ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to understand how the ‘free movement of CARICOM nationals’ (FMCN) and intra-regional migration have become securitised in Barbados. The key aim of the thesis is to understand the social facts constitutive of the FMCN in Barbados. The thesis presents data on key securitising actors and audiences in Barbados. It analyses how Caribbean Community (CARICOM) migrants are understood to be posing threats and dangers to the Barbadian society and/or state. The processes, interactions, and discursive practices that lead to these conditions of security/insecurity are then examined in more detail.

The thesis, on the basis of an instrumental case study of Barbados, advances social constructivism and the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitisation as the most appropriate theoretical framework for gaining an understanding on the FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration dynamics. Primary data are drawn from a selection of methods incorporating elite interviews with key state/institutional leaders and the media. This method is complimented with documentary research in the format of parliamentary debates; government speeches and reports; books and journals; communiqués; and newspaper articles. The thesis engages with critical discourse analysis in order to gain analytical purchase on agency within domestic and international structures. It argues that market forces, material conditions, cultural constraints, and technological forces are crucial indicators for any reading of the securitisations taking place in the transnational and national spaces of CARICOM.

The key findings and analyses show significant challenges for Barbados regarding perceptions of national versus regional identities. With the functioning of the FMCN, the social construction of fear and mistrust leads to grave misunderstandings among multiple actors. The thesis’ original contribution stems from analysing the securitisation dynamics underpinning FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados and CARICOM.

**Keywords:** securitisation; migration; CARICOM; social constructivism.
Dedication

It is with the most appreciative humility, heart-felt endearment, and sense of duty, honour, and loyalty that I dedicate this Doctor of Philosophy thesis – ‘CARICOM and the Politics of Migration: Securitisation and the Free Movement of Community Nationals in Barbados’ – to my very dear daughter Tammara Brathwaite; my cherished son Ryan O’Neill; and to the enduring memories of my caring and beloved father, George W. Bradshaw.

Tammara is destined to chart and follow her paths. Ryan is early in his days. I hope that this work and sacrifice inspires them to dream their dreams and live their lives while always remaining steadfast in striving towards the intended objectives. My advice to Tammara and Ryan is: tu ne cede malis sed contra audentior ito (yield not to misfortunes, but advance all the more boldly against them).

I still remember those last words said to me by my father: “you have hid your lamp under a bushel.” Today, I have removed the bushel. My hope is that others may be guided by the light rather than cower in the darkness of self-made fear: omnia mutantur nos et mutamur in illis (all things change, and we change with them)!

George Christopher Brathwaite

June, 02, 2014
Acknowledgements

I first give thanks to my creator, Almighty God, for without the mercies, forgiveness, and perpetual guidance of that omnipotent spirit, I may have been lost in a sea of moral turpitude.

There are many persons who have walked this journey with me. Some of these kindred persons were able to see me strive towards the journey’s end. Yet, there are others who were taken away to a higher calling before I could deliver on my promise and potential. I know that with this thesis, the journey continues and there are other paths to explore.

Hence, my sincerest gratitude and thanks go to the most significant person in terms of directing my actual destination. Dr. Kyle Grayson has been with me each step, slide, and sometimes fall. Kyle has guided, supervised, mentored, coached, and pacified me through the ups and downs of the PhD process. I am not sure that I would have looked forward to telling persons about the miraculous ways in which angels perform their duties without need for praise or reciprocity, but I am sure to cherish every moment of recounting Kyle’s consoling and encouraging inputs.

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Indeed, I wish to thank the CARICOM Secretariat in Guyana; and the Ministry of Education in Barbados, especially Minister Ronald Jones; Diane Goodridge; and Suzanne Griffith.

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My appreciation stretches across from the academic staff to my fellow colleagues; thanks to all of you that I am privileged to have met and interacted with some of you beginning in 2008; the experience will be cherished. Of those still remaining, I wish you success in completing that ‘doctoral’ journey.

I am eternally grateful to the kindness of Russell Foster who is a very good friend, and to whom I owe much. My office colleagues deserve a warm and special mention: Gerard, Steven, Nick, and Megan, thanks.

The personal side will always be touching because to a lesser or greater degree, some persons have come to know me as I battled with the bitter whilst tasting the sweet. I express gratitude to Dr. Alana Griffith at Kent University; Errol Crawford and his children, especially Krystle who took the time to read some of my draft work. Gline Nurse and his children always kept in touch, and we became great friends. Andy, Trevor, and the boys ensured that spirited socialisation was to be had, ever so often in London; this kept me walking and thinking.

I thank my uncle Christopher and his family for lending assistance in time of need. In that regard, very sincere thanks to a cousin I met for the first time in 2011, Oscar ‘Jon Jon’ Brathwaite, whose help, encouragement, and generosity were timely and far surpassed my expectations.

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Somra, and Janelle Greenidge for their roles as friends and ‘personal’ cheerleaders.

The Barbados Labour Party has been kind to me in many respects; therefore I am happy to say thanks to all of the members of the political party. For special mention, I would like to begin by singling out for special thanks Anthony Wood who was Minister of Education at the time a scholarship was granted to me.

Also kind thanks for Mia Mottley; Owen Arthur; David ‘Joey’ Harper; Noel Lynch; Sir Henry Forde; Edmund Hinkson; Dame Billie Miller; John Howard and his family; Trevor Prescod; Henderson Bovell; Rev. Joseph Atherley; and my best friend in the party, Rawle Eastmond; Rawle is one of the most benevolent and genuine persons I have ever met in my lifetime.

Still even nearer to home, I have a long list of family and friends; if I am guilty of omitting anyone, please forgive me. Thanks to Howard Rogers; Joyce Goddard and family especially Paul Goddard; Douglas ‘Bernard’ Brathwaite; Frederick and Judy ‘Angela’ Forde; Ricardo Clarke; Deryck Barrow; Alfred Gibson; Margaret Inniss; Gordon Medford; Ellis Brathwaite; Harold ‘Ricky’ Morris and the guys of the ‘Round-Table’; Esther Layne; Chris and Paula Jarvis; Fitz Hall; Ian Sealy; Martinson Gall; Claude Aimey; Cheryl Crawford; my brother John Bradshaw; my niece Jo-Anna Bradshaw; Claude Aimey; and Pancilla Smith. Thanks to all of my childhood friends; you made me who I am.

I know that I am touched by having to recall all of these individuals who have in some way contributed to my beliefs that a journey can be obtained if the will is strong enough. This brings me to the persons that I cherish the most and the persons who have given the most in terms of their patience, enduring faith in my potential; and who have sustained me in many different but inspiring ways.

The dearest and most sincere thanks go to all of the following: Juliet Cadogan my special friend – who tirelessly read almost every draft chapter I completed. Juliet provided inspiration and encouragement from afar, time after time. Then there is my mother Dorothy ‘Peggy’ Brathwaite who gave birth to me; and the ever loyal, faithful, and strong believer in the choices that I make, Veldene Bradshaw, my mother who mothered me. To Tammara Brathwaite, a wonderful daughter, if too a distant observer; she did not give up on her dad when there was every reason to do so.

Finally, I thank those souls from whom I draw inspiration and who have contributed to shaping my Caribbean identity – the builders of Barbados and the Caribbean experience – I thank God Almighty, the Alpha and the Omega for this chance to live again. *Hoc est vivere bis vita posse priore frvi* (To live twice is to make useful profit from one’s past.) Experience is the best teacher, so learn from it. Thanks!
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Abbreviations
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<tr>
<td>APIS</td>
<td>Advanced Passenger Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLP</td>
<td>Barbados Labour Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>BWU</td>
<td>Barbados Workers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARIFTA</td>
<td>Caribbean Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>CCJ</td>
<td>Caribbean Court of Justice</td>
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<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
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<td>CDB</td>
<td>Caribbean Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFHA</td>
<td>Coalition for a Humane Amnesty</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHOG</td>
<td>CARICOM Heads of Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>CARICOM Skills Certificate</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSME</td>
<td>Caribbean (or CARICOM) Single Market and Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLP</td>
<td>Democratic Labour Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECLAC</td>
<td>Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMCN</td>
<td>Free Movement of CARICOM (Community) Nationals</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAIA</td>
<td>Grantley Adams International Airport</td>
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<td>GCIM</td>
<td>Global Commission on International Migration</td>
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<td>GMG</td>
<td>Global Migration Group</td>
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<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMPACS</td>
<td>Implementation Agency for Crime and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECS</td>
<td>Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>Peoples Empowerment Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rights of Establishment</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTC</td>
<td>Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the CARICOM Single Market and Economy</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>UWI</td>
<td>University of the West Indies</td>
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<td>WIC</td>
<td>West Indies Commission</td>
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<td>WIF</td>
<td>West Indies Federation</td>
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<td>WMR</td>
<td>World Migration Report</td>
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Chapter 1

Securitisation of the Free Movement of CARICOM Nationals in Barbados

1.1 Introduction and Background: The Research Problem

Since 2009, Barbados has introduced a series of policy measures designed to control intra-regional migration and better manage Caribbean Community (CARICOM) nationals entering the country. More controversial were formal policies and actions towards the removal of migrant CARICOM nationals from within the jurisdiction of Barbados. The purpose of this thesis is to determine how several policy postures and governmental actions became possible given Barbados’ historical position and shared geopolitical factors in juxtaposition to the other CARICOM member states. There are legal constraints at the domestic, regional, and international sites regulating systems of migration practices. Notably and hereafter referred to as the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC) is the international agreement that establishes the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME). The RTC became the national law for Barbados and all participating CARICOM member states before the year-end of 2006.

Specifically, Articles 45 and 46 among others, set provisions for the freedom of movement by the citizens of CARICOM participating states (see table 1.1 and fig. 1.1). CARICOM nationals are granted special provisions and rights under the RTC to freely move, work, and reside in another CARICOM jurisdiction under specific provisions. The declared goal coincides with the creation of a single market space in which labour, goods, and services would spur national and regional development among the CARICOM member states. Bernal (2005: 36) contends that “the CSME is a regional economic arrangement, which can contribute significantly to the structural transformation and economic development of the small, developing economies of CARICOM.” The freedom of movement allows for specific categories of labour to explore cross-border opportunities. CARICOM nationals, as independent contractors and service providers, can “establish and manage economic enterprises in any national
jurisdiction” (Pollard, 2007: 12). Anderson (2011: 5), qualifying the definition at Article 32 (5), indicated that CARICOM nationals are citizens “of each Member State and persons belonging to that State,” and they “share a common entitlement to the collective resources of the Region.” The treaty arrangements affecting Barbados and other CARICOM countries were intended to facilitate labour migration among the signatory and participating CARICOM member states.

Table 1.1: Articles 45 and 46 of the RTC

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Article 45 Movement of Community Nationals</th>
<th>Member States commit themselves to the goal of free movement of their nationals within the Community.</th>
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<td>Article 46 Movement of Skilled Community Nationals</td>
<td>1. Without prejudice to the rights recognised and agreed to be accorded by Member States in Articles 32, 33, 37, 38 and 40 among themselves and to Community nationals, Member States have agreed, and undertake as a first step towards achieving the goal set out in Article 45, to accord to the following categories of Community nationals the right to seek employment in their jurisdictions: (a) University graduates; (b) media workers; (c) sportspersons; (d) artists; and (e) musicians, recognised as such by the competent authorities of the receiving Member States.</td>
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<td>2. Member States shall establish appropriate legislative, administrative and procedural arrangements to: (a) facilitate the movement of skills within the contemplation of this Article; (b) provide for movement of Community nationals into and within their jurisdictions without harassment or the imposition of impediments, including: (i) the elimination of the requirement for passports for Community nationals travelling to their jurisdictions; (ii) the elimination of the requirement for work permits for Community nationals seeking approved employment in their jurisdictions; (iii) establishment of mechanisms for certifying and establishing equivalency of degrees and for accrediting institutions; (iv) harmonisation and transferability of social security benefits.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed as inhibiting Member States from according Community nationals unrestricted access to, and movement within, their jurisdictions subject to such conditions as the public interest may require.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. The Conference shall keep the provisions of this Article under review in order to: (a) enlarge, as appropriate, the classes of persons entitled to move and work freely in the Community; and (b) monitor and secure compliance therewith.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rather than facilitating people flows across national borders, many of the key actors, coupled with policy processes and regulations, have rendered the freedom of movement arrangements contentious, problematic, and difficult to successfully implement. Generally, there are several socio-political, legal, and economic issues and circumstances that have surfaced in national jurisdictions (inclusive of Barbados) regarding intra-CARICOM migration which are likely to create barriers for CARICOM’s attempts at deepening regional integration. There are

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1 Throughout the thesis, tables citing Articles contained in the RTC are sourced from the Revised
issues and contentious behaviours among multiple actors that tend to feed the emergent tensions and the fear-filled cross-border politics being evidenced for instance in Barbados. Uncertainty with the laws and practices, and acrimony in the various relationships, are fuelling tensions and unease in the socio-political arenas of Barbados. Therefore, this thesis is inquiring: how does the securitisation of the free movement of CARICOM nationals in Barbados become possible?

Thus far, nationals of Guyana appear to have been the main targets of discriminatory discourses and actions. Acrimony has tended to accompany the Free Movement of Community Nationals (FMCN) and there is evidence of hostility that is being manifested in Barbados. The social contact and political interactions among the actors are leading to a securitised condition; that is, “domains of insecurity [that] arise from institutional and political reactions to a [perceived] threat” (Huysmans, 2006a: 6). It is in this unstable sphere that is the focus of investigation into order to analyse the underlying factors shaping the local and regional environments of Barbados and CARICOM regarding the FMCN project. The purpose is to reveal the fears and tensions contributing to the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration and free movement of Caribbean nationals into Barbados.

According to Buzan and Wæver (2003: 491), securitisation is defined as “the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existentialist threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.” The theory of securitisation will be fully discussed in the literature at Chapter 3 and is given further ventilation in the empirical chapters that follow. Legally, the participating CARICOM member states are pursuing their stated and collective goal of free movement; but they are yet to effectively deal with deep issues of fragmentation and discrimination. These have surfaced 2

Vertovec (2009: 2) defines transnationalism in terms of the “sustained cross-border relationships, patterns of exchange, affiliations and social formations spanning nation-states.” Chapter 4 clarifies usage on the concept of transnationalism.
and/or resurfaced alongside attempts to facilitate intra-CARICOM migration and deepen regional integration.

**Figure 1.1: The 12 CARICOM Countries Allowing for the FMCN and ROE**

*Note:* These same countries for the purpose of this thesis form the CARICOM (Regional) Security Complex as explained in Chapters 2 and 3.

Caribbean states, regional institutions, and individual societies are hardly progressing in harmony towards the stated objectives of CARICOM; and especially the goals indicated in Articles 45 and 46 of the RTC. There is scepticism regarding the benefits of intra-regional migration for the national states. National populations, for example in Barbados, appear divided on the issue of CARICOM nationals living and working in local jurisdictions other than those in which they hold citizenship. Many actions by national actors do not conform to the stated desire of the member states for deeper regional integration and integrated development.
Time for Action, the final report of the West Indies Commission (WIC), insists that in CARICOM one “cannot talk community and treat community partners as foreigners” (1993: 469). Regional talks and declarations, especially those coming from the CARICOM Heads of Government (CHOG), have failed to live up to the expectations of the people in their respective national spaces. This posturing has brought scepticism to the RTC and the goals expressed for freedom of movement and Rights of Establishment (ROE). Notwithstanding, Prime Minister (PM) Anthony of St. Lucia contends that “these are exciting times for the region to pull together and break the internal partisan moulds that so often grip” the Caribbean people; and the region’s peoples “must not be afraid of the future” (2012). Intra-CARICOM migration viewed in this thesis from Barbados’ perspective will challenge PM Anthony’s supposition.

Realistically, intra-CARICOM migration is a mode of international migration characterised by the movement of people across sovereign state borders. Migration is, nonetheless, a reality confronting Barbados and CARICOM with challenges. Several negatives associated with international migration, including the potential for social and political conflict, are testing CARICOM states and societies. The institutions and mechanisms available within the scope of Barbados and the region appear to lack the appropriate policy frameworks for directly linking intra-regional migration to integrated development. North (1991:97) defines institutions as the “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction.” Also, North (1991: 97) affirms that institutions:

> Consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). … Throughout history, institutions have been devised … to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange. … They evolve incrementally, connecting the past with the present and future … [and] provide the incentive structure of an economy.

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3 Italics are this author’s.
4 The terms international migration, intra-regional migration, and intra-CARICOM migration are used interchangeably; however, intra-CARICOM migration is preferred in context of the thesis. The terms are defined in Chapter 4.
Political institutions and actors will tend to work in tandem or separation from other actors although their influences and outcomes are derived from and impact on the public. In the mostly archipelagic region, CARICOM’s political actors confront heightened forms of politicisation, discrimination, and unease concerning the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration. It is reiterated that the “mood of intra-CARICOM resentment and suspicion ... is potentially most damaging” to the future of CARICOM (WIC, 1993: 79).\(^5\) In Barbados, the multiple actors, their relationships and interactions are under-explored in the context of economic integration and integrated development.

Previous research undertaken on the region has not linked intra-CARICOM migration with the security logic pursued in this thesis. It is arguable that security concerns will inform national policies. There are phenomena directly impacting on the manifested conduct of three discrete groups of actors in an active cross-border environment. These actors are namely – securitisers, audience, and functional – and they are relational to the referents of the state and society. The interactions and linkages existing among these groups of actors have not been adequately explored or examined in any comprehensive investigation on intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados or any other Caribbean jurisdiction.\(^6\) It is precisely against this background that the key question for this thesis is: \textit{how does the securitisation of the free movement of CARICOM nationals in Barbados become possible?} The next sub-section provides background reading on CARICOM’s regional integration.

\subsection*{1.1.1 Beginnings: Independence, Regional Integration, and the CSME}

Byron (1994: 3) writes that “regional integration was identified soon after independence as an essential element in the strategies for survival and development” for the ‘microstates’ comprising mainly the English-speaking Caribbean. A period of decolonisation spearheaded the short-lived experience of the West Indies Federation (WIF). Beginning in 1962, the granting of

\(^5\) Italics are used to emphasise the importance of these factors to the investigation.
\(^6\) These specific terms defining and giving meaning to the grouped actors are fully discussed in Chapter 3 of the thesis.
independence to Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago by the colonial power signalled a period of change in Caribbean affairs, and resulted in the gaining of independence by most of the other Caribbean states. Barbados and Guyana became independent countries in 1966; and extending to around the mid-1980s, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), a sub-grouping of Leeward and Windward Caribbean islands, gained independence. The former colonies, operating first as the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) and then CARICOM, entered regional arrangements. The ‘Caribbean Community’ “is in fact and in law an association of autonomous political and economic entities” (Pollard, 2007: 10). Today, Barbados and the other CARICOM member states operate within the context of the ‘Community’ setting.

The RTC of 2001 became the official document establishing the CSME in 2006. It is a departure from the original Treaty of Chaguaramas established in 1973 but inaugurated in 1974. The Treaty of Chaguaramas gave effect to CARICOM and replaced the 1965 Dickenson Bay Agreement that had established CARIFTA. The RTC is designed to progress the process of Caribbean regional integration from being that of a common market into the creation of a single market and economy. The CSME, therefore, provides formal opportunities for CARICOM nationals and the free mobility of skills and labour among CARICOM member states. The CSME was conceptualised in order to “achieve sustained economic development based on international competitiveness” for the national and regional economies of CARICOM (CARICOM Secretariat, 2002: 1). In the context of Barbados’ participation in CARICOM, the country’s input towards the deepening of regional integration, like that of other member states, involves both leadership and compromise. The sovereign state engages in functional cooperation and it is reflected in regional ambitions and consensus allowing for labour mobility.

A legacy of colonialism lingers and continues to shape the mobility of people throughout the CARICOM region. CARICOM’s historical evolution and immersion into a global system (e.g. globalisation and the supply and mobility of labour and skills) was predated by the Atlantic slave trade. Barbados, for
example, was a central hub and first point of entry and exit for the trans-shipment of human cargo – distinct from migrants – that was traded and dispensed with in other parts of the West Indies and the Americas. Welch (2005: 61) asserts that in Barbados, “the Bridgetown port played a central role in the operations,” and over time, “the Bridgetown port rose to become the most important communications centre for the reception and dissemination of news on slave prices throughout the region.” Indeed, Welch concludes that “the expansion of the regional market underlies the place of the Bridgetown port in the trans-shipment of slaves,” and the connection between migration and commerce (2005: 63). Barbados and its capital city Bridgetown, for over 300 years, have been central to the movement of people to and within the Caribbean.

Fundamentally, the role of Barbados and history cannot be dismissed against the contemporary practices shaping intra-CARICOM migration and attempts at deepening CARICOM’s regional integration. Barbados, along with its counterparts in CARICOM, has set in train a process for the creation of a single market and economic space. The countries through multiple arrangements and treaty attempt to facilitate a legal form of intra-regional migration that is regulated through the RTC and the national laws of each participating member state. The RTC makes it explicit that the FMCN, and by extension, the ROE are encompassed within national, regional, and international contexts.\(^\text{7}\)

With the key provisions for movement of people within CARICOM, this thesis presupposes that there will be economic, legal, socio-political, and socio-cultural consequences for CARICOM member states and societies. CARICOM member states are economically differentiated, vulnerable, unequally populated and underdeveloped, and reflect glaring imbalances regarding quality of life, and standards of living. The geography and other defining socio-economic characteristics demonstrate a region of unevenness and difference. Key regional

\(^7\) In this thesis, reference to the West Indies and/or Caribbean addresses the member states forming CARICOM. The countries are described as the Commonwealth or English-speaking Caribbean. Suriname is Dutch-speaking, and Haiti is French-speaking. Haiti, a member of CARICOM, does not participate in the freedom of movement.
actors often suggest that there is usefulness embedded in the project of labour mobility in the region, but there is also a sense of imbalance regarding intra-CARICOM migration.

Table 1.2: Comparative Statistics for 12 CARICOM Countries Involved in the FMCN.

Source: Amalgamated from the Caribbean Development Bank, UN Human Development Reports, Central Bank Reports, and statistical data available on the CARICOM Secretariat’s Website.

Note: The asterisk (*) denotes an anomaly. The use of N/A means that the requisite data were not available or are otherwise unreliable for entry. In relation to the population data appearing in the table, the figures are estimates or actual censuses for the year indicated in the data set.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Area (Sq. Km.)</th>
<th>Population (Estimates and Censuses with Base Year Indicated)</th>
<th>Population Density Approximate Person/Km²</th>
<th>GNI per Capita (US$) 2010</th>
<th>Unemployment (Most Recent Year Indicated)</th>
<th>HDI Rank 2009</th>
<th>HDI Rank 2011</th>
<th>HDI Rank 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>10,991</td>
<td>2,705,827 (2010)</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>4,770</td>
<td>12.3 (2010)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>5,128</td>
<td>1,308,600 (2008)</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>15,400</td>
<td>5.8 (2012)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>22,966</td>
<td>312,971 (2010)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3,740</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barbuda</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>87,506 (2008)</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>10,590</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>71,612 (2008)</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5,410</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>163,820</td>
<td>517,052 (2008)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5,470* (2008)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Lucia</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>170,331 (2008)</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>4,970</td>
<td>20.6 (2010)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>100,510 (2008)</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>4,850</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are wide differences among CARICOM countries, and the sizes of the respective economies are impacted by huge demographic, geographic and economic disparities. Guyana alone occupies more than half of the total surface area of all the countries put together. Jamaica has more than 40 percent of the total population, and the OECS countries account for just over 8 percent of total
CARICOM population. The persistence of disparities can be explained by the unequal endowment in natural resources, for example, with Guyana’s multiple and diverse range of agriculture and mining facilities, and Trinidad’s oil (Craigwell & Maurin, 2010: 6). The unevenness is depicted in the presented data in Table 1.2, with fuller discussions appearing in subsequent chapters.

To date, it is estimated that a small percentage of the total CARICOM population of the signatory countries to the CSME have migrated to another member state. On average, fewer than 3 percent of national populations are immigrants although this too has wide variations and unevenness (Fraser & Uche, 2008: 30). Not many CARICOM nationals have applied for permission or sought approval for movement under the FMCN or ROE requirements. This could suggest that scepticism remains rife while fragmentation and divisive politicking continue to inform CARICOM nationals on the CSME. CARICOM has not been “strong enough to overcome the weaknesses of fragmentation” (Boxill, 1997: 39). Freedom of movement in CARICOM idealistically indicates “lofty and noble expressions of intent and expectations” (Campbell, 2007: 404). Barbados’ conduct, and to a large extent the behaviour of all CARICOM member states, is exacerbated by consequences of market-led and economically driven intra-CARICOM migration. There are profound socio-economic differences associated with CARICOM countries and implied is uncertainty over opportunities or burdens that exist in national labour markets; these are discussed in the following sub-section.

1.1.2 The FMCN and Intra-CARICOM Labour Mobility

This sub-section addresses the contention that labour mobility, within CARICOM, is anticipated to contribute to the general quality of life for regional citizens although there are issues regarding fairness and social welfare distribution. The FMCN was supposed to allow for the formal mobility of skilled labour across the national borders within CARICOM. Compton Bourne asserts that “geographical mobility of labour is a critical equalizing force in economic communities” such as those small and vulnerable economies found in CARICOM
(2003: 6). Arthur (2007: 70) calls for “a process which seeks to decrease the ‘decent work deficit’ wherever it exists” within CARICOM. Although partially functioning earlier, the official signing of the CSME on January 30th and July 31st 2006 gave effect to five categories of movers and service providers (i.e. CARICOM nationals).

Table 1.3: Article 32 – Prohibition of New Restrictions on the Right of Establishment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article 32</th>
<th>Provisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Prohibition of New Restrictions on the Right of Establishment | 1. The Member States shall not introduce in their territories any new restrictions relating to the right of establishment of nationals of other Member States save as otherwise provided in this Treaty.  
2. The Member States shall notify COTED of existing restrictions on the right of establishment in respect of nationals of other Member States.  
3. (1) The right of establishment within the meaning of this Chapter shall include the right to: (a) engage in any non-wage-earning activities of a commercial, industrial, agricultural, professional or artisanal nature; (b) create and manage economic enterprises referred to in paragraph 5(b) of this Article.  
3. (2) For the purposes of this Chapter "non-wage earning activities" means activities undertaken by self-employed persons.  
4. The Community Council may, with the approval of the Conference and upon the recommendation of COTED or COFAP, as the case may be, enlarges the body of rights provided in paragraph 3 of this Article. The competent Organ shall establish basic criteria for Member States in order to safeguard against manipulation or abuse of such rights so as to gain an unfair advantage against other Member States, for example, in the areas of nationality criteria and in the operation of companies.  
5. For the purposes of this Chapter: (a) a person shall be regarded as a national of a Member State if such person - (i) is a citizen of that State; (ii) has a connection with that State of a kind which entitles him to be regarded as belonging to or, if it be so expressed, as being a native or resident of the State for the purposes of the laws thereof relating to immigration; or (iii) is a company or other legal entity constituted in the Member State in conformity with the laws thereof and which that State regards as belonging to it, provided that such company or other legal entity has been formed for gainful purposes and has its registered office and central administration, and carries on substantial activity, within the Community and which is substantially owned and effectively controlled by persons mentioned in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) of this paragraph; (b) "economic enterprises" includes any type of organisation for the production of or trade in goods or the provision of services (other than a non-profit organisation) owned or controlled by any person or entity mentioned in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph; (c) a company or other legal entity is: (i) substantially owned if more than 50 per cent of the equity interest therein is beneficially owned by nationals mentioned in subparagraph (a) (i) or (ii) of this paragraph; (ii) effectively controlled if nationals mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph have the power to name a majority of its directors or otherwise legally to direct its actions. |

Subsequently, the CHOG dispensed through a communiqué that “the categories of CARICOM nationals entitled to move freely within the community be expanded to include nurses and teachers” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2006). This list of categories was further amended by the conclusion of the 29th CHOG conference
in 2009. On that occasion, the CHOG “agreed that household domestics who have obtained a Caribbean Vocational Qualification or equivalent qualification will be allowed to move with effect from 1 January 2010” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2009). Consequential to the FMCN, a number of conditions have emerged in which intra-CARICOM migration, on a whole, appears to attract contention as occasioned by the highly politicised public debates on migration and immigration issues in Barbados. Freedom of movement for qualifying CARICOM nationals is enshrined in various articles of Chapter Three of the RTC of which Articles 45 and 46 are highlighted in Tables 1.1 and 1.3 respectively.

The fundamental treatment of treaty and public international law regarding the RTC and CARICOM foremost resides with the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). The CCJ has the legislative and judicial mandate for the interpretation and application of law regarding issues and disputes emerging from within the context of intra-CARICOM migration. The CCJ’s future judgements will transcend the national laws of the member states; this legal route is provided for in the RTC under Chapter Nine entitled Dispute Settlement. Attempts at reconciliation between the domestic and international realms of politics expose and possibly aggravate the weaknesses of regional relations among relevant actors in CARICOM. Actors and their interests often become more averse to dealing with national priorities than demonstrating commitment to regional community obligations. The free mobility of skilled labour is often internalised by domestic actors as encroaching on the state/society dynamic. Concerns are raised on forms of dislocations and disruptions to traditional practices affecting the localised political community. The actors’ conduct and behaviours directly influence actual occurrences regarding the flagship project of the CSME – the FMCN and the free mobility of labour – in Barbados and CARICOM. Outside of the strict parameters of the law, both the national preferences coupled with the possible lack of adequate understanding regarding the benefits of intra-CARICOM migration have become areas of concern. A precise description, examination, analysis and evaluation of these activities are accounted for in later chapters inclusive of Chapters 6 through 8. The next section presents the key research question.
1.2 The Research Question

This section discusses the research question from a perspective that explores the circumstances, events, and processes which have made it possible for the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration to occur in Barbados. Complex phenomena operating in the same social, cultural, economic, legal, and political spaces, nationally and regionally, have arguably led to grave misunderstandings among some actors. The spate of affairs may have amplified the possibilities for conflict thus frustrating efforts at cooperation and consensus within CARICOM. Management of CARICOM nationals moving across sovereign borders and into Barbados for economic and other possible reasons (e.g. family reunification) raises various questions. *Has the issue of ‘illegal’ CARICOM nationals and in particular Guyanese citizens, entering Barbados for work and residence, reached a stage of successful securitisation? How has this condition become possible? Who were the key actors, their behaviours, and how did they shape actual outcomes?*

In 2008, there was an announced ‘amnesty’ by Barbados aimed at CARICOM nationals living *illegally* in the country. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) defines illegal migrants as persons “who infringe a country’s admission rules and any other person not authorised to remain in the host country” (2004: 34). Other terms are used interchangeably besides ‘illegal’ – clandestine, irregular, and undocumented – although reliance on the word ‘illegal’ connotes criminality. In Barbados, the political directorate debated the numbers and incidence of CARICOM nationals residing and working, legally and illegally, in the country. A great deal of attention was given to CARICOM nationals of Guyanese nationality. The practices contributed to CARICOM nationals (e.g. Guyanese in particular) being labelled as threats to the Barbados state and society. Hence, the stakeholder actors created unease and a tense political climate between Barbados and Guyana, and between Barbados and other member states. The actions performed by Barbados’ authorities carried significant implications for

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8 In Chapter 4, there is discussion on the classification of migrants inclusive of the quest to control borders against illegal immigrants.
‘community nationals’ working outside of their normal countries of citizenship. This thesis is interested in the political escalation of intra-CARICOM migration becoming a security issue in Barbados.

Securitisation can be examined by determining the shift in actions and attitudes by the political leaders and Barbadians, and the responses that particular actions received. Williams (2003: 516) argues that “any issue is capable of securitization if it can be intensified [politically] to the point where it is presented and accepted as an existential threat.” There are particular discourses, policies and practices that exemplify a condition of security/insecurity in Barbados; this becomes clearer as the thesis develops. A preliminary assessment suggests that with an increase in the politicisation attributed to the FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration, major concerns became expressed inside and outside of print and electronic media, government institutions, national legislatures, and civic spaces in Barbados. Intergovernmental networks, performing their functions through the CHOG, the CCJ, the CARICOM Secretariat, national/regional agencies, and other authorities or expert groupings were inundated with pressures and concerns raised by their respective constituents. There were specific concerns and, in some cases, reactions to the socio-legal and socio-political contexts of the FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration.

Indeed, the central argument in this thesis claims that – the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration are, together and separately, rendered and perceived as existentially threatening Barbados. In the speech acts undertaken by key actors like politicians, state officials, and the media, Guyanese and other CARICOM nationals were presented to the Barbadian audience (i.e. the local population made up of mainly citizens) as posing dangers to Barbados. The institutional expression of threat is a magnet for an audience to express fear and to become reactionary to the perceived or prevailing circumstances of danger. The idea that CARICOM nationals, moving under the auspices of the FMCN or general intra-

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9 The two main groups are identified as the securitisers and the audience in this thesis with functional actors being a third category. These terms that are used to distinguish the relevant actors in the securitisation process are expanded upon in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
CARICOM migration, pose dangers for the Barbados society and state is a security move. It further implies the necessary security framing that socially begins to construct the securitised condition. Thereafter, particular strategies are directed to appeal to the audience in order to achieve an anticipated response of support and legitimacy. This is followed by the implementation of specific measures which, more often than not, rest outside the parameters of normal politics and produce situations of exceptionality.

In other words, something has been said about the key issue of intra-CARICOM migration by the political leadership (i.e. the securitisers) in Barbados that connotes anxieties of danger among the local public (i.e. the audience). Subsequently, institutional actions by the state through its officials involve a mixture of socio-cultural, economic, and political-legal policy prescriptions. The actions expand pressures in the local and possibly the regional environment out of which the CARICOM national is presumed to be an existential threat to a referent object: the Barbados state and/or society. It is understood then that the threat is so potentially disruptive that Barbados must be protected via the implementation of urgent measures that will likely break-free of existing rules/laws and step outside institutionalised procedures. The CARICOM national, directly and/or indirectly affected, becomes exposed to a climate of political unease wherein discrimination, hostility, and maltreatment characterise the interactions.

In all of these episodes, there are internal and external actors comprising regional stakeholders and international onlookers. These may not be directly affected by the decisions and actions; but are best described as functional actors. The evidence of successful securitisation is therefore the culmination of a process to be revealed in Barbados’ interactions inclusive of those inside the national, transnational, regional, and international spaces. The next section asserts the principal aim of the thesis.

1.3 Aim of the Thesis
This section presents the main aim of this thesis. The principle aim of this thesis is: to analyse, describe, and explain the historical and contemporary factors,
structural and material conditions, actors and agency dynamics, and the interactions and processes that are implicated in the securitisation of the FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. Against the background that the sovereign states of CARICOM, through the concert of national leaders (e.g. CHOG), have endorsed the treaty arrangements inclusive of the CSME and FMCN, the utility of securitisation theory becomes fundamental for achieving the aim of the thesis. This is notwithstanding that securitisation theory is said to have “limited analytical purchase beyond Western Europe and North America by virtue of its Eurocentric ethnocentrism” (Bilgin, 2011: 401). Fundamentally, Wilkinson (2007: 8) argues that it is timely “to actively escape from the Westphalian straitjacket” which is more of an ‘institutionalized' Eurocentric view that has predominated security thinking. The key aim in this thesis, therefore, presents an opportune moment for an investigation on Barbados and the Caribbean that escapes the dominance of Eurocentric and traditional readings of security. The next sub-section addresses the originality claim made in relation to the thesis’ contribution.

1.3.1 The Originality Claim: Place of Inquiry and Interdisciplinarity

This sub-section explains the merits for a claim of originality regarding the place of inquiry, and the interdisciplinary character followed on examining the several processes regarding the security-migration phenomena under investigation. From the outset, securitisation theory has predominantly been used in North Atlantic and European cases, and itself, has been “slanted in favour of state-society relations in Western Europe” (Bilgin, 2011: 401). There is a similarity to other case studies of the securitisation of migration in terms of Barbados being a liberal democracy, a sovereign entity functioning within a regional architecture, the interplay of socio-economic, cultural, and identity elements, and a migration pattern of movement from poorer to richer countries. The fact that an application of securitisation theory, in specific contexts of Barbados and CARICOM, is used for the first time to explain the security-migration dynamic in the region, bears out difference and the original contribution being made to knowledge in this thesis. Thus, applying securitisation theory to intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados, in
the context that Barbados is a micro-state with a colonial legacy and, that it operates in a regional architecture/dynamic, is itself distinct from research done on the EU.

Salter (2007: 121) suggests that “questions of identity, borders, action and sociology are serious, and will provide another direction of research” to build on the existing compendium of security knowledge. A security reading of the issues occasioning ‘illegal’ CARICOM nationals and intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados, therefore, involves instances and circumstances that imply a contextual difference with European experience. This research can account “for contexts that are characterized by different configurations of state-society dynamics” (Bilgin, 2011: 401). The historical, economic, and cultural attributes among others, together with the similarities and differences disposed to Barbados and the CARICOM region, in contrast to the EU or any other region, are pivotal for understanding the original findings (i.e. negative and positive) that this research reveals.

Additionally, the complexity of the Caribbean’s intra-regional dynamics is perhaps compounded by a time-driven situation (i.e. decolonisation and independence) in which there was a “desire to ‘localize’ scholarship in the social sciences” that identifies with the specificities of the Caribbean (Girvan, 2006: 331). ¹⁰ Headley (2007: 91) argues that it is necessary to “rethink Caribbean culture for the purpose of creating a space,” and to bring “openness to new understandings of things, understandings outside the current structure of possibilities.” This wave of thought ironically coincides with Barbados’ existential claims regarding its security concerns, and in mechanisms for deepening Caribbean regional integration. By explaining how the securitisation of the free

¹⁰ See also Anthony Bogues and his appeal for an “epistemic decolonization of the [Caribbean] region” (2003: 149).
movement of Community nationals in Barbados becomes possible in a regional setting, the investigation makes an original contribution to knowledge.\textsuperscript{11}

Therefore, this thesis draws on breadth in the social sciences by using an interdisciplinary approach that helps to explain the social phenomena the investigation examines. According to Aram (2004: 382), interdisciplinary research signals ‘transdisciplinarity’ by traversing one or more aspects within the social sciences while seeking “movement toward coherence, unity, and simplicity of knowledge.” This is an essential feature given the application of securitisation theory and its “self-referential nature” that spurs a “framework for the further exploration of security dynamics, rather than providing a definitive answer from the outset,” and in which “the aim is not to simply apply the theories to a given situation, but also to examine any problems that arise and attempt to explain them” (Wilkinson, 2007: 8). An interdisciplinary approach to the security-migration problematic in Barbados presents this practical way to achieve the aim of this thesis and, empirically, to make an original contribution to knowledge. The next section introduces background aspects of regional integration that are germane to the inquiry.

1.4 Barbados in CARICOM: Integration beyond Economics

Considering that the aim of the thesis requires the need to explain complex socio-political situations on issues which rest on factors of Caribbean integration and legal agreements, this sub-section provides an introductory discussion that considers several facets that will emerge in progression of this thesis. From the outset, CARICOM countries have frustrated over small size together with their inexorable vulnerability to external pressures from the international system notwithstanding that size is relative.\textsuperscript{12} Braveboy-Wagner (1989: 152) argues that

\textsuperscript{11} Scholars and researchers have written sporadically on limited aspects relating to the concerns that this thesis investigates. There are, however, useful studies that address more generally aspects of the phenomena under study. For example, ‘Freedom of Movement: The cornerstone of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy’ by Peter Wickham and others (2004).

\textsuperscript{12} This reference to the term small state or microstate considers the relative nature of physical size and population; but institutional capacity can also be a consideration. Hence, Belize, Guyana, Suriname, and Jamaica are considered microstates alongside Barbados, Trinidad & Tobago, and the OECS states for any one or more of the reasons suggested.
“size is the primary constraint or the basis of most other constraints” facing the Caribbean. Anthony (1998: 40) contends that “the economic viability” of the small states, “removal of preferential access to some [external] markets, the decline in concessionary financing and dismantling of national and regional protectionist policies” have all worked to configure the Caribbean's vulnerability.

Approaches towards Caribbean regional integration have tended to follow the view that “emphasis on economic integration” is perhaps a “more practical” form of integration; and that the rationale “relates to augmenting security arrangements and facilitating economic development through trade creation and trade diversion” which become constitutive of “a larger market” (Boxill, 1997: 5). These assumptions are vital given the contextual knowledge which further situates the historical and contemporary events and circumstances in the integration process together with the interests and preferences of CARICOM’s state and non-state actors. The actors’ behaviours within the regional grouping of CARICOM has led to a gradual and incremental project with much of the leadership for integration shared among a few key states including Barbados and Guyana being at the forefront for the most part. The WIC (1993: 34) reveals that “the cautious goals, [and] the gradualist approach” followed by the regional member states failed to “match the people's growing expectations” and progress as seen as “too limited.” Grenade (2008: 119) surmises that “the pace and quality of integration is based to a large extent on the will” of the CHOG. Brewster (2003) argues that:

The CSME has been defined in the same way as the concepts applied to the earlier Common Market, that is, the gradual, State-by-State removal of barriers. By contrast, the European Union when inaugurating its single market in the mid-1980s introduced the concept of the internal market that created an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured.

Despite the 1989 proposal for a CSME, intra-regional migration continues to be a difficult but teasing factor for the member states and their populations. Several barriers to entry have either remained in place, or have been only partially removed since 2006. Intra-regional migration was meant to be an important feature of the single market. The CARICOM Secretariat suggested that the
combination of intra-CARICOM migration and the CSME signalled “increased business and investment opportunities by offering a wider market in which to participate as well as access to a larger pool of skilled workers” (2007: 1). It reasons too that regional integration was underexplored given the “challenge facing the Caribbean Community” which amounted to “one of political, economic, and social survival” in the context of how practical it was “to reconcile the exercise of sovereignty individually and collectively by the member states” (Joseph, 2005: 10). Arguably, it was economic integration, above political and/or social unity that many key CARICOM stakeholders inclusive of technocrats, academics, and national leaders presented to the region.

The CSME was promoted among the best survival strategies for CARICOM member states. “The gains from the CSME are expected to result in the social as well as the economic development of the peoples of the Caribbean Community. Although economic growth is a prerequisite for social progress, it cannot stand alone to guarantee development” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2007: 6). The single market was to be that mechanism which would transform the region and guarantee survival against global occurrences in a liberalising era. In the liberalising era, factor mobility across national borders is inherent; but people mobility hardly occurs without dislocations to individuals and states.13

"Geopolitical and geo-strategic shifts” such as newly emerging economies, the emergence of new trading blocs and alliances, and 9/11 brought about a momentum that has “forced countries of the [CARICOM] region to promote closer economic integration” among themselves (TWG, 2006: 1).14 Worrell (1993: 33) asserted that “the Caribbean is being driven together by a common fear of marginalization and loss of identity, as world trading blocs develop.” CARICOM member states, in the face of these international dynamics including globalisation, became compelled to adjust their national orientations towards a

13 In Chapter 4, there are discussions regarding liberalising factors and some possible impacts on intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados.
14 The Technical Working Group (TWG) on Governance, was commissioned by the CHOG and chaired by Professor Vaughan Lewis of the University of the West Indies, and a former prime minister of St. Lucia.
regional or community point of reference. Notwithstanding the current efforts towards a single economy, a combination of political, legal, social, cultural, economic and non-economic factors have exposed several structural limitations in Barbados and the CARICOM region.

According to Axline, any regional integration scheme that sets out to “contribute to development must adopt ‘positive’ measures to counter the forces which may impede it,” thus implying a “dirigiste rather than a laissez-faire approach to integration;” and this of necessity “requires a high degree of political cooperation” among the entities seeking to integrate (1978: 954). The politics proposing and resisting the need for labour mobility, flexibility, and competitiveness became areas of unease and concern for the CARICOM member states. Labour market dynamics, critical components to development, encouraged policymakers to promote freedom of movement as means for expanding the national economic infrastructure and enhancing the prospects for national and integrated development (CARICOM Secretariat, 2001: 1). The TWG indicated that “the move towards the establishment of the CSME,” demanded a greater requirement for clarity on national and integrated regional development goals (2006: 11).15 Accepting that regional integration often is presented through economic rationales and developmental lenses, Grenade suggested that Caribbean integration ought to be “evaluated in terms of its contribution to development” (2008: 117). The CARICOM Secretariat endorses: (a) the promotion of forging a common market with relevant ‘free’ trade policies; (b) the necessity for collective action; and, (c) the more politically driven orientation for functional cooperation (2005: 52).16 The concept of functional cooperation underpins the treaty arrangements and is one of the pillars upon which CARICOM’s objectives rest.

The literature shows that insular behaviour has emerged alongside the politics of regionalism and survival. Girvan (2007b: 413) argues that “popular support for integration” within the member states inclusive of Barbados, would require that

15 See also the Preamble to the RTC.
16 For further discussion, please see George Alleyne’s Functional Cooperation in CARICOM: Philosophical Perspectives, Conceptual Issues and Relevant Examples.
“economic benefits are spread broadly across countries and social groups” since in terms of distribution and given the politics of identity, “it makes a difference to quality of life issues such as crime, health and education.” These are important considerations linking several events, interactions, and perceived interests with the politics of intra-CARICOM migration. The next section sets out practical and methodological criteria that explain the selection of Barbados for this case study.

1.5 Barbados: An Instrumental Case Study

This section outlines the value of an instrumental case study on Barbados given the specific conditions and contextual dynamics that are directly associated with intra-CARICOM migration. Studying the occurrences in relation to Barbados allows for a qualitative case study that “facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources” (Baxter & Jack, 2008: 544). From the onset, this instrumental case study on Barbados “provides insight into an issue” of the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration which arises out of the contexts of shaping a regional single market and economy (Stake, 1995). The instrumental case study allows for the identification of the factors and aspects that made the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados possible.

Indeed, the TWG informs that “there is some tension between nationalism and regionalism,” with both concepts representing “legitimate aspirations of the people” comprising the Caribbean Community” (2006: 13). Examining these types of contexts and issues regarding the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration with Barbados set as the case study reveals an observation that sits at the heart of the process of securitisation regarding the social construction of conditions whether the produced phenomena are rule-making or rule-breaking. According to Creswell and others (2007: 246), with an instrumental case study, the investigative focus is “on an issue or concern” such as the securitisation of intra-regional migration; and this spotlight is therefore indicative of “one bounded case” through which numerous other issues may arise. Moreover, the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados is “looked at in depth, its contexts scrutinized, its ordinary activities detailed, and ... [it] may or may not be
seen as typical of other cases” (Stake, 1995). Implicitly, factors of sovereignty, national identity, national interests, and other unique characteristics are integral in the context of this case study.

Issues of national identity, for example, are examined in the thesis given that an application of the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory tends to focus on social constructions in order to explain the security phenomena. In other words, with Barbados forming the instrumental case study and, using securitisation theory, allows for discovery of facts and meanings regarding national identity and customs. According Wæver (1995: 54), the necessity is to understand “what undercuts the political order,” considering that the threatening phenomenon “must therefore be met with the mobilization of the maximum effort.” The ways that Barbadian actors interact and behave with other CARICOM actors tend to suggest that the social and political actions coupled with the collective culture are of paramount importance.

An examination of intra-CARICOM migration and Caribbean regional integration, therefore, while being specific to the socio-cultural politics and legal claims regarding intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados, reviews but builds upon existing literature. It adds to knowledge on international security and intra-regional migration through methodological freshness, if not uniqueness. This methodological framework is presented in Chapter 3 at Section 3.6 and subsequent. The following sub-section provides a rationale for the selection of Barbados to form the instrumental case.

1.5.1 Why Barbados and Not Other Member States

In this sub-section, the aim is to disclose the main criteria for purposively selecting Barbados as the instrumental case study given the anticipated utility of securitisation theory. An ambition is to clearly set out the criteria for selecting Barbados given the ways that the justifications can be annexed to rudiments of securitisation theory. Huysmans (2006a: 61) argues that “administrative and political practice inscribes the relation” to the things underscoring this research topic on the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration. The requisite research
question prescribes the aim of the thesis which is to achieve an accurate understanding of the social and political facts leading to the securitised condition in Barbados. Barbados, together with 11 other CARICOM member states, participates in the CSME regime. The grouping has undertaken specific steps allowing for the FMCN and for hassle-free intra-CARICOM migration to occur since 2006.

Table 1.4: Main Criteria for the Selection of Barbados as Instrumental Case study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barbados’ Unique Features</th>
<th>Barbados’ Ties, Similarities and Differences within CARICOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In relative terms, the country is demographically homogenous with over 90% of the local population being of African descent</td>
<td>A major sea and air-transit conduit to developed countries, as well as being a regional hub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A central travel hub in the region with tourism being the foremost sector in a service-oriented economic industry</td>
<td>Traditionally, pivotal in regional leadership by being a founding member of CARIFTA and CARICOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The first and only premier of the defunct 1958-1962 WIF, Grantley Adams, is Barbadian</td>
<td>Holds the ‘country’ portfolio for the implementation of the CSME inclusive of monetary union within CARICOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The most advanced social welfare system among CARICOM member states</td>
<td>Consistently, is the highest ranked CARICOM country on the UNDP’s Human Development Index (see tab. 1.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The highest population density among CARICOM member states</td>
<td>Host to several international institutions for which the populations of other CARICOM member states must travel in order to conduct their business (e.g. The British High Commission and Embassy of the United States of America)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of the 12 CARICOM member states fully participating in the CSME, Barbados is the only one that had only one coloniser, that being the British.</td>
<td>One of the main countries into which the largest proportions of CARICOM immigrants express willingness to work and reside</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In explaining the factors upon which the selection of Barbados rests in the instrumental case study, the details are streamlined into categories for analytical efficacy. Barbados’ socio-economic and physical characteristics are depicted in Table 1.2 with Table 1.4 setting out useful considerations that are unique to Barbados. These details in Table 1.4 are basic but provide the analytical cusp from which the discussions on methodology in Chapter 3 expand, followed by a further grounding in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. Through integration and the CSME, the member states appear somewhat “wedded to each other” for the purpose of survival (Campbell, 2007: 405). Similar to other CARICOM member states, Barbados is structurally influenced by a legacy of colonialism.

Consideration on ‘survival’ is crucial to securitisation theory and it has been emphasised in relation to Barbados by PM Thompson as he contends that “regional integration is the last best hope for the Caribbean,” because “going it
alone or fragmenting into unworkable reconfigurations ... cannot be an enduring solution” for Barbados and the CARICOM member states (2009n). Successive governing administrations in Barbados have operated against a backdrop of traditions although gradually adjusting to challenges confronting the post-colonial and developmental state. Tennyson Joseph acknowledges that Barbados has erected “a highly developed welfarist-interventionist state,” and the country has been able to reach and maintain a “relatively high human development standard” and to “enjoy a commitment to democratic norms and institutions” while boasting of “high levels of social and political stability” (2006: 17). The consequential discussions are anticipated to provide a better understanding of the issues posed by the security-migration problematic in Barbados. The methodological limitations are discussed in the final sections of Chapter 3. The next section outlines the supporting research questions.

1.6 Contextualising the Research: Subsidiary Questions

This section lists important questions that are directed at international migration and aspects of Barbados’ national socio-political ordering whilst recognising the significance of Barbados’ arrangements in CARICOM. Barbados is operating within the consensual arrangements and legal parameters of treaty and international law. Hence, the convergence of intra-CARICOM migration and the FMCN are to be viewed from the intersections of domestic, regional, and international policies and practices. Declarations made by leaders and other actors in Barbados, and actions that purport to convey a deepening of regional integration, are key considerations in the investigation regarding the securitisation of the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. It is exactly the confluence and/or distinctiveness of security and legal/illegal migration that the interactions and processes instrumentally are considered informative sources of social facts.

CARICOM nationals move between the spaces of local and national politics towards transnational and regional spheres of institutionalised political activity. These are the ‘facilitating conditions’ – the conditions under which the speech act
works – in which a securitisation is likely to become successful; the sphere may involve rivalling identities and interests, contextual and social factors, the grammar of security, and other aspects that seldom remain static (Buzan et al., 1998: 32). It is for this reason that this thesis relies upon a wide array of literature and evidence that address the Barbados context. The investigation is bridged by drawing upon previous studies and through primary and secondary sources of data that speak to CARICOM member states and societies.

For instance, elite interviewing is a main method of data-gathering used in the investigation. There were 11 interviews purposively selected and representing a range of experts. Included are: the Prime Minister of Barbados; the CARICOM Secretary-General; the Honorary Consul for Guyana; the Programme Director in the CSME Unit in Barbados; academics linked to CARICOM research; a former immigration officer in Barbados; and local media personnel inclusive of an editor-in-chief. As stated earlier in the chapter, the media can be considered an important institution given its nature of work and roles played in politics. Overall, the data-gathering strategies drew on documentary research inclusive of reports, books, and selected speeches. The themes of the discourse are compatible with the major research and the key aim in this study. Principally, this thesis is guided by the following supporting questions:

a) What are the main advantages and disadvantages of the FMCN? (See Chapters 1 and 4).

b) Is there a local demand in Barbados for skilled labour considering the categories that are permitted to move on the basis of the provisions detailed in Article 46 and other relevant Articles contained in the RTC? (See Chapter 4).

c) What single event or discourse gave rise to the identification of CARICOM nationals, in particular Guyanese, as dangers for the Barbados state and/or society? (Chapter 6).

d) How did the process of securitisation flourish in a local environment that appears split between insular nationalism and regional ambitions? (See Chapters 2, 3, and 6).

17 A detailed list of the interviewed persons is provided in Table 3.3.
e) How necessary is economic migration to the development of Barbados; and is the CSME hampered by dysfunctional intra-CARICOM migration? (See Chapters 4, 6, 7, and 8).

f) What is the role of culture in popular politics and matters of identity, citizenship, sovereignty and Caribbean integration? (See Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 8).

g) Is the mass media (in Barbados and across CARICOM) an architect of fear or is its role the messenger of fear given the contexts of intra-CARICOM migration? (See Chapters 6, 7, and 8).

On their own, answers to the above questions are insufficient for a clear understanding on the securitising process that was triggered by the determination that the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration are existential threats to Barbados. However, these questions are put into the national/regional spaces of Barbados and CARICOM in order to draw out, interpret, and explain social realities and meanings. The local norms (e.g. economic, cultural, and social) are important factors for drawing contextual meanings on Barbados. The next section gives a synopsis of the significance of this research.

1.7 Importance of the Research

In many ways, this investigation will add to security and intra-regional migration knowledge in Barbados and CARICOM. Asserting that a condition of insecurity is being socially created in Barbados is characterised by several factors that have implications for the broader study of international relations and political sociology examined in this inquiry. These factors include but are not limited to the determination by Barbados that one or more entities have posed an imminent danger for the Barbados state and/or society. There are claims that the CARICOM national migrating into Barbados is someone to fear, and that the state through its officials must utilise means to immediately alleviate or curtail the pending danger. It is the combination of these factors that paves the way for this thesis to investigate how these related security-migration phenomena become possible in Barbados.

The analysis on securitisation and its application to intra-CARICOM migration expose problems relating to identity, intra-CARICOM migration, and immigration
among others which prompt questions on matters arising from legal statuses; social and political rights; and the utility of public resources. Experiences linking Barbados to other CARICOM member states reverberate around complex issues of intra-regional migration and are framed in security discourses. This thesis reveals that discursive practices under facilitating conditions made it possible for policy directions which gave credence to Barbados’ claim of being confronted with a particular danger. By discursive practices, this thesis particularly refers to social actions occurring in everyday practices but which largely arise, implicitly or explicitly, from political and institutionalised statements enunciated in Barbados and CARICOM. The final section in this introductory chapter summarises the structure of the chapters to follow.

1.8 Thesis Structure
Having outlined what this thesis is concerned with exploring, detailing the research and subsidiary questions, and precisely articulating the aim of this investigation, this section outlines and summarises the structure of the remainder of the thesis. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on issues of security. Traditional and non-traditional views are presented thus indicating paradigmatic shifts on readings of security. The chapter begins by acknowledging the contributions of realism on the emergence of critical theories of international relations and security. Theoretical points further demonstrate the contested scope of security as an explanatory tool. The approach in this thesis promotes the use of social constructivism. Social constructivism departs from realism although realism is used as a basic standard for reflecting on traditional security knowledge. Particularly, Chapter 2 indicates the necessity for moving from a realist, state-centric view on security towards a social and discursive treatment of the security issues under investigation.

Chapter 3 begins by advancing a comprehensive framework in which to understand the actors, processes, interactions, and other important variables under securitisation theory. Consideration on the discursive practices is instructive; and the chapter illustrates the ways that a combination of factors makes for a
‘successful’ securitisation. The appropriateness of social constructivism via securitisation theory is a critical approach best suited for capturing the nuances of a security-migration nexus. This theoretical chapter is developed in such a way as to introduce and discuss the methodological parameters used in the thesis given the complexities that abound in linking security to migration issues. The sets of data provide analytical purchase for the remainder of the inquiry. Indeed, the chapter builds upon the Copenhagen School’s reading of securitisation and contributions from leading critics. It provides a research design that is appropriate for understanding the dynamic practices evidenced in the process of securitisation as can be attributed to the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration pursued in Barbados.

Chapter 4 identifies and reviews relevant scholarship on migration, immigration, and transnationalism. Literature on the factors emerging across national and regional arenas, on account of the dynamism found in Caribbean migration, is reviewed in Chapter 4. The dynamics of international migration are projected as useful links with the practical experiences and the theoretical assumptions advanced in Chapters 2 and 3. General and specific discussions on migration and immigration draw out similarities, differences, and significant anomalies regarding Barbados and patterns of behaviour within CARICOM. The review captures specifics on transnationalism, liberalisation, globalisation, development, and even sovereignty regarding migration and the impact on states and societies. The discussions illustrate the formation of policies and actions regarding the FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. In Chapter 5, there is discussion of the characterisations that account for perceptions about Barbados’ identity. It highlights the historical development of Barbados from colonial and post-colonial perspectives, drawing out on representations that feed on traditions, cultural norms, and current situations which tend to inform the nature of a Barbadian identity. Also in Chapter 5, there are discussions of the key Barbados and regional institutional actors and how they relate to the CSME and the regulating of the intra-CARICOM migration project.
Chapter 6 describes the critical moment of the speech act of security. It illustrates the agenda setting and threat construction of undocumented and CARICOM nationals becoming dangers for Barbados. In Chapter 7, there is particular emphasis on the securitisation process and the particular securitising moves that bring fruition to the political exception in Barbados. Exceptionality and rule-breaking – going beyond the norms of ordinary politics – are contextualised against the practices happening in Barbados regarding intra-CARICOM migration into Barbados. Chapter 8 furthers the discussion with political exception having been accomplished, and the securitised condition materialised. This chapter addresses, in addition, a monumental case before the CCJ. It examines immigration issues at Barbados’ borders, and it provides discussion on several of the main implications for Barbados inclusive of important socio-cultural dynamics.

