

NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY

# The Temporal Conditions of the Static Image: Repetition as an Engine of Difference

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## Abstract

This practice-based research project addresses what might be considered a reasonably straightforward question: what, if anything, can be achieved in painting from what is often perceived to be a most unpromising strategy for the visual artist - that of repetition? The emergence of repetitive strategies in my own painting practice generated three questions that form the basis of a PhD project that examines the relations between repetition, time, and painting:

- How does repetition reposition the temporal conditions of the static painted image?
- What are the operational means of repetition as an engine of difference?<sup>1</sup>
- How does repetition temporalise the space of its encounter?<sup>2</sup>

This thesis proposes that repetition is not only a force that unlocks a multiplicity of incidences in both space and time, but that it is an engine of difference. In order to address the research questions, and substantiate these claims for repetition, a series of forty paintings titled *Repetition from Reproduction* were produced in order to be apprehended within what I have described as an open labyrinth, an installation space wherein *Repetition from Reproduction* are encountered both sequentially and simultaneously. The open labyrinth operates as a material *field* in which the temporal conditions of painting are tested.

Keywords: Repetition, Difference, Painting, Time, Space, Trompe L'Oeil, Labyrinths

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<sup>1</sup> By operational means of repetition, I refer to repetitive processes that, in re-citing the 'old', release the 'new'.

<sup>2</sup> By temporalise I refer to a heightened phenomenological awareness of a space in which memory continually re-inserts a 'then' into the 'now' - a collapsing and confusion of tense.

## Acknowledgements

I would to thank my father for his vote of confidence. Having informed him that I wanted to go to art school, he took me, in the summer of 1979, to see the only artist he knew personally. My father took me, along with my portfolio, to see an elderly neighbour who had fled Germany in 1937. I have long forgotten the man's name but not his work. After showing me a collection of paintings and drawings that hung in his living room, he spent a few minutes looking at my portfolio; and then held my hands, examining their bone structure before asking me what I thought about colour. The best I could come up with at the time was that I liked it, but didn't quite know how to use it. Words were exchanged between my father and the neighbour, and the deal, so to speak, was done. I went to art school. Paternal warnings about the folly of pursuing art, ceased after that day.

I would also like to extend my gratitude to my doctoral supervisors at Newcastle University; Professor Christopher Jones and Professor Richard Talbot, without whom I would have been unable to navigate the labyrinth of my own creation. I would particularly like to thank Professor Christopher Jones for his forbearance, frankness, and wisdom. Professor Jones, for the duration of the writing of this research, kept me focused on the repetitive, and forewarned of my straying into the repetitious.

My association with the Fine Art Department at Newcastle University has been a long and rewarding one. I would like, therefore, to acknowledge my appreciation for the support offered to me by teaching, administrative, and technical staff, then and now.

Finally, I would like to thank Bernadette O'Toole, whose support and encouragement allowed me keep going when I least wanted to.



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## Introduction

### Overview

In his collection of short stories *Blind Willow, Sleeping Woman*, Japanese author Haruki Murakami discusses the difficulties of writing a novel in comparison to the relative ease of writing the short story. Murakami describes the novel as a ‘challenge’ and the short story a ‘joy’. The two processes, however, constitute what Murakami refers to as a ‘complete landscape’.<sup>3</sup>

Many painters are all too familiar with the challenges of painting in comparison to those of drawing. From 2010 to 2011 I made the decision to forgo the challenges of painting in favour of a concerted period of drawing in order to sow the seeds, as it were, for a visual landscape that might inform future painting. This decision coincided with an offer from arts organisation METAL to undertake a year-long residency with a studio, at Edge Hill station, Liverpool.<sup>4</sup>

The studio overlooked platform two of Edge Hill station, and struggling to find a subject matter that might sustain my interest for the period of the residency, I found myself drawn to the strictly time-tabled choreography of people and trains as they travelled to and from Liverpool’s Lime Street Station. It was this daily repetition of looking that prompted the production of three hundred and sixty-five drawings, each one drawn from the memory of its predecessor on the book-backs of second-hand copies of first-edition *Readers Digests* [fig 0.1]. The image chosen for repetition was the back of a passenger’s head. The body of work addressed two kinds of stasis - of the observer in relation to perceived movement, and the immobility of the static image in its representation of motion.

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<sup>3</sup> Haruki Murakami, *Blind Willow, Sleeping Woman*, (London: Harvill Secker, 2006).

<sup>4</sup> METAL is an arts based organisation founded in London in 2002 by Jude Kelly OBE in order to provide studios and funding for visual artists. METAL has its premises in Liverpool (Edge Hill), Southend on Sea and Peterborough.



Figure 0.1

It seemed that repetition had emerged with full force as a new and significant strategy in my practice. Having decided to review the documentation of my painting and drawing made previously to the residency, it became clear, however, that my practice had been one long, though intermittent engagement with repetitive strategies. Paintings had been made in series [fig 0.2], were reproduced using printmaking techniques such as etching and dry-point, presented overlapping moments of time on the same surface [fig 0.3], and had appropriated images from the history of painting [fig 0.4].



Fig 0.2





Fig 0.3



Fig 0.4

Upon completion of the residency, the drawings were exhibited at METAL and at Liverpool's Bluecoat Gallery. These exhibitions allowed me the opportunity to consider how the drawings affected the space in which they were shown. Combined with an interest in how the drawings were apprehended by their audience, this speculative body of work not only helped foment the research questions at the centre of this dissertation but sowed the seeds for a new body of painting. In returning to the challenges of painting, an intermittent engagement with repetition gave way to painting that makes repetition its central concern.

The research questions that have emerged from this reappraisal of my painting practice in light of this series of drawings are as follows:

### **How does repetition reposition the temporal conditions of the static painted image?**

For the purposes of this research I define painting's temporal conditions as the ways in which painting depicts and represents time, the phenomenological encounter with painting as it unfolds in time, and paintings ability to temporalise the space of its encounter. My choice of the word *condition* is not an arbitrary one: temporality is conditional. Temporality cannot be disarticulated from philosophical, historical, religious, and political discourses, many of which, though not all, remain beyond the remit of this thesis.<sup>5</sup>

### **What are the operational means of repetition as an engine of difference?**

The second research question examines the apparently paradoxical nature of the relation between repetition and difference, or to put it in simpler terms, how the new emerges from the old. The question limits itself, in this instance, to painting - the ways in which repetition in the service of painting might extract difference from extant

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<sup>5</sup> The dissertation will have little to add to the discourses, for example, of repetition in relation to trauma as theorised by Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan and Julia Kristeva. The dissertation will also, for example, forego an analysis of Nietzsche's eternal recurrence, or Heidegger's *Being and Time*. See Keith Ansell Pearson, "Living the Eternal Return as the Event: Nietzsche with Deleuze", *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, No.14, autumn (1997), pp. 64-97. See also Robert D. Stolorow, "Heidegger's Nietzsche, the Doctrine of Eternal Return, and the phenomenology of Human Finitude", *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology*, No. 41, (2010), pp. 106 -14. For *Being and Time*, see Stephen Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time*, London: Routledge, (2003). For Freud and Nietzsche in relation to Deleuze, see Keith Ansell Pearson, "The Death Drive: Freud's reworking of Wisemann", and "The heredity of the Crack in Nietzsche's Superior Return" in *Germinal Life*, (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 104-21.

images. I propose that the new, or difference, can only emerge from the old, and that repetition is the means by which it can be released.

