Hans J. Morgenthau, the “marginal man” in International Relations.
A “Weltanschauungsanalyse”

Thesis submitted by

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‘Exactly the same life all-over again, only different’ – Fernando Pessoa

‘Be a stout soldier, a faithful guardian, and an incorruptible judge; if summoned to bear witness in some dubious and uncertain cause, though Phalaris himself should bring up his bull and dictate to you a perjury, count it the greatest of all sins to prefer life to honour, and to lose, for the sake of living, all that makes life worth having. The man who merits death is already dead, though he dine off a hundred Lucrine oysters, and bathe in a whole cauldron of Cosmus' essences’ – Juvenal
Abstract

This thesis about the German-American political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau investigates in the development of his Weltanschauung. It grew out of a discomfort with structuralist and post-structuralist interpretations of Morgenthau’s thought which are distorted, curtate, and/or selective. This Weltanschauungsanalyse contributes to the understanding of Morgenthau and his oeuvre in three distinctive ways and negotiates hitherto existing shortcomings. First, it provides a panoptic rather than selective reading by considering all of Morgenthau’s major published and unpublished writings. It is, second, unifying rather than segregative in the sense that it reflects all aspects of Morgenthau’s thought and sets it into relation with each other. Finally, it is inclusive rather than exclusive meaning that the contexts in which Morgenthau developed his Weltanschauung are considered.

This Weltanschauungsanalyse accentuates three dimensions in Morgenthau’s thought which are of relevance for contemporary theorising in International Relations. First, Morgenthau promoted a normative concept of power which is not to be confounded with violence, but to be considered as a group-dynamic element enabling to actively create a socio-political life world. Second, Morgenthau was one of the first IR-scholars to emphasise the conditionality of knowledge and political order, which makes his Weltanschauung a rich source for arguing that socio-political life is constructed and reason is limited as it enables to question “grand theories”. Finally, studying Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung concedes an important societal role to scholarship in the sense of disidence. It is a sceptical appraisal of the socio-political status quo while being committed to a humanist normativity.

To achieve this contribution to the current discourse on Morgenthau and elucidate his relevance for contemporary International Relations, this thesis applies Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of field and habitus. It proceeds by, first, elaborating the field of Continental
European intellectuals of the late 19th and early 20th centuries in which Morgenthau’s thought was formed. Based upon its findings it is possible to dissect Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung into its constitutive parts: ontology, epistemology, and political agency. Material for this analysis was procured in the Library of Congress, the Bodleian Library, the Hoover Institution, the Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève, and the Archive for Christian-Democratic Policy of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
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Chapter 1. Hans Morgenthau, International Relations, and Weltanschauung

The following study about the German-American scholar of International Relations, Hans J. Morgenthau, and his comprehensive oeuvre presents what can be called a “Weltanschauungsanalyse” (Karl Mannheim) which exceeds common Morgenthau-interpretations in three ways. First, this study will refute mainstream interpretations of Morgenthau within the discipline of International Relations from neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Second, it will also contradict core assumptions about his political thought as we find them in many post-structuralist writings and, finally, supplement individual recent though selective studies from critical normative scholarship about Morgenthau and his political thought. A Weltanschauungsanalyse in contrast provides three advantages. It is panoptic rather than selective since all of Morgenthau’s creative periods are considered, unifying rather than segregative since it reflects on all aspects of Morgenthau’s thought in relation to each other, and inclusive rather than exclusive since it studies all major aspects of Morgenthau’s thought by putting it into perspective. Only this comprehensiveness allows for reflecting on the relevance Morgenthau’s oeuvre has for contemporary International Relations as the relation, scope, and depth of his thought are disclosed. Thereby, this study shall promote the argument that the philosophical commitments which we find in Morgenthau’s oeuvre and which we can identify through a Weltanschauungsanalyse normatively speaking allow us a more appropriate understanding of politics than structuralist and/or post-structuralist theorising. This normativity is to be seen in Morgenthau’s analytical focus on the human being and the anthropological condition of politics rather than on structures as it is to be found affirmatively in structural and deprecatingly in post-structuralist approaches to International Relations. This
will enable the student of international politics to consider spontaneous elements of human life and thereby examine the causes and consequences of certain actions and policies in international politics more comprehensively than approaches concentrating on a particular structure since the individual interests of the involved parties are paid tribute and can be emphasised.

Putting the focus on the human being is a reflection of an encounter of two different cultures. Morgenthau received his intellectual socialisation in Continental European humanities of the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries. Its discourses made a lasting impression on him, but he made his career in the United States in the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. Despite his enormous academic success, Morgenthau remained a “marginal man” (Robert E. Park) and it was not until recently that his oeuvre received a more nuanced analysis than early structuralist attempts. Consequently, his Continental European intellectual socialisation is getting more and more into the spotlight. Stressing that Morgenthau offers a different approach to international politics demonstrates that he eventually did not succeed as a cultural broker and subsequently failed to set the agenda for the discipline of International Relations as structuralist approaches became the ruling dogma during the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. Furthermore, it was not before his death in 1980 that post-structuralism became more prominent in international politics, but Morgenthau was often ignored by its representatives for the development of anti-structuralist and anti-positivist epistemologies and they mainly referred to different, often French scholars despite the fact that similar episteme could have been found in Morgenthau’s work. Evaluating, therefore, Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung enables International Relations in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century not only to put the analytical focus on the human condition, but to introduce Morgenthau’s Continental European intellectual cosmos to contemporary International Relations. This approach of the following study will be
outlined in its core assumptions and proceedings in the subsequent three sections and will then be explained in greater detail in chapter two of this study.

1.1 Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung and International Relations

The study of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung particularly reveals three dimensions in his thought from which contemporary theorising in International Relations can profit most notably epistemologically and in its self-conception as an academic discipline.

First, the study of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung allows for a concept of power which is not confounded with violence, but which is considered as a group-dynamic element out of which a socio-political world can be constructed. Hence, power is not to be considered in means-ends relations, as it is often considered to be a realist position, but as the pre-requisite to even think in these relations. Understanding power as a positive, normative concept, as Morgenthau promoted for International Relations, rather than a negative, empirical notion will enable one to correspond more adequately the practical reason for the foundation of International Relations as an academic discipline since it stresses the ability to compromise and co-operate. This is the case because it accentuates the human will to construct and achieve something lasting and worthwhile, rather than an inhuman impotence in complying with some form of imposed and unalterable structure. Therefore, it also provides scholars with the episteme to critically question the contemporary system of international relations and point towards alternative forms of human sociation than the nation-state.

Second, considering that Morgenthau was one of the first International Relations scholars to stress the temporality and spatiality of knowledge and political order, his Weltanschauung is a rich source for arguing against positivistic convictions by stressing that the socio-political world is constructed and reason is limited. This does not mean that Morgenthau would have argued for relativism if understood as a cognitive and/or
moral inability to make judgements since otherwise International Relations would be bereft of the feasibility of scholarly insight. Such relativism would exempt outsiders from understanding, let alone normatively evaluating foreign political interests and actions since only an understanding of the researcher’s immediate socio-political life-world could be achieved. Yet, following Morgenthau’s argument of the construction of the socio-political world accentuates for International Relations that its field of study has two characteristics. The first characteristic signifies that human behaviour rests on specific patterns and interests regardless of time and space, i.e. international relations are etic. These patterns and interests are, however, due to the fluctuation of human inter-relations constantly rearranging in different combinations. This points to the emic character of international relations meaning that political concepts, discourses, or institutions can only be understood by analysing the particular context in which people create them.

Furthermore, the analysis of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung enables the reader to emphasise the limits of reason. “Grand theories” are neither able to comprehend international politics in its entirety, nor can this comprehension take place through an imperialism of concepts meaning that a fixed format of them would be universally applicable. The latter connotes that International Relations requires a set of complex and open concepts to be able to approximate an understanding that takes the conditions of human existence in their temporal and cultural context into account. The former signifies that studying Morgenthau demonstrates that singular, static theories are unable to adequately picture the fluctuation of human existence.

Third, Morgenthau promoted an understanding of scholarship as intellectual dissi-dence. Since Morgenthau put the human being at the centre of the analytical focus, studying his Weltanschauung enables the creation of a more pronounced role for scholarship than structuralist and post-structuralist approaches concede to it. Scholars not
only have to be concerned about creating knowledge for its own sake, which in structuralist approaches often leads to the cementation of the *status quo*, but have to be committed to pursue a normative end. This end is manifested in arguing against the value-freeness of knowledge, what is eventually a disavowed anti-normativity, since in its ostensible objectivity, scholarship runs the risk of being manipulated for totalitarian means suppressing humans psychologically and/or physically. Therefore, scholarship has to focus on making a humanistic world postulate its straight edge aiming to protect human dignity, secure the freedom from structural oppression, and provide the liberty to actively participate in the creation of one’s own life-world. It is particularly this latter aspect which allows for the argument that Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung* can be considered as a worthwhile addition to contemporary post-structuralist theorising. Scholarship has, therefore, the function to provide a critical appraisal and sceptical questioning of political discourses through a hermeneutical approach. This means their development has to be dissected by identifying actors’ interests and elaborating the context in which they were created. Furthermore, it has to inform and give citizens guidance in their political decision-making. Following Morgenthau, this *a posteriori* analysis would through the inclusion of potential alternatives to the *status quo* lead to *a priori* assumptions which in the case of international relations would indicate a world community to overcome the system of nation-states. These latter assumptions, however, stress that studying Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung* enables International Relations’ scholars to go beyond post-structuralist approaches. It not only permits us to critically reflect on how a particular political order came into being, but also, due to putting the focus on the human being, why this was the case. This in turn will allow rethinking the political because it enlarges our imagination to construct world postulates to better the contemporary situation.
1.2 The rationale for analysing Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung

Analysing a Weltanschauung is a panoptic approach. To this end, in a longitudinal analysis all of Morgenthau’s major published works – monographs, academic papers, and magazine articles – have been consulted which he wrote from the late 1920s to the late 1970s in Germany, Switzerland, Spain, and the United States. Furthermore, personal notes, newspaper articles, radio and television interviews, unpublished manuscripts, and letters amounting to a total of more than 80,000 items in the Library of Congress, the Hoover Institution, the Bodleian Library, and the Archive for Christian-Democratic Policy of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung have been scrutinised and employed to give further evidence for the arguments made. This took place by considering the time and circumstances of the formation of each document since only this carefulness will safeguard from drawing premature conclusions.

The methodological comprehensiveness which characterises a panoptic approach will provide an understanding of Morgenthau’s thought and contribution to International Relations which is more appropriate than previous, selective studies due to three distinct dimensions. First, through strict textual evidence, it will enable us to hermeneutically identify the major concepts and questions of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung to which he repeatedly referred during his lifetime. This longitudinal analysis will rule out an over-interpretation of temporary influences Morgenthau might have had during the formation of his thought-processes, while demonstrating if and in what way Morgenthau was influenced in his Weltanschauung by socio-political developments as well as his social field and in what way this led to alterations, amendments, or even to a continuity in his use of concepts. Second, it enables us to identify the persons and intellectual currents which had lasting influence on Morgenthau. This does not mean that the entirety of scholars of Continental European humanities and social sciences, which in one way or another intellectually crossed Morgenthau’s path, will be or even could be
referred to. Rather, analysing Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung allows identifying the primary sources of influence and also classifying the weight of their contributions. Finally, it enables us to realise the range of the above mentioned dimensions of Morgenthau’s contribution to International Relations and demonstrate their interrelatedness.

Furthermore, this panoptic approach prohibits misrepresentations of Morgenthau based upon selective readings of his work, which was often restricted to the six principles of realism, the first chapter in Politics among Nations since its second edition. This approach also averts misinterpretations based upon a selective reference to a particular period or aspect of his thought as well as to overemphasise a connection with a particular scholar or intellectual field. Hence, only arguments which rest upon extensive, recurrent textual evidence are provided in this analysis of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, rather than making claims of potential “hidden dialogues”.

1.3 Analysing Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung: its contribution to international political theory

To conclude, the particular contribution an analysis of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung provides for current discourses in international political theory is to be seen in its distinct methodology, conceptual framework, and findings. Before this will be further elaborated in chapter two the particular interest and intention of this study have to be disclosed. This knowledge-constitutive interest is twofold and explains why the following study was conducted in the particular way of a Weltanschauungsanalyse. On the one hand, this study is interested in demonstrating that Morgenthau was, as a European émigré scholar, a cultural broker and intends to evaluate his acculturation into American political science. Despite Morgenthau’s failure, this doctoral thesis takes place in the conviction that Continental European humanities and social sciences of the late 19th and
early 20th centuries are a rich, yet a largely uncharted source for contemporary International Relations. On the other hand, this study intends to provide a comprehensive interpretation of Morgenthau’s thought. This interest is born out of a discomfort with interpretations of Morgenthau which are selective either in their readings or research interests and which evidently will lead to abbreviated or even distorting classifications of Morgenthau’s contribution to International Relations.

This study will finally contribute to contemporary discourses of international political theory through its distinct findings, such as Morgenthau’s empirical and normative notion of power, alienation as his epistemological source, his critique on a commodification and acceleration of social life, or his insistence on the situational conditionality of knowledge and political order. It, furthermore, rebuts arguments that Morgenthau would have been exclusively influenced by scholars like Sigmund Freud or Max Weber and identifies Morgenthau’s relationship with Carl Schmitt as a negative, intellectual impasse, rather than a fruitful exchange of minds. This is achieved because the following study is unifying rather than segregative by revealing and classifying the extensive list of intellectual sources behind Morgenthau’s concepts and demonstrating the close correlations of these concepts. It will be, furthermore, accentuated that there is a strong continuity of thought in Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, which stresses the relevance of his contribution for contemporary International Relations since Morgenthau oriented his research agenda to general, recurrent political questions and aspects of human life which are of timeless importance for the discipline.
Chapter 2. *Weltanschauung as a conceptual framework*

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will explain the conceptual framework upon which this study was executed. This explanation will begin with an analysis of the deeper dimensions of Morgenthau’s threefold relevance for (international) political theory (Chapter 2.2): the first dimension is intrinsic to his life, the second one is intrinsic to his work, and the final element is to be found in the wider sphere of the history of political ideas in which the example of Morgenthau permits to argue for the mutability of concepts. This will be followed by an elaboration of interpretations of Morgenthau’s work and contribution to International Relations (Chapter 2.3). In this section it will be stressed that traditionally, interpretations of Morgenthau were concerned about either Morgenthau’s concept of power and to a significantly lesser extent about his epistemological approach. Only recently a further stream of interpretation has evolved that aims to elucidate Morgenthau’s intellectual background, while pointing out that Morgenthau promoted what Michael Williams termed “wilful realism” (2005a). The third section will talk about the aim and purpose of elucidating Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung* and its contribution to the current Morgenthau-discourse, what will be termed for the sake of clarity and distinction wilful realism (Chapter 2.4). What will be of importance in this section is to demonstrate in what way the concept of a *Weltanschauung* will enable to surmount hitherto existing shortcomings of works in the tradition of wilful realism. It will also have to address caveats of the concept of a *Weltanschauung* and in what way they are dealt with. The fourth part will elaborate the conceptual framework (Chapter 2.5). This will, first, contain a definition of the term *Weltanschauung* as well as terms which are used in a similar fashion. Second, the unifying, inter-relational aspect of a *Weltanschauung* will be demonstrated and, third, the collection of material will be discussed in order to furnish
proof that sufficient care was applied for the arguments made in this thesis. Finally, the structure of this thesis will be outlined as an analytical guideline for the subsequent chapters (Chapter 2.6).

2.2 Morgenthau’s relevance for (international) political theory

Studying Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung might initially cause mixed reactions since Morgenthau has not only been dead for thirty years, but he appeared outdated even during his lifetime. The kind of research he pursued seemed to be too conservative, as he admitted to Sandra Frye on 25th November 1964 (HJM-Archive 20), and at odds with the positivistic outlook of the discipline, which is why Morgenthau gradually fell into oblivion. He remained in textbook-accounts as a founding father of the discipline, but seldom played a role in the discipline’s research agenda, at least in the United States. In the previous chapter it was remarked that this assumption is doing Morgenthau wrong since his concepts of power and relationality as well as his understanding of scholarship still provide fruitful impetus for contemporary International Relations. The following section will look deeper into the unfolding of this impetus and will stress particularly three dimensions:

The first dimension is manifested in Morgenthau’s own life-experiences. Morgenthau was a marginal man which means that ‘... fate has condemned [Morgenthau] to live in two societies and in two, not merely different but antagonistic, cultures’ (Park quoted after: Golovensky, 1952, p. 334). Despite his enormous success with Politics among Nations, Morgenthau lived intellectually on the periphery and remained torn between the American and Continental European culture. He never fully penetrated the former while he remained attached to the latter leaving him to be a “Wanderer zwischen beiden Welten” (wanderer between two worlds) (Walter Flex). Like Hannah Arendt, Karl Deutsch, or Eric Voegelin, Morgenthau was part of the Euro-
pean émigré scholars who had great influence on the initial development of International Relations in the United States and political science in general. Despite stemming from different academic fields, such as philosophy, history, sociology, geography, and in Morgenthau’s case jurisprudence, numerous émigré scholars made their career in International Relations. Since there is until now no study exploring the acculturation of émigré scholars into the American discipline of International Relations and political science in general, the elaboration of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung serves as a case-study for what Alfons Söllner called ‘knowledge transfer’ (1987a) and is commonly referred to as cultural broker. This will, therefore, contribute to the elaboration of the plurality and diversity of political thought, according to Quentin Skinner (1969, p. 52) the genuine task of a history of political ideas. This knowledge transfer is the case because most European émigré scholars could not agree with the historical optimism underlying the positivism they found in the United States due to their intellectual background and their personal experiences of anti-Semitic ostracism and prosecution.

Another aspect of Morgenthau’s relevance as a cultural broker is to be found in the intellectual cosmos he was socialised in. Indeed, what has been persistently criticised about Morgenthau’s work is one of his strengths. Robert Keohane, for example, notes that “[h]is [Morgenthau’s] definition of power is murky, since he failed to distinguish between power as a resource and power as the ability to influence others’ behaviour” (1986, p. 10). Equally, Joseph Nye (1988, p. 241) praises Kenneth Waltz for having systematised Morgenthau’s thought and making it more accessible for scientific enquiries. A decade later, the critical theorist Jim George, concluded that Morgenthau adhered to a ‘very dark medieval perspective on the world and its peoples’ (1995, p. 204) since he would have cynically reduced human rights to the henchman of an uncontrolled arms race and the choices left for ‘Western policy makers … [were] arms racing, proxy war fighting, support for neo-fascist thuggery, and global containment’ (1995, p. 215). Fi-
nally, recently even scholars who are engaged in a more profound discussion of Morgenthau’s work, like Oliver Jütersonke (2010, p. 175), express concern about the value of Morgenthau’s contribution. This shows that Morgenthau was, and is, difficult to grasp no matter if scholars are in favour of or opposed to him if a panoptic contextualisation and elaboration of his work is missing. Even if a differentiated contextualisation took place analysing Morgenthau’s work through a particular lens, it might result in an underestimation of what Morgenthau has contributed to International Relations. Certainly, Morgenthau did not make it easy to be interpreted since he veiled his intellectual background due to the sparse use of references in his American writings. However, through a thorough elaboration of his *Weltanschauung*, Morgenthau can become a rich source for International Relations. Morgenthau’s work represents the Continental European intellectual cosmos of the late 19th and early 20th centuries and can be seen as a condensate of its controversies and insights. Arguments Morgenthau made and the kind of scholarship proposed by him demonstrate that it would not only be viable for scholars in International Relations to get engaged with Morgenthau again, but also with other scholars of that time. Morgenthau, for example, considered questions of de-territorialisation which were discussed at the turn of the century by scholars like Georg Simmel and these questions are still on top of research agendas in International Relations (Behr, 2004). Equally, Morgenthau argued for the scholarly acknowledgment of irrationalism and considered scholarship a sceptical corrective to socio-political developments as he found it demonstrated in the works of Freud and Gustav Ichheiser. Finally, he was also one of the first scholars to introduce socially conditioned knowledge to International Relations, a concept he had become acquainted with by studying the works of Karl Mannheim, but which in essence dates back at least to late 19th century Swiss art historians.
From this follows a second dimension. A careful and extensive elaboration of it will provide episteme which could be endorsed by critical theorists, feminists, or social constructivists alike and post-structuralists in general. However, often post-structuralists misperceived Morgenthau as having endorsed positivism or, indeed, having introduced it to American political science as George (1994, p. 92-5) claims. Morgenthau, furthermore, would not have opposed certain ‘ontological sensitivities’ (Tickner, 1997, p. 619), what J. Ann Tickner has identified to be one of the great strengths of post-structuralists’ approaches making them ‘superior’ to positivism (George, 1995, p. 222). Indeed, Morgenthau (1971b, p. 70) shared the same critique on International Relations and political science, though he did not, at least not openly, claim superiority for himself. Morgenthau, therefore, stands in the tradition of what Williams labelled wilful realism which is characterised by three dimensions: scepticism, relationality, and power politics (2005a).

Scepticism refers to Morgenthau’s critical questioning of the usefulness of empiricism and rationalism to study political science. Not that he would have opposed empirical and/or historical research, and subsequently the knowledge that is created out of it, but he would have asked about the limits of reason. The social world is created through the interests of humans, which often deprive themselves of rational examination. The second dimension, relationality, is the reason behind scepticism and stresses that wilful realists do not believe in any given order, be it individually or on any communal level. On the contrary, Morgenthau argued that the social world as an institutionalised entity and intellectual conception is constantly created out of human relationships and, therefore, subject to change. However, Williams also remarks that despite this relationality of politics, Morgenthau would have been sensitive enough not to perceive the social world as a set of conflicting dichotomies, but to stress the empowering capacities these relationships can provide. In the case of Morgenthau, as it will be argued later, this was a
humanist world postulate (*Weltwollung*). Therefore, power politics, the final dimension, reveals that Morgenthau (1964a; 1971b) argued that power is, on the one hand, the constitutive factor of politics which, as Morgenthau defined in his doctoral dissertation (1929a), is the case why politics is a realm that can affect any other social realms. But, on the other hand, there are two forms of power. One that is used to dominate others physically and/or mentally and which he often referred to in his earlier writings as *Macht* or *pouvoir* (power) and one, which he labelled *Kraft* or *puissance* in order to determine the capacity of self-determination and to be wilfully engaged in the creation of the social life-world. This demonstrates that Morgenthau’s epistemology is of particular relevance for current scholarship in political science since it provides the episteme to be (self-)critical and differentiated in one’s analysis while being open-minded and unprejudiced towards social and cultural contingencies.

The final dimension the study of Morgenthau reveals is that his example is demonstrating the persistence of thought styles in International Relations, while at the same time revealing that the content and meaning of concepts are subject to change. For Ludwik Fleck, scholarly thought would have been tied to social factors since they are created within thought collectives. A thought collective is ‘... a community of persons mutually exchanging ideas or maintaining intellectual interaction ...’ and Fleck added that it ‘... provides the special “carrier” for the historical development of any field of thought, as well as for the given stock of knowledge and level of culture’ (1981, p. 39). This carrier is the thought style, ‘[the readiness for] directed perception, with corresponding mental and objective assimilation of what has been perceived’ (Fleck, 1981, p. 99). Morgenthau’s example shows that International Relations remained largely insensitive to the temporal and spatial, hence cultural, conditionality of concepts since they remained in their American thought style. In other words, despite its international outlook, International Relations as a discipline largely failed to distinguish between etic
and emic dimensions. Despite similar or even equal wording, the meaning of a concept can alter drastically over time and/or in different cultures. This can be seen in Morgenthau’s dual concept of power which was for a long time not considered, maybe not even realised, and only the dominating aspect of it has been stressed. This demonstrates the relevance to consider the conceptual history for political science and especially for International Relations since its students deal with a multitude of temporal and cultural factors. Such an elaboration cannot take place here, but it is argued that Morgenthau and the concepts he used have to be contextualised into the cultural and temporal context of their development in order to understand their meaning and to be able to see if and in what way his concepts can contribute to current discourses within the discipline.

2.3 Morgenthau and International Relations

2.3.1 Power and knowledge: assessments of Morgenthau’s contribution to International Relations

Until recently, dominant interpretations of Morgenthau concentrated on two aspects of his work. One group primarily focused on Morgenthau’s concept of power, whereas another group, though significantly smaller, concentrated on Morgenthau’s approach to construct knowledge. Despite their different analytical concerns, both groups demonstrate that Morgenthau remained largely intangible to representatives of International Relations, as Stanley Hoffman (1977) notes, American discipline. The first group of interpretations was classified by Williams into materialism and instrumentalism to which a third group, functionalism, will be added here. The materialist version, mainly brought forward by neo-realists, argues that Morgenthau understood power essentially as the potential to employ force calculated through material, often military capabilities. The other interpretation, instrumentalism, can be allocated to constructivist scholars.
This interpretation assumes that Morgenthau considered power as an end in itself, sought after in order to acquire further interests (Williams, 2004, p. 639-41).

Furthermore, post-structuralist interpretations, exemplified in George (1994; 1995) and Tickner (1991; 1992), can be classified as functionalist. Functionalist interpretations in terms of entogenetic relations imply that Morgenthau considered power merely as a reaction of actors in international relations to structural implementations. Power would be sought by actors in order to secure their survival due to anarchy as a systemic characteristic of international relations. Hence, functionalist interpretations are a combination of materialist and instrumentalist interpretations, but more simplistic than the latter since Morgenthau’s notion of power is identified primarily with (military) force as a structurally determined end, which obligatorily serves the interest to secure one’s survival. The second group of interpretation is exemplified in the work of Richard Ashley (1981, similar: Rosecrance, 1981). Ashley stresses that there are two ways to read Morgenthau’s knowledge construction. The first, which he labels technical realism, would be positivistic, whereas the second, practical realism, would stress Morgenthau’s hermeneutic approach. Whereas in the first group of interpreters which was concerned with Morgenthau’s concept of power materialism, instrumentalism, and functionalism represent mostly opposing interpretations, Ashley sees both, technical and practical realism, fulfilled in Morgenthau’s work. A similar understanding can be found in Christoph Rohde’s recent monograph in which he argues that Morgenthau would have made the attempt to synthesise hermeneutics with positivism (2004, p. 111-6). This means that Morgenthau’s quest for knowledge was interpreted as being informed by two potentially conflicting approaches; one which would eventually argue for the fabricability of and teleology in life which could be achieved through rational and empiricist reasoning and one which would argue for a differentiated understanding of the ideas and processes that shape human life-worlds. The merit of Ashley’s assessment is that he was presumably
the first American scholar to explicitly stress that Morgenthau stood in the tradition of Continental European humanities and social sciences in which knowledge would have been equated ‘… with understanding, not causal explanation, [and] its relevant metaphor is found in the interpretation of texts’ (1981, p. 212).

However, both groups of interpretations demonstrate severe shortcomings and some are even ‘badly mistaken’ (Williams, 2004, p. 652). These shortcomings will be addressed in detail in the course of this thesis which is why it is sufficient here to state only the particular problems these interpretations are based upon.

First, it is to be assumed that Morgenthau is more often cited than read (Williams, 2005a, p. 82). This is the case, although Morgenthau was repeatedly acknowledged to be the founding father of International Relations (Hoffman, 1977, p. 44; Fromkin, 1993, p. 81; Kindermann, 2004, p. 85; Art, 2005, p. 77) and Henry Kissinger, a former student of Morgenthau, once even remarked that ‘Hans Morgenthau has turned contemporary study of international relations into a major science. All of us teaching in this field after him had to start from the ground he had laid’ (quoted after: Hacke, 2004, p. 5). Due to this status Morgenthau has to be cited and in textbooks a section is usually devoted to realism, but from his vast oeuvre more often than not only the six principles of realism, hence the first 13 pages of Politics among Nations, are considered in a de-contextualised reading of Morgenthau.5 Hardly anything else is cited which is the case especially for his German and French writings, the most essential works if one is interested in the development of his Weltanschauung.

Second, without claiming intentionality, positivists such as Waltz, Keohane, and Nye, refer to Morgenthau as their intellectual precursor and in doing so they can not only put themselves into a tradition of thought that ostensibly dates back to Ancient Greece, particularly to Thucydides, but they can also claim to have brought this intellectual process
to its teleological end through a systematisation and scientification\(^6\) of this tradition of thought, as implied in the title of Waltz’s *Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory* (1990).

Finally, Morgenthau seems to have been made a “scapegoat”, who was misused by scholars critical to structural realism and positivism in general. The result of this is that much of their critique on positivism and, indeed, their own differentiated approach to International Relations suffer from delegitimisation because they criticise a scholar who would have been sympathetic to their research agenda since he followed similar academic goals, although arguably being less radical, and in doing so some post-structuralists do not live up to their own academic standards (Gregory, 1989). This impression is received, for example, in Tickner’s account. For her, *Man, the State, and War* are the objective laws upon which Morgenthau would have intended to formulate his “grand theory” (Tickner, 1997, p. 618).\(^7\) This, however, is the title of one of Waltz’s books. There is only proof of one personal encounter between Morgenthau and Waltz at a 1959 conference and a letter of reference was written by Morgenthau upon request for Erich Hula and Waltz, in which he essentially declined to give a reference for Waltz due to the lack of personal acquaintance (HJM-Archive 60). In this sense, Gerard Holden (2002) is right to ask *Who contextualizes the contextualizers?* as it demonstrates that post-structuralism is an Anglophone scholarship that has yet to explore the intellectual potential of Continental European (and indeed other parts of the world) history of political thought.

### 2.3.2 International Relations and wilful realism

Until the early 1990s there was hardly any detailed elaboration of Morgenthau that would have challenged the dominant reading. Niels Amstrup wrote a piece on *The Early Morgenthau* in 1978, which despite rendering important service to the English-speaking academia since he consulted Morgenthau’s European works for the first time;\(^8\) it was
hardly ever referred to. Yet, Amstrup’s piece is valuable for this thesis since through the comparison of Morgenthau’s European and American works he concluded that there is a strong continuity of thought and that one subsequently needs to look deeper into Continental European humanities and social sciences to be able to establish a sound understanding of Morgenthau’s concepts. Only Morgenthau’s death in 1980 raised the academic interest in his work temporarily which led to special issues in *Social Research* and the *International Studies Quarterly* in 1981 and to an augmented edition of Kenneth Thompson’s *Truth and Tragedy* from 1984. All three provide value for the quest to elaborate Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung* since not only do they contain his only autobiographical sketch and interview (Thompson and Myers, 1984), but also memories of personal friends and colleagues (e.g. Eckstein, 1981; Hotz, 1984; Thompson, 1984). These autobiographical accounts and memories are important cornerstones in the quest to contextualise Morgenthau’s concepts since they provide first correlations. They also contain first intellectual discussions on Morgenthau’s work which differ from the main reading of Morgenthau as a positivist (Ashley, 1981; Tsou, 1984). Hence, Morgenthau’s death marks the gradual turn in International Relations of reading Morgenthau differently. However, in English-speaking academia soon thereafter Morgenthau fell into oblivion. In the remainder of the 1980s it was primarily the German political scientist Söllner (1987a; 1987b; 1988; 1990) who was interested in Morgenthau. Söllner (1996), like Amstrup, mainly devoted his research focus on the European background of Morgenthau and his subsequent acculturation into American political science as part of a wider project on the acculturation of European émigré scholars resulting in a monograph in the mid-1990s. Söllner’s works are particularly interesting in order to explore Morgenthau’s intellectual development. On the one hand, he stressed the influence German *Staatslehre*¹¹, the discipline Morgenthau was educated in, had on the development of political science and, on the other hand, the influence conservatism had on his
intellectual development, although Söllner failed to recognise that Morgenthau was not a conservative, but was sceptical of it, as he was of any ideology.

Despite these early efforts to contextualise Morgenthau, which remained partial, scattered, occasionally misleading, and widely unacknowledged, there were no detailed elaborations of Morgenthau’s life and work which would have allowed questioning mainstream-interpretations analytically enough. This changed with the publication of Greg Russell’s *Hans J. Morgenthau and the ethics of American statecraft* (1990) and Christoph Frei’s intellectual biography (1994) which was translated into English in 2001. While Russell primarily focused on Morgenthau’s time in the United States, Frei concentrated on his personal and intellectual European cosmos in which he researched not only Morgenthau’s German, French, and English publications, but also extensively consulted Morgenthau’s archive. This enabled Frei to provide a deeper understanding of Morgenthau’s scholarship since he was able to detect primary intellectual sources of Morgenthau, most notably Friedrich Nietzsche. However, Frei and Russell merely provided a solid starting point for the re-reading of realism and particularly Morgenthau, but this renewed interest was spurred by socio-political and intra-disciplinary developments. Williams recently identified three potential explanations, since ‘[t]he interpretation and use of “classical” thinkers in intellectual and political debate is never a wholly innocent process. It always reflects its historical genesis and context of current concerns’ (2007a, p. 5).

First, there is an increased interest in the history of International Relations. Despite being a relatively young field, as an institutionalised discipline, it gained maturity resulting in a rising interest in its historical and intellectual development which goes beyond canonical classifications of great debates, such as the dichotomy between idealism and realism (Waever, 1998; Wilson, 1998; Schmidt, 2002). Recent examples are works of Harald Kleinschmidt (2000) and Hartmut Behr (2010). Second, the renewed interest
in Morgenthau is also due to a reconsideration of the relationship of International Relations and political theory. There are widespread aspirations to reunite both strands of political science into international political theory which have been separated due to a ‘forty years’ detour’ (Smith, 1992) by positivistic approaches, mainly neo-realism and neo-liberalism. These approaches had attempted to create a “grand theory” which, as an International Relations Theory, would have allowed exclusively analysing international relations. Recent elaborations under the premise to reunite political science are the studies combined in the Palgrave Macmillan Series on the History of International Thought, edited by Peter Wilson. Finally, Williams identified increasing discontent with positivism within the discipline since these approaches would not uphold their promise to produce a theory which would allow understanding and explaining international relations. Mounting complexities in international relations have led to a variety of approaches, such as social constructivism, critical theory, and feminism attempting to capture reality in a more differentiated way, and, hence, more appropriately. However, this has also caused a reconsideration of classical scholars in the search for analytical insights to capture these raising complexities. Attempts to do so can be found in Rohde (2004), and in the works of Kenneth Booth (2005), Williams (2007b), or Marco Cesa (2009), where Morgenthau’s realism was applied to gain insights about the end of the Cold War, neo-conservatism, the transatlantic relationship, and tensions on the Korean peninsula.

Interpreting Morgenthau as a wilful realist concentrated so far on the elaboration of primarily two research interests. The first aspect focused on the misreading of Morgenthau’s work which, he had attempted to confront early on. In 1959, to mention just one example, he wrote a letter to the editors of International Affairs in order to repudiate Martin Wight’s view that he would have endorsed Thomas Hobbes’s doctrine that internationally there could be no morality or law (Morgenthau, 1959a, p. 502). There are two scholars in particular in which this misreading was discovered, its incon-
sistency analysed, and explanations for its development sought. Behr (2005; Behr and Heath, 2009) shed light into the beginnings of this misreading, by analysing material and technical realism in which he focused on Waltz’s understanding of Morgenthau. Equally, William Bain (2000) has to be credited for revealing that also George, who had intended to criticise positivism as an example of functional realism, reinforced the Waltzian reading. Behr and Bain have rendered service to the discipline by demonstrating that thought styles, such as the interpretation of Morgenthau as a positivist, are often of pertinacious persistence, although, as Fleck (1981, p. 27) remarked, contradicting information is readily available.

The major interest in Morgenthau as a wilful realist, however, is devoted to his contextualisation. This quest concentrates on three factors. First, there is a wide array of studies trying to establish an intellectual endowment of Morgenthau by exploring his intellectual and/or personal relations with other scholars. Since all of the following scholars will be addressed in the subsequent chapters, it will be merely stated here that their relevance on Morgenthau has been researched in one way or another. This does not imply, furthermore, that all of the arguments provided in the subsequent accounts would always be endorsed. Frei (1994) initiated this research agenda in his intellectual biography on Morgenthau by explicitly stressing his relationship with Nietzsche, which marked the beginning of an ever-increasing amount of such studies, whose latest contribution was recently put forward by Mihaela Neacsu (2010). She also stressed that next to Nietzsche, Morgenthau would have grounded his, as she calls it, theory of international relations on Weber. Her assessment is only the latest addition of a long list of scholars who argue they have found evidence of intellectual traces of Weber in Morgenthau. Most notably here are the contributions of Hans-Karl Pichler (1998), Tarak Barkawi (1998), and recently Stephen Turner (2009; Turner and Mazur, 2009).

The third major scholar who, as it is widely believed, was one of Morgenthau’s intellec-
tual sources was Schmitt. Indeed, William Scheuerman even argued that Morgenthau would have led a ‘hidden dialogue’ (1999, p. 225) with Schmitt. Over the course of a decade, Scheuerman (2007b, 2009a) further investigated this relationship resulting in a few more articles on Morgenthau and Schmitt, but in the meantime other scholars elaborated this relationship making it presumably the most extensively researched intellectual relationship in this quest to contextualise Morgenthau (Pichler, 1998; Koskenniemi, 2000; 2004; Brown, 2007). Furthermore, Robert Schuett (2007) recently added a new scholar to the already extensive list by uncovering Morgenthau’s relationship to psychoanalysis and particularly Freud. Finally, Anthony Lang (2007) and Seán Molloy (2009a) have provided first evidence that Morgenthau’s intellectual development not only took place during the Wilhelmine Empire and Weimar Republic, but that he also profited from the educational canon of the German middle-class. Both stressed that Morgenthau was deeply engaged throughout his life with the works of Aristotle and that his own work profited from this intellectual engagement. Indeed, Morgenthau repeatedly gave lectures on Aristotle, versions of which from the early 1970s were finally edited by Lang (2004), but date back at least to 1947. In the light of the contextualisation of Morgenthau, there is also a reconsideration of Morgenthau’s relationship with Reinhold Niebuhr, as it is implied in Vibeke Schou Tjalve’s recent Realist strategies of Republican peace (2008) and David Rice’s Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau: A friendship with contrasting shades of realism (2008). This discourse takes up notions from the 1960s, when a first interest aroused to intellectually locate Morgenthau’s contribution to International Relations (Good, 1960; Kindermann, 1965).

The second, more elaborate array of studies aims to contextualise Morgenthau and his work within certain categorisations to which there are, however, significantly fewer contributions. The first of these attempts is to find evidence for Morgenthau’s political attitudes. This is the case in Scheuerman (2008) and implicitly also in Véronique
Pin-Fat’s article on the *Metaphysics of the National Interest and the “Mysticism” of the Nation-State* (2005). Both intend to reveal Morgenthau’s personal and intellectual relation to socialism. The influence the other side of the political spectrum, conservatism, would have had on Morgenthau was already mentioned in the 1980s by Söllner (1987a; 1987b). Furthermore, Benjamin Mollov (1997; 2002) is to be credited for demonstrating the effect Judaism had on Morgenthau’s thought and political engagements. A final categorisation was recently provided by Jütersonke. In his study on *Morgenthau, Law and Realism* (2010), he contextualised Morgenthau within a particular culture by demonstrating the influence German jurisprudence during the first half of the 20th century had on Morgenthau. With it, he could show that Morgenthau’s decision to study law – a decision of the head, not the heart – had, nevertheless, a lasting influence on Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung*.

A final contextualisation took place particularly in the works of Richard Ned Lebow (2003), Williams (2005a), Molloy (2006), and Robbie Shilliam (2009). They attempted to contextualise Morgenthau into a particular tradition of thought and consequently within the wider aspect of international political thought. Their studies represent a sophisticated attempt to contextualise Morgenthau through not only elaborating on major concepts of Morgenthau, but also through positioning these concepts within wider discourses of realism and, indeed, political thought. Thereby, it is also pointed out to what extent Morgenthau’s concepts are of significance for contemporary scholarship in International Relations and to what extent one could make justifiable claims to get engaged again with realists and Morgenthau in particular, other than to show the plurality of political thought.

Contributions to the discourse of Morgenthau as a willful realist can especially take credit for three achievements. First, this is especially valid for Frei (2001) and Lang (2004), they have managed to secure primary resources in the form of Morgenthau’s
unpublished manuscripts and lectures and have shown that any serious engagement with Morgenthau has to make use of these materials. Second, all of these works have made valid contributions to the contextualisation of Morgenthau. Schuett (2007), for example, by elucidating Morgenthau’s intellectual engagement with Freud, added a new layer to the discourse of Morgenthau’s intellectual development which until recently was not even considered. Finally, they have contributed to the argument, though not necessarily stressing it, that Morgenthau’s thought is the condensate of a European intellectual cosmos and shows a striking continuity throughout his career. Taken together, these studies virtually leave no room for contemplation whether Morgenthau drastically changed his intellectual outlook after his emigration to the United States or not.

However, these contributions suffer from two shortcomings: one deriving from their analytical conceptualisation and one potentially resulting from this conceptualisation. The former is caused by a curtate presentation of Morgenthau’s development which renders it impossible to reveal the contextual comprehensiveness of Morgenthau’s thought. For this reason, the analytical concentration on one scholar may blind out other scholars who worked in the same discipline and made a similar impression on Morgenthau. As much as Schuett has to be credited for his work on Morgenthau and Freud, he left out the influence Ichheiser had on Morgenthau. Like Freud, Ichheiser was an Austrian psychologist and, unlike Freud, he was personally acquainted with Morgenthau. However, from this shortage suffer not only studies which link Morgenthau to one particular scholar, but also works which contextualised him into a specific category. Jütersonke, for example, elaborated the influence jurisprudence had on Morgenthau. This obstructs from recognising that Morgenthau was also influenced by other academic disciplines, such as sociology, philosophy, psychology, and even art history. In other words, Morgenthau would have to be contextualised within the entire Continental European humanities and social sciences at the time of his intellectual so-
cialisation. The second shortcoming these works suffer from, although certainly not intended by their authors, is that they allow a new kind of misinterpretation of Morgenthau. By claiming exclusivity for their readings, as a few authors do or at least imply (Schuett, 2007; Turner and Mazur, 2009), others might arrive at the conclusion that Morgenthau has to be understood in relation to one particular scholar, discipline, or attitude. This is beginning to be the case in Morgenthau’s relation with Schmitt. In this evolving Morgenthau-Schmitt-discourse, it is less and less of interest what Morgenthau actually thought of Schmitt, but only that there was some kind of relationship. Hence, the actual content is left more and more aside and filled with a potential hidden dialogue.

2.4 Elucidating Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung: its contribution to the current discourse

In consideration of these desiderata, this thesis takes on these shortcomings and intends to rectify them by elucidating Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung. The guiding research question of this thesis is, therefore: What was Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung and was it informed by Continental European humanities and social sciences? By pursuing to answer this research question, this thesis makes a contribution to the reading of Morgenthau in (international) political theory in three ways:

First, it is argued that Morgenthau was influenced by the discourses in Continental European humanities and social sciences that were prevalent during the time of his intellectual socialisation. Although this thesis cannot claim to have produced “the truth” about Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung and primarily intends to shed new light and revealing new layers of it (Fest, 2003, p. 38), it can be argued that in order to understand Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung this panoptic outlook is required since any curtailment would produce a simplified, if not distorted, result. The strongest authorisation, however, is to be found in Morgenthau’s work itself. In his autobiographical sketch and an inter-
view he gave, which are both reproduced in Thompson’s anthology (1984), Morgenthau made explicit reference to a variety of scholars and disciplines which only leads to the conclusion that Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung* was informed by this comprehensiveness. Hence, to fully appreciate the complexity of Morgenthau’s thought, to research its intellectual sources, and to consider its practical implications this panoptic outlook has to be sought. Furthermore, this allows contextualising the contribution Morgenthau made to the discipline, which prevents seeking a “grand theory” or “hidden dialogue” in it.

Second, this thesis contains numerous biographical references because Morgenthau’s work is reflected in his life and his life is reflected in his work (Kissinger, 1980, p. 14). This is why without a reference to the contexts of his *Weltanschauung*, it would be impossible for students of International Relations to assess Morgenthau’s contribution (Raulff, 1997, p. 33; Ullrich, 2007, p. 51). This study is the most extensive reading of Morgenthau’s work up to date. To this end, the entire span of Morgenthau’s academic career is considered. Therefore, this allows, on the one hand, an analysis of the whole spectrum of Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung*. On the other hand, it shows Morgenthau’s intellectual development. By demonstrating the personal correlation Morgenthau had with various scholars at that time, it is also possible to detect conceptual and contextual correlations. Frei’s intellectual biography has set the mark in this respect, but the present thesis goes beyond that. First, Frei only concentrated on Morgenthau’s pre-American years, which at the time of publication was a long-overdue project, but here Morgenthau’s entire life-span is considered. Second, Frei wrote an intellectual biography, whereas this work is concerned about his *Weltanschauung*. This allows, as opposed to a biography, a consideration of his intellectual development in conceptual terms. Therefore, it is possible to recognise alterations, contradictions, and correlations in his thought. As this thesis emphasises Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung* is characterised by a
coherence and pertinacity one would not expect from a person who led such a forced vagrant life.

Third and finally, it is argued that elucidating Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung* allows for the development of the earlier remarked relevance why Morgenthau is to be considered in International Relations. Morgenthau was, although for a long time misunderstood, a cultural broker who was part of a wider group of émigré scholars who introduced Continental European political thought to American political science and International Relations in particular. Thereby, Morgenthau can be seen as part of a ‘separationist movement’ (Guilhot, 2008) or better as a part of a critical, allochthonous movement. It is, furthermore, demonstrated that particularly Morgenthau’s epistemology in terms of a critical scholarship is worth being considered for current political science. In addition, this thesis will manifest that, in order to consider Morgenthau’s episteme and avoid misinterpretations, a careful temporal and spatial contextualisation has to take place to approach Morgenthau’s intended meanings as close as possible.

Before the conceptual framework is expounded, a caveat to a *Weltanschauungsanalyse* is to be mentioned. This analysis follows an approach that intends to understand Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung* out of itself. This means that through extensive reading of Morgenthau’s (un-)published works and based upon textual evidence the concepts were condensed that constituted Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung*. However, realising that all these concepts have a long history to which Morgenthau’s use is only a small addition, this thesis cannot discuss them in all philosophical detail (Koselleck, 2002, p. 23). *This is the case because this thesis intends to add to the history of the concepts to be discussed, but it does not write their history.* Therefore, it is asked how Morgenthau understood and used these concepts, what role they played for his *Weltanschauung*, and where their immediate origin is to be sought (Ball, 2004, p. 24-5). It also intends to elucidate their ‘coherence constraints’ (Bevir, 1997, p. 167), hence their underlying convic-
tions and desires which would be otherwise impossible to detect. Therefore, this thesis will provide a longitudinal conceptual history in the sense that Morgenthau’s concepts are analysed in the way he employed them throughout his life and a sequential conceptual history since these concepts are only considered in relation to Morgenthau.

2.5 Analysing a Weltanschauung: its conceptual framework

2.5.1 *Why Weltanschauung? A definition*

Michael Smith (1986, p. 226) once stated that realism is a *Weltanschauung* rather than a theory and this statement is to be seen as the guiding principle of this thesis. It is argued that at least for Morgenthau a full appreciation of his intellectual spectrum is only possible if it is considered as a *Weltanschauung* and analysed as such. Therefore, at the beginning of this section there will have to be a definition of the term *Weltanschauung* in order to distinguish it from the similar, yet conflicting terms of ideology and theory. This is required since these terms are often confused with each other or even used simultaneously (Mullins, 1972, p. 500). It is also necessary since Morgenthau’s thought was often classified as a theory (e.g. Wasserman, 1959; Nobel 1995; Pichler, 1998; Neacsu, 2010), but the distinction between *Weltanschauung* and theory will demonstrate that the latter would be too short to characterise Morgenthau’s thought. For Arendt (1953, p. 317-8), to give just one example for this confusion, a *Weltanschauung* was part of an ideology as the expressive factor of the total explanation of the world. Indeed, as Giovanni Sartori (1969, p. 398) remarked for ideology, but which is equally applicable for the other two notions, all of them contain a convolute of definitions.13 To avoid this convolute, the following definitions will act as a guideline for this thesis.

A *Weltanschauung*, as it is understood here, is quite literally an outlook of the world. It gives answers to the question of how the world, be it natural or social, is perceived and how its image is mapped, but also how it is desired. If a *Weltanschauung* is under-
stood in this way, six factors particularly characterise it. The first two characteristics
tend to be conscious constructs of the mind, whereas the next two factors are often un-
conscious. The final two factors deal more with the constructural aspect of a Weltan-
schauung, rather than the contentual part of it.

First, a Weltanschauung is empirical. This means that the construction of a Weltan-
schauung is dependent on natural and social actualities which each person faces in
his/her common habitat. The wider the habitat and the more experiences a person makes,

hence the wider and deeper spatial and temporal aspects play into the construction of a
Weltanschauung, the more pronounced it gets. Second, a Weltanschauung is normative.

Every Weltanschauung also contains a world postulate (Mannheim, 1952, p. 184-5;
Kettler, Meja, and Stehr, 1989, p. 78). This means that a Weltanschauung is directed
towards a particular reason, often to maintain the status quo or, if it is a newly estab-
lished Weltanschauung, to create a new power structure through a paradigm shift.

Therefore, a Weltanschauung provides not only a tool to see the world, but this tool also
provides an unuttered perception-presetting of how the world should be. Kurt Danziger
concludes in this respect that ‘[t]hese notions convey the strong implication that men are
to be studied as the producers rather than as the “consumers” of ideas’ (1963, p. 64).

Third, a Weltanschauung is ontological. This is the case since it arises out of the con-
templation about the essence and reason of one’s existence and it contains the urge to
create the factual embodiment of the conclusions which are drawn out of this contem-
plation. Fourth, a Weltanschauung is epistemological. In the course of its construction
the actual world is in a reciprocal, cognitive process perceived and classified according
to the normative and ontological aspects of the Weltanschauung.