Chapter 9 details the main findings from the investigation. The chapter shows that securitisation theory, used for the first time on intra-regional migration in Barbados and CARICOM, is appropriate for an investigation of the issues. This originality is able to provide insights on the security-migration nexus and effects impacting on integrated development in CARICOM. The chapter closes by summing up the findings and provides ample information on the overall impact of applying securitisation theory to the project of intra-CARICOM migration. It specifically highlights how the securitisation of the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration was possible in Barbados. In addition, Chapter 9 indicates possibilities for future research, considering two key things: (1) could the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration been avoided if the approach to the CSME was different; and (2), in the same way that securitisation became possible, could the condition be reversed? The thesis ends by stating its major contribution to the interdisciplinary literature on international relations, security studies, international migration, and regional politics. The next two chapters will be contextual and theoretical; the empirical accounts of the phenomena are provided for in Chapters 6 through 8.
Chapter 2

Security: From Traditional Perspectives to the Social Construction of Securitisation

2.1 Introduction: Positioning Security Knowledge

The overall aim of the chapter is to review literature on the concept of security. Given the issues to be discussed in this instrumental case study on Barbados, the chapter explores how security can be understood. Is security objectively determined or is it a subjective phenomenon? Throughout the sections, relevant literature is used to explain how particular theoretical assumptions can be linked to practices in view of the fact that they exert different types of influences on approaching security. Ranging from traditional to critical approaches, the chapter sets the stage for advancing a theory of securitisation which follows in the next chapter.\(^{18}\)

The leading positions considered in this thesis are grouped around theories falling under a realist paradigm\(^ {19}\) and social constructivism.\(^ {20}\) Notwithstanding that other theoretical perspectives are important, it is necessary to constrain theoretical arguments in terms of their concrete utility; this calls for isolating and explaining the most relevant issues to be examined in this inquiry. Indeed, a high proportion of background material for developing this review and

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\(^ {18}\) This chapter introduces the concept of security by first addressing traditional perspectives on what is security. The next chapter considers in a more precise way the concept of securitisation theory, especially as advanced by social constructivists and the Copenhagen School. There has never been an examination of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados, explained from the particular theoretical lenses of social constructivism.

\(^ {19}\) The term ‘realist paradigm’ is used in this thesis to capture and combine the different schools of realist and neorealist orientations. It is to be noted that there is no discussion of liberalism and its variants because largely these share many of the same underlying assumptions with regards to the nature of security, save for differences in relation to the prospects for sustained cooperation in the security realm.

\(^ {20}\) In the same way the realist paradigm contains its variations, social constructivism similarly operate with variants (see later in Section 2.4.1). Smith (1999: 685) contends that “constructivist accounts offer alternative ways of conceptualizing the relationship between norms, discourse, language and material capabilities, and as such can work alongside rationalist accounts.” In this vein, constructivism has its own trajectories that are more or less rationalist, and more or less depicts reflective thought. Overall, constructivism may be said to be a critical theory; this thesis links it with other perspectives that are critical of realism and traditional approaches to international relations inclusive of post-structuralism in so far that it provides valuable insights on the security dynamics under investigation.
thesis draws from the *Copenhagen School*, relevant followers, and/or critics. The next section presents a realist view of international politics.

2.2. Realism: A Standard, Not a Theoretical or Political Fact

This section provides a realist platform for conceptualising security; it starts with orthodox positions that feature in mainstream assumptions of international politics and international relations theory. Booth (1991: 528) submits that realism not only establishes the “agenda” in international politics, but it “stresses the tragic and conflictual side of relations between states, and sees foreign policy in terms of the pursuit of the national interest, defined as power.” Legro and Moravcsik observe that “realist theories rightfully retain a salient position in international relations theory” (1999: 5). The realist paradigm assumes that: (1) states are the key actors in international politics; (2) the international system is anarchic; and (3) power is central to political life in which states see their survival as priority, and there is the proclivity to maximise the relative power of a state. Attention to these factors, perhaps, reflects Crawford’s view that classical realists hold to certain basic assumptions in which “humans are assumed to be naturally aggressive, power-seeking, fearful, and rational” (2009: 271). It is a reasonable argument, therefore, to present realism as “an approach to international relations” that has “a distinctive but still diverse style or tradition of analysis” situated in a realm of power and interest (Donnelly, 2000: 6).

Buzan and Hansen (2009: 28) argue that realists have “privileged the security of the state and have understood security largely through the use of (military) force.” Krause and Williams affirm that throughout the course of realism and passing through to its systemic variant in neorealism, there has been a “linear process of scientific progress” that evolved with an “explicit epistemic hierarchy” which foregrounds the realist paradigm on “conventional security studies;” and eventually realism sets “itself up as the judge of alternative claims” (1997: 37). In

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21 Theorists that are labelled or follow the influential Copenhagen School usually include Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. Some key works cited in the thesis are: Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan and Wæver 2003, and Buzan and Hansen (2009: 36). The Copenhagen School focuses on societal/identity security and provides useful theoretical direction on securitisation.

fact, the discipline of International Relations, according to Wyn Jones, is essentially ‘statist’ and is “based on the foundations of a realist understanding of world politics” (1999: 95). Wæver (1997: 26) maintains that “realism is the prototype of what most other theories try to do.” Realism’s foundations thus offer the analyst on security study a base for theoretical grounding and/or of departure from orthodox understandings of security.

Table 2.1: Two Broad Paradigms in International Relations/Politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REALISM</th>
<th>SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States are the most important actors</td>
<td>States may or may not be the principal actors, but focus should be on the social rather than material factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on the behaviour of states and achieving relative gains</td>
<td>Focus on identities, interests, processes, interactions, and intersubjective factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The condition of anarchy is prevalent which results in a security dilemma</td>
<td>Anarchy is socially constructed as a result of structures that are the products of ideas, shared knowledge, material and social resources, and discursive practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States must of necessity rely on self-help measures</td>
<td>Actors are influenced by ideas and norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of force is always a possibility for states</td>
<td>Conflict, war, and insecurity are the results of discursive practices and self-fulfilling practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus is on power/security or security/power. Power maximisation in order to protect the national survival</td>
<td>Focus is on understanding the dynamics on an issue and making the necessary change in order to achieve different outcomes. Pursuit of policies for enhanced cooperation due to shared knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States adopt rational decision-making and policies</td>
<td>Need for understanding the social structures in society and political communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic politics is largely irrelevant to international relations</td>
<td>Interactions at all levels and between groups are significant in behaviour; hence there is no partitioning between the domestic, national, regional, or international politics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under realism, there are definite presumptions that try to capture political reality derived from observable conditions and from orientations to state-centric politics. Key assumptions defining realism spring from the idea that international relations is conducted by rational state actors who seek to survive within the underlying anarchic conditions prevalent in the international state system (see table 2.1). Things occurring in the domestic structures and governance of states are secondary to the overall pursuits of actors in the international system. The international system is seen as exhibiting the perennial condition of insecurity, hence its importance to shaping state conduct.
For instance, realists draw on Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan that indicates the absence of a supreme authority to govern the affairs of men man is predisposed to a ‘condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man’ (Hobbes, 1996: 208). In Table 2.1, the category of realism shows that one likely reading on the state of nature is that security/insecurity leads to a security dilemma wherein states operate with “pessimistic caution and shape their policies in relation to the capabilities possessed by other states, rather than in relation to possible intentions” or what may enhance societal security (Sheehan, 2005: 9). This thesis argues that because realism is preoccupied with the prevalence of systemic level anarchy in the pursuit of self-interests and power, it is too limited to either give an adequate explanation of the issues revolving around the FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration, or to clarify aspects of security that take place within and across societies without being overly state-centric or remaining narrow regarding factors of state sovereignty.

Wendt (1998: 113) is informative suggesting that “realists of all stripes believe that states do what they do because it is in their national interest, and that the national interest is self-regarding with respect to security.” In essence, the classical realist and liberal paradigms tend to focus on materialist structures and power at state levels, but overlook “how interests are thought to be [socially and culturally] constituted” (Wendt, 1998: 114). This *faux pas* contributes to weaknesses that emerge under a realist paradigm. The pessimism underscores the proclivity for advancing self-interest that is shielded in the cloak of the nation-state and in which the relative gains become objectives of their own in response to the security condition. As a matter of fact, Reus-Smit (2001: 521) argues that “realists treat sovereignty as an empirical attribute of the state, an assertion that states make about their territorial authority ... as an absolute, an empirical or institutional fact that cannot be qualified without nullification.” The treatment of security that is being established in this chapter contests realism’s positions which remain rooted in problematic assumptions about anarchy and state sovereignty.
Realism is short-sighted insofar that one may decide to depart from a classical definition of security purporting to be exercised in the strict domain of anarchy and performed by rational actors working for and against the sovereign state. This situation notwithstanding, indicates that realism has come to signify a prevailing socialisation of mistrust among sovereign states. Katzenstein (1996: 26), for instance, argues that some realists attempting to “explain aspects of national security with reference to social facts” resort to “a materialist or rationalist view of the world;” their analytical explanations on “identities and norms either are derivative of material capabilities or are deployed by autonomous actors for instrumental reasons.” This is significant in the context of domestic factors shaping national identities and interests in Barbados and CARICOM due to the customary ways that each CARICOM member state internalises its sense of national belonging.23

Keohane (2005: 14) believes that realist theories explaining international behaviour “on the basis of interests and power alone are important but insufficient for an understanding of world politics.” Indeed, Wæver observes that “in most debates it is assumed that realism is the appropriate theory when one needs to explain the uncooperative behaviour of states” (1995: 397). Those actors seeking to enhance cooperation and deepen integration as is the situation occurring among the sovereign state entities of CARICOM’s participating member states, are moulded to think fundamentally in terms of power and interest maximisation which are concerns that can impact on cooperation and hence influence conditions of insecurity.

It is in this sense that Buzan and Hansen register that realism “imposes assumptions on reality and, to the extent that it is influential, may therefore create the reality it assumes” (2009: 31). Slightly contrary to that view, Sterling-Folker (2006: 17n) asserts that “realism remains dominant not because most IR scholars subscribe to it, but because it allows IR scholars to define alternative theoretical

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23 This point on identity and the representations being made by relevant actors is discussed in Chapter 5 with examples given.
perspectives in relationship to it.” Realism glosses over individual agency by reducing international politics to one of rational decision-making within a limited set of options. In fact, the so-called imposition claim is a general critique of traditional arguments in realism; it is purported that realism stages the possibilities for conflict and war thus creating conditions of insecurity. Realism remains, nonetheless, inadequate for contestable and intersubjective linkages within society that fluctuate between identity and interests in Barbados and CARICOM. The next section discusses what can be said of security? Indeed, what is security?

2.3 What Is Security
Considering the conceptual understanding of security and juxtaposed to the empirical questions regarding the FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration, Wæver contends that “security cannot be fixed a priori in its definition” (1998a: 79). Booth (2007: 150) asserts that the manner in which “one conceives security is constructed out of the assumptions (however explicitly or inexplicitly articulated) that make up one’s theory of world politics.” Wolfers (1952: 482) recognising the complexity regarding what is security, argues that, the term security “covers a range of goals” so wide that, “highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of security” and in real terms, security “points to some degree of protection of values previously acquired.” Grayson (2008: 38) offers the ‘common terminology’ indicating that security is “about being protected, being free from danger, and feeling safe from threat;” and he makes a further determination that “security theory and security practice are always reflexive ... [and] feed back into each other.”

According to Waltz (2004: 2), a theory is a “mental picture of a domain – a picture showing how the domain is organized and how its parts are connected. Theory isolates a realm in order to deal with it intellectually.” Against these claims, Booth’s assertion is that security is “an epiphenomenon of political theory” (2007: 150): one's view of the political will shape the view of security that one holds. Differences between the domestic and international realms of
security exacerbate differences and highlight some similarities among the theories that are individually and collectively used for communicating positions on the determinants of security. Wæver (1998: 105) posits the view that “without war, security becomes much more complex, and the identities built on this kind of security pose challenges not only to security analysis but generally to international relations theory.” For him, thinking has to become unfettered from traditional thought; however, security will for some time remain a slippery and contested concept.

Buzan (1991: 15) asserts that security “encompasses several important contradictions and a host of nuances all of which can cause confusion if not understood.” The statement presents the difficulty of attempting to limit our thinking as to what constitutes security and even for whom and by whose account. Multiple readings of security lay a foundation for understanding the complex and ‘ambiguous’ phenomena of ‘national security’ and the emerging issues that are to follow in this investigation. It is essential to consider orthodox approaches that are featured in existing literature, but it is equally rewarding to draw insights from the unorthodox approaches which embark upon reading into the intersubjective areas and aspects on the phenomenon of security. Stern (2006: 192) argues that:

Security narratives are ostensibly written to provide safety, to counter danger. They can also be seen as attempts to impose order and certainty, to ensure existence. As a critique of the logic of the foundational myths of modern sovereignty, security instead can be understood as a discursive practice, which cannot be separated from the processes of identity formation and even the constitution of subjectivity.

Many of the factors under investigation in this thesis may often be reduced or go completely overlooked by researchers of the realist paradigm. Considering the complexity and intersubjective diversity of human and social phenomena, there are similar theoretical challenges with respect to security as a human experience. Of particular importance to this thesis is how best to analyse the interplay of a range of social, political, cultural, and even economic factors in the shaping and implementation of a security agenda within the particular context of Barbados. The limitations of realism are clear prompting Williams to argue that the ‘impact
of domestic structures’ and the ‘influence of culture and identity’ are “remarkably marginal ... within ‘classical’ realism, and that a broader, more sociologically and institutionally rigorous theory of the structure, dynamics, and multiple determinants of ‘politics’ at the domestic level is essential” for understanding and developing international security and international relations (2005: 105). It is in this fundamental regard that theorising on what is security, and especially considering intra-CARICOM migration, becomes interesting. Traditional positions, out of which many classical explanations of security originate, tend to be one-dimensional and narrowly state-centric. The next section provides a fuller discussion on contemporary readings of security dynamics by bringing social constructivism into the main focus.

2.4 Social Constructivism: Domestic Structure and Social Activity

This section turns attention to social constructivism. In this thesis, constructivism is understood to encompass a focus on the actors and their identities, the relationships and interactions that occur in the social structure, and the discursive elements that are involved in shaping and giving meanings to the contexts in which the milieu of social and political phenomena are produced and emerge. Smith (1999: 685) suggests that “constructivist accounts offer alternative ways of conceptualizing the relationship between norms, discourse, language and material capabilities.” Farrell (2002: 50) argues that constructivism locates “actors in a social structure that both constitutes those actors and is constituted by their interaction;” and what makes the difference between a realist paradigm and a constructivist perspective is that:

Constructivists tend to concentrate on the social structure of state action at the level of the international system. What matters most for realists is the material structure of world politics. States do what they have the power to do. For constructivists, states do what they think most appropriate. ... [And] constructivists are interested in exploring how norms shape world politics in general.

Price and Reus-Smit (1998: 259) contend that with constructivism, many general assumptions advance a “sociological perspective on world politics, emphasizing the importance of normative as well as material structures, the role of identity in
the constitution of interests and action, and the mutual constitution of agents and structures.” Hence, the following sub-sections are thematically divided and accordingly labelled: *Social Constructivism: General Assumptions; and Reading the Social Facts and Discourse.*

### 2.4.1 Social Constructivism: General Assumptions

In this sub-section, there is a brief presentation of general assumptions found in social constructivism that are applicable given the research question, and the aim of this thesis. Pouliot (2004: 320) contends that “the subdivision of constructivism into allegedly rival variants and the inquisition into who are its ‘genuine’ disciples lead to futile label wars.” This is acknowledged by Balzacq (2010) who states that constructivist approaches not only “vary widely in their nature,” but often the theoretical positions challenge researchers “to carefully think about the kind of constructivism present in securitization.” Risse and Wiener argue that social constructivists “share the ontological concerns about social understandings and systems of meanings” although they do “differ on epistemology” (1999: 776).24

Having established that social constructivism is a departure from realism, one is mindful that Smith (1999b: 77) explains that:

> The state is no longer the only or core actor, and as a result it is less privileged than before. The concept of security is more widely defined than before, and thus the sub-field of security studies is more intellectually exciting ... [and] above all there is an intellectual eclecticism about security studies specifically, and international relations generally, that stands in marked contrast to the ‘separate’ and authoritative discipline [read through realism].

This sub-section argues that constructivism is appropriate and can aptly explain security and intra-CARICOM migration phenomena, with key aspects of constructivism impactful across other theoretical perspectives. Hoffman (2009: 245) suggests that constructivism’s “strongest attribute” resides in “laying bare the ideational, intersubjective social structures that are conditioning behaviour, identity, and beliefs” which are the main targets of this inquiry in relation to security knowledge and meanings on intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados.

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24 These arguments surface again in Chapter 3, Section 3.6 on methodology.
Thus, the approach that is followed throughout this thesis is akin with Hoffman’s account; it leans towards an interpretive constructivism. Aware of the epistemological separations within constructivism, a full-fledged debate on the ontological or epistemological differences is not warranted nor is it pursued.

For Ruggie (1998: 857), social constructivism “rests on an irreducibly intersubjective dimension of human action.” McSweeney (1999: 219) suggests that “knowledge is made politically available to the cause of social change to the extent that it is discursive and capable of being theoretically articulated.” Social constructivism attempts to address these factors and their shortcomings by directly focusing on norms, political culture, and other intersubjectives found within the domestic structures. This is a fundamental position to take given that constructivism forms part of the leading literature on security issues. Pouliot (2004: 320) asserts that “constructivists can address the ‘politics of reality’ in their own pragmatist terms rather than going all the way to postmodernist relativism.” On that basis, security and securitisation are two complex and contentious concepts that, in many respects, continue to be at the forefront of international politics.

To move beyond these limitations, it is important to view security in its political and social dimensions. Doty (1998: 72) argues that in deference to the concept security, “a one-dimensional understanding is inadequate in terms of both scholarship and policy.” This is a purposive analysis that examines the contexts, meanings, processes and interactions. Social constructivism is a “theory of process, positing fundamental dynamics of interaction between actors and between actors and their social context” (Hoffman, 2009: 242). In addition, rules and norms are significant analytic elements; constitutive rules regulate behaviour among actors in Barbados and CARICOM. Ruggie (1998: 871) contends that “constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up a particular class of consciously organized social activity … they specify what counts as that activity.” Björkdahl (2002: 9) expresses the view that conventional theories do not “capture adequately the influence of ideas, values and norms on the identities and interests
of actors.” The following sub-section discusses the reliance on discourse as a form of analytical reading of security.

2.4.2 Reading the Social Facts and Discourse

This section discusses social constructivism’s practicality in offering lenses through which to examine the domestic structures and actors’ interactions that make for a contextual reading of security dynamics in Barbados. McSweeney (1999: 89), from the onset, insists that “to broaden and deepen the concept of security carries the risk that threats are expanded to include all the vicissitudes of life, and that security ... will be extended to include all possible sources and causes of insecurity.” This is not the intent in this research; rather it proposes a review of literature on security locating the process of securitisation in a practical and analytical framework. There are social facts, meanings and understanding that emerge in the general domestic and transnational arenas, in which social interactions take place, and tend to determine political outcomes.

Checkel (2006: 3) suggests that social constructivism has a “particular analytic orientation,” and that the key for understanding the possibilities of actions, events, and circumstances, is that the theory “explores the role of language in mediating and constructing social reality.” Williams (2003: 518) argues that the “significance of the speech-act of security lies ... in its specific vision” of a security self-characterisation. In the context of discourses of security, Jackson claims that security discourses are “a deliberately and meticulously composed set of words, assumptions, metaphors, grammatical forms, myths and forms of knowledge” that become part of the framing in order “to achieve a number of key political goals” (2005: 2). Price and Reus-Smit (1998: 269) defend the value of maintaining “an interest in the sociolinguistic or discursive construction of subjects and objects,” arguing that the “socio-historical conditions under which language, meaning and social power interact” are consequential “on how meanings arise and operate.” These aspects are crucial in the contexts and politics of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados.
Language and discourses, however, are not the only tools brought into use by constructivists for explaining security issues. Pouliot (2004: 327) asserts that “constructivism is not exhausted by language” and that the “social construction of reality is not limited to speech acts and language games.” Balzacq (2002: 192) contends that “if from the standpoint” of followers to the Copenhagen School “an effective securitization is derivable from the constitutive rules of the speech act,” there is every reason to accept that “the strategic approach embeds it in a configuration of circumstances, the congruence of which facilitates the realization of securitization.” Williams (2003: 512) concedes that the “processes of securitization take on forms, dynamics, and institutional linkages that cannot be fully assessed by focusing on the speech-act alone.” This important statement is elaborated upon in the methodology sections of Chapter 3.

Although the language of security practically determines the security issue, there are technological, economic, and other material factors which in combination with relevant institutional linkages construct the emerging contexts in Barbados and the security complex of CARICOM. Buzan and others define a security complex (see fig. 1.1) as representing “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interrelated that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (1998: 12).²⁵ Speech acts, while being “some of the most important mechanisms that generate social reality ... are never sufficient to constitute social facts and maintain them through time” (Pouliot, 2004: 327). Examination has to consider the specific actions, contexts, processes, structures, socio-cultural and material conditions that are consequential to the discursive utterances.

Quite explicitly, constructivism, “stresses the ways in which human action is linked to the subjective constitution of social reality” (Williams, 2007: 24). Farrell (2002: 51) insists that social constructivism, even within the contexts of its variants, proposes “a common view of the role of norms, of actors and structures

²⁵ The next chapter considers several institutional linkages, and it provides the research framework linking theory, norms and cultural practices.
as mutually constituted, and of the relationship between identities and interests” for the study of security issues and international politics. The extent that Farrell collapses the variations found in social constructivism may be arguable, but the general point is that constructivism’s utility, for addressing socio-political concerns in security, is itself insightful. In fact, Terriff (1999: 239) argues that “ideas are changing how we understand security, and there is no reason to believe that this process is likely to cease anytime soon.” The eventuality is that social facts are “the essence of constructivism,” and social facts are “essentialized by agents;” these types of insights on the social facts “provide constructivists with ‘foundations of reality’ that allow them to develop knowledge about social life while remaining agnostic about reality” (Pouliot, 2004: 332). As such, this thesis adopts constructivism’s position that ideas, norms, identities, interests, and so forth become generators of discovery and meaning.

Figure 2.1: A Model of the Domestic Structure

The domestic structure, as understood from Figure 2.1, is conceptually and analytically a combined representation of several key segments comprising a range of factors that come to shape and reflect social life and political organisation in Barbados. The operational effects of intra-CARICOM migration
that are raised in the concerns threatening Barbados are open to and reveal several socio-cultural and socio-political contexts. The investigation is positioned to explore the security-migration nexus that is contextually conditioned domestically and in a complex security field. In essence, leaders, state administrators, and other publics such as technocrats are part of a group that is constitutive of securitising actors. Indeed, all the groups of actors, implicitly or explicitly, act in differentiated but constitutive roles in the security realm. The audience and the functional actors are collectively part of the agency involved in shaping actions. The actors’ performances, identities and interests are domestically immersed and are connected. Indicatively, domestic structures are linked by ideational, material, and institutional factors and these are conditioned by the actors, identities and interests. The constructed politics, policies, and practices occupy places in the domestic structure.

Deudney (1996: 192) emphasises that “social practices generate, sustain, and reproduce political orders” and these things appear to “constitute political order.” Domestic structures in the construction of politics and the security constellation draw on the main actors and elements comprising both state and society. The combination of social and material dynamics, therefore, matters in the perception and articulation of threats, dangers, and declarations of societal and national interests. Effectively, constructivism engages the interactions operating within the domestic structure and “stresses the ways in which human action is linked to the subjective constitution of social reality” (Williams, 2007: 24). Wendt (1995: 74) argues that “social structures are real and objective ... but this objectivity depends on shared knowledge,” and this is precisely why context matters. Reliance on shared knowledge is conducive for shaping what happens at the state level; equally significant, societal actors are instrumental in the context of security/insecurity. These aspects are further explored in Chapter 3 on discussions detailing securitisation.

Sterling-Folker (2006: 13) argues that “all outcomes in realist analysis ... are ultimately dependent on the relative power of the actors involved, with those
having greater power determining outcomes according to their own interests.” It is this orthodoxy that is increasingly being challenged in the field of security studies. Contrastingly, social constructivists’ like Wendt (1992: 411) argue that “once constituted, any social system [such as Barbadian society] confronts each of its members as an objective social fact that reinforces certain behaviours and discourages others.” It makes sense therefore, that discovery should entail identifying whose reality matters in security. Accepting the premise of a constructivist approach, this thesis approaches the problem under investigation with a view that security and securitisation are intersubjective and interactional dynamics. The next section begins by examining security knowledge and the constitutive elements of national security.

2.5 Security Knowledge and National Security
This section continues with a focus that departs from an *a priori* notion of security logic as generally argued by realists. The core of constructivism and the Copenhagen School is, as Wæver argues, that security “is a practice, a specific way of framing an issue” (1996: 106). Against this reading of security, there is appreciation for the socio-cultural antecedents that help actors to understand the prevailing situational concerns but are then able to transcend through contextual and current circumstances relevant security logic. The issues being played out regarding illegal and/or undocumented CARICOM nationals and, the intra-CARICOM migration project in Barbados, are examples of an emergent security discourse and logic. Buzan and others (1998: 30) contend that states and societies, once they have progressed an issue from being a regular political issue to a security concern, “cause[s] the actor to operate in a different mode than he or she would have otherwise.” In practice, "the definition of security is to a considerable degree determined by the community" in which the issues arise and the arena in which these issues are analysed (Buzan et al., 1998: 30). In such conditions, identity politics will feature as an important signpost for state and societal security since, it is from actors who can be multiple and differentiated, that security will take its meanings.
A key question shaping meaning is what is understood to be under threat: is it the state or society or both? Buzan and others emphasise that there is an underlying ‘sociopolitical’ logic of security out of which the task is to gain a “precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions” (1998: 32). Huysmans argues that “security practices articulate a particular kind of order ... [and] embody a particular kind of ordering ... [which] evolves in a determined way” (1998c: 245). Identifying and addressing these elements are essential discussions taking place on the social and political influences that possibly shape the security concerns regarding the FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados.

Hence, security is a major concept affecting both the society and state; it is likely to affect the identities and ‘negotiable’ interests of multiple actors. Security cannot be enclosed within traditional reflections of systemic anarchy and materialist conceptions of state-centric views of security in international relations. This realisation therefore calls for a simultaneous re-evaluation on the usage of the term national security. Shinoda (2004: 6) argues that “we may add the adjective, national, to clarify the context” indicating the literal “security of the state at least to the extent we identify the state as national. This is what is referred to as the ‘traditional’ concept of security.” Wolfers (1952: 482) contends that “the formula of the national interest has come to be practically synonymous with the formula of national security;” wherein, it is the state’s security that is problematised and prioritised. This thesis advances security knowledge on the basis that it is to be considered in the broader sociological inclusive of the cultural contexts of threats to an actor’s identity and interests. It is as much the policies and practices that distinguish the condition of national (i.e. state) security, or the security of the society. To this end, Wolfers (1952: 483) argues that:

It would be an exaggeration to claim that the symbol of national security is nothing but a stimulus to semantic confusion, though closer analysis will show that if used without specifications it leaves room for more confusion than sound political counsel or scientific usage can afford. The demand for
a policy of national security is primarily normative in character. … [There are] value judgments implicit in these normative exhortations … the term ‘security’ covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of security.

Taking security to imply the absence of fear, and insecurity to mean its opposite, it is the nuances that are protracted through actors and the institutional processes which reveal the context of the security knowledge in the security field. 26 McSweeney (1999: 128) argues that it is the “domestic process of state interaction with the sub-state actors which influences the sense of commonality brought to bear upon international relations.” It is appropriate that the levels of analysis are not restricted to thinking in terms of the state and national security only because the society can be a referent that needs not to be analytically decoupled from the state. 27 The next section provides a summary of the discussions advanced in this chapter.

2.6 Summary
This chapter provided a brief discussion on realism as a traditional starting point for explaining phenomena in international relations. It then proceeded to provide theoretical accounts of the contestable concept of security. In attempting to answer what is security, the chapter positioned the surrounding logic in such a way as to show that the state is usually a priori prioritised in orthodox security thinking. Attention is thus paid to the concept of national security as a vital factor when examining international politics. The chapter argued that traditional perspectives overlook issues relating to discourse, language, domestic structures, culture, and the constitutive identities of actors. Hence, processes involved with the actors’ identities and interests, and the combination of dynamic factors that can be found within domestic and international structures are of importance. These non-static dimensions are formative in the determination of an issue as an existential threat. These phenomena equally become lost or are treated as givens under a realist paradigm.

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26 The security field was defined in Chapter 1 and is illustrated in Figure 3.2 of the next chapter.
27 Discussion on the referents takes place in Chapter 3, and especially on the concept of societal security.
Hence, while traditional security theories limit the range of possible explanations for state and societal behaviour regarding issues of existential threats to the referents, social constructivism broadens the theoretical base on what can constitute a threat, and for whom or what, thus providing alternative readings on what is security. The chapter sets a foundation for discussions on securitisation theory as a useful tool for explaining occurrences in Barbados regarding intra-CARICOM migration. The next chapter will explore the fundamentals of securitisation theory and thereafter, the methodological framework is presented. The combination of Chapters 2 and 3 will provide an understanding of what security entails and how securitisation theory can render a better understanding of how it becomes possible in Barbados to reach a securitised condition on intra-CARICOM migration.
Chapter 3

Securitisation: Arranging the Methodological Dimensions

3.1 Securitisation: Chapter Overview

This chapter builds on Chapter 2, and advances a theory of securitisation that takes its basic structure from constructivism and the Copenhagen School. Drawing from the literature, this chapter shows that securitisation theory can be applied in this instrumental case study given the security field and the socio-political issues that have emerged on intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. There are issues that bring into consideration the contexts, actors’ identities and interests, ensuing relationships, and norm dynamics. To date, these phenomena have been understudied in studies on regional integration and intra-regional migration in CARICOM. The chapter will therefore provide theoretical consideration on the following:

- The crucial players (i.e. identities and interests) that are involved in the social construction of security/insecurity;\(^{28}\)
- Elements of a speech act;
- Essential aspects in the process of securitisation, inclusive of the nature of an existential threat, and the securitisers’ strategies for framing a security agenda;
- Venue-shopping and need for support treated as legitimacy from the audience; and,
- The state and society as constituting referents of security.

In addition, and positioned around these identified areas for key discussions, the chapter will reveal how *discursive dynamics* influence social and political actions. These factors are essential, especially when combined with the *contexts* that are peculiar to Barbados and CARICOM. There are embedded nuances that can have subtle effects on actors’ performances in the security field. This chapter will, therefore, describe and examine several of these aspects that are represented or altered based on the *positional power* utilised by actors functioning in the scheme of a highly politicised climate. Inescapably, the breadth of the literature prompts pertinent questions on aspects such as the actors, identities, political interests,

\(^{28}\) This connection or unity is for an analytical treatment. Wæver (1995: 57) asserts that “security” when coupled to “insecurity” is “not binary opposites.”
social interactions, and the institutional choices preferred as means for alleviating dangers to the existence of the referent object(s).

Inferred from Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998: 30) is that “different states and nations have different thresholds for defining a threat,” and hence, there are socio-cultural and other political peculiarities which are likely to affect how security knowledge is construed. Indeed, the discussions prevail within the broader analytical framework of a security constellation described as an “institutionalized set of meanings” in which the contextual and objective knowledge about security materialises (Huysmans, 2006a: 25). Buzan and Wæver (2003: 491) establish that the security constellation comprises that space taking in the “whole pattern formed by the interplay of ... domestic, regional, interregional, global” political relationships and events, and intermediary dynamics. Thus, against the continuing discussion on the determinants of danger and the influences used to ascribe particular social and political actions, the chapter follows two important streams.

An initial direction furthers the overall theoretical and conceptual nature on what is being securitised (i.e. the referent – state and/or society), and who specifically does security. Is security best understood to be a speech act or an interactional process? The second course in the chapter establishes the methodological appropriateness for using and applying securitisation theory in order to understand what is happening in Barbados. It asks, ‘what are the practices’ in relation to the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration that bring theory and praxis together? With respect to theory and praxis, Williams (1999: 343) contends that “the problem ... is that both theoretical and political reality,” will rarely fall into a neat package as with so many things mundane; and hence, “rethinking the nature of security may be an essential element in evaluating emerging structures of political practice.” More specific to this instrumental case study, Huysmans contends that:

Turning immigration issues into a security question involves a mobilization of certain institutions (e.g., the police), a particular kind of knowledge (security knowledge), and specific expectations concerning the
social exchanges between various social groups. It is an intersubjective understanding of security, rather than a subjective one. (2002: 42).

Thus, the question provides a framework to find an answer to the question of how was it possible, in Barbados, for Guyanese, CARICOM nationals, and intra-CARICOM migration to become securitised. The following section introduces in-depth but relevant discussions on the Copenhagen School’s basic assumptions coupled with other pertinent contributions from related but distinct schools of thought on securitisation theory.

3.2 Introducing the Copenhagen School’s Mark on Securitisation

In this section the emphasis is on providing pertinent details regarding the basic assumptions that have emerged directly and obliquely from the Copenhagen School’s perspective on securitisation theory; although this is not to dismiss substantial contributions from others. The section will also examine several contributors from outside of securitisation theory. This approach is based upon providing a better understanding of the application of securitisation theory to non-traditional security areas, and in a geographical setting not covered in the securitisation literature. Buzan and Wæver (2003: 86) contend that:

Securitisation has a meta-theoretical function in insisting that one can never infer mechanically from objective factors to ensuing security dynamics because ‘security’ is a political battlefield on which is fought out what counts as security issues and thereby what is acted on in a security mode. Thus, securitisation protects us from objective security including its blindness to regional variation.

One of the first premises of securitisation theory is that it pertains to an act. A security analyst needs not to be constrained by rigidity but rather focus on “the inherently political nature of any designation of security issues” as posing an existential threat (Wæver, 2011: 468). This assumption will therefore prompt further actions which are likely to focus and mobilise “attention and resources” beyond the traditional explanations that are weakened by examining only the objective factors (Wæver, 2011: 468). In this sense, the speech act is important, and so are actors and the subsequent actions and performances that socially and politically produce the securitised condition. As a speech act, Williams argues
that “securitization has a specific structure which in practice limits the theoretically unlimited nature of security” (2003: 513). Yet at the same time, securitisation theory reinforces the presence of significant actors, agency, referent objects, and conditions within a political arena (Williams, 2003: 513).29 Wæver additionally argues that “security is always relative, and one never lives in complete security ... [and] if one has such complete security, one does not label” a threat to be a definite security concern (1995: 56). There is not a universal threat in which all states and even non-state actors may at one and the same time always internalise through acceptance and perception that a particular issue constitutes an existential threat.

Balzacq is arguably more encompassing than Buzan, Wæver, or Williams considering the array of influences making security/insecurity. Balzacq (2005: 172) argues that securitisation is better understood as “a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction.” In essence, Balzacq’s theory of securitisation addresses concerns over the securitisers and audience, the speech act, the referent, and the many other elements that emerge in the process of securitisation. These pieces help to assemble the puzzle that is playing out in Barbados regarding the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. The significant actors, the utterance of a speech act, and the active process of securitisation are analytically important for an informed reading of the political event. The next section continues the review by presenting an overview of the pivotal actors that are common to the securitisation process.

3.3 Securitisers, Audience, and Functional Actors: Who Does Security

In this section, the task is to differentiate categories of actors and their roles in constructing the securitisation process. Another requirement is to further advance accounts illustrating those that can ‘speak’ or ‘do’ security, and under which set of circumstances they do so. As identified in Chapter 1, the categories of actors

29 See also Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; Elbe 2006; and Huysmans 2006a.
that are namely: the securitisers, audience, and functional actors. In addition, this general section specifically identifies some of the main in-group members operating within the context of Barbados regarding the threat posed by intra-CARICOM migration. Figure 3.1 shows the basic security field for Barbados, and it represents an illustrative synopsis of key actors. The security field is a contestable arena that additionally indicates the possible levels of analysis arising out of the framing of intra-CARICOM migration as a security problem for Barbados. In this thesis, the levels of analysis are methodologically and empirically situated against the macro sites of the state and society.

Not directly depicted are the functional actors unless one can discern the grouping in the first pictorial representing the CHOG. Generally, the identifying characteristics of all the groups of actors have a sense of familiarity, but contextually, they convey different and unique meanings. There may well be strong inferences as to whom these actors represent, or what their roles are in the social construction of security, and whether there is inter-changeability in terms of identity, function, or role. The sub-section below begins by defining and describing the securitisers; both in a general context, and then alluding to some specifics regarding this instrumental case study.

3.3.1 The Securitisers

This sub-section is a brief and incisive explanation of perhaps the most mentioned actor in securitisation theory. Essentially, a securitising actor is best defined as the individual or group, whom “by stating that a particular referent object is threatened in its existence, claims a right to extraordinary measures to ensure the referent object's survival” (Floyd, 2007: 329). The securitiser is the actor determining that an issue should be treated as an existential threat. The securitiser initiates a series of actions inclusive of framing, security agenda-setting, communicating or uttering threat to an audience about a referent, and ultimately works towards ensuring that he/she “has claimed a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means, to break the normal rules of the game” (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). A securitiser is the presenter of a threat and the one (i.e. individual
or group) that employs strategies inclusive of venue shopping in order to gain the legitimacy to act or cause others to act in the protection of the referent that is threatened.

Figure 3.1: Basic Security Field for Barbados

In Figure 3.1, and also depicted in Figure 3.2, the first column suggests that political leaders working in tandem with Cabinet colleagues (i.e. the executive), other political elites (i.e. usually in the legislature and sitting on the side of government under parliamentary systems), technocrats and state officials, supportive elements in the media, business and professional elites, and some academics considered to be the intelligentsia are potential securitisers. These classifications within the group of securitisers are the most likely elements within a body politic that are sufficiently influential and powerful to determine how issues are framed and given meaning.
Securitisers usually have a proximity to political power. Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002: 24) argue that with the securitisation of immigration and related practices, the securitising discourse “is often produced by politicians, security agencies [such as immigration and border control], and the media”. Members of these groups are better positioned, most of the time, to sway the collective polity in one direction or another. In this thesis, the central securitisers that are singled out given the time-frame are PM David Thompson and Freundel Stuart, the Barbados Cabinet, the Barbados Immigration Department, other key members of the Democratic Labour Party (DLP), and technocrats and/or academics such as Lindsay Holder working through segments of the local print and electronic media.  

*Figure 3.2: Key Components in the Social Construction of Security*

Looking specifically at Figure 3.2, in the first quadrant, there is the group categorised as securitising actors “who securitize issues by declaring something –

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^30 See Chapters 6, 7, and 8 for details on how the grouping of securitisers was able to function and influence the securitisation process.
a referent object – existentially threatened” (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). In quadrant two, this box corresponds to the FMCN and more broadly, it connotes the progression that intra-CARICOM migration is posing a specific threat to Barbados which leads to the third quadrant which pinpoints the hybrid referent objects of the state and society as claimed in this thesis. Methodologically, the sovereign state of Barbados and its corresponding society are sometimes treated as a single and hybridised referent, except for analytical purposes, when a separation is necessary for clarity. Notwithstanding, there is no departure from the realisation that “societal security has a whole spectrum of possible actors and objects ranging from the individual, through society and the state” (Wæver et al., 1993: 191). On the particularity of the FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration, perceived or actual threats cannot be inferred in the two illustrations, but the actors’ relationships in the field can be accounted for visually. Discursively, securitisers enable a series of processes wherein legitimacy is sought and anticipated due to the presentation of an existentialist threat to the audience through securitising moves. This assortment places a number of factors that one would find in the security constellation and the security field. The next subsection specifically addresses the audience.

### 3.3.2 The Audience

In this sub-section it will become clear that the audience is not an innocent bystander or some other entity devoid of any meaningful contribution to security knowledge and to the securitisation process and outcomes. The preceding sub-section argued that the securitiser was the presenter of an existential threat. In Figure 3.2 the audience is depicted in the bottom quadrant; and this is the specific group that is appealed to by the securitiser. The audience is a grantor of legitimacy based upon the level of support the securitiser is able to attain from the ‘targeted’ audience. An audience may comprise the general population or particular groups within a populace. Hansen (2000: 289n) notes that “the relevant audience need not be the entire population; especially in non-democratic countries the audience might well be much smaller and restricted to the power elite.” According to Roe (2008: 620), the role of the audience is paramount; and
concerning the interactions with the securitisers, investigating the role “serves to reveal securitization as a distinct two-stage process” involving the “stage of identification” where the issue of the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration issues are defined as “security;” and the “stage of mobilization” where the responses made by the audience to the issues and again by the securitisers to the audience’s responses are “thereafter established.” The impacts are profound for the Barbados state and its society – as originally uttered by those individuals or groups determining ‘immigration’ and ‘migrant’ issues reflective of the CARICOM national to be labelled a danger.

According to securitisation theory, the audience becomes like a magnet attracting the attention of the securitisers in what is an interactive and social process. Indeed, Hansen (2000: 290) argues that “one has to engage in a collective process where the relevant audience needs to be convinced – or coerced – into recognising the ‘threat’ in question.” Nevertheless, in representative democracies such as Barbados, it is widely accepted that governments (e.g. the DLP administration) “derive their legitimacy from their citizens, so they associate state and democracy without much sense of the limits of and contradictions between these two notions” (Bigo, 2002: 67). The legal character of the audience – Barbadian citizens – is the group to whom the securitisers presented the CARICOM national and intra-CARICOM migration as constitutive of an existential threat. Bigo (2002: 67) contends that “citizens” rightly conceived as Barbadian nationals in the context of this case, will tend to be in “opposition to foreigners, and, migrants,” who by virtue of their non-citizenship to Barbados, are “framed through various cultural discourses as foreigners, or as citizens of a different national origin, who do not fit the ‘national standard’ of norms and values” held in Barbados. The following sub-section highlights an often neglected grouping in the social construction of security; the functional actors.

### 3.3.3 Functional Actors

This sub-section serves the purpose of bringing into the picture a group for which it is not unusual to find less mention of in terms of the significance of their
interactions with others in the process of securitisation. Absent in Figure 3.1 would be the functional actors. According to Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, functional actors “affect the dynamics of a sector” and do not constitute either “the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object” (1998: 36). It would be a grotesque understanding if one was to overlook the influential roles played by the functional actors. These functional actors are often close enough to the action, but as Buzan and others would have pointed out, they are still somewhat removed from the main action being played out in the process of securitisation.

To some degree, a similar treatment is meted out to this grouping by analysts and researchers on securitisation theory. For example, Balzacq building upon and offering critiques of securitisation theory provides added meaning to securitisation but fails to acknowledge the roles that functional actors play. Balzacq (2011: 3) sees securitisation as:

An articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts ... are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications ... about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development.

Indeed, it is the functional actors, working independently or in support of the securitisers, audience, or the socially constructed enemies that can bring about transformations which the securitisers and perhaps none of the other actors may have contemplated. Functional actors’ perceptions can feed to the political administrators and elites who may often take the requisite policy action even though the functional actors are not the actors determining which issue is to be treated as a security threat, they are not the targets or victims of security measures, or for that matter, they may have no say regarding whether a particular issue gets pushed onto the security agenda.

Furthermore, the functional actors may be pivotal to securitisers in terms of providing ’shopping venues’ to address audiences. The security knowledge and
responses of functional actors in the security constellation may in the future become part of the securitised condition or form part of the resistance to that situation. One can think in terms of the institutions, given the treaty arrangements within CARICOM, which may have to manage interactions between parties once a securitised situation develops (e.g. the CCJ, the CARICOM Secretariat, and the UWI). Put plainly, many of the key actors in these agencies are themselves functional actors operating within CARICOM at both the institutional and informal levels. The next sub-section provides a short but necessary explanation regarding the referent object whether in the case of the state or the society. This has implications for further developments in the chapter and thesis.

3.4 The Referent Object(s): The State and/or Society

This sub-section provides an important segment that is beneficial for examining the process of securitisation, and how the theory links the state and society as referents. In the simplest format, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde define referent objects as those “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival” (1998: 36). Reflecting on the realist paradigm and the history of international relations on the sovereign state system, it has been the state, and by the same token, the nation-state whose “survival” that mattered (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). McDonald (2005: 298) asserts that “security has generally been understood in statist, exclusionary and militaristic terms.” Similarly, Liotta (2005: 50) contends that “most often, decisionmakers only conceive of security concepts within a power-dominant, state-centric mindset,” and this approach has meant that contexts and meanings had the ‘real’ potential of becoming distorted within such narrow parameters.

Wilkinson (2007: 9) contends that the security part of the act “is taken to signify the presence of an existential threat to the referent object, or, more simply, a threat to its survival;” and this is situated against a background that “traditionally, the referent object has been the state.” Indeed, Wæver (1995: 49) argues that “the state level is privileged even as national security cannot be comprehended at the state level alone.” Occurrences at the sub-state and within the society are
important dynamics. With the politics of migration, Wæver (1993: 26) suggests that “state security can be influenced by the security or insecurity of a society on which it is based.” Floyd (2007: 40) asserts that “logically, the provision of human security can only be guaranteed by a larger entity such as society, the state, or some global institution.” Furthermore, Wæver insists that the idea of societal security happens to be relatively novel and “on some essential points it goes against the established procedures and premises” of the security field that has benefitted from the dominance of realist and neorealist thought in international relations (1993: 27). In terms of clarity, Doty (1998: 77) argues that:

Societal security refers to the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. Societal security is inextricably linked with the notion of identity. Social society represents a fundamental rethinking of security and is an important shift in the concerns traditionally expressed in the security studies subfield of international relations. It provides an opening ... to address issues heretofore ignored. It moves us into the realm of society and all its various aspects that are relevant to the processes whereby identities are constructed and societies come to perceive their identities as being threatened.

Given that a political community will share aspects of bonding around collective identity, “when it is no longer clear who makes up the nation, a state’s internal sovereignty and the existence of the state [and the society] itself is threatened” (Doty, 1996: 122). In addition, Wæver (1995: 66) contends that “social processes are already under way whereby societies have begun to thematize themselves as security agents that are under threat.”

In the security complex of CARICOM, one has to find out what are the impositions affecting behaviour among the member states. Mistrust can sometimes lead to political games and strategies; and the interactions can create unease. For securitisation to work, according to Floyd, “a securitizing actor needs capabilities ... otherwise the securitization will amount to nothing more than a securitizing move,” and the move “would be the expression of existential fear only, with no resonance with the audience and, importantly, no consequent security practice” (2007: 41). Notwithstanding, Booth raises a criticism suggesting that the Copenhagen Schools’ reliance on “a

31 Italics are in the original.
discourse-centric approach [to security] misses chunks of reality, and is based on
the fallacy that threats do not exist outside discourse” (2007: 165). Contrary to
Booth’s assertion, it is only through discourse that a sub-set of a larger spectrum
of phenomena that may threaten a referent is imbued with the meaning of a
security threat.

Realism does not effectively account for several factors such as identity and
societal politics. Securitisation theory does account for the society referent and
hence it surpasses the narrow and state-centric articulation of security knowledge
achieved under realist traditions. Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein contend that
“as the world system changes, so does the way in which the domain of security is
defined and conceptualised” (1996: 72). This view reinforces the social
constructivist outlook informing securitisation theory. Actors’ identities and
perceived interests work as composite sites for states to claim sovereign rights to
security and for the society to feel threatened in ways that existentially threaten
both state and society viewed as referents.

In other words, explanations from a traditional security standpoint lose relevance
by failing to go beyond a very narrow view of threats to state sovereignty when,
in fact, it is the collective identity of a society that can become endangered.
Jepperson and others (1996: 59) affirm that “nations do construct and project
collective identities, and states operate as actors.” Grayson (2003: 338), though
not an advocate of collapsing treatment on the combined referent objects of the
state and society, observes that threats and vulnerabilities are “primarily social
constructions that arise within particular political contexts and in turn shape the
contexts from which they have arisen.” Societal security engenders a broader
range of considerations inclusive of focus on the social, cultural, political,
economic, and material factors.

It is out of these concerns that securitising discourses, policies, and practices
come to reveal the challenges that Barbados advanced in its securitising moves to
be discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis – the determined and perceived threat to
Barbados’ national identity and interests. A society is likely to perceive itself as
being threatened by forces, events, and conditions challenging its very composition once this has been effectively presented to them by securitisers. The concept of societal security, therefore, marks another factor that helps to overcome the narrowly determined state-centric views of security which have been traditionally pursued under a realist paradigm. The next section examines security specifically as an act instigated through a social process.

3.5 Security as an Act and Social Process

In this section, the key is to determine the nature of security as envisaged by followers and critics of the Copenhagen School. Taking as a starting point, and accepting that the speech act is of importance, the work of Balzacq cannot be ignored. There ought to be no underestimation of how “the power of discourse has become an important aspect of security analysis” (Balzacq, 2005: 171). The speech act triggers a process of securitising moves in which agenda-setting, concrete actions and institutional practices become significant. Wæver (1995: 56) argues that security “signifies a situation marked by the presence of a security problem and some measures taken in response.”

Williams (2003: 513) sees security as “the outcome of a specific social process” that is characterised by the “social construction of security issues (who or what is being secured, and from what) is analyzed” by first referring to the speech acts “through which threats become represented and recognized.” Huysmans (2006a: 25) contends that there is a ‘security rationality’ taking place which “refers to a constellation of meanings that make it possible for the speech act of security to exist and do its work of securitizing phenomena.” These views are pertinent, and they set the foreground for theoretical explanation on securitisation.

In an increasingly politicised climate, the very “utterance is itself the act;” and a particular issue such as intra-CARICOM migration crosses into ‘a specific area’ thus allowing for a condition in which the securitising actor “claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block” that issue which is perceived and claimed to be a security concern (Wæver, 1995: 55). The thing identified as

32 Italics are in the original.
creating a security condition or problem (i.e. discourses of danger) and, the responses that are initiated, means that “both conditions share the security problematique” indicating that intersubjectively, “security is always relative” (Wæver, 1995: 56). Huysmans (2006a: 23) argues that the “use of security language can actively shape a phenomenon into a security question thereby changing the political understanding of the nature of the policy problem and its evaluation of adequate methods of dealing with it.” For Vuori (2010: 258), securitisation is, therefore, “a form of the power politics” and for these reasons, the security-migration nexus presents a fitting challenge for understanding the political dynamics that sit at the centre of intra-CARICOM relations and intra-CARICOM migration as manifested in Barbados.

Åtland and Ven Bruusgaard explain that “the escalation process” of securitisation “typically starts with an issue being placed on the political agenda” by the securitisers (2009: 335). This escalation represents a form of security framing that Huysmans describes as a “matter of security rhetoric triggering a particular mindset that would change the perception of both the nature of the problem and the adequate instruments to deal with it ... a matter of mobilizing certain perceptions through the use of security language” (2006a: 24). Additionally, Elbe (2006: 124) argues that security is a “social quality” from which political actors, namely the securitising actors and the audience – characterised as state and non-state actors – become implicated in the politics of security measures which are implemented. Thus, Vuori (2010: 257) asserts that securitisation is an “open social process,” which may or may not be successful. Given these considerations about the role of the social in securitisation, Williams (2003: 513) argues that:

‘Security’ is treated not as an objective condition but as the outcome of a specific social process: the social construction of security issues (who or what is being secured, and from what) is analyzed by examining the securitizing speech-acts through which threats become represented and recognized. Issues become ‘securitized,’ treated as security issues, through these speech-acts which do not simply describe an existing security situation, but bring it into being as a security situation by successfully representing it as such.
In this thesis, the focus is on the security rationality that considers central socio-political dynamics shaping the process of securitisation in Barbados with respect to intra-CARICOM migration. From the onset, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde argue that securitisation is reasonably a “more extreme version of politicization” (1998: 25). The writers qualify this fundamental aspect by stating that although a particular discourse “takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object [it] does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such” (Buzan et al., 1998: 25). As alluded to in the previous chapter, “the core of security, [is] the protection from harm, [and it] assumes a field of relationships” which are inclusive of the main actors and the “means of protection” (Fierke, 2007: 46). Thereby, the securitisers’ aims and objectives are intended to move the referent from being vulnerable into a situation that at least ensures the survival and protection of the referent from the existential threat.

A logical reading of these arguments thus far will suggest that key actions by the securitisers in Barbados, for example, are designed to impress upon the audience why it becomes both necessary and urgent to negate the existential threat posed by ‘illegal’ immigrant CARICOM nationals, and simultaneously by the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration. There is a further emphasis on how specific language – the speech acts – come to resonate in a discursive security field thus taking the FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration from a location of normal politics into a contestable and sometimes hostile environment in which the politics of exception may eventually ensue. Thus, securitisation is “not just a speech act” hinging on the importance of the utterance and language; but securitisation is a “much more elaborate phenomenon linking together sets of discourses of unease, bureaucratic and technical practices, and understandings of what constitutes security knowledge and expertise” regarding the particular topic of intra-regional migration (Buzan, 2006: ix). The contextual and factual environment in Barbados on intra-CARICOM migration is to be considered within the contexts of meanings underpinning CARICOM’s quest for integrated development via functional cooperation and deepening regional integration.
Hence, the socio-political practices undertaken by the pivotal groups of actors are viewed not only in terms of those utterances communicated by the securitisers, but there is also consideration for social and political actions that follow.

However, there are arguments describing the utility of discourse in the presentation of issues on intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados that are becoming or are have been represented as dangers for the state and/or society. Ambitiously, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde assert that by “focusing on the organizational logic of the speech act is probably the best way to identify who or what is the securitizing actor” (1998: 41). This academic approach becomes helpful for identifying and “to distinguish between securitizing actors and referent objects” (Buzan et al., 1998: 41). However, Stritzel (2007: 367) contends that “an actor cannot be significant as a social actor and a speech act cannot have an impact on social relations without a situation that constitutes them as significant. It is their embeddedness in social relations of meaning and power that constitutes both actors and speech acts.” Salter and Mutlu (2013: 5), likewise, suggest that the limitation found in earlier versions of securitisation theory which become known through the Copenhagen School, can be overcome by accepting that reliance on too strict a “discursive approach cannot analyse silence or absence of discourse.” The weakness on the over-emphasis of the speech act can result in the omission of several key aspects which emerge in the securitising process. Against that premise, there is a crucial question to be answered; and this means drawing from the literature so as to understand what politicisation entails both in terms of the speech act and in the social processes. Useful explanations are rendered in the following sub-section.

3.5.1 Politicisation: Venue Shopping and Moving into the Security Domain

This sub-section asks how an issue or event moves from the political arena into the security domain. Huysmans (2000: 752) provides ample insight by suggesting that the underlying criteria for the shift rest upon “a powerful political and social dynamic reifying” the issue or event “as a force which endangers the good life.” Moreover, Huysmans (2000: 752) is specific in referencing “technocratic and
politically manufactured spillover” as the mode of transition for an issue to move from the political to the security arena. In her work, Guiraudon (2000: 258) suggests that political actors undertake ‘venue shopping’ which involves determining policy avenues that will become “amenable to their ends by exploring new instruments and seizing upon windows of opportunity to occupy political space” in which they operate or intend to operate.

The evidence of this is not restricted to the politics of migration in Europe, but as this thesis argues and will subsequently demonstrate, intra-CARICOM migration has presented a challenge for political actors in Barbados. Wæver (1995: 57) posits that “security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites.” This factor will be elaborated upon in a subsequent section addressing the actors and who can speak security; it suffices that in any event, how and what the actors make of their realities become significant determinants in the ‘tactical’ process of securitisation. Balzacq (2005: 178) contends that in attempts at “an understanding of security discourses as actions,” it becomes vital “to recover not only ‘discourse itself’, but also other factors – agents’ capabilities, the ontology of their interactions – and the social field in which rhetorical games take place.” These rhetorical games are inherently strategic, and it becomes instructive to clearly link the strategies with the aspects of framing a security agenda.

In this way, Guiraudon (2000: 258) suggests that venue shopping involves and emphasises “actors’ strategies” in which the actors “resort to framing processes or policy images – the ‘constructivist’ moment.” When added to this view, Holyoke reveals that the concept of venue shopping has been around for a long time. As such, focus on any issue will disclose that the “ebb and flow of lobbying activity by interest groups from one venue to another” is realisable (Holyoke, 2003: 325). The interest groups here are represented by the securitisers. Fundamentally, the securitisers will invoke and adopt “advocacy strategies as if they were preparing for war, carefully selecting battlefields that play to their strengths at the expense of their [usually, already determined] enemies” (Holyoke, 2003: 325). This
allegory compares similarly with Guiraudon’s assessment that, “political actors seek policy venues where the balance of forces is tipped in their favour” (2000: 252). Notwithstanding, Guiraudon (2000: 258) asserts that such strategies will not “preclude unintended consequences or change over time” because actors recognise the existence of uncertainty; and as is often the case, tend to find that “it is too early to detect such changes” in the act of protecting against the danger in which new conditions and/or circumstances may arise over time. The next sub-section examines developments for framing a security agenda.

3.5.2 Language and Discourse: The Framing of a Security Agenda

In this sub-section the discussion proceeds to map of how language and discourse frame the security agenda and contribute to venue shopping. Hopf (2002: 6) asserts that “language is a product of the human drive to create order in society.” Highlighting language and/or discourse maintains the significance of the speech act. The prevailing discourse indicates that “there is a considerable element of politics involved in determining how a social issue” such as intra-CARICOM migration into Barbados “is presented in public debate” and eventually becomes a security concern (Elbe, 2006: 125). With the conflation of migration and immigration issues, as is the case regarding this instrumental case study on Barbados, Huysmans affirms that “the speech act of security draws upon a historically constituted and socially institutionalized set of meanings” (2006a: 25). As a result, there is the possible blurring of lines between the migrant and the immigrant based on the meanings communicated for one or both of the factors.

