by all interested parties in a property.\textsuperscript{12}

Londoners deciding to rebuild faced many practical problems. Rebuilding in earnest could not begin until April 1667, when the staking out of properties was finished. In addition, the sudden demand for new houses meant that everyone faced difficulties in supply of material and labour, although this problem was helped by Parliament’s decision to free up some trading restrictions. It normally took between six months and one year to build a house in London, but in the aftermath of the Fire, construction may have taken longer. It was only in 1668 that the activity of rebuilding could be deemed to be ‘general’.\textsuperscript{13} Individual rebuilding would have also been delayed by legislation that required every prospective builder to enter their name and place of proposed site at the Chamber of London in order to gain a certificate from the City Surveyors, without which rebuilding could not begin.\textsuperscript{14} The bulk of private rebuilding was probably finished by 1670, and the majority of the rest filled in by 1672.\textsuperscript{15}

The newly rebuilt London had a different housing stock to the pre-Fire city. The new houses had to be built according to strict plans, which specified size and material. As a result of the regulations, there was a reduction in the total number of houses in the fired areas after 1666. This was because the rebuilding tended to favour the construction of larger houses. Walter Bell estimated that around 9,000 new houses were built to replace


the 13,200 that were destroyed in the Fire.\textsuperscript{16} This would have led to a shortage of houses in the fired areas of London, which would have led to rises in rents. Increased subdivision of existing houses after the Fire may have met some of these shortages. ‘Internal colonisation’ of London through the subdivision of tenements and houses was commonplace, and would surely have intensified after the Fire.\textsuperscript{17} In spite of this, rents would have risen not only as a response to shortage of housing, but as a result of the increased expense of building new houses as a result of the rebuilding legislation. The ejected minister Samuel Rolls (c. 1628-79/80) commented in his 1667 account of the Fire that landlords asked for excessive rents after the disaster.\textsuperscript{18} London rents tended to be higher than the rest of the country in any case, and the further rent rises after the Fire may have therefore made staying in the City financially impossible for some.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{Mortality and the Fire}

It is a common trope of the story of the Great Fire of London that the immediate death toll of the disaster was negligible. Indeed, the report of the \textit{London Gazette} did not record a single fatality resulting from the Fire. The largest contemporary estimate of deaths directly due to flames was eight.\textsuperscript{20} However, some secondary sources argued that the death toll must have been far higher, as the incineration of bodies in the flames meant

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Bell, \textit{Great Fire of London}, p. 272.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Bell, \textit{Great Fire}, pp. 176-7.
\end{itemize}
that corpses could not be recovered.\textsuperscript{21}

The two closest contemporary disasters to the Great Fire of London were the fires in Edo (1657) and Istanbul (1660). Both of these fires had high death tolls. The Edo Fire killed about one-seventh of the city’s population of 600,000, and the Istanbul Fire killed as many as 40,000.\textsuperscript{22} The London Bills of Mortality do not record large numbers of deaths as a result of the Fire. They recorded the deaths of four people ‘Burnt at severall places’ and one person ‘Found dead in ye Streete’. There was no significant mortality spike in 1666 compared to 1667 or 1668. For the first three weeks of September 1666 (due to the disruption caused by the Fire the Bills for these weeks were condensed into one sheet) the number of burials recorded was 704, compared to 988 and 949 for similar periods in 1667 and 1668.\textsuperscript{23} Was London in 1666 markedly different to these cities, or was there a huge underestimate of the casualties caused by the Fire?

Most of the few casualties of the Fire recorded in contemporary sources shared a similar profile – the victims tended to be elderly. For example, Paul Lowell, an 80 year old watchmaker refused to leave his premises in Shoe Lane, was consumed in the flames.\textsuperscript{24}

On 14 January 1668, Samuel Pepys (1633-1703) recorded in his diary the story of an old


\textsuperscript{23} GL. Parish Clerks’ Company, Weekly Bills of Mortality, MS 3604/1, part 1, fols. 94, 145-7, 198-200.

man whose body was found under St Paul’s. The old man had returned there to fetch a blanket but was overcome by the flames. Similarly, the cleric William Taswell (d. 1731), who was 15 at the time of the Fire, recalled seeing the burnt corpse of an old woman amongst the ruins of St Paul’s. The elderly would have also been more vulnerable to the privations caused by camping out in the fields around London. For example, the antiquarian Anthony Wood (1632-95) recorded that the Royalist poet and playwright James Shirley (bap. 1596, d. 1666) and his wife Frances died as an indirect result of the Fire. They ‘were driven by the dismal conflagration … from their habitation near to Fleetstreet, into the Parish of St. Giles in the Fields in Middlesex, where being in a manner overcome with affrightments, disconsolations, and other miseries occasion’d by that fire and their losses, they both died within the compass of a natural day’.

Such casualties may have been the tip of the iceberg. The elderly and infirm would have been most at risk of being left behind in the evacuation of the City. It is possible to determine whether there was a significant rise in mortality of the elderly after the Fire. The burial records of the parish of St Botolph Bishopsgate, to the north-east of the City, recorded the ages of those buried. As one of the nearest parish churches to the City unaffected by the Fire, it is likely that many of the casualties of the Fire would have been buried there. However, a comparison of the age range of burials in the month after the Fire in 1666 and 1663-4 and 1667-8 revealed that there was no significant statistical

---


26 A. Wood, Athenae Oxonienses: An Exact History of all the Writers and Bishops Who have had their Education in The most ancient and famous University of Oxford, 2 vols. (London: T. Bennet, 1691-2), ii. 262.
difference in the distribution of ages.  

In addition, an exhaustive search of the contemporary descriptions of the Fire did not uncover any evidence for large numbers of deaths. Even though it would have added to the strength of the polemic of the anti-Catholic tracts on the Fire (see chapter 5), none mentioned the deaths of large numbers of Londoners. Similarly, none of the petitions for charity from Londoners burnt out by the Fire mentioned the death of a spouse or family member as a result of the flames. It is possible that there were more than the traditionally accepted ‘handful’ of deaths caused by the Fire, but there is no contemporary evidence for this. Secondary consequences of the Fire, such as exposure, may have increased the death toll. There is evidence of some violence after the Fire, particularly towards foreigners.  

A letter written three months after the Fire noted the dangers of the fired parts of London, noting ‘many persons have been found murdered in the vaults among the ruins’ after being robbed. However, there is no evidence that there was a mass breakdown of public order in London after the Fire. These were sporadic incidents. There were probably more than eight deaths caused by the Fire, but in no way were the casualties of the blaze in any way comparable to the Great Fires in Edo and Istanbul. Ultimately, the death toll of the Fire was limited by two main factors. Firstly, the Fire spread slowly, over three and a half days, giving time for people to leave. Secondly, the tight-knit nature of metropolitan neighbourhoods meant there would have been help and assistance for the vulnerable. Had the Fire spread more quickly, it is likely that the death toll of the Fire was limited by these factors.
toll would have risen considerably. The Great Fire had no significant effect on the mortality regime of early modern London, and in turn crisis mortality had no significant effect on the restructuring of London's households after the Fire.

**Sources and methodology**

Individual residential patterns will be examined using the Hearth Tax assessment records for the City of London and surrounding areas. The Hearth Tax records were chosen to reconstruct residential movement because of their mostly comprehensive and systematic nature, as well as the fact that they mostly indicated the exact place of residence. In addition, some of the Hearth Tax records also included occupational information about the individuals assessed. Samples from the Hearth Tax will be taken from just before the Fire (but as far as possible, after the 1665 Plague) and from after 1672, when most of the rebuilding had been completed.\(^{30}\)

The Hearth Tax was a property tax collected from 1662 to 1689.\(^{31}\) It was granted to the Crown in perpetuity by Parliament on 1 March 1662, and the first collection was made on Ladyday (25 March) 1662. The tax was essentially a levy on property, designed to be a stable, and regular, addition to royal revenue. In essence, the Hearth Tax subjected ‘the ordinary taxpayer to an inquisitorial right of search’ to determine how many hearths were

---


liable to be taxed in each property. The collection of the Hearth Tax originally leant heavily on existing local administration, which proved unable to meet expectations of revenue, so in 1664 the administration was transferred to Royal collectors. The Hearth Tax was farmed out to private collectors from 1666 to 1669 and again from 1674 until 1689. In the interim period, from 1669-74, the tax was directly collected. Almost all of the surviving Hearth Tax lists come from the periods 1662-6 and 1669-74, when local or central government mechanisms were used to collect the tax.

The most useful documents from the Hearth Tax for the purpose of reconstructing residential patterns tend to be the assessments, which were preliminary reckonings of the number of taxable hearths in each property. These are also more likely to be accurate than records of what was actually paid. These lists indicated both the exact place of residence and also the number of hearths per household. However, there are three major problems with these lists. Firstly, due to human error and the difficulties of collecting such an intrusive tax, it is hard to tell if the lists were complete. ‘The compiling of hearth tax assessments and returns was such a lengthy and involved process that carelessness, incompetence or ignorance … could easily generate omissions or mistakes’.

The second difficulty is that the Hearth Tax assumed that there was a direct link between the number of hearths and personal wealth. The poor were expected to live in houses

33 Arkell, ‘Printed instructions’, in *Surveying the People*, ed. Schürer and Arkell, p. 44.
with smaller numbers of hearths and the wealthier in houses with larger numbers of hearths. This was not always completely true. Chris Husbands has shown that social status or wealth cannot be ‘read’ directly off Hearth Tax totals. Rather, the returns represented a ‘broad continuum’ of wealth, with the rich at the top, the poor at bottom and a considerable degree of overlap in between. Also, the number of hearths a household was assessed for did not take into account the age or condition of the house. Poorer households could have large numbers of hearths if their property was old or had deteriorated. Occupation would have also distorted the relationship between the number of hearths and wealth. Although the Hearth Tax legislation had been amended to exclude kilns, furnaces and ovens, there was often confusion over their inclusion in assessment lists. As such, on occasion, generally less wealthy occupations such as cooks or bakers could have been assessed for an inflated number of hearths compared to their relative wealth, if the ovens on their properties were assessed. Thus, occupation could lead to anomalies in the number of hearths a household was assessed for.

Although the relationship between number of hearths and wealth and social status was not linear, comparison of Hearth Tax returns to other variables has shown there was at least a rough degree of correlation between the two variables. Margaret Spufford’s comparison of Hearth Tax records to inventories has shown there was a loose relationship between moveable wealth and number of hearths and Husbands has shown there was


some correlation between number of hearths and occupation. Nigel Goose, using probate records from Cambridge and Reading, has shown that some correlation between hearths and wealth in inventories existed, although with a range of wealth for each number of hearths. The number of hearths did not always link to the number of people residing in a property, as John Patten pointed out: ‘There appears to be no systematic relationship between the number of hearths in a dwelling and the number of people in it.’ In short, the Hearth Tax probably reflected wealth and social standing to a degree. However, this relationship was not linear, and was affected by other variables.

The third major difficulty of the Hearth Tax is the problem of exemption. In practice, there were two groups exempt from the Hearth Tax; those certified as exempt (and usually named) and paupers. The regulations concerning exactly who would be exempt from the tax were ambiguous, and mutable. An amendment to the 1662 Hearth Tax legislation exempted those who did not pay church or poor rates, those whose houses were worth £1 per annum or less, and those with moveable goods valued at less than £10. In 1663 an amendment required the names of all non-liable householders to be entered into assessment lists, and in 1664 exemptions ceased to be granted to those with more than two hearths. Ultimately, the criterion which appears to have the closest match to exemption in practice was renting a house worth £1 per annum or less.

brief, originated from a property's nature and not from an individual's circumstances.\textsuperscript{43} Tom Arkell has shown that perhaps 35 per cent of households were exempt from the Hearth Tax, containing 30 per cent of the population.\textsuperscript{44} Not all of the central instructions were implemented with equal thoroughness in all places. The number of hearths from exempt households was often omitted, and empty dwellings, ovens and forges were recorded inconsistently.\textsuperscript{45} Given the inconsistencies of recording exempt households, any study using Hearth Tax lists must first determine whether the list used contained those exempted from the tax.

In order to determine residential changes before and after the Fire, individual assessments for Hearth Taxes before and after the Fire were transcribed into an \textit{Access} database, from which the entries could be nominally linked. Each individual will be assigned a standardised first name and surname, enabling records to be linked. Unfortunately, this has the effect of largely excluding widows from the sample, as, for the most part, their first names were not recorded. However, it could produce inaccurate results to link two records without any information on first names, so this exclusion is necessary in order to maintain accuracy. In addition, each first name and surname will be assigned a percentage likelihood of it occurring based on how many times it appears in the dataset. The two ratios will be multiplied together to give an approximate indication of the likelihood of the combination occurring by chance. All combinations with an expected likelihood of more than 0.001 per cent will be excluded from the set of linked records in order to minimise any 'false' linkages. All the combinations below this threshold will be

\textsuperscript{43} Arkell, 'Identifying regional variations', 149.
\textsuperscript{44} Arkell, 'Incidence of poverty', 46.
\textsuperscript{45} Arkell, 'Identifying regional variations', 152.
included, as will any combinations including a first name or surname that only occurs once in the original dataset. These linked names will show the sequence of movement before and after the Fire. The specific nature of the recording of the place of household in the Hearth Tax will also illustrate the typology of locality in terms of whether it was a street, lane, alley or yard. This will contribute towards indicating if any change in residence was a move upwards or downwards in terms of the relative status of locality; along with the number of hearths an individual was assessed for before and after the Fire. In order to gain some idea of overall metropolitan mobility, samples will be taken from across London, not just the fired areas.

The data used comes from individual assessments for the Hearth Tax, recorded on manuscripts held at The National Archives. From the pre-Fire period, the main body of the data comes from a listing made for the collection for Ladyday 1666 in the City of London, placing it after the 1665 Plague (E 179/252/32). It consists of several books of assessments for various parts of the City, as well as some parts of Middlesex. Most of these returns contain full information on place of household and number of hearths. However, some parts of the assessment are missing or incomplete. The majority of the data is divided by parish. The data for Southwark is from the assessment for Surrey; it is undated, but almost certainly is from the period between Michaelmas 1664 and Ladyday 1666 (E179/258/4). The Westminster data is not actually from the Hearth Tax, but from a royal subsidy - the list dates from 28 April 1664 (E179/143/385). Although it does not indicate number of hearths it does show how much money each individual was liable to pay towards the subsidy.
The main body of data for the period after the Fire comes from a listing for the City and parts of Middlesex, which cannot be exactly dated - although it was presented to sessions on 1 February 1675, a faded note on the manuscript linked it to collection on Ladyday 1674 (E179/252/23). The entire listing is on a single roll of manuscript. Additional assessments from the eastern suburbs were collected from an assessment for Middlesex dating between Michaelmas 1674 and Ladyday 1675 (E179/143/380). The data for Southwark comes from an assessment for Surrey - it is not dated but probably is associated with the collection on Ladyday 1673 (E179/188/504). The Westminster data is associated with the collection made on Ladyday 1675 (E179/253/25). Due to differences in the scope and range of the assessments, not all of the areas of London covered in the database are exactly the same for before and after the Fire. The exact range of the data set is shown in table 1.1.

When the Hearth Tax assessments for the City within and without the Walls were entered into the database, each entry was assigned a ward designation if none had been given in the text. This was done using H. A. Harben’s Dictionary of London, which listed the wards of London’s historic addresses. Dividing the assessments into wards allowed for the data to be more easily processed and mapped. It also meant that the 1666 and 1675 listings for the City could be directly compared to each other, as the former list was divided mostly by parish, rather than ward. However, it must be noted that this meant that for some cases, the ward designations were estimates - particularly in cases when an

---

46 Full details of the manuscripts can be found on the website of the National Archives. [http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/el79] (19 April, 2007).
address spanned two or more wards. Comparing the number of households recorded for each ward means that any possible gaps in coverage can be identified. Once completed, the database created an individual entry for every household assessed for the Hearth Tax in the City and surrounding areas both before and after the Fire.

The Hearth Tax assessment lists were then compared to a contemporary seventeenth-century listing of houses destroyed by the Fire, which was probably made up using existing assessments for property taxes by ward officials. The ‘Alchin List’ is also more comparable to the 1666 Hearth Tax, as they were both drawn up after the 1665 Plague. This means that any possible effects of the Plague on London’s residential structure will be present in both lists, thus ensuring that the lists are comparable.

48 LMA, Lists (fifteen in Number) of the Inhabitants, whose Houses were destroyed in the Great Fire of 1666. Alchin Papers Box F/no. 65. COL/AC/06/006.
Table 1.1: Comparison of number of ‘Alchin List’ of households burnt out by the Fire to households recorded in Hearth Tax, by ward, 1666 and 1675

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward / Area</th>
<th>‘Alchin List’</th>
<th>Pre-Fire Hearth Tax</th>
<th>Post-Fire Hearth Tax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aldersgate Within</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aldersgate Without</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>1402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aldgate</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>1056</td>
<td>953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bassishaw</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billingsgate</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishopsgate Within</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishopsgate Without</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bread Street</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridge</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad Street</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candlewick</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castle Baynard</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheap</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coleman Street</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordwainer</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornhill</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cripplegate Within</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cripplegate Without</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dowgate</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farringdon Within</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>1099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farringdon Without</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>2749</td>
<td>3991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langbourne</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lime Street</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portsoken</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queenhithe</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vintry</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallbrook</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westminster (1664, 1675)</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>1109</td>
<td>7884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwark (1664/6; 1673)</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>2226</td>
<td>3267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East End (1673)</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>2105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 6,016 15,009 34,489

Sources: Alchin List: LMA, Lists (fifteen in Number) of the Inhabitants, whose Houses were destroyed in the Great Fire of 1666, Alchin Papers Box F/no. 65 COL/AC/06/006. Hearth Taxes: City of London 1666, TNA, E179/252/32; Southwark 1664x6, TNA, E179/258/4; Westminster, Royal Subsidy 28 April 1664, TNA, E179/143/385; City of London and parts of Middlesex 1675, TNA, E179/252/23; Middlesex 1675, TNA, E179/143/380; Southwark, 1673, TNA, E179/188/504; Westminster 1675, TNA, E179/253/25.

Note: The ward designations for the 1666 Hearth Tax were not specified exactly in the contemporary returns, so they were assigned using the place of the household - as such they are estimates.

Note: Wards in bold designate that the majority of the ward was directly affected by the Fire.
Table 1.1 shows that there are some gaps in the coverage of the 1666 City Hearth Tax assessment listings. This is due to its incomplete geographical coverage. Eight parts of the listing are missing. Presumably these parts contained listings for the parishes located in the wards with apparently insufficient households (for example, Bread Street and Cornhill). Also, several parts of the assessment did not provide any information on the exact place of residence of the individuals - only providing a list of people living in the parish. These parishes are: St Sepulchre Holborn, St Ethelburga Bishopsgate, St Helen Bishopsgate, St Andrew Undershaft, St Katherine Cree, St James Dukes Place, St Botolph Aldgate, Trinity Minories and St Andrew Holborn.\(^49\) These parishes account for some of the gaps in the 1666 Hearth Tax assessments for areas in the western and eastern parts of London, particularly in the wards of Farringdon Without, Bishopsgate Within and Bishopsgate Without. In comparison, the coverage for the 1675 City Hearth Tax appeared to be more complete, with the differences in the number of households recorded probably due to the effects of the Fire, rather than missing or incomplete records.

The returns for Westminster both covered the same geographical area. However, there are far more households recorded in the post-Fire listing than in the pre-Fire listing. This is due to the socially selective nature of the 1664 Royal Subsidy, which only seemed to have listed the wealthier members the area, and so is far less comprehensive than the 1675 Hearth Tax assessment for Westminster. The assessments for Southwark covered slightly different geographical areas, with only the parishes of St Olave Southwark and St Saviour Southwark being recorded in both listings.

\(^{49}\) TNA. 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32, Parts 9, 20-21, 30.
Exemption from the Hearth Tax: who is included?

The question of who exactly was being assessed in the Hearth Tax lists is a major issue. In this section, it will be tested whether the assessments used included the groups meant to be exempted from the tax. One method of assessing the question of who is included in the Hearth Tax lists is to compare them to the Poor Rate assessments drawn up by parochial officials. The 1662 amendment to the Hearth Tax legislation specified that those who did not pay poor rates would be excused from paying the tax. In order to make the comparison, listings from City parishes analogous in time to the Hearth Tax assessments will be compared to determine if the numbers are similar.

A comparison of the 1666 Hearth Tax to poor rate assessments for the parishes of St Stephen Walbrook (1664) and St Olave Hart Street (1664-5) showed that the numbers were similar. In St Stephen Walbrook, 65 were assessed for the poor rate and 69 were assessed for the Hearth Tax. Similarly, in St Olave Hart Street, 227 were assessed for the poor rate and 251 were assessed for the Hearth Tax. This pattern continued after the Fire. The poor rate assessments for St Michael Wood Street (1675) and St Olave Hart Street (1675-6) are comparable to the numbers assessed for the 1675 Hearth Tax. In St Michael Wood Street, 82 were assessed for the poor rate, and 87 were assessed for the Hearth Tax. Similarly, in St Olave Hart Street, 227 were assessed for the poor rate and 228 were assessed for the Hearth Tax. In addition, none of the parish pensioners listed in the overseers accounts as recipients of annual pensions were included in the Hearth Tax.

assessments.\textsuperscript{51} It appeared that those who did not pay poor rates were unlikely to have been assessed for the Hearth Tax.

These parishes only provide a small indication of whether the exempt groups are included in the assessment listings. This question can be answered on a wider scale by comparing the distribution of two variables - number of hearths and number of widows - to a population where it is certain that groups legally exempt from the Hearth Tax are included. A distribution of numbers of hearths including exempt groups should include households with one or two hearths. Households with small numbers of hearths were more likely to contain individuals likely to be exempt from the Hearth Tax. It is likely that the number of widows could signify if the sample includes exempt groups, as widows were traditionally a major component of the ‘deserving poor’ and usually were a significant proportion of those given payments from the parish poor rates.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{51} Gl., St Stephen Walbrook, Poor Rate Assessment, 1664, Add. MS 243; TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32, Part 3, fols. 9r-10v; GL, St Olave Hart Street, Poor Rate Assessment, 1665/5, MS 872/9; TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32, Part 18, fols. 23r-28v; GL, St Michael Wood Street, Poor Rate Assessment, 1675, MS 525/1, fols. 113-14; TNA, 1675 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/23, fols. 98r-v; Gl., St Olave Hart Street, Poor Rate Assessment, 1675/6, MS 872/12; TNA, 1675 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/23, fols. 8r-9v.

Table 1.2: Distribution of number of hearths per household and percentage of widowed householders in Hearth Tax listings before and after the Fire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% no. hearths</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7+</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% widow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St Saviour Southwark</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100 (2,014)</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Bride Fleet Street</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100 (1,573)</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1666 City, and parts of Middlesex*</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100 (8,651)</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1664x6 Southwark**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100 (149)</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1675 City, and parts of Middlesex</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100 (20,338)</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1673 Southwark</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100 (3,207)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1675 Westminster</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>100 (7,746)</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1675 East End (Middlesex)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100 (1,922)</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 1.1.
Note: Table does not include data from the 1664 Royal Subsidy for Westminster, which was socially skewed, and only included the wealthier members of society.
* Excluding the parish of St Bride Fleet Street.
** Excluding the parish of St Saviour Southwark.
Two parishes were selected: St Saviour Southwark, which specified paupers – individuals legally excluded from the Hearth Tax, and St Bride Fleet Street, which included details for individuals listed as ‘persons not chargable’. As such, in these parishes, distribution of widows and numbers of hearths will be fairly representative of the population including exempt groups. The socio-economic differences between these parishes and other areas of London will be made up for by conducting the statistical tests at 90 per cent, a lower level of significance, to allow some leeway for these differences.

Table 1.2 clearly shows that none of the Hearth Tax listings shared similar distributions of hearths per household to St Saviour Southwark. This parish’s assessment, because it included paupers, had higher proportions of one and two hearth households than in the other listings, with the exception of the 1675 East End listing. It may also reflect the generally lower social status of the parish. There was a significant difference in the distribution of hearths per households in the different assessments. However, this effect may not be solely due to differences in the inclusion of exempt groups in the Hearth Tax listings. Rather, the socio-economic differences between St Saviour Southwark and London’s population at large may be the cause of these statistical differences, in addition to differences in who was included in the Hearth Tax assessments. In addition, none of the listings (except those for the East End) have nearly as high a proportion of widowed householders as St Saviour Southwark. The higher proportion of widows south and east

---

53 TNA. 1664/6 Hearth Tax, Surrey, E179/258/4, fols. 271r-315; TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London and Middlesex, TNA, E179/252/32, Part 8/2, fols. 10r-34v.
54 Testing using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at 90%: 1666 City and Middlesex, D=0.431 and the critical value is 0.031; 1664x6 Southwark (excluding St Saviour Southwark), D=0.513 and the critical value is 0.104; 1675 City and Middlesex. D=0.476 and the critical value is 0.028; 1673 Southwark, D=0.354 and the critical value is 0.035; 1675 City of Westminster. D=0.542 and the critical value is 0.031; 1675 East End (Middlesex). D=0.076 and the critical value is 0.039. Therefore, for all the lists tested, the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.
of the Walls shows that any post widowhood mobility tended to be to less wealthy areas of London, such as Southwark or the East End.\textsuperscript{55}

The distribution of numbers of hearths per household for the parish of St Bride Fleet Street appeared to be more similar to overall patterns than St Saviour Southwark.\textsuperscript{56} This may be due to the fact that the St Bride Fleet Street list may not have included paupers as systematically as the St Saviour Southwark list, so socially skewing the data. It also reflected the fact that St Bride Fleet Street was a closer socio-economic match to other areas of London than the Southwark parish. This is shown by the overall proportion of widows in St Bride Fleet Street, which was more similar to most of the other listings. The widows in St Saviour Southwark probably tended to be poorer than in St Bride Fleet Street. Around three quarters (74.6 per cent) of the widows in the Southwark parish were listed as ‘paupers’, whereas in St Bride Fleet Street, only 19.0 per cent of the widows in the parish were listed as ‘not chargeable’. Also, the distribution of hearths was more skewed upward in the parish of St Bride Fleet Street. Nevertheless, there was still a significant statistical difference between the distributions of hearths in St Bride Fleet Street compared to other Hearth Tax listings.\textsuperscript{57}


\textsuperscript{56} Southwark in the seventeenth century had relatively higher levels of its residents involved in lower status occupations than in other areas of London. J. P. Boulton, \textit{Neighbourhood and society: a London suburb in the seventeenth century} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), table 3.3, p. 66.

\textsuperscript{57} Testing using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at 90%: 1666 City and Middlesex (excluding St Bride Fleet Street), D=0.181 and the critical value is 0.033; 1664x6 Southwark, D=0.439 and the critical value is 0.105; 1675 City and Middlesex, D=0.360 and the critical value is 0.032: 1673 Southwark, D=0.133 and the critical value is 0.038; 1675 City of Westminster, D=0.294 and the critical value is 0.034; 1675 East End (Middlesex), D=0.262 and the critical value is 0.041. Therefore, for all the lists tested, the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.
In spite of the statistical differences, as most of the listings are made up of around ten per cent one hearth households (indicating smaller houses and poorer households, as shown in table 1.2) it does appear that at least some of the exempt groups may have been included. However, perhaps not all of the parochial poor and paupers appeared in the listings in most cases, as was shown by the comparison of numbers assessed for poor rates and the Hearth Tax in individual parishes. As Michael Power showed in his 1986 article using the Ladyday 1666 Hearth Tax for London, in some cases the exempt were included, but this was neither comprehensive nor consistent. As such, the number of hearths per household recorded is probably slightly skewed upwards. 58 Also, it must be noted that in rebuilt areas of London, the houses built after the Fire tended to be larger so the distribution of hearths would also tend to be more skewed upwards than before the Fire. 59 In summation, then, it is likely that the Hearth Tax records used in this chapter did not consistently include the exempt groups, and in most cases the poorest members of metropolitan society were not recorded.

59 Bell, Great Fire of London, p. 272.
London's topography: a short overview

London's socio-economic topography at the time of the Fire had been clearly delineated since the early 1600s. Roger Finlay argued that urban social differentiation in the City can be identified as early as 1638, with the wealthier groups in the centre and the relatively poorer on the riverside and outskirts.60 In addition, Gregg Carr, making a comparison of the 1638 tithe assessments to the 1695 Marriage Tax, concluded that the structure of the reconstructed City within the Walls remained fairly similar over this period, with high rents and wealth in the centre, a surrounding poorer zone, and concentrations of wealth in the western limits. In addition, the distribution of substantial households was similar in 1638 compared to 1695. The basic housing statistics of the City appear to be stable during the seventeenth century. It was in the suburbs that the greatest changes in London's population structure were experienced in the seventeenth century. Also, outside of the City's Walls, rents tended to be lower and there were more opportunities for economic growth as a result of the growing size of the suburbs.61

London's suburbs grew quickly in the early modern period. Suburban growth was the major factor in overall metropolitan population growth.62 During the seventeenth century, the main areas of growth were to the west and the east of the Walls. The northern and southern suburbs had expanded rapidly from 1560 to 1600, and thereafter

62 R. A. P. Finlay and B. Shearer. 'Population growth and suburban expansion'. in London 1500-1700, p. 44.
increased at approximately the same rate as the City within the Walls. In the first half of
the seventeenth century the eastern suburbs increased very quickly compared to the other
suburban areas. The western suburbs ‘expanded continuously’ from 1600 to equal the
southern suburbs’ population by 1680. Increasingly, there were larger, more
prestigious, dwellings in the west, with high concentrations of elite groups, which
rivalled the centre. However, the City within the Walls still had a predominance of
high value households, but over the century, the West began to match it. The West End
had a similar structure although the highest value households did not represent such a
large proportion as within the Walls. The high value of the households within the Walls
(despite sometimes being smaller than those in the West End) reflected the value of land
they were on. The West End, however, was not only made up of large houses for the
wealthy; outside of the large developments around squares, there were still poorer quality
houses for poorer residents clustered in alleys and courts. In comparison, the East End
had a high concentration of low rents. Development there in the seventeenth century
tended to be lower density than in the West End, clustering along the River and the major
highways. Social structure in the suburbs was increasingly delineated along status
lines. However, it must be remembered that there was no strict delineation between
suburb and City – they were linked through the movements of goods and people and
social networks such as the livery companies.

---

63 Ibid., pp. 44-6; table 3, p. 45.
65 Spence, London in the 1690s, p. 68.
66 Carr, Residence and social status, p. 139; R. M. Smuts, ‘The court and its neighbourhood: Royal policy
67 Spence, London in the 1690s, pp. 68-70; Carr, Residence and social status, pp. 142-3.
68 J. P. Ward, ‘Imagining the metropolis in Elizabethan and Stuart London’, in The country and the city
revisited: England and the politics of culture, 1550-1850, ed. G. MacLean, D. Landry and J. P. Ward
Overall patterns of residential structure

Distribution of numbers of hearths per household

Figure 1.1: Number of hearths per household in London before the Fire

Sources: See table 1.1.
Note: Excludes Westminster, which had no data on the number of hearths per household before the Fire.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 clearly show the difference in the distribution of the number of hearths per household before and after the Fire. Figure 1.2 shows that in the City within the Walls, the proportion of households with seven or more hearths rose substantially after the Fire. The mean number of hearths per household rose from 4.9 before the Fire to 6.0 afterward. This was due to the larger size of houses in the rebuilt areas of London. There was a similar rise in mean number of hearths per household in areas west of the Walls, which rose from 4.4 to 6.2. However, this may be due to the fact that the data for after the Fire included Westminster, which was home to the West End, with its generally larger houses. Therefore, it would have higher numbers of hearths per household in these areas.

Sources: See table 1.1.

---

69 This difference can also be shown statistically. Testing using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at 95%: City within the Walls, D=0.210 and the critical value is 0.021; North of the Walls, D=0.200 and the critical value is 0.049; East of the Walls, D=0.189 and the critical value is 0.071; West of the Walls, D=0.213 and the critical value is 0.031; Southwark, D=0.312 and the critical value is 0.038. Therefore, for all the lists tested, the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.
In other areas of London, there was change in the numbers of hearths per household. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show an increase in the numbers of hearths per household recorded in Southwark. This may be due to differences in recording, and some differences in the geographical coverage of the samples. The assessments for Southwark before the Fire included paupers in some areas, which skewed downward the number of hearths per household. In the areas north and east of the Walls, there was a decline in the mean numbers of hearths per household from 5.0 to 3.7 in the north and from 3.7 to 2.6 in the east. This may be due to subdivision of houses as these areas coped with the influx of Londoners from the fired areas of the city displaced by the disaster. As a result of increased cost of housing in the centre of London, these people may have chosen to remain north or east of the Walls even after the fired areas of London were rebuilt.

Once ‘freed’ from their obligation to rebuild their pre-Fire residences, certainly many did remain outside of the City after the Fire. However, from around five years after the Fire, civic government did attempt to prevent new building in some areas outside of the City – particularly around Moorfields. For example, in 1671 the City Lands Committee denied one Mr Colegrave the right to build on a parcel of land in Moorfields, as it would not have been ‘Advisable to give ... any Encouragement or Countenance ... for that purpose ... (as) there are already too many Buildings in the Out parts of this City' which Entertaine Tradesmen & Inhabitants while other Buildings & Tenements in the body of

---

70 W. C. Baer showed that in seventeenth-century London, 13 to 16% of the city’s housing stock was made up of divided houses. Baer, ‘Housing the poor and mechanick class’. table 1, 23: Brett-James, Growth of Stuart London, p. 304.
the Citty stayd empty and unimployed'. In 1672 the Court of Aldermen asserted that 'the buildings or shedds in Moorefeilds or other places in or about this Citty' were prejudicial to the present welfare of the City, as many houses therein were still uninhabited. City officials were eager to prevent building outside of the Walls. On 23 March 1673, the Court of Aldermen declared that due to the 'great mischieves too visibly attending this Citty in the multitude of Buildings of late yeares erected in the Suburbs in all places round the Citty', the Bailiff of Southwark was to take care to indict all such people who erected any new houses without having laid them on four acres of ground - according to the 1588 Erection of Cottages Act. The Court also declared that the buildings erected between Whitechapel and Mile End, as well as in Spittlefields, would be likewise prosecuted.

Individuals would have chosen to remain outside of the City partly because of the high costs of returning there after the Fire. Rents outside of the Walls tended to be lower than within, and in addition to this, there was a rise in rents in London after the Fire, which is mentioned by Rolls. Even the master of chancery, Sir Nathaniel Hobart, faced eviction from his City home because his landlord wanted to raise his rent. Conversely, land outside and around London tended to be relatively cheap compared to that in the centre.

---

71 Thank you to David Marsh for the Moorfields references from the Court of Common Council and Court of Aldermen. LMA, Court of Common Council: City Lands Committee Papers, COL/CC/CLC/04/001, 35.
72 LMA, Rep. 77, fol. 219v.
73 LMA, Rep. 78, fol. 126v.
74 LMA, Rep. 78, fol. 126v.
The costs of rebuilding rose considerably after the Fire, and the price of labour and building materials increased. The City government had attempted to remedy this. On 7 November 1666 ‘to incourage the more free & plentifull making of Brick’ the City Lands Committee granted a City tenant in the parish of St Giles-in-the-Fields the right to dig and cut up her land to make brick. However, in spite of such efforts, the price of building materials would surely have risen.

Rebuilding was made more expensive by government legislation to safeguard London against future fires. The 1667 Rebuilding Act required all new houses to be constructed of brick or stone, which was more expensive than the usual building materials of timber frame and weatherboards. The Act also fixed minimum sizes for houses, dependent on their location. This rebuilding legislation appeared to have been assiduously enforced by the City government. On 27 July 1671, the Court of Aldermen ordered that any irregular new buildings be reported to the Court by the City surveyors. The City enforced these legislations in three main ways. Firstly, it made sure all buildings were built to the new specifications. For example, in 1675 Richard Freeman of St Mary Ax was brought before the Court because his house had no party walls, and was of irregular height. The Court also made sure that buildings were not made of timber, but constructed of stone. For example, in 1677 a house built of timber in Newgate was ordered to be torn down and rebuilt in brick.

77 LMA, Court of Common Council: City Lands Committee Papers. COL/CC/CLC/04/001, 1.
78 Reddaway, Rebuilding of London, pp. 80-1, 284, Illustration 5, facing p. 80.
79 LMA, Rep. 78, fol. 211v.
80 LMA, Rep. 80, fol. 305v.
81 LMA, Rep. 82, fol. 258v.
Secondly, the City sought to make sure that houses were not subdivided into tenements, which were potential fire hazards. In 1675 the Court of Aldermen ordered that a petition be made to Charles II (r. 1660-85) for a ‘present stopp to bee putt to the ... converting ... (of) Noblemens houses into Tenements’. The Court was especially anxious to prevent the subdividing of Essex House, which Nicholas Barbon (c. 1640-98) was planning to redevelop. In spite of opposition from the City government, Barbon eventually converted the site into various houses, tenements and shops.82

Finally, the City was eager to prevent the construction of ‘sheds’ – cheap temporary housing, usually made from deal boards. It is probable that there were large numbers of such structures built shortly after the Fire. A petition of a Dutch mariner to Charles II from September 1666 for a ‘free pass’ to import ‘Deale Boards’ into London recorded the ‘great use’ of them ‘for the rebuilding of ... Houses since the deplorable Fire’.83 In the long-term, however, such structures were discouraged by metropolitan authorities. For example, in 1674 one John Tombs was ordered to report to the Court of Aldermen for erecting sheds in Castle Yard, Holborn.84 These three measures, whilst important in preventing fires, all prevented the construction of cheap housing within the City and its liberties, and made moving back into the City more expensive.

Even if an individual wanted to return to London, they faced the problem of either having to rebuild (more expensively than if they built a house outside of the City) or having to 

---

82 LMA, Rep. 80, fols. 120v, 149r; N. G. Brett-James, ‘A speculative London builder of the seventeenth century, Dr. Nicholas Barbon’. Transactions of the London and Middlesex Archaeological Society, new series, 6 (1933), 114-15.
83 TNA. Petition of Teunis Willemsen to the King, 24 September 1666, SP 29/172, 153.
84 LMA. Rep. 79, fol. 255v.
pay higher rents. The City government would have been aware of this, so they made every effort to enforce resettlement within the Walls once the long-term rebuilding of the City began in earnest. However, they could not fight the long term trend of most of London’s population residing outside of the Walls. By the Restoration, just over half of London’s population lived outside of the Walls – rising to around two-thirds by 1700.85

Empty houses

The Hearth Tax assessments sometimes recorded the numbers of empty houses in each locality. The distribution of uninhabited houses is an important feature of changing metropolitan housing structure in the aftermath of the Fire, as well as the effects of the 1665 Plague. According to the City Surveyors, in 1674 there were still 1,000 empty plots and 3,500 houses unoccupied.86 Using the assessment lists, a ratio of empty to non-empty houses will be calculated and compared first across the wards of the City of London, then the whole metropolis. Given London’s high population turnover, it is likely that there would have been a significant number of uninhabited houses. Craig Spence argued that vacancy rates were more likely to be higher in poorer areas, where length of residence in a house tended to be shorter.87 In 1695, the statistician Gregory King (1628-86) estimated that 5.4 per cent of houses in London were empty at any point in time.88

87 Spence, London in the 1690s, p. 57.

45
Table 1.3: Number of uninhabited properties recorded in Hearth Tax, by Ward, 1666 and 1675

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Pre-Fire, empty houses</th>
<th>Pre-Fire, ratio of empty : non-empty houses</th>
<th>Post-Fire, empty houses</th>
<th>Post-Fire, ratio of empty : non-empty houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aldersgate Within</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1 : 8.6</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1 : 4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aldersgate Without</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1 : 7.9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1 : 86.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aldgate</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1 : 22.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bassishaw</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1 : 5.9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1 : 6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billingsgate</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1 : 16.6</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1 : 6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishopsgate Within</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1 : 24.4</td>
<td>‘Several’</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishopsgate Without</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 : 622.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bread Street</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1 : 1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridge</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1 : 29.5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1 : 14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad Street</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1 : 20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candlewick</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 : 70.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castle Baynard</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1 : 10.5</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1 : 2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheap</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1 : 11.8</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1 : 7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coleman Street</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 : 28.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordwainer</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1 : 14.2</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>1 : 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornhill</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 : 45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cripplegate Within</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1 : 5.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cripplegate Without</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 : 2150.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dowgate</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 : 11.0</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1 : 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farringdon Within</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>1 : 8.5</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>1 : 5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farringdon Without</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>1 : 12.3</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>1 : 29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langbourne</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1 : 18.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lime Street</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portsoken</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1 : 11.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 : 1999.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queenhithe</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>1 : 1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1 : 7.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 : 300.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vintry</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 : 13.7</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1 : 2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walbrook</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1 : 8.6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1 : 8.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 965 1 : 11.1 1,105 1 : 18.2

Sources: See table 1.1.

Note: Wards in bold designate that the majority of the ward was directly affected by the Fire.

Note: This table excludes the many plots that no houses were built on after the Fire. This is because they were almost always listed as just ‘a great toft of land unbuilt’, and so the extent of land not built upon could not be exactly quantified.

Table 1.3 shows that empty houses were a feature of urban topography before the Fire. Overall, there was a higher ratio of empty houses before the Fire. This difference must have been due the 1665 Plague, which meant that for the Ladyday 1666 assessments,
many households would have still been empty. The vacancy rates both before and after
the Fire were higher than those calculated by Spence based on the 1693-4 property
assessments of one empty dwelling for every 27 inhabited ones.\(^89\) It appeared that levels
of uninhabited dwellings were relatively high in the years around the Fire. The autumn
after the Fire, a London relative of the landowner and politician Sir Ralph Verney (1613-
96) wrote to him that ‘ground goes even a begging, & there is soe much to be sold that it
becomes every day cheaper than the other.’\(^90\) In 1672, the City government, in a petition
to Parliament, claimed that there were 3,000 empty houses and unbuilt tofts in the City
and liberties – representing one sixth of the area.\(^91\) The issue of areas of London being
depopulated certainly concerned the City government. In 1672, a committee was set up
‘consider of all expedients that may conduce to the better replenishing of this Citty with
Inhabitants’.\(^92\) However, it does appear that over time the empty houses in the City were
being filled. Even allowing for under-recording, by 1675, the number of uninhabited
houses had fallen compared to the previous year.

---

\(^89\) This value is, however, a lower limit - and may represent less than half of the true proportion of empty


\(^91\) GL, *Reasons humbly offered to The Parliament for The Abatement of the Proportion of the Assessment

\(^92\) LMA, Rep. 78, fol. 27r.
Figure 1.3: Ward map of empty houses recorded in Hearth Tax, 1666 and 1675

The locality of empty houses varied before and after the Fire. As table 1.3 and figure 1.3 show, there seems to be very little link between the levels of empty houses in the wards before and after the Fire. This is borne out by statistical testing, which determined that there was no correlation between the proportions of empty houses in the 18 wards with comparable data for before and after the Fire.\(^93\) This difference is due to the fact that in the wards largely unaffected by the Fire, the number of empty houses was likely to be much higher before the Fire. Although much rebuilding had been undertaken within the Walls, many of these new houses appear to have been left empty, as people may have preferred to remain in cheaper housing in areas of London unaffected by the Fire. This effect is shown in table 1.4. The locality of urban disaster also affected the distribution of uninhabited houses. Wards such as Portsoken and Tower, located in the more densely populated unhygienic areas east of London, were more heavily affected by the Plague than the centre of London but relatively untouched by the Fire. As such, the differential between levels of ‘uninhabitation’ before and after the Fire was higher in these areas. Houses on the periphery of the City that survived the Fire could cater for the demand for housing after the Fire. Although legislation often prohibited it, property owners in the suburbs frequently subdivided houses, converted existing structures into tenements or took in lodgers to meet demand for housing. It is likely that this would have intensified, in the short term at least, after the Fire – increasing population density in the suburbs.\(^94\)

\(^{93}\) Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient gives a value of 0.083, which is not statistically significant. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; \(t=0.332\) and the tabulated value is 2.12 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation between distribution of empty houses before and after the Fire must be accepted.

\(^{94}\) Baer, ‘Housing the poor and mechanick class’, 13. 21-2, 38-30.
Table 1.4: Number of uninhabited properties recorded in Hearth Tax, by region of London, 1666 and 1675

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Pre-Fire, empty houses</th>
<th>Pre-Fire, ratio of empty : non-empty houses</th>
<th>Post-Fire, empty houses</th>
<th>Post-Fire, ratio of empty : non-empty</th>
<th>ratio of non-empty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fired areas of London*</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>1: 9.4</td>
<td>1188</td>
<td>1: 6.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-fired areas within the Walls</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1: 10.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1: 732.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of the Walls</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1: 9.9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1: 300.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East of the Walls</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1: 11.5</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>1: 24.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West of the Walls</td>
<td>101**</td>
<td>1: 10.5</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>1: 70.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwark</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1: 36.1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1: 115.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1: 11.3</td>
<td>1,542</td>
<td>1: 21.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 1.1.
* Includes the areas north and west of the Walls directly affected by the Fire.
** Does not include data from the 1664 Royal Subsidy for Westminster, which was socially skewed, and did not include empty households.
Table 1.4 shows that there was little correlation in the distribution of empty houses, even when tabulated on a metropolis-wide basis. After the Fire, the areas that had not been rebuilt had high ratios of empty to non-empty houses compared to the rebuilt areas of London. It must also be noted that the levels of 'empty-ness' in the City within the Walls after the Fire shown in table 1.4 do not include the numerous plots of land with nothing whatsoever built on them, and so the figures are an underestimate. Also, in areas within the Walls directly unaffected by the Fire, the number of empty houses decreased sharply from 1666 to 1675. It is probable that the houses left empty in these areas after the 1665 Plague had been used after the Fire, meaning that far fewer empty households were recorded in the 1675 Hearth Tax listings. It is clear that much of the residential movement out of the City after the Fire must have become permanent. This suggests that perhaps the 'pull' of the City was declining, or at least was limited by the costs of building and living there. However, this may have been reversed by the 1690s, when it appears that vacancy levels fell in the City within the Walls, with the poorer more densely inhabited areas north and east of the Walls more likely to have consistently higher levels of empty houses.

---

95 Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient gives a value of 0.337, which is not statistically significant. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=0.716 and the tabulated value is 2.78 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation between distribution of empty houses before and after the Fire must be accepted.

96 Spence, *London in the 1690s*, p. 58, fig. 3.9, p. 59.
Housing Density

Figure 1.4: Comparison of total number of houses in 18 wards, 1666 and 1675

Sources: See table 1.1.

Figure 1.4 shows the total number of houses recorded in each ward where a full return exists for both before and after the Fire.\(^{97}\) There is high correlation between the total number of houses recorded in each ward before and after the Fire.\(^{98}\) This shows that the overall level of density of houses in each City ward did not change significantly as a result of the Fire. Rather, there was a change in the nature of the size of the households.

\(^{97}\) Aldersgate Within, Aldersgate Without, Aldgate, Bassishaw, Billingsgate, Bridge, Candlewick, Castle Baynard, Cheap, Coleman Street, Cordwainer, Cripplegate Within, Farringdon Within, Farringdon Without, Langbourne, Portsoken, Tower and Walbrook.

\(^{98}\) A Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient gives a high level of correlation of 0.826, which is statistically significant. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; \(t=5.87\) and the tabulated value is 2.12 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation between total number of households before and after the Fire must be rejected.
within these houses, which generally seem to have been larger after the Fire, which led to a fall in population density.\textsuperscript{99}

In summation, it appeared that there were some overall patterns for London's household structure before and after the Fire. There was a general rise in the number of hearths per household after the Fire, reflecting a general increase in the overall size of houses. The 1667 Rebuilding Act fixed a minimum number of stories on houses according to their position.\textsuperscript{100} This would have pushed the size of houses upwards. Secondly, there appeared to have been a change in the geographical distribution of uninhabited houses in London - from being concentrated in the suburbs before the Fire to being concentrated in the centre afterwards. In the years around 1666, the numbers of empty houses were probably higher than average, due to the effects of Plague and Fire. Finally, the total number of households in the destroyed areas of London did not change significantly after the Fire, as most new houses were built on the same site as previous dwellings.\textsuperscript{101}

\textit{Comparisons at the parish level}

To examine the question of uninhabited houses and distribution of numbers of hearths more closely, these variables for the 17 parishes with full returns for the 1666 and 1675 London Hearth Tax assessments were compared. All of these parishes are situated within the Walls, with the exception of St Bartholomew the Great and St Bartholomew the Less to the north and St Bride Fleet Street and St Dunstan in the West to the west. Comparing

\textsuperscript{100} Baker, \textit{London: rebuilding the City}, pp. 11-12.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p. 12.
individual parishes also meant that it was certain that the geographical areas being compared were identical.

The numbers of hearths per household in the 17 comparable parishes will be compared (named in table 1.5). As the data is organised by parish, it allowed it to be accurately divided into areas entirely directly unaffected by the Fire (St Bartholomew the Great, St Bartholomew the Less and St Olave Hart Street) and the rest of the sample, all of which was drawn from parishes which were in areas directly affected by the Fire. The results were plotted in figure 1.5.

**Figure 1.5: Number of hearths per household in 17 London parishes, 1666 and 1675**

![Graph showing number of hearths per household in 17 London parishes, 1666 and 1675.]

*Sources: See table 1.1.*
Figure 1.5 clearly shows the effect of the Fire on the number of hearths per household. After the Fire, in the fired and rebuilt parishes in the sample, there was an increase in the proportion of households with more than seven hearths, and a general rise in the number of hearths per household. In the parishes directly unaffected by the Fire, the distribution of the number of hearths per household remained more stable before and after the Fire. There was a significant degree of difference between the distributions of numbers of hearths before and after the Fire in parishes only for the destroyed areas of London.\textsuperscript{102} Thus, the comparison using the 17 parishes confirms the findings using larger samples - that in areas of London destroyed by the Fire, it was likely that the rebuilt houses would have larger numbers of hearths than previously.

Due to differences in how the Hearth Tax was assessed, it was not possible to compare the numbers of empty houses in the 17 parishes before and after the Fire; with the exception of two parishes located outside of the Walls: St Bride Fleet Street and St Dunstan in the West, as table 1.5, below, shows. The former parish, partially located in a fired area, experienced an increase in the incidence of empty houses after the Fire. However, the latter parish experienced a decrease. This may be due to the fact that St Dunstan in the West, which was comparatively untouched by the Fire compared to St Bride Fleet Street, experienced an influx of inhabitants after the Fire, resulting in a rise of levels of inhabitation.

\textsuperscript{102} Testing using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at 95%: Fired parishes, \(D=0.311\) and the critical value is 0.036. Therefore the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected. Non-fired parishes, \(D=0.043\) and the critical value is 0.077. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no significant difference is accepted.
Table 1.5: Empty houses in 17 parishes in the Hearth Tax Listings, 1666 and 1675

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parish</th>
<th>Pre-Fire inhabited houses</th>
<th>Pre-Fire empty houses</th>
<th>Post-Fire inhabited houses</th>
<th>Post-Fire empty houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Hallows Staining</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Alban Wood Street</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Alphage London Wall</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Andrew Hubbard</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Antholin Budge Row</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Bartholomew the Great</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Bartholomew the Less</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Bride Fleet Street</td>
<td>1493</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Dunstan in the West</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St George Botolph Lane</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Katherine Coleman</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Aldermanbury</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Magdalen Milk Street</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary-at-Hill</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary-le-Bow</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Michael Wood Street</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Olave Hart Street</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3878</strong></td>
<td><strong>348</strong></td>
<td><strong>3192</strong></td>
<td><strong>118</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 1.1.

Note: It was not able to accurately assess the numbers of uninhabited households per parish for after the Fire because the numbers of empty houses were given as a total for each ward, rather than topographically inserted into the listing.
Figure 1.6 shows that there was a high level of correlation between the total number of households recorded before and after the Fire at the parochial level.\footnote{A Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient gives an extremely high level of correlation of 0.968, which is statistically significant. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=15.051 and the tabulated value is 2.13 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation between total number of households before and after the Fire must be rejected.} The outlying parish in figure 1.6 was St Bride Fleet Street, which recorded 1,493 households before the Fire, but only 873 afterwards. This may be due to the fact that a large area of this parish had nothing whatsoever built on it after the Fire. The 1675 Hearth Tax assessment records that in the parish there were ‘22 great & little tofts unbuilt’.\footnote{1675 Hearth Tax, City of London and Middlesex, TNA, E179/252/23, fol. 95v.} As a result, the number of households recorded after the Fire was reduced. This depopulation was reflected in the average numbers buried in the parish before and after the Fire. From 1660-4, the mean number buried per annum was 372.6. This fell to 256.0 for the period.
The comparison of the numbers of households recorded at the parochial level confirms the conclusions of the comparison at the ward level – that the total number of households did not change significantly after the Fire.

Individual movement before and after the Fire

In this section, the movement of individuals with linked taxation records before and after the Fire will be discussed and explored. It will show how individual experiences shaped residential movement, and to what extent different social and geographical groups experienced common factors in their movements before and after the Fire. It will also place these movements in the context of over-arching population trends in seventeenth-century London. For example, the growth of the western suburbs of the city, which was mainly driven by the demands of the gentry, who increasingly flocked to these areas over the seventeenth century - in particular to planned developments such as Covent Garden. Conversely, there was also significant growth in the East End, although this area was characterised by settlement of individuals of lower social status.¹⁰⁶

The main challenge of nominal linkage is minimising the number of ‘false’ linkages - i.e. linking records which in fact are from different individuals, even if they share the same

¹⁰⁵ However, by the period 1676-80, the mean number of burials per annum in St Bride Fleet Street was 355.6 – a return to pre-Fire levels, and a possible reflection of the resettlement of the parish. A Collection Of The Yearly Bills Of Mortality, From 1657 to 1758 inclusive, ed. T. Birch (London: A. Millar, 1759), pp. 54-63, 78-97.

name. However, using the safeguards detailed above means that there is a high probability that the nominal linkage was accurate. In total, there were 11,861 linkable individuals recorded in the taxation assessments before the Fire. This excluded individuals whose first name was not listed - such as individuals with the title ‘Esq.’, ‘Mr’ or ‘Dr’. However, the most significant group to not have their first name listed were widows. Also, many entries recorded no name whatsoever - for example, for empty houses or illegible entries.

Table 1.6: Traceable individuals from taxation records before the Fire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Total records</th>
<th>% of which untraceable</th>
<th>Total traceable individuals</th>
<th>% of which nominally linked after the Fire</th>
<th>Total individuals linked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City within the Walls</td>
<td>7567</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>6021</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of the Walls</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East of the Walls</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West of the Walls</td>
<td>3401</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>3021</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwark</td>
<td>2226</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>1720</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,487</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.7 (2,564)</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,861</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>965</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 1.1.

Table 1.6 shows the difficulty of nominal linkage. Even with a large initial starting sample, there is a high rate of ‘attrition’ due to the gaps in the data and the problems of ensuring accuracy. It also shows slight geographical differences in the percentages of individuals nominally linked by region of London. Southwark and the areas east of the Walls were generally home to poorer individuals who were generally more unstable in their residential persistence, making nominal linkage from these areas more problematic.
Also, poorer areas were more likely to be home to larger numbers of widows, whose first names were usually not recorded.

One method of overcoming the difficulties of nominal linkage from the Hearth Tax assessments would have been to use witness depositions from ecclesiastical courts. These depositions recorded the questions asked to witnesses to establish their social credit, and often included information about past places of residence and the amount of time spent in each location.\textsuperscript{107} The church courts also would have provided more information on the residential movement of women, who were more likely to be recorded as witnesses than as householders in the Hearth Tax assessments.\textsuperscript{108} Theoretically, this information could have been used to examine individual sequential movement after the Fire, as well as indicating of the duration of residence in each location.\textsuperscript{109} However, due to gaps in the records of the Commissary and Consistory Courts of the Diocese of London from c. 1640-69, only the depositions of the Court of Arches (the appeal court for cases before all church courts in the Province of Canterbury held at Lambeth Palace) could be used to accurately trace residential movement shortly after the Fire.

The descriptions of these residential movements were included in the preamble to the deposition. For example, Samuel Wheeldon, testifying in the case of Isabella Metford vs. 


\textsuperscript{108} Particularly in certain types of libel cases. Laura Gowing calculates that from 1570-1640 in the London church courts there were c. 1,800 suits over sexual slander or marriage, of which 85% had at least one female litigant. There were c. 6,000 witness testimonials in these cases, of which 43% came from women. L. Gowing, \textit{Domestic Dangers: women, words, and sex in early modern London} (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1996), p. 12.

\textsuperscript{109} As has been carried out for migration studies for the nineteenth century, see, for example, R. Lawton and C. G. Pooley, ‘David Brindley’s Liverpool: an aspect of urban society in the 1880s’. \textit{Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire}, 125 (1975 for 1974), 149-68.
John Metford on 18 December 1666, was recorded as living in 'paroa St Jacobi Clerkenwell in St Johns street ... ubi habitavit per 4 menses ... antea in paroa St Anna Aldersgate per 12 annos'. These descriptions could have provided some insight into sequential residential movement after the Fire. However, from a three year sample after the Fire, only 11 witnesses could be found who had lived in destroyed areas of London - a sample not large enough to be statistically useful. As such, nominal linkage using the Hearth Taxes had to be employed as the method of examining individual movement after the Fire.

The nominal linkage exercise in this section could not examine the possibility of movement outside of London. Trying to take this into account systematically using Hearth Tax assessment records would have created too large and unwieldy a data set. Also, the increased number of names in the sample would have made nominal linkage a far more difficult prospect. There is anecdotal evidence of people leaving London to set up home in other parts of the country after the Fire. Anthony Wood recorded in his autobiography that in the aftermath of the disaster 'several traders' set up shop in Oxford, where he lived. A witness deposition from the Court of Arches from 27 June 1667 shows this. It recorded that Anthony Sturt, a haberdasher and Citizen of London, had been resident in Mitcham, Surrey, for nine months. Previously, he had lived in the parish of All Hallows Barking. The Hearth Tax assessments listed him as a householder in Mark Lane (an area destroyed in the Fire) in All Hallows Barking on Ladyday 1666. In

110 LPL, Court of Arches Depositions, 1665-1668, MS Film 147, Eee 2, fol. 208r.
111 Ibid., fols. 208r-209v. Of the sample, five moved north just after the Fire, three moved east, two moved west and one moved south.
June 1667, he successfully petitioned the Fire Court to order his landlords to contribute to the rebuilding of the property, but he does not appear to have stayed there in the long-term.\textsuperscript{13} He is not recorded in the 1675 Hearth Tax assessment for the City. All available evidence, therefore, suggests that Sturt moved from the City to Surrey after being burnt out, and remained there. Unfortunately, it was not feasible to systematically recover similar cases but it is likely that this type of residential movement after the Fire was not unique. There is also the possibility that some Londoners emigrated after the Fire.

The use of the Hearth Taxes may also exclude the poorer inhabitants of London who left the City for temporary dwellings after the Fire. Even the wealthy were forced into open spaces around the City. Francisco de Rapicani (b. 1636), an Italian visitor to London with a suite of Swedish diplomats, wrote in around 1719 that after the Fire there ‘was great distress among the people, and countless poor persons with nothing but a stick in their hands ... were scattered here and there in the fields where they had built huts for themselves’.\textsuperscript{114} It is clear, for example, that there was widespread settlement of Moorfields in the decade after the Fire. As early as April 1667, Pepys recorded houses in Moorfields two storeys high ‘and like to stand, and ... became a place of great trade till the City be built’.\textsuperscript{115} In July 1674 the Court of Aldermen ordered all the sheds in Moorfields to be demolished, and in May 1675 the Court ordered ‘the demolishing of all sheds ... erected since the Late dismall fire’.\textsuperscript{116} This would have included settlement in

\textsuperscript{13} LPL, Court of Arches Depositions, 1665–1668, MS Film 147, Eee 2, fol. 454v: TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32. Part 18, fol. 16r; Fire Court, ed. Jones, i, 38.
\textsuperscript{115} Pepys, Diary, ed. Latham and Matthews, viii. 155.
\textsuperscript{116} LMA, Rep. 79, fol. 292r; Rep. 80, fols. 184r–v.
Finsbury Fields, where the poor without dwellings were settled after the Fire. John Evelyn (1620-1706) recorded seeing ‘200,000’ people made homeless by the Fire in Islington and Highgate shortly after the Fire. There were also temporary dwellings set up south of the river, in St George’s Fields, an area of common ground south of Southwark and east of Lambeth. It is possible that residences there became permanent. For example, in 1680, the widow Frances Barnard petitioned the Court of Aldermen for permission to carry on building a tenement in St George’s Fields, possibly responding to demand for low cost housing in the area.

It is clear that individuals made homeless by the Fire moved to areas of open ground around the City, and that for many of these people the movement became permanent rather than a short term solution, due to the expense of moving back into the City. Many of these individuals were likely to have been poor, living in houses with a small number of hearths, or lodging. Therefore, they would not have been included in the listings made after the Fire. As such, the findings in this section may underestimate certain directions of movement, particularly to areas such as Moorfields.

117 LMA, Rep. 71, fol. 169r.
118 Evelyn, Diary, ed. De Beer. iii, 461-2.
119 Ibid., iii, 457.
120 LMA, Rep. 85, fol. 142v.
The 'covenant to maintain': a constraint on individual movement?