The final two characteristics require more explanation since they are, due to their
constructural aspect, essential for this thesis. The fifth characteristic is that a Weltan-
schauung is a mental visualisation of the floating world. In this sense, it bears resem-
blance to Mannheim’s particular form of ideology (1985, p. 55-9; Woldring, 1986, p. 191-3). This concept remains on the psychological level and debarks from an individual standpoint which means one considers the ideas of another person not necessarily as wrong, but as misleading and often as a lie towards oneself. Particular ideology is, therefore, at least on the political level, commonly used in a polemical way, in order to call into question the intentions of one’s opponent. As Terry Eagleton put it: ‘His thought is red-neck, yours is doctrinal, and mine deliciously supple’ (1991, p. 4). Also, Morgenthau referred to this particular concept of ideology. In Politics among Nations Morgenthau remarked that ‘… the element of power as the immediate goal of the policy pursued is explained and justified in ethical, legal, or biological terms. That is to say: the true nature of the policy is concealed by ideological justifications and rationalizations’ (1985, p. 101). However, one still shares a common set of criteria, out of which it would be possible to create objective validity in the sense of general acceptance. It is this last aspect how a Weltanschauung is understood here since it contains a positive rather than a negative element. A Weltanschauung is considered as open-minded since it is an intellectual process rather than a self-contained and completed condition. Therefore, the term Weltanschauung was chosen since the German term, in contrast to the English world-view, captures in its etymological origin the processual character of a Weltanschauung more accurately.

Finally, a Weltanschauung is individualistic, even though it is formed within a particular group and out of a distinctive cultural setting. As Mannheim noted:

‘… fundamental experiences and attitudes do not emerge in the substratum of individuals’ lives in isolation, but that individuals who are together in the same group share a basic stock of experiential contents. A further presupposition is that individual segments of experience are not to be found in isolation alongside one another within these basic forms, but rather that they possess an internal co-
herence and thereby constitute what might be called a “life-system” (1982, p. 91).

This life-system draws in the process of its constitution upon what Jan Assmann called collective memory. Collective memory is characterised by its distance from the everyday life. The members of a group or society share the same artefacts, like texts, rituals, ceremonies or monuments, on which they draw upon while making sense of their experiences in everyday-life. These “figures of memory” create a stable though gradually changing intellectual horizon. This means that a group member draws upon this collective memory in order to create his/her Weltanschauung and eventually also his/her identity. Cultural memory allows a group to get an awareness of its own unity and creates a sense of belonging. This means one’s current situation influences the way the past is understood (Assmann and Assmann, 1994, p. 114-40; Assmann and Czaplicka, 1995, p. 126-33). Yet, even though this is the case, a Weltanschauung is distinctively individualistic since, although there is a similarity with the Weltanschauung of other people who drew from the same collective memory, but the correlation of the factors of a Weltanschauung makes it an individual undertaking. Empirical, normative, ontological, and epistemological factors might be similar in view of their constitutive significance for a Weltanschauung, but the way they are being invoked and their constellations to each other in each individual Weltanschauung is unique.

To contrast a Weltanschauung from ideology and theory we focus on the processual character since this is the most distinctive aspect of Weltanschauung. This proceeds by giving definitions first and based on this definition the processuality of ideology and theory is assessed.

Ideology is understood here in the classic Marxist reading as a closed, generalised, and self-referential worldview promoting a ‘false consciousness’ (Kennedy, 1979, p. 353; Geoghegan, 2004, p. 129). Hence, an ideology is defined as ‘… clusters of ideas,
beliefs, opinions, values, and attitudes usually held by identifiable groups, that provide directives, even plans, of action for public-policy making in an endeavour to uphold, justify, change or criticize the social and political arrangements of a state or other political community’ (Freeden, 2004, p. 6; similar: 2003, p. 32). This definition accentuates that an ideology, unlike a Weltanschauung, is fundamentally characterised by statism. This statism rests on two pillars. First, following Mannheim’s concept of total ideology, ideologies claim to be based on some form of natural and/or teleological law(s) which allows them to monopolise thought within a collective. Mannheim noted to that effect that:

‘… it is not primarily the man of action who seeks the absolute and immutable, but rather it is he who wishes to induce others to hold on to the status quo because he feels comfortable and smug under conditions as they are … This cannot be done, however, without resorting to all sorts of romantic notions and myths’ (1985, p. 87; emphasis in the original).

Equally, Freeden informs that ‘all ideologies delight in surrounding their arguments in the opaque and non-transparent aura of terms … precisely because this captures the high ground that is immune from challenge’ (2004, p. 12). From Mannheim’s notion in particular follows that through such laws which act as a priori ontological parameters humans are turned into mere “executers” of these laws because life-experiences are mistaken to be ‘permanent constituents of reality’ (Lichtheim, 1965, p. 194) rather than temporal and spatial objectifications of human interaction.

From this ontological distortion springs a second, epistemological distortion signifying the statism of ideologies. Claiming total cognitive mastery of reality, ideologies are gnostic in Voegelin’s sense because the specific ideological rationale meticulously controls knowledge-construction prohibiting a critical view of reality. Accordingly, Arendt informs the student of politics that this would be the case because ideologies
treat the course of events as an unfolding of the logic they have derived from their ideological parameters. Therefore, history appears ‘… as something which can be calculated by it’ (Arendt, 1953, p. 317; emphasis in the original). The ontological and epistemological statism makes Mannheim’s notion of total ideology resemble Fleck’s thought style and Thomas Kuhn’s notion of paradigm since, as Ole Wæver remarks, ‘a paradigm contains with it a fundamental [irrevocable] view of the world, and its assumptions act as lenses through which that world is perceived …’ (1996, p. 159). This quotation condenses why the statism of an ideology cannot depict the processual character of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung. It was the result of a constant cognitive process that repeatedly experienced amendments and alterations, due to new experiences and changing life-worlds, although in its foundation it remained remarkably stable.

In contrast to an ideology, a theory is not static, but unlike a Weltanschauung a theory is procedural. Whereas the process of a Weltanschauung happens to a certain extent uncoordinated, theory-making is a coordinated procedure to analyse a specific aspect. To accentuate this difference we have to define a theory in order to recognise that they particularly differ in scope and durability. For this definition, Morgenthau and the results of a Rockefeller Foundation symposium on theoretical approaches to international relations that took place in 1954 will be considered. In the course of this symposium Morgenthau defined a theory of International Relations as ‘… a rationally ordered summary of all the rational elements which the observer has found in the subject matter’ (quoted after: Thompson, 1955, p. 737). This definition is equally applicable to any social science and resembles George Sabine’s well-known definition of a ‘… disciplined investigation of political problems …’ (1973, p. 4).

This definition emphasises that a theory is, first, shorter in scope than a Weltanschauung because a theory is not action. If we remember what was earlier said about Morgenthau that his work was his life and vice-versa than the concept of a theory could
not grasp this comprehensiveness. A theory in politics is the investigation of how and/or why a particular event took place in the political realm, but it does not contribute to political action; at least not intentionally. There is, certainly, the exception which in International Relations, however, was the norm during the 20th century that the analytical is not distinguished from the normative aspect of a theory, as Behr (2010, p. 206-7) recently noted. This distinction would lead to a reification of politics because the conclusions drawn from analytical assumptions appear not as a normative reasoning, but as a logical rationale. However, if this is the case theory turns into an ideology if we follow Arendt’s discussion of ideology because, as it is the case with grand theories, reality is perceived to evolve in a deterministic manner and comprehended through this seemingly logical deduction.

A theory is, second, also different to a Weltanschauung in its durability. Since a theory rests on a rationality postulate, it will eventually become abandoned if a theory no longer ‘… provides a base or fixed point upon which analysis can be founded’ (Thompson, 1955, p. 738) because reality has moved on and its hypotheses are subsequently refuted. The abandonment may be prolonged for a long time for various reasons, but it will eventually have to succumb to the fact that the ‘cosmos [is] in flux’ (Mannheim, 1985, p. 65). This is not the case with a Weltanschauung since its prosessual character allows the incorporation of changing life-situations and/or life-worlds. Therefore, it may even experience dramatic changes, as was the case with Mannheim, who after his emigration to the United Kingdom got engaged in social planning as a member of the “Moot” circle (Ziffus, 1988; Jones, 1997), but it still remains the Weltanschauung of an individual and cannot be abandoned.
2.5.2  Weltanschauung as the interplay of field and habitus

2.5.2.1  Framing a Weltanschauung: the elements of field and habitus

In order to elaborate Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung we will depart from Mannheim on whom we have relied so far due to a crucial flaw in his thought. For Mannheim a Weltanschauung was a ‘structurally linked set of experiential contextures which makes up the common footing upon which a multiplicity of individuals together learn from life and enter into it. A world-view is then neither the totality of spiritual formations present in an age nor the sum of individuals then present, but the totality of the structurally interconnected experiential sets which can be derived from either side, from the spiritual creations or from the social group formations’ (1982, p. 91).

However, in accordance with Thomas Jung (2007, p. 143), a Weltanschauung cannot be perceived as a structurally linked set of experiential contextures. First, the experiences a person makes throughout his/her life are not structurally linked since neither has he/she full control over these experiences, nor is a person one-dimensional in the sense that a person will encounter different temporal and spatial life-worlds which can, but do not have to be interlinked. Second, these experiences do not constitute the Weltanschauung, but merely contribute in a reciprocal process to its development as patterns of interpretation. To avoid this problem Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of field and habitus will be considered as the general conceptual framework. Applying these concepts allow us to distinguish the personal and conceptual interrelationship within the field and the habitus, as well as between them. This interrelational elaboration of the field Morgenthau was intellectually socialised in and the Weltanschauung or habitus he developed out of it enables to pursue answers to the intentions of this thesis. It reveals how Morgenthau was influenced by Continental European humanities and social sciences.
and it enables the tracing of the development of his *Weltanschauung* stressing what Morgenthau could contribute to contemporary (international) political theory. Finally, it accentuates the requirement of contextualisation.

Bourdieu defined the field

‘… as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation … in the structure of the distribution of species of power … whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions …’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 97).

This definition permits a general exegesis of social reality and its numerous subfields. Since Morgenthau’s life, however, happened to a large extent within an intellectual context, numerous ties between intellectuals constitute the field in which Morgenthau developed his *Weltanschauung*. Therefore, this study refers mainly to the intellectual fields Morgenthau lived in.

This definition suggests several aspects which need to be considered while elaborating on the development of Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung*. First, each field has a logic of its own because social space is made up of various fields which are relatively autonomous to each other. For Bourdieu, the intellectual field was independent since its agents mainly devote themselves to the intrinsic demands of the creative projects he/she follows. Its autonomy leads to the development of their own institutions and professions, either by creating new or by altering the meaning of existing ones. Still, the agents of the field are influenced by major issues of the larger society, but through the growing independence of the intellectual field, the field mediates it and the outside influence
vanishes (Bourdieu, 1969, p. 89-95). ‘No doubt agents do have an active apprehension of the world’, Bourdieu remarked on this occasion and he added that

‘[n]o doubt they do construct their vision of the world. But this construction is carried out under structural constraints. One may even explain in sociological terms what appears to be a universal property of human experience, namely, the fact that the familiar world tends to be “taken for granted”, perceived as natural’ (1990, p. 130).

Second, each intellectual field is characterised by a conflict. As Fritz Ringer noted: ‘The agents in the [intellectual] field are in conflict with each other. They compete for the right to define or to co-define what shall count as intellectually established and culturally legitimate’ (1990, p. 270). Indeed, this conflict is necessary for its constant reproduction and emphasises its dynamic character. This conflict is above all a competition for legitimacy. Bourdieu distinguished here between two positions: orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Orthodox agents claim for themselves the right to define what is intellectually valid and culturally legitimate since they occupy dominant positions within the field. But

‘[e]very intellectual brings into his relations with other intellectuals a claim to cultural consecration … which depends … on the position he occupies in the intellectual field and in particular his relation to the university, which, in the last resort, disposes of the infallible signs of consecration’ (Bourdieu, 1969, p. 111).

This also means heterodox scholars, often occupied by agents at the edge of the field, try to participate in this competition. Although they question the validity and credibility of the scholars, which are in the position to define the intellectual doctrines, they still strive to achieve these academic positions. Only by occupying these positions can they claim legitimacy for themselves and gain confirmation of their intellectual work. By participating in this process they approve the institutional design they originally in-
tended to dispute. In fact, this competition is especially pronounced in the intellectual field because its actors are generally more dependent on the foreign and meta image\textsuperscript{16} than other occupations due to an inability to prove the quality of their work to themselves. This means that intellectuals aspire to assure their work, first, by the advocacy of other agents of the intellectual field and, second, through the achievement of its core positions (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 15-6; 1990, p. 143).

Finally, the meaning and applicability of habitus has to explained. Whereas the factors of the field explained the objectivist more, the habitus refers largely to the subjectivist perspective. This is the case, although, as the following definition by Bourdieu implies, the habitus is the result of a constant interrelation between the individual and social reality. Habitus is ‘a system of schemata of production of practices and a system of perception and appreciation of practices’ (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 131). The latter is possible due to the \textit{doxa}. The doxic part of the habitus is ‘history turned into nature’ (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78). This means that these undisputed, seemingly perennial beliefs and patterns of thought act as a framework of reference for the agents in order to understand their current social reality. Mindful of the competition for consecration, both poles within the discourse – orthodoxy and heterodoxy – refer back to the same \textit{doxa} which in turn makes them accept the practice of the field. However, to a large extent, the habitus furthers the production of practices. This happens with the help of the collective memory through the ability to problematise one’s situation and draw analogies to similar situations. From this follows that even though the \textit{doxa} is rather similar for each agent in the field, it does not mean that the resulting habitus would be equal. Rather, each habitus is unique, because each agent refers to different parts of the \textit{doxa} while applying the matrix. Bourdieu spoke here of an open system of dispositions. Hence, although the agents remain within the practice of the field, they gradually affect and alter practice (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 79-87; 1990, p. 129-37; Behr, 2001, p. 385-6).
Regarding the analytical side of the concept of habitus, Bourdieu remarked that it serves as a matrix of three, interrelated aspects. The habitus ‘… ensures the presence of experiences which [are] deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of perception, thought and action …’ (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 54). First, schemes of perception, or ontology, deal with how people perceive the structures of social reality. Second, schemes of thought, or epistemology, examine the ways people construct knowledge and use it to interpret social reality. Third, schemes of action, or political agency, demonstrate specific actions, hence the practical conversion of the first two schemes. These three aspects – ontology, epistemology, and political agency – mark, therefore, the constitutive elements along which Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung is explained and determine the structure of this thesis. Before this will be further laid down in greater detail in Chapter 2.6, the above mentioned aspects require definition.

Ontology, as understood in this thesis, refers to the first elements of knowledge (Hartmann, 1949, p. 13). Hence, it is argued that these elements form the basis of knowledge since humans cannot think nothing, but have to think something (Bocheński, 1951, p. 220). Even in the case of “not-knowing” (Niklas Luhmann), as the source of acquiring knowledge in a cognitive process, there is agreement that there must be something which is still veiled in darkness from one’s mind. This something orients itself on the real being (reales Sein), in other words, the social reality to which not only material and life belong as constitutive elements, but also consciousness and spirit. Social reality consists, therefore, not only of objectifiable things, but also of metaphysical elements. Hartmann distinguished here between empirical reality (Dasein) and normativity (So-sein) (Hartmann, 1949, p. 22; Bocheński, 1951, p. 226). Hence, ontology has to consider not only objectifications, as it is the case for example with neo-realism, but also normative aspects, what Mannheim called world postulate. Applying such an understanding of ontology means that those concepts have to be identified, of which
Morgenthau thought they would constitute social reality – while bearing in mind that Morgenthau gained them from an engagement with social reality – but at the same time contain an element of normativity revealing the kind of social reality Morgenthau aspired for.

Applying Hartmann’s ontology provides the advantage of being able to consider the correlation between epistemology and ontology and demonstrate how ontological concepts fed into Morgenthau’s epistemology and vice versa. Epistemology is here understood as ‘… the study of the nature of knowledge and justification: in particular, the study of (a) the defining components, (b) the substantive conditions or sources, and (c) the limits of knowledge and justification’ (Moser, 2002, p. 3). However, although these elements of epistemology are considered here, the analysis of Morgenthau’s epistemology departs from a philosophical inquiry and is more concerned with an elaboration providing intellectual insights for (international) political theory. This means that when it comes to sources and justifications of knowledge it will not be asked how perception, memory, or reason works (Steup, 2005), but what is of interest here are more the socio-political and cultural aspects that helped him to construct his epistemology. Hence, it is of interest which concepts Morgenthau considered important in the process of knowledge construction and how, where, and from whom did he acquire them.

Finally, political agency, as the life-worldly implementation of ontology and epistemology, is understood here following Lang’s account in Aristotelian terms. Political agency is ‘… the capacity to change the world. This capacity, however, is not simply a physical characteristic … Rather, agency connects the physical capacity to change with either an analytical or evaluative dimension’ (Lang, 2007, p. 20). Since political agency is applied here in individual terms a philosophical interpretation is pursued rather than on a collective level as it is often the case in political science (Wendt, 1987). Aspiring to change the world requires a particular goal, or telos, in life, but this thesis concentrates
here on how Morgenthau turned his *vita contemplativa* into *vita activa* and what major concepts geared this action. Two aspects are of particular importance. First, and here Morgenthau’s *telos* will feed into the elaboration, it has to be analysed what socio-political problems Morgenthau was most concerned with. Second, it has to be questioned what kind of virtues, understood ‘… as the pursuit of excellence’ (Lang, 2007, p. 22), Morgenthau regarded as most effective in the aspiration of his *telos* to create a society in which its members feel committed to the common good.

### 2.5.2.2 Constructing a Weltanschauung: personal and conceptual interrelationships

Having defined the terminology of a *Weltanschauung*, the interest can now be turned to the elaboration of the interrelationship of these concepts. Applying the interplay of field and habitus as a conceptual framework allows the cognitive separation of Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung* into its constitutive framework and central aspects, but it also allows enough leeway to analyse the interrelationship between and within the field and habitus. This interrelationship is, on the one hand, personal, and, on the other hand, conceptual.

In order to physically define the intellectual field, i.e. the personal interrelationships which served as an intellectual platform for Morgenthau, the method of prosopography is applied (Stone, 1971; Appadurai, 2000). Even though this thesis is not a biography in the traditional sense, it still makes use of it since the exegesis of Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung* will be retraced through his biography. A prosopography is ‘a sophisticated tool for establishing links between action and context’ (Shapin and Thackray, 1974, p. 3). Indeed, Bourdieu also positively stressed the use of this method to identify fields (Broady, 2002, p. 381-5). Lawrence Stone defined prosopography as ‘the investigation of the common background characteristics of a group of actors in history by a means of
collective study of their lives’ (1971, p. 46). A collective biography, as it is also called, is a means to study particularly the political action and social structure of a group. Since this thesis leans more towards the elitist school of prosopography, it is required to analyse mainly the ideas, disputes, and debates of intellectuals because the academic practice is at the core of the life of intellectuals and it serves as the constitutive factor of their field, not least because this group has otherwise only a vague sense of togetherness (Stone, 1971, p. 63; Gallus, 2005, p. 42-5). Of course, we can neither recreate the entire field of German humanities and social sciences here, nor would it provide any analytical value. To ensure the latter, a star or wheel network (Evan, 1972, p. 186) is created within the field of German humanities and social sciences during the beginning of the 20th century. This network contains Morgenthau at its centre and it demonstrates the intellectual and personal links he had with other scholars and the topics that concerned them.

The conceptual interrelation is examined by considering the insights of conceptual history. First, it has to be asked what conceptual history can offer for analysing Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung and, second, it is outlined how it proceeds. Applying this approach allows the analysis of Morgenthau’s concepts through historical semantics. This means it will be argued here that concepts do not have fixed contents, but are contingent, changing entities depending on space and time (Bevir, 2000, p. 274). The conceptual history approach also enables to combine the history of ideas with social history (Koselleck, 2002, p. 20-37). Hence, it allows consideration, in what way Morgenthau’s concepts were informed by the social situation and strata he was part of. These two advantages of a conceptual history have to be considered when the procedure is outlined, which we will turn to now.

The procedure of a conceptual history explains why a subjective access to the elaboration of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung was chosen since it overcomes some of the cri-
tique conceptual history was exposed to. First, the concepts that formed Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung are analysed in their historic-semantic fields. This contextualisation will be less concerned with the identification of antonyms, synonyms, or related terms, as is often the case, but what is of interest here is to identify Morgenthau’s major concepts through a longitudinal analysis of his work and consider these concepts as they were understood at their very time and place. This means the student of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung has to free oneself from a potential contemporary understanding of these concepts and only consider their previous understandings by examining the discourses they were employed in. Second, the onomasiology and semasiology of the concepts will be considered. The former identifies the words which are related to one concept and the latter identifies the concepts which are directed to one word. This analysis will be of importance since in Morgenthau’s case, the German meaning of the words behind his concepts often remain unconsidered and have led to frequent misinterpretations. Furthermore, it enables to demonstrate the correlations of the particular concepts to be discussed in this thesis. Finally, the analysis of Morgenthau’s concepts will proceed in a synchronic and diachronic manner. The former is concerned with the elaboration of the particular class, strata, or order that employed a concept in a particular manner. Hence, elaborating a field may not end in identifying a group at a particular time and space, but the specific subgroup in which Morgenthau was intellectually socialised has to be mapped. This means it would not be sufficient enough to argue that Morgenthau’s socialisation took place in the Wilhelmine Empire and Weimar Republic, but one has to look deeper into his specific stratum. The latter will require relating Morgenthau’s concepts to specific socio-political developments. This is important demonstrating the mentioned alterations, amendments, or continuities in Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung (Bevir, 2000, p. 276; Koselleck, 2002, p. 45-83; 2010, p. 77-85).
The final aspect which has to be discussed at this stage are potential shortcomings of this combination of prosopography and conceptual history and how these potential limitations are taken into consideration. The first is what John Diggins called “the oyster and the pearl”. For him, it might be possible that “… an idea exists in relation to its historical context as a pearl to an oyster: we can appreciate the jewel without knowing what mysterious forces of nature produced it; and an idea, like a pearl, does not necessarily lose its meaning when it leaves its original context behind” (1984, p. 156). Indeed, a mere elaboration of personal interrelationships would tell the political scientist very little, but in combination with the contextualisation, the development and meaning of Morgenthau’s concepts can be more closely and appropriately approximated than without it (Collins, 1998, p. 21; Muslow and Mahler, 2010, p. 8-9). Therefore, contextualisation will allow prohibiting misinterpretations that arise out of a separation of the oyster from the pearl due to an understanding of interests, which led to the creation of concepts in the first place. To remain in the language of Diggins, we might be able to enjoy the pearl without the oyster, but we do so even more if we know how and where it was sourced and if we can prove its authenticity. But for this, we need the oyster.

A second potential shortcoming is recorded by Melvin Richter. He argues that a new scholarship is required in order to “… inquire into the linkages and oppositions among concepts hitherto treated in isolation’ (Richter, 1995, p. 54). This remark points out that studies in conceptual history might have so far failed to stress the correlation of concepts. Since here the concepts are analysed by directing them to one particular person, this thesis will overcome this potential shortcoming. This is the case because, at least in this individual case, the meaning of concepts is developed precisely out of their linkages and oppositions. Finally, Mark Bevir (2000, p. 281) remarks that conceptual history runs the risk of losing the agency of concepts. However, this thesis is able to avoid the risk since, as before, the concepts is related to Morgenthau and their development is
elaborated by stressing similarities to other scholars. Therefore, the accountability of concepts is ensured, precisely because the agency of the concepts to be discussed, hence Morgenthau, is at the centre of this thesis.

2.5.3  **Researching a Weltanschauung: the triage of material**

Finally, the methodological procedure to provide textual evidence for the exposition of the argument needs to be explained. The ambitious task of analysing Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung* must rest on the gathering and ascertaining of an extensive amount of material. Two kinds of sources were most important.

First, all of Morgenthau’s major published works were consulted. These works range from his doctoral thesis and early journal articles of the late 1920s and his *Habilitation* (post-doctoral thesis) from the 1930s, to first publications in the United States, like *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* and *Politics among Nations*, and his latest publications from the 1970s, like *Science: Servant or Master?*. In other words, all of his creative periods – German, French, and English – are considered. However, intending to elucidate Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung* cannot rest solely on a textual analysis of his published accounts. Not only would it be difficult to contextualise Morgenthau, due to his scarce referencing, but it would also hardly enable to depict the processual character of a *Weltanschauung* since publications are “only” the end result of a thought-process. Fortunately, Morgenthau gave reference for his *Weltanschauung* in the above mentioned autobiographical sketch and interview. Still, an analysis of a *Weltanschauung* cannot rest exclusively on such scarce and dubious source. Even though Morgenthau seems to have been a very strong-willed person with a remarkable capacity to remember (Postscript, 1984, p. 352-3), a second set of sources had to be consulted. This further source is archive material in the Library of Congress in Washington D.C., the Hoover Institution in Stanford, the Bodleian Library in Oxford, and the Archive for Christian-
Democratic Policy of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Archives not only ‘… enable a broader, richer, and more robust understanding of the nature of political thinking’ (Hazareesingh and Nabulsi, 2008, p. 170), but even more so can provide ‘… impetus for fundamental reinterpretations …’ (Hazareesingh and Nabulsi, 2008, p. 152). Certainly, this is the case with Morgenthau. In the archives numerous unpublished manuscripts from the 1930s are to be found, which are essential for analysing the development of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung. In manuscripts like Der Selbstmord mit gutem Gewissen (Suicide with a good conscience) (1930b), Über den Sinn der Wissenschaft in dieser Zeit und über die Bestimmung des Menschen (On the meaning of scholarship in this time and the human purpose) (1934b), or Die Krise der Institutionen als Glaubenskrise (The crisis of institutions as a crisis of faith) (1970d) this development becomes almost tangible since it reveals its processural character through hand-written amendments or deletions. Furthermore, the Morgenthau-Archive in the Library of Congress also contains letters which were particularly insightful since Morgenthau not only kept the letters he had received, but also made carbon-copies of his own. Therefore, it is possible to trace entire conversations which added a particular value for understanding the development of his thoughts. Despite the necessity of archival work to understand Morgenthau’s thought and action, it seems only two works have made exhaustive use of the material available (Frei 2001, Scheuerman, 2009a). Schuett (2007) and Jütersonke (2010) also refer to German, French, and English publications of Morgenthau, but due to their specific analytical interest they did not consult all available resources. Tjalve (2008) and Rohde (2004) make references to German and English works of Morgenthau, and Neacsu (2010) even only refers to English archive material. Particularly, the latter reveals that a cursory reading of Morgenthau may produce significant shortcomings if a contextualisation of Morgenthau is desired.
Working in an archive is like being confronted with a ‘black box’ (Hill, 1993, p. 44) since there is no knowledge about the content. Therefore, in order to make this content tangible for scholarly purposes, a systematic procedure is required. This might be simpler in purely academic or chronologically ordered archives, but the Morgenthau-Archive is alphabetically ordered. This often made it impossible to infer the content from, for example, the letters he exchanged with another person. Although the register of Morgenthau’s archive was examined, each person he had exchanged letters with was identified, and a set of research questions were developed as a guideline before the archive research began, it still required consultation of all 200 containers in the search for relevant material (Romein, 1948, p. 154-66). This comprehensiveness means that more than 30,000 letters and a total of 80,800 items were scrutinised. This enabled to make discoveries one could not have thought of before, as it proved that a deep personal and/or academic relation with Morgenthau was not often reflected in the content of the letters.

Finally, a word of caution is appropriate. Archives are ‘repositories of memory’ (Jimerson, 2003, p. 89) and as such allow reconstructing and reinterpreting political thought. However, archives are the result of a threefold process of ‘sedimentation’ (Hill, 1993, p. 8-19). This means that an archive is a collection of material of a person or institution put together by personally involved people. First, the creator of the archive content, in this case Morgenthau, might have removed material for various reasons (Harrison and Martin, 2001, p. 124). Second, also the persons putting together the material for archiving might have intentionally not included material, and finally archivists might have removed some material due to financial and/or spatial restrictions (Van Wingen and Bass, 2008, p. 578). Judging from previous archive research and considering the Eric-Voegelin-Library at the Friedrich-Alexander-University in Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany, which solely contains academically relevant material, it seems
possible that little sedimentation happened in the case of Morgenthau. This assumption can be made since otherwise presumably private, even intimate letters and postcards would have not made their way into the archive. It even contains his birth certificate and dismissal papers from the German civil service due to the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service from 1933 (HJM-Archive 65). It is, therefore, a fortunate coincidence that Morgenthau was a ‘paper saver’ (Frei, 2001, p. 4), and that a shell that had hit Morgenthau’s apartment in Madrid in 1936 did not destroy his papers, which he only got back after years to his great relief as he confessed to Rafael Altamira on 5th March 1945 (HJM-Archive 3). If he had not succeeded in retrieving them, a contextualisation of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung would have been certainly more strenuous as presumably many of his manuscripts would have been lost. An archive can, furthermore, only record written and at best audio-visual material. Private oral conversations are, however, excluded from any collection. Although, as it will be later remarked in the elaboration of the creation of the six principles of realism, access to such material would have been most valuable.

2.6 Analytical reflections and structure

From the conceptual framework outlined above, the composition of this thesis becomes almost self-explanatory. First, the field in which Morgenthau’s intellectual socialisation took place will have to be elaborated, before in the next step the three components of his Weltanschauung – ontology, epistemology, and political agency – will be assessed, each in one chapter.

Chapter three will discuss the fundamentals of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung. Morgenthau was the child of a Jewish physician who grew up in the small Ernestine town of Coburg which later, at the time of his graduation from the local Gymnasium (grammar school), became Bavarian (Fromm, 1990). As he was part of the Jewish
Bildungsbürgertum, the first part of this chapter will outline this specific German concept of a middle-class that stressed the importance of self-education since the Bildungsbürgertum provided the intellectual cosmos that informed Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung. The second part of this chapter will analyse the concepts that were widely discussed at that time among academics, the part of the Bildungsbürgertum Morgenthau was most influenced by as a student and young scholar, and became the foundations of his own Weltanschauung. These concepts would have been the disenchantment of the world, understood as Morgenthau’s critique on ideologies, the pariah, representing alienation as an epistemological source, and the power of dissent, understood as Morgenthau’s epistemological tool in his quest to safe democratic and humanist ideals. The disenchantment of the world largely shaped his ontological beliefs, while alienation mainly influenced his epistemology. Finally, the power of dissent informed his political agency.

Chapter four will discuss the fundamental aspect of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung; his ontology. This will, first, stress Morgenthau’s thought about human nature. This is required since, as will be mentioned, his Weltanschauung evolved around the individual human being, rather than any structural aspect. From this it will be possible to distinguish Morgenthau’s concept of power, as the major concept that, on the one hand, distinguishes politics from other social realms and, on the other hand, establishes politics as the realm that interlocks each of the other social realms with each other. It will be stressed that Morgenthau differentiated two varieties of politics, as mentioned before. One notion acknowledged the dominating possibility of power, hence a largely negative term, while the other notion stressed its positive engaging and enacting possibilities. The latter was the concept Morgenthau normatively propagated, while the former represents the empirical concept he understood as being prevalent during the 19th and 20th centuries; the time of nation-states. Hence, Morgenthau distinguished between an em-
pirical and normative concept of power. Finally, this chapter will analyse Morgenthau’s understanding of politics, how he perceived it by building upon his ideas about human nature and power, and what kind of values and society he aimed to establish through politics.

Chapter five will deal with Morgenthau’s epistemology. As outlined before, this is mainly interested in the practical aspects of his knowledge-construction. Therefore, first, Morgenthau’s stand towards positivism will be analysed, not only because this was the kind of knowledge-construction towards which Morgenthau largely directed his critique, but also because it gradually became the dominant form of knowledge-construction in the social sciences and particularly in political science. Second, we will turn towards the elaboration of Morgenthau’s major concepts that informed his epistemology: the temporality and spatiality of human knowledge and political order. With them in mind, Morgenthau argued it would be impossible to establish objective forms of knowledge, hence truth, since no knowledge could claim temporal or spatial universality. Hence, there would be truths, but no truth. Finally, this chapter will turn to Morgenthau’s own construction of knowledge. It will look, on the one hand, into the development of his methodology stressing that Morgenthau owed much credit here to Mannheim and Swiss art historians and their evaluation of Zeitgeist. On the other hand, it will be emphasised that Morgenthau anticipated with his hermeneutical approach what would nowadays be referred to as conceptual history.

Chapter six, finally, discusses Morgenthau’s political agency. This chapter will stress the importance Morgenthau gave to scholarship whose task he argued was to act as a socio-political corrective. Based upon this understanding, it will be, first, asked, what were for Morgenthau the major societal problems and what potential consequences would democracies have to face. It will be pointed out that Morgenthau primarily criticised modern democracies for their idealism and subsequent lack of acknowledging ir-
rationalism. Furthermore, he argued against the commodification and acceleration of life, due to an ever increasing technologisation. In a second step, it will be examined what solutions Morgenthau had in mind to solve these potentially dangerous shortcomings of democracies. For this Morgenthau propagated, on the one hand, the national interest as a rational and balanced tool to bring the various domestic interests to a compromise and, on the other hand, the world community to eventually overcome the system of nation-states.
Chapter 3. *Fin de siècle and Kulturkrise: Hans Morgenthau, the German Empire, and the Weimar Republic*

3.1 **Introduction**

Following the logic of a *Weltanschauungsanalyse* the analytical intention of this chapter is to investigate the field in which Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung* evolved. The necessity to contextualise was pointed out by Morgenthau himself, since in *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* he acknowledged that the individual ‘concerns itself not with ... survival but with his position among his fellows once his survival has been secured’ (1947a, p. 165). The field that had lasting influence on Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung*, however, was not located in the United States, but was distinctively German. Indeed, Morgenthau was condemned by ‘American political theorists ... [for his] “Germanic way of looking at things”’ (Thompson, 1978, p. 7). In a letter from 18th April 1961 to his former student and later professor in Munich, Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Morgenthau disclosed which field was decisive for the formation of his *Weltanschauung*:

‘As concerns your question about the ultimate source of my values, we are here, of course, in the realm of philosophy and religion. Men assure certain values as self-evident and justify theory in terms either of these religions or philosophic conditions. I would assume that mine stem from the Judeo-Christian tradition, fortified by Greek and German philosophy’ (HJM-Archive 33).

Despite the caesura of the First World War, this investigation of Morgenthau’s intellectual field will consider the German Empire and the Weimar Republic lasting from 1871 until 1933 because Morgenthau was not only a citizen of both states, but the political, social, and cultural conditions that shaped the Weimar Republic were already
laid out during the time of the Empire (Wehler, 2003; Büttner, 2008, p. 21-32). Peter Gay remarks especially in view of culture that:

‘the Weimar spirit ... was born before the Weimar Republic; so was its nemesis. As in the Empire, so now, too, there were exceptions [progressive intellectuals] and thanks to Weimar, there were more exceptions than before, but the bulk of the historical profession trafficked in nostalgia, hero worship, and the uncritical acceptance – indeed, open advocacy – of apologetic distortions and sheer lies ...’ (2001, p. 91-2).  

It will be argued that five concepts shaped Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, which are reflected in the outline of this chapter. The first two concepts, Bildungsbürgertum (Chapter 3.2.1), the educated middle-class, and Kulturkrise (cultural crisis) (Chapter 3.2.2), are fundamental in locating the field Morgenthau was socialised in as well as to position him within it. Like his friends, acquaintances, and colleagues, Morgenthau was part of the Bildungsbürgertum. This distinctively German elite (Kocka, 2008, p. 7-8) with their emphasis on Bildung (education) perceived itself to be in a cultural crisis. Whether this crisis was merely in the minds of the people or not, it is crucial to understand that it influenced the thoughts, discussions, and actions of the German Bildungsbürgertum and reference to this crisis has to be made in order to understand the remaining three concepts. 

These concepts were major issues for the Bildungsbürgertum at that time and lastingly contributed to the formation of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung by maturing his perception, thought, and action. The disenchantment of the world as a counter-ideology (Chapter 3.3), alienation as an epistemological source (Chapter 3.4), and the power of dissent (Chapter 3.5) are those concepts. The German Empire and Weimar Republic were the heyday of ideologies. People were yearning for an explanation of life and ideologies offered them a meaning to their existence. Morgenthau recognised the distortion
ideologies provided to life and hence argued for a realistic approach. Like ideologies, also the feeling of alienation grew out of this crisis. Since society in its pluralism offered no epistemological reference point anymore, many intellectuals focused on the human being. This individualism gave way to make epistemological use of alienation. The final concept implies that the Weimar Republic provided opportunities for a small group of intellectuals, previously segregated from the majority of society. Only a few of them, however, were engaged in politics and, therefore, the Weimar Republic lacked support not only from the masses, but also from the people who profited most from its existence. Morgenthau had recognised this circumstance and subsequently shifted his interest towards the political from his early academic stages onwards.

Before going into medias res, it has to be remarked that the following chapter can neither depict the entire development of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, nor is this its intention. Rather, these concepts signify the foundations, the pillars so to speak, upon which his Weltanschauung rested. Therefore, his Jewish identity is not discussed at length: although this identity fed into the development of the following concepts, it was not fundamental to the development of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung per se.
3.2 The Bildungsbürgertum during the German Empire and Weimar Republic

3.2.1 The significance of Bildung

The German Bürgertum was a small group at that time, made up of civil servants with an academic education, judges, physicians, lawyers, priests, and faculty members of universities. It represented merely, according to Hans-Ulrich Wehler (2003, p. 294), 0.8% of the German population, or approximately 540,000 to 680,000 persons at the beginning of the Weimar Republic. Agreeing with Wehler regarding the composition of the Bürgertum, Ringer defined them ‘... simply as a social and cultural elite which owes its status primarily to educational qualifications, rather than hereditary rights or wealth’ (1969, p. 5-6) and referred to them as “mandarins”. Morgenthau, the only child of a physician from the then Ernestine Coburg, who was married to the daughter of a wealthy merchant from nearby Bamberg, was throughout his life in Europe, from his birth in 1904 until his forced emigration in 1937, part of the mandarins (Fromm, 1990, p. 285; Frei, 2001, p. 12-3). In 1926 or 1927 his father could even afford a used car, which is, due to its exceptionality in the 1920s, a clear indicator that the Morgenthaus were well-established in the Bürgertum of Coburg (Postscript, 1984, p. 342). Furthermore, Morgenthau’s choice to major in law, after briefly studying philosophy, reflects his mandarin upbringing and the importance that was shed on the instance of having arrived in the middle of society by one’s own capacities. Originally planning to study literature, Morgenthau’s father dismissed the thought since it would have been no profitable occupation (Morgenthau, 1984, p. 4; Postscript, 1984, p. 344).

Ringer’s definition emphasises that the defining factor of the German Bürgertum was Bildung which is why it is commonly called Bildungsbürgertum. Its importance is tied to its particular historical development. Unlike in England and France with its noblesse de robe, wealth and birth mattered less in Germany. Until the foundation of the German
Empire in 1871, Germany was a loose federation of states and this ‘system of mini-
states’ (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 31) led to a considerably larger demand for higher gov-
ernment officials than anywhere else in Europe because the Deutscher Bund (German
Confederation) consisted of 39 states, all with their own administration. In the Stein-
Hardenberg-Reforms after Prussia’s defeat to France in 1806 the administration became
modernised and professionalised, but already in the 18th century with the absolutist state
and mercantilism as its economic policy, a larger administrative organisation became
necessary to coordinate its various tasks. The development of, for instance, standing
armies and a bacchanal lifestyle of its rulers required a basic form of economic coordi-
nation in order to create a positive balance of trade so that a constant source of revenue
was ensured. The bureaucratisation became even more rapid in the 19th century since
the “Great Transformation” (Polanyi, 2001) with the development of market economies,
accompanied by industrialisation, required more synchronised action of various policy
fields and, indeed, created new ones, such as social policy (Giesen, 1993, p. 105-14;

At that time government officials were often assigned to positions far away from
their hometown which caused an inability to communicate with the local population on
common grounds due to different educational and linguistic backgrounds. That different
life-worlds exist within societies was demonstrated to Morgenthau during his legal
clerkship in Wolfratshausen, a village at the foothills of the Alps, in 1927. Even decades
after it, he was taken aback by the primitiveness and brutality of its inhabitants (Post-
script, 1984, p. 345-7). What this manifests is that the Bürgertum was an exclusive class
at that time. Not only was the number of members limited, but even more so Bildung
was its entrance requirement and served as a status symbol for its members (Daum,
2002, p. 111-6). Therefore, the Bildungsbür gertum – the mandarins – was to a certain
extent uprooted from the rest of the population. They had their own manners, values,
and knowledge which prohibited them – consciously and unconsciously – to intermingle with other society members.

*Bildung* was also a central aspect in Morgenthau’s life. As a ten year old child, for example, Morgenthau, the grandson of the local rabbi, became so terrified by his Latin teacher who told him that he only got an A minus in the latest exam that he claimed to be able to find the exact place in Coburg where the teacher had informed him about his grade, more than half a century after the incident (Postscript, 1984, p. 339). Also later in his life Morgenthau set high intellectual standards on himself, but also on friendship (Eckstein, 1981, p. 680). The institutions, where the centrality of *Bildung* was observed, were primarily the universities. Already in 1770 Germany had 40 universities, whereas in France there were 23 and in England only two (Giesen, 1993, p. 113). Since then Prussia, as the biggest German state, centralised higher education and controlled its entrance requirements. In 1791, for example, Prussia standardised entry examinations for the regular civil service and introduced the *Abitur* (A-level) as the general requirement to enter universities in 1812 (Ringer, 1969, p. 16-32). With such actions, the state was able to control the abilities of future government officials, ensured that its subjects became obedient patriots, and created social barriers that separated its new elite from the rest of the population (Vierhaus, 1972, p. 523-5). Hence, universities provided the degrees which were not only then necessary requirement to lead a bourgeois life, but they also served as the symbol to be recognised as members of the *Bildungsbürgertum*.25

Furthermore, in the course of the Prussian Reforms after the defeat to France, Wilhelm von Humboldt became head of the Department of Religion, Public Institution, and Health of the Ministry of the Interior in 1809 and developed a modern kind of university, exemplified in the foundation of the *Friedrich-Wilhelm-Universität* (today the Humboldt-University) in Berlin one year later. Its fundamental principles were academic freedom and the unity of research and teaching, aspects soon to be found at all
German universities (Reill, 1994, p. 345-66; Kehm, 2004, p. 6-7). This freedom not only provided universities with the right of self-government (though under the legal auspices of the state), the right to train their own academic successors with the *venia legendi* (permission to lecture) through a *Habilitation*, and the right to do research for its own sake. By contrast with universities under absolutist rule, knowledge was to be increased through critical scholarship. Yet, *Wissenschaft* (scholarship) was less concerned with the immediate applicability of the research results, but committed to the ideal of pure scholarly work, whose task it was to increase knowledge (Sheehan 1968, p. 366-7; Schnädelbach, 1984, p. 20-30; Szöllösi-Janze, 2005, p. 343-6). Hence, the condition and purpose of the university, as the place where *Bildung* could be pursued, provided the faculty members with such a high self-esteem that they were convinced to be moral and virtuous role-models for the entire population. This is the case, because *Bildung* was, following humanist ideals, committed to the general education of people. It happened as an individual act, liberally executed, segregated from the practical world, and committed to the freely chosen interests of its pursuers (Vierhaus, 1972, p. 529).

The special status professors and *Privatdozenten* (associate professors) had, allowing them to set the rules and standards for membership to the mandarins, is expressed in Ringer’s term ‘mandarin intellectuals’ (1969, p. 6). The mandarin intellectuals were the core of the *Bildungsbürgertum* and it was this field Morgenthau intended to become part of. Not that Morgenthau aspired to make science his vocation ever since his childhood since it was not until 1928, when he came to Frankfurt to finish his doctoral thesis, where he decided, impressed by the intellectual air, to follow an academic career. “Uhu” (eagle owl), as Morgenthau was called in Frankfurt (HJM-Archive 54), made not only friends with other clerks of Hugo Sinzheimer’s law office, like Ernst Fraenkel, Franz Neumann, and Otto-Karl Freund, but he also became acquainted with Martin Buber, Paul Tillich, Mannheim, Franz Oppenheimer, and members of the *Institut für*
Sozialforschung (Institute for Social Research), such as Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and Erich Fromm (Postscript, 1984, p. 348-9; Frei, 2001, p. 37-40; Lebow, 2003, p. 253). Being at the periphery of this field and striving to become a full member of the mandarin intellectuals is one reason why Morgenthau decided to critically engage with the most eminent German legal theorists of his time in his inaugural lecture in Geneva from 1932: Georg Jellinek, Kelsen, and Schmitt.

3.2.2 Fin de siècle and the cultural crisis

The concept of fin de siècle is employed here to depict the significant socio-economic and cultural changes, such as urbanisation, political radicalisation, and an increasing industrialisation (Hochindustrialisierung), at the turn of the 19th century causing people to mentally and physically deteriorate (Marchand and Lindenfeld, 2004, p. 1; Osterhammel, 2009, p. 102-3). As guardians of culture, the mandarin intellectuals perceived these changes as threatening for three causes.

The first cause concerns the structure of knowledge production. The unique position universities had since Humboldt’s educational reforms in 1809 were questioned on the one hand by the foundation of numerous research facilities outside traditional academia. There were government funded bodies, like the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft27, or technical universities, private research institutes, like the Institute for Social Research, and research departments in large companies which appeared as new actors of knowledge production (Markl, 2003, p. 49-55; Szöllösi-Janze, 2005, p. 339-60). On the other hand, the structure of the university itself was subject to change. As the classicist Werner Jaeger observed in 1924: ‘Higher education has become an article of mass consumption, cheap and bad ... The mass as such is uncritical and fanatic’ (quoted after: Ringer, 1969, p. 256). This structural change of higher education was an effect of the rapid industrialisation in Germany in the latter half of the 19th century. It required university education
to focus more on immediate applicability of the learning outcome. Natural and applied sciences became more important and received more funding as the economy needed well-trained engineers. Particularly after the accession of the throne of Wilhelm II in 1888, this need became more and more pressing when the military entered a cataclysmic alliance with the economic and educational sector to achieve Germany’s imperialistic “place in the sun” (Bernhard von Bülow). Therefore, not more than three of the 29 institutes of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft were attributable to the social sciences and humanities.

The structural change, however, was only the apparent result of a deeper, second development. Philosophy was losing the primacy it had upheld among the classic faculties (medicine, law, and theology) and Geisteswissenschaften (humanities) in general fell behind natural sciences regarding public awareness because of rapid technological developments. Knowledge production in the universities shifted from the ideal of pure scholarship trying to enhance knowledge for its own sake to a knowledge more engineered for its applicability. Although rationalism and empiricism were identified as the primary means that will deprive humanities of their intellectual dominance, attempts were made to alter humanities into positivistic sciences by applying these means to epistemological and ontological questions in order to secure the place of humanities in the higher education curriculum (Lichtblau, 1996, p. 77-101). However, other scholars aimed to distinguish themselves from the exact sciences to which, as we will see, Morgenthau was particularly drawn to. Indeed, the very term Geisteswissenschaften received its contour in the 1880s from Wilhelm Dilthey in order to distinguish them from natural sciences and was further refined in the Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences in 1910 (Thielen, 1999, p. 91-2). The fierceness with which the mandarin intellectuals tried to uphold their position and set them apart is manifested in Nietzsche’s The Twilight of Idols, published around the same time in 1889.
‘All our political theories and state constitutions ... are derivatives, necessary consequences, of decline; the unconscious effect of décadence has mastered even the ideals of specific sciences. My objection to the whole of English and French sociology remains the fact that it knows by experience only the structures of decay in society and, in all innocence, takes its own instincts for decay as the norm for sociological value judgements. ... Our socialists are décadents, but Mr Herbert Spencer is also a décadent – he sees the triumph of altruism as desirable!’ (1998, p. 64; emphasis in the original).

What this quote shows is that the mandarins were essentially in fear that this development would make Wissenschaft seem banal; a fear that was shared by many of Nietzsche’s contemporaries, such as Simmel (2008, p. 169).28 Again Jaeger stressed this by remarking that ‘... since both are two fundamentally different things, and wissenschaft [sic] has no place where Empirie is required, for theory kills the instinct’ (quoted after: Ringer, 1969, p. 110).

Finally, it was believed that this striving for applicability would underestimate different forms of life, deny the importance of space and time, and eventually lead to a mediocrity that still had the power to shape German culture. What Hartmut Rosa (2005, p. 161-240) described for the age of “globalisation” was also the case at the fin de siècle. The original liberating and empowering impact of the Enlightenment’s legacy which was further increased through economic, technical, and social acceleration changed into its converse around the turn of the 20th century. The perception of time and the meaning of history were altered from a perspective of teleological, ever-increasing optimism towards the perception of an incoherent, self-preserving, meaningless, and vertiginous accelerating cycle (Ringer, 1969, p. 253-304). This ‘directionless, frantic change’ (Rosa, 2009, p. 102) shattered the identities and sense of belonging of many Germans by deriving them from the meaning their life was supposed to have.29 The mandarin intellectuals
feared that this meaningless would lead to a profanity and vulgarity of life, as they saw it exemplified in a fetishisation of mass-produced objects. What counted was no longer the materiality, but the ‘shop-window quality of things’ (Simmel, 1997a, p. 257). Meaning was sought in the very objects that were the products of a process which deprived people of their identity in their first place. Yet, it would be misleading to speak of a *Kulturpessimismus* (Gismondi, 2004)^30^, but Germany experienced this during the Kulturkrise (Mannheim, 1953, p. 218): the mandarins were not pessimistic about culture *per se*, but believed that “pure culture” was threatened to be overwhelmed by all these developments evoked by the legacy of the Enlightenment and industrialisation.