McDonald (2005: 298) argues that the “inter-subjective nature of security means that there are always possibilities for change in the way security is understood and realised.” Security knowledge involves the prioritisation of issues; and in that sense, the communications and interactions among the actors and in the arenas for venue shopping become critical. Choices are made based up opportunity and on the existing conditions and the regulatory domains. The practices and processes that are indicative of the securitisation process regarding the FMCN, ROE, and
intra-regional migration in Barbados, begin with at least social and contextual knowledge of what is possible.

Knowledge of the possible in the security domain is a feature shared between the securitisers and audience which prescribes eventual policy decisions. Actors’ interactions will present and communicate notions of what poses a threat, who or what ought to be protected, and the ways that one goes about safeguarding the referent from danger. According to Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, “because of its prioritizing imperative, securitization also has tactical attractions ... and one has to weigh the always problematic side effects of applying a mind-set of security against the possible advantages of focus, attention, and mobilization” (1998: 29). Moreover, it is through several intersubjective factors that the construction of threats, the promotion of fear, and the perceptions of existentialism is relayed to an audience.

Hence, securitising actors invest strategic politics into their communications with the audience. The securitising actors can socially construct a mind-set of threats, representations, and misrepresentations in order to select ‘battlefields’ that are conducive for them being relatively assured that the ‘balance of forces’ is tipped in their favour. It is, perhaps, this edge in the domestic domain and given the positionality to power that reveals the social and political dynamics for which securitisation theory is able to account for in international relations, and especially in relation to the objective conditions of security/insecurity. Embedded in securitisation theory, securitisers may have at their disposal a series of choices and decision-making tools (i.e. the means) that are likely to combine intersubjective factors with normal traits and customary situations in order to achieve the desired outcomes.

Floyd (2007: 41) contends that analysts should “focus on the state…most securitizations are still performed by state actors, as these – unlike most other securitizing actors – have the capabilities to make securitizations happen.” McDonald (2005: 299) asserts that “actors in international politics consistently engage in debate about the meaning of security in particular contexts, and their
practices evoke particular meanings or discourses of security in a variety of situations.” The performances which, are usually strategic, identify and determine that a certain issue is sufficiently dangerous and existential that it necessitates urgency in order to protect the referent. These attributes will likely require the state to take the lead; and by so doing, lend meanings to the specific contexts in which the main actors operate (e.g. Barbados, Guyana, the CHOG and CARICOM).

Securitisation focuses on a number of factors inclusive of the societal realities and the politics of identity which, according to Huysmans represent a “strategy of cultural discrimination” wherein inside membership and belonging is distinguished from outside communities (2006c: 118). Moreover, the security field is marked by “different discourses and symbolic technologies [which] dominate different political domains and institutions” wherein the “interaction of context and strategy ... are key parts of securitization processes” (Williams, 2011: 216). This will become evident in Chapters 6 and 7. It is important therefore, that this investigation not only examines the referent in terms of the state, but it must consider the ‘real’ social, material, institutional, and contextualised issues with which Barbados and other CARICOM populations must grapple. While a security framework informed by securitisation theory may not diminish the propensity to conceptualise security in terms of the dangers presented to state sovereignty and internal governance, it allows for investigation of the roles that power and norm dynamics play in shaping societal actions and reactions to migration politics.

This securitisation framework helps to link the agent-structure condition and the intersubjective meanings that emerge from the interactions; these factors are shaping the Barbados security field and the CARICOM security complex. Security conditions reveal more than the functioning of the FMCN inside of Barbados; it exposes the political dynamics that occupy the domestic actors and structures which are also influenced by regional and international forces. Together these phenomena help to determine issues and policy initiatives and socially construct security/insecurity in Barbados and within the regional security
complex. It is not incidental therefore to argue that actors’ choices and preferences in the security field occur both cognitively and pragmatically. Therefore, social constructivism offers a perspective that recognises the importance of a state-centric position on security, but equally, it is able to describe the less observable and intersubjective concerns for which meaningful actions are shown in the empirical chapters to follow. In the next section, the discussion relates to the methodology employed in the investigation.

3.6 ‘A’ Constructivist Research Framework
This section presents ‘a’ constructivist research framework rather than ‘the’ absolute constructivist framework if it does exist. Ours is a methodological design that guides this inquiry, and it is purposeful. Indeed, the aim of the research framework is the capacity to acquire maximum utility from an application of the research design and effective methods. Hence, the emphasis situates Barbados within the overall research inquiry as it sets out to simultaneously explore and explain the social facts derived from the produced data (i.e. collected, distilled, and presented). In this regard, this section reiterates a few crucial points that have been established in Chapter 2 and in the preceding sections of this chapter. Foremost is that “social reality is constructed” and is not exogenously given (Pouliot, 2007: 362). Reus-Smit (2008: 398) contends that, “it is a signature constructivist claim that the identities and interests of actors are constituted by social structures, particularly systems of intersubjective ideas, beliefs, and values;” and markedly, “these structures are produced and reproduced by the knowledgeable practices of social and political agents.” Furthermore, Fierke (2002: 339) argues that “actors are, through a process of interaction, socialized into a common game” in which the centrality of language in analysing and communicating about the phenomena has profound effect.

Put differently, there is no objective world out there to be known, but rather it is “what we perceive as the world through our cognitive endowment and conceptual instruments” (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009: 704). The methodological key, therefore, revolves on the awareness that “we have to reflect on the categories we
use” and our communicative interactions (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009: 704). A “single word can have any range of meanings when placed in different contexts” amidst different actors (Fierke, 2007: 84). A reality is that “these categories are part of the human mind and not a property of the object world” given the basis that “social facts are different from the facts of ‘nature’ ... [and] the social world is constituted not by physical objects but by intersubjective meaning” (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009: 704). Drawing from Pouliot (2007: 361), the “social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality are two sides of the same coin” in the descriptions that are forthcoming in this investigation on things occurring in Barbados.

This constructivist research design is geared towards a reading of how best one can understand securitisation as ‘the act’ and ‘the social process’ on the particular phenomenon of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. Guzzini (2011: 332) insists that securitisation “is strongly connected to a social ontology of discourses and practices ... [and] analysis focuses on security as a (contingent) process.” Coupled with this ontological foundation, Farrell suggests that “the constructivist project is not to change the world, but to understand it” (2002: 72). In this and the following sections, attention is placed therefore on knowing: (a) the criteria that establish a case; and (b) the scheme of things and the possible insights to be gained from the case. The following sub-section proceeds on discussions of the instrumental case study.

3.6.1 The Instrumental Case Study

In the first chapter, at Section 1.4, the concept of an instrumental case study was introduced referring to an “in-depth study of the particular, where the researcher seeks to increase his or her understanding of the phenomena studied” (Ruddin, 2006: 798). This sub-section is concerned with the instrumental case study and its application in this thesis. The focus is on events occurring in Barbados so as to get a clear understanding on several issues inherent to the security-migration problematic involving the multiple CARICOM actors, policy decisions and
measures. Also, under consideration are the combined socio-economic, cultural-
legal, geopolitical and other phenomena.

Thomas argues that “a case study must comprise two elements;” these are: (1) a
‘practical, historical unity’ also called the subject of the case study; and (2) an
analytical or theoretical frame also referred to as the object of the study (2011:
513).\(^{33}\) A combination of “conventional qualitative and interpretative methods” is
therefore crucial for “implementing and strengthening the rigidity of the research
framework” (Lupovici, 2009: 199). Essentially, the instrumental case study
requires a rigorous and systematic investigation that considers issues of
replication and validity although these will not be the end all for unearthing social
facts. Yin (1981: 59), furthermore, contends that “as a research strategy, the
distinguishing characteristic of the [instrumental] case study is that it attempts to
examine: (a) a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when
(b) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”

Given the earlier sections in this chapter that addressed the theoretical means of
explanation – highlighting social constructivism and securitisation theory – the
case reveals “an account of an activity, event, or problem” that is complex
(Dooley, 2002: 337). In terms of discovery, this instrumental case study on
Barbados allows for rigorous examination on issues of intra-CARICOM
migration and CARICOM nationals. This assists in drawing out contextual
meanings and the constitutive elements of the actors’ identities and interests that
are pertinent to the migration-security nexus in Barbados.

Sufficiently, Yin (1981: 59) argues that with a case study there is no attempt to
“deliberately divorce a phenomenon from its context.” It is precisely why the
approach, especially regarding “the credibility” criteria “rests not only on its
capacity to make the connection between ‘story’ and social reality, but also on its
ability to justify the process of analysis and the strategies of representation
insists that “a good case is generally taken from real life” and would examine the

\(^{33}\) The italics are used to stress the subject-object condition.
inputs such as language, and the “setting, individuals involved, the events, the problems, and the conflicts.” In that regard, Jackson (2005: 21) contends that “words are never neutral; they don’t just describe the world, they actually help to make the world.” This thesis remains mindful of Hopf’s position in which he contends that “intersubjective reality is not just spoken into existence, but is acted into existence” (2010: 544). Hence, this case study on Barbados embarks on achieving “a balanced [but accurate], multidimensional representation of the context, participants, and reality of the situation” (Dooley, 2002: 337). Starting from the perspective that securitisation is both an act and practice, can reveal ample evidence showing that it is possible to achieve meaningful readings on the security-migration dynamic in Barbados.

Table 3.1: Research and Paradigmatic Orientation

Note: This table is conceptualised against insights drawn from Suri (2012: 4) regarding research syntheses and the particular paradigmatic orientations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ontological Position</th>
<th>Assumption that ‘reality’ is socially constructed; shared meanings are achieved through an interactive process of actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Construct deeper and more comprehensive understanding about phenomena as experienced subjectively by different stakeholder actors and against the prevailing contexts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Strategies</td>
<td>Purposive sampling; emergent design; holistic case-oriented analysis (Barbados)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality Criteria</td>
<td>Deep and authentic understanding (discourse – written and spoken texts), and additional attention to practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suitable Genres</td>
<td>Comprehensive narrative of ‘security themes’ with thick descriptions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The case study “can accommodate a rich variety of data sources, including interviews, archival data, survey data, ethnographies, and observations” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007: 28). Usually, “various data-collection processes such as participant observation, document analysis, surveys, questionnaires, interviews ... and others” can be used to good effect (Dooley, 2002: 338). The methods, as used in this thesis, are ontologically and epistemologically reflective of social constructivism and securitisation theory (see table 3.1). The multiple qualitative methods are systematically used for data-collection, analysis,
evaluation and explanation. However, in attempting to attain accurate purchase, Wendt advises that “meanings must have something to do with the relationship of words to the external world” (1999: 54). This entails having the appropriate methods, samples, and data sources inclusive of interviewees and requisite documents.

Yin (1981: 61) explains that “there are no fixed recipes for building or comparing explanations” in a particular case. Hence, there has to be careful selection and attentive sifting regarding the data and analyses. This qualification is not a disclaimer for any eventualities; but, it affirms that the methods used for investigating a possible securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados redounds to the involved actors, their interactions, and the meanings that are attached to discursive elements, social actions, practices, and the events. Informatively, Mautner (2008: 37) contends that “choosing data always involves an element of subjective judgement;” and since this cannot be completely avoided in this inquiry, even if academically necessary, the reliance on “subjectivity needs to be counterbalanced by rigour and choices exposed to critical scrutiny” throughout the research process. The following sections and sub-sections, beginning with that addressing the use of discourse analysis, give detailed explanations on the methods and selection concerns.

3.6.2 Discourse Analysis

This sub-section starts by amplifying the foremost method that is applied in this investigation – discourse analysis. Use of discourse analysis is not grounded in rigid convention or orthodoxy; but there is reliance on its ‘open system’ attribute. Herrera and Braumoeller argue that “there are overlapping webs of meaning with no obvious starting or end points of analysis;” and given the emphasis on discourses, “choices matter substantially in the process of extracting meaning from text, regardless of the method used” (2004: 18). McKenna (2004: 14) suggests that “discourses establish relations among people and provide people with a range of utterance possibilities within various discursive sites.” With these basic assumptions set as the starting point, the selection, application,
and utility of a discourse analysis method is adapted to examine the circumstances and contextual meanings to be derived from the socio-political milieu in Barbados.

Figure 3.3: Research Methods Used in the Case Study

Figure 3.3 captures the methods used in the gathering and analysis of the data; and the illustration links each of the methods through discourse analysis. Wodak (2008: 2) suggests that discourse analysis is a research technique or method that provides a “general framework to problem-oriented social research ... [which] allows the integration of different dimensions of interdisciplinarity and multiple perspectives on the object investigated.” It is further argued that discourse analysts tend to “explore how knowledge, meaning, identities, and social goods are negotiated and constructed through language-in-use” (Starks & Trinidad, 2007: 1374). In the preceding sections on securitisation theory, it was indicated that “by mapping and tracing political discourses of security” it could be discerned whether “a political act of securitization has taken place” (Huysmans, 2006a: 86). The evidence is to be revealed in Chapters 6 through 8.
By “focussing on the speech act highlights the decision to securitize an issue ... [given] the explicitly political nature of such a choice” (Williams, 2003: 520). Wodak argues that discourse, on the one hand, is “linguistic action, be it written, visual or oral communication, verbal or non-verbal, undertaken by social actors in a specific setting determined by social rules, norms and conventions” (2008: 5). On the other hand, discourse analysis assumes a “dialectical relationship between particular discursive events and the situations, institutions and social structures in which they are embedded” (De Cillia et al., 1999: 157). The distinctions are instructive. Crawford (2004: 22) contends that:

Discourse analysis assumes that discourse – the content and construction of meaning and the organization of knowledge in a particular realm – is central to social and political life. Discourses set the terms of intelligibility of thought, speech, and action. To understand discourses then is to understand the underlying logic of the social and political organization of a particular arena and to recognize that this arrangement and the structures of power and meaning underpinning it are not natural, but socially constructed.

Wodak (2008: 12) affirms that in research of this kind, a solution is to ensure “which conceptual tools are relevant” for our given problem of securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration. It matters, therefore, to be capable of describing the context that is indicative of the socio-political factors and other significant dimensions in Barbados. Essential to the research framework including the deployment of discourse analysis will be consideration for the process and sequencing that demonstrate the preferences for particular sources and types of data. This does not mean subscribing to a positivist or realist approach to the investigation. Fundamentally, this thesis invokes subjective and intersubjective qualities into the analyses of data because discourse analysis allows for “the underlying meaning, deep assumptions, and relations of power that are supported by and constructed through a discourse” (Crawford, 2004: 22). This reading represents a constructivist clarity wherein the treatment of “methods as discrete techniques and methodology” form part of “the combination of methods with positions on epistemological and ontological questions” (Herrera

34 Italics are in the original.
The next sub-section addresses documentary research including the collection and identification of the relevant data for analysis.

### 3.6.3 Documentary Research: Identification of the Corpus

This sub-section starts on the assumption that documents and reports are essential data that can be characterised as being official or unofficial, or primary or secondary (Babbie, 2001: 325). It was a vital starting point to build a ‘corpus’ – the widest possible resource of discourse – for this research. Mautner (2008: 35) suggests that it is necessary to “identity the material that potentially constitutes data” given the considerations that were amplified in detailing the methodological foundations of this investigation. These sources are pulled together because documents need to be situated within a theoretical frame of reference. The documents and reports that were selected for this investigation are mixed in terms of their types, authors, institutional relevance, and agendas. As indicated in Figure 3.4, the documents under scrutiny include books, journal articles, published and unpublished reports, parliamentary records, speeches, newspaper columns, editorials, periodicals, and audio recordings that were selected on the basis of their thematic pertinence and capacity to corroborate other data in the overall investigation.

The collected documents and reports were sourced through print and electronic means. Print and internet resources allowed practical means for the preliminary research that involved sorting data by broad themes. Initially, the coding and filtering of the data also helped to situate the topics that lent to security meanings and those than appeared more pertinent to the literature on migration. From the coded materials, the refined information became the main input to the substantive research. Internet searches were crucial in the continuous process of finding, cross-checking and corroborating the data. Mautner contends that:

> The unique value of the internet as a source of data has to do with its significance as a medium in all social domains, with the ubiquitous, round-the-clock connectivity it provides, and its privileged status as the primary information source in the public and, increasingly, the private spheres (with the two becoming effectively blurred). ... [And] the starting
point for any investigation is not the language system itself, but a social issue, something ‘out there’ which has implications for discourse. (2005: 812).

**Figure 3.4: Main Documentary Sources**

The building of an adequate corpus relied upon following pre-determined labels and a ‘combination’ of terms based upon preliminary coding drawn from the broader literature and the *a priori* knowledge of occurrences taking place in Barbados and CARICOM. The labels and themes to be searched terms were often paired; this was a deliberate attempt to qualitatively position the use of topical prose and specific themes that emerged in the context of Barbados and intra-CARICOM affairs. The searches, often using ‘Google’ as a search engine, produced many useful results that became part of the corpus. Focus was on intra-CARICOM migration and the CSME. The key labels and terms used in the searches were: *immigration* and *border security*; *labour-market* and *intra-CARICOM migration*; *xenophobia* and Barbados; *CARICOM nationals* and *amnesty*; *freedom of movement* and *spirit of CARICOM*; *hassle-free travel* and
Barbados immigration; David Thompson and illegal immigrants; and influx of Guyanese and Barbadians. There were several ‘hits’ for these terms that appeared electronically for Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and other CARICOM member states. Consequentially, further searches followed leads from the original results; and these prompted following appearances in print media and other multiple formats of electronic media.

Table 3.2: Main Newspapers: Barbados and Selected CARICOM Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/CARICOM</th>
<th>Print and/or Online Newspaper #1</th>
<th>Print and/or Online Newspaper #2</th>
<th>Print and/or Online Newspaper #3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Nation Newspaper (inclusive of Saturday and Sunday Sun)</td>
<td>Barbados Advocate</td>
<td>Barbados Today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Stabroek News</td>
<td>Kaieteur News</td>
<td>Guyana Chronicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>The Observer</td>
<td>Jamaica Gleaner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>The Trinidad Express</td>
<td>The Trinidad Guardian</td>
<td>Newsday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Caribbean360</td>
<td>Caribbean News Agency (CANA)</td>
<td>Caribbean News Now</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A number of ‘online’ newspapers in the Caribbean region made it easier to trace events in the print media. In producing evidence in this investigation, this author made a decision not to include direct references of letters to the editor that appeared in the print or online newspapers, and a similar decision was made regarding online blogs. The reasons reflect that comments published by the print and online newspapers, although there was a requirement that persons must identify themselves in a bona fide manner which was acceptable to the editors of the relevant newspapers, there was no way that this author could verify the authenticity or state the duplicity of such letters simply by name appearing for the letter. The newspapers may also have had other considerations for selection and publication of letters. In terms of the blogs, the main arguments against their direct use were in terms of veracity and reliability of information since it was even more difficult to account for the authenticity or duplicitous nature of
comments. Many entries used on the blogs use ‘handles’ or ‘titles’ or post their comments in anonymity.

Parliamentary records were sparingly used although a notable exception was the ‘Caribbean Community (Movement of Skilled Nationals) Bill’ debated in the Barbados House of Assembly in July 2004. It was against key themes and terms that extracts were chosen for practicality; and several techniques were employed to limit bias in the data. Positions of the political parties represented in Barbados’ parliament were balanced against each other. The types of research questions avoided ambiguity. Discourse analysis was preferred over content analysis which is typically more quantitative-oriented. The treatment of the corpus of documents benefitted from the coding and other forms of streamlining for discourse analysis.

In Barbados, the Nation Newspaper and the Barbados Advocate were two ‘independent’ dailies that provided an invaluable data source. This depository of data was complimented by the online newspaper Barbados Today and several other regional print and online newspapers that are highlighted in Table 3.2.³⁵

“Their very ubiquity, coupled with intensity of usage, public attention and political influence” generated ample interest on the topic being studied in the instrumental case study (Mautner, 2008: 32). These newspapers, together with those from the selected countries and the region as a whole, were selected on the basis that as sources and vehicles of formal and informal discourses they offered logistical and practical ways for extracting rich and thematically detailed data (e.g. views on burden of illegal migration and large influxes of Guyanese). Additionally, the official websites of the CARICOM member states, and the Secretariat were key data repositories. Several documents helped in building preliminary knowledge on the relevant arrangements and aspects of intra-regional affairs. Given the background literature on international and intra-regional migration/immigration that follows in Chapter 4, the discussions featured here

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³⁵ This author submitted articles that were published in the Barbados Advocate and Nation newspapers. Since February 2012 the author became a columnist for Barbados Today.
account for the data collection and selection processes. The next sub-section examines specifics on the method of elite interviewing.

3.6.4 Elite Interviews

In this sub-section, there is a presentation of the *elite interviews* conducted by this author. Table 3.3 illustrates, with pertinent details included, the names and positionality of the 11 respondents. This sample size was numerically small but it proved to be adequate in terms of rich data. The interviews were administered between August 2009 and February 2010 mostly in Barbados with the exception of one that was conducted in Guyana. Given the inherent logistical hurdles, the success of these interviews fulfilled a particular purpose of being able to draw from a cross-section of institutional experts. These ranged from a prime minister; members of parliament; at least one each of an ambassador and consul; regional consultants operating within CARICOM; academics from the UWI – perhaps the leading light in regional institutionalism; a newspaper editor; and two ‘popular’ media personalities. This consortium comprised of persons of Barbadian, Guyanese, and other regional citizenships; this made it possible to acquire personal perspectives on cross-nationality issues.

Not least, in these one-to-one and unstructured interviews, opinions were shared. Quite telling was the ease with which respondents spoke for the most part about Barbados’ ‘xenophobic’ attitudes towards Guyanese; and to the concerned approach that Barbados was using to address issues of illegal CARICOM nationals said to be living and working in the country. Given the multiplicity of actors involved in the securitisation process and, the complexity of the contexts in which the actors operated, 11 interviewees can be by no means a representative sample of the population. Nonetheless, the capacity to receive rich data has more than compensated for numerical or sampling limitations. Furthermore, the ‘politicised’ environment in which the elite interviews took place was more or
less, close-up and opportune given the timing the announced amnesty policy by PM Thompson and the Barbados Government.\textsuperscript{36}

**Table 3.3: Interviewee Data Set**

*Note:* Mark Russell is the only used pseudonym entered in the research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OR PSEUDONYM*</th>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL POSITION\textsuperscript{37}</th>
<th>GENDER</th>
<th>PREVIOUS WORK OR CONSULTANCY WITH THE CARICOM SECRETARIAT OR ITS AGENCIES (Yes, No)</th>
<th>COUNTRY OF BIRTH/CITIZENSHIP</th>
<th>RANKING CARICOM’S IMPORTANCE – On a scale of 1 – 5 with 5 signifying very important. N.B. Standard Question posed to all interviewees.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David Thompson</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Barbados</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>UK/Barbados</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mia Amor Mottley</td>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister of Barbados; Leader of the Opposition</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwin Carrington</td>
<td>CARICOM Secretary-General</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rose-Marie Antoine</td>
<td>Professor of Law, UWI</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Wickham</td>
<td>Director of CADRES and Political Analyst, CBC (Barbados)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Russell *</td>
<td>Retired Immigration Officer</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivor Carryl</td>
<td>Programme Director, CSME Unit</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not Ascertained (non-Barbadian)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dennis Johnson</td>
<td>Programme Director, Starcom Network</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Grenada/Barbados</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendy Grenade</td>
<td>Lecturer in Political Science, UWI</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norman Faria</td>
<td>Honorary Consul for Guyana in Barbados</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roxanne Gibbs</td>
<td>Newspaper Editor-in-Chief</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Guyana/Barbados</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first interview was with the Prime Minister of Barbados, David Thompson; this was tactful and opened the door to an important interview with the CARICOM Secretary-General. All interviewees, as a matter of standardisation, were questioned on the usefulness and future of CARICOM. This invited talk on intra-CARICOM migration, the CSME, and intra-regional affairs more broadly. Indeed, the prime minister and ambassador threw open issues that were not

\textsuperscript{36} The details are examined in Chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{37} The column ‘Institutional Position’ relates to the professional designation at the time interviews were undertaken.
directly solicited but are intrinsic to this investigation. For example, PM Thompson (2009e) alluded to the idea that differing socio-economic variables between Barbados and Guyana, and/or between Barbados and other member states could not be wafted aside in the quest to reach the ideal described in Article 45 of the RTC. For PM Thompson, Article 45 only formalised the intent concerning the ‘spirit of CARICOM’ in moving towards full freedom of movement for all CARICOM citizens. On the spirit of CARICOM, the CARICOM Secretary-General voiced concerns on the possibility that there existed an information deficit and a lack of policy harmonisation in the region.

Not all of the interviewees for this research were initially contemplated. Mikecz (2012: 482) argues that “the viability of researching elites hinges on the willingness of respondents to talk and to open up;” and moreover, “gaining access to elites is hard enough; gaining their trust and building rapport with them is even more difficult.” Given the key actors that were anticipated to be involved in threat construction and securitising moves in Barbados, and the early skirmishes that came by way of functional actors, this investigation realised that an alternative strategy was needed in terms of interviewees. Mikecz (2012: 483) contends that “elites can command significant resources and exert influence over others” which can compound the researcher’s plans. Hence, a strategy of ‘snowballing’ was contemplated and effectively used. Snowballing is a “non-probability sampling technique which some consider to be a form of accidental sampling” (Babbie, 2001: 180). The selection process for the interviewees became purposive and incidental rather than being accidental.

In fact, the CARICOM Secretary-General, Ambassador Carrington, suggested the interview with the Programme Director at the CSME Unit in Barbados. That interview led to receiving statistical data that proved difficult to obtain from the Barbados Immigration Department. Moreover, a research channel led to actors not interviewed but their contributions have been included in this thesis (e.g. Steve MacAndrew). Generally speaking, there was a dearth of publicly available data and vital statistics for Barbados and the CARICOM countries on immigration and
related topics. Grenade (2007: 10) argues that “a major challenge” affecting CARICOM relates to the “disconnect between the people and the regional project;” and with the condition of “an ‘information deficit’ among the citizens of the Community.” Bureaucracy was a considerable stumbling-block in assessing institutional information from Barbados.

These elite interviews provided useful qualitative data and insights on occurrences occasioning intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados and for the region. The conversational and probing nature of the ‘unstructured’ interviews tended to reveal the often silent details on the implied and actual nuances found in the threat construction and securitising moves being played out in Barbados. The language of fear and sublime nationalism emerged in the interviews and this was consistent with things being presented in print and electronic media. A “neutral analytic account,” was not intended nor solicited; however, it was anticipated that the 11 interviewees would illustrate “further variability” between versions of things that were being publicly stated even if “in a particularly explicit manner” (Potter & Wetherell, 2002: 57). Specific to this investigation, the focus was on gaining greater depth and richness of data from experts in the field; and that is why structured interviews or less obtrusive methods of data collection were not considered adequate for the aim of this thesis. The knowledge sought required interpretive enterprise such as probing; and researcher reflexivity is to be assumed despite deliberate efforts by this interviewer for attaining impartiality.

Notwithstanding, there were drawbacks given the timeliness of the interviews, and follow-up interviews would prove to be logistically improbable. At the time of interviewing, the focus of this research was on a series of related events acting as barriers to deepening regional integration. Questions specifically regarding securitisation as particular security logic given its emphasis on: dynamics of the speech act; the existential threat; reactions to danger; and the politics of emergency were at that time not directly put to the interviewees. This too was part of a deliberate attempt not to influence the language or contextual meanings in the data being received. The concepts and terms that are peculiar to securitisation
theory did not form part of the interviews. Hence, it was unlikely to have swayed the interviewees in any particular direction regarding issues of security or securitisation. Where necessary, additional but indirect probing was done for acquiring supplementary detail on matters of significance, peculiarity, and/or popularity.

Put differently, while it may have been a drawback not to have pushed the core concepts implied in securitisation theory, probing did allow for this interviewer “to explore and clarify inconsistencies within respondents’ accounts” on details emerging on intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados (Barriball & While, 1994: 331). All together, the sources provided valuable conduits towards being able to situate the socio-economic, socio-cultural, and legal-political dynamics shaping the political climate in Barbados. From the many and varied responses to the questions posed, and after coding and analysing the data, the key claim raised in the research question, was manifestly materialising. The securitisers, audience, and functional actors, given the interactional means for socially creating actions in the securitisation process, were identifiable and distinguishable from data received from the interviewees. Data were corroborated through other sources available such as documents. The evidence is presented in Chapters 6 through 8. The final section now provides a summary of this chapter.

3.7 Summary
This chapter marks the pivotal point at which this thesis moves from theoretical, conceptual, and methodological directions towards the application of these facets in order to be better able to gain analytical purchase on the practical and empirical dynamics that follow in the remainder of the inquiry. The chapter gave theoretical and conceptual accounts on securitisation theory and then showed how these aspects fit into the larger picture of security-migration. The chapter emphasised the significance of language and discourse; it discussed the multidimensional nature of applying securitisation theory to the complex problem being presented here in regards to the securitisation process and intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. In the discussions, the benefits of using securitisation theory became
clear given the chapter’s weight on the speech act and the social process undergirding the interactive milieu.

Key actors and their roles were identified in the chapter; and these were discussed amidst a platitude of social, cultural, and political phenomena. Actors socially construct the condition and make the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration possible in Barbados. Securitisation theory makes it plausible for an enhanced reading of the security-migration dynamic in Barbados. In fact, the review stressed several fundamental assumptions that demonstrate the utility of securitisation theory. The securitisation process would involve such dimensions as threat construction, venue-shopping, agenda-setting, securitising moves, gaining legitimacy from the audience, enduring critique from functional actors, and the creation of facilitating conditions. The referent objects of state and society invited macro-levelled considerations on the concepts of state sovereignty, the nation’s collective identity, and strategic political behaviour in terms of domestics and international actors. It is through these arteries that this chapter connects theory with practice.

Additionally, the chapter presented a methodology that is compatible with the ontology brought to the inquiry. The qualitative methods/techniques selected are well-suited for answering the research question over traditional or positivist approaches. Discussions on the selections of methods and data opened the investigation to rigour and scrutiny; and directed necessary channels for understanding the treatment of data. The internet and printed documents were featured in preliminary searches to the substantive stages of presenting empirical material. The systematic analysis of data included thematic coding. Discourse analysis, used in the context of this instrumental case study on Barbados, makes it possible to discern contextual meanings from the various socio-economic and other dynamics. The relationships and interactions that operate in the local security field and CARICOM security complex are thrown open to discourse analysis and other corroborative treatment validating data. Overall, the building of a document corpus, elite interviews, and discourse analysis are shown to be
selected methods that can best answer the key question in this instrumental case study. The next chapter provides a concise review on international migration, and specifically in the context of intra-CARICOM migration.
Chapter 4

Review: International Migration/Immigration Dynamics

4.1 International Migration: Chapter Overview

This chapter reviews relevant literature on international migration. Barbados’ approach to international migration with the CARICOM member states – considered as intra-CARICOM migration – is singled out for central treatment. Castles (2008: 4) argues that “migration embraces all dimensions of social existence, and therefore demands an interdisciplinary approach.” This review explains a number of the factors, situations, circumstances, of international migration and ways of life that become implicated considering the interconnectedness of Barbados with CARICOM member states/societies. The discussions consider cultural, geographical, psychological, social, economic, legal, and political phenomena. The chapter addresses economic and other possible reasons for intra-regional migration; it describes patterns of mobility, and examines the incidence of intra-regional migration as it functions in Barbados and within CARICOM under the aegis of the RTC.

Table 4.1 Selected General Characteristics/Factors for Barbados

Source: Compiled from Data Presented by Fraser and Uche (2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentages</td>
<td>60 % of all immigrants are women</td>
<td>43.9 % of all immigrants fell between the 25-44 years age grouping</td>
<td>44.9 % of all immigrants living in Barbados were married</td>
<td>55.4 % of all migrants entered the local labour market performing jobs of a technical, clerical, sales and services nature.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chapter provides definitions on key terms and emphasises specific dynamics that factor in accounts of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. Table 4.1 shows a few general observations in terms of the socio-demographic indicators for Barbados regarding immigrants from all countries. For example, the information indicates that ‘younger persons’ and ‘women’ are likely to be the
main immigrants into Barbados. This is indicative of a shift in global migration which in less than two decades has seen more women becoming migrants. Furthermore, most of those immigrants going on to work in the country tend to pursue work in the areas of technical, clerical, or other service-oriented areas. The next section begins with some useful definitions and general observations relating to international migration.

4.2 International Migration Defined: Multi-Dimensionality

This section begins by defining the terms migration and international migration. Migration may be defined as a “process of moving, either across an international border, or within a state,” and it is also a “population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; [and] it includes ... economic migrants” (Geneva. IOM, 2004: 41). The term international migration addresses the “movement of persons” and the decisions made by the migrants “to leave their country of origin, or the country of habitual residence, to establish themselves, either permanently or temporarily in another country” (Geneva. IOM, 2004: 33). Closely related is the term ‘global mobility’ which refers to movements of people across international borders for any length of time or purpose. Intra-CARICOM migration, also referred to as intra-regional migration, meets the definitional parameters for international migration because the migrants are crossing the national borders of one or more of the CARICOM member states.

CARICOM member states, operating as individual sovereignties with their own national systems and laws, are participating in a project of hassle-free, freedom of movement. The specific dynamics of immigration and migration are complex; the problems, issues, and challenges that can affect the main actors, their relationships and behaviour in the migration process are multiple. To be discussed in relation to migration are: trends and patterns; major causes and motivations; economic circumstances; voluntary versus involuntary; transnationalism as a factor; development; identity and citizenship; and rights issues in which the state becomes implicated. This list of themes or factors is not exhaustive. These
pertinent discussions on intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados and CARICOM have interdisciplinary resonance.

Spencer asserts that “there are few issues that are of such significance to civilisation, or so consistently present on international, state and local political agendas, as migration” (2003: 1). Brettell and Hollifield caution that “there are differences of approach within each discipline” (2000: 7). Henry (2009: 692) argues that the “influence of economic theories related to immigration policy, the social and ideological forces that affect how rights are allocated to members and non-members of societies, and the role of groups and state institutions in shaping immigration policy” are important in the literature on international migration. International migration is a phenomenon that has, over time and under different conditions, prompted states and societies to make changes of all kinds. States have had to undertake infrastructural transitions in order to accommodate, cope with, or limit/reject the flows of people migrating across national borders, while societies often have had to make numerous social and sometimes economic adjustments.

The World Migration Report (WMR) contends that, in recent years, migration “has come to be recognized as an integral and essential feature of modern life,” and that in an “increasingly integrated global economy,” it offers “tremendous development potential for individuals as well as societies of origin and destination” (2010: 9). The Global Migration Group (GMG) defines development as “a process of improving the overall quality of life of a group of people, and in particular expanding the range of opportunities open to them” (2010: 10). According to de Haas (2005: 1270), international migration is a “constituent part of development processes and an independent factor affecting development in migrant sending and receiving societies.” The Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) suggests that “international migration affects countries at every level of economic development and of every ideological and cultural persuasion” (2005: 5). Under a myriad of circumstances, global mobility influences national development, and these are considerations that would have
faced CARICOM member states in their proposals for a freedom of movement and intra-CARICOM regime. The “potential of enhanced national and international mobility to increase human well-being leads us to expect that it should be a major focus of attention among development policy makers and researchers” (UN HDR, 2009: 10). This is to the extent that claims linking migration and development, while being contested, remain integral for explanation including factors of geography and demography.

Moreover, Silvey (2009: 507) insists that “the subject of the migrant thus carries with it a broad range of normative attachments representative of development as both fear and hope.” Specific to intra-CARICOM migration, there are uncertain pathways to development. Historically, intra-regional migration has played a significant role in the development of Caribbean people and states; but intra-CARICOM migration has sometimes been downplayed as a major contributor to development. Ideologically, Marshall (2002: 729) argues that “successful development outcomes are conditioned by the domestic enterprise culture and the balance of class forces, state posture, economic fundamentals, historical timing (and sheer luck), and by a facilitating world context.” Global activities are demanding flows across borders in light of “changing technology and free market imperatives” (Marshall, 2002: 729). Boxill (2010: 3) suggests that a research deficit within CARICOM “may, in part, explain why seemingly ill-informed statements have been made by a number of regional leaders with respect to benefits and costs associated with migration.” The next section discloses factors that confront researchers and observers on international migration.

### 4.3 Possible Explanations for International Migration

This section considers possible arguments explaining international migration, together with decisions and/or factors spurring migration into Barbados. Collective experiences, especially public perceptions of identity regarding immigrants, can become laden with multifarious meanings. WMR (2003: 53) suggests that “the stages of the migration process are interlinked, involving a variety of actors, partnerships and policy considerations at different levels and to
varying degrees.” Consequentially, international migration produces myriad impacts on people, communities, and states. Several issues abound in the justification and practice of international migration, especially when examined alongside goals for development and/or regional integration. A number of considerations are depicted in Table 4.2 and are explained as the section progresses.

Table 4.2: Immigration/Migration Factors for Consideration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigration/Migration - Considerations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Push and Pull Factors (theoretical explanations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Politics (with related interests)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and Material Factors (national development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Transnational Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borders/ Control/Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociological Factors, and Cultural Norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship; Political Belonging; and Insider versus Outsider or Inclusion versus Exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social, Political, &amp; Economic Rights Inclusive of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Immigration and International Laws</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An ECLAC report (2006: 8) informs that for many Caribbean people “the search for a better life has quite often begun within the region;” and that migration may be initially contemplated as requiring multiple destinations in order to achieve the desired ends. 38 Given the dynamics of the Caribbean, it is essential to link explanations of intra-regional migration with national/regional development and integration. Worrell (1993: 47) insists that Caribbean countries must “aim to maximize labour mobility within the region. The degree of labour mobility will ultimately be determined by a complex of factors, including shared language, economic disparities, size, the degree of economic concentration in a few locales, political divisions and cultural affinities.” These factors are important as discussions move from migration to immigration practices; and they re-emerge as critical components in Chapters

38 The discussions in Section 4.8 are relevant.
6 through 8 of this thesis wherein the emphasis is on the security-migration linkages falling under the formal and related arrangements of the RTC.

Caribbean “migrants leave their country mainly because of economic reasons, and they expect better living conditions elsewhere” (Hooghe et al., 2008: 477). Push-pull explanations pivot on two fundamental considerations. There is an economic reading which often relays the message that poverty or some drastic economic condition in the sending state has sufficiently influenced the individual migrant to be pulled into another system that has on offer opportunities for increased income and/or well-being. Returning to Table 1.2, the socio-economic indicators reveal for instance, that Barbados has a significantly higher GNI per capita than Guyana. The indices convey a higher standard of living for Barbados, and this situation is likely to be a strong pull factor for influencing migrants into the island. Compared to Guyana for example, Barbados traditionally has enjoyed a rather stable economic climate in the post-independent years. The period of possible exception is more recent given Guyana’s economic diversity better suited for coping with the recessionary years that coincided with the security-migration politicisation in Barbados after 2009.39

Additionally, available literature shows that Barbados is among the CARICOM territories attracting the most intra-regional migrants whilst Guyana is the main country from which the greatest flows of intra-regional migrants originate (Fraser & Uche, 2010: 30). The “absolute number of foreign-born nationals” living in another CARICOM country “has steadily increased over the last two decades” (ECLAC, 2006: 8). While the “absolute migrant stock is comparatively small in the Caribbean, the migrant stock as a percentage of the population is considerably high,” measuring approximately “3% of the Caribbean population” (ECLAC, 2006: 8). Guyana and Jamaica rank among the lowest in the CARICOM in that regard. It is expected that "the absolute number of foreign-born nationals living in the Caribbean

39 It is a useful reminder to consider that both Barbados and Guyana attained independence in 1966.
countries will continue to grow in the foreseeable future” (ECLAC, 2006: 10). Nevertheless, push-pull explanations emphasise individual agency. In this sense, the migrations contemplated would under the circumstances indicate a voluntary and/or rational decision by the individual. Thomas-Hope (2002: 16) argues that several of the assumptions drawn under push-pull models “have been accepted all too often without serious question.” There is a tendency to grossly under-theorise many issues of migration. Indeed, Massey contends that:

Although international migration is widely recognized as an economic process, the economic foundations of immigration are frequently misunderstood and rest on two common misconceptions. The first is that immigration is caused by wage differentials between sending and receiving countries, and the second is that pressures for emigration stem from a lack of economic development in sending regions. ... Although a large wage differential is clearly an incentive to movement, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. Migration decisions in developing countries are typically made by families, not individuals, and families migrate not only to maximize earnings but also to minimize risks. (1994: 183).

In that sense, Hollifield (2000: 138) asserts that between states and other actors, “international migration provokes a sense of crisis.” More significant is the realisation that there are factors of economic pressures and incentives that combine with non-economic circumstances which influence the migration decisions contemplated by individuals and families. For example, identities and cultures are socially constructed and these move across the geographical boundaries of states. Indeed, social labelling which is a non-economic factor, combines with the economic factors wherein, “within receiving societies, once immigrants have been recruited into particular occupations in significant numbers, those jobs become culturally labelled as ‘immigrant jobs’ and native workers are reluctant to fill them” (Massey et al., 1993: 453). Massey and others (1993: 453) further insist that “migration is a selective process that tends ... to draw relatively well-educated, skilled, productive, and highly motivated people away from sending communities.” Structurally, “immigration changes the distribution of income within a country, creating winners and losers” (Hanson, 2010: 190). At the same time, the dynamism found in societal and national identities become
expressive in group formations such as transnational networks which are briefly discussed in the following sub-section.

4.3.1 Migrant Networks

This sub-section considers migrant networks since these become factors in the politics of identity and operate across national borders, states and societies. Castiglione (2009: 29) suggests that political identity “is both a social and a historical construct” thereby reflecting “the institutional nature of the political community” and it can be historically altered due to migration practices. The migrant networks, in conjunction with the ways that local cultures respond to the immigrant population in the labour market, help to reinforce the structural demand for immigrants. “Immigration changes the social definition of work, causing a certain class of jobs to be defined as stigmatizing and viewed as culturally inappropriate for [the] native worker” (Massey et al., 1993: 453). Networks respond to these perceptions and, from such a perspective, groups forge their identities and political membership from multiple locations. The influence of migrant networks cannot be underestimated because they are central to international migration. Poros (2008: 1616) contend that “networks represent structures through which individual and collective action occurs” and it is usual for them to be visible regarding “individual participation in protest or migration to another country.” Overall, there are many factors that can impact decisions on international migration (see fig. 4.1).

The influence and practices of networks such as the Guyana Association of Barbados Incorporated (GABI) may likely inform migrant choices in the sending state (i.e. Guyana), as well as the political and policy choices in the receiving state of Barbados on approaches to intra-CARICOM migration. However, social institutions in Barbados and the CARICOM member states have become equally relevant in the evolution of intra-CARICOM migration. Appropriately, Wickham and others contend that “any discussion of freedom of movement in the Caribbean has first to be contextualised since this concept can be subjected to two interpretations within a regional community” (2004: 18). The two bases are: (1)
there is an expectation of living and working in another member state, because of the nature of a single market, provided that one is a CARICOM national defined by territorial citizenship; and (2) that a hassle-free or facilitative environment is to be encouraged and shaped by the state because this factor, although running contrary to traditions in a fragmented region, is conducive to reducing social conflict in the CARICOM single market. The literature shows that insular behaviours are simultaneously shaped by factors emerging from the migrant networks and institutional arteries found in the politics of regionalism and globalisation.

In the area of competitiveness in labour markets, aspects of these phenomena are considered in existing literature on CARICOM integration. For instance, Girvan (2007b: 413) suggests that “popular support for integration” within the member states inclusive of Barbados, would require that “economic benefits are spread broadly across countries and social groups” since in terms of distribution and given the politics of identity, “it makes a difference to quality of life issues such as crime, health and education.” Multiple factors as expressed in Table 4.2 consolidate structures and shape dynamics on international migration within the sending and receiving states. The next section reviews the types and form of migrants, and brings definitional clarity to several factors.

4.4 Migrants and Immigrants: Types and Classifications

In this section, emphasis is on the forms, types, and classifications of migrants. The section provides definitions so as to achieve descriptive uniformity. The reactions that differentiated actors have on the migration processes may be considered positive or negative. The classification of migrants and immigrants is regularly political and often partitioned for bureaucratic and administrative purposes as part of a narrower system of state control. Accompanying rules and criteria for the admissions of migrants often have the net effects of accommodating distinct categories of immigrants over other less valued
migrants. There is the long-term migrant that chooses to live in another country for an extended period of time and residence is for the purpose of work and other economic opportunities. The IOM (2004: 39) suggests that “long-term migration exists when the period of stay is at least of one year. ... [This] is recorded when an individual enters a country and establishes there his [or her] usual place of residence for one year or more.” Another category is the short-term migrant whose stay in another country is temporary, and likely to be for contractual or seasonal work. The IOM defines this category of migrant as someone who “moves to a country other than that his or her normal residence for a period of at least three months but less than a year” (2004: 60). This definition on the short-term migrant is qualified with the exception that “in cases where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends or relatives, business or medical treatment,” the migrant’s period of stay is not counted as a short-term migrant classification (Geneva. IOM, 2004: 60). International migration is sufficiently complex as to influence behaviour in and among receiving and sending societies/states simply on the basis of administrative classifications of migrants and, the bureaucratic tiers compounding the issues.

Issues of identity and cultural politics are unlikely to be sidelined from economic integration; these often become visible through the classifications used to differentiate migrants. Intra-CARICOM migration is, indisputably, plagued by attempts to categorise for purposes of inclusion and exclusion. A problem area that appears in international and intra-CARICOM migration stems from the condition of irregularity which is often referred to as being illegal. Persons become illegal “owing to illegal entry” into a country, or with the expiry of visas and/or other pertinent documentation that is necessary for ‘resident’ status (Geneva. IOM, 2004: 34). The incidence of these things is dependent on situations and issues; implicitly, identity politics is again at work.

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40 One can suggest for example that the prefixed descriptors of ‘highly’ and ‘lowly’ inherently signal worth and value in distinguishing between categories of migrants.

41 For further reading, see UN (1998), Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration – Revision 1. New York.
In Barbados, the national discourse became preoccupied with the term *illegal immigrant* when discussing CARICOM nationals. To reiterate the accepted definition advanced in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the illegal or irregular migrant is a person who, owing to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry, or the expiry of his or her visa/work permit, lacks legal status in a host country such as Barbados. In Barbados, there was evidence of lapses regarding the expiry dates on work permits. Despite the specific calls for the abandoning of work permits for CARICOM nationals as part of the ‘facilitation’ under Article 46 of the RTC, this requirement has remained operative in Barbados. Nonetheless, immigrants to Barbados originating from within CARICOM (e.g. Guyanese) were regularly called *illegal aliens* and *foreigners*. Once *illegal* was prefixed to the words alien, immigrant, foreigner, or even Guyanese, led to connotations in which crime and the presence of CARICOM nationals in Barbados became linked. The specific actions became an incipient alarm to both locals and to non-Barbadians. Migrant classifications were of growing concern for the relevant actors.

Migrants become a “special object of policy-making” when they traverse international borders; and this is often exacerbated because migrants operate under partial knowledge of their destinations while being “perceived as foreigners to the community” in which a sense of “shared loyalty towards the state and shared rights guaranteed by that state” may already exists within the polity (Wimmer & Schiller, 2002: 309). Castles (2004: 210) contends that “migrants are not just isolated individuals” reacting to “market stimuli and bureaucratic rules,” but importantly, they are “social beings who seek to achieve better outcomes for themselves, their families and their communities through actively shaping the migratory process.” Push and pull explanations of migration fail to address these contrasting but pertinent concerns.

Political actions and the discursive practices pursued by state authorities can be indicative of local antipathy towards CARICOM nationals and intra-CARICOM migration. Public sentiments and official responses, while being parochial, can be

42 The discussions in Chapter 7 are pertinent.
aimed recklessly at groups of immigrant communities. Targeting such communities may be based on the fact that work permits became essential tickets for border-entry and access to work but were otherwise insufficient to encourage social integration and cohesiveness in a territory with Barbados' homogenous characteristics. Additionally, previous histories, institutional profiling, and racial/ethnic differentiation that emerged over time, together with the changing economic circumstances (e.g. economic recession), have tended to factor in the identity politics of intra-CARICOM migration. In the context of Barbados operating within a pluralistic CARICOM framework, both the presentation of economic circumstances and dimensions of identity politics aroused local anxieties. The act of classification for visa and/or work permit purposes generally reflects weakness in the local labour market and in the capacities of receiving states such as Barbados to regulate and control migration/immigration. Hence, state-led institutions are challenged regarding the classification of migrants and the politics of identity. These 'control' factors are discussed in the following sub-section.

4.4.1 Control: Voluntary Migration and the Challenge of Illegal Immigrants

This sub-section outlines the ways in which states try to gain control of national borders through policy-making. Interactive relationships resonate in the host and sending countries, and these involve the state, society, national institutions, and individuals. The administrative and regulatory institutions are avenues through which migrants will encounter new norms, procedures, rules, cultures and lifestyles that may be vastly different from those existing at the points of origin in sending countries. Dauvergne (2004: 588) observes that “the worldwide fear of terror has overlapped and intertwined with the fear of illegal migration.” This may form a collective attitude towards controlling migration; but may force migrants into running the risks of becoming or remaining undocumented.

To be more explicit, a state’s actions can be understood as either facilitating or restricting immigration, and this is based on the policies it decides to pursue. International migration can be as much problematic for the migrant as it is an
interactive and problematic activity demanding state control/management. Added to this outlook, there is a likelihood that, issues never before encountered, prompt states to be conscious of implementing regulations, forms of control, and the means for classifying migrants and the relevant permits for work. Indeed, Spencer (2003: 21) argues that international migration “has significant economic and social impacts – touching multiple areas of government policy” inclusive of “international development” and other sectors such as “health, education and social cohesion” which require “planning across policy domains.” In fact, international migration has become a socio-cultural issue of immense proportions as people move across national borders and enter labour markets.

Immigration policy is “associated with broader ideological currents in society” (Massey, 1999: 310). The regulatory framework available to the state usually addresses particular categories of people more than others; and the cross border movement of people increasingly demands a “tightening of immigration controls” (Population and Development Review, 2004: 376). The actual flows of people across state borders may be based on the voluntary actions of individuals who pursue migration as a socioeconomic opportunity. Fergusson (2003: 6) argues that over time, “economic and voluntary migration has been a particular feature of the region ... people from the Caribbean were migrating in large numbers in search of work, a better life, and to escape from small and constricting island societies.”

Hinging on at least two dimensions, Pienkos (2006: 9) argues that “migration is an economic strategy to enhance material well-being, [and] it is also a ‘transformation project’ in that it involves new identities” which “embodies a concept of livelihood that is more about mobility than place” (2006: 9). Intra-CARICOM migration would therefore seem to be in line with neoliberal discourses that emphasise circulation and freedom to do so.

Intrinsically, a key concern relates directly to the practice of voluntary migration since it is often seen to be economic and/or entrepreneurial migration; and may account for the network impacts of family and friends. Massey (2003: 15) stresses that “the concentration of immigrants in certain destination areas creates a ‘family
and friends’ effect that channels immigrants to the same places and facilitates their arrival and incorporation.” Thus, in making a distinction between the voluntary aspect of migration and forced migration, it is argued that voluntary migration follows a rational schema whereas forced migration is, more often than not, of an arbitrary and capricious nature.\textsuperscript{43} Technically, it is voluntary formats of migration that are accounting for the FMCN, ROE, and general intra-CARICOM migration. Richmond (1988: 7) stresses that voluntary migration involves “seasonal, nomadic and other temporary moves as well as more permanent migrations” which, in many cases, are “largely economic in nature.” Voluntary and entrepreneurial migration is marketed to the Caribbean public as capable of expanding the economic infrastructures in member states. Voluntary migration contributes to the creation of a single market and economy thus enhancing development prospects.\textsuperscript{44}

Nevertheless, Anderson (2010: 301) contends that immigration controls “function both as a tap regulating the flow of labour ... [and] a mould shaping certain forms of labour.” Policy directives, therefore, tend to be ironically initiated and perpetuated by state actors. So that economic wealth and migrant classifications have become embedded in national policies and integration mechanisms. Massey (1999: 310) observes that during “periods of economic distress,” such as the economic/financial recession that afflicted Barbados since 2008, countries trend “toward restrictions whereas economic booms are associated with expansive policies.” As such, it is realistic to assume that with implications for the demography of a country, international migration “inherently raises a tension between the right of individuals to circulate freely ... and the right of states to control their borders” (Lahav & Messina, 2006: 1). The international state system is rife with general and specific evidence of a global system that is ‘unsafe’ in the post-9/11 world.

\textsuperscript{43} The thesis’ concern is on the voluntary aspects of intra-CARICOM migration as occurring in Barbados with the FMCN and ROE.

\textsuperscript{44} This economic link with migration is briefly discussed in the next section.
Wright (2012: 112) suggests that “macroeconomic conditions shape demand for immigration” given the overall globalising effects of laissez faire in world politics. Dauvergne (2008: 31) throws into the debate a question on “whether globalization threatens the nation-state” and the fact that it means a “reordering of the social” aspects of normal life. A liberalised regime, of necessity, entails regulations but having lesser state interventions and protectionist measures. Yet, governance under a liberal regime can encourage the utility of discretionary measures and, the possible exercise of arbitrary powers by immigration officials. In the contemporary era, there are greater demands for regulatory controls and improved administrative systems regarding quantities of migrants. The next sub-section continues the discussion on immigration control while examining factors of the labour market.

4.4.2 Geo-Significance and Links with the Labour Market

In this sub-section, the examination considers an affirmation that the Caribbean “is a geopolitical, geoeconomic and geocultural concept,” and that these characteristics obtain given the politics of place and identity in intra-regional migration (Girvan, 2007a: 22). In this instrumental case study on Barbados, several of the major claims being advanced speak to the presence of ‘fear’ regarding the security-migration nexus. The security-migration nexus is not limited to a geopolitical conception but is very concerned with the geography of culture and wealth among other things. Barbados and the small countries comprising CARICOM have been forced to redistribute scarce resources to the controlling of borders and costly security-related measures. This is instead of prioritising national development per se. Krystyna Iglicka advances the view that:

Various means and mechanisms of border and inflow control have been significantly enforced. The migration policy is an area, where complying with the international and national laws may well coexist with fighting international terrorism and transnational organized crime. Enforced border control, enforced entry control, more restrictive visa policy, applying cutting-edge solutions for recognition of identity, collecting and regional exchange of personal data [e.g. through the Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS); Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC); the Joint Regional Communications Centre (JRCC); and the CARICOM
Watch List] concerning, among other things, these individuals who have breached the law; these are unfortunately the means that seem indispensable in the modern world. (2005: 2).45

In this regard, Flynn (2006: 466) argues that immigration checks at national ports of entry “necessarily involved delays for passengers;” but this, while disconcerting for some persons, “had been mitigated ... by procedures which focused examination on a narrow range of travellers, with country of origin being taken to be the primary indicator of a potential threat to the integrity of control.” A factor driving much of the fear towards intra-CARICOM migration is the sense that Barbados has become more restrictive and less facilitative for unskilled and low-skilled labour from CARICOM nationals. Globally, economically endowed migrants are less likely to face negative encounters with immigration authorities. Wilson and Jaynes (2000: 137) argue that “relative to the demand for unskilled labor, the demand for skilled workers continues to increase, allowing skilled immigrants to be more readily absorbed into labor markets.” Effectively, lower-skilled migrants and those not falling under the pre-determined categories outlined in Article 46 of the RTC have become the types of persons to face tighter controls and barriers at immigration lines in Barbados and other CARICOM ports. Attempting legal entry into the potential receiving states, often appears less problematic for those migrants in possession of economic wealth or the categories of persons that have achieved a 'highly skilled' classification considering Chapter 3 of the RTC.

It is therefore by implication that international migration contributes to stereotypical, discriminatory, and preferential modes of behaviour as will become evident in later chapters regarding Barbados’ specific behaviour.46 MacAndrew (2004) stressed that “in these times of global uncertainty and insecurity all [of the regional mechanisms] are meant to provide us [the CARICOM nationals] with some kind of security, be it as a Community or as an individual.” Subsequently, Hall and Chuck-a-Sang (2007: ix) argue that the “process of Caribbean

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45 The italicised insertion is to make the connection with CARICOM; the original author did not use the stated example but chose another.
46 Chapters 6, 7, and 8 are descriptive in this regard.
integration is primarily an institutional activity,” and almost parallel, “the free movement of skills – an institutional activity – is without doubt, a positive development” within CARICOM. Similar type explanations promote push and pull factors. The indication addresses rational utility on the part of migrants, and sometimes by governments in terms of recruitment for highly skilled migrants. As was mentioned before, push-pull factors, in many respects, offer ample but incomplete explanations for the practices of intra-CARICOM migration. Voluntary forms of economic and entrepreneurial migration, while being rooted in rational-actor or push-pull explanations, tend to overlook agency and the subjective dimensions of a society's culture (see fig. 4.1). At the macro level of explanation and analysis, the arguments are that people move to geographical locations and socio-cultural spaces where their skills and social familiarity may afford levels of imagined belonging while enhancing the possibilities for economic self-improvement.

Figure 4.1: Migrants as Rational Actors

Fergusson (2003: 7) argues that, for instance, “women are increasingly at the forefront of intra-Caribbean migration, as growing educational achievement and economic aspirations encourage them to quit their home countries,” while
concurrently, “gender disparities in wealth, power and authority” may have become a major ‘push’ factor in the Caribbean," and thus, a pull factor specific to Barbados. Economic migration “is normally a voluntary market transaction between a willing buyer (whoever is willing to employ the migrant) and a willing seller (the migrant), and is hence likely to be both economically efficient and beneficial to both parties” (Glover et. al., 2001: 4). It is through an examination of intra-regional migration, broadly conceptualised to draw on the socio-economic and cultural parameters, that the formal goals expressed in the RTC become opened to contrasting scrutiny on the practices occurring in Barbados.

Overall, economic migration will usually rests upon the individual migrant working in tandem with the available opportunities or perceived benefits, even if these are encouraged by sending or receiving states. Accessible labour markets are partly determined according to liberal ideologies and are pursued by migrants. Massey (1999: 304) argues that “the entry of markets and capital-intensive production technologies” often “disrupts existing social and economic arrangements and brings about the displacement of people from customary livelihoods,” thereby creating a “mobile population of workers” whose pursuits are concentrated upon “new ways of earning income, managing risk, and acquiring capital.” The demand in Barbados and CARICOM for skilled versus unskilled migrant labour is part of a liberal tenet giving efficacy to market demands.