### **How does repetition temporalise the space of its encounter?**

This is perhaps the most important question as it cannot be approached until the first two questions have been negotiated successfully. The question will again limit itself to the ways in which paintings might temporalise space - paintings specifically constructed and installed in a space to generate the apperception of time that has ceased to flow ceaselessly.<sup>6</sup>

### **Dissertation structure**

In order to assist the reader's navigation of this particular labyrinth, the four chapters of the dissertation are punctuated by three case studies. I have used the painting of three contemporary artists as visual instantiation for the claims I make for repetition, chapter by chapter.

Chapter One functions, not only as a literature review and an engagement with the discourses surrounding the temporality of painting but introduces my contention that repetition always results in difference. Chapter One will begin by contesting enlightenment thinking on the differences between painting and poetry, typified by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's assertion that 'painting must relinquish all representations of time' and address itself only to space.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> I have chosen to use the word apperception, as distinct from perception, due to its relevance to the claims I make for a phenomenological encounter with repetition. Apperception, as defined by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, is distinct from perception along temporal axes that can be described as being underpinned by repetition. In Leibnizian terms, the process by which one perception is followed by another is 'appetition'. Apperception, therefore, is a general term for mental processes in which a presentation is reflected upon in relation to one that preceded it - dependent upon memory. An awareness of the differences between one perception and another engenders self-consciousness, whereas perception alone does not. For Leibniz, some perceptions are not noticed, and therefore, not reflected upon. In straightforward terms, apperception promotes self awareness, a meta-cognitive state in which a subject's mind becomes aware of its own inner state. This self-reflexivity finds equivalence, not only in the use of *trompe l'oeil* in painting but in the apprehension of repeating images in space. See Lloyd Strickland, *Leibniz's Monadology: A New Translation and Guide*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), pp. 66-7. See also Martha Bolton, "Leibniz's Theory of Cognition", in Brandon C. Look, *The Bloomsbury Companion to Leibniz*, (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), pp. 135-58.

<sup>7</sup> Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Laocoon: An Essay upon the Limits of Poetry and Painting*, translated by Ellen Frothingham, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1873), p. 90.

Chapter One also discusses the relation of repetition to difference by building a case that the repeated image causes a rupture in linear time, out of which difference may emerge. Chapter One concludes by framing the relations between repetition and difference through the lens of Roman goddess Copia - goddess of plenty. This particular discourse is introduced in order to present the work of Cecilia Edefalk, the first of my three case studies. While many have written about Edefalk's practice in terms of the relation between original and copy, I propose that Edefalk's repetition is in the service of uncovering latent subject matter - dormant in an image until released by repetition.

Chapter Two reviews the literature and discourses that will help the reader navigate the complex and shifting domain of repetition, a domain in which the definition of terms has become convoluted over time. In order to arrive at a consensus regarding terms, Chapter Two examines the shifting of repetition's meaning by analysing its relation to originality in examples of pre-modern, modern, and contemporary painting. Chapter Two also considers the emergence of painting in series in the nineteenth century as a forerunner to the explosion of serial practices in the 1960s.

By examining the repetitive impulse in the art of the 1960s, the chapter will expand the focus of the chapter's enquiry from time to space. I will argue that an encounter with repeating images foments a specific way of looking, one that collapses the distinction between painting and site, figure and ground. As an example of the temporal and spatial implications of this collapse, the second case study will present the work of American artist Ann Craven. Craven's painting practice can be described as employing a doubling of repetition.

While the first two chapters allow the reader an understanding of the theoretical and philosophical contexts within which my research is positioned, chapters three and four turn to practice. Chapter Three charts the development of a series of paintings that respond to all three research questions, and specifically to the third. The chapter will make clear how the paintings from this series shift the temporal conditions of painting and employ repetition as an engine of difference.

As a painter with a healthy suspicion of what Yves-Alain Bois described as '*theoreticism*' – the perceived obligation to be theoretical, it is nonetheless incumbent upon me to write something here about the nature of the relation between theory and practice as I have experienced it throughout the duration of this practice-based research

project.<sup>8</sup> As a much younger painter, my suspicion of the theoretical manifested itself in a firm conviction that to rationalise, valorise, validate, or even explain one system of signs - painting, with another - words, was an absurdity. This, I realise, is an anti-theoretical stance and the antithesis of Bois' theoreticism.<sup>9</sup> I now, of course, consider this position also absurd but perhaps less so than I might be comfortable to admit.

Many painters, however, though not all - find the attempt to situate their practice within a seemingly inexhaustible number of theoretical, and often conflicting discourses, while remaining both objective and at a distance from the object of their enquiry – their own painting - a challenge. The pitfalls afforded by this plethora of ready-made theoretical frameworks lies in the temptation to apply them to practice without first being sensitive to what unfolds in their own studios and not in the pages of books. In an attempt to avoid such pitfalls, It is worthwhile heeding the advice of both Yves-Alain Bois and Mieke Bal. Bois, for example, concludes his introduction to *Painting as Model*, by arguing a case that painting can be thought of as, 'not the illustration of a theory but as a model, a theoretical model in itself'.<sup>10</sup> Bal, in a statement echoing that of Bois's, writes; 'Theory is not an instrument of analysis, to be "applied" to the art object, it is instead a discourse that can be brought to bear on the object at the same time as the object can be brought to bear on it'.<sup>11</sup>

Both Bois and Bal suggest that painting, in its ability to theorise, is in effect, a thinking object.<sup>12</sup> While this claim is open to debate, what is perhaps less contentious is to acknowledge that many painters, though not all, are accustomed to dealing with, on a day to day basis, what Rudolf Arnheim referred to as 'vizualising complexity and conceiving of phenomena and problems in visual terms'.<sup>13</sup> This strikes me as a sensible - in more ways than one - position for a painter to take in response to the theoretical. What, for example can be thought, without first accessing the sensorial as retained by memory? It can be argued then, that theory for some painters is primarily a decidedly optical affair. This should come as no surprise considering the etymological root of the

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<sup>8</sup> Yves-Alain Bois, *Painting as Model*, (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1990), xii

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., xii.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., xxx.

<sup>11</sup> Mieke Bal, *Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide*, (London: University of Toronto Press, 2002), p. 61.

<sup>12</sup> Mieke Bal, *Quoting Caravaggio: Contemporary Art, Preposterous History*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 117.

<sup>13</sup> Rudolf Arnheim, *Visual Thinking*, (Berkley: University of California Press, 1969), 296.

word theory: *theoria*. - 'to see, to contemplate – also a sight, a spectacle – to look on'.<sup>14</sup> Theories, therefore, can be described as observations. It has been my challenge to bring my studio based practice into conversation with a number of theories - art historical and philosophical. Interestingly, the word *conversation* itself suggests something of the richness inherent in this reciprocal exchange. In *Conversation Pieces: About Mieke Bal*, for example, Deborah Cherry discusses the etymological root of the word conversation;

[...] conversation, defined as the exchange of observations and ideas, takes its form from *conversatio*, in turn derived from *conversari* - to associate with and is resonant with *convertare*, to convert or turn around, suggestive of the ebbs and flows of argumentation, the changes of mind that take place in debate.<sup>15</sup>

The relation between theory and practice is, therefore, elastic and not unidirectional, and unidirectional suggests spatial relations. The relation between theory and practice that I find most interesting, however, is also temporal. Painting, as a visual language, has the potential to *convert* or turn round any agents that it comes into conversation with - whether they may be other paintings, philosophical concepts or theoretical positions. In this sense it is not only painting that is an open ended and unfinished business but apparently monolithic and unassailable historical texts are subject to revision as they enter into conversation with it. This interdisciplinary agency, however, often finds - in philosophers writing about contemporary art - the discussion of art as but one tool among many in order to embody a potentially infinite disciplinary proficiency - the results of which, to borrow from Friedrich Schlegel, 'usually lacks one of two things: either the philosophy, or the art.'<sup>16</sup> Throughout this dissertation, I have therefore, listened, so to speak, to my painting first and to theory second in an effort to 'explain to myself what I am already doing'.<sup>17</sup>

The chronology of this dissertation's development started with such a response to painting. As mentioned above, the desire to undertake a practice-based PhD was a realisation that my painting practice was one long engagement with repetitive processes.