Throughout the different intellectual professions – art, literature, theatre, academics, and even politics – there were two distinct ways to cope with these aspects of the cultural crisis. Ringer chose the terms orthodoxy and modernists to emphasise this dichotomy, but due to numerous meanings the term modernity has, creating a definitional preoccupation (Gumbrecht, 1978, p. 93-131), Bourdieu’s term heterodoxy will be considered here.^31^

Representatives of the orthodox position were generally critical towards the social developments at the *fin de siècle*. This does not come as a surprise, since they were threatened with losing their significant position which they had upheld since the establishment of Humboldt’s educational reforms, and the apparent materialism just reinforced their fear that culture would slip into banality. Unwilling to cope with the changed circumstances, they reacted by protecting their vested interests. As Bourdieu outlined in his concepts of field and habitus, the orthodoxy’s sense of protection extended also to their profession. In most cases their work reproduced the common scholarly grounds and little was produced that furthered knowledge significantly. New tendencies in the social sciences and humanities, such as sociology, were eyed. To a large extent, German intellectuals thought of sociology as a scholarly field solely concerned
with the promotion of positivism (Ringer, 1969, p. 233). The above cited passage of Nietzsche in which he uttered legitimate concerns exemplifies this since Nietzsche failed to see the potential that sociological research could have for the analysis of modern life. This protection of their vested interests also determined their position towards politics. During the German Empire a large part of the Ordinarien (full professors) supported reactionary thoughts and were fierce followers of imperialistic claims. After the downfall of the monarchy, they were still arguing for a conservative revolution, essentially an undemocratic and nationalistic movement in order to perpetuate the old ideals. Therefore, most rejected the Weimar Republic (Laqueur, 1972, p. 226; Hardtwig, 2004, p. 337). Ludwig Fulda, the first German PEN-president and Thomas Mann, who published his Reflections of an Unpolitical Man in 1918, are two of the few examples who made the transformation from an ardent supporter of the Empire in terms of culture to a Vernunftrepublikaner (republican by reason) and, finally, to an equally ardent democrat. The anti-democratic nationalism of the orthodox intellectuals was often accompanied by anti-socialism and anti-Semitism, the latter being made socially acceptable again not least because of the work of the historian Heinrich von Treitschke from the 1870s onwards. As Fritz Stern (1989) has shown in his study The Politics of Cultural Despair, it was this anti-Semitism, nationalism, and the fear of cultural decline of the intellectuals that not only led to a lack of support for the Republic, but eventually fostered the rise of national-socialism in Germany.

However, there was also a second position towards the cultural crisis among German intellectuals, but it received significantly less support than the orthodox. They were equally critical of changes caused in an industrialised society, but other than the orthodoxy, the heterodoxy tried to engage with the given circumstances. It was particularly this group of scholars that affected Morgenthau’s intellectual socialisation. Simmel, for example, not only extensively worked on the impact modern cities had on social rela-
tions and produced a treatise on fashion, but was also concerned about fetishised materialism, as cited above, and argued for women’s liberation (Gassen and Landmann, 1958; Coser, 1965b; Simmel, 1964b, p. 409-24; 1995, p. 7-37; 2005, p. 33-8). Besides, as the next paragraphs will show, this group of scholars was also engaged to enhance the methods applied in humanities and social sciences to ensure a more rigid, but yet more creative contribution to knowledge production (Dahme and Rammstedt, 1984, p. 463-75). During the time of his doctoral thesis, Morgenthau shifted his interest from pure jurisprudence towards sociology of law, which he considered better suited to provide an effective tool to study international law (Scheuerman, 2009a, p. 12-8). To further this research interest, Morgenthau edited an issue on sociology of law for the *University of Kansas City Law Review* in 1940 for which he also contacted his former colleague from Madrid, Altamira, where Morgenthau was briefly working from 1935-1936 (HJM-Archive 3).

Heterodox intellectuals, like members of the orthodoxy, were to be found in all professions of the liberal arts, but especially the new discipline of sociology was their field of activity, since ‘German sociology is the product of one of the greatest dissolutions and reorganizations, accompanied by the highest form of self-consciousness and self-criticism.’ Mannheim added that ‘... sociology is seen to be not only the product of this process of dissolution but also a rational attempt to assist in the reorganization of human society ...’ (1953, p. 210). Certainly, this is what scholars like Simmel, Weber, Norbert Elias, or Walter Benjamin wanted to achieve. Since a lot of these scholars tended politically towards socialism and/or were Jewish, it was not only their progressive ideas that hindered their career progress in the German Empire. Simmel, to mention just one example, was not awarded with a full professorship until 1914 in provincial Strasbourg; four years before his death (Jung, 1990, p. 14-8). Morgenthau himself once remarked that ‘[i]f Simmel or Freud had been baptized, they would have become full professors in
no time’ (2004, p. 43). This, however, gradually changed during the Weimar Republic. They could now achieve senior positions in university, but also in other fields of intellectual life that were until then blocked by orthodox concerns. Indeed, Gay (2001, p. 9-10) is convinced that it was this minority of thinkers (*Kulturschaffende*) that contributed most to the success of the Weimar Spirit with its support for democracy in general and intellectual creativity in particular, but were also symptomatic for Weimar’s subsequent downfall. Already in 1907, for instance, 12% (19% including the converts) of the *Privatdozenten* and 3% (7% including the converts) of the professors were Jewish (Gay, 1978, p. 96, 118). Given the Jewish share of approximately 1% of the population and the confessional reservations, these figures were high and rose during the Weimar Republic. Indeed, by April 1936 1,145 Jewish (full) professors were forced to retire (Lamberti, 2006, p. 159) and Claus-Dieter Krohn (1997, p. 222) reports that more than 2,000 scholars emigrated alone to the United States. Morgenthau’s faith might have played a role that he felt more inclined to these scholars, but, as the rest of the chapter will show, it was their understanding of the social world, commitment to democracy, and their scholarly pursuit of humanism that convinced Morgenthau of their agenda. Morgenthau retained this tendency to opt for heterodox scholars in the USA demonstrating that subsequent concepts became fundamental to his *Weltanschauung*. In a letter to the Committee for Selected Social Study from 17th June 1941 he remarked that he had little contact with the faculty members in Kansas City, other than ‘... politically progressive members ...’ (HJM-Archive 10).

### 3.3 Time of ideologies and Morgenthau’s quest to disenchant the world

#### 3.3.1 The loss of simplicity

The *Kulturkrise* fostered the development of ideologies. Life in its totality went out of joint due to the above mentioned dramatic changes and consequently seemed incom-
prehensible. Ideologies had filled the metaphysical void and subsequently formed “poli-
tical religions” (Voegelin) since they were able to serve the need of the masses by pro-
viding shelter from the yearning for a meaning in life and guidance to make sense of the
social world. Following Morgenthau’s assessment, Germans were particularly suscepti-
ble to the promises of ideologies (1930a, p. 171-2), as he agreed with his mentor
Sinzheimer, who had remarked in a letter to Morgenthau from 11th March 1932 that
there would exist ‘eine absolute Furcht des Deutschen vor der Realität’ (an absolute fear
of the Germans of reality) (HJM-Archive 197). It, furthermore, explains Morgenthau’s
anti-ideological stance as he aspired to disenchant the world, to employ a Weberian
times acknowledged the urgency to re-establish a metaphysical system precisely be-
because it would enable humans to find a sense in life again, he still remained critical to-
wards the promises of ideologies. A metaphysical system would have to guarantee em-
pirical and normative objectivity (Morgenthau, 1937, p. 97-100) and, at least the latter,
ideologies would not be able to provide because they would remain the subject of their
particular time and culture, despite their intentional obscuring of their own perspectivist
outlook on the world. Mannheim, whom Morgenthau got to know in Frankfurt during
the late 1920s, had identified hereunto mainly four types of ideologies in his study on
Ideology and Utopia, originally published in 1929, which dominated the political dis-
course at that time: socialism, conservatism, liberalism, and fascism (Mannheim, 1985,
p. 117-46), but particularly the first two were important for his intellectual development.

The socialist ideology particularly found adherents within the heterodoxy. Morgenthau got into closer contact with its representatives when he started to work for
Sinzheimer in Frankfurt in 1928. Sinzheimer was one of the most prominent lawyers in
the Weimar Republic, specialised in labour law, and a social-democratic member of the
National Assembly in 1919-20 (Livneh, 1975, p. 272-5; Frei, 2001, p. 35-6). Over the
years, Morgenthau and Sinzheimer became not only friends, but Sinzheimer also affected Morgenthau’s quest for a sociology of law which ‘... called for an analysis of the fundamentally dynamic or historical character of the nexus between legal norms and reality’ (Scheuerman, 2009a, p. 17). This quest that was fostered through the study of the works of Mannheim and Simmel led Morgenthau to support Sinzheimer’s view that laws can only be understood if they are put into the social context in which they exist. Morgenthau became convinced that it was not legal norms that shaped social reality, but it was social reality that in the first place influenced the creation of norms. This implied that even equal laws could be applied differently under diverse social contexts (Scheuerman, 2008, p. 31-8; 2009a, p. 12-8). As it will be pointed out later, it can be clearly seen that Morgenthau took the importance of contextualisation to heart from his doctoral thesis Die internationale Rechtspflege, ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen (international judicature, its nature, and its limitations) onwards in which he was dealing with international law.

However, this does not mean that Morgenthau was embracing socialism per se. On the contrary, he remained critical towards socialism due to its estrangement from reality. Later in his life, he recalled the night before he left Germany for Switzerland. That night he attended a lecture given by Mannheim at the Institute for Social Research in which he proposed the “free-floating intelligentsia” as a key factor in the fight against Nazism. This instance convinced Morgenthau that ‘[m]oi, je ne suis pas Marxiste’ (I am not a Marxist) (1984, p. 14; emphasis in the original). What Morgenthau criticised socialists for, was not necessarily the content of their concepts and thoughts, but their conviction in their reality changing capacity, as the reference to Mannheim suggests, and their incapability to see that it was rather the particular context that shaped their concepts and thoughts. On an undated slip he accentuated that ‘[t]he idea of scientism is clearly recognizable here [Marxism], the idea that you only need to use the correct formula to ap-
ply to the right mechanical device, and the political subjugation of man will disappear ...’ (HJM-Archive 30). This estrangement is what Morgenthau criticised Kelsen for. Kelsen, founder of the Vienna School of legal positivism, came to Geneva when Morgenthau was submitting his Habilitation (Métall, 1969, p. 63-77). After inner-departmental disputes, Morgenthau only passed it because Kelsen provided a comment in favour of Morgenthau’s work. Kelsen was chosen because Morgenthau’s work was primarily a critique of his “pure theory of law”. Morgenthau remained thankful for this intervention for the rest of his life, but this did not change his criticism of Kelsen.35

Kelsen argued for a strict separation of the different norm systems, such as mores and laws. The reason for this was that, according to Kelsen, law had often been misused by politics in the name of justice. Hence, law and the analysis of law needed to be strictly separated from distorting effects to ensure its purity (Raz, 1986, p. 79-97; Dyzenhaus, 1997, p. 102-60). Morgenthau dismissed legal positivism not only in his Habilitation, but already in his inaugural lecture in Geneva. There he argued against the proposition to separate the realm of be, the actual reality, from the normative ought because, following the sociology of law, the normative would not exist without reference to the realm of actuality. Indeed, this metaphysical nihilism fostered for Morgenthau an ideology that in its framework of thought created a pure, hence rationalistic system of norms that Morgenthau considered as a worthwhile and to a certain extent necessary theoretical exercise. However, due the denial of its social context, Kelsen’s legal positivism was facing the threat of either being misused or being unaware of contemporary problems.36 This is what he not only criticised socialism for, but also later, after his emigration to the United States, liberalism. In a letter to Sister Dorothy Jane Van Hoogstrade from 6th December 1951 he remarked that

‘both liberalism and Marxism believe that the evils to which the flesh is heir can be remedied here and now by man’s unaided efforts. In other words, liberalism
and Marxism are really secular religions which believe that salvation attained [sic] in this world through ... social reform, economic and technological development, or political revolution’ (HJM-Archive 26).

Having experienced the ultimate effect ideologies can have, it becomes comprehensible why Morgenthau laid his academic focus in uncovering the failures of liberalism, culminating in his book *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* from 1946.

The other ideology that affected Morgenthau was conservatism, whose representatives were compiled primarily out of the orthodox part of the mandarin intellectuals. They promoted a conservative revolution by arguing to recreate a worthwhile cultural and political system which had evaporated with the collapse of the German Empire after the First World War. They agreed in their denial of the Weimar Republic as a weak state without real sovereignty. Morgenthau came into contact with this kind of thought in the work of Schmitt whom he had studied, like his colleagues from Sinzheimer’s law office, in his quest to develop an approach capable of properly reflecting the reality within the field of *Staatslehre* (Morgenthau, 1932; Wolin, 1992; Scheuerman, 2009a, p. 32). Presumably this intellectual engagement with Schmitt began while Morgenthau studied in Munich as it is suggested by library tickets which are conserved in the Library of Congress (HJM-Archive 151). This might seem astonishing, bearing in mind Schmitt’s later development to the “*Kronjurist* of the Third Reich” (Waldemar Gurian), but as Morgenthau (1932) himself remarked, Schmitt was alongside Kelsen and Jellinek the doyen of German *Staatslehre*. One should, therefore, not overestimate the relation to Schmitt, as it is the state of current academic debates (e.g. Pichler, 1998; Scheuerman, 1999; 2007b; Koskenniemi, 2000) since he left no doubt about his contempt for Schmitt. After a personal meeting with Schmitt, he later recalled that he had met ‘… the most evil man alive’ (Morgenthau, 1984, p. 16). At that time the controversies between the leading ideologies were still only academic disputes and not yet a question of life and
death. Schmitt (2002, p. 23), for example, later remembered of having had a few inter-
esting discussions with Mannheim, who in his youth had close relations to socialism.\textsuperscript{39}

Morgenthau’s position becomes apparent in his lecture \textit{Der Kampf der deutschen Staatslehre um die Wirklichkeit des Staates} (The fight of German \textit{Staatslehre} about the reality of the state), but was briefly outlined in his piece on Gustav Stresemann (1930a, p. 176) and in the unpublished manuscript \textit{Einige logische Bemerkungen zu Carl Schmitt’s Begriff des Politischen} (Some logical remarks about Carl Schmitt’s notion of the political), written in Geneva (HJM-Archive 110). Schmitt steps in where scholars like Kelsen have failed in the course of the cultural crisis. According to Morgenthau, they not only have denied their own particularity while claiming to have produced a pure theory of law, but they have also neglected the ideological standpoints of their fellow citizens. This means that \textit{Staatslehre} would have to acknowledge, in Morgenthau’s words, an ‘irrational element’ caused by the fact that it is impossible to think about the structure of the state completely rationally since this question would affect one’s own environment. Hence, there would always be emotions, fears, and nescience involved. Morgenthau was convinced that especially within a society like the Weimar Republic, characterised by its pluralism, Kelsen could not succeed. Morgenthau argued, however, that Schmitt would have been aware of the importance of the political for a \textit{Staatslehre} committed to accurately depict reality. In agreement with Schmitt, the political would have to be understood as the ‘entity of public reality’ that would be created by the interaction between its people and the political as an ‘objectification of thought and action’ (Morgenthau, 1932) would lie within the soul of the human beings. Hence, not laws would create the state, but the political would create and give meaning to laws. Here, it is important to note that Morgenthau agreed with Schmitt on the importance of the political, also supported by his interest in sociology of law, but disagreed with Schmitt’s embodiment of the political. Schmitt argued in his “friend-foe-scheme” that the political
would be violent, but Morgenthau believed that this opinion is underlined by the fact that Schmitt would lack the necessary ‘geistig-seelische Zentrum’ (spiritual-moral centre) (1932; 1933, p. 47). Schmitt’s quest for scholarly insight would not have been guided by an ethical relation towards an aspiration of truth, but would be biased and openly promoting a reactionary ideology. This was the trouble in Schmitt’s thought for Morgenthau since, like Kelsen, he would not have been able to reflect on his own spatial and temporal conditionality. As it is reasoned by Morgenthau (1932), he would have been looking for the solution in the same ideology which would have created the problem in the field of *Staatslehre*. Schmitt’s ideological position concerning the political led him to the proposition of creating a strong state by arguing for homogeneity among its population regarding the fundamental social principles (Morgenthau, 1934b, p. 54-5). The existing pluralism of thoughts would, therefore, endanger the order of the state.

### 3.3.2 The alternative route of life philosophy and German historicism

Since ideologies conceal the pluralism of reality, Morgenthau turned to life philosophy, whose representatives offered for Morgenthau the possibility to gain a deeper and critical understanding of it. A first access to life philosophy was provided for Morgenthau in the study of Nietzsche, ‘the God of my [Morgenthau] youth’ (quoted after: Frei, 1994, p. 101). Indeed, Nietzsche remained a constant intellectual companion throughout his life, as a request to the library in Chicago to acquire more copies of Nietzsche’s books exemplarily demonstrates (HJM-Archive 52). Nietzsche was influential for Morgenthau regarding his distrust in ideologies. As it is manifested in Nietzsche’s remark that ‘God is dead’ (2003, p. 120), for him there was no objective world order anymore and certainty could only be found in distorting concepts of order that simplify reality. Nietzsche argued to recognise what and how it exists is a much nobler scholarly task than claims to how it should be. Certainly, Morgenthau took this
to heart, as demonstrated in an article written in Madrid, where he exclaimed: ‘Je con-
state simplement ce que je vois’ (I only remark what I see) (1936, p. 5). This led to an-
other aspect Morgenthau found stimulating in Nietzsche. By demystifying eternal truth
proclaimers, Nietzsche pointed out those forces that appeared to really shape the world:
emotions, passions, hopes, and wishes. All of this is ‘human, all too human’ (Nietzsche,
1996a) and eventually led Morgenthau to the conviction that human beings need to be at
the focus of scholarly work. Late in his life Morgenthau was still convinced that this
task was far from being achieved, since ‘[t]here is a fog of mystery in which human ex-
istence is embedded’ (1972, p. 63).

This occupation with Nietzsche brought Morgenthau into further contact with repre-
sentatives of life philosophy and particularly German historism (Jung, 1990, p. 152; Frei,
2001, p. 108-9). On the basis of his Nietzsche studies, Morgenthau found affirmation
regarding the anthropological condition of political order and relativism of being, which
were cornerstones of life philosophy and also became central to Morgenthau’s thought
(Bochénski, 1951, p. 133). Simmel, whom Morgenthau frequently read with satisfaction
during his formative years41 and whom he recommended to Alfred Hotz in a letter from
11th October 1950 (HJM-Archive 28), considered irrationalism as a defining factor of
modern societies. To make sense of this irrationalism one had to start from analysing
the anthropological condition of political order. This is the case since for Simmel sci-
ence, technology, works of art, and even civil laws would only gain meaning through
the reciprocal relation of the involved persons. Since the entity of life would be incorpo-
rated in them and life would be in constant flux, also the context of these relations
would be dynamic and could take numerous forms. For Simmel, therefore, truth would
have only existed within the realm of a specific context (Kaern, 1990, p. 78-83).
Morgenthau became aware of this irrationalism while studying international law. This
realm would have been, according to Morgenthau, marked by a tension of the statism of
international law and the constantly changing actualities. Therefore, international law would have been incapable of depicting reality appropriately (Morgenthau, 1929b, p. 623; 1930b, p. 18). But there would be a further conflict within life itself. Life would not only be expressed through a curtailed ego, but also manifested in an infinite continuity. This would be the case since, on the one hand, there would be a ‘struggle [of life] against form itself, against the very principle of form ...’ (Simmel, 1997b, p. 77). Life would be dynamic and in constant flux, but would need to manifest itself in forms. Yet, they would be static expressions that from the moment of their creation would be inadequate images of life, manifested for Morgenthau in international law. ‘[F]rom the first moment of their existence, they have fixed forms of their own, set apart from the ... rhythm of life itself ...’ (Simmel, 1997b, p. 76). Hence, according to Simmel, life would have to recreate continuously new forms of manifestation since the old ones, due to their statism, would not be allowed to be filled with life. There would be irrationalism in life because the form in itself would not reflect the intentions of its creators anymore and would remain excluded from life, although having been created out of it. By arguing to do so, Simmel anticipated Alfred Schütz’s idea of multiple realities (Šuber, 2002, p. 172). For Simmel, therefore, one could not speak of a society, but of sociation. It is not the forms, hence institutions, that would be of importance, but the interactions of people (Simmel, 1908, p. 4-10; Frisby, 1984, p. 120-3; Scaff, 1990, p. 288; Lichtblau, 1997, p. 83-98).

Morgenthau concluded from this that scholarship would need to consider a critical relativism and in doing so, he particularly referred to Mannheim, whom he later recommended to Charles A. McClelland on 16th March 1949: ‘I am glad to know that you got acquainted with Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia. It will pay re-reading, and you will probably find, as I have, that the oftener you read it, the more it will help you in your thinking on political problems’ (HJM-Archive 53). Though Mannheim had a sim-
ple understanding of relativism which was based on the argument that there would be no objective standards or laws, Mannheim is important to consider since Morgenthau initially started from a similar assumption. For Mannheim thought would be existentially determined:

‘The existential determination of knowledge may be regarded as a demonstrated fact in those realms of thought in which we can show (a) that the process of knowing does not actually develop historically in accordance with immanent laws ... On the contrary, the emergence and the crystallization of actual thought is influenced in many decisive points by extratheoretical factors ... existential factors. This existential determination of thought will also have to be regarded as a fact (b) if the influence of these existential factors on the concrete content of knowledge is more than mere peripheral importance ...’ (1985, p. 267).

This means that thought and knowledge would be constructed in one particular social reality and that this constellation would be constitutive for the content and the way a person would think due to the specific semiotics (Scott, 1987, p. 41-54; Knoblauch, 2005, p. 100-15; Jung, 2007, p. 120-41). This thought was explicitly supported by Morgenthau: ‘In other words, political thinking is ... “standortgebunden”, that is to say it is tied to a particular situation’ (1962a, p. 72-3; emphasis in the original). Morgenthau agreed, therefore, with Mannheim that any reflection would be tied to a particular perspective and only the totality of these perspectives would lead to an objective reflection. Being aware of one’s own perspective would enable to acknowledge other perspectives as well and this would lead to a more sound truth claim since the scholar would be able to incorporate other perspectives into his/her own (Mannheim, 1985, p. 75-83). The lack of being able to relate one’s position to another position is what Morgenthau criticised Schmitt for. Schmitt would have had only his point of view and interest in mind. Therefore, Schmitt’s scholarship would, following Morgenthau, not contribute to truth, but to
a specific ideology. It will be pointed out later, that this, what Mannheim called *relationism*, was not only important for Morgenthau’s perception since dealing with representatives of life philosophy and historicism showed him that as a scholar, but also generally one should never consider his own perception so highly that it would lead to a denial of other perceptions, but also for his thought and action.

3.4 **The alienated mind**

3.4.1 **Recourse to individualism**

Morgenthau’s anti-ideological stance moved his focus of attention towards the human being. Therefore, already early in his career he got into contact with Freud and psychoanalysis, not least because with Fromm, psychoanalysis was well received at the Institute for Social Research. Besides, the Weimar Republic with its cultural open-mindedness during the 1920s offered the stage for ground-breaking theory, like psychoanalysis, to become popular (Gay, 1988, p. 446-69). Since psychoanalysis is individual psychology, Morgenthau hoped to have found the solution in his quest to develop an approach that considered the political as the key to understanding reality (Schuett, 2007, p. 65). This is why he got briefly engaged with it between his doctoral thesis and Habilitation resulting in a manuscript called *Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen* (The derivation of the political from the nature of man) (HJM-Archive 199).

Freud seemed to be well suited to Morgenthau’s quest since he provided an analytical scheme to explain the human mind. According to Freud, the mind would be divided into three instincts: the *id*, *ego*, and *super-ego*. The *id* would be the realm of unconscious drives that would influence human actions. This would include hunger, thirst, and sexual desires. It would also include the conflictive drives of *Eros* (life drive) and *Thanatos* (death drive). The latter would be characterised in the human aspiration to re-
peat, to keep, and the yearning for a standstill, whereas *Eros* would be the exact opposite. This drive would instil in humans the urge to construct and be productive. The *super-ego*, however, following Freud, would be opposed to the natural drives of the *id*. The *super-ego* would contain instructions and prohibitions imposed by the environment on human beings, such as family or other social authorities. Perception of morality and values would be created with the intention to restrain the *id* within human beings. These two opposed instincts would clash into the *ego*. This is the realm where humans would make sense of the world and live their life by trying to balance the other instincts. This conscious process of balancing would be intended to produce seemingly rational solutions for the questions that have to be taken throughout one’s life (Freud, 1961a, p. 13-59; Gay, 1988, p. 403-16). Morgenthau thought he had found the solution for his quest, not least because Freud provided with the *id* and *super-ego* space to analyse human conditionality. Indeed, even later Morgenthau acknowledged that ‘[i]n our time Sigmund Freud has rediscovered the autonomy of the dark and evil forces which, as manifestations of the unconscious, determine the fate of man’ (1947a, p. 175).

This belief was put on a firm basis since Freud also tried to apply this theory on the international level. Freud pointed out that the instincts intrinsic to people could not be followed at the national level due to moral, societal, or legal restraints. Indeed, within a society these instincts would have to be suppressed because the potential aggression that comes along with human instincts would otherwise threaten to dissolve the society. As Freud put it:

‘The existence of this tendency to aggression ... is the factor that disturbs our relation with our neighbours and makes it necessary for culture to institute its high demands. Civilized society is perpetually menaced with disintegration through this ... hostility of men towards one another ... Culture has to call up every pos-
sible reinforcement in order to erect barriers against the aggressive instincts of men ...’ (1953, p. 37-8).

However, the international level with no legal or social restrictions, only at best moral ones, would give, according to Freud, the possibility to follow one’s instincts ruthlessly, as the First World War showed. Through identification with the nation-state especially at times of crisis, by “rallying around the flag”, to use a more modern term, each citizen could satisfy his instincts by receiving a share of the power a nation acquires on the international scene (Schuett, 2007, p. 61-66; Scheuerman, 2009a, p. 37-8).

Yet, Morgenthau eventually abandoned Freud’s thought. Not that he did not gain useful insights in the human psyche that consolidated his picture of men and women, whose foundation was already laid through the studying of Nietzsche (Morgenthau, 1937, p. 82-7), but Morgenthau was dissatisfied with the insights psychoanalysis provided which is why he did not even consider the above mentioned manuscript as good enough for publication. In his autobiographical sketch, Morgenthau provided us with the reasons for his dissatisfaction: ‘[W]hat defeats a psychoanalytical theory of politics is the impossibility of accounting for complexities and varieties of political experience with the simplicities of a reductionist theory, economic or psychological’ (1984, p. 14). Hence, psychoanalysis seemed too static for Morgenthau. It did not allow him to incorporate all aspects of human life and eventually showed him that in order to effectively fulfil this task, the thought has to focus on one’s own self, instead of other persons’ egos. Once again, life philosophy provided Morgenthau with a solid basis to channel his thoughts effectively. As the next section will show, Morgenthau’s ‘methodological individualism’ (Schuett, 2007, p. 62) was not based upon Freud, but found its scholarly expression in reflections of life philosophy.
3.4.2 Alienation as an epistemological resource

Alienation is without doubt a concept that has triggered philosophical debates again and again (Behr, 1995, p. 178). Also, during the time of Morgenthau’s intellectual socialisation alienation played a crucial role, not least because of the cataclysmic experiences of the loss of metaphysics, and moved into the centre of epistemological thought of numerous German humanists (Geisteswissenschaftler) (Pachter, 1972, p. 236; Björk, 2005).

Within Morgenthau’s field, the two most prominent attempts to make use of alienation for epistemological elucidation were provided by Simmel and Schütz. Both followed different conceptions of alienation. While Simmel focused on the stranger within a society, ‘... the person who comes today and stays tomorrow’ (1964a, p. 402), exemplified in the history of European Jews, Schütz considered the stranger as an outsider, manifested in the ideal type of the emigrant. Certainly, Schütz’s experiences as an émigré scholar, having been expelled by the rise of Nazism, played a role in his understanding of the stranger since the stranger is ‘... an adult individual ... who tries to be permanently accepted or at least tolerated by the group which he approaches’ (1944, p. 499). Both, nevertheless, appraised an increased epistemological ability as the most important feature (Endreß, 2006, p. 123). Alienation, on the one hand, would increase it since the stranger would be better suited to rationally analyse his/her environment. This would be the case since, following Simmel, the stranger would have more ‘freedom’ (1964a, p. 405) because he/she would be more detached from social conditions and obligations that would determine the perception and thoughts of people living under these conditions. Schütz emphasised that alienation might increase knowledge since people, well-established within society, would not have to question everyday actions and common beliefs because one could assume their general acceptance. Their knowledge would be ‘... (1) incoherent, (2) only particularly clear, and (3) not at all free from contradictions’
(Schuetz, 1944, p. 500). This, on the other hand, would lead to a further reason for the increased epistemological abilities of strangers. Whereas for Simmel the enhanced mobility of the stranger was essential because it would enable the stranger to acquire more knowledge due to more experiences, and he saw estrangement consistently positively, Schütz also acknowledged the burden alienation would require from its bearers. The stranger would enter a life-world in which nothing would remain unquestioned since it would be different from one’s former life and common beliefs. Although, according to Schütz, the past of the new society would remain excluded to the stranger, numerous beliefs, manners, and rules would have to be understood to ensure one’s subsistence.

Recently, Enzo Traverso (2004) provided an example which emphasises this questioning of common assumptions. Émigré scholars, like Arendt, Adorno, and Horkheimer, would have contributed significantly to the interpretation of the Holocaust since they would have been free from the constraints of national contexts. Simmel and Schütz’s remarks accentuate that within life philosophy there was a tendency to acknowledge that more objectivity would be achieved through the physical and/or mental detachment from the rest of society and through an increased willingness to self-reflect. Morgenthau was exposed to both kinds of alienation and gradually turned his circumstances of life into his epistemological basis (Frei, 2001, p. 23).

On the one hand, Morgenthau was, due to his family and religious background, a stranger in Europe in the sense of Simmel. Morgenthau grew up as the only and lonely child of an authoritarian father. Although patriarchy was then common, it left scars in Morgenthau’s psyche in the form of shyness and the fear of being rejected (Postscript, 1984, p. 339-41; Frei, 2005, p. 39). The relation to his father was further tested in 1927, when Morgenthau was diagnosed with tuberculosis, very much then a socially ostracised disease. As a result he not only had to spend five months in a sanatorium, but also suffered from a fragile health for the rest of his life (Frei, 2001, p. 34-5). The family,
however, was not the only source of Morgenthau’s alienation. What made matters worse, was that Morgenthau grew up in Coburg, where in 1929 the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) won the absolute majority in city council (Stadtrat) elections (Hayward and Morris, 1988, p. 110-5). Life as a Jew in a particularly anti-Semitic area was difficult and lonesome. This was manifested in an incident at the boy scouts, as Morgenthau later recalled: ‘I remember being spit at when marching in a group. This treatment aggravated the traumatic experiences I had at home and led to a kind of retrenchment. I retreated into my own shell in fear of disappointing human contacts’ (Postscript, 1984, p. 339). Being in the boy scouts, however, just like the membership to the fraternity Thuringia (HJM-Archive 44), which was partly his father’s wish, shows that Morgenthau took various efforts to overcome alienation and become an unquestioned member of society. The road to consider alienation as a source for his epistemology was long and stony and became not obvious before he made science his vocation and certainly aggravated, when he was forced to leave Europe. But from Frankfurt onwards this certainty became a deliberate act since the transfer to Frankfurt, being a Prussian city, from Bavaria’s capital Munich, required special, official permission to do so (Postscript, 1984, p. 348).

As an intellectual, Morgenthau’s forced emigration had three implications, as Neumann, his former colleague in Sinzheimer’s office, once remarked. Not only was he displaced with his family from his friends and belongings, but he was also displaced as a scholar from his intellectual field and, finally, as a political person, who promoted republican and humane conditions (Eisfeld, 1991, p. 116). But unlike other émigré scholars, such as Reinhard Bendix and Arendt, Morgenthau was also a ‘double exile’ as Felix Frankfurter remarked in a letter to Nathan Greene from 9th December 1937, since he was expelled from Germany and Spain (HJM-Archive 22). Hence, twice in his life Morgenthau was forced to adapt to new life-worlds and the second time was especially
difficult for Morgenthau. He knew nobody in the United States since his only acquaintance, Richard Gottheil, a professor at Columbia, had died shortly before Morgenthau arrived in 1937 (Postscript, 1984, p. 364) which aggravated his anxiety to get a position in American academia. This was different from Madrid since he went there, like Hermann Heller, to take up a position at the Instituto de Estudios Internacionales y Económicos (Meyer, 1967, p. 310-1). His first academic position in the United States at Brooklyn College consequently required him to teach ‘... just about everything under the sun’ (Postscript, 1984, p. 367). A further problem was the different intellectual tradition in which liberalism was the ruling dogma. In accordance with his anti-ideological stance, Morgenthau early on warned of the dangers an exaggerated understanding of liberalism would cause. This almost intransigent understanding of philosophical traditions is manifested in his remark to Rita Neumeyer Herbert from 2nd June 1947 in which he stated after reading the reviews to Scientific Man vs. Power Politics that ‘... they literally don’t know what I am talking about’ (HJM-Archive 26). Indeed, this might explain why most of Morgenthau’s friends were also European emigrants. Among them were the already mentioned Arendt and Gurian as well as Richard and Hildegard Mainzer, Karl Löwenstein, and the Schulmann family. It is to be assumed that there was a particular bond between German-speaking émigrés since, as Elisabeth Young-Bruehl remarked for the circle around Arendt, these were people ‘... who could respond to a quotation from Goethe with a quotation from Heine, who knew German fairy tales’ (1982, p. XIV). Besides, Morgenthau used any possibility to return to Europe, be it for official reasons, like the sojourn to Austria upon the request of the American Department of State (HJM-Archive 59), academic reasons, teaching at the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies from 1950-1976 or the Villa Serbelloni in Italy (HJM-Archive 50; 53), or private reasons, since ‘man streicht sich [dort] die Seele glatt’
(one can mentally recover there) as Arendt mentioned shortly before her death in a letter to Morgenthau in 1975 (HJM-Archive 5).

On the other hand, Morgenthau was also as an immigrant a stranger in Schütz’s sense. The hardship Morgenthau suffered throughout his life proved decisive for the development of his epistemology. As pointed out, it is reasonable to believe that early on Morgenthau was aware of the possibilities alienation could offer as his choice to work for Sinzheimer and writing *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* put him at odds with the orthodoxy of American political science (Amstrup, 1978, p. 173; Scheuerman, 2009a, p. 13). Alienation was for Morgenthau the conscious act of detachment that enabled him to analyse situations with greater rationality due to his greater capacity of synopsis, as Mannheim also had hoped to achieve with his “free-floating intelligentsia” (Kögler, 1997, p. 144-8; Loader, 1997, p. 217-29; Barboza, 2006, p. 232-255). This ability to rationalise is confirmed by several people who knew Morgenthau personally. George Eckstein noted that Morgenthau had a ‘... very rational mind, always coolly alert to analyze and understand any given event or situation’ (1981, p. 641). Likewise, Richard Falk accentuates Morgenthau’s ‘... unflinching capacity for objectivity’ (1984, p. 77). Alienation also enabled Morgenthau to become more aware of his own and the position of others. This not only allowed him to remark and obviate own distortions of his consciousness, but it also provided him with the capacity to perceive the nuances in human interrelation that often mark the difference (Morgenthau, 1965, p. 81), as a reviewer remarked about Morgenthau’s *The Purpose of American Politics*:

‘Prof. Morgenthau’s great advantage is that, as a scholar and citizen already mature, when he chose the United States as his country, he can look at it from within and also with the critical objectivity of an outsider. So he knows where the foundations, emotional and social, are weak’ (HJM-Archive 144).
3.5  The outsider as insider and the power of dissent

3.5.1  The nemesis of the Weimar Republic

The Weimar Republic was for the intellectual elite in many ways a possibility to overcome the rigid social conventions of the German Empire if we just think of the *Neue Sachlichkeit* in literature, film, and art. Still, the downfall of the Weimar Republic was not only a constant political and economic threat, but particularly also culturally and intellectually (Büttner, 2008, p. 296). Neither orthodox nor heterodox intellectuals used the opportunities which they were conceded in the Weimar Republic responsibly and, therefore, they eventually contributed to its downfall.

For numerous orthodox intellectuals the Weimar Republic was a symbol for vulgar- ity and decadence. The emergence of a commodified mass-culture threatened traditional family structures as much as moral conceptions (Büttner, 2008, p. 332-3). This not only had far-reaching consequences for their life-world, but also eroded their position as custodians of these traditional structures which is why orthodox intellectuals aspired to a conservative revolution right after the downfall of the German Empire. As the University of Berlin, then the most eminent German university, was the centre of orthodoxy, it was perceived by open-minded students like the literary critic Hans Mayer and also Morgenthau, who studied there briefly, as an anachronistic place where professors desperately clung to their old positions (Postscript, 1984, p. 345; Mayer, 1988, p. 77). One reason for this threatening prospect was for the Germans and the orthodox mandarins in particular that the same people who were made responsible for, in their eyes, shameful defeat, were often to be found in leading government positions of the Weimar Republic. Morgenthau later recalled the importance this “stab in the back” legend had gained in the minds of the people (Postscript, 1984, p. 335). The ultimate denial of the Weimar Republic is manifested in the assassination of several hundred people, often Jews, Catholics, and liberals that were associated with this legend. Many of the assas-
sins were academics with roots in the nobility and/or military. Both groups suffered the steepest decline in importance after the downfall of the Empire since the nobility had lost its privileges in the Weimar Republic and the military had been restricted in the Treaty of Versailles. The father of Heinrich Tillesen, for example, who was one of the assassins of Matthias Erzberger, a member of the delegation to sign the Versailles Peace Treaty, was Lieutenant General and the Bavarian Prime Minister, Kurt Eisner, was assassinated by the law student Anton Graf von Arco auf Valley (Mommsen, 1996, p. 125-7).

Yet, also the heterodox intellectuals, who profited most from the changed political and social conditions, contributed to the Republic’s nemesis. Right after the Empire’s downfall, numerous heterodox intellectuals engaged in the promotion of society. However, they were too idealistic and had no possibility of implementing their ideas for a different society. This pluralism of views is demonstrated in the formation of the Novembergruppe (November group) in December 1918, where artists like Lyonel Feininger, Otto Dix, George Grosz, and Walter Gropius wanted to create a young and free Germany. Likewise, the Arbeitsrat für Kunst (work council for art), formed in 1919, argued that the people needed to be able to get culturally engaged and, therefore, promoted the construction of people’s theatres, arenas, and parks. Yet, the government was supposed to remain in the hands of intellectuals. A first step towards this platonic noocracy was the proposal to nominate Gerhard Hauptmann and later Heinrich Mann as President (Gay, 2004, p. 138-57; Büttner, 2008, p. 297-8). When these idealistic tendencies remained unfulfilled, not least, because of the orthodoxy’s instigation, the heterodox turned away from expressionism towards the Neue Sachlichkeit, a symbol of their Republic’s renunciation (Peukert, 1991, p. 33-5).

Few of the heterodox intellectuals, like the peace activist Ludwig Quidde, full heartedly supported Weimar. Typically, its representatives pursued one of the following
three attitudes towards the Weimar Republic. The first attitude, although positive towards the Weimar Republic, was characterised by a political misinterpretation towards its problem-solving capacity and the mind of Germans in general. In particular, Jewish members of the mandarins misinterpreted the ameliorations which were achieved during the German Empire and Weimar Republic as further steps to assimilation and often underestimated the latent anti-Semitism. Morgenthau noted in a lecture given at the Leo Baeck Institute New York in 1961 that ‘... it so happens that the philosophy and the institutions of liberalism are not the expression of eternal verities. [They] arose under certain historic conditions and, hence, were bound to disappear under different historic conditions’ (1961a, p. 6-7). Morgenthau’s assessment rested on his own family experience since he was born into one of those liberal Jewish families. His father was a patriot, trying to assimilate as best as possible, as his support for Morgenthau’s fraternity membership demonstrates (Frei, 2001, p. 21-2). Despite this positive stance towards Weimar, their support vanished because this group was not aware of the changing actualities of the political. Apart from this misinterpretation, there was also indifference towards the republican ideal of the common good. Although the proverbial German Vereinsmeierei (devotion to associational life) was a distinctive trait of social life during the early 20th century, it cannot be considered as a strengthening feature of the Republic per se (Berman, 1997, p. 401-29; Heilbronner, 1998, p. 443-63). On the contrary, the associations promoted their own particular interests, some openly anti-republican, nationalistic, and even racist, like the Thule-Gesellschaft, the Stahlhelm, or the Blücherbund, and, therefore, had a negative impact on Weimar’s already weak institutions. But even if they were not anti-republican, heterodox intellectuals retreated into associational life after their initial idealistic disillusion and turned at best into Vernunftrepublikaner, like the historian Friedrich Meinecke. Others, however, could not even support Weimar for sound reasons anymore. Indeed, they openly opposed it. After the idealism of the start-
ing years had vanished, due to conservative efforts, exemplified in the abolition of the Bavarian Soviet Republic in 1919, the Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch in 1920, or the Hitler-Ludendorff-Putsch in 1923, numerous mandarin intellectuals turned to communism in their quest for a more equal and free society. As a consequence, they refused to support Weimar and occasionally worked against it (Peukert, 1991, p. 172-4; Wehler, 2003, p. 535-41). The capital Berlin especially remained a hotbed for extreme ideals and numerous younger members of the mandarin intellectuals turned to communism while trying to find their place in life. Both Mayer (1988) and Eric Hobsbawm (2002), to mention just two examples, became communists in Berlin.  

This demonstrates that the Weimar Republic was certainly a highly politicised state because there was a multitude of interests which either struggled for a niche to exist or tried to change the political system altogether. Yet, it was no ‘Republic of the reasonable’ (Bookbinder, 1996) because in the end there were not enough supporters of the Republic. Like representatives from the orthodoxy, heterodox members of the mandarin intellectuals also showed little interest in the Republic as a hoard of the common good and followed their own particular interests. This weak support was one of the reasons why the institutions of the Weimar Republic could no longer withhold the forces that were tearing them apart.

3.5.2  *The political as society’s core*

The developments in Europe, culminating in the Holocaust and the Second World War, reinforced Morgenthau’s conviction that the political is the central aspect of society and active civic engagement is required to prohibit its violation.

Morgenthau was an eye-witness of the rise of the totalitarian national-socialistic state. In the 1920s and 1930s, agitation and propaganda gradually mantled the political discourse with a total form of ideology. Through a discourse of exclusivity, minorities like
Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, or communists could be barred from society and the individual was attached and subdued in his/her quest for identity to the masses. Shortly after Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor (30th January 1933) on the “Day of Potsdam” (21st March 1933), this discourse of uniqueness was further historicised and visualised through the seizure of the Prussian myth (Münkler, 2009, p. 275-94) which was supposed to put Hitler into direct line with Fredrick the Great, Otto von Bismarck, and Paul von Hindenburg as depicted in contemporary postcards. Arendt (1953, p. 303-6) has noted that totalitarianism would have been a new form of government precisely because it would provide remedy for the modern feeling of meaninglessness and solitude by recreating identity within the totalitarian framework. A democratic republic, like Weimar, would have been especially endangered by totalitarianism since other than in an absolute monarchy or theocracy, where the subjects are born into a transcendental order and would not have to question their identity, it would require its citizens to create their identity by themselves. The specific danger of totalitarian regimes would be that they do not operate from a lawless and arbitrary basis, like tyrannies, but would claim to be derived, in the case of national-socialism, from natural law. Since these laws would precede positive laws, totalitarian regimes would remain within this realm, though gradually washing it out (Arendt, 1953, p. 306-10).

It was this danger that Morgenthau had in mind when he criticised Kelsen’s pure theory of law for not taking this possibility into account and made conscious that the survival of a republic is dependent upon its ideal of embedded criticism (Tjalve, 2008, p. 5). The enforcement of constant and common guiding of the political needed, as Morgenthau pointed out in later years, strong political leadership (Tjalve, 2008, p. 114-6). Political leaders, Morgenthau hoped, would be able to provide channels of dissent, while having the greatness of mind to transcend their own particular conditionality in their decision-making. Yet, leaders needed not only to monitor public opinion, but
should also provide visions that could stir up public opinion in the first place (Morgenthau, 1957a, p. 7-11; 1959d, p. 5-8). Morgenthau (1962c, p. 18) argued this could provide a solution for the ideological takeover of the political which would have made any contradicting idea suspicious from the beginning. Morgenthau’s yearning for a strong political leadership can also be seen in his scepticism of direct democracy. Public policies, like diplomacy, should remain in the hands of political leaders since ideally they would be able to find less biased, more nuanced, and hence sounder decisions than would be possible in a direct democracy. The public opinion, as Morgenthau stressed in the “radio-university” (Funk-Universität) broadcasting programme of the RIAS (radio in the American sector of Berlin), would tend to think too simplified in moral and legal categories of good and bad which could potentially result in too superficial political decisions (1957b, p. 5).

This does not mean that Morgenthau was objecting to a democratic republic. Morgenthau, however, defined democracy as a noocracy legitimised by the people, hence, as ‘... the government of an elite with the consent of the people’ (HJM-Archive 28). Following Morgenthau, it would be the patriotic task of citizens to be aware of the decisions taken and scrutinise them critically because ‘[t]he right to dissent derives from the relativistic philosophy of democracy. That philosophy assumes that all members of society... have equal access to the truth, but none of them has a monopoly in it’ (Morgenthau, 1970a, p. 40). From this follows that Morgenthau hoped, on the one hand, that citizens would gain tolerance in the sense that they would become aware of their own potential fallibility and that public opinion could create a pluralism of views, all convinced of their truthfulness. On the other hand, as Morgenthau remarked for the Weimar Republic, there would need to be the awareness of the temporality of one’s and others’ convictions. Policies, deriving from such convictions, would be power relations, but they would have to be accepted as temporal in the sense that they would have been
sustained by a majority and could be changed as soon this majoritarian support vanished. This emphasises that ‘[a] notion of patriotism as dissent ... rests on dedication to the perpetual process of contestation over the substance of policies, and yet absolute respect for the immutability of political procedures’ (Tjalve, 2008, p. 125-6). Yet, this kind of patriotism would require well-educated citizens, capable of self-reflection and empathy, actively engaged in the political and social life enabling them to experience and contribute to the pluralism of views, which is why Morgenthau was a strong supporter of education throughout his life.

This conviction that the society would need the political understood as civic engagement so that it will not be usurped by ideologies already existed when Morgenthau was still in Europe. Yet, Morgenthau became only fully aware of the total nemesis – physically and morally – totalitarianism can cause after the Second World War. This retrospective comprehension is manifested in his autobiographical sketch in which Morgenthau remarked that the work in Sinzheimer’s office consisted of ‘... interesting and sometimes fascinating intellectual exercises. But they were marginal to the crucial issues with which society had to come to terms. What was decisive was not the merits of different legal interpretations but the distribution of political power’ (1984, p. 9). Still, Morgenthau tried to engage in the political sphere within the realms he, as a lawyer who just had finished his doctoral thesis, could reach, as a series of articles in the Frankfurter Zeitung, a then prominent liberal newspaper, on reforms of the jurisprudential study suggest (HJM-Archive 95). At that time, he already anticipated that the political sphere of the Weimar Republic was in danger of being replaced by the racist ideology of national-socialism, while the majority of the mandarin intellectuals, as noted above, remained indifferent. This was demonstrated to Morgenthau at a soirée Morgenthau was invited to by Karl Neumeyer while visiting Munich in 1935. All guests were critical towards national-socialism, yet, ‘[t]hey all argued against the Nazis from
their own personal point of view.' And Morgenthau added that after mentioning to them the story of the murder of an acquainted Jewish lawyer they replied as follows: "Don’t talk to us about this. We don’t mix in politics ... It doesn’t interest us" (Postscript, 1984, p. 363-4).

After the enormous success of his textbook *Politics among Nations* in 1948, Morgenthau’s popularity rose to a level which made him a sought-after commentator and Morgenthau was eager to fill in this role. Morgenthau wrote for numerous newspapers, like the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*, and liberal magazines, like *Commentary*, *Worldview*, and *The New Republic* commenting on topics, such as the Vietnam War, the rise of China, and student protests in the late 1960s. Furthermore, he supported the public’s capacity to follow the opinion making process by instructing the wider public on a local level. He worked, for example, for the *Keneseth Israel Beth Shalom* Congregation in Kansas City, while at the local university from 1939-1943, and the Adult Education Council of Greater Chicago until the late 1960s (HJM-Archive 3; 91). During this time, Morgenthau also gave more than 60 public lectures and talks per year throughout the United States which clearly indicates his enormous efforts (HJM-Archive 153). Morgenthau also actively engaged in the public opinion creation by participating and heading countless civil rights associations, such as the Academic Committee on Soviet Jewry from 1969-1979 (HJM-Archive 2). Certainly, the interest to facilitate the emigration of Soviet Jews can be explained through his own experiences of being an emigrant (Mollov, 1997, p. 561-575). Largely forgotten today, however, is the enormous efforts he undertook to criticise and argue against the righteousness of the Vietnam War. At that time, he was probably its most eminent critic and was engaged in several associations that fought against it. As it will be later discussed in detail, Morgenthau considered the Vietnam War as a civil war, in which the USA only took part because it was in fear that Vietnam would fall into the hands of communism.
Morgenthau tried to convince the public of the catastrophe that would necessarily follow after starting to wage war, but he remained largely unheard (Rafshoon, 2001, p. 55-72). Indeed, when he was heard, he was often threatened for his civic engagement, as it was the case when he argued for nuclear disarmament and Germany’s acceptance of the Oder-Neiße-border with Poland (HJM-Archive 39; 185). Yet, this could not stop Morgenthau from his civic engagement and participation in the public opinion making process and proves that he was actively engaged in the political sphere. He had once witnessed how quickly a republic can be turned into a totalitarian state and he tried to prevent this from happening again in the future.