Thus, Taylor (2005: 572) contends that “it can actually make political sense for governments to step back from the language of control” which often transcends the migrants’ experiences in the new cross-border environs. Realistically, it is regularly the case that the migration environment will rest on the politics of fear in which illegality goes almost synonymous with preconceived perceptions of immigration and immigrant workers. Anderson (2010: 301) suggests that the immigration controls employed by states are “increasingly presented as a means of prioritising the national labour force in employment at the same time as protecting migrants from exploitation.” Glick Schilller (2010: 23) contends that:
Politicians, demagogic leaders, and media personalities [among others] blame migrants for national economic problems, including the growing disparity between rich and poor, the shrinking of the middle class, the reduction in the quality and availability of public services and education, and the rising costs of health care and housing. Calls for tightening borders and ending the influx of migrants are widespread, and countries around the world are shutting their doors in the faces of people desperately trying to flee war, rape, and pillage. In the meantime rates of deportation are rising dramatically. Within these anti-immigration discourses, little is said about migrants’ provision of vital labor, services, and skills to their new land or their role in the reproduction of work-forces – including their sustenance, housing, education, and training – in countries around the world.

International migration results in a glaring contradiction in which there is a call for more liberalisation while at the same time, the politics of fear is set in motion by negative discourses hiding behind claims of protection. Bauböck (2007: 400) argues that “economic globalization also erodes the capacity of states to effectively control immigration.” Sides and Citrin (2007: 480) contend that “if a sense of threat underlies opposition to immigration, then beliefs about the size of the immigrant population are a logical trigger for such feelings of anxiety.” As articulated in the previous chapter, securitisers will tend to be strategic by employing negative discourses whilst utilising restrictive immigration policies as means for protecting the society. There are numbers of pressures that result on a receiving society and state which can compel political actors to take stock of the policy directions.

Political pressures have entered the immigration discourse in Barbados through the geo-significance of domestic perceptions on the labour market by external others coupled with the dollar values of potential immigrants.47 Related to this phenomenon, is the category of ‘high net worth individuals’ defined in Barbados as those individuals with “net assets of not less than $10, 000, 000” (Sinckler, 2012). The special provisions and incentives for attracting the high net worth individuals are comparable, in many respects, to the system of economic citizenship that is extended to the migrant holding wealth as economic collateral.

47 There are also the negative impacts for sending countries. However, with focus on Barbados as a receiving country, the review is less concentrated on the sending country.
Economic citizenship is not provisioned formally in the laws of Barbados. However, there are attractions such as the indefinite special permit; this is an immigration classification set for high net worth individuals. The category is based on the migrants’ capacity to invest in the island (Sinckler, 2012). Additionally, under the ROE, there is an indirect inference to immigrant status that is based on (1) being a CARICOM national; and, (2) being able to add economic dimensions as a service provider in a host country. Review on immigration statuses and concepts of citizenship and national belonging are briefly discussed in Section 4.6 of this chapter. Nonetheless, Section 4.5 provides a background frame of the overarching socio-economic climate and circumstances in Barbados, and to a lesser extent CARICOM.

4.5 Socio-Economic Factors: Integration to Contingent Rights

This section discusses the general socio-economic conditions and several economic indicators that are pertinent for understanding security-migration developments in Barbados. The period of focus highlights Barbados' socio-economic climate in the immediate years prior to the increased intensity and problematic of intra-CARICOM migration. Mindful that there was an apparent turning point between early 2008 and May 2009, this section considers the socio-economic position of Barbados. The section also links significant assumptions made under securitisation theory with aspects of integration and intra-regional migration. There were practices and types of behaviour performed by multiple actors, inclusive of the CARICOM migrants into Barbados. These shaped the contexts and could be considered the felicity conditions that are helpful to the events which follow.

The prevailing economic circumstances underwent transformations as Barbados and the CARICOM member states worked towards goals of deeper integration. To a large extent, and around 2001, the political and technical architects operating within the CARICOM Secretariat and member states reached reasonable

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48 This discussion is not a preface for the definitive speech act rendered by PM David Thompson in May 2009. Rather, mention here is to disclose that the timing of incidents may have coincided with declines in Barbados' economy. The details receive amplification in Chapter 6 of this thesis.
consensus on the legal instruments pertinent to the CSME. Nevertheless, there continued to be prevarications by leading state actors (e.g. CHOG) on matters of the free movement of people in the region. Bernal (2005: 43) reminded CARICOM countries that:

Public support for the CSME should not be taken for granted simply because of the commonality of location, small size, culture and historical experience. The collapse of the West Indies Federation under the weight of nationalism and parochialism should be a salutary lesson. The fear that the free movement of labour will lead migrants from Guyana ... to overrun the more prosperous domains of the Bahamas, Barbados and Trinidad is palpable. The deeply felt concern about the movement of labour has been repeatedly and openly expressed by a wide cross-section of society including ... trade unionists in Barbados.

In terms of protectionist measures and shared concerns, the CARICOM member states saw and understood the need to advance proposals for contingent rights. These were “those rights to which skilled CARICOM nationals (and their dependents) are entitled when they exercise freedom of movement from one member state to another to engage in an economic activity, such as employment or the provision of services” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2008). Contingent rights were to be extended to migrant workers based on CARICOM citizenship, notwithstanding the non-national ascriptions plaguing these CARICOM foreigners while living and working in another jurisdiction. However, local actors expressed “concerns with respect to contingent and social rights associated with spouses and children of these workers” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2006: 401). Even at the time of writing, many crucial matters on contingent rights remain outstanding.

According to Wickham and others, the CARICOM member states “have not agreed on how to address matters affecting contingent rights,” and “the question frequently arises whether a person from another member state will receive the same social benefits as a national of the host member state, when such benefits are payable” (2004: 25). Difficulties with contingent rights involved the different institutional capacities, levels of economic development, and stages of delivery/distribution regarding the member states’ provision of social goods. Barbados’ advanced institutional capacities in contradistinction to most other
CARICOM countries were repeatedly flagged. The difficulties with contingent rights were complex due to the different tax thresholds among CARICOM countries. Issues relating to situations in which aggregate people flows across national borders, aroused anxieties regarding the distribution of wealth and social welfare benefits were prominent. Hence, there was increasing politicisation in Barbados on the proposed rights’ regime; this possibly compromised future growth of the cross-national labour market. The sub-section that follows binds the socio-economic factors with pivotal occurrences trending in Barbados.

4.5.1 Contextualising Change in Barbados' Social Economy

Following on from the previous section, numerous factors (e.g. contingent rights) made it difficult for deepening integration among the CARICOM member states, and for the facilitation of intra-CARICOM migration. Onwards of 2004, there were critical events (e.g. the ICC World Cup in 2007) and, transformational dynamics (e.g. actual signing for the CSME in 2006) that became emergent within the contexts of intra-CARICOM migration and regional integration. The fact that Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad & Tobago are considered the 'big four' or the More Developed Countries (MDCs) among CARICOM countries can be misleading in relation to the socio-economic factors and experiences challenging the individual countries and their populations when it comes to the FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration. Kendall (2008: 5) argues that:

An important principle undergirding this [freedom of] movement is a set of contingent rights in the form of non-discriminatory access to land, capital, buildings and property. The aim eventually is to have a fully integrated Caribbean labour market by permitting completely free movement. There are, however, clearly difficulties in the implementation of the free movement of skills one of which is the fear of economic competition, xenophobia and the consequential political constraints thereby imposed.

Therefore, a crucial task is to reveal relevant and specific details that demonstrate Barbados’ economic position relative to Guyana, Jamaica, and/or any of the CARICOM member states. The details are to be considered in a context that reveals the concerns emerging from the Barbados society and state. Dislocations,
anxieties, and the disordering/reordering of the Barbados society and state became part of the local discourse. Segments of the social realities exposed differing perceptions on the socio-economic conditions among the member states. Discernible from the HDI rankings included in Table 1.2, is the top rating Barbados consistently achieves in contra-distinction to CARICOM countries. Guyana, for example, has the largest land mass and a population more than double that of Barbados, yet Guyana maintains one of the lowest HDI rankings among CARICOM member states. The comparisons reveal pronounced disparities in the socio-economic indicators, with the statistics having implications for actors' perceptions on the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration. Undoubtedly, contingent rights and the national capacity to provide public goods became a bone of contention in CARICOM. Barbados increasingly expressed concerns about the numbers of CARICOM nationals entering and remaining in Barbados. While the concerns may well have been prompted by the recessionary times impacting on Barbados and the region after 2008, it was possible that social and cultural factors propagated the unease associated with the post-2008 economic downturn.

Barbados would have perceived itself as facing unaccustomed socio-economic conditions against a rising immigrant population. PM Thompson (2009e) stressed that in terms of CARICOM nationals (i.e. one presumes undocumented migrants), “current levels are unacceptably high, increasingly difficult to control and pose potentially negative socio-economic challenges” for Barbados. Additionally, the extension of contingent rights for immigrant workers may have appeared an onerous cost at a time that Barbados was coping with a perilous economy. Carryl (2009) indicated that Barbados’ “obligations only go as far as its commitments specify in the treaty.” Also, Carryl (2009) insisted that “without contingent rights, free movement would remain hollow” as a regional goal.

49 Similarly, international publications and agencies such as the IADB's Country Program Evaluation: Barbados 2005-2009 has highlighted Barbados’ standing in contradistinction to regional counterparts.
Economically, soaring unemployment rattled Barbados to the extent that Governor of the Central Bank, Delisle Worrell, stated that “in line with the downturn in economic activity, the average unemployment rate rose to 10.1% during the first quarter [of 2009], as compared to 7.9% a year earlier” (Barbados Central Bank, 2009: 5). By 2012, Barbados’ Finance Minister stated that the “lingering effects of the global and financial crisis coupled with slow economic growth reflected the level of unemployment which rose to 11.2% in 2011, up from 10.7% at the end of 2010” (Sinckler, 2012). With minimal or negative growth since then, Barbados' quandary over accommodating numbers of migrant CARICOM nationals continued. Barbados may have presumed that its higher standard of living, relative to other CARICOM countries, would begin to wilt away under the perceived or actual pressures associated with intra-CARICOM migration and economic decline.

In pragmatic terms, the regional integration movement in the Caribbean was conditioned through an economic thrust that was supposed to enhance prospects for national productivity and development by utilising labour and factor mobility (CARICOM Secretariat, 2002: 1). In fact, Williams (2003: 185) was of the view that “lack of labour mobility works to the disadvantage of countries with limited capital and abundant human resources” for which Barbados had consistently prided itself. For example, in Global Excellence: Barbadian Traditions, it was stated that “Barbados has an enviable record of macroeconomic stability,” and the country’s economic and social development is grounded in a number of social and political institutions indicating a “very high level of social cohesiveness” (Barbados. Ministry of Economic Affairs & Development, 2007: 11). There remained many aspects in regional integration, especially on factors of labour mobility that were impacting and/or reshaping the constitutive nature, size, and development of the labour market in Barbados.

Accordingly, it was indicated that “size, composition, distribution and growth of the population all have an important influence on the structure of the economy,” and with the competitiveness of the labour force, and the creation of “present and
future employment opportunities” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2006: 403). Prospects about the benefits of an integrated labour market were being put in economic terms. Yet, the fallout in Barbados over intra-CARICOM migration became at once as much social and political as it was a problem of deepening economic integration. A pioneer of Caribbean regionalism, William Demas, had long argued that “questions of identity, culture and sovereignty” would inherently become important in the contexts of Barbados and the CARICOM member states; and that those and related concerns would “have to be given their due weight in discussing both national development and economic integration” (1997: 42). A combination of local, regional, and international factors thus compelled Barbados to rethink both national and regional development.

Most member states shared a theoretical view “in pooling the strengths ... to foster their economic development;” although the reality against the occurrences in Barbados came under the microscope (Bravo, 2005: 148). Either as a precursor or consequence, the emergent social and cultural dynamics became manifest in resistance to labour mobility and to dimensions of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. The economic impulses that were being used to fuse a single market space among those participating in the CSME after 2006 were ultimately affected by positive and negative socio-political occurrences. The dynamics were historical, economic, political, cultural, and legal; but significantly, many critical dimensions on intra-CARICOM migration and regional integration were socially cast. The momentum towards the creation of a single market, with its economic preponderance, managed to reinforce the need for enhanced cooperation, and harmonisation of policies. By the end of 2007, officially there was a regional discourse that was slowly prioritising community over insular practices in the individual member states, although one may surmise that informally, resistance to intra-CARICOM migration was intensifying. PM Arthur (2005: 6) contended that:

Over an extended period, the respective Caribbean economies have put in place a formidable array of barriers to the easy and free movement of goods, services, skills and capital among their respective economies. Indeed, it might well be said that foreign enterprise and entities have, in the main, being traditionally afforded a more accommodating and
potentially profitable environment within which to do business than the
typical Caribbean enterprise. Much of the economic potential of the
respective Caribbean economies has been stifled by their arrangements
[with each other].

Barbados, up to around 2009, formerly approached intra-regional migration as a
liberalising factor to enhance Barbados’ labour market while expanding the
economic infrastructure. Similar can be said about other CARICOM member
states. Intra-CARICOM migration, and especially the migration of *highly* skilled
labour, was promoted as an activity that anticipated greater productivity and
competitiveness. There was however, a downside described by Girvan in which
there was “fragmentation and diversity [that] have been barriers to regional
cooperation and have prevented the emergence of the region as a cohesive group”
(1997: 3). It became evident that social interactions and other intervening events
could impact (i.e. positively and negatively) on national and integrated
development. Similar phenomena limited Barbados and the member states' quests
for deepening regional integration. The next sub-section provides contrasting
indices for Barbados.

4.5.2 Comparative Indices for Barbados and Selected Countries

In this sub-section, focus is on the indices that reveal contextual data for Barbados
while highlighting the importance of CARICOM to the country. Girvan (1997: 5)
argues that “most Caribbean economies depend on the export or one or a small
number of resource products, and/or tourism.” The CARICOM region by 2006
was responsible for 35 percent of Barbados’ total exports and had become
Barbados’ second largest market for imports (BLP, 2007: 16). Migrant labour and
other cross-border flows within CARICOM increased in Barbados during a period
when Barbados’ unemployment figures showed unprecedented declines (i.e.
approximately 6.7 % by the last quarter of 2007). Indeed, the Barbados Central
Bank reported that the Barbados economy “grew by approximately 4.2 % during
the first nine months of 2007, compared to an increase of 3.7 % in the
corresponding period of 2006” (Central Bank of Barbados, 2007: 1). By 2007 in
the lead up to the ICC World Cup final, Barbados registered significant growth in
agriculture (i.e. 4.9 %) and construction (i.e. 5.1 %).
Additionally, the Central Bank reported that a “hive of business activity associated with the preparation for and subsequent staging of the CWC matches contributed to growth in these sectors, with spill over effects into the third quarter of 2007” (2007: 3). The Central Bank reported that from January to the end of September in 2007, the “average unemployment rate was 7.1 %, compared to a rate of 9.8 % for the corresponding period of 2006. The proportion of unemployed males declined to 5.4 % from the 9.4 % a year earlier, while the percentage of unemployed females fell to 8.9 %, following the 10.3 % recorded for the similar period in 2006” (2007: 4). Perhaps, it remains debateable if both the CSME and intra-CARICOM migration were fundamental to Barbados’ favourable macroeconomic situations during the given period of 2004 and at least until early 2009.

The years 2003 to 2008 coincided with the height of Guyanese and other CARICOM nationals entering the Barbados labour market. During the period, Barbados experienced sustained annual economic growth averaging 3.2 %. PM Thompson (2009n: 27) in the ‘Budget Speech’ remarked that “the performance of the Barbados economy” for the first three months of 2009 was bothersome because “output fell by an estimated 2.8 %, making not only a reversal of the 3.2 % growth averaged” for the period alluded to up to 2008, but Barbados recorded “one of the most pronounced contractions since the 1991/1992 recessions.” Prior to 2008, Barbados had actively courted CARICOM nationals in order to ameliorate local labour shortages, with agriculture and construction absorbing the bulk of Caribbean migrant labour.

The statistics do not show the direct or indirect linkage between those things that transpired after the actual World Cup Cricket tournament. Nonetheless, by 2009 the recession was impacting heavily on Barbados and several Caribbean countries with the possible exception of Guyana. According to Finance Minister Sinckler (2010), “the protracted weakness in economic activity was reflected in severe labour market dislocations in terms of employment and wages, and dampening

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50 See Table 4.4 appearing later in the chapter.
domestic demand.” Guyana is a resourcefully diverse country and while, for example, the services-driven economy of Barbados suffered, the commodity-oriented economy of Guyana with resources such as sugar, rice, bauxite, gold, forestry, fishing, and livestock better weathered the recessionary forces which were emergent in the international economy. In Chapter 6 to follow, it becomes clear that there was a securitising discourse in Barbados indicating that intra-CARICOM migration was perceived to be problematic for the local economy.

Through the CHOG, some member states expressed scepticism regarding intra-CARICOM migration based on the structural unevenness in their particular economies. It was suggested that regional migrants were more likely to gravitate to countries that had more favourable economic climates and, access to social programmes such as health and education. Indeed, reflecting on Table 1.3, the socioeconomic indicators coupled with economic rationalisation are likely to have accounted for Barbados being perceived by CARICOM nationals as being better able to deliver on the Caribbean migrants' material expectations of economic opportunities. This is despite that Barbados is the most densely populated CARICOM member state.

The presence and prevalence of unequal socio-economic conditions and general economic factors were, in many cases, structural. Hornbeck (2008: 8) considers that “structural factors, particularly the similarity in economies and high concentration of export products” among the territories, “naturally limited the potential trade effects of CARICOM’s regional market for goods.” Fuchs and Straubhaar (2003: 9) earlier argued that:

The economies are not very diversified. Agriculture is losing in importance, but still accounts for a high proportion of GDP in most CARICOM countries. Manufacturing constitutes only a small part of industrial production and its share has been declining in most countries over the last twenty years. Because the Caribbean is a very attractive region for tourism, the service sector is well developed in most countries and still growing in many of them.

It was after 2009, however, that the Caribbean territorial economies experienced problems of factor mobility that clearly were undermining the CSME. Girvan
(2007: 3) suggested that it was not generally appreciated in the region that with “the appropriate measures” there are benefits that could ensue from greater intra-regional activities and with the CSME. The benefits would be evident in the “growth of intra-Caribbean investment and foreign investment, labour flows and service provision and ultimately of exports to extra-regional markets” (Girvan, 2007: 3). Former Barbados Central Bank Governor, Marion Williams, stated that:

If you can trade without barriers in a single economic space the possibility of growth and expansion is enhanced and the hurdles, legal, administrative, regulatory, etc. are lessened. As a single market we can now offer our members better terms of operating, and greater freedom from barriers than we offer any third country. For these reasons the Caribbean had very little option but to form itself into a single market. We have created a greater single economic space and a greater market for ourselves in which we are the beneficiaries. ... The requirements for the proper functioning of the CSME are the removal of restrictions on the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital and the right of establishment. The intention is to reduce the economic vulnerability of regional economies by providing an avenue to expand trade and investment opportunities, thereby lowering consumer prices and improving standards of living across the region. (2005: 1)

Consistent with concepts already introduced in the chapter, there were ‘pull’ factors attracting CARICOM nationals to Barbados. Indeed, Williams (2005: 2) said that with the free mobility of labour under the CSME, “the implications for the employment situation in Barbados” came under increasing focus with labour being “attracted to higher-wage jurisdictions.” Barbados’ GNI per capita, however, remains one of the highest among the member states participating in the CSME.\(^{51}\) Beyond the attractions of higher wages, the civility of Barbados speaks to a country in which national pride and belonging have been culturally fused into its own dynamic of resistance to intra-CARICOM migration though supportive of economic integration.\(^{52}\) Hence, review on the concepts of citizenship and national belonging in Barbados take on particular significance. The next section examines general practices and explanations highlighting boundaries, citizenship, and belonging.

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\(^{51}\) See table 1.2.

\(^{52}\) This assertion is further discussed in Chapter 6 under Section 6.4.
4.6 Boundaries: Citizenship and Belonging

This section, positions the concept of citizenship and belonging in the context of social, legal, and geographical boundaries. Bauböck (2007: 400) contends that “a territorial border serves two quite different purposes” and these are: “to demarcate a jurisdiction and to regulate flows (of people or things).” Newman and Paasi (1998: 187) suggest that it has become a norm to view borders and “boundaries as expressions or manifestations of the territoriality of states.” Newman and Paasi (1998: 197) reason that “geographic processes of socialization,” coupled with other intangible factors, have been integral in the knowledge-construction regarding “the state system within which we live – a spatial system which is characterized by more or less exclusive boundaries.” Indeed, Anderson, Sharma and Wright (2009: 6) argue that borders are:

Presented as filters, sorting people into desirable and non-desirable, skilled and unskilled, genuine and bogus, worker ... national borders are better analyzed as moulds, as attempts to create certain types of subjects and subjectivities. Thus borders are productive and generative. They place people in new types of power relations with others and they impart particular kinds of subjectivities. Borders, then, are the mark of a particular kind of relationship, one based on deep divisions and inequalities between people who are given varying national statuses.

Carolissen (2012: 632) asserts that boundaries “support separation, thus creating insiders and outsiders and, by implication, inclusions and exclusions.” In essence, state boundaries “are equally social, political and discursive constructs, not just static naturalized categories located between states” (Newman & Paasi, 1998: 187). In fact, the concept of belonging offers “a way to ground the relationship between migration and identity ... particularly through its erection of barriers, policing of borders and practice of exclusion” (Gilmartin, 2008: 1342). These things are important given the security-migration dynamic. Benhabib (2002: 444) refers to the construction of political membership in which “the principles of incorporating aliens and strangers, immigrants and newcomers into existing

53 Also see the later discussions in Section 4.8.2.
polities” takes place. This factor presents an interesting dynamic. Jones and Krzyżanowski (2008: 44) contend that belonging to a political community involves “a process whereby an individual in some way feels some sense of association with a group, and as such represents a way to explain the relationship between a personalized identity and a collective one.” Ralph and Staeheli (2011: 523) argue that “while belonging is a subjective feeling held by individuals, it is also socially defined.” Clearly, the dynamic is featured in “social processes of inclusion and exclusion [that] depend critically on the categorisation of people as belonging and not belonging” (Ralph & Staeheli, 2011: 523). Citizenship in this sense presents a subjective judgment of inclusion and exclusion.

Borders and boundary practices are instrumental regarding developments that have emerged in Barbados on intra-CARICOM migration; these are discussed in Chapters 6 through 8. In terms of law, citizenship is “a legal status and identity that excludes rather than includes people” (Joppke, 1999: 630). Issues of citizenship and belonging are practices that entail social and cultural affiliations; with the construction of boundaries serving to further single out the non-citizen and are used to decide issues of rights. In fact, Carens (1987: 253) argues that “the state is obliged to protect the rights of citizens and noncitizens equally because it enjoys a de facto monopoly over the enforcement of rights within its territory.” Staeheli (2008: 568n) finds that “there is often a tension in that citizenship and rights are conceptualized in liberalism as attaching to individuals, even though citizenship and rights are often, in practice, extended to groups.” The Barbados Constitution under Chapter Three expresses the “protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual” as opposed to rejecting non-citizens that may abide in the country, although this is not dismissive of rights for groups (Laws of Barbados, 1985: 1).

Clearly, citizens possess civil, political and social rights that are considered “bound to the status of being a ‘national’ – which is particularistic and exclusive” (Mehta & Napier-Moore, 2010: 14). Howard (2006: 443) argues that “citizenship is the most basic and fundamental starting point of a democratic polity” for which
Barbados and the CARICOM participating states qualify and share consensus. Harder and Zhyznomirska (2012: 297) argue that “place and national identity interact in the formulations of dangerous internal foreigner and dangerous external national to mark out a sense of home and a set of related affiliations and behaviours that are ‘other’ to the host nation state, and hence vulnerable to suspicion.” Barbadians and indeed Caribbean people have acquired strong attachments to their particular countries, and with intra-CARICOM migration, there are issues that arise within the politics of identity.

Indeed, when viewed through the lenses of political membership and community, profiles and discrimination, the cost of entering Barbados as a CARICOM national, but not as a citizen of Barbados, can become a traumatic experience for the individual and for collectives such as Guyanese. In practice, citizenship in Barbados and CARICOM, may under the circumstances be “marked by a tension: between a citizenship that is derivative of the nation-state, and a citizenship that is defined by free movement” with “a deep-rooted tension between nationality and free movement” (Aradau et al., 2010: 945). Emerging in Barbados, and this is against the background of regional integration and recognition of CARICOM nationals, is a shunning of ‘CARICOM’ citizenship. Similar to arguments in Europe, Caribbean citizenship among CARICOM member states has possibly meant “undermining the exclusivity of national citizenship” (Kostakopoulou, 2007: 625). This observation is to be read in contradistinction to the state actors seeking to maintain control over the administration of border-entry into Barbados. The next section briefly addresses concerns regarding institutional discrimination.

4.7 Discrimination and Prejudice

This section addresses concepts of discrimination and prejudice; these concepts surfaced in the social and political practices informing readings of securitisation in Barbados which are accounted for in the empirical chapters to follow. Discrimination and prejudice are resident in the insider/outsider dynamics shaping intra-CARICOM politics. Discrimination may be defined as “a selectively unjustified negative behavior toward members of the target group that involves
denying individuals or groups of people equality of treatment which they may wish” (Henkel et al., 2006: 101). The same authors define prejudice to be “an unfair negative attitude toward a social group or a person perceived to be a member of that group” (Henkel et al., 2006: 101). Realistically, discrimination and prejudice are perceived in negative terms. Given the emphasis in this inquiry on intra-CARICOM migration, there are linked concepts of xenophobia and xenocentrism that feature.

Essentially, xenophobia is the fear of strangers, and xenocentrism is the fear of marginalised groups based upon identity markers such as race and ethnicity. Rydgren (2008: 743) contends that xenophobia has an “ambiguous etymological meaning” that indicates “fear of strangers or guests,” and its aptness is manifested in the claim that “it is strangers as unwanted guests who are feared or met with hostility.” In terms of clarity, Rydgren (2008: 740) sets this understanding against a reading that:

It is ‘natural’ for people to live among others of ‘their own kind’... with a corresponding hostility toward people of ‘another’ kind. However, this hostility need not be activated until ‘strangers’ come too close to the ingroup (in geographical or social space) and are believed to threaten the identity (consensual beliefs and practices, mores and traditional values) or the material interests of the ingroup. Strangers at a distance will not meet the same hostility or be as feared.

On the definitional meaning of xenocentrism, Wallach contends that xenocentrism is “the belief, not uncommon in postcolonial societies, that a foreign culture,” for example Barbadian in contradistinction to Guyanese, “is superior to all others” inclusive of other cultural expressions in CARICOM member states (2002: 82). Xenophobia and xenocentrism are not new forms of social productions in the Caribbean; but they have been present regarding intra-regional migration whilst a condition of ethnocentrism comes to mind in terms of international migration. Ethnocentrism reveals a “strong sense of ethnic group self-importance and self-centeredness,” and is characterised by “intergroup expressions ... which assume that the ingroup is more important than other groups;” and that the “intragroup expressions ... assume that the ingroup is more important than individual ingroup
members” (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012: 903). In fact, these attributes can be located in the migration/immigration climate being shaped in Barbados; and are emblematic of subjectification/objectification.

Grayson (2008: 266) defines objectification as “instances in which the dominant interpretations of an event is naturalized within a particular social context” wherein the specific event or experience of FMCN and the danger it holds for locals “is no longer seen as an interpretation but rather as an objective truth.” Representations of self and other come to depend upon the action of labelling and are capable of influencing specific behaviours (e.g. legitimate and exceptional regulatory practices) within the administration and governance of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados and CARICOM.

Subjectification, signals the indoctrination of negative connotations brought about by the performance of an in-group against the labels applied to another group (i.e. outsiders). At least since 2008, the CARICOM national living and working in Barbados has been already presumed to represent a danger for the state and society.54 These important concepts play out in the politics of intra-CARICOM migration, and is especially visible as this inquiry focuses on the actors and their interactions. In fact, discrimination and prejudice together with the other concepts advanced in this section, inform the practice of institutional and cultural discrimination.

Institutional discrimination is to be understood as any systematic or functional practices that discriminate or manifest unequal treatment. According to Dovidio and others (2010: 10), institutional discrimination is “associated with formal laws and policies,” and cultural discrimination “may originally stem from individuals’ prejudices and stereotypes;” and it refers to “the existence of institutional policies ... that unfairly restrict the opportunities of particular groups of people” such as immigrants and CARICOM nationals.

54 The empirical details are examined in Chapters 6, 7, and 8.
Moreover, institutional discrimination “is deeply embedded in the fiber of a culture’s history, standards, and normative ways of behaving” (Dovidio et al., 2010: 11). With regards to the cultural component, the authors proceed to suggest that cultural discrimination occurs “when one group exerts the power to define values for a society. It involves not only privileging the culture, heritage, and values of the dominant group, but also imposing this culture on other less dominant groups” (Dovidio et al., 2010: 11). The behaviour one expects is therefore characterised by the conscious and unconscious outcomes of insider and outsider politics.

Bartlett (2009: 1900) argues that “unconscious discrimination is a problem worthy of focus, both from the perspective of achieving non-discrimination ... and in reducing the larger societal disparities based on race” or any other attributes such as ethnic origin which surfaces in intra-CARICOM migration. In Barbados, as will be specifically illustrated in Chapters 6 through 8, reactions to public policies and practices that pit one group in contradistinction to another group, for example the ‘foreigners’ or CARICOM nationals as distinct from Barbadians, is the actual manifestation of the attendant institutional discrimination.

At the same time, xenophobia and xenocentrism, and subjectification and objectification are the social practices that underpin the domestic environment in the process of unfolding politics of international and specifically intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. In other words, domestically, there is a process of labelling that emerges given the available knowledge, prejudices, and discriminatory actions in Barbados' formal policies and institutions. The results inform and are informed by the security dynamics and socially constructed processes that are exposed through the application of securitisation theory. The actors, agency, interactions and communication, inclusive of individual acceptance and actualisation, prompt further meaningful actions; these are considered inclusionary for those on the inside and exclusionary for those seen as outsiders such as Guyanese immigrants. The next section turns the focus to historical factors on Caribbean migration.
4.8 Caribbean Migration: History, Trends, and Directions

This section brings to the fore historical and contextual factors that have become significant dynamics in intra-regional migration for Barbados. There is no doubt that CARICOM’s colonial history is entrenched in the psyche of Caribbean people as a lived reality. Wiltshire-Brodber (1999: 140) asserts that in the post-colonial CARICOM countries, “independence did not remove the dominant racial and class structures which had been erected during colonialism.” Roberts (1957: 268) contends that:

Many features and problems concerning West Indian populations today [have a colonial base]. Slavery, apart from its potent influence on the social structure of the Caribbean area, had also over-riding effects in that it conferred on the region a common racial characteristic, the dominance of Negro stock. Likewise indenture immigration brought further racial groups into the region ... the racial and cultural diversity of the region.

Wiltshire-Brodber (1999: 140) added that the “value system that the old colonial order had entrenched remained embedded in Caribbean psyches.” The defunct WIF serves as a constant reminder of the scepticism and underlying suspicions expressed by CARICOM actors, each against the other. Within the Caribbean, these were actions that traditionally were used to divide and fragment, and became obtrusive towards intra-Caribbean migration during the colonial period.

Roberts (1955: 246), for instance, notes that Barbados as early as the middle to late 19th century had opposed migration and had in fact implemented “restrictive measures ... opposing all forms of migration.” Years later, Arthur would reveal that CARICOM’s “regional society is the product of the ordeal of migrant labour ... under which the Caribbean labour force” is indicative of “the shabbiest part of our tortured economic history” (2007: 30). Boxill (2010: 1) argues that “modern Caribbean society was formed as a result of waves of migration – forced and unforced – from Africa, Asia and Europe” and migration, “whether historical or recent, is therefore, very much part of the Caribbean experience.” Likewise, Thomas-Hope (2002: 2) contends that there has always been a “propensity for Caribbean migration” and it “continues to be high;” especially in circumstances wherein “historical factors relating to the limitations of size and therefore of
opportunities” meant that the Caribbean migrant was ever mindful of his survival and life-chances.

Intra-CARICOM migration continues to be a dynamic phenomenon and is one of the oldest means of economic survival and social transformation. Caribbean people have used migration as an outlet pursued by Caribbean people in search of enhanced socio-economic opportunities and standards of living. However, contemporary intra-regional migration has resulted in significant political unease and apprehension in Barbados and CARICOM. This is not to suggest that CARICOM member states, inclusive of Barbados, have reneged on repeated objectives for full freedom of movement. The claim in this thesis is that there is a securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados that has sufficiently intimidated some actors and brought into question the minutiae of integrated development. The securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados is a by-product of socially constructed boundaries by the relevant actors that challenge, if not undermine, the original objectives of CARICOM. The following sub-section prises open migration in context of the regional labour market.

4.8.1 CSME: Liberalisation in Local Labour Markets

This sub-section advances relevant literature on the critical factors impacting labour markets in Barbados and CARICOM. They are many who believe that “for a single market to be truly effective, the free movement of people is a fundamental prerequisite” (Skeete, 2007). Carryl (2009) affirms that the region has “to deal with the free movement of skills” because it is labour migration that “drives an economy” and “free movement is a pivotal driver of the economy.” Moreover, “one of the main pillars of the CSME is the commitment to liberalize the movement of labor and to abolish the need for work permits for nationals from CSME participating countries” (ECLAC, 2006: 6). Wickham and others (2004: 18) advise that:

Freedom of movement in the Caribbean has first to be contextualised since this concept can be subjected to two interpretations within a regional community, or free trade area. In the wider context, freedom of movement is associated with the right of members of a ‘formal’ regional community
(such as CARICOM) to settle and work in any member state of that community. In the Caribbean context, however, the term ‘freedom of movement’ has been associated with the less ambitious objective that is commonly referred to as hassle free travel.

In an era that is increasingly shaped by labels such as productivity, competition, and factor mobility, the “major challenge” facing Caribbean people “is the psyche” in which there is the “fear associated with nationals of other CARICOM countries being afforded the same rights and privileges as nationals from ‘MY’ country” (Greene, 2007: 125). Indeed, there are socio-political activities that feature circumspectly on intra-CARICOM migration.

On the one hand, Barbados’ acceptance and hospitality to CARICOM nationals appears lukewarm; and on another hand, Barbados’ recent posturing leads to considerations suggesting that there are ulterior motives and other factors fuelling tensions and fears among Barbados, CARICOM immigrants already living in the country, and several of the potential migrants preferring to seek out opportunities in Barbados as a right under the RTC.

Restrictions and controls implemented by Barbados are making it possible for functional actors to suggest Barbados’ opposition to intra-CARICOM migration. At the same time, Barbados is said to be more accommodating and less prohibitive towards immigrants from outside of CARICOM, especially North Americans and Europeans. Is this part of a colonial footprint? Two additional questions, therefore, emerge in the context of the discussions.

First, given the definitions provided earlier on legal and illegal migration, have Barbados and CARICOM member states done sufficient work towards achieving common understandings and harmonised legislation on intra-CARICOM migration, and particularly on immigration practices? Second, what does the ‘welcoming’ or ‘facilitating’ of CARICOM nationals into Barbados actually entail; do CARICOM nationals entering Barbados, other than as tourists, become arbitrarily challenged? The sub-section following contextualises the possible legal shortcomings that have appeared.
4.8.2 Legal Shortcomings on Regulating Intra-CARICOM Migration

There are shortcomings that are embedded in the regulatory framework which has as its ideal Article 45 of the RTC. In the context of a regional system, treaty arrangements including restrictions and control measures, are supposed to regulate the cross-border flows of migrants between Barbados and other CARICOM member states. The very act of privileging 10 categories of persons for movement tend to frustrate the overall efforts at forging a regional labour market in which the social and economic skills are best maximised without favour or institutional discrimination. The current regional effort “will at best result in an ‘elitist’ common market with major sections of the Caribbean population remaining alienated” (Wickham et al., 2004: 31). The national rules, policies, and practices that are in operation regarding the CSME and intra-CARICOM migration may indicate shortcomings facing the actors. Yet, these national rules may fail to fit the regional objective due to local actors’ proclivity for narrowly managing migration.

Table 4.3: Sets of the ‘Competent Authority’ Issuing CSC in Member States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPETENT AUTHORITY</th>
<th>COUNTRIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance and the Economy/Industry/Investment</td>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barbuda; St. Kitts &amp; Nevis; St. Lucia; Suriname</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Trade/Foreign Affairs/Tourism</td>
<td>Belize; Dominica; Grenada; Guyana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Security/National Security</td>
<td>Jamaica; St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition of Service Industries</td>
<td>Barbados; Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Barbados and across the inter-connected CARICOM communities, there are recommendations and inclinations for greater policy coordination, harmonisation, and coherence within CARICOM. For instance, the certificate affording ‘right of entry’ for potential migrants is issued in the member states by local bodies described by the CARICOM Secretariat as being ‘competent’ authorities (see table 4.3). On the treatment accorded to bearers of what is termed a CARICOM Certificate of Recognition of Skills Qualifications and otherwise known as a
CARICOM Skills Certificate (CSC), there are attempts for policy harmonisation. Within the national state units, there is the establishment of a National Accreditation Body that assesses the qualifications of CARICOM nationals. The agency is expected to advise a Free Movement Committee working in conjunction with and under the aegis of the CARICOM Secretariat and related agencies. There are procedural requirements that are set out for the CARICOM national which include application, approval, and permission for entry into the particular member state.

In effect, CARICOM nationals can pursue economic ‘wage-earning’ activity in the receiving state under the full extent of treaty provisions and of national laws of the particular jurisdiction. CARICOM nationals who move are expected to receive ‘national treatment’ in the host country. National treatment means that a CARICOM national will be able to work, set up businesses or provide services in a participating CARICOM member state, subject to the same rules which apply to nationals of the host country. However, there remain tensions and complaints that confront potential immigrants in possession of the CSC at national borders. Concerns have been raised by one or more member states and by several type actors regarding violations on the issuance of certificates and the treatment CARICOM nationals receive in Barbados and some other member states. The crux of this discussion on the actual practices being undertaken by institutional and non-institutional actors is first identified in the next chapter showing the relationships of the actors with each other; and then these are elaborated upon in presenting the evidence in Chapters 6, 7, and 8.

Yet, it is reasonable to infer that lack of policy harmonisation in CARICOM on the intra-regional migration regime is contributing to de facto practices – often informal – that are characterised by suspicion and apprehension among the local residents and transnational communities in Barbados. Generally and specifically, there are tensions and forms of social conflict that are manifested through contestations which result in differences expressed across the transnational social field in Barbados. Policies are being devised with a national purpose by local
authorities; and at the same time, networking actors operating in Barbados are deciphering the mixed messages and anti-immigrant sentiments. Intra-regional and national identity politics have resulted in the heightened politicisation of issues on the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration amongst the participating member states and societies.

The politicisation has manifested within the CARICOM security complex and facilitated member states pushing the boundaries of what may be legally permissible regarding the implementation of new and restrictive measures for immigrants. The rules and legal frameworks governing intra-CARICOM migration, and especially the FMCN and ROE, are predominantly nestled between the RTC and the national laws of the nation-states (e.g. Barbados). Given its mandate, the CCJ represents that body empowered with the task of interpreting and applying treaty and international law regarding legal issues that may arise. In fact, the CCJ can alter existing laws in their adjudication of matters giving consideration to other factors such as the human rights of individuals, ratified conventions relating to the rights of migrant workers, and the constitutional provisions inscribed in national legislation.

Many CARICOM nationals perceive Barbados as an economic option offering better opportunities for economic safety. Nevertheless, Barbados may only be a stepping-stone to further migrate to the developed world of North America or Europe. This is an old pattern in movement from the Caribbean for several migrants; it is not unusual for CARICOM migrants inclusive of Guyanese to use another regional destination, such as Barbados or Antigua, as intermediate ports. When extra-regional migration occurs, there are negatives that emerge. For example, the idea of ‘brain drain’ becomes a factor for the original sending country as well as for the region. Barbados, seeing itself as a short-term option, has a second problem when illegality becomes a factor. Fraser and Uche (2010: 51) contend that in CARICOM:

Some countries will continue to be the main destination countries because of either relaxed policies, or better opportunities. Because the region is
relatively small, with few countries with relatively strong economies, there are potential issues with immigration as countries will start receiving more immigrants than they can actually cater for and this will create other problems of illegal migration and the challenges that come with it. So while immigration is indeed a positive phenomenon, if not controlled and regulated effectively, it can prove just the opposite.

Overall, an economic rationalisation is linked to the social and political actions of multiple actors in both sending and receiving states. The combination of actions is a key feature regarding the FMCN and ROE. The broader conceptualisations regarding the strengthening of the CSME and deepening regional integration will likely demonstrate the complexity of intra-CARICOM migration. The intra-CARICOM migration framework as espoused in Barbados and within CARICOM raises structural and institutionalised concerns. Socio-economic factors, including the HDI rankings, indicate that the labour market chances in Barbados are economically stronger (i.e. in terms of income and especially in services) than in Guyana and/or most countries within CARICOM. Although the free mobility of specific categories of people is expected to be an actual economic benefit for the receiving and sending states across the CARICOM region, it remains problematic for national and regional actors if the attendant migration processes are not effectively managed and administered across borders.

Indeed, “discussions of immigration policy customarily treat the flow of labor as the result of individual actions, particularly the individual’s decision to migrate in search of better opportunities” (Sassen, 1996: 90). However, it is the state or institutional management that often reverts to language that is meant to discourage the individual immigrant unless economic gains appear calculable in advance (e.g. through the various categories of skilled labour). Influxes and the lapsing of statuses into situations of irregularity can be burdensome. Like trade, if intra-CARICOM migration is welcomed, the actual effects of immigration on receiving countries tend to encourage “many citizens of migrant-receiving states [to] perceive negative consequences – economic and noneconomic – that lead them to prefer more restrictive immigration policies” (Cornelius & Rosenblum, 2005: 104). In fact, it is not uncommon that discourses in international migration
circles are haphazardly informed through guesstimates as to the *swamp* or *flood* of *foreigners* and *aliens*. This is coupled with the claim that *illegal* immigrants are *burdens* for the countries in which they are living and working.\(^{55}\)

Murray (2003: 446) argues that “the invocation of large, rounded, and elastic numbers” by officials and general members of the local population conveys that there is “the sense that illegal immigration is an essentially unknowable phenomenon, something that is largely uncontrollable and dangerous, disruptive and detrimental to the health of the body politic.” Combinations of economic, social, cultural, legal and political factors help to shape and reshape the dynamics of intra-regional migration. CARICOM nationals, choosing to enter Barbados for work, leisure, or other reason, are frequently seen in exclusionary terms. CARICOM citizenship, without having Barbados citizenship, may still be viewed as foreign to local Barbadian membership. The Report of the WIC (1993: 79) confirms that:

> The movement of skilled West Indians … is by no means facilitated. Resentment, not welcome, seems to govern procedures when any hint of settlement surfaces in a West Indian travelling in the Region. The barriers which bureaucracies put in the way of qualified professionals, including UWI graduates, transferring home and work place are not only a contradiction of agreed integration principles but also a betrayal of the spirit of regionalism. … Attitudes must suffer a sea change through every level of administration.

The fact that insularity is linked to nationalism and belonging to a particular political community exacerbates the ‘reality’ that there is no explicit legal ‘beast’ termed CARICOM citizenship. This is the case even though CARICOM citizenship is often implied when one speaks of a CARICOM national. The myth or reality presents an anomaly or deficiency regarding the freedom of movement regime in CARICOM on CARICOM citizenship and identity which rouse ‘deep-rooted tensions’ and insularity. The extent that these practices occur in Barbados and/or other CARICOM member states is examined on the basis of evidence provided in Chapter 6 of this thesis. The next sub-section discusses patterns and

numbers regarding the CARICOM nationals, especially Guyanese, migrating to Barbados on account of the RTC.

4.8.3 Intra-CARICOM Migration: Patterns and Trends

This sub-section provides numerical data regarding vital statistics for Barbados and CARICOM in the scheme of intra-CARICOM migration. It must be admitted here that gaining adequate and pertinent data from the relevant governmental and institutional agencies within Barbados and CARICOM is a structural deficiency. Indeed, current CARICOM Secretary-General, Irwin LaRocque reasons that:

There are still critical data gaps, problems with the quality and timeliness of the statistics that are produced and with the level of detail and attributes that are required. Statisticians across the Region are encouraged to continue to bridge the gaps in the data and in its timeliness, which will ensure that users of statistics are provided with accurate, reliable and timely statistics for decision-making. (2012).

Table 4.4: CARICOM Skilled Nationals Approved (2006 to 2008) in Barbados

Source: Original data from the Barbados Immigration Department 2009, and provided by the CSME Unit in Barbados.

Note: As stated in the text, a major drawback in CARICOM is the non-availability of accurate and timely data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CARICOM COUNTRY</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total: All CARICOM Countries</strong></td>
<td><strong>123</strong></td>
<td><strong>144</strong></td>
<td><strong>184</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The numbers of CARICOM nationals on the move within the CARICOM region are numerically small and much less than might be present in bigger and more populated countries outside of the CARICOM setting. The numbers of skilled migrants moving as a direct result of the FMCN are substantially lesser than similarly labelled flows of migrants in Europe or North America. Downes (2006: 223) suggests that “labour mobility within the region has been much lower than mobility outside the region.” A snapshot of approved CARICOM skilled
nationals’ applicants from selected countries is indicated in Table 4.4. The trends for the years highlighted show patterns of small changes regarding the directions of the flows across national borders into Barbados.

Table 4.5 Selected CARICOM Countries: Refused Entry into Barbados

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Refused Entry into Barbados 2007-2012</th>
<th>Total Seeking Entry into Barbados from Selected CARICOM Countries - 2012</th>
<th>Total Refused Entry - 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>2,128</td>
<td>21,358</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>1,485</td>
<td>12,888</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent &amp; the Grenadines</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>29,781</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>42,295</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nevertheless, the Barbados Immigration Department has indicated recently that, between 1997 and September 2009, a total of 1,683 CARICOM ‘skilled nationals’ gained approval to undertake work in Barbados. Even within this context, PM Skerritt of Dominica said that CARICOM member states “should not continue to hold on to unreasonable fears or hostility towards other CARICOM nationals” (2011). PM Skerritt went on to reveal that throughout CARICOM, 4,500 persons moved under the skills regime in the period 1997 to June 2010, and these statistics were emphatic that the movement is ‘low’ amidst “persistent rumours” that CARICOM countries “are being flooded by skilled CARICOM nationals” (2011). Furthermore, Table 4.5 shows a comparison of four selected CARICOM countries. In the first data column the numbers that have been refused entry into Barbados for the five year period, 2007-12 are illustrated. The second data column accounts for the total numbers of persons seeking entry into Barbados from the selected countries in 2012. The third column shows those that have been refused entry in that same year. It is to be noted, that there are no specifications regarding the purposes for intending to enter Barbados. Several of these persons possibly comprised a large portion of visitors.

Another insight from PM Skerritt suggested that regionally, “an estimated 85,000 work permits were issued by member states, of which 63,750 were issued to
nations” of non-CARICOM countries (2011). The outcome is that “the main movers in our community [CARICOM] in the past decade have been non-CARICOM nationals” (Skerritt, 2011). While Guyana represents the country with the largest numbers taking advantage of the RTC’s provisions into Barbados, the statistical data demonstrate a steady decline of Guyanese nationals over the period 2006-2009 in terms of overall percentages compared with other CARICOM nationals. Drawing from the general movements of people within CARICOM, Thomas-Hope (2002: 3) insists that:

The countries with the lower income levels are the net exporters of skilled migrants to the region. While regional skill exchange is regarded as a good thing, and policies are being developed to facilitate this, there has been reluctance on the part of some governments because of the disparities in national development levels and the imbalance that could occur in an environment of the free movement of labour.

There are certain dynamics that this thesis will not fully examine due to the parameters set out in the methodology section of Chapter 3. Nevertheless, this chapter has introduced the difficult issues of identity, belonging, inclusion, and exclusion that become exacerbated by the perceptions of ‘influx’ and large numbers of CARICOM nationals moving into countries such as Barbados to join the migrant populations already resident. The social ordering of Barbadian society is dependent upon historical factors. Voluntary migration otherwise conceived as economic and entrepreneurial migration, impacts on Barbados and becomes a matter of critical security concern. The next section summarises the content and contextual markers identified in this chapter, particularly from the perspective of intra-CARICOM migration and the spotlight for an analysis using securitisation theory.

4.9 Summary
The discussions in this chapter began with elaboration on key concepts and definitions on migration, immigration, citizenship, and institutional discrimination among others. Relevant sections showed that it was possible for migration to have

56 This argument is discussed in Chapter 5.
different forms of utility for migrants, as well as implications for non-immigrant individuals, societies, and states; and that push-pull explanations provided some insight on intra-regional migration. The chapter addressed several concerns associated with governance, administration, and the functionality of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados.

The discussions proceed to put into perspective the economic landscape of Barbados in contradistinction to aspects of other CARICOM member states in which Guyana stood out. Included in the economic overview were particular timelines with the relevant statistical data such as unemployment figures and average economic growth rates. The key was to illustrate that in terms of economic integration and the pillars driving the CSME, intra-CARICOM migration was important. Although there were several coincidences regarding the politics, economic, law, and socio-cultural dynamics, it became possible to suggest that the Barbados economy was influenced by patterns of intra-CARICOM migration juxtaposed to the prevailing economic circumstances. Types of migrants, namely voluntary migrants, and the characterisations that tend to affect CARICOM nationals as immigrants were discussed in terms of economic, social, and cultural identity.

The possible institutional affects due to labelling the legal and illegal migrant were pitched alongside the broader treatment of immigration. Intra-CARICOM migration was presented as a social activity with the idea that rights for entry and remaining in a country were often discernible from economic terms of market demands and the agency of actors. Observations, both general and specific, included data for CARICOM nationals entering Barbados. The chapter discussed features of high net worth individuals in Barbados, and possible connotations economic for issues on citizenship and belonging. The sense in which cross-border ties and place comes to be defined gave practical utility for understanding forms of cultural and institutional discrimination. International migration throws up a series of potential crises; and at the core, forms of subjectification and objectification occupied the directional and numerical flows of migrants across
national borders. There were implications arising from such, once put into a context specific to Barbados and CARICOM. The relationship between the economics of migration/immigration and the socio-cultural nuances prompting particular security issues were discussed with a view to demonstrating the practicality of the events and circumstances in the empirical chapters to follow. The next chapter examines historical characteristics of Barbados’ collective identity, other representations and misrepresentations that are shaping attitudes to self and other within CARICOM.
Chapter 5

Barbados’ Collective Identity, Regional Institutional Actors: Representations and Misrepresentations

5.1. Chapter Introduction
This chapter brings together elements from colonial history to examine the politics of identity formation in Barbados. It will also discuss the legal and institutional frameworks of CARICOM while disclosing that the politics of identity continues to be significant in the context of Barbados and CARICOM’s affairs. The chapter links historical dimensions with the contemporary trends; and this is evident in the way that national actors in Barbados and other CARICOM member states approach problems associated with intra-regional migration. Colonial legacy and the politics of identity are central to the project of intra-CARICOM migration. Indeed, the chapter reveals that elements of race/ethnicity and insular nationalism partly shape the political climate in CARICOM.

This chapter assumes a transitioning role in the investigation. It seeks to describe characterisations of Barbados by other CARICOM actors and vice versa because beneath the veneer, there are underlying suspicions that traditionally shaped actors’ perceptions of states and societies with each other in CARICOM. Emphasis is placed on distinguishing aspects said to be present between Barbados and Guyana. In addition, the later sections in the chapter will examine several key national and regional actors that have substantial roles in the format of the CSME. A number of the actors are, directly or indirectly, related to the functionality of intra-CARICOM migration. By the end of this chapter, there will be a strong sense of the facilitating conditions that can lead to the possibility wherein successful securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration becomes realisable in Barbados. The next section begins by examining concerns on identity and other vital features that shape the domestic/regional political environment.

5.2 Caribbean and Barbados’ Identities: Influences of Colonial History
This section directs attention to identity formation in CARICOM and draws on attributes that have been used to socially construct the Barbados identity. Girvan
(2000: 34) insists that “the very notion of Caribbean was not only invented but has been continuously reinterpreted in response both to external influences and to internal currents.” Varying descriptions are coloured by what Nettleford calls the “paradox of Caribbean life” in which, “the more things change the more they have remained the same” (2003: 4). The Caribbean, “as a geographical expression is a very imprecise place that is difficult to define” (Premdas, 1996: 2). The Caribbean “metaphorically, has emerged as roughly containing the rhythm of Africa, the chords of Asia, the melody of Europe and the lyrics of the Caribbean itself” (Gonsalves, 1998: 55). At the heart of Caribbean social fabric is culture and, separately and collectively, to speak of the contemporary Commonwealth Caribbean countries, one refers to a continuity of language but the maintenance of social ruptures which are both the evidence of slavery and colonialism.

According to Gordon Lewis, “all societies ... have been shaped by geography and history,” and in many respects, the “Caribbean today is no exception” (1986: 219). Political actions are oriented around perceptions of a past, and recurring, rupture to Caribbean identity. Ramphal (2011) suggests that as West Indians, the region's peoples “have always faced a basic contradiction of oneness and otherness, a basic paradox of kinship and alienation.” Hoetink (1986: 74) writes that “cultural, racial, and economic differences were thus accentuated by geographical separation,” in more profound ways than the archipelagic shorelines may indicate. 57 Caribbean regional identity then is “an interpretation of the process through which a region becomes institutionalized, a process consisting of the production of territorial boundaries, symbolism and institutions” (Paasi, 2003: 478). National identities in CARICOM member states are, in actuality, manifestations of the institutional linkages and fractures that exist between the “centrality of place in identity and the ease with which such [embracing] sentiments have been conflated with particular political claims” (Deudney, 1997: 131). The dynamics that are integral to the socio-cultural and historical transitions combine with the political affairs in CARICOM to construct a distinct Caribbean

57 Italics indicate the original author’s highlighting of race.
personality. The following sub-section examines aspects that have become integral in the characterisations for Barbados’ identity.

5.2.1 Barbados’ Constitutive Identity: History’s Marker

This sub-section presents those historical and other phenomena that tend to characterise Barbados’ sense of identity and distinctiveness. Barbados’ unique geological and geographical features are distinct; the island logistically sits in the Atlantic Ocean away from the archipelago of islands. Barbados is distant enough from Belize and the South American mainland containing the biggest CARICOM states – Suriname and Guyana – in terms of land mass. Barbados is frequently projected as being the envy of the neighbouring former colonies stretching from Jamaica in the north, surpassing the Leeward Islands, moving southwards and especially across the Windward Islands, and passing through the twinned-territory of Trinidad & Tobago. It is critical therefore to identify factors influencing perceptions of Barbados’ identity. This identity is set in juxtaposition to Barbados’ neighbours within CARICOM and against a background of its colonial history. In the 19th century, F.M. Endlich wrote that:

Barbados, most prominent among the Windward Group, was discovered early in the seventeenth century by Portuguese seafarers. It was taken possession of by British subjects, and settlements were, started in 1625. Since that time it has been ruled under the British flag. Until 1627 the island was the property of the Duke of Marlborough, then was transferred to the Duke of Carlisle, and in 1652 was attached under colonial charter to the British crown. During the two and a half centuries that have passed over this flourishing colony, its inhabitants have developed an independent, self-reliant character. (1882: 212).

A reference that stands out is an often told perception that Barbadians are conservative, full of pride, and snooty towards regional counterparts. Endlich (1882: 214) recollected on “the proud spirit of the ‘true-born Barbadian’ [that] has found vent in impassioned speech, defending the colony from real or fancied encroachments upon its colonial rights and prerogatives on the part of the home government.” With the self-importance that Barbadians are perceived to have assumed, partially on the basis of the past settlers’ experiences, it is said that an endearment to British influences contributes to Barbadians’ self-praise. Since the
inception of colonial rule in Barbados, no other European power managed to wrestle Barbados from the British as happened in the colonial histories of most other CARICOM participating states.

The nicknaming of Barbados, *Little England*, after the mother country by the former settler population is a lingering delight for present day Barbadians. Outside of the Caribbean region and in European circles, the term ‘little England’ appears in more deleterious discourses connoting sentiments of reactionary conservatism, xenophobia, and ignorance. Whether those feelings are communicated to Barbados when reference of its Little England pseudonym is made by CARICOM actors remains speculative; but it is possible that snide cynicism may be intended. In spite of Barbadian pride, there is little to mitigate negative labelling that comes from its neighbours.

On the act of labelling, Hamilton (1956: ix) wrote that Barbadians “display in their attitude towards and relations with sister colonies a national pride (or complacent insularity) which, however galling to their neighbours and fairly ridiculous to the detached observer, is undoubtedly deep-seated and unaffected.”

The genesis of contemporary identity problems in Barbados and the CARICOM region are historical; and colonial history has contributed to descriptions that Barbadians attach to their collective national identity. Barbadians claim to have a distinctive social and economic history that is elevated on the basis of strategic ties to Britain, although the country is less embracing of the slavery and racial prejudices that shaped these ties.

Lowenthal (1958: 346) contended that Barbados, in contradistinction to several of the larger and more populated Caribbean islands inclusive of Jamaica and Trinidad, is “more crowded and less cosmopolitan;” and faces “accusations in the other islands of a prejudice against colour not found elsewhere” in the region. Mintz (2005: 41) argues that “so-called race relations have to do with perceptions of others which are based on physical differences.” In addition, Mintz suggested that prevailing differences are “diagnostic features of membership in groups, called races,” and issues of race are technically social constructions (2005: 41).
To say that colour of skin does not have social implications in Barbados would be misleading.

Issues of race, ethnicity and class have tended to be subdued in Barbados. Barbados is seen to be naive in avoiding racial debates; yet its actions have been perceived as prudent once racial and ethnic tensions surfaced. History of regional migrations reveals that since the flows of Caribbean people have become increasingly institutionalised, there are systemic reproductions of racial and ethnic tensions factoring in the contemporary politics of Barbados. These tensions are presented in Chapter 6 as part of the threat constructions that emerged with intra-CARICOM migration; but it is clear to say that the Indo-Guyanese has raised curiosity in Barbados. The next sub-section further develops the historical characterisation of Barbados’ sense of uniqueness in contradistinction to other regional territories.