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<sup>14</sup> *Oxford English Dictionary*, Second Edition. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), Vol xvii, p.902.

<sup>15</sup> Deborah Cherry (ed), *Conversation Pieces: About Mieke Bal*, (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2008), p 1.

<sup>16</sup> Friedrich von Schlegel, *Lucinde and the Fragments*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), originally published as *Kritische Fragmente*, 1794. Quoted by Jorg Heiser in *Frieze*, "Do Philosophers Understand Contemporary Art?" <https://frieze.com/article/sight-reading>, pp 1-13.

<sup>17</sup> Boris Groys, *In the Flow*, (London, New York: Verso, 2016), p.24.

The first year of the research project was one in which theory was examined in relation to repetition and time. It was also during this year that my research questions were approached through a range of media including digital film and photography. It was not until the second year of the research that I decided upon the book, or more specifically - images in books - as an appropriate object with which to address these research questions - an object that remained at the centre of the project for its duration. The research project's third year saw the body of painting, *Repetition from Reproduction* - appropriated from the pages of a book - placed into a number of labyrinthine spaces in order to address the project's third research question - the temporalisation of space by static painted images. It also became clear during the project's third year that the majority of the research carried out in the first, had relied too heavily on the philosophical and theoretical at the expense of contemporary painters whose practice might offer insights in terms of how to best progress.

*Repetition from Reproduction* are repetitions of the reproductions of painting printed on the pages of a book. As an example of contemporary art practice that makes time, space, and the book its business, the final case study examines the networked images of American artist R.H. Quaytman. Quaytman is an artist whose practice is haunted by the influences of images from the history of art, often first encountered in books. Quaytman refers to her exhibitions as chapters, and each chapter is carefully considered in terms of the temporal and spatial contexts that permeate the spaces in which she exhibits these chapters. I present work by Quaytman in order to help the reader discern the relevance of *Repetition from Reproduction* to the research question addressed in Chapter Four.

The case studies of Quaytman, with Ann Craven and Cecilia Edefalf, used to punctuate this dissertation's chapters proved to be particularly useful to the writing of this dissertation and to the development of my practice. I decided to choose three contemporary painters whose practice might not only substantiate the claims made for the relations between repetition and painting but help resolve more formal problems in terms of my painting, time and space.

In deciding upon these three painters, I avoided more obvious choices. Two painters, for example, whose practice might have been useful in exploring the relations between painting and repetition, originally intended for inclusion, were the British painter Glenn Brown (1966 - ) and German painter, Gerhard Richter (1932 - ). These two highly

successful painters were subsequently left out for a number of reasons - one of which was a direct result of their success - the amount of ink already spilt in discussing their practice - neither painters have, to my knowledge, stated anything definitive about how their work operates in space and time - and both are men. While I admire the considerable technical abilities of both painters, I consider their use of repetition to be secondary and even stylistic strategies rather than being central to their practice. I was more interested in including three women painters whose practice is, perhaps, not as widely known as it deserves to be in this country, and whose painting has direct connections to my own in terms of repetition, time and space. The order in which these case studies unfold, falling between each dissertation chapter, has been deliberately designed to echo the development of my painterly responses to the dissertation's research questions - from the temporal, to the repetitive, and then the spatial. The relevance of these three painters to my own practice is most evident in the dissertation's final case study - that of R.H. Quaytman, where the temporal, repetitive and the spatial coalesce in Quaytman's practice in ways that informed the response to my third research question - the temporalisation of space by repetition. The decision to include these case studies and to position them as I did within the dissertation was very useful in arriving, finally, at what I considered to be an appropriate dissertation structure.

The fourth and final chapter functions as both a fold and the culmination of a journey. The chapter charts the development of a site into which the responses to all three questions are folded. Chapter Four describes the ways, in which a number of labyrinths were constructed, both real and virtual, to house *Repetition from Reproduction*.

The decision to undertake an enquiry that encompasses repetition, time and space, with the medium of painting at its centre, might seem limiting. Photography, to follow Laura Mulvey, 'relates exclusively to its moment of registration; that is, it represents a moment extracted from the continuity of historical time', and the duration of the moving image affords cinema 'an unprecedented reality in its representation of the past'.<sup>18</sup> This doctoral research project places painting at its centre in the conviction that it is a time-based medium that equals the temporal conditions of film and photography as defined by Mulvey. Painting is also a medium that continues to negotiate its meaning and significance long after its historical moment of production. In this sense it is a

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<sup>18</sup> Laura Mulvey, *Death 24x a Second*, (London: Reaktion Books, 2006), pp. 9-12.



future-orientated medium, a point of departure that affords an opportunity to respond to painting's original impulses and unrealised potentials.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> For a fascinating book on time, relays and signals in relation to art, see George Kubler, *The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of Things*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 18-27.

## Methodology

I have made it clear in this dissertation's introduction that my practice had been a long, though intermittent engagement with repetitive strategies, the significance of which, I had previously failed to position within relevant theoretical discourses. This can be described as a situation where 'know-how' was the dominant method. In order to satisfy the requirements of practice-as-research, a number of interlocking methodological approaches have been employed to redress this imbalance by unifying the 'know-how' with the 'know-what', and the 'know-that'. Robin Nelson defines 'know-how' as prior skills, 'procedural knowledge', gained incrementally in order to arrive at complex outcomes.<sup>20</sup> In contrast, the 'know-that' is propositional knowledge, the acquisition of traditional academic knowledge drawn from reading.<sup>21</sup> While Nelson concedes that the 'Know-what' is 'not an established' methodological mode, she defines it as an informed reflexivity, a critical reflection on the know-how, the ability to discern which aspects of the know-how are relevant to research goals, and why.<sup>22</sup>

Rather than an immediate return to the familiarity of studio-based practices, I first addressed the know-that by engaging with a broad range of theoretical and philosophical texts. Since many of the texts often offered conflicting accounts of the relations between repetition, time and difference, I ultimately focused on a reading of duration as discussed by Henri Bergson and the post-structuralism of Gilles Deleuze for reasons that are clarified throughout this dissertation.<sup>23</sup> I am not suggesting that having engaged with these conceptual frameworks it became clear how to proceed with painting but the reading did help clarify what I wanted them to do. A secondary level of reading was undertaken, one that examined a range of discourses on painting and time that could be described as falling under the aegis of aesthetics. This reading was carried out, in concert with art historical discourses to scrutinise the long held assumptions in which these existing discourses are couched, and to examine the ways that painters have

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<sup>20</sup> See Robin Nelson, *Practice as Research in the Arts: Principles, Protocols, Pedagogies, Resistances*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 23-47.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Deleuze's conceptual framework of the rhizome and of the book thought of as a multiplicity were particularly useful. For Deleuze's crystal image see page 73, footnote 191.

attempted to transgress the temporal and spatial boundaries ascribed to their medium by convention.