The majority of Londoners in the City were leaseholders. As such, they had an obligation to their landlord to maintain the condition of their household. Technically, this meant that they had an obligation to rebuild their house after it was destroyed in the Fire. Although in practice, the rebuilding legislation and the Fire Court realised that it was financially impossible for many to rebuild, leaseholders still had a legal obligation to their landlord. In this section, a sample of individuals linked in the Hearth Tax before and after the Fire who also appeared before the Fire Court will be discussed to show the relationships between residential change and lease-holding.

For the Fire Court, the ideal situation was for the tenant in possession of the property at the time of the Fire to take charge of the rebuilding themselves. In return, they were given reductions in rent and extensions in the length of their lease. If the tenant had the immediate means to rebuild, in the long-term they could reduce the costs of their housing. When Henry Hothersall, a vintner of Fleet Street, appeared before the Fire Court in May 1667, his pre-Fire rent was £75 per annum and ten gallons of 'Canary Sack' and his lease had 23 years to run. When he agreed to rebuild by Christmas 1668, he was given a new lease of 61 years and his rent was reduced to £40 per annum. The Court also gave Hothersall a small parcel of additional land to give him access to Shoe Lane. The decision must have benefited Hothersall, and the number of hearths in his property increased from 18 to 31 between 1666 and 1675. This was not an isolated incident.

121 TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32. Part 8/2, fol. 25v; TNA, 1675 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/23, fol. 95v: Fire Court, ed. Jones, i. 82-3. On 3 September 1667 and 19 February
On 17 April 1667, Peter Pickering of Pater Noster Row agreed to rebuild and had his rent reduced from £10 per annum to £6 13s 4d and his lease extended by 37 years. The lease of George Torriano of St Nicholas Lane, in the parish of St Nicholas Acon, at a length of 24.75 years, stipulated an annual rent of 42 shillings in addition to quarterly payments of £10 14s 6d to pay off his fine – in effect £45 per annum. On 29 April 1668, after he agreed to rebuild, the Fire Court reduced his rent to £25 and added 40 years to his old lease.

Occasionally it appeared that tenants did agree to rebuild their house but still changed their residence between the linked Hearth Tax assessments. For example, Godfrey Beck, a goldsmith, relocated from Lombard Street to Broad Street after the Fire. On 14 October 1668, he agreed to rebuild in Lombard Street. The Fire Court ordered his annual rent halved to £8, and his lease, which had around two years to run, was extended to 51 years. Beck paid to have foundations laid out on Lombard Street on 14 October 1668. In a similar case, Mark Catesby, a skinner who moved from Fleet Street to Clare Street (in the parish of St Clement Dane) after the Fire, agreed to rebuild but did not remain in his pre-Fire location. On 10 March 1668, the Fire Court decreased his rent from £28 to £16 per annum, and extended his lease by 45 years. Catesby paid to have foundations laid out on

122 TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32, Part 5/4, fol. 31r; TNA, 1675 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/23, fol. 72v; Fire Court, ed. Jones, i, 16-17. The foundations were staked out on 31 March 1668. Mills and Oliver, Survey of the building sites, ii, fols. 82v-83r.

123 TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32, Part 2, fol. 4r; TNA, 1675 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/23, fol. 106r; Fire Court, ed. Jones, ii, 131. The foundations were staked out on 18 May 1668. Mills and Oliver, Survey of the building sites, i, 52.

124 TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32, Part 3, fol. 3r; TNA, 1675 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/23, fol. 84r; Fire Court, ed. Jones, ii, 272; Mills and Oliver, Survey of the building sites, i, 46.
Fleet Street on 3 April 1668. The explanation for cases of this type may be that the tenants took advantage of the decreased rents and increased leases awarded by the Fire Court by sub-letting the property at a higher rent after it was rebuilt, and then moving. It appears that individuals with sufficient capital or credit to rebuild could benefit greatly from the decisions of the Fire Court.

Of course, many Londoners did not have the means to rebuild, and it appears that the Fire Court would not coerce them to honour their ‘covenant to maintain’. Subtenants appear to have often been given leeway. For example, Gervaise Byfield, a skinner, the tenant of a property in Walbrook leased from the subtenant of the owner was freed by the Fire Court on 4 July 1667 of all obligations on the property upon payment of two months arrears of rent. By 1675 he had relocated to George Yard in Cordwainer Ward. On 12 December 1667, Thomas Frampton, an under tenant in a large property in the parish of St Edmund King and Martyr was ‘discharged from the covenants’ when he ‘came voluntarily into Court and declared his willingness to surrender’ his interests. By 1675 he had relocated to Milk Street.

The Fire Court did not always allow tenants to escape their obligations. Anthony Selby, a salter, leased a property on New Fish Street Hill from Widow Elizabeth Robinson. He had been granted a new 25 years lease on 8 March 1666, and when he appeared before

---

the Fire Court on 25 April 1667, he refused to rebuild because he claimed the house had lost twelve feet in frontage when the new foundations were staked out. He also sought compensation of £100 for the cellars and vaults remaining on the property that he had added. In fact, the Court decreed that Selby was to pay Robinson £120 for the surrender of the lease. In a fairly unusual event for the Fire Court, Selby appealed the decision on 10 June 1667, but the original decision was upheld and he was ordered to pay Robinson £5 for the inconvenience he had caused. Selby eventually resettled in King’s Head Yard in Billingsgate Ward.128

It is clear that tenants could not completely escape their obligation to their landlords to maintain their houses. However, in practice, this did not extend to an obligation to rebuild completely. If a tenant was unable to do so, they were allowed to surrender their lease – almost always after some payment to their landlord, usually in the form of arrears in rent or a cash payment. If a tenant had the means to rebuild, they would be awarded improved leases by the Fire Court. Theoretically, the Fire Court could limit residential movement after the Fire, but in practice the court’s decisions did not seem to have constrained those who were financially unable or unwilling to rebuild their houses, allowing them to resettle elsewhere. Conversely, the Fire Court also protected the landlord’s investment, as it ensured that if the tenant was able to rebuild, they could be forced to do so, or else compensate the landlord. The destruction of a house, thus, did not destroy all of its value to its owner.

Nominal linkage of the taxation assessments concluded that 84.8 per cent of 547 individuals burnt out changed their location after the Fire. However, movement was commonplace even from areas directly unaffected by the Fire, where 64.6 per cent of 418 individuals moved in the years after the Fire. Most Londoners moved several times over the course of their lives. Much of this movement would have been relatively short distance - as most moves were within the same neighbourhood. The proportion of residential movement is higher in areas which were destroyed by the Fire, and is similar to the proportion of Merchant Taylors who moved from areas destroyed by the Fire (80.0 per cent). However, the Hearth Tax assessments, because they give very specific household locations, mean the figures record relocation of any kind - even highly localised moves.

The examination of Merchant Taylors and booksellers in chapter 2, below, will show that returning to the same pre-Fire address, with an intervening spell in an undamaged part of London, was common. For example, the Merchant Taylor Oliver Crumpton, a 'salesman' based in Cannon Street before the Fire, moved to the Minories, east of the Walls, shortly after the Fire, but had returned to Cannon Street by 1672 at the latest - or possibly earlier: he had paid to have foundations staked out for a property in Cannon

Street in November 1667. Similarly, the bookseller George Calvert (1620-91), brother of the radical bookseller Giles Calvert (bap. 1612, d. 1663), had been based in Paul’s Churchyard before the Fire and had moved north to Jewen Street before returning to his original workplace by 1676.

Linkage of the witness depositions in ecclesiastical courts to the Hearth Tax assessments also illustrated this. Henry Baldwin, a baker, appeared as a witness in the Court of Arches on 27 June 1667, and was recorded as living in the parish of St Ethelburga Bishopsgate. Around nine months previously (just before the Fire) he had lived in the parish of St Bride Fleet Street. He had probably returned to the parish by 1675. A Henry Baldwin appears in the assessment for that parish for the 1675 Hearth Tax, listed in a house with ten hearths (a high number, linked to his trade as a baker) in Fleet Street. Anecdotal evidence linked to Fire Court records also illustrated short-term movement after the Fire. Abraham Browne’s inn, the ‘White Horse’, was located in Lombard Street before the Fire. Pepys recorded in his diary on 24 February 1667 that Browne’s wife Frances, ‘a most beautiful woman’, had committed suicide by throwing herself into the Thames, supposedly a result of the grief caused by the loss of the inn. It appeared that the Brownes had moved to a different location, as Pepys recorded that Frances was the mistress of the ‘Beare Tavern’ on Bridge Foot at the time. Just over one year later, the

133 LPL, Court of Arches Depositions, 1665-1668, MS Film 147, Eec 2. fol. 455r; TNA, 1675 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/23. fol. 91v.
Fire Court ordered Browne to rebuild the tavern on Lombard Street, with his rent decreased by half to £20, and lease extended by 40 years. The foundations were staked out in June 1668. It appeared that, in spite of the death of his wife, Browne was able to return to his pre-Fire address with a much reduced rent in exchange for taking on the rebuilding of the property.

In the section below the relative distance of the moves will be assessed. The figures for percentages of individuals moving may also be a slight over-estimation because they do not take into account the remarriage of widows. In this case, the name of the householder would change to the new husband's - thus masking the residential persistence of women who remarried. The levels of residential persistence (35.4 per cent did not change residence) amongst Londoners not burnt out in the decade after the Fire match the 25 to 40 per cent rate of residential persistence calculated by Finlay using parochial lists of householders. This is similar to the levels of residential persistence in seventeenth-century Southwark calculated by Boulton, where just 24 per cent of the population stayed in the same house for ten years. It appeared that the experience of being fired increased the likelihood of changing residence by roughly half. The high levels of residential mobility and low levels of attachment to residence in early modern London may have mitigated the psychological effects of being burnt out, as most Londoners were used to moving house on a fairly regular basis.

134 TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32, Part 3, fol. 4r; Pepys, Diary, ed. Latham and Matthews, viii, 82; Fire Court, ed. Jones, i, 270; Mills and Oliver. Survey of the building sites, i, 46. 135 Finlay, Population and metropolis, pp. 46-7. 136 Boulton, 'Neighbourhood migration', in Migration and society, ed. Clark and Souden, table 11, p. 119.
Table 1.7: Movement of nominally linked individuals from taxation assessments before and after the Fire (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of London</th>
<th>Fired</th>
<th>Non-fired</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moved within same region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of London</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City within the Walls</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved into different</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>region of London</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Into the City within the</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northward</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southward</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastward</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westward</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (464)</td>
<td>100 (270)</td>
<td>100 (734)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 1.1.

Table 1.7 shows the movement of Londoners before and after the Fire. Overall, the most common type of movement was within the Walls. It appears that movement within the fired areas of the City tended to be within the Walls, with movement north being the most popular destination outside of the Walls, followed by movement west. Movement eastward or to Southwark appears to have been relatively uncommon - particularly if it was from areas directly unaffected by the Fire. This may be due to the lower social status of these areas, meaning their residents would be less likely to be assessed for the Hearth Tax, and so not be included in the listings.

There seems to have been relatively higher levels of movement in areas west of the Walls unaffected by the Fire. This may be due to the fact that many of the great noble houses in this area were being divided and sub-divided after the mid seventeenth century, and that many householders took in lodgers as a method of supplementing their income and
perhaps making up for the higher costs of residing in a more prestigious area. As such, there was perhaps a greater availability of housing for poorer groups in the areas west of the Walls. As a result of this, the levels of movement west might have been underestimated as a result of the social skewing of the Hearth Taxes. There is certainly anecdotal evidence for the movement of poorer groups west. A 1666 petition from the churchwardens of St Martin-in-the-Fields for the payment of £11 ls 6d for pickaxes and ‘other necessities’ provided (and presumably lost) during the Fire requested the money as it was ‘parte of the poore stock who are soe numerous that (we) are not able to provide for them’. Similarly, a 1666 petition from the parish of St Sepulchre Holborn to the King claimed that poor from other parts of London had come to the parish after the Fire. In 1667, the Provost Marshall Gilbert Thomas wrote that ‘since ye late lamentable fire in London greate numbers of fellons Robbers & other notorious offenders doe harbor resort & are received in & about ye said Citty of Westminster’. Such individuals were unlikely to have been included in the Hearth Tax.

The increase in population west of the Walls is also shown by a 1668 petition to Charles II, from the vicar and churchwardens of St Martin-in-the-Fields, which asked him for a piece of royal ground to increase the size of the parish’s burial ground, ‘by reason not only of ye late sickening ... but alsoe by reason of ye late sadd fyre which hath fild ye parish with Inhabitants’. It is likely that many individuals who moved west –

---

138 TNA, Petition of churchwardens of St Martin-in-the-Fields to the King. 1666, SP 29/173, 116; TNA, Petition of the vicar of St Sepulchre Holborn and other inhabitants of the parish to the King. 1666, SP 29/173, 117.
139 TNA, Petition of Gilbert Thomas to the King. February 1667. SP 29/192, 70.
140 TNA, Petition of the vicar and churchwardens of St Martin-in-the-Fields to the King, 21 February 1668,
particularly into Westminster, were not included in the sample taken for this chapter, and therefore the totals for movement in this direction may be an underestimate.

Table 1.8: Non-movement of individuals linked in taxation assessments before and after the Fire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of London</th>
<th>Total number linked</th>
<th>% which did not move</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area destroyed in the Fire</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City within the Walls, unaffected by the Fire</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of the Walls</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East of the Walls</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West of the Walls and Westminster</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwark</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>965</strong></td>
<td><strong>23.9 (231)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 1.1.

Table 1.8 shows that residential movement was a regular occurrence, even in areas directly unaffected by the Fire. The areas with the most stable residential structure appeared to have been the areas of the City not destroyed in the Fire and the areas north of the Walls. The areas east of the Walls appear to have been relatively more residentially mobile, which perhaps stemmed from the lower social status of the area. Poorer people tended to have shorter leases and experienced higher population turnover, so they were less likely to remain in the same dwelling on a long-term basis. There was a high degree of residential mobility in the West End, as leases there tended to be short, thus facilitating frequent residential movement. Southwark and the areas west of the Walls, despite their socio-economic differences, had almost identical levels of

---

142 The West End was an area of generally higher socio-economic status than Southwark. Stone, ‘Residential development’, in After the Reformation, ed. Malament, pp. 167-212; Smuts, ‘Court and its
residential stability, but for different reasons. Southwark was an area of generally lower social status than the West End.

To gain a finer sense of residential change after the Fire, individual movement of linked individuals before and after the Fire will be examined and profiled more closely by constructing a typology of the range of residential movements. A gradient of movement will be identified by examining each move. Firstly, individuals who moved to neighbouring adjacent locations will be identified. An example is Thomas Knightley, who moved from Fetter Lane to the adjacent address of Fleet Street after the Fire. Secondly, movement within a ward will be identified (For the areas south and west of the Walls not located in a ward, the parish, which tended to be larger outside of the City, was used.). Thirdly, movement to neighbouring wards (or parishes) was identified.

There was a statistical difference between the range of movement in fired and non-fired areas. The range of individual movement was affected by being located in an area of London destroyed by the Fire. As table 1.9, below, shows, in areas unaffected by the Fire, movement was around 15 per cent more likely to be short range than in areas of London destroyed by the Fire. Overall, movement to areas beyond neighbouring wards was at higher levels in fired areas. It appears that individuals who were forced to move their households after the Fire experienced more dislocation in terms of the distance of their moves than individuals from other parts of London.

neighbourhood", 117-49; Boulton, Neighbourhood and society, pp. 60-137.

143 TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32, Part 8/1, fol. 4r; TNA, 1675 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/23, fol. 91v.

144 Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 55.000, tabulated value is 7.820, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected.
Table 1.9: Close and medium-range movement amongst linked individuals before and after the Fire (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of London</th>
<th>Total moved the Fire</th>
<th>no. after</th>
<th>% of moved adjacent location</th>
<th>% of which moved within ward / parish</th>
<th>% of which moved to neighbouring ward / parish</th>
<th>% of which moved beyond neighbouring ward / parish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area destroyed in the Fire</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Walls, unaffected by the Fire</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of the Walls</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East of the Walls</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West of the Walls</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwark</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>734</strong></td>
<td><strong>26.4 (194)</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.9 (117)</strong></td>
<td><strong>18.7 (137)</strong></td>
<td><strong>39.0 (286)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: See table 1.1.*
In general terms, it appeared that most residential movement in seventeenth-century London tended to be relatively short-range. Overall, just over one-third of residential movement was beyond neighbouring jurisdictions. However, of these ‘longer-range’ movements, just under one-third (29.7 per cent) was within the Walls, a relatively small geographical area. It appears that there was an overall pattern of residential persistence within the same district.\textsuperscript{145} Even if an individual had been forced to move household as a result of the Fire, it appears that the resultant residential movement still tended to be fairly localised in character.

It is difficult to measure precisely the exact personal circumstances behind each individual movement. As has been shown above, the majority of residential movement tended to be relatively short distance, with just 39.0 per cent of the movement being beyond the neighbouring ward. How individuals accessed information flows about available housing outside of their immediate neighbourhood is difficult to determine. It is possible that these individuals moving longer distances across London may have moved to areas with family, or other social, links that gave them access to information about the residential circumstances of the area.

To assess this, a sample of individuals whose houses were destroyed by the Fire and who moved beyond their neighbouring ward was taken. To accurately measure whether family links had an impact on residential movement, the 100 individuals with the rarest surnames were selected (to minimise the problem of false linkage), and the Hearth Tax

assessments were searched for individuals nearby with the same surname. Of the sample of 100, just six moved to areas nearby an individual with the same surname. For example, Robert Pigg, a victualler residing in St Magnus the Martyr Churchyard before the Fire, moved to Codpiece Court in the parish of St Margaret Westminster, nearby to his probable kinsman, Ralph Pigg, of Peter Street. This rate of six per cent of the individuals moving having a kin link to their new area is an underestimate, as it does not take into account households who moved to areas as a result of a kin link through the wife’s family, who would have had a different surname to the household. Also, it also does not take into account the impact of non-kin social links, which were probably more important and numerous than family links in the metropolitan context. Neighbours were the most important source of networks of social support in early modern London. However, social links were also formed by livery company membership, apprenticeship or even originating from the same part of the country before moving to London. In addition, many households were part of a network of debt and credit, which relied on a member of the local community with social credit to give someone with less credit the requisite security to carry out the loan. This mechanism became one way of forming social bonds, which may have facilitated the relocation of individuals forced to move after the Fire.

147 Boulton, Neighbourhood and society, pp. 247, 261.
Change in the social standing of individuals after the Fire

To gain an insight into the effects of the Fire on change in the wealth and social standing of householders after the Fire, the number of hearths per household will be used as an approximate proxy for these variables. The number of hearths is not a precise measure of individual wealth, but it does serve as an approximate indicator.\textsuperscript{149} A larger number of hearths in a household probably indicated a larger house size. Although in some cases, the number of hearths was skewed upward by occupation – for example, trades with forges or ovens may have been assessed for more hearths. In turn, the subdivision of houses may have skewed down the number of hearths per households.

Figure 1.7: Change in number hearths per household, individuals linked before and after the Fire

Sources: See table 1.1.

Note: This does not include the 80 individuals who could not have their change in number of hearths traced because the information was not included in the assessments.

\textsuperscript{149} Husbands, ‘Hearths, wealth and occupations’, in Surveying the People, ed. Schürer and Arkell, p. 75; Spufford, ‘The scope of Local History’, 204.
Figure 1.7 shows the distribution of the change in the number of hearths per linked individual before and after the Fire. It is clear that it was more common to experience a rise in the number of hearths per household, rather than a decline. This was due to the increased size of rebuilt houses. Over half of the individuals in the sample had an increased number of hearths, whilst around 20 per cent experienced no change. However, the numbers of people who experienced a decline in the number of hearths per household, and thus a decline in social status, may be underestimated. Individuals who experienced a marked decline in social standing after the Fire may have been too poor to be assessed for the Hearth Tax, and therefore would have been excluded from the dataset. However, for the individuals who could be linked before and after the Fire, around 90 per cent lay in the range between a net gain or net loss of five hearths, although there were outliers.

The largest decline in number of hearths was 17. Sir Joseph Sheldon (d. 1681), Lord Mayor of London, 1675-6, moved from a household of 36 hearths in the parish of St Botolph Aldersgate to one of 19 hearths in Paul’s Churchyard. Although Sheldon’s property experienced a reduction in the number of hearths, it must have still been a fairly large, and it was also newly built. Sheldon paid to have foundations staked out on 24 April 1668. Also, Sheldon moved to a more prestigious area. In this case, a decline in number of hearths did not mean a decline in the relative status of a household.

However, an example of a decline in the relative status of a household matching a decline

150 TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32, Part 11, fol. 8r; TNA, 1675 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/23, fol. 76r; Mills and Oliver, Survey of the building sites, i. 61.
in number of hearths is provided by the example of James Beacham. After the Fire, he moved from a household of seven hearths in Cheapside to a one hearth household in Beake's Rents, Portsoken Ward. This type of move, from the centre of the City to the periphery, and away from a main street, represented a significant loss of status, was possibly resultant of a failure to recover from the losses suffered as a result of the Fire.

The largest positive change in number of hearths in a household was 20. Arthur Stanley moved from a household of four hearths before in Lombard Street to one of 24 hearths in Broad Street after the Fire. The factor explaining this dramatic increase in Stanley's number of hearths is unclear. Perhaps the household after the Fire was some kind of hostelry. These individual case studies illustrate some of the different factors surrounding change in number of individual hearths.

152 TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32. Part 2. fol. 5r; TNA, 1675 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/23, fol. 84r.
Table 1.10: Change in number of hearths per household amongst individuals linked before and after the Fire (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in hearths</th>
<th>No. fired moved area, did not move place of household</th>
<th>Fired area, did not move place of household</th>
<th>Non-fired area, moved place of household</th>
<th>Non-fired area, did not move of household</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From -20 to -11</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From -10 to -6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No change</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 6 to 10</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 11 to 20</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (460)</td>
<td>100 (83)</td>
<td>100 (219)</td>
<td>100 (123)</td>
<td>100 (885)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 1.1.

Note: This does not include the 80 individuals who could not have their change in number of hearths traced because the information was not included in the assessments.
Table 1.10 illustrates how the circumstances of the linked individuals led to slightly different profiles in the gain or loss of hearths per household. A clear feature of this table is the fact that individuals from outside of the fired areas of London who did not move household retained the same number of hearths before and after the Fire just under two-thirds of the time (63.4 per cent). For example, George Westby, an upholsterer resident in Long Lane in the parish of St Botolph Aldersgate, was assessed as having three hearths before the Fire but five afterward. The fact that there was a degree of change in numbers of hearths in this group could be down to three factors. It could be as a result of individuals modifying or extending their households. It could be a result of a highly localised move - such as a movement within the same street. Finally, and most likely, it could show the inconsistency in the assessment of the Hearth Tax, particularly as there appears to have been a degree of confusion over which hearths were in fact liable to be taxed - particularly forges and ovens. The group with the biggest range of gain / loss in number of hearths was amongst individuals from areas not directly affected by the Fire who moved their household. This is unsurprising, given that this group would have had the highest number of motives for moving, be it older people relocating to smaller households, or perhaps a move to a larger household for economic or social reasons.

The group that experienced the highest proportion of individuals experiencing a decline in the number of hearths after the Fire were the individuals who had households in fired areas of London who moved. Over one-quarter (25.2 per cent) of this group experienced

154 Arkell, 'Incidence of poverty', 33.
155 Goose, 'How accurately do the Hearth Tax returns reflect wealth?', 44.
a decline in the number of hearths in their new households - perhaps reflecting a slight decline in economic means after the Fire. For example, Samuel Spilworth moved from a dwelling of seven hearths near the church of St Mary Aldermanbury before the Fire to a dwelling of just one hearth in New Cheapside after the Fire. However, over half of this group (58.0 per cent) increased the number of hearths per household after the Fire, reflecting the growth in house size in the rebuilt areas of London. This trend is most clear amongst individuals whose houses were destroyed in the Fire but who did not move - over two thirds of them (67.5 per cent) increased the number of hearths in their rebuilt houses, once again, suggesting that houses in the rebuilt areas of London tended to be larger. For example, Samuel Swinock, a merchant based in Magpie Alley (in the parish of St Katherine Coleman) was assessed for six hearths at that address before the Fire, but for thirteen afterwards. In the next section, the effect of the direction of residential movement on the gain / loss of hearths will be assessed.

Table 1.11: Change in number of hearths per household, individuals linked before and after the Fire who moved, by direction of movement (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in no. hearths</th>
<th>Moved within Walls</th>
<th>Moved into City within Walls</th>
<th>Moved northward</th>
<th>Moved southward</th>
<th>Moved east-ward</th>
<th>Moved west-ward</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-20 to -11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-10 to -6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 10</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 20</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (296)</td>
<td>100 (49)</td>
<td>100 (85)</td>
<td>100 (64)</td>
<td>100 (48)</td>
<td>100 (137)</td>
<td>100 (679)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 1.1.

Table 1.11 shows how the geographical location of the household and the direction of residential movement affected the changes in numbers of hearths per household. Movement into two of the higher social status areas of London - the City within the Walls and the Western suburbs tended to be more associated with an increase in number of hearths (73.5 per cent and 64.2 per cent, respectively). For example, when Ward Deakes moved from Three Legg Alley in the parish of St Dunstan in the West to Bow Street in the parish of St Paul Covent Garden, his assessment went up from four to ten hearths.158 Also, over half (56.8 per cent) of the movement within the Walls was associated with an increase in number of hearths per household. Clearly, the new rebuilding regulations and

the higher status of this area meant that houses there would tend to be larger, and thus have a higher number of hearths. The majority of movement east, north and south of the Walls tended to represent either no gain or a loss in the number of hearths per household, perhaps suggesting that the size of houses in these areas tended to be smaller, and that movement in these directions tended to represent more of a downward shift in social status. For example, before the Fire, James Beacham was listed as living in a dwelling of seven hearths on Cheapside but after the Fire, he had relocated east of the Walls to a dwelling of one hearth in Beakes Rents in Portsoken Ward.\(^{159}\)

\textit{Changes in the typology of locality}

Michael Power’s 1986 article on the social topography of early modern London used Hearth Tax assessments to investigate the importance of locality. Not all addresses in seventeenth-century London were equal. Rather, there was a rough gradient of desirability. Although there were exceptions, for the most part, the street was the most favoured location. Wealthier selling groups dominated these more expensive street fronts, whilst poorer craftsmen and the semi-skilled had to make do with the cheaper lanes, yards and alley. Ultimately, choice of location was dictated by commercial advantage and rent, which was weighed against the needs of particular occupations. Those in retail or service trades, for example, would have a strong preference for being located on principal streets.\(^{160}\) Power’s article examined the impact of occupation on

\(^{159}\) TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32, Part 5/3, fol. 28r; TNA, 1675 Hearth Tax, Middlesex, E179/143/370, fol. 23v.

location, but in this section the impact of the Fire on changes in the typology of location of individuals who moved household will be examined.

Table 1.12: Changing typology of locality before and after the Fire, from taxation assessments (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Fire locality</th>
<th>Post-Fire locality</th>
<th>Directly affected by the Fire</th>
<th>Unaffected by the Fire</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Street</td>
<td>Street</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lane</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alley</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yard</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street</td>
<td>Lane</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lane</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alley</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yard</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alley</td>
<td>Street</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lane</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yard</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yard</td>
<td>Street</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lane</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alley</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yard</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (415)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100(203)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100(618)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 1.1.
Note: Excludes the 116 individuals for whom there was not full information on locality before and after the Fire.

Given that there was a rough gradient of how socially desirable a locale was, it was possible to assign each type of move a rough nominal value. For example, a move from a street to a yard is given a value of -3, whilst a move from an alley to a lane is given a value of +1. A move to the same type of locale is thus socially neutral, and given a value of 0. However, these nominal values can be no more than estimates, as they do not take into account the relative prestige of neighbourhood. For example, Lawrence Baskerfield
moved from Milk Street (in the parish of St Lawrence Jewry) to Birds Court (in the parish of St Mary Aldermanbury) after the Fire,\textsuperscript{161} and Grace Bachelor moved from Fenchurch Street to Steile Alley, off Houndsditch, east of the Walls, after the Fire.\textsuperscript{162} Both these moves were given a nominal value of -3, even though the latter move represented a greater decline in the relative prestige of address as it was associated with a geographical movement to a less prestigious area. The nominal values thus can only represent a fairly broad spectrum, not a wholly accurate ‘value’ of the social desirability of a residential move.

Table 1.12 sets out the movement of individual households before and after the Fire in these terms. Overall, it appears that roughly similar proportions of moves were ‘positive’ (33.5 per cent), ‘neutral’ (27.0 per cent) or ‘negative’ (39.5 per cent). However, it is striking that change in locality, rather than stability, was the norm. Over two-thirds of residential movement was accompanied by some change in locality. When movements are divided into groups based on whether the individual was from an area of London destroyed by the Fire, slight differences emerge. Although similar proportions of movements were ‘neutral’ (27.0 per cent amongst fired householders, 27.1 per cent non-fired), there was a slightly higher proportion of ‘negative’ movements amongst those from non-fired areas (45.3 per cent) compared to fired areas (36.6 per cent).

\textsuperscript{161} TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32, Part 6, fol. 4v; TNA, 1675 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/23, fol. 100r.

\textsuperscript{162} TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32, Part 19, fol. 6v; TNA, 1675 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/23, fol. 47r.
Table 1.13: Changing typology of locality before and after the Fire, from taxation assessments, by direction of movement (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Fire locality</th>
<th>Post-Fire locality</th>
<th>Moved within Walls</th>
<th>Moved into City within Walls</th>
<th>Moved northward</th>
<th>Moved southward</th>
<th>Moved eastward</th>
<th>Moved westward</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Street</td>
<td>Street</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lane</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alley</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yard</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lane</td>
<td>Street</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lane</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alley</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yard</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alley</td>
<td>Street</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lane</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alley</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yard</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yard</td>
<td>Street</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lane</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alley</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yard</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100 (42)</td>
<td>100 (73)</td>
<td>100 (42)</td>
<td>100 (39)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(284) (138) (618)

Sources: See table 1.1.
Note: Excludes the 116 individuals for whom there was not full information on locality before and after the Fire.

Table 1.13 shows the impact of the direction of the move on changing typology of locality, and the differences between them. It appears that movements southward and eastward were perhaps slightly more likely to be 'negative' than other directions of residential movement, as 50.0 per cent of moves to the south and 53.8 per cent of moves eastward were associated with a downward movement in locality. After the Fire, John Hewer moved east from the fairly high status locality of Lombard Street to the less
prestigious address of Anchor and Hart Court in Portsoken Ward.\textsuperscript{163} This reflected the fact that the eastern and southern suburbs of London tended to be relatively less socially desirable, on the whole, than other areas of London. However, it does not appear that movements to more desirable locations, such as the western suburbs, were overwhelmingly ‘positive’ - only 34.8 per cent of movement to the west was of this character - similar to the proportions of ‘positive’ moves northward (34.2 per cent) and within the Walls (33.8 per cent). Perhaps the expense of moving to the west meant many were not able to relocate to a more desirable locale. The direction of move that tended to be most ‘positive’ was movement into the City (40.5 per cent). In general, though, no one type of residential movement can be overwhelmingly associated with one ‘direction’ of change in locality although it is probable that movements south and east were perhaps more likely to represent a downward shift in locality than other directions of movement.

As each type of movement in locality was assigned a numerical value, it enabled these moves to be correlated with the change in number of hearths before and after the Fire (for the 742 individuals for whom both of these variables could be calculated) to determine if there was any correlation between these variables. Statistical testing showed that there was correlation between change in the number of hearths per household and change in the type of locality.\textsuperscript{164} Thus, it appeared, for example, that a movement to a household with a higher number of hearths tended to be associated with a move to a more socially desirable locale. This is unsurprising given that rebuilding legislation stipulated that

\textsuperscript{163} TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32, Part 2, fol. 6v: TNA, 1675 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/23, fol. 50r.

\textsuperscript{164} Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient gives a value of 0.111, which is statistically significant. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=3.04 and the tabulated value is 2.0 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation between change in number of hearths before and after the Fire and change in typology of locality must be rejected.
larger, four storey, houses were to be built on ‘high and principal’ streets.\textsuperscript{165} Although
given the low level of correlation, this would not be true in all cases.

\textit{The effect of occupation and status on movement}

It is evident that socio-economic status would have had a significant bearing on an
individual’s ability to recover from the Fire. As a result of the small amounts of gold and
silver currency in circulation, most Londoners would not have had large cash assets as a
sizeable part of their assets. Earle has calculated that cash compromised no more than
five per cent of the gross assets for the ‘middling sort’ in early modern London. Even the
wealthiest merchants’ cash assets rarely exceeded £500, and this was usually in the form
of plate.\textsuperscript{166} Therefore, many would be forced to borrow. Wealthier individuals and those
in more prestigious occupations would have had easier access to credit, which was linked
to an individual’s personal wealth.\textsuperscript{167} For example, Sir William Turner (1615-93), Lord
Mayor of London from 1668-9, and a wealthy woollendraper and French silk merchant,
was owed £19,937 in ‘bonds and other securities’ up to 12 December 1666.\textsuperscript{168} Although
many of these debts may have had to be deferred or discounted as a result of the Fire,
Turner would have still had a large resource to fall back on to insulate him from his
losses as a result of the Fire. This is an extreme example, but it does show how wealthier
Londoners were relatively economically insulated from some of the adverse effects of the
Fire. Therefore, it would have been easier for richer people to either rebuild within the

\textsuperscript{165} Reddaway. \textit{Rebuilding of London}, fig. 5, between p. 80 and p. 81.
\textsuperscript{166} Muldrew. \textit{Economy of obligation}, p. 98; Earle, \textit{Making of the English middle class}, table 4.6, p. 121: .
Grassby, ‘English merchant capitalism in the late seventeenth century: the composition of business
\textsuperscript{168} GL. Sir William Turner. Stock Books, 1662-71. MS 5109/2, fol. 24v.
Walls or to move to a relatively prestigious area after the Fire.

Occupational status would have had an impact on the initial reaction to the Fire. Those in retail trades which relied on large amounts of movable goods (for example, the booksellers) would have been especially damaged by the Fire as they would have almost certainly lost most of their stock. The lack and expense of carts in London during the Fire was remarked upon by several sources. Certainly carts would have been at a premium whilst the flames spread across London. The ejected minister Richard Baxter (1615-91) recorded in his autobiography that only wealthy individuals could get ‘Carts, and saved much; and the rest lost almost all’. 169 Samuel Newton (1629-1718) of Cambridge, wrote in his diary on the day of the Fire that carts were available at ‘vast rates ... 8 or 10[^1] for the carriage of a load’. 170 John Tremayne (bap. 1647, d. 1694), a Cornish gentleman writing to his father after the Fire, was damning in his opinion of London’s carters, calling them ‘uncouchenable villans (who) wrought on the peoples necessity & would doe nothinge, but at the most unreasonable rates’. 171 Letters to Ralph Verney from London recorded that the price of hiring a cart rose as high as £20. Similarly, the political arithmetician Sir William Petty (1623-87) commented on the ‘Extraordinary gaine of porters, labourers, Carmen’ during the Fire. 172 These high rates meant that it would have been probable that tradesmen could lose all of their stock during

---

171 Letter of John Tremayne, September 1666, LMA, COL/SJ/03/014, p. 1.
the Fire, unless they were able to pay high prices for carts. As such, poor tradesmen would have suffered from the Fire disproportionately more than craftsmen whose stock of unfinished materials would have been worth less on the whole. Similar complaints of price gouging by carters were made after the Second Great Fire of New York (1835). 173

The Ladyday 1666 Hearth Tax assessments for the City included information about occupation for some of the returns. In this section, the effect of occupation on residential movement before and after the Fire will be discussed. Firstly, however, the distribution of occupational groups amongst individuals linked before and after the Fire will be compared to the overall occupational distribution to ensure that it is a representative enough sample. This section, due to the way the data was collected, is not representative of the whole of London, as for the most part occupational information was only included for assessments for areas within the City.

Table 1.14: Socio-occupational groups of individuals assessed in the Ladyday 1666 Hearth Tax assessments for the City of London (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Sub-group</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Nominally linked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gentry to Mr.</td>
<td>‘Gent.’ or above</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Esq.’</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Mr.’</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling</td>
<td>Dealer</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victualler</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft</td>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>Builder</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carrier</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 (2,471)</td>
<td>100 (186)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 1.1.
Note: Individuals who did not specify their occupation are not included in the calculations. 8,724 from total for Ladyday 1666 assessment and 779 from nominally linked individuals. Occupational groups adapted from Power, ‘Social topography’, in London 1500-1700, table 27, pp. 214-15.

Table 1.14 shows that there were far higher proportions of individuals with the title of ‘Mr.’ (and to a lesser degree, ‘Esq.’ and gentry groups) in the overall socio-occupational distribution than amongst linked individuals. This difference is due to the fact that these groups tended not to have their first names noted in the assessments, and as such, could not be included in the nominal linkage exercise. Accordingly, there was a statistical difference between the overall distribution and the nominally linked individuals. \(^{174}\)

However, when the gentry and individuals with the title ‘Esq.’ or ‘Mr.’ are removed, there was no statistical difference between the two distributions. \(^{175}\) As such, the socio-

---

\(^{174}\) Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 51.1, tabulated value is 21.03, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected.

\(^{175}\) Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 15.1, tabulated value is 16.92, and
occupational distribution of the individuals nominally linked before and after the Fire is representative of the entire dataset, but only for occupational groups 'below' the status of 'Mr.'. In this section, the effect of occupation on a number of variables will be tested, to determine what impact it may have had on residential change after the Fire.

It must also be noted that pre-Fire occupation did not always match post-Fire occupation. Occupation was often fairly fluid in early modern London, particularly outside of the City where livery company controls could be applied less stringently. This could not be traced from the Hearth Tax assessments, as the post-Fire listings do not include systematic information about occupation.

In order to determine the effect of socio-occupational group on change in the size of household, a comparison of the number of hearths per household of the 135 individuals linked before and after the Fire with sufficient information for socio-occupational group will be made. This showed that socio-occupational group may not have had any obvious effect on the relative likelihood of gaining or losing hearths. However, firm conclusions are difficult to draw, as the sample size of two groups, 'Gentry to Mr.' and 'semi-skilled', were relatively small – six and eight, respectively. However, there was similarity in the distributions of the two largest groups, 'selling' and 'craft'. For the 72 individuals from the 'selling' group, 20.8 per cent experienced a loss in the number of hearths, 56.9 per cent a gain, and for 22.2 per cent there was no change in the number of hearths. The proportions for the 49 individuals from the 'craft' group are similar - 22.4 per cent experienced a loss in the number of hearths, 59.2 per cent a gain, and for 18.4 per cent therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is accepted.
there was no change in the number of hearths.

This appears to suggest that occupational group had relatively little effect on change in number of hearths per household after the Fire. Change in this variable was probably due to the less easily quantifiable (using the Hearth Tax assessments) heading of 'personal circumstances' - for example, period in lifecycle, access to credit or number of members of the household. It must also be remembered that the socio-occupational categories used here represent a broad spectrum of wealth and status, and there is probably a considerable degree of overlap between each group. However, what effect did social grouping have on the direction of movement after the Fire?

Table 1.15: Effect of socio-occupational group on geographical direction of residential change of individuals moving after the Fire, 1666-75 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Did not move</th>
<th>Moved within Walls</th>
<th>Moved into City Walls</th>
<th>Moved northward</th>
<th>Moved southward</th>
<th>Moved eastward</th>
<th>Moved westward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gentry to Mr. (22)</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling (95)</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft (61)</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled (8)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (186)</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 1.1.

It appears that socio-occupational grouping had an effect on the direction of residential movement. The group 'Gentry to Mr.' appears to have been far more likely to move westward than the other groups, reflecting the fact that movement into the western suburbs was primarily movement of the 'better sort'. For example, Mr Dean Burgesse, a
lawyer, moved west from Ironmonger Lane to St Martin's Lane (in the parish of St Martin-in-the-Fields) after the Fire. However, this group was also more likely than other groups to remain in the same location before and after the Fire - residential persistence was socially selective. Wealthier groups of society were more likely to remain in the same place as they would have held longer leases, and it is possible some owned their property’s freehold. Accordingly, the semi-skilled appear to have been the most mobile group, with the entire group (although it is small and probably not statistically representative) moving their place of household. This reflected the fact that Londoners lower down the social scale were more mobile than other social groups.

There were some differences between the two most numerous groups. Craft groups appeared relatively more likely to move north or south of the Walls than selling groups, and less likely to remain within the Walls. This may be due to the fact that selling groups were more reliant on being based near their customers in the City, whereas craftsmen could afford to be more mobile. For example, before the Fire, Francis Ellison, a merchant, and John Granes, a cooper, were both based in Marke Lane (in the parish of All Hallows Staining). After the Fire, Ellison moved to nearby Blanchampleton Court whilst Granes moved east of the Walls, to St Katherine’s Street (in the parish of St Botolph without Aldgate). However, the differences between the residential movements of these groups are all less than ten per cent, and so it does not appear that

(outside of the ‘Gentry to Mr.’) socio-occupational grouping had a major impact on the geographical direction of movement of household after the Fire.

Unfortunately, due to lack of data for after the Fire, this section cannot take into account how a change in residence interacted with a change in occupation. It is likely that certain geographical directions of movement were associated with certain occupational movements. For example, the western suburbs tended to be more focused on consumer goods and services, with retail trades outnumbering manufacturing, so movement to the west may have been accompanied by a concomitant change in occupation. Similarly, individuals forced to move to a less prestigious area may have experienced a comparable downward shift in occupation. For example, John Reading was a silk dealer based on Pater Noster Row before the Fire but after the destruction of his stock and home, he moved east to the Armitage, where he worked as a lighterman. Occupation was mutable, and reflected changing personal circumstances.

Power has shown that the type of address varied with trade - for example, textile and leather workers did not need street frontage, and could be located in alleys and yards, whereas trades involving wood probably did, due to transport issues. For the most part, the wealthier selling groups dominated the street, whilst poorer craftsmen and the semi-skilled had to make do with lanes, yards and alleys. If this is the case, then the wealthier socio-occupational groups would be more likely to remain in street-front addresses after the Fire, whilst poorer groups would live in other locales.

180 GL., MT. Co. Apprenticeship Bindings. MS 34038/15, p. 66; 34038/16, p. 222.
Table 1.16: Changing typology of locality before and after the Fire, by socio-occupational group (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Fire locality</th>
<th>Post-Fire locality</th>
<th>Gentry to Selling</th>
<th>Craft</th>
<th>Semi-skilled</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Street</td>
<td>Street</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lane</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alley</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yard</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lane</td>
<td>Street</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lane</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alley</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yard</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alley</td>
<td>Street</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lane</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alley</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yard</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yard</td>
<td>Street</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lane</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alley</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yard</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>100 (14)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (72)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (41)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (8)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** See table 1.1.

**Note:** Excludes the 16 individuals for whom there was not full information on locality before and after the Fire, and the 38 who did not move.

Table 1.16 shows that socio-occupational group seems to have had some effect on changing locality amongst individuals who moved after the Fire. It appeared that selling groups were the most likely to change locality in a 'downward' direction. 59.7 per cent of this group experienced a decline in the relative prestige of their address, compared to 44.4 per cent overall. This may be a side-effect of a loss of stock due to the Fire. Loss of stock may have forced many dealers to move to a less prestigious address. For example, the apothecary Robert Bristoll was based on Fish Street before the Fire, but had moved...
Craftsmen would have experienced destruction of stock as well. However, the destruction of finished goods would, for the most part, have entailed a greater capital loss than the loss of raw materials. Also, crafts involved in the refurbishment and building of houses experienced a boost after the Fire, thus perhaps insulating them from some its deleterious effects. As such, the craft and semi-skilled groups would have been more able to maintain the status of their address after the Fire, and even improve it. The group ‘Gentry to Mr.’ would similarly have been insulated by loss by having, on average, greater economic clout and access to credit due to their status. Socio-occupational standing had a clear effect on the relative status of a locality moved to after the Fire.

The effect of gender on residential patterns

The difficulties in the process of nominal linkage of women, particularly widows, from the Hearth Tax assessment records have been detailed above. As the majority of female householders were widows, women were significantly underrepresented in the dataset of individuals linked before and after the Fire. In total, only 50 women could be accurately traced before and after the Fire. The other difficulty this dataset faces is that it is not representative of female householders in seventeenth-century London, the majority of whom were widows. In comparison, only ten per cent of the linked female

183 In the Hearth Tax assessments taken before the Fire, 57.6% of female householders were women. And 61.6% in the assessments taken after the Fire.
householders were widows. As widows tended to be amongst the poorer members of society, they were likely to have fewer hearths per household. As such, the linked females would have an artificially skewed-upward number of hearths per household, as well as possibly representing a wealthier and more secure dataset than a truly representative sample of metropolitan female householders; most of which would have been widows.

The residential circumstances of the women nominally linked before and after the Fire will be tested against the (male) population at large to investigate the possible differences caused by gender for a number of variables – the first of which is the number of hearths per household. For the entire Hearth Tax sample, female householders tended to have fewer hearths per household than male householders, reflecting the relative socio-economic disparity between the genders. However, the distribution of hearths per household amongst nominally linked female households was in fact statistically similar to the distribution amongst males. There was no statistical difference between the genders in number of hearths per household of linked individuals. This further shows that the nominally linked females were not representative of female householders as a whole, and that the sample of women linked before and after the Fire was socially skewed upward.

184 A Chi-squared Test for all of the taxation assessments shows that the number of hearths per household, both before and after the Fire, was affected by the gender of the householder. Pre-Fire: testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 652.2, tabulated value is 12.59, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected. Post-Fire: testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 816.5, tabulated value is 12.59, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected. 185 Pre-Fire: testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 1.55, tabulated value is 12.59, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected. Post-Fire: testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 1.62, tabulated value is 12.59, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected.
There was, however, some difference between gender in terms of gain and loss of number of hearths per household, even though the data for the women is not truly representative. It appears women were less likely to increase the number of hearths (52.9 per cent of males increased their number of hearts, compared to 32.6 per cent of females). Although a lesser proportion of women experienced a loss in the number of hearths than men, a loss of over six hearths occurred around twice as often among females. This could reflect the social and economic vulnerability of women, especially after crises. Ultimately, change in number of hearths per household was affected by gender.  

The effect of gender on the direction of residential movement was the next variable to be tested. Only 31 women who moved after the Fire could be reliably traced, so it was impossible to make any certain statistical conjectures. However, it does appear that females were possibly more likely to make long range residential moves; 48.4 per cent of the females who moved went beyond their neighbouring ward (or parish), compared to 38.5 per cent of males. Males were slightly more likely to move to an adjacent address (26.6 per cent) or within the same ward (or parish) (15.8 per cent), compared to females (22.6 per cent and 9.7 per cent, respectively). However, the percentage differences are not large, and there is no statistical difference between the range of male and female residential movement. However, if the dataset of women was representative of female householders at large, and not socially skewed upwards due to the lack of widows it is likely that a statistical test would show that gender had an effect on the range of hearths per household.

\[\text{Testing using chi-squared at 95\%, calculated value of chi-squared is 13.11, tabulated value is 5.99, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected.}\]

\[\text{Testing using chi-squared at 95\%, calculated value of chi-squared is 1.70, tabulated value is 7.82, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is accepted.}\]
movement after the Fire, with females more likely to move further distances than males.\textsuperscript{188} Also, widows were unlikely to carry on their late husband’s trade after his death, due to formal (and informal) obstacles in livery company organisation.\textsuperscript{189} So, unless they remarried quickly, they would have had no economic imperative to stay in a particular location.

Figure 1.8: Change in relative status of locality of individuals moving household after the Fire, by gender

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.8}
\caption{Change in relative status of locality of individuals moving household after the Fire, by gender}
\end{figure}

Sources: See table 1.1.

Figure 1.8 shows that females were more likely to experience a downward shift in their address of all ‘values’. Simply, females were not only more likely to move downward in the prestige of their address, they were also more likely to experience a decline of more than one or two degrees. This reflects Boulton’s study of seventeenth-century Southwark, which found that proportions of female heads of household were far higher in

\begin{flushleft}
\end{flushleft}
low status addresses such as yards or alleys. Females appeared to have been more likely to experience a decline in the relative status of their address than males; 51.9 per cent compared to 38.9 per cent. Equally, males were more likely to have moved upward in the status of their address - 34.0 per cent did, compared to 22.2 per cent of females. However, there was no significant difference between the genders in terms of changing locality after the Fire. However, as before, this appearance of similarity may be false - because of the unrepresentative nature of the female dataset, and mask the fact that females were possibly more likely to experience a downward shift in address.

Residential persistence after the Fire

This section will briefly examine the Londoners who remained in the same address before and after the Fire. Peter Clark has argued that 1666 was a watershed in the social evolution of London – the rebuilding process created a sense of ‘spatial disorientation’ and ‘neighbourhood erosion’ in the City, which was overtaken by suburban sprawl. Despite this alleged trend, nearly one-third of the sample of those burnt out returned to the same or nearby locations: 15.2 per cent returned to the same address, and 17.9 per cent returned to an adjacent location. This level of residential persistence was possible because the layout of London’s streets, lanes and alleys remained similar after the Fire. In spite of numerous new schemes for a rational street lay-out, London’s topography after

---

190 Boulton, Neighbourhood and society, p. 175.
191 Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 2.28, tabulated value is 5.99, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is accepted.
the Fire remained consistent. \footnote{J. Hanson, ‘Order and structure in urban design: the plans for rebuilding London after the Great Fire of 1666’, Ekistics, 56 (1989), 37.} ‘Many miniature worlds compromised the social and cultural universe of the metropolis.’ \footnote{Boulton, ‘London 1540-1700’, in Cambridge Urban History of Britain, volume II, ed. Clark, p. 332.} Therefore, what, if anything, did these ‘worlds’ have in common, and what common factors, if any, did these individuals share in choosing to return to the same address after the Fire and rebuilding their lives there?

There appear to have been some slight differences between the different groups considered – in particular between fired individuals who did not move and fired individuals who moved away from their pre-Fire neighbourhood. Individuals who were fired and moved far away from their locality appear to have had a lower average number of hearths per household, 4.95, compared to those who were fired and did not move (5.87) or those who were fired and moved to an adjacent location (5.54). It appeared that statistically, the mean number of hearths per household of those who remained at the same address after the Fire tended to be higher than for those individuals who moved further afield. \footnote{ Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one-tailed, at 95% level, \( Z=2.56 \), tabulated value \( Z=1.75 \), thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.} Similarly, if a numerical value was assigned to each type of locality, it tended to be higher for those who remained at the same address than for those who moved further afield. \footnote{ A yard was assigned a value of 1, an alley 2, a lane 3, and a street 4. Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one-tailed, at 95% level, \( Z=2.37 \), tabulated value \( Z=1.75 \), thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.}

On the whole, individuals who moved away from their pre-Fire neighbourhood tended to be more likely to be from lower status socio-occupational backgrounds and localities, and had households with lower numbers of hearths. Individuals who remained at the same address...
address tended to be wealthier. Such groups were more likely to be part of parochial or civic government – institutions that integrated individuals into the local community, creating a sense of ‘belonging’. They may have also had closer social relations with their neighbours, which was important in creating a sense of ‘loyalty’ to an area. Movement at lower levels of society may have been more prevalent because they were less integrated into their neighbourhood, and so had fewer social ties to the place, and also as a result of generally shorter periods of property tenure at lower levels of society (see above).

Figure 1.9, below, shows that residentially persistent neighbourhoods tended to be clustered around the more economically and socially important areas of the City – in particular, in the neighbourhood around St Paul’s Cathedral. It appeared that the City’s major thoroughfares, such as Cheapside, Fenchurch Street, Fleet Street and Lombard Street, were also likely to house individuals who returned to the same address after the Fire. This may explain why individuals involved in retail trades, who relied on passing trade, would be likely to return to these areas. In comparison, the relatively poorer areas of the City, around the riverside, did not appear to have experienced the same levels of residential persistence. South of a line running roughly from Cannon Street to Bridewell, there were only three householders who returned to the same address after the Fire. Superficially, it appeared that the geographical location of a neighbourhood did have an effect on its likelihood of housing individuals returning to their pre-Fire addresses. The main factor in this appeared to have been the socio-economic status of the neighbourhood. Higher status areas experienced higher levels of residential persistence.

Figure 1.9: Location of fired householders with the same location before and after the Fire, 1666-75

Sources: See table 1.1. Map adapted from Plan of the City of London before the Fire (London: J. Stockdale, 1796).
Case study: Two neighbourhoods after the Fire

To gain a greater insight into the neighbourhood differences in residential change after Fire, two localities were examined. The boundaries were chosen along parish lines, which was the principal way in which early modern Londoners referred to where they resided. Also, the Hearth Tax returns from before the Fire are divided by parish, making it easier to make up the sample populations. The first neighbourhood was positioned around St Paul’s Cathedral, along the boundaries of the parish of St Gregory by St Paul’s. This area experienced high levels of residential persistence after the Fire (see figure 1.9). This area was relatively prestigious compared to the second neighbourhood in the case study, which was positioned around Pudding Lane, where the Fire started. Its boundaries were comprised of four riverside parishes – St Michael Crooked Lane, St Magnus the Martyr, St Botolph Billingsgate, and St Mary at Hill.

The two neighbourhoods present some significant differences. For St Gregory by St Paul’s, there were a total of 364 households assessed, compared to 502 in the four riverside parishes. The mean number of hearths per household assessed before the Fire was 5.20 for St Gregory by St Paul’s, and 4.55 for the riverside parishes. Finally, 7.7 per cent of the individuals assessed in St Gregory by St Paul’s had a title (from ‘Mr.’ upwards), compared to 2.0 per cent for the riverside parishes. Finlay’s analysis of the 1638 Listing of London showed that the four riverside parishes were poorer and more densely populated than St Gregory by St Paul. The four riverside parishes had a mean of 22 per cent ‘substantial households’ and a mean of 38.4 houses per acre, compared to 34

198 Archer, Pursuit of stability, p. 83.
per cent 'substantial households' and 18.1 houses per acre for St Gregory by St Paul. One of the riverside parishes, St Magnus the Martyr, also housed 66 tenements.\textsuperscript{199} Clearly, the neighbourhood around St Paul's was, on the whole, wealthier than the riverside neighbourhood. No clear comparison of occupations could be made because no information was given for the St Gregory by St Paul's returns, and only the assessment for St Magnus the Martyr of the riverside parishes included occupational information.\textsuperscript{200}

There were clear differences between the two neighbourhoods considered here. The small sample size means that these differences cannot be statistically examined, but some observations can be made. Firstly, it appears that both St Gregory by St Paul's and the riverside parishes experienced relatively high levels of residential persistence compared to the average for the fired areas of London, although levels were higher in the former neighbourhood. The way in which the residential movements manifested themselves, however, appears to have differed between the two neighbourhoods, as figure 1.10 and table 1.17, below, show.

\textsuperscript{200} St Magnus the Martyr had relatively high levels of individuals in the dealing (38.2%) and victualling (34.3%) trades compared to the rest of London.
Figure 1.10: Movement after the Fire from St Gregory by St Paul’s and Four Riverside Parishes, 1666-75

Sources: See table 1.1. Map adapted from Plan of the City of London before the Fire.
Table 1.17: Movement after the Fire from St Gregory by St Paul’s and Four Riverside Parishes, compared to totals for individuals directly affected by the Fire, 1666-75 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Total for individuals</th>
<th>fired St Gregory by St Paul’s</th>
<th>St Paul’s</th>
<th>Four Riverside Parishes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moved after the Fire</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved within Walls</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved Northward</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved Southward</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved Eastward</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved Westward</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved to adjacent location</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved within ward</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved to neighbouring ward</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved beyond neighbouring ward</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean gain / loss hearths</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean ‘value’ of change in locality</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>-1.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 1.1.

Most of the movement from the parishes considered was within the City Walls. Movement east and north occurred at roughly similar levels for both neighbourhoods. However, movement to Southwark seems to have been more associated with the riverside parishes. Higher proportions of movement from St Gregory by St Paul’s were westward, and four of the linked individuals were traced to around the socially prestigious Covent Garden area, where none of the riverside group relocated to. Inhabitants of both neighbourhoods showed high proportions of movement to adjacent areas compared to the rest of London. Movement to areas in the City’s direct periphery appeared to have been more commonplace than movement to the suburbs further away from the Walls.

The main difference in the post-Fire movement from the two neighbourhoods appeared to have been in the relative social prestige of the move. The movement from St Gregory by
St Paul’s was associated with an average net gain of around two hearths per household, whereas movement from the riverside parishes was associated with a net gain of around 0.5 hearths. Similarly, inhabitants from St Gregory by St Paul’s appeared to have tended to move to relatively more prestigious localities after the Fire. In comparison, movement from the riverside parishes, on average, entailed a loss in the social prestige of their address. Movement from the poorer neighbourhood appears to have been associated with a decrease in the social cachet of locality, as well as a probable decrease in the size of the house. This may have arisen through decreased financial resources compared to the generally wealthier neighbourhood near St Paul’s.

A closer look at some of the moves also illustrated how the social space of the neighbourhood transcended the trauma of recovering from disaster. Two pairs of near linked individuals were near neighbours both before and after Fire. Peter Prince and Edward Wakeford lived in nearly adjacent properties in Thames Street before the Fire, relocating to nearby King’s Head Court by 1675.201 Similarly, Henry Loades and Peter Thorowgood both lived on St Mary at Hill before the Fire, and both moved to Cross Lane by 1675.202

Such relationships also existed across longer moves across the metropolis. Before the Fire, Charles Hinton and Nicholas Alexander were both located on Pater Noster Row. After the Fire, they moved to adjacent streets in Covent Garden – Hinton to Henrietta

201 TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32, Part 4, fol. 4v; TNA, 1675 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/23, fol. 90r.
Street, Alexander to Bedford Street. Such links are likely to be the tip of the iceberg, given how important the bonds of neighbourhood were in forming networks of social support in early modern London. It is likely that many individuals' choice of a new location after the Fire may have been influenced somewhat by the presence of a neighbour from before the Fire there. It appeared that many of the information flows about available properties after the Fire were accessed through personal links and social networks created before the Fire at the neighbourhood level.

Conclusions

It is clear that the Great Fire of London significantly affected London's residential structure. This impact, however, was not felt uniformly by all groups of society - and personal circumstances before the Fire appear to have had a significant impact on patterns of recovery after the disaster.

After the Fire, the number of hearths per household in the rebuilt areas rose significantly - reflecting the increased size of houses in the new city. This was shown at both the ward and parochial level. It does not appear that the average numbers of hearths changed to such a degree in areas of London not directly affected by the Fire. However, there remained considerable numbers of uninhabited houses as well as unused plots of land after the Fire. Empty houses had been a part of the urban landscape before the Fire due to the 1665 Plague, but after the Fire they became more concentrated in the City of

London and other fired areas. In areas not destroyed by the Fire the housing stock was more utilised - probably by those forced into moving household because of the Fire. For many Londoners burnt out by the Fire, it may have been an unattractive prospect to return to one’s original place of household due to the costs of rebuilding.

This chapter has made much use of nominal linkage in order to examine individual movement after the Fire. This laborious process was made difficult by some of the gaps in the Hearth Tax assessment but overall nearly ten per cent of individuals from before the Fire could be traced, and with a fairly high degree of accuracy and certainty. The nominally linked records show that movement, even amongst groups of Londoners not burnt out, was commonplace - although being burnt out did increase the proportional likelihood of moving household. Nearly two-thirds of individuals who were not fired moved household, whilst over 80 per cent of those burnt out moved household. However, these movements had different characteristics. Although nearly half of all movement was relatively short distance, burnt out groups were more likely to move longer distances, whereas those not burnt out tended to be more likely to make shorter range moves, in common with the general pattern of neighbourhood migration.\footnote{Boulton, ‘Neighbourhood migration’, in Migration and society, ed. Clark and Souden, pp. 123-4; Shoemaker, ‘Gendered spaces’, in Imagining early modern London, p. 155.} Individuals directly affected by the Fire appear to have been more likely to move into different areas of London, with movement north and the west of the Walls appearing to be the most common destinations.

Shifts in the relative status of a household were measured by changes in the number of
hearths and in the relative prestige of the location of the household. Over half of the sample increased the number of hearths in their household - this was because of the generally larger size of house in the rebuilt city. Thus, individuals who remained within the City or who moved westward were more likely to increase the number of hearths per household whilst those moving other directions tended to experience a decrease in the number of hearths. Changes in the typology of locality were commonplace - only around one quarter of individuals moving after the Fire moved to a similar locality. Movement south and east in particular appeared, again, to have been more associated with a 'downward' shift in the prestige of address, whereas other movements tended to be more likely to be 'upward'. This correlates with Vanessa Harding's assertion that the Fire led to a shift in the social topography of London, with poorer groups pushed into the overcrowded suburbs, in comparison to the relatively more ordered City.205 It also appears that there was at least a loose correlation between change in the number of hearths per household and change in the relative prestige of the location of household.

Examining the effect of socio-occupational status and gender on residential change after the Fire was made more problematic by the small usable datasets detailing these variables. However, some broad conclusions can be drawn. The gentry groups and individuals with the title 'Mr.' tended to be more likely to move westward than other groups but for the most part no clear trends emerged in terms of a link between socio-economic group and geographical direction of movement. It appears that individuals involved in retail trade tended to suffer the most pronounced relative decline in the status

of their household, both in terms of decline in number of hearths and in the status of their locality. Although there were numerous problems with the dataset of females linked before and after the Fire, some patterns did emerge. It is probable that females were more likely to experience a decline in the number of hearths and move to a less prestigious locale than males. Also, females were more likely to move longer distances than males. The most vulnerable groups were likely to be most dislocated as a result of the Fire.