3.6 Conclusion

The intention of this chapter was to contextualise Morgenthau within the field of the German mandarin intellectuals in which he was socialised and point out that this socialisation is crucial to elucidate the foundations of his Weltanschauung. It was disclosed that Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung rested on “social group formations”, as Mannheim called it; in Morgenthau’s case the heterodoxy of mandarin intellectuals, and as intellectual creations that were identified in the concepts of ideology, alienation, and the dissidence. Certainly, building this fundament was not a coherent, teleological process and its development experienced breaks and inconsistencies, as the temporal occupation with Marxism and psychoanalysis reveal. Yet, by the time Morgenthau was forced to leave Europe, he had developed a firm basis of his Weltanschauung that remained stable after his emigration to the United States. Of course, Morgenthau’s life in the United States affected him. Inventions like nuclear weapons, developments, such as the Second World War, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War, and experiences like his outstanding career in a different form of academia, left their marks. However, these marks did not call his Weltanschauung into question, but rather reassured it, as the next
chapters will show. Therefore, other than recent scholarship claims (e.g. Guzzini, 2004, p. 547), this chapter identified guiding concepts of his socialisation within the Weimar mandarin intellectuals and they remained the basis upon which he founded his academic career in the United States, as Neacsu (2010, p. 69) also recently noted.

It was also remarked that Morgenthau’s socialisation has to be understood as the condensate of the entity of the German mandarin intellectuals. This means Morgenthau cannot be pinned down to one particular scholar, like Weber, Schmitt, and Freud, although some scholars were certainly more influential, like Nietzsche, Simmel, and even Mannheim. All of them remained constant companions from Morgenthau’s early study years until the end of his life. Morgenthau began his academic career within the heterodox part of the mandarin intellectuals, remained there throughout his career despite his success, and its representatives contributed most to the development of his Weltanschauung. The constant mutual personal and intellectual exchange he had with them centred his thoughts on principal intellectual debates of that time. These debates were conceptualised in this chapter under the terms of disenchantment of the world, alienation, and the power of dissent. As it was shown, Morgenthau, however, did not solely echo these debates, but developed his own, unique, and critical stance. He remained for example sceptical about the major ideologies and criticised the non-identification of the importance the political has for the well-being of a society and in particular for a republic. Indeed, these ramified fundaments of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, made it not only difficult for other scholars to label him (Vasquez, 1979), but also Morgenthau himself had problems answering questions about which camp he would be classified in, as demonstrated in a letter to Sandra Frye from 25th November 1964: ‘I think as far as method is concerned, I am a conservative. As for the objectives of politics are concerned, I think I am a liberal’ (HJM-Archive 20). These remarks point out that one
should do away with labelling and rather focus on the comprehensiveness of the contexts Morgenthau developed his *Weltanschauung*.

Now that its fundament has been elaborated, the next three chapters will follow precisely this task of understanding Morgenthau’s *Weltanschauung* by elaborating his ontology, epistemology, and political and civic engagement.
Chapter 4. Under an empty sky: Hans Morgenthau’s ontology

4.1 Introduction

Having established the field and core concepts upon which Morgenthau developed his Weltanschauung, the task remains to elucidate its components. As elaborated in chapter two, the methodology this part of the analysis rests upon is Bourdieu’s concept of habitus which was subdivided into ontology, epistemology, and political agency. To begin this part of the analysis, this chapter intends to unravel Morgenthau’s ontology. The previous chapter has shown that the development of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung was notionally, intellectually, and personally accompanied by various scholars who can be subsumed under the term life-philosophy and, hence, scholars like Nietzsche and Simmel reappear as thought-provoking sources in Morgenthau’s ontology. In order to give evidence that Morgenthau’s ontology possessed in his fundamental beliefs continuity throughout his life, as also confirmed by Morgenthau’s former student David Fromkin (1993, p. 84), his entire oeuvre ranging from the late 1920s till the late 1970s will be referred to.49

In particular, Morgenthau’s personal experience of ideologies and its effects fostered the development of his basic principles of politics. Ideologies created a ‘veil of illusion’ (Nietzsche, 2000, p. 46), covering the ‘disenchantment of the world’ (Weber, 2004, p. 30), by providing a telos in life, be it historical, spiritual, or biological, and, thereby, claiming a coherence where there was none. Morgenthau fundamentally opposed this view, as the elaboration of his main ontological principles, power and the political, will reveal.

Conscious of this anti-ideologism, it will be asked which concepts were crucial for Morgenthau’s ontology? Identifying power and politics as these concepts is nothing new: other authors have acknowledged it before (e.g. Tsou, 1984; Mollov, 2002; Hacke,
2005; Scheuerman, 2007a). What is new, however, and what this chapter aims to explain, is the normative profoundness both concepts had for Morgenthau since so far the elaboration of Morgenthau’s ontology has remained perfunctory. Just like Mannheim’s notion of Weltanschauung anticipated, it also contains a specific world postulate, an intention of how the world should be (1952, p. 185). It will be emphasised in the course of this chapter that this is also the case with Morgenthau. Power and politics are normative concepts for Morgenthau containing elements of how the interactions of people ought to be. Although the complexity of Morgenthau’s notion of politics had received a first appropriate elaboration in Frei’s monograph (2001), it sank back into oblivion and was at best exclusively related to Schmitt (Koskenniemi, 2000; 2004; Brown, 2007; Scheuerman, 2007b; critical: Brown, 2004). Only recently was this complexity reconsidered (Neacsu, 2010). Likewise, the distinctive normative orientation of Morgenthau’s notion of power was until today never fully elaborated and quite often even misunderstood, as remarked in chapter two. More often than not, Weber’s notion of power was imposed on Morgenthau’s notion reducing it to a fraction of its meaning (Coser, 1984; Pichler, 1998; Shilliam, 2007; 2009; Turner, 2009; Turner and Mazur, 2009).

The elaboration of Morgenthau’s ontology will begin with what Morgenthau (1949a, p. 2) considered as his analytical starting point: the individual (Chapter 4.2). The anthropological condition of politics allowed Morgenthau to perceive human beings to be in a tragic position (Lebow, 2003, p. 308). Two conflicting drives, one existential and the other one assertive, to which any person would succumb, requires human beings to socially interact, although these drives would have the ability to destroy this interaction. Therefore, these drives need to be constrained. Next, the elaboration of Morgenthau’s concept of power, his central ontological concept, will reveal that he distinguished between two types of power (Chapter 4.3). First, he noted the animus dominandi which he identified as the prevalent empirical concept due to the absence of constraining values.
Second, however, Morgenthau promoted a different, normative concept of power with the intention to replace the former in order to re-establish societies based on humanistic values. Finally, this chapter will deal with the collective level, societies, and the role of the political for them (Chapter 4.4). This will include Morgenthau’s thoughts on the development and composition of societies. Furthermore, Morgenthau considered the political realm as central since this realm with power as its ultimate component would allow re-establishing values in order to prevent the extinction of social beings and eventually human beings.

4.2 The tragedy of hedonism

4.2.1 Hunger and the interest of existence

The mind of human beings is for Morgenthau determined by two basic drives (Smith, 1986, p. 136). Being aware of these drives will be important for the following elaboration of Morgenthau’s concept of power since it will help to distinguish between the two notions he applied. In its most coherent elaboration, an unpublished manuscript from 1930, Morgenthau acknowledged that the basic human fact is ‘the impulse of life striving to keep alive, to prove oneself and to interact with others’ (1930c, p. 5; my translation).\(^{50}\) Hence, these two dominating drives are the drive for self-preservation (Selbsterhaltungstrieb) and the drive to prove oneself (Bewährungstrieb) (Morgenthau, 1930c, p. 15).\(^{51}\)

Morgenthau found a similar argument in the works of his ‘early love’ (Jugendliebe) (Frei, 1994, p.102): Nietzsche. In the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche introduced the Dionysian principle as one of the major human traits. Just like Morgenthau’s drives, the Dionysian signifies the passionate and creative urges in life that one wants to follow with relish (Kaufmann, 1968, p. 128-9; Nietzsche, 2000, p. 19-23). Yet, in his elaboration of these drives, Morgenthau primarily relied on Freud and the newly established
discipline of psychoanalysis. Schuett (2007, p. 59) recently stressed that the drive for self-preservation would resemble Freud’s ego-instinct whereas Morgenthau’s drive to prove oneself would be similar to the libido, the Eros, or sexual instinct. These two drives can be subsumed as “hunger” and “love”, as Freud noted: ‘... I took as my starting-point a saying of ... Schiller that “hunger and love are what moves the world”’ (1961b, p. 117). Indeed, Morgenthau argued similarly:

‘If the striving for the preservation of one’s life is caused by a deficiency, he is, figuratively speaking, a child of hunger. If he is striving to balance or avoid a lack of energy, then this striving to prove oneself is caused by a surplus of energy seeking release. This finds, again speaking figuratively, one of its most characteristic expressions in love’ (1930c, p. 5-6; my translation).

What Schuett, however, failed to point out is that these drives are situated in what Freud called, the Id, as previously elaborated, hence, in what Nietzsche called Dionysian and, therefore, inherent in every human being. The intention of both drives would be to increase one’s pleasure and the foremost drive is the one for self-preservation (Morgenthau, 1930c, p. 77).

In his 1930 manuscript, Morgenthau pointed out that the drive for self-preservation would be the basic principle of life. It would signify one’s yearning for survival and would be manifested in the pursuit of food or in modern times the aspiration of money as a substitute for acquiring food (Morgenthau, 1930c, p. 5, 15). Furthermore, it would also contain other vital interests, such as shelter and security and the means to achieve them, like marriage or a secure workplace (Morgenthau, 1947a, p. 165). In this later publication, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Morgenthau expanded the drive of self-preservation which he perceived until then primarily as a self-centred principle of life, to the concept of selfishness which was more focused on exchange with other people. Selfishness would prohibit completely unselfish behaviour because taken to the extreme
this would mean risking one’s own life (Morgenthau, 1947a, p. 164). Indeed, unselfish-
ness would require a certain amount of selfishness since otherwise not even the slightest
philanthropic achievement could be realised. This dilemma is summed up in a letter to
John Masek from 13th May 1959, in which Morgenthau remarked that ‘... frequently in
history men with good intentions ... have done great harm to their nation’ (HJM-
Archive 38).\textsuperscript{53} This necessity of selfishness indicates the first human tragedy. For
Morgenthau, therefore, tragedy was a ‘quality of existence, not a creation of art’ (1948c).

Furthermore, this statement shows that Morgenthau applied this individual drive of
self-preservation, just like Freud, to the collective level of interstate relations. Indeed, in
his doctoral thesis Morgenthau (1929a, p. 119-30) utilised both drives on this level by
considering them to be questions of honour (\textit{Ehrfragen}). The term honour seems some-
what out-dated today and Morgenthau dropped this ambiguous term shortly thereafter
for the more technical classification of ‘questions politiques de première classe’ and
‘questions politiques de deuxième classe’ (1933, p. 33-4). The drive of self-preservation,
political questions of the first order, is presented in his doctoral thesis as interests of ex-
istence (\textit{Lebensinteressen}) and, indeed, this terminology is the one Morgenthau settled
for when he reused it in \textit{Politics among Nations} stating that ‘[t]he main signpost ... to
find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest de-
efined in terms of power’ (1985, p. 5). Returning to the interest of existence, Morgenthau
(1929a, p. 98) comprehended this interest as the preservation of all the constitutive ele-
ments of a state, such as questions of sovereignty, the legal order, and also questions
concerning the position of a state among other states. Yet, in his book from 1933,
Morgenthau remarked that these questions would be of relative permanence and, return-
ing to his manuscript from 1930, in fact, they resemble a necessity caused by natural
law (1930c, p. 65). This highlights that Morgenthau, despite acknowledging its primacy,
considered the drive for self-preservation less important for his concept of power and,
indeed, politics since ‘[t]he desire for power ... concerns itself not with the individual’s survival, but with his position among his fellows once his survival has been secured’ (1947a, p. 165).

To conclude, the drive for self-preservation was for Morgenthau an important element of the human psyche. Indeed, this drive, being the precondition of the drive to prove oneself, enjoyed Morgenthau’s classification as the primary drive of life since it would be concerned with its preservation. Yet, due to its permanence, the drive of self-preservation would be less important for politics than the drive to prove oneself. This elucidates that Morgenthau’s concept of power is by no means to be seen in the Hobbesian tradition as a means of self-preservation (Good, 1960; p. 612; Murray, 1996, p. 84; Frei, 2001, p. 127) for what Morgenthau was repeatedly unjustly criticised (e.g. Tucker, 1952; Forndran, 1997, p. 47; Hartmann, 2001, p. 24-5; Hall, 2006, p. 1161).

4.2.2 Love and the interest to prove oneself

As mentioned in the previous section, there is a second fundamental human drive. The drive to prove oneself is crucial for one side of Morgenthau’s ontological concept of power and despite or, indeed, due to this centrality, this drive led to widespread confusion. Its importance for politics is caused by its categorical relation to other people, although the drive of self-preservation is of a higher vital reference since it would be concerned with one’s preservation.

For Morgenthau, the intention of the drive to prove oneself was to make oneself aware of one’s own life and thereby become aware of one’s own strengths and capabilities. This drive would be manifested in the effect on the other gender, but also games, artistic and academic expressions. Hence, ‘everywhere where the human being strives to show “what he can”’ (Morgenthau, 1930c, p. 6; my translation)\textsuperscript{54} is the drive to prove oneself its origin. It would be entirely directed to gain and increase pleasure and in par-
ticular, challenging situations would promise the highest pleasure since they would require overcoming obstacles by mastering non-routine situations (Morgenthau, 1930c, p. 26-7). Only then one’s identity could be assured through the appraisal of others and would provide a surplus of pleasure (Morgenthau, 1930c, p. 31-2). Two issues require further discussion in the analysis of Morgenthau’s drive to prove oneself.

First, this drive would be excessive. Neither the potential gain of pleasure nor the objects to which it could be directed would know any limit (Morgenthau, 1930c, p. 70). In his doctoral thesis, Morgenthau remarked that by considering this drive on the national level any question would become interesting for this drive since they ‘are seized at random, irrespective of the actual content ...’ (1929a, p. 126-7; my translation). This excess signifies the second tragic aspect of human life. Satisfaction of one’s pleasure could be aspired, but, due to its limitlessness, never be achieved. Only a few times the pleasure principle would have reached its near achievement for which Morgenthau (1945b, p. 13; 1947a, p. 166) had chosen the love of Don Juan and Faust’s thirst for knowledge as examples. More than 15 years earlier, Morgenthau (1930c, p. 71) also included in this list the political aspirations of Alexander the Great and Napoleon. However, these would have been exceptions and their aspiring would have also failed since vanitas (transience) took hold of Don Juan, Faust, Alexander, and the current of the Berezina washed away Napoleon’s ambitions. A further tragedy reflected in the drive to prove oneself would be, following Morgenthau (1930c, p. 75-7) and Freud (1961b, p. 117), that its extreme limitlessness would get into conflict with the drive of self-preservation and eventually could mean one’s life is endangered as well as the lives of others.

The second issue is related to the misperception this drive caused when Morgenthau (1945b) introduced it to American political science. There, he referred to this drive by employing Augustine’s diction of the animus dominandi, the lust for power, inherent in
every human being, a terminology which he considered for the rest of his academic ca-
reer (Morgenthau, 1947a, p. 167). This reassured Schuett (2007, p. 61-2), but also
Ashley Tellis (1995, p. 40) and to a certain extent Frei (2001, p. 125-8), that the drive to
prove oneself would be the concept behind Morgenthau’s notion of power. Yet, the pur-
pose why Morgenthau introduced this concept to the American academia has to be
borne in mind. *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, where Morgenthau elaborated the
*animus dominandi* most thoroughly, was a critique on the American ideology of liberal-
ism, manifested in the dominance of positivism in American social sciences. In the
chapter *The moral blindness of scientific man*, Morgenthau criticised that ideologies, in
this case liberalism, bereave human beings of values upon which political power would
have to rest and which would have to be implemented to re-establish them. Hence,
Morgenthau did not endorse but instead criticised a society whose lack of values would
cause people to fall back to its animal-like state. This is why Morgenthau eventually
abandoned Freud. Not that he disagreed with him for elaborating these basic human
drives. On the contrary, as it was mentioned, Morgenthau applied them also in his later
works, but Freud could not provide the normativity Morgenthau (1984, p. 14) aimed to
establish.

To sum up, Morgenthau, referring to Nietzsche and predominantly Freud, perceived
the human being to be determined by two fundamental drives: the drive of self-
preservation and the drive to prove oneself. In their urge to devote oneself to hedonism,
both drives would cause human existence to become tragic, as for various reasons
pleasure could never be fully achieved. However, human beings are by no means only
slaves to their drives as otherwise there would be little difference to animals, although
they are in danger of being turned into animals, due to the absence of values to constrain
these drives. Hence, and this will be analysed next, for Morgenthau normative postu-
lates were important for politics and society. ‘Man is a political animal by nature; he is a
scientist by chance or choice; he is a moralist because he is man’ (Morgenthau, 1947a, p. 145) and Morgenthau argued that this moralism has to manifest itself in the comprehension of the concept of power.56

4.3 Morgenthau’s dual concept of power

4.3.1 The animus dominandi: Morgenthau’s sole concept of power?

Recapitulating the last section, students of International Relations are inclined to argue that Morgenthau’s concept of power is essentially the drive to prove oneself and is therefore synonymous with Freud’s sexual instinct, as Schuett (2007, p. 60) does. Indeed, also Scheuerman (2009a, p.52-3) pays tribute to the influence of psychoanalysis on Morgenthau’s development of power. Certainly, there is a kernel of truth in it, as mentioned, and Morgenthau employed the figure of animus dominandi, ‘the desire for power’ (1947a, p. 165), in a few of his academic writings. In the 1960s, for example, Morgenthau (1962c) devoted an entire article to the relation between love and power and as late as the 1970s he referred to this lust for power (1970c, p. 69; 1972, p. 31; 2004, p. 53). Hence, a cursory reading would endorse Schuett’s assessment and see that a fraction of Morgenthau’s concept of power resembles Freud’s sexual instinct. As the remainder of this chapter will point out, however, Morgenthau’s concept of power was not the animus dominandi, but fundamentally opposed to it on normative terms (Fromkin, 1993, p. 82).

Before this argument is further elaborated, we have to return to the Freud-claim for the moment since there is some truth in it. This element of truth lies in the fact that the lust for power was considered by Morgenthau as prevalent in his times and as shown in Morgenthau’s statement, ‘je constate simplement ce que je vois’ (1936, p. 5), he was aware of the necessity to deal with this concept analytically. Hence, Morgenthau accepted it as an empirical concept of power. This concept would allow it to be related to
Weber’s notion of power. Indeed, despite the fact that Frei (2001) argued not to overestimate Weber’s influence on Morgenthau, there is strong agreement within International Relations that Morgenthau owes this concept to Weber (e.g. Pichler, 1998; Barkawi, 1998; Turner, 2009; Turner and Mazur, 2009). Weber defined power as ‘… the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests’ (1978, p. 53). If the human being would solely be guided by a lust for power, meaning that he/she would constantly aim to acquire power, people would, indeed, try to take any chance to dominate others, as Weber wrote. This means power would be sought regardless if there is legitimation for it or not because its aspiration is inherent in human nature. As Morgenthau argued in his doctoral (1929a) and postdoctoral thesis (1934a), at least on the international level, there would be no societal restrictions to hinder people from seeking to fulfil their lust for power.

Since Morgenthau did not endorse this concept, but understood it only as empirically prevalent in his times, it illustrates that he did not consider power simply in terms of military or economic capabilities for which he was later denounced. As the elaboration of the drive to prove oneself already suggested, Morgenthau (1930c, p. 41) made clear that power is not to be confused with force. Force may be applied to achieve power, but power should be of ‘durchgehende[r] Geistigkeit’ (constant spirituality) (Morgenthau, 1930c, p. 43). In Politics among Nations Morgenthau was even more precise by remarking that ‘[p]olitical power is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised. It gives the former control over certain actions of the latter through the impact which the former exerts on the latter’s minds’ (1985, p. 32). Also late in his life Morgenthau (1970a, p. 436) referred back to this Weberian-Freudian concept of power. This conceptualisation of power entails three strategies of how to deal with it. In Politics as Vocation, which Morgenthau has apparently read enthusiastically
Weber noted that ‘[w]hen we say that a question is “political” ... we always mean the same thing. This is that the interests involved in the distribution or preservation of power, or a shift in power, play a decisive role in resolving that question’ (2004, p. 33). Frei (2001, p. 130) has remarked that Morgenthau already referred to these strategies in his doctoral thesis (1929a, p. 59), but only in 1933 did he become explicit. Power ‘... peut viser à maintenir la puissance acquise, à l’augmenter ou à la manifester’ (Morgenthau, 1933, p. 43). Hence, due to human nature, the aspiration of power would require one to keep, increase, and eventually demonstrate their power.

Almost 15 years later, Morgenthau exerted exactly the same scheme noting that ‘[a]ll politics ... reveals three basic patterns ... either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power’ (1985, p. 52). Morgenthau agreed with Weber, therefore, on how this lust for power is socially embodied.

From this follows that it is reasonable to argue that Morgenthau employed a concept of power that can be referred back to Freud and Weber. However, this is only one side of Morgenthau’s concept of power. In fact, Morgenthau considered this kind of power as empirically verifiable throughout his life and argued that this is the power to refer back to when analysing contemporary politics, but there ought to be a different kind of power which will be elaborated next. Frei (2001, p. 131-2) argues that, although Morgenthau (1933, p. 9; 1985, p. 53) pointed out several times that this concept of power is only provisional, Morgenthau gradually transformed its tentativeness into a constant since he did not alter this concept anymore. However, it was not his concept of power that turned into a constant per se, but for Morgenthau modern societies would have transformed from ideological tentativeness into a constant. Therefore, he had to refer analytically back to this brute concept of power (Morgenthau, 1929a; 1934b). This in the end is the final tragic aspect of human life since, as Morgenthau explained in a letter to Michael Oakeshott from 22nd May 1948, ‘[m]an is tragic because he cannot do
what he ought to do’ (HJM-Archive 44).\textsuperscript{61} This implies that in a world bereft of values where ideologies blurred the people’s minds, humans would be bound to follow the life-threatening \textit{animus dominandi}. This suggests his initial deep-rooted reluctance to give his consent for a second edition of \textit{Politics among Nations} (HJM-Archive 121). Only after Morgenthau had realised this ideological constant due to the rise of communism he finally agreed to its publication.

\textbf{4.3.2 Power: Morgenthau’s agent of a world postulate}

\textbf{4.3.2.1 The nihilism of life and its liberation through will}

The last section has shown that Morgenthau empirically acknowledged a brute concept of power, the \textit{animus dominandi}, which essentially renders people as slaves to their own drives and can be traced back to Freud and Weber. However, its acknowledgment should not lead to temptation to argue that Morgenthau also would have endorsed it normatively. On the contrary, he disagreed with the \textit{animus dominandi} and promoted a normative concept of power that aimed to transcend power politics of his time (Nobel, 1995, p. 66). ‘To say that a political action has no moral purpose is absurd’, Morgenthau noted since ‘political action can be defined as an attempt to realize moral values through the medium of politics, that is, power’ (1962a, p. 110). Such a concept would help to overcome human nihilism which he considered as the hotbed of ideological devotion and, therefore, Morgenthau’s power would enable to commission citizens to the establishment of the common good.

In the elaboration of Morgenthau’s normative concept of power, a student of his work is bound to acknowledge the initial influence of Nietzsche. Morgenthau followed several of Nietzsche’s concepts in his development of power: eternal recurrence, the \textit{Übermensch}, and will to power. The most fundamental is Nietzsche’s insistence of the eternal recurrence of events and objects. In \textit{Thus spoke Zarathustra} Nietzsche noted that
‘[e]verything goes, everything returns; the wheel of existence rolls forever. Everything
dies, everything blossoms anew; the year of existence runs on forever … Everything
departs, everything meets again; the ring of existence is true to itself forever’ (1969,
p. 234). Just like Benjamin’s notion of ‘homogeneous, empty time’ (1999, p. 252),
Nietzsche employed a concept of time and space that contradicted any teleological life-
stories and provided Morgenthau with strong arguments against ideological temptations.

Yet Morgenthau was also aware that this nihilism of life would be, at least in the be-
ginning, a great disappointment to humans since it ‘… offers with each answer new
questions, with each victory a new disappointment, and thus seems to lead nowhere. In
this labyrinth of unconnected causal connections man discovers many little answers but
no answer to the great questions of his life, no meaning, no direction’ (1947a, p. 176).
Countless combinations of actions and reactions would provide a myriad of ever recur-
rent moments which evolve without pre-prescribed purpose or aim. However,
Nietzsche’s concept does not imply surrendering to the nihilism of life, but overcoming
it. In a later work, which remained unpublished during his lifetime, Nietzsche accentu-
ated that ‘[t]he unalterable sequence of certain phenomena demonstrates no “law” but a
power relationship between two or more forces’ (1968, p. 336). This means that these
returning moments would not only have to be agonised, but one could choose to affirm
and endorse them. Nietzsche argued that the awareness of nihilism should lead to amor
fati (2003, p. 157), the embracing of one’s destiny since endorsing such recurrences
would mean relating these initially meaningless moments to oneself and, thereby, by
even altering them ever so slightly, transform them into significant situations. This posi-
tive attribution would enable people to overcome their surrounding nihilism since, as
Lee Spinks mentions, they could recognise that ‘life is an eternal movement of becom-
ing’ (2003, p. 131).
However, the acceptance of the *amor fati* denotes a dolorous affair since, as Georg Lukács noted in an early work, it would cause a ‘transcendental homelessness’ (1963, p. 41). As this is hard to endorse, transcendentally sheltered people or, in Nietzsche’s words, ‘the ultimate man’ (*letzter Mensch*) (1969, p. 45) would succumb to ideologies because they would provide a carefree, clearly structured life by monopolising accepted ideas of reason, virtue, justice, and even pity or happiness. The price to be paid would be the renunciation of one’s subjectivity. Only a few people, Nietzsche believed, would be apt to counteract this intellectual subordination. The super or over-man (*Übermensch*) is its ideal typification and Neacsu (2010, p. 99) recently emphasised the importance of this concept for Morgenthau. The *Übermensch* has long suffered from the instrumentalisation of nationalistic thinkers who overemphasised biological or racist interpretations. However, Nietzsche also intended to present with this notion the intellectual conception of a positive ability and will to recognise and overcome the surrounding nihilistic world. Through self-restraint, self-reflection, and self-assurance, Nietzsche argued, he/she would be able to refer the ever-recurrent moments on oneself and, thereby, could create new values. Morgenthau deplored the absence of the qualities of an *Übermensch* in *Science: Servant or Master?* This is of particular value since Morgenthau (1972, p. XXI) based the first part of the book on a manuscript he had written in the 1930s.62 This demonstrates the stability of Morgenthau’s fundamental beliefs throughout his life. Regarding this absence, Morgenthau noted:

‘[t]his meaningless and aimless activity may convey the superficial appearance of an abundant dynamism trying to transform the empirical world. In truth, however, it is not the pressure of creative force but flight from his true task that drives man beyond himself through action. In the intoxication of incessant activity, man tries to forget the question posed by the metaphysical shock. Yet, since the noise of the active world can drown out that question but cannot altogether
silence it, complete oblivion, which is coincident with the end of consciousness itself, becomes the unacknowledged ultimate aim’ (1972, p. 48-9).

Becoming an Übermensch would however offer its bearers total liberation since ‘[w]illing liberates: that is the true doctrine of will and freedom’ (Nietzsche, 1969, p. 111). It would liberate people of reactionary forces, such as ideologies and other supernatural teleological visions of life, that would control reality and life in order to affirm the status quo; an argument that was endorsed by Morgenthau, as the last chapter demonstrated. The Übermensch would also liberate from ostensible eternal dichotomies. This would be the case because these dichotomies would not have universal meaning, but would be created to legitimise cultural habits and policies (Nietzsche, 1969, p. 84-6).

An example of Morgenthau’s refusal of such ostensible absolute, yet simplifying dichotomies is stipulated in a letter to Bryon Dobell, then editor of the Book World, from 9th July 1968 which deserves to be quoted at length since it not only reflects on the nihilism of life, but also provides insight into Morgenthau’s political agency to be discussed in chapter six:

‘[N]ot being God, I am unable to pass judgement on student dissent in terms of “good” or “bad”. What the students revolt against in the universities is what they are revolting against in the world at large. That world, thoroughly secularized and dedicated to the production of consumer goods and weapons of mass destruction, has lost its meaning. The university does not raise, let alone answer, the existential questions the students ask about themselves and their world. That world is also thoroughly mechanized and bureaucratized. Thus it diminishes the individual who must rely on others rather than himself for the satisfaction of his wants, from the necessities of life to his spiritual and philosophical longings’ (HJM-Archive 43).
From this quotation, the scholar of International Relations can infer that politics was for Morgenthau a social realm in which people would not have to succumb to structural obligations manifested in dichotomies of good and bad, right and wrong, or friend and foe, as Schmitt had argued, but people could follow their interests and participate in the creation of their own life-world.

Therefore, this liberation would have been the requirement to actively create life-worlds and value systems by ascribing meaning to recurrent moments. Morgenthau reflected on this meaning-attribution by considering the counterpart of life: death. Death would be a form of liberation, as Morgenthau elaborated in his manuscript Der Selbstmord mit gutem Gewissen (1930b), thereby picking up the thought of one of Nietzsche’s aphorisms in the Gay Science and returned to the thought much later in Science: Servant or Master? Mor­genthau argued that death ‘… is the very negation of all men experiences as specifically human in his existence: the consciousness of himself and of his world, the remembrance of things past and the ambitions of things to come, a creativeness in thought and action that aspires to … the eternal’ (1972, p. 144). Yet, Morgenthau argued that even for humans who disapproved religious discourses of eternity or ideological promises of immortality, death would signify no end of liberation. He saw one explanation in the pieces of reminiscence, be it in the polis or the oikos, they would leave behind as results of their efforts to actively give meaning to life. Furthermore, even death itself could become a liberating experience since, by committing suicide with a good conscience, people would be enabled to master their biological death by choosing place, time, and tenor of their own death (Morgenthau, 1972, p. 144-5). This proves that Morgenthau endorsed Nietzsche’s concepts of eternal recurrence and the Übermensch to describe his life-world and criticise his contemporaries about their deficiencies. By doing so these concepts mark the basis of his concept of power.
4.3.2.2 Power as a liberating end: Morgenthau’s pledge for normativity

Morgenthau not only endorsed Nietzsche’s concepts of eternal recurrence and the Übermensch as primary requirements of his normative concept of power, but also followed to a certain extent in his elaboration Nietzsche’s will to power. This will to power is essentially the Übermensch’s aspiration to discern. To be able to understand the nihilism and to overcome it by attaching value to initially insignificant moments, hence, by alluding one’s surrounding world to oneself, the will to power finds its expression. Nietzsche remarked that ‘[m]an first implanted values into things to maintain himself – he created the meaning of things, a human meaning … Only through evaluation is there value: and without evaluation the nut of existence would be hollow’ (1969, p. 85). Morgenthau picked up this ‘facteur psychologique, la volonté de puissance’ (1933, p. 43) in the 1930s by relating it to the vocation of a scholar (1934b, p. 11) and even as late as the 1970s, he acknowledged that homo faber would enable humans to imbed ‘… his biological existence within technological and social artefacts that survive that existence. His imagination creates new worlds of religion, art, and reason that live after their creator’ (1972, p. 146). Clearly, Morgenthau pointed out on this occasion that human beings would be capable of producing their life-worlds, giving evidence that disguised in Morgenthau’s notion of the homo faber is essentially Nietzsche’s will to power, understood in terms of desire to overcome (Reginster, 2007, p. 35). Hence, it would be the strenuous efforts to master one’s vocation by overcoming the obstacles and resistances that pave the way to true recognition and mastery which, eventually, would lead to joy, but also identity. Yet, it takes an Übermensch to vanquish such a resistance. The ultimate man is not apt enough for Nietzsche. The will to power is ‘a will to overcome, overthrow, dominate, a thirst for enemies and resistance and triumph’ (Nietzsche, 1996b, p. 29). This conceptualisation of power was endorsed by Morgenthau, as the following passage of Science: Servant or Master? reveals:
‘Thus the scholar seeking knowledge seeks power; so does the poet who endeavours to express his thoughts and feelings in words. So do the mountain climber, the hunter, the collector of rare objects. They all seek to assert themselves as individuals against the world by mastering it. It is only when they choose as their object other men that they enter the political sphere’ (1972, p. 31).65

Thus far, Morgenthau followed Nietzsche in his elaboration of the concept of power. Yet, Simmel (1995, p. 361-2) noted in his piece on Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, for which he was highly praised by Morgenthau (Frei, 2001, p. 100), that the former’s concept of power would have accentuated the individual, indeed particular individuals, but would have ignored social relations. Even though Morgenthau seemingly endorsed Nietzsche’s individualism by observing that ‘[m]an is the victim of political power by necessity; he is a political master by aspiration’ (1947a, p. 153), his general assessment resembles Simmel’s view since in Morgenthau’s manuscript on metaphysics, he criticised Nietzsche for promoting the will to power for its own sake. Morgenthau did not endorse Nietzsche’s view of a pre-existing reality which would consider the will to power and its achievement as the highest ethical value in itself. On the contrary, the will to power would have to be implemented in order to create a metaphysics, since ‘there is nothing more senseless for the human conscience than a morale which is indifferent to the dissolution of human society’ (Morgenthau, 1937, p. 88; my translation).66 Power, as a political concept for Morgenthau, needed to be relational and normative in the sense that it would have to contain a commitment to establish values and mores upon which society could rest. Throughout his academic career Morgenthau insisted on this normative concept of a political theory and power as its ultimate criteria (HJM-Archive 10). What makes it even more remarkable was that this aspect was either overlooked or

It is in this sense that Morgenthau’s concept of power resembles Arendt’s notion, as Rohde (2004, p. 98) implies though he pays little attention to this important exchange of ideas. Arendt and Morgenthau, who got to know each other in the 1950s while occasionally having lunch together at the University of Chicago faculty club, intensified their friendship during the 1960s due to their common disapproval of the Vietnam War, culminating in an affectionate obituary from Morgenthau on the occasion of Arendt’s death (Morgenthau, 1976a; Young-Bruehl, 1982, p. 383-9). In fact, their friendship went so far that Arendt’s biographer Young-Bruehl characterised them as ‘thinking partners’ (1982, p. XV), a privilege both rarely offered. This thinking partnership also affected Morgenthau’s normative notion of power. Since Morgenthau never coherently elaborated it, Arendt’s concept, which she stipulated in her study *On Violence* in 1970 and for which Morgenthau sent her affirmative remarks after the study received disapproving reviews (Young-Bruehl, 1982, p. 424-5), will be drawn upon as a heuristic device.

For Arendt ‘[p]ower corresponds to the human ability not just to act but act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together’ (1970, p. 44). Hence, power would signify the consent of people to temporarily come together in a collective of speech and action by creating institutions, laws, and norms (Arendt, 1970, p. 41). Power was, therefore, for Arendt (1970, p. 51), just like for Morgenthau (1929a, p. 74; 1933, p. 43), not a means, but an end in itself which explains that both scholars, in agreement with Weber, distinguished between power and violence. It is an end since only through its achievement would it be possible in a society to create the good life (Morgenthau, 2004, p. 30) which ‘… is a life that is led by justice, which is also indicated by the general concep-
tion of politics ... that the philosophy of politics is really a subdivision of ethics’ (Morgenthau, 2004, p. 56). In a letter to Edward Dew from 22nd August 1958, Morgenthau became a bit more explicit regarding what he meant with a good life. This would have been ‘the preservation of life and freedom in the sense of the Judeo-Christian tradition and ... of Kantian philosophy’ (HJM-Archive 17). In a lecture on Human Rights about 20 years later, Morgenthau (1979, p. 25) largely repeated this definition. This absence of a clearer definition of, or investigation in, the good life in Morgenthau’s work demonstrates that it was a flexible concept in which the particular content would be based on a consensus of interests of the involved people. The integrity of human life and dignity were considered by Morgenthau as its basic elements. It would be especially the task of rulers, the statesmen, or, to speak in Nietzsche’s term, the Übermensch, to have such a broad telos in mind since communities would be led by them towards the good life or bonum commune (common good), as Morgenthau (2004, p. 106) also called it. As Morgenthau noted in one of his lectures on Aristotle ‘[t]he virtue of a good ruler is identical with a good man. Because the good ruler, having to preside over a human society of which all human beings are members, must promote ... the telos of man as such ...’ (2004, p. 91). As chapter six will indicate, the implementation of such a concept of power was for Morgenthau a real concern since he considered the underlying values destroyed what is necessary for any society to achieve the bonum commune.

To conclude, the elaboration of Morgenthau’s concept of power has proven two points. First, power was for Morgenthau primarily a normative concept. He did not promote a concept of power that was based on brute human drives, be it for self-preservation or to prove oneself, but only considered its reliance as prevalent in his lifetime. Since ideologies had destroyed old values and mores that had held societies together previously, Morgenthau argued for a positive kind of power that realises one’s
own nihilistic existence and by overcoming it, liberates people to take action again. Power then becomes a collective affair through which societies are formed and manifestations of this power, such as institutions, are created that strive for the *bonum commune* with values and mores as normative guidelines. Second, the elaboration of Morgenthau’s concept of power has also shown that his ontology was not pessimistic *per se*, but Morgenthau critically analysed the distorting effects ideologies had on modern societies and its implications for the applied concept of power as the ultimate criterion of political action (Raskin, 1984; Shinn, 1984).

### 4.4 The tragedy of society and the necessity of politics

#### 4.4.1 Sociation: the relational construction of societies

The final section of this chapter will bring the aspects thus far dealt with – the individual and power – together on the collective level and will analyse how Morgenthau conceived its interplay. This interplay will primarily consider the political realm since it is here where power comes into play and where the possibility arises to construct societies.

Morgenthau (1947a, p. 145; 2004, p. 105) agreed with Aristotle that a human being would be a *zoon politikon* that is a political animal for whom it is a conditionality to form societies. As previously elaborated, especially the drive to prove oneself, but also to a certain extent the drive of self-preservation, require people to interact with others in order to find satisfaction. Morgenthau found a kindred spirit here in Simmel who accepted Aristotle’s notion likewise. Simmel defined society as a condition, ‘... where several individuals act in reciprocal orientation. This reciprocal orientation always comes into being due to specific drives or for the achievement of particular ends’ (1908, p. 4; my translation). This shows that reciprocal orientations (*Wechselwirkungen*) were for Simmel the constitutive factors of societies, which is why he also preferred to
speak of sociation (*Vergesellschaftung*) rather than society. Sociation would signify, and in this aspect Simmel’s argumentation resembles Nietzsche’s notion of eternal recurrence, the countless ways of how the individuals’ desire to live together and interact would be expressed depending on their interests (Simmel, 1908, p. 5). Mor
genthau employed a similar argument when he defined politics as the social realm where an ‘interest defined in terms of power’ is at stake (1985, p. 5). Further evidence for Morgenthau’s intellectual cadence with Simmel is to be found in Morgenthau’s contemplation about the study of international relations for the Foreign Policy Association on 1st December 1976:

> It ‘… is not primarily a scientific but a humanistic enterprise. This is so because it mainly focuses on man’s relations with other men. It is concerned with man as a political animal, opposing or cooperating with other men similarly defined. The actions and reactions … to [be understood] are … unique occurrences. They happened in this one way and never before or since. [Yet], they are similar; for they are manifestations of social forces. Social forces are the product of human nature in action. Given the identity of human nature in time and space, social forces, under similar conditions, will manifest themselves in a similar manner’ (HJM-Archive 21).

This quotation shows that Morgenthau conceived societies to be human constructs whose shape, as Morgenthau (1930b, p. 42; 1945b, p. 10) already remarked earlier in the 1930s and 1940s, would be influenced by spatial and temporal aspects. Indeed, Morgenthau also followed Simmel in the explanation why societies would be human constructs because in his lectures on Aristotle, Morgenthau (2004, p. 78-9) paid tribute to him for having elucidated this artificial character of societies. Simmel manifested this construction when remarking that there would be different degrees of sociation depending on the involved interests. This may range from ephemeral unions as would be the
Morgenthau’s comprehension of societies as dynamic constructs dependent on the particular social conditions of the people who create them already gives a first hint that Morgenthau did not promote the nation-state as the sole and unitary actor on the international scene as seems to be common knowledge in various (text-)books on International Relations (e.g. Hoffmann, 1998; Krell, 2000). Morgenthau considered the nation-state as one, albeit contemporary form of society and, as will be elaborated in chapter six, this did not mean Morgenthau would have been an advocate of this ‘blind and potent monster’ (1962a, p. 61).

4.4.2 Wither simplifying dichotomies: Morgenthau’s infinite concept of the political

For Morgenthau, the core of any process of sociation was the political. As early as 1930, Morgenthau (1930c, p. 2) emphasised that this would be the case because politics would be the realm in which diverse human interests would collide out of which eventually dominant social institutions such as the basic societal elements would emerge. Since ‘carriers of all societal forces are always … individuals’ (Morgenthau, 1930c, p. 4; my translation), politics as the balancing of individual interests was for Morgenthau even a presupposition of society. A similar argument was made in Schmitt’s 1932 version of The Concept of the Political in which he remarked that the political would be a prerequisite of the state (1996, p. 19, 37). As Scheuerman remarked, this congruence is due to amendments Schmitt made to his previous essay with the same title from 1927 after Morgenthau had sent him a copy of his doctoral thesis. Before, Schmitt pursued a concept of power politics that would be unrestricted by normative influence and could
be distinguished from other societal realms, like economics (Scheuerman, 2007a, p. 510).

However, this discovery does not inform the student of International Relations about Morgenthau’s concept of the political and if there truly was such a close correlation to Schmitt, as implied by recent scholarship. Indeed, in the course of this Morgenthau-Schmitt discourse it was argued that a ‘hidden dialogue’ between Schmitt and Morgenthau would have taken place (Scheuerman, 1999). As previously mentioned, Schmitt considered ‘[t]he specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy [foe]’ (1996, p. 26). However, Morgenthau, having agreed with Schmitt that the term political is the core of society, repudiated Schmitt’s conceptualisation and, therefore, overemphasising or interpreting this relationship positively, is misleading. This repudiation is manifested in Morgenthau’s *La notion du politique* from 1933 and in the undated and unpublished manuscript *Einige logische Bemerkungen zu Carl Schmitt’s Begriff des Politischen* which Morgenthau, in consideration of the references, must have written in 1934 or 1935. In these works, Morgenthau not only criticised Schmitt for his lack of morality, but he also criticised his analytical framework since he disagreed with Schmitt’s reduction of the political to the dichotomy of friend and foe as tautological. He argued that love and hate would be human traits that are expressed in personal beliefs and tastes, but would not be sufficient to distinguish the political realm (Morgenthau, 1933, p. 52-3). The distinction between friend and foe would be politically tautological because friends and foes could be of political value (*wertvoll*) as much as both could be politically of no value at all (*wertlos*) (Morgenthau, 1934-35, p. 5). What is more, Morgenthau would have agreed with Kleinschmidt’s assessment that this generally signified Schmitt’s approach and the problem with it. Schmitt would have decided at his sole discretion since he would have assessed existing norms in correspondence to the
‘meta-standard’ (2004, p. 17) of his own values, which is why Morgenthau (1932) claimed that this dichotomy would not be relevant for scholarly purposes to distinguish politics from other social aspects.

A first attempt of Morgenthau to define the political can be found in his doctoral thesis. There, he argued that ‘[t]he concept of the political has no once and for all fixed substance. It is rather a feature, a quality, a colouring which can be attributed to any substance … A question which is of political nature today, can be bereft of any political meaning tomorrow … (Morgenthau, 1929a, p. 67; my translation). Hence, Morgenthau (1933, p. 30) considered politics not as the individuals’ relations out of which society is constituted, but as a quality adhering to these relations which, therefore, would be affected by temporal and spatial alterations. At this stage, however, Morgenthau left aside the concept of the political since his focus of scholarly interest was international judicature. Therefore, he concluded that the political would require further elaboration since it would be physically indeterminable (Morgenthau, 1929a, p. 68-72). One year later, in Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen, he returned to this unresolved problem. There, he took up the sociological notion of politics from his earlier book. In this manuscript Morgenthau argued that politics would be a ‘quality that has to be sought in the minds of involved individuals’ (1930c, p. 4; my translation). Politics would not be constituted through the societal framework, hence political institutions, but through the interactions of people pursuing their interests in a common realm. Morgenthau continuously referred to this definition of the political when considering for instance ‘[t]he aspiration for power being the distinguishing element of international politics, as of all politics …’ (1985, p. 37) and also late in his life Morgenthau (1972, p. 31) repeated this definition. As the premier elaboration of Morgenthau’s concept of power had revealed, politics can potentially consist of any of the two kinds of power: empirical and normative.
However, as his biographer Frei notes, Morgenthau intended to promote a ‘dynamic and critical approach’ (2001, p. 124) with his work which is why he already stressed in his elaboration of the political that normative power would be an end to re-establish a value-system which would also enable one to constrain empirical power. This would have been necessary because Morgenthau considered the *animus dominandi* as being open to a ‘malicious exegesis’ (*böswillige Auslegung*) (1929a, p. 129). To stress his distinction and indicate his preference, Morgenthau paid particular attention to the diction in his German and French writings. Morgenthau (1930c, p. 9; 1934b, p. 33) employed the term *Kraft* rather than *Macht* to signify the political as a strife for power. Whereas the latter implies a dominating influence, the former constitutes energy or the ability to act. A more modern English term for the German *Kraft* would be empowerment. This difference of meaning is further supported by their etymology and certainly Morgenthau intended to emphasise the normative claim of his concept of power by using a term signifying a positive ability to create rather than dominate.⁷⁴ Likewise, in his French publications Morgenthau (1933, p. 43) spoke of *puissance*, instead of *pouvoir*. Both terms have a similar meaning like the German *Kraft* and *Macht*. We can only speculate why Morgenthau did not distinguish in his American writings anymore between these two concepts, but only used the term power. It did, however, contribute to Morgenthau’s misinterpretation.

### 4.4.3 Meeting under an empty sky or the loss of values in modern societies

Roger Shinn characterised Morgenthau in a short piece for *Worldview* as a ‘Realist and Moralist’ (1970, p. 9), and indeed he was. As elaborated, Morgenthau was realistic enough to have realised that due to the loss of values in modern societies people would fall back on their drives and give themselves away to an unhindered lust for power (Morgenthau, 1948a, p. 99). But Morgenthau was also moralistic enough to argue for a
concept of power that aimed to re-establish the lost values in the realm of politics. Hence, it is the intention of this final part of Morgenthau’s ontology to elaborate those values Morgenthau was arguing for. Recent scholarship intended to demonstrate that Morgenthau would have had a universalistic, teleological understanding of values (Pin-Fat, 2005, p. 221-6; Cozette, 2008, p. 18-20; Neacsu, 2010, p. 33). However, this interpretation fails to distinguish between the two sets of values Morgenthau was writing about. Although both sets of Morgenthau’s values refer to value experiences (Werterfahrungen) which would get accepted through the collective memory, Morgenthau distinguished between values on the individual and collective levels. First, values on the individual level, which will be termed here personal values, were for Morgenthau the requirement to establish values on the collective level. These personal values would have been etic in the sense that Morgenthau considered them as intrinsic to human beings. Second, collective values were emic for Morgenthau as they would have been spatially and temporarily conditioned. In a lecture on human rights at the end of his life, Morgenthau (1979, p. 4-5) disagreed with a simple universalism promoting Western human rights as universal goals, as it would have been the case in the United States.

Two questions will have to be answered: What were those values? How did he consider their embodiment?

For Morgenthau, values had a vital normative and social function. It would be their task to constrain the human drives and, therefore, secure the survival of any society which is why there could be no universal values, but only values which would be followed within a specific culture. ‘[T]he common roof of shared values and universal standards of action’ (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 359) would provide society members with certainty, sense of belonging, but also compassion and the willingness to integrate because ‘norms [as the reification of values] became the most reliable weapon of the human society to protect themselves against the mischief anti-social behaviour can cause
them’ (Morgenthau, 1935, p. 19; my translation). Therefore, Morgenthau refuted Immanuel Kant in his post-doctoral thesis *La Réalité des Normes* for having separated the realm of *is* and *ought* and banished them to the ‘Elysian fields’ (1934a, p. 12). Although there would be a difference between these realms, both would have to be set into context because neither could there be an empirical world without values, nor would it be possible to have values indifferent to reality. Therefore, Morgenthau aimed to bring back values and norms as their empirical embodiment to the ‘réalité terrestre, la réalité de hic et nunc’ (1934a, p. 12) for the sake of humanity. Indeed, this is where Morgenthau’s criticism on the Nuremberg Trials stemmed from. Not that Morgenthau did not want to bring such war criminals like Wilhelm Keitel (head of the German High Command of Armed Forces), Karl Dönitz (Grand Admiral and last head of the German Reich), and Hans Frank (Governor-General of the occupied Polish territories) to trial, but Morgenthau (1962a, p.377-9) questioned the validity of turning a punitive trial into one of divine justice.

Despite Morgenthau’s distinction between emic collective values and etic personal values, interpretations of Morgenthau’s thought often missed this distinction, not least because he referred to both of them as values. Still, we can attempt to distinguish them. In an early manuscript, Morgenthau (1937, p. 114) noted that due to the destruction of objective moral order the soul of the individual would have to be looked at in order to find the essence of these lost values. Referring to the essence of values, Morgenthau argued for the universality of personal values that would allow the creation and sustenance of collective values in order to constrain human drives. Morgenthau found these values in the German-Jewish symbiosis Arendt considered to be partly rescued in the United States by referring to its representatives as ‘conscious pariahs’. German-Jewish émigré scholars would have offered personal values such as humanity, humour, pursuit of freedom, open-mindedness, and sensitivity to injustice (Arendt, 1978, p. 65-6). From
an obituary of Arthur Schlesinger (1980) we know that Morgenthau’s personality comprised these values. Yet, this claim for re-establishing these values was less motivated by religious reasons, as Mollov (2002) implied. Although Morgenthau was engaged in Jewish community work in the sense of lived spirituality, such as teaching at a Jewish congregation in Kansas City, as previously noted (HJM-Archive 91), but these personal values would provide a ‘firm standpoint’ (festen Standpunkt) (Morgenthau, 1932, p. 27) to make value judgements, as Morgenthau demanded it for German Staatslehre. Hence, they would allow people to establish a set of collective values each society would have to create by themselves and critically, yet open-mindedly, reflect on the values of other societies.