The three case studies of work produced by contemporary painters have helped me to see how my painting might do things differently. An understanding of the know-that has helped show how my practice might be modified in light of its impact with the theoretical, historical and philosophical discourses outlined earlier, and perhaps more importantly, in its connection to the work of painters whose practices address similar concerns to those of my own.

The studio-based responses to my research questions embodied a temporal unfolding referred to by Nelson as procedural knowledge. While the know-how has been charted in detail in chapters three and four, I will present here, a brief account of the processes and strategies employed in order to arrive at the series of paintings, titled *Repetition from Reproduction* and the space of their encounter.

Early-stages of research relied upon a range of approaches to drawing and painting informed by digital technologies. Typically, these small-scale exploratory works were produced in watercolour and gouache. In addition, a series of drawings were produced using graphite, and graphite powder. This trial and error process, using drawing and painting, helped develop a vocabulary of repetitive strategies that would eventually inform *Repetition from Reproduction*. These early studies relied, to some degree, on the digital manipulation of images from the history of painting. Watercolours, gouaches, drawings, and paintings were also used as the source material for a number of short digital animations [fig 0.5]. Other than to document research outcomes, the further use of the moving image was rejected in an understanding that I had lost sight of the specificities of my research questions, questions that were addressed specifically to the medium of painting.

In returning to the medium of painting, a series of oil paintings on linen were produced and tested in venues described in Chapter Four. As the series developed, I began to explore the specifics of how they might be apprehended in space. After researching a number of recursive mazes, and producing a number of drawings and floor plans, a scale model of a labyrinth was constructed in foam-board in order to explore the possible positioning of paintings. In order to further understand how the

positioning of painting might be apprehended by an audience, a short digital film was produced, a virtual walkthrough of a labyrinth using 3D-Max software.




Fig 0.5

I have briefly covered the ‘know-how’ and the ‘know-that’ of this research’s methodology. I will finish by describing the ‘know-what’. ‘Knowing-what’ is, as discussed earlier, defined by Nelson as an ‘informed reflexivity’ by which critical

reflection on the processes of making and ‘its modes of knowing’ might be brought to light.<sup>24</sup>

Throughout this research, I have attempted to reflect on what has, and has not worked, in a number of journals. These journals are full of questions. Each time a possible answer to these questions was tentatively formed, it was tested as painting, as a drawing, digital film, or model. Despite my interest in all things repetitive, this relation between practice and reflection proved to be a corrective to the potential repetitiousness of practice. It helped move my practice beyond the comfort and over-familiarity of approaches to making that can often prevent practice from producing anything significantly different.

The relation between practice and reflection has been documented and articulated in a number of journals. Excerpts from these journals are presented in the appendix along with the series of paintings *Repetition from Reproduction* in its entirety in the spaces in which they have been shown. The appendix also presents a selection of journal entries, source material, and a range of small-scale drawings, watercolours, and gouaches. While this is not intended as a comprehensive document, it does, however, provide evidence of the scope and range of the practice-based methods employed.

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<sup>24</sup> See Robin Nelson, *Practice as Research in the Arts: Principles, Protocols, Pedagogies, Resistances*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 44-5.

## Chapter One: The Temporal Conditions of the Static Image.

No one will deny the general rightness of his [Lessing's] contention that the greatest painting, like the greatest poetry, observes the limitations of its medium; or that it is dangerous for a spatial art like painting to attempt the progressive effects of a temporal art like poetry.<sup>25</sup>

\_\_\_\_Rensselaer W. Lee

Painting is an object 'that does not shrink from impossible tasks'.<sup>26</sup> One such task, in opposition to Lee's insistence that painting observes the limitations of its medium, is its attempt to depict and/or represent time.<sup>27</sup> To describe painting as a static image, one that does not move, is an over simplification, but one that nevertheless provokes an admiration for painting's long history of attempting to overcome the limitations of its inertia - its ability to refer to time, both on its surface and of the world beyond its edges. One question that this practice-based research addresses is the way in which repetition might shift the temporal conditions of the static image. In order to discuss repetition's role in this re-positioning, it will be useful to determine what can be said about the temporal conditions of the static image.

We might be forgiven for thinking that recent developments in digital technology have at last rescued painting from its long immobility. The Rijksmuseum's 2016 blockbuster show *Late Rembrandt* exhibited a series of animations that offered audiences the opportunity to experience Rembrandt's painting in an entirely new way. According to an optimistic publicity release, these animations bring Rembrandt's paintings 'to life' [fig 1.1].<sup>28</sup> The corpus of Vincent Van Gogh has also been submitted to a similar resurrection by BreakThru Films in their 2016 feature length animation *Loving Vincent* [fig 1.2].<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Rensselaer Lee, "Ut Pictura Poesis: The Humanistic Theory of Painting", *Art Bulletin*, Vol. 22, No 4. (Dec, 1940), p. 215.

<sup>26</sup> Adrian Searle, extract from "Unbound", in *Unbound: Possibilities in Painting*, (London: Hayward Gallery, 1994), pp. 13-17.

<sup>27</sup> Distinctions between the depiction and representation of time will be discussed in chapter 1.2.

<sup>28</sup> Six of the twelve canvases from the *Late Rembrandt* exhibition were animated by CS Digital media for Dutch telecommunications KNP. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q-3LVTGpv4Q>. See also, <http://www.openculture.com/2015/03/late-rembrandts-come-to-life.html>

<sup>29</sup> 'Loving Vincent will be the world's first feature length painted animation, with every shot painted with oil paints on canvas, just as Vincent himself painted'. [www.lovingvincent.com/?id=technique](http://www.lovingvincent.com/?id=technique).



Figure 1.1



Figure 1.2

The desire to set the motionless image into motion is a long one, and in the animations mentioned above, it is easy to be convinced that what we might perceive is real motion.<sup>30</sup> The paradox however, is that each still image occupies a position in space, none of which can be described as being *in* motion. The static image lies at the heart of an illusory movement and suggests, despite the best efforts of ‘chronophotographie’ and its subsequent incarnations that space is the purview of the static image and not time.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> ‘*Loving Vincent* employed thirty artists to produce fifty six thousand, eight hundred frames for an eighty minute film. Each frame is an oil painting on canvas.’ [www.lovingvincent.com](http://www.lovingvincent.com).

<sup>31</sup> By the 1870’s photography had developed to the point that shutter speeds broke the thousandth of a second barrier, enabling Eadward Muybridge to undertake a study of animal locomotion (1878). At the same time French physiologist Etienne Marey developed a similar process he labelled chronophotographie. See Rebecca Solnit, *Motion Studies: Time, Space and Eadweard Muybridge*, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2004).