Closer examination of residential persistence and movement after the Fire show that these variables were highly contingent on individual wealth and status. Individuals from relatively more socially prestigious localities appear to have been more likely to return to their pre-Fire address. This may be because the 'better sort' were more strongly integrated into local social networks, and also because they would have been more likely to have the financial resources to rebuild within the ruined city. However, as the case study shows, neighbourhood persistence appears to have occurred even in relatively poorer areas.

Neighbourhood relationships seem to have transcended the difficulties of rebuilding and were 'recreated' elsewhere in London, sometimes quite far afield from the original locality. This apparent residential stability after the Fire perhaps explains, or was resultant from, the social stability of London as a whole in the seventeenth century. Also, the fact that residential mobility was the norm meant that psychological attachment to dwellings was probably low, thus mitigating the sense of loss and shock after the Fire.

---

destruction of the Fire. Londoners, in spite of their material losses after the Fire, were able to go some way in attempting to recreate their social space as it existed before the disaster.
Chapter 2: London’s economic topography after the Great Fire

The Great Fire made tens of thousands of Londoners homeless. In doing so, it severely damaged the city’s economy. London’s economic activity was still inextricably bound to the household, meaning that almost every house destroyed was potentially a workplace damaged and disrupted. In addition, the Fire destroyed a significant amount of London’s economic fabric and trading stock. ‘Rege Sincera’s’ 1667 tract on the Fire estimated the total losses to the city were £7,335,000. The economic disruptions of the Fire to London’s economy would have also been felt at a national level, so central was the metropolis to England’s economy. A letter from Norwich written shortly after the Fire recorded that people there were ‘at their wits ends knowing not how to carry on trade bey the Reason of the sad fier at London’. Similarly, Samuel Rolls wrote in 1667 that ‘a great part of the strength and defence of all England, yea, of all the three Kingdomes, is lost and taken away, in and by the destruction of London’. The Fire forced a major short-term disruption and re-distribution of London’s economic topography, as the city’s tradesmen and merchants attempted to reconstruct their economic lives.

Examining the economic recovery of London after the Fire will demonstrate how the metropolitan economy responded to crisis. The study will also be taken to an individual and neighbourhood level, to show how different Londoners adopted differing economic strategies in response to the Fire. Clearly, not all Londoners could recover from a

---

catastrophic event like the Fire. In 1667, Edward Waterhouse (1619-70), a fellow of the Royal Society and resident of Sion College, called for the immediate payment of the debts of those made homeless by Fire, as many would have been ruined because they had no credit. 3 Captain John Wadlow a vintner who had lost all of his stock in the Fire, in a petition to Charles II from September 1666, wrote that because of the Fire he was not able to 'satisfy Bills of Exchange and mainteyne his Credit'. Similarly, Sir James Bunce, in another petition to Charles II from November 1666, wrote that the Fire had 'consumed almost all ... of his much impoverished and languishing Estate which did support and mainteyne himselfe, his Wife, and numerous Family' and that if his petition (for assignment of £5,776 owed him by Excise) was not granted he would be 'imprisoned, his Credit Estate wife and Children irreparably ruined'. 4 The destruction of houses not only destroyed homes, it devastated personal fortunes. Investment in property or leases was a common method of hedging against inflation. Wealthy Londoners usually held reserves of urban property as a major proportion of their fortune. William Baer has found that for the middling sort, around one quarter of households had real estate investments - representing 21 per cent of their total wealth. Groups of lower social status also invested in real estate in the same proportions but it tended to count for higher proportions of their total wealth. 5 As such, the Fire could devastate estates and as most houses were held by multiple leases and sub-leases, all of which could be readily bought and sold, the destruction of a single house could damage multiple individuals.

4 TNA, Petition of Captain John Wadlow to the King, 19 September 1666, SP 29/172, 42; TNA, Petition of Sir James Bunce to the King, 7 November 1666, SP 29/177, 104.
Waterhouse's proposal to cancel debts never happened, although Samuel Pepys recorded in his diary on 5 May 1667 that some people were forced to sell bills from before the Fire at a 35 per cent to 40 per cent loss. Many Londoners could not recover. The Fire's effects must have been felt some years after the event. A 1675 pamphlet urging Charles II to grant more relief to London recorded that many of the city's inhabitants still laboured under the ill effects of the Fire, and faced 'the merciless fury of their Creditors upon them; where of the Prisons about London are severe Testimonies; as if they had been Men markt out by Divine vengeance ... because of Debt, without any reflection upon the inevitable Hand of God that disabled them'.

Ultimately, the costs of restarting businesses within the Walls may have been too great for many Londoners. The two major studies of the Fire, by Walter Bell and Thomas Reddaway, do not explore London's economic recovery in any great depth, nor do they show empirically how the topography of London's businesses changed (or to what extent they may have remained stable) as a result of the Fire, or, indeed if other long-term trends had a greater impact than the Fire.

The fate of London's tradesmen after the Fire was a matter of concern for the City authorities. London could not recover immediately after the Fire, indeed, the economic recovery of London probably did not begin until the late 1660s. Rebuilding was not immediate. A royal proclamation directly after the Fire forbade rebuilding until

---

7 'Philanthropus Philagathus', *An humble remonstrance to the King & Parliament In the Behalf of Many Decayed and Decaying Citizens and Families of London, Occasioned solely by the Dreadful Fire of That City, and Some concurring Calamitous Events of Providence since* (London, 1675), pp. 1-2, 4-5.
regulations for the process could be made. However, by 1669, John Evelyn noted in his
diary that London had ‘now began a little to revive, after its sad calamite’. In September
1670, the Common Council proclaimed that the livery of all the city’s companies should
come to the Guildhall in their gowns, walking together in companies, on the next election
of a Lord Mayor, as ‘The City being by gods blessing (was) soe free recovered out of ye
deplorable Ruines’.

There were still problems for the metropolitan economy. In 1672, the City petitioned
Parliament for a reduction in its taxation due to ‘The withdrawing (after the Fire) of
several Inhabitants, to the Increase of Trade where they are gone and the Loss of it within
the City’. London’s government was so concerned with promoting economic growth in
London after the Fire, that in 1673 the freedom was granted to any person who would
build in an empty plot in an area of the city affected by Fire. For example, on 8 June
1675, the Court of Aldermen ordered that Peter Vandenanker ‘having built severall
houses in the Late ruines of this Citty and himself inhabited in one of them shall admitted
into the freedome of this Citty by redempcon in the Company of Haberdashers’. The
City paid his entry fine of 46s 8d. The economic recovery of London after the Fire was
remarkable, but clearly many in the City government in particular felt that it was still
incomplete by the mid 1670s.

---

10 LMA, Jour. 47, fol. 66v.
11 Reasons humbly offered to The Parliament, for The Abatement of the Proportion of the Assessment upon
12 J. R. Kellett, ‘The breakdown of gild and corporation control over the handicraft and retail trade in
London’, Economic History Review. 2nd series, 10 (1957-8), 382.
13 LMA, Rep. 80, fol. 208v. He was assessed for 7 hearths in Fenchurch Street in 1675. TNA, 1675 Hearth
Examining changes in the spatial distribution of metropolitan businesses will show what effect the Fire had on London's economic topography, and whether this effect was lasting. Also, this section will examine to what degree the Fire contributed to longer term trends in metropolitan topography, in particular the growth of London to the west. It will also attempt to determine if the Fire led to any changes in occupation, thus expanding some of the findings in chapter 1. The location of business was a vital decision for Londoners, and highly important in their economic lives, as Michael Power pointed out - 'choice of residence was probably dictated by considerations of commercial advantage and rent, the two inextricably intertwined'.

The resettlement of London's traders and merchants after the Fire was clearly a vital and much discussed issue. Their movement is mentioned in William Wycherley's (1640-1716) Love in a Wood, first performed in 1671. In the play's first scene, Lady Flippant, the widowed sister of the lecherous Alderman Gripe, says to Mrs Joyner of her search for a husband - 'Tis well known no woman breathing could use more industry to get her a husband than I have. Has not my husband's scutcheon walked as much ground as the citizens' signs since the fire, that no quarter of the town might be ignorant of the widow Flippant?' The Fire clearly had had a significant effect on the topography of the metropolitan economy.


Sources and methodology

Two sources of data will be used to examine the changes in the economic topography and structure of London as a result of the Fire. The first source used in examining the economic changes in London after the Fire were the apprenticeship binding records of the Merchant Taylors, one of the largest of London’s livery companies. Apprenticeship and the guild system in general were in relative ‘decline’ in the later seventeenth century. As guild controls disintegrated, it became less necessary to serve an apprenticeship in order to work or set up an independent business. However, in London the freedom of the City and livery company membership still remained important, as it allowed an individual to trade freely throughout London, and was also vital if one wanted to embark on any kind of political career in metropolitan civic government. The breakdown in guild controls mostly affected the end of apprenticeships, rather than their beginning. As policing guild controls became more difficult, and the area of inspection of guild controls grew larger and more densely populated, apprentices could leave their masters without serving a full term and gaining the freedom through service and trade independently without being a full member of a livery company. Binding records occur at the start of a guild career, and so were not affected by this development. In spite of the fact that many apprenticeships were not completed, the institution was still an important part of economic training, as it was the starting point of many economic lives, and the vast

The Merchant Taylors' apprenticeship records were extremely useful for examining London's economic topography before and after the Fire, because unlike most other London livery companies, they included information on the place of business of the master. The Merchant Taylors were one of the largest and most influential guilds in London, and one of the twelve 'great companies'. In the century before 1650, the rate of growth of new admissions to the company outstripped total metropolitan population growth by 138 per cent. The Merchant Taylors' intake of apprentices also outstripped most other companies. It was also an economically diverse company in terms of the occupations of its members, its connection to its original craft becoming increasingly tenuous by the eighteenth century.20 As such, an examination of the Merchant Taylors' will illuminate a broader cross section of the economy than most other livery companies. Most of the apprenticeship binding records also recorded the exact trade of the master, so they will show if the Fire had any effect on occupational status on a wider scale than the limited findings on this variable uncovered in chapter 1. A complete run of the apprenticeship binding records for this company is held at the Guildhall. The sample was selected from the fourteen years (i.e. two complete terms of the standard length of an apprenticeship) before and after September 1666; 1652 to 1680, and then compiled onto a database. As such, the sample should include the majority of Merchant Taylors active in London at the time of the Fire. However, this sampling method may not include some of

---

19 Around 90% of the Merchant Taylors in the 1652-66 sample would have become freemen as a result of service; the rest either became freemen as a result of patrimony or redemption.
the poorer members of the company who did not take on any apprentices because they could not afford the associated costs of housing and training. Therefore, the sample will be socially skewed upward – in addition to the inbuilt skew of using the Merchant Taylors’ records, whose members were likely to be of a relatively higher social status compared to the rest of London.

The second occupational group examined were London’s booksellers. The ubiquity of bookselling in London was frequently noted by visitors to the metropolis, and London was the centre of book distribution in England. Also, booksellers were perhaps the trade group most damaged by the Fire. The book trade was synonymous with Paul’s Churchyard, an area totally devastated by the Fire. The Fire was made doubly damaging because much of the area’s stock of books had been laid up in the cathedral and in the church of St Faith under St Paul’s. William Taswell recorded that the cathedral was full of stock because the booksellers believed it would not burn down - in the event, the Fire around St Paul’s Cathedral was hot enough to melt the cathedral’s bells. On 5 October 1666, Pepys estimated that £150,000 worth of books were destroyed in the blaze (a figure also arrived at by other contemporary writers), and he was also concerned it

---

might lead to a rise in prices. The numbers of books destroyed in the Fire must have been considerable. Richard Baxter recorded in his autobiography that he saw the burnt leaves of books in the air at his home in Acton, and that some were seen as far afield as Windsor—he noted that ‘the Loss of Books was an exceeding great Detriment to ... Learning’. The London book trade was central to England’s consumption of printed material, and so was a highly significant feature of the metropolitan economy, and English cultural life in the later seventeenth century in general.

The booksellers provided a stark contrast to the Merchant Taylors. Firstly, they were a smaller group. There were at least 150 (or perhaps as many as 250) book shops and stalls in London in the seventeenth century, and although this number was probably on the increase over the century, it was nowhere near as many as the numbers of Merchant Taylors operating in and around London. Secondly, the booksellers were a far more homogeneous group than the Merchant Taylors, certainly in terms of occupation. Not all booksellers, however, dealt only in books. Joseph Moxon (1627?–1700), of Ludgate Hill, was not only a publisher. He was also a globe and instrument maker, as well as the supplier of Pepys’ globes both at home and in the Navy Office. The booksellers were less variegated in their locations across London, bookselling having a highly

24 Pepys, Diary, ed. Latham and Matthews, vii, 309-10; Sincera, Observations both Historical and Moral upon the Burning of London, p. 14; Waterhouse, Short Narrative Of the late Dreadful Fire, p. 78
28 Pepys, Diary, iv, 302; v, 83, 136.
Although in the later seventeenth century the London book trade expanded to be more topographically diverse, as merchants followed wealthy customers westward, and the significance of areas such as Fleet Street and Temple grew, the Merchant Taylors, in comparison, were still far more spread out across London (and beyond) than the booksellers were.

Using livery company records for the booksellers would have produced inaccurate and unrepresentative data. Although the Stationers’ Company was responsible for much of the administration of the metropolitan book trade, not all booksellers were members of this company. Increasingly, booksellers were members of other livery companies. In 1684 it was recorded that there were booksellers from thirteen other livery companies. For example, the bookseller James Magnes (d. 1678), of Covent Garden, was a member of the Merchant Taylors.

The method used to chart the topography of the booksellers in London was to search the Early English Books Online database for all books published in London in the years 1663-5, 1667-9 and 1676-8. From this, the place of business of the bookseller was extracted from the title page of the book, and compiled into a database. Books from 1666 were not used as it could not be specified when in the year the book was published - before or after the Fire. Using this method creates a comprehensive database of

---

29 Mandelbrote, ‘From the warehouse to the counting-house’, in Genius for letters, ed. Myers and Harris. p. 50.
booksellers active in London at the time of the Fire, and also indicated how many were active in the years after the Fire. Some of the title pages also indicated the signs under which the booksellers traded, and these were also added to the database, to attempt to examine if changing location was accompanied by a change in sign.

There were problems with this sampling method. It may not have included some of the poorer booksellers dealing in pamphlets, which sometimes did not include the publishers' details. It would also not include the booksellers who only dealt in second hand books. Unlike the apprenticeship binding records, details on title pages do not give an exact date, rather - they only give a year, which means that if a bookseller changed shops mid-year, it would not be possible to determine which place he sold from first. This problem, however, can be overcome by finding the same bookseller in the next year to see which shop he sold out of first. Occasionally, it is also specified if the book was published as part of a partnership. In this case, the partnership will be noted to see if it remained operational after the Fire. There is also the problem of booksellers who operated out of more than one outlet, which could mean that an expansion in number of outlets could be falsely classified as a 'move'. Multi-outlets can be identified through a bookseller having two workplaces specified over more than one year. However, this problem will not affect the results too radically, as it appears booksellers operating more than one shop were rare at this time.
Overall patterns: economic topography before and after the Fire

Merchant Taylors

Table 2.1: Place of business, Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, 1666-80 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1652-66</th>
<th>1666-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City within the Walls</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East of the Walls</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West of the Walls</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westminster</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of the Walls</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwark</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrey</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesex</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100  (3532)</td>
<td>100 (2119)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: GL, MT. Co. Apprenticeship Bindings 1652-80, MS 34038/13-16.
Note: Calculations do not take into account the 62 masters from 1652-66 and the 43 from 1666-80 whose place of workshop could not be exactly specified.

Table 2.1 shows that there was a major change in the distribution of the Merchant Taylors' company across London. In absolute terms, there are fewer Merchant Taylors registering apprentices after the Fire. The main reason for this was the depopulation as a result of the 1665 Plague. However, it could also be partly due to the increasing breakdown of guild controls in London - especially as after the Fire London’s guild controls were less regulated than previously. This also may be partly due to a relative downturn in London’s economic fortunes after the Fire, which may have led to masters delaying taking on the expense of an apprentice, or only taking on one apprentice, or even opting out of the apprenticeship system altogether. Apprentices may also have
decided to stay on with a master for longer before setting up independently.

There is clearly a shift in the distribution of the Merchant Taylors across London. The Fire affected the geographical distribution of the company across London. Of the first 1652-66 sample, just over half (53.3 per cent) were based in areas of London directly affected by the Fire. The area which experienced the greatest decline in numbers was the City within the Walls, which had been most devastated by the Fire, and experienced a relative decline of 17.7 per cent. In relative terms, the eastern and northern suburbs experienced the greatest relative growth; 5.9 per cent and 5.8 per cent respectively. Numbers of Merchant Taylors based in other areas remained relatively stable before and after the Fire. Samuel Rolls noted in 1667 that many areas to the east of London were ‘formerly mean’, but after the Fire contained ‘good citizens’. There was especially growth in areas near to the Walls such as East Smithfield and the Minories, where there were 43 Merchant Taylors before the Fire but 72 afterwards. These areas were very close to the Walls, and so this did not represent a significant move from the City. Further East, in areas such as Whitechapel (31 before, 32 after) and Houndsditch (41 before and after), absolute numbers of Merchant Taylors remained stable. The numbers of Merchant Taylors relocating to the East End might be underestimated by these figures. The East End was comparatively poorer and cheaper to live in than other areas of London, and thus would have been more attractive to poorer masters, who were less likely to take on apprentices, and so would not have been counted in the sampling method used here.

33 Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 325.1, tabulated value is 12.59, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected.
North of the Walls, most of the sample seems to have been based near to the City in areas such as Aldersgate Street, Clerkenwell and Smithfields. There seemed to have been no significant rise in the number of Merchant Taylors based in Moorfields, which may suggest that some of the settlement there was only short term or that economic enterprises in that area were conducted on a fairly ad hoc basis, outside of guild control. There was certainly economic activity around Moorfields, as the Scottish politician John Lauder (1646-1722), visiting London in 1667, noted that he saw in the area ‘a new street wheirin dwells thosse that ware burnt out in the fire. They pay ... dear for their ground and it is but to stand til they rebuild their houses again in the city.’

Routes to the neighbourhood were probably more used after the Fire because on 15 September 1668 the Court of Aldermen ordered the approaches be re-gravelled because it had been much worn (on 30 March 1669 £53 14s were paid for 358 loads of gravel for Moorfields).

---

36 LMA, Rep. 73, fol. 266v: Rep. 74, fol. 121r.


Booksellers

Table 2.2: Geographical distribution of booksellers, 1663-5, 1667-9 and 1676-8 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1663-5</th>
<th>1667-9</th>
<th>1676-8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City within the walls</td>
<td>53.13</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East of the walls</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West of the walls</td>
<td>31.27</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westminster</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of the walls</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwark</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (160)</td>
<td>100 (153)</td>
<td>100 (170)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Early English Books Online catalogue.

Table 2.2 shows that the Fire radically affected the geographical distribution of booksellers in London, at least in the short term. The City within the Walls experienced a relative decline of 34.2 per cent after the Fire, whilst the areas north of the Walls experienced relative growth in numbers of booksellers of 30.7 per cent. Numbers in other areas remained relatively stable. However, as the distribution for the 1676-8 cohort shows, there seems to have been a return to the pre-Fire distribution after the initial changes immediately after the Fire. Statistical testing showed that although the Fire affected the distributions of booksellers before and after the Fire, this was not the case ten years after the Fire. The positions of the booksellers for 1663-5, 1667-9 and 1676-8 were then mapped.

37 1667-8: Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 146.66, tabulated value is 7.82, therefore null hypothesis of no difference is rejected; 1676-8: Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 4.84, tabulated value is 7.82, therefore null hypothesis is accepted.
Figure 2.1: Distribution of booksellers in London, 1663-5

Due to limitations in scale, it was not possible to accurately map the number of booksellers in the following locations:

a. St Paul's Church Yard: 42
b. Royal Exchange: 16

Sources: See table 2.2. Map adapted from Plan of the City of London before the Fire (London: J. Stockdale, 1796).
Figure 2.2: Distribution of booksellers in London, 1667-9

Sources: See table 2.2. Map adapted from Plan of the City of London before the Fire.
Figure 2.3: Distribution of booksellers in London, 1676-8

Due to limitations in scale, it was not possible to accurately map the number of booksellers in the following locations:

a. St Paul's Church Yard: 33 (12 fired, moved from 1667-9 site to 1663-5 site; 3 fired, moved from 1667-9 site to new site; 8 not fired, moved from 1667-9 site; 10 new booksellers)

b. Royal Exchange: 23 (1 not fired, moved from 1667-9 site; 4 fired, moved from 1667-9 site to 1663-5 site; 2 fired, moved from 1667-9 site to new site; 5 not fired, moved from 1667-9 site; 11 new booksellers)

Sources: See table 2.2. Map adapted from Plan of the City of London before the Fire.
As figure 2.1 shows, before the Fire the main area for booksellers was around Paul’s Churchyard. Just over one quarter (25.6 per cent) of the subjects in the 1663-5 sample were based there. Amongst booksellers north of the walls, it appeared they were mostly clustered north of Paul’s Churchyard in areas such as Little Britain and Pie Corner. Little Britain had been the traditional home to the second hand book trade for generations, and there were also many second hand bookshops in Moorfields. In the western suburbs, the main areas of concentration were around Fleet Street and the Temple.

Figure 2.2 shows that after the Fire, only two of the subjects were based in Paul’s Churchyard. Those remaining within the City walls tended to be in the eastern parts of the City, around Bishopsgate Street or Gresham College. The area north of the walls was the biggest recipient of fired booksellers, in particular, around Little Britain, where 39 (25.5 per cent) of the sample were based. The profile west of the walls is similar to 1663-5, with most booksellers based around Temple and Fleet Street.

For the 1676-8 sample, mapped in figure 2.3, there seemed to be a return to the 1663-5 distribution. There were slightly more booksellers based to the north and east of the Walls, but the differences are not significant in general. Paul’s Churchyard re-established itself as the main concentration of booksellers in the City, but it experienced a relative decline of 7.4 per cent compared to its numbers in 1663-5. This decline was probably due to the decreasing numbers of stalls in the area, which were replaced with shops, meaning that the concentration of booksellers would decrease. It seemed therefore that

---

the Fire only temporarily reversed St Paul’s status as major book selling area. Giles Mandelbrote concluded that St Paul’s probably began to recover its dominance of the book trade from 1670 on. Although Little Britain still had the densest concentration of booksellers north of the Walls, the proportion of booksellers in the sample based there decreased 16.7 per cent from 1667-9 to 1676-8 (although there was a 5.4 per cent rise from 1663-5 to 1676-8). The numbers based in Little Britain probably fell away in the 1670s as Paul’s re-established itself. Again, the area around Fleet Street and Temple remained the most common areas for booksellers in the western suburbs.

Some booksellers could not survive the dislocations and damage caused by the Fire to their business. Joshua Kirton (d. 1667) of Paul’s Churchyard had been Pepys’ regular bookseller from at least 1660. Kirton, like many other booksellers, lost most of his stock during the Fire, and built up debts afterwards. On 5 October 1666 a kinsman of Kirton’s told Pepys that Kirton was ‘utterly undone … and made 2 or 3000l worse then nothing, from being worth 7 or 8000l’. Kirton was not able to rebuild his business. On 11 November 1667, Pepys recorded: ‘This day I hear Kirton my bookseller, poor man, is dead; I believe of grief for his losses by the fire’. Kirton’s death was also recorded in October 1667 in the Obituary of Richard Smyth (1590-1675), a London lawyer and book collector who recorded the deaths of over 1,900 individuals. Pepys, however, had a ‘new bookseller’ within six months of the Fire - John Starkey (c.1630–1690) of Temple Bar.

41 Ibid., p. 26.
42 Pepys, Diary, ed. Latham and Matthews, vii, 309; viii. 525. 156; R. Smyth, The obituary of Richard Smyth, secondary of the Poultry Compter. London: being a catalogue of all such persons as he knew in
On 30 September 1666, John Ogilby (1600-76), the publisher and cartographer, in a petition to Charles II asking for leave to import printing paper from France, duty free, wrote that he lost £3,000 worth of stock in the Fire. The losses sustained by the booksellers of the St Paul's area could clearly run into the thousands, making the recovery from the Fire particularly difficult for this group. For example, Smyth's *Obituary* recorded the death by consumption in February 1669 of the bookseller Thomas Dicas of Paul's Churchyard, who died 'much indebted'. Two booksellers – Philemon Stephens the Elder and Samuel Gellibrand (both of Paul's Churchyard) were amongst the first to be granted money by the City from the 1666 brief for distressed Londoners. Gellibrand claimed to have lost at least £1,700 as a result of the Fire.

It appeared that booksellers operating two outlets did occur, but only one example of this was found. Henry Mortlock operated in Westminster both before and after the Fire. However, sometime after 1669, he opened another shop, as a 1678 title page recorded that he also had an outlet in Paul's Churchyard. Anecdotal evidence in Pepys' diary suggests that this was not a unique occurrence. Henry Herringman (d. 1704) was one of


43 TNA, Petition of John Ogilby to the King, 1666, SP 29/173, 109.
45 Stephens received £20 on 23 February 1667 and Gellibrand received £10 on 26 February 1667. LMA, *Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666*, 'Payment of the aforesaid monies', 14 February 1667, 23 February 1667, COL/SJ/03/006; LMA, *Fire of London Grants of Money 1667-75*, COL/SJ/03/009, 3, 5; G. Williams, *The description and the practice of the four most admirable beasts explained in four sermons upon Revel. 4.8* (London: P. Stephens, 1663), title page; H. Hickman, *The believers duty towards the Spirit. and the Spirits office towards believers, or, A discourse concerning believers not grieving the Spirit. and the Spirits sealing up believers to the day of redemption grounded on Ephes. 4.30* (London: S. Gellibrand, 1665), title page.
London's (and England's) most well known and influential booksellers, publisher of Dryden, Rochester, Davenant and Shadwell (amongst others), as well as a (perhaps unsuspecting) partner in Pepys' infidelities. Herringman operated shops on both the New Exchange and Temple Bar, both of which Pepys visited between 1667 and 1668.

Partnerships were commonplace amongst booksellers. Frequently many booksellers operated together to finance and sell a particular book. For example, Thomas Cock's 1665 treatise on hygiene for Londoners returning to the city after the Plague had four publishers. Partnerships between fewer booksellers also occurred. For example, Jonathan Robinson and Nathaniel Ranew operated as a partnership both before and after the Fire, firstly in at Paul's Churchyard before the Fire, then on Jewen Street afterward.

---

48 Pepys told one 'Mrs Willet' to leave a time and place for an assignation in a sealed envelope at Herringman's shop on New Exchange on 18 November 1668. Pepys, Diary, ed. Latham and Matthews, ix, 367.
49 Ibid., viii, 380, 383, 597-8; ix, 248, 367.
Individual mobility after the Fire

London's traders and merchants, for whom residential mobility was by no means an unusual occurrence, faced a stark decision after the Fire. Movement back to their pre-Fire address was an expensive proposition. The cost of rebuilding would have prohibitive for many, and rents in the rebuilt areas of London had increased considerably after the Fire. To continue their economic lives at the same address as before the Fire was clearly not a straightforward decision, as it had to be weighed up against the expense of returning.

There was an alternative solution to the problem of high costs of premises in the rebuilt areas of London. After the Fire, on 8 September 1666, the Court of Aldermen allowed freemen to set up sheds or tents for 'their trade and employment' anywhere outside the Wall from the Postern at Broad Street to Smithfield (this area included Moorfields). They were also allowed to set up temporary premises on any 'void ground' either side of the Bridge. The Court of Aldermen also allowed all traders formerly based in the Royal Exchange to set up shops in Gresham College. 52 Similarly, shops set up around St Bartholomew's Hospital may have provided a short-term solution for many traders. 53

Moorfields was the main area of these temporary premises. On 5 February 1667, the citizens that had moved to Moorfields were granted permission to erect a turnpike 'to

---

52 LMA, Rep. 71. fols. 168v-169r, 170v.
53 G. Whitteridge, 'The fire of London and St Bartholomew's Hospital', London Topographical Record, 20 (1952), 47-8
convey in Carts their goods to & from their respective houses'. However, by the 1670s, the City government began to attempt to move these individuals. In 1673, the City Lands Committee recorded the dire condition of Moorfields, which had left the grounds spoiled, and the gates and walls 'much decayed'. In July 1674 the Court of Aldermen ordered all sheds remaining in Moorfields to be demolished, and in May 1675 that the Court of Aldermen ordered 'the demolishing of all shedds ... erected since the Late dismall fire'.

It is clear, then, that many traders stayed in these temporary premises for a considerable period of time. Although initiated by metropolitan government as a short-term solution, economic reality meant temporary premises sometimes became permanent.

These traders based in sheds or tents would have almost certainly been small-scale, and it is probable that the majority of such traders would have not had the need, or financial wherewithal, to take on any apprentices. As such, the sampling technique for the Merchant Taylors may have underestimated the numbers of masters who moved to these temporary premises, as they may not have taken on any apprentices immediately after the Fire. There is also the element of social status skewing the data. The traders remaining in these temporary areas would have been likely to be poorer than those who could move back into the City. Indeed, the City Lands Committee records that in Moorfields there were once 'many considerable Citizens, who are now returned into the Citty, and in the Room of them Remain for the most part publique and scandalous houses'. Despite the long-term problems of allowing traders to set up temporary shops in some areas around

54 LMA, Rep. 72, fol. 56r.
55 LMA, Court of Common Council: City Lands Committee Papers, COL/CC/CLC/04/001, 80.
57 LMA, Court of Common Council: City Lands Committee Papers, COL/CC/CLC/04/001, 80.
London, there is no doubt that in the short-term, the initiative would have had a major benefit. Despite being burnt out, traders could continue to operate close to their original markets, and perhaps more importantly, could begin to trade again fairly quickly after the disaster without having the time or expense of finding a new premises.

After charting overall geographical distributions of the Merchant Taylors and the booksellers, the samples before and after the Fire were compared in order to determine individual movements (or non-movements) across London. As has been shown above, the decisions surrounding movement after the Fire would have been affected by a number of other considerations surrounding leases, rents and rebuilding. Pepys’ recording of a conversation on 14 January 1668, with one of his ‘new booksellers’, John Martin (of Paul’s Churchyard before the Fire and Temple bar afterward) neatly encapsulated some of the trends and problems of traders wishing to return to the fired areas. Pepys noted, ‘most of the booksellers do design to fall a-building again the next year; but he says that the Bishop of London doth use them most basely, worse than any other landlords, and say he will be paid to this day the rent, or else he will not come to treat with them for the time to come; and will not, on that condition neither, promise them anything how he will use them.’ Rebuilding was thus delayed because of problems with a landlord, a problem that must have been repeated throughout the rebuilt London. Poorer traders in particular may have been ‘priced out’ of a return to the City.

58 Pepys, Diary, ed. Latham and Matthews, ix. 23.
Merchant Taylors

The Merchant Taylors were a larger group than the booksellers. This made nominal linkage more difficult. Out of the 3,594 Merchant Taylors in the 1652-66 group, only 596 (16.6 per cent) could be linked with certainty to the 1666-80 group. This low proportion of nominal linkage could be partly due to mortality, i.e. the subject would die before the Fire. In order to estimate how many masters may have died before the Fire, an age distribution of the masters was created using the approximate age of attaining the freedom (see table 2.3, below).

Table 2.3: Age of masters in the Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, c. 1665

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No. recovered from freedom records</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Approximate no. amongst masters 1652-66 not linked to 1666-80 list</th>
<th>Approximate no. surviving to 1665</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25-9</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-4</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-9</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-4</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-9</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-9</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-4</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1073</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3002</td>
<td>805</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Calculations are based on a proxy age of freedom of 25, and the 1073 masters whose dates of freedom could be accurately recovered from company records.
Based on table 2.1, 97.3 per cent of the sample would have lived in the City, its liberties and out parishes. Thus, around 783 would have been directly affected by the 1665 Plague, which had an overall mortality rate of around 17.6 per cent.\textsuperscript{59} This meant that around 138 would have been killed by the 1665 Plague. Thus, by 1666 there were 667 Merchant Taylors who could not be traced into 1666-80 who would have survived into 1667. This figure may be an overestimate, as it cannot take into account Merchant Taylors who decided to move out of London before the Fire. It also cannot take into account those masters who decided not to take on any apprentices. In addition, many of the masters could not be reliably linked because their names were too common, making reasonably certain nominal linkage impossible. This gave a revised figure of at most 47.0 per cent of the 1652-66 sample that could potentially be linked to the 1666-80 sample, although in practice this proportion was probably even lower. Therefore, around half of the Merchant Taylors active in London just before the Fire were linked after the Fire.

Of the 549 masters linked before and after the Fire, just over half were based in burnt out areas of London (51.7 per cent). Over 80 per cent of the Merchant Taylors burnt out moved their place of work permanently after the disaster, and 3.5 per cent moved but returned to their original address. Overall, the Fire led to more than half (56.8 per cent) of the Merchant Taylors moving to another area of London, although not all of these moves were permanent. However, even if a subject was based in an area of London unaffected by Fire, 29.1 per cent moved permanently, and 0.7 per cent made temporary moves. Mobility, thus, seems to have still been a fairly common occurrence even for

individuals not based in Fire-affected areas, as was found in chapter 1. However, it does appear that being burnt out increased the likelihood of moving. Significantly, few of the Merchant Taylors who moved as a result of the Fire returned to their original place.

Table 2.4: Type of movement, Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, 1666-80 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of London</th>
<th>Fired areas</th>
<th>Non-fired areas</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moved within same region of London</td>
<td>City within the Walls</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved into different region of London</td>
<td>Into City within the Walls</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northward</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southward</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eastward</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Westward</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Out of London</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (241)</td>
<td>100 (77)</td>
<td>100 (318)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 2.1.
Note: Table does not include 17 masters whose moves cannot be exactly identified; and the 261 masters who did not move.

Table 2.5: Proportion of movers who moved into another region of London, Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, 1666-80 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Fired areas</th>
<th>% of which permanent</th>
<th>Non-fired areas</th>
<th>% of which permanent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Into the City</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northward</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southward</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastward</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westward</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out of London</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>90.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 2.1.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show that there were differences in the movement of Merchant Taylors, according to where they relocated, and whether the move was as a result of the Fire. Table 2.4 shows that movement west was the most popular destination, followed by movement east. There are differences in the type of movement depending on if the master was based in a fired area of London. It appeared that movement outside of the Walls was more common for Merchant Taylors affected by the Fire, with movement west being the most popular, in particular to areas such as Holborn, Temple and Fleet Street as well as some movement into the developments in the West End. There was also significant movement to other areas around the City. For a fuller portrait of movement after the Fire, the destinations of the masters who had been burnt out were mapped.

Figure 2.4, below, shows that the movement of fired Merchant Taylors ranged across London. Movement west seemed to have been mainly towards Fleet Street, the Strand and Holborn. Another common destination was east of the Walls, in particular areas such as the Minories, Houndsditch and Bishopsgate. Movement north was mostly toward Smithfield, with some movement towards Moorfields. Movement south appeared to have been less common. However, this may be due to the fact that these areas were relatively less prestigious, so the masters who relocated there after the Fire may not have been able to take on any apprentices, and so would not have been included in the sample. The sample also does not record any movement south outside of Southwark. There is some anecdotal evidence of this. A petition to the Court of Aldermen recorded that four dyers had moved to Lambeth, and had erected stairs onto the Thames for their trade.60

60 This was technically illegal, but the dyers, due to their 'present exigency', were allowed one year's grace to remove the stairs. LMA, Rep. 73, fol. 281r.
Figure 2.4: Destinations of fired masters, Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, 1666-80

Sources: See table 2.1. Map adapted from Plan of the City of London before the Fire.
Note: Does not include the four masters who moved outside of the borders of the map: one each to Burnham (Essex), Highgate, Hampstead and Islington.
Movement from areas unaffected by the Fire was proportionately more likely to be short range, with fewer masters moving to different districts of the city. However, for this group relocation to the western suburbs was the most commonplace. Movement west occurred at high levels whether or not a master was based in a fired area of London before 1666, whilst movement to other areas was more likely to be a reaction to being burnt out. The Fire only accelerated movement west, a trend that had been ongoing for decades.

Table 2.5 shows that there were slight differences in the likelihood of a move to a different district of London being permanent dependent on where the move was made to, and if the move originated in a fired area. Moves from fired areas were only 3.8 per cent less likely to be permanent than moves from non-fired areas. This slight difference may stem from the fact that moves after the Fire were more likely to be based on short term considerations based on the instant loss of a property, whereas if the move came from a non-fired area it was probably more likely to be either part of a considered business strategy or at least to have come with some longer-term warning (for example, a lease ending). The decision to move back to a fired area of London may also have been motivated by improved terms of lease holding to encourage movement back into damaged areas of the city. However, the difference is only slight.

The Merchant Taylors in this sample affected by the Fire appear to be likely to stay in areas moved to after 1666. This may be due to the method in which the sample was collected. Taking on an apprentice was more likely to occur if the master had a settled
location. Therefore, it may be that there was a short-term 'middle step' move between the Fire and the long-term residential change that could be recorded from the apprenticeship bindings. As has been discussed above, movement back into fired areas of the City could not take place immediately after the Fire because of the process of rebuilding. As such, there would have been a period of at least one year after the Fire where it would have been impossible to move back into a workplace in a fired area of London. Secondly, it appears that movement within the Walls and west of the Walls appeared to have been more likely to be permanent than other movements. These areas were generally more settled and prestigious than the areas north, east and south of the Walls making them a more potentially lucrative and stable long-term place of business.

**Booksellers**

After collecting the distributions of the booksellers in 1663-5, 1667-9 and 1676-8, the names of the subjects were linked to attempt to assess individual movements before and after the Fire. Just under half of the 1663-5 sample, 79 (49.4 per cent), could be traced to the 1667-9 sample, and just over a quarter of the 1663-5 sample, 43 (26.9 per cent), could be traced to the 1676-8 sample.

In total 51 booksellers based in fired areas were linked between the 1663-5 and 1667-9 samples. Of these, 51.0 per cent moved north, 21.6 per cent moved west, 19.6 per cent moved east and 7.8 per cent did not move. None of the 28 booksellers linked between the 1663-5 and 1667-9 samples based in areas directly unaffected by the Fire moved. It
appears that booksellers unaffected by the Fire were more stable in their residence than
the Merchant Taylors. However, those booksellers affected by Fire almost all moved -
only four remained in the same place before and after the Fire; George Hurlock of St
Magnus the Martyr Church Corner, Joseph Moxon of Ludgate Hill, and Humphrey
Robinson and Samuel Gellibrand of Paul’s Churchyard. 61

The majority of the movement after the Fire was northward. Most of these moves were
from Paul’s Churchyard to the Little Britain and Smithfield areas. They appear to have
occurred fairly quickly after the Fire. A letter from two London booksellers to a Flemish
dealer asking for new books to replenish their stock showed that within days of the Fire,
these booksellers from St Paul’s had moved on to new premises, in this case to Little
Britain. 62 Those who moved westward tended to go towards Fleet Street and the Strand.
Eastward movers tended to stay within the Walls, five clustering around the temporary
shops in Gresham College, where the Court of Aldermen allowed all traders formerly
based in the Royal Exchange to set up shops after the Fire. It is clear that many made this
move – for example Nathaniel Brooke and Ralph Smith moved from the Royal Exchange
to Gresham College after the Fire. 63 There was only one bookseller who moved outside

61 E. Bushnell, The Compleat Ship-Wright (London: G. Hurlock, 1664), title page; R. Norwood, Norwood’s
Epitomy: Being the Application of The Doctrine of Triangles (London: G. Hurlock, 1667), title page; Book
of sea-plats, title page; J. Moxon, Mechanick Dyalling: Teaching Any Man, though of an Ordinary
Capacity and unlearned in the Mathematicks. to draw a true Sun-Dyal (London: J. Moxon, 1678), title
page; J. G., A Sermon Treating of the Tryall of all Things by the Holy Scriptures (London: H. Robinson,
1664), title page; F. Bacon, The Essays, or Counsels, Civil & Moral. of Sir Francis Bacon (London: H.
Robinson, 1669), title page; The Believers Duty Towards the Spirit (London: S. Gellibrand, 1665), title
page; Two Consolatory Letters Written to the Right Honourable The Countess of Westmorland (London: S.
Gellibrand, 1669), title page.
62 Mandelbrote, ‘Workplaces and living spaces’, in London book trade, ed. Myers, Harris and Mandelbrote,
p. 22.
63 LMA, Rep. 71, fol. 170v; A True and Compendious Narration, Or (Second Part of Amboyney) Of Sundry
Notorious or Remarkable Injuries. Insolencies. and Acts of Hostility, which the Hollanders Have Exercised
(London: N. Brooke, 1665), title page; Rules and Directions prescribed for the Pitching and Levelling the

149
of the Walls - Dixy Page, who relocated to East Smithfield from Cornhill. It is also possible that a bookseller could operate a business in their former place of work in a fired area of London whilst living in the area they moved to after the Fire. Although booksellers frequently tied workplace to dwelling, the trade did not always require a shop - many booksellers operated out of stalls, and so would have had separate homes and workplaces. This would mean a bookseller could operate out of a temporary stall whilst living elsewhere.

There was not a long-term change in the distribution of the London booksellers - by the 1670s the pre-Fire status quo had been virtually re-established. To what extent is this reflected in the individual movements of the linked booksellers?

Table 2.6: Long-term movements of London booksellers, 1663-5, 1667-9, 1676-8 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of move</th>
<th>Proportion (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affected by Fire, did not move at all</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affected by Fire, moved, returned to pre-Fire residence</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affected by Fire, moved, returned to pre-Fire neighbourhood</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affected by Fire, moved, stayed in same residence</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affected by Fire, moved, stayed in same neighbourhood</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffected by Fire, did not move at all</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffected by Fire, moved</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (43)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: see table 2.2.*

---

65 Johns, 'Printing, publishing and reading in London', in Urban achievement, ed. O'Brien, Keene, 't Hart and van der Wee, p. 268; Mandelbrote, 'From the warehouse to the counting-house', in Genius for letters, ed. Myers and Harris, p. 52.
As table 2.6 shows, 26.9 per cent of the 1663-5 sample could be traced to the 1667-9 and 1676-8 samples. A comparison of place of work shows that the booksellers appear to be very stable in their distribution across London. Eighteen of the booksellers linked between 1663-5 and 1676-8 were from areas unaffected by the Fire, and only one of them moved, in this case, from Temple to Cornhill. There seemed to have been a general movement back to pre-Fire topographical patterns; of the 25 booksellers affected by the Fire, 22 returned to, or near to, their pre-Fire places of work. Only three booksellers remained in the same area they had moved to after being burnt out in 1666. It appeared that even if a bookseller was burnt out, it was fairly likely he would have returned to his original place of work by the 1670s, for the most part after a spell operating in a different area of London.

This section has explored how London’s existing booksellers were distributed after the Fire. Briefly, the distribution of the booksellers who set up shop in the aftermath of the Fire will be discussed here (defined here as booksellers who were not linked to anyone in the 1663-5 sample for 1667-9; and for booksellers not linked to anyone in the 1663-5 and 1667-9 samples for 1676-8).
Table 2.7: Topographical distribution of ‘new’ booksellers in London after the Fire, 1667-9, 1676-8 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1667-9 'New' booksellers</th>
<th>1667-9 Existing booksellers</th>
<th>1676-8 'New' booksellers</th>
<th>1676-8 Existing booksellers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City within the Walls</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East of the Walls</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West of the Walls</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westminster</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of the Walls</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwark</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (74)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (79)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (88)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (50)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: see table 2.2.*

Table 2.7 shows that there were slight differences in geographical distribution between the booksellers setting up shop for the first time after the Fire and those booksellers who had been operating since before the Fire. For the 1667-9 group, the proportions were broadly similar, except that the ‘new’ booksellers were slightly more concentrated north of the Walls than the pre-existing ones, as well as less likely to be based west of the Walls. This is probably due to the relative expense of the two areas. London’s western suburbs were more expensive and prestigious than the northern suburbs, and so were more likely to be home to established booksellers with more financial resources.

The profile changed in the 1676-8 group as the pre-Fire distribution of London’s booksellers was re-established, as the majority of booksellers were located within the Walls again. Once again, the relative proportions for ‘new’ and existing booksellers’ geographical locations were broadly similar. There are however differences. As for the 1667-9 group, ‘new’ booksellers were more likely to be based in the areas north of the Walls. However, unlike the 1667-9 group, the proportions based in the western suburbs
were broadly similar. This may be due to the costs of locating in these areas becoming more stabilised over time, as the developments to the west got older. It appeared that ‘new’ booksellers were less likely to be based within the Walls, perhaps reflecting a dearth of properties available as the City was rebuilt. ‘New’ booksellers may also have been more likely to settle outside of the Walls of the City because there were more opportunities and consumer demand in these areas, as they became proportionately more populous than the City over time.

**Occupational change after the Fire**

The Merchant Taylors were not a homogenous trade group. By the seventeenth century, many of its members had diversified out of the cloth trade. The ‘custom of London’ meant that any freeman had the right to operate in any trade, regardless of their company. The apprenticeship bindings (mostly) recorded the exact occupation of the master. From this, a rough hierarchy of trade groups for the Merchant Taylors was constructed. This showed the occupational diversity of the company. It also illuminated to what extent locality affected the exact trade of a master, and to what extent the Fire may have affected the distribution of trades in the company.
Table 2.8: Trade groups, Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, 1666-80 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Sub-group</th>
<th>1652-66</th>
<th>1666-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selling</td>
<td>Dealer</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dealer of textiles</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victualler</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft</td>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>Builder</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carrier</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 (1805)</td>
<td>100 (2138)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 2.1.
Note: Masters who did not specify their occupation are not included in the calculations. 1789 from 1652-66 and 24 from 1666-80. Occupational groups taken from Power, ‘Social topography’; in London 1500-1700, table 27, pp. 214-15.

Table 2.8 shows that the Merchant Taylors were involved in many different trades, although the textiles trade appeared to remain the most significant sector the company was involved in, with over half of the company involved in either the manufacture or sale of textiles both before and after the Fire. The Merchant Taylors’ involvement with its original trade may have been in decline in the seventeenth century, but the textile trade and tailoring in particular remained the most important sector. Nigel Sleigh-Johnson has found that tailor constituted between one half and one third of the company’s membership beyond 1660, and a 1676 quarterage book with over 1,000 names referred to 23 per cent of them as tailors. This trend was reflected in the Merchant Taylors sample in this thesis. For the 1652-66 group, 32.2 per cent identified themselves as tailors, declining to 27.1 per cent for the 1666-80 group.

Clearly the occupational distribution of the Merchant Taylors differed from that of the rest of London. When comparing the occupational structure of the Merchant Taylors to Michael Power's study of 20 parishes in 1666, the distributions were statistically different. When the textiles trades were excluded, the differences in the distributions are still statistically different, but they are more similar. The main differences were that Merchant Taylors were more likely to be involved in dealing and textiles occupations than the rest of London, and less likely to be involved in the victualling, building and carrying trades.

There appeared to have been slight differences in the occupational distributions before and after the Fire. After 1666, it appeared that craftsmen within the company became more diversified in their occupations, with proportionally fewer being involved in the textiles. This may be due to the long term tendency for manufacturing to move out of London after the mid seventeenth century. It may also reflect the long-term decline in textile prices in England from the second half of the sixteenth century to the late eighteenth century. These two factors may have combined to make textile manufacturing a less attractive prospect, and meant that other trades would have grown in relative size as new masters chose to pursue avenues outside of textiles. The main

---

67 Power, 'Social topography', in London 1500-1700, pp. 214-15; 1652-66: Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 1582.752, tabulated value is 16.92, therefore null hypothesis of no difference is rejected; 1666-80: Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 1217.938, tabulated value is 16.92, therefore null hypothesis of no difference is rejected.

68 1652-66: Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 168.762, tabulated value is 15.51. therefore null hypothesis of no difference is rejected; 1666-80: Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 186.289, tabulated value is 15.51. therefore null hypothesis of no difference is rejected.


change was the increased proportion of Merchant Taylors becoming involved in the building trade - this more than doubled after the Fire. Clearly this was a response to the building boom after the Fire.

Table 2.9: Proportionate distribution of trade groups by region of London, Merchant Taylors, 1652-66 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Sub-group</th>
<th>City within the Walls</th>
<th>East of the Walls</th>
<th>West of the Walls</th>
<th>North of the Walls</th>
<th>Southwark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selling</td>
<td>Dealer</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victualler</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft</td>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>Builder</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carrier</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 (906)</td>
<td>100 (132)</td>
<td>100 (374)</td>
<td>100 (226)</td>
<td>100 (98)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 2.1.
Note: Does not include masters who did not specify their occupations, or Merchant Taylors based outside of London.
Table 2.10: Proportionate distribution of trade groups by region of London, Merchant Taylors, 1666-80 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Sub-group</th>
<th>City within the Walls</th>
<th>East of the Walls</th>
<th>West of the Walls</th>
<th>North of the Walls</th>
<th>Southwark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selling</td>
<td>Dealer</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victualler</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft</td>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>Builder</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carrier</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 (715)</td>
<td>100 (276)</td>
<td>100 (467)</td>
<td>100 (408)</td>
<td>100 (168)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 2.1.
Note: Does not include masters who did not specify their occupations, or Merchant Taylors based outside of London.

Tables 2.9 and 2.10 show regional differences in the occupational distribution of the Merchant Taylors across London, and how they varied before and after the Fire. Before the Fire, the City within the Walls had a far higher proportion of dealers than other areas of London. However, after the Fire, the proportion of dealers east and west of the Walls grew, in response to the growing population density of these areas, as well as the problems of rebuilding the fired areas of London. The proportions of craftsmen were fairly similar before and after the Fire. The exception was Southwark, which had a higher proportion of builders and victuallers both before and after the Fire, and a higher proportion of masters involved in carrying trades than other areas of London.

These differences were probably due to long-standing trends in Southwark's occupational
structure. The higher proportions of victuallers in the area were a result of Southwark’s important position on the southern routes into London, meaning hospitality accounted for a significant proportion of the local economy. Borough High Street, in particular, which was the main route between the South Coast and London, had a high concentration of inns to cater for travellers. Southwark’s leisure attractions may also have encouraged the hospitality trades in the area. 71 Jeremy Boulton’s study of the occupational structure of seventeenth-century Southwark showed that many parts of the area had a relatively higher proportion of people working in the building and carrying trades than other parts of London. 72 Once again, tables 2.11 and 2.12 show the growth of building trades after the Fire, whose proportions increased in all areas.

Next, the occupations of nominally linked masters will be examined, to determine if their occupations changed over time, and if moving shop or being burnt out had any significant effect on occupation.

72 Ibid., table 3.3. p. 66.
Table 2.11: Occupation, nominally linked Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, 1666-80 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Sub-group</th>
<th>1652-66</th>
<th>1666-80</th>
<th>No. in different occupation in 1666-80 from 1652-66</th>
<th>% of 1652-66 in different occupational from 1652-66 to 1666-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selling</td>
<td>Dealer</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victualler</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft</td>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Misc.</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>Builder</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carrier</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 2.1.

Note: Masters who did not specify their occupation are not included in the calculations.

Table 2.11 shows that occupational mobility was not uncommon. Even though the overall occupational distributions are similar both before and after the Fire, there was movement in occupations, with over ten per cent of the linked masters changing their exact trade from 1652-66 to 1666-80. Builders and craftsmen working with wood experienced the highest levels of occupational turnover. This is unsurprising given that these trade groups were comparatively low status, low skill and probably had the cheapest manufacturing and trading stock. For example, when Abraham Wright of St Martin-in-the-Fields changed from a carpenter to a wheelwright, it would not have required a great deal of change in stock or materials. 73

---

73 The change may also have been a result of differences in noting an occupation, given that the trade of wheelwright could be viewed as being a 'branch' of carpentry. Therefore, the apparent change in occupation may have been due to merely greater specificity of recording Wright's trade, rather than an actual change. GL, MT. Co. Apprenticeship Bindings, MS 34038/15, p. 240; 34038/15, p. 339.
For the most part occupational changes were in related industries. For example, Robert Croft (of Cheapside before the Fire, and the Strand after) changed from bodice seller to a bodice maker. Similarly, John Andrews (of Fenchurch Street before the Fire, and Bishopsgate Street Without after) changed from a linen draper to a woollen draper. However, some occupational moves may have been a response to local market demand. For example, Isaac Logsdon of Holborn changed his occupation from a wheelwright to a tennis court keeper – perhaps catering to the leisure needs of residents of the western suburbs and the nearby Inns of Court. This change may also have been due to lifecycle, as old age may have made manual labour more difficult.

Table 2.12: Type of occupational movement, nominally linked Merchant Taylors, and proportions from burnt-out areas of London, 1652-66, 1666-80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Type of movement</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>No. of which from fired areas</th>
<th>% of which from fired areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selling</td>
<td>Within group</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From craft</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From semi-skilled</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft</td>
<td>From selling</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within group</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From semi-skilled</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>From selling</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From craft</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Within group</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>53</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 2.1.
Note: 423 masters did not change occupational group, 130 could not be identified because occupation not specified.

74 GL, MT. Co. Apprenticeship Bindings, MS 34038/15, p. 258; 34038/16, p. 92.
76 GL, MT. Co. Apprenticeship Bindings, MS 34038/15, p. 294: 34038/16, p. 311.
Table 2.12 shows that not all occupational moves came as a result of being burnt out. Rather, it seemed that a master who changed occupations was equally likely to come from a fired area of London as a non-fired area. However, as the sample was so small, it is difficult to generalize regarding which types of occupational movements were more likely to be associated with being burnt out. In spite of the small sample size, it is probably fairly likely that (given the similar proportions for each group) no type of occupational movement was particularly associated with being burnt out.

From the details of exact occupations specified in the linked Merchant Taylors’ masters from before and after the Fire, a rough measure of what social direction the occupational moves were can be made. Around two out of five (39.6 per cent) of the occupational moves were not accompanied by any significant alteration in social status. Roughly similar proportions of masters experienced either a gain or a loss in social prestige as a result of changing their occupation. Fifteen masters (28.3 per cent) were deemed to have moved ‘down’ the social scale, and 17 (32.1 per cent) were deemed to have moved ‘up’. The masters who moved socially downward were slightly more likely to have burnt out than those who moved upwards, but the proportions are not dramatically dissimilar. Exactly 40 per cent of the masters who moved downwards were directly affected by the Fire, but 35.3 per cent of masters who moved upwards were also from fired areas of London. Moving place of work seemed to have been slightly more associated with downward mobility - 53.3 per cent of the masters who moved downward changed their workplace, compared to 41.2 per cent of masters who moved upward. As the sample is so small, no firm conclusions can be made about the effect of the direction of the move.
on social mobility. On the whole, it appeared that the experience of being burnt out or of moving did not have a major effect on social mobility.

Changing occupation was not always accompanied by movement in workplace. Just under half of the masters who changed their occupation did not move their place of work. The majority of the masters who moved came from areas of London affected by the Fire, which is unsurprising. Once again, given the small sample size, it is difficult to precisely say what type of movement was particularly associated with being burnt out or moving to a particular region of London.

**The impact of age**

Using the freedom register of the Merchant Taylors, it was possible to approximate proxy ages for the sample of masters before the Fire. Taking 24 as the age for gaining the freedom of the company through service or redemption and 21 as the age for gaining the freedom through patrimony approximate ages could be calculated. These ages provided a minimum approximation for the age at which the master was at the time of the Fire. The age at which the freedom was attained did vary, although it is unlikely it would be any older than the ages detailed above. Also, gaining the freedom did not always mean complete economic independence. A few years of work as a journeyman were

---


usually necessary to build up enough capital to start one's own business - usually in the late twenties or early thirties. This point also tended to coincide with marriage. 79

Although the ages calculated are approximate, they do offer a relative view of the ages of the Merchant Taylors, and allow the effect of age on movement before and after the Fire to be gauged. It was expected that younger members of the company would find it more difficult to recover after the disaster given the high costs of re-establishing a business in London and the relative difficulty young businessmen had in obtaining credit. 80

As table 2.3, above, shows, out of the 3,594 masters in the 1652-66 sample, only 1,073 could be linked accurately to individuals in the freedom registers. Clearly, given the high ages of some in the sample, it is unlikely that they would have indeed survived to 1666. For example, Adam Dagwell of Whitefriars Precinct took on an apprentice in 1654, and was freed of Humphrey Hammond in 1611, 81 giving him (using the method detailed above) an approximate age at the time of the Fire of 80, which although not totally impossible, is at best unfeasible - especially given the effects of higher urban mortality and the 1665 Plague. Thus, only individuals who could be linked to both before and after the Fire will be examined in this section, as this ensured that only Merchant Taylors who were actually alive and economically active after the Fire were considered. This was borne out by a statistical comparison of the age ranges of the linked and non-linked Merchant Taylors. Even at the highest levels of rejection (99.99 per cent), the linked

81 GL. MT. Co. Apprenticeship Bindings, MS 34038/14, p. 8; GL. MT. Co. Index of freeman. A-D. MS 34037/1.
individuals tended to have been younger. In other words, individuals with improbably high ages probably either died or ceased to be economically active before 1666.

For the Merchant Taylors, it was possible to estimate the ages of part of the sample. Of the total 596 masters that could be accurately linked before and after the Fire, the approximate age of roughly 40 per cent (242) of this sample could be calculated. This allowed the effect of age on individual circumstances after the Fire to be examined.

Figure 2.5: Approximate age range of Merchant Taylors linked before and after the Fire, 1652-66 and 1666-80

Figure 2.5 shows that the age range of the sample was broadly what one would expect, based on custom and tradition in London, which specified that apprentices should be at

---

82 Testing using one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at 99.99%: D=28.787 and the critical value is 13.82. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.
least 24 on attaining the freedom. This set an inbuilt lower limit of around the mid twenties for the age range sample. As such, the sample was statistically different from Steve Rappaport’s 1552 figures for the ages of London males. The Merchant Taylors age range sample showed comparatively higher proportions of masters aged 35 to 44, with comparatively few in their early twenties or older than sixty. Over 90 per cent of the sample was aged between 26 and 56. The oldest master was Peter Whalley, a writing master who moved from Old Jewry to Houndsditch after the Fire. He was in his early eighties in 1666, and gained his freedom through service in 1608. Conversely, the youngest master was William Gibbons, a Chandler from Bishopsgate Street, who was in his early twenties and gained his freedom through patrimony from his father in 1664.

Table 2.13: Age range of Merchant Taylors linked before and after the Fire, by geographical movement, 1652-66 and 1666-80 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Range</th>
<th>Fired, moved</th>
<th>Fired, did not move</th>
<th>Not fired, moved</th>
<th>Not fired, did not move</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 or below</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 or above</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (97)</td>
<td>100 (31)</td>
<td>100 (35)</td>
<td>100 (75)</td>
<td>100 (238)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 2.1.
Note: The movement of four of the masters could not be traced because of insufficient information given in the apprenticeship bindings.

Rappaport, Worlds within worlds, pp. 323-6.
Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 126.387, tabulated value is 19.68, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected. 30 to 39. Rappaport, Worlds within worlds, table A1.3, p. 392.
Table 2.13 shows that age had a slight bearing on movement after 1666, although there was no significant statistical difference between the ages of those who moved and did not move. For the masters burnt out, slightly higher proportions under the age of 29 moved workplace after the Fire, rather than returning to their original address. In comparison, masters between 30 and 49 seemed to have been more likely to return to their original workplace. Masters over 50 appeared to have been more likely to move after the Fire. However, this may be a commonly occurring phenomenon in metropolitan economic life, as the group of Merchant Taylors not burnt out had a similar profile to the masters that were burnt out. Younger Merchant Taylors may have been poorer and less economically stable and established than those in the prime of their business lives, and so may have been slightly more likely to move in order to find an effective trading site. To more accurately profile this economic movement, it was linked to geographic direction.

Table 2.14: Direction of movement of Merchant Taylors linked before and after the Fire, by age group, 1652-66 and 1666-80 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age (number of masters)</th>
<th>Moved within Walls</th>
<th>Moved northward</th>
<th>Moved southward</th>
<th>Moved eastward</th>
<th>Moved westward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 or below (26)</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 39 (48)</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 to 49 (39)</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 to 59 (16)</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 plus (5)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (134)</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>32.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>38.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 2.1.

Note: The movement of four of the masters could not be traced because of insufficient information given in the apprenticeship bindings.

87 Masters fired: Testing using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at 95%: D=0.092 and the critical value is 0.281. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no significant difference is accepted. Masters not fired: Testing using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at 95%: D=0.112 and the critical value is 0.278. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no significant difference is accepted.
Clearly given the small sample sizes of some of the groups in table 2.14, it is difficult to generalise – particularly for masters aged over 50. However, some broad observations can be made. Masters in middle age (30 to 49) were slightly more likely to remain within the Walls, whilst younger and older masters showed a slightly greater proclivity to move outside of the Walls. However, these differences were marginal. The relatively higher numbers of older masters moving east, which is possibly the most downwardly socially mobile ‘direction’, perhaps reflected a contemporary trend towards ‘downsizing’ in old age. It was usual to take on a smaller house as one got older,88 so perhaps it was possible that this trend could be extended towards ‘downsizing’ in terms of geographical location to an area of cheaper rent. In summation, it appeared that younger Merchant Taylors may have been slightly more likely to move than their older contemporaries, but the sample size was too small to make any firm conclusions about the impact of age on geographical movement in particular. Next, the effect of age on change in trade groups after the Fire will be examined.