The values Morgenthau had in mind for Western societies were European values, as he called them in Der Selbstmord mit gutem Gewissen (1930b, p. 41-52), even though he refrained from a clear definition. Therefore, this thesis turns to Frei’s biography in which he argued that an elaboration would have not been necessary then because Morgenthau’s contemporaries would have been aware of what was meant with European values and their ‘Christian, cosmopolitan, and humanitarian elements’ (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 269). To illustrate these European values, the sociologist Helmuth Plessner, a coeval of Morgenthau, is consulted. Plessner elaborated on them in Die verspätete Nation (The belated nation) which was originally published in 1935. Plessner depicted European values as the fundamental human rights, rationality and progress through education, the interplay of intellectual scepticism and tolerance, and democracy (Plessner, 1959, p. 29-31; Frei, 2001, p. 167). In short, these values refer to the humanist liberal tradition of the German-Jewish Bildungsbürgertum. Indeed, Morgenthau (1961a) was as a humanist, which is manifested in his analysis of the lost German-Jewish symbiosis before the Second World War at the Leo-Baeck-Institute.77
These European values would have been intended to be re-established in the Western World, but these are not values Morgenthau would have claimed to be universal.

Morgenthau saw the loss of these values in his own academic environment; a topic which is still noteworthy today. In the 1930s he published several articles on the reform of juridical education in the Frankfurter Zeitung (HJM-Archive 95), most revealing, however, is his analysis of the problem of the American university system, published in the Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung from 10th January 1938. There, he argued ‘that the technological progress is bought with the loss of cultural substance’ (HJM-Archive 96; my translation).78 His solution was to leave aside an education that would have aimed at immediate usefulness and, instead, create a general humanistic education focusing on fundamental ideas and cultural goods inherent to humankind. Only people with such an education would be intellectually and morally capable of fulfilling their later roles and tasks in society and eventually establish a new humanistic metaphysics. Morgenthau returned to this argument in the 1950s, when he expressed growing concern with the development of political science and International Relations in particular into a positivistic science (Morgenthau, 1952a; 1959c; 1974b). He even argued to resurrect this humanistic kind of education, what he perceived to have existed in German universities until the early 20th century, in a letter to the editors of the New York Times, published in the issue from 23rd August 1966 (HJM-Archive 43).

In his post-doctoral thesis, Morgenthau also considered the realisation of values in the form of norms. Any kind of norm consisted for Morgenthau of two elements: the ‘disposition normative’ and the ‘élément validité [sic]’ (1934a, p. 25). The former element would signify the content of the norm and refers to the aspired attitude or behaviour. However, the content of a norm would not be sufficient to claim validity, let alone that people would follow it and thereby allow the norm-setter to influence their behaviour (Morgenthau, 1934a, p. 32). Therefore, a second element would be necessary as a
means to effectively achieve validity. Morgenthau argued that it is essentially any form of sanction that would make people follow a norm. Not that people could also follow a norm voluntarily, being convinced of its righteousness, but usually people’s interests would clash with the norm, which is why the potentiality of physical or mental sanctions would have to be present. The justification for considering sanctions as sufficient means to enforce norms, brought Morgenthau back to his elaboration of the human drives. In *La Réalité des Normes* Morgenthau noted that ‘it is precisely the fear of a displeasure which is the most appropriate means to provoke the desired reaction through the norm’ (1934a, p. 46; my translation). Hence, Morgenthau returned to the principle of lust he had found in Nietzsche and Freud, and which he had elaborated into the principle to prove oneself. Morgenthau alluded here to a paradox: people in fear of losing possibilities to increase pleasure or being exposed to displeasure would follow the norms and thereby restrict their lust, resulting in giving away the possibility to achieve even more. In other words, the fear of losing the possibility to increase lust altogether would be stronger than the incentive to increase lust even more. Nevertheless, Morgenthau believed only sanctions would make people succumb to norms, since otherwise, as Morgenthau noted in one of his first American publications, it remains ‘… a mere idea, a wish, a suggestion, but not a valid rule’ (1940, p. 276).

Finally, for Morgenthau, norms could have taken three forms of sanctions. First, people would get sanctioned through morality, which he considered to be the most fundamental norm because the individual’s conscience would act as the ‘tribunal intérieur dans l’homme’ (Morgenthau, 1934a, p. 59). The second kind of norms, mores, would act as a sanction on the collective level through spontaneous and arbitrary reactions of the society they exist in. This public opinion, however, would bear the risk, due to its arbitrariness, that the effectiveness of sanctions would get distorted since it was potentially neither controllable, nor just (Morgenthau, 1973, p. 54-5). Finally, legal norms
would be norms that fulfil what mores could not achieve. They would offer controlled, and at best just, forms of sanctions since they would succumb to a normative regulation (law) if their norms are infringed (Morgenthau, 1934a, p. 69-88).

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that Morgenthau’s ontology possessed a profoundness that most studies so far have not grasped and the few who have even went so far as to consider it an example of transcendentalism (Rengger, 2005; 2007; Neacsu, 2010). American scholars in particular, stemming from a different intellectual tradition, faced Morgenthau’s transcendental ontology with discomfort since they recognised ‘something almost continental’ (Good, 1960, p. 615) in it.

It was pointed out that the very basis of this ontology is the human being and his/her tragic existence. Religious and political certainties had vanished for various reasons, leaving people behind bereft of their beliefs and identities, making them susceptible for the distorting views ideologies promised. This development destroyed the values Morgenthau considered as vital for the viability of societies. Since these values are missing as regulatory bodies, the human drives of self-preservation and to prove oneself broke through unhindered. The existence of these drives, whose elaboration Morgenthau had found in Freud and Nietzsche, convinced him that humans are in a tragic position for several reasons: not only are these two drives conflicting and hindering each other in their fulfilment, but they also cause selfishness and its limitlessness ends in the impossibility of their complete realisation. Finally, and this is certainly the greatest tragedy, due to the lack of values, these drives prohibit humans to do what they ought to do and potentially cause a society’s downfall.

This final tragedy highlighted that Morgenthau had two kinds of power in mind. The first one, the *animus dominandi*, which is essentially his drive to prove oneself and
which he further elaborated by referring to Weber, was for Morgenthau an empirical concept that he considered as prevalent and, therefore, had to be taken into consideration analytically to grasp reality. Yet, he argued for a second kind of power which he employed as a normative concept. With this kind of power, which he had based upon Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence, the Übermensch, and will to power and which is in striking similarity to Arendt’s concept of power, Morgenthau aimed to re-establish the values he perceived to have been lost in modern societies. The disenchantment of the world elucidated the nihilism of life. Nevertheless, Morgenthau argued that this had to be accepted and positively transformed to get engaged into and create a good, value-based life. However, Morgenthau was aware that transcendental homelessness, to use Lukács’s term, was the high price to be paid for its achievement. Hence, power was for Morgenthau both the destroyer and creator of social life.

The realm in society where both kinds of power, empirical and normative (as discussed above), are applied was for Morgenthau the political. The elaboration of Morgenthau’s concept of the political pointed out that he considered it as the quality of interpersonal relations that are subject to changing interests. From this follows that Morgenthau, in agreement with Simmel and in anticipation with for example Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, perceived societies as constructed out of these interest-guided relations are in constant flux due to spatial and temporal changes which affect them. Hence, societies, for example the nation-state, are constructed and its construction depends to a good degree on the embodiment of the political, in other words, the concept of power. Therefore, Morgenthau aimed to re-enchant the world (Neacsu, 2010) by applying his normative concept of power that would enable the recreation of the lost values. It was noted that these values primarily were those he had experienced himself in the German-Jewish humanist, liberal tradition of the Bildungsbürgertum he grew up in. Values such as freedom, tolerance, humour, respect for oneself and others,
and certainly prudence were qualities he considered essential to save societies, and particularly democracies as chapter six will reveal, from extinction which they were threatened to be if individuals only seek the fulfilment of their drives.

Hence, throughout his life Morgenthau aimed ‘to speak truth to the power’ (1967a, p. 17) by revealing the devastating effects a misguided concept of power can have, by pointing out that humanistic values are vital for the survival of any society, and by promoting a concept of power that enabled people to constructively and positively act together. Chapter six will reveal that modern societies in their blind following of an assumed logical rationalism and belief in eternal progress through technological advancement were threatened to exactly implement what Morgenthau urged to prohibit and negate those qualities he argued to preserve; a danger at present as topical as 50 years ago. Before this elaboration can take place, however, Morgenthau’s epistemology will be turned to in the next chapter as it helps to explain and more profoundly grasp certain strategies, perceptions, and actions of Morgenthau’s political agency.
Chapter 5. Politics is art, not a science: Hans Morgenthau's epistemology

5.1 Introduction

Other than Morgenthau’s ontology, his epistemological insights have so far been less extensively researched. This might explain why for a long time, at least well into the 1990s, Morgenthau was almost exclusively considered to have been a positivist (e.g. Smith, 1997, p. 10). Indeed even today, some scholars try to maintain parts of this claim by noting that Morgenthau was neither a coherent positivist, nor a clear anti-positivist. This view is present, for example, in Rohde (2004) and in the works of Stefano Guzzini (1998; 2004).

Hence, it is the intention of this chapter to reveal that such a claim owes its existence to a dogmatic understanding of the development of International Relations. There are no traces in the vast oeuvre of Morgenthau where he would have spoken in favour of positivism. Rather, it will be argued, Morgenthau aimed to establish, not unlike Dilthey in the century before him for the entire Geisteswissenschaften, a feasible and intelligible theory for political science based upon epistemological directions which stood in stark contrast to positivism. Morgenthau’s intention is already visible in his manuscript Über den Sinn der Wissenschaft in dieser Zeit und über die Bestimmung des Menschen (Morgenthau, 1934b). However, it was particularly in the United States that Morgenthau had realised, like other like-minded scholars in International Relations at that time, who were also often of German origin, the necessity to establish a theory for International Relations to counter the ruling dogma of behaviouralism.

The elaboration of his epistemological foundations will, furthermore, elucidate that it firmly rested on the earlier mentioned alienation as a source of self-reflection and reveals that Morgenthau’s epistemology was formed within the concerns that German
humanities troubled at that time. Morgenthau developed them along the line of the controversy between historicism and historism. Essentially, this was a debate whether to accept the relativism of knowledge or truth claims, as emphasised in Stefan Berger’s definition:

‘I deliberately use the term “historism” … rather than “historicism”… Whereas “historism” (… Historismus) … can be seen as an evolutionary, reformist concept which understands all political order as historically developed and grown, “historicism” (Historizismus), as defined and rejected by Karl Popper, is based on the notion that history develops according to predetermined laws towards a particular end’ (2001, p. 28; emphasis in the original).80

Hence, this debate dealt with the question whether historically determined knowledge is absolute or if it has to be relativised in terms of the particular historical contexts in which knowledge was constructed. The epistemology that Morgenthau exercised allowed him to critically reflect on his and the position of others. Besides, it enabled him to critically question and uncover what could be consciously discernible and which processes and forces would shape social relations. Such an epistemology, geared by alienation, enabled Morgenthau to develop a method best called conceptual history (Begriffsgeschichte) as it allowed him to transcend trivial everyday occurrences and to identify general political concepts. Certainly, Morgenthau is to be criticised for not having pointed out the centrality of alienation for his epistemology as it would have allowed later students of Morgenthau’s work to more easily distinguish his core epistemological concepts. However, as with the previously mentioned European values, Morgenthau considered this as widely known. This wide acceptance of alienation as an epistemological source is to be remarked in Schütz’s *The phenomenology of the social world*, originally published in 1932, in which he argued that alienation would be the very essence of any social science (1967, p. 140-1).
In order to elaborate these arguments it will first be necessary to analyse Morgenthau’s attitude towards positivism (Chapter 5.2). This will contain a critical assessment of major forms of positivistic sciences he encountered during his lifetime: legal positivism in Europe and behaviouralism in the United States. This section will be finished with an analysis of the main concerns Morgenthau had with positivism: rationalism and empiricism. This leaves the task to elucidate the epistemological foundations Morgenthau rested his approach on. It will be pointed out that concepts of intersubjectivity, temporality, and spatiality were crucial aspects Morgenthau considered for the construction of knowledge (Chapter 5.3). Finally, this will be followed by the elaboration of his analytical framework to approach and understand politics (Chapter 5.4). It will be emphasised that this framework rested on ‘principles of politics’ (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1950) or ‘perennial problems’ (Morgenthau, 1955, p. 434; 1962a, p. 19). It will also contain a correlation of his conceptual history with intellectual forerunners of this approach, primarily to be found in Swiss representatives of art history, to give further evidence for Morgenthau’s intellectual coherence that rested upon Central European humanities and social sciences.

5.2 The insufficiency of positivism

5.2.1 Morgenthau’s dispute with legal positivism and behaviouralism

5.2.1.1 Hans Kelsen and legal positivism

Before analysing Morgenthau’s own epistemology and the concerns he had with positivism, it first has to be remarked what Morgenthau perceived to be positivism. For Morgenthau (1936, p. 1; 1940, p.201) a positivistic approach mainly concentrated on empirically verifiable objects and disapproval of metaphysics and is, therefore, to be understood similarly to what Hoffmann called, by referring to Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘applied Enlightenment’ (1977, p. 45). Often positivistic approaches would try to apply methods
of natural sciences for social scientific questions in order to establish a unity of science. For Morgenthau, therefore, positivism promoted a scientific method through deductive reasoning and the establishment of hypotheses. Since positivistic scholars concentrated on social objects that could be verified through observation, it was, finally, commonly believed that through the testing of knowledge via empirical means a stage would be achieved where law-like generalisations and absolute truth statements would become possible. Consequently, Morgenthau believed that positivism would be geared by an unflinching belief in progress.

This section will argue that Morgenthau remained critical towards any positivistic thought throughout his career, as was recently ascertained by Behr (2010, p. 213-4). Morgenthau considered positivism largely as tautological and as a set of epistemological perspectives that would present empirical trivialities concealed in scientific language (Tsou, 1984, p. 47). Furthermore, positivism was for Morgenthau a retarded, even hypocritical undertaking because it claimed to have deprived itself from the traditions of Western philosophical thought, but, as Morgenthau (1940, p. 246; 1944, p. 174) claimed, it would have been only a sign of self-denial because, as it will be further explained below, knowledge construction would be influenced by its particular context. Finally, Morgenthau experienced positivism as a form of scholarship that would promote the status quo ‘… since it substitutes what is desirable for what is possible’ due to an indifference to normative concerns (1970c, p. 69). In the worst case, therefore, positivism would run the risk of becoming the compliant agent of any ideology because the aspiration of a “value-free science” would not be concerned with value based judgements and would eventually strengthen the status quo. The resulting unqualified relativism would lead, according to Morgenthau, to a situation in which any behaviour could be endorsed as long as it is in agreement with what is perceived to be of factual evidence. To elaborate Morgenthau’s criticism on positivism his assessment of two major forms that he
encountered during his life, will be examined. First, Morgenthau’s attitude towards legal positivism will be elaborated, before we will turn to his experience with behaviouralism.

At the time Morgenthau made first steps into academic jurisprudence, legal positivism was the dominant tradition of German *Staatslehre* (Jütersonke, 2007, p. 103). Jellinek has been one of its most distinguished representatives, but legal positivism is mainly associated with Kelsen and the Vienna School. Kelsen played an important role for Morgenthau epistemologically and personally, as mentioned above. Morgenthau owed the successful start of his academic career to Kelsen, which resulted not only in great gratitude, but also a friendship-like relationship with Kelsen. Indeed, Morgenthau had sympathies for Kelsen’s work. While being a law clerk in Sinzheimer’s chambers, Morgenthau endorsed Kelsen’s critique of modern capitalism (Scheuerman, 2008, p. 32), which will be of further interest in the next chapter. He even acknowledged Kelsen’s legal positivism as an attempt to save public law from the crisis of European culture. In one of the first articles Morgenthau published in the United States, he noted that

‘… positivism accepted the breakdown of the great metaphysical systems of the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries and the resulting decadence of metaphysical jurisprudence as an established fact. It endeavoured to save the scientific character of jurisprudence by eliminating from it all metaphysical elements, thus separating it from the discredited doctrines of natural law’ (1940, p. 262).

Further evidence that Morgenthau could comprehend Kelsen’s scholarship is given in his inaugural lecture at Geneva from 1932 and an article on positivism from 1936. In these papers, Morgenthau considered Kelsen’s legal positivism as a temporarily feasible solution for *Staatslehre*. The breakdown of all metaphysical beliefs and the subsequent cultural crisis made it necessary for Kelsen to withdraw from reality and the moral, po-
political, and economic issues that influenced the state. Morgenthau (1932, p. 11-3) was convinced that if this would not have been the case, Kelsen could not have succeeded in reclaiming universality for *Staatslehre*. In this sense, Kelsen’s pure theory of law was accepted by Morgenthau as an attempt to partition *Staatslehre* from the ever-challenging social developments and, thereby, rescuing scholarly standards from turning into ideological henchmen. Thus, he regarded legal positivism as being more cautious than other types of positivism (Morgenthau, 1936, p. 10-4).

This initial acceptance of Kelsen’s legal positivism, however, should not entrap the student of Morgenthau’s work to believe he would have endorsed Kelsen’s views. Quite the contrary, he only conceded to legal positivism a temporary right to exist until the cultural crisis would be resolved. Kelsen’s pure theory of law in Morgenthau’s assessment would provide no answers to the traditional questions of German *Staatslehre*. Neither would Kelsen have been concerned with questions regarding the existence or value of governmental institutions and legal orders as well as their development and demise, nor would he have been analysing justifications of human forms of authority. For this reason, due to its lack of intention, it could not address these questions which Morgenthau considered to be the most fundamental to humankind. Yet, people, Morgenthau was convinced, would strive to get meaningful explanations and justifications about the society they live in. They would aspire to make sense of the concrete circumstances of the life they face, but legal positivism would only provide abstract explanations of the legal framework (*Sollordnung*) to which the state would have been reduced to. For Morgenthau, however, this was the cardinal error of Kelsen’s legal positivism for it would omit the human element in public law. However, such a human element would be inevitable ‘… as long as the formation of the public reality remains the subject of emotional contentions. Until then it is impossible to think about the state, whose existence is tied to one’s own destiny, without making judgements about and as-
Therefore, Morgenthau renounced Kelsen’s positivistic epistemology as not being able to depict the real image of human affairs. As we will see now, the kind of positivism Morgenthau encountered after his emigration to the United States, behaviouralism, was in this sense even more problematic.

5.2.1.2 The Chicago School and behaviouralism

Following the definition provided by one of behaviouralism’s foremost advocate Robert Dahl (1961) and by Dwight Waldo (1950), who on behalf of UNESCO scrutinised political science in the United States, behaviouralism is the umbrella term for approaches promoting a unified method for the social sciences focusing on directly observable reality, applying deductive reasoning and believing in unlimited scientific progress. Such a definition does at first sound similar to general definitions of positivism, but in one important aspect behaviouralism differs from it. Quite different from legal positivists before the Second World War, behaviouralists argued against the value relativism of pure positivism, and aimed to achieve the ‘… realization of a science of liberal politics’ (Gunnell, 1988, p. 80; emphasis in the original), thereby giving political science a practical purpose. For this, they not only received criticism from Morgenthau, but even Kelsen disagreed in this sense with behaviouralism (Guilhot, 2008, p. 286). Surprisingly, Morgenthau spent most of his academic career at the University of Chicago, the centre of American behaviouralism, as Morgenthau himself remarked in a newspaper article for the Neue Zürcher Zeitung which he wrote before coming to Chicago in 1938 (HJM-Archive 96). Soon after his arrival in Chicago tensions developed between what Morgenthau called the ‘Merriam fraction’ and him, not least because of Morgenthau’s critical assessment of the relations between liberalism, science, and politics in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Postscript, 1984, p. 370-1). Already
before the Second World War, Charles Merriam and Harold Laswell had established the politics department in Chicago as the foremost promoter of behaviouralism in the United States and after the War scholars such as Gabriel Almond fostered this image (Heaney and Hansen, 2006, p. 589). This explains why even years later Morgenthau expressed relief that he had received tenure a few weeks before *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* was published.

However, behaviouralism not only strived in Chicago, but gradually became the leading dogma in American political science (Guilhot, 2008, p. 297), which is why it also demonstrates Morgenthau’s increasing intellectual alienation to mainstream American political science. Three reasons are provided for this behavioural turn. The first practical reason was repeatedly noted by Morgenthau. Any topic for which no other discipline seemed apt would have been added to political science (Morgenthau, 1955; 1959c; 1962a). This diversity and vastness in the political science curriculum was a sign of little acceptance of this new discipline in the academic world, as was the case with sociology before (Mannheim, 1964, p. 614-24). Through rigorous application of scientific methods, behaviouralism promised for political science to become a respected member of the higher education curriculum. A second, geographical explanation was provided by Hoffmann and Ekkehart Krippendorff. Until the end of the First World War, the United States would have had little experience with the typical conflicts and problems that had influenced (international) policy making in Europe. Scientification seemed, therefore, an appropriate means to satisfy the liberal, democratic zeal that would have crept over American politics after having been involved in the First World War (Hoffmann, 1977, p. 42-3; Krippendorff, 1989, p. 31-3). Recently, Molloy came to a similar conclusion that ‘[w]ithout a tradition of international involvement, the Americans were forced to rely on the Enlightenment ideology of reason and its 19th century
successor, positivistic science, as the key to effective, rational practice in international relations’ (2003, p. 72).

A further explanation for the rise of behaviouralism would lie, according to David Kettler and John Gunnell’s assessment, in the numerous arrivals of émigré scholars to the United States in the 1930s and 1940s and their increasing influence in the discipline. In the decades after the Second World War émigré scholars contributed to an increase in articles concerned with political theory in the American Political Science Review (Kettler, 2006, p. 533-4). To counter this rise of ‘traditional political theory’ (Kettler, 2006, p. 531) behaviouralism would have turned into a ‘conservative rebellion’ in order to save the traditional liberal values of American political science as many of these émigré scholars represented a different kind of scholarship that focused on historical analysis and, due to their experience with Nazi Germany, could not share American optimism (Gunnell, 1988, p. 73; 2006, p. 484-5, specifically on Morgenthau: Rosecrance, 1981, p. 749). Indeed, this explanation is in line with a recently proposed argument that International Relations Theory as a discipline during the 1950s and 1960s was a ‘separationist movement’ (Guilhot, 2008, p. 282) for many of these émigré scholars, but also like-minded American scholars, like Thompson or William Fox. Furthermore, outside of International Relations, émigré scholars contributed to the criticism of behaviouralism, as Voegelin’s The new science of politics (2000), which originated out of the Walgreen-Lectures at the University of Chicago, exemplarily demonstrates. Morgenthau approvingly acknowledged this similar research interest in a letter to Voegelin on 10th June 1953 (HJM-Archive 60). This helps to explain why Morgenthau (1955, p. 450) criticised during this time the separation of political theory from political science. Although Morgenthau was very engaged in this “separationist movement”, what Morgenthau actually wanted to achieve was to bring an anthropologically oriented theory into American political science. This is the case because he argued that any science would need to
be theoretical because its task would be to systematise events whose analysis goes beyond the common sense. Political theory would be essential to political science as it would be its task to distinguish these political elements which would be valid regardless of time and space from those elements which are situationally conditioned (Lebow, 2003, p. 248-9). Behaviouralism, however, had deprived itself from this task by seemingly cutting off its ties not only from Western political thought, but also from contemporary political issues.

For Morgenthau this would make behavioural approaches sterile and they would provide no academic value, which coincides with Louis Hartz’s argument that ‘[i]t is only when you take your ethics for granted that all problems emerge as problems of technique’ (1955, p. 10). Until the late 1960s Morgenthau hoped his efforts would succeed and the behavioural movement would vanish, as noted in a letter to Michael Carder from 7th September 1966: ‘… I am inclined to think that the recently fashionable types of research such as systems theory, game theory, and behaviouralism will decline because of their sterility which is now increasingly being recognised. Conversely, I would anticipate a revival of interest in the traditional types of historical research and intellectual analysis’ (HJM-Archive 9). A similar hope was expressed by Morgenthau three years later in a letter to Rosemary Galli from 3rd January 1969 (HJM-Archive 24). Ultimately, however, Morgenthau and his fellow colleagues’ aspirations and ambitions failed since behaviouralism became the dominant approach in political science in the second half of the 20th century (Guilhot, 2008, p. 300).

Two further objections arose for Morgenthau in his discussion of behaviouralism. First, Morgenthau (1944) criticised the trend towards applicability in social sciences, eventually resulting in attempts of social planning. This quest for certainty, which ‘…explains the rage for premature theoretical formulation, the desire to calculate the incalculable … the crusade to replace discussions of motives with such more objective
data as word counts and vote counts, the crowding of strategic research …’ (Hoffmann, 1977, p. 57), particularly concerned Morgenthau. Without acknowledging one’s own intellectual standpoint and promoting an alleged value-freeness that, nevertheless, aimed to foster liberalism, political science would be endangered to uncritically serve the liberal *status quo*. Hence, Morgenthau recognised here a similar danger that had already disturbed him about legal positivism in the 1930s. And as Hoffmann’s remark of the ‘kitchens of power’ (1977), what Krippendorff calls the ‘Kissinger-syndrome’ (1989), shows, Morgenthau’s fear was not made up out of thin air. Finally, the intellectual sterility and focus on immediate applicability of science further promoted optimism in the USA where, as mentioned earlier, optimism was already strong due to liberalism (Shimko, 1992). Again Hoffmann’s assessment is most elusive. We read: ‘There is … the profound conviction … that all problems can be resolved, that the way to resolve them is to apply the scientific method assumed to be value free, and to combine empirical investigation, hypothesis formation, and testing and that the resort to science will yield practical applications that will bring progress’ (Hoffmann, 1977, p. 45).

As a Jew who had experienced the rise of fascism in Europe, who was forced to emigrate twice, and who had experienced the destructiveness of science in the wrong hands, Morgenthau could not endorse the almost naïve optimism of his American colleagues. This disaffirmation, for example, underlies Morgenthau’s criticism of American foreign aid. In a lecture given at the Naval War College in 1957 and a newspaper-account in the *Globe and Mail* more than ten years later from 27th July 1969, Morgenthau disagreed with an American foreign aid as it would base its efforts on the assumption that the American way of living would be superior to others and that foreign aid would increase the standard of living in the recipient-countries, which in turn would create democracy and finally peace (Morgenthau, 1958a, p. 7; HJM-Archive 186).
To sum up, this section elucidated Morgenthau’s largely negative relation to positivism throughout his career. He dismissed any approach based on a positivistic epistemology because such approaches did not adhere to basic academic standards. Thereby, this analysis has established that any claim that Morgenthau endorsed positivism is devoid of any foundation. What follows is an analysis of the main criticism Morgenthau made against positivism as an epistemological approach.

5.2.2 The perils of science: rationalism and empiricism

In his critical position towards positivism, Morgenthau brought forward two aspects – rationalism and empiricism – which deserve further elaboration. As this section will demonstrate, Morgenthau was not fundamentally opposed to these two aspects. On the contrary, he also employed them in his epistemology and considered them as vital aspects of sound scholarship, but Morgenthau’s understanding of the purpose and scope of rationalism and empiricism was diametrically opposed to the one of positivistic scholars. As elaborated, political science in the United States has been dominated by and, indeed, owes its existence to the urge for practicability. Morgenthau (1962a, p. 113-26) was also aware that the Second World War only intensified this urge through an increasing personal interchange between academic, governmental, and military institutions; a concern that had reached the wider public in Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidential farewell-address in 1961 in which he called this interconnection the “military-industrial complex”. Its aim was, not least in a state of emergency such as war, to increase the reliability of predictions by removing factors of uncertainty. Various scientific approaches saw the light of day during this time, characterised by an optimistic outlook due to an uncritical belief in progress which would enable concise planning (Morgenthau, 1944, p. 181-5). In Great Britain, the strife for social planning got so contagious that Mannheim also occupied himself with this topic after his emigration (Blokland, 1984; Ziffus,
1988). For Morgenthau, it seemed that rationalism would provide the authorisation for this belief in progress because

‘… the world is governed by laws which are accessible to human reason. In the last analysis, there exists fundamental identity between the human mind and the laws which govern the world … It is this identity which enables man to understand the causes of events and, by creating causes through his reasonable action, to make himself master of events’ (1947a, p. 11).

Morgenthau argued here, as Neacsu (2010, p.78-9) pointed out, that rationalism would seemingly allow the construction of an accurate model of the world and its social forces which would guarantee its internal coherence as it would have been believed that human beings are capable to act in full rational determination. This kind of rationalism, Morgenthau was convinced, would have led to the belief of having reached a ‘… mythological level of absolute certainty and predictability …’ (1944, p. 179).

Morgenthau was critical towards the promises of rationalism to effectively simplify and mechanically analyse the social world because it is ‘complicated [and] incongruous’ (1947a, p. 10). Indeed, Morgenthau has to be seen here in the wider context of the state of the discipline during this time. Power, as the central concept of politics, was introduced by Morgenthau and other émigré scholars to distinguish themselves from the rationalism of American political science (Guilhot, 2008). Morgenthau’s article Education and World Politics from 1955 shows this attempt by first elucidating the failures of rationalism, before pointing out the philosophical basis of political science and finally introducing the concept of power as central for the analysis of political science. Yet, at least for Morgenthau, this was not a criticism of rationalism per se, but of the way it would have been perceived and employed. Molloy recently turned to this aspect in Morgenthau’s thought. We read: ‘Where rationalism provides merely an illusion of control over knowledge … rationality is an effective approach to knowledge, it is what
makes knowledge possible in international relations …’ (Molloy, 2004, p. 3). This is possible as the social world ‘… is not devoid of a measure of rationality if approached with the expectations of Macbethian cynicism’ (Morgenthau, 1944, p. 184). What Morgenthau wanted to show here is that although in theory there would be uncountable contingencies, it would still be possible to detect perennial problems of politics, which decrease the possible number of these contingencies and thereby anticipate potential trends (Morgenthau, 1970a, p. 242-3). Carefully applying this kind of rationality would allow political practitioners to approximate potential solutions in consideration of the specific configuration of each problem. Therefore, Morgenthau argued similarly to Mannheim that ‘[p]olitics is an art not a science, and what is required for its mastery is not the rationality of the engineer but the wisdom and the moral strength of the statesman’ (1947a, p. 10).85

The second aspect that Morgenthau criticised about positivistic approaches was empiricism. As Morgenthau’s former student Lebow (2003, p. 248) remarks, in particular this dimension would have concerned Morgenthau. Like with rationalism, Morgenthau did not criticise empiricism per se, but the kind of empiricism endorsed by positivists identified particularly by two devices: reductionism and quantification (Morgenthau 1970a, p. 243; 1970c, p. 69). Morgenthau saw reductionism symbolised in the application of, what he called, ‘method of the single cause’ (1944, p. 174-5; 1947a, p. 95-105). He employed this term to characterise social scientific efforts to mimic natural sciences by developing an approach based on deductive-nomological reasoning implying that in the social world the development of one particular effect could be explained through one particular cause. Approaches based upon this method would also have been potentially factor and regression analysis and correlation, all of which were used for the first time in Chicago (Heaney and Hansen, 2006, p. 589). Morgenthau criticised positivistic political science in its inability to predict and its recourse on explanation. This reduc-
tionism was particularly disquieting for Morgenthau (1971b, p. 77) as, like Voegelin (Henkel, 1998, p. 17-8), he propagated an encyclopaedic scholarship in the sense that political science would have to rest on a large stock of historical and philosophical knowledge that would allow analogies to be drawn.

The discomfort Morgenthau caused with his rejection of reductionism among political scientists is to be noticed in a contemporary critique on Morgenthau’s work, where it was presented as lacking rigorous scientific standards. ‘Science is not a reality. It consists of theories or hypotheses whose truth or reality has to be established by critical experiment or testing’ (Wasserman, 1959, p. 67). However, Morgenthau made clear that any such approach would be bound to fail because the contingencies would be so numerous that one cause could lead to numerous effects and the cause itself could have sprung from numerous effects. Nevertheless, the application of the method of the single cause inspired the formulation of social laws. Following Morgenthau, they would have been formulated under hypothetical assumptions irrespective of complex and incongruent actual social relations. Therefore, despite their dogmatic claim for universality and practicability, the best these laws could do is to ‘present a series of hypothetical possibilities, each of which may occur under certain conditions and which of them will actually occur is anybody’s guess’ (Morgenthau, 1944, p. 176; 1949a, p. 1).

The second device of empiricism Morgenthau criticised is quantification. In his article *Power as a Political Concept* Morgenthau (1971b, p. 69-70) dismissed quantification because in his estimation not even in the areas of political science that would allow a certain quantification, like voting habits, would it lead to satisfying results. Furthermore, as Molloy (2004, p.4) has remarked, Morgenthau would have criticised quantification for its fragmentary character. This is the case as approaches relying on quantification would only depict at best the factual appearance of the social world because they would not ask for the development, reasons, and implications of this factual reality. Yet,
for Morgenthau these kinds of questions would constitute the essence of a sound social science (Morgenthau, 1944, p. 244-5; 1970c, p. 67-71). In Science: Servant or Master? Morgenthau accused positivism that it had ‘… lost sight of the very existence of the unknowable’ (1972, p. 62), the reflexive character of the human being, due to the quantification and its subsequent claim to accurately depict social reality. This claim was for Morgenthau the peril of empiricism, and this statement deserves to be quoted at length due to its forcefulness:

‘Facts have no social meaning in themselves. It is the significance we attribute to certain facts of our sensual experience, in terms of our hopes and fears, our memories, intentions, and expectations, that create them as social facts. The social world itself, then, is but an artefact of man’s mind as the reflection of his thoughts and the creation of his actions’ (1962b, p. 110).

To counter this uncritical confidence in quantification, Morgenthau proposed the concept of ‘higher practicability’ (1955, p. 455; 1959c, p. 131-2). With higher practicability Morgenthau meant to establish those concepts that would be lacking in quantification: to shed light on the development, reasons, intentions, and implications of factual reality. This surplus of knowledge would lead to an enhanced understanding of the world and save political scientists, like social scientists in general, from becoming a mere chronologist of the status quo by transforming them to their actual right to exist: to become able to critically assess the one existing social world and thereby pointing towards a different, potentially better social reality.
5.3 The development of Morgenthau’s epistemological foundation in the interplay of German historism and historicism

5.3.1 The particularity of being and the limitations of knowledge

So far Morgenthau’s critical view towards positivism has been elaborated, but this does not yet explain his own epistemology. Morgenthau’s intellectual development took place at a time when German humanities were heavily debating knowledge production, which can be classified along the lines of historism and historicism. Morgenthau was influenced by this debate during his studies in Munich, where he attended lectures by Hermann Oncken and Heinrich Wölfflin, both of whom contributed to this debate (Jaeger and Rüsen, 1992, p. 141). He acknowledged their importance late in his life (Morgenthau, 1984, p. 5; Postscript, 1984, p. 344) and also emphatically mentioned Oncken in a letter to Thomas W. Robinson from 3rd November 1969 (HJM-Archive 49).

That these scholars and their insights had a lasting influence, an effect which was largely overlooked in International Relations, has further been remarked by Morgenthau (1970a, p. 251) when he classified his approach to knowledge as historical. As this chapter will show, Morgenthau developed an epistemology that took an intermediary position between historism and historicism. His foundations, which will be discussed now, were primarily influenced by historist assumptions, while his epistemological implementation, to be discussed in chapter 5.4, found intellectual stimulation in historicism due to the fact he applied general concepts to distinguish politics from other scholarly fields.

In his engagement with this intellectual dispute Morgenthau learned that human beings would be tied to a particular culture and even specific social groups. This means that humans would be in their very existence dependent on the constant mutual interplay with other humans and through this interplay they would develop their identity and world-view. Morgenthau (2004, p. 105) agreed with Aristotle that a human would be a
zoon politikon; through this common interplay a particular social and political life-world would be created in which humans could follow their aspirations. This institutionalised meaning of the social world would in turn influence their meaning-construction, i.e. the way people perceive and understand the social world. Therefore, as Morgenthau mentioned, they would become ‘both the creature and the creator of history and politics …’ (1958b, p. 17). This, what Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger (1966, p. 23) defined as intersubjectivity in the late 1960s, was in its essence for Morgenthau already in Europe accessible through his knowledge of Simmel and Schütz’s work.87

Simmel employed the term “reciprocal orientation” (Wechselwirkung) to identify the mutual interaction of people (Abel, 1959, p. 473; Kaern, 1990, p. 83-5). Indeed, reciprocal orientation was society’s constitutive factor for Simmel, because a society would come into being only ‘where several individuals act in reciprocal orientation. This reciprocal orientation always evolves out of a peculiar drive or reasons’ (1908, p. 4; my translation).88 Defining society as the entity of these reciprocal orientations and stressing its dynamic character, Simmel intended to point out that a social unity in the empirical sense would only be conceivable because there would be different degrees of this orientation which would make it possible to distinguish different societies. To stress this dynamic character of societies Simmel (1908, p. 29) employed the above mentioned term sociation. Therefore, the dynamics of reciprocal orientation could lead to forms of sociation with varying intensity, ranging from the interactions of people in a hotel lobby to members of a nation-state (Simmel, 1908, p. 4-10).89

Whereas Simmel primarily conceived society in spatial terms, Schütz also added a temporal aspect to society. For Schütz, there would be four social worlds: first, the worlds of the predecessor and successors.90 None of these worlds would be accessible for the human being: the former would already be in the past and could only be seen as an observer, whereas the latter would still be indefinite and one would only have the
possibility through their participation in the present world to contribute to the constitution of the future world of predecessors. Second, there would be two worlds of the present: the social world of the contemporaries and of the fellow men. ‘[L]iving with my fellow men, I directly experience them and their subjective experiences. But of my contemporaries we will say that, while living among them, I do not directly and immediately grasp their subjective experiences but instead infer … the typical subjective experiences they must be having’ (Schuetz, 1967, p. 142-3). The social world of the fellow men would be the realm of temporal and social coexistence and, therefore, the realm of everyday-life. The social world of the contemporaries, however, would only allow indirect experience. This is the case that although their social world would also be characterised by temporal coexistence, there would be no immediate spatial overlap which would hinder its accessibility due to cultural, social, or political restrictions (Luckmann, 1993, p. 321; Natanson, 1998, p. 10).

A further refinement, more thoroughly incorporating spatial and temporal aspects, was suggested by Simmel’s pupil, Mannheim, in his essay The problem of generations (1952, p. 276-320). He distinguished between three concepts subdividing socio-historic space. First, he identified “generational locations” which, like Schütz’s social world of contemporaries, acknowledged that the social world would consist of multiple cultural entities. This in turn was further divided by Mannheim into ‘generation[s] as an actuality’ (1952, p. 303). The members of these “generational associations” would share, like in Schütz’s fellow men, ‘a common fate or sensibility’ (Kettler and Loader, 2004, p. 163) that would distinguish them from other groups. Finally, Mannheim also introduced the concept of ‘generation-units’ (1952, p. 306), where even though actual generations would share a common fate and sense of common problems, they would possibly respond differently. Hence, there would be different units within each generation, such as
political parties, that would respond differently to problems and issues (Kettler and Loader, 2004, p. 163-4).

This emphasises that the scholars who particularly contributed to the intellectual socialisation of Morgenthau argued that societies would not only be human constructs that are subject to change, but the reciprocal orientation of humans would have also led in a dialectic process to the establishment of a temporally and spatially divergent nexus of societies. Simmel, for example, argued that there are several capacities which would enable society as an ‘objective form of subjective souls’ (1908, p. 21; my translation).91 Here, however, merely one capacity is of interest. For Simmel, an individual would be capable of understanding their inner-life because he/she would live through it every day. Yet, complete knowledge of the individuality of others would be impossible because one could not know their inner-life exactly (Simmel, 1908, p. 24). However, people approximate and anticipate thoughts and feelings of others through a typification of one’s own experiences. This would be possible as these typifications would be tested and revised in the dialectic process of everyday life situations. The more often people would have to test their typifications, the more closely they could approximate others’ inner-lives, and the more coherent their relation would get. Schütz generally agreed with Simmel due to his ‘… underlying idea has proven fruitful and is still utilized. This is the notion that all concrete social phenomena should be traced back to the modes of individual behaviour and that the particular social form of such modes should be understood through detailed description’ (1967, p. 4). However, he disagreed that empathy would be sufficient enough to constitute particular societies. Schütz claimed that empathy would also require a common expressive basis that would allow perceiving, understanding, and transmitting the objectifications of social reality and their meaning-context in a similar way, i.e. signs which he defined as ‘… art-objects which are interpreted not according to those interpretive schemes which are adequate to them as objects of the ex-
ternal world but according to schemes not adequate to them and belonging rather to other objects’ (1967, p. 118). They could be verbal, but also para-, extra-, or non-verbal and would help to structure everyday life by distinguishing different realms of societies.

From this follows that through the reciprocal orientation of human beings, common inter-subjective schemes of experience would develop. This, what Assmann called “collective memory”, would be shared through Schütz’s signs, like texts, rituals, or monuments, and transmitted through a common sign-system, usually language, which in turn would permit the reciprocal orientation. It would guide the way people perceive, understand, and structure the social world. This understanding was the basis for Morgenthau, like for other scholars of German humanities at that time, to highlight that also knowledge, as a mental result of this reciprocal orientation and expression of the collective memory, would be limited in its scope and depth because there is no absolute super-temporal structure through which reality could be judged. Hence, Morgenthau was influenced by an academic environment that held the belief that knowledge was created in delimited groups within specific contexts and out of particular experiences. This would make knowledge liable to change, but also significant due to its particular relevance.

Early on, Morgenthau came into contact with this kind of thought in the works of Dilthey and Jacob Burckhardt, whose significance for Morgenthau will be further elaborated later in this chapter. Dilthey, whose intellectual stimulation Morgenthau acknowledged in a letter to Samuel B. Magill from 5th January 1962 (HJM-Archive 39), had a holistic notion of an epoch and spoke in this context from a ‘life-horizon’ (Dilthey, 2002, p. 198; emphasis in the original). Hence, every epoch would be focused on itself and would create its own aspects of knowledge which would be true only in the specific context. Equally, Burckhardt, like his successor in Basel and later professor of Morgenthau in Munich, Wölfflin, spoke of a particular ‘spirit of the age’ (Zeitgeist), which would define the way and content of people’s thoughts (Sigurdson, 1990, p. 428;
Young, 2002, p. 117). Burckhardt and Wölfflin also stressed the temporal aspect of knowledge and argued for its changeability.

A further source for Morgenthau’s view that knowledge would be related to a specific time and place might have been Weber as he stressed, next to the temporality, also the spatial context of knowledge, as Stephen Turner and George Mazur (2009, p. 486-8) recently remarked. Weber wrote in his *Methodology of the Social Sciences* that “’[c]ulture’ is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance’ (1949, p. 81). This leads Turner and Mazur to argue that for Weber scholarship could be referred back to choices of value which would be situated in a particular cultural context. Therefore, social sciences would be, other than natural sciences, subject to the culture they were created in and would be abandoned if they would not reflect the social reality of this culture anymore. It is assumed that Morgenthau’s stance on this subject was intensified through the study of Weber, although the causal relation between Morgenthau and Weber that Turner and Mazur aim to establish is mistaken. The evidence they claim to have found in Morgenthau’s work is not a reference to Weber, but Morgenthau had Mannheim in mind when he spoke of a German sociologist (Turner and Mazur, 2009, p. 487-8).92

Mannheim, who made a first contribution to the historism-historicism-debate in 1924, revived the issues of this debate in 1929 with the publication of *Ideology and Utopia*, the same year that Morgenthau published his doctoral thesis. This book, as was the case with Mannheim’s presentation at the Congress of German Sociologists the year before (Kettler, Meja, and Stehr, 1984, p. 76), was emphatically received by German scholars such as Marcuse and Arendt (Kettler, Meja, and Stehr, 1990, p. 1445). Also, Morgenthau remarked in a letter to Charles McClelland from 16\textsuperscript{th} March 1949 that *Ideology and Utopia* ‘will pay re-reading, and you will probably find, as I have, that the oftener you read it, the more it will help you in your thinking on political problems’
It certainly paid off for Morgenthau who primarily gained his insights on the temporality and spatiality of knowledge from Mannheim. This can be seen in a quotation of which Turner and Mazur think that Morgenthau was referring to Weber. We read: ‘political thinking is … “standortgebunden”, that is to say, it is tied to a particular situation’ (Morgenthau, 1962a, p. 72-3; emphasis in the original).\footnote{Standortgebundenheit des Denkens (situationally conditioned knowledge) is a term not employed by Weber, but was introduced by Mannheim.\footnote{This essentially meant for Mannheim that the production of knowledge would be tied to a particular time and space in history and could only claim validity then and there (Mannheim, 1985, p. 74-8; Pels, 1996, p. 39). Morgenthau agreed with this assumption, as not only the above-mentioned quotation reveals. With the situationally conditioned knowledge, more than Burckhardt and Wölfflin’s *Zeitgeist* and Dilthey’s *Lebenshorizont*, Morgenthau had found a concept that acknowledged the particularity of knowledge, but also left room for the acceptance that knowledge would be created in a historical process that would take former stages of knowledge into account. This is what Morgenthau had in mind when he remarked in his lectures on Aristotle in view of his own situationally conditioned knowledge that ‘I haven’t come down from heaven to this chair and started to teach … obviously my mind has been formed by certain experiences. And naturally those experiences are part of my intellectual composition’ (2004, p. 137). In his article *Power as a Political Concept* Morgenthau gave further evidence for the situationally conditioned knowledge as one of his basic epistemological concepts. There, he remarked that ‘… in a particular culture and a particular period of history, there is likely to be one perspective which for theoretical and practical reasons takes precedence over the others’ (Morgenthau, 1971b, p. 74).}
5.3.2  The relativism of truth

Scholars committed to the approximation of truth, yet operating on the epistemological premises elaborated above, are often faced with charges of being relativistic. Morgenthau, therefore, had to deal with this problem. This charge of relativism was also brought forward against Mannheim who considered relativism as an acceptance that ‘there are no standards and no order in the world’ and that ‘everybody and nobody is right’ (1985, p. 254). Goldmann (1994, p. 269) observed that Mannheim had in fact a simplistic understanding of relativism. Yet, Morgenthau (1959c, p. 129) operated on a similar understanding of relativism, and both Mannheim and Morgenthau developed their epistemological concepts to counter this claim. Mannheim’s answer to relativism was relationism which stated that ‘… every assertion can only be relationally formulated’ (1985, p. 270). Relationism for Mannheim basically meant a positive interpretation of the spatial and temporal condition of knowledge. Objective truth could be found, although not in the absolute sense, but for the particular moment in time and place out of which knowledge was created. This would be the case because criteria of right- and wrongness would be employed by the people involved in this knowledge construction. Truth, therefore, would have to be put into relation with its particular context and for this specific instance it could claim absoluteness due to its general acceptance (Mannheim, 1985, p. 253-4).

It is unknown to what extent Morgenthau endorsed Mannheim’s concept of relationism, but he certainly agreed with its implications (Morgenthau, 1971b, p. 77). One such implication is that the scholar would have to thoroughly study the context of his/her research object to be able to understand it and to draw the right conclusions from it. Certainly, Morgenthau’s sense for alienation helped him to fulfil this task more easily than other scholars since due to his ability to compare he had the possibility of understanding the wider context while acknowledging different nuances. However, Morgenthau not
only considered the context of the research object, but also ways to obviate the herme-
neutic circle, as Mannheim’s pupil, Elias (2006), had demanded it in his study on
time.  

This realisation of the contextual peculiarity was, however, no particular new insight
to Morgenthau as it was a much debated question in German humanities. In 1916 for
example, Simmel gave a talk at the Berlin section of the Kant Society entitled Das
Problem der historischen Zeit (The problem of historic time) with which Morgenthau
was familiar.  

Simmel (2003, p. 294) argued that every occurrence is bound to a spec-
cific place in time (Zeitstelle). Indeed, only when an occurrence is related to a particular
context, it would become historical and only then would it get a specific place in the
flux of time. The wider implications of Simmel’s remark for Morgenthau’s epistemol-
ogy will be discussed shortly, but first it has to be questioned how such an understand-
ing of an occurrence’s context is supposed to be achieved. Morgenthau stood in the
hermeneutical tradition which he had found in the writings of Dilthey. Dilthey intro-
duced the triptych of experience, expression, and understanding (Erleben, Ausdruck,
Verstehen) in order to disentangle the process of understanding. Experience was the ba-
sis for Dilthey and would be created out of what Simmel later called reciprocal orienta-
tion of human beings. The expression is the manifestation of experience and the basis of
understanding, as without an external symbolisation, access to the inner experience
would be impossible. The realisation of this inner experience through the dissection of
external expressions is, according to Dilthey, understanding. Academic understanding,
and this is the kind of understanding Morgenthau was interested in, would require put-
ting oneself into an existing expression and reconstructing it from its onset onwards.
This would require that the scholar knows as much as possible about the context of the
expression, in other words its subjective and objective conditions. The better the context
would be known, the greater would be the chances for the scholar to arrange the frag-
ments in a coherent and meaningful correlation. Absolute understanding and knowledge, however, is to be aspired, but would never be achievable (Tuttle, 1969, p. 8; Linge, 1973, p. 540-6; Thielen, 1999, p. 91-102).

However, Mannheim’s relationism was not sufficient enough for the kind of epistemology Morgenthau had in mind. If he would have followed Mannheim’s concept of the ‘free-floating intelligentsia’ (1985, p. 75-88; Loader, 1997, p. 225-9), for which he would have been “qualified” due to his own vita, he would have run the risk of arriving at the same problems he had identified with methodological quantification. The free-floating intelligentsia meant for Mannheim that certain unattached intellectuals would have the possibility to transcend their own limitations of knowledge, acquire the different situationally determined forms of knowledge, and combine it into a coherent ensemble. Morgenthau (1984, p.14), however, already declined the prospects of this concept in the 1930s because he believed it would provide no epistemological insight and was running the risk, as he pointed out for quantification, to produce a “… pretentious collection of trivialities” (1962a, p. 27). Therefore, Morgenthau needed to go a step further, for which Simmel’s above-mentioned lecture must have been an early intellectual stimulant.