5.2.2 Barbados’ Uniqueness: Anti-Confederation Stance

This sub-section further presents the view suggesting that Barbados’ self-perception of uniqueness is acted out within the region. Greenwood and Hamber (2003: 57) argue that Barbados has “always held herself aloof from the other islands because of her much longer colonial history and the strength of her government institutions.” Hamilton (1956: ix) wrote that:

Whether the cause is geographical, historical, and political isolation, or some fundamental condition of life peculiar to the island, there are certain habits of mind and temperament which nearly all true Barbadians share, however extreme their differences in racial origin. There is a prevailing easy-going good nature, a less agreeable side of which is seen in a quite excessive tolerance of small abuses. There is a quick sense of fun, sometimes childish but often quite subtle, and capable of being effectively directed, in true British fashion, against any form of pretentiousness. There is a refreshing realism of outlook, degenerating sometimes into a bad habit of smart-aleck cynicism, the morbid form of which displays itself in a proneness to attribute base motives to any and everybody. There is a simplicity and restfulness of behaviour which creates a delightfully easy and soothing social atmosphere, but which is liable to break down, under very small stresses into gesticulating excitability. There is a slowness of tempo, seemingly an indispensable concomitant to existence in the tropics, to which strangers just have to adjust themselves if they
want to keep their balance; and it is compensated by an infinite readiness
to oblige, exhibited with such unforced courtesy that the recipient of
favours is made to feel no sense of obligation. ... The tastes, manners and
morals of the upper and middle classes do not differ very markedly from
their equivalents in England, but it is noteworthy that a higher degree of
refinement, delicacy of speech and manners, and liberality of outlook is
often shown by the educated people of colour than by the whites. Possibly
this superiority is, here and in many countries with a predominantly
coloured population, the by-product of a historically inferior social and
economic position.

A closer reading of Hamilton’s depiction of Barbadians profoundly raises interest
in the possibility that the country’s national motto reading *Pride and Industry* may
be a self-fulfilling designation of Barbados’ uniqueness. The wider regional
security complex is being shaped by a constructed legacy that was reproduced
through colonial organisation and the forms taken by nascent forms of
nationalism. Significant events took place in the region towards the end of the
19th century.

Specifically, in 1876, “the anti-confederation camp” campaigned against
confederation with the Windward Islands “through public meetings, some public
demonstrations and continuously used the established press ... for wide
propagation of their political point of view” (Belle, 1996: 184). It was stated then
that the “sensitive upper classes of Barbados” took “immediate and deep
hostility” to probable changes and possible shocks that would ensue from the
integrative efforts proposed by Lord Hennessy for the confederation of Barbados
with the Windward Islands (Belle, 1996: 181). These antecedents are noteworthy
when drawing comparisons with contemporary phenomena unfolding in
Barbados.

Greenwood and Hamber suggest that regional initiatives inclusive of federation
and confederation involving Barbados, “were unpopular and the forces pulling
them apart were stronger than those holding them together” (2003: 59). Belle
(1996: 183) reveals that confederation of Barbados with the Windward Islands in
1876 received “vehement opposition from the Barbadian oligarchy.” The
contemporary political climate in Barbados may have retained spill-over effects
from the stance taken during colonial times. In fact, it is the linkages between colonial history and contemporary circumstances that contribute to problems being experienced by Barbados, Guyana, CARICOM nationals, and other actors in the intra-CARICOM migration endeavour. In Barbados, and elsewhere in CARICOM, there is said to be noticeable aspects of fragmentation, insularity, and divisiveness that have become a critical part of intra-CARICOM relations. Insular discourses form part of the politics of identity in Barbados and other CARICOM member states. Payne (2008: xxxiii) contends that “one of the most striking features of the region’s political culture is, and always has been, the intensity of insular self-regard.” Insularity influences *les experiences quotidiennes* of Barbadians and CARICOM nationals in the respective domestic sites of the CARICOM member states.

Patsy Lewis indicates that it was insularity that “plagued” the WIF, and the manifestation of it was in “a fear of a loss of jobs to other nationals ... resistance towards the free movement of labour, as opposed to people” (1999: 44). Payne (2008, xxxiii) insists that the problem of insularity “traditionally begets an ignorance and suspicion of the other islands” as insular distrust “is maintained by the existence of stereotyped image.” *Time for Action* suggests that the actuality of local actors wanting to “remain free to act” as they please “or as every passing advantage induces” them to do, is a real but perilous modality impacted by “insular prejudices” (WIC, 1993: 467). It is in terms of identity characterised by uniqueness, rivalry, and insularity that colonial history connects with the contemporary Caribbean.

The WIC discloses that “a tension has existed between the yearning for a West Indian Community across national boundaries and a hesitancy about how far to go in actually dismantling those boundaries” (1993: 51). Barbados, as will be presented in the next few chapters, continue to employ historical labels that have customarily stereotyped the CARICOM national with the tag *foreigner*. Interestingly, former PM Errol Barrow of Barbados once declared that:
In Barbados, our families are no longer exclusively Barbadian by island origin. We have Barbadian children of Jamaican mothers, Barbadian children of Antiguan and St. Lucian fathers. And there is no need to mention Trinidad which has always been tied to us not only by the inestimable bonds of consanguinity, but by the burgeoning cross-fertilization of cultural art forms. We are a family of islands nestling closely under the shelter of the great Cooperative Republic of Guyana. And this fact of regional togetherness is lived every day by ordinary West Indian men and women in their comings and goings. (2003: 153).

From, PM Barrow, it was suggested that the practices experienced by ordinary citizens may not have been understood by the elites. Elites may have failed to appreciate the ‘bonds’ that link ordinary people, and hence some political decisions could be viewed as being elitist and antagonistic. Reinforcing this view, PM Gonsalves said that notwithstanding the few categories of CARICOM nationals qualifying to move freely under Article 46 of the RTC, the process “has regrettablly strengthened the impression in the minds of ordinary Caribbean folk that ‘this integration business’ is for the elite” (2001). Furthermore, Barbados, as an instrumental actor in CARICOM, has not been able to prevent suspicion from CARICOM nationals given recent occurrences in Barbados regarding intra-CARICOM migration. Insularity therefore, became “a matter of grave concern” wherein, “the intangible spirit of Community in the Region” was under stress (WIC, 1993: 52).\(^58\) The next section positions discussion to several important elements on race and ethnicity that can be highlighted between Barbados and Guyana, and in the necessary circumstances, that include other CARICOM countries.

5.3 Race and Ethnicity: Contrasting Barbados and Guyana

The emphasis in this brief section is to show that race and ethnicity, above other factors such as gender and religious had a presence in the intra-regional affairs of CARICOM. Afro versus Indo debates became pronounced in former British colonies before and after emancipation, especially with the introduced facility of indentured labour in Guyana and Trinidad. The culture of identity politics, predicated on race/ethnicity, set copious facilitating conditions for an eventual

\(^{58}\) The italics are used to emphasise the counter-insular narratives.
securitisation of intra-regional migration. These things are highlighted given the emphasis on identity differences and diversity that regularly play out across national borders within the Caribbean. These dimensions connect with practices indicating differing patterns of inclusion and exclusion, and institutional discrimination in Barbados. Social and institutionalised forms of discrimination became visible in the processes and issues surrounding intra-CARICOM migration and treatment of CARICOM nationals.\textsuperscript{59} As facilitating conditions, religion and gender are not excluded, but are less prioritised in the scheme of this inquiry considering the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{racial_ethnic_ranges.png}
\caption{Racial/Ethnic Ranges of Population – Guyana (1) and Barbados (2)}
\end{figure}

Race and ethnicity, religion, and gender issues are all embedded in the social fabric of domestic politics and within intra-CARICOM relations. Wiltshire-Brodber (1999: 136) reveals that “in the Caribbean one can hardly speak of race without also identifying colour as an important focus for status ordering, power and dominance.” Reddock suggests that “issues of race and class and later ethnicity have been central to Caribbean postcolonial discourse” (2001: 201). Lowenthal (1967: 583) argued that a “great many West Indians, in short, are highly sensitive about matters of color.” In Guyana the majority of the population is of Asian descent and is “largely polarized between an East Indian majority and

\textsuperscript{59} These claims are borne out in evidence presented in Chapters 6 through 8.
a substantial Afro-Guyanese minority” (Ribeiro, 2006: 23). With a focus largely on Barbados, the ways that identities are conceived and reflected upon in terms of the different physical attributes, statuses, and material conditions of key actors represent areas for gaining insights on intra-CARICOM migration since 2008.

Social actions and constructions, recognising race and ethnicity, have been integral to outlooks on the Caribbean persona. Lowenthal (1967: 591) argues that “in West Indian economic and social life, color until recently played almost as great a role as it had during slavery.” Without attempting to specify the ethnic composition for the entire CARICOM region, one may readily state that Guyana, Trinidad, St. Vincent, and to a lesser extent Dominica and Jamaica may sit outside a pattern of the homogeneity that more resembles Barbados which is predominantly Afro-centric (see fig. 5.1). Ryan (1999: 177) believes that “controversy also exists over the term that should be used to categorise Indians in the Caribbean,” since the majority populations are black and tend to see other races as the intruders. In fact, Ryan (1999: 177-181) suggests that:

Some Indians expressed resentment at what they saw as an attempt to define them as ‘black’. ... There is no mistaking the fact that Indians in the Caribbean are becoming more assertive and are demanding that they be accorded the respect to which they are due as one of the foundation communities of Caribbean society.

Typically Guyana is characterised by greater ‘plurality’ while Barbados is more homogenous and dominated by Christianity while in Guyana, half of the population is of the Christian faith, 35 percent Hindu, and Muslim a little more than 10 percent. Indeed, Ribeiro suggests that there is a “high degree of fragmentation, leading to very high levels of ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity” being played out in intra-CARICOM politics (2006: 33). Having shown this contrast between Barbados and as possible facilitating conditions, the next section brings Barbadian party politics into the discussion.

5.4 Political Parties in Barbados: From Support to Partisan Dilemma
This section briefly puts into perspective the ways that Barbados’ two major political parties have approached intra-CARICOM migration given their
respective stances on deepening regional integration. Both the Barbados Labour Party (BLP) and the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) have been influential in shaping regional opinions on regional integration and on CARICOM nationals. The parties have influenced attitudes and treatment of CARICOM nationals in Barbados. This influence extends towards CARICOM nationals, the CSME, and intra-CARICOM migration. The official stances declared by the BLP and DLP in Barbados, although such are reproduced elsewhere within CARICOM member states, appear on the surface to support several CARICOM objectives, although freedom of movement has lacked ample information and support. At the intergovernmental levels, the BLP and DLP have contributed at various intervals and in diverse ways to CARICOM institutionalism.

The leadership of the two political parties, with cadres of securitising actors when in government, have been able to use, manipulate, and target support from the audience in Barbados. The Barbadian electorate, in this sense, is courted in order to provide the legitimacy needed by the securitising actors for them to introduce particular policies and implement specific actions regarding the CSME, intra-CARICOM migration, and CARICOM. On the assumption that CARICOM is indispensable to the national development of Barbados, the political parties have swayed Barbadians into accepting that CARICOM, and its stated objectives, are key mechanisms for deepening region integration. Economic development is said to be the underlying force for most of those things driving the regional efforts.

In the context of intra-CARICOM migration, the social and political actions that have occurred in Barbados since January 2008 were framed out of interactive processes among a plurality of actors. The discourse of fear is sometimes pushed by the political parties in Barbados and has penetrated the domestic arena. Depending on which party forms the government, support for intra-regional migration and in contrast for anti-immigrant sentiments have fluctuated; this is based on the partisan positions adopted by the political party. Through capacity building, institutionalisation, access to power and decision-making, and in terms

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60 These actions are presented in the next chapter.
of the national agendas, both the BLP and DLP continue to be influential regarding patterns of behaviour in Barbados. The political parties have turned towards the local population in the island to engender support and/or resistance to certain initiatives involving CARICOM’s regional people. The two major political parties are instrumental in stimulating sub-national debate. The following subsection reflects on the political parties’ stances towards initiatives for integration.

5.4.1 Barbados' Party Politics: Initiatives for Integration

This sub-section provides substantiation showing that at differing times, both major political parties in Barbados were instrumental in support for regional integration. Given the impressive accomplishments of Grantley Adams and Errol Barrow in relation Caribbean regionalism, Former PM Sandiford, of the DLP, made the proposal for the introduction of a single market and economy at the conference of the CHOG in 1989. Another former prime minister, Owen Arthur of the BLP, since then contended that:

> The major decisive difference that the coming into existence of the Single Market will make, will arise from its provisions for labour mobility – something that was not contemplated in preceding forms of integration in the region, nor in any other set of economic policies used in modern times to influence the course of Caribbean development. (2006).

Thus, the CSME and the provisions for the free mobility of labour within CARICOM were presented as means for moving the region towards the stated goal of deepening regional integration whilst accomplishing more concrete forms of integrated development for the participating member states and people. It was October 1999 before the CHOG constituted a quasi-cabinet of individual ‘Heads of Government’ to spearhead action in critical sectors, thus pushing the region's integration and its vision of development into the twenty-first century. Portfolios were assigned to the respective member states through the CHOG. In CARICOM’s portfolio arrangements, the prime minister of Barbados has lead responsibility for the implementation of the CSME. This quasi-cabinet position placed Barbados in a leadership role, and this continues a trend whereby Barbados continues near the apex of intra-regional affairs and integration.
This is significant because the BLP and DLP have been active in the national legislature. In parliament, political parties representing the multiple domestic actors have been able to influence public attitudes regarding the interlinked projects of CARICOM, the CSME, and intra-CARICOM migration. This dynamic is especially noticeable given the importance that Barbados has traditionally extended to matters of CARICOM, and in the general relations between Barbados and all other CARICOM member states. By the turn of the 21st century, and at a time when the CSME seemed to be gaining momentum, there were several pronouncements made by the national and regional leadership within CARICOM.

Locally, the positions of Barbados’ two main political parties encouraged the idea that CARICOM nationals are to be viewed as presenting both known and unidentified problems that threaten to cause dislocations for Barbados’ state and society. Since the official start of the CSME, coupled with changing governments across CARICOM and the impact of an international recession, progress in CARICOM appeared to have slowed significantly. Girvan and others contends that “the most obvious manifestation of regional malaise is the apparent institutional stagnation within many of the organs of regional governance and, especially, CARICOM” (2011: 5). Barbados, for its part to date, is reckoned to be one of few key actors fulfilling a majority of the implementation instruments for deepening regional integration despite institutional stagnation is but one of several related problems. In that regard, the next section examines the nucleus of the main actors implicated in the national/regional regulatory regime in Barbados’ affairs concerning CARICOM.

5.5 Linking Securitisation Theory to the Regulatory Environments

This section establishes the main institutional actors that are situated in the legal-political frameworks of Barbados working in conjunction with CARICOM and key agencies within the regional network. The actors are generally policy and decision-makers in the CARICOM security complex. At the apex of the regulatory environment are the national legislatures, the CCJ, and the CHOG. These realms of policy and law encapsulate the institutional arrangements and
legal relationships in the construction of the CARICOM security complex (see fig. 5.2). These essential actors combined with other significant formal and informal actors are instrumental in bringing about the crucial securitising moves given the evidence that emerges over the next three chapters.

**Figure 5.2: Main Groupings of Actors in CARICOM**

The relationships connecting these institutional actors are structured around a conglomeration of legal instruments, norms, and practices with an underlying economic purpose. Descriptions of the legal-political frameworks in Barbados and particularly with the considerations for CARICOM’s arrangements make for interesting insights on the ways that that intra-CARICOM migration and regional integration are perceived and pursued by member states and their societies. Indeed, Anderson (2011: 3) contends that:

> The Community is the legal integration of Caribbean economies through the creation of a single, liberalized regional market. The establishment of the integrated market is premised on the belief that it represents the best model for the economic and social development of the peoples of the Community. In particular, the CSME is considered the best approach for ensuring favourable conditions for sustained market-led production of goods and services on an internationally competitive basis.

The significance of the regional institutional actors is that they operate within national domains such as Barbados as well as across the participating member states. Functional arrangements necessitating cooperation across national borders and social boundaries are influential in CARICOM, and this also brings into focus
the functional or operating aspects of the CARICOM Secretariat. Figure 5.2 shows different ways of perceiving the principal agents and their connected relationships within the regional security complex. The linkages, when analytically brought together, indicate the utility of actors, institutions and social practices as events and different circumstances develop within the contexts of intra-CARICOM migration and regional integration. Nelson (2011: 2) contends that:

There is no doubt that the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), like the European Union, is a creature of international law. International law principally consists of: (a) customary international law, i.e. legally binding rules that have developed between states over time and (b) the law of treaties, which deals with the principles affecting the making of international agreements.

According to Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (2004: 239), “rule systems, or institutions, enable actors to conceive, pursue, and express their interests and desires, but also to co-ordinate those desires with other individuals.” The regional grouping of institutional actors is shaping the overall course of the integrated development being attempted in CARICOM. Importantly, the actors and institutions, and their strategic actions help to bring about and reveal several aspects regarding the national and regional political affairs. Sub-section 5.5.1 presents the key pivotal actors and institutions while linking their fit into the broader regulatory framework.

5.5.1 Key Actors, Institutions, Relationships, and Functionalities

In this sub-section, the task is to present the combination of institutional actors (i.e. state and non-state) in their differentiated roles. The main institutional actors involved in the CARICOM framework on general decision-making operate at several levels, inside and beyond the nation-state. Usually beginning in the domestic domains, politics and political affairs are often played out before reaching the stage at which the nation-state interacts with other state actors and institutions in the regional and international systems. However, in the context of CARICOM, “no other international tribunal [other] than the Caribbean Court may
be called upon to adjudicate a dispute between Member States or between Member States and the Community or between a CARICOM individual and either a Member State or the Community” (Nelson, 2011: 2). Figure 5.3 reveals an institutional spindle; this effectively connects several components and matters/issues in a discernible manner for analytical purposes.

![Figure 5.3: An Institutional Spindle](image)

The participating member states of CARICOM acquire specific mandates which, on record, are included and given particular character through the RTC, the national laws and jurisdictions, and the CCJ. Indeed, this point is substantiated in Sub-section 5.5.2; it is further discussed in Chapter 8 of the investigation relevant to the CCJ’s adjudication on a landmark case for CARICOM. The roles of relevant actors are to a large extent clearly defined in the RTC. Actors’ inputs have direct bearing on the CSME, the FMCN, ROE, and the general thrust of intra-CARICOM migration. Indeed, at the sub-national level, there are stakeholders that are not always politically visible in the context of everyday intra-regional affairs. For example, numerous business classes and entrepreneurial elites, the churches and labour unions feed input into various regional agencies. Nevertheless, several of the actors share common interests yet they have interests
which are peculiar to their group memberships. Barbados’ actors are likely to articulate the country’s interests from positions of cultural background and sectional but national perceptions.

At regional and international levels, much of the same can be said that actors and their interests may intersect on several fronts but not in all positions because of their memberships’ unique needs. So that in international relations, the inputs that help actors subscribe to rules often come in the form of treaties, conventions, judicial precedents, and institutional norms. The actors that are illustrated in Figure 5.4 contribute both active and passive inputs into the domestic politics of the member states and into CARICOM’s regional affairs. These actors and institutions are directly implicated in the decision-making processes of governance and functionality in the legal framework. Ultimately, the actors and pivotal institutions are able to influence the implementation of measures. Non-state and non-institutional actors although being less proximate to decision-making and the institutional centre of the respective legal frameworks at national and regional levels still manage to influence policy and implemented measures.

Figure 5.4: Institutional and Non-institutional Actors for CARICOM and Member States
In Figure 5.4, therefore, the light blue shape recognises domestic elites, a business class, local intellectuals and academics, and the general environment of civil society inclusive of the church, pressure groups, youth organisations, political parties and some actors not named. Parliament and the National Assembly are represented in the crimson-coloured shape. The pink shape captures the entire population although these are classified as citizens, immigrants, and residents of which some may not be of CARICOM origin. Realistically, no single group tends to be mutually exclusive in a security complex. For analytical purposes, individual groups and their separate and combined interests often show that as key actors intersect, interact, or even distance themselves from each other, they are likely to base policy decisions on different episodes and background reasons. The rationales may be inclusive of their fundamental differences regarding national identity or the articulation of their self-interests.

Shaded dark blue, are the CHOG and CARICOM which, according to the RTC, represent the highest decision making entities within the CARICOM set-up. The green shape represents the central administrative auspice of CARICOM in the Secretariat, the Secretary-General, and lesser agents/agencies. The orange profile illustrates the international agencies beginning with the CCJ and extending outwards to the UN. The issue of a protective state sovereignty besets most, if not all, CARICOM member states. There are tensions to the extent that national decisions are exclusively the preserve of state sovereignty in a regional security complex. Nevertheless, Geddes (2000: 38) contends that “states can integrate and actually enhance their sovereignty.” This is plausible, given the arrangements in CARICOM that are fused through the RTC, the CSME, and especially the decision-making capacities of the CHOG and the CCJ. The next sub-section turns to examining these essential actors and institutions in their direct relation to the regulatory system under the RTC.

5.5.2 The Essential Actors and Outline of the Governance System

This sub-section is direct and at the same time is broader in naming the key institutional actors within CARICOM’s arrangements. Mentioned are the essential
actors beginning with the CHOG. The others are: the Council of Ministers; the CCJ; the CARICOM Secretariat; other inter-governmental Councils, and subsidiary agencies of the CARICOM Secretariat. Positioned within this set of actors is the CARICOM Secretary-General. The CHOG embodies the national executive leaders of the member states; the CHOG stands at the forefront of Caribbean integration and remains the primary institution of regional governance. Working alongside the CHOG, each participating state’s group of intergovernmental agencies and issue-networks are included in this institutional arrangement.

There are provisions in the RTC that are imposed upon CARICOM’s institutions and constitutive actors which carry a range of broad and specific duties. Similarly, the range of actors comprising the regional is linked in with respect to the roles of national agents working in tandem or through key organs such as the CHOG or CARICOM Secretariat. Under the general stipulations listed in Chapter 2 of the RTC, the institutional arrangements show ranges that are wide and including but not limited to:

- Initiating proposals for development and approval by the Ministerial Councils;
- Facilitating implementation of Community decisions, both at the regional and local levels, in an expeditious and informed manner;
- Providing guidance to the Secretariat on policy issues;
- Promote, enhance, monitor and evaluate regional and national implementation processes and, to this end, establish a regional technical assistance service; and,
- Receive and consider allegations of breaches of obligations arising under the Treaty, including disputes between Organs of the Community.

The list goes on with specific duties endorsed into the workings of multiple actors and institutions; besides, regional actors operating under the auspices of CARICOM are expected to do the following:

- Promote the development and oversee the operation of the CSME;
- Promote and develop policies and programmes to facilitate the transportation of people and goods;
- Promote the development of friendly and mutually beneficial relations among the Member States;
Co-ordinate the positions of the Member States in inter-governmental organisations in whose activities such States participate;

Promote and develop co-ordinated policies and programmes to improve the living and working conditions of workers and take appropriate measures to facilitate the organisation and development of harmonious labour and industrial relations in the Community; and,

Co-operate with each other for the achievement of Community objectives. (CARICOM Secretariat, 2002: 8 – 19).

Figure 5.5: CARICOM’s Central Institutional Actors (Legal-Political)

The multiple connections and relational positions between the national and regional systems given the politics of regional integration and intra-migration demonstrate the importance of these key institutions and regulatory frameworks to the functionality of CARICOM and the member states (see fig. 5.5). The RTC and national laws come into effect on the governance of the processes, and assumes the legitimate grouping of CARICOM; and the legal presence of the CCJ. The CCJ is essential for ensuring the uniform interpretation and application of the RTC throughout the CARICOM member states. Berry (2009: 1) contends that the CCJ “is the original, exclusive, compulsory, and final interpreter of CARICOM’s constituent treaty,” the RTC. According to McDonald (2003: 931), in its original jurisdiction, the CCJ is an “international judicial tribunal basing its judgments, advisory opinions, orders,” and other effective tools at its disposal on “rules of international law.” As such, the result according to McDonald (2003: 931) is that:
[The CCJ provides] flesh to the plethora of new rights and concomitant obligations granted to and imposed upon the Member States, Community Organs and Bodies, and most importantly to natural and legal persons. The Court has the important task of defining the contours and guaranteeing the observance of the law of the Revised Treaty, thus ensuring its supremacy, facilitating uniformity in the application of that law and thereby contributing to legal and economic cohesion from the outset of the operation of the CSME.

The perspective brings a greater focus on the role of the CCJ and its workings. The CCJ becomes engaged with governance of the state and non-state actors, institutions, and societies. The rules and legal frameworks governing intra-CARICOM migration, and especially the FMCN and ROE, are predominantly nestled between the RTC, the national laws of the nation-states (e.g. Barbados), and the interpretations advanced in international law given the mandate and legal force of the CCJ. In fact, the CCJ “is the only body competent to deliver advisory opinions on the interpretation and application” of the RTC (Pollard, 2004: 102). Against this mandate, the CCJ can bring awareness to laws in consideration of other factors such as individuals’ human rights; ratified conventions relating to migrant workers’ rights; and breaches to the constitutional provisions which are inscribed in national legislation of the particular member states.61

Nevertheless, the CARICOM national is faced with procedural requirements that include application, approval, and permission for entry into another member state. In effect, CARICOM nationals can pursue economic ‘wage-earning’ activity in the receiving state under the full extent of treaty provisions and of the national laws in that jurisdiction. This does not, however, negate the possibility that there could be infringements, tensions, and complaints confronting immigrants even those in possession of the CSC. For instance, Barbados has raised concerns regarding violations on the issuance of certificates, while other member states have complained about the treatment their nationals receive from Barbados. It is reasonable to infer that lack of universal policy harmonisation in CARICOM on the intra-regional migration regime is contributing to de facto practices – formal

61 In Chapters 7 and 8, discussions on the political exception take these factors into consideration.
and informal – that are characterised by suspicion and apprehension. Intra-regional and national identity politics have resulted in the heightened politicisation of issues on the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration amongst the participating member states and societies. The escalated politicisation resulting in the re-emergence of deep-seated suspicions within the CARICOM security complex have frustrated regulatory efforts and have created challenges for the entire institutional mechanisms inclusive of the CHOG and the CCJ.

5.6 Summary

This chapter began by bringing the significance of identity into the discussion on intra-CARICOM migration. It revealed that territoriality and place are inherent to perceptions on the social and cultural identities defining the relevant actors; these are widely implicated in the project of intra-CARICOM migration. The chapter highlighted socio-cultural and symbolic characterisations that remain from colonial rule but which formulate perceptions on today’s actors. These internal elements illustrate that diversity is compounded by the rivalries that play out in the politics of identity in Barbados and within CARICOM. The chapter highlighted several historical antecedents that confer on Barbados a sense of uniqueness about itself; this was matched by perceptions of Barbados by others. Issues of race and ethnicity among other variables such as gender, religion, and cultural norms were advanced as aspects impacting on identity and national/regional behaviour.

The chapter suggested that in Barbados, both the BLP and DLP have been proactive in pursuing leadership roles within Caribbean regional integration. It was equally demonstrated that the two political parties tend to be ambivalent in terms of garnishing local support for CARICOM and this was dependent on whether a particular party sat in government or opposition. The further point stressed that factors of partisan politics and a polarised audience can derail regional initiatives; thus harbouring an environment for the felicity conditions in which securitisation can become reality. The chapter then proceeded to draw
awareness to the key institutional actors and their interactional functions in Barbados and CARICOM.

Much of the focus considered the roles assigned to the CCJ, CHOOG, the CARICOM Secretariat and its agencies. There was an identification of the pivotal functionality that entities such as the CHOOG and the CCJ possess in the legal architecture regulating the CSME and intra-CARICOM migration. In that sense, the chapter presented a comprehensive overview of the main actors – state, non-state, and institutional – which are collectively crucial in the decision making processes at national and regional levels. In the broader framework, several nuances that are specific to the legal infrastructures including the national legislatures and the CCJ were discussed. The CCJ was shown to have the legal mandate for interpreting and applying international law regarding the RTC. The next chapter will present the key speech act and the threat construction that ignited the securitisation process in Barbados.
Chapter 6

Amnesty! The Crucial Speech Act

6.1 Introduction: The Utterance

This chapter turns to the pivotal announcement made by a key securitiser in Barbados. It was the amnesty announcement for CARICOM nationals and this was delivered by PM Thompson through a Ministerial Statement in the Barbados House of Assembly on May 5th, 2009. The utterance by PM Thompson, granting a six-month amnesty specifically for CARICOM nationals residing ‘illegally’ in Barbados was topical and controversial. On top of the concession, PM Thompson (2009c) promised that he “must make it clear that after the qualifying period has expired, those CARICOM nationals without lawful permission to remain in the island will be removed.” Theoretically referred to in Chapter 3, the central utterance made by PM Thompson ushered in a sense of fear. This was to the group for which the granting of an amnesty was intended and, to the local audience in Barbados told that CARICOM nationals living ‘illegally’ in the country presented a certain danger for Barbadians.

Wæver (1995: 55) argues that “the utterance itself is the act” and that “the utterance is the primary reality” giving momentum to security developments which are referred to in this chapter and thesis as securitizing moves. Indeed, Stritzel (2011: 349) contends that “the securitizing move is an illocution of declaring an emergency condition that does not in itself guarantee any success in terms of actually dealing with something as a security issue,” but it does give impetus to the securitisers and audience’s engagement with security meanings and discourse. Vuori (2011: 190) readily admits that “the construction of security issues is a very useful political tool for power-holders.” However, the “security label does not merely reflect whether a problem is a security problem, it is a political choice ... a decision for conceptualization in a particular way” (Wæver, 1995: 65). In that sense, the choice that PM Thompson made, and his utterance that the influx of Guyanese and CARICOM nationals residing illegally in
Barbados prompted the announcement of an amnesty, changed intra-CARICOM migration from being a political concern into a security problem.

Unlike the realist camp that views the security threat as something objective and that is out there, the social constructivist reading of security sees the security threat as a problem that is largely dependent upon the interactions of significant actors; especially the ones speaking security and the audience to whom they speak. Vaughan (2009:260) posits that determining what constitutes the audience “requires a nuanced shift in focus from the centrality of content (i.e. what securitizers say) to an appreciation of both the content and the presentation of securitizing moves (i.e. how securitizers speak and therefore to whom they speak).” Included in this dynamic of bringing the actors, content, and presentation together, the existential threat is contextualised against the prevailing circumstances that may be cultural, political, and economic or any other factor implied in the transformational setting.

In Barbados, the security threat was projected as being ‘real’ to the audience in circumstances reflecting increasing competitiveness in the labour market, apparent demographic factors, and a local change in the political party assuming the seat of government. Hence, this chapter will examine the danger of intra-CARICOM migration contextualised around these factors and events. The first step in the process of securitisation was the presentation of an issue as an existential threat. The illegal or irregular CARICOM nationals, as well as the project for facilitating the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration, were not always clearly distinguished nor were they always treated differently by the securitisers. The threat posed by illegal CARICOM nationals in Barbados, and the growing influx of these foreigners, were presented to the audience. The audience then accepted the ominous nature of the illegal CARICOM nationals and intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados as a threat to the state and polity.

Thus, the speech act or utterance by PM Thompson, on the premise of conveying a message of fear, sparked the initial and major securitising move undertaken by
the political authorities in Barbados. In effect, the utterance made by PM Thompson revealed “the persuasiveness of a speech act as crucial in elevating an issue out of the ordinary and into the realm of security” (McInnes & Rushton, 2013: 116). It is precisely this sequence and then the ‘framing’ and ‘performance’ dimensions of persuasion that emerged in the securitising moves which this chapter reveals. The data will reinforce the view that, “the framing of something as a security issue is not the sole preserve of the securitizing actor but must also be accepted by a relevant audience” (Roe, 2013: 255). PM Thompson’s speech act became the key securitising move in which the securitisers – that is, the Cabinet of the Barbados government – decided that urgent and emergency measures were needed in order to avert an imminent danger. The securitisers engaged with the audience in social interaction. The outcome of the interactions altered perceptions and constructed social realities for these groups of actors; a case was put that there was an existential threat and Barbados needed to be protected from danger. The next sub-section presents a sequence of the discussions to follow in the remainder of this chapter.

6.1.1 Considerations for the Remainder of the Chapter

This sub-section provides an outline of further evidence and arguments to be considered in this chapter. The focus rests upon the contentious statements by PM Thompson and other securitisers that ignited the passions and/or affected the local audience, undocumented CARICOM nationals living in Barbados, several CARICOM nationals that saw themselves as potential immigrants into Barbados, and functional actors operating within the CARICOM security complex. The positions taken by Barbados had the characteristics of being one or more of the following: highly emotive, hostile, strict, harsh, or they stood out in opposition to the status quo. The process of securitisation in Barbados was given ignition by the actors, their interactions, and the circumstances that fed the perception of an existential threat.

62 Also see Huysmans (2006a: 32).
63 These groups are distinguished in Section 6.3.
PM Thompson, together with the Cabinet of Barbados, claimed that phenomena directly related to undocumented CARICOM nationals in Barbados posed an existential threat to the country. These Cabinet and other state officials – the securitisers – spoke in terms of the necessity for urgent state action in order to remove the danger to the state and society. Thus, this chapter will identify, explain, and reveal several factors that provide ample purchase for evaluating the evidence of threat construction, security framing, and the presentation of danger that led to a securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados.

It is important to find out “who can ‘do’ or ‘speak’ security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects” (Buzan, et al., 1998: 27). This means, therefore, providing details on the typical narratives used by the securitisers that set the tone for the interactions that would follow. This is inclusive of putting forward the government’s agenda that would lead to the final episode of acting in ways considered extraordinary or exceptional. Considering that there was resistance and that various actors directed verbal attacks towards Barbados’ emergent policy on intra-CARICOM migration in the regional security complex, the task of answering, how it became possible for the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration to occur in Barbados begins to get clearer as the chapter proceeds. Specifically, the upcoming sections will detail the following components in the securitisation process:

- The specific context of the pivotal speech act;
- The key security actors, their roles;
- The securitising actors’ social construction of the existential threat;
- The audience, in terms of demonstration of support for the securitisers;
- The securitisers procurement of legitimacy from the audience;
- The introduction of a Green Paper for a ‘new’ immigration policy and legislative reform;
- Functional, media, local, and regional actors’ counter-narratives;
- Barbados’ antipathy towards intra-CARICOM migration and Guyanese migrants;
- And, the impacts of the discursive practices by Barbados, as well as the consequences that followed.
An effective reading of the securitisation process as it was occurring in Barbados regarding intra-CARICOM migration, considers the actual context in which the conditions for a securitisation materialised. Vuori argues that the “settings may have conducive resonance for the political message delivered,” and this suggests that “the immediate setting of any political act can then be widely recognised as either appropriate or inappropriate for the kind of act committed” (2011: 156). Viewed as the definitive speech act and initial action, PM Thompson’s utterance in the specific awarding of an amnesty to CARICOM nationals, above all other immigrants, becomes a crucial point of reference for the thesis. This securitising move critically and strategically begins the process of securitisation. The next section, therefore, starts with outlining and putting into context the utterance of the amnesty, the setting of the announcement, and other defining moments that played out in the political climate in Barbados.

6.2 The Amnesty as Speech Act

This section focuses on the amnesty as speech act, and the fact that it became the primary act upon which actors’ persuasiveness became pivotal for the commencement of securitising moves aimed at the audience. The prime minister declared that “with effect from 1st June 2009, all undocumented CARICOM nationals who entered Barbados prior to the 31st December, 2005 and remained undocumented for a period of eight years or more, are required to come forward and have their status regularised” (PM Thompson, 2009c). In order to meet the qualification for amnesty, undocumented CARICOM nationals had to submit an application to the Immigration Department before December 1st 2009, and the applicant had to be able to sustain his/her claim that he/she has been residing in Barbados for at least eight years immediately prior to December 31st, 2005.

Additionally, an applicant had to prove that he/she did not run afoul of the laws of Barbados and that they were employed at the time of application. In real terms, the amnesty was being extended to those CARICOM nationals that were living in Barbados prior to January 1st, 1998, and those that would not have been in trouble with the law, especially as it related to serious criminal offences. As will be
detailed below, despite appearing as a progressive gesture, the announcement of the amnesty was seen to be a regressive policy for many CARICOM nationals. Table 6.1 provides a brief timeline that aids in contextualising the sequencing of the amnesty with other related events and factors. PM Thompson’s announcement of an amnesty may be described as the first presentation of danger. By making the audience aware of an existential threat that was being posed by another identifiable group sharing a public space was the type of securitising move which appealed to security logic. Indeed, Jutila (2006: 172) asserts that “the framing of an issue as an existential threat – and the acceptance of this act by the relevant audience – may render options playable that would not be so in the case of more everyday situations and problems.” Barbados’ political executive dramatically presented “security as a technique of government” (Huysmans, 2006a: 6). In several ways, the supporting securitisers, guided by PM Thompson’s amnesty announcement, changed the political climate in and outside of Barbados regarding the condition of immigrant CARICOM nationals in Barbados, and the handling of migration/immigration affairs in the country.

**Table 6.1: Timeline on Key Announcements and Events**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeline Important Dates</th>
<th>Announcement/Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 15th, 2008</td>
<td>The DLP assumed the government of Barbados under the leadership of PM Thompson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28th, 2008</td>
<td>Cabinet sub-committee is set up with a remit to craft a new and comprehensive immigration policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 5th, 2009</td>
<td>PM Thompson announces an amnesty for ‘undocumented’ CARICOM nationals living in Barbados</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1st, 2009</td>
<td>The start date for the commencement of applications for amnesty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 13th, 2009</td>
<td>PM Thompson lays the Green Paper entitled, <em>A Comprehensive Review of Immigration Policy and Proposals for Legislative Reform in the Barbados House of Assembly</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1st, 2009</td>
<td>The cut-off date for all applications regarding the amnesty extended to CARICOM nationals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wood and Velditz (2007: 553) suggest that “attempting to make sense of an issue in an uncertain information environment,” as the audience was being asked by the
securitisers to do in light of an information deficit, indicated that people “generally define an issue in a manner that most closely aligns with their own predispositions.” The underlying suspicions of CARICOM others that were presented in Chapters 4 and 5 are informative. Moreover, a June 2nd, 2009 column appearing in the Barbados Advocate, titled ‘Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants Begins Today’ stated that:

This new policy has not been without controversy. Since the May 6 announcement, there has been much opposition coming from immigrants here, the Opposition Barbados Labour Party as well as Heads of Government throughout the region. ... [And that within the region] Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves of St Vincent and the Grenadines has been openly critical about the action, while his Trinidadian counterpart, Prime Minister Patrick Manning has distanced himself from the move.

Attention, therefore, was given to occurrences within Barbados and the participating CARICOM member states on the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration. On the one hand, PM Thompson’s statement largely attracted favourable local support; but on the other hand, the statement of amnesty received torrents of external criticisms and resentment. In particular, the discourses relied upon and utilised by PM Thompson to communicate the amnesty were crucial in setting the stage for agenda-setting and the further threat elaboration that would continue to shape the political climate. Indeed, PM Thompson’s statement that CARICOM nationals, believing Barbados to be an opportunistic option and immigrant destination, were “ever so welcome,” but they should “wait for a call” before proceeding to enter the country for the purposes of residence and work; the statement attracted several criticisms (PM Thompson, 2009g). These utterances and other arrangements were crucial to Barbados’ approach to intra-CARICOM migration and related issues. Reactions from regional actors would later become the additional contexts out of which criticisms were directed at Barbados. Vice versa, Barbados delivered equally stern responses. Barbados, at the level of popular discourse, sought to reduce the tensions that were building within its borders and in the security complex. However, Barbados keenly defended its position and remained resolute that
influxes of CARICOM nationals, many illegal, posed a threat for the country and local society.

The amnesty, as explained by PM Thompson (2009c) to the local audience, insisted that his government had to move “in a timely fashion [to] address those situations faced by members of the public on a daily basis.” PM Thompson (2009c) said that the situation in Barbados required a tough policy-direction, and “when the amnesty period is over on December 31st [2009], then the sanctions, if you want to call it that, or the second part of the policy then kicks in, which is the removal of those who are here illegally.” The resoluteness in Barbados’ approach was stated in PM Thompson’s remark that nothing has changed. The circumstances in which the state was bound to protect the citizens and alleviate the burden of large numbers of immigrants from Guyana and CARICOM were dramatised to have the effect of being dire and necessitating immediate attention. This was the situation in Barbados, given that there is an observation suggesting that, immigrant CARICOM nationals, “are framed through various cultural discourses as foreigners, or as citizens of a different national origin, who do not fit the ‘national standard’ of norms and values” (Bigo, 2002: 67).

It was to this end, that state agents in Barbados insisted that the country was being challenged by an external and existential threat. The CARICOM national was suspiciously viewed and deemed to be alien; this was so much so, that Lindsay Holder suggested “casual observation 64 would support the Government’s position that the level of undocumented immigration is unacceptably high” in Barbados (2009). To the region, inclusive of functional actors, PM Thompson argued that the intent of the government was not “to chase everybody out,” but rather that the government had to find ways “to deal with CARICOM nationals,” taking into account Barbados’ myriad commitments and obligations to CARICOM and other international bodies (2009b). The prime minister was forthright and indicated to the local audience and, to the functional actors in the CARICOM security 64 At best, it may have been evident of increasingly visible numbers of Indian ethnicity in Barbados; but it would have been impossible on sight to simply determine that many were Guyanese or for that matter originated within CARICOM.
complex, that a Barbados Cabinet sub-committee (i.e. of the ruling DLP executive in government) had arrived at a determination on immigration matters which took great concern to protect citizens and Barbados’ interest.

PM Thompson said that “the current level of immigrants is unacceptably high, difficult to control and poses a significant challenge to socioeconomic development in Barbados” (2009b). PM Thompson contended that stemming from the sub-committee, it was discerned that Barbados would offer an amnesty directed at those immigrants of CARICOM origins already living in Barbados for a specified period. Huysmans (2011: 372) argues that “the key political quality of the speech act of security is a break in the normal political rules of the game.” Barbados, through PM Thompson’s utterance and the subsequent discursive practices, was venturing into a different realm of political action. Security language used by the securitisers meant that the country’s approach could no longer be seen as “a routine practice,” working through “given procedures and institutionalized conditions of felicity, [or] a habitual practice,” but that the Thompson speech act created “a scene in which actors and things are brought into a relation that challenges a given way of doing things” in Barbados (Huysmans: 2011: 373).

With angst brewing in Barbados over the topic of intra-CARICOM migration coupled with the influxes of illegal Guyanese and other CARICOM nationals, the political climate became substantially altered. Local institutions, such as the Barbados Cabinet and Immigration Department, became mobilised. These institutions, inclusive of the Prime Minister of Barbados, had socially constructed the conditions out of which the regional actors responded. The inquiry now turns to section 6.3 which will list the key groups of actors that are implicated in this important aspect of the securitising move.

6.3 The Key Actors
As discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, there are three discrete groupings of actors that are critical to the process and success of securitisation. Section 3.3 lists
these as: the securitiser, audience, and functional actors. Beginning with the
securitisers, these can be identified as constituting:

- PM David Thompson;
- Individual and collective members of the Barbados Cabinet;
- Government officials and agents that were not necessarily members of the
  executive or legislature, but in their own rights performed roles consistent
  with the messaging set by PM Thompson (i.e. Lindsay Holder, Yolande
  Forde, and the Chief Immigration Officer among others);
- Media personnel that ‘bought into the threat construction’ and were in
  positions to disseminate and promote the Barbados government’s agenda.

According to Bigo (2002: 64), “the securitization of migrants,” as in the case of
Barbados’ moving the issue of undocumented CARICOM nationals from the
political sphere into a securitised domain, “derives from the language itself and
from the different capacities of various actors to engage in speech acts” which
became evident as PM Thompson and the Cabinet among others set out on an
agenda said to be necessary in light of the danger posed to Barbados. Indeed, Bigo
(2002: 65) contends that “securitization of the immigrant as a risk is based on our
conception of the state as a body or a container for the polity. It is anchored in the
fears of politicians about losing their symbolic control over the territorial
boundaries.” This assumption is ably demonstrated in PM Thompson’s assertion
and statements made by other securitisers that Barbados’ national borders had to
be protected against the encroaching CARICOM national.

For instance, PM Thompson (2009g) said to the audience that there were “a
number of challenges” being faced by the Barbados government and the
Immigration Department which included “commitments to CARICOM;
globalisation and its attendant demands for the freer movement of persons across
borders,” and hence, there was an “obvious demand for systemic changes
involving both policy and law” in Barbados’ approach to CARICOM nationals
and intra-CARICOM migration. Incidentally, many of the CARICOM nationals
that entered Barbados would have done so legally; but eventually and over time,
these immigrants fell into a categorised status of illegality. In essence, the
securitising actor is implicated in the politics of fear that is tactically
communicated to locals and to the illegal CARICOM national. Regarding intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados, the securitising actor’s strategic role is well positioned to authority and power.

Bigo (2002: 65) does not attach similar significance to the speech act as is the case with the Copenhagen School; rather he argues that the securitisation of immigration “emerges from the correlation between some successful speech acts of political leaders,” such as PM Thompson’s statement regarding amnesty and, the subsequent warnings and actions issued and implemented to rid Barbados of the CARICOM nationals living there illegally. Bigo (2002: 65) contends that “the mobilization” that securitisers “create for and against some groups of people, and the specific field of security professionals” including but not limited to state agents, immigration officers, the police, academics, and media personnel help to characterise this grouping. While this section focuses on listing these securitising actors so that there can be clarity regarding their roles in relation to the construction of an existential threat in Barbados, it is in later sections of this chapter that the evidence substantiates this outlined group of securitising actors as being authoritative and instrumental in the social construction of security/insecurity conveyed through a politics of fear.

Turning to the audience, in the context of Barbados, this group was comprised of the general population. Most of the audience to whom the securitisers would have directed their appeals for support were Barbados citizens. This is notwithstanding that some members of this grouping may have been themselves CARICOM nationals. However, they were not negatively affected by the public discourses mounted by PM Thompson and other securitising actors. Rather, they were co-opted into the Barbados polity through citizenship or permanent residence. It is also reasonable to assume that such persons may have considered themselves closer to PM Thompson and Barbados’ position than in offering resistance to the amnesty, or any of the other discursive practices.

Therefore, the importance of this Barbadian audience cannot be undervalued because “successful securitization is not decided by the securitizers but by the
audience of the security speech act” (Buzan et al., 1998: 31). Moreover, Stritzel also affirms the significance of “two elements: the securitizing actor performing a securitizing move by uttering a security speech act, and the relevant audience accepting or refusing this move” (2007: 363). A similar perspective is put by Sjösted (2013: 146), arguing that a “securitization process cannot be seen as complete until the audience accepts an issue as an existential threat; until that has happened, one can only talk about securitizing moves.” This means that there is interaction between securitiser and audience and this interaction could be followed, either by acceptance or rejection, by that audience. Buzan and others (1998: 25) contend that:

The existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of return, and necessity.

It is the audience’s support that counts as legitimacy. For example, the issue of undocumented CARICOM nationals and intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados presents “an existential threat to a shared value” through which the interactions between securitiser and audience are informative and the determinant factor for a successful securitisation becomes the level of acceptance passed to the securitisers to implement the requisite policy or actions in order to negate the existential threat (Buzan et al., 1998: 31). To reiterate, Section 3.3 and subsequent subsections in that chapter provide an ample theoretical base regarding the actors and their roles. The next section, however, examines the evidence regarding the construction of the threat as presented by Barbadian securitisers to the audience.

6.4 Existential Threat Construction

In this section, a key aim is to understand the social construction of the threat by the securitisers. The purpose is to be better positioned and informed in order to understand how it is that undocumented CARICOM nationals, Guyanese especially, and intra-CARICOM migration were projected as an imminent danger for Barbados by the securitisers as was communicated to the audience. Grayson (2003: 338) argues that threats “are primarily social constructions that arise within
particular political contexts and in turn shape the contexts from which they have arisen.” Similarly relevant is Balzacq (2005: 183) contending that:

> The semantic repertoire of security rests with overarching consequences for a given community .... The semantic repertoire of security is a combination of textual meaning – knowledge of the concept acquired through language (written and spoken) – and cultural meaning – knowledge historically gained through previous interactions and situations. Taken together, these two kinds of meanings form a frame of reference through which security utterances can be understood. The role of a frame is to structure various properties of an entity or development under the same label – ‘threat’ – by virtue of the conventions governing the use of the concept and the conditions under which its invocation is justified.

The securitising moves assumed a characteristic that demonstrated an intention by the securitisers to communicate fear to the audience in the domestic environment of Barbados recognising that such acceptance that a threat existed, would filter through the transnational space and enter the regional security complex. The distribution of fear on the basis of an issue determined to be a threat by the securitisers in Barbados, was strategic action and it called into action the audience in Barbados, more or less, pitted against the threat in which the origins were external to the Barbados polity. According to Wæver and others (1993: 191), “any security agenda requires consideration of strategy.” Strategy is developed to correct an issue that has been problematised as “policy needs strategy if it is to be effective” (Waever et al., 1993: 191). Barbadian securitisers were able to largely influence the audience that a prevailing perception of undocumented CARICOM nationals and intra-CARICOM migration posed a threat for Barbados. The appeals by the securitisers, using danger as a discursive tool, induced sentiments from the local audience.

The assertion of communicating fear, therefore, prompts answers to the question: “when is a threat really threatening – or, more precisely, what factors and mechanisms cause decisionmakers to construct an issue as a threat to national security” and, in the case of Barbados, to societal security (Sjöstedt, 2008: 8)? Highlighting the process of securitisation regarding the significance of the speech act and (subsequent) strategic securitising moves, this and subsequent sub-
sections, describe the factors and mechanisms utilised by the Barbadian securitisers in the process of treating to intra-CARICOM migration.

6.4.1 Strategy for Framing and Projecting the Threat
Fierke (2007: 100) writes that “security as a speech act,” and according to the Copenhagen School's approach, “is fundamental to the constitution of threats.” The implication is that the securitisers determine the issue to be ‘sold’ to the audience as a threat. Securitisers interact with the audience in a social process out of which emerges the acceptance. Given the abrasive socio-economic climate that gripped Barbados since 2008, the securitisation process advanced along a path in which resource-scarcity and economic recession became part of a subtle messaging that was used by the securitisers to communicate intra-CARICOM migration to be a threat to the referents of the Barbados state and society. Huysmans (2000: 767) argues that “scarcity” tends to make immigrants become perceived as “rivals to national citizens in the labour market and competitors in the distribution of goods.” In addition, because migration, and in the particular context of Barbados and CARICOM, the intra-CARICOM migration project could also be identified as “being one of the main factors weakening national traditions and societal homogeneity” (Huysmans, 2000: 758). So that scarcity and societal transitioning formed part of a discursive situation that emerged in the political context of Barbados as would be demonstrated under this key section examining the threat construction. The securitisers’ acts may best be described as strategic framing to present intra-CARICOM migration as a security threat. Huysmans (2000: 761) argues that:

Migration is a nodal point in the internal security field. It is a key issue which facilitates the connection between professional security practices in the field and the wider normative political questioning of migration. ‘Migration’ and related labels such as ‘foreigner’ ... are politically powerful signifiers ... [and] have a capacity to connect the internal security logic to the big political questions of cultural and racial identity, challenges to the welfare state, and the legitimacy ... [given the existing political order].
In Barbados, the claim of a threat emerged on account of foreigners, originating within CARICOM, but remained in Barbados thus becoming illegally categorised. This was the essence of the discourse communicated to the Barbadian citizens unsettled by recessionary times, and by the sense that ‘illegal’ activities involving immigrant CARICOM nationals presented a looming danger. This danger was revealed to the audience as being able to challenge the survival of the Barbados state and society; these referents were now were imperilled. Furthermore, as Fierke (2007: 101) argues, “the scope and seriousness of threats” tend to be “shaped by social, cultural and political processes that produce some phenomena as ‘security’ threats.” Intra-CARICOM migration was presented by Barbadian securitisers in a suitably broad security context to achieve a specific mode of support for eliminating the existing danger of the undocumented CARICOM national as an immigrant in Barbados, as well as to otherwise reject aspects of the intra-CARICOM migration project that Barbados’ securitisers communicated to the audience to be threatening. In one revealing piece of discourse, PM Thompson (2009e) stated that:

The integration of our twelve states [participating in the FMCN regime] has presented tensions and we must not ignore them. Not only do we have domestic priorities which arise from the confluence of national and global developments, but [we have] the harmonization of policies. But across key sectors of our economies, the single market has challenged the national economic systems in each of our countries. The question of movement of people across borders has elicited vigorous responses from the length and breadth of our Community.65

The statement gave the impression that here was a prime minister uncomfortable with the arrangements that were in place, and that freedom of movement and intra-CARICOM migration were contentious issues. The Barbadian audience were equally made aware of the threat that intra-CARICOM migration issues would present as direct challenge to the state and society. It is the ways that meanings are communicated and the threat is represented that the “shared understanding attached to security is one of existential threat (Fierke, 2007: 104). It confirms a view argued by Sjöstedt (2008: 10), that the securitising move is

65 The italics are used here to emphasise the freedom of movement aspect of the regional integration; and the fact that the responses to freedom of movement appeared contentious.
the public framing of an issue as a national [or societal] threat, accompanied by a strategy to act.” The important element often used to convey a message of intent by securitisers to the audience, is a politics of fear that puts the existential threat into a context that has intelligibility by the audience in regards to the referent being threatened. For example, government economist Lindsay Holder, in an article entitled *Immigration Blues in CARICOM* advanced the view that:

Across the length and breadth of Barbados CARICOM immigrants, primarily Guyanese, have taken up residence. When compared to the official data on the number of work permits granted annually, including renewals, it is inconceivable that all of the immigrants living in communities across the island could have been granted legal status. Rather, the evidence tends to support the statement that the bulk of CARICOM immigrants living in Barbados are undocumented. (2009).

Surely and from a slightly different perspective, the framing of the undocumented CARICOM national, and by extension intra-CARICOM migration, was presented as a collective entity posing a threat to Barbados even on the basis of being illegal. The audience in Barbados was told that there was a threat to Barbados which was imminent on account of illegal immigrants and influxes of persons originating from within CARICOM. PM Thompson (2009i) was adamant that Barbados “will not permit illegal unchecked migration to continue,” all the while directing the political discourse on the broader topic of intra-CARICOM migration. In this context, the audience was being strategically conditioned by the securitisers.

Huysman’s study on the politics of insecurity in EU migration demonstrated that “insecurities are constructed by investing structures of intelligibility in political and social relations” (2006a: 153). This appeared the case with Barbados; the securitisers inclusive of PM Thompson, Inniss, Holder, and others used information that connected and impacted on the daily livelihoods of Barbadians to impress upon them the need for the state apparatuses to address the problems of influx, illegality, and other major concerns abounding in the politics of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. PM Thompson (2009i) indicated that since many CARICOM nationals were known to have “remained indefinitely and
illegally” in Barbados, the country “was being presented with many challenges due to increased pressure on its limited resources.” Holder (2009) later insisted that “the issue of the high number of undocumented CARICOM immigrants in Barbados is a real problem” that would both harm and cost Barbados in inextricable ways.

It was argued by the securitisers that the government had to protect the citizens from dangerous practices that were unaccustomed to the Barbadian way of life of doing things. Holder (2009) claimed that if Barbadians were “not willing to accept decreases in their welfare, then they should urge the Government to proceed with haste to implement its managed migration policy.” The economist further advocated for Barbadians to support the government’s stance “regardless of the comments emanating out of Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, or any other CARICOM member state” (Holder, 2009). Holder’s statements, when added to PM Thompson’s initial speech act, magnified the perception of threat and transformed it into a social reality for the audience. In effect, the securitisers approached the local population with a discourse rooted in a politics of fear in order to draw support from the audience. The securitisers displayed reliance upon antecedents discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, such as the underlying suspicions and scepticisms that characterised several of the actors within the regional space. Local socio-cultural dynamics, Barbados’ economic realities, and other relevant conditions perceived to be challenging Barbados, were thrown into the presentation of the threat to the audience by the securitisers. The next sub-section examines the use of the some socio-cultural dynamics by the securitisers in the social construction of fear presented to the audience under appropriate conditions.

6.4.2 Socio-Cultural Symbolisms in Threat Construction

This sub-section focuses on the display of Barbadian socio-cultural symbolisms that were ushered into the context as another dimension of intelligibility by the securitisers in presenting the threat of undocumented CARICOM nationals to the audience. These symbolisms can be classified alongside what Huysmans refers to
as ‘signifiers’ that are “expressive dimensions of language” which strategically went into discourses on the securitising moves taking place in Barbados (2000: 761). The symbolisms or signifiers used by the securitisers were inclusive of cultural expressions showing metaphorical affection; these were rendered in things such as calypso songs and slogans. 66 A Trinidadian – Kelvin Pope – popularly known as The Mighty Duke, in 1968 queried: What Is Calypso? Duke’s rendition is fitting for the purpose here in this section.

The words that we rhyme and sing, is only half the thing, I could tell you that calypso is more than a work of art. It is a feeling which comes from deep within; a tale of joy or one of suffering. It's an editorial in song of the life that we undergo; that and only that is true calypso.

Calypso songs grabbed national attention in the local domain and domestic structure. Two examples demonstrate the impact of cultural expressions that impacted on the politics of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. Firstly, in a popular Barbadian calypso song, Stedson ‘Red Plastic Bag’ Wiltshire, persuaded the audience that before placing world affairs or CARICOM issues at the forefront of Barbados’ affairs, it is instrumental that “home drums got to be first ... home drums is the thing I beating first” (2009). There is indication that at the time of June/July 2009 this song ‘Home Drums’ became popular, emotions and increased politicisation on intra-CARICOM migration had escalated between the local and immigrant and transnational communities in Barbados.