---

Table 2.15: Trade groups in the Merchant Taylors, by age group, 1666-80 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Sub-group</th>
<th>29 or below</th>
<th>30 to 39</th>
<th>40 to 49</th>
<th>50 to 59</th>
<th>60 plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selling</td>
<td>Dealer</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victualler</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft</td>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Misc.</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>Builder</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carrier</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 (50)</td>
<td>100 (91)</td>
<td>100 (66)</td>
<td>100 (23)</td>
<td>100 (11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 2.1.

Note: One master who did not specify his occupation was not included in the calculations.

It appeared, from table 2.15, that the youngest group of Merchant Taylors had a fairly different distribution of occupations compared to the older age groups in two main ways. They were far less likely to be engaged in textile-based crafts than other age groups, and far more likely to be engaged in the building trade. This reflected the flexibility of the younger masters not yet fully established in one trade, and able to react to changing economic conditions – namely, the decline of the textile trade and the boom in building in London after the Fire. This difference is also borne out by statistical testing, which shows that the 29 or below age group is the only group whose distribution of occupations differed from the overall distribution for all Merchant Taylors in the years 1666-80.89

---

89 29 or below: Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 15.053, tabulated value is 9.49, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected. 30 to 39: Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 3.416, tabulated value is 9.49, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected. 40 to 49: Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 1.545, tabulated value is 9.49, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is accepted. 50 plus: Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 1.443, tabulated value is 9.49, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected. (Note: the groups ‘50 to 59’ and ‘60 plus’ had to be combined because of restrictions on the chi-squared tests about a minimum level of expected values.)
Unfortunately, due to the small numbers of appropriate cases, it was not possible to examine the impact of age on masters who changed their occupation after the Fire.

The small size of some of the samples in this section meant it was difficult to form definite conclusions about the impact of age on the Merchant Taylors before and after the Fire. However, it was clear that there were some differences between the age groups. Younger masters were slightly more likely to have moved their place of business than older masters. However, there do not seem to be any major differences between the age groups in terms of the geographical directions of these movements.

The effect of the Fire on female-run businesses

Women played an important role in the metropolitan economy. However, this role was limited. The guild system, which still regulated much of the trade in the City, was overwhelmingly masculine in identity and membership. It was almost always as the wife or widow of a master that women had the right to trade within the guild system. 90 However, some female livery company members had their trading rights through serving an apprenticeship, but their numbers were small – usually less than ten per cent of the total. 91 Indeed, only two out of the 57 female Merchant Taylors from the 1652-66 sample gained freedom in their own right, through service. 92 It was mostly widows who

---


92 Margaret Brookes, a seamstress of Seething Lane, GL, MT. Co. Index of freeman, A-D, MS 34037/1. Susanna Ridley, a streamstress of Cheapside, GL, MT. Co. Index of freeman, K-R, MS 34037/3.
could have operated businesses independently, as the livery company system gave widows the trading rights of their deceased husbands.

Widows were vulnerable and sometimes isolated members of the community. Widows of wealthier tradesmen may have been able to remain economically independent and active, but most widows would have continued their economic life through remarriage rather than remain independent in a patriarchal society. However, for older women and those lower down the social scale, widowhood left many women in a precarious financial position, reducing their chances of economic success and leaving them at risk of poverty. Boulton’s study of seventeenth-century Southwark has shown that incidence of poverty was related to having a female head of household. Many widows, even if they had wanted to, would be unable to take on the cost of an apprentice. This explains the low proportion of female masters in the Merchant Taylors’. Women accounted for only 1.6 per cent of the masters in the 1652-66 sample - however, this figure did rise to 3.5 per cent for the 1666-80 sample.

There were proportionally more women involved in bookselling. This was probably due to the fact that bookselling was a generally more prestigious occupation than most Merchant Taylors’ occupations, meaning that the females in the trade would have had more resources, and so been more likely to be able to start and sustain their independent business. However, the proportion of women in bookselling declined over time. For the

1663-5 group, 5.0 per cent of the booksellers were women, falling to 3.3 per cent in 1667-9, and 0.6 per cent in 1676-8. This decline may have been due to the increased costs of operating in London, which would have affected women more, as they were more likely to have fewer economic resources than men.

The structure of metropolitan widowhood also contributed to fewer women operating as independent traders for an extended period of time. Remarriage in London was both commonplace and (in the national context) fairly rapid - around two-thirds of widows remarried within one year. Younger widows in particular were more likely to remarry, whereas those over 50 tended to find remarriage more difficult. When a widow remarried, the new husband would usually take over as the head of the business from the widow, and also enjoy her trading rights. However, even if a widow did not remarry, it appeared that only small numbers operated their businesses for longer than a few years. It was not common for widows to carry on their late husband’s trade. Most were unsuccessful in ‘male’ trades, and were frequently (older widows in particular) forced to turn to marginal occupations with low wages such as spinning, laundry or nursing. As such, many could not take on apprentices, probably because of the cost involved in the process. These considerations mean that it may be difficult to link significant numbers of women before and after the Fire, as they were less likely to operate businesses...

---


independently for an extended period of time, and because they tended to be more vulnerable to downward social mobility, which may have priced them out of either the apprenticeship system, or operating in London altogether.

**Female economic topography**

**Table 2.16: Place of business, female Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, 1666-80 (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1652-66</th>
<th>1666-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City within the Walls</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East of the Walls</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West of the Walls</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westminster</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North of the Walls</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwark</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrey</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesex</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (56)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (76)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: See table 2.1.*

*Note: Calculations do not take into account the master from 1652-66 whose place of workshop could not be exactly specified.*

Table 2.16 shows that before the Fire, female Merchant Taylor topographic structure was similar to the overall pattern, although proportionately more women were likely to be based in Southwark. However, it does not appear that gender had a statistically significant effect on economic topography for the 1652-66 group. 97 Likewise, gender did not have a statistically significant effect on economic topography after the Fire. 98

97 Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 7.024, tabulated value is 9.49, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is accepted.

98 Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 5.473, tabulated value is 9.49, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is accepted.
However, there were slight differences - women continued to be more likely to be based in Southwark, but also appear to be more likely to be based in the City within the Walls after the Fire; 40.9 per cent of female Merchant Taylors were based in the City after the Fire, compared to 32.9 per cent of male Merchant Taylors.

As the numbers of booksellers were lower than the Merchant Taylors, it was not possible to examine the effect of gender on their topography in the same way, as there were only a handful of female booksellers (eight in the 1663-5 group, five in the 1667-9 group and one in the 1676-8 group).

**Female occupational structure**

Table 2.17: Trade groups, female Merchant Taylors, 1652-66, 1666-80 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Sub-group</th>
<th>1652-66</th>
<th>1666-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selling</td>
<td>Dealer</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victualler</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft</td>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>Builder</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carrier</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 (24)</td>
<td>100 (74)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources:* See table 2.1.

*Note:* 32 masters from 1652-66 and 2 from 1666-80 did not exactly specify occupation.

Table 2.17 shows that the occupational structure of female Merchant Taylors was similar
to the overall pattern. There was no statistical difference between the occupational structure of females and the overall structure, both before and after the Fire.\textsuperscript{99} However, it does appear that there were slightly higher proportions of women involved in the victualling trades than the overall pattern. The similarity between female and male occupational structure in the Merchant Taylors is probably due to the fact that most females operating in the company were widows. As such, it would have been likely that they would have continued the trade of their husband, as a great deal of their economic experience and connections would have gained in the trade of their late husband.

**Trading signs**

To the outsider, and even the native, London's street system probably seemed confusing and disorganised. Prior to street numbering, most businesses in London were identified with a sign. Some books recorded the sign that the bookseller traded under. (The Merchant Taylors apprenticeship bindings do not record the sign traded under.) David Garrioche has determined that many Londoners took their signs with them when they moved shop.\textsuperscript{100} Out of the 26 booksellers who moved as a result of the Fire, and whose signs were recorded for both before and after the disaster, over half (57.7 per cent) changed the sign they traded under when they moved. Although the sample is too small to generalise with certainty, it appears that when a bookseller returned to his pre-Fire

\textsuperscript{99} 1652-66: Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 1.260, tabulated value is 5.99, and therefore null hypothesis of no difference is accepted. 1666-80: Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 9.209, tabulated value is 11.07, and therefore null hypothesis of no difference is accepted.

\textsuperscript{100} D. Garrioche, 'House names, shop signs and social organization in Western European cities, 1500-1900', *Urban History*, 21 (1994), 31.
place of business, he generally would adopt his old sign. No booksellers used the sign they traded under in their immediate post-Fire place of work when they returned to their original site. A slight exception is Thomas Parkhurst, who united his pre-Fire sign (The Three Crowns) and his immediate post-Fire sign (The Golden Bible), when he returned to Cheapside from London Bridge to trade under the sign of the Bible and Three Crowns. 101

Conclusions

In summation, the Fire clearly had a significant effect on the topographical distribution of the metropolitan economy, although there were certainly significant differences between the two trade groups examined in this section. Firstly, it appeared that the nominal linkage exercise was successful. Regardless of whether or not one was fired, around half of the sample of booksellers and Merchant Taylors (once adjusted for mortality) could be accurately linked after the Fire and known to have continued their economic lives around the metropolis. In practice, these proportions would have been higher. It is remarkable that at least half (and probably more) of the individuals fired were able to restart their businesses in London in spite of the losses entailed in the Fire. Most businesses ran on credit, as the volume of gold and silver currency in circulation in England was insufficient. 'All men in active business had ... a high proportion of their working capital in credit to clients and in debts owing'. 102 As such, many assets of individuals burnt out would be in the form of credit for money owed – be it an informal agreement or a formal

102 Grassby, 'English merchant capitalism', 91.
bill of exchange. Credit was essentially ‘Fire-proof’, and could be redeemed for cash or in-kind. 103 Presumably, many Merchant Taylors, and indeed booksellers, would have called in debts or bills after the Fire. Even if they were partially discounted, as Pepys recorded occurring in May 1667, they could still be a valuable asset in the rebuilding of businesses. 104 There were other mostly ‘Fire-proof’ resources that would have eased the pressure on Londoners whose businesses were destroyed. As the majority of London’s port facilities survived the Fire, investment in shipping, which was especially common amongst the ‘middling sort’, would have been unaffected. 105 The existence of the Fire Court also partially preserved the investments of landlords by enforcing tenants to rebuild if they were able to do so. In addition, wealthier Londoners who invested in government posts or trading rights would have also found these assets mostly untouched by the Fire.

The booksellers, the smaller and more homogeneous group, superficially appeared to have been more likely to have experienced disruption as a result of the Fire as its centre, Paul’s Churchyard, was completely destroyed. However, the booksellers appeared to have returned to pre-Fire topographical patterns after short-term changes immediately after the Fire. About half of the booksellers in the London were forced to move after the Fire. The most popular destination was north of the Walls, to areas like Little Britain, where the costs of setting up a shop were lower. However, these moves were mainly temporary, as most booksellers were likely to return to their pre-Fire place of work. There were slight differences in the topography of new and established booksellers, with

103 Ibid., 100-2; Muldrew, Economy of obligation, pp. 98-100.
104 Pepys, Diary, ed. Latham and Matthews, viii, 201.
fledging enterprises more likely to be based outside of the centre of the City than established ones. This may be in response to increasing demand in the areas outside of the City. Also, as far as can be seen, the signs under which booksellers traded appear to have been stable over time, and even accompanied booksellers on their moves across London after the Fire. Overall, the topography of the metropolitan booksellers was remarkably stable.

The Merchant Taylors were a far more diverse group than the booksellers. They were also a far larger group, leading to a slightly more problematic process of nominal linkage. However, sufficient numbers of masters were linked before and after the Fire to build up some kind of picture of the changes the company members experienced as a result of the catastrophe. The Fire directly affected more than half of the company’s members, forcing four out of five of the masters in fire-affected areas to move their place of work. These movements were far more likely to be long-term than for the booksellers. Overall, the Fire appeared to have led to an increase in the numbers of Merchant Taylors based in the northern and eastern suburbs of London. Movement to the western suburbs appears to have occurred in response to the Fire, but it also appears to have occurred from non-fired areas. Clearly this was a long-term topographical trend that would have occurred regardless of the Fire. The same is probably not true for the growth in the proportion of Merchant Taylors operating in other suburbs of London.

Gauging the effect of the Fire on occupational changes in the Merchant Taylors is problematic, as the numbers recovered with sufficient information are too low to be
statistically sound. However, it does appear that there was around a ten per cent occupational turnover in the company, usually between related trades. This occurred in equal measure for masters who were burnt out and those who were not, although masters burnt out who had changed occupations were more likely to move location as well. It was also difficult to measure the impact of age on movement after the Fire. However, it is probable that younger masters were more likely to move, whether or not they were burnt out. Also, it is clear that younger masters were more likely to take up occupations in the building trades after the Fire than older masters.

The effect of the Fire on businesses run by women was similar to the effect of it on businesses run by men. Although it is probable that women traders had slightly different economic profiles to men - they were more likely to be involved in less prestigious occupations and live in relatively cheaper areas - these differences (for the sample involved) do not seem to have been statistically significant before or after the Fire. The difficulties of tracing female economic activity over a long period of time meant that nominal linkage of a significant number of women before and after the Fire did not produce a large enough group to compare to overall patterns.

Modern studies have shown that cities are highly robust to exogenous shocks even of immense size. Donald Davis and David Weinstein’s study of the recovery of Japanese cities after World War II showed that they returned to their pre-shock function, in economic and demographic terms. ‘In the aftermath of a shock, there is a strong tendency for city population, aggregate manufacturing and even the particular industries
that existed prior to the shock to return to their former importance. Over time, it appears that even if the shock was of a large size, its effects tended to undo themselves eventually. Similarly, in seventeenth-century England, it is clear that London was able to retain its economic pre-eminence after the Fire in spite of the destruction of its traditional core. William Petty did speculate that other towns may advance at the expense of London, but eventually decided ‘What other places may compete with it for naturall advantages?’ Many of London’s advantages were indeed ‘naturall’ – for example, its geographical position and close access to deepwater ports. However, London’s economic strength ultimately lay in the progressive centralisation of English politics, society and economy on the metropolis.

The Fire spared the political centre of the metropolis – Westminster – allowing Parliament to come to London less than a month after the Fire. One of London’s primary cultural functions was also left intact after the Fire. The only licensed theatres in England were both based in non-fired areas of London and although they had been closed as a result of the 1665 Plague, they re-opened the month after the Fire. Finally, London’s economic function was able to continue after the Fire because its core – shipping – was

largely unaffected by the Fire. In the second half of the seventeenth century, London became the globally dominant centre of the long-distance and re-export trades. The Port of London, which extended from just below London Bridge two miles downriver to Limehouse, escaped any severe damage as a result of the Fire. The wharves destroyed by the Fire around Billingsgate and Queenhithe were all rebuilt by c. 1670 with little or no change. The survival of London’s shipping network meant it could continue to flourish economically whilst dealing with the dislocation caused by the Fire.

In addition to this, London remained the centre of English politics and culture, and continued to attract money and talent from the rest of the country. For the wealthy and the nobility, London continued to offer leisure and access to power. For footloose labourers, attracted to the metropolis by the prospect of higher wages, London was still an attractive destination – particularly as the Fire did not destroy their main area of settlement – the suburbs. As such, London’s population could continue to grow in size, and pre-Fire demographic trends could continue.

Ultimately, as Derek Keene pointed out, ‘trade was the prime force which conditioned


the reordering and rebuilding of the city after the Great Fire'. Elaborate rebuilding schemes were eschewed in favour of practical and quick reconstruction along the existing layout of the City. The only major change was the straightening of Cheapside, which further integrated the City. The absence of a total reconstruction of London’s layout, in addition to London’s wholly essential place in the English economy, meant the metropolitan economy was able to recover and resume its growth and expansion. As well as this, the presence of London’s suburbs as a residential outlet and legislation allowing the short-term settlement of open areas near to the City meant that economic recovery did not have to wait until the City was rebuilt. Indeed, many booksellers but especially Merchant Taylors settled permanently outside of the devastated areas of London after the Fire. London’s Merchant Taylors and booksellers operated in a paradigm that meant that they could rebuild their businesses and economic lives as quickly as was feasibly possible to do so. Thanks to the continuation of London’s economic and demographic function, they did not face a reduction in market size, and so, to an extent, could recover their pre-catastrophe equilibrium. London’s merchants and traders were no strangers to mobility, which was a common part of business life. The losses caused by the Fire were mitigated by a credit-based economy, ample suburban space and a population of traders not unaccustomed to mobility. This allowed businesses to be rebuilt more quickly. The Fire delayed metropolitan economic growth slightly but ultimately its effects were not deleterious enough to reverse it.

Chapter 3: The national response: Charity and the briefs of 1666 and 1678

The previous two chapters have examined how London's topography and economy changed after the Great Fire, and how Londoners reacted to the disaster. This chapter will examine how the nation reacted to the Fire. This reaction will be measured using the records of two major national charitable collections that were undertaken with the aim of aiding the reconstruction of London. Charity brought regions and localities into contact with each other — 'not only was charity a badge of protestant identity; it could be a powerful agent of national integration'.¹ This chapter will show what, if any, were the determinants of generosity in charitable collections, and how people and social groups responded to charitable appeals on an individual level. It will provide an important, extra-metropolitan, perspective on the impact of the Fire.

There were two briefs for London in the aftermath of the Fire. The first was a 1666 brief for the relief of Londoners who had suffered as a result of the Great Fire. It was issued by royal proclamation on 10 October 1666, on the fast day for the Fire (although donations had been taken since two weeks previously). The St Paul's brief was issued on 26 February 1678 to raise funds for the rebuilding of the cathedral when it became clear that the coal dues alone would not be sufficient to complete the new cathedral.² These briefs are an essential source as they reveal how the nation as a whole responded to events in the metropolis, and how this response may have changed over time and between

regions. These briefs are almost unique in their scope and detail, providing information both about the totals collected, but also about the amounts given at the parish level.

Briefs had been the chief method of collecting charitable donations nationally in England since the medieval period. The main mode of transmitting briefs was the parish, the focus of religious life in early modern England. Charity was directly connected to religion in early modern England. This was despite the fact that the reformed Protestant religion no longer viewed good works as a direct route to salvation. However, Protestants had nonetheless forged an association between godliness and charity, and emphasised the benefit of giving to the poor. There still remained a language of reward from God for charitable works. As such, charitable giving was firmly rooted in the English Protestant ethic. Even Calvinists, 'while denying that good works were efficacious in achieving salvation ... were nevertheless urged to perform them', and Calvinist preachers urged charitable giving as a necessary 'fruit of Grace'.

Over the seventeenth century, charity began to focus more on the 'worthy poor'. Preachers distinguished between worthy and unworthy recipients of charity. At the parochial level in particular, the 'worthy' were singled out, and resources were preserved

---

for those deemed to be ‘deserving’. Such organised charity, as I. K. Ben-Amos pointed out, was probably the ‘tip of the iceberg’. Much charity was informal and unrecorded, particularly at the family level. Also, private charity was often distributed through public institutions, but these could allow discretion in who it was given to. The briefs examined here cannot indicate much about informal charity, although there was one incidence of a special family request being made. When John Tounson, vicar of Bremhill, Wiltshire, donated £45 to the 1666 brief in October 1666, he stipulated that £5 of it be distributed amongst his relatives in London.

Central authorities had the power to print and publicize briefs. Warrants for briefs were issued for a set time, area and subject. Local briefs were frequently taken for victims of fires, whereas major national briefs tended to be taken for the plight of foreign Protestants. Briefs were taken through the parish, which ‘constituted an efficient network for collecting money from an almost literally captive audience’. Well organised and promoted briefs could raise substantial sums. Donations were either collected after a service or via a house-to-house collection by the churchwardens or another parochial official. The diary of Roger Lowe (d. 1679) of Ashton-in-Makerfield, Lancashire, recorded a house-to-house collection on 16 October 1666 for the 1666 brief. The parish

---

9 Schen, Charity and lay piety, p. 170.
10 Ben-Amos, ‘Gifts and favors’, 295-6, 301; Archer, ‘Charity of early modern Londoners’, 244.
11 LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666. ‘An Account of what monies received from these Persons, & Places hereunder named (being their free Gift) towards Releife of those Persons who were great Sufferers by the late Sadd Fire, within ye City of London’, 25 October 1666, COL/SJ/03/006.
priest asked Lowe and two ‘friends’ to see what the people of the village would donate ‘towards the reliefe of such needie psons as had sustained losse by the great fire in London and to set their names down’. Briefs were a regular and accepted feature of early modern parochial life, and a significant way of showing how concerns in one part of England were responded to in the other areas.

Examining the briefs: 1666

Extensive returns survive for both collections, although they both have gaps in coverage and scope. The returns for the 1666 brief run from 27 September 1666 to 12 June 1676, and the details of each donation were noted in the order received by the Chamberlain of the City. The returns were also recorded in a posting book, which detailed the donations by parish of each county. There were 2,096 returns in this collection. The majority of the returns (1,898) were from individual parishes. They recorded the amount and date of the donation, and who it was received from. In addition to this, there were also donations from larger divisions - archdioceses, dioceses and boroughs. The returns also recorded 23 individuals who donated to the collection, the largest donation being from Sir John Woolstenholme of the City of London, who gave £100. (The largest recorded individual donation for the St Paul’s brief was also £100 - given by three

---

16 LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666, COL/SJ/03/006.
17 LMA, A Posting Book for ye collection money for reliefe of those that have had great losse by ye lamentable Fire within ye City of London & Liberties thereof, COL/SJ/03/007. Both the posting book and the account book for the 1666 brief were purchased from the stationer Thomas Rookes for the sum of £1.20, LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond 1666, ‘Payment of the aforesaid Monies’, COL/SJ/03/006, unnumbered.
18 LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666, ‘Accomt of what monies received’, 8 November 1666, COL/SJ/03/006.
individuals; Sir Thomas Page and Sir Thomas Exton (bap. 1631, d. 1688, the Master of Trinity Hall and advocate-general), both of the University of Cambridge, and Sir Thomas Allen of Finchley, Middlesex. Aside from this, details of individual donors were not recorded for the 1666 brief. The collection also seemed to be complete in terms of geographical area covered, with all of the counties being represented.

Table 3.1: Method of transmission to London, money collected for the 1666 brief, 1666-76

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Received from</th>
<th>% made</th>
<th>Returns made</th>
<th>No. returns</th>
<th>No. individuals involved</th>
<th>% delivered</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private individuals</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>1016</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of which Mr)</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of which Dr)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of which ‘Gent.’ or above)</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(of which parishioners)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parish officials</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher officials</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher clergy</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official receivers</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2096</td>
<td>1296</td>
<td>100 (£16508.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 3.3.

The returns for the 1666 brief also included information on how the return was brought to London. Table 3.1 shows that nearly 1,300 individuals were involved in bringing the collections to the metropolis. Nearly half of the returns were made by individuals not

---

19 GL. St Paul's: Cambridgeshire, MS 25565/4, fols. 38-9; GL. St Paul's: Middlesex. MS 25565/17. fols. 52-3.
formally involved in local administration or the Church, showing how much the mechanism of briefs relied on more informal means of organisation. However, over half of this group either had the title of ‘Mr.’ or were members of the gentry. Parish officials, who were likely to be amongst the wealthiest members of their community,\(^{20}\) delivered over ten per cent of the returns. Local officials such as justices of the peace, mayors and constables delivered just over three per cent of the returns. Overall, it seemed that the transmission of sums to London was dominated by the ‘better sort’ of local society - clergy, gentry and the ‘chief inhabitants’ of parish society. Money collected in the provinces could also be transmitted to London using bills of exchange. A June 1667 letter from the Bishop of Durham, John Cosin (1594-1672) to the Lord Mayor Sir William Bolton (d. 1680), informed him that some ‘parishes ... had not brought in their Collections’, to the value of £30, and accordingly, Cosin enclosed ‘a Bill of Exchange for ye Receipt of £30’.\(^{21}\)

Although 1,016 returns were made by individuals, this actually represented 564 people. Clearly, several parishes would join their contributions together and rely on one person to bring them all to London. For example, on 29 December 1666, John Meriton brought the returns of eight Suffolk parishes to London at once.\(^{22}\) The amount in the return varied according to the person who was bringing it. Returns from higher clergy had a mean of £67.77, whereas those from individual parishioners had a mean of £4.18. Statistically,


\(^{21}\) LMA, Letter from Bishop John Cosin of Durham to Sir William Bolton, 7 June 1667, MISC MSS/159/3.

\(^{22}\) LMA, \textit{Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666}, ‘An Account of ye Receipts of money from these Places following which was collected by virtue, of his Majesties Proclamation on ye Fast Day, being ye xth of October 1666, towards releife of those Persons who were great Sufferers by the late Sadd Fire, within ye Citty of London’, 29 December 1666, COL/SJ/03/006.
the cash value of a return was affected by the individual bringing it to London.23

The administration of the 1666 brief also detailed the City's attempts to ensure all of the money collected reached those it was intended for. As early as 1668, the Court of Aldermen ordered that three of their members should attend the bishop of London (as well as other bishops) and the king in order to secure a proclamation ensuring that money collected for the 1666 brief was actually sent to London.24 The next year, the Chamberlain of the City, Sir Thomas Player (d. 1672), wrote to the counties asking about the whereabouts of the money collected for London.25 Eventually, legislative action in parliament was secured in 1671 to ensure that the money collected in the provinces for London was actually sent to the city.26 This was probably in response to pressure from metropolitan government. A few weeks after the bill was passed, the Court of Aldermen demanded a grand jury be set up to 'inquire of and present the names of all such persons as they know or believe to detain any of the moneys collected'. Later that year, Player sent out a proclamation to nominate agents in each county to ensure all the money collected for London went to its intended recipient.27 A 1673 letter from the Court of Aldermen to Player showed how the above act of parliament was used. A deputy of Player, who had been sent to locate money collected for London had been 'denied the

23 Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 24522.69, tabulated value is 19.68, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected.
24 The aldermen were Baron Sir John Robinson (c. 1625-80), Lord Mayor 1662-3, Sir Joseph Sheldon. (d. 1681), Lord Mayor 1675-6, and Sir Denis Gauden. (c. 1600-88), the Alderman of Dowgate Ward 1667-76. All three men were members of the Tory faction of the City government. LMA, Rep. 73. fols. 78r-v, 91v.
25 LMA, Rep. 74. fol. 135r.
26 An Act for the Discovery of such as have defrauded the Poor of London of the Moneys given them at the Times of the late Plague and Fire, tenth session of Charles II's second parliament, 22 April 1671, The History and Proceedings of the House of Commons from the Restoration to the Present Time, vol. 1 1660-80 (London: R. Chandler, 1742), pp. 162-3.
sight of the Vestry bookes in severall parishes by which hee might be better informed of
the moneys given within such parishes'. The Court asked Player to 'make Applicacon
unto such Byshopps as hee shall thinke convenient according to ... the Act of Parliament
to inspect their registry & parishes within their severall Dioceses for his better
enablement to proceed in the discovery and receipt of all such moneys'.

The City government continued to attempt to collect money from the 1666 brief into the
mid 1670s. In December 1672, one Mr Richard Baddeley was deputed to collect moneys
collected for London on behalf of the Chamberlain. However, by January 1674, it was
declared Baddeley had brought in 'little or nothing', and on 17 March 1674 he was
ordered to give up his deputation. Two days later, the Court of Aldermen, in an attempt
to procure all of the money collected for London, suggested the practice of offering 'for
the discovery ... of any such monies they (the collectors) shall have & receive to their
Owne use the fourth pte of all such monies wch they shall discover'. A letter from the
Court of Aldermen recommended one Mr Barker as 'very fitting' for this task in Wales.
Coincidentally, on 29 January 1675, £38.15 was received into the Chamber from 'several
hundreds' in Worcestershire from one Thomas Barker Esq. He was to receive £12.72 for
his efforts in gathering this money. This is the only recorded event of this practice for
the 1666 brief. In March 1675, as the act for the recovery of money had expired, the

---

28 LMA, Letter from Wagstaffe of the Court of Aldermen to Sir Thomas Player. 13 February 1673, MISC
MSS/159/3.
29 LMA, Rep. 78, fol. 49r.
30 LMA, Rep. 79, fols. 65v, 143v.
31 LMA, Rep. 79, fol. 150v.
32 LMA, Letter from Wagstaffe of the Court of Aldermen to Sir Thomas Player. 19 March 1674, MISC
MSS/159/3; LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666, 'Account of receipts of money for the second
proclamation', 29 January 1675. COL/SJ/03/006; LMA, Fire of London Grants of Money 1667-75,
COL/SJ/03/009, 184.

189
Court of Aldermen requested that three members of parliament for the City prepare a bill ‘for the better getting in of the ... moneys’. However, such a bill does not appear to have been passed, and after 1675, it appears that the City government finally gave up its attempt to collect all of the money gathered for its poor. It is clear though that for nearly ten years the government of London did all in its power to ensure that the money collected for their city in fact reached it.

Examining the briefs: The St Paul’s Collection

The records of the St Paul’s brief are incomplete. The returns were presented to the Chamber of London by individual dioceses. However, there were few or no returns for the dioceses of Bath and Wells, Carlisle, Chichester, Durham, Norwich, Winchester and York; as well as the Archdioceses of Cornwall and Nottinghamshire. Welsh returns were mainly limited to the diocese of St Asaph. As such, returns for Somerset, Cumberland, Westmoreland, Sussex, Durham, Northumberland, Norfolk, Suffolk, Hampshire, Surrey, Yorkshire and most of Wales are either underrepresented or completely unrecorded (see figure 3.3, below). The returns do not provide a comprehensive national picture. There was diary evidence of the ‘missing’ collections. William Sampson (bap. 1635, d. 1702), rector of Clayworth, Nottinghamshire, recorded on 9 February 1679, ‘I read ye 6 Brief for S’. Paul’s ; & Gathered 3£. 35

33 The three members were: Sir William Thompson (d. 1681), William Love (1618-89) and John Jones Esq. LMA, Rep. 80, fol. 139r.
The data for the St Paul’s brief consisted of returns sent by each individual parishes (as well as constituent chapelries, townships and tithings) to their diocese. There were notable differences in the contents of each return. The returns are not systematic, and do not all include the same details. Around 60 per cent of the returns are not dated, and 439 of the returns provided only details on the overall amount given. However, 2,752 returns recorded each donor’s name and the amount given. Eighty returns named individuals who did not donate to the collection. For example, the return for Meesden, Hertfordshire, acerbically noted that ‘Mr John Cornelius son to the Reverend John Cornelius … a Right noble Benefactour he gave towards the rebuilding of St Pauls Cathedrall in London Not one Farthinge’. Some returns also indicated whether anyone had pledged any future donations to St Paul’s. For example, Edward Farmer of Great Parndon, Essex, obliged himself to give £4 per annum to St. Paul’s for four years, adding the caveat, ‘if I shall soe long live’. The lists of donors from each parish usually indicated if any of the donors were gentry and can also show the gender ratio of giving. In addition to this, 70 returns provided information on the social status or occupations of the donors.

The returns contain information on why charitable efforts were unsuccessful in some places. A small number of returns include communications from the parish priest, usually apologising for the small size of the collection. John Wall, vicar of Rostherne, Cheshire, noted on his parish’s return that the parishioners were ‘coldly affected to such good works’. There are 39 returns from parishes and chapelries that gave nothing to the collection, which are shown in table 3.2, below.

---

36 GL, St Paul's: Hertfordshire, MS 25565/12, fol. 62.
37 GL, St Paul's: Essex I-Y, MS 25565/9, fol. 71.
38 The total collected in the parish was 18s, 8d. GL, St Paul's: Cheshire, MS 25565/5, fols. 120-5.
Table 3.2: Reasons given for lack of money collected, St Paul’s brief, 1678-86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Where nothing collected</th>
<th>Where small amount collected and reason</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No local ‘enthusiasm’</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief not received</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty of the parish</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small size of the parish</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parish church damaged</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No reason given</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: See table 3.3.*

As table 3.2 shows, for 23 of these returns no explanation is given. However, the parish priest did sometimes write an explanation for the lack of money. Thomas Heydon, rector of Cottisford, Oxfordshire wrote that nothing was collected there ‘for reason of ye poverty of ye place; ye whole parish consisting ... of a few day labourers & one rack-renter’.\(^{39}\) William Aust, vicar of Sutton Benger, Wiltshire, wrote that his parish could give nothing because funds were needed elsewhere as ‘the Church is much in decay and in danger of falling if not speedily prevented, which will be a great charge to the whole parish’.\(^ {40}\) Sometimes the reasons for lack of money were more practical - Thomas Sawbridge, vicar of Hungarton, Leicestershire, wrote that he had never received a brief, and so could collect nothing.\(^ {41}\) Thomas Walker, vicar of Clent, Worcestershire, wrote he could not contribute to the collection because ‘he ... doth sue in ye Excheqr for ye

\(^{39}\) GL, St Paul’s: Oxfordshire A-L, MS 25565/20, fol. 61.
\(^{40}\) GL, St Paul’s: Wiltshire L-I, MS 25565/25, fol. 91.
\(^{41}\) GL, St Paul’s: Leicestershire, MS 25565/15, fol. 79.
Churches Rights, & therefore can give nothing'. The St Paul’s returns are a richer and more detailed source than the 1666 brief in some respects, but they were far less systematic in their recording and less comprehensive in their coverage.

The Briefs: an overall comparison

In this section, the sums collected for the 1666 and St Paul’s briefs will be compared and analysed. These will be compared to the 1655 brief taken for the Protestant refugees of the Vaudois, which was a major national collection for which extensive returns survive. The comparison will be based on Jeremy Boulton’s analysis of that collection.

42 GL, St Paul’s: Worcestershire. MS 25565/26, fol. 21.
Figure 3.1: Distribution of amount collected for 1666 and St Paul’s briefs, by county, 1666-76 and 1678-86

Sources: See table 3.3.
Table 3.3: County contributions for 1655 Vaudois Brief, 1666 Brief and 1678 St Paul’s Brief (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Vaudois Brief</th>
<th>1666 Brief</th>
<th>St Paul’s Brief</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London &amp; Westminster</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesex</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrey</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedfordshire</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkshire</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckinghamshire</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hertfordshire</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>London &amp; Home Counties</strong></td>
<td><strong>41.9 (£15,991.54)</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.2 (£4,805.77)</strong></td>
<td><strong>38.7 (£2,838.88)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sussex</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorset</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornwall</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.6 (£4,784.21)</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.7 (£2,589.91)</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.7 (£269.99)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herefordshire</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shropshire</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.9 (£2,649.20)</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.8 (£2,451.19)</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.8 (£1,011.88)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffolk</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridgeshire</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huntingdonshire</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutland</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincolnshire</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>East</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.8 (£3704.97)</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.4 (£2037.79)</strong></td>
<td><strong>20.4 (£1496.74)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfordshire</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northamptonshire</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leicestershire</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwickshire</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffordshire</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derbyshire</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nottinghamshire</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Midlands</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.7 (£3347.38)</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.7 (£2402.31)</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.9 (£1238.60)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County</td>
<td>1655 (00000)</td>
<td>1666 (00000)</td>
<td>1678 (00000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheshire</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancashire</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westmorland</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northumberland</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.7 (£3302.53)</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.0 (£2169.22)</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.4 (395.11)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>1.5 (£582.39)</td>
<td>0.2 (£30.73)</td>
<td>1.1 (£78.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>90.2 (£38,097.32)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (£16486.92)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (£7,329.97)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Boulton, ‘Charity universal?’; LMA, A Posting Book for ye collection money for releife of those that have had great losse by ye lamentable Fire within ye City of London & Liberties thereof, COL/SJ/03/007. LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666, ‘Accomt of what monies received’, COL/SJ/03/006. GL, St Paul’s, MS 25565/1-28, 25568 and 25747.*

*Note: The total for the 1655 brief also included £2,000 personally donated by Oliver Cromwell (1599-1658), as well as donations from Ireland and other individuals. Collections are incomplete for the 1678 St Paul’s brief for the counties of Somerset, Cumberland, Westmoreland, Sussex, Durham, Northumberland, Norfolk, Suffolk, Hampshire, Surrey and Yorkshire.*

As figure 3.1 and table 3.3 show, contributions to the briefs were not distributed evenly geographically, and they changed for each of the collections. Although the data is skewed by the gaps in the coverage of the St Paul’s collection, it is clear that the counties around London and London itself contributed higher proportions than for the 1666 brief. However, statistically, the distribution is not dramatically skewed, especially given the differences between the collections. The Vaudois collection was the least statistically skewed of the three. Possibly this was because it was the only collection where London’s contribution truly matched its clout in terms of population and wealth. For the 1666 and St Paul’s briefs, London’s absolute contribution was low, meaning that the distribution of wealth was less evenly spread. Statistical tests showed that the St Paul’s brief was the most unevenly spread, possibly due to the high levels of donation from the universities of...
Oxford and Cambridge, and also due to the gaps in its coverage. 44

Overall donations for the 1666 brief were significantly higher than the St Paul’s brief in most of England. However, the Vaudois collection was significantly more successful than both of the later collections. It gathered around twice as much as the collection for those Londoners distressed by the Great Fire, and four times more than the collection for St Paul’s. Donations for the Vaudois were significantly higher across the country. The 1655 data also shows how significant London was in terms of national charitable donations - contributing nearly one quarter of the total collection. Traditionally, London dominated charitable giving, and Londoners frequently made bequests to their provincial hometowns. 45 In 1667, the ejected minister Thomas Doolittle (1630/3-1707) wrote that London was a ‘City eminent for Charity ... How many works of Charity have Londoners done towards their own Towns and Countries, from whence several of them came!’ 46 An example of this charitable clout is shown when a 1561-76 brief to raise money to repair the steeple of St Paul’s raised £6,000 - of which London gave half. Even in a 1583 collection for fire relief for the relatively distant town of Nantwich, Cheshire, London gave nearly 20 per cent of the total raised. 47

The relatively higher rate of the return for the Vaudois collection compared to the two

---

44 The Gini Coefficient is 0.136 for the Vaudois collection, 0.230 for the 1666 collection, and 0.323 for the St Paul’s collection.
London briefs may have also been due to contemporary antipathy towards the plight of the metropolis. Many may have distrusted Londoners for political reasons. The Civil Wars had an important impact on the perception of the metropolis. Although some saw London as a ‘mansion house of liberty’, some Royalists saw it as the cradle of rebellion.48 Some criticisms were based on the perceived lack of morality in London. For example, a 1670 poem speaks of the ‘horrid Atheism’ and pride of the ‘Shaggy Gallants’ of London, as well as the vanity of the city’s woman and their ‘rowing Eyes’.49 Criticism of the immorality of Charles II’s court would also have naturally focussed on London. Also, residents of provincial towns may also have resented the increasing centralisation of England’s economy on London – Southampton, for example, suffered economically as a result of the growth of London.50 There was also some criticism of cartels of London merchants driving down prices of produce from the provinces – for example in 1670, the politician Sir Edward Dering (1625-84) of Kent complained that metropolitan bakers and brewers drove down the price of the county’s hops and wheat. The same year, Sir William Coventry (1628-86) complained that the rebuilding effort in London may have been taking away tenants from land in the provinces.51 Finally, in some quarters, London’s rapid population growth was viewed as parasitic, and so may have lessened willingness to contribute to the recovery of the city. From 1580 to 1671,


198
there were 17 royal proclamations and three Parliamentary statutes prohibiting new building in London, with the aim of limiting population growth in London. For various factors both economic and moral, many people in the provinces may have been less likely to donate to briefs specifically with the aim of benefiting the reconstruction of the metropolis.

The absence of London’s significant charitable clout from the latter two collections thus is responsible for the proportional rise in the contributions of the other regions of England. The metropolis gave less proportionately and absolutely in both the 1666 and St Paul’s briefs. London’s low returns in 1666 are probably due to the disruptions caused by the 1665 Plague and the Fire. That the trend continued for the St Paul’s brief may be due to the fact that London’s economic recovery was incomplete from the disaster by this date. However, it is more likely that it stemmed from the fact that London’s charitable efforts at the time were subsumed in rebuilding the parish churches and fabric destroyed during the Fire, meaning the enthusiasm and means to give to St Paul’s would have been relatively low. For example, in January 1669, Alice Dudley (1579-1669), widow of the mariner Sir Robert Dudley (1574-1649), bequeathed £100 for the repair of the steeple of St Sepulchre Holborn, which had been damaged during the Fire. Similarly, in 1678 Christopher Park Esq presented the parish of St Michael Bassishaw with £100, to be used for the purchase of new pews.  


53 TNA, Memorandum of charitable giving of Alice, Duchess of Dudley, January 1669, SP 29/255, 24; GL, St Michael Bassishaw, Vestry Minutes, MS 2598/1, pp. 70-1.
Contributions for St Paul’s may also have been lowered due to the fact that there was a compulsory levy on coal from 1670 for the new cathedral, at the rate of 4.5d per cauldron. In 1685 Parliament extended the coal dues to 1700.\textsuperscript{54} As such, many people may have reasoned they were already contributing to the rebuilding of the cathedral, and viewed the St Paul’s brief as an unwarranted further levy. This is mentioned in the one of the returns for the St Paul’s collection. The return for Deal, Kent, noted that some parishioners were unwilling to contribute as, ‘many of them having shares in Coal vesells say they do contribute every day’\textsuperscript{55} London especially relied on coal - by the early seventeenth century it was London’s staple domestic fuel, the city’s coal consumption increasing over the century from 150,000 tons per annum in 1600 to 450,000 tons per annum in 1700.\textsuperscript{56} Given this rate of consumption, many Londoners may have reasoned they had already contributed to St Paul’s, causing the city’s contribution to be lowered. Also, Londoners faced rises in the price of coal caused by disruption to shipping due to the war with the Dutch. Samuel Pepys noted in his diary on 8 December 1666 that Dutch activity had put the price of coal up.\textsuperscript{57} Indeed, only 11.5 per cent of the rebuilding funds for St Paul’s raised from the Restoration to March 1685 actually came from briefs, whereas 54.5 per cent came from the coal duties.\textsuperscript{58}

In absolute financial terms, the 1666 brief invoked a greater response than the St Paul’s

\textsuperscript{54} Lang, Rebuilding St Paul’s, pp. 47-52, 123.
\textsuperscript{55} GL., St Paul’s: Kent, MS 25565/13, fols. 58-66C.
brief. This reflected a shift in English charitable giving since the late sixteenth century. It had become accepted that giving to the poor and needy, especially the deserving Protestant poor, was the best use of charitable giving. As the poor became the most significant focus of charity, interest in other foci, like the maintenance of the church, fell away.\textsuperscript{59} Analysis of the amounts given to briefs between 1674 and 1701 in the parish of Clayworth, Nottinghamshire, showed that briefs for the rebuilding of churches raised an average of £0.19, whilst collections for victims of fires raised an average of £0.30. Collections for distressed foreign Protestants raised the most money - an average of £1.92 per brief.\textsuperscript{60} By the later seventeenth century, it may have been the case that collections for the poor and needy, such as the 1666 brief, were more pressing charitable issues than collections for the rebuilding of churches, like the St Paul's brief. These trends thus contributed to the higher levels of return for the 1666 brief.

In only three counties were the donations for St Paul's higher than for 1666. In Herefordshire the gap was only £23.67. In Cambridgeshire and Oxfordshire the gap was higher, £1,103.09 and £156.34 respectively. However, this difference is due to the increased contributions of the universities for the St Paul's brief. In 1666 the University of Cambridge donated £1 to the brief for distressed Londoners. Given its small size, this may have been a token donation – perhaps the fellows and students of Cambridge donated to the brief in their home parishes. Cambridge’s donation to London rose substantially to £1,137.8 in 1678.\textsuperscript{61} The change at Oxford was less radical, but donations

\textsuperscript{60} Sampson, \textit{Rector's Book}, ed. Gill and Guilford, pp. 14-140.
in 1666 still rose 44.7 per cent to 1678, from £222 to £496.65.62 This change may be due to the religiously conservative nature of these institutions, as well as indicating an enthusiasm for Sir Christopher Wren’s (1632-1723) design. When the donations from the universities are excluded, contributions in Cambridgeshire and Oxfordshire are higher for the 1666 brief.

In statistical terms there was no clear relationship between the total amount a county contributed in 1666 and in 1678, when the 25 counties with complete returns were compared.63 Figure 3.2 showed that there was slight positive correlation when donations in 1666 were plotted against the St Paul’s brief. However, the level of correlation was not statistically significant.64 When the donations from the universities of Cambridge and Oxford are removed from the county contributions, figure 3.3 shows the positive correlation to be far stronger, and statistically significant.65 When the county contributions for the 25 counties with full returns are ranked (not excluding the universities), a clearer relationship emerges, as there is statistically significant correlation between the two briefs.66 There is therefore correlation between these two variables.

The amount given in by a county for the 1666 brief correlates with the amount given for

---

62 LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666, ‘Accomt of ye Receipts’, 12 November 1666, COL/S1/03/006; GL, St Paul’s, MS 25747, fols. 151-71.
64 Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient is 0.243. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=1.145 and the tabulated value is 2.07 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation between donations in 1666 and 1678 must be accepted.
65 Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient is 0.672. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=4.349 and the tabulated value is 2.07 meaning there is a less than 5% level of probability that the observed correlation is due to chance, and so the null hypothesis of no correlation is rejected.
66 Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is 0.653. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=6.332 and the tabulated value is 2.07 meaning there is a less than 5% level of probability that the observed correlation is due to chance, and so the null hypothesis of no correlation is rejected.
the St Paul’s brief, especially once the universities were excluded. There was positive correlation between absolute county contributions to the two briefs.

**Figure 3.2: Contributions of 25 counties for the 1666 and St Paul’s Briefs, 1666-76 and 1678-86**

*Sources:* See table 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Contributions of 25 counties for the 1666 and St Paul's Briefs, 1666-76 and 1678-86, universities excluded

Sources: See table 3.3.
Time series analysis

Collections for these two major briefs did not occur over a matter of weeks or even months. Rather, returns continued to be sent to London from the provinces for several years after the start date of both briefs. The 1666 brief continued to receive returns until 1676. Similarly, the St Paul’s brief continued to receive returns until 1687. Analysing the timing of the St Paul’s brief was made problematic by the fact that only around one-third of the returns are dated. However, the data is from a wide enough sample to be representative. The dated returns account for 39.3 per cent of the total number of returns, and for 35.9 per cent of the total amount collected. As such, they should be fairly representative of the whole sample.

It is important to note that there was a slight difference in how the date of the collection is recorded between the two briefs. For the 1666 brief, the date was taken as when the money was received into the Chamber of London, whereas for the St Paul’s brief it was taken from when the brief was read in the parish, as there was no systematic recording of when it arrived in London. Mostly, it seemed there was not a large (i.e. more than a few weeks) discrepancy between the taking of a collection and its arrival in London, however it did happen. For example, a letter from Thomas Hurst of Chichester dated 9 August 1669 to the Lord Mayor Sir William Turner notified him that there was, ‘in the hands of ye high Constabll of this Citty £21 ... wch was two years since Collected & Guien towards the relife of ye poor distressed pipell of ye Citty of London & severall somes in severall other parisshes wch money if not caled for will be lost & many pore distressed
soules want it’. Less than a month later, the Chamberlain received £42.21 from ‘several hundreds’ in the country of Sussex. 67

Figure 3.4: Time series of 1666 Brief, 1666-76

Sources: See table 3.3.

67 LMA, Letter from Thomas Hurst of Chichester to Lord Mayor Sir William Turner, 9 August 1669, MISC MSS/159/3; LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666, ‘Account of receipts of money for the second proclamation’, 1 September 1669, COL/SJ/03/006.
**Figure 3.5:** Time series of St Paul’s Brief, 1678-86

Sources: See table 3.3.

**Figure 3.6:** Cumulative proportion of sums collected, 1666 and St Paul’s briefs, 1666-76 and 1678-86

Sources: See table 3.3.
Figure 3.6 shows that the time series of the two collections was markedly different. Statistical testing showed that there was only a 0.1 per cent probability that the difference between the two distributions arose by chance.\textsuperscript{68} When the time series for the two briefs was divided into urban and rural returns, it is clear there was a significant difference in the distribution of both collections' time series.\textsuperscript{69} The difference varied between the two briefs; for the 1666 brief, urban returns tended to be returned more quickly (75 per cent of urban returns arriving within four months; compared to 19 months for rural), but for the 1678 brief rural returns tended to be taken more quickly (75 per cent of urban returns arriving within 11 months; compared to 32 months for urban).

Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show that the 1666 brief provoked a more immediate response than the St Paul's brief. Nearly three-quarters of the total collected for 1666 was gathered within six months of the brief's first reading. In comparison, six months after the St Paul's brief was first read, only 3.5 per cent of the total amount collected had been gathered. This difference was probably due to the fact that the 1666 brief had a greater sense of urgency than the 1678. Londoners dispossessed of their homes after the Fire needed immediate aid, whereas the rebuilding of St Paul's was an ongoing project by 1678 - and one that had already used public money via the coal dues. Also, considering the frequency of briefs for individuals who had suffered as a result of fire, and the high incidence of fires in early modern England, it is probable that most people would have

\textsuperscript{68} Testing using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at 99.9%; $D=0.724$ and the critical value is 0.041 meaning the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.

\textsuperscript{69} 1666: Testing using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at 95%; $D=0.388$ and the critical value is 0.021 meaning the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected; 1678: Testing using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at 95%; $D=0.724$ and the critical value is 0.578 meaning the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.
had either a direct or second hand experience of suffering as a result of fire. Whereas not everyone would either approve of the new cathedral for religious reasons or simply viewed it as a remote phenomenon. Thus, the 1666 brief would have struck a more universal chord of sympathy than the St Paul’s brief amongst most people in England.

Figure 3.4 shows that the 1666 brief experienced a second (albeit much smaller) influx of returns around winter 1668/9. This coincided with a ‘second proclamation’ asking for contributions towards distressed Londoners, leading to large influx of donations from the dioceses of Bath and Wells and Norwich, in particular. There was a further influx of returns between March and September of 1669. This was mainly due to contributions coming in from county receivers, who had been put in charge of coordinating parochial collections at a county level, who then brought all the county’s contributions to London in one delivery. For example, on 22 May 1669, William Levett Esq delivered returns from 28 parishes in Wiltshire to London, to the value of £12.13. Figure 3.4 also shows a second, smaller, spike in returns coming to London during 1671. This occurred at around the same time as parliamentary legislation and attempts from metropolitan government to ensure all collections meant for London actually reached the city.

The St Paul’s brief, as figure 3.5 shows, did not receive returns as quickly as the 1666 brief. For the first six months of the collection returns were slow. The St Paul’s brief did

71 £120 was donated from the diocese of Bath and Wells in three returns and £354.08 from the diocese of Norwich. LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666, ‘Account of receipts of money for the second proclamation’, 10 December 1669, 12 February 1669, 10 April 1669, 9 January 1669, COL/SJ/03/006.
72 Ibid., 22 February 1669.
not have the same sense of urgency as the 1666 brief. The timing of its announcement
must have appeared fairly arbitrary, as rebuilding of the cathedral had been going on
since 1675. The brief was in fact announced because it appeared that money from the
coal duties was beginning to decline. This was hardly as urgent a cause as Londoners
lying homeless. However, from late August 1678 until the end of the year, contributions
began to come in more quickly. This coincided with the start of Titus Oates’ (1649-
1705) activities, and a wave of national anxiety about the possibility of a Popish Plot.
This increase in donations may have come about as people wished to show their loyalty
and commitment to the Church of England by donating to a national symbol of it - the
first cathedral to be built in England since the Reformation. Figure 3.5 showed a second
spike in donations in the first half of 1680. This was due to an influx of contributions to
the brief from several Oxford colleges. There were also significant contributions from
several London parishes at this time - the largest being £228.23 from St Gregory by St
Paul on 23 June 1680. The taking of a second brief for the rebuilding fund in 1682
appears to have had little impact in terms of leading to a surge in monies collected.

73 Lang, Rebuilding St. Paul’s, p. 93; T. F. Reddaway, The rebuilding of London after the Great Fire
74 Oriel, Trinity, Balliol, Hart and Lincoln donated a total of £64 between them in February - March 1680,
Gl., St Paul’s, MS 25747, fols. 153, 159, 161, 168, 169.
75 Gl., St Paul’s: Cities of London and Westminster, MS 25565/18, fols. 35-53.
Table 3.4: Time series analysis of county contributions, 1666 and St Paul’s briefs, number of months taken to reach n% of county total, 1666-76 and 1678-86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>25%</th>
<th>25%</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>75%</th>
<th>75%</th>
<th>100%</th>
<th>100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1666</td>
<td>1678</td>
<td>1666</td>
<td>1678</td>
<td>1666</td>
<td>1678</td>
<td>1666</td>
<td>1678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesex</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedfordshire</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkshire</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckinghamshire</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hertfordshire</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London &amp; Home</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sussex</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorset</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornwall</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herefordshire</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shropshire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffolk</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridgeshire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huntingdonshire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincolnshire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfordshire</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northamptonshire</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leicestershire</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwickshire</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffordshire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derbyshire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nottinghamshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.4 clearly shows that the returns for the 1666 brief were collected more quickly than the St Paul’s brief. It also shows that there is relatively little regional variation in the returning of contributions for the briefs. London and the Home Counties appear to respond marginally more quickly than other regions, sending 25 per cent and 50 per cent of their total contribution one or two months before other parts of England and Wales.

Factors determining level of generosity towards the metropolis

‘Generosity’ in terms of charitable giving cannot be wholly quantified by the absolute amount given by each county, given that the differences in size and population amongst the counties of England are significant. For this section, the mean sum per parish contributing was calculated to give an indication of the average size of each parochial donation in each county. This measure does have the effect of excluding around half of the data from the 1666 collection figures, which are partly recorded in terms of donations by diocese, archdiocese or borough. However, it still takes into account data from 1,902 parishes that donated towards the 1666 collection. By calculating average amounts given...
by county, it also meant data from some of the incomplete counties in the 1678 collection could be taken into account. In this section, a county’s generosity will be measured based on the proportion of parishes in the county that donated more than the national average for parochial donations for that collection (see table 3.3, above).

Table 3.5, below, showed that mean donations tended to be lower for the 1666 and St Paul’s briefs than for the Vaudois collection. However, some of the county comparisons may not be fair as a result of the small sample sizes for the 1666 and 1678 collections. To gain a more robust view of the comparative mean parochial donations, the data was reorganised by region (see table 3.6, below).
Table 3.5: Mean parochial county contributions for the 1655 Vaudois Brief, 1666 Brief and 1678 St Paul’s Brief

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>1655 No. parishes donating</th>
<th>Mean collected per parish (£)</th>
<th>1666 No. parishes donating</th>
<th>Mean collected per parish (£)</th>
<th>1678 No. parishes donating</th>
<th>Mean collected per parish (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bedfordshire</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkshire</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucks.</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridgeshire</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheshire</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornwall</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.56</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derbyshire</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8.47</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorset</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herefordshire</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hertfordshire</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>5.80</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>2.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huntingdonshire</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancashire</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.61</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leicestershire</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincolnshire</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7.71</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>72.19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20.81</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesex</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>15.33</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>15.80</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>9.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northants</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northumberland</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16.71</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nottinghamshire</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.51</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfordshire</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutland</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shropshire</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7.54</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffordshire</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffolk</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrey</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>7.03</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sussex</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwickshire</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westmoreland</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilts</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** | **8110** | **4.17** | **1902** | **4.00** | **2661** | **2.12**

*Sources: See table 3.3.*
Table 3.6: Regional comparison of mean parochial collections for the 1655 Vaudois Brief, 1666 Brief and 1678 St Paul’s Brief

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1655 No. parishes donating</th>
<th>Mean collection per parish (£)</th>
<th>1666 No. parishes donating</th>
<th>Mean collection per parish (£)</th>
<th>1678 No. parishes donating</th>
<th>Mean collection per parish (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London &amp; Home Counties</td>
<td>1712</td>
<td>9.34</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>1170</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>1201</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>694</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>1823</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>1362</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8110</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2661</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 3.3.

Overall, mean parochial contributions grew progressively smaller over the three briefs. The decline from 1655 to 1666 in terms of mean parish donations did not occur as dramatically as the overall absolute decline. The greatest decline was in London and the Home Counties, which had a mean parochial donation of £9.34 for the Vaudois collection, which declined by nearly half to £5.00 for 1666, and further declined to £3.81 for St Paul’s. This was due to London’s relative absence from the 1666 and St Paul’s collections compared to 1655, when all of London’s parishes donated to the brief, accounting for nearly one-quarter of the total amount collected. However, for both 1666 and St Paul’s London and the Home Counties remained the most ‘generous’ region.

---

76 Boulton, ‘Charity universal’.
Proportion of parishes donating

It was not possible to compare the 1666 and St Paul’s collections in terms of the overall proportion of the parishes that donated. This is because the 1666 collection was not organised wholly in terms of parochial returns. This meant that the number of parishes recorded from the 1666 collection data will be an underestimate. Accurately gauging the degree of this underestimation is impossible as the records for 1666 stated fifteen times that a collection was undertaken in ‘several parishes’ without giving any indication of the number of parishes this actually represents. Similarly, it gave returns for dioceses, archdioceses and towns without indicating the exact number of parishes. Therefore, the St Paul’s collection will be compared to the Vaudois collection, for which there are fuller returns.
Table 3.7: Proportion of parishes contributing, 1655 Vaudois Brief and 1678 St Paul’s Brief

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>% contributing 1655</th>
<th>% contributing 1678</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bedfordshire</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkshire</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>65.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckinghamshire</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridgeshire</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheshire</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derbyshire</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorset</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>47.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herefordshire</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hertfordshire</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huntingdon</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancashire</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leicestershire</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincolnshire</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesex</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>83.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northamptonshire</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfordshire</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutland</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shropshire</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffordshire</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwickshire</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
<td><strong>26.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Cornwall, Cumberland, Durham, Hampshire, Norfolk, Nottinghamshire, Northumberland, Somerset, Suffolk, Surrey, Sussex, Westmoreland and Yorkshire excluded.

Table 3.7 shows that there were significant differences between the 1655 and 1678 collections. A far lower proportion of parishes donated to St Paul’s compared to the Vaudois. Metropolitan parishes especially donated in far lower proportions in 1678 (the reasons for this are discussed above), but overall there were major differences in percentages of parishes donating. There were only three counties (Cheshire,
Gloucestershire and Worcestershire) with figures within ten per cent of each other for the amount collected. The geographical distribution of which counties were most generous also changed between 1655 and 1678. There was not statistically significant correlation between the proportion of parishes donating in 1655 and 1678. For the St Paul's brief, the differences were most radical in London and the South-East, whose parishes (barring Middlesex) gave in far lower proportions in 1678 compared to 1655. There was no statistically significant correlation between the proportion of parishes donating in a county and its 'generosity'. As such, it seemed that even if an area contained a larger proportion of parishes donating to the St Paul's collection, it did not necessarily follow that they would be more generous to that collection.

The differences between urban and rural parishes

The average parochial donation from urban parishes tended to be significantly higher than those from non-urban parishes. The mean donation per urban parish for the 1666 collection was £12.99, whereas it was only £2.64 in non-urban parishes. Over one in ten (13.2 per cent) of the parishes donating to the collection were urban - a total similar to the national urban population of England, yet they represented 42.8 per cent of the total

---

77 Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is 0.334. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=1.77 and the tabulated value is 2.07 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation is accepted.

78 Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is 0.294. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=1.08 and the tabulated value is 2.07 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation is accepted.


donated to the collection. Urban parishes gave at a level far outweighing rural parishes for the 1666 collection. The picture was similar for the St Paul’s collection, although once again the absolute total donated was lower. For the St Paul’s brief, the mean donation per urban parish was £6.88 and £1.52 in non-urban parishes. Around one in ten (11.1 per cent) of the parishes donating were urban, but they were responsible for 36.1 per cent of the total. Clearly, urban parishes were more generous than rural parishes. This is not surprising as urban areas tended to represent greater concentrations of wealth than rural areas. As such, they would be in a position to donate to collections far in advance of their relative share of the population. This was borne out by statistical testing. 81

**Experience of fire**

This section will examine if a community having a past experience of a large fire would be more generous to the collections for London after 1666. Determining which communities had experienced fires was based on E. L. Jones et al’s table of fires in provincial England. 82 The vast majority of communities listed in this table were urban areas.

---

81 For 1666, Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, Z=15.96, tabulated value Z=1.75, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected; for 1678: Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, Z=8.34, tabulated value Z=1.75, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.