Morgenthau fostered an epistemology that was guided by criticality and cognitive scepticism for which a critical examination based upon an awareness of the spatiality and temporality of knowledge would have only been part of the process. Morgenthau, furthermore, argued that knowledge would only become meaningful if it is theoretically justified as ‘[s]cience [as the task of creating knowledge] is theoretical or it is nothing’ (1955, p. 451). This means that the research-interest of the scholar would also rest on a spatial and temporal conditionality and would affect the research questions, which would be pursued and the way the cognitive interests would be guided. Morgenthau’s contemporary, Schütz, elaborated this issue further. Considering an action on the level
of the observant, Schütz argued that this would consist of three stages: project, action, and act. First, there would be the project. This preliminary stage would model the anticipated action based upon the intended outcome, disadvantages, and advantages. After laying the reflective basis, the observant would be capable of executing the project.

This process was called the action by Schütz. Finally, after having completed the action, it would turn into the act. Only this final stage could be attached with a meaning by the observer as this would be the only truly accessible part. The project and even the action would remain at least in the entirety incomprehensible for the scholar, as Dilthey had anticipated earlier (Schuetz, 1967, p. 57-72; Srubar, 1988, p. 101-3). This means for the scholar that only through the reflection of past experiences and retrospective meaning-allocation would it be possible to gain understanding of actions, as Morgenthau (1970a, p. 257) also stressed. Like the observant’s action, the scholar would undertake an action and would be, according to Schütz (1967, p. 86-96), dependent upon two general motives in his action. Schütz distinguished the in-order-to and because motive in disagreement with Weber’s understanding of motives which he considered as insufficient (Peritore, 1975, p. 137-40; Endreß, 2006, p. 70-1). The former would arrange the project in a means-end structure towards an anticipated goal. This means the project would start with the intended outcome and from there would subdivide the intended action towards the beginning. The latter motive would find its incentive in the past. The because motive would be, therefore, a disposition of action whose origin would lie in the past.

This emphasises that the scholar aiming to understand a particular research situation would be, not least due to his/her particular spatial and temporal conditionality, in his/her meaning-construction subject to particular interests. The awareness of one’s own position was for Morgenthau the crucial aspect of his epistemology. As Morgenthau stated in the 1950s:
'The content of theory, then, must be determined by the intellectual interest of the observer. What is it we want to know about politics? What concerns us most about it? What questions do we want a theory of politics to answer? The replies to these three questions determine the content of political science; and the replies may well differ, not only from one period of history to another’ (1955, p. 453; 1959c, p. 130).

It is in this sense that Morgenthau tried to solve the issue with relativism while aiming to approximate truth. Absolute truth was for Morgenthau neither possible, nor did he aspire to achieve it. He strived for truth, but as the following quotation reveals, he argued for an objective truth, which would gain its significance in the relation between research object and scholar. This means that knowledge could only claim legitimacy in its particular context, but never in an absolute sense transcending space and time. We read in Education and World Politics:

‘A theory of politics, domestic or international, must search for the truth about matters political. In that search it is subject to a purely pragmatic test. Does this theory broaden our knowledge and deepen our understanding of what is worth knowing? If it does, it is good; and if it does not, it is worthless, regardless of its a priori assumptions’ (Morgenthau, 1959c, p. 129-30; similar: 1955, p. 453).

Hence, truth and its founding constituent, knowledge, would be spatial and temporal constructs whose relevance would be tied to this specific time and space. For Morgenthau, therefore, it was satisfying if knowledge would be rationally constructed because then it could enhance the stock of knowledge. From this follows that Morgenthau did not endorse “grand theories”, which culminated in the neo-neo-debate during the 1980s, because in their positivistic theorising they abnegated the conditionality of knowledge.
This, finally, puts also the question of re-issuing *Politics among Nations* in a new perspective and reveals an epistemological implication for his own work. It was noted earlier that for several months Morgenthau refused to issue a second edition of *Politics among Nations* because he argued that it had served its needs (HJM-Archive 121). Behr recently convincingly reasoned that also Morgenthau’s thought has to be seen as spatially and temporally determined, hence, ‘historically and politically contingent’ (2010, p. 215). This means for *Politics among Nations*, which he wrote as a counter-ideology to fascism, that Morgenthau presumably only agreed to republish the book when he considered communism to be the new world-threatening ideology (Morgenthau, 1971c; Mollov, 1997).

### 5.4 Conceptual history as epistemological guideline

#### 5.4.1 Historical patterns and perennial problems of politics

Shortly after Morgenthau’s death, Norman Graebner (1984, p. 67) noted that Morgenthau would have considered the distinction of specific from general aspects of the social world as the primary concern for social scientists. Despite this early insight, Morgenthau’s concern for, as he called it, ‘perennial problems’ (1955, p. 434; 1962a, p. 19) or ‘general principles’ (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1950; Morgenthau, 1962a, p. 55), were either neglected or misinterpreted by scholars of International Relations as a sign of his positivistic epistemology. Only recently Behr (2010, p. 215-6) pointed out the specific role such concepts had for Morgenthau and in which way they would have to be considered. This makes it even more necessary to carefully elaborate the importance concepts would have had for Morgenthau’s epistemology and trace back their intellectual development. This section will aim to find answers to the following questions: What were those general principles Morgenthau spoke of? Who or what can be regarded
as intellectually stimulating for the development of Morgenthau’s epistemological implementations?

Generally, Morgenthau’s six principles of realism are considered his major principles. These principles are, however, prone to be misunderstood if a contextualisation of Morgenthau’s work is missing as is the case with Tickner (1991). Besides, much more revealing about Morgenthau’s epistemological framework are those numerous articles he devoted to the study of political science and/or International Relations throughout his career. For Morgenthau since the time of his doctoral dissertation, power was the concept that primarily shaped politics, what he elaborated as late as the 1970s in *Power as a Political Concept* (1971b). As Morgenthau (1945b, p. 15) had learned from Burckhardt, politics could be turned into an absolute evil. Certainly, for most parts of his life politics was an absolute evil and that made it even more important for him to find alternative pathways. Yet, power was only the most central of these principles, others, which are all related to power in one way or another, were for Morgenthau ‘… legitimacy, authority, freedom, forms of government, natural law, sovereignty, revolution, tyranny, [or] majority rule’ (1955, p. 434; 1962a, p. 19). These concepts in turn would produce a set of questions with which political science would have to deal:

‘Why is it that all men lust for power; why is it that even their noblest aspirations are tainted by that lust? Why is it that the political act, in its concern with man’s power over man and the concomitant denial of the other man’s freedom, carries within itself an element of immorality and puts upon the actor the stigma of guilt? Why is it, finally, that in politics good intentions do not necessarily produce good results and well-conceived plans frequently lead to failure in action, and why is it, conversely, that evil men have sometimes done great good in politics and improvident ones have frequently been successful?’ (Morgenthau, 1955, p. 450).
On the same page Morgenthau remarked that these questions would be of a philosophical nature and would have to be addressed if a ‘scientific understanding of politics’ is aspired. To achieve such an understanding, however, an epistemological framework would be necessary to be able to elaborate the shape of these questions at specific instances. Only if this takes place ‘[b]y detecting in the international relations of different cultures and historic periods identical responses to identical challenges, we are able to develop certain theoretical propositions about international relations that are true regardless of time and place’ (Morgenthau, 1962b, p. 167). This approach resembles what is today known as conceptual history and Morgenthau considered these above-mentioned concepts as valid for the political realm regardless of time and space. Through the application of a heuristic device – Reinhart Koselleck’s conceptual history – Morgenthau’s own procedure can be elucidated.

Koselleck (2010, p. 58) accentuated that concepts would be essential as otherwise experiences could not be made, categorised, let alone understood. Only concepts would allow people to make use of past experiences so that one’s own behaviour could be affected positively or negatively, depending on the experience. Morgenthau also stressed the importance of a concept for guiding people’s lives, when he frequently argued that it functions like a map:

‘A central concept, such as power, then provides a kind of rational outline of politics, a map of the political scene. Such a map does not provide a complete description of the political landscape as it is in a particular period of history. It rather provides the timeless features of its geography distinct from their ever changing historic setting. Such a map, then, will tell us what are the rational possibilities for travel from one spot on the map to another, and which road is most likely to be taken by certain travelers under certain conditions. Thus it imparts a measure of rational order to the observing mind and, by doing so, establishes
Hence, Morgenthau also argued that a central concept would be required in order to make sense of past experiences which would allow to anticipate and understand the present and, therefore, to act rationally under the current conditions. These conditions, Koselleck (2002, p. 24-6) was convinced, would be largely determined by the employed language, which was endorsed by Morgenthau as a letter from his son, Matthew, suggests (Morgenthau, 2009). Morgenthau always chose his words carefully and observed their cultural determination. Certainly, the success of Morgenthau’s aspirations is questionable because using a terminology like power, (national) interest, and *animus dominandi* invites misinterpretation. Still, language would be dependent on changing conflicts, class interests, friend- and foe-images (Koselleck, 2010, p. 56), and in short from emotions and interests that drive out of a specific culture. Language would constitute a selection regarding the concepts. Even though without concepts experiences could not be made because language would be the primary factor of transmitting past experiences, language would predetermine the creative and explanatory power of concepts because it would restrict the way concepts can be thought of. The reference to language emphasises that, although Morgenthau argued for a central concept in politics, this would not mean that the content of this concept would be universal. On the contrary, power as the central concept would differ depending on the time and culture in which it was used. Therefore, Morgenthau’s six principles of realism are, in Behr’s words, “political and historical contingent”, as previously noted. Early reviewers, however, missed this point. For Barrington Moore ‘the major weakness of this study [*Politics among Nations*] lies in its shaky psychological underpinning. With no empirical evidence beyond the questionable parallel with animal societies, the author assumes that the drive for power is both strong and universal’ (1949, p. 327). The lack of scientific rigour was
criticised, furthermore, in a review in the *New York Times Book Review* which led Morgenthau to defend his work as ‘… a systematic, analytical treatise on international politics …’ in a letter to the editors from 23rd October 1948 (HJM-Archive 161). Such misinterpretations might have been the reason behind Morgenthau’s decision to add the six principles of realism to the second issue of *Politics among Nations*. At least in the correspondence with his publisher, Morgenthau indicated that people in whose verdict he trusted, suggested for him to do so to accentuate its character as a textbook (HJM-Archive 121). Two aspects further define this relation of conceptual universality and particularity.

First, political science was like a ‘spotlight’ (Morgenthau, 1959c, p. 130) because even though a political scientist would try to illuminate all of politics, the meaning of concepts would shift due to the ever-changing focus of attention or circumstances. This implies, however, that meaning and reality would never be identical. Although they would be related to each other, both would constantly change with different pace (Koselleck, 2010, p. 67). This different pace is what Morgenthau criticised about international law in the 1930s when he argued that *Staatslehre* and international law would be sterile and could not keep up with the changing reality. As Heiner Schultz has emphasised, there are four ideal-typical changes: it would be possible that neither change happens which would be unlikely because this would lead to achievement of eternal truth statements. More likely would be that either meaning, reality, or both change so that meaning and reality would diverge, always resulting in an adjustment of meaning (Schultz, 1979, p. 43-74). Morgenthau was in this sense convinced that ‘[g]enuine political thinking is action’ (1972, p. 59). Using concepts to scholarly understand the social reality would not only change the circumstances of the scholar, but also the political world because politics would be the inter-subjective realm and if one person would be changed the entire political realm would be changed. Yet, despite these constant
changes there would be a certain amount of stability due to its repetitive structure. Following the historian Fernand Braudel, this is what Koselleck called ‘longue durée’ (2002, p. 124; 2010, p. 59) and would be necessary because otherwise change could not be perceived. Events would be in their singularity unique but conditions for these events would be to a certain extent universal. Only this universality allows constructing concepts in the first place. This repetitive, transcendental character of concepts is summed up by Morgenthau:

‘Underlying all area research must be the awareness that all the specific manifestations of a particular culture contain an element of universality, however undiscoverable or improvable it may be in a particular instance. Area research, then, must take into account an element that transcends the limits of any particular area. More than that, it is this transcendent element that makes area research possible in the first place. For if we could not assume that, while investigating a foreign area, we should find not only things that are strange but also things that are familiar, we would not be able even to try to understand a foreign area and would face it uncomprehendingly’ (1959c, p. 133; similar: 1962a, p. 65).

Second, all concepts would have what Koselleck called a ‘temporäre Binnenstruktur’ (temporal internal structure) (2010, p. 68). Any concept could in theory have three functions and in practice it could be assumed that a concept fulfils all three functions; sometimes more or sometimes less pronounced. Concepts would be a means to create expectations. Any concept would contain elements of past meanings of this concept and its employment would express expectations for the future. For the same reason, Morgenthau (1972, p. 15-6) was not convinced that scholarship could be value-free, but would always contain a normative element. Academic concepts would always be pre-figurative and this pre-figuration in turn would be intended by the past realities that had shaped the meaning of the specific concepts.
What does this mean for the application of a conceptual history? Despite the universal aspects of concepts, which would allow certain generalisations, the actual embodiment of concepts would be dependent on the context and the network of concepts the particular concept is situated in (Koselleck, 2010, p. 101-2). Hence, concepts would contain an etic and emic element which would enable the scholar to identify particular political situations while analysing them in their framework of culture, time, and language. The scholar would have to be aware of the aspects that shaped the meaning of a concept and the intentions and aspirations which were connected to its usage. This, however, would require, as Kari Palonen notes, a ‘Verfremdungseffekt’ (2002, p. 102; emphasis in the original): in other words the ability to alienate oneself, which was considered by Morgenthau highly, as chapter three has shown, in order to free oneself from one’s own understanding of concepts, its meaning, and usage.

5.4.2 **The development of Morgenthau’s conceptual history: the intellectual influence of art history**

Turner and Mazur (2009, p. 484) mention that Morgenthau occasionally stressed his refusal to engage in methodological discussions due to their alleged fruitlessness. If this was the case then it was probably more a sign of intellectual modesty or coquetry of Morgenthau as he consistently got engaged in such discussions. To mention just one example of this engagement, Morgenthau participated in a symposium of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1954 in order to discuss *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations* with amongst others Fox, Niebuhr, Walter Lippmann, and Paul H. Nitze (Thompson, 1955). His remarks allow the student of International Relations to relate them to the intellectual sources that Morgenthau’s epistemological implementations found stimulation in.
Morgenthau famously stated in *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* that ‘politics is an art’ (1947a, p. 10), as previously noted, and Morgenthau not only meant this figuratively. It is curious to see that this relation has been so far almost completely overlooked in International Relations, although Morgenthau made reference to art history in his autobiographical fragment and during the interview with Bernard Johnson. The influence of other scholars he mentioned, such as Weber, Schmitt, and Sinzheimer, were extensively researched. After leaving the University of Frankfurt in 1923, Morgenthau came to Munich to study law, but ‘… instead [took] courses whose subject matter and … whose professors interested me’ (Morgenthau, 1984, p. 5). One of these subjects was art history and his professor was the Swiss, Wölfflin. Leaving Wölfflin aside for the moment and, first, drawing the attention to Wölfflin’s lecturer at the University of Basel, Burckhardt, one remarks that Morgenthau was first of all influenced by him. This was the case because Morgenthau got acquainted with Burckhardt’s work through the study of Nietzsche. Nietzsche had also briefly worked in Basel and personally and intellectually admired Burckhardt (West, 2007, p. 40-1).

Burckhardt repudiated against the belief that history represented a teleological process and favoured an unattached continuum (Große, 1999, p. 538; West, 2007, p. 38). Therefore, Burckhardt argued against the study of history as the analysis of a given set of facts, a ‘quagmire of facts’ (1930, p. 4; translation Jurgen Große)\(^\text{101}\), as he called it in his *Griechische Kulturgeschichte*, which led to the aspiration of a teleological, yet limitless process. This shows (recalling the quotation from Morgenthau’s *The perils of empiricism*) ‘facts have no social meaning themselves’ (1962c, p. 110), and that Morgenthau’s insight was derived amongst others from the study of Burckhardt. Facts would have to be distilled and the recurrent, constant, and eternal would have to be sought. Burckhardt exemplarily elaborated this understanding of history in his posthu-
mously published *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen* which was only partly translated into English as *Reflections on History* (1943).

In this work Burckhardt identified three great *Potenzen* (forces): the state, religion, and culture. According to Burckhardt, these three forces would have shaped the structure of the world through their interplay. Hence, it was Burckhardt from whom Morgenthau had learned that there would be recurrent patterns whose identification would help to meaningfully analyse the social world due to their guiding character. From Wölfflin, however, Morgenthau was able to acquire a further aspect. Wölfflin essentially agreed with his teacher Burckhardt, but developed Burckhardt’s thoughts further. Like him, Wölfflin repudiated against the thought that history would be a mere collection of facts (Kultermann, 1993, p. 177), but wanted to find the characteristics of an epoch or entire culture. This would enable the art historian to distinguish them from other epochs or cultures. Wölfflin aimed to achieve this with his formalistic approach. In Morgenthau’s words this approach can be classified as ‘… the theory of “prefiguration”, covering not only form but also content. Thus he [Wölfflin] accounted for changes in style … in terms of the transformation of fundamental forms rather than of mere chronological sequence’ (1984, p. 5). Wölfflin distinguished between several dichotomies with which it would be possible to distinguish the different epochs. These dichotomies were: linear – painterly; plane – recession; closed – open; multiplicity – unity; and absolute – relative clarity (Kultermann, 1993, p 178; Hatt and Klonk, 2006, p. 77). Morgenthau employed in his characterisation of Wölfflin’s approach the term prefiguration for a good reason. He pointed out that Wölfflin considered these dichotomies as central concepts because he believed that these categories would be recurrent in art works of all time (Hatt and Klonk, 2006, p. 72).

Despite their recurrence, Wölfflin did not argue that they would remain the same. The meaning of these conceptual dichotomies would be subject to change, reflecting the
changing cultural and social realities. Entire dichotomies could be disregarded and other categories could become more pronounced. This is due to the changing Zeitgeist, as Wölfflin pointed out in *Principles of Art History*: ‘[I]t remains no problem to discover the conditions which, as material element – call it, temperament, Zeitgeist, or racial character – determine the style of individuals, periods, and peoples’ (1950, p. 11). This view that each time period would have its particular forms of life, politics, morals, art, and science, summed up in the term Zeitgeist, was borrowed from Burckhardt (Sigurdson, 1990, p. 428). Hence, both Wölfflin and Burckhardt argued for central concepts as epistemological guidelines and Morgenthau’s own epistemology received stimulation from them as a young student.

At the end of his studies in Munich, Morgenthau (1984, p. 6-7) attended a seminar on Weber’s political and social philosophy by one of Weber’s friends, Karl Rothenbücher. It was then that Morgenthau first got acquainted with Weber and since then Morgenthau was ‘… influenced by Max Weber’, as he reassured Martin Bodilsen in a letter from 3rd May 1976 (HJM-Archive 7). This influence Weber had on Morgenthau’s intellectual development has been the topic of numerous studies, but often, as for example in Peter Breiner’s works, the relevance of Weber was either over-estimated or one-sidedly elaborated (2002, p. 14; 2004, p. 141-2). The chronology of Morgenthau’s intellectual development suggests that Weber might have been an important source of confirmation for his belief in the conditionality of knowledge and political order. The initial source for Morgenthau was, however, the work of Burckhardt and Wölfflin. Still, Weber’s ideal-type must have convinced the young Morgenthau to have found an appropriate analytical tool to serve his epistemological concerns, although Turner and Mazur (2009, p. 490) rightfully note that Morgenthau never used the term ideal-type.

‘An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present
and occasionally absent *concrete individual* phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified *analytical* construct (*Gedankenbild*) (Weber, 1949, p. 90; emphasis in the original).

Hence, the ideal-type is a concept that ‘…selectively present[s] some aspects of social life, particularly social action, for the purpose of making them more fully intelligible by re-describing them in terms of clarified concepts’ (Turner and Mazur, 2009, p. 490). Like the concepts of his predecessors, Weber’s ideal-type is a device that would help to understand social reality and to distinguish the antagonism of interests within the social reality by stressing certain recurrent factors. Williams (2004, p. 641-6) demonstrated that Morgenthau applied this central concept or ideal-type to the entire political sphere by making power its distinguishing factor. The following lengthy quotation of Morgenthau reveals that he used the concept of power to distinguish politics from the rest of the social realms. Morgenthau acknowledged this as a one-sidedness, but as a necessary undertaking in order to be able to rationally analyse politics because a central concept would allow to make sense of the numerous, disparate elements that would make up the social world:

‘By making power its central concept, a theory of politics does not presume that none but power relations control political action. What it must presume is the need for a central concept which allows the observer to distinguish the field of politics from other social spheres, to orient himself in the maze of empirical phenomena which make up the field of politics, and to establish a measure of rational order within it. A central concept, such as power, then provides a kind of rational outline of politics, a *map* of the political scene. Such a map does not provide a complete description of the political landscape as it is in a particular period of history. It rather provides the timeless features of its geography distinct
from their ever changing historic setting’ (1955, p. 455-6; similar: 1959c, p. 132; 1971b, p. 75; emphasis added).

The image of a map Morgenthau employed here, however, points to the influence of art history due to the fact that Burckhardt also referred to the image of a map to characterise his approach (Fernie, 1995, p. 14). Weber might have provided a more coherent elaboration for Morgenthau, but his ‘Weberian legacy’ (Williams, 2004, p. 641) goes in fact beyond, and past, Weber.

5.5 Conclusion

The intention of this chapter was to elucidate Morgenthau’s epistemology. It has been emphasised that its development took part in the German controversy between historicism and historicism and, due to the dominant behaviouralism in American political science, Morgenthau’s efforts aimed to bring forward a more sound epistemological approach. Morgenthau’s epistemology was in its acknowledgement of temporal and spatial conditionality contrary to positivistic attempts to bring forward a “grand theory”. This acknowledgement made Morgenthau even before his emigration to the United States call his approach realistic.

In order to elaborate Morgenthau’s epistemology his attitude towards positivism was analysed. It has been pointed out that throughout his career he remained sceptical about the promises such scholarship offered in the forms of legal positivism and behaviouralism. Particularly an ill-informed rationalism and empiricism fostered Morgenthau’s criticism of positivism. Indeed, in the United States he became one of the foremost promoters of International Relations Theory as a counter-movement primarily made up of German émigré scholars.

Furthermore, it has been elaborated in the second part of this chapter that Morgenthau developed his epistemology in response to German humanities, which were
enmeshed in the struggle between historism and historicism. Most influential in the development of Morgenthau’s epistemological foundation have been scholars such as Mannheim, Simmel, Schütz, and Weber revealing the wide spectrum in which his intellectual socialisation took part. Morgenthau combined aspects of both, at times conflictive strands in an original way in his own epistemology which essentially argued for the spatial and temporal determination of knowledge and truth. This would be the case for both observer and observant and Morgenthau, therefore, argued to approximate truth through a critical elaboration of the interplay of the scholar’s focus, language, and circumstances with the one of the research object. This would lead, according to Morgenthau, to a knowledge-construction which is more veridical than any epistemological claim of the universality of truth because the scope of a truth claim is limited to the particular situation of the scholar.

Finally, Morgenthau constructed his central concept in his conceptual history, power, and the subsequent concepts not as law-like generalisations and did not consider these concepts as accurate pictures of reality. He utilised them as analytical devices to locate, first, the political realm within the broader social sphere and, second, to understand the specific peculiarities of this realm. To typify the meaning of his approach, Morgenthau once again referred back to the world of art.

‘The difference between the empirical reality of politics and a theory of politics is like the difference between a photograph and a painted portrait. The photograph shows everything that can be seen by the naked eye. The painted portrait does not show everything that can be seen by the naked eye, but it shows one thing that the naked eye cannot see: the human essence of the person portrayed’ (1955, p. 456, similar: 1963b).

Essentially, Morgenthau hoped that this approach would allow him to grasp the interests and intentions of political actions and consequently be better able to understand
them. The enumeration of empirically verifiable facts seemed for Morgenthau not being able to depict the social world accurately. The last quotation, finally, also reassures the argument brought forward that Morgenthau was largely influenced in his approach by art historians, Burckhardt and Wölfflin, and found reaffirmation by studying Weber. Hence, politics and the analysis of politics were for Morgenthau a complex art, rather than subject to the structural procedure of science.
Chapter 6. We live in a dream world: Hans Morgenthau’s political agency

6.1 Introduction

The final chapter of this thesis will deal with Morgenthau’s political agency, which was informed by the public role Morgenthau assigned to the scholar. In contrast to Morgenthau’s concept of power this aspect of his Weltanschauung has only recently received greater academic interest. Muriel Cozette contends that Morgenthau argued for a scholarship that agitates as the ‘conscience of time’, providing a ‘corrective’ (2008, p. 11-2; emphasis in the original) for (international) politics. The same year, Tjalve identified Morgenthau’s quest as an ‘embedded criticism’ (2008, p. XIV), equally revealing that Morgenthau would have understood scholarship as a conscious, (self-)critical, but positive and open-minded civic engagement, identified as a conscious pariah (as discussed in chapter three). An important aspect of this pariah-ness was his concept of alienation because, as Morgenthau learned in Europe, it was the outsider who became the insider (Peter Gay) meaning in particular that people on the fringes of society could appreciate its achievements since they would be most threatened to lose them. This pariah-ness showed Morgenthau that, first, civic engagement would mean criticising the status quo in a positive, constructive manner. Second, being an outsider, Morgenthau gained a deeper understanding of the political context due to his personal experiences and ability to draw analogies. Not least because of this claim, Morgenthau’s realism was later classified as either ‘critical’ (Cozette, 2008; Scheuerman 2009b) or ‘evaluative’ (Spegele, 1996; Lang, 2007). This discussion will not be repeated here, but it will suffice to let Morgenthau speak to stress the public engagement Morgenthau pursued for himself in his role as a scholar:
‘The intellectual in general, and the political scientist in particular, to be true to their mission, must be committed in a dual way. They must be committed to the objective truth, and they must be committed to the great political issues of the contemporary world. They must descend into the political arena not on behalf of government or any other political interest but on behalf of the objective truth as they see it’ (1966b, p. 79).

In contrast to Cozette’s account, this chapter will focus on the actual political agency of Morgenthau, hence we will follow him in his descent into the political arena, rather than on the philosophical and personal motivation for it as that was discussed in a previous chapter. Consequently, it will have a wider scope than Tjalve’s work since it not only takes his political, but also his socio-economic concerns into account.

Before elaborating Morgenthau’s political agency, we have to recall that it was informed by his normative world postulate. This normativity served in Morgenthau’s political agency as a guideline to explain and/or criticise contemporary political and social affairs, while the experiences he had also allowed him to test, solidify, or rectify his normative world postulate. Morgenthau’s world postulate was informed by the European values he spoke about in some of his unpublished German manuscripts (1930b; 1934b). These values were attributed by recent scholarship to the Judeo-Christian heritage (Murray, 1996; Frei, 2001; Mollov, 2002), to Aristotle and his claims for a telos (goal) in life and phronesis (prudence) as the most important virtue (Lang, 2007; Molloy, 2009), and even to the American founding fathers (Russell, 1990) were drawn upon to explain them. All of these explanations bear truth in them as they all represent aspects of Morgenthau’s humanist consciousness.

To detect Morgenthau’s political agency, we will, first, scrutinise the major dehumanising concerns Morgenthau had with liberalism if the dangerous potential of ideologies is to be confined. The first concern Morgenthau had was of a political nature
and deals with his repudiation of idealism (Chapter 6.2). The second criticism Morgenthau brought forward against modern liberal societies had a socio-economic character (Chapter 6.3). He argued against the acceleration and commodification of life in which he detected a threat for humans in their quest to become self-determined citizens as well as threats for the environment and humanity in general. Both criticisms will be elaborated by, first, asking, what Morgenthau specifically understood by these kinds of concepts and, second, by analysing the consequences these societal developments would have had. Finally, the last section of this chapter will discuss the national interest and world community as solutions Morgenthau had in mind to alter these developments (Chapter 6.4).

### 6.2 Liberal democracies and the threat of idealism

#### 6.2.1 Idealism as liberal irrationalism

In International Relations, idealism often tends to get equated with liberalism. This is demonstrated for example in Ulrich Menzel’s account, who argued that the heyday for idealism had been the inter-war period highlighted by Woodrow Wilson’s “14 Points”, the establishment of the League of Nations, and British appeasement towards Nazi-Germany. It would have been based on normative constructs that favoured peace, equality, solidarity, and disarmament. Power, exploitation, violence, and war, however, would have been considered as excrescences of evil. Behind these ideas was the belief that humans would be naturally good, peaceful, and most of all rational (Menzel, 2001, p. 66-7). In a Kantian tradition idealists assumed that humans would be rational actors who aim not to physically or mentally deplete the liberty of others in order not to face similar threats against oneself (Crawford, 2000, p. 5-6).

Also, Morgenthau saw a correlation between liberalism and idealism since the latter signified for him an extreme, even degenerated liberal position that would not take hu-
man nature into account. As early as 1930 Morgenthau noted that ‘[t]he Germans faithfully salute Wilson’s 14 Points as the declaration of a new era in international relations. This is the case because in international questions Germans are only all too happy to take the most extreme positions thinkable by considering the influence of an ideal construct in the creation of reality as sacrosanct or as null and void’ (1930a, p. 171-2; my translation). Almost 30 years later at a lecture for the “radio-university” broadcasting programme of the RIAS in Berlin, Morgenthau took up this notion again that liberalism would not consider the anthropological condition of politics, thus turning into idealism. As before, Morgenthau (1957b, p. 1-3) elaborated this argument by referring to the example of Wilson, but also to the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, labelling them a utopian approach to international relations. The diction in both examples demonstrates that Morgenthau considered an idealist outlook on international relations as irrational precisely because of its inability to consider human nature in its way of thinking. Referring to a utopia Morgenthau remained unclear as to whether he meant a positive eutopia or negative dystopia (Waschkuhn, 2003, p. 1-14). This might seem paradoxical, but is clarified by looking at a lecture Morgenthau gave months before he died in 1979. We read that

‘… there exists of necessity a relativism in the relation between moral principles and foreign policy that one cannot overlook if one wants to do justice to the principles of morality in international politics … It is a relativism in time … when certain principles are applicable in one period of history and not applicable in another period of history, and … in terms of culture … in that certain principles are obeyed by certain nations, by certain political civilizations, and are not obeyed by others’ (1979, p. 4).

This quotation shows that Morgenthau argued that the policies idealism promoted, which he did not necessarily oppose as expressions of value and which seemed to be
rational within the idealistic framework of thought which were in fact not. Morgenthau considered them as flawed because idealism would not take into account that human behaviour is geared by the drive for self-preservation and the drive to prove oneself. These drives create emotions, desires, passions, and fears and are in turn influenced by the situational factors of time and culture (chapter five above). Any thought that would not take these human conditions into account and would operate from an ostensible universal-rational basis would become irrational in the sense of providing an unrealistic outlook on the world. To illustrate this, it is most revealing to elaborate Morgenthau’s relationship with Ichheiser, an émigré scholar just like Morgenthau.

The intention to explain parts of Morgenthau’s thought by reference to a scholar who spent a good deal of his adult life in a mental asylum and who, after being released after eleven years (Rudmin, 1987, p. 168), ‘had been reduced to a vegetable’ (Morgenthau, 2004, p. 41) may seem odd. Still, Morgenthau called him a friend during the same lecture and even managed to get him a position in his Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy in Chicago as a research assistant after his release (Bayer and Strickland, 1990, p. 701). In American foreign policy, idealism was particularly expressed in what Morgenthau termed “nationalistic universalism”.

‘This nationalism tries to impose a new order upon a fragmented and anarchical political world, and it does so by using its own national order as a universal model’ (Morgenthau, 1966a, p. 8). This concept will be of further interest below, but here it is important to note that Morgenthau argued similarly to Ichheiser in whose writings we find a concept called “unconscious nationalism”. This type of nationalism would be characterised by two major features. First, like Morgenthau, Ichheiser argued that culture influences the way people feel about and perceive things.

‘If, therefore, members of two groups influenced by two different cultures meet, both … take it for granted that they themselves see the things … “as they really
are.” When they find … that others see things differently, both reach the conclusion that it is the other fellow who is unable to see the things “as they really are” and who has distorted conceptions about himself as well about others’ (Ichheiser, 1951, p. 312-3).

Eventually, this would lead to the creation of defence mechanisms in order to ensure one’s cultural outlook. Also the second aspect, limits of insight, would result in these defence mechanisms which would often be the cause of conflict. In intercultural communication people have to deal with symbols and interpret them according to their temporal and cultural background, which according to Ichheiser may happen in four ways. The first two would be unproblematic as they would occur consciously: identifying symbols and understanding their meaning or identifying symbols and being unable to understand their meaning. The second set, however, would be a cause of conflict: not identifying symbols and being, therefore, unable to understand their meaning or identifying symbols, but misinterpreting their meaning (Ichheiser, 1951, p. 313). Being unaware of this selective process of perception, of which time, culture, and intercultural communication are just three influencing factors, Ichheiser (1966, p. 554-6) arrived at the conclusion that social perception would be either distorted as relevant information would be missing or at times even inexisten; an insight upon which Morgenthau also operated.

People would often simply be unaware of their own situational determination of knowledge, in other words of the anthropological conditionality of their thought and action, and, therefore, would arrive at conclusions that seem within their own outlook rational, but may not do so from a different outlook. What Morgenthau called idealism was, therefore, a liberalism that had lost sight of its own particularity and universalised its once transcendental political ideals into immanent objective truths. Ichheiser, in agreement with Morgenthau, reminded that ‘…not the generalizations but the exempli-
fications are “the real thing”. Even if … all people were to agree with each other … that they are “against prejudices”, they might … find out that they refer … to entirely different kinds of prejudices, and would therefore soon start again denouncing each other as being prejudiced.’ This resulted in “being against prejudices” in general, does not mean actually anything in fact (1966, p. 557; emphasis in the original). Yet, as the next section will demonstrate, this is what Morgenthau perceived would have happened in American foreign politics.

6.2.2 Between Scylla and Charybdis: hubris and homogeneity as political consequences of idealism

This section will analyse the political implications of idealism on liberal democracies as Morgenthau saw it. The first implication for Morgenthau was that liberal democracies would face the danger of hubris and self-centred moralism (Tjalve, 2008, p. 139-44). The second implication of this would be that liberal democracies would lose their ability to be self-reflective and consequently face the danger of becoming resistant to critique.

In a 1974 piece for the New Republic, Morgenthau expressed concern about the Decline of Democratic Government, an issue which he had frequently addressed in earlier stages of his career. In 1962, for example, Morgenthau brought together various articles in the first part of his trilogy on Politics in the Twentieth Century under the heading of the Decline of Democratic Politics (1962a). In this article for the New Republic, Morgenthau (1974c, p. 17) particularly argued that all democracies would suffer from the fact that fundamental political issues would not only be turned into political ideals and subsequently often codified, but that these fundamental issues would be withheld from any further public debate. Therefore, Morgenthau essentially argued that politics in liberal democracies would get deprived of the political in the sense that human inter-
ests could not evolve anymore in the political realm. People in democracies would only have the choice to vote about minor issues, but not about those that would truly affect their social life-world. Even more so, Morgenthau argued that these political ideals would be reified from a transcendent nominal into an immanent actual condition. For Morgenthau, this would have meant that democracies face the danger of believing that political ideals, such as fundamental rights once they have been codified, would be considered as eternally established, rather than being the product of a continuously ongoing process. As he had put it almost two decades earlier, ‘… moral principles [upon which political ideals] rest can never be fully realized, but must at best be approximated through the ever temporary balancing of interests and the ever precarious settlement of conflicts’ (Morgenthau, 1957a, p. 9). Furthermore, such moral principles would always be the product of a particular historical setting which means that they would be related to a certain time and space and could change in a different setting (Morgenthau, 1979, p. 4).

The result of this reification would be hubris, in the sense that one society would claim a political status of inviolability for itself, and in a reciprocal process also moralism, understood as claiming a moral status of inviolability for itself. Although Morgenthau argued that all democracies would be in danger of succumbing to hubris and moralism, it was the United States he was particularly concerned with. Being the first modern democracy out of which a foundational myth of uniqueness (in contrast to absolutistic Europe) developed, the original ideals of the Federalists were gradually turned into manifestations of eternal truth (Morgenthau, 1952b, p. 3). As Robert Good put it: ‘First, the idealist becomes intoxicated with the world-embracing principles which are too vague and too general to provide guidance to policy … Second, the idealist dresses parochial interests in the garb of universal moral principles …’ (1960, p. 602). Hence, seemingly universal moral principles would become the criterion for the
conduct of politics because politics in the United States would have to meet the moral standards for good individual conduct rather than being interested in the public good (Morgenthau, 1957a, p. 7-9).

This hubris and moralism was for Morgenthau particularly obvious in American foreign politics in which times of self-containment (‘isolationism’) would have contrasted with times where their sense of mission would have been internationally pursued (‘internationalism’, ‘Wilsonianism’) (1951a, p. 4; 1952b, p. 2), but which would be ‘brothers under the skin’ (1951a, p. 29) because in both periods abstract moral principles would have been turned into standards of action for American foreign politics. This meant for Morgenthau that during times of isolationism, the United States would have retreated from international affairs even when their own interests were at stake because other states would not meet their moral standards. On the other hand, during times of internationalism the United States would have engaged heavily in international affairs because they would have considered their moral values as universally true and to be aspired by every other state. Both policies would threaten the existence of the United States as the former in its retreat would fail to make necessary decisions and the latter, quite practically, would not be able to live up to its standards. This would be the case because, first, the universal enforcement of these standards could not be ensured. It would overstretch the capacities of the United States; where the Founding Fathers would have aimed through their own existence to convince the world of American moral superiority by exemplifying what could be achieved if the common good would be truly aspired, the internationalism of the 20th century resembled a coercive hegemon by using force to convince others of their moral superiority. A second reason saw Morgenthau in conflictive interests. Since the United States would have pursued various interests on the international scene, it might happen that one or more of these interests would outweigh its moral principles. This, however, would lead to a loss of trust of
other states since these moral principles, previously presented as inalienable, would have to be renounced (Morgenthau, 1979, p. 5-6). Therefore, hubris and moralism would not only cause ‘political dilettantism’ (Morgenthau, 1950a, p. 834), but even threaten the existence of the United States (Gottfried, 2003, p. 23).

Two examples will further stress this point. First, Morgenthau was critical towards the usefulness of foreign aid. He is reported to have argued that foreign aid is based upon an ‘ethnocentric arrogance’ (Winsor, 1969, p. 7) because it would be assumed that the economic and technological level of the Western world would be an asset to which all countries should aspire. However, there would be numerous goals which countries could aim to achieve. Indeed, the very distinction of advanced and developing countries would be reprehensible since it ‘… only makes sense in the absolute values we attribute to Western industrial and technological society’ (Winsor, 1969, p. 7). Rather, Morgenthau perceived the problems foreign aid recipient countries would face not as primarily economic, but political. As long as there would be an oligarchy profiting from the status quo within foreign aid recipient states, Morgenthau was convinced that foreign aid based upon universalised moral principles would fortify this as a morally unjust perceived situation, instead of changing it, despite the insertion of enormous amounts of money (Schatz, 1970, p. 247-8). Hence, the possibility to alter the political situation in these countries would lie within and not outside of themselves. Their citizens would have to come to terms with their situation, define a common good, and establish a political system which would aspire this common good instead of being the privilege of a small minority.

Second, Morgenthau argued in a televised interview with the late William Buckley that there would be a ‘… lack of clarity as to what we are after in Vietnam’ (1967b, p. 2). This was the case, as Michael Cox (2007, p. 182-3) and Jennifer See (2001, p. 424) noted, since Morgenthau would have considered the Vietnam War not as a
struggle between communism and liberalism, but as a fight for independence from colonial rule and a yearning for political and economic self-determination. This American misperception of the situation in Vietnam would have been based, according to Morgenthau, on the consequent implementation of the Truman Doctrine from 1947, which turned the struggle with the Soviet Union over global hegemony into a ‘moral crusade’ (1965a, p. 82) in which Soviet advancements had to be contained by all means. Therefore, ‘… a concrete interest of the U.S. in a geographically defined part of the world [was transformed] into a moral principle of worldwide validity, to be applied regardless of the limits of American interests and … power’ (Morgenthau, 1965a, p. 83). In their misperception, the United States would have even gone so far to support the authoritarian regime of Ngô Đình Diệm in order to contain communism and maintain the status quo (Morgenthau, 1965a, p. 32). However, thereby the United States would have de-legitimised its universal claim to leadership, made Vietnam susceptible to communism as an alternate political and social system (See, 2001, p. 429), and, eventually, over-stretched their hubris and moralism capacities.

For Morgenthau, a second set of political consequences idealism would have caused was a lack of self-reflection and a refusal of critique. Treating transcendent political ideals as immanent standards of action, a society would have no interest in social change, but in the maintenance of the status quo since the argument would be raised that a status of perfection would have been achieved. Morgenthau stated in the Basler Nationalzeitung that ‘… politics, which desires stability, leads in the name of anti-communism to the suppression of all manifestations of social unrest and to the oppression of reforms’ (Kränzle, 1976; my translation). Hence, such a society would have to enforce homogeneity which, first, stymies self-reflection and, second, would preclude the possibility of political criticism as this would mean to renounce the alleged status of perfection and, consequently, even to question one’s political ideals and self-
understanding. Morgenthau saw this exemplified in Lyndon B. Johnson’s stance on public opinion during the Vietnam War as he had ‘… declared … criticism to be unhelpful and even damaging’ (Morgenthau, 1965a, p. 50). Morgenthau (1974c, p. 15) found further evidence for this argument in Senator Joseph McCarthy and the “Red Scare” during which the professional and personal life of numerous citizens were destroyed in the name of anti-communism. At a time when the Cold War had just begun and its outcome was still uncertain, hence a time when the immanence of America’s political ideals could become threatened, the refusal of critique, i.e. the anti-pluralism of political interests, had become so pronounced that its defence had become menacing for people who questioned the homogeneity.

Morgenthau was convinced that in such a society there would be only two options into which citizens could direct their critique: apathy or violence. With the effects of both consequences which potentially causing the downfall of a democracy, Morgenthau had already experienced this during the Weimar Republic (chapter three above). For Morgenthau (1972, p. 104-5), political apathy meant a total retreat from politics. People would boycott elections, decrease their civic engagement, or even be unaware of basic political procedures. Political apathy could also mean for Morgenthau that people would get engaged in communities outside of the political realm in order to create a counter-culture which ‘… makes him [the citizen] at home by giving meaning to his life and a chance for his abilities to prove themselves’ (1974c, p. 16), as he had witnessed in the Weimar Republic. The second consequence would be equally, if not more dangerous for the preservation of democracies because violence could be directly employed to usurp political power. Yet, Morgenthau argued that violence is a mere sign of political despair born out of the conviction that critique is not possible any longer and influence on political decision-making processes would be, therefore, inconceivable. Recourse to violence would at least allow the government to recognise a critique of the status quo
(Morgenthau, 1957a, p. 11; 1974c, p. 16-7). An example of violence due to political despair was the student protests of 1968 in whose course Morgenthau became a ‘national figure’, as Arendt wrote to Mary McCarthy on 28\textsuperscript{th} May 1968 (1995, p. 217). Students revolted, according to Morgenthau, because they would have been frustrated as there appeared to be no viable political alternative to the ruling government. They would have believed it would make no difference to vote for one party or another since truly relevant political issues would not be at stake, which is why a change in government would not cause a different kind of politics (Morgenthau, 1968a, p. 9). Indeed, Morgenthau argued that in the course of history students in particular, as the young and educated stratum, would have been forced to direct their critique into illegal, violent outbreaks if rulers prohibited any legal form of criticism. This is why Morgenthau expressed surprise in a letter to the editors of the \textit{New York Times} from 16\textsuperscript{th} August 1966 that German students had so far shown signs of political apathy rather than agitation (HJM-Archive 43). Less than one year later in 1967, during the visit of the Persian Shāh, Mohammad Rezā Pahlavi, the student Benno Ohnesorg was shot dead by the police and German student protests broke out.

Thus, due to the lack of acknowledgement of the anthropological condition of politics and the resulting turning of transcendent political ideals into immanent strategies of action that would have led to a refusal of critique, hubris, and moralism, Morgenthau had a special role in mind for scholars. In order to safeguard the undisputable societal achievements of liberal democracies and, as we will see, to prevent their downfall into totalitarianism, Morgenthau demanded that scholarship to take a position of (what was earlier identified) as embedded criticism or dissidence. This means that in striving for the common good, Morgenthau considered it as a patriotic task to critically reflect and scrutinise government decisions because ‘[t]he right to dissent derives from the relativistic philosophy of democracy. That philosophy assumes that all members of society,
being rational, have equal access to the truth, but none of them has a monopoly of it’ (1970a, p. 40). If this critical inspection is missing, the government evidently would not follow the common good since a monopolisation of truth took place, as Morgenthau argued had happened in the United States. For Morgenthau, therefore, critical scholarship meant pointing out shortcomings and offering a different voice in an otherwise ocean of uniformity. For this, however, the scholar would have to be committed to truth in all conscience as he/she would have to provide guidelines for the public to facilitate their opinion-making. This attitude is demonstrated in Morgenthau’s assessment of the “Van Doren scandal”. Van Doren, a scholar at Columbia University, took part in a fraud during a popular game show which was uncovered in 1959 (Cozette, 2008, p. 15). Morgenthau reacted furiously to this fraud because Van Doren had clearly breached this commitment to truth, which is why Morgenthau believed that a scholar like Van Doren ‘… is not so much the corruptor of the code by which he is supposed to live as its destroyer’ (1959b, p. 17; 1960a, p. 344).

However, Morgenthau was aware that this commitment would require a strenuousness that might exceed human competencies which is why he referred to Nietzsche’s concept of the Übermensch. Hence, this kind of critical scholarship would demand a high price from its followers, as he elaborated for political science. Morgenthau noted that

‘[a] political science which is true to its moral commitment ought at the very least to be an unpopular undertaking. At its very best, it cannot help being a subversive and revolutionary force with regard to certain vested interests – intellectual, political, economic, social in general. For it must sit in continuous judgment upon political man and political society, measuring their truth, which is in good part a social convention, by its own. By doing so, it is not only an embarrassment to society intellectually, but it becomes also a political threat to the de-
fenders or the opponents of the status quo or to both; for the social conventions about power, which political science cannot help subjecting to a critical – and often destructive – examination, are one of the main sources from which the claims to power, and hence power itself, derive’ (1955, p. 446-7).

Certainly, this awareness is caused by the fact that Morgenthau had to pay this price several times during his life, as two examples will show. First, in a lecture Morgenthau gave in Bologna, Italy in April 1961, he spoke in favour of the acceptance of the “Oder-Neiße-line” as the border between Germany and Poland, nine years before the German Chancellor Willy Brandt did so with his signature under the Treaty of Warsaw. Morgenthau argued for its acceptance because it would serve the interests of all involved parties best (Morgenthau, 1961b, p. 6). This led to strong reactions in Germany, as highlighted in a newspaper clipping of the Südhessische Post from 26th April 1961. Furthermore, the Göttinger Arbeitskreis, a group of scholars from Pomerania, Silesia, and Eastern Prussia, which had arranged for Morgenthau’s lecture to be translated into German, called Morgenthau a scholar who ‘… does not know principles of foreign politics which are derived of an international morale or from an international law’ (Braun, 1961, p. III; my translation). He even received critical letters in which Morgenthau, who was forced into exile twice, could read that he would have no idea about the pain it caused when forced to leave one’s homeland (HJM-Archive 34).

A further example must have been even more difficult for Morgenthau to endure as he was one of the first and foremost critics of the Vietnam War (Myers, 1980, p. 3; See, 2001, p. 419-20). However, soon after public criticism against the Vietnam War in the United States had increased, Morgenthau’s criticism was still not appreciated. Not only was he disapproved of by other critics, who had become more numerous after the failure of the TET-offensive in 1968 (Cozette, 2008, p. 16) due to their moralistic reasoning in absolute terms, but he was also criticised by officials and his career threatened. In
“the week” section of the *National Review* from 15th June 1965, which stressed his role as an outsider, we read for example that ‘Professor Hans Morgenthau’s hyperactive role as a protester against our policy in Vietnam is embarrassing many of his friends, and may even be embarrassing to himself, who is not used to the kind of self-exposure he is submitting to or to the company he finds himself keeping’ (HJM-Archive 20). However, it did not remain at obloquy from the conservative press, but Morgenthau even lost his position as consultant in the Department of Defense (Morgenthau, 1967b, p. 5-6) and it is argued that, during the Johnson government, there was a “Project Morgenthau” in order to discredit him (Cozette, 2008, p. 17). Finally, as several letters, public announcements, and newspaper clippings in the Morgenthau-Archive in the Library of Congress indicate, even his candidature for the presidency of the APSA during the beginning of the 1970s was thwarted by people who resented to his stance on Vietnam (HJM-Archive 4; equally: Lebow, 2003, p. 240). Morgenthau, however, was willing to pay this price because he considered this role of scholarship as a vital corrective for the perils that democracies may succumb to.

6.3 *Homo faber* or *animal laborans?* Bringing the human back into liberal societies

6.3.1 *Acceleration and commodification of life*

Alongside the political implications of idealism resulting in de-humanisation, Morgenthau also perceived socio-economic implications that drastically transformed the life-worlds of people. Liberalism would also cause a de-humanisation in the economic sphere in the sense that freedom was considered more and more as an immanent, quantifiable commodity and in its course any limit to personal freedom had been seemingly removed. This might sound paradoxical, but Morgenthau was convinced that this ‘unrestrained and self-sufficient hedonism’ (1960b, p. 69) would threaten collective freedom
as a qualitative good providing equality, the security to create one’s life and, thereby, establish an identity in the sense of freedom from constant self-doubt. Collective freedom would provide the possibility of working towards the transcendent aims of a common good (Morgenthau, 1960b, p. 73). If a sole pursuit of individual freedom, however, would take place, as Morgenthau argued had happened in the United States during the 20th century, it would endanger the collective freedom as the individual freedom of different persons might conflict due to their diverse interests. This in turn might threaten the individual drive for self-preservation because the freedom of one person would create a menace for another.