This *self evident* truth is most associated with enlightenment philosopher Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729 - 1781). Lessing, by no means the originator of distinctions between painting and poetry does, however, differentiate the boundaries of media along temporal and spatial axes.<sup>32</sup> In *Laocoon: An Essay upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry* (1766), Lessing writes:

Since painting, because of its signs or means of imitation can be combined only in space, must relinquish all representations of time, therefore progressive actions, as such, cannot come within its range. It must content itself with actions in space; in other words, with mere bodies, whose attitude lets us infer their action.<sup>33</sup>

W.J.T. Mitchell draws our attention to an alternative translation (from German) of 'limits' in *Laocoon's* subtitle - one that replaces 'limits' with 'borders' (*Grenzen*).<sup>34</sup> Lessing's frontier throughout *Laocoon* is a heavily guarded one where temporal conditions are deeply entrenched and trespass by painters such as Titian result in 'an encroachment of the painter on the domain of the poet, which good taste can never sanction'.<sup>35</sup> Lessing develops the metaphor of a frontier between painting and poetry in language more closely resembling international diplomacy than aesthetics:

Painting and poetry should be like two just and friendly neighbours, neither of whom indeed is allowed to take unseemly liberties in the heart of the other's domain, but who exercise mutual forbearance on the borders, and effect a peaceful settlement for all the petty encroachments which circumstances may compel either to make in haste on the rights of the other.<sup>36</sup>

Lessing demarcates time and space along an uneasy fault line, and friction along fault lines results in a release of energy. Despite Lessing's plea for an inviolable border, the

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<sup>32</sup> Lessing undoes Horace's *Ut Pictura Poesis* (as in painting, so is poetry) along temporal and spatial axes. For an explication of *Ut Pictura Poesis*, See Rensselaer Lee, "Ut Pictura Poesis", *The Art Bulletin*, Vol. 22, No. (December. 1944), pp. 197-269.

<sup>33</sup> Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Laocoon: An Essay upon the Limits of Poetry and Painting*, translated by Ellen Frothingham, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1873), p. 90.

<sup>34</sup> W.J.T Mitchell, "The Politics of Genre: Space and Time in Lessing's *Laocoon*", *Representations*, No. 6 (Spring, 1984), p. 105.

<sup>35</sup> Lessing gives the example of Titian's *Prodigal Son* in which 'his dissolute life, his misery, and repentance' are depicted simultaneously. *Laocoon*, p.100.

<sup>36</sup> Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Laocoon: An Essay upon the Limits of Poetry and Painting*, translated by Ellen Frothingham, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1873), p. 90.



energetic transgression of boundaries delineated by time and space is imminent in painting, neither peripheral to it, nor confined to any historical period.




Fig 1.3.



Fig 1.4.

This transgression of frontiers, a reversal of Lessing's spatio/temporal domain is evident, for example, in a comparison between American artist Robert Smithson's *A Heap of Language* [Fig 1.3] and *June 16, 1966*, a painting by Japanese/American artist On Kawara [Fig 1.4]. The title for Smithson's 1967 essay in which *A Heap of Language* appears, *Language to be Looked At and/or Things to be Read*, clearly enunciates the reversal of roles apparent in the above images.<sup>37</sup> In *A Heap of Language* the emphasis is placed on language (words) used to build rather than to be read, and has therefore been spatialised. Reading is inscribed in a temporal sequence and in Kawara's text-based painting we read the name of a date in and over time. Kawara temporalises the space of painting, and Smithson spatialises the time of text. Paintings takes time to look at, they are simultaneously objects in space and in time, and in some cases audiences will consider the time invested in their production during the time spent in front of them. Both painting and text persist in time, are accessible, protected and preserved in the cultural archive in ways that extend their longevity as both cultural artefact and model for subsequent artists.

I can, if I choose, visit the Rijksmuseum and look at Rembrandt's *The Jewish Bride* (1665), and read on the tram back to the hotel, a copy of Plato's *Timaeus*, first written in 360 BC.<sup>38</sup> The father and daughter in Rembrandt's painting will never change places,

<sup>37</sup> Robert Smithson, "Language to be Looked at and/or Things to be Read", *Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings*, edited by Jack Flam, (Berkley: University of California Press, 1996), p.61.

<sup>38</sup> In *Timaeus*, Plato provides an image of time that seems to confirm its timelessness - "The thought occurred to him of making a moving image of eternity; and in ordering the heaven he makes the heaven as an image of the eternity that abides in unity, an image moving according to eternal number, that which

and the textual arrangement of Plato's dialogue will remain faithful to the copy in which it is printed, though the interpretation of both may shift over time. Returning to my fictitious hotel room, my tram might pass another moving in the opposite direction in space. Both however, share the same temporal direction - forwards. Can the same be said of Rembrandt's painting and Plato's *Timaeus*? One answer might be that, unlike Plato's *Timaeus*, the perception of Rembrandt's medium and message is instantaneous, and therefore unfolds at a different rate. This seems an unsatisfactory response as it relies on something as speculative and equivocal as an instant of time.

The question of time measured by movement (change) is perhaps the strongest argument Lessing uses to support his thesis of painting as a spatial art. If we discount the digital animations mentioned above, it is safe to assume that Rembrandt's couple in *The Jewish Bride* will not change places in the future. Lessing states that due to the successive nature of actions a painting must confine itself to the choice of a germane instant or pivotal moment of time in order to successfully imitate an action:

Actions on the other hand, cannot exist independently, but must always be joined to certain agents. In so far as those agents are bodies or are regarded as such, poetry describes also bodies, but only indirectly through actions. Painting, in its coexistent compositions, can use but a single *moment* of an action, and must therefore choose the most pregnant one, the one most suggestive of *what has gone before and what is to come*.<sup>39</sup>

The idea of deducting a moment or instant from the flow of time presents its own set of metaphysical and pictorial problems, and Lessing's quote suggests that his 'single moment' is neither a past nor a future, but a present.<sup>40</sup> In order to say something unequivocal (where possible) about the unit of time that the instant purports to represent and its temporal position relative to past and future, sub-chapter 1.1 will first examine the instant as thought by James Harris, and Anthony Ashley-Cooper (The third Earl of Shaftsbury).

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we call time'. See Plato, *Timaeus*, translated by Donald J. Zeyl, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2000).

<sup>39</sup> My emphasis, *Laocoon: An Essay upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry*, p.92.

<sup>40</sup> Op Cit.

## 1.1: Moment, Instant and Punctum Temporis.

For, of necessity, every picture is a *punctum temporis*, or “instant”.<sup>41</sup>

\_\_\_\_James Harris.

The *punctum temporis* as defined by James Harris (1709-1780), English politician and grammarian, is a repetition of ideas set forth thirty-three years earlier by Anthony Ashley-Cooper (1671-1713), English philosopher and uncle of Harris. Before discussing the *punctum temporis* in detail it is worthwhile discussing the temporal conditions of painting as outlined by Ashley-Cooper.<sup>42</sup>

I have discussed above how Lessing in *Laocoon* criticises (perhaps erroneously) Titian’s use of continuous narrative in *The Prodigal Son*.<sup>43</sup> Titian, according to Lessing conflates three distinct temporal episodes of the prodigal son - ‘his dissolute life, his misery, and repentance’.<sup>44</sup> Ashley-Cooper in *A notion of the Historical Draught, or Tablature of the Judgement of Hercules* (1713) provides the blueprint for Lessing in discussing the temporal order of the ‘fable or history of Hercules’.<sup>45</sup> In order for the painter to achieve the maximum dramatic impact, Ashley-Cooper suggests three possible narrative episodes from which to choose;

This fable or history may be variously represented according to the order of time. Either in the instant when the two Goddesses (*Virtue and Pleasure*) accost HERCULES; Or when they are enter’d on their Disputes; or when their Dispute is already far advanc’d, and *Virtue* seems to gain her Cause.<sup>46</sup>

Ashley-Cooper discusses a fourth possibility, one where Hercules is finally won by *Virtue*. This fourth possibility is rejected as ‘there wou’d be no room left to represent his Agony’ or inward ‘Conflict, which indeed makes the principal Action

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<sup>41</sup> James Harris, *The Works of James Harris Esq. with an Account of His Life and Character by his Son the Earl of Malmesbury*. (Oxford: J. Vincent for Thomas Tegg, 1841), p. 30. All subsequent quotes from Harris are taken from this edition, digitized by Google books, 2015.