Given Red Plastic Bag’s calypso, Home Drums could be interpreted as a means for rallying the audience to be patriotic. In recent years, Barbados turned to courting a ‘100 Percent Bajan’ slogan; it was a form of commercial advertising and self-promotional brand used in the economic markets of the region. 67 The brand, offensive as it came to be inferred in some quarters of CARICOM, effectively promoted Barbados through self-centred tones similar to those connoted in Wiltshire’s song. This signifier gave effect to the escalating tensions around the CSME, intra-CARICOM migration, and Barbados’ responses to

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66 There is also a discussion on calypso music and its socio-cultural impacts in Chapter 8.
67 The ‘100 Percent Bajan’ logo is presented as ‘100 % Bajan’ in the marketing and advertising of Barbadian products.
Guyanese and other CARICOM nationals. The concept of ‘100 Percent Bajan’ solicited a nationalistic spirit and discourse from the audience towards Barbados’ interests. In the nationalist discourse, the imperative was for the Barbados citizens to come together around a particular issue or problem and to identifiably consider Barbados’ interests above those of other CARICOM actors.

On the assumption that the securitisers targeted the audience for their support meant that culture and identity became factors influencing social and political actions in the securitisation process. Barbadians were influenced and encouraged to act firstly on the grounds of national interest defined as self-interest, in terms of conducting business, trade and investment, and consumerism. Barbadians were also actively encouraged to use a new found ‘sense of self’ and ‘national identity’ to stave off increasing competition from CARICOM nationals entering the local labour market, and against criticisms emerging from the neighbouring CARICOM member states. Hence, the propositions that were lifted on account of Wiltshire’s song and the ‘100 percent Bajan’ slogans are rightfully considered symbolisms and signifiers. These signifiers help to substantiate the idea that subjectification and objectification are instrumental in distinguishing those belonging to the Barbados political community from those whose memberships are determined to form the community of foreigners, transnationals, and immigrant CARICOM nationals.

Captured in Home Drums and in the 100 Percent Bajan promotions was a collective and national consciousness that became buttressed in PM Thompson’s threat construction and defence of offering an amnesty to CARICOM nationals in Barbados. Even the proposed immigration reforms to ensure that “comprehensive security arrangements be put in place within the community so as to maintain a safe and secure environment for [Barbadian] residents and visitors” anchored the point to the audience that Barbados’ safety was paramount (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 39). In addition, the aesthetic forms of identity combined with other signifiers and aspects relating to institutional practices and similarly echoed the alert of danger regarding intra-CARICOM migration.
A number of concerns attached to the main issues of CARICOM nationals and the labour market in Barbados were potentially problematic. Presented strategically by the securitisers, these dimensions were able to assist in the securitisers’ quest for support from the audience because Barbados was ill-prepared technically to remedy the legal shortcomings in a short space of time or with limited resources. The key for Barbados’ securitisers was to gain control over, if not limit, the flow of ‘illegal’ numbers of CARICOM nationals domiciled in Barbados. Overall, cultural and identity dynamics were part of the securitisation moves used to shape the process. These were indicative of the symbolic forms and signifiers in which the language of security meaning and logic unfurled but within a specific context that was being established in Barbados through the actors’ interactions.

The securitisers’ assertions called for putting Barbadians first recognising that with the additions of CARICOM nationals providing labour competition and the quest for property ownership, the possibility existed that Barbadians could become negatively affected. The messaging instilled fear within the society. Gibbs (2010) lamented that the socio-political climate had “stirred-up raucous” in Barbados. The magnification of the cultural, social and political differences that existed between Barbados and CARICOM member states erupted in the social construction of the threat presented to the audience. Hence, the facilitating conditions that can be considered appropriate for securitisation resulted in the situations for which the audience was being influenced by the securitisers as they increasingly characterised the threat as posing dangers for the country and people of Barbados.

The Barbadian state and society’s collective survival were presented to the audience as being threatened and necessitating their support for the state to act accordingly. PM Thompson (2009i) pleaded “to Barbadians at home and abroad to put Barbados first in their submissions on this sensitive, but absolutely necessary debate” because “the bottom line,” even in the absence of statistics on the issues, was that “Barbados has a serious problem of illegal; unchecked and undocumented migration and this [DLP-led] government” is committed to do
something about it. Furthermore, PM Thompson (2009b), inquired whether it is a “responsible” action for the Government of Barbados, “to charge headlong behind a noble ideal [as outlined in Article 45 of the RTC] whose time has not yet come, only to trip over all the obstacles that we [the country] have clearly seen, defined, and in some cases studied, but left unresolved?” Clearly, the securitisers continued to push the discourses of danger to the audience, and a state of uneasiness emerged in the security discourses within the regional security complex.

The Barbados government had to send a message of threat, in a manner sufficiently drastic, to grab the audience’s attention in mounting support in order avert the looming dangers of immigrant influx that were dampening labour opportunities. MP Lashley (2004), of the DLP had warned, as early as 2004 that CARICOM nationals immigrating into Barbados would bring “additional demand for housing” and the demand would place “pressure on Government” since the “Barbadian worker feels threatened in terms of his employment.” Holder (2009) argued that “formal and now legalized competition for jobs and housing could pose problems for bona fide Barbadians, and the competition for housing could result in increases in the price of land.” These could be viewed as economic arguments that were nationalistic and, perhaps, stretched the reality of the day. Nonetheless, the utterances of threat and the signal of something to be feared were effective in translating the dangers to the audience.

The securitisers’ contributions were conveyed to the Barbadian audience using a material topic, but one that resonated against the socio-cultural dynamic wherein the national mantra suggested that every Barbadian’s dream was ‘to own a piece of the rock’ – meaning their own house. Hence, this symbolism was more than likely able to appeal to the audience’s sensibilities and emotive sense of ownership in the national setting. The situation of intra-CARICOM migration being a threat was made to appear dire in circumstances wherein Barbadian citizens were compelled ‘to struggle’ with CARICOM nationals in increasingly competitive housing and labour markets. These vital interactions with the
audience placed the securitisers in influential positions in the domestic realms of Barbados.

Another way of examining this emerging political context is in the way that the political climate became charged. Williams (2003: 514) contends that “the distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure,” and is characterised by “the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics.” Given the things that ensued after the utterance was made public, and the fact that the discourses tended to mostly express the preservation of a Barbadian order and equally dissatisfaction with the CARICOM other, there was intensification in Barbados of this highly politicised issue of intra-regional migration. The securitisers influenced the Barbadian audience to become foremost self-conscious regarding self and the national interest. Hence, the audience ought to brace against the impending threat of danger from CARICOM nationals. The threat construction by the securitisers also gravitated to issues of healthcare. This is expanded upon in the following sub-section.

6.4.3 Threat of Possible Health Hazards

This sub-section emphasises the ways in which healthcare issues were used to advance more concerns and were persuasive in helping the audience to be aware of threats facing Barbados from intra-CARICOM migration. MP Inniss (2009), the Barbados Minister of Health, said that “public health facilities were under mounting pressure as a result of having to deal with the high number of undocumented immigrants.” Furthermore, Inniss (2009) declared that “the reality is that it is a necessary expectation that any large increase with respect to inward migration would place pressure on our hospital, our polyclinics and all our health care facilities.” There was a measure of fact embedded in the minister’s statement. However, in Barbados’ case, there was no authoritative or immediate evidence on the actual impact of immigrants on Barbados’ capacity to deliver healthcare; no evidence was provided by the securitisers at the time that the amnesty was announced for CARICOM nationals. Hence, there was much speculation and
guessing as to factors actually impacting negatively on Barbados’ healthcare system.

Historically, Barbados’ healthcare system has been perennially plagued by some inefficiencies despite it is considered to be at, or near, the apex of healthcare among CARICOM countries. Anselm Hennis (2011), a medical expert, contends that “one of the attractions of living in Barbados is its good health care system, ranked among the best in the Caribbean” (2011). Hennis (2011) acknowledged that “while there are challenges of gaining access to some highly specialized clinical and rehabilitative services, the core services are quite well developed” in Barbados. Additionally, across CARICOM, it was otherwise reported that:

The health status in the Caribbean can be considered to be good according to health indicators but the challenge is to sustain the current health status and to continuously improve health in an environment of new threats, globalization, increasing cost and increasing demands. ... In general the Caribbean is disadvantaged with respect to their small size and small economies which limit the resources and investments. (HECORA, 2008: 11).

It is instructive for Barbados, that several generalised statements that were clouded in myth and/or ambiguity jolted the attention of the audience as far as the threat to well-being was concerned. The audience was well aware that healthcare in Barbados was one of the best, and it attracted a fair size of government’s budget annually. Minister Inniss (2011) stated to the audience that the Barbados authorities “have been inundated with calls and complaints from people residing in Barbados for many years and who feel that they are entitled to free health care.” The suggestion to the audience was that such a situation was a threat to Barbados.

The dire circumstances that Barbadians faced were made worse by the fact that there were “several instances of fraudulent use” of Barbados identification cards in order to gain access to free healthcare (Inniss, 2011). More precisely, Inniss (2011) related his awareness that the “activities involving the use of Barbados identification cards,” had already “resulted in some benefits of the Barbados Drug
Service being picked up in other parts of the region.” Clearly the inference can be made that the threat MP Inniss was bringing to the attention of the audience was sufficient and had implicated CARICOM member states and their nationals. While it remains reasonable that Barbados could not afford to be saddled with the burden of burgeoning healthcare costs, the statements by this securitiser were made for the audience’s consumption. In fact, Minister Inniss (2011) rhetorically bewailed to the audience that “the Immigration Department is under immense pressure, but what do we do; throw our hands in the air and say that everybody who gets off an aircraft can access healthcare in Barbados for free?” This series of securitising moves, propelled by Barbadians’ awareness of political issues that made it difficult for citizens to have comfort in the healthcare system, made the fear of threat of CARCOM nationals resonate easily with the audience.

Plagued by a political climate that, in the context of immigrant CARICOM nationals (i.e. legal and undocumented), the securitising move using healthcare registered with an audience that was increasingly fearful of immigrant influxes. There were several CARICOM nationals working in Barbados and contributing to the National Insurance Scheme (NIS); they paid taxes like any worker that is a citizen of Barbados. This was confirmed by Mia Mottley (2011) indicating that “we have immigrants who have made applications for up to five years. They pay taxes, NIS, and are eligible to vote, but [through] no fault of their own, they cannot have [free] access to the health care system.” These CARICOM nationals became legally barred from obtaining ‘free healthcare’ although there were cases in which a few had either become citizens or permanent residents of Barbados.

In essence, the change in Barbados’ policy on this fundamental issue of providing healthcare for immigrants in need, can also be considered a form of political exception because it became an action spurred by earlier securitising moves. The new direction was a securitising move designed to send a message of looming threat to the audience indicating that CARICOM nationals were said to be taking advantage of a financially challenged government-run health system in Barbados. Rickey Singh (2011) observed that in CARICOM, there is a need for:
A region-wide common approach for non-nationals with legal status to access prescribed drugs and health care benefits – without discrimination. This problem has been made all the more urgent for objective consideration as a result of cries against discriminatory practices being experienced by non-nationals, with Barbados referenced as a current example for its exclusion of CARICOM nationals from access to even free drugs they once received – unless they have citizenship or ‘permanent residence’ status.

The government of Barbados faced several distributive challenges. Hennis (2011) confirmed that “access to acute care has significantly expanded, particularly in the private sector,” while the audience was made aware by the securitisers that factors such as intra-regional migration and large numbers of undocumented CARICOM nationals were likely to be disastrous for Barbados. Furthermore, restrictions and limitations applied to non-Barbadians and, specifically to the documented and undocumented CARICOM nationals, were more likely to bring about adverse effects for the state and society than if immigrants were encouraged and allowed to ‘freely’ utilise the Queen Elizabeth Hospital and the local polyclinics.

MP Inniss and the Barbadian securitisers may have overdressed their claims on the total impact of CARICOM nationals on its healthcare system. Yet, the strategy for communicating the threat posed by CARICOM nationals was a strategy that sent fear into the immigrant community. Perhaps, the securitisers also expected that CARICOM nationals seeking healthcare in Barbados would be willing to pay for such services or return to their native lands once the cost factor became prohibitive. The securitisers impressed upon the audience, with good effect, the fear factor in order to enforce the point that undocumented CARICOM nationals would bring untold burdens and damage that would destroy Barbados’ healthcare system.

Nevertheless, it is also reasonable to assume that the threat to the healthcare system in Barbados, if undocumented migrants were to retreat underground rather than return to their origins could be more harmful for Barbados although this side was not expressed by the Minister of Health. The possibility that undocumented migrants may seek to avoid detection from immigration authorities is a serious
factor that was left out of the main threat construction narratives. Avoiding detection while increasing the possibility for expulsion, once caught by the authorities, became a factor in Barbados. The threat of danger was transferred from securitisers to audience and then to the undocumented CARICOM nationals. Other CARICOM nationals felt the effects of an adverse environment being shaped in Barbados on the issue of intra-CARICOM migration. It is important that an intelligible threat was presented by the securitisers to the audience. The audience, in other words, was influenced to think about the looming danger and the referents that constituted the Barbados state and society. The securitisers appealed to the Barbadian citizens’ collective sense of patriotism. In the next subsection, race and ethnicity are factors drawn upon to show that differentiation and heterogeneity were being put to the audience by securitisers; this formed part of the threat to be concerned about, especially relating to Indo-Guyanese.

6.4.4 Ethnic and Racial Discourses
This section demonstrates how racial and ethnic discourses entered the political climate of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. The effects of identity, in addition to economic constraints, became useful for the securitisers in the dramatised renditions used to instil fear in the Barbadian audience. As Williams (2003: 512) contends, viewed from the perspective of the pivotal speech-act, “securitization is located with the realm of political argument and discursive legitimation” which occurred between the interactions of the securitisers and audience. These engagements were personified in PM Thompson’s speech-act and the local audience’s discourses. The self-centredness of Barbados was promoted through cultural conduits including that of Barbados relative racial homogeneity versus the heterogeneity that comprise the polity in CARICOM countries such as Guyana.

The securitisers were less virulent and more subtle in the articulation of ethic/racial discourses, but these emerged with regularity and potency of tone. Caribbean people had over the years become increasingly institutionalised, and there are systemic reproductions of racial and ethnic tensions abounding within
the contexts of Barbados and its approach to intra-CARICOM migration and in Barbados. Racial and ethnic discourses became instrumental in shaping the hostile environment in Barbados; the discourses were antithetical to intra-CARICOM migration. This section describes contributing elements that factor into this particular hostile climate whereby Barbados’ securitisers presented or may have encouraged racial/ethnic references to persist in discourses wherein Barbados felt it was under threat to the state and society from the Indo-Guyanese.

In Barbados there was a wide perception that recently landed immigrants coming out of Guyana were in the majority of Indian descent due to the demographical and political attributes pertaining to the country. Elements of the securitising class of actors, in Barbados, contended that the social conflicts between Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese would ultimately spill-over into Barbados. Rivalries may determine a number of political happenings in Barbados due to the relative high numbers of Guyanese trending to move into Barbados in search opportunities and new residence. Indeed, it was on June 17th, 2009 that an editorial made direct reference to the threatening possibility that with the entry of an ‘influx’ of Guyanese into Barbados there was distinctly likely that the result may lead to “a disturbance of the existing equilibrium among races” in the country (Nation Newspaper, 2009). This was not only a divisive statement, but it was laced with a racial tenor. The audience understood the dislocation in relative terms, because the Indo-Guyanese had not been a major factor in Barbados.

There were suggestions that the island would be overcome by the impact of harmful Indo-Guyanese on the more homogenous and majority population in Barbados. Racial/ethnic statements poured into the intra-CARICOM migration project, and ultimately became part of the threat construction used by the Barbadian securitisers in their securitising moves. Fear and xenophobia thus fed into the popular discourses through the media. Faria (2009) said that he was frequently “hearing on the radio stations, and reading the blogs and newspapers, that the Indian Guyanese will likely dilute the racial purity of Barbados.” Faria (2009) dismissed that obtuse claim as another inflammatory and “unlawful
statement” that often goes “uncensored” in Barbados. The Caribbean foreigner, and particularly the Indo-Guyanese choosing Barbados as a migrant destination, became a negated, if not demonised, CARICOM national. Antoine (2010) related that she suspected that “at some point in time, there may well have been more tension ... it has to do with culture ... these different people coming into your country.” In sum, the evidence revealed that there were overt prejudices and active forms of resistance to CARICOM nationals and the Indo-Guyanese’s presence in Barbados. Statements of colour, prejudice, and even religious preferences attracted their own controversies. These discourses were introduced or instigated by the securitisers, and in particular by PM Thompson’s statement of amnesty targeted CARICOM nationals for treatment one could hardly consider as ‘favourable’ given Articles 7 and 8 of the RTC.

Racial and ethnic differentiation appeared to be a distinguishing threat factor in Barbados that served to draw fear from the audience. In the security complex, identity politics, understood against the demographics and internal politics of Guyana triggered local scepticism in Barbados and indeed countries across the CARICOM member states. The Indo-Guyanese became an easy target in the scheme of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. Faria (2009), in his official capacity of Honorary Consul for Guyana, wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Police in Barbados inviting the Commissioner to reflect upon complaints coming to his desk from “Guyanese ... [and] some Bajans who do not like it” that incidences of “inflammatory remarks” were being orchestrated by elements within Barbadian society. According to Faria (2009), the statements being made by Barbadians and presented to the public through the media were ‘distasteful’ and xenophobic with several of the sentiments expressed running “contrary to the laws of Barbados.” Faria (2009) insisted that several statements were laced with “racial and ethnic prejudices” and had the potential to bring about “serious social conflict” that would inevitably reduce relations in what already was becoming “an increasingly hostile” and charged political climate in Barbados.
Later that month, Sir Shridath Ramphal (2009) in repudiating the reference to race and ethnicity, posited the view that “it is always a sadness when, however propelled, our societies are caught in a downward spiral of separateness with fellow West Indians cast as outsiders” on the basis of national origin or ethnicity. In addition, Ramphal (2009) warned that it was a blemish that had moved the region to a state of affairs in which current national “policies and practices are deepening Caribbean divides.” It is unclear whose national ‘policies and practices’ if any are being singled out by Ramphal, but many Barbadians perceived his remarks were offensive and provocative to the ‘sensibilities’ of Barbadians. Hence, the vehemence against Guyanese, and the Indo-Guyanese grew alongside the discourses speaking out against the possible dangers arising from intra-CARICOM migration when the country did not have the size or resources to cope with such. The next sub-section examines the audience in terms of their acceptance to the threat and the indicators pointing to support for the securitisers.

6.4.5 The Audience Factor: Threat Acceptance and Support
This sub-section is concerned with demonstrating that there was significant acceptance by the audience of an issue determined to be an existential threat; and then there was ample support by the same audience for PM Thompson and the various securitisers. The political context and strategies engaged by the securitisers, which went into the securitising moves in order to elicit acceptance and support, are realistically very important to our understanding of the progression in the securitising process. The speech act was politically framed in order to elicit a specific action – support and the legitimacy that derives from the audience’s participation operating under democratic institutions and frameworks in Barbados. As Balzacq (2005: 182) argues, “the fact is, to move an audience’s attention toward an event or a development construed as dangerous, the words of the securitizing actor need to resonate with the context within which his/her actions are collocated.” The securitisers would have embarked on gaining the

68 Italics illustrate the original emphasis.
popular support for the prime minister’s stance as a means for pressing the momentum regarding the securitising moves.

PM Thompson (2009j) had contended to the audience that their support was necessary in order “to send a strong message that Barbadians would not tolerate any and everybody flooding this island in search of jobs without the necessary legal statuses.” The audience was swayed, and a security discourse began to clearly emerge in which the securitisers began to receive support from the audience. From the onset, it is to be revealed that surveys taken in Barbados between 2007 and 2010 by Caribbean Development Research Services (CADRES) consistently revealed that there was a majority proportion of the population indicating support for the Thompson-led approach to intra-CARICOM migration. As stated, the political rhetoric approaching the January 2008 general elections in Barbados was adamant about combating problems relating to the presence of large numbers of undocumented Guyanese and other CARICOM nationals resident in Barbados. Thereafter, the DLP government in its quest to tackle problems of intra-CARICOM migration took some things that outsiders and internal critics saw as harsh and rigid positions and decidedly moved against CARICOM nationals.

It is understandable therefore, that PM Thompson was ready to indicate that the amnesty and subsequent proposed reforms for immigration policy materialised on the basis of the support gifted to the government of the day. The prime minister’s utterance and later actions were in tandem with the popular support received from the local Barbadian audience. Barbadians indicated support for the government of Barbados for attempting to eliminate the threat of having vast numbers of undocumented CARICOM nationals living and working in the country. A CADRES public opinion survey poll published in August, 2009, showed that “70 % of Barbadians” maintained their support for the stance taken

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69 The business firm CADRES is a social and political research entity operating in Barbados and several other CARICOM countries, producing analyses on a variety of issues and problems, inclusive of presenting statistical data and results of polls. CADRES’ director is Peter W. Wickham.

70 This was indicated in the foreword to the Green Paper on Immigration Reforms of 2009.
against illegal CARICOM nationals, and the readiness to impose further restrictions to the movement of people into Barbados from other CARICOM member states; there was only a registered 14% that objected to the authorities, and the remainder preferred not to offer an opinion” (2009: 3). Thus, the licence to implement extraordinary measures without being restricted to normal politics and procedures may well have used the publication as a gauge for indicating popular support for the securitisers. This securitising move became advantageous for the securitisers because gaining the necessary legitimacy from the audience by way of its support for the securitisers was a crucial stage in the securitising process. Indeed, and according to CADRES (2009: 3), while 53% of Barbadians felt satisfied with the offer of amnesty to CARICOM nationals, there was “little support for an extension of the amnesty beyond the present eight year limit since more than half of Barbadians,” 55% to be precise, “were opposed” to any extension of the amnesty beyond that set out by the Prime Minister of Barbados.

PM Thompson (2009d), in speaking about Barbados’ readiness to facilitate the aspects agreed to under the RTC, said that “when the conditions are appropriate in Barbados and the resources are there for us to accommodate more Caribbean nationals beyond the categories that are already agreed, we will do so. But we’re not ready right now.” This provided some indication that Barbados was not comfortable with ‘threatening’ aspects of intra-CARICOM migration. The prime minister was at that time honing in on the state of uneasiness for which Barbados possessed regarding the FMCN, ROE, and intra-regional migration. This fact is borne out in the intermittent data contained in the CADRES polls. The indications were that Barbados’ scepticism towards intra-CARICOM migration and ultimate support for the government of Barbados were becoming popularised.

In the case of Barbados and then (re)-emerging in the politics sphere of the CARICOM security complex, there were concerns on factors of race and ethnicity, healthcare provision, labour market competition, economic vulnerability, and the availability of resources among other phenomena that would impact negatively on Barbados, if the country did not act swiftly and
forcefully to negate the danger. It is precisely these concerns which were used by the securitisers in Barbados for addressing the local audience that would eventually gain audience acceptance. More and more, public discourse became uneasy with functional actors taking contrary positions to Barbados’ approach regarding the legal and illegal modalities of intra-CARICOM migration. The audience’s discourses, courting the perils of intra-CARICOM migration in the small country of Barbados, were phenomena that made it possible for the politics of fear to become instrumental in shaping the political climate in Barbados. The next section brings into focus the production of a Green Paper on immigration reform that added to the materialising of the speech act and the securitising moves undertaken by the securitisers.

6.5 Synopsis of the Green Paper

This section gives details and an assessment behind the granting of an amnesty that were contextualised in the published and instructive Comprehensive Review of Immigration Policy and Proposals for Legislative Reform. The document is referred in this thesis as the Green Paper, and it was laid in the House of Assembly on October 13th, 2009 (see table 6.1). In terms of a reading of the discursive practices and nature of the Green Paper, there are two critical dimensions that can be analysed. The Green Paper:

1. Represents a significant aspect of the ‘governability’ integral to the securitising moves;
2. And, the Green Paper can be considered a first-step leading to an emergency or exceptional political measure taken by the securitisers. 71

In this section and for the remainder of the chapter, emphasis is placed on the first dimension in terms of governability and the Green Paper being indicative of the securitising moves undertaken by PM Thompson and the Barbados government. Indicated in the preface to the Green Paper on immigration reform, a Cabinet sub-committee (i.e. the executive), sought to remedy a situation it believed that Barbados citizens (i.e. audience) were disturbed about. The Cabinet sub-committee had a remit “to craft a new and comprehensive immigration policy,”

71 The Green Paper in relation to exceptionality is examined in the next chapter.
because it was concerned that Barbadians perceived that government’s actions and “the legislation governing current immigration practices were in need of a significant review” (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 9).

In addition, the Green Paper was envisaged to solicit public opinions as well as to chart new pathways for Barbados in order to cure a threatening situation. In fact, PM Thompson (2009m) contended that the ‘Green Paper’ would be made public and it was “intended to stimulate discussion” on vexing issues which drive Barbados’ “immigration policies and [which] are critical to both national security and national development.” The authorities claimed that issues regarding intra-CARICOM migration, inclusive of the non-regularised CARICOM nationals, “created numerous challenges for immigration policy and procedures in Barbados” (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 4). The Green Paper stated that under consideration for Barbados’ position towards immigration and CARICOM nationals were the following factors:

- The freedom of movement within the context of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy;
- Management of labour migration;
- Border control and national and regional security;
- Public health and public policy.

The Government of Barbados’ approach to immigration and, in particular, to the immigrant community comprising a number of CARICOM nationals living in the country, was to re-take control of a situation for which the executive of the day (i.e. the DLP) deemed to have been too lax or overlooked in the past administration (i.e. the BLP). PM Thompson lamented the status quo under which most of the applications for stay and work were old; and that “no action was taken” by the previous administration (2009j). The Barbados government, under PM Thompson, was adamant about not allowing the situation of illegality to continue festering as it had done under the previous BLP administration. Indeed, the mounting of public forums to discuss and/or debate the contents and approach of the Barbados government represented a departure from the directions followed by the BLP administration. Qualitatively, the move to a form of deliberative
democracy or public venue was different. This may have been contemplated by the securitisers as a means for gaining support and by extension, legitimacy from the audience. Kim & Kim (2008: 51) argue that:

Deliberation in democracy, however, is more than a decision-making process. Deliberative democracy involves public deliberation not only as a tool of using public reasons and making collective decisions (i.e., instrumental deliberation) but also as a process of producing public reasons and reaching mutual understanding (i.e., dialogic deliberation).

From this perspective on what deliberative democracy entails, and approaching the issues on intra-CARICOM migration coupled with the policy proposals contained in the Green Paper, the Barbados authorities demonstrated the strategic element inferred in securitising moves. Lahav and Guiraudon (2006: 212) suggest that “immigration policy-making has long been conducted in the absence of public debate.” It remains certain that the DLP’s administrative approach to illegal CARICOM nationals, intra-CARICOM migration, and immigration reform became a clear-cut securitising move for gaining audience support. It is unclear if a politics of decentralisation was indicative of genuine deliberative action.

The securitisers were well-positioned in terms of power and influence to garnish further local support for its policy on amnesty and proposed reforms contained in the document. The government of Barbados promoted the well-attended forums in a format resembling ‘town-hall’ meetings. The officials presided in a hierarchical position over the audience (i.e. considering the seating arrangements with government officials at a ‘head’ table, and the audience seated in inferior
positions).\textsuperscript{72} Originally, there were plans for four of the two-hall meetings, but the first was cancelled on account of PM Thompson's unavailability. These public spaces were led in discussion by securitising actors inclusive of the Permanent Secretary for Security and Immigration, the Acting Chief Immigration Officer, and with several Cabinet Ministers present. PM Thompson himself presided over the final two of such public forums, although the first of the meetings which was coincidentally or strategically slated for the Barbados Worker’s Union headquarters, \textit{Solidarity House}, was cancelled due to PM Thompson's unavailability as communicated to the public.\textsuperscript{73} PM Thompson (2010a) said that the state of affairs confronting Barbados was so threatening that:

\begin{quote}
It has created a situation where you have substandard housing in some areas, squatting in water zones in this country… elements of corruption in the public sector have been encouraged, with people seeking to get false identification cards, with persons renting ID cards that don’t carry photographs so that children can go and receive benefits in the polyclinic system…we are not going to allow that to happen.
\end{quote}

This revelation on fraudulent practices was part of the official discourse informing the audience, although the Barbadian authorities may have relied upon information stemming as far back as October 2006. It was then that Barbados' Chief Immigration Officer, Gilbert Greaves, relayed concerns which according to the Government Information Network Agency (GINA) out of Guyana, represented “a significant number of Guyanese seeking to enter the island [that] were caught with forged passports” (GINA, 2006). At these crucial forums, Greaves functioned in the capacity of Permanent Secretary for Security and Immigration. Barbados’ prime minister diplomatically avoided naming the specific countries involved in scams and fraud. However, and for the most part, there were instances during the forum when direct referencing to Guyana were

\textsuperscript{72} This writer attended the forum held at the Christ Church Parish Church on January 28\textsuperscript{th}, 2010. Subsequent town-hall meetings were held at the Alexandra School on February 4\textsuperscript{th} and Princess Margaret Secondary school on February 11\textsuperscript{th}, 2010.

\textsuperscript{73} An earthquake in Haiti on January 12\textsuperscript{th}, 2010 forced changes in terms of a CARICOM response to the disaster. PM Thompson, along with other CARICOM colleagues, journeyed to Haiti. Therefore, a forum set for Solidarity House was cancelled.
made highlighting the fact that this group of CARICOM nationals represented a major concern for the authorities in Barbados.

Another way of viewing the elements and events surrounding the Green Paper is the fact that not only did the forums help to mobilise the securitising moves perpetuated by the securitisers, but the accompanying discourses paved the way for political exception. In Barbados, it was not the tradition of the day for the governing political administration to organise ‘town-hall’ meetings with the public to gather the polity’s input, or to discuss views on the government’s policy options and/or actions. While this approach was not transgressing procedural rules or laws, it was an unorthodox and unaccustomed practice. The political system in Barbados with its representativeness in parliament was not predisposed to laws requiring a government to seek public approval prior to debates in the Barbados House of Assembly.

The soliciting of public views and commentary through an official mechanism such as discussion on the Green Paper was alien to the political culture in Barbados. The practice, as commenced under PM Thompson, was an abnormal act given the social and political traditions and expectations in Barbados. Therefore, having a strategically defined agenda for action to combat a socially constructed threat, the securitisers were able to make public a policy framework – the Green Paper – proposing legislative reforms. Listed among the government’s intentions for reform, as contained in the Green Paper, was a statement highlighting ‘the need for change’ that had become crucial in light of the following:

- The full implementation of the CSME under the RTC which provides for the movement of community nationals into and within the jurisdiction of member states without restrictions or the imposition of impediments;

- Events in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 which have placed effective border control and the maintenance of domestic security as critical items on the national agenda. (Barbados. Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 19).
By amalgamating the CSME, the RTC, and intra-CARICOM migration into the same discourse as 9/11 and linking the association with appeals for border control and domestic security became part of the strategic plan by the securitisers – a securitising move – that would facilitate the audience making connections that increased the perceptions of threat arising from migrants. The gaining of support from the audience would allow the securitisers to achieve the legitimacy that was anticipated given the rationale that the securitisers’ agenda surpassed the initial claim of illegality by CARICOM nationals in Barbados. The audience gave acceptance of the presented threat, and the securitisers’ willingness to act came on the basis of audience support. This contrivance triggered the use of urgent measures and mechanisms of exception to deal with the threat of danger. Nevertheless, the notion of the Green Paper, with the actions and events that began to emerge, had to be viewed holistically in terms of the securitising process. It became first a securitising move; but once certain measures gained momentum and became active forms of implemented policy, then had to be considered in an element of political exception. The focus on political exceptionality will be discussed in the next chapter because “persuading the audience to accept that the issue is an existential threat is the key to the success of securitization” (McInnes & Rushton, 2013: 119). The next section provides a summary of this chapter.

6.6 Summary
This chapter outlined the key aspects that initiated the securitisation process in Barbados and the CARICOM security complex. Fundamental in this comprehensive and evidential chapter is the significance of PM Thompson’s grant of amnesty; uncertain welcome; the proposals contained in the Green Paper; and the subsequent discourses that reflected different policy-directions as Barbados moved to reform its immigration system. It was around these phenomena that the process of securitisation gained increasing momentum coupled with the forms of resistance and counteracting forces out of which Barbados defended its actions. It became pellucid that the securitisers determined the issue of threat; and, the
audience was persuaded to accept that intra-CARICOM migration and CARICOM nationals posed a threat for the Barbados state and/or society.

The chapter showed how intra-regional migration was constructed into something to be feared by linking the discursive and socio-cultural arenas to the agenda setting predisposed to Barbados’ security. The securitising moves that took place showed that there were underlying and evolving suspicions and scepticism regarding the CARICOM national that locally spilled over into a competitive labour market, and other aspects involved in a regional sphere of activities. Indeed, the relationships amongst the multiple actors helped to define the utterances and political actions that appeared in a series of strategic and pivotal actions – the securitising moves.

Gaining support from the audience was sought, received, and accepted by the securitisers. There was ample evidence as shown in previous surveys that support was not necessarily difficult in coming although the securitisers used strategies to persuade and influence the audience. The received happened to provide Barbados with a sense of legitimacy needed even as the securitisers defended Barbados’ approach to CARICOM nationals and to the intra-CARICOM project. It was demonstrated that certain discourses promoted by Barbados against CARICOM nationals left feelings of ill-will amongst several CARICOM actors. The discourses shaped the political climate in Barbados to the extent that the securitising moves became more effective in bringing about the desired results for implementing measures to diffuse the threats. The chapter described actions and reactions showing that contradictory policy directions were amenable to the social construction of a hostile environment in Barbados, especially with race/ethnicity and the Indo-Guyanese intensifying the threat-discourses. A number of factors indicated that institutional discrimination was a possible factor regarding the treatment meted out to both documented and undocumented CARICOM nationals; both groups were perceived as foreigners and threats to the local order of things.
Appeals to the sensibilities of Barbadians attracted patriotic support and local discourses that reflected an insular nationalism as opposed to a strong sense of regional community. The audience were therefore influenced to lend their support to the securitisers in terms of prioritising the national security interests above anything else. In the final analysis, a core set of discursive practices were placed in the context of the multiple CARICOM actors socially constructing the dynamics that would play out in the securitisation process. This type of behaviour would have made finding political or legal solutions more difficult as the insider/outside politics were set in a relatively hostile environment. In Barbados, intra-CARICOM migration became increasingly politicised. Thus, the situations and circumstances transitioned into securitisation with the strategic performances of securitisers working through the audience as well as with the inputs of functional actors. The next chapter will examine those phenomena and factors that could be considered a string of abnormal or exceptional politics. The following chapter will also describe in detail events and situations that brought the securitisation process closer to being labelled successful.
Chapter 7

The Politics of Exception: Suspension of Normal Politics in Barbados

7.1 Introduction: Exceptional Measures and Breaking Free of the Rules

This chapter analyses the politics of exception and the breaking free of the rules by the authorities in Barbados. It examines practices that were specifically designed to mitigate the imminent dangers perceived to be generated by an influx of CARICOM nationals (illegally) residing in Barbados. The relieving of pressures associated with the threats impacting on Barbados due to intra-CARICOM migration became a priority area for emergency action by the governing officials. Jutila (2006: 172) argues that “emergency politics and securitizing acts might be understood as initiatives made in the name” of the state and/or society “in order to save it from future disaster or extermination.” Additionally, Huysmans contends that security acts connect “technocratic discourse and practice back to political decisions and answerability, and thus to questions of accountability, legitimacy and public judgement” (2011: 378). Legitimacy was given to securitisers after the issues of undocumented CARICOM nationals and frustrations with intra-CARICOM migration were accepted to be of a threatening nature by the audience in Barbados.

Securitisers thus socially constructed a threat in conjunction with the audience whose acceptance was vital in the context of legitimising the ‘security act’ – emergency action – in the final process of securitisation. This chapter now examines the shift in momentum from securitising moves to a critical component in the securitisation process – the politics of exception. Approximating McDonald (2008: 567), this chapter contends that the securitising moves that were examined in the previous chapter, enabled the “emergency measures and the suspension of ‘normal politics’ in dealing” with the issue of CARICOM nationals residing illegally and the intra-CARICOM migration project by the authorities in Barbados. The next sub-section outlines the tasks to be achieved in the remainder of the chapter.
7.1.1 Discussions for the Remainder of the Chapter

This sub-section outlines the tasks to be considered in the remainder of this chapter. It sets apart the introduction of new and possibly controversial measures and regulations that departed from the usual passage and enactment of legislation in Barbados’ parliament. The central themes to be discussed regarding the political exception are inclusive of: the guest worker and managed migration programme, raids and deportations by immigration officials, and fingerprinting at the GAIA. These policy measures and/or acts demonstrated the security politics of the political exception. Similarly, the new regulations and acts revealed some less obvious departures from the existing regulatory norms that preceded PM Thompson’s speech act of May 2009 in Barbados. The country’s officials, thereafter, commenced executing key changes and pathways for dealing with the undocumented CARICOM nationals and intra-CARICOM migration problematic.

The problems for Barbados were characterised by challenging matters of immigration; beforehand, these issues of immigration and CARICOM nationals had been brought together under a rendition of ‘danger’ by the securitisers.

Several practices by the securitisers and state officials took on the appearance of breaking procedural norms, if not always stepping outside of the existing laws. These practices were performed through attempts by the securitisers in Barbados to stop undocumented CARICOM nationals, influxes of Guyanese, and an intra-CARICOM migration project which ostensibly required the state’s urgent attention and intervention. In this sense, the radical or urgent shift away from normal politics would bring profound ramifications for the regulatory framework, the actors, and their subsequent performances in defence of Barbados’ positions. Similarly, there would be indications of additional ramifications emerging out of local and regional responses to Barbados’ authorities. All of these would eventually overflow from domestic spaces and into the wider security complex of CARICOM. The specific actions and practices to be examined in the subsequent sections are:

- General policy actions in light of the Green Paper;
- The guest worker and managed migration programme;
- Raids, detentions, and deportations that were performed by the Immigration Department;
- And, the introduction of fingerprinting at GAIA.

The analyses in the chapter will illustrate how the condition of securitisation reflected a particular politics of exception in Barbados. Hence, a question that this chapter will answer is: how far did Barbados go in terms of executing exceptional politics by breaking free of rules and procedures and did Barbados’ practices fit the classic interpretation of the exception as argued by scholars using securitisation theory? The next section starts with a brief account on the phenomenon of political exception.

7.2 Political Exception

This section begins with a brief discussion on those nuances entailed in the political exception given the definition used in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Security “is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al., 1998: 23). The strong inference being made is that the political exception will generally constitute actions that rest outside of the normal rules, regulations, and procedures that define a political context. Furthermore, the political exception can go as far as to allow for actors to bring about infractions in the holding up of laws on the basis of the urgency required in resolving matters of a threatening nature.

For clarity and in the context of this thesis, political exception involves an immediate policy action by the Barbadian authorities that violates rules, norms, and/or laws. New policy actions and rules are used by the securitisers, and have been determined to alleviate the threat of undocumented CARICOM nationals as presented to the audience. These new measures go beyond the established regiment of rules, norms, and/or laws that previously existed. After the Barbadian audience accepted the presented danger, and something had to be done to safeguard the survival of the Barbados state and society, the securitisers and state
authorities received the legitimacy to act. The derived legitimacy equated to power of decision and implementation on particular policy areas.\footnote{This supports the Bigo (2002: 67) contention that governments in representative democracies “derive their legitimacy from their citizens, so they associate state and democracy without much sense of the limits of and contradictions between these two notions.”}

These actions led to policies that would entail new prohibitive or restrictive measures against CARICOM nationals. The securitisers and state officials took a particular course of ‘urgent’ action that necessitated one or more of the following: (a) the breaking of a written rule or regulation; (b) the violation of norms or other ‘softer’ forms of regulation; (c) the use of executive power in policy areas that would normally be subject to the legislature and political oversight; (d) the retreat from ‘liberal’ politics and ‘facilitative’ moves to new technocratic forms of governance; and (e) absolute law-breaking which included applying interpretations to laws in circumstances wherein ambiguities, inconsistencies, and existing oversights exposed weaknesses in the certainty of the law. A situation of representativeness in Barbados’ practices of liberal, democratic, and constitutional governance is given that “the Caribbean has been able to sustain and deepen its democratic traditions and practices, a reality which is reflected in the electoral developments” (Barrow-Giles & Joseph, 2006: 4).

It is in the context of state actions that securitisers were able to by-pass direct reference to the audience or go through other means which would enable securitisers to suspend the political normality of an established regulatory framework in Barbados, or otherwise infringe on the rights of persons. The inherent contradiction between the legitimacy to act and the securitisers’ execution of acts emerged in the possible infringements, breaks, or exceeding of the rules and laws that came about from within a policy framework defined by \textit{urgency}. Securitisation theory argues that the urgent attending to the danger necessitates a suspension from the normal rules. This factor forms a crucial segment in the securitisation process. Thus, the concept of political exception fosters the interpretations that political actions will possibly go beyond normal and established ways of doing things given that urgency is a perceived necessity.
for performance. Against the reasonable allowances for speedy action, there may be a lesser consideration for the rule of law, thus resulting in executive actions being able to violate legal rules and norms. Rosenfeld (2001: 1307) contends that:

The rule of law requires that the state only subject the citizenry to publicly promulgated laws, that the state’s legislative function be separate from the adjudicative function, and that no one within the polity be above the law. The three essential characteristics of modern constitutionalism are limiting the powers of government, adherence to the rule of law, and protection of fundamental rights.

The infractions by the executive or officials instructed to act in the name of the state – Barbados – for example may indicate the audience’s acceptance, tolerance, or even ignorance regarding possible infractions by these securitisers. Suspension or breaking free of the rules may be related to societal customs, institutional procedures, and national or international laws. Considering Barbados, an assumption of exception made it possible for executive power to trump normality with the implementation of measures by the securitisers and state officials without reverting to the legislative function that is formally vested in the Parliament. The very extraordinary and urgent nature of implemented security measures, under the circumstances and specific contexts of the existing emergency, will likely make the political exception less or more contestable.

Roe (2012: 251) contends that the judgement necessary for considering the securitising process is “centred on the argument that the panic politics of securitization disrupts, if not destroys completely, the openness and accountability that defines the legislative role in the liberal democratic context.” It is in that sense that the discursive practices and policy measures that were implemented in Barbados to deal with the problems frustrating efforts at negating the danger associated with intra-CARICOM migration and undocumented immigrants, brought Barbados and CARICOM’s legal frameworks and customary practices into focus. Specific to the issues raised in this thesis, the securitisation process unfolded in the securitisers’ responses to undocumented CARICOM nationals living in Barbados and intra-CARICOM migration. The state authorities in
Barbados introduced or adopted particular courses of action to negate the danger, including new restrictive measures. It is against the transformative effects of the securitisers’ urgent and necessary measures (i.e. self-determined determined by the securitisers and not always considering basic human rights) that the political exception in Barbados became indicative of the departures from normal politics. The next section begins by examining crucial aspects that emerged out of the legal and political contexts contained in the Green Paper.

7.3 The Green Paper: A Platform for Political Exception

The proposals contained in the Green Paper effectively straddled the securitising moves discussed in the previous chapter and positioned authorities for the execution of the subsequent politics of exception. Hence, the concentration on the Green Paper is first to establish that it was due to the securitisers’ urging that a ‘new’ policy direction was being articulated by Barbados. Secondly, the Green Paper is used to situate the context of the actual ‘emergency’ practices that followed the precursory securitising moves inclusive of the threat construction discussed in the previous chapter. Fundamentally, this section is concerned about the final shift towards exceptionality and the emphasis is on the policy measures and official state actions that were either beginning to go or actually went beyond normal politics.

In Chapter 3 of this thesis, coupled with the opening section of this chapter, the indication is that the politics of exception is a culmination point in the securitisation process which may lead to a condition of successful securitisation. The Green Paper clearly states that “the full operationalization of the free movement regime” under the CSME and “subsequent developments in this regime have created numerous challenges for immigration policy and procedures in Barbados and other member states” (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 20). The Green Paper saw the urgency and necessity for new

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75 For example, the securitisers raising issues about the alarms over increased competitiveness in the labour market, apparent demographic factors especially relating to the Indo-Guyanese, and pressures on the social services which would make governance more difficult for the Barbados political executive.
policy measures and actions that would give Barbados an improved capacity, for example, “to monitor persons moving to Barbados and to ensure that those persons who do not engage in employment are required to leave after a reasonable opportunity is granted to seek employment” (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 27). The situation facing Barbados after May 2009 can be classified as perplexingly threatening and dangerous as framed, presented, and perceived respectively by the securitisers and audience.

As discussed in the previous chapter, notions of an unsustainable influx of immigrant CARICOM nationals were understood to be placing pressures on employment, social welfare, healthcare, and housing; and numerous concerns were therefore reflected in the Green Paper proposing new directions for Barbados’ approach to immigration issues. Buzan and others (1998: 25) suggest that the identification of “existential threats” were to “legitimize the breaking of rules” in efforts to monitor CARICOM nationals and control intra-CARICOM migration. The securitising process constructed several social realities for the audience, the state authorities, and for the undocumented and immigrating CARICOM nationals. Both individual and collective meanings and practices became entwined with the speech act that triggered the securitising process.

How did this socio-political ‘reality’ become possible? Wendt (1992: 407) argues that “identities and interests are constituted by collective meanings that are always in process ... because their practices made it that way. Changing the practices will change the inter-subjective knowledge that constitutes the system.” The idea of identities and interests is, for example, noteworthy in so far as to illustrate that the Barbadian’s traditional interests could be challenged on the basis of competing external identities from across CARICOM that were entering Barbados to live and work. The individual and cultural meanings attached to other culturally determined aspects of identity as expressed in Barbados, and possessed the potential to create changes in everyday socio-cultural practices. Regional politics were being prised open by intra-CARICOM migration on account of the local actions and regional reactions.
In that way, Wendt’s idea of identities and interests can be said to realistically influence the inter-subjective knowledge appearing in the cross-border relations and in the local domain of Barbados. For instance, the interests of Guyanese or Jamaicans brought altered ways of daily living into Barbados. Some of the CARICOM nationals’ routines were considered to have been inconsistent and dissimilar with aspects of Barbadians’ cultural and socio-political practices. Russell (2009) stated that Guyanese, for example, were ‘dirty’ and that they “do not respect people and property” in the same way that Bajans mostly do; the statement may have been pejorative but it also highlights the cultural effect on socio-political practices. There was possible contradiction between the normative and actual outcomes regarding practices in Barbados based on the identity factors presupposing the immigration of CARICOM nationals. This aspect is reinforced, given the view that the national states, functioning in conjunction with the wider CARICOM, “are constrained by lack of financial, human and technological resources to put in place the requisite measures” (Ward, 2008: 142). The section following examines the ‘new’ guest worker programme for the management of migration in Barbados.

7.4 A Guest Worker Programme: Rationale for Managing Migration

This section begins examination on a guest worker programme that the Barbados Cabinet advanced through the Green Paper for proposed immigration reforms. The guest worker programme, a form of managed migration, was to be extended to immigrants inclusive of CARICOM nationals expecting to work in the island. In fact, the Green Paper specifically stressed that the guest worker programme was anticipated by the securitisers to be a “solution to the labour migration problem,” and it was “designed to achieve a drastic reduction in the number of CARICOM nationals who regularly violate the terms of their status as visitors and others who remain illegally in the country after their work permits have expired” (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 12). The mere fact that steps were taken to bring into fruition this plan for managing, or restricting, migrant CARICOM labour was contradictory in terms of the ideal declared in Article 45 of the RTC.
This reasoning emerges in the specific and important contexts of the provisions included under Article 46 of the RTC. The provisions addressed issues of facilitation and the eventual elimination of the need for work permits by CARICOM nationals. The Green Paper (2009: 82) declared that Barbados’ ‘new’ policy position was intended to track CARICOM nationals’ presence and activities in Barbados so that the administration would effectively “minimize the administrative burden of finding and removing” illegal and undocumented CARICOM nationals. CARICOM nationals were already identified to be presenting difficulties and security concerns for the Barbados state and society. The indication was that against the looming danger and with Barbados operating under laws that were procedural by nature, the implementation of ‘emergency measures’ would require unorthodox actions by the state.

PM Thompson (2009k) asserted that given the current circumstances and the fact that Barbados was unable to “sustain free movement of persons,” the country “should move toward a formal system of managed migration, through guest worker programmes similar to the type” Barbados currently experienced with Canada and the USA. Barbados was proposing and seeking to bring effect to a new regulatory system that would on the one hand, “allow for, and even encourage, the movement of genuine skilled labour in the region,” while on the other hand, the new system “would serve as a means of protecting the social services of the country” by implementing a guest worker programme for CARICOM nationals (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 82). There were to be a number of controls inclusive of, but not limited to, the following actions:

- Provide a policy on legal migration with clearly outlined admission procedures
- *Simplify the process of work permit administration*
- Reduce the need for such persons to remain illegally in the country
- Reduce the number of undocumented workers
- Minimize the administrative burden of attempting to find and remove such persons
Immigration would have greater control of the numbers. (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 82-83).

Barbados exemplified political will and a national outlook in its attempt to change or work around conditions that were, in some cases, frustrating to Barbados’ national development plans as perceived by the securitisers and local state agents. The new regulatory system for effectively managing CARICOM nationals appeared to be taking Barbados in a direction away from its legal remit under national laws directly pertaining to the RTC and, from those rules that comprised part of the country’s regional obligations under the actual treaty. Actions taken to inculcate a guest worker programme or some format of managed migration by Barbados had progressed sufficiently that these became crucial within CARICOM.

The fact that Barbadian securitisers placed the illegal CARICOM national at the forefront of threat construction and treatment for restrictions through a guest worker programme, led to a possible interpretation that the country was willing to expend greater focus on restricting and keeping out ‘low-skilled’ workers, or those from specific countries. The entry into Barbados of certain groups of CARICOM nationals, such as Guyanese, appeared to have come under greater scrutiny and restrictions. No official justification was provided by Barbados, except that parliamentarians from across the political divide, and officials, lamented the fact that Guyanese represented the single largest immigrant group in Barbados. MP Estwick (2004), of the then opposition DLP, suggested that an influx of Guyanese that he likened to “ants” would “over-populate Barbados,” and that the citizens of Barbados, need to be “very careful” in accommodating CARICOM nationals. MP Wood (2004), of the ruling BLP, suggested that with the “numbers of Guyanese coming to Barbados,” it became necessary for “the movement of labour across borders” to be “closely monitored.” Generally, it became the popular discourse that influxes of Guyanese and other CARICOM nationals were causing headaches for Barbados.
Low-skilled Guyanese and other CARICOM nationals working in areas of construction and agriculture, for example, were in local demand. Nonetheless, these groups attracted greater attention from Barbados’ authorities due to the likelihood of them achieving statuses of illegality especially when they were non-categorised in terms of Articles 32 and/or 46 of the RTC. CARICOM nationals immigrating into Barbados under the ROE or one of the 10 categories afforded through the FMCN provisions in Article 46 of the RTC were easier to legally facilitate, if only for their skill-sets and potential for expanding the economic infrastructure in another CARICOM state. Interestingly, De Somer (2012: 7) argues that:

Migration policies for the highly skilled can be accused of paying insufficient attention to the framing practices underlying the allocation of rights to foreign workers ... policies on lower-skilled migrants tend to focus predominantly on designing schemes that are circular or temporary in nature, and able to guarantee the eventual return of the (less-wanted) lower-skilled foreign worker.

Traditionally, the emphasis on migration management in the CARICOM countries, historically, was related to the cultural norm of outward migration to the developed world. There was a lesser preference for ‘legal’ restrictions on intra-CARICOM migration. Managed migration, for example, was to inhibit Caribbean skilled workers in the service-oriented areas of nursing and teaching thus minimising an exodus of skilled professionals from the CARICOM region. Indeed, PM Thompson (2010a) said that “the vast majority of Barbadians migrated under schemes ... [such as] the Windrush scheme; many other people went to work in the London Transport or to train as nurses. They went under orderly immigration programmes;” and that was as much as the Barbadian authorities “are saying is necessary,” by implementing a guest worker programme for CARICOM nationals.

Barbados sought to “effectively track the movements” of CARICOM nationals while additionally utilising the avenue of work permits (Barbados. Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 2). This action by Barbados was being pursued in
spite of the country’s commitments and recommitments to the CSME and the facilitation of freedom of movement. Carrel (2009) contends that in CARICOM, “each state wants to meet the criteria [as laid out in the RTC], but in its own image” and this situation became problematic because intra-CARICOM migration became increasingly “undermined by national treatment” and this produced “fractures” in the regional security complex. Under the RTC, the ideal was projected to encompass all CARICOM nationals, the highly skilled and lower-skilled worker, as reflected in Article 45. Clearly, if the member states were moving towards full freedom of movement for CARICOM nationals as a goal, elimination of the need for work permits, and the facilitation of hassle-free treatment at ports of entry as guided under the provisions of Article 46 of the RTC ought to have obtained.\footnote{The Barbados Immigration Act CAP. 190, Section 17 indicates that short-term work permits are valid for a period up to eleven months. Long-term work permits are valid for a period of up to 3 years.}

Instructively, the securitisers acknowledged that “artisans already have the right to move as CARICOM skilled nationals, and domestics will have that right in January 2010” (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 83). Through the introduction of a guest worker programme, Barbados was in essence seeking greater control regarding the immigration movements of CARICOM nationals. The guest worker programme was to become fully operational for Barbados and “would be instrumental in regulating the movement of these and other groups until all categories of workers are free to move” (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 84). The following sub-section details areas in which Barbados may have transgressed or were complicit in the suspension of rules on account of the political exception.

### 7.4.1 A Guest Worker Programme: The Political Exception

This sub-section discusses the political exception as it relates to Barbados’ proposal for the guest worker programme; it shows that the new regulatory system for managing intra-CARICOM migration was a significant policy change in terms of the regulatory regime. Underlying the guest worker programme, there was the
emergence of a moral argument that suggested Barbados was in breach of *the spirit of CARICOM* with respect to the movement of CARICOM nationals given the ideal plainly expressed in Article 45 of the RTC. This is best understood in the context of functional cooperation and the institutional procedures for decision-making for which the CARICOM member states agreed as a collective objective.

Indeed, the Preamble to the RTC specifically itemises the importance attached to “functional co-operation” and the collective determination to “enhance the effectiveness of the decision-making and implementation processes” so that the CARICOM member states would better be able to cope with external and internal affairs challenging intra-regional relations (CARICOM Secretariat, 2002: 1). Therefore, Barbados was working outside of the procedural norms thus creating a moral dilemma in the eyes of other participating actors within the regional security complex. The issue belatedly formed part of the security agenda that was put to the CHOG in July of 2009. Barbados’ intentions and approach to intra-CARICOM migration were placed under the regional spotlight.

Quite a few of the participating member states of CARICOM neither agreed with Barbados, nor sought to explore the issue of a guest worker programme for CARICOM nationals. Barbados appeared to be working unilaterally around some declarations previously agreed by the CHOG. Barbados in several respects appeared more focussed on restricting rather than facilitating the CARICOM national and intra-regional migration. On evidence, the guest worker programme and subsequent actions inclusive of renewed demands for work permits and the enhancement of facilities for tracking CARICOM nationals meant that Barbados was departing from the procedural rules and law as directed under Article 46 of the RTC.

Even in the context of national laws, the established and customary practices of entering a ‘Bill’ on the ‘Order Paper’ of the Barbados House of Assembly and

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77 Regarding the spirit of CARICOM, this was introduced in Chapter 1. In this and later sections, the phrase and ideal connoting the spirit of CARICOM becomes, in a sense, reflective of possible infractions to the normative aspirations shared by the CARICOM states given their collective and declared goals under the RTC.
allowing for debate, to date, has not occurred with respect to a guest worker programme. Executive actions courted and relied upon delegated legislation and ministerial privilege on these immigration matters that were of high import for the Barbadian populace. Analytically, it was evident that the Barbados Cabinet had exercised its own interpretation of the procedural norms. The Cabinet and other securitisers invested in ministerial or executive discretion despite the historicity and functionality of Barbados’ legislature. Tsoukala (2006: 608) contends that:

> It is the exclusion, then, that gives sense to the norm in so far as it blurs the limits between norm and exception. Consequently, when suspending legal categories, the executive redefines its legal system and creates new legal categories. Emergency rules thus become part of an ordinary model of governance, indicating at the most its degree of compliance with the ideal-type of democracy.

Barbados state officials were putting forward the implementation of a guest worker programme under a security rationale and using security heuristics when legal and political avenues remained available. There was the irony of Barbadian securitisers expressing concerns that the guest worker programme was “expected to regulate migrant labour while at the same time ensuring that the rights of migrants are protected” (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 15). There was an intrinsic contradiction that appeared against the expressed goals of integrated CARICOM development, and the possibility that the CARICOM nationals’ basic human rights could be trampled. Barbados had now set about instituting its own mechanism for controlling free movement and intra-CARICOM migration.

Inferring from Joppke (1998: 292) that “accepting unwanted immigration is inherent in the liberalness of liberal states,” the measures adopted by Barbados were plainly contentious. New forms of policy action and implementation became noticeably exceptional. The guest worker programme was being introduced in spite of Barbados previously amending its national legislation, first in 2002 to embrace the RTC, and then in late 2004 to account for the passage in July, 2004 of the Caribbean Community (Movement of Skilled Nationals) Act. Pollard
 Relevant decisions cannot remain unimplemented if the stated objectives of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy are to be realised. An immediate task confronting all Member States on the entry into force of the revised Treaty would be its implementation by the enactment of relevant legislation. A model Bill has already been drafted by the CARICOM Secretariat and Barbados has already enacted implementing legislation for proclamation at a later date.