The dominance of individual freedom, hence the unrestricted evolution of the drive to prove oneself, and the resulting deprivation of a collective good has led to a development in which the human as *homo faber*, ‘… the maker of tools, [aspired to transform him-/herself] into *homo deus*, the maker of worlds …’ (Morgenthau, 1972, p. 2; emphasis in the original). Morgenthau showed here that the individualisation in modern societies would have turned humans into egoists who presume to have lordship over the world rather than aspiring to construct it in the struggle for a common good. In order to be able to do so, humans would have employed science, particularly natural sciences (Morgenthau 1973, p. 47), to follow their quest to master the world. Morgenthau (1972, p. 15-6) reasoned that only in such a society in which metaphysical discourses of transcendence had been replaced by an individually focused immanence, science could be perceived as “value-free” in which only questions of correctness and error are to be disputed. Hence, it would not be of interest what ought to be known, but only what can be known (Morgenthau, 1972, p. 6-11). Anything which would promise to increase individual freedom would be sought after, which is why ‘[w]e expect everything from science: transformation of our natural and social environment, control of human behaviour, social planning … and the indefinite prolongation of human life’ (Morgenthau, 1972,
Morgenthau’s realism was, therefore, an attempt to contradict arguments of social planning and historic optimism in general. Believing that human nature could be engineered in a particular way was utopian for Morgenthau, because it would not consider a political anthropology based on the two human drives. For this utopianism Morgenthau criticised Niccolò Machiavelli in an early piece in *Ethics*. Machiavelli believed that through the application of rules of political conduct, as he had articulated in *The Prince*, hence through social planning, it would be possible to achieve the unity of the Northern Italian city states (Morgenthau, 1945a, p. 145).

This growth of science leading to a technologised world, however, would have caused two effects – acceleration and commodification – that would have changed human life dramatically. It would have turned humans not into the autonomous master of the world, but heteronomous subjects. First, mechanisation and later technologisation would have led to the acceleration of life in three realms: military, transportation, and communication. It would be militarily now possible with the deployment of fewer people to achieve greater and more precise destruction in less time. Indeed, with the development of weapons of mass destruction, humans could even achieve their own extinction. Similarly, in the realm of transportation humankind would have achieved ever greater means of faster transportation which would be available to an increasing amount of people. The “American Dream” would have been based on the promise of unlimited individual mobility. It also meant, although Morgenthau did not explicitly refer to it, that an increasing amount of goods could be quickly transported to any place on earth. Finally, technologisation would have also led to faster means of communication. For Morgenthau (1973, p. 51-3), communication was the sector where the acceleration of life would be most obvious as the development of the telephone made it possible to communicate without any time delay. Morgenthau was aware that acceleration had positive effects as it would have enabled people to span time and space, especially through
the technological advancements in the transportation and communication sector, and eventually contributed to the technical realisation of a world community of which we will speak more about below. Still, Morgenthau was concerned about the de-humanising effects of technologisation which will threaten the environment, humans, and humanity altogether, as the next section will elaborate.

The second effect can be classified as commodification of life. For Morgenthau this meant that a system of production was put into place in modern societies that would have existed for its own sake in which the strife for quantity replaced the fulfilment of genuine human desires. Through an artificial system of supply and demand, all aspects of life in a market society would experience reification and become part of this system of production. What Morgenthau criticised was that this aim for quantity exceeded human demand and an increase was only achieved through ‘artificial or imaginary obsolescence, advertising, and marketing’ (1960b, p. 70). Similar to what Simmel had identified as ‘shop-window quality of things’ (1997a, p. 257), as mentioned above, Morgenthau argued that production in market societies would have no intrinsic value other than creating a desire among humans to possess commodities. Morgenthau criticised that companies measured their success by sales records which would have led to an uncritical implementation of what in microeconomics is called “economies of scale” (reducing the average cost of one production-unit) and “economies of scope” (reducing the average costs by producing more than one product). Companies would increase their “output” without considering the actual demand or purpose of a product. Therefore, there would be a constant succession of almost identical products to artificially instil a demand and keep or even increase the buying behaviour of people (Morgenthau, 1960b, p. 71). For Morgenthau, this artificial system of supply and demand would work because the promise of individual freedom had freed the drive to protect oneself from any
restraints, due to the lack of a metaphysical order, and humans could be manipulated to exhaust this drive in the constant acquisition of commodities.

6.3.2 The threat for the environment, the human, and humanity

The acceleration and commodification of life was the cause for the development of security-threats for the environment, the human, and humanity altogether, demonstrating the close intellectual relation Morgenthau had in this aspect with the Frankfurt School. Certainly, this was due to the close intellectual exchange he had with them during the time of his doctoral thesis and which he intensified through personal ties with other émigré scholars, including Arendt.

The first threat concerned the environment. Morgenthau was convinced that the system of production in modern societies would not be oriented towards a transcendent end, particularly one that would consider the satisfaction of basic human needs, but represents a ‘meaningless growth’ (1972, p. 23). For Morgenthau this meant that the result of the production process, the commodity, would not represent an end in itself, but would have become part of a process in which quantity became the guiding principle. The commodity, therefore, would be bereft of any intrinsic purpose which would enable further amelioration of the humans’ position to actively create their life-worlds through the satisfaction of one particular need (Morgenthau, 1960a, p. 215-22; 1960b, p. 69-74). This purposelessness would have required the creation of a consumer society which would eventually lead to a threat for the environment as the consumer society would turn into a ‘society of waste’ (Morgenthau, 1960a, p. 215; 1960b, p. 69; 1972, p. 23).

It is likely that Morgenthau adopted this term from Arendt’s The Human Condition (1958) which she compiled out of a Walgreen Lecture Series at the University of Chicago. In any case, Morgenthau employed it in a similar way where he argued that a society in which goods would be produced and consumed for no other purpose than
producing and consuming ever more quantities, a society would squander its limited resources. Although this was not Morgenthau’s major concern and it would go too far to call him an environmentalist, it still shows that Morgenthau’s political agency was holistic as he was concerned about any aspect that would negatively affect the human ability to get purposefully engaged in one’s life-world. This was highlighted when Morgenthau called on his fellow citizens to a sustainable stewardship of available resources long before the first oil-crisis in 1973 raised global concerns about the environment and the Club of Rome published a first scientific study about the *Limits of Growth* in 1972.

The modern consumer society was also criticised by Morgenthau for being immanent to the human being. Again we find a consistency here with Arendt in the concepts Morgenthau used to characterise this threat further demonstrating that Arendt played a vital intellectual role for Morgenthau in formulating his political agency. Of course other (émigré) scholars also criticised the modern consumer society, most notably members of the Frankfurt School, but the congruence of concepts suggests that Morgenthau had a strong thinking partnership with Arendt. From the early 1950s on Arendt, like Max Scheler earlier, distinguished between the *homo faber* and the *animal laborans* (1953, p. 323), which became popular after the publication of Arendt’s seminal *The Human Condition* (1958). Like Arendt, Morgenthau considered the *homo faber*, the creative human, as a person who would produce and use tools to create a life-world and would be, therefore a symbolisation of a meaningful life. Since the *homo faber* would be able to identify his/her work as valuable due to its life-worldly significance, the *homo faber* would find self-assurance and identity in his/her work (Morgenthau, 1972, p. 146). In the modern society, however, which would succumb to acceleration and commodification, the human would be turned into an *animal laborans*. In such a society humans would seek a comfortable life from the restlessness of the labour-
process. This is the case because people would have to succumb to this process in which machines set the repetitive rhythm and the individual worker is detached from the product he/she is working on (Arendt, 1958, p. 146-7). This labour-process would not allow for participation in creating one’s life-world through one’s own will and in doing so gain identity. The individual would take, therefore, recourse in a comfortable life which often expresses itself in the satisfaction of material desires. Therefore, ‘[m]odern man [is] diminished in his humanity and threatened with atomization by unintelligible and unmanageable anonymous social forces …’ (Morgenthau, 1972, p. 51).

The result of this degrading process would be loneliness. This would not be the case for the *homo faber*, as Arendt wrote, because, although he/she would work in isolation, he/she would be able to add value to the life-world through the tools the *homo faber* would produce and use. Thereby, an active engagement with the life-world would be secured (Arendt, 1958, p. 139-40). The *animal laborans*, however, would not have such a capacity and consequently could not escape loneliness. The *animal laborans* would not only be incapable with his work to get engaged in society and achieve self-fulfilment, but being part of the production and consumption process would demonstrate to him/her that one would also be incapable of mastering one’s life-world and even more one would be replaceable (Arendt, 1953, p. 323). A second consequence would be, according to Morgenthau, an indulgence in mediocrity. Being part of the production and consumption process in modern societies, mediocrity would be sufficient since one would only be responsible for one’s immediate task and any further effort would make no difference. A *homo faber*, however, could increase his stance in building a life-world and consequently the level of self-fulfilment directly as a result of his efforts. Efforts, therefore, would be like in a self-fulfilling prophecy, a positive effect on the strengthening of his/her identity because the more one would invest, the more success one would have. The world of the *animal laborans*, however, ‘… compels its
members to live below their capabilities rather than exhausting them. It misdirects their energies and wastes the best of their talents’ (Morgenthau, 1960b, p. 79). In such a society the aspiration for excellence, in the way Morgenthau understood it as critical scholarship, would not only be unnecessary, but quintessentially also a menace to be suppressed because it could result in calling the foundation of their society into question by aiming for a different kind of society. These two consequences – loneliness and mediocrity – particularly led to Morgenthau’s concern that liberal democracies should be aware of the peril of totalitarianism, as it will be discussed in the next section.

The final threat concerns humanity in general. For Morgenthau, the development of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, caused a radical change in foreign politics. A first extensive engagement of Morgenthau with the question of nuclear weapons was provided at a lecture series in 1961-1962 entitled *Reflections on the Nuclear Age*. As Scheuerman has shown, Morgenthau was influenced in the development of his thoughts on the consequences of atomic warfare by Karl Jaspers. Morgenthau had reviewed Jaspers’s *The Future of Mankind* upon request by Jaspers’s former pupil, Arendt (Scheuerman, 2009a, p. 146-8). Morgenthau incorporated the main argument of Jaspers in his thought that with nuclear weapons, humans for the first time would have been given the technical means to extinguish humanity altogether. That this was the case, however, dawned upon him much earlier, when the Soviet Union became the second atomic power in 1949, an ‘event of the greatest importance’ (Morgenthau, 1950c, p. 24). From this time on violence would have ceased to be an appropriate means of politics, understood as coercive diplomacy, because nuclear weapons could not serve the causes of attack or defence, but deterrence. During the Cold War employing nuclear weapons would have let to the extinction of all conflict-parties and to the doctrine of *Mutual Assured Destruction* (MAD). Therefore, violence could no longer be employed to create a (new) political order (Morgenthau, 1960c, p. 5; 1970b, p. 38; 1973,
This in itself would have less a foreign than an internal political consequence, as today all nations have one interest in common which transcends almost all others: the avoidance of a general war (Morgenthau, 1954, p. 83). But, as pointed out earlier, people would not always act rationally, let alone in foreign politics, the realm in which humans could, due to the nation-state, follow their drives almost unhindered, as argued by Freud. The threat for humanity stemming from nuclear weapons, however, is not only the threat of extinction, but the kind of death humans would have to face. As Morgenthau elaborated in a striking episode at the end of Science: Servant or Master?, nuclear weapons cause a collective death and lead people into meaninglessness. Neither would there be people left to bemoan their death and remember them, nor would the artefacts which humans have created survive a nuclear strike (Morgenthau, 1972, p. 149).

From this follows that nuclear weapons are the ultimate source of human threat caused by the modern production and consumption process. The production of nuclear weapons would not enable to pursue war to achieve a certain end since nuclear weapons could not be employed. Otherwise even “nuclear-weapon-states” could face complete destruction. Furthermore, nuclear weapons provide not increment value to conventional arms as their use would provide no benefit. On the contrary, the use of nuclear weapons almost certainly would decrease the benefits due to the mutual destruction (Morgenthau, 1970a, p. 32; Scheuerman, 2009a, p. 141). Still, the exploitation of the drive to prove oneself would make nation-states want nuclear weapons.

6.4 Totalitarianism, the national interest, and world community

6.4.1 The peril of totalitarianism

Before finally elaborating on how Morgenthau suggested tackling the problems of modern democracies, it remains to be demonstrated which peril incited him to promote a critical public role for the scholar and act upon it, not least because in this constella-
tion it has attracted little academic interest so far. The political and socio-economic con-
sequences of a de-humanised liberalism, hence idealism, leading to hubris and refusal of
criticism as well as the acceleration and commodification of life, would run the risk of
caus[113x747]ing the contrary effect of liberalism: totalitarianism.

Totalitarianism was for Morgenthau a total form of government which would influ-
ence all aspects of life because its main feature, the superiority of government, caused
by the above elaborated crisis of liberal democracy, would be supported by an interac-
tion of democratic and despotic elements which would hamper its overthrow. In a dis-
cussion in the course of the fourth “Salzburg Dialogue on Humanism” (Salzburger
Humanismusgespräch) Morgenthau remarked that just as in the case of fascism, totali-
tarianism would be democratic because it governed with the consent of the majority of
the people (Schatz, 1970, p. 247). Yet, despite its public consent, totalitarianism would
also be despotic as the government would rule with absolute power meaning that it
would be in their often arbitrary ruling not restricted by any legal or moral norms
(Morgenthau, 1972, p. 79-80; 1973, p. 48). Following Arendt in his assessment,
Morgenthau considered totalitarianism to be a ‘new form of government’ (1972, p. 79;
1977, p. 127) and there were two characteristics of totalitarianism making it a truly new
form of government.

First, totalitarianism would possess the material and technical means to completely
eliminate criticism. The former means that it would have the suzerainty of violence. The
possession of privately owned arms would be restricted if not prohibited at all, from
which it follows that violence could legally be used only by the government through
armed forces like the police or military (Morgenthau, 1970a, p. 292-314). In particular,
this material aspect demonstrates that for Morgenthau there was a fine line between de-
mocracy and totalitarianism because also in democracies the government possesses the
monopoly of violence or at least punishes its abuse, which helps to explain his insis-
tence on dissidence. Yet, there is a second material aspect. A totalitarian government would have the ability to monopolise key economic sectors, such as communication and transportation, in order to exert violence over its subjects. This demonstrates that totalitarianism would have introduced a ‘… bureaucratization of terror … which gives political power an efficiency it did not have before’ (Morgenthau, 1977, p. 127). Due to the material surplus on the side of the government, people may still be able to demonstrate or go on strike, but they would lack the means to overthrow the government (Morgenthau, 1970a, p. 32-3). The latter aspect, technology, would be particularly important because

‘[i]t is not by accident that the rise of totalitarianism coincides with the development of the modern technologies of communication, transportation, and warfare. These technologies have given modern governments the tools with which to penetrate and overwhelm the sphere that tradition has reserved for the individual and his freedom … Before the advent of the technological age, no government … could have become totalitarian because of its limited technological resources; thus the freedom of the individual was protected by the inability of the government to utterly destroy it’ (Morgenthau, 1972, p. 80).

Furthermore, advancements in the communication sector would have enabled the government to increase its influence in all parts of society and suppress criticism as they would now possess the means to create a surveillance society as depicted by George Orwell in 1984. That Morgenthau considered the United States at times on their way into such an Orwellian state becomes obvious when, for example, he analysed *How Totalitarianism starts: the Domestic Involvement of the CIA* in 1967 (Morgenthau, 1970a, p. 51-5; equally: Young-Bruehl, 2006, p. 35). In such a surveillance society the private sphere would become abolished and criticism would be made impossible as no one could feel certain of not being spied on or tapped.

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Second, totalitarianism would also be able to technically and contextually control the public opinion. Technically, totalitarianism would be able to do so as they would not only be able to police the media, but also to employ media and communication devices to spread their doctrines among their subjects (Morgenthau, 1973, p. 54-5). Morgenthau experienced these technical possibilities of totalitarianism to control its people’s minds with the introduction of the *Volksempfänger*, a radio receiver, which since its introduction in 1933, became one of the major propaganda devices for the NSDAP.\(^{111}\) Not least this experience must have brought Morgenthau to the conclusion that ‘[w]e must particularly recognize that the medium through which information policy proceeds is language’ (1970a, p. 323) and that a totalitarian government would have an interest in transmitting their statements to its subjects. The indoctrination of totalitarianism, however, is even more important. Totalitarian rulers would be able to control the political discourses through a reciprocal discourse.

On the one hand, technologisation would have provided totalitarianism with the means to create a bureaucratic apparatus with which totalitarian governments would have been able to monopolise the political discourses and create homogeneity in thought and life-style among its subjects (Morgenthau, 1977, p. 127). On the other hand, totalitarianism would establish an ideology to legitimise its rule and to further homogenise its subjects. In such a system, the purpose of an ideology would have been to cloud the total de-politicisation because totalitarianism would remove the freedom to act (Morgenthau, 1977, p. 128). This would happen through the allocation for a place in society for each individual and the establishment of norms through which it would be possible for subjects to give meaning to their life-world. This is what Morgenthau found in Arendt’s “banality of evil” since ‘[t]he evildoer can be a minor figure in a bureaucratic machine believing in the presuppositions of the doctrine’ (1977, p. 129). As soon as an ideology provides a ‘mystical role’ (Pin-Fat, 2005, p. 234), by universalising their
particular norms, totalitarianism would have reached its final level. Their foreign politics would not only be persecuted in dichotomies of good and bad or friend and foe anymore, but totalitarianism would be able ‘… to destroy its citizens in the process of defending them’ (Morgenthau, 1970a, p. 30).

These two aspects – suppression of criticism and the creation of homogeneity – were Morgenthau’s main concerns of totalitarianism and made him stand up against any totalitarian development in liberal democracies. Still, Pin-Fat arrives at the conclusion that Morgenthau’s realism could eventually lead into totalitarianism due to Morgenthau’s universal moral standards, the European values. The only candidate Morgenthau would have been able to imagine to enforce these standards would have been the nation-state (Pin-Fat, 2005, p. 234). With this assessment, however, Pin-Fat failed to distinguish between content and scope of Morgenthau’s values (chapter four above), as the humanism Morgenthau universally aspired to was not to be acquired through collective enforcement but as an individual act of will. She also misinterpreted Morgenthau’s stance towards the nation-state since, as we read in Politics among Nations, ‘… [t]he light hearted equation between a particular nationalism and the counsels of Providence is morally indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the Biblical prophets warned rulers and ruled’ (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 13).

6.4.2 The national interest and world community

The problem Morgenthau faced on how to avert totalitarian rule, which previously had also drastically affected his life, led him to two conclusions: the national interest and world community. Although Morgenthau considered the national interest if understood correctly as a feasible epistemological tool to evict totalitarianism from the system of nation-states, he stressed that his second option, world community, was his preferred choice.
The national interest is a concept that in its diversity and quantifiable inconceivability repeatedly led to misunderstandings about its meaning among practitioners and academics alike because, as Smith remarked, ‘[h]ow one defines the national interest depends on the values he espouses and the way he ranks them’ (1986, p. 110; similar: Scheuerman, 2009a, p. 85). Despite Smith’s assessment being true in its essence and what Lebow referred to Morgenthau’s national interest as a ‘fluid concept’ (2003, p. 245), it is still possible to distinguish two elements in it which will document consistency with Morgenthau’s view on human nature and its drives, which he had elaborated in his earliest academic writings in the late 1920s. This is to be remarked in a definition of the national interest provided by one of Morgenthau’s pupils, Thompson. He notes that the national interest

‘… postulates that every nation by virtue of its geographic position, historic objectives, and relationship to other power centers possesses a clustering of strategic interests each more or less vital to its security. At any point in time, a rational foreign policy must attend to the safeguarding of these claims. The national interest stands above and absorbs the limited and parochial claims of subnational groups, even though such groups seek to interpret the national interest in their own terms’ (1960, p. 36).

These two dimensions which inform the national interest are, therefore, the element of survival and the element to collocate the diverging interests within the state.

As Thompson’s definition accentuates, the first dimension of the national interest would be survival. Like an individual, a nation-state would also always consider it as its primary duty to secure its survival and the survival of its citizens (Morgenthau, 1950c, p. 841). A nation-state, therefore, would have a vital interest in existence (Lebensinteresse), as Morgenthau called it in his doctoral thesis (1929a, p. 98). This demonstrates that for the sake of one’s survival, conflicts may appear as no state would be able to act
completely unselfishly as otherwise its survival might be threatened and this selfish behaviour may have threatening consequences for other nation-states. For this reason, Morgenthau, like Arendt, did not oppose violence *per se* as a political means to achieve one’s interests, but clearly Morgenthau considered it as the last resort if all other options to secure one’s survival had failed. Scheuerman has recently pointed out that this element would not only contain the territorial integrity of the state and physical preservation of its citizens, but also normative visions of social life. When Scheuerman speaks of an American ‘way of life’ (Scheuerman, 2009a, p. 83), however, one should not be inclined to follow the common, often materialistic images, but rather consider Tjalve’s assessment. What Morgenthau included in the national interest as necessary for the survival of a democratic nation-state was the ability to utter dissent in a public discourse through which policies aspiring to the common good would crystallise and finally be formulated (Tjalve, 2008, p. 120-31).

This normative element in the survival of a nation-state leads to the second dimension. As Morgenthau remarked in the early 1950s, a time when he devoted much of his academic interest in the elaboration of this concept, ‘[a]ll the cross currents of personalities, public opinion, sectional interests, partisan politics, and political and moral folkways’ (1952c, p. 973) would be part of the national interest. This demonstrates the importance Morgenthau gave to the ability to express criticism in the public realm. Only if this would be secured and citizens could contribute to it widely, a national interest could evolve that follows no particular interests, but would be committed to a common good which would serve the various citizens’ interests best.

In order to do so, this second dimension would require a ‘rational order’ (Morgenthau, 1952c, p. 976). As Pin-Fat notes, this rational order would be created through a hierarchisation of the various interests in a society starting from ones that secure survival (Pin-Fat, 2005, p. 232). The national interest was, therefore, for
Morgenthau an epistemological tool to rationally reflect on foreign politics. Morgenthau was aware that it required a particular person with strong qualities, like those he had found in Nietzsche’s Übermensch, to create such a rational order. In his American writings, Morgenthau (1945b; 1952b) had found the figure of the statesman to give these qualities a name, but without a doubt Morgenthau in his earliest German writings shaped the conviction that strong political leadership would be required in a democracy to lead the diverging interests of its citizens. Morgenthau (1930a) had found an example of such a statesman in the late German Minister of Foreign Affairs Stresemann, whom he prized as the ‘creator’ (Schöpfer) of German foreign politics as Stresemann peacefully reintroduced Germany into the community of states. Stresemann and other politicians Morgenthau deemed highly, such as the US-Secretary of State (1949-1953), Dean Acheson, offered in Morgenthau’s view a particular quality: wisdom. As he remarked in some of his latest writings:

‘[w]isdom is the gift of intuition, and political wisdom is the gift to grasp intuitively the quality of diverse interests and power in the present and future and the impact of different actions upon them. Political wisdom, understood as sound political judgement, cannot be learned; it is a gift of nature …. As such, it can be deepened and developed by example, experience, and study (Morgenthau, 1971a, p. 620; 1972, p. 45).

Even though wisdom was for Morgenthau an inherent human quality, it still would require values that could be acquired. From Lang we know that these values are closely related to Aristotle’s ideal of a virtuous person who is characterised through prudent demeanour, courage, and sound judgement based upon knowledge and experience (Lang, 2007, p. 29). Due to Morgenthau’s personal experience (chapter three above), a fourth feature can be added here which is alienation (Neacsu, 2010, p. 104). As politics was for Morgenthau always a choice among evils and the task of a statesman was to
‘choose the lesser evil’ (Morgenthau, 1945b, p. 18), the latter would enable him/her to do so since alienation would provide the politician with an ability to compare and weigh the importance of interests due to an unbiased assessment of those interests. This feeds into the ability to judge. With the concept of wisdom, Morgenthau intended to criticise the tendency in political science to constantly accumulate data to provide political guidelines as he was not convinced that an increased quantity of data would create more knowledge and improve political decision-making. On the contrary, a politician would only need to have sound information after an alignment with his/her experiences. Any further knowledge would not improve the judgement, but would probably make it even more difficult as the amount of information could not be handled anymore. Once a judgement would have been achieved, a politician, finally, would have to have the courage to implement his/her decisions. Like Caesar, ‘[t]he statesman has to cross the Rubicon not knowing how deep and turbulent the river is, or what he will find on the other side’ (Morgenthau, 1962c, p. 103).

The political realm in which Morgenthau deemed wisdom as most important was diplomacy. Certainly, for this reason he devoted his research interest again and again to diplomacy, which is why one has to pose the question why so far only Russell (1991) developed a deeper interest in Morgenthau’s view on diplomacy. In his last publication on diplomacy, Morgenthau (1974a, p. 14) remarked that on the international scene one would deal with conflicts which were caused by the particular interests of nation-states. He elaborated on this argument in his doctoral thesis referring to ‘tensions’ (Spannungen) as a source of conflict between states (Morgenthau, 1929a, p. 72-84) and in _La Notion du Politique_ in which he spoke of ‘différends d’intérêts’ (1933, p. 23). This is why Morgenthau (1945-1946, p. 1079) was convinced that these kinds of conflict could not be settled by legal means because they were usually not caused by questions of uni-
versal right or wrong, but each interest would have a right of its own as it would have been borne out of particular historic trajectories.

In order to minimise the violent settlement of conflicts, Morgenthau proposed a two-step strategy on the basis of equal rights. First, it would have to be determined which interests are involved and, second, terms of condition would have to be agreed upon in order to reach a settlement (Morgenthau 1956, p. 408; 1957b, p. 6-7; 1974a, p. 14). This procedure seems fairly simplistic, but the task ‘… to redefine the seemingly incompatible vital interests of the nations concerned in order to make them compatible’ (Morgenthau, 1974a, p. 15) and to achieve a compromise through negotiations, proved in the history of humankind more often than not to be unattainable. Still, Morgenthau (1950c; 1971c) repeatedly argued to enter negotiations with the Soviet Union, particularly after their acquisition of the nuclear bomb, because violent conflict settlement would have been devastating for everyone. With regard to those negotiations Morgenthau proposed being aware of one’s own interests, while being sensitive enough to consider those of the other side so that a compromise could be reached. For Morgenthau, this compromise would have been to accept two spheres of interest in order to minimise the risk of violence.113 This example with the Soviet-American relations demonstrates that diplomacy in Morgenthau’s understanding required a statesman. In a letter to the editor of the New York Times from 13th August 1957, Morgenthau remarked that he/she would require expertise in the sense of ‘… knowledge … of history, of current events, of foreign countries, of men’ and a profound judgement ‘… of men and situations … and transform situations on behalf of the policies of his Government’ (HJM-Archive 43; equally: 1957c, p. 1) demonstrating Morgenthau’s insistence on encyclopaedic knowledge. Prudence, judgement, and courage would enable the diplomat to find a viable compromise while not renouncing from one’s own interests. Considering what was earlier said about his insistence on civic engagement, it might come as a
surprise that Morgenthau was in favour of a Bismarckian cabinet and clandestine diplomacy, disapproving what he called “democratic diplomacy”. However, in a democratic diplomacy, Morgenthau was convinced that the necessary compromises could not be reached due to constant public scrutiny. The public at large would not have the qualities of a statesman and would rather follow their own particular interests or even be manipulated in their thought by ideologies. This would make it difficult for the statesman to follow political wisdom and achieve a verdict that would suit one’s national interest best, being sensitive enough to have considered the national interest of the other party (Morgenthau, 1957b).

The national interest was ever since the cause of academic concern about its feasibility (e.g. Good, 1960; Herz, 1981; Jervis, 1998; Meier-Walser, 2004; Pin-Fat, 2005; Scheuerman, 2009a) and also Morgenthau was aware that the qualities he asked from a statesman were not always attainable, particularly in democracies in which long-term values are often sacrificed for short-term achievements in order to secure re-election. What Morgenthau, therefore, aspired to was nothing less than a paradigm-change in international relations. In fact, one could argue that he wanted to abolish inter-national relations altogether as he argued in one of his last public appearances while delivering the first Council on Religion and International Affairs (CRIA) lecture on Morality and Foreign Affairs that ‘… we are living in a dream world’ (Morgenthau, 1979, p. 42). Humans would still cling to a form of consociation, the nation-state, although the world would have so dramatically changed since 1945 that this form of consociation would have become outdated. In the same lecture, Morgenthau also gave reasons why this obsolescence was supposed to be the case. Nation-states ‘… are no longer viable economic, political, or military units’ (Morgenthau, 1979, p. 34) and thereby would lose the ability administrate their sovereignty. Philip Mirkowski (2011, p. 212) is, therefore, mistaken in his argument that Morgenthau, in agreement with the economist Friedrich Hayek,
would have promoted a strong state to minimise the perils of democracy. On the contrary, Morgenthau’s insistence on living in a dream world emphasises his quest for peace. As a German Jew, he had experienced the horror of the ideologies of belligerent nationalism and fascism and, therefore, dedicated his thought to create a more peaceful outlook on the world. As Steven Forde (1995, p. 155) notes this would have been a common trait among realistic scholars who often were also émigrés.

That Morgenthau considered the nation-state as economically outdated can be explained by considering that he gave this lecture under the impression of the evolving second oil-crisis, which not just in the United States irretrievably destroyed the myth of a consistent economic upheaval in which numerous states in the Western world had lived since the late 1940s under the Bretton-Woods-System. This manifested that one state would no longer be able to yield enough economic power to control all the interrelationships of an increasingly globalised economy. Morgenthau, furthermore, considered the nation-state as a politically outdated model of consociation. These ‘blind and potent monster[s]’ (Morgenthau, 1962a, p. 61) would have an interest in securing their existence through an increase in the possibility of international conflict in which its citizens could freely follow their drives because nationally various ideologies would have in their egalitarianism deprived them of their ability to act and establish thereupon an identity. Finally, Morgenthau also argued that in military terms nation-states would face threats to their sovereignty since a nation-state could not guarantee its territorial integrity and the security of its citizens anymore. Indeed, the development of nuclear weapons would have made the existence of borders obsolete because to overcome them an aggressor would not have to face own considerable losses any longer. A border would, therefore, be in Morgenthau’s sense reduced to an artificial line on a map (1966a, p. 9; 1970b, p. 61-2). This final argument was prominently discussed in International Relations during the height of the Cold War, when more and more states acquired nuclear
weapons or the possibility to do so. The permeability of borders was most notably averted by another émigré scholar, John Herz, who stressed that although nuclear weapons would provide the state with ultimate might, it would also lead to ultimate impotence. This would be the case because neither ‘protection through distance’ would be given anymore, nor would distinctions of ‘front’ and ‘rear’ during wartime make sense since nuclear weapons could bring destruction to any place on earth (Herz, 1959, p. 168-72).

Therefore, Morgenthau argued for the creation of a world-state which has repeatedly caused academic bewilderment. Either this part of Morgenthau’s normative world postulate was dismissed as a utopian wish (Söllner, 1987a, p. 264) or in consideration of the national interest discussed as a source of confusion in Morgenthau’s thought (Craig, 2007, p. 210). Both assessments are comprehensible, but what they failed to understand is that the national interest is merely a concept to avert greater damage, but the form of society to which this concept applies is irrevocably antiquated. Therefore, Morgenthau aspired to a world-state and as Fromkin expressed in his commemoration of Morgenthau, he had also considered political preconditions. Before a world-state could be institutionalised, a world community would have to be achieved: if the citizens would not be willing to give their loyalty to a world state and rather leave it with their nation-state no attempt at establishing institutions for such a world-state would be successful (Fromkin, 1993, p. 84; similar: Speer, 1968, p. 215). Furthermore, in the 1940s Morgenthau expressed doubt that the principle of national sovereignty could be circumvented in the near future because it would have provided the state with an impenetrability. Morgenthau (1948b, p. 344) employed this term by Kelsen to stress that under the current system only one organisation could claim sovereignty within a given territory. Therefore, Morgenthau argued first to establish a world community, a concept that resembles Raymond Aron’s transnational society, and who is also commonly associated
with realism (Hoffmann, 1985, p. 16). Aron defined the transnational society as the intercultural exchange of individuals through

‘… commercial exchange, migration of persons, common beliefs, organizations that cross frontiers and, lastly, ceremonies or competitions open to the members of all these units. A transnational society flourishes in proportion to the freedom of exchange, migration or communication, the strength of common beliefs, the number of non-national organizations, and the solemnity of collective ceremonies’ (1966, p. 105).

These were aspects Morgenthau had in mind to create a world community and in *Politics among Nations* we read how Morgenthau thought it could be established: ‘We find that the creation of an international community presupposes at least the mitigation and minimization of international conflicts so that the interests uniting members of different nations may outweigh the interests separating them’ (1985, p. 559).

This means that Morgenthau considered a similar means for a world community as for the traditional form of diplomacy. Through negotiations on equal terms, Morgenthau hoped to distil a compromise that would prove feasible enough to establish such a community since it would eventually create common understanding, trust, and loyalty among people. Morgenthau, however, was cautious that an institution like the United Nations would be the ideal setting to achieve such a world community. In the 1950s he argued that the United Nations would be a place where only national interests would be pursued. At that time Morgenthau’s scepticism still rested on the impression of the downfall of the predecessor of the United Nations, the League of Nations just 20 years before and expressed itself in two major points of criticism. On the one hand, Morgenthau criticised specialised agencies of the United Nations that also recipient countries would be represented and more importantly, on the other hand, the right to veto of the Security Council member-states. With this right any member-state would
have the possibility to frustrate the making of any decisions which could run counter to one’s own national interest (Morgenthau, 1954, p. 81-2). Only in the 1960s, under the impression of the achievements of the late Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld (Morgenthau, 1970a), Morgenthau started to renounce from his overly critical position of the United Nations as he had realised that it offers, despite its failures, at least a forum in which the different nation-states are able to get together peacefully and exchange their ideas, as exemplified in his introduction to David Mitrany’s *A working peace system*:

‘According to Professor Mitrany, an international community must grow from the satisfaction of common needs shared by members of different nations. International agencies, serving all peoples all over the world regardless of national boundaries, could create by the very fact of their existence and performance a community of interests, valuations, and actions. Ultimately, if such international agencies were numerous enough … the loyalties to these institutions and to the international community of which they would be the agencies would supersede the loyalties to the separate national societies …’ (Morgenthau, 1966a, p. 11).

Morgenthau followed a similar attitude towards the European Coal and Steel Community, the predecessor of the European Union. At the 46th annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, Morgenthau still expressed, equally under the impression of the failure of international law in the interwar period, doubts about the prospects of the Schuman Declaration to solve what Morgenthau perceived to be the main problem in European politics: the relationship between Germany with its ‘… natural superiority … among the nations of Europe’ and ‘… the unwillingness of the other European nations to accept that fact’ (1952d, p. 131). By the 1960s, however, when the European Coal and Steel Community merged with the European Economic and European Atomic Energy Communities Morgenthau changed his opinion about the
prospects of European unification for the same reason he had reversed his stance towards the United Nations. The European Communities also provided a forum to approximate different national interests and find viable compromises.

Hence, Morgenthau (1962a, p. 75-6) came to the conclusion that as much as a common agreement to shift loyalties to a world-state would have to be achieved by creating a world community, also international forums would have to be established in which such compromises could be facilitated because through daily contact they would allow countries to recognise commonalities, while being sensitive enough to accept those conditions and experiences which separate each culture.

6.5 Conclusion

The final chapter of this thesis has analysed Morgenthau’s political agency. The reason why this was provided at the end of this thesis was partly owed to the analytical modus operandi since his ontology and epistemology both set the intellectual framework for his political agency and, consequently, without knowledge about his ontology and epistemology it would be difficult to analyse his political agency. However, this is also due to the fact that Morgenthau devoted a lot of time and interest in this practical part of his Weltanschauung. During the 1950s and 1960s Morgenthau became truly a national figure, as Arendt wrote. Morgenthau deemed the public role of scholarship highly because for him a scholar was a person who is not only committed to create knowledge, but who is also guided by a normative concern on what ought to be known. The scholar turns, therefore, in his/her dissidence into a public corrective for the particular life-world he/she lives in. It is especially this insistence on being a critical normative scholar and the kind of criticism on liberal democracies Morgenthau brought forward that makes him, if nothing else, today worth considering for contemporary scholarship in International Relations and social sciences in general, especially at times.
when the latest self-induced economic bubble burst that led to a “privatisation of profits and socialisation of losses” (Nouriel Roubini).

The point that Morgenthau raised in all of his civic commitments was that the liberalism of Western democracies would in its degeneration as idealism run the risk of imploding and turn into totalitarianism, as he had witnessed in the 1930s in Germany and Spain. Liberal democracies were for Morgenthau transforming their transcendent political ideals in immanent standards of action and, thereby, succumbing to political hubris and socio-economic de-humanisation. The former meant for Morgenthau that liberal democracies would be threatened with hubris by considering their way of life as most developed in which other conceptions of life would be either neglected or fought against. But like Pangloss in Voltaire’s *Candide* came to realise, Morgenthau also stressed that this transformation would not create the best of all worlds, but would lead to an artificial homogeneity in which criticism would be considered as a threat to society, despite being its lifeline. If all legal channels of dissent would be closed, liberal democracies would be endangered because citizens could only take recourse in violence or apathy.

Also in the socio-economic realm Morgenthau expressed great concerns. The scientification and the subsequent technologisation of life created an acceleration and commodification of respective life-worlds and would, according to Morgenthau, threaten to destroy the environment, the human, and humanity altogether. In a fierce critique on modern consumer societies, which bears resemblance to the kind of criticism we find in writings of the Frankfurt School and French Marxist philosophers, Morgenthau was particularly disturbed about the transformation of the human from a *homo faber*, a person who constructs his/her own life-world through wilful acts, into an *animal laborans*, a person who is forced to succumb to the industrial production process. He agreed with Arendt that the resulting faceless loneliness would be one of the major causes for the rise of totalitarianism and their seemingly identity-creating ideologies. He, furthermore,
expressed concern about the development of weapons of mass destruction because this would rule out violence as a means of politics and in awareness of human nature, Morgenthau stressed the uttermost importance of keeping peace.

Therefore, he promoted the national interest as a way of keeping as much rationalism in politics as possible and a world community as a feasible alternative to the nation-state, which he considered as an antiquated form of society. Morgenthau argued for the national interest as a practical and normative guideline for politicians to enforce political decisions that serve the common good and on – the international realm – to consider the interests of other nation-states in order to ensure peace. This, however, would require particularly virtuous people in governmental positions who would have the ability to alienate themselves from their own interests and would, therefore, be able, due to their particular political wisdom, to have the knowledge about the different interests within society, judge them according to the common good, and the courage to enforce their decision against all odds if necessary. Yet, Morgenthau was convinced that even if the national interest as an epistemological tool would be employed to balance potentially divergent societal interests and not considered to be a justification for power politics, this would not hide from the fact that the nation-state has to be removed as their existence is too threatening for humanity. He, therefore, promoted a world community in which people start to shift their loyalty from the nation-state to larger bodies of representation and consider more the aspects that unite rather than separate them in order to eventually be able to institutionalise this world community in a world-state.
Chapter 7. The marginalisation and rediscovery of Hans
Morgenthau in International Relations

In his recent monograph Jütersonke arrived at the conclusion that Morgenthau would
today be largely forgotten if he had not written Politics among Nations.

‘Were it not for those six principles of realism and the success of that textbook,
it is doubtful whether we would be still talking of Morgenthau today, and even
more doubtful that he would be considered a “canonical” thinker in International
Relations. Grumble as he might about being misunderstood, even Morgenthau
would have to accept that fact’ (Jütersonke, 2010, p. 175).

This analysis of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, however, has provided evidence
through its panoptical, unifying, and inclusive approach to successfully challenge this
view. The current debate about Morgenthau and realism is owed to the fact that
Morgenthau’s thought is still an important contribution to International Relations.
Therefore, he has to be allocated a place in the discipline’s canon, although not for the
reasons Morgenthau is usually added to the discipline’s introductory textbooks which
often consider him to be a positivist and/or a predecessor of structural realism.

To rebut Jütersonke’s assessment a conclusion of the previous chapters will be drawn
by, first, discussing Morgenthau’s marginal existence and why it might have prompted
Jütersonke to arrive at his conclusion. This will be divided into two parts. First, it will
be argued that Morgenthau was a marginal man in the sense of Park because he was
torn between American and German cultures. This will help the student of International
Relations to realise that, despite Morgenthau’s personal gratitude to the United States,
his thought remained in essence within the cosmos of Continental European humanities
and social sciences (Chapter 7.1). In the second part we will discuss Morgenthau as a
marginal man in International Relations stressing that he was and, indeed, for his kind
of scholarship he had to be part of the academic heterodoxy (Chapter 7.2). In the next step, we will talk about the post-structuralist turn in International Relations. This will take place by arguing in accordance with Jenny Edkins who made the point that post-structuralism is a movement to re-introduce the political into politics (Chapter 7.3). This discussion of Edkins’s assessment of post-structuralism will take place in order to be able to classify Morgenthau’s contribution to International Relations in the final step (Chapter 7.4). This is not to argue Morgenthau would have been a proto-post-structuralist or would have followed them in all regards, but it will be accentuated that Morgenthau pursued a similar research agenda and intellectual concern to establish International Relations as a form of scholarship that is concerned with the human. It will also demonstrate that post-structuralism, irrespective of its merits, has to develop a more pronounced understanding of the history of (international) political thought because this history is much more eclectic than post-structuralism often concedes to it.

### 7.1 Morgenthau, the marginal man

Morgenthau’s life is an example of a marginal man in Parks’s sense. Morgenthau, like many other émigré scholars, remained torn between his new home, the United States, and his old home, Germany.

Certainly, Morgenthau had his own “from rags to riches” story. He rose from an elevator boy (Lebow, 2003, p. 219) to an eminent political scientist, who almost overnight became renowned with the publication of *Politics among Nations*. Jütersonke is right, therefore, in this sense because this textbook not only made him a name in the discipline for what he is still remembered today, but he truly became a ‘national figure’ (Arendt and McCarthy, 1995, p. 217). Morgenthau’s *Politics among Nations* even became part of America’s popular culture, which is evidenced in a *Mary Worth* comic-strip from 14th August 1955 in which reference is made to Morgenthau’s textbook (HJM-Archive 130).
In addition, several rankings in the 1960s and 1970s listed Morgenthau among the most influential contemporary thinkers in the United States (Frei, 2001, p. 76-9). This remarkable life-story lends to the interpretation that Morgenthau was all or part an American in his thought or significantly altered his thought after his emigration, as we find in numerous interpretations (e.g. Honig, 1996; Lebow, 2003; Guzzini, 2004; Scheuerman, 2009b). Indeed, if we look into this relationship with Germany, this conclusion seems not to be unjustified. Lebow, a former student of Morgenthau notes that ‘… questions about his German past were taboo’ (2003, p. 219) and what is more the analysis of Morgenthau’s correspondence in the Library of Congress has shown that after his emigration he never replied to a German letter in German, but only in English. Even conversations with friends within the émigré (scholar) circle were held in English from his side and in German from their side. Finally, in one of the first visits to Germany after his emigration in 1951 he admitted in an interview with the Munich-based Abendzeitung that his impressions about Germany were ‘ambivalent’ (zwiespältig) (HJM-Archive 178).

The impressions were ambivalent for Morgenthau because in his lifestyle and thought he remained German. Morgenthau was born into a liberal Jewish family that was part of the German Bildungsbürgertum and educated within the heterodox part of the German humanities and social sciences. The experiences he made, the insights he gained through studying works of Nietzsche, Simmel, Mannheim, Burckhardt, Freud, and Weber, and the education he received by people like Wölflin, Sinzheimer, Mannheim, Rothenbücher, and Oncken were crucial for his own Weltanschauung. We see this German foundation of his Weltanschauung not only in Morgenthau’s life-style as most of his friends were also European émigrés who shared similar cultural and social interests and knowledge, but particularly in his way of thinking. This German fundament of his thought has caused several American colleagues of Morgenthau to either
misinterpret his work, to be doubtful of its scientific value, or to even suspect ‘something almost continental’ (Good, 1960, p. 215) in it as if this would have a stigmatic effect. Hence, major concepts of Morgenthau can only be understood if comprehensively related to Continental European thought during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Morgenthau’s empirical and normative concept of power, for example, can only be appreciated if contextualised within the cultural crisis of the Weimar Republic, hence the decline of metaphysics and the rise of ideologies, and through an analysis of Morgenthau’s reading of Freud, Nietzsche, and Arendt.

Still, arguing that the foundation of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung was quintessentially German did not mean that he would not have made amendments or alterations to his Weltanschauung because, as remarked in chapter two, it is characterised by a processual element. This means Morgenthau had experiences and faced different ways of thinking that caused him to rethink elements of his Weltanschauung. This can be seen, for example, in his assessment of the United Nations and European Communities. In the 1950s, Morgenthau was still under the impression of the downfall of the League of Nations which he had experienced while in Geneva in the 1930s and was, therefore, sceptical about the promises of both institutions. In the 1960s, however, Morgenthau’s opinion changed when he realised that both offer, despite their organisational shortcomings, an international forum for innovation and re-ordering in which divergent national interests can be approximated and a viable compromise eventually reached. Similarly, the development of weapons of mass destructions led Morgenthau to an even firmer belief that the nation-state as a form of human sociation is outdated and has to be replaced by a world community. This was, on the one hand, because Morgenthau feared that the deployment of such powerful weapons in the name of nationalism could lead to the extinction of humankind and, on the other hand, would erode the principle of sovereignty.
and, therefore, the nation-state’s source of dominance. None of these experiences, however, were fundamental enough to completely change his Weltanschauung.

7.2 The marginalisation of Morgenthau in International Relations

Morgenthau, however, was not only a marginal man in the sense of being torn between the American and German culture, but also a marginal man in the discipline of International Relations.

This marginalisation was already the case to a certain extent in Europe. Due to his faith, education, and research agenda, Morgenthau was part of what Bourdieu (1969; 1985) called the heterodoxy in German jurisprudence. Like many other Jewish scholars before him, Morgenthau’s career in Germany was constrained during the Weimar Republic and came to a definite halt shortly after the national-socialist seizure of power when Morgenthau was dismissed as the acting president of the labour law court in Frankfurt due to the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service. The ostracism Jews faced in Germany contributed to the fact that numerous Jewish scholars were part of the academic heterodoxy as they were intellectually open-minded and challenged established modes of thought (Coser, 1965a, p. 5). The intellectual network that evolved around Morgenthau during his graduate studies was predominantly, though not exclusively, Jewish with Nietzsche and Burckhardt as prominent exceptions. Morgenthau studied works of Simmel and Freud, he was educated by Sinzheimer, and held close links in Frankfurt to Mannheim and members of the Institute for Social Research. Numerous other clerks in Sinzheimer’s chambers were also Jewish, most notably Fraenkel and Neumann. In fact, the intellectual air in Frankfurt that Morgenthau praised even half a decade later was predominantly conveyed by these Jewish scholars. However, it would go too far to claim that this close interrelation with other Jewish academics was always by choice or that his faith was the general aspect of his thought as
recent scholarship implied (Mollov, 2002). Certainly, however, Morgenthau, due to his
humanism, felt more attached to these kinds of scholars than to others because Jewish
scholars often advanced traits that Arendt (1978) had summed up under the term ‘con-
scious pariah’. This is evidenced, for example, in his critique of Schmitt and Kelsen.
Morgenthau criticised both of their research agendas, but whereas he attempted to re-
main rather sympathetic with his criticism on Kelsen, even before Kelsen saved his aca-
demic career, Morgenthau was always critical of Schmitt. Morgenthau not only rebutted
Schmitt’s scholarship as ideologically informed, but he personally attacked Schmitt as
an immoral person in his inaugural lecture in Geneva.

Even after Morgenthau came to the Institute des Hautes Etudes Internationales in
Geneva, the centre of international law in Europe at that time, he experienced margin-
alisation. Pursuing his Habilitation in Geneva was to a good deal forced, even though
the Academic Assistance Council did not acknowledge it (Skepper, 1934; 1935), but as
we know from the memoir of Herz, at that time a doctoral student of Kelsen, Geneva
used to be a haven for numerous Jewish social scientists (1984, p. 108). Morgenthau’s
lectures were boycotted by German students and due to a negative judgement of
Morgenthau’s colleague Paul Guggenheim his Habilitation was rejected. Only through
a positive comment of Kelsen, who had come to Geneva shortly before, Morgenthau’s
academic career was saved (Postscript, 1984, p. 353-4). Hence, to rephrase Jütersonke’s
verdict, without Kelsen, Morgenthau would probably not have become what he is con-
sidered to be today; the doyen of International Relations.

The marginalisation of Morgenthau did not come to an end when he emigrated to the
United States, but aggravated even more. This might sound paradoxical because Frei is
correct to call Morgenthau’s academic rise a ‘brilliant career’ (2001, p. 74). He taught at
some of the most prestigious universities in the country, being amongst others a faculty
member of the University of Chicago and the New School for Social Research. Equally,
Morgenthau held visiting professorships in Harvard, Princeton, Yale, Columbia, and Berkeley to name only the most well-known. Furthermore, he received numerous honorary doctorates and, until the American involvement in the Vietnam War, Morgenthau was also successful outside the academic realm as a welcomed consultant to the State and Defence Departments.\textsuperscript{116} Certainly, most of this achievement rested on the publication and subsequent unprecedented success of his textbook *Politics among Nations*. On 15\textsuperscript{th} October 1953 Morgenthau reported to John Hawes that it ‘had more adoptions than all other text-books taken together and more than twice as many as its nearest competitor’ (HJM-Archive 126).

Still, Morgenthau did not manage to enforce his scholarly and political agenda which rested on Continental European thought. Ironically, Morgenthau even became remembered, quoted, and criticised for having promoted a positivistic scholarship, something which he condemned throughout his life, as this thesis has shown.