Table 3.8: Mean parochial donations of communities that had experienced fires, 1666 Brief and St Paul’s Brief, 1666-76 and 1678-86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time frame</th>
<th>1666 parishes</th>
<th>No. 1666 parishes</th>
<th>Mean donation (£)</th>
<th>No. 1678 parishes</th>
<th>Mean donation (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Last 10 years</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21.26</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>21.59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(less London)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21.88</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last 10-50 years</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.90</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+ years</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20.98</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>20.34</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>14.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(less London)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20.01</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5.73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.8 showed that 51 parishes from the 1666 collection had experienced a fire since 1500, and they gave an average of £20.34 per parish. This was higher than the national average of £4.00 and the urban average of £12.99. Even when the London parishes are excluded, the mean remains relatively stable at £20.01 per parish. This was higher than both the national average per parish donation. The fact that there was no discrepancy is due to the fact that London’s wealthier central parishes could not donate to this collection, meaning the usual metropolitan charitable advantage did not occur. The relative chronological proximity of the fire also has an effect on generosity. Even when the fire was relatively recent (within the past ten years) mean donations remain at a level comparable to the overall average. When the fire was in living memory (defined here as occurring in the past 50 years), the mean donation declines to £14.90. Once the fire was out of living memory, the parochial mean donation rose to £20.98. The generosity of communities very recently affected by fire to the 1666 collection showed that a recent experience of fire made the community more sympathetic to the plight of distressed Londoners in spite of the fact that a recent fire may have caused economic disruption.
On average, contributions for the 1666 collection from parishes that had experienced fires tended to be larger than those from parishes that had not experienced fires.83

The profile was slightly different for the St Paul’s brief. The mean parish donation of communities affected by fire was £14.64. However, when London was excluded this fell to £5.73. This showed that some London parishes were donating to collections at a higher level than 1666, as the city was recovering from the economic shocks of plague and fire. The mean parochial donation of parishes affected by fires was higher than the national average of £2.12, but not the urban average of £6.88. However, as for the 1666 collection, communities that had been recently affected by fire (in the past ten years) were more generous.84 Even excluding London, they gave a mean of £7.34, which slightly exceeded the national urban mean.

---

83 Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one-tailed, at 95% level, Z=6.99, tabulated value Z=1.75, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.
84 Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one-tailed, at 95% level, Z=4.36, tabulated value Z=1.75, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.
Wealth of county

In this section, the wealth of each county will be compared to its generosity to determine what correlation there was between these two variables. Wealth will be based on E. J. Buckatzsch's rankings of county wealth, which are based on land taxes.\(^85\) When ranked, the correlation between these two variables is low, and not statistically significant.\(^86\) The correlation is slightly higher for the St Paul’s brief, but it is not statistically significant.\(^87\) The test was repeated using R. S. Schofield’s revised figures for county wealth in 1535.\(^88\) The levels of correlation are slightly higher for both collections, but again, not statistically significant.\(^89\) A comparatively wealthy county was not necessarily more likely to be generous to the two collections for London’s recovery from the Fire.

Local incidence of non-conformity

Using the 1669 returns for the number of conventicles per diocese, the total number of conventicles per county was tabulated.\(^90\) The total number of conventicles was compared to the sum donated by the county for both the 1666 and 1678 briefs. In both cases, local


\(^86\) Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is 0.050. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=0.29 and the tabulated value is 2.03 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation is accepted.

\(^87\) Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is 0.270. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=1.38 and the tabulated value is 2.06 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation is accepted.


\(^89\) 1666: Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is 0.259. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=1.470 and the tabulated value is 2.04 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation is accepted; St Paul’s: Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is 0.319. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=0.319 and the tabulated value is 2.09 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation is accepted.

incidence of non-conformity as expressed by the number of conventicles in a county had no correlation with the total amount given to either brief. For 1666, the correlation between the number of conventicles and amount given was not statistically significant.\textsuperscript{91} For the St Paul’s brief, the correlation was even less, and was not statistically significant.\textsuperscript{92} There was almost certainly no correlation between non-conformity and generosity in the two briefs considered here.

**Correlates unique to the St Paul’s collection**

The returns for the St Paul’s brief frequently included many details unique to its returns. As such, the correlates considered here can only be applied to the St Paul’s brief. Many of the returns included information on the donation of the parish priest, total number of donors in a parish and the number of gentry donating in a parish. There was a correlation between all of these factors and the total amount given by a parish, and all of the results were found to be statistically significant. The correlation between the parish priest’s donation and the total amount rises by around 20 per cent when the 277 parishes and chapelries where the parish priest donated nothing are excluded from the calculations.\textsuperscript{93} This higher correlation may stem from the fact that richer parishes tended to be home to richer priests, who had greater means to donate to charitable collections. Unsurprisingly,

\textsuperscript{91} Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient is 0.230. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=1.59 and the tabulated value is 2.06 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation is accepted.
\textsuperscript{92} Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient is 0.083. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=0.427 and the tabulated value is 2.06 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation is accepted.
\textsuperscript{93} Where all parish priests taken into account. Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient is 0.332. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=15.582 and the tabulated value is 2.00 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation is rejected; where parish priests who donated nothing are excluded, Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient is 0.548. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=26.855 and the tabulated value is 2.06 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation is rejected.
the greater the number of donors in a parish, the higher the total amount given tended to be, however, the correlation, although statistically significant, is not very strong.\textsuperscript{94} It seemed that who donated, rather than how many, might be a more significant factor - especially as there is a stronger correlation between numbers of gentry donating in a parish and the total amount donated by a parish.\textsuperscript{95}

\textit{The effect of social status on charitable giving}

This section draws on the 77 returns from the St Paul’s collection that gave information on the social status of the donors. Social status was highly mutable in early modern England, and in the long term it was often difficult, for example, to sustain elite status.\textsuperscript{96} However, the social structure examined here is a ‘snap shot’, and not a description of long-term trends. In table 3.9, below, the social groups are set out as many early modern contemporaries would have described them - a hierarchy of status and occupational groups. The elite position of the gentry was accepted in early modern society.\textsuperscript{97} ‘Professionals’ indicates the ‘traditional trinity’ of church, law and medicine,\textsuperscript{98} but in table 3.9 the clergy are excluded from the ‘professional’ group because of their unique charitable habits. Crafts and trades are separated, as the two groups probably had socio-

\textsuperscript{94} Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient is 0.349. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; \(t=19.129\) and the tabulated value is 2.00 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation is rejected.

\textsuperscript{95} Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient is 0.737. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; \(t=100.862\) and the tabulated value is 2.00 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation is rejected.


economic differences. Yeomen are distinguished from other types of rural landholder. 99

Servants and widows occupy the positions at the lower end of the social spectrum.

Table 3.9 showed that donations for St Paul's were received from all levels of society. It is clear that it was not only gentry, professionals and clergy who gave to briefs. Over 80 per cent of the people who contributed to the collection were from outside of these social groups. However, it is clear that donations were not distributed evenly across all levels of society. There was a significant statistical difference between donations of the various social groups. 100 The social groups at the 'top' of early modern society gave at far greater levels than those at the 'bottom' - gentry, professionals and clergy were only 14.1 per cent of the sample population, yet they gave 58.4 per cent of the total amount. Table 3.9 also shows that men tended to dominate charitable giving. Six times as many men gave as women, and men gave around ten times as much as women did. However, as amongst the sample population at large, there was a degree of social inequality in terms of amount donated. 101

99 Wrightson, 'Social order', p. 188, 184-5.
100 The Gini Coefficient of inequality for the sample population in table 9 is 0.391. This inequality is also born out using a Chi-squared test. Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 171.431, tabulated value is 14.07, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected. This was also consistent when the data was split into urban (calculated value 659.146, tabulated value 14.07) and rural parishes (calculated value 177.760, tabulated value 14.07). In both cases, at the 95% level, the null hypothesis of no difference was rejected.
101 The Gini Coefficient is 0.300. A Chi-squared test also shows there to be significant differences amongst levels of donation of different social groups. Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 1266.361, tabulated value is 14.07, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected.
Table 3.9: Social status of donors to St Paul's Brief, and proportion of amount donated, by region (%), 1678-86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Gent.</th>
<th>Prof.</th>
<th>Clergy</th>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Craft</th>
<th>Yeo.</th>
<th>Semi-skilled</th>
<th>Servants</th>
<th>Widows</th>
<th>Not spec.</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male : Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London &amp; Home Counties Donated:</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>100 (568)</td>
<td>6.0 : 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Donated:</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>100 (42.8)</td>
<td>8.4 : 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Donated:</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>100 (293)</td>
<td>6.7 : 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands Donated:</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>100 (47)</td>
<td>46.3 : 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Donated:</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>100 (17.9)</td>
<td>14.7 : 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales Donated:</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>100 (170)</td>
<td>2.9 : 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Donated:</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>100 (1667)</td>
<td>6.2 : 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>100 (83.9)</td>
<td>9.9 : 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 3.3.

Note: No returns from the South of England included information on the social status of donors.

Table 3.10: Mean donation per person (pence), by social status, St Paul’s Brief, 1678-86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gent.</th>
<th>Prof.</th>
<th>Clergy</th>
<th>Merchants</th>
<th>Craft</th>
<th>Yeo.</th>
<th>Semi-skilled</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Widows</th>
<th>Not spec.</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Mean male donation</th>
<th>Mean female donation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London &amp; Home</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counties West</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>141.2</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>48.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>42.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>73.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 3.3.

Note: No returns from the South of England included information on the social status of donors.
Table 3.10 shows that the clergy were the group that donated the most on average per person, donating a mean of 73.9 pence, or just over six shillings. Professionals and gentry also donated at higher levels per person than the rest of the social groups, around four shillings per person. On the whole, mean donations per person were higher in London and the Home Counties, which was probably due to the relative wealth of these areas compared to the rest of England. Outside of the gentry, clergy and professionals, widows were the social group with the highest level of donations, 9.5 pence on average.

There is a clear difference between levels of giving amongst urban and rural societies, with urban parishes contributing more than rural parishes. However, this does not fully portray the true situation. Urban parishes were usually more populous and compact than rural parishes - making collecting for briefs an easier and more convenient process. However, when individual donations were compared in urban and rural parishes, there was no significant statistical difference in central tendency. This was also the case for all comparable social groups (those with enough rural and urban data to make a comparison). The exception to this was the clergy. Urban clergy tended to contribute more than rural. This showed that, for the most part, individual donations were fairly steady across urban and rural society - urban parishes only tended to give more overall

---

102 Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, Z=0.718, tabulated value Z=1.75, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is accepted.
103 For gentry, Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, Z=0.043, tabulated value Z=1.75, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is accepted; for sellers, Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, Z=0.505, tabulated value Z=1.75, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is accepted; for craftsmen, Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, Z=1.674, tabulated value Z=1.75, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is accepted; for widows, Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, Z=0.351, tabulated value Z=1.75, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is accepted.
104 Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, Z=4.448, tabulated value Z=1.75, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.
because greater numbers donated, and because their clergy, on average, gave more.

**Clerical giving**

It was clear that the clergy played a highly significant role in giving to the St Paul’s brief, contributing amounts far beyond their numbers. Levels of clerical donation can be examined further as the majority of the returns specifically highlighted how much the parish priest’s contribution was, making it feasible to compare levels of clerical generosity across a far wider range of the data set. 2,228 parishes (around 70 per cent of the returns for the brief) included information of both the total amount donated and the amount donated by the parish priest.

Table 3.11: Proportion of collection donated by parish priest by region for St Paul’s brief, 1678-86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No. parishes examined</th>
<th>Amount donated by priests (£)</th>
<th>% of total donated by priest</th>
<th>Mean amount donated by priest (£)</th>
<th>Mean amount donated by priest, excl. donations of 0 (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>0.659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Counties</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>239.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>0.473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>0.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>161.2</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>0.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>0.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>118.7</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>0.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>0.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2228</strong></td>
<td><strong>672.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>18.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>25.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.305</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources*: See table 3.3.
Table 3.11 shows that the clergy accounted for a high proportion of the amount donated for the St Paul’s brief across the nation. This amount was lowest in London, which also had the highest levels of priests choosing not to donate to the brief. This may be due to the higher levels of non-conformist leanings in the metropolis, or it may reflect other drains on metropolitan charity. In spite of this, metropolitan clergy still donated, on average, higher amounts than in the rest of the country, suggesting that when the priests of London did choose to give to the St Paul’s brief, they had higher means with which to do so. Lower mean levels of donation in the North and Wales are probably associated with the relative poverty of these areas compared to the rest of the country. It was clear that priests accounted for significant proportions of charitable giving across the nation, even though in many areas (particularly in the North) they chose not to give to the collection.

**Donating in London**

London was traditionally the centre of charitable giving in England. Although the city gave less for the 1666 and St Paul’s briefs than usual, London’s charity in these two collections must be examined more closely. Firstly, examination of the contribution of London shows how communities directly affected by the Fire responded in charitable terms. Secondly, the population of London’s parishes can be estimated roughly using the Bills of Mortality,\(^{105}\) which gives an indication of per capita donations, allowing a closer

---

\(^{105}\) Annual burial numbers are in *A Collection Of The Yearly Bills Of Mortality, From 1657 to 1758 inclusive*, ed. T. Birch (London: A. Millar, 1759). Numbers of burials are translated into estimates of population using the death rate of 47 per 1,000, calculated from a comparison of bills of mortality to a 1638 population count R. A. P. Finlay, *Population and metropolis: the demography of London 1580-1650*
examination of charitable giving. In addition, the contributions of the parishes in the Bills of Mortality can be compared to the earlier 1655 collection for the Vaudois.

Table 3.12: Donations per 1,000 within Bills of Mortality for parishes with returns for 1666 and St Paul’s briefs, 1666-76 and 1678-86 (£)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parish</th>
<th>1666 donation per 1,000</th>
<th>St Paul’s donation per 1,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St Alphage London Wall</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>5.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Andrew Undershaft</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>10.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Christopher le Stocks</td>
<td>19.58</td>
<td>49.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Clement Dane</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>2.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Dunstan in the West</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>10.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Katherine Coleman</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>21.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Leonard Shoreditch</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Margaret Westminster</td>
<td>17.20</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Islington</td>
<td>8.46</td>
<td>5.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Whitechapel</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Olave Hart Street</td>
<td>39.43</td>
<td>54.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savoy Parish</td>
<td>18.59</td>
<td>9.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Thomas Southwark</td>
<td>19.13</td>
<td>3.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 3.3.

Table 3.12 shows the thirteen parishes within the Bills of Mortality for which returns for both the 1666 and the St Paul’s collections are extant. Generally, it is clear that the St Paul’s collection attracted higher contributions in parishes within the walls such as St Christopher le Stocks (where donations averaged around one shilling per person for the St Paul’s brief) or St Katherine Coleman (averaging around five pence per person), which had been virtually razed by the Fire, and so would not have been able to contribute as significantly to the 1666 brief as to the St Paul’s brief. However, in parishes that were not directly affected by the Great Fire, contributions tended to be higher for the 1666 brief. The contribution of these parishes may have been buoyed slightly by the


231
Parliament in session between September 1666 and May 1668, which would have brought wealthy short term residents to these areas of London unaffected by Fire, able to contribute to the collection. This is certainly shown by the significantly higher return for the 1666 brief in St Margaret Westminster compared to the St Paul's brief. Donors may also have been moved to be more charitable by Edward Stillingfleet’s (1635-99) sermon to the House of Commons, which called for a more righteous and holy nation.\textsuperscript{106} Certainly one of the keys to being righteousness and holy was to be charitable to worthy causes. Overall, as figure 3.7 shows, there is a fairly strong correlation between per capita donations for the 1666 brief and for the St Paul’s brief, which was statistically significant.\textsuperscript{107} Clearly levels of generosity to these two charitable collections remained fairly consistent even though the degree of generosity varied according to neighbourhood.


\textsuperscript{107} Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient is 0.7171. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; \(t=3.413\) and the tabulated value is 2.20 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation between donations in 1666 and 1678 must be rejected.
Figure 3.7: Contributions of thirteen parishes in Bills of Mortality for the 1666 and St Paul's Briefs, 1666-76 and 1678-86

Sources: See table 3.3.

In the next section, the returns for all the parishes within the Bills of Mortality will be examined for both collections, and compared to the 1655 Vaudois brief.
Table 3.13: Donations per 1,000 within Bills of Mortality for 1666 Brief (compared to Vaudois Brief), 1666-76

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parish</th>
<th>1666 collected (£)</th>
<th>1666 estimated population</th>
<th>1666 donation per 1,000 (£)</th>
<th>Vaudois donation per 1,000 (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holy Trinity Minories</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>31.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Alphage London Wall</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>35.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Andrew Undershaft</td>
<td>16.38</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>25.65</td>
<td>77.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Andrew Holborn</td>
<td>39.18</td>
<td>10,426</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>10.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Bartholomew</td>
<td>7.01</td>
<td>1,723</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>7.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Bartholomew the Great</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Botolph without Aldgate</td>
<td>11.55</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>28.57</td>
<td>8.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Christopher le Stocks</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>12,596</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>4.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Clement Dane</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>19.58</td>
<td>179.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Dunstan in the West</td>
<td>31.01</td>
<td>6,809</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>9.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Dunstan Stepney</td>
<td>21.05</td>
<td>3,319</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>24.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St George Southwark</td>
<td>13.35</td>
<td>30,915</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>7.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Giles Cripplegate</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>3,596</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>3.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Giles-in-the-Fields</td>
<td>14.63</td>
<td>16,511</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>7.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Helen Bishopsgate</td>
<td>23.77</td>
<td>10,298</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>11.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St James Duke Place</td>
<td>34.00</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>57.07</td>
<td>81.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St John Hackney</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>37.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Katherine by the Tower</td>
<td>23.77</td>
<td>2,191</td>
<td>10.85</td>
<td>110.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Katherine Coleman</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>4,298</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>17.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Katherine Cree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Leonard Shoreditch</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>19.58</td>
<td>179.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Magdalen</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>1,468</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>27.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bemondssey</td>
<td>15.70</td>
<td>6,021</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>10.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Margaret Westminster</td>
<td>11.18</td>
<td>9,574</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>8.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Martin-in-the-Fields</td>
<td>198.00</td>
<td>11,511</td>
<td>17.20</td>
<td>18.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Martin Outwich</td>
<td>409.86</td>
<td>15,553</td>
<td>26.35</td>
<td>15.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Islington</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>47.00</td>
<td>68.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Lambeth</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>2,128</td>
<td>8.46</td>
<td>5.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Newington</td>
<td>35.80</td>
<td>7,915</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>19.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Savoy</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>2,872</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>29.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Staining</td>
<td>28.48</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>18.59</td>
<td>44.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Whitechapel</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>42.63</td>
<td>73.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Olave Hart Street</td>
<td>16.98</td>
<td>11,085</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>12.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Olave Southwark</td>
<td>30.20</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>39.43</td>
<td>34.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Paul Covent Garden</td>
<td>100.06</td>
<td>11,447</td>
<td>8.74</td>
<td>10.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Peter le Poor</td>
<td>42.78</td>
<td>1,894</td>
<td>22.59</td>
<td>62.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Saviour Southwark</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>11.72</td>
<td>95.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Thomas Southwark</td>
<td>70.60</td>
<td>12,277</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>18.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.69</td>
<td>872.34</td>
<td>19.13</td>
<td>10.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 3.3.
Figure 3.8: Amount given to the 1666 brief within Bills of Mortality, by parish, 1666-76

Donation levels were affected by parish. Central parishes tended to give more because they were wealthier. These central parishes were in the areas most directly affected by the Fire, meaning that most of them could not give to the 1666 brief. Table 3.13 and figure 3.8 show that just eleven parishes within the walls donated to the 1666 brief, and only five of these parishes were directly affected by the Fire. Most of the contributions came from the outlying parishes unaffected by the Fire, although the parishes with the highest levels of donations still tended to be those central ones like St Mary Staining or St Olave Hart Street (although the latter parish was largely directly unaffected by the Fire). Figure 3.8 also shows how the western parishes tended to have given more than the parishes to the south and east of the Walls. Despite the effects of the Fire, levels of donations in areas directly affected by the Fire and areas not directly affected did not differ significantly.

Figure 3.9, below, shows that there was a significant degree of correlation between donations for the Vaudois and 1666 briefs. This may reflect the rhetoric of both briefs was similar. Both were for an ostensibly godly people ‘distressed’ by disaster. The Protestant rhetoric of giving stressed that these groups were highly worthy of charitable efforts, and should be a priority for the charitable efforts of the Elect. Table 3.13 shows that levels of donation still remained higher in most of London for the Vaudois collection.

---

108 Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 990.664, tabulated value is 55.76, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected.

109 Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, two tailed, at 95% level, Z=0.332, tabulated value Z=1.96, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is accepted.

110 Pearson's Product Moment Correlation Coefficient is 0.453. Testing using Student's T-test at 95%; t=3.048 and the tabulated value is 2.03 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation between donations in 1655 and 1666 must be rejected.
than for the 1666 collection. Parishes where the contributions for the 1666 brief were at a higher level than for the Vaudois brief tended to be outlying parishes like St Thomas Southwark or St Mary Islington, possibly moved to donate at relatively higher levels by greater levels of direct contact with homeless Londoners seeking refuge in their parishes.

Figure 3.9: Contributions of 37 parishes in Bills of Mortality for the Vaudois and 1666 briefs, 1655 and 1666-76

Sources: See table 3.3.

Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, $Z=4.415$, tabulated value $Z=2.58$, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.
Table 3.14: Donations per 1,000 within Bills of Mortality for St Paul’s Brief (compared to Vaudois Brief), 1678-86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parish</th>
<th>St Paul’s amount collected (£)</th>
<th>St Paul’s estimated population</th>
<th>St Paul’s donation per 1,000 (£)</th>
<th>St Vaudois donation per 1,000 (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Hallows Barking</td>
<td>58.28</td>
<td>2,383</td>
<td>24.45</td>
<td>22.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Alban Wood Street</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>27.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Alphage London Wall</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>5.69</td>
<td>35.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Andrew Hubbard</td>
<td>23.05</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>67.71</td>
<td>32.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Andrew Undershaft</td>
<td>91.18</td>
<td>1,362</td>
<td>66.96</td>
<td>77.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Andrew by the Wardrobe</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>1,404</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>5.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Benet Shereshog</td>
<td>13.48</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>63.33</td>
<td>55.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Botolph without Aldersgate</td>
<td>54.44</td>
<td>4,213</td>
<td>12.92</td>
<td>30.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Christopher le Stocks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Clement Dane</td>
<td>26.08</td>
<td>10,596</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>9.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Dunstan in the West</td>
<td>47.84</td>
<td>4,660</td>
<td>10.27</td>
<td>24.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Ethelburga Bishopsgate</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>9.93</td>
<td>25.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Gregory by St Paul</td>
<td>228.23</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>170.26</td>
<td>42.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Katherine Coleman</td>
<td>18.03</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>21.18</td>
<td>20.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Leonard Shoreditch</td>
<td>11.02</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>10.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Magnus the Martyr</td>
<td>28.38</td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>26.67</td>
<td>133.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Margaret Lothbury</td>
<td>10.08</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>10.29</td>
<td>89.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Margaret New Fish Street</td>
<td>14.80</td>
<td>553.19</td>
<td>26.75</td>
<td>85.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Margaret Westminster</td>
<td>21.73</td>
<td>17,936</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>18.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Martin Vintry</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>13.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Aldemarysthin</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>195.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary-at-Hill</td>
<td>41.38</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>74.79</td>
<td>96.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Islington</td>
<td>14.70</td>
<td>2,915</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>5.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Savoy</td>
<td>22.23</td>
<td>2,298</td>
<td>9.67</td>
<td>44.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Whitechapel</td>
<td>9.08</td>
<td>19,128</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>12.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Woolchurch Haw</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>32.05</td>
<td>99.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Magdalen Old Fish Street</td>
<td>8.32</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>15.03</td>
<td>19.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Michael Bassishaw</td>
<td>26.89</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>57.45</td>
<td>59.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Michael Cornhill</td>
<td>44.73</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>60.06</td>
<td>72.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Michael Crooked Lane</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>53.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Michael Queenhithe</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>14.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Michael le Querne</td>
<td>15.38</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>51.62</td>
<td>129.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Michael Paternoster</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>11.44</td>
<td>15.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Olave Hart Street</td>
<td>62.45</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>54.36</td>
<td>34.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Olave Silver Street</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>30.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Peter Cornhill</td>
<td>24.29</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>39.36</td>
<td>100.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Sepulchre Holborn</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>14,425</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>12.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Stephen Walbrook</td>
<td>40.76</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>59.87</td>
<td>179.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Swithin London Stone</td>
<td>13.84</td>
<td>702.13</td>
<td>19.71</td>
<td>124.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Thomas Southwark</td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>1,638</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>10.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Vedast Foster Lane</td>
<td>17.20</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>20.21</td>
<td>30.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 3.3.
Figure 3.10: Amount given to the St Paul's brief within Bills of Mortality, by parish, 1678-86

Sources: See table 3.3. Map adapted from Spence, London in the 1690s, fig. 1.5, p. 17.
As with the 1666 brief, donation levels in London for the St Paul's brief were also affected by parish. Unlike the 1666 brief, as table 3.14 and figure 3.9 show, giving in London towards the St Paul's brief was dominated by the central parishes - 31 out of the 41 parishes in the Bills of Mortality that donated were from within the walls. Levels of donations in areas directly affected by the Fire and areas not directly affected did differ significantly in central tendency - parishes affected by the Fire tended to give more.

By 1678 the parishes razed during the Fire had recovered sufficiently to become the dominant part of London in terms of charitable collecting. However, it is important to note that of these 31 central parishes contributing to the St Paul's brief, only six were in the process of rebuilding their parish churches whilst the collection was being taken. For the most part, those parishes rebuilding their churches after the Fire did not give to the St Paul's collection. It was also clear that suburban giving to the St Paul's brief, particularly to the south and west of the Walls, was at a far lower level than for the previous 1666 collection.

112 Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 104270.78, tabulated value is 55.76, and therefore the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected.

113 Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level. Z=2.579, tabulated value Z=1.65, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is accepted.
There was significant correlation between donations towards the Vaudois and St Paul’s briefs. The correlation is less than for the 1666 brief, which may be due to the intervening variables between the two collections. Table 3.14 shows that levels of donation still remained higher for the Vaudois than for St Paul’s. The parish that donated the highest amount to St Paul’s was St Gregory by St Paul, which had links to the cathedral, being located directly adjacent to it. Many parishioners would have been involved in the book trade, which also had historic links to St Paul’s. Before the Fire,

---

114 Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient is 0.309. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; \( t = 2.03 \) and the tabulated value is 2.02 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation between donations in 1655 and 1678 must be rejected.

115 Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, \( Z = 2.601 \), tabulated value \( Z = 2.58 \), thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.
sections of the crypts were rented out as stockrooms, and stalls and lock-ups directly against the cathedral walls were the norm.\footnote{J. Raven, ‘St Paul’s precinct and the book trade to 1800’, in St Paul’s: the Cathedral Church of London 604-2004 ed. D. Keene, A. Burns and A. Saint (New Haven, Conn. & London: Yale University Press, 2004), pp. 432-3.}

**National parochial comparisons**

There is a limit to the statistical utility of comparing overall county figures, as the quality of data and the modes of recording differed so markedly between the two collections. As such, a more effective measure of gauging change between the two collections would be to examine the parishes for which data on both collections exists.

As table 3.15, below, shows, donations towards the 1666 brief tended to be larger than towards the St Paul’s brief.\footnote{Established by a Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, $Z=4.278$, tabulated value $Z=2.58$, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.} Even when comparing returns on a parish by parish basis, it is clear that the 1666 brief attracted higher contributions. Levels of generosity to the two charitable collections were further explored by creating crude populations for the parishes with two returns using the results of the 1676 Compton Census. These returns mostly gave information on the number of households in a parish, so a multiplier of 4.25 was used in these cases to create an estimate of the parochial population.\footnote{The Compton Census of 1676: a critical edition, ed. A. Whiteman (London: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 1986). p. lxvii.} Combined with calculations based on the Bills of Mortality, this gave information on per capita levels of donation for 288 parishes. For the 1666 brief, three parishes gave more than one shilling per inhabitant (that is, over £50 per 1,000). The parish with the highest level of
donation was Tilsworth in Bedfordshire, which donated £86.25 per 1,000, or around twenty pence per inhabitant. Heythrop in Oxfordshire and Wheathurst in Gloucestershire donated £61.96 per 1,000 and £59.44 per 1,000 respectively. In comparison, for the St Paul’s brief, only two parishes donated over £50 per 1,000. Both were London parishes: St Andrew Undershaft (£66.96 per 1,000) and St Olave Hart Street (£54.36 per 1,000).

Table 3.15: Parishes with returns for 1666 and St Paul’s briefs, 1666-76 and 1678-86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Parishes linked</th>
<th>% where 1678 higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bedfordshire</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkshire</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckinghamshire</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambridgeshire</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheshire</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derbyshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devon</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorset</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloucestershire</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herefordshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hertfordshire</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huntingdonshire</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancashire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leicestershire</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesex</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northamptonshire</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfordshire</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shropshire</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffordshire</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrey</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwickshire</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiltshire</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcestershire</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>322</strong></td>
<td><strong>33.2 (107)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: See table 3.3.*
Table 3.16: Donations per 1,000 by region, 1666 and St Paul’s briefs, 1666-76 and 1678-86 (£)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1666 donations per 1,000</th>
<th>St Paul’s donations per 1,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>13.55</td>
<td>7.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Counties</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.68</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.78</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 3.3.
Note: Only one parish from North of England had information from Compton Census so this region had to be excluded because of this lack of data. Wales was also excluded because no parishes were returned in the Compton Census.

Table 3.16 clearly shows that across England, the 1666 brief attracted more money than the St Paul’s brief. London remained consistently the area with the highest levels of donation to both briefs. The metropolis was followed by the Home Counties and the Midlands. Overall, the national total of £2.68 donated per 1,000 for the 1666 brief represented around two-thirds of a penny per person residing in each parish that donated to the collection. The overall total for the St Paul’s brief represented around half a penny per person from the parishes that did donate.

There was one major difference between the levels of donations towards the two briefs. For the 1666 brief, on average, rural parishes tended to donate at a higher level (£5.91 per 1,000) compared to urban parishes (£4.80 per 1,000).119 Whereas for the St Paul’s brief, this situation is reversed, and donations tended to be higher in urban parishes (£5.47 per

---

119 Established by a Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, \( Z=1.788 \), tabulated value \( Z=1.65 \), thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.
than in rural parishes (£3.52 per 1,000).\textsuperscript{120} This may be due to economic 
disruptions caused in towns in the Southeast by the 1665 Plague, which meant that for the 
1666 brief, some urban areas might have given at a lower rate than usual.

Figure 3.12: Contributions of 238 parishes with population information, 1666 and St 
Paul’s briefs, 1666-76 and 1678-86

Sources: See table 3.3

Figure 3.12 shows that there was some limited correlation between donations towards the 
1666 and St Paul’s briefs.\textsuperscript{121} This level of correlation is higher than the overall levels of 
correlation based on the county returns due to the more accurate comparison for this data

\textsuperscript{120} Established by a Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, Z=7.788, 
tabulated value Z=1.65, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.

\textsuperscript{121} Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient is 0.562. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; 
t=10.452 and the tabulated value is 2.00 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation between donations in 
1666 and 1678 must be rejected.
set, given that is directly comparing the same two places, rather than a broader unit such as a county. Based on a parish comparison, there was a relationship between the amounts donated for the 1666 and St Paul’s briefs.

**Examining the amounts given: levels of currency circulation**

This section will examine how coinage in seventeenth-century England affected the charitable collections. A lack of suitable money could have limited how much charitable support England could show the metropolis in the aftermath of the disaster. Levels of coinage in circulation in early modern England are hard to calculate exactly. Even the government, during the 1696 Great Recoinage, lacked certain information on how much money there was in circulation - estimates ranged from £6 million to £20 million. A modern estimate puts the amount of money in circulation in 1670 at £12 million.122 Smaller denominations of coin were scarcer in the seventeenth century than in previous periods, and the number of coins in circulation was limited - especially coinage in good silver.123 This problem was exacerbated by the fact that the Mint produced relatively few coins of smaller denomination - by the 1670s it was stipulated that only 0.5 per cent of the coins minted were to be valued less than a shilling. This meant that the poorer

---

members of society were left with poor quality coin. Coinage in brass was an attempt to solve the problem of a lack of gold and silver. Craig Muldrew asserted that such brass farthings were not readily accepted in long distance trade, and were probably only used locally. This is partly borne out by the returns for the 1666 brief, where only £1.67 of the collection was stated to be in the form of brass money.

Table 3.17: 'Bad Money' returned for 1666 Brief, 1666-76

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>'Bad Money' returned (£)</th>
<th>% Regional total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Counties</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20.26</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.12</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 3.3.

The returns also mentioned 'bad money'. As shown on table 3.17, the 1666 brief systematically listed any counterfeit money sent to London. Most counterfeit money seemed to originate in the Home Counties, but even there it was not in any significant amount. Only around 0.1 per cent of the money collected was counterfeit. The St Paul's returns were less systematic in recording 'bad money', although there are some isolated references. For example, amongst the returns of Ashton-under-Lyme, Lancashire was 'one supposed shilling ... with an hole in'. One parish even attempted to make up for

---

125 Ibid., 102; LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666, 'Account of receipts of money for the second proclamation', 29 March 1669, 28 June 1669, 8 December 1669, COL/SJ/03/006.
126 GL, St Paul's: Lancashire, MS 25565/14, fols. 2-5.
the lack of coinage in circulation by sending their donation in the form of building goods.

Hinxton, Cambridgeshire, in addition to donating £0.36 in cash, also donated £1.08 worth of iron nails and 22 cart tyres worth £4.34 parts and labour.\textsuperscript{127}

Some of the St Paul’s returns detailing individual donations can also be used to show how much each individual gave. This allowed the currency used to contribute to the collection to be examined.

Figure 3.13, below, uses data from the parishes that detailed social status. It shows that most donations took the form of small denominations of coinage. Nearly 80 per cent of the donations were under one shilling (£0.05). This showed that it was possible for those with reduced material means to contribute to collections using lower denomination coinage, in spite of the possible scarcity of such currency at the time. The lack of suitable coinage made it more difficult for poorer people to contribute, but it did not totally prevent it. Figure 3.13 also showed that donations over one pound tended to be the sole preserve of the upper echelons of society - the gentry and clergy. The majority of donations came from those from the lower ranks of society giving small denomination coinage.

\textsuperscript{127} GL., St Paul’s: Cambridgeshire, MS 25565/4, fol. 90.
Figure 3.13: Amounts given to St Paul’s brief from sample with social status information, divided by status, 1676-86

Sources: See table 3.3
When the 6,170 donations of a shilling or less were tabulated, it appeared that the absolute lower limit on donations was a penny (given on 473 occasions). There were only seven donations less than a penny. However, in practice the lower limit on donations was higher as a result of the difficulties in circulating small value coinage. The most common amount donated less than a shilling was six pence (1,964 occasions) – occurring around twice as much as two pence (1,180) and four pence (1,084). A lack of small denomination coinage could have prevented many people from donating to charitable collections as a lack of suitable currency prevented them from donating according to their means.

The relative infrequency of small donations may also stem from the social bias of collecting. Perhaps the ‘poorer sort’ of local society was simply not asked for donations. There was also geographical variance in the amounts given. For example, Londoners tended to donate higher amounts than in the rest of the country. Just under half (42.5 per cent) of donations from the nation excluding London were of five pence or less, whereas only 2.7 per cent of the donations from within the Bills of Mortality were less than five pence. The wealthier metropolis donated larger sums than the rest of the nation.
Conclusions

The data from the returns to the 1666 and St Paul’s briefs represents a significant and unique body of evidence in examining how England responded charitably to the demands of rebuilding the metropolis after the Great Fire; and further, in examining early modern English charitable giving and the mechanisms of taking a nationwide brief in general. The differences between the two data sets meant that different aspects of the brief could be examined.

In general, it appeared that the 1666 brief was far more popular, in terms of overall amounts given, than the St Paul’s brief. However, neither brief was as successful as the 1655 Vaudois brief in terms of overall amount raised. This may be partly due to the relative decline of the metropolis as the most significant area in terms of charitable giving. As a result of the upheavals it was subjected to, London gave less towards the 1666 and St Paul’s briefs than the Vaudois brief. London’s decreased generosity may also be due to a refocus of charitable energies towards church rebuilding, as well as the fact that the city was already financing a great deal of the rebuilding effort through its payment of coal duties. Metropolis aside, the geographical distribution of donations remained relatively consistent, with the South-East in particular donating larger amounts than other regions.

There were other important differences between the 1666 and St Paul’s briefs. The most obvious difference is the time series of the two collections. The 1666 brief provoked a
far more instant response than the St Paul’s brief. Contributions towards distressed Londoners flowed to the metropolis quickly, whereas it took the external event of the Popish Plot for the St Paul’s brief to really take off. The time series shows that large nationwide briefs also tended to take a long time to be completed - both the briefs examined here lasted for over seven years. The 1666 brief returns also show how this money was transmitted to the metropolis. It appears that it was mainly sent through informal channels - mostly the ‘better sort’ of parochial society were responsible for bringing the specie to London. In addition, the universities, especially Cambridge, played a far more significant role in the St Paul’s brief.

Determining the exact contributing factors towards what made an area more likely to be generous led to some concrete findings. Firstly, it was statistically proven that there was a correlation between the amount donated towards the 1666 brief and the St Paul’s brief, both at county and parish level. The relative wealth and non-conformity of an area did not appear to have an effect on its generosity. However, it was statistically shown that urban areas, especially urban areas that had experienced fires, tended to be more generous to the two collections. The St Paul’s brief also included unique local data explaining why donations were not forthcoming; ranging from lack of local enthusiasm, the small size or poverty of the parish, or even the excuse that the parish priest had not received the brief.

The St Paul’s brief returns also gave some indication of the social composition of those who donated to the collection. It appears that all levels of society donated - from servants
to nobles. However, it is clear that men donated in far greater numbers, and far greater sums, than women. In addition, it is also clear that the ‘better sort’ - professionals and gentry donated higher sums than the rest of society. The backbone of the collection for St Paul’s though was the clergy, who consistently donated larger sums of money.

The data also shows how neighbourhood patterns of giving varied in London between the two collections, tracing roughly the recovery of the city. For the 1666 brief, most of the London donations came from the outlying parishes of the city - the traditionally generous and wealthier central parishes directly affected by the Fire could give nothing, although it is possible that former inhabitants of these areas donated in collections taken in London’s outlying parishes. However, by the time of the St Paul’s brief, the central metropolitan parishes gave at a higher level than the outlying parishes, with the exception of those parishes that were in the process of rebuilding their parish churches.

Finally, the St Paul’s brief returns also shed some light on how currency levels may have affected donations to the collection. Firstly, it appeared that higher social ranks donated higher sums of money than the rest of society. It was also clear that the donations given in London tended to be higher sums of money than the rest of the country. The data also shows that there may have a lower limit on donations, imposed by the problems of circulating small denominations of coin. Donations of less than two pence were relatively unusual – making up only 7.9 per cent of all donations less than a shilling. It appeared that two pence was probably the minimum level of donation possible in most cases.
The findings of the examination of these two charitable collections show that these nationwide briefs were large, ongoing, enterprises that had differing responses from the local community for a number of reasons; especially whether the community was urban or had had some experience of fire in the past. Political events, be it lobbying in Parliament for a more zealous ability to locate charitable funds, or events such as the Popish Plot, had an impact on the taking of a brief, and the generosity of those who gave. It has also been shown that all levels of local society responded to charitable briefs, although it was the 'better sort' of local society, particularly the clergy, who gave the majority of the sums collected. The examination of the two collections show how attitudes to the Fire varied. The areas close to London tended to be more generous to the collections, and the 'better sort' of local society tended to give more money. The 1666 Brief for distressed Londoners evoked a far stronger and more immediate response than the St Paul's Brief, and it is certain that there was a 'dark figure' of face-to-face charity not recorded in the records of the 1666 Brief, particularly given that many Londoners had relatives in the provinces.\(^\text{128}\) As a cause, the 1666 Brief was more in fitting with contemporary perceptions of suitable objects of charity. St Paul's Cathedral provoked a slightly less enthusiastic response. The nation was sympathetic to the needs of the metropolis, and in particular the people whose houses and property had been destroyed in the Fire.

\(^{128}\) Archer, 'Charity of early modern Londoners'. 242.
Chapter 4: Distributing the 1666 brief and post-Fire charity in London: 1666-79

The previous chapter examined how the nation reacted to the Great Fire in terms of charitable giving. This chapter will again use the prism of charity to examine the consequences and reactions to the Fire. However, the focus will be on London and Londoners whose houses and property were destroyed in 1666. The chapter aims to show how the system that distributed the monies collected for Londoners ‘distressed’ by the Fire determined which groups were the most deserving of charity, and how the voluntary 1666 Brief interacted with existing public structures of metropolitan charity such as the parish.

The examination of the distribution of the money collected from the brief for Londoners ‘distressed’ by the Fire can show what the charitable priorities of metropolitan government were in the aftermath of the catastrophe. It was expected that people who suffered as a result of the Fire should receive money. Indeed, John Evelyn noted with surprise in his diary on 7 September that when he came to the temporary camps to the north of London, no one asked ‘for one penny for reliefe, which to me appeard a stranger sight, than any I had yet beheld’, yet Richard Baxter recorded in his autobiography that ‘Thousands ... (were) cast into utter Want and Beggary: And ... Thousands of the formerly Rich were disabled from relieving them’. Clearly, the relief of Londoners distressed by the Fire required a major administrative effort.

A providential event such as the Great Fire was an opportunity for England to display its charitable nature. David Stokes (1590/2-1669), in a sermon just after the Fire, stated that the event was ‘a fiery triall, to see whether upon so great an occasion, you are apt to admit large charitable thoughts’. Once the money collected nationwide was brought to London, it appears that the task of doling it out fell mostly to Sir Thomas Player, the Chamberlain of the City. He acted on the advice and orders of several bodies and individuals; especially the Court of Aldermen, the Lord Mayor, and the Bishop of London, Humphrey Henchman (bap. 1592, d. 1675).

Details of the distribution of the collection were gleaned from a variety of sources. Firstly, when money from the collection was allotted, it was noted in the same book that was also used to record when money was brought to London. There are also two sets of signed and dated receipts that detail individual payments. One is a bundle of 204 receipts, each of which notes the amount given to a specific person, parish or ward, and occasionally including information on the circumstances of the payment. The other is a bundle of 140 orders to the Chamberlain asking him to pay money to various individuals, parishes and wards. When the two sets of receipts detailed the same payment, in every case, the date and amount they record is the same, and also matched the amount and date recorded in the book noting the amounts paid. Some of the amounts paid out were also recorded in the Repertory of the Court of Aldermen. These sources are vital as the extant

3 LMA. *Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666. ‘Payment of the aforesaid Monies’*, COL/SJ/03/006.
4 LMA. *Fire of London Grants of Money* 1667-75, COL/SJ/03/009, 1-204.
5 LMA. *Orders upon the Chamberlain. 1666-71*, COL/SJ/03/010A, 1-140.
parish and ward records do not shed much light on how the 1666 brief was distributed.

Table 4.1: Breakdown of payment of money from 1666 brief, 1666-79 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of payment</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative charges</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal costs</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass poor relief</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payments to charitable foundations</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payments to ‘distressed’ individuals</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payments to parishes</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payments to wards</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (£16250.80)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666, ‘Payment of the aforesaid Monies’, COL/SJ/03/006.

Figure 4.1: Breakdown of payment of money collected for 1666 brief, 1666-79

Sources: See table 4.1.
As figure 4.1 and table 4.1 show, most of the money was distributed to the wards, who were tasked with distributing the money to the ‘poore sufferers by fire’. A large proportion of the collection money was given to parishes affected by the Fire. Smaller proportions were spent on measures to relieve the poor of London and individuals ‘distressed’ by the Fire who had petitioned the Lord Mayor, Bishop of London or the Court of Aldermen for money. The rest was spent on the administration of the brief, and on legal costs and lobbying. The breakdown of how the money was spent in each of the individual categories will be examined in detail below.

Figure 4.2: Time series analysis of the collection and distribution of the 1666 brief, 1666-79

Sources: See table 4.1.

---

6 LMA. Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666, ‘Payment of the aforesaid Monies’, 23 December 1667, COL/SJ/03/006.
Figure 4.2 shows when the money was distributed. It is clear from the cumulative frequency of the amounts distributed that the 1666 brief was not used for the immediate relief of Londoners recovering from the Fire. In the first eight weeks after the brief was proclaimed, £2,327.91 had been collected. However, only £9.86 had actually been spent - and all of this had been on legal and administrative costs (see figure 4.3, below). Even one year after the brief had been proclaimed, and £13,462.06 (81.6 per cent of the total collected) had been collected in the Chamber of London, only around half of this money (£6804.85) had actually been distributed. As figure 4.2 shows, it took over two years for the amount distributed to approach within five per cent of the amount collected. The fact that the money from the 1666 brief was distributed in this fashion shows that London was capable of catering for, in the short term at least, the needs of those ‘distressed’ by the Great Fire without relying on charitable contributions from the rest of the country.

Figure 4.3: Breakdown of money paid out during first two years of 1666 brief, 1666-8

Note: £10,825.55 was distributed in this period.
Sources: See table 4.1.
Figure 4.4: Breakdown of money paid out during years 3 to 4 of 1666 brief, 1668-70

Note: £4,621.53 was distributed in this period.
Sources: See table 4.1.

Figure 4.5: Breakdown of money paid out during final years of 1666 brief, 1670-9

Note: £804.99 was distributed in this period.
Sources: See table 4.1.
Figure 4.3 shows that in the first two years following the start of the brief, most of the money was distributed amongst the wards and parishes. It is clear that the payments to the wards affected by the Fire were the largest group of payments, especially during the middle years of the collection (figure 4.4). Figure 4.5 shows that in the final years of the collection, payments to wards no longer accounted for the majority of payments. In absolute terms, the total amounts paid to the wards declined over time. In contrast, payments to ‘distressed individuals’ continued throughout the time period studied, albeit at lower levels of value, until 1679.

Figures 4.3 to 4.5 echo the point that the monies collected from the 1666 brief were not used for the immediate relief of Londoners as soon as they were received into the Chamber. By 1669, around 90 per cent of the total collected had been distributed - mostly in bulk payments to wards and parishes and for mass poor relief. After this date, until 1679, payments seem to have been distributed as money trickled in from across England; the majority to those ‘distressed individuals’ who had suffered as a result of the ‘late dismall fire’. Figure 4.5 also shows that most of the legal costs incurred during the brief occurred during the last years of the collection.
Analysis of how the money was distributed

In this section, the manner in which the money from the 1666 brief was distributed will be examined by dividing it into the categories in table 4.1, and examining each in detail.

Administrative charges

Like any other major charitable collection, carrying out the 1666 brief entailed administrative costs. Some money would inevitably be spent on the task of bringing money from the provinces to London. The business of bringing money to London was mostly carried out by local parish officials. No doubt many combined bringing monies to London with a business or social journey to the metropolis. However, on seven occasions, money to a total of £13.10 was spent paying those who had brought charitable money to London. These sums were mostly small payments, for example, one shilling was given to a man who brought £52.41 from three parishes in Nottingham.\(^7\) However, larger amounts were paid out, especially when the money came from a larger area - for example George Evans of Gloucester was paid £9.86 on 4 December 1666 as he had paid several messengers himself, as well as ‘Collecting & returning ... money gathered in the County & diocese’.\(^8\) The Lord Mayor Sir William Bolton was given £1.90 to cover his costs of sending letters and packets on the subject of the brief.\(^9\) The materials used in the machinery of the collection also had to be paid for - two printers were paid £2.08 for

---

\(^7\) LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond 1666, ‘Payment of the aforesaid Monies’, 2 November 1666, COL/SJ/03/006.
\(^8\) Ibid., 4 December 1666.
\(^9\) Ibid., 13 March 1667, 17 October 1667.

262
printing 2,000 accquitances and £1.20 for the collection and posting book.¹⁰

Publicising the brief came at a cost. When a second proclamation was made in October 1668, the Chamber paid out £113. £40 was paid to the royal printers to print out these proclamations, and, £50 was paid to the messengers carrying them. The Crown Clerk was paid £23, presumably to cover any legal costs.¹¹ The collection also incurred other miscellaneous administrative costs. For example, on 7 February 1673, Mr William Player (possibly a relation to the Chamberlain) was paid £4 ‘as a gift’ for his efforts in copying out how much money had been collected so far. This was to aid in the effort to collect any monies outstanding to the collection.¹²

Legal costs

The legal costs of the 1666 brief can be broken down into two categories; £43.89 for pursuing a case against Sir William Bolton and £114.76 for lobbying for a 1671 act, passed in April 1671, allowing London’s government to seek to obtain money collected for the metropolis in the provinces.¹³ The money was distributed in three payments; £40 to Mr James Cole on 28 February 1671 and on 28 September 1671 another £50.52 to Cole and £24.25 to Mr Daniel Mann, the Keeper of the Guildhall. These payments were presumably ‘lobbying’ and legal costs, although the records of payment are vague, it

¹⁰Ibid., 31 January 1667, 13 May 1667.
¹¹Ibid., 16 October 1668; Orders upon the Chamberlain, 1666-71, LMA, COL/SJ/03/010A, 116.
¹²LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond 1666, ‘Payment of the aforesaid Monies’, 7 February 1673, COL/SJ/03/006.
notes the money was to cover costs ‘expended in the prosecution of the Bill’.\textsuperscript{14}

Sir William Bolton was Lord Mayor for one year from November 1666. During his term, he misappropriated £1,800 from the 1666 brief.\textsuperscript{15} A bill of charges prosecuting him was issued during Michaelmas term 1668 (October to December), the case carried on to Hilary term 1669 (January to April), by Gregory Peake, clerk to the commission of charitable uses, who spent £33.81 ‘in the prosecution of Sir Wm Bolton for Misimploying the great sume of Money hee recieved of the Collections for the releife of the poore distressed by the late dismall fire’.\textsuperscript{16} In March 1671, £10.01 was paid out to the widow of Mr Robert Whiting for work he had done on the case in 1668/9.\textsuperscript{17} Bolton was involved in a large number of payments from the charitable funds collected. In all probability, most of the suspected ‘misappropriation’ might have occurred when he was paid £1,000 (which represented 19.0 per cent of the total amount that had been paid out of the collection at that date) during summer 1668 ‘to bee issued out for reliefe of the poore sufferers by the late fire’.\textsuperscript{18} The exact breakdown of how this large sum of money was spent is not clear, and this ambiguity certainly aroused suspicion against Bolton.

\textsuperscript{14} LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond 1666, ‘Payment of the aforesaid Monies’, 28 February 1671, COL/SJ/03/006.
\textsuperscript{16} LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond 1666, ‘Payment of the aforesaid Monies’, 21 October 1668, COL/SJ/03/006; LMA, Fire of London Grants of Money 1667-75, COL/SJ/03/009, 72. Gregory Peake in fact died before he could be paid for his efforts - the money was paid to the executrixes of his will, Barbara and Elizabeth Peake.
\textsuperscript{17} LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond 1666, ‘Payment of the aforesaid Monies’, 30 March 1671, COL/SJ/03/006; LMA, Fire of London Grants of Money 1667-75, COL/SJ/03/009, 151.
\textsuperscript{18} LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond 1666, ‘Payment of the aforesaid Monies’, 29 June 1667, 10 July 1667, COL/SJ/03/006.
Whenever it occurred, Bolton’s activities had aroused suspicion by the end of his term. On 3 December 1667 Samuel Pepys wrote that Sir Richard Ford (1613-78), Lord Mayor from 1670-1, had told him ‘an odd story of the basenesse of the Late Lord Mayor, Sir W Bolton, in cheating the poor of the City (out of the collections made for the people that were burned) of 1800l, of which he can give no account … which is the greatest piece of roguery that they say was ever found in a Lord Mayor’.  

Bolton himself never admitted fault and claimed that the actions against him stemmed from jealousy within the City government at a royal petition to make him Surveyor General of the rebuilding of London. On 31 May and 5 June 1667, Charles II wrote to the Court of Common Council and then the Court of Aldermen recommending Bolton ‘for the place & employment of … Surveyor General’. Bolton was never appointed to this office. After he was forced to surrender his office as alderman of Castle Baynard ward in May 1668, Bolton petitioned Charles II to call to account London’s government for their actions. Bolton claimed that the royal petition had created ‘animosity’ against him and led to his being deposed ‘arbitrarily & unjustly’ from his office as alderman. He went on to add; ‘ye present malice of a few (of the Court of Aldermen) … prodigiously shown against your Petitioner in publique reproaches, wounds ye honor of that famous City, & therefore infinitely meritts your most gracious & effectuall Animadversion’, and closed by asking ‘your Majesty … to Command ye Lord Major, & some of ye Court of Aldermen to give … an Accompt of these irreguler & unjust dealings … and that in ye

20 TNA, Letter from the King to the Court of Common Council, 31 May 1667. SP 29/202, 95; TNA, Letter from the King to the Court of Common Council and the Court of Aldermen, 5 June 1667. SP 29/203, 69.
meane time your Petitioner may by your Majesty’s grace & favour ... be permitted to attend in his Ranke & quality of an Alderman ... without any indignities & disrespectfull usages put upon him’. 21 Such efforts were to no avail. Bolton never again held civic office.

However, the affair still rankled. On 13 April 1673, Bolton complained of ‘hard and unkind usage’ from members of the Court of Aldermen. 22 In response, the Court set up a committee to make him ‘sensible of and to acknowledge his error and impudence in charging and reflecting upon this Court’. 23 In February 1676 Bolton again complained of legal proceedings against him in the Court of Chancery, but was advised by the Court of Aldermen to have ‘a more due and becoming deportment in reference to this Court & City’. 24 It appears this was Bolton’s last attempt to protest his innocence. On 19 March 1677, he petitioned the Court of Common Council for a pension, as he was ‘reduced to a low Condicon and utterly unable to support himself’. By then Bolton had resettled in Clerkenwell Green, to the north of the City. He was granted the sum of £3 a week for life. 25 The Bolton affair showed how zealously the City government sought to protect the charitable money for the sufferers of the Fire. It also transcended party lines. Figures as diverse as the Tory Sir George Waterman (d. 1682), Lord Mayor 1671-2, and the Whig Sir Patience Ward (1629-96), Lord Mayor 1680-1, and Bolton’s own brother-in-law, were involved in attempts to make Bolton admit his guilt and culpability. Metropolitan

21 TNA, Petition of Sir William Bolton to the King, May 1668, SP 29/240,190.
22 LMA, Rep. 78, fol. 134v.
23 LMA, Rep. 78, fol. 147r.
24 LMA, Rep. 81, fols. 79v-80r.
government was assiduous in using legal mechanisms to ensure that all the money collected went to London, and that any misappropriations in how it was spent were revealed.

Charitable foundations

There was one payment made to a charitable foundation from the 1666 brief. On 19 June 1668, £500 was paid to Christ’s Hospital because of its ‘great losses’ of ‘the late dismall fire ... besides a great decay of their revenue by many houses consumed & other losses occasioned by the ... fire’. The Bishop of London also approved this order. The petition recorded that the total value of the damage done to Christ’s Hospital was over £8,000.26 The foundation received further support when a 1667 Act of Common Council to prevent fires legislated that a proportion of any fines arising from prosecution of offenders under the act was to be given to the treasurer of Christ’s Hospital towards the maintenance of poor children there.27 Considering that the finances of most charitable foundations relied heavily on rents from properties they owned, it is surprising that there was only one payment to a charitable foundation. However, only Christ’s Hospital and Bridewell out of London’s five major hospitals were damaged during the Fire. Bridewell was rebuilt through money from the coal dues, whereas Christ’s relied mainly on charitable contributions from individual benefactors.28

26 LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond 1666, ‘Payment of the aforesaid Monies’, 19 June 1668, COL/SJ/03/006; LMA, Orders upon the Chamberlain, 1666-71. COL/SJ/03/010A, 111.
27 The other half went to the individual who sued the offender. An Act For Preventing and Suppressing of Fires within the City of London, and Liberties thereof (London: A. Clark: 1677), p. 10.
A 1667 printed report of the numbers of poor people cared for by several hospitals in London shows the great damage done to the solvency of these institutions by the Fire, and was perhaps an attempt to raise the status of the institutions, which was comparatively low in the 1660s. Christ's is recorded as losing half of its yearly revenue, St Bartholomew's the 'greatest part' of its revenues, St Thomas' a 'considerable' part of its revenue as result of Fire, and Bridewell two-thirds of its revenue. Bethlehem had preserved its small rental revenues, 'yet by reason of the late ... Fire the Hospital is very much prejudiced in other Incomes'. The report recommended London's hospitals as 'good objects' of charity, so it possible that charitable giving in the years after the Fire may have made up for the losses suffered to rental revenues.

Similarly, the smaller foundation of King Charles' Hospital, founded by Charles I (r. 1625-49) for the care of fatherless children, lost half of its annual revenue of £100 because of the Fire. To make up for this, it received a royal grant of £50 in July 1669.

Even if London's hospitals received cash donations after the Fire, they still would have experienced major short falls in revenue after the Fire, as they had lost a reliable source of annual income in the form of their rental revenues, which could not be recouped until they were rebuilt. However, it appears that the Fire Court was fairly assiduous in ensuring tenants of hospitals rebuilt after the Fire. For example, a tavern owned by St Bartholomew's Hospital in St Nicholas' Shambles, which they had leased to Theophilus


29 Ibid., p. 242.

30 TNA, A true report of the great number of poor Children and other poor people maintained in the several Hospitals under the pious care of the Lord Maior, Commonalty and Citizens of the City of London, 8 April 1667, SP 29/196, 149.

31 TNA, Warrant for grant for King Charles' Hospital. July 1669. SP 29/264, 134A.
Clever for 29.5 years at £10 per annum in 1662, was ordered to be rebuilt by the Fire Court in November 1667. The rent paid by Clever was to remain the same; however, the lease was extended to 61 years. In the long term hospitals may have suffered by being tied down to a longer lease, however, at least they probably did not have to pay for the rebuilding of their rental properties themselves.

After the Fire, London’s charitable foundations were forced to seek out alternative forms of income. For example, although St Bartholomew’s Hospital was not directly affected by the Fire, 190 properties from its housing stock were lost. To compensate, the governors built shops around the hospital and leased them out. The hospital also suspended salaries and debt payments and closed some of its facilities. Despite the availability of such survival strategies, some charitable foundations could not continue as they had done in the pre-Fire years. Many of London’s charities suffered greatly as a result of the Fire. Edward Waterhouse’s account of the Fire published in 1667 recorded that after the disaster London’s charities became companions with the poor in ‘Misery & Poverty’.

---


33 G. Whitteridge, ‘The fire of London and St Bartholomew’s Hospital’. London Topographical Record, 20 (1952), 47-8

rebuilding and of the losses sustained in their housing stock. 35

**Mass poor relief**

Some £1,504.20 was distributed to be spent on relieving ‘poor sufferers’ of the Fire. This was separate from the individual payments made to people who claimed to have suffered losses as a result of the Fire. These mass payments tended to be large. On 3 May 1667, Mr Randall Bolton was given £500 to be distributed amongst the poor tradesmen of London. Sir William Bolton received £1,000 in summer 1667, to be issued to relieve the poor who had suffered as a result of the Fire. 36 There is no record of exactly how this money was distributed, which may have led to the later legal proceedings against Bolton. Some payments were smaller. For example, £4.20 was spent on 9 October 1666 on bread for the poor. This bread would have probably been distributed amongst people, or ‘poor wretches’ as Pepys deemed them, living in temporary settlements in open spaces to the north of London, such as Moorfields, Islington and Highgate (Evelyn also recorded that there were camps in Southwark). Evelyn noted on the Friday after the Fire that there were ‘200,000’ hungry and destitute people in these areas, of all ranks and degrees, for whom the Crown and Council organised supplies of bread. 37

36 LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond 1666, ‘Payment of the aforesaid Monies’, 3 May 1667, 29 June 1667, 10 July 1667. COL/SJ/03/006.
37 Ibid., 9 October 1666; Pepys, Diary, ed. Latham and Matthews, vii, 276; Evelyn, Diary, ed. De Beer, iii, 457, 461-2.
Payments to parishes

Table 4.2: Breakdown of payments to parishes from the 1666 brief, 1667-9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parish</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount (£)</th>
<th>% of total given to parishes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Hallows Barking</td>
<td>20 March 1668</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Hallows the Less</td>
<td>24 December 1667</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christchurch Newgate Street</td>
<td>3 October 1667</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Andrew by the Wardrobe</td>
<td>6 August 1667</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Andrew Hubbard</td>
<td>16 April 1669</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Ann Blackfriars</td>
<td>21 October 1667</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Anthonil Budge Row</td>
<td>18 July 1668</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Bartholomew by the Exchange</td>
<td>4 September 1667</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Benet Paul’s Wharf</td>
<td>28 August 1667</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Bride Fleet Street</td>
<td>1 August 1667</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Dionis Backchurch</td>
<td>5 July 1667</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Dunstan in the East</td>
<td>26 June 1667</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Edmund the King and Martyr</td>
<td>12 July 1667</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Faith under St Paul</td>
<td>23 July 1667</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Gabriel Fenchurch</td>
<td>12 July 1667</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Gregory by St Paul</td>
<td>7 June 1667</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St James Garlickhithe</td>
<td>3 August 1667</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St John the Baptist Wallbrook</td>
<td>18 October 1667</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Leonard Foster Lane*</td>
<td>25 April 1667, 11 October 1667, 15 January 1668</td>
<td>109.90</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Margaret Pattens</td>
<td>12 October 1668</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Martin Ludgate</td>
<td>6 August 1667</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Martin Vintry**</td>
<td>17 October 1667, 24 September 1669</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Abchurch</td>
<td>5 February 1669</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Aldermary</td>
<td>31 July 1669</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Magdalen Old Fish St.</td>
<td>7 September 1667</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Mounthaw</td>
<td>1 November 1667</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Somerset</td>
<td>8 August 1667</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Mary Woolnoth</td>
<td>13 September 1667</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Michael Bassisshaw</td>
<td>16 January 1669</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Michael Cornhill</td>
<td>15 May 1667</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Michael Queenhithe</td>
<td>31 August 1667</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Nicholas Cole Abbey</td>
<td>8 July 1667</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Nicholas Olave</td>
<td>29 August 1667</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Olave Jewry</td>
<td>26 May 1668</td>
<td>56.625</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Pancras Soper Lane</td>
<td>28 July 1669</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Peter Paul’s Wharf</td>
<td>23 July 1670</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Stephen Wallbrook</td>
<td>13 July 1667</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Thomas Apostle</td>
<td>17 September 1667</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>3486.525</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See table 4.1.
Note: St Leonard Foster Lane and St Martin Vintry were both paid in multiple instalments. For explanations, see text below.
London's parishes were not immediately granted money from the funds from the 1666 brief. As table 4.2 shows, the first payments were in spring 1667, to St Leonard Foster Lane and St Michael Cornhill. The last payment made was in July 1670 to St Peter Paul's Wharf. However, by 20 March 1668, 86.6 per cent of the total granted to the parishes had already been paid out. In all, 38 parishes received money from the 1666 brief. In almost every case, the money was collected by a churchwarden from the parish. On some occasions, a deputy or collector for the poor was given the money.