The proclamations regarding the CSME and the freedom of movement of skilled labour by Barbados, as stated above, were achieved following the passage of Bills on the RTC and skilled CARICOM nationals. By the end of 2006, the CARICOM member states became, in law and fact, signatories to the treaty that called for regional consensus as articulated under Articles 26, 27, and 28 of the RTC. Article 27 (4) states that “subject to the agreement of the Conference, a Member State may opt out of obligations arising from the decisions of Competent Organs provided that the fundamental objectives of the Community, as laid down in the Treaty, are not prejudiced thereby” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2002: 20). Moreover, Article 28 (1) confirmed that “the Conference shall take decisions by affirmative vote of all its members and such decisions shall be binding” (CARICOM Secretariat, 2002: 20). Barbados’ actions on intra-CARICOM migration, characterised by the securitising moves of early 2009 were based on national perspectives rather than on regional consensus. The actions further served to mobilise and instantiate a politics of exception.78

Furthermore, Abbott and Snidal (2000: 421) contend that “international actors choose to order their relations through international law and design treaties and other legal arrangements to solve specific substantive and political problems.” Normatively, this should have been the case with Barbados and the other member states in CARICOM. However, once rules appear to be broken or indeed are in danger of being broken by one of the actors, it is realistic that one or more of the

78 In relation to other issues that became matters of political exception, such as fingerprinting, similar procedural arguments obtained.
remaining actors will offer practical resistance to the offending member state or states by approaching the political and/or legal channels opened to them – the CHOG or the CCJ. The CHOG and the CCJ were the institutions that Barbados and the participating member states ought to have sought redress; this was set out in Chapter Nine of the RTC, and specifically under Articles 187, 188, and 189. Treaty law suggested that Barbados had this formal recourse without acting unilaterally. Barbados, by offering its citizens protection from the dangers of illegal CARICOM nationals working in Barbados, brought into play the politics of exception.

Barbados acted outside of established procedural norms; these were created locally and within the regional arrangements. The legal situation was murkier regarding whether Barbados violated in totality the international laws governing CARICOM member states. Barbados came to rely upon drastic actions, and the laying aside of the established regulatory environment in order to execute its nationalist-oriented plans of action against influx and illegal CARICOM nationals. Was the guest worker programme the means to obtain safety from the harm that Guyanese, lower-skilled and other CARICOM heaped on Barbados? The follow-up actions by Barbados sought to regulate, restrict, and/or prohibit unwanted intra-CARICOM migration. Member states, through treaty and international laws, were bound by interpretations and applications of law from the CCJ. The grey areas that rested between politics and law; and between pragmatic acts versus a normative and possibly moral dilemma came to be challenged by multiple actors. The management/administration of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados, through a guest worker programme, encouraged political exception. The following sub-section, therefore, reveals the typical and main responses to Barbados’ regulatory infringements.

7.4.2 Reactions to Barbados’ Eye on Managed Migration

This sub-section accounts for significant responses and reactions to Barbados’ attempt at implementing a guest worker programme. The guest worker programme was interpreted and perceived by several regional and functional
actors to be likely more restrictive for CARICOM nationals rather than fostering a facilitative environment for them. Barbados was being viewed as a dissident regarding the cooperation and decision-making envisaged by the participating member states in the CSME under the RTC. Barbados’ embryonic guest worker programme was understood to be interfering with or manipulating the current rules in order to appease itself regarding undocumented CARICOM nationals. Barbados was pursuing greater administrative control and autonomy in the decision-process over the length of time that artisans, skilled CARICOM nationals, lesser-skilled workers, and other regional citizens should remain inside the country to work.\footnote{These rules are listed under Chapter 3 in the RTC. Specifically, Article 46 as presented in Table 1.1 of this thesis with consideration for those moving under the ROE at Articles 33 and following.}

However, PM Gonsalves (2009) was adamant that “Barbados cannot have it both ways; enjoying the trade opportunities” that it does with CARICOM while restricting CARICOM workers from opportunities in Barbados. The economic situation confronting Barbados showed that approximately 52% of all exports in goods and services were with CARICOM countries. Confirming the Gonsalves’ statement, PM Thompson (2009b) said that he was told – “you manage migration in Barbados, we will manage trade.” This statement would later prove to be problematic for Barbados given the country’s dependence on CARICOM trade (e.g. approximately 50%), and in the context of a recessionary period.

Guyana’s Minister Rohee, suggested that the “effective utilisation of skilled labour ... through free movement is the correct integration policy and approach to economic development of CARICOM states” (2005). Rohee (2005) went on to point out that because none of the CARICOM member states inclusive of Barbados “have a ready supply of all of the various categories of skills which a modern economy needs,” that “implementing and operating free movement of labour” became even more central, and indeed critical for “delivering real benefit directly to individual citizens of the Community and to the [regional] private sector.
By and large, the previous chapter illustrated that the local citizenry in Barbados appeared satisfied that something had to be ‘immediately’ done in order to curb the influx of Guyanese and undocumented CARICOM nationals living and working in the country. In August 2009, the CADRES’ periodic survey which measures popular opinions on governance issues in Barbados indicated that there was majority support by the audience for PM Thompson and the government’s approach to immigration. Wickham (2009: 2) reported that:

70% of Barbadians support the PM’s stance on immigration, while 14% object and the remainder preferred not to offer an opinion. ... Half of Barbadians (53%) support the amnesty offered to Caribbean nationals and this statistic is consistent with an earlier CADRES poll in which Barbadians expressed a preference for this type of facility to accommodate persons that were presently living in the island illegally. There is, however, still a strong body of opinion (30%) that is not supportive of the amnesty and this level of opposition should not be ignored. It is also clear that there is little support for an extension of the amnesty beyond the present eight year limit since more than half of Barbadians were opposed to such an extension. 80

The award of an amnesty by PM Thompson, and the government’s approach to immigration matters combined to attract more than 50% national support in Barbados. The Barbadian authorities were granted popular legitimacy to undertake urgent actions that would eliminate the dangers posed by the illegal CARICOM nationals. However, it remains debateable if popular support would have anticipated that the Barbados government would set to work on the creation of a guest worker programme.

As stated before, the attempt at managing intra-CARICOM migration through a guest worker programme was not a policy direction that had been provisioned for in the laws governing Barbados, but was since 2009 being contemplated as a reform measure (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009). The securitisers declined the route of parliament for the implementation of any aspects relating to the new regulatory system. The next section examines a series of

80 Also refer to the arguments in the preceding chapter at Section 6.4.5.
actions and events that manifested in the Barbados authorities’ reliance on raids, detention, and deportations.

7.5 Raids and Deportations: The Necessity and Justification

The start of this section addresses phenomena that led to the Barbados immigration authorities exercising raids, deportations, and other forms of activities which saw the departures of CARICOM nationals, and the removal of illegal foreigners from Barbados. These activities replaced the warnings that the securitisers issued when the announcement of the amnesty for CARICOM nationals was made public. In that atmosphere, and given the relative support and legitimacy obtained from the audience by the securitisers, particular and urgent actions by the Barbadian officials were put into motion. Actions involved the surveillance and identification of the undocumented CARICOM nationals remaining in Barbados after the critical speech act. These actions began before the end period for amnesty. State officials acted in ways that they anticipated would remedy the danger; and went about their tasks sooner rather than later.

By this time in 2009/10, the political climate in Barbados had deteriorated into one that was characterised by divisive and hostile political discourses. The topic of illegal Guyanese and undocumented CARICOM nationals was stressed. There was unease being experienced by locals and CARICOM nationals alike, and this emerging condition produced contestable state practices. The performances by the Barbadian authorities appeared, during this time, echoed acts of institutional profiling and discrimination against CARICOM nationals. The Barbados Immigration Department was alleged to be resorting to raids, detentions, and deportations. There were increasing reports that the Barbadian authorities were raiding homes, businesses, and vehicles in search of illegal CARICOM nationals.

Gibbs (2010) said, for instance, that the Nation Newspaper was compelled to carry a story wherein “immigration officers ransacked a place one night; they kicked, and pulled people out” of their homes. PM Thompson together with one or more of his Cabinet colleagues acknowledged that raids were conducted by
immigration officers. Yet, the prime minister objected to accusations of ill-treatment against the Barbados immigration officers. PM Thompson (2009l) retorted that accusations against the immigration authorities were “reckless and unfair” given that under the prevailing circumstances of large influxes and illegal CARICOM nationals living in Barbados, it was within Barbados’ right to respond. Indeed, the local and regional media were widespread in the share of reporting on the raids and deportations; the allegations pointed to Barbados’ conduct.

The reports were carried in the *Nation Newspaper*, the *Barbados Advocate*, and others inclusive of the *Stabroek News* out of Guyana, and the *Jamaican Observer*. PM Thompson (2009l) revealed that since “June 1 to 26 [2009], raids were made on 15 residences between 3 am and 6 am, leading to the detention and removal of 47 non-nationals, 34 of whom were Guyanese.” Even against this admission of raids, MP Inniss tended to dismiss the gravity of Barbados’ actions by the immigration officials. Inniss (2009) advanced a scenario that queried “if you are living in a country illegally and it is the determination of the immigration office that you are to be deported, what are we [the Barbadian authorities] to do?” Moreover, Inniss (2009) rhetorically asked if it was practical for the immigration officer, in following the lead to an illegal CARICOM national, to give “a phone call and tell you that we are coming for you next Thursday at 2 am?” The health Minister was adamant that “you do not make an appointment with an individual to deport them” (Inniss, 2009). The fact was that raids and deportations by the immigration authorities, in Barbados, attracted a course of accusations from CARICOM nationals and functional actors.

Locally, support was given to the securitisers by the audience via several avenues of which one was the DLP’s overwhelming victory in the 2008 general elections. By virtue of the victory, the DLP would have received a majority mandate to act on affairs relating to CARICOM nationals. This is so because these issues ignited the political platforms; and the DLP’s 2008 election manifesto also sensitised the general public to the discomfort the DLP had with the intra-CARICOM migration
project as it was occurring in Barbados. Indeed, the 2008 DLP Manifesto (2008: 35) stated specifically that:

Barbadian workers face competition in the labour market from foreign workers. For the most part, these workers come from other CARICOM countries ... the potential for the erosion of employment opportunities of the local labour force is obvious. It is for this reason that the Democratic Labour Party will: introduce policies to manage immigration in the interest of the local labour force.

PM Thompson was keen on a ‘Barbados First’ policy as suggested in his amnesty declaration in the Ministerial Statement before the Barbados House of Assembly. On top of that, the audience through the popular blogs such as ‘Barbados Underground’ and in letters to the media editors such as the Barbados Advocate and the Nation Newspaper sent messages of support for PM Thompson and the DLP-led administration’s approaches to intra-CARICOM affairs. Additionally, several contributions raised in the popular radio call-in programmes, qualitatively and quantitatively, tended to support rather than criticise the Barbados approach to illegal CARICOM nationals, amnesty, and intra-regional migration. \(^{81}\) Nonetheless, it was not difficult to fathom an understanding of the securitisers’ necessity to act urgently on the belief that a majority of Barbados’ population were favourable to the policy directions employed by PM Thompson. The prime minister had taken definitive steps first, to the granting of an amnesty, and subsequent to that, the Barbados government’s follow-up actions treating to the perceived emergency with urgency.

In essence, the securitisers and state officials assumed a course of urgent actions for remedying the ominous danger of undocumented CARICOM nationals residing in Barbados based upon perceptible support for the government. Investigations and intelligence-gathering resulted in the contentious raids and these were often precursory to ‘illegal’ CARICOM nationals being removed from the jurisdiction of Barbados. CARICOM actors, and especially Guyanese citizens

\(^{81}\) See Sub-section 3.6.3 for the related discussions. At the time of data-gathering there was no deliberate attempt to pursue research on these components due to logistical and ethical considerations that went beyond the analytical framework and anticipated scope of the thesis.
directly affected by the raids and deportations were vocal with acrimony against Barbados’ authorities. Guyana was the country identified as having the largest transnational and immigrant population in Barbados as stated in Chapter 1 of this thesis. Guyana registered constant displeasure with Barbados’ increased ‘policing’ practices against its nationals.

Contrastingly, Barbados communicated that there were problems of false documentation originating in Guyana, and fraudulent practices were manifesting at Caribbean ports of entry, and specifically Barbados. The matter of false documentation, leading to the illegality of some immigrants, was perceived to trigger problems and some transnational crimes in Barbados. For clarity, Mark Russell (2009) indicated that fraudulent practices were being conducted by Guyanese, “inclusive of forged passports, entering Barbados on differing occasions under different names and ‘official’ documentation,” which made it necessary for the immigration officials in Barbados to profile Guyanese. The actual practice of fraud complimented the securitisers in shaping the threat perceptions of the local audience; and fraud was identified by the Barbadian officials as a concern requiring immediate and strong actions. Notwithstanding the expressed support Barbados received from its locals, Guyanese sources accused Barbadian immigration officials of performing early morning raids. Herweg (2009) stated that:

Soon after the amnesty law was first implemented [in Barbados], Guyanese sources charged that violations of privacy were committed as Barbadian immigration officials, in pre-dawn raids, entered the homes of suspected aliens between 3am and 6am. Guyanese residents accused the Barbadian officials’ that their unruly actions were motivated by racial factors singling out the growing Guyanese population on the island. Other offensive actions have included the looting of possessions of deported Guyanese, as well as bounties placed on the heads of Guyanese aliens turned over to the Barbadian immigration authorities.

It became clear that incidents of significant magnitude were happening in Barbados that caused several actors impacted by the decisions to speak out either in condemnation or shock at things that were reported via public media. In terms of recognising that a country has the right to protect its borders and citizens,
Gibbs insisted that while she did not bring everything to the general public, the Nation Newspaper “wanted people to get a sense of what is happening” in terms of Barbados immigration officers and the ‘raiding’ and ‘harassment’ of Guyanese and CARICOM nationals (2010). Many actions said to have been conducted by immigration officials in Barbados of a disparaging nature were sometimes rebutted with denials by the Barbadian authorities.

Deportations following the rampant raids caused a stir in terms of their regularity on the targeted groups and the probability that those CARICOM foreigners to be deported experienced undue losses of dignity. The deportees were not told that legally they may have had recourse open to them and this omission was abandonment by Barbados officials from normal procedures in the execution of deportation orders. The timing of these raids and deportations coincided soon after the securitising moves had taken effect. Hence, the securitisers’ claimed a legitimacy to act by virtue of the local audience’s support of the government and the urgency required for protecting Barbados and its society from the threatening impulses of intra-CARICOM migration and the flood of Guyanese said to be living illegally in Barbados. The next sub-section will more thoroughly examine the actions in terms of their exceptionality.

7.5.1 Raids and Deportations: The Exceptionality

This sub-section locates the actions of Barbados’ officials regarding the raids, detentions, and deportations within the prism of the politics of exception. That these situations and incidents of raiding, detention, and removal were happening in the domestic political sphere of Barbados, and to the extent that unorthodox policy measures and policing actions undergirded the regional security complex of CARICOM, brought into question the consideration of legitimacy versus illegitimacy. In fact, it is noted by Flynn (2011) that:

States have generally emphasized their sovereign rights over those of the non-citizen, leading to what many observers deem the increasing ‘criminalisation’ of immigration. Criminalisation can take many forms, including the adoption of new laws providing criminal sanction for irregular residence or the increasingly strict application of existing laws.
Also, criminalisation is often linked ... to the broadening use of detention as a means of managing immigration.

This is not to deny that the claims made in the previous section did not occur. Rather, the notion of pulling out the factors of legitimacy or illegitimacy is to further demonstrate that the securitisers in Barbados made choices, created new rules and policy directions, and implemented measures that would severely impact on those living in Barbados illegally or without proper documentation. Legitimacy had less to do with whether circumstances had developed under the laws of Barbados that may have provided the ‘unwanted’ groups of CARICOM nationals with other legal pathways for remaining in Barbados.

Thus, one can identify with the preferences of Barbados’ securitisers for using the term ‘illegal’ rather than ‘irregular’ or ‘undocumented’ when referring to CARICOM nationals not possessing the requisite immigration statuses. The criminalisation of ‘illegal’ CARICOM nationals by way of nominal politics became part of the successful securitised condition, especially once the actions led to detention by the police/immigration officials and the expulsion of the illegal CARICOM nationals. There were times that the state authorities ordered deportations and other times that they simply invited persons to voluntarily leave Barbados.

Despite PM Thomps’s denial that the raids which took place occurred under unusual methods, there were several claims that kept springing up across the regional security complex. Guyana, particularly, brought the rule-based environment regarding expulsions and/or expulsions into the spotlight. For example, Rodrigues-Birkett (2009) disputed PM Thompson’s figures regarding persons detained and those subsequently asked to leave as indicated under Section 7.5. Rodrigues-Birkett said that “in May, 29 Guyanese were deported from Barbados, and 24 so far for the month of June. In total, 53 Guyanese have been deported from Barbados” since the amnesty announcement was made on May 5th, 2009 and several of them occurred prior to the amnesty’s implementation on June 1st, 2009.
Two key points are inferred here; firstly, there was some disparity in numbers deported as opposed to those being asked to voluntarily leave. Secondly, there was confirmation that Barbados and Guyana had become enveloped in a situation involving their respective nationals, with one group (i.e. immigration officials) seemingly targeting a group of immigrants with actions that were sure to embroil the relations between the two countries. In fact, Thompson (2009i) told regional actors that those CARICOM nationals “who do not leave voluntarily will be deported” clearly indicating that the two possible eventualities were dissimilar. One was framed through a ‘departure’ order meaning that the person could return to Barbados after two years, and the other was an order for ‘deportation’ which would affectively diminish the likelihood of returning to Barbados in the future. These choices that the Barbados authorities had at their disposal clearly indicated there was some measure of success regarding a successful securitisation given Barbados’ capacity to expel CARICOM nationals from the country, and the tools that could be used to keep them out of Barbados for the period of two years or a longer and more indefinite sojourn.

Practices of raids, detentions, expulsions, and deportations were mounted by state officials prior to any official reference or debate in the Barbados House of Assembly barring the actual amnesty announcement and the PM Thompson’s quest for a ‘Barbadians first’ policy as enunciated in parliament. The year 2009 represented arguably the most strained period of growing unease. Given the DLP’s realistic two-thirds majority in the Lower House of the Barbados House of Assembly, it was almost certain that Bills presented on the basis of national security concerns would have found an easy passage through the legislature. This condition was presupposed against the gravity expressed by the securitisers of the threat to the state and society. Additional concerns were reflected in the context that measures to counter the illegality of undocumented CARICOM nationals had human rights implications. The political actions by Barbados were sufficiently unorthodox as to raise legal connotations and interpretations that Barbados was not strictly playing by the rules.
In the situation of a ‘real’ or ‘perceived’ emergency to the infrastructure and borders of the state, it became easy to implement practices that were either considerably *ultra vires*, were not confined within the precincts of the rule of law, or could possibly be construed as encroaching on the rights of Barbadian citizens, and other ‘legal’ persons. The types of infractions in which raids and arbitrary expulsions by an agency of the state could be affected were not usually permissible under everyday circumstances. The suspension and/or breaking free of the normal rules would be more effective, if for pragmatic reasons, for exceptional politics to be actively performed by Barbados’ state officials.

*The Barbados Advocate’s* editorial of August 7th, 2009, insisted that “while the attention that has been paid to deportations is understandable, it is time to look beyond” that mode of security measure and to recognise that it is “only one line of action in a multi-pronged approach” to assuage the dangers of influxes and illegal CARICOM nationals in Barbados. The need for unorthodox measures was already sold to the Barbadian audience on the basis that the danger of illegal CARICOM nationals had began to create burdens and pressures in the state and society. It is in this context that the urgency to act was strategically implied and utilised by the securitisers and state officials. The securitisers contemplated actions and the implementation of harsh measures that would not normally obtain in everyday situations. Raids and deportations, to address problems of influx and illegality, appeared for the most part, tolerable for the audience. The dire situations and consequences of illegal CARICOM nationals residing in Barbados necessitated swift emergency actions as performed by the Barbados Immigration Department. These were exceptional politics constituted by way of the multiple actions by the securitisers and governmental authorities. The next sub-section examines crucial responses emerging in the context of the alleged actions of raids and deportations by Barbados.

### 7.5.2 Raids, Detention, Expulsions: The Responses and Reactions

This sub-section provides a form of synthesis with emphasis on the responses and actions which characterised the policing and expelling actions of immigration
authorities in Barbados. Davis (2009), a Barbadian visual artist and an employer of Guyanese in the area of farming and agriculture, said that she was “absolutely correct” in previously stating that immigration officials working in conjunction with the police were “knocking on doors usually at 4.30 in the morning” similar to ‘Gestapo-like’ operations and removing migrants from their homes without even as much as “giving them the opportunity to pack their things.” Added to Davis’ pronouncements which suggested a harsh stance by Barbados in executing the raids, Honorary Consul for Guyana, Faria (2009) suggested that in the immediate aftermath of the announcement of an amnesty targeting CARICOM nationals only, there was ‘hard reason’ to believe that “an unusually high number of Guyanese nationals” were being rounded-up, detained, and “sent back to Guyana.”

Further to Davis’ claims, Gibbs (2010) indicated that she was in possession of conclusive evidence pointing to the “immigration [officials] breaking down [immigrants’] doors” in order to proceed with ridding the country of ‘unwanted and illegal Guyanese’ and other CARICOM nationals. In a later response to Barbados’ actions, Guyana’s Foreign Minister stated that “those [Guyanese] who are easily recognisable because of their ethnic features are given the brunt of the harsh treatment” by the government and immigration officials in Barbados (Rodrigues-Birkett, 2009). PM Thompson had confirmed that the policy of Barbados did target undocumented CARICOM nationals, but he expressed ignorance regarding the profiling of a particular ethnic group. Furthermore, PM Thompson (2009) denied that any alleged raids which were suggested to have been carried out by the Immigration Department were done in an “inhumane or unreasonable” fashion. Sir Ronald Saunders, a prominent CARICOM businessman, former diplomat, and social commentator wrote that:

Picking-up people in the middle of the night and deporting them without due process is not right or legal; nor is deporting people who are legitimately waiting for a work permit to be renewed. This is especially so when the only people treated in this way are those from the Caribbean. (2009).
Gibbs (2010) added that while the newspaper carried the details of the ill-treatment, “some [local] people were upset we brought it.” The editor related that the Nation Newspaper did not carry every issue relating to immigration and CARICOM nationals inclusive of Guyanese. The then President of the Caribbean Development Bank, Compton Bourne, was of the view that with all that was happening, he had “never seen any statistics that tells one authoritatively how many Guyanese and CARICOM immigrants” were in Barbados illegally (2009). Additionally, Bourne (2009) said that:

As regards the way some are being rounded-up and deported … the entire issue of undocumented immigrants was one that required much sensitivity … [and] should be handled with much more sensitivity than it seems to have been handled with so far in Barbados. There are way too many stories in the media about the rounding-up of people and I think that is not the proper way to do it. … There should be a proper way to handle it. Rounding up people like prisoners in the dead of night is not the way to do it.

Gibbs (2010) maintained that there were “other stories” and proceeded to speak of an example “when immigration officers stopped a bus and made people get off,” with the expectation of finding illegal CARICOM nationals aboard after receiving advanced information on the subjects. The media, on conditions of safeguarding a source, later reported that a landlord providing rental accommodation to Guyanese insisted that he too became an indirect victim of the Barbados authorities. The landlord, according to the Nation Newspaper (June, 2009) source relayed that:

[Immigration officials] broke in all of my rooms and terrified persons who were not even illegal. One lady was dragged off the toilet and all the urine and stool fell on the floor. It was humiliating for her, [but] only for them to find out after that she was a legal Guyanese here. People are human beings and I have to foot the bill for all these repairs. The next problem I’m faced with is, all the belongings of these persons deported have been left behind. I’m giving them a month to get a friend or family member here to collect the items. If not, I’ll be renting these rooms with the appliances left behind.

In the same report, a Guyanese man that managed to evade the authorities as they raided his home is reported to have said that there was damage to his personal
items, and also the possibility of a theft since a sum of money went missing. The *Stabroek News of Guyana*, in a June 17th, 2009 feature report, stated that an unidentified man had been recently deported from Barbados after being awoken from his sleep at around 6 a.m. and taken to the airport. According to the report, the man complained that ‘Guyanese are being taken from their homes and deported’ with some of these CARICOM nationals ‘getting a knock on the door’ while sometimes the immigration officials were ‘just showing up, marching in people’s home and taking you’ if you did not have the requisite documentation to show the immigration officials.

Quite a few accusations shaped the discourses in the regional security complex and they were of a sensitive nature thereby raising ethical concerns. PM Thompson (2009l) indicated that the ‘complaints’ appeared unfounded, but he instituted “a special committee,” chaired by prominent lawyer and former magistrate, Keith Simmons “to investigate any complaints that might be made” against the local immigration authorities. To that end, Rodrigues-Birkett suggested that since her meetings and discussions with Barbados’ officials on the allegations advanced by deported Guyanese, there were “no new raids” nor were there any “reports of ill-treatment meted out to Guyanese” (2009). Notwithstanding these episodes, Leader of the Opposition, Mottley, condemned the incumbent government.

Mottley (2009a) said that the actions of the immigration authorities “coming on the heels of the Prime Minister’s statement in Guyana of *ever so welcome, wait for a call*’ and, the draconian way in which many CARICOM immigrants have been unceremoniously removed from Barbados over the last year.” Mottley (2009a) said that these issues would present numerous “implications for Barbadians working and moving in the wider region.” Moreover, Mottley (2009a) maintained that “a government is entitled to implement strong policies,” but those policies “must be applied consistently, fairly and humanely.” These pronouncements by Mottley highlighted an argument made by Williams regarding the application of emergency measures.
Williams (2011: 457) suggests that “declarations of the need for a politics of emergency are rarely likely taken by other actors,” and this was perhaps the situation given Mottley’s reactions to the Thompson-led government. Mottley (2009b) indicated that Barbados must consider “when people are asked to leave that they are given the time to pack up their belongings and leave in a manner that does not reduce them to feeling like criminals.” Comissiong (2009) said in a press statement that apart from viewing “the amnesty as harsh,” he believed PM Thompson had “enunciated a policy that will assist virtually no one,” and will “traumatise and dislocate many men, women and children – inclusive of children who are citizens of Barbados by birth – who have established deep and stable roots in Barbados and who are making constructive contributions to Barbadian society.” The decisions and follow-up actions to pursue and remove the undocumented foreigners from Barbados demonstrated the potency of political agency in the final phases of the securitising process.

Williams (2011: 457) argues that making declarations of emergency can “come with significant risks to one’s credibility and sense of judgement – something that is heightened when the political context is at least partly informed by the fear of fear.” This appeared to be the case for Barbados. Complaints and negative discourses, proven or otherwise, brought scepticism questioning the securitisers’ motives and judgement on the measures the country implemented. Barbados’ actions were considered harsh; and the choice to pursue restrictive practices fuelled ‘hostilities’ which came to be expressed in and outside of Barbados. Interestingly, it is argued in Security Dialogue that:

Security is therefore not simply exceptional, but has constitutive effects upon the normal. Normality is simultaneously a field of struggle, where technologies of constituting subjects and ordering the social come up against the intransigence of political agency and the resistance of political subjects. (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006: 457).

The political exception was constituted by the raiding, rounding-up, detention, and finally deporting/expelling of several CARICOM nationals living in Barbados in conjunction with the resistance that obtained from affected CARICOM
nationals and other functional actors. Without the severest application to ensure the rule of law, and the probability that Barbados had broken rules and norms relating to customary practice, would have had constitutive effects upon the normal. The failure to pursue the enactments through national debate in the Barbados House of Assembly was a departure from political normality given the sensitivity and seriousness attached to immigration issues. At the same time, the immigrants’ rights became contestable both in terms of Barbados’ Constitution and the possible violation of CARICOM nationals on the basis of discrimination and human rights.

The CARICOM nationals challenged Barbados’ state authorities based upon their perceptions of arbitrary removal from Barbados on the basis of their non-Barbadian nationalities. The Barbados Constitution at Chapter 23 (1b) states that: “no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting by virtue of any written law or in the performance of the functions of any public office or any public authority” (2002: 29). Was there legitimacy or illegitimacy in the alleged acts done by the Barbados authorities? Barbados’ authorities through their exceptional actions and implemented measures had provoked a string of animosities against Barbados. The political climate in Barbados had previously inhibited tensions and unease and these spilled over into the emergent securitised environment.

These areas of political agency that demanded immediate detection of undocumented CARICOM nationals and, in particular the vast numbers of Guyanese, was followed by detention and expatriation. These phenomenal practices came to intensify the discourses of security in Barbados and the wider CARICOM security complex. Challenges by affected CARICOM nationals and functional actors were numerically on the increase and, intensified in terms of seriousness – the Shanique Myrie case – being an example. Overall, these events and circumstances, and the discursive practices forged by the various interactions of the multiple actors changed the political climate in the securitisation process.

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82 Shanique Myrie's case is before the CCJ; details are explained in the next chapter.
The next section will examine the decision and rationale to introduce fingerprinting at the GAIA in Barbados.

7.6 Implementation of Fingerprinting at GAIA

This section examines the decision, related phenomena, and the consequential contexts that became major concerns on the ‘biometric’ surveillance measure of fingerprinting. This measure of gathering biometric data on travellers was implemented at the GAIA, the national and lone airport of Barbados in September 2009 but became short-lived due to intense resistance by local and regional actors. The fingerprinting exercise by the Barbados state officials was not restricted to immigrants but included persons emigrating from Barbados. Nor was the exercise of fingerprinting confined to Caribbean foreigners, but it very much included Barbados citizens and non-citizens possessing legal immigrant statuses in Barbados. The section starts by addressing the official rationale for the introduction of fingerprinting by the Barbados securitisers and authorities. The implementation of a surveillance system for the taking of fingerprints was an action perpetrated by the administration at the GAIA. The measure of fingerprinting was included in the Green Paper as a policy option to be implemented once the necessary amendments to the laws came about. Indeed, the Green Paper (2009: 95) contends that:

The Government of Barbados is in the process of installing fingerprint scanners and readers at the ports of entry. It is expected that with time the Department will wish to obtain and store other bio data as a means of strengthening its border security system. However legislation is required to authorize the capturing and storing of bio data.

To date, there have been no amendments to the laws, but it is pellucid that in 2009 the Barbados state authorities implemented a short-lived fingerprinting scheme at GAIA. In the subsequent sub-section, it will be demonstrated that even in the context of the intent as set out in the Green Paper, fingerprinting undoubtedly was an act of political exception. Notwithstanding, and up to the actual introduction, a

83 According to Nieto and others (2002: 4), ‘bio data’ or ‘biometrics’ is a term that “applies to the many ways in which human beings can be identified by unique aspects of the body. Fingerprints are the most commonly known biometric identifier.”
scheme for fingerprinting at the airport (or seaport) was not communicated to the wider public in Barbados. The security tool was glibly spoken of in the past in relation to improving and utilising surveillance technologies and especially for its potential for acquiring data on the immigrant population, but the limited discussions did not address its application for Barbadian citizens.

Internationally, many felt biometric forms of identification inclusive of fingerprinting had become necessary in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the war on terror. Added to this security dimension was the International Cricket Council (ICC) Cricket World Cup (CWC) tournament that was played in the Caribbean in 2007. During the preparations, this measure of fingerprinting became a matter of serious consideration although it failed to be implemented by Barbados or any of the other CARICOM member states. Not until the pragmatic, if tactful, implementation under the DLP’s leadership more than two years later in September 2009 was the pilot scheme employed in Barbados.

According to a report carried in the *Nation Newspaper* of September 25th, 2009, it was revealed that travellers including Barbadians were ‘being fingerprinted upon entering and leaving’ GAIA. Minister of State with responsibility for Labour and Immigration, Arni Walters confirmed that travellers “were being fingerprinted but they were not obligated to have it done” because the security surveillance was a “pilot scheme aimed at enhancing our [Barbados’] border security” (2009).84 Walters (2009) was at pains to stress to the media, audience, and functional actors that the fingerprinting measure which was implemented by the Barbados government, was in fact “a pilot scheme aimed at enhancing” Barbados’ border security.

Walters (2009) articulated that “border control is an important element of any nation.” Barbados may well have considered that the timing and appropriateness

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84 Minister Arni Walters, responsible for immigration matters in the DLP administration, was interviewed by Ricky Jordan in September 2009, and the interview was reported in the Barbados Nation Newspaper. The interview was in response to a press meeting previously called by the Leader of the Opposition, Mia Mottley, in deference to reports reaching the BLP on fingerprinting introduced at the GAIA.
for the introduction of fingerprinting were ripe. Wilson and Weber (2008: 125) contend though that “the heightened regulation and surveillance of borders occurs within a political context in which social problems are increasingly reconfigured as problems of security” (2008: 125). Given the discourses prevailing in Barbados and the securitisers’ emphases on the pressures and burdens faced by the country; together with an economic recession that tended to be further exacerbated by the influx of illegal Guyanese and other CARICOM nationals residing and working in Barbados, surveillance at the border seemed a practical option for the Barbados authorities. Walters (2009) contended that fingerprinting had become a “necessary” elevation of “surveillance at the airport due to incidents of forged documents among other concerns” prevailing at the time.

Walter’s statements were the first official pronouncements spoken by the Barbados government or any other state official in public on the fingerprinting matter. Walters insisted that fingerprinting procedures were already “mandatory in the USA and at some ports in Europe,” and “Barbados and the Caribbean had to be conscious of the same kinds of border security risks, especially since this country accommodated international airlines and heavy cruise-line traffic” (2009).

Julia Rawlins-Bentham (2009), in her coverage on comments made by senior police officials on the necessity for fingerprinting, wrote that the law enforcement of the RBPF “could not control the movement of criminals around the Caribbean without fingerprints.” Again the capacity to compile and store data on persons that were not otherwise part of a ‘security databank’ in Barbados was disconcerting. More evident was the securitisers’ suspending of rules and the normal formats for legal enactments given that the government by way of the Green Paper had already acknowledged the absence of the relevant laws in Barbados.

Walters (2009), defensively stressed that transnational crime, inclusive of terrorist threat and human trafficking risks, “have been here [in Barbados] since the 1990s, and every so often, you have to look again at the surveillance of people” traversing GAIA; and these risks would compel Barbados “to improve on the
way” security was being managed. Fingerprinting at Barbados’ border transcended messages of security and insecurity, criminality and illegality to the local and regional multiple actors. At first, the ‘pilot scheme’ of fingerprinting went unnoticed; but soon afterwards, the Opposition BLP and other local and regional actors expressed cynicism on its implementation. Notwithstanding the lingering security discourses that were prevalent regarding international travel since 9/11, several concerns raged about Barbados’ introduction of fingerprinting as surveillance and another form of technological governability. Before exploring the responses to fingerprinting, the next sub-section briefly situates the factor of fingerprinting within the setting of exceptional politics.

7.6.1 Fingerprinting: Breaking Free of the Rules

In this sub-section, the task is to indicate the ways that Barbados’ security-oriented actions featured to become exceptional politics. Once knowledge that fingerprinting was introduced for locals and foreigners the securitised domain was essentially affected by yet another state practice viewed in terms of its unorthodoxy. Fingerprinting at GAIA for travellers, local and international, made it possible for a confrontation between the normative social order of normalcy and the implied radical transformation found in political exception. The matter of enhancing security technologies at the GAIA became a political factor in terms of the judgement used by the securitisers and the execution which appeared to require transparency and public sensitisation. There were the perceptions of separate CARICOM actors that saw the fingerprinting of immigrants and locals as an exercise that could prove problematic in terms of persons’ liberty and their rights in respect of access to their data. The so-called foreigners originating from Guyana and other CARICOM member states, in their resistance and criticisms of Barbados’ actions, were able to draw attention to the Barbados authorities’ actions.

It was acknowledged by the securitisers that certain legal amendments would have to be affected if fingerprinting was to be made an available security option for Barbados’ combat against immigrating CARICOM nationals. The Green
Paper (2009: 95) recommended that “the legislation should be amended in order to authorize the capturing and storing of fingerprints and the eventual capturing and storing of other bio data.” In Barbados, and despite the securitisers’ awareness of the legal instruments needed for fingerprinting at the border, there was no subsequent action taken by the securitisers inclusive of the political executive to initiate debate in parliament on the issue of biometric data-gathering and/or storage before having implemented the pilot scheme at GAIA.

Given the fears and possible ways that data can be handled, manipulated, used, and misused, it is almost certain that Barbados had an equally pressing commitment to uphold the sanctity of the individual being fingerprinted. Popescu (2011: 188) argues that “acceptability is relevant to the fundamental human rights at the individual level and involves developing an appropriate legislative framework. The main problem that arises is ... the gathering, recording and use of individual biometric data.” There are no laws reflecting these concerns in Barbados and in terms of immigration practices. Various dimensions of technological surveillance operating at the GAIA, but specifically the fingerprinting project, are conducive to the trepidation expressed by multiple actors. Barbados may have gone beyond the confines of normal procedures in its ‘new’ immigration practices and border policing.

More crucial on the politics of exception in Barbados was Walter’s resolve that fingerprinting would not have been undertaken without the executive having the legislative authority to do it. Walters (2009) stated that it was entirely possible “using directions under the Immigration Act, to establish fingerprinting procedures at the ports of entry without having to seek legislative approval from Parliament.” This was clearly a departure from the arguments contained in the Green Paper which called for enabling legislation. Given the sweeping powers attained by the Minister in respect of the Laws of Barbados CAP 190, a number of questions began to emerge regarding the rightfulness of so important a change to go unchallenged by the stakeholders and the local public’s representatives.
In the final analysis, “there is a tension between laws and practices, since laws have been a slow response to a perceived vulnerability. This hiatus has left room for emergency measures which are not always in line with national and international provisions on human rights” (Miggiano, 2009: 7). In the case of Barbados, there were surely inconsistencies with the RTC, interpretations of national laws, and culturally valued customs of operations relating to the treatment of tourists and immigrants. Thus, the political exception represented a definite step from operating under regular practice in the regulatory framework, to one that became manifested through the breaking of norms and a situation of exceptionality by the securitisers and other state officials in Barbados.

Indeed, for Barbadian securitisers and officials, by-passing the national legislature in its pilot scheme would have broken the tenets that undergird essential characteristics of modern constitutionalism and rule of law. In other words, Barbados did not possess or provide the requisite laws to safeguard the arbitrary use of the biometric data it was collecting; this provoked concerns regarding individuals’ rights to confidentiality, matters of disclosure, and related concern on storage and use of immigrants’ personal data at GAIA. Barbados’ executive, by the implementation of the fingerprinting exercise, thereby created impressions that the combined securitisers acted above the law. Ministerial privilege appeared to allow for the political exception. 85 Hence, the securitisers’ need for operating through means identified as the political exception surpassed and breached the rights of the individuals’ confidentiality and basic human rights on the protection of identity. The securitisers failed to adequately justify their intent and Barbados’ precautionary actions on the crucial matter of fingerprinting at the border. The next sub-section considers key responses and reactions to the fingerprinting pilot scheme at GAIA.

7.6.2 Fingerprinting: The Responses and Reactions
In this sub-section, the study considers significant responses and reactions to fingerprinting at GAIA. Nadia Alleyne (2009) reporting in the Barbados

85 Please refer to Section 7.2 of this chapter.
Advocate, suggested that there was “a hue and cry regarding the fingerprinting of persons” at the GAIA. The opposition, through former Attorney-General, said that the BLP “fielded many calls from Barbadians and visitors complaining of this development” which indicated that the fingerprinting measure had been introduced unaware to the Barbadian public (Marshall, 2009). Fingerprinting, as an exceptional practice, was utilised by the Barbadian authorities and it became implemented without consultation or suitable communication between the state and major stakeholders.

This extraordinary measure included the by-passing of the legislature and suitably informing Barbadians and the airline industry. MP Marshall (2009) claimed that the BLP opposition “received reports from visitors” that felt “aggrieved at this intrusion into their own privacy.” Arbitrary fingerprinting of those traversing the entry and exit booths at GAIA, clearly had “potential to do damage” to tourist arrivals from within and outside of the region (Marshall, 2009). Moreover, Marshall (2009) observed that it was “galling … that an administration could now implement a mandatory system which requires persons leaving our shores and arriving in Barbados, including Barbadians, to be fingerprinted.” Minister Walters (2009) said that “Barbadians were being fingerprinted but they were not obligated to have it done.” Whether Barbadian citizens were aware of this factor was anyone’s guess; and even if they knew, on what grounds would exemption be conveyed? Barbados’ official explanations were late in coming, and in fact, the issue was brought to the attention of the audience and functional actors (i.e. the local and regional public’s attention) by actors that were equally affected and dismayed by the operation.

Rawlins-Bentham acknowledged that the issue of fingerprinting had “resulted in a huge public outcry from travellers, Barbadians, and the Opposition Barbados Labour Party” (2009). Several Barbadians reacted to the unsatisfactorily implemented measure; this was alarming given the securitisers’ expectations that they could hold their position of countering an emergency with the necessary urgency. The audience’s reaction ably demonstrated that there was no prior and
adequate notification of the pilot project. Fingerprinting, therefore, met local and regional resistance in Barbados. Marshall (2009) iterated the view that “Barbadians associate the capturing of fingerprints with the investigation of criminal activity,” the authorities should ensure that fingerprinting was contained within that socio-cultural context of meaning. Marshall (2009), countering the securitisers’ claims about transnational crimes and Barbados’ vulnerabilities as a small state, contended that the fingerprinting “requirement [in the USA] is directly proportional to the risk of terrorism” evidenced in the USA, and he determined that the risk that Barbados and the region faced was “nowhere near that same level of risk.” The fact that there were no discussions, debates, or warnings given to the local general public prior to the implementation, meant that in effect, the fingerprinting initiative was a ‘backdoor’ entry by the securitisers which characterised the politics of exception.

Marshall (2009) insisted that “when faced with security risks during the hosting of Cricket World Cup 2007, the then BLP Government had secured its [Barbados’] shores in a reasonable way that did not affect the civil liberties of Barbadians or Caribbean nationals.” For the tournament, “it was necessary, therefore, that the regional security strategy for the tournament be innovative, creative, all encompassing” and that focus would be trained to “the protection” of the national borders “from all potential threats ... [while] acknowledging the assistance received from ... indigenous human and financial resources” (PM Manning, 2007: i). It was with “unprecedented co-operation, and political commitment” among the participating member states that the region hosted a successful world tournament (Marshall, 2009). An IMPACS report, at the time, stated that:

The ‘Host Venue Agreements for CWC 2007’ required the region to be treated as one geographical space, facilitating unprecedented freedom of movement across borders by nationals of many countries, some of which may have been targets of activities not yet experienced in our region and others which are the source of the perpetrators of such activity. The challenge, therefore, was to facilitate such movement, so important to our many tourism based economies, while at the same time preserving the [territorial integrity and] security of our region. (IMPACS, 2007: 4).
Thus, the countering discourse clearly indicated that there was an encroachment by the Thompson-led government regarding the rights and civil liberties of Barbadians, regional, and international actors. Was fingerprinting necessary for CARICOM nationals; and should it have been mandatory for Barbadians; and if so, on what grounds? The securitisers’ implementation of this new policy directive for fingerprinting at the GAIA was assumed by those resisting the act, to transgress the normal order of things done in Barbados. Furthermore, Marshall argued that what was happening under the DLP administration was an “unwarranted intrusion into our civil liberties,” and hence it became *sine qua non* that the fingerprinting activity at GAIA “must be reconsidered and, in point of fact, it must be reversed” (2009). Marshall argued that legally and ethically, “Barbadians had not been consulted,” nor was “the slightest attempt [made] to prepare us for this move” (2009). Fingerprinting, as far as scores of Barbadians were concerned, clandestinely emerged without warning to citizens. The next section is a summary of the discussions advanced in this chapter.

### 7.8 Summary

This chapter began with discussions that came into view from the securitising moves and led to a politics of exception in Barbados. The initial focus was to put into perspective a reading of political exception given the Barbados situation. Next, discussion was on the Green Paper and some key contents that brought direct bearing on the way that problems were identified by Barbados. There were new recommendations which would chart a course for Barbados’ response to the danger of undocumented CARICOM nationals and the project of intra-CARICOM migration. Specifically, as the chapter developed it stressed the significance of Barbados’ emerging restrictive policies regarding the CARICOM national. This facet introduced the proposed guest worker programme and aspects of its implementation for the management of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados.

Demonstrated in the chapter, were some key contradictions arising out of this quest by Barbados to control and manage migration, and the practices that were
noted to be either breaking free of the rules or otherwise getting around normal procedures and accepted forms of behaviour by the Barbadian authorities. Considered were moral and ethical claims that could be interpreted as breaching the spirit of CARICOM for which, Barbados was a signatory actor sharing the objectives of the participating member states of CARICOM. Included in these discussions were issues of work permits and again the ambiguities and contradictions that prevailed over this non-facilitation by Barbados, which in fact went against the grain of Article 45 and 46. It was revealed that in several respects Barbados was either close to, or was in some way contravening the normal practices which formed part of the regulatory framework of the CSME and intra-CARICOM migration. On each major aspect in which political exception followed a Barbados initiative, the relevant sections also provided responses and reactions so as to further contextualise and generate accurate meanings on those things happening in Barbados and involved other CARICOM actors.

Another key measure depicted in the chapter highlighted Barbados’ security tools which became punctuated with raids, detention, and different forms of expulsion for the undocumented CARICOM nationals ‘caught’ in Barbados. CARICOM nationals complained about Barbados’ immigration authorities, and the fact that allegations of harassment and inhumane treatment challenged Barbados’ eagerness to fend off the danger of influx and illegality concerning CARICOM nationals residing in Barbados. The introduction and discussions on fingerprinting as a surveillance method demonstrated the subtle if not totally abnormal way in which Barbados was responding to a problem it identified to be a major security concern that would require immediate actions. The political actions that fit the characterisation of a politics of exceptionality and breaking free of normal rules were highlighted and discussed with a focus on the ‘harsh’ measures that Barbados were either about to introduce, or that the country had partially or fully implemented as security tools. The next chapter proceeds from the politics of exception by placing the reactions to the securitised condition at the forefront in order to better identify and understand the impacts and implications in a regional setting.
Chapter 8
Reactions to a Securitised Condition: Legal, Political, and Socio-Cultural Considerations

8.1 Reactions to the Securitised Condition: Overview
Recognising that a condition of securitisation had materialised in Barbados, and that political exception had now produced domains of insecurity, this chapter considers the reactions to the securitised condition. The impacts of securitisation were felt both by legal and illegal CARICOM nationals living in Barbados. The securitisation of migration had implications for current and future cross-border relations within the broader CARICOM security complex. In this chapter, the reaction of multiple actors will be evaluated in relation to the securitised condition in Barbados by examining the following: (a) legal reactions; (b) political reactions; and (c) socio-cultural reactions.

The sections demonstrate that the policy framework is not immune or disconnected from happening in the political environment. Moreover, the impact of individual and collective agency from actors perceiving to be victims or those speaking on behalf of the victims is crucial and can be expressed in legal and socio-cultural domains. The analysis will begin with the legal realm. This chapter presents two clear examples, firstly the automatic six-month rule and secondly the Shanique Myrie case. These examples will show that given the securitised condition in Barbados, the CCJ’s presence may be viewed as either daunting or inspirational depending on the actor’s outlook. Hence, the next section starts with discussions examining Barbados’ interpretation of a six-month automatic rule of entry for CARICOM nationals.

8.2 The Automatic Six-Month Rule of Entry for CARICOM Nationals
This section discusses the declaration for an automatic six-month stay for CARICOM nationals as agreed upon by the member states at the 28th Regular Meeting of the CHOG held in Barbados (CARICOM Secretariat, 2007). The directive was expected to further facilitate free movement and encourage increased intra-CARICOM migration as alluded to under the provisions that were
set out in Chapter 3 of the RTC. The decision of the CHOG indicated that CARICOM nationals “should be allowed an automatic six month stay on arrival in another CARICOM member state;” and this was notwithstanding that only “Antigua and Barbuda” among the member countries “entered a reservation” regarding the directive (CARICOM Secretariat, 2007). Specifically relating to skilled CARICOM nationals, the CARICOM Secretariat stated in a series of dispatches that:

- A CARICOM national entering another Member State with a Skills Certificate issued by another member state must be granted a definite entry of six (6) months and has the right to work immediately.

- A CARICOM National entering with a Skills Certificate issued by the receiving country must be granted an indefinite entry.

- **CARICOM nationals would be extended definite entry of six (6) months irrespective of purpose into another participating CARICOM member state.**

Reinforcing the point, Barbados as a sovereign actor did not register any formal reservations against this directive. Evidence would emerge that after the securitisation process was well underway and the securitised condition had come to envelop Barbados’ political climate, several concerns were expressed by Barbados. Barbados’ implementation of the six-month rule covered relevant aspects of laws and practices on intra-CARICOM migration. Barbados made decisions on the basis that the granting of an automatic six-month rule of entry could possibly become detrimental to Barbados’ well-being by contributing to influx; thus raising security concerns (Barbados. Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 27). Barbados pointed, for example, to scenarios wherein it was possible that problems could emerge if a CARICOM national did not find work in an allotted six-month period. Barbados contended that having CARICOM nationals wait around in a jurisdiction and being hopeful of work was “not the intent” of the RTC; and Barbados argued that “the intention is for community nationals to move to engage in employment” (Barbados Ministry of Labour &

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86 Italics are used here to highlight the provision because the grey statement became controversial given the securitised condition in Barbados.
Immigration, 2009: 22). Indeed, the country was on record of stating subsequent to its initial agreement on the measure that the local immigration department wanted “to more effectively monitor the problem of ‘over-stayers’ and to apply stricter enforcement measures as the situation warrants” (Barbados Ministry of Labour & Immigration, 2009: 27). Barbados interpreted and then decidedly acted by granting three months stay in the first instance to CARICOM nationals; and on application, a second allotment of three months was possible if the extended time was requested by the immigrant.

For CARICOM nationals having to return to the Barbados Immigration Department for an extension of three months to complete the six month period, meant that the CARICOM national was, deliberately or unintentionally, put under a form of surveillance which did not form part of the agreement entered by the CARICOM member states. Barbados had used its interpretation and re-defined the terms of granting the six-month stay for CARICOM nationals. Barbados was explicit that its way of altering the directive of the CHOG was a way to control and monitor the entry of immigrating CARICOM nationals. Barbados may have failed to live up to its commitments regarding the automatic six-month rule of entry for CARICOM nationals due to the way this rule was implemented by the Barbados executive and securitisers.

In Barbados, the law became “a technical instrument for the execution of certain political objectives” that would be difficult to otherwise achieve (Huysmans 2006b: 15). Arguably, rather than invoke the political exception at the regional level, Barbados’ implemented a particular interpretation regarding the application of the automaticity rule that was congruent with it securitisation of inter-CARICOM migration. Yet, Barbados’ position went beyond the stated declaration, as expressed in 2007 by the CHOG. Barbados’ variance in contradistinction to other member states created uncertainty regarding entry for CARICOM nationals. Barbados was ultimately challenged by CARICOM actors directly impacted by the country’s decision, as well as by functional actors. In essence, by the end of the 33rd Regular Meeting of the CHOG in July 2012,
Barbados’ position on the application of the six-month rule was being challenged. From CARICOM, there was a reminder that the member states had agreed to the original intention of the initiative. Barbados came to admit, in the circumstances, that its way may not have been correct and that the country would make the necessary re-adjustment. The cue called for a return to the “strategic focus for an effective CSME” which would re-consider the:

- The expansion of the categories of skilled Community nationals, including the introduction of additional categories;
- Adherence by all Member States to the decisions that make CARICOM nationals welcome in other Member States. The decisions include the automatic grant of a period of six months upon entering a Member State, subject to security exceptions. (CARICOM Secretariat, 2012).

PM Stuart (2012) admitted that the Barbados way “has been seen as not implementing the agreement of Heads of Government.” The Nation Newspaper (2012) reported that:

CARICOM nationals who travel to Barbados should soon be able to stay for up to six months at a time without the hassle of seeking an extension. Prime Minister of Barbados Freundel Stuart has given his commitment to CARICOM leaders that his Government will fall in line with Caribbean neighbors that have fully applied the automatic six-month stay agreed by CARICOM Heads of Government at their summit in Barbados five years ago. Although Barbados already grants CARICOM travelers the stay, it does so in installments – three months in the first instance and then, if the beneficiary is interested, an additional three months with no objections.

This violation of the spirit, if not the letter of the law was noted by Steve MacAndrew of the CSME Unit in Barbados. MacAndrew (2011) stated that “while Barbados would not face any penalties from the 15-member regional bloc for misreporting,” conflict could arise if CARICOM nationals insisted on being granted the time as agreed under the breadth of the CHOG’s declaration that was buttressed by the overall intent contained in the RTC. Thus, Barbados made a promise to the CHOG and, CARICOM as a whole, to take “a decision to revisit … [and to] look at the automatic six months stay subject” so as to keep with its CARICOM commitments (PM Stuart, 2012). PM Stuart (2012) indicated that Barbados would make the adjustment “to all the security and other considerations
that attend visitors when they arrive at our ports of entry.” Clearly this was an about turn from Barbados on the country’s original position for CARICOM nationals.

While not challenged by the Barbadian audience, the practice had been successfully challenged at the regional level on the grounds that it went beyond the strict application of the rules intended by the CHOG. On the one hand, the relative success of securitisation began to expose contentious areas in the integration process. Barbados was said to have faced danger from one or more groups of CARICOM nationals, but was at the same time deviating from initiatives that the country signed as an un-coerced, voluntary, and sovereign entity in the CARICOM security complex. On the other hand, the political executives and authorities in Barbados who had initially resorted to the idiosyncratic interpretations of existing regulations, capitulated when challenged by regional actors, but then were slow to follow through on promises of change. Practices of renewal continue unabated in Barbados several months after the promise of change. The next section starts with the primary example of discrimination at the border, and it accounts for the events regarding the Shanique Myrie case.

### 8.3 The Shanique Myrie Case

This section analyses the case of claimant Shanique Myrie in her pivotal legal action against Barbados before the CCJ. Myrie, has claimed that she suffered ill-treatment and indignity at the hands of Barbadian authorities. The section draws on proceedings from the CCJ's official website, local and regional newspapers such as the *Barbados Advocate*, the *Nation Newspaper*, the *Jamaica Gleaner*, and the *Stabroek News* to provide accounts of Myrie’s claims. These sources are also used to detail formal and informal developments that brought the serious issues before the CCJ especially those relating to the interests of Barbados and Jamaica in the matter. In sub-sections, the political and legal implications will be

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87 There are audio and video recordings of this case’s proceedings that are available at the main website of the Caribbean Court of Justice.
discussed. These are the factors that gave rise to arguments which ensued in the court proceedings. The first sub-section begins by detailing Myrie’s claims regarding the maltreatment that the Jamaican national is alleged to have received on her arrival at GAIA.

8.3.1 Myrie: Hurt and Ashamed by ‘Worst Nightmare’

It was reported in several leading Caribbean media outlets that on March 14th, 2011 Shanique Myrie arrived on a flight BW 415 from Jamaica; and it was her first visit to Barbados. It came to be understood that Myrie requested from the Barbados immigration authorities at GAIA, two weeks stay in Barbados in the capacity of a tourist. Myrie claimed that soon thereafter, she was “defiled” and the Barbados authorities “humiliated me and searched me like I was an animal;” which in Myrie’s estimation amounted to experiences of sexual and verbal abuse from Barbados’ authorities while performing their duties at GAIA (Barbados Nation Newspaper, Sunday Sun, 2011). According to the Jamaica Observer (2011), Myrie was initially cleared for entry after a brief interaction with the immigration officer on duty; but was again interviewed by Barbadian authorities after being asked to accompany them to collect her luggage.

Thereafter, Myrie claimed that she experienced degrading and insulting treatment that left her in tears and feeling humiliated. In fact Karyl Walker (2011) of the Jamaica Observer wrote, “Myrie complained bitterly ... that when she attempted to enter Barbados on March 14, 2011, she was subjected to two demeaning cavity searches by a female immigration officer who continuously spewed venom about Jamaicans,” while contending that it was Myrie’s first trip out of the island. Myrie asserted that the treatment she received at the hands of the Barbadian officials ran contrary to her entitlements provided under the RTC, and against her basic human rights. Walker (2012), recounting Myrie’s account of the allegations, wrote in the Jamaica Observer that:

The lady took me into a bathroom and told me to take off my clothes. I did as requested. After searching me and my clothes she found no contraband or narcotics. She then asked me to bend over, open my legs and spread [my vagina] ... she said that if I did not comply she would see that I
end up in prison in Barbados. When I bent over and spread my [vagina] I felt something enter my [vagina] and when I looked between my legs I saw her gloved hand in my [vagina]. I screamed and stood up. She then told me if I obstructed her doing a cavity search she would have me locked up. I bent over again and spread. She again inserted her fingers and poked around. I felt like I was being raped. I was so hurt and ashamed. I felt dirty and defiled. ... ‘I asked her who she was’ [and the officer] said ‘I am your worst nightmare.’ She [the officer] then said ‘all you (expletive) Jamaicans come here to do is either steal people’s man or bring drugs here.’ ... She [the officer] said ‘I hate these (expletive) Jamaicans.’

In her substantive evidence before the CCJ, Myrie claimed that her ‘horrible’ ordeal upon entering Barbados was unanticipated. In her testimony, Myrie (2012) suggested that she experienced “discriminatory and demeaning treatment by Barbadian Customs and Immigration officials.” Myrie (2012) contended that in addition to being “subjected to two humiliating cavity searches,” she was also “locked in a dark room by immigration officials” at the GAIA. Myrie further reported that she was forced to endure intensive interrogation by two officials. Myrie (2012) expressed the view that she was “discriminated against because of [her] nationality.” Subsequently, the stamp of entry that the immigration officials had entered in Myrie’s passport was revoked and replaced with a stamp showing denial of entry, all of which was done in the same evening. The next sub-section provides the main aspects emerging from Barbados’ responses to Myrie’s accusation.

8.3.2 Barbados’ Denials and Counter-Accusation

In this sub-section, the initial and subsequent responses to Shanique Myrie’s accusations are presented. Prior to the litigation that was heard by the CCJ, Senator Maxine McClean (2011), Minister of Foreign Affairs in Barbados, stated that the accusations offered by Myrie to Jamaica officials and media held “absolutely no truth.” McClean (2011) suggested that after an extensive investigation, Barbados’ Chief Immigration Officer reported that “Myrie’s claims

88 The italics here point to national stereotyping; similar public connotations were made regarding Guyanese.

89 These allegations implicated the Barbados Immigration Department, the Barbados Customs & Excise Department, and the Royal Barbados Police Force, although, during the court hearings there was doubt by Myrie specifically distinguishing the actual identity of the institutional officers.
were baseless.” Senator Harry Husbands (2011), under whose portfolio immigration matters directly fell, revealed that “Shanique Myrie, on arrival in Barbados, claimed she would have been staying with a female resident, but a closer investigation revealed she was actually staying with a Barbadian man who actually facilitates the entry of non-nationals into the island.” In an official statement communicated through a press conference from the Barbados Government on March 26th, 2011, it was explained that “Myrie was denied entry into Barbados because she failed to establish” where or with whom she would be staying in Barbados (McClean, 2011).