<sup>42</sup> Ashley Cooper’s *Characteristicks, of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* was the most reprinted book in the English language in the eighteenth century.

<sup>43</sup> Lessing may have confused *The Prodigal Son* with Titian’s *Miracle of the Irascible Son* (1511). Titian, to my knowledge did not produce a painting titled *The Prodigal Son*. *Laocoon*, p. 100.

<sup>44</sup> A continuous narrative presents successive episodes of a narrative simultaneously.

<sup>45</sup> Ashley-Cooper, *A notion of the Historical Draught, or Tablature of the Judgement of Hercules*, 1713,

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p.6.

here...'<sup>47</sup> Ashley Cooper clearly implies that in order for a painter to achieve maximum dramatic success in representing action, s/he must choose a germane instant, and not a progression of temporal episodes. This instant exists as a present as it must leave 'room' for the representation of Hercules's impending 'Conflict'.<sup>48</sup> The use of a continuous narrative, a means of *making room* for the past and the future is not confined to a historical period. Contemporary painters continue to present successive episodes of a narrative simultaneously. Five hundred and fifty eight years separate Giovanni di Paolo's *Saint John the Baptist Retiring to the Desert* (1453) [fig 1.5] from *Vanishing Point* (2011) [fig 1.6] by contemporary painter Emma Talbot, both of which employ continuous narrative.<sup>49</sup>



Fig 1.5.




Fig 1.6.

Both images challenge Ashley-Cooper's insistence that in order to represent time, the painter must by necessity choose an instant that (by recollection of the past and anticipation of a future), infers temporal progression.<sup>50</sup> Ashley-Cooper in an assertion echoed in turn by Harris and Lessing, binds fast the ways in which time is normatively represented in painting in ways that remain unchallenged for a considerable period of time.<sup>51</sup> It is worthwhile quoting Ashley-Cooper at length on this point:

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p.8.

<sup>48</sup> Op Cit.

<sup>49</sup> Curator Roger Malbert discusses the temporal and spatial conditions of Talbot's work in a press release for *Self Portraiture, Personal Narratives and Selfies* at the Drawing Room gallery, London in 2015 - 'These events are based on personal experiences, family history and narrative fictions. Scenarios from different times in history and from different places can be seen alongside one another. This allows a visual linking of events and thoughts, not bound by chronology, which gets closer to the way memories are retained and retold', <https://drawingroom.org.uk/events/self-portraiture-personal-narratives-and-selfies>.

<sup>50</sup> Whether painting can depict time, rather than represent time will be dealt with in chapter 1.2. W.J.T Mitchell suggests that 'The very fact that temporality must be *inferred* in a painting suggests that it cannot be directly represented by the medium in the way that spatial objects can'. 'The politics of Genre: Space and Time in Lessing's Laocoon', *Representations*, No. 6 (Spring, 1984), p. 101.

<sup>51</sup> The first concerted challenge to the 'instant' occurs in 1964 from Ernst Gombrich, two hundred and fifty three years after Ashley-Cooper first published *A notion of the Historical Draught, or Tablature of the Judgement of Hercules* 'For it may be argued that it was the way in which the problem of the passage

Tis evident that every Master in Painting, when he has made choice of the Determinate Date or Point of Time, according to which he wou'd represent his History, is afterwards debar'd the taking advantage from any other Action than what is immediately present, and belonging to that single instant he describes. For if he passes the present only for a moment, he may as well pass it for many years. And by this reckoning he may repeat the same Figure several times over...There remains no other way by which we can possibly give a hint of any thing future, or call to mind any thing past than by setting in view such passages or Events as have actually subsisted, or according to Nature might well subsist, or happen together in one and the same instant.<sup>52</sup>

Harris differs slightly from Ashley-Cooper (though not Lessing) in allowing time represented in painting certain latitude, a margin of temporal extension that paradoxically is compressed into an instant:

To begin, therefore with painting. A subject in which the power of this art may be most fully exerted...must be a subject which is principally and eminently characterized by certain colours, figures, and postures of figures whose comprehension depends not on a succession of events; *or at least*, if on a succession, on a short and self-evident one which admits a large variety of such circumstances, as *all concur in the same individual point of time*, and relate to one principal action.<sup>53</sup>

...In large historical pictures the single moment of time is always somewhat extended...<sup>54</sup>

Harris also makes it clear that he has certain doubts about the ability of this temporal extension's ability to operate at all, where the observer remains ignorant of the paintings historical incident:

The reason is that a picture being (as has been said) but a point or instant in a story well known, the spectator's memory will supply the previous and the subsequent: but this cannot be done where such knowledge is wanting.<sup>55</sup>

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of time in painting was traditionally posed that doomed the answers to relative sterility'. Ernst Gombrich in "Moment and Movement in Art, *Journal of the Warburgh and Courtauld Institutes*, Vol. 27, (1964), p. 293.

<sup>52</sup> Ashley Cooper, *A notion of the Historical Draught, or Tablature of the Judgement of Hercules, 1711*, quoted by Gombrich in "Moment and Movement in Art", (1964), pp. 293- 94.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., My italics, p. 34.

<sup>54</sup> Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Laocoon: An Essay upon the Limits of Poetry and Painting*, translated by Ellen Frothingham, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1873), p. 110.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., p.30.

According to Harris, the ability to parse a narrative in painting depends to some extent upon *a priori* familiarity with the fabula in order to comprehend the compression of past, present and future into a single image - an instant.<sup>56</sup> In privileging the embodied enactment of a given fabula, all three (though Lessing makes the stronger case) agree that painting, in the rejection of poetry's progressive and successive (temporal) narration must confine itself to the production of static (spatial), images and neither Harris, Lessing nor Ashley-Cooper clearly define the unit of time that the instant describes.

Instant, is unsurprisingly, the shortened form of instantaneous. The unhelpfully tautological definition of instantaneous offered by the Oxford English Dictionary is 'something that happens in an instant'.<sup>57</sup> Its etymological root from the Latin verb *instare* means 'to be at hand'.<sup>58</sup> This also sounds unhelpful as 'at hand' seems to say more about spatial relations than it does time. One definition given by Robin Le Poidevin in *Time and the Static Image* is 'an extensionless moment of time', but a moment is normatively defined as a brief period of time.<sup>59</sup> It has extension. The moment of painting according to John Berger in *Painting and Time*, unlike photography does not preserve a moment, as it never existed.<sup>60</sup>

Dutch painter Samuel Dirksz van Hoogstraten (1627-1687) preferred *oogenbliklijke daedt*, or 'blink of an eye', to describe the instant.<sup>61</sup> In a blink of the eye, however, the eye is closed and indicates a perceptual lacuna. To follow Van Hoogstraaten, the *oogenbliklijke daedt* advocates time thought as an undetermined perceptual affect, rather

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<sup>56</sup> Richard Wollheim describes this in terms of the 'suitable spectator', '[I]f a picture represents something, then it will be a visual experience of that picture that determines that it does so. This experience I call the "appropriate experience" of the picture, and ...if a *suitable spectator* looks at a picture, he will, other things being equal, have the appropriate experience. A suitable spectator is a spectator who is suitably sensitive, suitably informed, and, if necessary, suitably prompted', Wollheim, "On Pictorial Representation", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. 56, No. 3 (1998), p. 217.