Only two parishes received more than one grant of money. The parish of St Leonard Foster Lane, in the north-west of the City, was the first parish to be given money from the 1666 brief. It was given £19.50 on 25 April 1667, it was used for 'the Ceeping of five Children from Midsummer 1666: to Lady day 1667', at the rate of £3.90 per child. On 11 October 1667, the parish was given a further £10.40 for 'placing out of ye poore Children which now remaine upon ye Comon Charge of ye pish' to nursemaids. The parish's main payment of £80 was made on 15 January 1668 to its churchwardens. This was used in the same way as the other parishes used the money from the 1666 brief. The two payments made to St Martin Vintry, a mid-sized riverside parish, were both used in this way. It appears that the parish had just petitioned for more money.

The money given to the parishes was not spent on outdoor relief of the inhabitants of the parish who had suffered as a result of the Fire. This is unsurprising, as most of the

---

38 LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond 1666, 'Payment of the aforesaid Monies', 25 April 1667, 11 October 1667, 15 January 1668, COL/SJ/03/006; LMA, Orders upon the Chamberlain 1666-'71, COL/SJ/03/010A, 77; LMA, Fire of London Grants of Money 1667-75, COL/SJ/03/009, 17.
39 LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond 1666, 'Payment of the aforesaid Monies', 17 October 1667, 24 September 1669, COL/SJ/03/006.
payments were made over a year after the Fire, when short-term subsistence needs of those made homeless would have been met already. Rather, it appears that 28 out of the 38 parishes receiving money spent it on placing out poor children who were on the common charge of the parish. This represented 65.3 per cent of the total amount given to the parishes. As such, the money was used to shore up parochial finances in the short term. All of the parishes that spent their grants on placing out poor children petitioned the Court of Aldermen for permission. Each petition was of the same format, asking that the ‘sume ... allotted ... bee imployed and bestowed for the disposing and placing out of the poore Children which remaine upon the comon charge of the said parish’.\(^{40}\) Some parishes treated the grant as a form of loan, St Gregory by St Paul recording in the parish vestry minutes that the £200 it was granted be ‘afterwards repaid when the sd parish shall bee rebuilt, into the Chamber of London for such other good and charitable uses to which the same upon further consideration shall be designed and appointed’.\(^{41}\)

The main determinant of how much money a parish was given depended on its size, population and perhaps its relative wealth. As figure 4.6, below, shows, small centrally located parishes such as St Pancras Soper Lane and St Andrew Hubbard received far smaller grants of money (£20 and £30 respectively) than larger parishes on the peripheries of the City, like St Bride Fleet Street and Christchurch Newgate (£360 and £300 respectively). Statistical testing shows that there was a significant relationship between a parishes’ population and the amount of money that it was granted. There was

\(^{40}\) LMA, Rep. 72, fols. 150r-v.

\(^{41}\) GL., St Gregory by St Paul. Vestry Minutes, MS 1336/1, fol. 74r.
high correlation between these two variables, and it was statistically significant.42 This conclusion was echoed by correlation between the amount given to a parish and two other variables; the total acreage of a parish,43 and the total number of households in a parish.44 It is clear, therefore, that more populous parishes tended to receive more money.

Not all of the money received by parishes was given directly from the Chamber. One of the orders to the Chamberlain records that Queenhithe Ward distributed its 9 January 1668 grant of £100 amongst its constituent parishes. St Michael Queenhithe received £33, St Mary Somerset £22, St Peter Paul's Wharf £13, St Nicholas Cole Abbey £12, St Nicholas Olave £10 and Trinity Precinct (part of the parish of Holy Trinity the Less) £10.45 This is the only record that illustrates how a ward distributed the money it was given. However it is reasonable to expect that most wards would have given the money allotted to them to their constituent parishes, as the parishes had the institutional mechanisms and experience necessary to distribute money to the poor.

---

42 Pearson's Product Moment Coefficient is 0.824. Testing using Student's T-test at 95%; t=8.726 and the tabulated value is 2.02 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation between population and amount granted in 1666 must be rejected. Population was estimated using the number of burials in 1664, before the Plague, adopting the technique as used by J. P. Boulton, 'Charity universal? Parochial contributions to distressed Protestants in Cromwellian England', Institute of Historical Research seminar, 9 December 2005. For most of the parishes examined here there are no burial figures for 1667-9.

43 Pearson's Product Moment Coefficient is 0.802. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=10.047 and the tabulated value is 2.02 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation between population and amount granted in 1666 must be rejected. Figures for acreage from R. A. P. Finlay, Population and metropolis: the demography of London 1580-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), table A3.1, pp. 168-72.

44 Pearson’s Product Moment Coefficient is 0.764. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=9.291 and the tabulated value is 2.02 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation between population and amount granted in 1666 must be rejected. Figures for acreage from Finlay, Population and metropolis, table A3.1, pp. 168-72.

45 LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond 1666. 'Payment of the aforesaid Monies'. 9 January 1668. COL/SJ/03/006; LMA. Orders upon the Chamberlain 1666-71, COL/SJ/03/010A, 26.
Figure 4.6: Map of payments made to London parishes from the 1666 brief, 1667-9

Payments to wards

As figure 4.1, above, shows, the wards were responsible for doling out the majority of the money from the 1666 brief. Unfortunately, the ward records did not illuminate much about how this money was distributed, but some conclusions can be drawn from how the money was distributed amongst the wards. The money was given to the wards, broadly, in two forms: money for the ward's poor, and grants to the ward's beadle. Money given to wards for poor relief will be examined first.

The poor relief money was given to the wards in five blocks. The first payment was in December to February 1666/7, to the total of £2,967.60. There were four further payments; £2,149 in December to January 1667/8, £1,971 in December 1668, £1,717 in November to December 1669 and finally £333 in January to February 1672. The money was paid during winter, the time when temporary poor relief was probably most needed. This problem may have been compounded in London, where the price of coal often rose in winter, putting further pressure on the resources of the marginal poor.46 Dutch attacks on English shipping could also lead to a rise in the price of coal.47

The Bishop of London authorised the poor relief payments to the wards on 24 December 1666. He specified that they were to aid in the economic recovery of those affected by the Fire, directing that the money should go to 'Tradesmen who have suffered & are disabled to continue their Trade', however he also desired that 'none that have kept

Alehouses or Tipling houses may have any Share in this Releif. A letter from the Lord Mayor to the Alderman of Bridge Ward dated 25 December 1666 is typical of the advice given to the wards. It requested him to obtain information on 'ye most distressed late Inhabitants of ye said Ward who have suffered by ye said fire & to distribute to & amongst such of them who are qualifiyed accordingly' (i.e. tradesmen who have suffered as a result of the Fire, as long as they are not involved in running alehouses or tippling houses). It is also requested that the ward provide a 'list of ye Names of all persons who shall take of ye said Releife & of ye Sume distributed to everyone respectively'. However, these lists do not appear to survive. The other later payments to the wards were aimed at the 'poore distressed by the sd fire in aporcon to evre ones condicion sufferings and necessities'. Payments to wards were obviously the preferred mode of distributing money for the Court of Aldermen - compared, for example, to dealing with numerous individual petitions. Indeed on 10 November 1668, the Court declared 'it inconvenient to order any further sumes of money to particular psions distressed by ye late dismall fire, but to order moneys to ye wards that ye distributions may bee made ... in proportion to their respective wants & necessities'.

50 LMA, Letter from Sir William Peake, Lord Mayor, to the Wards, 29 December 1667, Orders upon the Chamberlain, 1666-71, COL/SJ/03/010A, 23.
51 LMA, Rep. 74, fols. 8v-9r.
Table 4.3: Distribution of money from 1666 brief to wards ‘for releife of the poore that suffered by the late sadd fire’, 1667-72

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Amount (£)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aldersgate Within</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bassishaw</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billingsgate</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishopsgate Within</td>
<td>46.80</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bread Street</td>
<td>156.80</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridge</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad Street</td>
<td>166.80</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candlewick</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castle Baynard</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheap</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coleman Street</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordwainer</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cornhill</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cripplegate Within</td>
<td>285.60</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dowgate</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farringdon Within</td>
<td>1078.60</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farringdon Without</td>
<td>2138</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langborne</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queenhithe</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tower</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vintry</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walbrook</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9022.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: See table 4.1.*

*Note: Aldersgate Without, Aldgate, Bishopsgate Without, Cripplegate Without, Lime Street and Portsoken wards did not receive any money from the 1666 brief.*
Figure 4.7: Map of payments made to wards from the 1666 brief, 1667-72

As table 4.3 and figure 4.7 show, the money from the 1666 brief was not distributed evenly. The smaller, central wards, which tended to be wealthier in comparison to other wards, received smaller amounts of money than larger wards like Farringdon Within and Farringdon Without. The inner wards, on average, tended to receive less than the other wards. It is statistically highly probable that the money was distributed to the wards according to their population size. Using Roger Finlay’s 1631 population data, the correlation between population of a ward and its amount given was found to be statistically significant. The two Farringdon wards received over one-third of the money given to the wards between them. This is in spite of the fact that the majority of this area was not directly affected by the Fire. It was also notable that Cripplegate Without Ward, the location of Moorfields, a key site for those made homeless after the Fire, received no money. Possibly by the time the money was distributed they had moved on.

It is likely that the ward of Farringdon Without received so much more than the other wards because of its larger size, and the fact that it may have had to absorb more displaced people both because its housing stock and charitable mechanisms were more intact and because London’s population was naturally growing westward before the Fire.


\[53\] Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, Z=3.890, tabulated value Z=1.75, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected, and it is accepted that, on average, the inner wards received less than the other wards.

\[54\] This does not include Farringdon Without and a single value for Bishopsgate Within, so these two wards are excluded. Finlay, Population and metropolis, table A4.1, p. 173.

\[55\] The level of correlation is 0.576. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=2.990 and the tabulated value is 2.09 meaning there is a less than 5% level of probability that the observed correlation is due to chance, and so the null hypothesis of no correlation is rejected.
A case in point was Frances Aske, a spinster who received £2 on 14 December 1667. She formerly lived in the parish of St Dunstan in the West before ‘her whole substance and maintenance … was utterly consumed’, in addition she ‘is now friendless & helpless aged threescore and nine years also blind (as she hath been for many years past) & under other distempers & great weakness of Body which doe not only disable her to doe anything towards her Maintenance’. The Court of Aldermen requested that ‘shee bee recommended to ye Ward of Farringdon without for a further epporcon of the money that shall bee distributed in the sd Ward for reliefe of those poore that suffered by the sd fire’, 56 which meant she would probably have gone on to receive a parish pension.

Money was also distributed to the beadles of the wards, as ‘the ordinary meanes for their supports & livelihoods’ had been lost and to compensate them also for ‘their attendances … on solemn occasions upon the Aldermen as on other business of the said respective wards are very frequent & necessary and in that respect ought to bee recompenced & too have all just incouragement therein’. 57 Each ward’s beadle received a payment of £5 on four occasions: April 1667, December 1667, May 1668 and February 1669. As Farringdon Without was such a large ward, extra money was given to the beadles of the St Sepulchre and St Bride’s divisions within that ward in the latter three payments. There was one occasion when a beadle was denied his grant. On 10 February 1669 it was decreed that, John King, beadle of Walbrooke Ward ‘who keeps victualing in a Booth or Shedd … shall not receive his benefitt of this order till hee give over his said victualing’. King eventually received his £5 on 26 May 1669 ‘Upon satisfacion … that (he) … hath

56 LMA, Fire of London Grants of Money 1667-75, COL/SJ/03/009, 21.
57 Ibid., 13.
discontinued and given over his selling of Drinke, for which hee was denyed to receive his share of a late benevolence to the Beadles of the Wards'.\textsuperscript{58} It was probable that after the Fire, ward administration became a more consuming activity than previously.

\textit{Individual payments}

As figure 4.4 shows, individual payments were made to people who had suffered as a result of the Great Fire up to thirteen years after the event. These payments illuminate the 'blurred lines' between institutional and face to face charity. Although administrated by the Court of Aldermen, each of these payments was a result of an individual petition. Patronage could still exist within charitable bureaucracy,\textsuperscript{59} and the outcomes of these petitions for money from the 1666 Brief show the charitable targets identified by the metropolitan government.

In total, there were 220 payments made to a value of £986.13, giving a mean of £4.48 per payment. The lowest payment made was four shillings, two pence to Ann Williamson on 29 July 1679, and the largest was £40 to the widow Clara Bolton on 15 January 1668 as 'the whole remainder of her estate consisting in houses holden by Lease from the City was destroyed'. Bolton's problems after the Fire were in fact more serious. She had been granted an annual royal pension of £200 for the loyalty of her late husband, and for sheltering Royalist soldiers during the Civil Wars. However, the pension had been stopped when her nephew, a Major Wood, complained that the pension had been partly

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 33, 101.
\textsuperscript{59} I. W. Archer. 'The charity of early modern Londoners'. \textit{Transactions of the Royal Historical Society}, 6\textsuperscript{th} series, 12 (2002), 244.
for his maintenance also and that Bolton had turned him and his family out of her home
and wished to remarry. In 1667 Bolton claimed arrears of £500 in a petition to Charles
II. Although she paid to have foundations staked out for a new house in Gracechurch
Street on 9 July 1668, her financial problems appear to have continued. In 1669, she
petitioned Baron Arlington (1618-85), the secretary of state, for £500 as she had
mortgaged her City lands for £700 and needed to rebuild on them before the ground was
seized.\textsuperscript{60} It is unclear what ultimately became of Clara Bolton, but her case does
illustrate the point that petitioners of high social esteem who had experienced significant
loss of revenue in the Fire tended to be paid higher amounts from the 1666 brief.

These individual payments were made after the grantee (or someone acting on their
behalf) petitioned the Court of Aldermen. These petitions survived for 93.6 per cent of
the amounts paid to ‘distressed’ individuals, and contain varying degrees of information
about the means and circumstances of the petitioner, as well as giving an indication of
their literacy (the petitioner was obliged to ‘sign off’ upon receipt of the money, and
those who could only leave their ‘mark’ are deemed to be illiterate). For this section, the
petitions and payments will be examined to see what groups received the charitable
money, and what determinants affected how much they received.

When the date of the payment was compared to its value, there was slight negative
correlation between the two variables. The longer the payment was made after the Fire,

\textsuperscript{60} LMA, \textit{Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666}, ‘Payment of the aforesaid Monies’. 15 January 1668, 29
July 1679, COL/SJ/03/006; TNA, Petition of Clara Bolton to the King, 1667, SP 29/229, 117; Mills and
Oliver, \textit{Survey of the building sites}, i. 40; TNA, Petition of Clara Bolton to Arlington, 10 July 1669, SP
29/262, 150.
the less it was likely to be. There was negative correlation between these two variables, and it was statistically significant.\textsuperscript{61} This negative correlation might also have come as a consequence of a fall off in funds available with which to pay out money to petitioners. As there was less money in the Chamber, so the amounts given may have declined in order to conserve the money for longer.

When the seasonality of payments was examined, the highest numbers were made during autumn and winter. Statistical testing showed that seasonality affected the number of payments made in a month.\textsuperscript{62} However, it does not appear that in winter the highest numbers of payments were made. Measuring the affect of seasonality is made more difficult due to the fact that payments were often approved and made in clusters - for example, on 30 October 1668, fifteen payments were made.\textsuperscript{63} The highest mean payments were in January and February; £7.14 and £6.32 respectively. The lowest mean payments were in August, £2.21. There is, however, not a great deal of statistical difference between the mean monthly payment made, the standard deviation is 1.374. It appeared that the level of payments, though not the volume, remained fairly consistent throughout the year. Other factors probably had a more significant affect on the amount of money received by individuals from the 1666 brief.

Some of the petitions recorded the titles of the individuals seeking relief, allowing the

\textsuperscript{61} Pearson’s Product Moment Coefficient is -0.370. Testing using Student’s T-test at 95%; t=5.883 and the tabulated value is 2.0 meaning the null hypothesis of no correlation between date of payment and amount granted must be rejected.

\textsuperscript{62} Testing using chi-squared at 95%, calculated value of chi-squared is 69.599, tabulated value is 19.68, therefore null hypothesis of no difference is rejected.

\textsuperscript{63} Fire of London Grants of Money 1667-75, LMA, COL/SJ/03/009, 73-87.

284
effect of social status to be examined. The petitions show that 24 of the petitioners were citizens, three were gentry and nine were either ‘Mr’ or ‘Mrs’. The mean amount granted to petitioners from this group was £7.30, compared to £3.91 for the rest of the petitioners. Statistical testing shows that petitioners of higher social status, on average, tended to receive more than others. This shows that it was likely that status before the Fire had an impact on how much was received from the brief. Indeed, ‘respectable’ people fallen on hard times were traditionally key recipients of parish pensions and payments, and this seemed to have continued in the payment of monies from the 1666 brief.

Status was significant in distribution of charitable monies. For example, Charles Ubaldini, who was noted as a gentleman of a noble Italian family, received £20 on 26 February 1667 as he was known ‘for his learning and profession of the reformed religion’. Those of higher social status were also likely to have had more resources to lose, and so would need more money to help them in reconstructing their lives. For example, Mr Samuel Gellibrand, a ‘stationer’, received £10 on 26 February 1667, having lost at least £1,700 as a result of the Fire. It is likely that this was the same Samuel Gellibrand who was a bookseller based in Paul’s Churchyard. Most of the booksellers based in this area before the Fire lost the majority of their stock, so it is unsurprising his losses were so high. Similarly, the widow Elizabeth Kendall received £20 on 17 October 1667 as ‘the whole estate left by her said husband consisting of goods & Merchandizes to

---

64 Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, Z=3.332, tabulated value Z=1.75, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.
66 LMA, Fire of London Grants of Money 1667-75, COL/SJ/03/009, 4.
67 Ibid., 5; H. Hickman, The believers duty towards the Spirit, and the Spirits office towards believers. or, A discourse concerning believers not grieving the Spirit, and the Spirits sealing up believers to the day of redemption grounded on Ephes. 4. 30 (London: S. Gellibrand, 1665), title page.
the value of five thousand pounds was destroyed in the late dismal fire'.

Widows were traditionally a major component of the ‘deserving poor’ and usually were a significant proportion of those given payments from the parish poor rates. They were particularly vulnerable to poverty. Wealthier widows may have been able to escape the threat of poverty, but lower down the social scale, widowhood left many women in a precarious position, making them more likely to become dependent on the goodwill of neighbours and the parish.

A particularly full (but not necessarily atypical) example of the ‘desolate’ widow was Elizabeth Peacock, who received £10 on 5 March 1667, whose ‘husband & eldest sonne (in whome were her greatest hopes) being both lately dead’ and ‘her dwelling house ... on Snow Hill (a faire and hardye Inne wherein she had a Terme of 4 yeares left past) had layd out and expended 800 s in building ... was utterly consumed by the late dreadful fire together with her whole stocke of hay coales & beere layd in for her winter provision & alse all the furniture of her said home to a greate value’. She was left with only 39 shillings, five small children and ‘not soe much as A stoole to sitt uppon’. Her neighbours had given her some support in the form of a plot in Smithfield which ‘with ye assistance of her friends’ she has built upon but could not make any progress.

68 LMA, Fire of London Grants of Money 1667-75, COL/SJ/03/009, 105.
71 LMA, Fire of London Grants of Money 1667-75, COL/SJ/03/009, 6.
Widows were an important focus of charity in the 1666 brief. They were the recipients of over half of the grants paid out (117 out of 220), although on average they were given less (£4.10) than others (£4.91), however this difference is not statistically significant. However, it does appear that compared to the 36 women who received money but were not widows (at an average of £2.15 per grant) that widows, on average, received more.

There was occupational information given for 33 of the people who received money from the 1666 brief, shown in table 4.4, below. The higher status one's occupation was, the higher the amount they were granted. The £5 given to the labourer (Thomas Bellars on 7 November 1671) did not reflect this, as he was probably granted more as he was already a subject of charity, being 'a poore Old man imployed as a Labourer for a long time past in the Citty Worke and lately disabled by some greate hurte received in that service'. Excluding this labourer, higher esteem occupational groups like dealers, victuallers and ministers averaged £8.42, whereas all other groups averaged £3.79. Statistical testing showed that higher esteem occupational groups, on average, tended to receive more than others.

---

72 Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, Z=0.698, tabulated value Z=1.75, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is accepted.
73 Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, Z=3.241, tabulated value Z=1.75, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.
74 LMA, Fire of London Grants of Money 1667-75, COL/SJ/03/009, 156.
75 Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, Z=3.570, tabulated value Z=1.75, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.

287
Table 4.4: Occupation of recipients of charity from 1666 brief, 1666-79

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Mean amount granted (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dealer</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victualler</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsman</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.41</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources:* See table 4.1.


The fact that only 24 out of the 220 payments made to individuals were to members of livery companies perhaps indicates that the companies were able to take care of their own members. Indeed, on 6 September 1666 the Court of Aldermen ordered that ‘the Masters Wardens & Assistants of the several Companyes Doe take care for the releife and succour of their respective poore during the present extremity’. 76

In addition to the information about occupation and social status, the petitions can also be used to show whether the object of the charity had informal ‘social credit’. This can be shown in terms of who authored the petition. For example, Edward Reynolds (1599-1676), the Bishop of Norwich, wrote two petitions in February 1667, and both received £20. For one of these individuals, Mr Philemon Stephens (probably the bookseller Philemon Stephens the Elder of Paul’s Churchyard), Reynolds had informed the Bishop of London about ‘the great losse that he had sustained by the late dreadfull fire, to his

76 LMA, Rep. 71. fol. 169r.
It appeared that if the petitioner was related to a person of high esteem it could raise the chances of them receiving a higher amount from the 1666 collection. For example Mr John Anderson, the grandson of Sir Henry Anderson, a former sheriff of London, received £20 on 3 June 1668. Likewise, Magdalen Burroughs, the widow of Mr John Burroughs, the late recorder of the City, received £10 on 21 April 1668. Finally, a petition could have attached to it the recommendation of a person of high social standing. For example, the widow Bennett Crosse received £10 on 13 January 1669 on the recommendation of Anne, Duchess of Albemarle (d. 1670). In total, the average sum given to the 27 individuals with informal social status indicators as described above received a mean of £9.97, whereas all other individuals received an average of £3.71; this difference is statically significant. ‘Connections’ to esteemed individuals or groups raised the chances of receiving a higher payment. Informal social patronage clearly had a major impact on the distribution of money from the 1666 collection.

As the petitioners had to sign the petition on receipt of money from the 1666 brief, the levels of literacy and its effect on the amount given could be examined. Firstly, in 49 cases, the petitioner did not receive their money in person. This was probably because

---

77 LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666, ‘Payment of the aforesaid Monies’, 14 February 1667, 23 February 1667, COL/SJ/03/006; LMA, Fire of London Grants of Money, 1667-75, COL/SJ/03/009, 3; G. Williams, The description and the practice of the four most admirable beasts explained in four sermons upon Revel. 4.8 (London: P. Stephens, 1663). title page.
78 LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666, ‘Payment of the aforesaid Monies’. 3 June 1668, 21 April 1668, COL/SJ/03/006.
79 Ibid., 13 January 1669.
80 Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, Z=4.390, tabulated value Z=1.75, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.
the petitioner was unable to physically reach the Chamber of London. For example, the widow Anne Southwicke, who received £2 on 30 April 1668, had her brother John Jackson receive the money for her as ‘The Peticoner is soe weake that shee can not come herself’. 81 One hundred and seventy two of the people granted money received it in person. Of these, 59.9 per cent were literate and able to sign the petition - the rest were only able to leave their mark. This was higher than the levels of illiteracy determined by David Cressy for 1641-4, based on returns to the Vow and Covenant and the Solemn League and Covenant. He calculated that 22 per cent of his sample was illiterate - compared to around 40 per cent of the petitioners from the 1666 brief. 82 This difference was probably due to the likely lower status of those petitioning for money from the 1666 brief, meaning literacy would be lowered. Also, the high proportion of women applying for money from the brief may have decreased the levels of literacy, even if women in the London area tended to be more literate than in the rest of the country. 83 The literate received an average of £6.13, whereas the illiterate received an average of £2.73, and this difference is statistically significant. 84

Only four of the petitions actually specified what the money was to be used for. A payment of £10 to the family of Samuel Wells on 14 September 1667 was for ‘the releasing of (him) out of prison’. 85 The other three payments with specified aims were for the purpose of placing out of children. For example, on 30 March 1667, widow

---

81 LMA, Fire of London Grants of Money, 1667-75, COL/SJ/03/009, 42.
83 Ibid., tables 6.1 to 6.5. pp. 119-21.
84 Mann-Whitney U Test, based on normal distribution, one tailed, at 95% level, Z=4.753. tabulated value Z=1.75, thus the null hypothesis of no significant difference is rejected.
85 LMA, Fire of London Grants of Money, 1667-75, COL/SJ/03/009, 16.
Elizabeth Hicks received £10 'for the placing out of two ... children'. Some payments were also to compensate individuals for supporting charitable objects after the Fire, whilst the parish poor relief mechanisms remained in flux. For example, Eleanor Case of St Olave Old Jewry received £3.38 for looking after Mary Whitehall, 'an impotent poore woman petitioner'. However, as so few of the petitions included information about the purpose of the payment no firm conclusions can be drawn about its affect on the amount paid out. The other moneys granted were presumably used to help in the reconstruction of lives after the Fire, or as short term poor relief.

In summation, it appears that payments to individual petitioners followed partly along the lines of existing charitable habits. The most vulnerable members of society, particularly widows and the aged were the main recipients of the 1666 Brief. The wellbeing of these groups was highly sensitive to crises such as trade depression and bad harvests - situations where they would be forced to rely on charity. These individuals probably lived in what Paul Slack termed 'shallow poverty'. The crisis of the Fire forced them to seek cash doles. However, in addition to these traditional objects of charity, the 1666 brief also granted money to individuals who would probably not have required poor relief before the Fire. For these people, their social standing before the Fire had an impact on how much they would receive. Pre-Fire differences in social status made a significant difference on the amount of money an individual was likely to receive. Social credit in the form of being a citizen, having relations of standing in the community or of having the support of an individual with social clout in their petition all contributed to a higher

---

86 Ibid., 10.
87 Ibid., 107.
likelihood of receiving a larger sum of money from the brief. The social and economic resources of these individuals would probably have ‘insulated’ them somewhat from traditional crises. However, an event such as the Fire, which destroyed goods and property on a wide scale, may have forced them to seek charitable relief.

**Petitions to central government**

The State Papers, Domestic Series, held at the National Archives preserved some petitions to the Crown made by individuals who claimed to have suffered as a result of the Fire. These petitions would have been from individuals with sufficient social standing or financial resources to deliver a petition to the King or a high official. For the most, they fall into three main groups: firstly, requests for a grant of money or some other direct royal favour, secondly, a request for an official position, and thirdly, payment for an existing Crown debt. Unfortunately, the series does not systematically record the outcome of these petitions, but in some cases this can be deduced using other sources.

*Requests for royal grants or favours*

This category covered a wide range of petitions – from requests for trading rights to demands for money to help in rebuilding. Many of these requests were made by former royal servants, or their relatives. On 12 September 1666, Richard Pierce, who had been yeoman of the palace kitchen, petitioned Charles II for the right to trade in the livery hall

---

of the Cooks’ Company near Aldersgate, which had survived the Fire, claiming he had lost £4-5,000 as a result of the Fire. Three days later, Charles II wrote to the Cooks’ Company asking them to allow Pierce to use their hall until ‘it shall please God to restore him by his … industry to a condition of building … (a) Dwelling of his owne’. Pierce appears to have been able to weather the effects of the Fire. On 28 August 1667 he paid for the setting out of foundations in Cannon Street, where he was assessed for a property of 12 hearths by the 1666 Hearth Tax. He remained there up to 1675, and appeared to have slightly increased the size (or number of ovens) of his property, as the Hearth Tax assessed him for 13 hearths. 90 In September 1666, Ann Lloyd, the widow of a groom of the royal stable, who had lost her house and all of her possessions during the Fire successfully petitioned Queen Catherine of Braganza (1638-1705) for a place in the alms house in Clerk’s Alley, Bishopsgate Street, after the death of one of its inmates. 91

The case of another widow, Sarah Crafts, shows how Londoners who suffered as a result of the Fire could pursue a number of charitable avenues. In 1666 she petitioned the King for money towards rebuilding her ruined estate, which had been worth around £5,000. She claimed that her family had been ‘reduced to great Extremity’ and was ‘inforced to turne Servants and to worke hard for a poore Livelyhood’. She received £15 from the 1666 brief in two payments in May 1667 and August 1668, as well as £10 for the relief of her father Samuel Mann, a stationer in May 1667. When Crafts appeared before the Fire Court in November 1668 to petition her tenant, Thomas Fincham, a mercer, to rebuild her

90 TNA, Petition of Richard Pierce to the King, 12 September 1666, SP 29/171, 67; TNA, Letter from the King to the Company of Cooks. 15 September 1666, SP 29/171, 124; Mills and Oliver, Survey of the building sites, i, 20; TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/32, Part 3, fol. 6v; TNA, 1675 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/23, fol. 65v.
91 TNA, Petition of Ann Lloyd to the Queen, 13 September 1666, SP 29/171, 89.
property in Cannon Street that she held on a long lease from the City, it appeared her circumstances had changed. Instead of the estate of ‘houses and buildings’ she had previously referred to, she now claimed the house in Cannon Street was the ‘sole livelihood’ of her family. Either Crafts had lost the rest of her estate between 1666 and 1668, or she had adjusted her background for her audience. In petitions for charitable money, the greater the pre-Fire circumstances had been, the higher the payment tended to be, whereas in cases in the Fire Court, it appeared that the judges were more likely to favour the landlord and order a tenant to rebuild if the landlord was of more limited circumstances. The Court eventually ordered Fincham to rebuild the house but reduced his annual rent from £35 to £15, and ordered his lease be increased by 40 years.\(^\text{92}\)

**Requests for an official position**

This group of petitions shared a similar profile to the other requests. They all emphasised the straightened circumstances of the petitioner at the time of the Fire, as well as the loyalty of the petitioner to the Crown. For example, in the petition of William Garrett, a stationer to the Crown, for the position of a waiter in Customs House, he claimed that because of his loyalty to Charles I he had been ‘sequestered, plundered & Imprisoned … and suffered great losses in the late Rebellion, as alsoe by the late fire … where hee had his house and Goods destroyed, soe that hee is now in great want and necessity, having a

\(^{92}\) TNA, Petition of Sarah Crafts to the King, 1666. SP 29/173, 101: LMA, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond 1666, ‘Payment of the aforesaid Monies’, 21 May 1667, 6 August 1668, COL/SJ/03/006; Fire Court, ed. Jones, i. 332-3. The house in Cannon Street was assessed at 7 hearths in 1666. TNA, 1666 Hearth Tax, City of London. E179/252/32, Part 3, fol. 6v.
Wife and seaven Children’. There were petitions to Charles II for the office of muster master of the City and the right to publish several works imprinted with the royal favour. There were also two petitions to Arlington for the office of postmaster and letter carrier.

Two clergymen also petitioned Charles II for ecclesiastical office, using the Fire as a reason for their request. In 1667, Dr William Bell (1625-83), vicar of St Sepulchre Holborn, petitioned the King for the next vacant prebendary of Westminster. He wrote that during the Civil Wars he had been deprived of his fellowship at St John’s College, Oxford, and had served for seven years as a chaplain in the royal army. He had stayed in London through plague and Fire and ‘preserved the remaineing Parishioners together in the publique worshipp of God’, as well as securing the charity of others and contributing some of his own money, in the rebuilding of the parish church. He does not seem to have been awarded the prebendary, but he was made a royal chaplain in 1668. In 1670, Dr Israel Tonge (1621-80), the rector of St Mary Staining, sometime chaplain of the garrison at Tangiers, and later one of the main instigators of the rumours of the alleged Popish Plot in 1678, petitioned Charles II for the rectory of Broadwater, Sussex, as ‘amongst his sufferings by the dreadfull conflagracon ... he ... sustained the loss of his ... parish Church together with his Parsonage and Glebe houses’. Tonge did not receive this preferment, but from 1672 he held the rectories of St Michael Wood Street and Aston, Herefordshire.

---


94 TNA, Petition of Captain James Bradshaw to the King, December 1667, SP 29/225, 225; TNA, Petition of John Ogilby to the King, 1666, SP 29/173, 110; TNA, Petition of Richard Poole to Arlington, September 1667, SP 29/218, 66; TNA, Petition of Francis Dickinson to Arlington, 1670, SP 29/281A, 49.

Requests for payment of royal debts

Obtaining payment from the Crown, particularly during the reign of Charles II, who was not always on the soundest financial footing, was frequently a difficult business. In early modern England, debts could frequently last for years, and many lengthy debts were never paid. Craig Muldrew has shown that many were prepared to tolerate unpaid debts for a long while. Those who were owed money by Charles II who had had their business destroyed during the Fire may have been forced to petition the king for payment of debts. The Fire would have added extra urgency to their demands.

Two petitions are for payment of arrears in royal salaries. On 7 November 1666, twelve of ‘His Majesty’s Violins’ petitioned the King to pay a proportion of their arrears from the £15,000 ‘lately ordered for payment’ of royal servants, as during the Fire many of them had been reduced to ‘great misery and want’. They were ordered to be paid on 26 November 1666. Similarly, in 1666, John Gamble, one of the consort of wind instruments to the King petitioned Charles II for arrears of £221 10s 4.5d, as his wage had not been paid in nearly five years. As a result of the Fire, he had contracted debts of £120, and one his securities was now in Newgate Prison. The payment of his salary would allow the debt to be cleared.

---


98 TNA, Petition of HM violins to the King, 7 November 1666, SP 29/177, 105; TNA, Petition of John Gamble to the King, 1666, SP 29/173. 103.
There were three petitions for payment of debts for goods provided to the Crown. In 1666, the jeweller John Le Roy petitioned Charles II for £357 owed for a diamond ring made for the king's mistress, Barbara Palmer, Countess of Castlemaine (later Duchess of Cleveland, 1640-1709) in November 1664. Prompt payment would ensure 'him self and family from ruine'. There were also petitions for payment of £600 furnished on the royal account at a vintner's by the Prussian ambassador in 1662, as well as a petition from a cooper for £267 11s 8d from the Navy. Both requests stressed the great losses experienced by the petitioner as a result of the Fire.99

Summary

The petitions to central government from individuals who suffered as a result of the Fire show that Londoners were willing to resort to multiple charitable avenues in order to recover from the Fire. Petitions came from a wide range of social groups, and were for a wide range of reasons. All of the petitions stress the damage done in 1666 in order to gain greater sympathy from the Crown. It appeared that a statement of the great losses in the 'late dismal fire' became commonplace amongst petitions from Londoners in the aftermath of the Fire as a rhetorical trope to add importance to the petition.

99 TNA, Petition of John Le Roy to the King. 1666. SP 29/173, 106; TNA, Petition of Elizabeth Proctor to the King. 1666. SP 29/173, 114; TNA, Petition of Roger Morris to the Navy Commissioners, 1667, SP 29/229, 161.
Other methods of relief for ‘distressed’ Londoners

The receipts from the 1666 brief have left a detailed administrative trail, allowing the way in which the brief was distributed to be examined. However, there were other ways in which Londoners ruined by the Fire received charitable succour, although these methods do not have any detailed records, and so cannot be too closely examined.

In the immediate aftermath of the Fire, there were two plans to relieve Londoners by sending food. Just a few days after the Fire, William Waynflet of Southwold, Suffolk, wrote to Joseph Williamson (1633-1701), an important aide to Arlington, that due to his experience of the Southwold fire of 1659, he knew there would ‘great want’ of food for the poor in London. Waynflet went on to inform Williamson that the price of cheese was low, and that if letters were sent to knights and gentlemen thereabouts, they would load a small vessel for London, and the cheese could be distributed to the poor.\(^{100}\) Similarly, on 6 November 1666 the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (James Butler, Duke of Ormond (1610-88)) offered to import 20,000 head of cattle from Ireland to distressed Londoners. However, a vote in the House of Commons decided that the cattle could not be sent to England, dead or alive.\(^{101}\) It must also be remembered that the livery companies were deputed by the Court of Aldermen to attempt to care for their distressed members.\(^{102}\) In the aftermath of the Fire, the ruins of London’s churches were utilised as a source of raising money for parochial charitable functions. For example, in October 1666, the

\(^{100}\) Letter from William Waynflet to Williamson. 11 September 1666, TNA, SP 29/171, 49.


\(^{102}\) LMA, Rep. 71, fol. 169r.
churchwarden of St Margaret Lothbury was instructed to use the sale of the bell metal and any lead left in the ruins of the church to keep, school and clothe a poor fatherless child belonging to the parish. This was not a unique occurrence. The sale of the metals from the ruins of the church also took place in the parishes of St Michael Cornhill, St Sepulchre Holborn, St Stephen Walbrook and St Swithin London Stone. London’s parishes would use whatever means possible to remain maximise their income in the difficult years after the Fire.

The nonconformist community appeared to have had its own methods of caring for its distressed members in London. Richard Baxter recorded in his autobiography that Henry Ashurst (c. 1616-80), a Presbyterian merchant famed for his philanthropy, solicited the rich abroad for help for poor honest Londoners. Thomas Gouge, the ejected minister of St Sepulchre Holborn, acted as treasurer for this money, which was distributed in a weekly meeting. Money for London’s dissenting community also came from their co-communicants across the Atlantic. The congregational minister Increase Mather (1639-1723), the foremost figure of American Puritanism, preached a sermon to raise contributions for ‘poor saints’ in England and wrote letters to ministers in London about the collections. Similarly, the pastor John Davenport (bap. 1597, d. 1670), responding to a request from Jane Hooke (fl. 1622-81), the wife of the Independent minister William Hooke (1600/01-1678), raised a fund for the assistance of English ministers who had lost

103 GL, St Margaret Lothbury Vestry Minutes, MS 4352/1, fols. 262r-v. The money raised was used to apprentice the poor child to a silk weaver based in Long Alley in 1667.
104 GL, St Michael Cornhill, Vestry Minutes, MS 4072/1, part 2, fol. 244v; GL, St Sepulchre Holborn, Vestry Minutes, MS 3149/2, p. 101; GL, St Stephen Walbrook Vestry Minutes, MS 594/2, p. 112; GL, St Swithin London Stone, Vestry Minutes, MS 560/1, 4 December 1666.
their homes.\textsuperscript{106} It is probable that other dissenting communities, such as the Quakers, also had their own mechanisms for caring for members of their faith who had suffered as a result of the Fire. These mechanisms would have considerably lightened the load on official means of relieving distressed Londoners.

**Conclusions**

The distribution of the money collected for the 1666 brief revealed a number of key features about charitable efforts in early modern London after the Great Fire. Existing mechanisms of government, such as the parish and the ward, received the majority of the monies distributed. Although it is not exactly clear how the wards distributed the money, it is likely that it was spent the same way as the money given to individuals who petitioned the Court of Aldermen - the 'deserving poor' and Londoners who had been 'greatly distressed' in their losses as a result of the Fire would have been the main recipients of the charitable monies, either directly through the ward or via one of the ward's constituent parishes. Most of London's parishes, on the other hand, used the 1666 money to spend on the placing out of poor children on the parish charge. This would have probably relieved some of the strain on parochial charitable commitments after the Fire, allowing the parish to focus on other groups in need of poor relief.

London's charitable foundations were not a major focus of the distribution of monies from the 1666 brief. Only Christ's Hospital received a grant from the collection, as it

was the only major charitable foundation that was totally destroyed during the Fire. The administrative and legal costs of the brief amounted to a fairly small percentage of the monies spent. It was clear that most of the individuals who brought the money to London did so free of charge; perhaps combining the visit to the metropolis with some other social, economic or cultural function. For the officers of the metropolitan government (beadles of the wards) aside the distribution of the charitable funds seems to have been taken on as an additional duty of office. As for litigation surrounding the brief, it appears that only the former Lord Mayor Sir William Bolton attracted any legal problems. In addition, money from the collection was spent on lobbying and procuring parliamentary support for the brief.

How much money a parish or ward received was largely dependent on its population and size. The larger the population or size of these areas, the greater the amount was received out of the monies from the 1666 brief. London’s government mostly relied on existing mechanisms such as the parish and the ward to dole out the money from the 1666 brief. It seemed that the Lord Mayor considered distributing the money directly himself, as on 9 October 1666 he requested a list ‘of all necessitous poore ... that need the said relieve’ from Churchwardens, but it this task was eventually mostly devolved to the parishes and wards.  

There were some individuals who directly petitioned the Lord Mayor or the Court of Aldermen, but they do account for a smaller proportion of the total amount doled out than the parishes or wards. It appears that having some degree of social standing or social

---

107 LMA, Jour. 46, fol. 124.
credit meant a larger grant of money was more likely. Also, the sooner the petition was after the Fire, the larger the sum of money granted was likely to be. However, most of the payments made were some time (one year or more) after the Great Fire. It appeared that the money was not for short run relief, but for aiding in a more long term reconstruction of individual lives. As the money was probably not for short-run relief, it appeared that seasonality (that could cause those living in ‘shallow’ poverty to require poor relief) had little effect on how much one was granted. Rather, it was social status that was paramount. This was perceived in terms of being a member of a livery company, or of the gentry. In addition, having familial or social connections to people of high status seems to have had a direct, positive, affect on how much money one would be granted. As a result, this led to literate Londoners being granted more money, as they were more likely to be of high status.

Widows, traditional recipients of charity, were the key focus of grants from the brief. It seemed that the distribution of the 1666 brief roughly followed the parish practice of doling out money to the ‘deserving poor’ - in particular widows and those once of high status fallen on hard times. For the latter group in particular, the higher the status the greater the amount of money they would be likely to be granted, as Evelyn notes in his diary those ‘who from delicatnesse, riches & easy accommodations in stately & well furnishd houses, were now reduced to extreamest misery & poverty’ seem to have stood out as the most deserving of the Londoners ‘distressed’ by the Fire.108

Money from the 1666 brief was not the only charitable avenue for Londoners. Many

individuals petitioned the Crown for money, offices or payment of debts in the aftermath of the Fire, possibly using the disaster as an extra source of leverage in gaining sympathy from the reader of the petition. In addition, London’s non-conformist community probably had its own significant system of charitable relief for its members after the Fire.

Most charity after the Fire probably was informal, and went unrecorded, but from what was recovered, it appeared that charitable giving after the Fire certainly continued along pre-Fire lines. Although some payments were made to Londoners who would not have normally qualified for poor relief, the majority of the money allocated to individuals from the 1666 Brief was for groups who would usually expect to receive charity. It seemed that most Londoners did not have the need to apply for formal charitable handouts. This showed there most have been informal help given to many Londoners in the aftermath of the Fire. For example, Evelyn recorded on 7 September 1666 that many of those burnt out who had sought refuge in the open spaces near London then repaired ‘into the suburbs about the Citty, where such as had friends ... got shelter & harbour’. Many Londoners would have had sufficient resources, social or material, to recover from the disaster without charitable help. The majority of Londoners were resilient in the face of the Great Fire, allowing charitable resources to be focussed on the most vulnerable groups.

109 Ibid., iii. 462.
Chapter 5: Understanding 1666: popular and cultural reactions to the Great Fire

The first four chapters of this thesis have shown the effects of the Great Fire on London’s residential structure and economy, and then how local and metropolitan society reacted to the destruction caused by the flames. As far as possible, rigorous statistical techniques were utilised in these chapters. However, examining the popular and cultural reaction to the Fire demanded the use of qualitative sources. This chapter will attempt to explore the immediate popular reaction to the Fire. It is problematic determining exactly how Londoners reacted to the disaster. However, using biographical sources, contemporary descriptions of the Fire and enactments of the City government some initial observations can be made. Next, the cultural reaction to the Fire will be examined – this will be divided into two sections: narrative texts and verse. Finally, the response to the Fire in London’s built environment will be briefly explored. This chapter aims to show how Londoners would have perceived the Fire, and how it was explained and portrayed in the long term.

Towards an understanding of the popular reaction to the Fire

The early administrative reaction to the Fire showed that public disorder was expected. Fire was linked to the threat of foreign invasion as well as civil or religious division.¹ On 3 September 1666, Charles II ordered the Lord Lieutenants of the counties surrounding

London to draw together the county militias to help keep the peace.² Anthony Wood recorded in his diary on 2 September that the Fire had put all the towns in England on alert against arson - ‘all townes stood upon their owne defence day and night’.³ Two years after the Fire, the Court of Aldermen, worried about possible public disorder stemming from rumours of plots to start fires in London stated that ‘Care be taken for prevencon of such a Mischiefe ... (and) punishment inflicted upon the Reporters and Dispersers of such Rumours to the Disturbance of the Quiet of the Citty’.⁴ The memory of the Great Fire meant that rumours of possible future fires would be all the more effective in creating public anxiety. The prospect of another fire in London was clearly felt to have the potential to create disorder amongst the metropolitan community. However, in spite of the concerns of civic government, it seemed there was no significant disorder in London after the Fire. Certainly there was no rioting in the streets in spite of the scale and gravity of the disaster.

What contemporary sources recorded was wide-scale xenophobia after the Fire. Distrust and suspicion of foreigners appears to have been widespread. Francisco de Rapicani, an Italian member of a Swedish diplomatic suite visiting London, recorded that there was ‘hatred’ of foreigners in the streets at the time of the Fire, and that one of his colleagues was nearly lynched. Similarly, on 6 September 1666, Samuel Pepys recorded in his diary that it was dangerous for any ‘stranger’ to walk the streets. A letter from a Dutch visitor to London claimed that ‘it will be a long time before the people of London forget their

⁴ LMA, Rep. 73, fols. 132r-v.
wild rage against the foreigners'. Foreigners were also prime suspects of arson. For example, the day after the Fire, Cornelius Rietvelt, a Dutch baker, was detained in the Gatehouse in Westminster on suspicion of firing his own house.

The nature of this 'foreign' threat was thought to either be Dutch or French; who exactly got the blame depended largely on political leaning. Steven Pincus argued that the immediate predisposition of Anglican Royalists was to blame the Dutch for starting the Fire. However, over time, public opinion, if it was searching for an earthly, malign, cause of the fire, tended to unanimously blame the French or the Papists, or both. This change matched the long-term shift in popular sentiment from anti-Dutch to anti-French and perhaps growing discontent with Charles II. The French were ostensibly England's European ally, but in spite of this tended to be more likely to be blamed for the Fire. In comparison the Protestant Dutch, even though England were shortly to be at war with them, tended to be mostly ignored as potential culprits for starting the blaze.

John Evelyn recorded in his diary on 7 September 1666 that due to fears about a potential foreign attack, people took up weapons and fell upon any Dutch or French people they

---


6 TNA, Commission of Cornelius Rietvelt to Arlington, 3 September 1666, SP 29/170, 62.


found, 'without sense or reason'. Lady Hobart, in a letter to Sir Ralph Verney dated 3 September 1666, asserted that the Fire began in 'pudding lan ... whar a Duch rog lay' and that Dutchmen 'have attempted to fier many plases & thar is a bundane tacken with grenades & poudre'. John Tremayne, a Cornish gentleman writing to his father shortly after the Fire, recorded that he saw Dutch and French plotters spreading flames in London. However, in the popular mind the French bore the brunt of the blame for the Fire. Tremayne recorded: 'Any that had but the looke of a Frenchman was taken & carried to prison or cutt & slashed & the people ... were ... violently bent against the French.' Similarly, William Taswell recorded that in the aftermath of the Fire, 'the ignorant and deluded mob, who upon the occasion were hurried away with a kind of phrenzy, vented forth their rage against the Roman Catholics and Frenchmen.' He also mentioned the ransacking of French-owned businesses, and attacks on Frenchmen after the Fire. It appeared that the Catholic French were more likely to be blamed for the Fire than the Protestant Dutch. This matches the shift in popular sentiment proposed by Pincus.

Placing the blame for a disaster on foreigners was by no means a unique feature of the popular reaction to the Great Fire of London. John Miller argued that it was a 'common trait' of collective psychology to try to explain disasters in terms of the machinations of those who are regarded as a threat. Likewise, Penny Roberts, using the example of early

---

12 LMA, Letter of John Tremayne to Lewis Tremayne. COL/SJ/03/014. p. 2.
modem France, showed that the blame for fires and conspiracy theories often became associated with fears of the ‘other’ – strangers and foreigners. Social scapegoats frequently bore the brunt of the suspicion of early modern fires. For example, after the 1728 Copenhagen Fire, seven entirely innocent Jews were arrested. Similarly, the fires in Lisbon after the 1755 Earthquake were blamed on Spanish deserters, who were also accused of looting and robbery after the disaster. Clearly the French, in large part because of their association with Catholicism, were deemed to be the greater threat than the Protestant Dutch.

In spite of the governmental worries about the possibility of public upheaval after the Fire, and reports of sporadic violence against foreigners, it seems there was no great breakdown in public order after the Fire. Popular sentiment appeared to have lent towards reconstruction rather than recrimination. Ultimately, London was pragmatic in the face of disaster. This pragmatism probably stemmed from contemporary religious beliefs. In 1666, most people had a providential view of fires, and saw them as a way in which God punished sinful communities. For example, a consolatory letter written from the civic officials of Londonderry to the City bemoaned the ‘direfull & astonishing Judgments it hath pleased the Almighty to lay on you’. Similarly, Sir Nathaniel Hobart wrote just after the Fire that ‘the image of this terrible judgement has made such an


impression in the soules of every one of us, that it will not be effaced while we live ... God was not pleased, & we must submit to his will'.

The Fire in narrative texts (1): the years after the Great Fire

In many respects, most of the narrative accounts of the Great Fire can be divided into two ‘competing’ streams. Most accounts shared a broadly providential view of the event – that the disaster was ordained in some way by divine intervention. However, beyond this, there were key differences in the interpretation of the memorialisation of the Fire. There were two ‘sides’ in the contest of shaping the perception of the Fire. There was a Royalist perspective, which tended to view the Fire as accidental. The event was a symbol of the Stuarts’ commitment to London, as well as the consequence of the city’s ‘disloyalty’ during the Civil Wars. Opposing this perspective was an anti-Catholic memorialisation of the Fire, which tended to be Whiggish and dissenting. These groups used the event to question the loyalty of the Duke of York (later James II, r. 1685-8) and Catholics in general, as well as to criticise the policies of the Restoration administration. These two streams drew their inspiration and many of their claims to veracity upon two sources: the account of the Fire in the London Gazette and the supposed report of a parliamentary committee set up to investigate the causes of the Fire.

The first printed account of the Fire appeared in the Gazette the week after the Fire. It embodies the ‘official’ perspective of the Fire – treating it as an accident. and

---

16 LMA, Jour. 46, fol. 130r: Memoirs of the Verney Family from the Restoration to the Revolution, ed. Verney, p. 142. The providential view of the Fire is explored more fully, below, in chapter 6.
emphasising the role of Charles II and the Duke of York in the fire-fighting effort. It is a factual and official account, which stresses the role of God in starting the flames and of the king in helping to stem them and begin the reconstruction and recovery of London after the disaster. One of the first books published on the Fire was 'Rege Sincera's', Observations both Historical and Moral upon the Burning of London, which drew its narrative of the Fire’s progress entirely on that published in the *Gazette*, calling its account a ‘true and naked Narrative of the Fact as it did happen’. This extract from the *Gazette* resurfaced in many subsequent accounts of the Fire. The rest of the *Observations* identified the primary cause of the Fire as God, with all other factors acting as ‘second causes’ used by God to accomplish His will.

Opposing the providential, royalist account of the *Gazette* was the supposed report of the parliamentary committee of Sir Robert Brooke, the Member of Parliament for Aldeburgh, Suffolk. The report includes numerous examples of Catholic plotting in the lead-up to the Fire, and was first presented to Parliament on 22 January 1667. The politician John Milward (1599-1670), who was attending Parliament at the time, was sceptical of the importance of the report. He recorded that it could not prove ‘a general design of wicked agents, Papists or Frenchmen, to burn the city’ and ‘I cannot conceive that the House can

---

18 'Rege Sincera', *Observations both Historical and Moral upon the Burning of London, September 1666* (London: T. Ratcliffe, 1667), pp. 1, 2-7. For example, in a 1720 tract on the Fire, *An account of the Burning the City of London. As it was Publish'd by the Special Authority of the King and Council in the year, 1666. To which is added, The Opinion of Dr Kennet the present Bishop of Peterborough, as Publish'd by his Lordship's Order, and That of Dr Eachard, relating thereunto* (London: J. Stone, 1720), pp. 5-13.
19 'Rege Sincera', *Observations*, pp. 9-11.
make anything of the report from the committee'. The report was never fully debated or discussed in Parliament as the House was prorogued in February 1667. However, the report appeared in print in 1667 as *A True and Faithful Account of the Several Informations Exhibited To the Honourable Committee*. Robert Hubert (c. 1640-66), the Huguenot executed for starting the Fire, was described as a Catholic and accused of working with a number of accomplices. The report suggests that large numbers of Catholic plotters, some from abroad, used various incendiary devices to spread the flames across London. It casts aspersions on the loyalty of the Duke of York, as well as suggesting a wider Catholic conspiracy drawing on support from the French, which was supposed to end in an invasion of England. Many subsequent anti-Catholic accounts of the Fire relied on Brooke’s report to add verisimilitude to their claims of an ongoing Popish Plot. There was frequent reprinting of the two competing accounts – in particular at moments of political crisis such as during the Exclusion Crisis and at the height of fears about a Jacobite invasion.

When the report was first published in 1667, many Royalists were convinced of the subversive nature of the work. On 13 July 1667, Sir Thomas Langton, the Mayor of Bristol and the local merchant Sir John Knight (bap. 1613, d. 1683) wrote to Arlington reporting that the radical bookseller Elizabeth Calvert (d. 1675?), of Little Britain, had sent ‘fifty bookes concerning the late fire in London’ to the city, which had been seized,

---

21 *A True and Faithful Account of the Several Informations Exhibited To the Honourable Committee appointed by the Parliament To Inquire into the Late Dreadful Burning Of the City of London* (1667), pp. 5-24.
as they were deemed to be ‘seditious and to be scattered abroad to seduce his Majestys subjects against his government’.

On 16 August 1667, Daniel Fleming (1633-1701), wrote to Williamson from Rydal, Cumberland, that the report had appeared in the locality recently, and he thought that it had been ‘maliciously (& surely very falsely) published by some Presbiterian hand’ and that it ‘may doe harme, beeing ... approved ... by some of that party’. Three days after Fleming’s letter, Sir Philip Musgrave (1607-78), the Royalist officer and politician, wrote to Williamson from Carlisle notifying him that he had seen ‘a printed booke containeing the informations given last winter to the House of Comons concerninge the burneing of London ... also the informations concerning the insolenceys of Papists with some additions very seditious’. Musgrave reported that he had seized eighteen of the works from the shop of a ‘fierce Presbiterian’. The anxiety of the correspondence about the seditious nature of the report is clear.

Many of the first accounts of the Great Fire were penned by clergy. These accounts share many characteristics; mainly, that the event was providential, and caused by the anger of God at the sins of the nation. Edward Waterhouse’s Short Narrative Of the late Dreadful Fire in London (1667) takes the form of a letter written 20 October 1666 to Sir Edward Turner, Speaker of the House of Commons. Waterhouse reasoned that the Fire may have been caused by human agency from England’s enemies, as the event caused commotion in England, and adversely affected the war effort, as London was so central to the nation’s trade. However, the work ultimately determined that the Fire was a divine

---

23 TNA. Letter from Sir Thomas Langton and Sir John Knight to Arlington, 13 July 1667, SP 29/209, 75.
24 TNA. Letter from Daniel Fleming to Williamson, 16 August 1667, SP 29/213, 118.
25 TNA. Letter from Sir Philip Musgrave to Williamson, 19 August 1667. SP 29/214, 27.
judgment. Waterhouse’s account is strongly loyalist, praising Charles II and his brother, and calling for a halt in criticism and dissent so that England can recover effectively - ‘Nothing is a Curse of subversion to a Nation but Faction, Dissent, Jealousie’. Accounts written by nonconformist clergy share the providential view of the Fire, but not the admiration for Charles II. The ejected minister Thomas Vincent (1634-78), who stayed in London throughout the Plague and the Fire, published an account of his experiences in 1667 - *Gods Terrible Voice in the City*. Vincent’s nonconformist views are clear in this work. In his opinion divine displeasure was increased by government legislation against dissenters. Vincent’s narrative mentioned the dry weather, wind and combustible materials in the houses, as well as insinuating Catholic involvement - ‘this doth smell of a Popish design’. However, it was sin which was the primary cause of the Fire, which ‘hath received its commission from God to burn down the City, and therefore all attempts to hinder it are in vain’. He goes on to give an account of the causes of the divine judgment, firstly arguing it was a national judgment, because London was the ‘Metropolis of the Land, where all its Beauty, Riches, Strength and Glory’ lay. He also mentions the godlessness of the gentry (perhaps a veiled criticism of Charles II’s bawdy court) and the vast numbers of the ‘ungodly crew’ who reside there. Ultimately London’s pride and sin brought about a divine judgment, and to forestall any other such

27 Ibid., p. 136.
28 T. Vincent, *God’s Terrible Voice in the City* (London: G. Calvert, 1667), pp. 21, 23
29 Ibid., p. 47.
30 Ibid., p. 51.
31 Ibid., pp. 61-2, 70-1.
events and prosper, London must turn from sin, and be humble towards God.

The ejected minister Samuel Rolls published an account of the Fire in 1667. Sin was the cause of the disaster. Rolls included a litany of sins, including Sabbath-breaking, debauchery and idolatry, that had previously brought the divine judgment of fire, and all of which London was guilty of. Unusually, Rolls attempted to discuss the scientific background of fire, calling it ‘a mighty swarm, and torrent of sulphurous particles, or motes of brimstone, violently agitated or moved, and forcibly breaking out from these respective bodies, to which they formerly belong’. Everything in nature contains an element of fire, but it is usually kept in check by the internal balance of salt and water, which can be interrupted by flammable elements, such as sulphur. Rolls did blame Catholics for starting the Fire - ‘The losse was Catholick (that is universall) in the consequences, as well as Roman Catholick in the Causes of it’, but also argued they could not have done it unless God had ordained it because of the sins of the people.

Another ejected minister, Thomas Doolittle, penned *Rebukes for Sin by God’s Burning Anger* (1667), which emphasised the sinfulfulness of man, and the wrath of God. Sin was the bellows which fueled ‘God’s burning anger’. There was a catalogue of sins which especially kindled divine anger, with biblical examples of each. Doolittle reminded the reader that the Fire was a ‘general’ judgment, so all English people must forsake sin and

---

33 Ibid., part 2. p. 93, 110-11, 102-3.
34 Ibid., part 3. pp. 11, 79.
pray for London, especially as many had relatives in the metropolis.\textsuperscript{36}

Two works published shortly after the Fire specifically offered religious consolation and advice for those distressed by the disaster. Owen Stockton (1630-80), an ejected minister, penned \textit{Counsel to the Afflicted} in 1667 and the same year Thomas Jacombe (1623/4-87), also an ejected minister, wrote a \textit{Treatise of Holy Dedication}. The latter work was `especially recommended' to Londoners moving into new homes – by dedicating themselves, and their new houses, to God, they can avoid another fiery catastrophe.\textsuperscript{37} Stockton urged readers to look beyond the `instruments' that caused the Fire, but to remember God's hand, which kindled the Fire, and its progress.\textsuperscript{38} Like Doolittle, Stockton included a list of sins which had brought divine judgment of fire in the past, along with biblical references.\textsuperscript{39}

There were also two short historical compendiums of fires that had occurred in English history produced after the Fire. They placed the Fire in the context of earlier disasters, both in London and England. \textit{An Exact Account of the most Remarkable Fires} and \textit{Flagellum Dei} are lists of fires that had afflicted England since the late eleventh century. Both attributed the 1666 Fire to material causes such as drought, rotten houses, and flammable materials held in houses, all overseen by the primary hand of God.\textsuperscript{40}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., pp. 190-216, 210.
\textsuperscript{37} T. Jacombe, \textit{Hosios Enkainismos, or, A Treatise of Holy Dedication, both Personal and Domestick} (London: R. Smith & S. Gellibrand, 1668), epistle dedicatory, p. 245.
\textsuperscript{38} O. Stockton, \textit{Counsel to the Afflicted: or, Instruction and Consolation for such as have suffered Loss by Fire} (London: E. Cotes, 1667), pp. 8-9, 14.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., pp. 140-2.
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Flagellum Dei: Or, A Collection of the several Fires, Plagues, and Pestilential Diseases that have happen'd in London especially, and other parts of this Nation, from the Norman Conquest to this present, 1668} (London: C.W., 1668), p. 11: \textit{An Exact Account of the most Remarkable Fires which have happened}
The Fire in narrative texts (2): the Great Fire and the Exclusion Crisis (1678-81)

During the Exclusion Crisis, the Whiggish faction made extensive use of the Great Fire as a polemical tool to stress the past and ongoing danger of the insidious Popish menace in England. Andrew Marvell’s (1621-78) *Account of the Growth of Popery, and Arbitrary Government in England* (1677) asserted that the Fire had been the effect of Popish plotting, and the Pope had planned the blaze so as to weaken England.41

In 1679, at the height of the fears over the Popish Plot, the Fire was frequently mentioned. Titus Oates asserted that there had been an active Popish plot to fire London since February 1665. During the fire the plotters had been helped by some Irishmen, using 700 fireballs. They had also employed people to plunder the ruined city.42 The plots revealed by William Bedloe (1650-80) set forth the techniques used by Catholic plotters to start the 1666 Fire. For example, by using fireballs, hiring servants or firing their own houses.43 The tract also explicitly denied the providential view of the Fire (always expressed in loyalist descriptions of the Fire), writing that it had been propagated ‘to make the Ignorant believe it was only the pure Effect of Chance, or Default of a drowsie Negligence’.44 Charles Blount’s *Appeal from the country to the city* urged Londoners not to forget the ongoing danger of Popish plotters firing London, and their
dimensions: 2909.0x4565.0
[Image 0x0 to 2909x4565]
dimensions: 212x3922

44 Ibid., p. 1.
culpability in the blaze of 1666.  

These works made use of the existing preconceptions and fears about Catholics in the English psyche, and their close association with fire. During the crisis, 'Fires were confidently attributed to Papist incendiaries unless clear proof existed to the contrary'. Anti-Catholic sources also made extensive use of the findings of Brooke's report. This report had been published shortly after the Fire, and was also reprinted several times during the Exclusion Crisis, as well as being used as a documentary source for some accounts of the Fire.