Politically, his efforts have been torpedoed because his understanding of scholarship as dissidence was not well received at the height of the Cold War, when liberalism in the United States became a political religion and critical thinking that might have questioned the foundations of common beliefs were considered a threat to society. Morgenthau saw this tendency evidenced during the McCarthy era in the late 1940s and 1950s and, although Morgenthau did not become a victim of this “crucible” (Arthur Miller), he still had to tolerate criticism for his rejection of American involvement in Indochina. Morgenthau was never again appointed consultant to any governmental department and his candidature for the APSA-presidency was impeded. There is even evidence for a “Project Morgenthau” to collect incriminating evidence against Morgenthau to publicly expose him. We know from the Arendt-McCarthy correspondence that Morgenthau was affected by the disrepute against him. After publishing *We are deluding ourselves in Vietnam* in the *New York Times Magazine* in 1965, for example,
Morgenthau received criticism by the journalist Joseph Alsop who considered Morgenthau’s stance as ‘pompous ignorance’ (Arendt and McCarthy, 1995, p. 181). Even more disheartening must have been for Morgenthau that other critics of the Vietnam War were sceptical of Morgenthau as they were arguing from a moralistic standpoint and seemed to be unaware of the Continental European cosmos in which Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung was formed. If one, however, is able to consider Morgenthau’s arguments more thoroughly and go beyond the positivistic paradigm, one is often left in astonishment as it had happened to Lippmann, who is recorded to have said in the 1960s: ‘How curious you [Morgenthau] are misunderstood. You are the most moral thinker I know’ (quoted after: Thompson, 1980-1981, p. 197).

Academically, Morgenthau became out-dated and subsequently marginalised when behaviouralism became the ruling dogma in the discipline from the late 1950s onwards. This is evidenced, for example, in the circumstances of his retirement from the University of Chicago. A comment in the student newspaper, The Chicago Maroon, indicates that Morgenthau would have liked to stay at the University despite having reached the official retirement age (HJM-Archive 86). This request was turned down, demonstrating that Morgenthau’s academic position was in decline, whereas in other cases scholars were able to stay on beyond retirement age, like Leo Strauss. This gradual academic marginalisation caused Morgenthau resentment, which is why he turned down the offer of the American University in April 1970 to become dean of their School of International Service (HJM-Archive 5) pointing out that there were times he would have been honoured to accept, but these times have passed.

The reason for this marginalisation is to be found in the encounter of two contrary epistemologies. This thesis has provided evidence that Morgenthau’s work was informed by a non-positivistic epistemology. He argued for consideration of the spatial and temporal conditionality of knowledge and political order that would not allow
claiming objectivity in an absolute sense. Therefore, Morgenthau, who had brought ‘Old World wisdom to the continent of Utopia’ (Hoffmann, 1987, p. 76), remained sceptical about the promises of rationalism and empiricism and even attacked the hubris that would have befallen numerous colleagues in their urge to socially plan the world. Indeed, Morgenthau expressed gratitude that *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* was published shortly after he had received tenure at the University of Chicago as the book was a critique on liberal hubris and positivistic scholarship (1984, p. 371) which most of the other faculty members in Chicago promoted. Like the majority of his American colleagues, they were, due to their socialisation, characterised by an unflinching optimism (Shimko, 1992) and could not make sense of the pessimism and urge for scepticism that was underlying Morgenthau’s epistemology. Therefore, they criticised Morgenthau for being “unscientific” and/or praised Waltz for having made his thought suitable for scientific analysis (e.g. Nye, 1988; Keohane, 1993).

This caused an almost tragic element in Morgenthau’s life when during the height of behaviouralism, Morgenthau was marginalised because his scholarship was considered to be out-dated, un-American, and unsuitable for the purpose of International Relations theorising. This purpose was, due to its close interrelation with government institutions and agencies, to provide foreign policy recommendations to foster American interests on the international scene (Hoffmann, 1977; Krippendorff, 1989) rather than critically question the formation and deployment of these interests. When behaviouralism, however, started to lose influence, Morgenthau did not become rehabilitated, but he was now also perceived to have been a positivistic scholar who attempted to establish a “grand theory” (Holsti, 1971, p. 165). Even post-structuralist scholars, such as Barkawi, George, and Tickner, put Morgenthau on a level with Waltz, equally scolding him for having produced a belligerent picture of international relations. Therefore, precisely these scholars who might have profited from a serious engagement with Morgenthau’s
work as it would have told them that positivism was not the necessary mode of scholarship but merely the representation of a particular phase in history disapproved of Morgenthau due to a non-observance of their own academic standards.

Hence, for a good part of his academic career, he was taken to be someone whom he was not and/or his academic qualifications were called into question. On numerous occasions Morgenthau took action against these misinterpretations and there are several personal accounts in the Archives in which Morgenthau lamented against this marginalisation. To be fair, however, Morgenthau’s terminology lends itself to be misinterpreted. We have no concrete evidence why Morgenthau did not distinguish in his English writings his concepts as sharply as in his German and French ones. One reason might have been the unfavourable climate towards Germany during and shortly after the Second World War which is why Morgenthau certainly attempted to separate himself from his German past. A second reason was presumably the shift of interest from purely theoretical studies towards works with a higher interest in contemporary policy issues (Guzzini, 1998, p. 24), such as *The problem of German reunification* (Morgenthau and Warburg, 1960) or *Vietnam and the United States* (Morgenthau, 1965a). Still, this does not settle the question why Morgenthau did not attempt to improve the clarity of his concepts in the United States, especially since he had realised this problem early in his career. To Oakeshott Morgenthau wrote in 1948 that

‘I can now see clearly that my attempts to make clear the distinctions between rationalism and rational inquiry, scientism and science, were in vain. I think I was fully aware of the importance and difficulty of these distinctions when I wrote the book, and it is now obvious to me that I have failed in the task to make my meaning clear’ (HJM-Archive 44).

However, this thesis also stressed that Morgenthau’s thought and his *Weltanschauung* in general were fundamentally informed by the concept of alienation as an
epistemological source. His understanding of scholarship as a critical corrective of contemporary forms of sociation placed him outside the academic orthodoxy of his time and, indeed, required him to be on the margin. This is the case because, as Morgenthau emphasised on numerous occasions for example his article *Reflections on the State of Political Science* from 1955, being critical of contemporary society and challenging vested interests will not only cause discomfort among contemporaries because their habitual ways of thinking will be questioned, but it also means for the political scientist to place him-/herself outside of these interests to avoid being biased. Therefore, Morgenthau intellectually profited from his personal tragedy.

7.3 **Bringing the political back in: the post-structuralist turn in International Relations**

In order to assess Morgenthau’s contribution to International Relations, to counter the marginalisation of his work in the discipline, and help visualise that he is rightly part of the discipline’s canon, we will turn to Edkins’s reading of post-structuralism as a heuristic device. This is not to argue that Morgenthau was a proto-post-structuralist, but it will help to demonstrate that he followed similar academic and societal aspirations.

Edkins understands post-structuralism as a movement that is committed to re-politicise politics because in modern Western societies the political would have been gradually removed from it (1999, p. 1). Whether or not post-structuralism achieved this aspiration does not have to interest us here, but what is important for the argument of this thesis is to briefly outline the reasons and consequences of de-politicisation.

To begin with, Edkins distinguishes between politics and the political; a distinction Morgenthau would have endorsed. Politics is defined by Edkins closely to the common meaning of it and would be, therefore, the realm of institutionalised execution of government. Elections, political parties, the Executive, Judiciary, and Legislature, diplo-
macy, war, or international treaties would all be part of politics (Edkins, 1999, p. 2). What is commonly called politics would be, therefore, closely linked to the idea of the sovereign state (Edkins, 1999, p. 6) and Jellinek’s general theory of the state in which he distinguished between national territory, people, and authority. Politics is perceived to be the realm in which the government would have the means to execute authority within a certain area over a certain amount of people and it would have the rights to do so as other nation-states would mutually recognise each other’s monopoly of power. The history of the state would have to be perceived as a history in which the political would not only have been removed by a narrative of security, but the political would even be considered in modern societies to be a cause for insecurity as it could question the existential institutions of the state (Stern and Öjendal, 2010, p. 14). Therefore, post-structuralism argues, according to Edkins, that sovereign politics would have led to a de-politicisation within the realm that sovereign politics is executed and the international system it had created; the Westphalian system of nation-states. By referring to the examples of humanitarian aid and securitisation Edkins stresses that in particular technologisation allowed states to de-politicise politics because it would have provided them with the means to, on the one hand, deprive people of the possibilities to criticise government decisions, hence to fulfil their role as citizens, and, on the other hand, create a substitute for the political through ideologies and/or consumerism (1999, p. 9-14).

Paul Hirst provided a further explanation why de-politicisation occurred in the Westphalian system. He considered the very system of nation-states as an act of de-politicisation because internally the idea of sovereignty would have permitted states to reduce if not remove conflicts from the realm of politics. This would have enabled states to build other forms of identification through ideology in order to create homogeneity and compliance within the state. Externally however, the establishment of states would have created a self-fulfilling prophecy by putting the focus on the primacy of the
reason of state. This would have reduced international relations to the question ‘… of
the balance of power and the acquisition of territory in Europe and colonies abroad’
(Hirst, 2001, p. 57).

According to Edkins post-structuralism was established as a movement to counter
this de-politicisation and to bring the political back in. The political is defined by her as
having ‘… to do with the establishment of that very social order which sets out a par-
ticular, historically specific account of what counts as politics …’ (Edkins, 1999, p. 2).
The political would be, therefore, the moment when a new social and political order
would be created, regardless of what this new order would look like. Hence, there
would be uncertainty among its creators about the final objectification of this order, but
it would also be a moment of openness characterised by a dispute of its creators as they
would all attempt to reify their social and political ideals. The political would be, there-
fore, quintessentially a moment of subjectivity as the moment when people come to-
gether and act in their quest to establish some form of social and political order (Edkins,
1999, p. 7-9).

7.4 The anthropological condition of politics

In consideration of Edkins’s reading of post-structuralism, it will be possible to high-
light that Morgenthau’s marginalisation is unjustified. The initial concern to bring the
political back in, which had fostered post-structuralist theorising from the onset, is an
endeavour to which Morgenthau felt obliged half a century earlier. Indeed, Morgen-
thau’s approach is even more sophisticated because his analytical focus rested on the
anthropological condition of politics as this Weltanschauungsanalyse has shown. What
is more, Morgenthau belonged to a group of European émigré scholars, whose contribu-
tion to political science and International Relations is yet to be researched, who were
ahead of their time in the discipline because during their academic career, International
Relations remained dominated by positivism as the discipline was deeply enmeshed with governmental institutions and agencies that did not allow scholars to fundamentally divert from the beaten tracks. Considering the post-structuralist agenda, this demonstrates that International Relations is still not commonly aware of its own history outside the “great debates” – discourses (Wæver, 1998; Jørgensen, 2000, Thies, 2002). Elaborating Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, therefore, has not only demonstrated that Morgenthau’s research agenda resembles common post-structuralist accounts (Wong, 2000, p. 409; Cozette, 2008, p. 16) and that his thought is a useful addition to them, but also that International Relations’ scholars still apply broad brush strokes to paint pictures of the world. Political thought, as condensed in Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, is far more eclectic than post-structuralist scholars make students of International Relations believe and its acknowledgment would make their theorising even more convincing and worthwhile. Only recently analysts have emphasised that (international) political theorising in the 20th century would have been deeply influenced by German intellectual traditions (Bell, 2009, p. 7).

In the course of the 20th century, the human factor would have had been removed for Morgenthau from politics because nation-states, as the major actors in international relations, would have had an interest in maintaining the status quo. This de-humanisation, as Morgenthau argued in accordance with Arendt (1970), would have not only had effects on international politics, but also on the discipline (Morgenthau, 1950b). Morgenthau saw the climax of this de-humanisation of politics reached in American foreign politics during the Vietnam War. Morgenthau criticised Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defence at that time, for measuring the success of the Vietnam War through “body counts”. Killing humans, therefore, became the quantifiable end through which the implementation of foreign policy strategies could be scientifically assessed (Morgenthau, 1969a, p. 138). Three forms of reification in particular led Morgenthau to
this de-humanisation in modern societies: ideologisation, technologisation, and scientification.

_Ideologisation._ Morgenthau remained sceptical about the promises of ideologies and, indeed, understood *Politics among Nations* ‘as a temporary and historically caused counter-ideology to the ideologies of the 20th century’ (Behr, 2010, p. 211) rather than a theory of international politics as the subtitle of the German translation would make the reader believe. People yielded to the temptation of ideologies because they provided in Anthony Giddens’s words ‘ontological security’ (1984, p. 375). This means that ideologies furnished people in their yearning to give meaning to the social world and establish their identity within it, not only with the ontological framework that would allow them to do so and thereby gain security, but there would also be a reification of the ideology through social structures and institutions. Morgenthau (1960b) saw in this ideological takeover of reality two de-humanising problems, both of them prompting mediocrity.

On the one hand, Morgenthau argued that ideologies would promote creative mediocrity. Humans would not be able to fully utilise all their creative abilities within an ideological framework. Ideologies would be established to provide a discourse of legitimacy for the current political order, but they would also provide ontological security. Retaining the social structures would be, therefore, a vital expression of this legitimacy and security. An alteration of these structures through the creative abilities of humans would mean that people would be threatened to lose their ontological security due to changes to the reification of their thought. Consequently, the creative abilities of humans would only be used to support the ideologised reality. Morgenthau’s criticism is similar here with Edkins’s final pledge that international relations theorists should render visible ‘the contingent, provisional nature’ (1999, p. 142) of political order. On the other hand, ideologies would also promote intellectual mediocrity. This would be the case because conflicting worldviews or merely a critical potential would challenge the
political order and could, therefore, not be tolerated. Morgenthau’s criticism of ideologies resembles Armin Nassehi’s concepts of inclusion and exclusion (2004). Hirst (2001, p. 53) remarked for nationalism, but which is true for all ideologies, that it would operate on dichotomous perceptions of otherness because this would create homogeneity within a group, which would be necessary to uphold the political order to monopolise narratives of reality. Therefore, anyone who challenges these narratives through his/her beliefs, knowledge, or even existence would have to be excluded. This exclusion may range from criminalisation to expulsion and even extinction, as happened in fascism and communism. Morgenthau was confronted with the intellectual mediocrity and exclusion during the evening in Neumeyer’s house in 1935 (Postscript, 1984, p. 363-4) when the other guests remained largely indifferent to the execution of a Jewish lawyer. That evening showed Morgenthau that it would require the qualities of an Übermensch to surpass dichotomous thinking and a critical mass of them to re-establish the political. To avoid exclusion, even people critical about fascism could only resort to political apathy and, eventually, contribute to an intellectual mediocratisation since critical voices would and could no longer constitute public opinion.¹¹⁷

Technologisation. Morgenthau (1973), furthermore, criticised modern societies for their technological penetration of social life which would have two de-humanising effects. First, the technological interlocking would lead to increased complexity. On the one hand, technological advancements would enable an accelerated individualisation in modern societies because people would acquire the spatial and temporal abilities to participate in numerous sociations, but, on the other hand, technologisation would have also required them to meticulously structure their lives in a regulatory framework like timetables or diaries, as Rosa (2005, p. 97-100) recently emphasised. If these regulatory frameworks become unreliable, life would not only lose its synchronicity, but would come to a standstill altogether. Hence, it is not only in labour terms that people are
turned from a *homo faber* into an *animal laborans* (Morgenthau, 1960b; 1972) meaning that they lose their ability to pursue their life out of their own free will, but succumb to various societal and/or political requirements and structure their life accordingly.

Second, technologisation allowed the production of mass-produced consumer goods which in modern societies would compensate for the loss of identity (Morgenthau, 1960b). This would be the case because the common realms of identity-creation, politics and economy, would have been de-humanised. People could neither get politically involved as critical citizens, albeit being a *zoon politikon* (Morgenthau, 1947a; 2004), due to the ideologisation of politics and would be turned into an *animal laborans* which would suppress their drive to prove oneself. Modern marketing strategies would seize the yearning for identity to create a frantic and constant urge to consume commodities as a replacement for identity. For Morgenthau, this would not only create a ‘society of waste’ (1960a, p. 215; 1960b, p. 69; 1972, p. 23), but eventually a reification of identity.

*Scientification*. The final aspect Morgenthau repeatedly criticised about modern societies is the scientification of politics. Similar to Edkins’s assessment of post-structuralism Morgenthau was sceptical about the promises of the application of natural science methods in politics. Still, as the common usage of the term political *science* suggests the “separationist movement” (Guilhot, 2008) to which Morgenthau can be attributed, unsuccessfully opposed the positivistic dominance. Morgenthau’s lore was suspicious of the epistemological value of such positivistic-structuralist approaches to politics (1944, p. 176; 1949, p. 1) because they would not concede a vital role to the human. Rather than focusing on the creative abilities of humans to act together and create a compromise through the alignment of interests, as Morgenthau did with his concepts of normative power and national interest, structuralist approaches often promoted a belligerent outlook on the world. In those approaches the nation-state would be considered as an ‘organismic’ unit (Waltz, 1954, p. 178), which would attempt to survive in
an anarchical structure. This, however, would cause a reification of politics, as Behr recently noted. Due to scientification, political science would have omitted the distinction between the analytical and the normative. From the analytical assumption of anarchy, normative conclusions would have derived what measures have to be taken to secure one’s survival. These conclusions, however, were not termed in normative diction, but presented as a logical reasoning from which foreign policy guidelines would have been produced (Behr, 2010, p. 206-7).

The result of this de-humanisation of modern societies caused by the ideological, technological, and scientific reification would have been the de-politicisation of politics demonstrating that post-structuralist accounts, as presented by Edkins, are congruent to Morgenthau’s argumentation. The political would have been eliminated from politics because scrutiny and criticism would have become considered as a menace to the political status quo (Morgenthau, 1952b, 1974c). A questioning of this status quo would have seemed at times threatening, when the dominant liberal ideology was challenged, as happened during the “Red Scare”, and at times unqualified as the de-humanisation of modern societies had led to a hubris of thought, as depicted in chapter six. Ideologically, the discourse on freedom would have instilled the urge to maintain the status quo because living in the “Free World” would have to be safeguarded from the atrocities of the “Eastern Bloc”, but also political science would have pioneered the hubris. By not distinguishing between analytical and normative elements in their approaches, normative assumptions would have been presented as logical reasoning and their foreign policy advice would have had fewer guidelines than parameters. Criticism, therefore, would have seemed unqualified if not preposterous and humans could only resort to apathy or violence to express criticism (Morgenthau, 1965a; 1972; 1974c). Indeed, following Morgenthau’s letter to Dobell (chapter four), this is what would have happened during the student protests in the 1960s. Being unable to critically discuss existential questions
about the society students lived in, in particular the definition of the common good, they would have had to resort to violence to make themselves heard. Politics in modern societies would have been, therefore, reduced to its institutions – it would have been reified, so to speak – but the political, hence the quality or colouring of issues, as Morgenthau had defined it in his doctoral thesis, would have been eliminated from politics.

The emphasis of the anthropological condition of politics and eventually the re-humanisation of modern societies is to be considered as Morgenthau’s guiding principle of his Weltanschauung and his legacy for contemporary International Relations. For Morgenthau, scholarship would have had to make serious efforts to alter this de-humanisation and act as its critical public corrective. However, political science in general and International Relations in particular did not live up to Morgenthau’s expectations, but the positivisation of political science even contributed to this de-humanisation. He believed the discipline would ‘… retreat into the trivial, the formal, the methodological, the purely theoretical, the remotely historical – in short the politically irrelevant …’ (Morgenthau, 1955, p. 448; 1966b, p. 73) rather than discussing politically relevant issues that concern the well-being and interests of people. Morgenthau perceived the political wider than what is commonly called politics. Resembling Simmel’s notion of sociation, the political would have been for Morgenthau the constant interaction of people who would come together in the public realm, while everybody would express and pursue their interests, but they would also attempt to find a compromise that would suit the common good. In this sense his line of argumentation also exceeds post-structuralist theorising since it argues that the political would be the moment of de-politicisation (Edkins, 1999, p. 126). To ensure the political even in the ideologised reality of nation-states, Morgenthau (1950a; 1951; 1952b; 1952c) introduced the concept of national interest, which he argued would allow the reconciliation of numerous do-
mestic interests and transfer it into a classification in consideration of the common good. This demonstrates that politics was for Morgenthau a process that would require constant political involvement of people. What is commonly referred to as politics would be merely the institutionalised expression of the political which would be, however, subject to constant revision due to the processual character of the political. Since politics, as an academic discipline and societal realm, would not have considered this processual character, it would have faced the same problem as (international) law during the interwar-period. It would become sterile (Morgenthau, 1966b) and, eventually, create a systemic outlook on the world in which the human would not be considered anymore. Problems or conflicts in the political realm would become issues of structural constraints in which remedy would be sought through technological measures.

Emphasising the political as constant human interaction, eventually, allowed Morgenthau to pursue the normative side of power as this would have been required to re-establish the political. Any form of sociation would be constructed through the interaction, commitment, and will of people and could not be considered as naturally given and/or non-influenceable. In accordance with Arendt (1970), Morgenthau argued, therefore, for nothing less than a paradigmatic change in perceiving power not merely as its empirical concept in the form of a belligerent, suppressing, and authority-ensuring means, as in the case of the nation-state, but as normative power understood as empowerment which would become an end in itself. This is the case because power would be the very capability to create and act together and, eventually, manage to establish a reconciliation of interests for the common good. To achieve this stage of empowerment, however, Morgenthau argued that it would require educated people, in the sense that they would have been able to transcend the de-humanisation in modern societies. Since he agreed with Nietzsche that this transcendence could not be achieved by everybody without guidance, it would require, therefore, people acting as an Übermensch to edu-
cate and free the humans in their thinking from ideological, technological, and scientific constraints. Morgenthau, therefore, had high expectations of scholarship to fulfil this role of a public corrective. In the 1940s, however, he argued that social sciences would not yet have achieved this significance.

‘The science of international law, as well as the social sciences in general, are still awaiting their Newton, their Leibniz, their Faraday, their Carnot, their Maxwell, and their Hertz. To expect the contemporaneous lawyer to be an “engineer” or “technician” of the law means to expect Edison before Faraday, Wright before Carnot, Marconi before Maxwell and Hertz. And this is certainly a futile expectation. The great task which lies before the social sciences is to prepare the work of the latter so that the former can build upon it’ (Morgenthau, 1940, p. 284).

Edkins’s reading of post-structuralism as a movement to bring the political back in shows that Morgenthau’s agenda of a re-humanisation of social sciences is still contemporary and it is for this reason that Morgenthau is rightfully added to the canon of International Relations and it is to this end that studying Morgenthau is a rich source for contemporary International Relations theorising.
Allgegenwart des Machtkampfes. Über die Prämissen der Theorie Hans J. Morgenthau

1 HJM-Archive stands for the Papers of Hans J. Morgenthau at the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. The following number indicates the respective container.

2 This was to a certain extent different in Germany, where Morgenthau’s former student and later professor in Munich, Kindermann, promoted Morgenthal’s work. In 1963 Morgenthal’s Politics among Nations, was published as Macht und Frieden. Kindermann (1965) equally published an introductory article to Niebuhr’s and Morgenthal’s thought in the major German political science organ. Indeed, the 1960s marked a time when Morgenthal’s thought moved into the focus of German political science, as articles of Krippendorff (1964) and Werner Link (1965) suggest.

3 For Park the marginal man was a ‘cosmopolite and citizen of the world’ (1928, p. 892), while for Golovensky the marginal man remained ‘in the twilight zone of two cultures’ (Golovensky, 1952, p. 334). If Morgenthal was tending towards the one or other extreme is a source for speculation, probably at times he tended more to the one, while at other times he tended more to the other. It is certain, however, that Morgenthal was torn between the two cultures. His former student Lebow notes that ‘… questions about his German past were taboo’ (2003, p. 219). It fits well into this picture that research in the Library of Congress has shown that Morgenthal never replied to a German letter in German but in English, although some of these letters were written to him by personal friends. Still, Morgenthal remained attached to the German culture, most of his friends were also émigré scholars, and Morgenthal frequently visited Continental Europe. This yearning for European culture is exemplified in a letter to his doctoral student Gerald Stourzh from 24th September 1951 asking him to bring various goods from Vienna (HJM-Archive 55).

4 Also Guzzini (2004) implies this distinction, although he does not further elaborate it.

5 In English-speaking academia this thought style is to be found for example in: Hollis and Smith, 1990; Knutsen, 1997; Nye, 2000; Baylis and Smith, 2001; Jackson and Sørensen, 2003; Williams, Goldstein, and Shafritz, 2005; Collins, 2010. This thought style is so widespread that also German political science endorses it, as the following examples indicate: Zürn, 1994; Krell, 2000; Hubel, 2005; Jacobs, 2006. For a critical elaboration, see: Cristol, 2009.

6 Scientification is not similar with the more common term scientization. Scientification signifies the process of firmly grounding positivism as the only viable framework for theorizing in international relations and politics in general. This scientification or “reification of politics”, as Behr (2010, p. 197-209) put it, is already visible in the common usage of the term political science rather than politicoLOGY to classify scholarly work dealing about political issues.

7 A similar intellectual lineage is drawn by Erhard Forndran (1996, p. 1024) and Stephen Walt (2002, p. 198).

8 The first German study to have relied on Morgenthal’s European works was Link’s Die Allgegenwort des Machtkampfes. Über die Prämissen der Theorie Hans J. Morgenthau (1965) which appeared in the Neue Politische Literatur.

9 Publish or Perish only shows twelve citations of which the first one was in 1990 (Accessed: 12th October 2010).

10 The first version was published in 1977.

11 (Allgemeine) Staatslehre is a German academic field which deals generally about questions of sovereignty, but also questions regarding the development, forms, and intentions of state. During the time of Morgenthal Staatslehre was primarily dominated by jurisprudence, but it is interdisciplinary because it touches upon political, philosophical, sociological, economic, and even theological aspects. Jütersonke translated it as ‘general theory of the state’ (2010, p. 37) and Ludwig Adamovich even called it ‘science of the state’ (1950, p. 25). However, like the prefix “neo”, the term “science” indicates a positivistic epistemology which is why we follow the more neutral suggestion of Jütersonke theory or lore.

12 For more on the influence of German-speaking émigré scholars in American social sciences and humanities, see for example: Coser, 1984; Greenberg, 1992; Averbeck, 2001; Krohn, 2002.

13 A conceptual history for the term ideology is provided by Emmet Kennedy (1976). From a term depicting the science of ideas, as used by the French idéologues, it turned into a largely pejorative term for false consciousness (equally: Bracher, 1985).

14 Gnosticism refers ‘… to a purported direct, immediate apprehension or vision of truth without the need for critical reflection; the special gift of a spiritual and cognitive elite’ (Voegelin, 2000, p. 279).

15 For more on a Mannheinian Weltanschaungsanalyse, see: Nelson, 1992, p. 31-7.

16 The foreign-image is the perception other people have about oneself, whereas the meta-image is what one thinks how oneself is perceived by other people (Bolten, 2001, p. 52-5).

17 Germany will be equated with Central Europe here. This does not mean that there was or is an intellectual dominance or primacy favouring Germany, but it rather follows Johan Galtung (1981) and Richard Münch (1990). Both argue that there was an intense intellectual exchange between
Germany and other Central European countries, such as Poland, Hungary, Austria, and the Czech Republic. Both scholars use the terms “German” and “teutonic” to characterise this exchange.

A similar remark was given by Morgenthau at the end of his life in an interview with Johnson pointing out that it was not American pragmatism that shaped his thoughts (Postscript, 1984, p. 378-9).

In order to catch the atmosphere of this time adequately, the term fin de siècle will be applied. Although traditionally reserved for France and Austria and restricted to the turn of the 20th century (Marchand and Lindenfeld, 2004, p. 1-2), much of what Philipp Blom (2009, p. 1-4) has recently remarked for the first 14 years of the 20th century, lingered on in the Weimar Republic. Old certainties withered away and numerous ideologies co-existed next to each other, struggling for the monopoly of interpretation, be it in arts, literature, or politics, leaving the people with the feeling of alienation, crisis, and uncertainty. Nevertheless, at the same time the hope for the better, which dominated much of the 19th century, was still in the people’s minds. Stefan Zweig, the Austrian novelist, remarked in his autobiographical The World of Yesterday that “[i]n its liberal idealism, the nineteenth century was honestly convinced that it was on the straight and unfailing path toward being the best of all worlds. Earlier eras, with their wars, famines, and revolts, were deprecated as times when mankind was still immature and unenlightened. But now it was merely a matter of decades until the last vestige of evil and violence would finally be conquered, and this faith in an uninterrupted and irresistible “progress” truly had the force of a religion for that generation’ (1943, p. 14).

Altogether there were approximately 28,000 civil servants, 10,200 judges, 26,000 protestant priests, 9,300 teachers at secondary schools, 4,500 professors and Privatdozenten, 34,000 physicians, and 12,500 lawyers. The Bürgertum consisted also of several thousands of journalists, catholic priests, artists etc. With a family coefficient of four to five one reaches the number stated above.

Coburg only became part of Bavaria in 1920 by popular vote. Until then it was the capital of the Thuringian duchy of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha. Hence, during the time Morgenthau lived there, it was actually not part of Bavaria.

This centrality Bildung had then in Germany is further revealed by quoting Mannheim who wrote that “[t]he modern bourgeoisie had for the beginning a twofold social root – on the one hand the owners of capital, on the other hand those individuals whose only capital consisted in their education. It was common therefore to speak of the proprieted and educated class, the educated element being, however, by no means ideologically in agreement with the property-owning element’ (1985, p. 156).

The German Confederation existed from 1815 (Congress of Vienna) until 1866 when the Austro-Prussian War broke out.

However, it took until 1834 before the university entrance examinations were abolished and the Abitur became the only state-controlled requirement. From this time on only persons with an Abitur could enter universities. Since 1885 administrative privileges became more and more connected to an academic education. For the right to receive a provincial administration post or to become a higher official in a postal department at least six years of higher education were required (Ringer, 1969, p. 26-32).

As Henry Pachter put it for the Weimar Republic: ‘As academic persons or teachers, they enjoyed the security and status of the civil service. In a society which still measured a man’s value by his title, they were Herr Direktor, Herr Geheimrat, Herr Advokat, Herr Rechtsanwalt, Herr Professor ...’ (1972, p. 228).

Herbet Schnädelbach remarks that ‘[t]he Humboldt-University sought to achieve a creative compromise in all respects: academic freedom alongside responsibility for the requirements of state and society; vocational training combined with the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake’ (1984, p. 23).

The successor of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft are the Max-Planck-Institutes.

Simmel noted that ‘[t]his primacy of technique has infected even the purely intellectual branches of knowledge: in the historical sciences, as in that of experimental psychology, investigations, essentially worthless and, as regards the ultimate end of all research, most unimportant, frequently enjoy a quite disproportionate degree of recognition, provided only that they be carried out by means of perfect methodical, technical processes’ (2008, p. 169).

In an earlier publication, Rosa gets even more to the point by calling this circumstance a ‘rasender Stillstand’ (frenzied deadlock) (2005, p. 41).

The term Kulturpessimismus was made popular by Stem in his The Politics of Cultural Despair (1989).

This is possible since Bourdieu used, similar to the meaning of Ringer’s dichotomy, the terms or-
thodoxy and heterodoxy. Another terminology, which eventually points out the same aspect, is provided by Gay. He distinguishes between insiders and outsiders (Gay, 2001).

32 Robert Michels for example, a student of Weber, did not receive his venia legendi in Germany because he sympathised with socialist ideas. Therefore, he had to move to Italy, where he eventually became a supporter of Italian Fascism (Ringer, 1969, p. 143).

33 Sinzheimer was one of the few people who saw Morgenthau off in Antwerp, where he boarded the SS Königsstein on 17th July 1937 (Frei 2001, p. 61).

34 On Geneva as an asylum for German Jewish intellectuals, see: Herz, 1984.

35 Morgenthau not only dedicated a collection of essays Truth and Power to Kelsen, but, as he pointed out in a letter to Hula from 4th January 1941, he was trying to promote Kelsen as a scholar in the USA and to find employment for Kelsen's son-in-law (HJM-Archive 11).

36 This becomes apparent in a letter to Masek from 13th May 1959 in which Morgenthau stated that ‘... frequently in history men with good intentions ... have done great harm to their nation’ (HJM-Archive 38).

37 In his autobiographical sketch Morgenthau noted that '[i]t was inevitable that I would be influenced – however temporarily and negatively – by Carl Schmitt ...’ (1984, p. 15).

38 Similar evidence is given in a letter to Arendt from 14th January 1965 in which Morgenthau criticised Schmitt’s work. Arendt had sent him Schmitt’s Theory of the Partisan which Morgenthau commented as ‘... interesting, but unbelievably shoddy, both in thought and exposition’ (HJM-Archive 5).

39 However, it has to be noted that Ex captivitate salus was published after the Second World War, a time when Schmitt was desperately trying to restore his reputation.

40 In a letter to Magill from 5th January 1962, Morgenthau even remarked: ‘As concerns the predominant intellectual influences on me, a most powerful and probably decisive influence has certainly been Nietzsche’ (HJM-Archive 39).

41 These books were: Philosophie der Mode, Grundfragen der Soziologie, Hauptprobleme der Philosophie, and Das Problem der historischen Zeit.

42 A contemporary discussion of alienation is provided by Ian Burkitt. He remarks that ‘[a]lienation ... is one of the central aspects of reflexivity ... It is as an outsider that we can engage in the work of codification ...’ (1997, p. 195).

43 Morgenthau recounts one of these anti-Semitic incidents himself. Being the best pupil in his grammar school, the Casimirianum, he was chosen to give a speech in front of the school and crown the statue of the duke afterwards. However, people in the audience were using foul language and were holding their noses because of this “stinking Jew”. Morgenthau recalled this incident to have taken place in 1923, but a look into the local newspaper, the Coburger Zeitung from 4th July 1922, shows that it happened already one year earlier (Postscript, 1984, p. 340-1; Fromm, 1990, p. 289).

44 Lebow (2003, p. 219) notes that before Morgenthau was able to get the position at Brooklyn College, he had to work as an elevator boy to make ends meet.

45 Klaus and Erika Mann (1996) beautifully captured this particular life-world of German-speaking émigré intellectuals in the United States in their book Escape to Life by portraying the most important personalities who forced to leave Germany.


47 Irma Thormann, Morgenthau’s wife, later recalled that Morgenthau’s father was ‘a Jew who wanted to be a German and who adored the emperor Wilhelm II’ (quoted after: Frei, 2001, p. 13).

48 Also daughters of Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord, head of the Supreme Army Command during the Weimar Republic and son-in-law of Walther von Lüttwitz, responsible for the Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch, got attracted to communist promises and clandestinely supported the German Communist Party during their youth in Berlin (Enzensberger, 2009).

49 Bendix argued that this continuity of thought is generally the case among émigré scholars (1988, p. 35-6).

50 The original reads: ‘[D]er Impuls des Lebens, der danach strebt, sich zu erhalten, sich zu bewähren und sich mit gleichartigem Leben zu verbinden.’

51 Schuett uses a different term ‘the instinct of self-assertion’ (2007, p. 59). Translating it as the drive to prove oneself is, however, more accurate since, on the one hand, my translation is more accurate to the German term and, on the other hand, Morgenthau used this translation as well (1974c, p. 16).

52 Verdankt das Streben nach Erhaltung des eigenen Lebens einem Mangel seine Entstehung, ist er, um im Bilde zu sprechen, ein Kind des Hungers, strebt er danach, ein Defizit an Energie auszugleichen bzw. zu verhindern, so entspringt das Streben nach Bewährung einem Uberfluss [sic] an Energie, der nach Entladung drängt, findet er also, um wieder im Bilde zu sprechen, einen seiner
bezeichnenden Ausprägungen als Liebe.’

53 With this statement Morgenthau is consistent with Lord Darlington in Oscar Wilde’s Lady Windemere’s Fan. Wilde let Lord Darlington express ‘... that good people do a great deal of harm in this world’ (2003, p. 423).

54 The original reads: ‘Ueberall [sic] wo der Mensch danach strebt zu zeigen “was er kann”.’

55 ‘... die wahllos, ohne Rücksicht auf ihren sachlichen Gehalt ... ergriffen werden.’


57 Despite this problematic translation of Weber’s work, it is used here since it is the standard translation. The original, however, reads ‘Macht bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Be-ziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstand durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf diese Chance beruht’ (Weber, 1947, p. 28) This essentially means: ‘Power means every chance to enforce his own will within a social relation, also against resistance, no matter what this chance relies upon’ (my translation).

58 In his monograph German thought and International Relations, Shilliam makes the same claim, referring to page seven of Morgenthau’s autobiographical sketch (2009, p. 183). While at this page Morgenthau did refer to Rothenbücher’s seminar on Weber and we can assume that Morgenthau has read The Vocational Lectures, not least because his biographer Frei informs us that Morgenthau had read Science as Vocation (2001, p. 121), there is no clear evidence that he did so emphatically and that it had a lasting influence on his Weltanschauung.

59 In relation to the state Morgenthau speaks of the following: ‘Toute politique étrangère n’est que volonté de maintenir, d’accroître ou d’affirmer sa puissance, et ces trois manifestations de la volonté politique se traduisent ici par les formes empiriques fondamentales de la politique du statu quo, de la politique impérialiste et de la politique de prestige’ (1933, p. 61).

60 In Politics among Nations we read for example: ‘It should be noted that these formulations are of provisional nature and are subject to further refinement’ (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 53).

61 Also later Morgenthau made a similar argument in a letter to Richard S. Cohen from 4th October 1962 (HJM-Archive 10).

62 The manuscript Morgenthau was referring to was Über den Sinn der Wissenschaft in dieser Zeit und über die Bestimmung des Menschen (1934b).

63 The aphorism Morgenthau referred to is the 338th in Nietzsche’s The Gay Science (2003).

64 In an earlier publication Morgenthau noted that ‘[f]acts have no social meaning in themselves. It is the significance we attribute to certain facts of our sensual experience, in terms of our hopes and fears, our memoires, intentions, and expectations, that create them as social facts’ (1962b, p. 110).

65 Similar ideas were expressed in Truth and Power (Morgenthau, 1970a, p. 133).

66 ‘... nichts sinnloseres für das menschliche Bewusstsein als eine Moral, die der Auflösung der menschlichen Gesellschaft gegenüber indifferent bleibt ...’

67 The German original reads: ‘... wo mehrere Individuen in Wechselwirkung treten. Diese Wechselwirkung entsteht immer aus bestimmten Trieben heraus oder um bestimmter Zwecke willen.’

68 It is curious to remark that scholars like Simmel but also Scheler, despite their promotion of society as a human construct, praised the First World War and warfare in general as a means to enforce the coherence of societies as “collective beings” (Kleinschmidt, 2000, p. 179).

69 Social institutions are understood here following the definition of Jonathan Turner. They are ‘a complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular types of social structures and organising relatively stable patterns of human activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment’ (Turner, 1997, p. 6).

70 The original reads: ‘Träger aller gesellschaftlichen Kräfte aber sind immer nur Einzelmenschen ...’

71 Morgenthau signed this manuscript, which is essentially a translation of parts of La notion du politique, as Privatdozent, a title which he was only allowed to carry after having finished his post-doctoral degree. Since Morgenthau did so in 1934 and left for Madrid in 1935 this paper must have been written in between those dates. Curiously, it was neglected so far by those scholars who promote the Schmitt-Morgenthau relation, even though, as their references reveal, they speak German and had access to the Morgenthau Archive in the Library of Congress.

72 The German reads: ‘Der Begriff des Politischen hat keine Substanz, die ein für allemal feststünde, er ist vielmehr eine Eigenschaft, eine Qualität, eine Färbung, die allen Substanzen anhaften kann ... Eine Frage, die heute politischen Charakter hat, kann morgen jede politische Bedeutung abgeben ...’

73 ‘... Seele des Menschen als Trägerin des Politischen.’

74 Making a linguistic argument is permissible here since as Morgenthau’s son, Matthew, pointed out in a letter: ‘My father was very concerned about language. Each word was in there for a specific reason’ (Morgenthau, 2009). Hence, it is to assume that Morgenthau deliberately used the term
Kraft.

75 The French original reads: ‘Les normes deviennent l’arme la plus redoutable dont la société humaine se sert se protéger contre les dommages que les comportements asociaux pourraient lui causer.’

76 See as well: Murray, 1996, p. 92-3.

77 A critical appraisal of the term “German-Jewish symbiosis” is provided by Scholem, 1979.

78 Der technische Fortschritt wird mit dem Verlust der kulturellen Substanz erkauft.’

79 The French original reads: ‘C’est précisément la crainte d’un déplaisir qui est le moyen le plus propre à provoquer la réaction voulue par la norme.’

80 In the English-speaking academia, academism and historicism are often used simultaneously. This is, however, misleading since both schools of thought are dialectical, as the definition of Berger reveals.

81 The German original reads: ‘… solange die Gestaltung der staatlichen Wirklichkeit noch Gegenstand emotionaler Auseinandersetzungen ist ... sich über den Staat Gedanken zu machen, in dessen Gestaltung ja zugleich auch ihr eigenes persönliches Schicksal eingeschlossen ist, ohne sinngebend und wertend zu den öffentlichen Dingen Stellung zu nehmen ...’

82 E. H. Carr made a similar remark noting that ‘the age of innocence, [where] historians walked in the Garden of Eden, without a scrap of philosophy to cover them, naked and unashamed before the god of history’ had come at least in Europe to an end (quoted after: Carlsnaes, 1981, p. 173).

83 Miles Kahler speaks in this regard of a discipline that is ‘driven by demand’ (Kahler, 1997, p. 22).

84 Also Morgenthau’s last monograph *Science: Servant or Master?* (1972) bears this connotation.

85 Mannheim claimed that ‘[w]hat has been said here about the teaching of the “arts” applies *mutate mutandis*, in a very large degree, to politics’ (1985, p. 181; emphasis in the original).

86 This point was also stressed by Graebner (1984, p. 66) in his account on Morgenthau as a historian.

87 The latter was the teacher of Luckmann and Berger at the New School for Social Research in New York during the 1950s.

88 The German original reads: ‘... wo mehrere Individuen in Wechselwirkung treten. Diese Wechselwirkung entsteht immer aus bestimmten Trieben heraus oder um bestimmter Zwecke willen.’

89 These terms are taken from Friedrich Schiller’s inaugural lecture on the purpose of studying world history at the University of Jena in 1789 (1996).

90 The German version reads: ‘als eine objektive Form subjektiver Seelen.’

91 The study of Weber’s work, intensified Morgenthau’s thoughts for chronological reasons, rather than being ‘... a Weberian at heart’ (Lebow, 2003, p. 246). Morgenthau (1984) got first into contact with Wolfflin and Burckhardt and only later he took the seminar on Weber. His biographer Frei (2001) also notes that Morgenthau never mentioned Weber in his diaries, unlike other thinkers who influenced him more, like Nietzsche.

92 Similar: Morgenthau, 1970a, p. 257.

93 In a later publication on Conservatism, Mannheim also referred to *Seinsverbundenheit* which he, however, used interchangeably. There would be, however, a difference between *Seinsver- and Seinsgebundenheit* whose elaboration is, however, for the purpose of this thesis not necessary (Kettler, Meja, and Stehr, 1984, p. 78).

94 More on Elias’s concept of time can be found in: Tabboni, 2001.

95 This was confirmed to the author by Frei in an e-mail from 6th June 2007.

96 More on Elias’s concept of time can be found in: Tabboni, 2001.

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98 Morgenthau held this view not exclusively, but he is merely an example of the common belief of his fellow refugee scholars who argued that any discipline in the social sciences or humanities has to be theoretical or philosophical (Greenberg, 1992, p. 67-79).

99 Later in his life Morgenthau essentially repeated these perennial problems right in the beginning of his lectures on Aristotle: ‘The problem of authority, the problems of the relations between the individual and the state, the common good, the issue of law versus naked power, the problem of violence, the class problem, the distribution of wealth in political terms – all those problems are perennial in nature’ (Morgenthau, 2004, p. 15).

100 In an earlier publication, Morgenthau developed this even more profoundly: ‘The first lesson the student of international politics must learn and never forget is that the complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible. Here the scholar and the charlatan part company. Knowledge of the forces that determine politics among nations, and of the ways by which their political reflection unfold, reveals the ambiguity of the facts of international politics. In every political situation contradictory tendencies are at play. One of these tendencies is more likely to prevail under certain conditions. But which tendency actually will prevail is any-
body’s guess. The best the scholar can do, then, is to trace the different tendencies that, as potentialities, are inherent in a certain international situation. He can point out the different conditions that make it more likely for one tendency to prevail than for another and, finally, assess the probabilities for the different conditions and tendencies to prevail in actuality’ (1985, p. 23-4).

100 Doubtlessly, employing such a heuristic device bears the danger of drawing an analogy between, in this case, Morgenthau and Koselleck where there is none and come to conclusions that at best distort reality (Skinner, 1969, p. 7-9). However, it will not be argued here that Morgenthau informed Koselleck in the development of his approach, but both scholars were intellectually nurtured in a similar academic environment and arrived at similar epistemological conclusions, which is why it is suitable to view Morgenthau through Koselleck’s lenses.

101 Große’s translation is appropriate since it catches the essence of the original which reads much more complex: ‘Abgesehen davon, daß für die griechische Geschichte allmählich durch treffliche Darstellungen gesorgt ist, würde uns die Erzählung der Ereignisse und vollends deren kritische Erörterung in einer Zeit, da eine einzige Untersuchung über Richtigkeit einzelner äußerer Tatsachen gerne einen Oktavband einnimmt, die beste Zeit vorwegnehmen.’ An Oktavband is an outdated German term to classify books through its size by which the Roman parchment was folded three times, creating eight sheets. The introductory section of Burckhardt’s book in which the above mentioned quotation is to be found was omitted in the English translation (1963).

102 Morgenthau’s memory was wrong here. Wölfflin distinguished not between Romanesque and Gothic art, but the Renaissance from the Baroque.

103 The term itself, however, was, according to Ringer (2000, p. 111), first introduced by Jellinek.

104 ‘Das deutsche Volk, immer nur allzu gerne bereit in geistigen Dingen die äußersten denklichen Positionen einzunehmen und ein ideelles Gebilde in seinem Einfluß auf die Gestaltung der Wirklichkeit entweder aus tiefster Überzeugung für ernst oder leichtfertig für nichts zu nehmen, hatte die 14 Punkte Wilsons glaubig als die Verkündung einer neuen Epoche im Leben der Völker begrüßt.’ Around the same time Morgenthau’s mentor Sinzheimer arrived at a similar assessment about the Germans in a letter to Morgenthau from 11th March 1932 (HJM-Archive 197).

105 If the text refers to democracy, this is to be considered as a modern, liberal democracy since this is the form of government Morgenthau was referring to.

106 The German original reads: ‘... führt eine Politik, die der Stabilität verschrieben ist, im Namen des Antikommunismus zur Unterdrückung aller Manifestationen sozialer Unruhe und zur Erstickung von Reformen.’

107 On the criticism on Morgenthau for his criticism on Van Doren, see: Arendt and McCarthy, 1995, p. 160.

108 The German reads: ‘... keine Prinzipien einer Außenpolitik kennt, die von einer internationalen Moral oder vom geltenden Völkerrecht abgeleitet werden ...’

109 The TET-offensive was a military campaign of Northern Vietnam forces named after the Vietnamese New Year, Tết Nguyên Đán. On this holiday, the 31st January 1968, the campaign began.

110 The reference to Carl von Clausewitz is appropriate here, as Morgenthau had Clausewitz’s dictum in mind, when he made this argument. This is evidenced in a lecture he gave at Dartmouth College in 1958 (Craig, 2007, p. 203).

111 From Peukert we know that in comparison to other countries at that time radio receivers played an important role in Germany as a medium of mass media. In 1932 there were 66 radio listeners for every 1,000 people in Germany in comparison to a mere 35 in the European average (Peukert, 1991, p. 174). With the introduction of the affordable Volksempfänger the ratio must have risen significantly.

112 Although it has to be agreed here with Scheuerman (2009a, p. 80-1) that this is one of the most concise definitions of the national interest, the implication he makes that the national interest is a concept from Thompson rather than from Morgenthau cannot be endorsed given that Morgenthau consequently elaborated on this concept from his doctoral thesis onwards.

113 Morgenthau already argued at the beginning of the Cold War to accept the two spheres of influence because it would be the lesser evil (Morgenthau, Kuh, and Stevenson, 1946, p. 9).

114 Morgenthau’s critical stance towards the League of Nations is, for example, apparent in his discussion on the non-compliance of Swiss neutrality and its admittance to the League of Nations (1938a).

115 An example of this inner diremption numerous intellectuals faced after their forced immigration is to be found in the novelist Carl Zuckmayer (1896-1977): ‘I absolutely did not want to go to America. I hold it personally against Mr. Hitler and his Providence, the destiny, God, and the 20th century that I was forced to emigrate. It is embarrassing and disgraceful to a country, where we don’t belong, which does not have to tell us anything, from whom we could not learn anything, and to whom
we did not have anything to say. I was never in the United States and Werfel [Austrian novelist, 1890-1945] only once for a short stay in New York. But we all knew exactly what we had to expect or better not to expect: from bad food, up to moral and sexual frigidity ... A country of unimaginative standardisation, shallow materialism, witless mechanics. A country without tradition, culture, urge for beauty or form, metaphysics, and Heurigen [Austrian tavern with new wine on tap]. A country of artificial fertiliser and tin openers, without grace and dung heap, classical music, sloppiness, Melos, Apollo, or Dionysius. Should we escape the enslavement of European mass dictatorship in order to proceed ourselves towards the tyranny of the Dollar, business, advertisement, and forced disposal? And, by the way, Werfel said, we have to learn English’ (quoted after: Adams and Lösche, 1998, p. 519-20; my translation).

116 Indeed, Young-Bruehl recalls that Arendt had suggested to her to take a course of Morgenthau at the New School for Social Research since “[i]t will be very practical …” She [Arendt] viewed her old friend and fellow émigré as a practical man – that is, a man of praxis, action’ (2006, p. 34).

117 This, however, happened to the hosts of the evening, Karl and Anna Neumeyer. They committed suicide in 1941, when their library was confiscated and they were being threatened of expulsion from their own home.
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