<sup>57</sup> www.oed.com.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Robin Le Poidevin, "Time and the Static Image", *Philosophy*, Vol. 72, No. 280 (April, 1997), p. 175.

<sup>60</sup> 'the moment of painting, unlike a moment photographed, never existed as such. And so a painting cannot be said to preserve it', John Berger, "Painting and Time", published in *The Sense of Sight*, edited by Lloyd Spencer, (New York: Vintage International, 1993), pp. 205- 11.

<sup>61</sup> Quoted by Lyle Massey in "Reflections on Temporality on Netherlandish Art", *Art History*, (November 2012), p. 1051, from Thijs Westeijn's, *The Visible World: Samuel Van Hoogstraten's Art Theory and the Legitimisation of Painting in the Dutch Golden Age*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, (2009), p. 185.

than a quantifiable extension.<sup>62</sup> Harris's *punctum temporis* could be described as an extensionless point in time, but this definition seems unhelpful on two counts; can time have a point (as can a line), and extensionless implies timelessness. If Ashley-Cooper, Harris and Lessing are reluctant to define the duration of an instant, they are more succinct about where their instant lies relative to past and future.<sup>63</sup>

For Ashley-Cooper, the instant must recall a past and anticipate a future, and therefore must be a present. Ashley-Cooper calls this '*anticipation and repeal*'.<sup>64</sup> I have quoted Ashley-Cooper on this subject previously, but it is worthwhile quoting the remainder of the section where the instant is firmly located as a present,

Again by the same means which are employ'd to call to mind the past, we may anticipate the *future*: as wou'd be seen in the case of an able painter, who shou'd undertake to paint this History of Hercules according to the third Date or Period of Time propos'd for our Historical tablature...If by any other methods an artist shou'd pretend to introduce into his piece any portion of Time future or past, he must either sin directly against the law of Truth and Credibility.<sup>65</sup>

The instant as thought by Ashley-Cooper, Harris and Lessing is a present extracted from predominantly biblical, mythological and biographical narratives.<sup>66</sup> These adaptations from historical sources are repeated as conditions of the present and not

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<sup>62</sup> Massey suggests that the majority of painting from the Netherlands 'Golden Age' deals predominantly with time by provoking 'attentiveness' in the beholder. This attentiveness not only 'unfolds over time', but also 'brings into relief the elusive and changing nature of perception and reception'. Perhaps more importantly, Massey suggests that for Brusati, 'what makes the Dutch exploration of perspective unique is that it represents an attempt to pictorialize and engage a model of vision that embraces the "temporal dimensions of real-time viewing"'. Dutch perspective, unlike its more static Italian counterpart, models the temporal attentiveness that informs perception. The relation between attentiveness, *trompe l'oeil*, time and perception will be discussed in chapter 2.4. See Massey, *Op cit*, and Celeste Brusati, "Perspectives in Flux: Viewing Dutch Pictures in Real Time, *Art History*, November (2012), pp. 908- 33.

<sup>63</sup> According to Medieval Latin, an hour equals four *puncta* or points (15 minutes) and one *puncta* is two and a half *minuta* (six minutes). In Byzantine Greek, an hour is comprised of five *lepta* or *small things* (12 minutes), and one *lepton* equals four *stigmai*, meaning *point* (3 minutes). In durations that shrink towards Van Hoogstraten's *oogenbliklike daedt* - one *stigma* equals two *rhopai* or *impulses* (one and a half minutes), one *rhopai* is comprised of three *endeixeis* or *showings* (one minute), and one *endeixeis* equates to twelve *rhilai*, or *blinks*. The *blink*, at one and a half seconds was comprised of ten *atoma* (a fifteenth of a second). See Leofranc Holford-Strevens, *The History of Time*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.10.

<sup>64</sup> Ashley Cooper, *A notion of the Historical Draught, or Tablature of the Judgement of Hercules, 1711*, p.12.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

<sup>66</sup> According to the Hierarchy of Genres formulated by the Académie Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture, founded in 1648, still life painting flounders at the bottom of this hierarchy with history painting at the top, and portrait, genre, and landscape painting between.

faithful reconstructions of the past.<sup>67</sup> History painting as defined by Ashley-Cooper, Harris and Lessing, privilege a present whose presentness depends upon an understanding of the whole narrative - a continuum. On Kawara's *Today Series* [fig 1.4] in contradistinction do not depend on a future (tomorrow) or a past (yesterday) as each painting is resolutely a *now* (yesterdays tomorrow is always a today), a perpetual present where tomorrow never comes.<sup>68</sup> Kawara's paintings, like Netherlandish still-life painting, rely on the temporality of the here and now, the ephemeral - an *evenement-courte-duree* that exists outside the flow of history.<sup>69</sup>

The ephemeral and timeless, according to Berger, have been under considerable pressure since the second half of the nineteenth century, when the Impressionists compressed their representations to that of an hour, the Expressionists to an instant of solipsistic subjectivity, and in Pop Art, the ephemeral is emptied of all but the fetish or fashionable.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Massey differentiates the temporality of history painting from Dutch still life painting thus, 'Indelibly tied to archaeology, art theory and the writing of history, classicism nevertheless did not guarantee the specificity of the past through careful reconstruction. Instead, it presented the past anachronically as an affect of the present.' "Reflections on Temporality on Netherlandish Art", *Art History*, November (2012), p. 1052.

<sup>68</sup> The 'perpetual present' (Alain Robbe -Grillet), and the 'instantaneous present' (Samuel Beckett), both attempt to describe what Bruce Kavin refers to as 'natural time sense', time at the 'limits of speech in time', where temporal shifters such as 'before, then, next and after' become irrelevant, See Bruce Kavin, *Telling it Again and Again: Repetition in Literature and Film*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 110. A cinematic example of the 'perpetual present' can be seen in Alain Resnais' *Last Year in Marienbad* (1961), written by Robbe-Grillet. Robbe-Grillet renders the question of whether the films protagonists have or have not met previously at Marienbad meaningless; "The universe in which the entire film occurs is, characteristically, that of a perpetual present which makes all recourse to memory impossible. This is a world without a past, a world which is self sufficient at every moment and which obliterates itself as it proceeds. This man, this woman, begin existing only when they appear on the screen for the first time...The entire story of *Marienbad* happens neither in two years nor in three days, but in exactly one hour and a half. And when at the end of the film the hero and heroine meet in order to leave together, it is as if the young woman were admitting that there had indeed been something between them last year at Marienbad, but we understand that it was precisely last year during the entire projection, and that we were at Marienbad. This love story we were being told as a thing of the past was in fact actually happening before our eyes, here and now. For of course an *elsewhere* is no more possible than a *formerly*'. See Alain Robbe-Grillet, *For a New Novel*, translated by Richard Howard, (New York: Grove Press, 1962), pp. 152- 53.

<sup>69</sup> French historian and leader of the Annales school (the enquiry into long-term social history) Fernand Braudel's tripartite division of time is useful in discussing the work of both Kawara and Netherlandish still life. Braudel divides time into three categories; *structure-long-duree* (thousands of years), *conjocture-moyenne-duree* (hundreds of years), and *evenement-court-duree* (weeks and days). See Immanuel Wallerstein, "History and the Social Sciences: The Longue Duree", translated by Immanuel Wallerstein, *Review*, 32, (2009), pp.171 - 203.