These assertions of menacing Popish plots to Fire London in the late 1670s were not merely polemic tools confined to broadsides, but were clearly an important issue in City politics at the time. In 1679, when Sir Thomas Player (d. 1685/6), Chamberlain of the City, and a leading London Whig, led a large body of citizens to meet with the Lord Mayor (Sir James Edwards (d. 1691), who was a Tory Royalist) and expressed the gravity of the Popish menace, he utilised the memory of the Fire, stating, 'it cannot be forgot, That ... this City was Destroyed ... by the Cursed Designs of the Papists, it being

---

47 See, for example: Londons Flames Discovered by Informations Taken before the Committee Appointed to enquire after the Burning of the City of London And after the Insolvency of the Papists, &c. (London, 1667), pp. 1-9; True and Faithful Account of the Several Informations Exhibited To the Honourable Committee, pp. 5-24; London's Flames: Being an Exact and Impartial Account of Divers Informations Given in to the Committee of Parliament (London, 1679), pp. 1-14; A compendious history of the most Remarkable Passages of the last Fourteen Years (London: A. Goodbid & J. Playford, 1680), pp. 3-8.
now out of all Doubt, That they Burnt the City'. 48 Similarly, when a large number of London apprentices addressed a petition to the Lord Mayor in 1681, they emphasized the danger of Popish plots, and presented their petition on the anniversary of the Fire. They also brazenly appropriated the event by claiming Tories had helped to start the blaze. 49 The Fire also played a key role in the scandal over the death of Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey (d. 1679), a justice of the peace who had been knighted and rewarded with plate worth £200 for his role in stopping the Fire. Godfrey’s apparent murder by Popish agents, so claimed by Oates, showed their malice towards him for preventing their plot to destroy London in 1666. 50

These fears of another ‘dismall fire’ in the late 1670s prompted legislation by the Court of Aldermen. In December 1677, it was ordered that the 1667 Act of Common Council to prevent fires be reprinted and sent to each alderman to be read at the wardmote. 51 The next year, it was legislated that ‘in these times of Danger’ a curfew in the City should be enacted, and that all cellar windows should have shutters on them ‘for Prevencon of fire balls being thrown into the said windowes’. 52 This latter point in particular showed how claims made in Brooke’s report about the Catholic use of incendiary devices manifested itself. The report stated that fireballs were thrown through windows but could also be used by putting a ‘Fireball at the end of a long pole, and lighting it with a peice of match,  

49 The Address of above Twenty thousand of the Loyal Protestant Apprentices of London: Humbly presented to the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor, Septemb. 2. 1681 (London: W. Ingol the Elder. 1681).
51 LMA, Rep. 83, fols. 45v-46r.
52 LMA, Rep. 84, fols. 4v-5v. Similar legislation was passed in sixteenth-century France after fears of plots to fire various urban centres. Roberts. ‘Arson, conspiracy and rumour’. 17.
to put it in at a window. Although many sources mentioned the use of these fireballs, none give any description, however brief, of their composition. 'Fireballs' were included in a 1679 military handbook written by a Frenchman called Louis de Gaya, and were made up of a mixture of gunpowder, saltpetre, charcoal powder and camphire that was placed into a 'hollow bullet' and lit with a short fuse.

During the Exclusion Crisis, fears over the possibility of Popish Plots meant that the Fire became an essential polemical tool for those wishing to show the danger of the Catholic presence in England, and prevent the possibility of a Catholic on the throne. The Fire tapped into fears about the loss of 'Liberty and Property', and made Whig attempts to save them more resonant. As London was still in the process of reconstruction, the Fire would have had a particular relevance in the metropolitan context. The memory of the Fire helped to foster belief in the Popish Plot in the popular mind.

The Fire in narrative texts (3): the Great Fire in the eighteenth century

53 London's Flames Discovered, p. 3.
54 L. de Gaya, A Treatise Of The Arms and Engines Of War, Of Fire-works, Ensigns, and Military Instruments, both Ancient and Modern; With the Manner they are at present used, as well in French Armies, as amongst other Nations (London: R. Harford, 1678), p. 62.
56 Kenyon, Popish Plot, p. 13.
In the early eighteenth century, in the midst of fears about the possibility of a Jacobite invasion of England, the memory of the Fire was utilised again to remind readers of the Popish menace. Most of these sources utilised the report of Brooke’s committee. ‘Opposing’ these tracts were sources that took a more providential view of the Fire, and tended to use the account in the *Gazette*.

*London’s Flames Set in a True Light* (1712) included the report of Brooke’s committee, as well as a postscript of a supposed letter found at the Temple detailing a planned French invasion of England. The *Burning of London by the Papists* appeared two years later. Although it did not include Brooke’s report, its influence is clear. The Popish menace was still held to be a threat to the nation by dividing it against itself, ‘They who before set our City on fire, are now as busie to set the Citizens themselves on fire one against another’. The Fire was just one branch of an overall plot, which included killing the king, subverting the government, carrying out a massacre and putting a Catholic on the throne. The Fire could also be utilized by the opposite end of the political spectrum. A 1712 tract called *A Protestant Monument* blamed the Fire on a ‘Whiggish faction’, and implicated the Dutch in the firing of London. It also cleared the Stuarts and Catholics of any blame in the Fire, blaming it on ‘a company of barbarous villains called protestants,

---

*London’s Flames Set in a True Light: Being a True and Faithful Account of the Several Informations exhibited To the Honourable Committee Appointed by the Parliament To Inquire into the late Dreadful Burning of the City of London* (London: J. How, 1712), pp. 7-25, 34.

who, after they had fired the city, did basely (to screen themselves and the Dutch from that odium) cast that most horrid villany on the papists. 59

In 1720, two opposing tracts about the Fire were published: *An account of the Burning the City of London* and *The True Protestant Account of the Burning of London*. The former work included a verbatim copy of the report of the *Gazette*, and the latter included the report of Brooke’s committee. 60 *The True Protestant Account* asserted that all official accounts of the Fire were unreliable, as thousands of eyewitneses saw Popish agents firing London as well as the fact that both Charles and the Duke of York were Catholics. 61 *An account of the Burning the City of London* attempted to combat this viewpoint by suggesting that the Fire was a providential event, or may have even been caused by nonconformist plotters. It included extracts from two contemporary historians; one, Dr White Kennet, Bishop of Peterborough (1660-1728) suggested that Republican plotters may be to blame for the Fire, whilst the other, an extract from a history of England written by Dr Lawrence Eachard (bap. 1672, d. 1730), Archdeacon of Stow, took the view that the Fire was almost certainly an accident caused by the conditions in London at the time, and the anger of God. 62 Eachard’s opinion had provoked a response from the Presbyterian historian and minister, Edmund Calamy (1671-1732), who accused

60 *An account of the Burning the City of London, As it was Publish'd by the Special Authority of the King and Council in the year, 1666. To which is added, The Opinion of Dr Kennet the present Bishop of Peterborough, as Publish'd by his Lordship's Order, and That of Dr Eachard, relating thereunto* (London: J. Stone, 1720), pp. 5-13; *The True Protestant Account of the Burning of London, or, an Antidote, Against the Poison and Malignity of a Late Lying Legend, entituled An Account of the Burning of London, &c* (London: S. Popping, 1720). pp. 15-22.
Eachard of having a 'great tenderness' towards Papists, even though 'they were evidently prov'd the authors and instruments (of the Fire), by a great many depositions that were taken by the order and authority of Parliament in 1667, and afterwards printed'.

Once the Jacobite threat had subsided, and the Fire was no longer in living memory, it seemed it ceased to be used as a polemical trope to make a political point. A 1769 history of London by Gideon Harvey emphasised the providential nature of the Fire, and accepted that the true cause of the Fire was likely to be never known. The Stuarts, the French, the Dutch, Catholics, Jesuits and Republicans had all been blamed in the past but ultimately the author determined that the Fire was probably an accident that had ultimately improved London - 'a more pardonable instance of doing evil that good may come of it, cannot perhaps be produced'.

\[\text{63 E. Calamy, } A \text{ Letter to Mr. Archdeacon Echard, Upon Occasion of his History of England (London: J. Clark, 1718), p. 57.}\]
\[\text{64 G. Harvey, } The \text{ City Remembrancer: being historical narratives of the Great Plague, at London 1665; Great Fire, 1666; and Great Storm, 1703. volume 3: of the Fire and the Storm (London: W. Nicoll, 1769). pp. 1-23, 52-66, 67.}\]
The Fire in verse

The period after the Restoration saw poetry 'assume office'. From the mid 1660s, once the euphoria of the Restoration had dimmed, 'every aspect of public affairs in England was subjected to ... increasingly minute and bitter scrutiny'. By 1666, 'political and social circumstances had produced a situation in which poetry's immediate justification was its capacity to engage in topical issues'. Poems were responsive to events. The representation of the Fire in contemporary verse therefore showed how this process of reflecting current events in verse took place. The interpretation of the causes of events such as the Fire became a contested site of interpretation, and thus was politicised.

This 'contest' is best shown in the differing views of Fire showed by John Milton (1608-74) and John Dryden (1631-1700). For Milton, events such as plague and fire were a 'public penal ceremony' for the sins of the people. Fire was a reflection of God's anger with a sinful nation. Dryden's *Annus Mirabilis* (1667) treated fires 'as heavenly visitations'. However, they were 'brought on the nation by the guilt of Dissenters', amongst other groups. They were not so much judgments as 'trials of endurance' for the nation to show its loyalty. Dryden's work is essentially propaganda, an answer to the

---

69 Ibid., p. 145.
mid-1660s critique of Charles II.\textsuperscript{71}

It was not only sophisticated verse that tackled events like the Fire. In the mid 1660s there was a flood of polemical activity, and ‘all the literary forms, both popular and elite, were responsive to and helped shape and interpret the crises of the mid-1660s’.\textsuperscript{72} Street-level ballads, often of a ‘low level of banality’ co-existed with increasingly sophisticated satires.\textsuperscript{73} Most of the verse accounts of the Fire appear to fall into the former group, exploring the same themes using the same exemplars. Nonetheless, this does also reflect a certain return to conservatism away from the perceived ‘anarchy’ of the 1640s and 50s. G. D. Lord argued that this growing trend stemmed from the influence of Dryden, who established ‘a conservative tradition-orientated consensus as the norm of the new poetry’.\textsuperscript{74} This conservative style, with familiar allusions, emphasised what Royalists wished to be seen as a return to ‘normality’.\textsuperscript{75}

The verse response to the Fire is an important study of how one of the chief modes of media in seventeenth-century England responded to an event of national crisis. It was set in the context of a series of crises, and a growing dissatisfaction with the reign of Charles II, whose rule had initially created an abundance of celebratory material, and had been ‘welcomed by more poems and ballads than any other event of the century’.\textsuperscript{76} This section will explore verse descriptions of fire, and the common features of the medium.

\textsuperscript{71} Wedgwood, Poetry and politics, pp. 138, 143.
\textsuperscript{73} Wedgwood, Poetry and politics, pp. 193, 207.
\textsuperscript{74} Lord, Classical presences in seventeenth-century English poetry, p. 146.
\textsuperscript{75} Trickett, ‘Samuel Butler’, in English poetry and prose, ed. Ricks, p. 312.
\textsuperscript{76} Zwicker, Lines of authority, p. 90: Wedgwood, Poetry and politics, p. 125.
The early modern belief in a judgmental God playing an active part in daily life is evident in verse about the Fire. The anonymous *Londons Destroyer Detected* (1666) saw the Fire as a providential event. The poem called for a return to godliness in London, so it may be a place of praise once more, / And flourish as thou hast done *. The anonymous broadside *The Londoners Lamentation* (1666) stated that the city’s ‘sinful hearts’ were more guilty than the French and Dutch agents suspected of starting the Fire. The elegist John Crouch’s *Londons Second Tears* (1666) made a similar point. Although the Dutch or French may have started the Fire, it was sin that had spread it: ‘Sin was the Common Cause’. Another anonymous poem, *The Citizens Joy* (1667), wrote that ‘God-consuming punisht Her (London) with Fire’, as a result of the sins of the people, in particular the sin of pride. Dryden’s *Annum Mirabilis* stated that God was in control of the Fire, ‘Each element his dread command obeys’. The moderate Puritan minister Simon Ford (1618/19-99), writing in 1667, attributed the Fire to God’s ‘bellows’, which had blown the ‘coals’ of the blaze. The cleric John Allison (1645-83), in *The Late Lamentable Accident* (1667), wrote that the Fire was a form of divine judgement on popular sin. John Tabor’s poem on the Plague and Fire in London, *Seasonable Thoughts in Sad Times* (1667), stated that God had denied all attempts to put out the Fire. This was because the event was His work, brought about because of popular sin, ‘God is

---

80 ‘The Citizens Joy’, in *London in flames*, p. 120.
the Author, and our Sins the Spring'. 84 Samuel Wiseman's 1667 narrative of the progress of the Fire stated that the event was exemplary of 'our angry GOD / Threat' ning poor LONDON with his flaming Rod'. 85 An anonymous poem, written six years after the Fire, stated that God sent the flames to chastise a people who had grown 'lukewarm'. 86 The ejected minister Thomas Gilbert (1613-94) wrote that London had been warned of its sins - 'Thy Prophets were not dumb, but thou wert deaf', and goes on to suggest that if London had been more penitent, the Fire might have been prevented. 87

The Fire was not always viewed as a providential event. The anonymous acrostic poem London’s Fatal-Fall (1666) deemed the Fire to have been an 'accident'. 88 Another anonymous poem, The Burning of London (1667), suggested that the causes of the Fire were ultimately unknowable, although the poem named some likely culprits: Hell, the Dutch, the French or the Pope. 89 The last three suspects in particular, frequently appeared as alternative guilty parties for the Fire. Given the traditional connection between Catholics and fire in the contemporary discourse, 90 it is surprising that the blame is often mitigated by sharing it. Crouch claimed that the Dutch or the French may have started the Fire. 91 The Royalist cleric Abraham Markland (1645-1728) is more certain in pinning the blame on the French, although he does suggest that the Fire may have been

84 J. Tabor, Seasonable Thoughts in Sad Times, Being some Reflections on the Warre, the Pestilence and the Burning of London (London: A. Seil, 1667), p. 35.
90 See, for example, Pyrotechnica Loyolana, Ignatian Fire-works. Or, the Fiery Jesuits Temper and Behaviour (London: G.E.C.T., 1667); Oates, True Narrative of the Horrid Plot, pp. 22-5; Bedloe, Narrative and Impartial Discovery of the Horrid Popish Plot.
‘helped’ by a Dutch ‘east-wind’. 92

Nonconformist poets were more extreme in laying the blame on Papists. The ejected minister Robert Wild (1615/16-79), had no doubts about the causes of the Fire; ‘Incendiary Priests, and subtle spies, / Who when our Londons fiery tryal came, / Like Salamanders feasted in the flame’. 93 This difference in approach was perhaps due to the political leanings of many of the poets. Blaming the French or Catholics undermined the Stuart monarchy. Firstly, it questioned the loyalty of the king’s Catholic brother, and secondly it ignored England’s actual European enemy, the Dutch. As such, Royalist poets may have perhaps side-stepped the issue by making the Fire a providential event caused by the sins of the people (in particular, as a result of the execution of Charles I), or downplaying the role of the Catholics altogether. In comparison, nonconformist poets, fearful of the rise of Catholicism in Europe and at home, chose Papists as the prime causes of the Fire.

In other respects, the verse reaction to the Fire was often strongly Royalist. Many of the poems on the Fire mention the key role played by the Stuarts in stemming the flames. 94 Dryden predictably presented Charles II as London’s pious and heroic saviour. In doing so, he explicitly compared him to other heroic princes, thus creating an idealized vision

---

94 See, for example, Ford, ‘Conflagration of London’, in London in flames. pp. 11-12.
of his kingship, which stood in stark contrast to his human weaknesses.\textsuperscript{95} Ford implored
Charles II, as did many other poets, to aide in London’s reconstruction. ‘Let next Age
add, when they Your Titles sing, / London’s Restorer, to Great Britain’s King’.
\textsuperscript{96}

However, the execution of Charles I remained a greater focus for Royalist-leaning poets.
Perhaps because of Charles II’s obvious weaknesses and growing unpopularity, a more
potent symbol was his ‘martyred’ father. Eulogising Charles I had been an ongoing
process since his execution. Although the numbers of Royalist eulogies may have
declined since the early 1650s, they continued to re-appear, throughout the decade, and
presumably with greater numbers after the Restoration. The typology of Charles I as
‘royal martyr’ was well known by 1666.\textsuperscript{97} Therefore, there are numerous mentions of the
‘martyrdom’ of Charles I, and London’s ‘responsibility’ for this event. Royalists would
have viewed the Fire as ‘punishment’ for the ‘sins’ of regicide and the Commonwealth,\textsuperscript{98}
many of which occurred in London.

The execution, especially after the Restoration, was still of national importance; as Ford’s
\textit{Londons Remains} (1667) asserted: ‘Long-handed are the Ghosts of Kings’.
\textsuperscript{99} Englands \textit{Lamentation} called Charles I, ‘a Royal VICTIME on the stained Floor’, whose death was
partly due to the ‘Factious Spirit’ of London, which also had led to events such as the

\textsuperscript{95} R. W. McHenry, Jr., ‘Dryden and the “Metropolis of Great Britain”’, in \textit{The Restoration Mind}, ed. W. G.
Marshall (Newark, DE & London: University of Delaware Press and Associated University Presses, 1997),
\textsuperscript{96} Ford, ‘Londons Resurrection’, in \textit{London in flames}, p. 137; see also, for example, ‘Citizens Joy’, in
\textsuperscript{97} A. Lacey, ‘Elegies and commemorative verse in honour of Charles the Martyr. 1649-60’, in \textit{The
225-46.
\textsuperscript{98} Smith, ‘“Making fire”’, in \textit{Imagining early modern London}, p. 286.

328
1665 Plague. Crouch's poem on the Fire was more explicit in laying the blame on London's complicity in Charles I's execution - 'Now Loyal London has full Ransome paid / For that Defection the Disloyal made'. Tabor's poem went further, and placed the guilt for the event on the whole nation, 'This Nation cannot but be deep in guilt: / Especially when Royal blood hath been / Profanely shed'. London thus assumed the guilt of the whole of England. The staunchly Royalist Markland blamed the Fire on London's size; the city had risen to such greatness that it was devoured by itself - 'So mighty Empires when too large they grow, / Fall by their strength, o'recome by their Own Power'. Markland saw the Fire as retribution for London's support for Parliament during the Civil War. Just as Charles I was martyred in London, so after the Fire, the destruction of London meant that 'Our very Kingdom is Beheaded Now'.

A commonly held view of fire in general was that it was a purgative. In this vein, Englands Lamentation hoped that the Fire would 'prove a Refining-one / And purge Our Sins'. Vox Civitatis (1666) predicted that even though London would rise again, it still feared for the degeneracy of her 'sons' and their ingratitude to God. However, most of the poems about the Fire viewed that purgative effect as one that would refine the city, and lead to its improvement. The Fire thus became almost viewed as a positive event. This effect did not only apply to people, but also to buildings. Dryden wrote that the Fire 'purged' St Paul's, which had been 'profaned' during the Civil War.

100 Englands Lamentation For the Dismall Conflagration, pp. 6-7.
102 Tabor, Seasonable Thoughts in Sad Times. p. 42.
103 Markland, Poems On His Majestie's Birth and Restauration, pp. 15-16.
104 Englands Lamentation For the Dismall Conflagration, p. 16.
106 McKean, Politics and poetry in Restoration England, p. 64.
Other poets saw the Fire’s purifying force as one which could improve the fabric of the city. The 1666 anonymous poem *London Undone* portrayed the Fire as not so much a tragedy, as an opportunity; ‘When like the Churches you her Streets shall see / Founded, and fronted uniformallie / … Then you’ll conclude with me, the Flames were kind, / She was not so much ruin’d, as refin’d.’ Similarly, an anonymous poem celebrating the election of Sir William Turner as Lord Mayor in 1668 predicted that although the Fire had ‘laid … (London) low’, it would eventually rise higher. The anonymous *Londons Stately New Buildings* (1672) takes a virtually celebratory view of the Fire, stating that the Fire had purged the ‘dross’ of the city. The poem went on to challenge the Catholic powers of Rome or Paris to rebuild their cities as handsomely if they were destroyed. The Rebuilding effort spurred comparisons and rivalry between London and other cities – particularly Paris. Jeremiah Wells’ 1667 poem *On the Rebuilding of London* also predicted that London would be improved after the Fire. The rise of London will echo the re-establishment of the Stuarts. ‘So shall the City thank her cruel fate, / And bless those flames that did their help afford … Glad to be Ruin’d So to be Restord.’ Fire was therefore seen as a purifying force, capable of wiping away sins of the past.

For some poets, an extension of viewing the Fire as punishment for the execution of Charles I was to view it as a positive event, responsible for improving the city and wiping away the past. Ford’s *Londons Resurrection* (1669) predicted that eventually London

---

might even ‘thank her Flames, and count it Prize, / Ev’n so to die, that so she might arise’. George Eliott, writing in 1671, noted that after London’s rapid recovery after the Fire, ‘Europe’s amazed, the Whole World doth admire, / That LONDON which so late was burnt with Fire, / In so short space, should with such splendour rise, / As all the Cities underneath the Skies’. Dryden ultimately viewed the Fire as a positive event - as it had wiped away the sins of the past, and, more importantly, had strengthened the bonds between a prince and his people. Robert McHenry argued that Dryden’s *Annum Mirabilis* suggests that he hoped the new city would become a confident symbol of reasserted royal power, and a means of consolidating it.

Other poems portrayed the Fire as a form of divine mercy. The anonymous *Englands Lamentation* (1666), written from the point of view of the metropolis, stated that during the Fire God actually showed mercy, as he preserved the Tower of London (packed with gunpowder in the royal armoury) from being fired; ‘GOD gratiously preserv’d my choycest Tow’r’. Similarly, *Londoners Lamentation* ended by thanking divine mercy that the Fire did not spread to Whitehall or any of the other suburbs.

Verse accounts of the Fire also focussed on the chaos in the streets during the blaze. There was certainly a press to get goods and possessions out of harm’s way. Samuel Pepys recorded in his diary on 2 September 1666, ‘The streets full of nothing but people

---

115 *Englands Lamentation For the Dismall Conflagration Of her Imperial Chamber the Citie of London: Sept. 2d MDCLXVI* (York: F. Francis Mawbarne, 1666), p. 12.
and horses and carts loaden with goods, ready to run over one another'. A popular theme in discussing the immediate reaction to the Fire seems to have been the rates charged by carters. Londoners Lamentation commented that the hire of a cart cost £30, and in the midst of the disaster each man looked ‘to his own’. Similarly, Tabor railed against the ‘excessive’ rates charged by carters. This contrasted with a 1675 poem about a fire in Northampton, which stated that ‘A joyn-concern engaged all the Town, / ... Fire ... makes every house our own’. In comparison, Great Britains Glory (1672), mentioned the ‘rude sort’ who stole people’s goods during the chaos of the Fire. However, there is little mention of such looting in any source contemporary to the Fire.

Verse accounts of fire frequently included some biblical or historical allusions to past societies that had suffered disaster. Sodom and Gomorrah appear to be the most common biblical exemplars employed. Both Joseph Guillim, of Brasenose College Oxford, writing in 1667, and Tabor compared London to the two biblical cities. Allusions to the ancient world were also significant – the Fire was frequently viewed through the lens of ‘classical precedent’. Dryden was keen to emphasise the links between Charles II and his brother to the heroic prince Aeneas. Guillim compared the ruins of London to those of ancient Rome, partly to emphasise London’s place as a latter day Rome, with

---

117 Pepys, Diary, ed. Latham and Matthews, vii, 270.
121 J. Guillim, ‘The Dreadful Burning’ in London in flames, p. 35; Tabor, Seasonable Thoughts in Sad Times, p. 28.
122 J. Monteyne, The printed image in early modern London: urban space, visual representation, and social exchange (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 120.
matching imperial aspirations. Londons Fatal-Fall likened the city to Troy, whose fires were caused by rape and sin. The poem warned that London itself had too many ‘Helens’, aggravating the city’s guilt. Tabor also compared London to Troy. One poem harked back to London’s medieval past. The playwright Elkanah Settle (1648-1724), in his Elegie On the late Fire And Ruines of London (1667), noted that London had also been ruined by fire during the reign of William I (r. 1066-87), but had managed to recover. Settle was probably referring to another ‘Great Fire’ that occurred in 1087. However, he was almost spoiled for choice in choosing a fire from London’s past - serious fires were commonplace throughout the city’s history.

The verse reaction to the Great Fire showed how strong the providential view of the event was. Even an overtly secular form (albeit sometimes written by clergy) of media almost always views the Fire as created by a vengeful God. The verse reaction does appear to be more strongly loyal to the Stuart dynasty than the sermon reaction, for example. The Fire became punishment for the sins of England, and in particular London, during the years of Civil War and Commonwealth. The Fire does not purge London of the sins of the people, but of the sins of the past, creating a new symbol of a strong restored monarchy.


333
The memorialisation of the Great Fire in London’s built environment

Just as livery companies and parish churches used monuments and memorials to create what Ian Archer called ‘theatres of memory’ to create exemplars to posterity,127 so there were several commemorations of the Fire in London’s built environment. However, what they symbolised and how they commemorated the Fire varied. The most visible symbol of the memorialisation of the Fire in London was the Monument. Ordered to be constructed by the Rebuilding Act, it was a large Wren-designed column completed in 1677, near to the place where the Fire began. Such memorialisation was not unique to London. For example, in Chicago, to mark their Great Fire of 1871, a 30 foot high sculpture of bronze flames designed by Egon Weiner (1906-89) was erected in 1961.

Before the Monument was completed, the construction had already drawn public attention. In 1676, the Court of Aldermen ordered workmen to stop letting visitors in to view the site, as they were delaying construction.128 Early views on the Monument were mixed. For example, London’s Index (1676) stated that the Monument was ‘London’s Standard, and proclaims / Vict’ry ore the fiercest flames’.129 However, not all reactions were positive. An anonymous 1679 poem viewed the Monument as an aberration, ‘what mad Frenzy set your Zeal on fire, / (Grave Citizens!) to Rise Immortal Spire / On Sea-coal Basis? … What the Coals build, the Ashes bury!’.130 The poem depicted the

---

128 LMA, Rep. 81, fol. 268r.
Monument as a ‘white elephant’, a showy edifice instead of a real sense of penitence: 'Ah fools! to dress a Monument of woe / In whistling Silks, that should in Sackcloth, go'.

The Monument was mentioned in sermons. Robert Scott, in a sermon for the 1700 Edinburgh fire, mentioned the good example set by London in erecting the Monument, which reminded people of the disaster and to pray that it would not be repeated, ‘by ... the frequent passing of many thousands that way, incessant Prayers are made, that they may not be again reduced to ... Misery’. The Monument was not always so lauded. William Hopkins (1647-1700), in his 1683 sermon on the fast day for the Fire, called it an ‘outward symbol’ and argued that London had remained sinful, and ‘this solemn Anniversary ... is dwindled into almost nothing, saving ... this Great Appearance’.

At first, the Monument itself was not especially politically charged. Charles II appeared on the bas relief on the west plinth of the Monument, dressed in Roman garb, commanding the relief of the city. His brother also appears on the relief. The royal cipher is inscribed on the urn on top of the column. However, Wren’s plan to top the Monument with a statue of Charles never materialised and the personification of the Duke of York is not explicit – he could also represent Mars or Victory. Thus the Monument could not be seen as highly Royalist. The Latin inscription on the north plinth

---

131 Ibid., p. 1.
of the base did not blame the Fire on any particular group. Rather, it described the Fire as being part of God’s will.

However, in the midst of the Popish Plot the Monument became more politically charged and contested. In particular, Whigs utilised the Monument. In November 1677 a crowd burnt an effigy of the Pope near the column. In 1679, Charles Blount’s *Appeal from the country to the city* urged Londoners to go to the top of the Monument and look over the rebuilt city, and imagine the consequences of Popish tyranny on London. Joseph Monteyne showed how this tract became the template for a print by Benjamin Harris (c. 1647–1720) called *A Scheme of Popish cruelties* (1681) that displayed the disasters that would occur if the Popish threat was not met. The Monument, positioned on the left of the print overlooking a series of tableaux of Popish atrocities starting with the firing of London, provided a ‘symbolic and explanatory grounding’ for this foresight into disaster – its height allowing increased clarity of vision to truly imagine the Popish threat.

The ultimate re-appropriation of the Monument occurred in 1680 when the Whig Lord Mayor Sir Patience Ward ordered a new inscription ‘to be affixed on the Monument ... signifying that the City of London was burnt & consumed with fire by the treachery & malice of the papists in September in the yeare of our Lord 1666’. The new inscriptions were added in June 1681. Added to the Latin inscription was the line:

---

134 The inscription was written by Dr Gale of St Paul’s School in consultation with Wren and Hooke, he received the commission from the Court of Aldermen on 4 October 1677 and was rewarded a plate worth 10 guineas for his work. LMA, Rep. 82, fol. 269v, 291r
138 LMA, Jour. 49, fol. 156v.
'Popish frenzy, which wrought such horrors, is not yet quenched'. Also added was an English inscription stating: 'This Pillar was sett up in Perpetuall Remembrance of that most Dreadfull Burning of this Protestant City Begun and Carried on by the Treachery and Malice of the Papists ... in order to the carrying on their Horrid Plott; For Extirpating the Protestant Religion, and old English Liberty and Introducing Popery and Slavery'. As this inscription was in English, rather than Latin, and so would have been legible to far more people than the original text. It both blamed the Fire on Catholics and also sought to remind the reader that the threat still existed. Although this plaque was removed during the reign of James II it remained there, unaltered, until 1830. Even in the early eighteenth century, the Monument continued to be used as a symbol of the Popish menace. For example, a 1720 tract urged its readers to remember the inscription on the Monument and 'let the Remembrance of SIXTY SIX be Engraven in ... on the Hearts of Posterity, to make them abhor POPERY'. The highly visible Monument could not remain 'neutral' in its memorialisation of the Fire, given its site on one of London's major thoroughfares it was too great a tool not to be utilised.

There were three other memorials to the Fire in London's built environment. The site of the house in Pudding Lane where the Fire began appears to have initially been viewed as a monument in itself in the years after the Fire. The City Lands Committee Papers recorded that at first nothing was built on the ground 'upon a supposicon that it ought perpetually to ly wast'. However, upon a petition in 1676, and after examining the

139 LMA, Jour. 49, fol. 224r.
140 Dolan, 'Ashes and “the archive”', 379-408.
142 LMA, Court of Common Council: City Lands Committee Papers, COI/CC/CLC/04/001, 208a.
Rebuilding Act, the committee decided there was actually no reason why the land should not be built upon. The site was declared to be worth £5 per annum, and the petitioner, Mr Henry Freeman, was allowed to build on it.\textsuperscript{143} Clearly, the considerations of rebuilding the city were paramount. In 1681, an inscription was placed on the house, stating, 'Here by the Permission of Heaven, Hell broke loose upon this Protestant City from the malicious hearts of barbarous Papists, by the hand of their Agent Hubert'.\textsuperscript{144} Like the Monument, the house on Pudding Lane was appropriated by the Whigs for polemical ends.

The two other memorials seem to have attracted less controversy. On the south pediment of St Paul's is an engraving of a phoenix with 'RESURGAM' written underneath it. The engraving is a metaphor of the rising of London from the ruins.\textsuperscript{145} A more light-hearted memorial to the Fire is a small statue of a fat boy known as The Glutton erected in the late seventeenth century, near to Pie Corner, where the last flames of the Fire were meant to have died out. The inscription ascribes gluttony as the cause of the Fire. However, as the statue was placed on the corner of a tavern in an area of London well known for leisure and recreation, it is probably meant ironically.\textsuperscript{146} Indeed, it may have been an advertisement for an inn or cooks' shop on the site. Given London’s rise to global economic pre-eminence after the Fire, it is fitting that the oldest unchanged memorial to the Fire in the city was probably part of a commercial enterprise. It also hinted at a third,

\textsuperscript{143} It was probable that this individual was already resident in Pudding Lane when he made this petition: the 1675 City Hearth Tax records a Henry Freeman on Pudding Lane in a house assessed at 5 hearths. TNA, 1675 Hearth Tax, City of London, E179/252/23, fol. 104r.
\textsuperscript{144} LMA, Jour. 49, fol. 224r.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., pp. 147-8.
non-politicised, popular memorialisation of the Fire, which was not recorded in contemporary media.

**Summary of conclusions**

One of the most significant long-term effects of the Fire was its frequent reappearance in numerous texts, tracts, poems and monuments for nearly a century. The majority of these attempted to use the Fire to make polemical points – mostly either stressing the malign, Catholic, origins of the Fire or its strictly providential nature. There was never one, single, perception of the Great Fire. Rather, it provoked a multiplicity of reactions – ranging from recriminatory warnings to positive views of a potentially magnificent rebuilt London. The Monument, a classical column decorated with Royal symbols and Providential explanations as well as explicit accusations of Catholic plotting perhaps best displays the duality of how the Great Fire was memorialised in later seventeenth century England. The entire range of the political spectrum attempted to appropriate the Great Fire by playing on existing conceptions of the phenomenon.
Chapter 6: The Great Fire and religion in the later seventeenth century and beyond

The previous chapter explored the popular and cultural reaction to the Great Fire. This chapter will examine the perception of the Fire in the religious context, and how this may have changed over time and ideological perspective. Fire was an important symbol of divine wrath. The Old Testament had made it clear that God was willing to use fiery disaster to punish sinful people and nations and move them to live more godly lives. In religious reasoning, 'disasters are usually aimed at a group of people when their moral condition is at stake'.1 Fire would be there at the End of Days, when the material world would be consumed.

This chapter will examine how the Fire was described in sermons to show how religious figures explained the Fire. It will also consider sermons given before the Fire, as well as sermons given for other fires, in order to determine what, if any, were the differences in how the Fire was explained, and how these explanations may have changed over time. This section will also examine some diaries by religious figures, as well as some other religious writings in order to gain a sense of how the Fire was understood across the denominational spectrum.

The Fire in sermons

The sermon was one of the chief modes of media in early modern England. It was not just heard from the pulpit. Printed sermons were read, collected and used as a guide to personal piety. They were typically sold in simple, unbound octavo pamphlets retailing at between two and four pence. Around 24,000 sermons were printed in England between 1660 and 1783. The majority of these texts were derived from the preacher himself, who produced written copy from his notes, which he sent to the printer. Many of these were augmented for the public; carefully polished with references and an epistle dedicatory to a patron. Sermon texts could also be derived from a copy ‘pirated’ by a listener or directly edited by the printer from the preacher’s notes. For nonconformists in particular, the sermon was a key vehicle of socialisation as well as an essential part of their spiritual life. Public events were frequently mentioned in sermons, especially providential disasters such as fires. The early modern disaster sermon was an important part of the psychological recovery from trauma - the tragedy ‘could only be overcome if it could be explained’.

The English Protestant clergy interpreted their world through a Scriptural matrix, and it

---

was Scripture which formed the basis of the clerical ‘explanation’ of disaster. Moral
deviation from godly ideals was treated as a repetition of Jewish lapses in idolatry, and
so was shown to deserve divine punishment.6 Sermons for fast days in particular were
frequently used by preachers as an occasion to rally against the sins of an undeserving
people by listing the sins that had led to disaster. However, it also admonished them to
repent, and reminded them of the actions of the God of the Old Testament against sinful
communities. The sermon both consoled and urged listeners to repent for their sins.7

In this section, 54 sermons from 1615 to 1770 were examined. They were selected using
a search on the Early English Books Online catalogue on all sermons either on the subject
of fire, or with ‘fire’ in the title.

Table 6.1: Time period and subject of sermons examined

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>On Great Fire</th>
<th>On another Fire</th>
<th>On other subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Great Fire</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Fire</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living Memory of Great Fire (1667-1716)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-1716</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: EEBO catalogue

The majority (43) of the sermons were given in London. Thirty-five of the sermons were
delivered by Anglican clergy, the rest by nonconformists. The majority of the sermons in

---

the sample were given in the context of the official fast day for the Fire, which had been set by royal decree as a perpetual memorial of the Fire. These sermons appear to have been given by clergy of the established church. Sermons memorialising the Fire given by nonconformist ministers do survive, but all date from the early eighteenth century.

The vast majority (around 90 per cent) of the sermons examined viewed fire as the representation of the wrath of God against the sins of the people. This is consistent with John Spurr’s assertion that ‘Anglican preachers dwelt in morbid detail upon the ‘controversy’ between a wrathful God and an incorrigible nation’. Anglican clerics frequently stressed the notion that national sins brought national judgments, and their interpretation of the Fire was no different. This occurred across all ideological stances. The strongly puritan Samuel Ward (1577-1640) called God in 1615 ‘a consuming fire ... hating lukewarmness; not onely destroying Sodom with fire and brimstone ... but awakening also his drowzie servants’. Nearly a century later the dissenting minister Matthew Henry (1662-1714) told his congregation in 1713 that ‘God had made London as a fiery Oven in the Day of his Wrath, and the Flames went on like a mighty Army’.

Anglican preachers had similar views. In a sermon to the House of Lords on 10 October 1666 Seth Ward (1617-89), at the time Bishop of Exeter, asserted that, ‘The breath of the

---

9 S. Ward, A Coal From The Altar, To Kindle The holy fire of Zeale. In a Sermon preached at a generall isitation at Ipswich (London; S. Macham, 1615), pp. 53-4.
Lord kindled the fire, he rode upon Cherub … He made the winds his Messengers, and the flames of fire his Ministers. Similarly, in a sermon to the House of Commons directly after the Fire Edward Stillingfleet noted that great fires represented ‘the kindling of his (God’s) wrath against us’. Nathaniel Hardy (1619-70), vicar of St Martin-in-the-Fields, in a sermon just after the Great Fire stated that ‘this Fire which hath laid waste so many beautiful Churches, goodly Fabricks and Houses … (was) the fire of God, a fire of his sending’. The staunchly loyalist Benjamin Calamy (1646-85/6), curate of St Mary Aldermanbury, took a line similar to the non-conformist ministers above, stating in a 1684 sermon, ‘it is necessary that God should manifest his Power and Displeasure, by some remarkable Punishments, inflicted on Places generally infamous for their Ingratitude towards, and horrid Contempt of his Divine Majesty’. Such views continued into the mid eighteenth century. Angel Chauncy, on the 1747 fast day for the Fire noted ‘All the most terrible things … are brought upon wicked Men by the Hand of God’, and William Meades, in his 1750 sermon for the same event stated that the Fire was ‘kindled by Divine Permission, and through Divine Displeasure’.

These textual similarities between nonconformist and Anglican clergy were

---

commonplace across all subjects. F. Deconinck-Brossard’s comparison between the attitudes of Anglican and non-conformist sermons showed their similarities. ‘They found their inspirations in the same books, appealed to the same examples and even the same quotations’.16 All preachers viewed their world providentially and saw God’s hand active in everything. Thus, the vast majority concluded that any catastrophe in a sinful world would be regarded as symbolic of God’s wrath against the transgressions of the people. Just as it was the will of God that fires should start, so it was down to divine providence when fires were prevented. On a thanksgiving sermon for the twentieth anniversary of the Gunpowder Plot, the godly minister Theodore Hering proclaimed: ‘if the Lord had not beene with us, that fire had beene kindled, and wee all has perished in that flame’.17 Likewise, the moderate Presbyterian Edward Reynolds (1599-1676), in a 1657 thanksgiving sermon for London’s preservation from disaster, noted that the fact that there had been no fires in London was ‘an evident demonstration of Gods watching over such a City, and being himself a wall of fire about it, and giving his Ministers, who are a flame of fire, a special charge over it, that other fires do not break out in it.’18 Prayer was also believed to be capable of preventing fires. The moderate Presbyterian Thomas Horton (d. 1673), preaching on a 1656 day of thanksgiving for the health and safety of London, attributed the decline of fires in the city to the fact that ‘God hath grateiously quench’t and extinguish these flames amongst us, and he hath done it also as a

A common assertion was that fire was a ‘good servant’, but a ‘cruel master’ - this occurred in five sermons. William Sancroft (1617-93), later Archbishop of Canterbury, in a sermon before Charles II on 10 October 1666 argued that God gave humanity fire as a servant, but man had ‘degraded (it)... to the meanest Offices, to the Drudgery of the Kitchen, and labour of the Furnace’. Reversing this, God had made fire a ‘Tyrannical Master’ of men during the Fire ‘when he escaped from all your Restraints, mockt all your Resistance, scorn’d the Limits, you would have set him’. Likewise Malachi Blake (1687-1760), minister of Blandford Forum, stated in 1735 that ‘Fire and Water become raging and destructive, if such be their Commission from the eternal God’. This language of the reversal of the usual conditions of the material world is strongly apocalyptic and millenarian. The Independent Thomas Gibbons (1720-85), preaching after a fire in London in 1748, stated - ‘God can turn our most desirable Comforts into the sorest Evils’. There seems to be no correlation between employing this simile and the ideological stance of the preacher, or the time or occasion of the sermon.

22 Blake, Brief Account Of The Dreadful Fire At Blandford-Forum, p. 38.
Fire was used eleven times as an occasion to warn of the vanity of material goods. William Sherlock (1639/40-1707), Dean of St Paul's Cathedral, reflected in his 1699 sermon on the fast day for the Fire that it had taught the uncertainty of all material things. Likewise, on the 1682 fast day for the Fire, the popular preacher Henry Hesketh (1636/7-1710?) argued that the event showed 'how fugitive and uncertain' the material world was. Similarly, Benjamin Ibbot (1680-1725), rector of St Vedast-alias-Foster and St Michael-le-Quern, argued in 1711 that people should not place their happiness in earthly things, as 'the World ... which is the Support of these Things ... is it self hastening to a Dissolution'. Henry Parker, the rector of St Michael Crooked Lane, stated on the 1727 fast day that God sent disasters to warn humanity not to overvalue material possessions.

Nonconformist sermons shared similar viewpoints. The moderate puritan William Whately (1583-1639), vicar of Banbury, in a sermon after a fire there in 1630 reminded his congregation that they had a store in 'celestial habitations', which cannot be taken away by fire, unlike earthly goods. The Presbyterian minister John Evans (1679/80-1730), preaching after a 1715 fire in Thames Street, argued that the event had showed the vanity of earthly things. Philip Doddridge (1702-51), minister of Northampton, in a 1738 sermon on the occasion of a fire in nearby Wellingborough, stated that the event showed 'the Vanity of worldly Possessions, and the superior Value of spiritual and

24 H. Hesketh, A Sermon Preached before the Right Honourable The Lord Mayor And Aldermen Of The City of London At Bow Church, September the 2d. 1682 (London: R. Sollers, 1682), p. 10.
26 H. Parker. The Original of Publick Calamities. A Sermon Preach'd before the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Several Livery Companies of the City of London. At the Cathedral of St. Paul, on Saturday, September the 2d, 1727 (London: W. Meadows, 1727), pp. 23-4.
eternal Blessings'. Another dissenter, Gibbons, urged his congregation to ‘turn off our Eyes and Hearts from this empty delusive Scene, and fix them upon the incomparable Excellency, and unchangeable Perpetuity of the World above’.

The temporal nature of earthly cities was also reflected on. Charles Mason (1616/17-1677/8), rector of St Peter-le-Poer, stated in 1676 that, unlike Heaven, cities on earth had no certain foundation. The moral reformer Josiah Woodward (1657-1712), in the 1706 sermon on the fast day for the Fire stated that the only perpetual city was the new Jerusalem. The vanity of earthly things was not mentioned in any sermons given in the decade after the Fire. However, they were more frequently mentioned (in London at least) by the last quarter of the seventeenth century, when the city’s growth was rapidly accelerating. Fire was used as an occasion to prevail upon congregations the need for spiritual reformation.

The theme of urban apocalyptic destruction by a cataclysmic fire was well known across English Protestant culture. The Final Judgment was alluded to ten times in the sermons examined. On all of these occasions the sermon is either directly after a fire, or on a fast day for a fire. Once again, neither established nor nonconformist clergy held a clear monopoly on apocalyptic language. Although strongly associated with resistance to

29 Gibbons, Divine Improvement of desolating Judgments, p. 37.
30 C. Mason, The Day of the Lord; Or, A Caution to the City of London after the many Dreadful Fires. Preached before the Right Honourable The Lord Mayor, And the Citizens of London At Bow-Church July the 9th. 1676 (London: J. Williams & B. Teuke, 1676), p. 17; J. Woodward, A Sermon Preach’d before the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor And Aldermen Of the City of London, At the Cathedral of St. Paul’s. On Monday the Second of September, 1706 (London: J. Downing, 1706), p. 17.
Charles I, Royalists increasingly utilised this language after the Restoration.\textsuperscript{32} Seth Ward stated the Fire called to mind the day when everyone would be judged.\textsuperscript{33} Five sermons on the fast day for the Fire mentioned the End of Days. Christopher Flower, rector of St Margaret Lothbury, preaching on the 1669 fast day, stated that on the Last Day, Jesus’ eyes will be like a ‘Flame of Fire, that is, agile, nimble, and able to penetrate any thing’.\textsuperscript{34} Mason, in 1676, stated that ‘in all ages’, God had shown man some semblance of the Last Fire. However, these earthly flames could not compare to the Last Fire, when ‘the whole Globe shall be a sacrifice to Divine Justice by Fire’. Similarly, Hesketh in 1679 called the Fire a prelude of God’s ‘great Appearance in Wrath, and of the final Conflagration’. In 1697 Samuel Pratt (1658-1723), the chaplain to Prince William, Duke of Gloucester (1689-1700), told his audience that London would eventually undergo another conflagration, when nothing would remain.\textsuperscript{35} Paul Lorrain (d. 1719), chaplain of Newgate (and formerly secretary to Samuel Pepys), in a 1707 sermon, stated that sin would only end on the Last Day - ‘It is reserv’d to be finally destroy’d in the World by that Universal Fire’.\textsuperscript{36} Ibbot in 1711 stated that although the Great Fire was dreadful, ‘how much more terrible and dreadful will that Day be, when not only this City, but all the Cities of the World, and the World it self shall be burnt up’.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{33} Ward, \textit{A Sermon Preached before the Peers}, pp. 2-3.
\textsuperscript{34} C. Flower, \textit{Mercy In the midst of Judgment, with A Glympse of Or A Glance on London’s Glorious Resurrection, Like a Phoenix out of it’s Ashes} (London: N. Brooke, 1669), p. 13.
\textsuperscript{35} S. Pratt, \textit{A Sermon preach’d before the Right Honourable the Lord-Mayor, the Aldermen and Citizens of London, At St. Mary le Bow On Thursday, Sept. 2. 1697} (London: S. Lowndes, 1698), p. 27.
\textsuperscript{36} P. Lorrain, \textit{A Sermon Preach’d in the Morning at St Dunstan’s in the West; and in the Afternoon (with Some Variations) at Newgate, on the Second Day of September, 1707} (London: B. Bragg, 1707), p. 8.
\textsuperscript{37} Mason, \textit{Day of the Lord}, p. 11; H. Hesketh, \textit{A Sermon Preached before the Right Honorable The Lord Mayor and Aldermen of London: At Guild-Hall Chappel Upon the Second of September, 1679} (London: W. Leach, 1679), p. 8; Ibbot, \textit{Dissolution of this World by Fire}, p. 15.
In 1713, the dissenting minister Matthew Henry used the example of the Fire to show how much more dreadful Judgment Day would be, when Jesus will be revealed in 'the flaming Fire, the Fire that will devour before him; he will come with an innumerable Company of Angels, and each one of those Spirits is a Flame of Fire'.

Similarly, another London-based minister, Gibbons, called fire a 'premonition' of the last judgment, when Jesus shall 'pour from his Throne a Flood of Fire, by whose inextinguishable, insufferable, and overwhelming Fury, not only Streets, Towns, Cities, and Countries, but the whole Globe shall be set on Fire, and become one general Heap and Wreck of burning Destruction'.

Robert Scott, in his sermon for the 1700 Edinburgh fire, deemed that temporal fire was a small example of when God will give 'Commission to the pure Element (fire), by which he shall burn up the Earth and the Works thereof, at the final Overthrow of the World'.

Doddridge reminded his congregation that God will kindle a far fiercer fire, when 'all the Beauties of Nature and Art shall be sunk into Rubbish and Chaos'.

Fires were used to remind congregations of the coming of the ultimate judgment, and thus acted as an imperative towards personal reformation.

Hellfire was mentioned in twelve sermons (although four of these sermons are specifically about Hell). The sermons on Hell all emphasised the difference between Hellfire and earthly fire. ‘N.B.s’ 1649 sermon asserts that the fires of Hell are ‘such a terrible fire, as this with us (i.e. earthly fire) scarce warme in comparison of that’.

---

38 Henry, Memorial of the Fire of the Lord, p. 29.
39 Gibbons, Divine Improvement of desolating Judgments, p. 18.
40 R. Scott, A Sermon Upon Occasion of the late Dreadful Fire, which happened at Edinburgh the Third of February 1700 (Edinburgh, 1701), p. 8.
41 Doddridge, Sermon Preached at Wellingborough, p. 34.
1655, the non-conformist pastor of Norwich, Timothy Armitage (d. 1655), stated that only in Hell were light and heat were separated from fire.\textsuperscript{43} Similarly in 1659, the ejected minister Richard Adams (1626/7-98) stated that although 'fire is the most furious of all Elements ... this ... fire (Hellfire), hotter than Elementary or culinary fire, importing the torments to be of a more violent nature than any other'.\textsuperscript{44} William Dawes (1671-1724), a royal chaplain, clearly delineated the differences between Hellfire and earthly fire, 'how fit soever fire may be to purge material things ... yet it is evident that it can have no cleansing quality for Souls, immaterial Substances, whose dross and filth ... can be reach'd and separated thence by no other Fire, but that of the Holy Spirit'.\textsuperscript{45}

Contemporary writing on Hell also reflected this delineation between fires on Earth and fires in Hell. For example, the moderate puritan minister Robert Bolton (1572-1631) wrote that the difference between material fire and Hellfire was 'one was created for comfort; the other purposely to torment'.\textsuperscript{46} Robert Elborough, vicar of St Lawrence Pountney, also made the difference between earthly and Hellfire clear when he reminded his listeners to repent in a sermon given just after the Great Fire - 'though our houses be destroyed by Fire on earth, our souls may not be destroyed by Fire in Hell'. Robert Scott's sermon after the Edinburgh fire made a similar point - that it is a mercy that God sends a temporal fire to awaken men from sin rather than suffer them to eternal burnings.


\textsuperscript{46}R. Bolton, \textit{Mr Bolton's Last And Learned Worke of the Four last Things, Death, Judgement, Hell and Heaven} (London: E.B., 1632), p. 100.
in Hellfire. William Parker (1714-1802), vicar of St Katherine Cree, made a similar point in a sermon on the 1748 fast day for the Great Fire. Gibbons' 1748 sermon stated that the blaze was an 'emblem of Hell', and ruminates on the question that 'If Fires on Earth, short temporary Fires, are so dismal, what must be infernal and inextinguishable Flames?'

Hellfire, despite its dreadfulness, was still part of God's plan for sinful man. William Foxon's 1649 sermon on Hell asserted that Hellfire is so dreadful because it is at one with, and created by, God, 'he is All in Hell, that namely is Fire and Brimstone, which is nothing else but torment'. Sancroft's 1666 sermon stated that God would remain eternally, and He had 'a fire that is not quenched: The Babylonian Furnace'. This divine commission of Hell further emphasises its difference to earthly fire used by man, which could be controlled (most of the time), and the fires of Hell, which could not be regulated. Fires were used to dwell on the ultimate punishment for a failure to heed God's word.

Fire was not always described in negative terms. Three sermons associate fire with holy qualities. Horton, alluding to Hebrews 11.34, compared prayer to fire, stating, 'Faith,

---

48 Gibbons, Divine Improvement of desolating Judgments represented, pp. 20-1. 22.
50 Sancroft, Lex Ignea. p. 36.
whereof Prayer is the flame, it hath quenched the violence of fire'.

Samuel Ward described zeal as a 'heavenly fire', which God caused to descend from Heaven so that it might cause 'Sacrifices to ascend thither again'. Just as providential flames are a divine punishment, the flames of holy zeal are a divine gift, God baptised man 'with fire: hee breath on us, and inspire into us the spirit of life and power'. Another godly minister, Benjamin Pikering, a member of the Assembly of Divines, described zeal as kindled from divine fire.

Conversely, fire can also be associated with ungodliness. Hardy's 1656 sermon on the anniversary of a fire in Barking compared fire to the 'rage in the minds of the ungodly' - they are both insatiable and go on as long as there is fuel.

The possible positive benefits of fire were dwelt upon. In this case, the sermons urged their listeners to use fires as an occasion to purge their lives of sin and purify themselves. Fire thus could have a potential positive effect. Pikering's 1644 sermon compared the Godly elect to the 'Choice gold' that would endure the purging fire that separates all heterogeneous things; 'the wicked of the earth as dross from the godly'. Hardy, preaching after the Fire, urged his listeners to use the event as a chance to purge themselves of sin: 'let the heat of that flame not only thaw our frozen hearts into tears of godly sorrow, but melt away the dross of our corruption; that the Fire which was consuming to our Houses, may be as a Refiners fire unto our lives.'

---

51 Horton, Safety of Jerusalem, p. 35.
52 Ward, A Coal From The Altar, To Kindle The holy fire of Zeale, pp. 1, 9, 81.
53 Pikering, A Firebrand Pluckt Out Of The Burning, p. 18.
54 N. Hardy, Safety In The Midst Of Danger: A Sermon Preached in the Church of Allhallowes Barkin, Jan. 4. 1655. Upon the Anniversary Comemoration of that dismall Fire which happened in the said Parish, on Jan. 4. 1649 (London: J. Clark, 1656), p. 16.
55 Pikering, A Firebrand Pluckt Out Of The Burning, pp. 16, 5-6.
56 Hardy, Lamentation, Mourning and Woe, p. 31.
urged his congregation ‘lose the dross only of our sins, not the gold of our patience’. Doddridge, in his 1738 sermon, made a similar point, that ‘the Dross of Sin may be purged’ by the example of the recent fire. William Gearing, the rector of Christchurch. Surrey, on the fast day for the Fire in 1688 stated that ‘Fire cleaneth, purgeth, and getteth out the dross’, and reminded his congregation that men can glorify God by losing their sins after a fire. On the 1730 fast day, John Banson, the vicar of St Bartholomew the Less, stated that the Fire had been a means to purify the people of London. Likewise, Gibbons reflected in 1748, ‘This would be an useful Fire indeed did it thus strengthen, enliven, and purify our Devotions.’ William Cokayne, in his 1753 sermon on the fast day for the Great Fire argued that the purpose of divine fire was to ‘cleanse and purify (a nation) from that State of Guilt and Corruption into which it had lapsed’.

According to most sermons, the positive purgative effects of fire were not felt. Hesketh, in his 1679 sermon on the fast day for the Fire compared the sins of the people to dross, which God was forced to refine with fire - ‘if our City was made a fiery Oven, it was because we had contracted Dross, from which we needed a refining’. However, in his 1682 sermon for the same event, he reflected that the Fire had not achieved its aim of purging the sins of the people - ‘we came all Chark and Cinder out of this Furnace,

57 Flower, Mercy In the midst of Judgment, p. 25.
58 Doddridge, Sermon Preached at Wellingborough, p. 19.
60 J. Banson, The Designs of God’s Visitations. A Sermon Preached Before The Right Honourable the Lord-Mayor and the Court of Aldermen, at the Cathedral-Church of S. Paul; On Wednesday, September 2. 1730 (London: G. James, 1730), p. 4.
instead of purified Ore'.  

William Hopkins (1647-1700), curate of Mortlake, made a similar reflection in his 1683 sermon on the fast day for the Fire, ‘We have passed through the Fire, but are not purified’. The physical properties of material fire are thus transmuted into the spiritual life of the congregation, as a reminder to desist from sin.

Fires acted as a trial for the godly. This discourse would have had added resonance in the minds of early modern listeners from the widespread awareness of the fiery end of the Protestant martyrs from the reign of Mary I. Hering said that the beleaguered Protestant churches in Bohemia, France and the Palatinate were ‘in the furnace’. The preface of Armitage’s sermon noted: ‘it hath been the Lot ... of the Saints ... in all Ages ... to meet with ... Fiery Tryals’. David Stokes, a fellow of Eton, in a sermon there on 10 October 1666 called the Great Fire ‘a fiery triall, to see whether ... you are apt to admit large charitable thoughts’. Fires thus acted as an occasion for people to reform through the rebuilding of their lives and communities in a more godly fashion.

The physical properties of earthly fire were only reflected upon in a handful of sermons. Hardy, preaching in 1656 on the Burning Bush, discussed the flammability of various materials, noting that wood, especially bushes, was most susceptible to burning and far more easily consumed than stone, brass or brick. He went on to mention St Austin’s

---

63 Hesketh, Sermon Preached before the Right Honorable The Lord Mayor ... 1679, p. 14; Hesketh, Sermon Preached before the Right Honourable The Lord Mayor ... 1682 (London: R. Sollers, 1682), p. 22.
65 Hering, Triumph Of The Church Over Water and Fire, p. 23.
66 Armitage, Son Of God Walking in the Fire with the Servants of God, preface, unnumbered.
comparison of the Bush to the Jews in the Old Testament - they were both charged with a
substance (fire / God’s spirit) yet neither was destroyed (bush / sins of the people) - ‘as
the fire could not consume the Bush, no more could the Law of God consume the thornes
of their sins’. Reynolds noted that fires could be easily caused in London by the
misplacement of flammable goods. Likewise Henry mentioned the high likelihood and
number of fires in London due to people’s carelessness. The paucity of the detailing of
the exact nature of fire is due to the fact that it was simply not known of, either by
preacher or congregation. The task of the preacher was to translate the implications of
Scripture into terms applicable to contemporary society, so most preachers would
explain fire in terms of biblical exemplars, rather than ruminating on its scientific nature.

It was commonplace to give examples of previous fires, be they contemporary, historical,
classical or scriptural. Around one in five of the sermons examined mentioned some past
fire. Unsurprisingly, the scriptural example of Sodom and Gomorrah is mentioned most
frequently. Pikering mentioned the punishment of these cities as the most radical God
could offer, and counted it as a mercy that England had not suffered similarly. Benjamin
Calamy described the event as an occasion where the sins of the people caused divine
fire, as did John Scott (1638/9-95), rector of St Peter-le-Poer, in his 1686 sermon on the
fast day for the Fire. Stillingfleet, in 1666, used Sodom and Gomorrah as an example
of a fire that the hand of man could not stop, along with the Great Fire of Rome (64) and

---

68 Hardy, Safety In The Midst Of Danger, pp. 6-7, 11.
71 Pikering, A Firebrand Pluckt Out Of The Burning, p. 11; Calamy, Sermon Preached before the Right
Honourable The Lord Mayor, pp. 15-16; J. Scott, A Sermon Preached before the Right Honourable the
Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of London; At the Church of St Mary le Bow, September the Second,
1686 (London: W. Kettilby, 1686). pp. 5-6.
the Fire of Constantinople (465). Mason, in 1676, mentioned these cities as an occasion when God had sent a reminder of what the Last Fire will resemble.