It was reiterated during the court proceedings that Myrie would have had insufficient funds, Barbados $300, to sustain her stay in the opinion of the immigration official. This determination was based on the interrogating officer’s assumption that Myrie may have been forced to rely upon public funds since the named individual that Myrie indicated she would be staying with, when contacted by Barbados authorities, denied knowledge of Myrie (CCJ, 2012). A report published in the Barbados Advocate of March 27, 2011 stated that Myrie failed to satisfy the concerns of immigration officials and was subsequently questioned by members of the RBPF’s Drug Squad Unit.

Senator Husbands (2011) contended that “wherever these cases of facilitating are discovered, regardless of what country the individual is coming from, whether it be a CARICOM country or an extra-regional country, that person is denied entry.” Senator McClean (2011) countered that “Myrie’s body was never searched, only her luggage.” However, Senator Husbands (2011) made a possible contradiction when he stated that “there was no record of Myrie being searched by either immigration or customs officers,” and that the Jamaican was a probable “victim of human trafficking.” Barbados’ legal team argued that it was against the combination of factors that Myrie came to Barbados for a covert and undisclosed reason. Hence, entry was denied to the Jamaican on those grounds. In fact, it was relayed to the local press that after three days of a full investigation by the Acting Chief Immigration Officer, “there is absolutely no truth ... that a female citizen of
[Jamaica] ... was body-searched by Immigration officers on arrival at the Grantley Adams International Airport” (Barbados Nation Newspaper, Sunday Sun, 2011). The next sub-section draws out additional facts that have, so far, emerged in the case proceedings. It focuses on the legal claims and arguments, followed by the counter-claims in the dispute.

8.3.3 Myrie, Barbados, and Jamaica: Legal Claims and Counter-Claims

This section puts into perspective the claims and counter-claims on the Myrie case. It addresses the legal factors in relation to the RTC. Myrie approached the CCJ in an effort to determine, under the RTC, the “minimum standard of treatment applicable” to CARICOM citizens moving within national jurisdictions of the region (Nation Newspaper, 2013). Myrie, in earlier submissions to the CCJ, provided sufficient evidence in the preliminary enquiries in which she tried to obtain leave to have the case adjudicated before the CCJ. There were conditions that had to be met for private parties to be able to access the court in its original jurisdiction.

Article 222 of the RTC was relied upon by Myrie. In April, 2012, the CCJ granted Myrie special leave of the court to commence proceedings against Barbados. According to a ruling in its preliminary findings, the CCJ held that Myrie’s application for special leave of the court “was supported, inter alia, by evidence demonstrating that, in accordance with Article 222(c) (ii) ... Jamaica had expressly agreed that she should herself bring her claim against Barbados in lieu of Jamaica espousing it on her behalf” (CCJ, 2012). The CCJ reported that Myrie filed the substantive case on May 17th, 2012, on the basis of a claim that “is

90 ARTICLE 222 – Locus Standi of Private Entities – of the RTC states that: Persons, natural or juridical, of a Contracting Party may, with the special leave of the Court, be allowed to appear as parties in proceedings before the Court where: the Court has determined in any particular case that this Treaty intended that a right or benefit conferred by or under this Treaty on a Contracting Party shall ensure to the benefit of such persons directly; and (b) the persons concerned have established that such persons have been prejudiced in respect of the enjoyment of the right or benefit mentioned in paragraph (a) of this Article; and (c) the Contracting Party entitled to espouse the claim in proceedings before the Court has: (i) omitted or declined to espouse the claim, or (ii) Expressly agreed that the persons concerned may espouse the claim instead of the Contracting Party so entitled; and (d) the Court has found that the interest of justice requires that the persons be allowed to espouse the claim.
rooted in an incident involving her and Barbadian customs and immigration officials” on March 14th and 15th, 2011 at GAIA (CCJ, 2012).

The following authorities in Barbados were implicated in the accusations: the RBPF; the Immigration Department; and the Barbados Customs and Excise Department. The CCJ indicated that Myrie believed the ‘object or purpose’ of the RTC was ‘frustrated and prejudiced’ by Barbados’s treatment towards her. The CCJ (2012) has indicated that Myrie's claim is “relief for serious injury, prejudice suffered and impairment of benefits in respect of enjoyment of her rights under the treaty, with specific reference to Articles 7, 8, 9, 28(1) and 45.” It was argued by Myrie’s team that the Jamaican national was subjected to ‘forceful brutish language’ on arrival into Barbados. Myrie’s attorney maintained that her client is ‘still unaware’ of what laws of Barbados she broke that would have resulted in her being refused entry into a CARICOM country which had signed onto the RTC and other declarations made by the CHOG. In the closing arguments of the substantive case, Myrie through attorney Michelle Brown and her defence team indicated that she was seeking relief from the CCJ for approximately $500,000 United States dollars in moral and punitive damages inclusive of special damages as well as legal costs for her team of two attorneys (Stabroek News, 2013). Myrie’s request for financial restitution was based on her claim to the court that “since the ordeal, she has been forced to endure emotional and other forms of distress” due to the injuries she bore on account of Barbados’ ill-treatment towards her at GAIA contrary to the RTC (CCJ, 2013).

Through the available legal means, Myrie (given the additional agency of her attorney) urged the CCJ to declare that Barbados breached the Jamaican's right to enter the country in pursuant of Article 45, 9, 12, 28, and 240 of the RTC and the 2007 CHOG decision on an automatic six month entry. Moreover, Myrie wished to have Barbados sanctioned for being subjected to inhumane treatment by immigration officials. Brown (2013) said that “the alleged body cavity search” conducted by Carrington, the female RBPF constable, “amounted to rape, resulting in Myrie experiencing post traumatic stress disorder and difficulty
sleeping.” From Barbados’ perspective, immigration officials denied Myrie entry into the country because she had not told the truth. The lead attorney presenting Barbados’ case, Roger Forde, in his closing summation to the CCJ, insisted that Myrie’s statement contained several inconsistencies and that there is no evidence to support her claim of discrimination.

Forde (2013) argued that “even though a CARICOM decision entitles them to a six-month stay,” the sovereign right of Barbados would indicate that “each national should have to continue to show that he or she is a desirable person, and would not be a charge to the public funds” before entry into Barbados. Thus, the actions undertaken to deny Myrie entry were permissible. The Queen’s Counsel (QC) admitted to the CCJ that people “had a right to stay in Barbados for six months” under the RTC “if they were able to pass the test to enter the country in the first place,” and Myrie did not succeed (Forde, 2013). Furthermore, Forde (2013) contended that the decision of the CHOG in 2007, “even if it is determined to be binding by the CCJ, cannot trump the ability of Barbados’ border officials to thoroughly determine the desirability of any CARICOM national seeking to enter the island.”

Indeed, Gladys Young (2013) representing CARICOM, in her submission to the CCJ, said that “on entry into any CARICOM country, Caribbean citizens would get an automatic six month stay … [but] the member state can refuse entry on the basis of undesirability or in order to prevent the person from becoming a drain on the public purse” (2013). Young (2013) explained that there was an omission in the fact that the term ‘undesirable’ was not defined in terms of the RTC, but “while there is no parameter … for assessing personal conduct, if it is found that there is a genuine, serious and sufficient threat, then the person may be refused entry.” Ambassador Carrington (2009) had previously suggested that the immigration officer is the first point of entry and the officer possesses the requisite “experience and knowledge about movement, and he or she operates on the basis of a legal legislative instrument.”
The Jamaican position was expressed by the country’s lead attorney. Kathy-Ann Brown (2013) argued before the CCJ that there is ample “evidence” which “presents a pattern of behaviour in relation to persons with a particular group characteristic – that being their Jamaican nationality.” Notwithstanding, statistical evidence submitted by both Jamaica and Barbados demonstrated a “persistent and relatively constant disparity,” over the period 2007-2012, and regarding the denial of entry of Jamaican nationals compared with nationals of almost all other CARICOM countries (CCJ, 2013). The proceedings exposed uncertain areas of law regarding the RTC, and practices addressing intra-CARICOM migration. PM Tilman Thomas (2011) had indicated when he was the Chairman of CARICOM that:

An automatic six-month stay for CARICOM nationals has been implemented by several member states; but it is not clear that it is being consistently applied by all. This is leading to confusion and perceptions of discriminatory treatment among Community citizens. Recent incidents underline the need for clarity in the degree of administrative discretion exercised by immigration officers; the grounds upon which automatic entry may be legally and reasonably denied; the right of Community nationals to be treated in a dignified and humane manner; and the right of appeal of Community nationals in cases of alleged unfair and inappropriate treatment.

Moreover, there were many things that emerged in the proceeding that indicated, there was divergence as to whether things such as ‘desirability’ and ‘public interest’ ought to be left for the national entities to decide. Judgement in this monumental case is forthcoming. Barbados may have to make trade-off given its immersion in regional political arrangements and the rules embodied in the RTC. The next section identifies the shift in Barbados’ approach and the dynamics that attracted reactions in the political sphere Barbados and CARICOM actors.

8.4 Shifts over Time: Political Reactions
The importance of the CCJ to the regulatory environment of the CARICOM security complex cannot be underestimated or miscalculated as suggested in the preceding sections. Clearly, the RTC became the national law for Barbados and the member states once it had successfully passed through the member states’
respective legislatures. However, the interpretation and application of the RTC remain fundamental aspects that are grounded in the mandate of the CCJ. PM Thompson (2009b) agrees that “the harmonisation of immigration policies” was a difficult achievement for the CARICOM member states but it still remained an ambition for Barbados. The extent that a harmonisation of several aspects of immigration policies and practices would materialise and work in the CARICOM security complex effectively meant that directions emerging from the CCJ would have greater significance in terms of standardisation.

Moreover, Barbados’ measures for screening CARICOM nationals seeking to enter the country became increasingly debateable and contestable among the regional and functional actors. This was so under the securitised condition that was created given the facts expressed in the two previous chapters which led to political exception. The implementation of extraordinary measures was an attempt to ‘safeguard’ Barbados’ threatened state and society. According to Wæver (1995: 76), “to act politically means to take responsibility for leaving an impact, for forcing things in one direction instead of another.” It was argued that Barbados had in fact operated well within its sovereign rights regarding its handling of CARICOM nationals and intra-regional migration; but based on the various forms of contention for which Barbados found itself entangled, and the securitised condition that materialised, perhaps assured Wæver’s position that “acting politically can, consequently, never be risk-free, and ‘progressiveness’ is never guaranteed by one’s political or philosophical attitude.” PM Thompson (2009b) specifically said that “Barbados has a right to pursue” the types of policies it sees as being necessary and he asserted that Barbados’ decisions regarding new immigration directives and actions represented “a sovereign matter which our [Barbados] Parliament and our policy directives base the objectives on,” for advancing the country and routing any perceived dangers to the state and society.

The Barbados leader’s affirmation rested on the fact that functional actors across CARICOM were “seeking to say something” that contradicted Barbados’ position, and it seemed apparent that the implications would eventually be “doing
more to damage the objectives of CARICOM than anything else” even if the state’s behaviour dispensed with aspects of customary practices and politics (2009b). Indeed, PM Thompson (2009k) suggested that misunderstanding may have arisen among regional actors because:

The issue as I understood it was how people are treated. That is what it boiled down to ... not how Barbados can cope with illegal immigration; nobody was interested in that. Nobody was interested in how my social services in this country will cope ... in the myriad other issues that we are facing as a country, how we can maintain the standard of living for immigrants who come here such that they are not exploited. Nobody is talking about that, they are talking about how people are collected and carried to the airport and asked to leave. ... Even [if] one person has had an infringement of their human rights it’s wrong, but taken against the background of the many other issues that we are facing in this country, how could that be the most compelling issue for people [in CARICOM] to be discussing with me?

Based upon the preceding sub-sections regarding alleged mistreatment and how Barbados’ approach affected intra-CARICOM migration, the political actions would equally bring profound implications for local and regional actors. The condition of a securitisation affected Barbados’ relationships in the regional security complex. Incidents and complaints that were consequential of the initial utterance by PM Thompson, and all things that occurred alongside the securitising moves, and more menacing, those things that happened during and after the Myrie 2011 problem, revealed that Guyanese, Jamaicans, and others from within CARICOM may have been denied entry by Barbados’ authorities on the basis of their nationalities, xenophobia, and/or other underlying attributes. Within Barbados, and this is outside the scope of strict treatment by immigration officials, traditional suspicions were often and pejoratively expressed about the immigrants countries’ of origin and the peoples of those societies. These complaints cannot be overlooked in the context of the regional affairs and

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91 In Chapter 6, it was established that the definitive speech act came about on May 5th, 2009 in a Ministerial Statement expressing that an amnesty would be granted to CARICOM nationals living ‘illegally’ in Barbados (See Section 6.1).
92 All of these phenomena were spelled out throughout Chapters 6 and 7.
agreements that are operational within CARICOM. PM Thomas (2011) gave a comprehensive appeal to CARICOM actors indicating that:

The experience of travelling and seeking work within the Community is what constitutes the meaning of CARICOM to the ordinary folk of our region. ... The difficulties experienced by some member states due to the impact of global economic conditions and pressures on their social services are well understood.

Therefore, the nature of several complaints that emerged under the securitised condition that was constructed in Barbados, singling out immigration practices and ‘new’ restrictive measures, demonstrate that the process of securitisation and its culmination in political exception would have created a domain of insecurity with far-reaching implications for the wider CARICOM security complex. For instance, Rickey Singh (2011) reported in a Trinidad Express column that “the wider issue of violations of ‘hassle-free’ intra-regional movement of Caribbean nationals in a number of jurisdictions continue to attract complaints with a few member states being accused of hostile and even degraded treatment of visiting nationals.” The regional agendas for the CHOG consistently and repeatedly, since 2009, have had to deal with the fall-out from the restrictive practices performed by individual nation-states, with Barbados often located at the centre of controversy. These things occurred despite the RTC required practices of facilitation as stated under Article 46.

Immigration ‘shiftiness’ by Barbados was already being contested by some regional actors, although one may argue that the friction was contained to the political domain. Since PM Thompson’s speech act that began the process of securitisation, Barbados’ actions attracted a greater sense of acrimony characterised by concentrated insider/outsider discourses. For instance, as a precursor, President Jagdeo opposed Barbados’ restrictive and ‘despicable’ approach towards the facilitation of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. Jagdeo (2008) stated that:

Most disturbing is not the issue of the denial of entry of CARICOM citizens at the various ports of entry of the Community, but the
humiliation suffered at the hands of some immigration officers at these ports. One of the tragic truths is that we treat foreigners [who are not CARICOM nationals] better than we treat our own people ... harassment of our citizens is unacceptable.

Comissiong (2011), in a statement to the press shared the PEP’s view that:

We can assert, without fear of contradiction, that the general attitude of our Immigration Department towards Caribbean and African migrants has undergone a substantial deterioration ... the change in Government that occurred in Barbados in January 2008 brought with it a drastic change in the official policy and attitude of the Barbados Government towards our Caribbean brothers and sisters.93

In effect, the controversies that arose through securitisation and the use of exceptional measures brought much uncertainty to the ROE, FMCN, and the project of intra-CARICOM migration. President Jagdeo may have been one of the first, but he was joined by several other leaders of government within CARICOM that spoke out about issues of inadequate facilitation or non-facilitation by Barbados. The facilitation of intra-CARICOM migration was seemingly embedded in arbitrary and discriminatory actions. PM Stephenson King (2009) reacted to the immigration problems affecting St. Lucians in intra-CARICOM migration by suggesting that “we have received complaints, and throughout the region there have always been complaints from St. Lucians who travel to other countries, whether it is to Trinidad & Tobago, Barbados or Antigua.” PM King (2009) added that “there are situations where St. Lucians complain of either harassment or being denied entry and are sent back home.” These changes and/or complaints could hardly be overlooked within the parameters of Barbados’ regional obligations and working with the treaty arrangements affecting all other member states that were provisioned under the RTC. Criticisms and general discourses on the CSME and intra-CARICOM migration became more pronounced. Singh (2011) contended that:

The traumatized Myrie … may well have done all CARICOM citizens a favour by going public with her experience; filing written complaints … [and] contrasts with numerous allegations by other claimed victims of

93 Italics reflect the original highlighting.
humiliating treatment, arbitrary detention and deportation from, for instance, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Antigua and Barbuda, who are generally short on specifics for the record, fearing denial of re-entry.94

The securitising moves undertaken by the Barbadian securitisers did not isolate the policy environment from that of an active and heightened political arena. Policies made possible by the securitisation of migration in Barbados were thus negatively affecting the CARICOM security complex. Phillips (2007: 167) contends that securitisation “is not only about the deployment of the rhetorical device of ‘security’ and the location of policy discourse within that framework, but also about the capacity thereby to achieve a disruption to the normal rules, practices and politics of policy-making,” as can be discerned by the evidence surrounding the Myrie case and those issues considered in the previous chapter. PM King (2009) reasoned, “Caribbean leaders must act on the concerns about impediments to travel in the region and put measures in place to arrest the problem.” The leader advised that while there are common goals and objectives among the CARICOM member states for integrated development, “we can’t, at this stage, begin to place doors at our ports of entry and begin to profile our nationals by saying [that] you are Guyanese, I am not going to allow you to come in” (King, 2009). Politically, it appears that Barbados’ claims to sovereign jurisdiction that is based on its sovereignty and the defence of its territorial space remain open to legal challenge under the CCJ, notwithstanding that with the securitised condition, Barbados would have used the “tool of securitization” because it seemed necessary (Wæver, 1995: 76). The next section examines the securitised condition in terms of the socio-cultural field of experiences.

8.5 Socio-Cultural Relations and Representations

This section briefly considers important socio-cultural factors that emerged in the context of what was happening in Barbados and that were also mentioned in evidence situated in the Myrie case. Amongst the alleged insults that Myrie claimed to have received, there was institutional reference to the ‘fact’ that Jamaican women came to Barbados in order ‘to steal’ Bajan men. This is a claim

94 Italics used here to stress the perpetuation and seriousness of these activities.
that has familiarly been linked to sociological factors in the region, and especially on matters linking socio-economic progress to social mobility and migration. In essence, the claim is rooted in identity politics through which local perceptions on gender issues are held in relation to Jamaican, Guyanese, and CARICOM nationals as immigrants. Therefore, this section examines the role of socio-cultural dynamics and the circulation of tensions through cultural representations. Emphasis is on the securitisation of migration, with additional focus on the representations that are made public and performed in popular calypso songs.

In Barbados and several CARICOM countries, calypso has become a significant part of the domestic climate and is manifested in cultural expression, social commentary, satirical story-telling, and other forms of resistance. In Barbados, *calypso* and *soca* are the featured genres of music in the popular annual *Crop-Over Festival* or *Kadooment* held in Barbados. Rao and Sedlaczek (2012: 318) propose that calypso songs address all “kinds of social and political issues such as crime, social injustice, questionable politicians and political programs, unemployment, relationships between men and women, and homosexuality.” Decouvelaere (2010) contends that “the use of calypso has significant implications for gender” in the Caribbean and it can demonstrate links between aesthetics and political dynamics. Assuming and accepting that the art form of calypso music is an ‘editorial’ reflecting ‘our way of life’ and that we can use or examine calypso songs for their content and context regarding social and political issues inclusive of relationships, present a useful point in this section. Intra-CARICOM migration also features in calypso expressions and popular representations. In the sub-section following, humour and social commentary were performed as means for communicating things such as cultural beliefs, identity and belonging, and the impact of rivalry in terms of cross-cultural gender relations.

### 8.5.1 Advice from a GT Girl: The Socio-Cultural Dimensions

This sub-section describes and discusses key socio-cultural dimensions on political identity; these were voiced within Barbados. A song that came to be
popular in Barbadian calypso, depicted the way that local and regional cultures can perceive relationships and attach importance to the politics of identity and migration. Nalini Sukhram used wit and lyrics to encourage Barbadian women to become aware of the harm and tensions that were being created regarding the way in which Guyanese and foreigner migrants, especially women, from within CARICOM were being represented in Barbados. The calypso, which came to be commonly called Advice from a GT Girl, was in essence, a response to the Barbadian audience and authorities as directed from a victim’s perspective – Indo-Guyanese, Jamaican, or any other CARICOM national – entering Barbados.

The threat constructions of the CARICOM national as a danger were central to securitisation in Barbados. In many respects, the song repeated things that became part of the national discourse. Suspicions and fears existed in the resident population among citizens and non-citizens of CARICOM origin; these were apparent within the local and regional politics. Advice from a GT Girl was written by MADD Entertainment Group of Barbados and sung by Nalini Sukhram, an Indo-Guyanese immigrant. The song addressed cultural identity issues and it depicted instances of gender, discrimination, and objectification found within Barbados. Sukhram (2009) said that the song sought to satisfy “an issue which needed to be addressed,” and counter the understanding held “by Barbadian women that Guyanese women were coming to Barbados and getting more attention from the [local] men.”

The song suggested that there were underlying prejudices and suspicions in Barbados and that the complaints of Barbadians on immigration matters may have been the polite face of deeper prejudices and xenophobic behaviours. The perception that Guyanese women set out to steal ‘Bajan’ men and disrupt the lives of Barbadian women and families was consistent with initial claims made by securitisers that the Guyanese are inherently dishonest and that they are prone to the habit of stealing. The lyrics of this calypso are reproduced, in full, because of the symbolic and metaphorical representations regarding the Guyana-Barbados

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95 Mark Russell’s claims and these can be put alongside the allegations made by Myrie of Jamaica.
factor. Connotations descriptive of the socio-cultural contexts and meanings on the diversity of identities, and on the differentiated claims are linked to the securitised environment in Barbados.

_I want all yuh Bajan gals, stop all o’ this complaining_
_How we Guyanese gals theifing all yuh husbands and yuh boyfriend_
_Bajan gal stop it right now, stop all de finger pointing_
_How we Guyanese gals theifing all yuh husbands and yuh men_
_Bees does find honey and ants does run to sugar_
_So don’t blame we if all yuh man like sugar from Guyana_
_If yuh wanta keep yuh man, darling take my good advice_
_Some o’ yuh Bajan gal must learn to treat a man nice._

_So yuh must learn to wine, like de Guyanese_
_Learn to grind like de Guyanese_
_Kiss him from toe to head and do all de thing de man like in bed_
_Kiss him all ova, make him scream and holla_
_Do things to mek he hair curl_
_And he ain’t go lef yuh for no Guyanese girl._

_Every night yuh rubbing down, that does turn off de fella_
_Bengies Balsam, citronella, candle grease and alcolada_
_Yuh sleep in a church dress, petticoat and two brassiere_
_Got de sheet pull up round yuh neck, and a big parachute underwear_
_And when de man he pull at you, yuh snap like alligator_
_Move man, leh muh sleep nuh, I gotta get up early tomorrow_
_And when he find a Guyanese girl to give him good movementation_
_Yuh get she deport, yuh run and call immigration._

_But yuh must learn to wine, like de Guyanese_
_Learn to grind like de Guyanese_
_Kiss him from head to toe and do all de thing de man like in bed_
_Put he pun de table, put ice-cream pun he nable_
_Do things mek de man holla_
_He ain’t gine want no girl from Guyana._

_De man wuk hard a whole day, stirring concrete and lifting bricks_
_Come home looking for a hot meal, you gi de man sardine and biscuits_
_Meanwhile at Rajeena she got roti and dhal puri_
_How you expect you gin keep a man, with cornbeef and macaroni_
_And when de man he wid he friends yuh quarreling and keeping noise_
_Yuh cuss him, gal yuh cuss him mek him shame in front o’ de boys_
_When yuh treat yuh fella so he gine find a new partner_
_A nice sexy girl like me from Guyana._

_Still yuh gonna learn to wine, like de Guyanese_
Learn to grind like de Guyanese
Kiss him from head to toe and do all de thing de man like in bed
Yuh must come out de bedroom, try something in the living room
Send de children at dem grandmother
And do things to mek de man bawl for murder.

Despite the popularity of the song, it entertained its share of criticism by those alarmed at the portrayal of immigrant CARICOM women set in subservient roles to Barbadian men. The song challenged – and was challenged – on the basis that the boldness of an Indo-Guyanese immigrant, legally abiding in Barbados, would issue advice to Barbadian women and articulate a critique of common biases based on gender, status, ethnicity, and national origin. Indeed, there was a calypso song that issued a reply to the *GT Lady*. The performer was ‘Thicky Sweet’ and the artist gave renditions of her self-penned *Keep Yuh Guyanese Wine* commonly referred to as *Bajan Reply to GT-Advice*, in which it was stated that “GT girl there is no contest ... keep yuh Guyanese wine” (Thicky Sweet, 2009). Barbados’ alleged treatment towards Guyanese, and to a lesser extent, CARICOM nationals introduced many issues that were expressed in public discourse.

Sukhram, socialised in the Indo-Guyanese culture, said that she was taught that women ought to “treat our men-folk good” (2009). But this appeal to cultural difference was problematic because it asserted that Hindu Indo-Guyanese have differing perceptions of gender relations than Judeo-Christian beliefs said to be held by Barbadians. Moreover, the stress on inherent difference and the impossibility of reconciling cultural differences were staples of the securitisation discourse. PM Thompson indicated that “ethnicity is always a big issue” and that he was “amazed that people bury their heads in the sand” (2009b). PM Thompson (2009b) admitted that there was “an undercurrent” in Barbados and the region, whereby there has been “seething resentment” to the Indo-Guyanese and to “mixed-marriages” that in many respects “needed attention” due to problems that ultimately came to afflict the local population in Barbados.

Both songs identified here suggested that the successful courting of a ‘Bajan’ man ought to be reified. The song’s lyrics illustrated that a Guyanese woman or other
CARICOM national is under constant threat because when a man finds “a Guyanese girl” to provide care and satisfy his needs, Barbdadian women tend to resort to lodging complaints with the Barbados immigration authorities in order to get the CARICOM nationals deported (Sukhram, 2009). Reference was also made to the fact that Barbadian women take offence to the presence and/or perceived interference of Guyanese and other Caribbean women. Beyond romantic suspicions, this hostility also reflected how the ‘GT’ woman and CARICOM national accepted that their attachments to Barbados were primarily material and economic, with the ‘real’ bonds of ‘belonging’ and ‘identity’ being found at home. Again, in attempting to contest the dominant discourse, this song also reinforced key assumptions about identity that made securitisation possible. Approximately a decade earlier, Gonsalves (1998: 69) suggested that:

Gonsalves (1998: 69) suggested that:

Guyanese visitors are, by and large, looked upon with grave suspicion by the immigration authorities of sister CARICOM countries; Americans and Canadians are welcomed with open arms in Barbados whilst St. Lucians and Vincentians are generally treated as unwanted strangers at the gate ... and Barbadians are caricatured as ‘smart men’ who must be watched closely at ports of entry and beyond. ... No ... form of union can truly survive these indignities and irrationalities. ... It has regrettably strengthened the impression in the minds of ordinary Caribbean folk that ‘this integration business’ is for the elite.

The figurative language and descriptive terms used by PM Gonsalves are demonstrative of the suspicions and insider/outsider politics playing out in Barbados, and in the CARICOM region. Sasse (2005: 674) argues that “migrants have significant implications for social cohesion and welfare,” and these are both at the level of the nation-state and the regional community. Barbados adopted a security-led approach to the management of CARICOM nationals living in Barbados. Cultural differences became exacerbated through securitisation. Prejudices, suspicions, and discrimination shaped the political and legal contexts of the securitised condition in Barbados.

The Guyanese, Jamaicans, and other CARICOM nationals immigrating into Barbados were perceived as dangers to be feared by the local population. The
suspicions, threats, and strategies for survival from Barbadians as well as the CARICOM nationals revealed that negative social attitudes regarding intra-CARICOM migration have become, in effect, part of the collective imagination for Barbadians and an identity of resistance for CARICOM nationals. Therefore one of the key findings of this chapter has been that cultural norms have been integral to the social construction of the securitised condition in Barbados. The next section provides a summary of the key aspects and implications of this finding.

8.6 Summary
The chapter detailed controversies that arose at Barbados’ border with respect to securitising migration. Disagreements arose in relation to Barbados’ claim that a sovereign right existed to determine those persons entering the country and that immigration officers could exclude CARICOM nationals on these grounds. In fact, the main observations made in the discussions revealed that:

- Barbados was slightly coy when claiming to operate within the existing regulatory framework;
- The forms of migration management made possible practices such as invasive bodily interventions; and
- Representations within popular culture were related to the types of profiling that occurred.

Amidst charges of discrimination at the border, the chapter provided a detailed account on the incident and subsequent court case involving Shanique Myrie. This litigation represents a landmark case for CARICOM as it was adjudicated by the CCJ, with the final judgement pending. The episode, and other complaints against Barbados, illustrated that the securitisation of migration had created other forms of insecurity within CARICOM for Barbados. It became clear that individual and group agency had impacts on subsequent interactions of other key actors, as well as being impactful on the policy environment through which the intra-regional politics played out. The securitising moves that were perpetrated by Barbados did not remove policy from political practice; and different forms of resistance (i.e. agency) to Barbados’ measures brought the legal and socio-cultural arenas into
contextual focus with the things happening. The next chapter concludes the thesis and lists the key factors that led to the securitisation of the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration. The significance of the research and possibilities for future study on the phenomenon of intra-CARICOM migration from a perspective of securitisation theory are provided.
Chapter 9

The Barbados Securitised Condition: Conclusions

9.1 Overview: Securitisation of Intra-CARICOM Migration in Barbados

Ivor Carryl has stated that CARICOM’s political leaders “have reaffirmed and confirmed” the spirit of moving towards the full FMCN collectively, yet he questions “how then can someone say that someone is *invading* their sovereignty” (Carryl, 2009)? It is clear from the developments presented in this thesis on Barbados’ operations within the CARICOM security complex that ‘moving towards the full FMCN’ has been hampered by specific actions and counter-reactions. Through the many interactions and discursive practices regarding the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados, representations, culture, interests (national preferences over community goals), and sovereignty have mattered to the politics of identity. These dynamics have then played major roles in securitisation in Barbados once the initial utterance on an amnesty was made by PM Thompson.

This securitised condition was ultimately characterised by specific actors (i.e. the Barbados Cabinet and others comprising the securitisers) determining through their interactions with the audience of Barbadian citizens that intra-CARICOM migration, and groups of CARICOM nationals, should be treated as an existential threat to Barbados. Thus it was deemed necessary to implement a plan of action, which would engage the citizens of Barbados. Several discourses such as referencing to the ‘burdens’ caused by the ‘influx’ and ‘illegality’ of CARICOM nationals; and discursive practices like enhanced monitoring and the ‘rounding-up’ of immigrant CARICOM nationals, settled into the policy domains administering and managing migration and other regional integration arrangements.

In effect, Barbadian citizens – the audience in this investigation – came to be aware of the threats posed by Guyanese and CARICOM nationals seeking to enter Barbados for work and/or residence. Alarmed by the possible disruptions and
dislocations to their everyday lives because of demographic and cultural changes said to arise from ‘large’ migrant populations living ‘illegally’ in Barbados, the audience subsequently gave their support to the political leaders and those repeating the alarms of danger. The prevailing threat perception was that intra-CARICOM migration would negatively affect the small and resource-limited country and people of Barbados. The audience, therefore, was willing to support the specific actions that state authorities used to remedy the imminent danger associated with Guyanese, CARICOM nationals, and their cross-border movements into Barbados. That is, even if such actions were circumventing ‘treaty’ arrangements, directives, procedural rules, or the Barbados Constitution and relevant national laws.

Once the support arrived from ‘patriotic’ Barbadians, Barbados’ political leaders and elites (i.e. key securitisers) used this popular legitimacy to act. The securitisers resorted to restrictive, prohibitive, and irregular policy initiatives akin to enhanced screening of CARICOM nationals inclusive of the implementation of fingerprinting on entry and exit, and invested in new amnesty arrangements specifically for CARICOM nationals. In addition, the amnesty timelines were preempted by emergency measures such as deportation and expulsion of those CARICOM nationals already living undocumented or irregularly in Barbados. These were the persons that the securitising actors described as ‘illegal’ immigrants. These policies were undertaken in order to safeguard against a migration/immigration problem that was both formally and informally assessed to be typified by large ‘waves’ and ‘influxes’ of foreigners. These foreigners were all CARICOM nationals said to be affecting Barbados. In sum, Barbados’ defence and control of its borders and society, against a CARICOM-propelled migrant invasion, ensured that the state officials could present the exceptional measures as necessary and justifiable actions under the prevailing circumstances since, in essence, Barbados had effectively securitised intra-CARICOM migration.

Barbados’ securitisers, aided by the local audience, had determined that state and society were placed in positions wherein the country could no longer open its
doors to any and every CARICOM national seeking entry. This understanding of the environment meant that the state was inclined to advance and implement a format of exceptional politics. The extraordinary nature of Barbados’ subsequent performances came to be labelled and defined by other CARICOM actors as acts of discrimination, harassment, and ill-treatment against Guyanese and citizens of the participating member states. This thesis argued that these behaviours and the measures utilised by Barbados were outside the normal routine of customary practice and everyday politics. The sentiments emerging from Guyana, and elsewhere in CARICOM, including the so-called ‘anti-Barbadians’ that were living in Barbados, charged that Barbados was acting contrary to the spirit of regionalism. President Jagdeo (2009) referred to the behaviour as being ‘un-CARICOM’ given that PM Thompson’s DLP administration had appeared to reverse gains achieved under the previous administration.

This concluding chapter returns to the key aim of the thesis: to demonstrate how the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration became possible in Barbados. Given that Barbados and CARICOM commonly refer to a shared historical legacy of colonialism, the treaty arrangements and collective goals for integrated development have been tied together by the multiple and disparate actors and events shaping the CARICOM project for more than a quarter of a century. Thus, it is essential to reiterate the central arguments made and the approach used to analyse the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. Section 9.2 will outline the most important and specific arguments that brought this thesis together. Section 9.3 will explain the significance of the findings and discuss the implications for Barbados. Section 9.4 will discuss the applicability and appropriateness of the paired concepts/theories of securitisation and social constructivism to security and migration. It will be argued that the research design provided a robust account of the securitisation of migration in Barbados and CARICOM; in fact, this is the first time that the application of a combined theoretical approach using social constructivism and securitisation theory appears in the context or location of Barbados and the CARICOM region.
The section will, additionally, restate the emergent issues as they relate to the specific nexus of security and migration. It provides ideas on the future of migration management/control in Barbados and CARICOM. In this way, the contention that Barbados may have negatively affected the ‘spirit of regional community’ in CARICOM is linked to the future directions for policy harmonisation and the deepening of CARICOM’s regional integration project. In concluding the thesis, Section 9.5 will outline and briefly discuss some key areas for future research that have been opened by this investigation. The final task will be to indicate this thesis’ fit into, international relations, specifically security and migration studies. The final remarks will focus on reemphasising the thesis’ original contribution to knowledge in the social sciences, that is, the application of relatively non-traditional theoretical perspectives to Barbados and the CARICOM region. The following section now discusses the approach and the core argument advanced throughout the thesis.

9.2 The Central Approach and Argument

This section provides a recap of the central approach and main argument regarding security and migration in this thesis. Together social constructivism and securitisation theory were applied to the issue of migration politics. From the outset, the examination of international migration occurring within the context of a regional setting – as viewed through security lenses – is understood as a complex phenomenon with economic, political, and cultural dimensions. This thesis sought to provide a security reading of intra-CARICOM migration through a case study of Barbados. As stated, the key aim was to examine and reveal meanings that explained how the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration came to be securitised in Barbados. Furthermore, the thesis revealed important particularities of this case in comparison to other regional studies that have been undertaken, especially from a securitisation perspective:

1. The post-colonial setting is a featured dynamic in the context of CARICOM. It emerges that one of the dilemmas facing Barbados is the maintenance of an old order of values which includes an obsession-like affinity to national uniqueness in contradistinction to other former colonies in the Caribbean.
Indeed, the cultural transformations being evidenced appear to be direct results of new formalities attempting to regulate and manage the process of intra-CARICOM migration.

2. The immigration flow between Barbados and other CARICOM states is numerically small compared for example with the UK and its share of EU migrants. Whereas in Barbados the annual migrant population is kept to hundreds, in the UK the figures reflect millions.

3. The politics of race and ethnicity presents an entirely different challenge for Barbados than it does between the USA and Mexico, or between those existing among EU countries regarding its treatment to freedom of movement. As stated in Chapter 4 of this thesis, the major racial/ethnic divides centre on the Afro-Caribbean and the Indo-Caribbean identities. In Barbados, and these CARICOM member states, while there are laws against discrimination based on race and ethnicity as in the developed world, there is no strict enforcement of such laws in the region. Linked to the post-colonial frame of analysis is the view that racial/ethnic differentiation is a problem for Barbados on the grounds of the politics of intra-CARICOM migration.

Within this context, social constructivism and the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitisation were deployed. At the heart of social constructivism in this thesis, and similar to arguments made by Thomas Christiansen and others, there is a determination to “stress the impact of ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘social context’ on the continuing process” of intra-CARICOM migration and regional integration (1999: 528). Meanwhile, the key ingredients in the assessment of the securitisation process as applied in the inquiry are the components of a “successful speech act,” inclusive of identifying the issue and setting the agenda (Stritzel, 2007: 358-360).

Securitising actors and the audience became the foundation for understanding the securitisation process for the FMCN and general intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. Beginning in Chapter 1, a background of the problematic issue of intra-CARICOM migration was provided in light of other moves towards deepening regional integration. This chapter also illustrated the regulatory framework and treaty arrangements. Colonial and immediate post-colonial histories were also shown to be important for understanding contemporary events and circumstances.
In the early stages of the investigation, it was made clear that while contentions and rivalry are not new phenomena for the independent and sovereign CARICOM nation-states, social, economic, cultural, political, geographical, sociological, and legal factors all help to determine the progress of the regional integration project. The results of actions that are supposed to be pursuant to the intended goals of Barbados and the CARICOM member states are interconnected. To this end, the regulatory regime was analysed especially regarding the relevant Articles contained in the RTC. Indeed, as the thesis progressed, it was clear that Article 45 of the RTC was important for signatory member states. While Barbados saw Article 45 as an ideal and felt justified in moving away from the declared obligation when it saw it fit to do so, other regional actors were more determined to take the ideal to a point of realisation.

Chapter 1 also emphasised that the people of the Caribbean region tended to utilise intra-regional migration as a route toward better opportunities and circumstances. Moreover, Barbados itself was a central plank from which migration activities in the form of slavery and trans-shipment positioned the country into the commercialised mainstream of international migration during slavery and colonialism. In that regard, it is reasonable to assume that for several hundred years, both inward (i.e. intra-regional) and outward (i.e. extra-regional) migration were practices that had been encouraged and facilitated. International migration, and in this sense, intra-regional migration provided Barbados pecuniary benefits and notoriety as the transition was made from involuntary to voluntary forms of migration.

In Chapter 2, it was argued that knowledge about security involves factors that tend to be overlooked by the realist paradigm and orthodox theories of international relations. This thesis acknowledged that theoretically, realism was a standard by which to engage knowledge on security although realism was a static and state-centric view of an international system characterised by anarchy. Realism does not prioritise the areas that a critical approach such as social constructivism would with its emphasis on inter-subjective factors which bring to
international politics means for explaining congruence in the domestic and international realms of politics. By implication, the idea of non-traditional perspectives on security connotes considerations for entities other than states in international relations. In this sense, a theory of social constructivism opened the door for examining the discourses, social facts, and contextual meanings regarding Barbados’ security and intra-CARICOM migration nexus.

In Chapter 3, the discussions were expanded particularly with the discussions focussed on social constructivism and in particular on securitisation theory as a mode of explanation that is applicable to this instrumental case study on Barbados. The focus was on determining the factors that brought a regional grouping of states together through integration, but simultaneously rendered the states and societies capable of being fractured through the socio-cultural and discursive articulation of fear and danger. Theoretically, it was established in the chapter on securitisation theory that discourse shapes power-relations; metaphorical language for example could be used to direct or influence public sentiments towards intra-CARICOM migration. An identified security issue was said to be threatening Barbados; not just in terms of the state but similarly so for society. The securitising actors relied upon the aesthetics of social and cultural attributes in order to suggest that the cultural integrity, national labour market, and state autonomy of Barbados were threatened by intra-CARICOM migration phenomenon. Hence, a reading of security built on the Copenhagen School’s framework of analysis was provided. In terms of the methodology, the latter sections of Chapter 3 advanced ample and pragmatic reasons for selecting Barbados as the instrumental case study. The research framework was built on the basis of a qualitative design that utilised discourse analysis on a corpus of documentary literature and elite interviews. This ensured that there was a means for examining, analysing, and explaining the contextual meanings and social facts within the prevailing political climate in Barbados.

It was drawing on inter-subjective understandings that positioned the research design to be able to reveal assertions that were being made by Barbadian and
regional actors. International migration was defined and was shown to be an activity replete with issues and controversies that prevail theoretically across social science disciplines and actual real sectors. The literature revealed that there is a vastness of actors, interests, and concerns affecting and challenging states and societies, both domestically and internationally. The key arguments established in Chapter 4 were that:

- In the context of CARICOM, voluntary migration for economic reasons was primary and the preferred option for CARICOM nationals either as long-term settlement or as a gateway to the developed world;
- Xenophobia, while not peculiar to one group of actors such as Barbadians, was intense in Barbados, especially regarding the Indo-Guyanese. Xenocentricism became an issue for Barbados in light of practices of institutional discrimination;
- The policy arena of international migration has profound impacts on states, societies, and individuals;
- Factors inclusive of liberalisation, and the classification of migrant workers (e.g. highly skilled and low-skilled) are considerations juxtaposed to the availability of resources and distribution in an economy;
- International migration invariably is about the politics of belonging and identity as well as the politics of inclusion and exclusion.

It is precisely the highlighted factors of identity, inclusion and exclusion that were discussed in Chapter 5. The characterisations of the key actors, namely Barbados and Guyanese, by self and others revealed the social constructions that underpinned Barbadian and Caribbean identities. It was historically illustrated that there were suspicions, resentments, and impressions factoring in intra-regional affairs. Barbados possessed ‘sensitive upper classes’ that traditionally opposed Barbados’ lead role in Caribbean regionalism. This feature would shape the securitisation process regarding the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration. From an inter-subjective reading of securitisation, evidence was provided that compared the ways that Caribbean actors represented and misrepresented the identities and interests of each other – through subjectification and objectification – from one era to another. Insular discourses strongly undergirded those things said and done in the contemporary period among the CARICOM states and societies. As such, insularity became a tool of the national
political party in Barbados, and it was especially important given the politics of identity, security and migration.

Also, Chapter 5 highlighted the key institutional actors and institutions involved in the CSME, CARICOM, and the national arenas. The institutional structures of governance were used to draw linkages showing that the legal and regulatory environment in Barbados and the member states were well advanced through the RTC but lacked sufficient harmonisation within the contexts of the individual member states. This conclusion was determined on the basis of norms, procedures, and the various practices inclusive of slow, low, or non-implementation of policies agreed upon by the CHOG. It was shown, despite the consensual arrangements attuned to the CHOG and the overall RTC, national states were sometimes guilty of contradictory statements and practices regarding the very operational aspects of CSME, intra-CARICOM migration regime, and objectives for deepening regional integration. Indeed, the CCJ was intended – and was slowly becoming pivotal – for the governance of regional integration given its mandate for the interpretation and application of the RTC.

In Chapter 6, the empirical discussions began with a presentation of the key speech act that was made by PM Thompson in the Barbados House of Assembly extending the grant of amnesty to CARICOM nationals that were already living in Barbados for a specifics period but their statuses had lapsed into one of being undocumented. The key actors were explained and given prominence regarding the roles that they actually performed in the social construction of danger. Moreover, details on the surrounding discourses that emerged from the various grouping of securitisers were revealed. These discourses and discursive practices demonstrated the shaping of issue of intra-CARICOM migration in a security context. CARICOM nationals had successfully been determined to be threats and dangers for the Barbados state and society.

The security framing took place as part of a broader set of initiatives that are called securitising moves; it was through the utility of language and interactions
that cultural otherness and other forms of differentiation in the politics of identity were used to gain support from the Barbadian audience. The audience, in effect, accepted that CARICOM nationals were a definite danger to Barbados and gave the legitimacy to the securitisers to act to protect the referents of the state and society. Analytically, it becomes lucid that Roe (2007: 633) would assert that “the stage of identification” that is defined by threat construction, “is a fundamental part of the securitization process (rhetorical securitization), [and] the success or failure of security policy (active securitization) rests firmly in the stage of mobilization.” PM Thompson and the Cabinet of Barbados had effectively brought about a sense of insecurity to prevail in Barbados as well as in the politics across the CARICOM security complex.

Chapter 7 proceeded along the course that was opened up by the securitising moves to examine the specific measures that brought about political exception in Barbados. Opened for discussions were the practical examples of the guest worker and managed migration programme, raids and deportations by immigration officials, and fingerprinting at the GAIA as measures that were either initiated or fully implemented in Barbados that tended to break free of existing rules. These developments brought consternation to some locals and to several CARICOM actors. Perhaps more so, arriving and departing CARICOM nationals saw themselves as targets of Barbados’ institutionalised intolerance to the national citizens of CARICOM member states.

The analysis examined and explained the allegations of mistreatment; and Barbados’ defences inclusive of proposals contained in the Green Paper with definitive moves towards a managed migration policy. The chapter showed that the intra-CARICOM migration project had past the stage of politicisation and exceptional politics brought various contentions into the framework especially regarding Barbados’ approach or withdrawal regarding the spirit of CARICOM. Intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados had reached a stage of a ‘successful’ securitised condition on the basis that the very security mechanisms that were introduced since the speech act for protecting Barbados, such as profiling of
CARICOM nationals, fingerprinting, and invasive body searches at ports of entry were attracting external resistance and entertained legal recourse. These phenomena, both political and legal, were unsettling to the internal dynamics of Barbados’ state and societal security. In that sense, the discourses were critical to the follow-up actions and reactions that spilled over from Barbados into the wider CARICOM security complex.

Chapter 8 showed the reactions of the multiple actors inclusive of Barbados’ securitisers, CARICOM actors, and functional actors. The reactions were identifiably projected in the legal, political, and socio-cultural realms. Against that consideration, this chapter examined Barbados’ interpretation of the automatic six-month rule of entry for CARICOM nationals; the landmark case involving Shanique Myrie that was being adjudicated before the CCJ; the political responsibility of the executive and the political demands that would envisage forms of policy harmonisation; and socio-culturally, how Barbadians and CARICOM nationals impressed upon and interacted with each other which may not have tended towards deepening regional integration. There would be implications for the future of the intra-regional migration movement, especially as the CCJ would have the final say in determining rules of entry and questions over discrimination that emerged in the contexts of the migration politics. Barbados may have overly relied on its sovereignty claims when in fact treaty and international laws were impactful and held within the grasp of the CCJ. There are likely to be continuing difficulties, and the entrenching of disagreements among the member states. Compromise and cooperation are now seemingly deficient under the CSME and movement towards deepening CARICOM’s integration. The next section addresses the significance of the findings.

9.3 The Significance of the Findings

The findings of this thesis demonstrate that securitisation theory is appropriate to study and examine many aspects of the cultural, socio-political, and legal phenomena impacting on Barbados and the territorial entities comprising the CARICOM security complex. There was emphasis on the discourses and how
these come to materialise in the interactions between the local securitisers and audience in Barbados. The interactions between the local securitisers and the external and/or functional actors also led to discursive situations of intense tension regarding the complex issues daunting intra-CARICOM migration. Therefore, this thesis makes the following original contribution(s) to knowledge regarding the political affairs occurring in Barbados, and in CARICOM with respect to migration. The inquiry showed how these phenomena are shaped by issues of identity and personifications of the ‘outsider’ which do not connote with the sense of Caribbean unity that the political leaders attempt to portray in shaping the politics of deepening regional integration.

The fact that animosities can be found at the national level in Barbados in the government and opposition, and that the majority of the audience (i.e., the general public) accepts nationalistic discourses, means that the political climate is conducive to anti-immigrant discourses. This was evidenced in Barbados as the DLP administration came to power and began implementing strategies that it had earlier thrown into the public domain while in opposition to the then BLP government. The significance of this turn of events, demonstrated that political leadership, as has emerged in Barbados under a usually combative Westminster style of government, forms part of the structural conditions which play into the domain of regional policy and administrative affairs.

On the actual processes shaping and administering the FMCN and intra-CARICOM migration, it was demonstrated that information deficits do exist between the securitisers and audience. This view was supported by CARICOM Secretary-General Carrington, Norman Girvan, and other functional actors. There is said to be a lack of accurate data to inform ordinary people comprising the audience in Barbados. The lack of accurate data therefore, becomes part of the strategy used by securitisers for gaining the legitimacy and support of audiences by securitisers so that state officials could go beyond the normal bounds of accepted practices.
Another value of securitisation theory is the consideration it gives to the presence of culture, contexts, and norms operating inside societies, institutions, and states. All contribute to the specific situations in which the rules and implemented preferences of exception differentiate between those on the inside and outside of Barbados. Attention given in the thesis to Barbados’ rally around ‘home drums’ and ‘100 Percent Bajan’ substantiates the idea that subjectification and objectification are instrumental in distinguishing those belonging to the Barbados political community in contrast to those whose are deemed to be foreigners. National citizenship is tied to the particular territory rather than to a region or community arrangements in CARICOM. The issuing of CARICOM passports did little to enhance the standing of a CARICOM national by virtue of expressing a regional citizenship. The next subsection considers the implications that have emerged as a consequence of the examination of the securitisation process alongside the given factors of intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados.

9.4 Security and Migration: Implications for Future Management/Control
According to Wæver (2011: 469), an additional benefit of using securitisation theory is that it “fosters critical attention to the costs of securitization but allows for the possibility that securitization might help society to deal with important challenges through focusing and mobilizing attention and resources.” In this regard, this thesis was able to addresses issues and concerns that demonstrate how securitisation can produce insecurity, even for those who are supposedly being protected from a threat once particular emergency measures are introduced. CARICOM nationals, including Guyanese and Jamaicans, saw Barbados as a country offering opportunity by the country’s overall mark regarding socio-economic indicators and openings in labour markets. It was seen that immigrants are unlikely to be negatively impacted by constraints that may affect a receiving country. Rather, as was the case with CARICOM nationals, they will respond and can so ignite transnational and cross-border spheres of activities on the manner in which they are perceived and ultimately treated by host nations. What is the potential hazard for the Barbados and CARICOM actors; and are Barbados’ referents protected?
In fact, one may deduce from this thesis that along similar lines as the securitising of intra-CARICOM migration, a reversal is possible even if less probable in the absence of facilitating conditions. Jutila (2006: 181) considers that “people inside the ‘us’ are in most cases better positioned to start new ontological narratives about who ‘we’ are” thus making the inside discursively inclusive. As Huysmans (2006a: 125) argues, securitisation theory allows the researcher to “frame insecurity,” the logical opposite of security, “in a knowledge that draws on alternative understandings of the political.” However, in reaching a point of safety and protection requires logic beyond the dialectic of security/insecurity but “this is not always the case” (Jutila, 2006: 181). Wæver (1995: 61) speaks about “the security mechanism” and this would likely be inclusive of the facilitating conditions losing the “internal functioning;” and thus would make it “extremely difficult to argue for any acts or policies” in calling for national security in Barbados. This meaningful phase can be called a zone of de-securitisation or de-politicisation and it can become practical to those that had previously been categorised as securitising actors but in terms of political willingness to be inclusive as Jutila has suggested.

There may be nothing odd or peculiar about Barbados’ discursive sentiments regarding the flows of neighbouring people into its jurisdiction for work and residence. These things often are happening in other regionalising areas in the world. However, the capacity to see the political in alternative terms raises questions as to whether Barbados and indeed CARICOM have taken into consideration the history of movement and traditional migration patterns that have been etched out among Caribbean peoples. If the technocrats and architects of Caribbean regionalism and the FMCN and ROE have not done so, how could one reasonably expect that old rivalries and suspicions would not continuously threaten the very institution of CARICOM and regional political belonging? Answering these questions may not have been the priority for this thesis, but these queries have revealed insights as by-products of the analysis that has been undertaken.
Accepting that securitisation is influenced largely by the initial utterance of security and subsequent strategic actions that follow, means that the reverse of a securitised condition is possible using similar elements: culture, norms, values, ideas, and appeals to practicality. For some in the Copenhagen School, this commences a process of de-securitisation. In other words, it means removing intra-CARICOM migration from a security domain and returning the problem to a sphere of discussion and negotiation with the expectation of achieving a political outcome in a less volatile political sphere. Already CARICOM has the foundational mechanisms to adequately deal with the issues that emerged with intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados. There has to be policy harmonisation instituted not on the basis of power dynamics or citizenship ties, but on the fundamentals of understanding and applying the regional cultural and social histories to contemporary circumstances. This should see the reduction of combative and acrimonious relations among the member states. Respect for human rights and dignity would force states to give way to the regulatory stipulations provided for in the RTC, and that can be adjudged under the mandate of the CCJ.

Ruling politicians tend not to be experts in the field of governance, and many more are perhaps less attuned to the language of diplomacy. On the sensitive issues that accompany international migration, Barbados and CARICOM ought to seek to address through enhanced cross-border training and deployment, a cadre of competent regional immigration officers capable of interpreting and deciding on entry and exit based on standard best practices. In other words, there need to be greater collaboration between and among the various actors and institutions seeking to administer, manage, and control the national borders. In light of the relative degree to which states cannot be sanctioned for the non-implementation of agreed policies, there needs to be the institutional capacity within CARICOM or its Secretariat to ensure that state entities adhere to the provisions they agree upon. Failures in enforcement account for some of the misunderstandings that have been allowed to fester.
While Barbados is a guilty party here, the more general problem can be found throughout the CARICOM member states. The complexity of international migration demands that apart from recourse through the CCJ, which is an expensive undertaking for litigants, action should be swift in creating a regional body that will act independently of the political directorate. This body should be established and be given the power to review decisions such as deportations and expulsions. The mandate should be exercised with a full public disclosure (i.e. regional) regarding intra-regional complaints and arbitrary actions pursued by national authorities. The next section contemplates on possible avenues and perhaps closely related issues for future research.

9.5 Prospects for Future Research

This thesis was the first of its kind to examine the FMCN, ROE, and intra-CARICOM migration from the perspective of the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory, and thus makes an original contribution to literature on CARICOM affairs. In the contexts of the inter-subjective dimensions that are characterising the policy and political environments in Barbados and the CARICOM security complex, insight was provided into the meanings of social actions and practices undertaken by a plethora of differentiated actors. These actors were namely, the securitisers in Barbados and by extension those securitisers across CARICOM, as well as the local audience in Barbados, the affected CARICOM nationals, and the functional actors. An area for further examination is “whether an audience accepts the speech act of security” in recognition that “those speaking security” have come to rely upon “an audience agreeing with them or not” (Huysmans 2011: 373). While some evidence was provided to demonstrate public support for securitisation in this case study, future research should consider the voice of the audience in more detail.

Additionally, it would be useful to have the insights of skilled and unskilled CARICOM migrants that are living and working in Barbados. These two groups have not been adequately represented in this thesis, except via the more formal and institutional discourses presented in the data and analyses. There is also scope
for conducting similar studies in other CARICOM jurisdictions in order to get a better sense and comparative analysis of the myriad dynamics underpinning intra-CARICOM migration. To this end, this thesis proposes a study on St. Kitts/Jamaica given that there appears to be a recent history of misunderstandings surfacing between these two states. The success of such a study would be reliant on key data being made available. This may prove difficult, especially from the institutions having to consider whether the release of immigration statistics and sensitive data is likely to present risks for national security or the undermining of community protocols.

Against the background of Barbados' political economy, and the broader CARICOM goals of striving towards a single market and single economy, there are questions that prompt future research. Importantly, the securitising process gained momentum at a time that Barbados and CARICOM member states faced a severe economic downturn; it is at best conjectural but may be appreciated if future research can provide further insights on the causal factors associated with the macro-economy, integrated development, and intra-regional migration. The felicity conditions for securitisation may have been present, but would these conditions have been perceived differently for integrated development under more favourable national and regional economic circumstances?

Accepting that intra-regional migration was one of the key mechanisms being used for deepening regional integration and achieving integrated development, further investigations ought to be directed towards finding out the role that happenstance contributed to the process of securitisation. Were the felicity conditions as contextual and dynamic as several of the important characteristics such as national identities and perceived interests in the construction of securitising moves or in terms of resistance to such moves? Securitisers were able to draw on socio-cultural factors and national symbolisms in achieving and galvanising shared national perspectives and support regarding the dangers facing Barbados.
Similarly, localised symbols, even in the context of cross-border and transnational spaces were able to be used by the immigrant CARICOM national as well as by functional actors in order to embark upon activities of resistance and protests. One can therefore envisage a need for further examination on the construction of securitising moves that involve specific and contextual socio-cultural traits and norms. Did the multiple actors use socio-cultural dynamics for the purposes of convenience; and if so, how much more can similar socio-cultural dynamics be used in a process of de-securitisation?

Through this thesis, there is now a platform for exploring the construction of securitising moves and linkages with political concepts such as sovereignty and nationalism. Vuori (2011: 21) asserts that what securitisation theory brings to analysis “is the means to identify something as a securitisation move or as the maintenance of a security discourse;” and further “textual analysis of securitisation has to then be related to the political context, where theories of politics and models of political orders become relevant as well as the capabilities and capacities of both agents and structures,” so that these can be compared. Given CARICOM's fitting classification of being a regional grouping of small developing states, future research can be uniquely revealing as to provide insightful and comparative analyses on the construction of securitising moves in developing countries/regions in contradistinction to advanced countries/regions.

The postcolonial moorings together with an interdisciplinary approach showed that the securitisation of intra-CARICOM migration became possible due to the felicity conditions that emerged over time in Barbados. This investigation demonstrated that three distinct groups - securitisers, audience, and functional actors - had socially constructed the securitised condition that materialised in Barbados. A combination of historical factors, prevailing economic conditions, cultural practices, and underlying socio-political behaviours by the actors brought intra-CARICOM migration into the situation of hindering progress in terms of integrated development and deepening regional integration. The security-migration issues that were pulled together for analytical and explanatory
purposes, illustrated the contextual and, in some cases, the peculiar nature of political affairs in Barbados and CARICOM. The evidential data on intra-CARICOM migration in Barbados, and the specific contests unique to Barbados and CARICOM amplify the originality of the thesis.
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