The most frequently alluded to classical event was the Great Fire of Rome (64), allegedly started by Nero. This is because it could be used to show the mendacity and ruthlessness of the early modern ruler of Rome - the Pope. Hering compared Guy Fawkes to Nero, as they had both wished to fire a city and blame Christians (or in Fawkes’ case, according to Hering, puritans). Mason called Nero the ‘greatest monster’ on earth, and Hesketh in 1679 stated that men who can fire cities are more derived from Nero, or the incarnate Devil, than Jesus. Contemporary fires were also mentioned. For example, Thomas Cooke, rector of St Nicholas Worcester, in a sermon after a fire there in 1703, mentioned a fire which had destroyed part of Port Royal in Jamaica.

The Great Fire itself eventually became a historical exemplar of how a city’s transgressions were punished. William Parker in 1748 reminded his congregation that even through the Fire was nearly a century ago, and despite the fact that many of London’s present inhabitants were not descended from the city’s inhabitants in 1666, they should still learn from the example of 1666. The allusion to historical events was commonplace across early modern sermons. Sherlock’s statement - ‘the Remembrance

72 Stillingfleet, Sermon Preached before the Honourable House of Commons, pp. 10-11.
73 Mason, The Day of the Lord, p. 2; Hesketh, Sermon Preached before the Right Honorable The Lord Mayor ... 1679, p. 21.
74 Hering, Triumph Of The Church Over Water And Fire, pp. 34-5.
75 Mason, The Day of the Lord, pp. 16-17.
76 The city was in the midst of its recovery from a devastating earthquake in 1692 when it was struck by fire in 1703. T. Cooke, A Sermon Preacht in the Parochial Church Of St. Nicholas In the Cit’ of Worcester, On Wednesday the 19th of January, Being the Day of the General Fast (Oxford: J. Butler, 1704), pp. 19-20.
of past Judgments teaches us to Fear God’, would have met with approval from English Protestant preachers of all stripes.78

As chapter 5 has shown, Catholics (and Jesuits in particular) were frequently associated with arson and other fiery activities in early modern England.79 The Fire added to this popular belief.80 However, only around one in five of the sermons examined specifically targeted Catholics as fire starters, and all consider them secondary causes to the primary cause of popular sinfulness. No one ideological group tended to target Catholics more than any other. A typical example is Hesketh’s statement that even though there is a chance that Catholic plotters might be to blame for the Great Fire, God and sin should not be forgotten. ‘All this should not divert our thought from that great Providence, without which … so great a City falls not to the ground’. Likewise David Jones (1662/3-1724), the truculent vicar of Marcham, Berkshire, argued in a 1703 sermon that even if it is true that the Papists were the incendiaries, they were only the ‘instruments’ - the sins of the people were the only causes of the Fire.81 Similarly, in 1727 Henry Parker asserted that although Catholics may have started the Fire, they were ‘second causes’, ‘Executioners’ of divine ‘Wrath against Sinners’.82

Some sermons were more explicit in blaming the Catholics for the Fire, although they still dwelt on sin as the primary cause. Hopkins stated - 'neither the strong East-winds nor the famous Popish or French Fire-balls carried on the Fire so much as the Trains our Sins had laid in all quarters of the City, and the fierce Blasts of God’s just displeasure'.

Ibbot, referencing the ‘lost’ report of Sir Robert Brooke’s 1666 parliamentary committee, which contained reports of various Catholic plots, argued that the Popish faction were ‘active and responsible’ - however, this does not make the Fire any less of a divine punishment. In 1713 Matthew Henry unequivocally blamed the Fire on a Popish plot, claiming Robert Hubert was a Catholic agent, and claiming that ‘as it (the Fire) should increase our hatred of the Romish Religion, so it should increase our Dread of the Romish Designs against us’. Evans called the Great Fire an occasion when God ‘permitted Popish Treachery and Cruelty to lay the greatest part of it (London) in Ashes’. These sermons all date from the early eighteenth century. It is probable that in many sermons given in the years after the Fire, particularly by nonconformist ministers, the event was explicitly linked to Catholic plotting. However, these sermons were never given in the ‘official’ context of the fast day, and nor were they published in the years after the Fire.

This relative paucity of specific anti-Catholic sentiment might be down to the fact that 14 of the sermons examined are from the reigns of Charles II and James II, at a time when many preachers would have been reticent to criticise Catholics too openly. However, this

---

83 Hopkins, Sermon Preached before the Right Honourable The Lord Mayor. p. 24.
84 Ibbot, Dissolution of this World by Fire. pp. 28-9; his information on Brooke’s committee probably came from London’s Flames Reviv’d. or, an account of the several informations exhibited to a committee appointed by Parliament, September the 25th 1666 (London: N. Ranew, 1689). or a similar work.
85 Henry, Memorial of the Fire of the Lord, pp. 18, 19.
86 Evans, Sermon Preach’d in London January 16th 1714, p. 16.
is unlikely. East Apthorp (1733-1816), the Anglican vicar of Croydon, preaching in 1770, when the clergy were free to blame Catholics to their hearts' content, stated that the Fire 'was not owing to any conspiracy of our civil or ecclesiastical enemies: although the zeal and party-passions of those times have on very doubtful evidence perpetuated that idea'. Ultimately, Catholics could not be blamed wholly for any Fire because the vast majority of clergy believed fires, and other providential events, were divine punishments occasioned by a sinful nation. On such events Catholics were ironically agents of God, doing a service that might ultimately benefit Protestant England by reforming her iniquitous people.

**The Fire and nonconformist clergy**

Due to the political climate of the later seventeenth century, there were no sermons given on the Fire by nonconformist ministers until Matthew Henry's 1713 sermon. As has been shown above, it is likely that nonconformists used many of the same exemplars and linguistic models when describing fire, and the Great Fire, as clergy of the established church. However, it is likely that there may have been an 'alternative' nonconformist perception of the Fire in the years immediately after 1666.

Richard Baxter wrote in his autobiography that the disaster led to an increase in nonconformist preaching and an increase in the numbers attending nonconformist conventicles, 'For ... the peoples necessity was unquestionable ... they had none other to hear, saving a few Churches that could hold no considerable part of the people'. There

---

was an increase in nonconformist preachers coming into London, for example Joseph Caryl (1602-73), Thomas Brooks (1608-80) and John Owen (1616-83). \textsuperscript{88} Edmund Calamy recorded that Nathaniel Vincent (1637/8-1697), the younger brother of Thomas Vincent, author of \textit{God's Terrible Voice in the City}, 'came to the City soon after the Fire ... and preach'd to large Multitudes. Sometimes he would have Thousands to hear him, as he was preaching in the Ruins'. \textsuperscript{89} It is probable that this relative rise in nonconformity continued in the years after the Fire. In spite of the fact that eight dissenting meeting houses were appropriated for the use of London's displaced Anglican parishioners, metropolitan nonconformity found ways to adapt.\textsuperscript{90} For example, in 1675, the Court of Aldermen was informed that conventicles continued to be held in many public places and livery company halls.\textsuperscript{91}

The Fire was also a significant event for nonconformists in America. Nonconformists in the New World believed that God had punished England for its transgressions by sending the Fire, and indeed Thomas Vincent's \textit{God's Terrible Voice} was republished in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1667, and reprinted in 1668. The Cambridge printing presses were responsive to local public demand, and it is clear that they recognised the commercial potential of providential events such as the Fire. Vincent's work continued


\textsuperscript{89} E. Calamy, \textit{A Continuation of the Account of the Ministers, Lecturers, Masters and Fellows of Colleges, and Schoolmasters, who were Ejected and Silenced after the Restoration in 1660, by or before the Act for Uniformity} (London: R. Ford, R. Hett & J. Chandler, 1727), p. 137.

\textsuperscript{90} R. H. Harrison, 'Temporary churches after the Great Fire', \textit{Transactions of the Ecclesiological Society}. 3 (1955-6), 251-8.

\textsuperscript{91} LMA, Rep. 80, fol. 122r. A year later it was recorded that the halls of the Haberdashers, Embroiderers, Curriers, Plaisterers, Lormiers, Cutlers, Cordwainers, Joiners, Dyers, Turners and Pewterers were used as conventicles. LMA, Rep. 81, fol. 148v-149r.
to be a best seller into the eighteenth century. In 1676, days before the Boston Fire, the Puritan minister Increase Mather (1639-1723) reminded his congregation of the Great Fire, and the impending nature of divine wrath. It is clear that there was a significant nonconformist sermon reaction to the Fire in the late seventeenth century, but what form would it have taken?

Philip Henry (1631-96), an ejected minister living in Wales at the time of the Fire, recorded his reactions to the event in his diary. For Henry, sin was the ultimate cause of the disaster - 'the nations sin, the sin of London, my own sin'. The event also showed how vain the material world was, 'how far it must needs be from making a man happy, seeing in one moment it makes to itself wings and fly's away'. It was also a reminder of the End of Days, 'when all the world shall be on fire and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and all the works that are therein shall be burnt up'. Baxter had a similar view of the event, that 'It was a sight that might have given any Man a lively sense of the Vanity of this World, and all the Wealth and Glory of it, and of the future conflagration of all the World'. Several nonconformist ministers recorded their reactions to the Fire in tracts published shortly after the event. Thomas Vincent, who remained in London throughout the Plague and Fire, wrote a record of his experiences in 1667 - God's Terrible Voice in the City. Vincent immediately made it clear that the Fire

---

95 Baxter, Reliquiae Baxterianae, ed. Sylvester, part 3, p. 17.
was divinely ordained, and caused by the sins of the people. Samuel Rolls wrote that the Fire was representative of divine anger, and compared London to Sodom and Gomorrah. Thomas Doolittle, who set up an illegal meeting house in Bunhill Fields after the Fire, wrote that the Fire had been a ‘little Emblem of the great and generall Conflagration and burning of the World’, and compared the wrath of God at sin to the Fire. Finally, Owen Stockton, writing the year after the Fire, compared 1666 to numerous Old Testament fires, all of which were caused by divine anger at sin. It is clear that nonconformist ministers shared much with the viewpoint of the established clergy in their description of the Fire. Broadly, they all accepted that the Fire was caused by divine anger, and should serve as a reminder of the consequences of sin, the transitory nature of the material world, and the eventual coming of the Final Judgement.

There were however, differences in the perception of the Fire. Nonconformist sources viewed Charles II’s legislation against their community as one of the causes of the Fire. In the context of the perceived ‘victory’ of the Anglican Royalist faction of the Restoration after the Interregnum, providential events like the Fire, that struck at the heart of the Stuart establishment, showed that God still favoured the dissenting faction. Philip Henry wrote that the Fire was a voice to the government saying ‘let my people go’, as God had said to the Pharaoh. He also wrote that it was a ‘mercy’ that dissenting

99 O. Stockton, Counsel to the Afflicted: or, Instruction and Consolation for such as have suffered Loss by Fire (London: E. Cotes, 1667), pp. 140-2, 170-3.
100 Hall, Worlds of wonder, days of judgment, p. 105.
ministers had been cast out of London before the Fire, as Lot had been cast out of Sodom. The tracts on the Fire used the description of the event to offer a critique of Restoration religious policy. Vincent wrote that divine displeasure had been increased by the 1662 Act of Uniformity and 1665 Five Mile Act. The eviction of ministers had presaged London’s ruin by divine judgment. Certain sins were emphasized in nonconformist discussions of the Fire, particularly the loose morals of London. Sabbath breaking was frequently focussed on as an important factor in increasing divine anger against London. Henry wrote that the Fire starting on the Sabbath was symbolic of, ‘the lords controversy wth london … for prophaning the holy day’. Vincent, Rolls, Stockton and Doolittle also wrote that Sabbath breaking was a cause of the Fire.

Nonconformist sources on the Fire were also far more confident in ascribing the event to Catholic plotters. Vincent wrote that the Fire ‘doth smell of a Popish design’, and corresponded to previous Papist plots, such as the Fifth of November. However, Catholic plotters were merely the instruments; God was the ultimate author of the Fire. Vincent also mentioned that the presence of Jesuits and priests sent from Rome in London as contributing to divine anger against the city. Similarly, Rolls wrote that the Fire was ‘Roman Catholick in the Causes of it’. It is probable that many in the Quaker community believed that the Fire had been a consequence of Catholic arsonists; the Quaker George Whitehead (1637-1724) recorded in his autobiography that the event was

102 Vincent, God’s Terrible Voice, pp. 20-3.
104 Vincent, God’s Terrible Voice, pp. 47-8, 78.
part of a Popish plot. He also recorded a foretelling of the Fire two days before it occurred, when a Quaker from Huntingdonshire came to London in great haste, "and foretold his Vision ... That the City would be laid Waste by Fire".106

There were many similarities between the immediate responses of the established and nonconformist clergy to the Fire. Broadly, all agreed the event was caused by divine anger at the sins of the people. However, there were some key differences. Nonconformist sources tended to concentrate more on the moral decay of London. They also, predictably, emphasised the recent legislation against nonconformity as contributing to divine anger. Finally, they were far more certain in blaming Catholic plotters for the Fire than the established clergy were in the years after the Fire.

**Summary of conclusions**

The perception of the Fire by contemporary religious figures was by no means wholly consistent across any ideological group, event or time period. Also, it appeared that the religious language used in discussions of the Fire was similar to the sermons on fire before 1666. The Great Fire was variously used as an occasion to dwell on Hellfire, the Last Judgment and the vanity of earthly things. There was one feature which the vast majority of sermons, and religious leaders, had in common. Around 90 per cent of the sermons examined portray fire as symbolic of divine anger with a sinful nation. This remained consistent before and after the Fire, indeed the point is perhaps driven home

with greater imperative after the Fire as it clear, in the minds of the preachers at least, that sinful London has not learned and reformed as a result of the catastrophe. Even criticism of Catholics and accusations of Papist plots remained secondary to these reflections on God's displeasure with the nation. Although for most nonconformists the Catholics were the ultimate authors of the Fire, it was nonetheless a divinely ordained event. In this respect there was significant continuity and uniformity in the attitudes to the Fire. This did not extend to the other facets of the language of fire detailed above, none of which were mentioned nearly as frequently as the assertion that fire arose because of the fury of God at a sinful people.
Conclusion

The Great Fire was a disaster for the Londoners whom it directly affected. However, it was not a disaster for the long-term development of the metropolis. This thesis has revealed the essentially stable and resilient nature of London's demography, society and economy in the seventeenth century. The Fire only devastated the City within the Walls - an area of London that was slowly declining in its importance in the overall structure of the metropolis – in particular, in terms of population. The longer-term impact of the Fire lay in its ideological value, both in religious and political terms.

Chapter 1 investigated the problem of how London’s population was resettled after the Fire. It appears that many of the individuals burnt out did not return to their original location. The costs of rebuilding, and the rises in rent caused by the reduction in housing stock in the City, would have made London’s suburbs a more attractive economic proposition for many. The Fire did have the effect of forcing people into the suburbs. Such movement, in particular to the west and east, was part of an ongoing redistribution of London’s population. However, there was a difference in the social profiling of these moves. Movement west was most associated with the gentry, who relocated in this direction in large numbers. More broadly, settlement west of the Walls tended to be accompanied by upward social mobility in the relative prestige of location, both in terms of a rise in the number of hearths per household as well as the social desirability of a locality.
Many Londoners were forced to move out of the City after the Fire. It was movement north that was the most significant direct consequence of the population resettlement forced by the Fire, as burnt out individuals relocated to the open spaces north of the Walls. Movement east was far more likely to be associated with a reduction in the social status of an address or household. Relocation to the western suburbs appears to have been to areas near to the Walls, rather than the prestigious new neighbourhoods of the West End. Movement south of the river was relatively unimportant in comparison to other types of relocation. As Vanessa Harding suggested, the City must have grown more ‘ordered’ as a result of the Fire, whilst the suburbs (in particular the East) became more ‘disordered’.

Early modern metropolitan neighbourhood migration was usually short-distance, and this was often the case for those who moved but were not burnt out. However, Londoners whose homes were destroyed tended to move farther across the metropolis. Such movement was socially selective. Women in particular were more likely to move longer distances as a result of being burnt out. Economic vulnerability before the Fire appears to have led to an increase in dislocation after it. Individuals who remained in the same location after the Fire were more likely to be from socially desirable areas of the City, and from higher social strata. The case study of the two neighbourhoods suggests that residential stability was far more likely to be associated with the relatively

---

prestigious area around St Paul’s Cathedral than the lower status area around the riverside. However, even amongst poorer neighbourhoods there was still some degree of social continuity after the Fire. It appears to have been relatively commonplace for near-neighbours to relocate to similar areas after the Fire, even if they were a long distance from the pre-Fire address. It is clear that existing social links underlay movement after the Fire, whether it was a return to a pre-Fire location or resettlement in another part of the city.

Changes in the economic topography of London after the Fire were investigated in chapter 2. To a degree, they echoed the findings of chapter 1 in terms of movement. The relatively wealthy Merchant Taylors in particular moved westward in large numbers, regardless of whether they had been burned out. The more homogeneous trade group, the booksellers, whose business was largely reliant on passing consumer traffic, appear to have been more stable in their locations before and after the Fire. Their topography remained stable in the long-term – regaining its pre-Fire pattern a decade after the disaster. However, ‘new’ booksellers setting up after 1666 appear to have been more likely to be located outside of the City, where rents tended to be cheaper.3

There were difficulties in this exercise. As with the Hearth Tax records, the sources used in chapter 2 tended to under-represent female traders. On the whole, it appears that the women considered in chapter 2 tended to share similar patterns of resettlement and recovery to men. For the Merchant Taylors data there was not enough information on the


369
age and occupation of the masters to form firm conclusions about the effects of these variables on the economic recovery from the Fire. Occupations did change for the Merchant Taylors over time. After the Fire, there was a surge in members of the company engaged in the construction trade in particular. Overall, there was a ten per cent occupational turnover rate - usually between linked trades. However, it was not possible to determine the exact effects of the Fire on occupation given the small sample sizes. When age is considered, it is likely that younger Merchant Taylors, like 'new' booksellers, were slightly more likely to settle outside of the City. They were also more likely to change their occupation, and engage in the building business after the Fire.

There were limitations to the findings of chapters 1 and 2 because of the methodology. The movement of poorer groups and widows, who were both unlikely to be linked using the techniques utilised, could not be analysed systematically. However, it is likely that many of them found temporary homes in the settlements in the open fields around London, and in the longer-term in the tenements and lodgings of the East End. The exercise also could not take into account movement outside of London. A study of parish registers and poor rates around London for an influx of new names in the years after the Fire may illuminate such movement. Many Londoners were migrants from other areas of England, and so they may have returned to their provincial family homes to recover after the Fire. In addition, it is probable that networks of credit and investment in shipping and government finance meant that most Londoners had a degree of 'fire-proof' resources to

fall back on to aide them in the rebuilding. This could be examined by a wide-scale study of trade papers in the years after the Fire, to determine if the disaster led to a significant rise in Londoners attempting to liquefy their assets in order to reconstruct their households or businesses.

Chapter 3 analysed the charitable reaction to the Fire in England and London. The analysis of the large bodies of data arising from the two briefs – one read in 1666 for Londoners ‘distressed by the Fire’ and one from 1678 for the rebuilding of St Paul’s Cathedral – provided important insights in how London was perceived by the rest of the nation, and seventeenth-century English charity in general. The 1666 brief was far more successful in raising money than the St Paul’s brief, as well as having a more immediate response. London’s homeless and ‘distressed’ were a more pressing and emotive cause than the rebuilding of a cathedral.

Compared to previous national charitable collections, the 1666 and St Paul’s briefs were not as successful in terms of total funds raised. This stems from the absence of London’s considerable charitable clout. It also appears that the areas around London were more likely to be generous than the counties more distant from the metropolis. In general terms, urban areas – and in particular towns that had been previously damaged by fires – were more likely to be generous to London. In terms of levels of individual donation, it is clear that the ‘better sort’ of parochial society donated at higher levels than the rest of the population. Clergy especially donated at high levels – particularly to the St Paul’s brief.
Chapter 4 used the records of the distribution of the monies collected by the 1666 brief to examine the charitable priorities of metropolitan government after the Fire and thus gauge the severity of the disaster. The examination of the individuals who petitioned for money from the 1666 brief showed that the distribution of the collection was mainly along traditional lines. The ‘deserving’ poor – widows and higher status individuals fallen on hard times – were more likely to receive larger doles when they petitioned for money. These petitions show that the Fire did not make Londoners who did not usually receive poor relief more likely to seek it after the disaster. However, most of the money was not given to individual petitioners but to existing mechanisms of government – the City parishes and wards. Larger wards were more likely to receive higher amounts to distribute to their poor – even if they were mostly not directly affected by the Fire – for example, Farringdon Without. Similarly, the larger a parish was the more money it tended to receive – although most of the parishes actually used the money to place poor children on the parish charge in apprenticeships.

This chapter could not consider the more informal means of charity in London after the Fire. Many of London’s traditional charitable institutions - for example, livery companies, found it difficult to maintain their charitable function after the Fire owing to the loss of housing stock and the costs of rebuilding.\(^5\) It is likely that only part of this vacuum was filled by the 1666 brief. Further study of the livery company charitable records in the later seventeenth century may be worthwhile. Many Londoners would

have no doubt received aid from relatives in the provinces after being burnt out. A study of provincial wills may uncover this trend, but it would be a major undertaking. A wide examination of parochial charitable records in the areas surrounding London immediately after 1666 may also show if there were any significant payments made to Londoners burnt out by the Fire. However, ultimately, most early modern English charity (especially at the family level) was informal. Therefore, it is unlikely that a systematic study of this type of charitable relief after the Fire will be possible.

The symbolic value of the Great Fire had a longer-lasting impact than its damage on London’s socio-economic fabric. The Fire was a heavily contested phenomenon, and was quickly politicised across all forms of contemporary media – including monuments in London’s built environment. Chapter 5 showed that the Fire was an important polemical tool for a number of reasons. ‘Fire’ was associated with disorder and the loss of property, and so had a powerful potential impact on the early modern psyche. Royalist groups used the Fire to remind the reader of England’s (and London’s) sins during the Interregnum. The Fire’s association with foreign, and particularly Catholic, plotting was utilised by Whiggish groups in particular. At key political ‘moments’, the memory of the Fire was frequently called into play. During the Exclusion Crisis in particular, the Fire was used to warn of the impending doom if England was ever to have a Catholic on the throne. The Fire was explicitly linked with Popish plotting. In comparison, Tory groups sought to maintain that the Fire was accidental – a providential event. The Monument.

---

which was used by both Whigs and Royalists as a symbol of either the deliberate or accidental nature of the Fire, shows this duality.

In spite of the often vicious nature of the polemic around the Fire, it appears that the popular reaction to the event was more measured. Although personal accounts of the Fire frequently blamed unnamed foreign conspirators for the disaster, there was no large-scale persecution of foreigners in London after the Fire. Similarly, there appears to have been no significant breakdown in public order in 1666. Rather, it appeared that Londoners concentrated more on fleeing the flames and preserving what possessions they could during the Fire. Fire, as we have seen, was a frequent menace in urban early modern England. As such, many Londoners would have reacted to the Fire phlegmatically – as one more metropolitan menace along with plague, unhygienic streets and inadequate housing.

England’s clergy frequently mentioned the Fire. A study of sermons showed that the Fire was almost always linked to the concept that it had been brought about by divine anger at the sins of the nation. This providential view of fire was not an innovation, but a familiar trope in early modern religious thought. The established clergy seem not to have linked Catholics to the Fire directly. However, nonconformist groups were quick to associate Popish plotting with the Fire – although they still held that God was the ultimate author of the disaster. In some respects, the Fire was a vindication for England’s nonconformist

---

ministers, who had been banished from London in the early 1660s. The Fire showed God’s displeasure at this act. In the aftermath of the Fire, there was a rise in nonconformist activity in the metropolis, as its preachers filled the void caused by the disruption to London’s established parochial system.

Comparative study of the Fire showed that London 1666 by no means had a monopoly on the concept and experience of a ‘Great Fire’. Indeed, it appears that such events are not uncommon in the growth and development of major cities. ‘Great Fires’ and other disasters such as earthquakes or enemy invasion became stage posts in the mental and social history of the city, just as they did for London. There are numerous general themes that occurred in major urban fires. A cause of the blaze was always sought. Major fires tended to be accidental, created by a random incident which escalated due to the existing pre-conditions of the urban environment, and the immediate conditions of the moment, such as weather conditions. In the early modern context in particular, in seeking to explain the disaster, contemporary views of fires almost always eschewed an accidental view of a major fire. The ‘blame’ was ascribed to two main sources. Firstly, fires were mainly ascribed to the anger of a vengeful God – a providential event caused by the sins of a nation or people. Secondly, the blame or recrimination for starting the blaze was often laid on a social group defined by their race or religion – frequently this took the form of a conspiracy.9 The rebuilding and resettlement of fired cities was often

---

9 This is explored further by Penny Roberts. P. Roberts, ‘Arson, conspiracy and rumour in early modern Europe’, Continuity and Change 12 (1997), 9-29.
The Great Fire of London had the potential to severely disrupt the city’s socio-economic structure, and by extension that of the country at large. However, because the Fire spread slowly and was mostly limited to within the Walls of the City, its negative effects were limited. London did not experience a second mortality shock in 1666, following the 1665 Plague. The Fire did not spread west into the West End and Westminster. Had it done, it would have destroyed many of London’s leisure attractions, as well as its political centre and the metropolitan homes of most of the nation’s nobility. Similarly, if the Fire had penetrated the walls of the Tower of London and ignited the stock of gunpowder there, the resulting flames could have razed most of the densely populated East End. This would have destroyed most of the cheap housing for migrant labour. As well as this, the Port of London – essential to the metropolitan economy – could have been destroyed. In fact, the Fire was restrained to within the Walls, and although there was short term disruption, London resumed its demographic and economic growth in the later seventeenth century. The Fire had the effect of speeding population growth outside of the Walls, but this was a trend that was ongoing in 1666.

London was able to recover from the damage done by the Great Fire. The sheer scale of the Fire may have caused significant psychological anxiety. On 15 September 1666.  

---

Samuel Pepys recorded in his diary that he was ‘much terrified in the nights nowadays with dreams of fire and falling down of houses’. However, in the past London had dealt with fire and disasters such as war and plague, and so similarly it recovered from the Fire. Londoners’ frequent mobility and relatively loose attachment to their homes, as well as the presence of the suburbs, meant that movement after the Fire became less traumatic, and metropolitan social and economic systems could be reconstructed. The Great Fire did not cause a significant lasting crisis in metropolitan society or economy.

As in many other major cities, the ‘Great Fire’ became part of the fabric of civic history, representing the resilience of the city, and the industry of its inhabitants. The long-term effect of the Great Fire lay ultimately in its polemic and symbolic value, which meant that the event retained its historic importance for centuries. However, London’s resilience meant that the damage done by the flames of 1666 would ultimately be temporary, and reversed.

---

Appendix: Statistical methods used in the text

Hypothesis Testing

Many of the statistical techniques used in this thesis rely on hypothesis testing. This is a means of making statistical decisions about sets of data. It is based on forming a null hypothesis, which is a statement that exists to be rejected or accepted by the sample and subsequent statistical testing of it. For example, the statement ‘there is no difference in the distribution of hearths per household across regions of London’ can be proved or disproved by hypothesis testing. The binary nature of the technique allows for straightforward conclusions: based on statistical testing any reasonable hypothesis about a set of data can be shown to be either true or false.

The reliability of the test is determined by the ‘level of significance’ applied to the test. Unless otherwise indicated, the level used throughout this thesis is 95 per cent. Essentially, if the null hypothesis is accepted, this means that there is only a five per cent chance the statement is not true.\(^1\) Once the hypothesis and level of significance have been formulated, a suitable statistical test is chosen to analyse the data. The hypothesis tests used in this thesis were:

The Chi-Squared Test

A Chi-Squared test compares categorized sets of nominal data to determine if the observed results differ from expected frequencies. For example, it can find if the age range of the Merchant Taylors’ sample in this thesis differs from the age range found by Steve Rappaport for male Londoners in 1552. The ‘expected’ results are created by using the distribution of the parent population of the sample. These are then compared to the ‘observed’ results. The differences between the two sets of data create a calculated, test, value - \( \chi^2 \), which is compared to a tabulated, critical, value (p) to determine the probability that the differences between the two populations arose solely by chance. The null hypothesis of no difference is upheld if p exceeds \( \chi^2 \). There are restrictions on the use of this test. The categories must be mutually exclusive, and there should not be ‘many’ categories for which the expected frequency is ‘small’.

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test is used to test if the underlying distribution of two samples is statistically different. For example, it could test if the time series distributions of the two charitable collections for London after the Fire were statistically different. It does this by comparing the cumulative distribution of the two paired sets of data. The test value, D, is calculated by finding the maximum absolute difference between the

\[ 2 \text{ Statisticians usually define this as having no more than one in five of the expected frequencies being equal to less than five, and none being less than one. } D. \text{ Ebdon. Statistics in geography (2nd edition, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 64-7.} \]
cumulative frequencies of the datasets. If this exceeds the tabulated critical value then the null hypothesis must be rejected.³

*The Mann-Whitney U Test*

The Mann-Whitney U Test determines whether two samples from a common population differ significantly in their central tendency - i.e. it shows if they are drawn from the same populations. For example, it can show if the mean number of hearths per household increased for individuals who moved after the Fire compared to those who stayed in the same location. All of the observations in both samples are tabulated and ranked according to their overall value. The sum of the rankings for each sample is then calculated and used to create the test value, U. In this thesis, because the samples used were large (greater than 20), then the calculation of the critical value could be based on the normal distribution, and ‘U’ is used to create the test value ‘Z’, which is compared to a tabulated, critical, value. If the calculated, test, value exceeds the tabulated, critical, value then the null hypothesis must be rejected.⁴

*The Student’s t Test*

The Student’s t Test determines if there is a statistical difference between two samples. In this thesis, it was used to determine the significance of the levels of correlation between two variables found by the Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient

³ Ibid., pp. 54-5.
⁴ Ibid., pp. 59-61.
and the Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient (see below). For example, it will show if there is a significant level of correlation between the size of a London parish and the amount it was allocated from the 1666 Brief. The null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between the two variables. This is rejected if the calculated, test, value ('t') exceeds the tabulated critical value.⁵

Measuring Correlation

The aim of measuring correlation is to determine if there is a relationship between two factors, and what the strength of this relationship is. This can be shown graphically by plotting a scattergram of two paired sets of data – for example, the total number of houses recorded in each City ward before and after the Fire. The overall linear trend of this relationship is then shown by plotting a straight line of ‘best fit’ that passes close to as many of the points as possible (shown in this thesis by a green dashed line). The strength of correlation can be measured exactly by calculating the ‘correlation coefficient’,⁶ two types of which were used in this thesis:

The Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient

This test determines the level of association between paired observations, x and y, giving a value ‘r’. This expresses the level of association as a range between -1 and 1. The more the value tends towards -1 or 1, the stronger the correlation is. An ‘r’ value of zero

⁵ Ibid., pp. 61-2, 95-6.
⁶ Ibid., pp. 90-1, 106-7.
indicates that there is no correlation whatsoever. The significance of this value is then tested using the Student’s t Test (see above). ⁷

The Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient

Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient compares two sets of ranked data. It does not use the actual values themselves, but their ranks. This is especially useful when dealing with ordinal data, or if there is a large margin of error for the values that are being compared. Like the Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Coefficient, it produces a value, ‘r’, between -1 and 1, which shows the level of correlation. The significance of this value is tested using the Student’s ‘t’ Test (see above). ⁸

Other statistical terms

Mean

The mean (or ‘arithmetic mean’) is a measure of average. It is calculated by adding all of the values in a data set and dividing this by the total number of values. ⁹ The drawback of this method is that very large or small anomalous values can distort the mean.

Standard Deviation

The standard deviation is a measure of the ‘dispersion’, or spread of values, of a dataset. The larger this number, the greater the spread is. The standard deviation also has another

---

⁷ Ibid., pp. 91-4.
⁸ Ibid., pp. 97-100; Hammond and McCullagh. Quantitative techniques in geography. p. 223.
useful property; for any dataset at least 75 per cent of it must lie within two standard deviations of the mean, and at least 94 per cent must lie within four standard deviations of the mean.\textsuperscript{10}

\textit{The Gini Coefficient}

The Gini Coefficient is a measure of inequality, where zero represents 'perfect equality', where everything is distributed evenly across a population, and where one represents 'perfect inequality', where all the resources of the population are in the hands of one person.\textsuperscript{11} It was used in this thesis to measure how evenly spread out across the country contributions to charitable collections were.

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., pp. 27-8.
\textsuperscript{11} Hammond and McCullagh, \textit{Quantitative techniques in geography}, pp. 76-7.
Bibliography

Manuscript primary sources

Guildhall Library

Parish Records
St Gregory by St Paul, Vestry Minutes, MS 1336
1: 1642-1701
St Michael Bassishaw, Vestry Minutes, MS 2598
1: 1669-1715
St Michael Cornhill, Vestry Minutes, MS 4072
1: 1593-1697
St Michael Wood Street, Poor Rate Assessments, MS 525
1: 1644-1702
St Olave Hart Street, Poor Rate Assessments, MS 872
9: 1664-5
12: 1675-6
St Sepulchre Holborn, Vestry Minutes, MS 3149
2: 1662-83
St Stephen Walbrook, Poor Rate Assessments, 1664, Add. MS 243
St Stephen Walbrook, Vestry Minutes, MS 594
1: 1648-99
Records of the brief for the rebuilding of St Paul's Cathedral

List of parishes contributing towards the Rebuilding after the Great Fire of London.

1677/8 onwards, MS 25565

1: Bedfordshire
2: Berkshire
3: Buckinghamshire
4: Cambridgeshire
5: Cheshire
6: Derbyshire and Devon A-G
7: Devon H-Y and Dorset
8-9: Essex
10: Gloucestershire
11: Hampshire and Herefordshire
12: Hertfordshire and Huntingdonshire
13: Kent
14: Lancashire
15: Leicestershire
16: Lincolnshire
17: Middlesex
18: City of London and Westminster
19: Northamptonshire

20-21: Oxfordshire

22: Rutland, Shropshire, Somerset, and Surrey

23: Staffordshire and Warwickshire

24-25: Wiltshire

26: Worcestershire and Yorkshire

27: Wales

28: Unidentified parishes

List of parishes contributing towards the Rebuilding after the Great Fire of London, 1677/8 onwards, parishes in peculiar jurisdictions, MS 25568

List of parishes contributing towards the Rebuilding after the Great Fire of London, 1677/8 onwards, MS 25747

*Records of the Parish Clerks’ Company*

Weekly Bills of Mortality, MS 3604

1: 1664-75

*Records of the Merchant Taylors’ Company*

Registers of Apprentice Bindings, MS 34038

13-16: 1647-80

Alphabetical Lists of Freemen, MS 34037

1-4: 1530-1928
Records of Sir William Turner

Stock Books, MS 5109

2: 1662-71

Lambeth Palace Library

Court of Arches Depositions 1665-1668, MS Film 147, Eee 2

London Metropolitan Archives

'Alchin List'
Lists (fifteen in Number) of the Inhabitants, whose Houses were destroyed in the Great Fire of 1666, Alchin Papers Box F/no. 65 COL/AC/06/006

Court of Aldermen

Repertories of the Court of Aldermen

Rep. 71-86: 1665-1681

Court of Common Council

City Lands Committee Papers, COL/CC/CLC/04/001

Boxes 1-2: 1666-1700

Journals of the Court of Common Council

Jour. 46-9: 1664-82

387
Records of the 1666 Brief for ‘Distressed’ Londoners

Account Book, with returns of the brief and details of its distribution, Poor Sufferers by Fire in Lond. 1666, COL/SJ/03/006

A Posting Book for ye collection money for releife of those that have had great losse by ye lamentable Fire within ye City of London & Liberties thereof, COL/SJ/03/007

Fire of London Grants of Money 1667-75, COL/SJ/03/009

Orders upon the Chamberlain, 1666-71, COL/SJ/03/010A

Letter of John Tremayne to Lewis Tremayne, COL/SJ/03/014

Collection of letters concerning the brief, MISC MSS/159/3

Proclamation of Sir Thomas Player, Chamberlain of the City of London, P.D. 10.200

The National Archives

Hearth Tax assessment listings

City of London and parts of Middlesex, Ladyday 1666, E179/252/32

Part 1: Bassishaw Ward, St Olave Old Jewry, and St Mary Colechurch.

Part 2: St Michael Crooked Lane, St Clement Eastcheap, St Nicholas Acon, St Edmund the King and Martyr, All Hallows Lombard Street, St Mary Fenchurch Street, All Hallows Staining, and St Katherine Coleman.

Part 3: St Mary Woolnoth, St Swithin London Stone, St Mary Bothaw, St Stephen Walbrook, St Benet Sherehog, St Antholin Budge Row. St John the Baptist Walbrook, and St Michael Paternoster Royal.
Part 4: St Magnus the Martyr, St Margaret New Fish Street, and St Leonard Eastcheap.

Part 5: Christchurch Newgate, St Martin Ludgate, St Gregory by St Paul’s, St Vedast Foster Lane, St Michael le Querne, and St Faith under St Paul’s.

Part 6: St Lawrence Jewry, St Mary Magdalen Milk Street, St Alban Wood Street. St Mary Aldermanbury, St Peter Westcheap, St Michael Wood Street. St Olave Silver Street, and St Alphage London Wall.

Part 8: St Dunstan in the West and St Bride Fleet Street.

Part 10: St Bartholomew the Great and St Bartholomew the Less.

Part 11: St Botolph Aldersgate and St Martin le Grand.

Part 16: St Pancras Soper Lane, St Mary le Bow, All Hallows Honey Lane, and St Martin Pomeroy.

Part 18: Tower Liberty, All Hallows Barking, St Olave Hart Street, St Dunstan in the East, St Mary at Hill, St Botolph Billingsgate, St Margaret Pattens, St George Botolph Lane, All Hallows Staining, and St Katherine Coleman.

Part 19: St Dionis Backchurch, St Benet Gracechurch, St Ethelburga Bishopsgate, St Helen Bishopsgate, St Andrew Undershaft, and St Katherine Creechurch.

Part 25: St Martin le Grand

City of London and parts of Middlesex, presented 1 February 1675, E179/252/23, fols. 1r-118r

Middlesex, between Michaelmas 1674 and Ladyday 1675, E179/143/380. fols. 20r-24v

Surrey, between Michaelmas 1664 and Ladyday 1666, E179/258/4, fols. 267r-315r

Surrey, around Ladyday 1673, E179/188/504, fols. 1r-10v
Westminster, Ladyday 1675, E179/253/25, fols. 1r-27v

Royal Subsidy Listings

Westminster, 28 April 1664, E179/143/385, fols. 2v-15v and Part 4, fols. 1r-2v

State Papers, Domestic Series

Commission of Cornelius Rietvelt to Arlington, 3 September 1666, SP 29/170, 62
Letter from William Waynflet to Williamson, 11 September 1666, SP 29/171, 49
Petition of Richard Pierce to the King, 12 September 1666, SP 29/171, 67
Petition of Ann Lloyd to the Queen, 13 September 1666, SP 29/171, 89
Letter from the King to the Company of Cooks, 15 September 1666, SP 29/171, 124
Letter from Robert Scrivener to James Hickes, 17 September 1666, SP 29/172, 6
Petition of Captain John Wadlow to the King, 19 September 1666, SP 29/172, 42
Petition of Teunis Willemsen to the King, 24 September 1666, SP 29/172, 153
Petition of Sarah Crafts to the King, 1666, SP 29/173, 101
Petition of John Gamble to the King, 1666, SP 29/173, 103
Petition of William Garrett to the King, 1666, SP 29/173, 104
Petition of John Le Roy to the King, 1666, SP 29/173, 106
Petition of John Ogilby to the King, 1666, SP 29/173, 109
Petition of John Ogilby to the King, 1666, SP 29/173, 110
Petition of Elizabeth Proctor to the King, 1666, SP 29/173, 114
Petition of churchwardens of St Martin-in-the-Fields to the King, 1666, SP 29/173, 116
Petition of the vicar of St Sepulchre Holborn and other inhabitants of the parish to the King, 1666, SP 29/173, 117

Petition of Sir James Bunce to the King, 7 November 1666, SP 29/177, 104

Petition of HM violins to the King, 7 November 1666, SP 29/177, 105

Letter from James Hickes to Williamson, 12 December 1666, SP 29/181, 76

Petition of Gilbert Thomas to the King, February 1667, SP 29/192, 70

A true report of the great number of poor Children and other poor people maintained in the several Hospitals under the pious care of the Lord Maior, Commonalty and Citizens of the City of London, 8 April 1667, TNA, SP 29/196, 149

Letter from the King to the Court of Common Council, 31 May 1667, SP 29/202, 95

Letter from the King to the Court of Common Council and the Court of Aldermen, 5 June 1667, SP 29/203, 69

Letter from Sir Thomas Langton and Sir John Knight to Arlington, 13 July 1667, SP 29/209, 75

Letter from Daniel Fleming to Williamson, 16 August 1667, SP 29/213, 118

Letter from Sir Philip Musgrave to Williamson, 19 August 1667, SP 29/214, 27

Petition of Richard Poole to Arlington, September 1667, SP 29/218, 66

Petition of Captain James Bradshaw to the King, December 1667, SP 29/225, 225

Petition of Dr William Bell to the King, 1667, SP 29/229, 112

Petition of Roger Morris to the Navy Commissioners, 1667, SP 29/229, 161.

Petition of Clara Bolton to the King, 1667, SP 29/229, 117

Petition of the vicar and churchwardens of St Martin-in-the-Fields to the King, 21 February 1668, SP 29/235. 33
Petition of Sir William Bolton to the King, May 1668, SP 29/240, 190

Memorandum of charitable giving of Alice, Duchess of Dudley. January 1669. SP 29/255, 24

Petition of Clara Bolton to Arlington, 10 July 1669, SP 29/262, 150

Warrant for grant for King Charles' Hospital, July 1669, SP 29/264, 134A

Petition of Dr Israel Tongue to the King, 22 August 1670, SP 29/278, 30

Petition of Francis Dickinson to Arlington, 1670, SP 29/281A, 49

**Printed primary sources**

*An account of the Burning the City of London, As it was Publish'd by the Special Authority of the King and Council in the year, 1666. To which is added, The Opinion of Dr Kennet the present Bishop of Peterborough, as Publish's by his Lordship's Order, and That of Dr Eachard, relating thereunto* (London: J. Stone, 1720)


392
The Address of above Twenty thousand of the Loyal Protestant Apprentices of London:

Humbly presented to the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor, Septemb. 2. 1681

(London: W. Ingol, 1681) GL, Broadside B-106

Allison, J., ‘The Late Lamentable Accident’, in London in flames, pp. 73-83

Apthorp, E., A Sermon At St. Paul's Cathedral, September 2, MDCCCLXX (London, 1780)

Armitage, T., The Son Of God Walking in the Fire with the Servants of God. In Nine
Sermons Upon Dan. III. XXV (London: H. Cripps, 1655)

‘B., N.’, A Sermon, Shewing The Meanes how we may Escape the Damnation of Hell
(London: R. Royston, 1649), BL, Thomason Tracts E. 579 (4.)

Baxter, R., Reliquiae Baxterianae: or, Mr. Richard Baxter’s Narrative of The most
Memorable Passages of his Life and Times, ed. M. Sylvester (London: T.
Parkhurst, J. Robinson, J. Lawrence & J. Dunton, 1696)

Bedloe, W., A Narrative and Impartial Discovery of the Horrid Popish Plot: Carried on
for the Burning and Destroying of London and Westminster, With their Suburbs,
&c (London: R. Boulter, J. Hancock, R. Smith & B. Harris, 1679)

‘Bethlehems Beauty’, in London in flames, pp. 245-8

Blake, M., A Brief Account Of The Dreadful Fire At Blandford-Forum In The County of
Dorset, which happened June iv. MDCCXXI. Together with a Sermon Preached at

Bolton, R., Mr. Boltons Last And Learned Worke of the Foure last Things, Death,
Judgement, Hell and Heaven (London: E.B., 1632)

‘Brutus, Junius’. An Appeal from the Country to the City. For the Preservation of His
Majesties Person, Liberty, Property, and the Protestant Religion (London, 1679)


*The Burning of London by the Papists: or, A Memorial to Protestants on the Second of September* (London: J. Clark, 1714)

Calamy, B., *A Sermon Preached before the Right Honourable The Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of London, At the Church of St. Mary le Bow, September the Second, 1684* (London: W. Kettily, 1685)

*Calendar of State Papers, domestic series, of the reign of Charles II, 1666-70*, ed. M.A.E. Green (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts & Green, 1864-95)

*The Case of the Inhabitants of the Cities of London & Westminster, And of the Parishes and Places within the Bills of Mortality, with respect to the Laws now in Force for preventing Mischiefs that may happen by Fire* (London: H. Meere, 1718)

*The Case Of The Inhabitants of the Parish of St. Mary Woolnoth, London* (London, 1707)


A Collection Of The Yearly Bills Of Mortality. From 1657 to 1758 inclusive, ed. T. Birch
(London: A. Millar, 1759)

A compendious history of the most Remarkable Passages of the last Fourteen Years
(London: A. Godbid & J. Playford, 1680)

University Press for the British Academy, 1986)

Conway, G., The Blessedness of Giving, above that of Receiving. A Sermon Preach’d at
the Tabernacle At Blandford; Soon after a Distribution Of Part of the Charitable
Collections, Made for the Relief of the distressed Sufferers there (London: S.
Austen, 1732)

Cooke, T., A Sermon Preacht in the Parochial Church Of St. Nicholas In the City of
Worcester, On Wednesday the 19th of January, Being the Day of the General Fast
(Oxford: J. Butler, 1704)

The Country-Man’s fare-wel to London: Or, A Broad-side against Pride (London: J.
Conniers, 1670)


Dawes, W., The Eternity of Hell-Torments. A Sermon Preach’d before King William, At
Kensington, January 1701 (London: H. Hills, 1707)

A Description Of The Dreadful Fire Of London, In the year of our Lord 1666 (London:
G. Larkin, 1683), GL, Broadside 26.3

Doddridge, P., A Sermon Preached at Wellingborough, in Northamptonshire, November


Englands Lamentation For the Dismall Conflagration Of her Imperial Chamber the Citie of London: Sept. 2d MDCLXVI (York: F. Mawbarne, 1666)

Englands Warning or, Englands Sorrow for Londons Misery (London: T. Passenger & W. Whitwood, 1667)


An Exact Account of the most Remarkable Fires which have happened in London And other places in England, from William the Conqueror, to the Reign of the Best of Kings, Charles the Second (London: R. Head, 1667) GL, Broadside 3.12

Fenne, W., 'London Surveyed' in London in flames, pp. 158-66

The Fire Court: calendar to the judgments and decrees of the Court of Judicature appointed to determine differences between landlords and tenants as to rebuilding after the Great Fire, ed. P. E. Jones, 2 vols. (London: The Corporation of London, 1966-70)

Flagellum Dei: Or, A Collection of the several Fires, Plagues, and Pestilential Diseases that have hapned in London especially, and other parts of this Nation, from the Norman Conquest to this present, 1668 (London: C.W., 1668)

Flower, C., Mercy In the midst of Judgment, with A Glympse of Or A Glance on London's Glorious Resurrection, Like a Phoenix out of it's Ashes (London: N. Brooke, 1669)

Ford, S., 'The Conflagration of London', in London in flames, pp. 6-19

‘Londons Remains’, in London in flames, pp. 93-105

‘Londons Resurrection’ in London in flames, pp. 136-50

Foxon, W., A brief Discovery Of The particular making out the infinite Reigning and Being of God in Mankind. Together with a particular description of Hell, and the torments there ensuing and accompanying (London: W. Larnar. 1649), BL. Thomason Tracts E. 1367 (2.)


Hardy, N., *Safety In The Midst Of Danger. A Sermon Preached in the Church of Allhallowes Barkin, Jan.4. 1655. Upon the Anniversary Commemoration of that dismall Fire which happened in the said Parish, on Jan: 4. 1649* (London: J. Clark, 1656)

*Lamentation, Mourning and Woe. Sighed forth in a Sermon Preached in the Parish-Church of St Martin in the Fields, On the 9th day of September. Being the Lords-Day After The Dismal Fire in the City of London* (London: W. Grantham, 1666)

Harvey, G., *The City Remembrancer: being historical narratives of the Great Plague, at London 1665; Great Fire, 1666; and Great Storm, 1703*, volume 3: of the *Fire and the Storm* (London: W. Nicoll, 1769)


Hering, T., *The Triumph Of The Church Over Water And Fire. Or A Thankfull Gratulation for that Miraculous Deliverance of the Church and State of Great Britaine, from the Romish Tophet; or, that barbarous and savage Powder-plot* (London: N. Bourne, 1625)

Hesketh, H., *A Sermon Preached before the Right Honorable The Lord Mayor and Aldermen of London At Guild-Hall Chappel Upon the Second of September. 1679* (London: W. Leach, 1679)

_A Sermon Preached before the Right Honourable The Lord Mayor And Aldermen Of The City of London At Bow Church, September the 2d. 1682_ (London: R. Sollers, 1682)


Hopkins, W., *A Sermon Preached before the Right Honourable The Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Citizens Of the City of London, In the Parish Church of S. Mary le Bow, September 3. 1683._ (London: W. Kettilby, 1683)

Horton, T., *The Safety of Jerusalem, Exprest In a Sermon to the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor, with the Aldermen, and Common-Council of London* (London: J. Clarke, 1657)

Jacombe, T., Hosios Enkainismos, or, A Treatise of Holy Dedication, both Personal and Domestick (London: R. Smith & S. Gellibrand, 1668)

The Jesuit’s Manner of Consecrating Both the Persons and Weapons Imploy’d for the Murdering Kings and Princes By them accounted Hereticks (London: T.S., 1678)


Lamont, J., The diary of Mr John Lamont of Newton. 1649-1671 (Edinburgh: Maitland Club, 1830)

Lauder, J., Journals of Sir John Lauder, Lord Fountainhall, with his observations on public affairs and under memoranda, 1665-1676, ed. D. Crawford (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press for the Scottish History Society, 1900)

Litterae Consolatoriae; From the Author to the dejected place of his Nativity, the Honourable City of London (London: R. Reynolds, 1669)

‘The Londoners Lamentation’, in London in flames, pp. 84-8

‘London’s Fatal-Fall’, in London in flames, pp. 89-92

400
London's Flames: Being an Exact and Impartial Account of Divers Informations Given in to the Committee of Parliament (London, 1679)

Londons Flames Discovered by Informations Taken before the Committee Appointed to enquire after the Burning of the City of London And after the Insolvency of the Papists, &c. (London, 1667)

London's Flames Reviv'd: or, an account of the several informations exhibited to a committee appointed by Parliament, September the 25th 1666 (London: N. Ranew, 1689)

London's Flames Set in a True Light: Being a True and Faithful Account of the Several Informations exhibited To the Honourable Committee Appointed by the Parliament To Inquire into the late Dreadful Burning of the City of London (London: J. How, 1712)

‘London’s Index’, in London in flames, pp. 238-44


Lorrain, P., A Sermon Preach'd in the Morning at St Dunstan's in the West; and in the Afternoon (with Some Variations) at Newgate, on the Second Day of September, 1707 (London: B. Bragg, 1707)

Lowman, R., *An Exact Narrative and Description of the Wonderfull and Stupendous Fire-works in Honour of Their Majasties Coronations, and for the High Entertainment of Their Majesties, the Nobility, and City of London: made on the Thames, and perform'd to the Admiration and Amazement of the Spectators. on April the 24, 1685* (London: N. Thompson, 1685)

Markland, A., *Poems On His Majestie's Birth and Restauration, His Highness Prince Rupert's And His Grace the Duke of Albermarle's Naval Victories; The late Great Pestilence and Fire of London* (London: J. Cotterel, 1667)

Mason, C., *The Day of the Lord; Or, A Caution to the City of London after the many Dreadful Fires. Preached before the Right Honourable The Lord Mayor. And the Citizens of London At Bow-Church July the 9th. 1676* (London: J. Williams & B. Teuke, 1676)


'N. E.', *Londons Destroyer Detected; And Destruction Lamented: Or, Some Serious Ruminations, and Profitable Reflections upon the late Dreadful, Dismal, and never-to-be-forgotten Conflagration* (London, 1666)

Nicoll, J., *A diary of public transactions and other occurrences, chiefly in Scotland, from January 1650 to June 1667*, ed. D. Laing (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1836)


Parker, H., *The Original of Publick Calamities. A Sermon Preach’d before the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Several Livery Companies of the City of London. At the Cathedral of St. Paul, on Saturday, September the 2d, 1727* (London: W. Meadows, 1727)


‘Philanthropus Philagathus’, *An humble remonstrance to the King & Parliament In the Behalf of Many Decayed and Decaying Citizens and Families of London, Occasioned solely by the Dreadful Fire of That City, and Some concurring Calamitous Events of Providence since* (London, 1675)


Pratt, S., *A Sermon Preach’d before the Right Honourable the Lord-Mayor, the Aldermen and Citizens of London, At St. Mary le Bow On Thursday, Sept. 2. 1697* (London: E. Jones for S. Lowndes, 1698)

*Pyrotechnica Loyolana, Ignatian Fire-works. Or, the Fiery Jesuits Temper and Behaviour* (London: G.E.C.T., 1667)
The Ranters Recantation; And their Sermon Delivered At a Meeting on Tuesday last, in White-Chappel, being the 17 of this instant December (London: G.H., 1640). BL.

Thomason Tracts E 620 (10.)


Reasons humbly offered to The Parliament, for The Abatement of the Proportion of the Assessment upon the City of London (London, 1672) Guildhall broadside 20.109

Reasons Humbly Offered for a Bill To Rebuild the Parish-Church of St. Botolph Bishopsgate, at the Publick Charge, as one of the Fifty New Churches (1724), BL.

SPR 357.b.6.(48.)

‘Rege Sincera’, Observations both Historical and Moral upon the Burning of London, September 1666 (London: T. Ratcliffe, 1667)


Reynolds, E., Sions Praises, Opened in a Sermon Preached Before the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor, Aldermen and Common-Council of London: On the Day of Solemn Thanksgiving unto God For his long and gracious Preservation of that great City, from Pestilence, Fire, and other Dangers (London: G. Thomason, 1657)

Londons Resurrection or the Rebuilding of London (London: W.R. for T. Parkhurst, 1668)


Salter, S., A Sermon Preached before the Right Honourable The Lord-Mayor. The Court of Aldermen, And Several of the Livery Companies of the City of London. At the Chapel at Guild-Hall, On Tuesday the 2d of September, 1740 (London: E. Say, 1740)

Sampson, W., The Rector's Book, Clayworth, Notts., ed. H. Gill and E. L. Guilford (Nottingham: Henry B. Saxton, 1910)

Sancroft, W., Lex Ignea: or The School of Righteousness: A Sermon Preach'd before the King, Octob. 10. 1666. At the Solemn Fast appointed For the late Fire in London (London: R. Pawlett, 1666)

Scott, J., A Sermon Preached before the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of London; At the Church of St Mary le Bow, September the Second, 1686 (London: W. Kettilby, 1686)

Scott, R., A Sermon Upon Occasion of the late Dreadful Fire, which happened at Edinburgh the Third of February 1700 (Edinburgh, 1701)

The Screw-Plot Discover'd: Or, St. Paul's Preserved (London, 1710)

Settle, E., An Elegie On the late Fire And Ruines of London (London: W. Crook, 1667)


Stockton, O., *Counsel to the Afflicted: or, Instruction and Consolation for such as have suffered Loss by Fire* (London: E. Cotes, 1667)


Tabor, J., *Seasonable Thoughts in Sad Times, Being some Reflections on the Warre, the Pestilence and the Burning of London* (London: A. Seil, 1667)


Thomas, W., *The Countries Sense of Londons Sufferings In the Late most Lamentable Fire* (London: J. Sims, 1667)

Trap ad Crucem; Or, *The Papists Watch-word* (London, 1670)

A True Account of that Dreadful Fire, Which happened in the House of Mr. Samuel Seaton, a Pewterer (London: W. Downing, 1687)

A True and Faithful Account of the Several Informations Exhibited To the Honourable Committee appointed by the Parliament To Inquire into the Late Dreadful Burning Of the City of London (1667)

*Upon the Stately Structure Of Bow-Church and Steeple, Burnt, An. 1666. Rebuilt, 1679. A Second Poem upon Nothing!* (1679)


Vincent, T., *God's Terrible Voice in the City* (London: G. Calvert, 1667)


Ward, Samuel, *A Coal From The Altar, To Kindle The holy fire of Zeale. In a Sermon preached at a generall Visitation at Ipswich* (London: S. Macham, 1615)


Warning for Servants: And a Caution to Protestants. Or the Case of Margaret Clark, Lately Executed for Firing her Masters House in Southwark (London: T. Parkhurst, 1680)

Waterhouse, E., A Short Narrative Of the late Dreadful Fire in London (London: R. Thrale & J. Thrale, 1667)


Whately, W., Sinne no more, Or A Sermon Preached in the Parish Church of Banbury on Tuesday the fourth of March last past, upon occasion of a most terrible fire that happened there on the Sabbath day immediately precedent (3rd edition, London: G. Edwards, 1630)


Wild, R., ‘Upon the Rebuilding the City’ in London in flames, pp. 153-7

Wiseman, S., A Short and Serious Narrative of Londons Fatal Fire (London: P. Dring, 1667)

Wood, A., Athenae Oxonienses: An Exact History of all the Writers and Bishops Who have had their Education in The most ancient and famous University of Oxford, 2 vols. (London: T. Bennet, 1691-2)

Woodward, J., *A Sermon Preach'd before the Right Honourable the Lord Mayor And Aldermen Of the City of London, At the Cathedral of St. Paul's, On Monday the Second of September, 1706* (London: J. Downing, 1706)


**Secondary sources**


‘The arts and acts of memorialization in early modern London’, in *Imagining early modern London*, pp. 89-113


'Identifying regional variations from the hearth tax', *The Local Historian*, 33 (2003), 148-74


Baer, M. D., 'The Great Fire of 1660 and the Islamization of Christian and Jewish space in Istanbul'. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 36 (2004), 159-81


Baker, T. M. M., London: rebuilding the City after the Great Fire (Chichester: Phillimore, 2000)


Bell, W. G., The Great Fire of London (London: John Lane, 1920)


Bewes, W. A., Church briefs: or, royal warrants for collections for charitable objects (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1896)


'London widowhood revisited: the decline of female remarriage in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries’, *Continuity and Change*, 5 (1990), 323-55


'Charity universal? Parochial contributions to distressed Protestants in Cromwellian England’, Institute of Historical Research seminar, 9 December 2005
Boxer, C. R., *Some contemporary reactions to the Lisbon Earthquake of 1755* (Lisbon: Faculdade de Letras, Universidade de Lisboa, 1956)


Brett-James, N. G., ‘A speculative London builder of the seventeenth century, Dr. Nicholas Barbon’, *Transactions of the London and Middlesex Archaeological Society*, new series, 6 (1933), 110-45


‘Food consumption and internal trade’, in London 1500-1700. pp. 168-96


416
Literacy and the social order: reading and writing in Tudor and Stuart England
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980)

Bonfires and bells: national memory and the Protestant calendar in Elizabethan and

Davies, M., and Saunders, A., The history of the Merchant Taylors’ Company (Leeds:
Maney, 2004)


Deconinck-Brossard, F., ‘Eighteenth-century sermons and the age’, in Crown and mitre:
religion and society in Northern Europe since the Reformation, ed. W. M. Jacob

De Krey, G. S., A fractured society: the politics of London in the First Age of Party 1688-

London and the Restoration, 1659-1683 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005)

Dolan, F. E., Whores of Babylon: Catholicism, gender and seventeenth-century print

‘Ashes and “the archive”: the London fire of 1666, partisanship, and proof’. Journal of
Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 31 (2001), 379-408

Topographical Society Newsletter, 56 (2003), 5-8


Gaskin, M. J., Blitz: the story of 29th December 1940 (London: Faber & Faber, 2005)


Hanson, J., ‘Order and structure in urban design: the plans for rebuilding London after the Great Fire of 1666’, Ekistics, 56 (1989), 22-42


*Restoration: Charles II and his kingdoms, 1660-1685* (London: Allen Lane, 2005)

Harrison, R. H., ‘The rebuilding of the church of St Andrew by the Wardrobe after the Great Fire of London, 1666’, *Transactions of the Ecclesiological Society*, 3 (1954), 163-71

‘Temporary churches after the Great Fire’, *Transactions of the Ecclesiological Society*, 3 (1955-6), 251-8


Holmes, G. S., ‘Gregory King and the social structure of pre-industrial England’, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series, 27 (1977), 41-68


Lang, J., Rebuilding St. Paul’s after the great fire of London (London: Oxford University Press, 1956)


424


‘Class and credit: social identity, wealth and the life course in early modern England’.


‘From butterboxes to wooden shoes: the shift in English popular sentiment from anti-Dutch to anti-French in the 1670s’, *Historical Journal*, 38 (1995), 333-61


‘The great fire of Gravesend, 1727’, *Southern History*, 12 (1990), 19-33
The Great Fire of London (Stroud: Sutton, 1996)


Reddaway, T. F., The rebuilding of London after the Great Fire (London: Edward Arnold, 1940)


'Government and information in seventeenth-century England', Past and Present, 184 (2004), 33-68


Smith, N., "'Making fire": conflagration and religious controversy in seventeenth-century London', in Imagining early modern London, pp. 273-93


Whitteridge, G., ‘The fire of London and St Bartholomew’s Hospital’, *London Topographical Record*, 20 (1952), 47-8