<sup>70</sup> 'The timeless - as Rothko so intensely showed us - has been emptied. The ephemeral has become the sole category of time. Banalized by pragmatism and consumerism, the ephemeral was excluded from abstract art, or fetishized as short-lived fashion in pop art and its derivatives. The ephemeral, no longer appealing to the timeless, becomes as trivial and instant as the fashionable. Without an acknowledged coexistence of the ephemeral and the timeless, there is nothing of consequence for pictorial art to do.



Having established that the *punctum temporis* is a present that seems perpetual and that the perpetual is symbolic of timelessness, it will be useful to discuss challenges to the instant.

## 1.2: Gombrich and the Specious Instant

Do we not beg the most important question when we ask what ‘really happens’ at any point of time?<sup>71</sup>

\_\_\_\_Ernst Gombrich.

Gombrich’s essay *Moment and Movement in Art*, is, according to Robert Le Poidevin, a ‘blistering attack’ against both the *punctum temporis* and the conviction that the static image cannot represent time, and is perhaps the most well known response to Lessing and Harris’s temporal aesthetics.<sup>72</sup> According to Gombrich, significant challenges to the distinction of time and space in painting had been languishing at the margins of art historical discourse since 1804.<sup>73</sup> Gombrich’s 1964 challenge to the *punctum temporis* relies upon questions of depiction, representation and perception. In light of the abundant theories of representation, I am reminded of Richard Wollheim’s advice, that when in doubt, a painting’s label will help clarify representational content.<sup>74</sup>

This chapter therefore, will limit itself to Gombrich’s use of the terms in relation to the *punctum temporis* in *Moment and Matter*.<sup>75</sup>

Gombrich’s challenge to the *punctum temporis* hinges on perception mediated by the instantaneous photographic image of the type developed by Eadweard Muybridge. In a fundamental change to the nature of photography Muybridge, in 1877 took an instantaneous photograph of the racehorse *Occident* with a camera shutter speed of less

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Conceptual art is merely a discussion of this fact’. John Berger, “Painting and Time”, published in *The Sense of Sight*, edited by Lloyd Spencer, (New York: Vintage International, 1993), p. 210.

<sup>71</sup> Ernst H. Gombrich, “Moment and Movement in Art”, *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, Vol. 27 (1964), p. 297.

<sup>72</sup> Robin Le Poidevin, “Time and the Static Image”, *Philosophy*, Vol 72, No. 280, (April 1997), p. 175.

<sup>73</sup> ‘These particular conclusions [by Lessing and Harris] were implicitly challenged by the Romantics [Friedrich Schlegel, 1804] but as far as I know the underlying distinction between the art of time and space, of succession and simultaneity, remained unquestioned in aesthetics’, Gombrich, “Moment and Movement in Art. p. 295.

<sup>74</sup> Richard Wollheim, “On Pictorial Representation”, *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. 56, No.3 (Summer, 1998), p. 218.

<sup>75</sup> For a comprehensive enquiry into representation, both pictorial and verbal, see W. J.T Mitchell, *Picture Theory*, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994).

than one-thousandth of a second.<sup>76</sup> This in turn lead to Muybridge's *Attitudes of Animals in Motion* series of 1881, a series that allowed spectators the opportunity to apprehend a dynamic world stilled in ways previously unavailable to the eye.<sup>77</sup>

Gombrich's principle rebuttal of the *punctum temporis* is a question of the limits of human perception and it takes us to the core of his argument. Gombrich's thesis also includes a bold attempt to give measurement to the moment, and relies on two of Zeno's paradoxes - *Achilles and the Tortoise* and *The Arrow*. Though lengthy, the quote from Gombrich is important as it raises a number of questions:

Do we not beg the most important question when we ask what 'really happens' at any point in time? We therewith assume that what Harris called a *punctum temporis* really exists, or, more radically, that what we really perceive is the infinite sequence of such static points in time. Once this is conceded the rest follows, at least with the demand for mimesis. Static signs, the argument runs, can only represent static movements, never movements which happen in time. Philosophers are familiar with this problem under the name of Zeno's paradox, the demonstration that that *Achilles could never catch up with a tortoise and no arrow could ever move*. As soon as we assume that there is a fraction of time in which there is no movement, movement as such becomes inexplicable. Logically the idea that there is a 'moment' which has no movement and can be seized and fixed in this static form by the artist, or for that matter, by the camera, certainly leads to Zeno's paradox. Even an instantaneous photograph records the traces of movement, a sequence of events, however brief. But the idea of the *punctum temporis* is not only an absurdity logically; it is a worse absurdity psychologically. For we are not cameras but rather slow registering instruments that cannot take in much at a time. Twenty-four successive stills in a second are sufficient to give us the illusion of movement in the cinema. We can see them only in motion, not as stills. *Somewhere along this order of magnitude, a fifteenth or a tenth of a second, lies what we experience as a moment, something we can just seize in its flight.*<sup>78</sup>

Gombrich uses two of Zeno's paradoxes without developing, in any detail, (beyond his assertion that movement cannot occur in an instant or moment) the ways in which these

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<sup>76</sup> See Rebecca Solnitt, *Motion Studies: Time Space and Eadweard Muybridge*, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2004), p. 182.

<sup>77</sup> This stillness sent out a shock wave, provoking a range of responses from artists of the day. Auguste Renoir declared that photography lied, while the artist tells the truth, as time cannot stand still, and French Classicist painter Jean-Louis-Ernest Meissonier (1815-1891) was forced to repaint the legs of a horse, having seen Muybridge's *Motion* series. Ibid., pp. 196-198.

<sup>78</sup> With the exception of *punctum temporis*, My Italics, Ernst H. Gombrich, "Moment and Movement in Art", *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, Vol. 27 (1964), p. 297.

paradoxes support his argument.<sup>79</sup> According to Le Poidevin, however, both of Zeno's paradoxes can in fact be used to support the idea of an instant.<sup>80</sup> Gombrich's second argument relies more strongly on the moment as apprehended by a perceiver. We are, to follow Gombrich, 'rather slow registering instruments', and therefore do not have the recognition capacity for an instant. Recognition implies the comprehension of resemblance, and at risk of stating the obvious, depiction is a representation that resembles.

Gombrich's challenge to Harris and Lessing's position that static images can only represent an instant (an instantaneous state of affairs) appears sound, but if we look at some of the ways in which painters have attempted to represent movement, we come across images that seem to support the very argument that Gombrich seeks to undermine. In Marcel Duchamp's *Nude Descending a Staircase, No. 2* (1912) [Fig 1.7] and Giacomo Balla's *Dynamism of a Dog on a Lead* (1912) [Fig 1.8], we see the representation of movement by the depiction of asynchronous states. This can be described as the superimposition of instants.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> Gombrich initially uses both of Zeno's paradoxes to challenge the instant, but they describe two different ways of thinking about an instant, and in using them together Gombrich muddies the water slightly. One way of thinking time is that is discrete, and if we can agree that time is indivisible, that it has no end, then it is clear that Achilles can never catch up with the tortoise. Achilles, in pursuing a tortoise that has been given the advantage of a head start must make up the distance between them, by which time the tortoise will have advanced, each time, by a shorter distance. It is a race of ever decreasing distances, and if time is indivisible, there is no end, and no possible instant in which Achilles overtakes the tortoise. Zeno's paradox of the arrow in flight however, suggests a more complex way of thinking about the instant, one that negates the idea of indivisible time, replacing the instant with a boundary between two instants, a view that Aristotle advances in *Physics*, 'The now is a link of time...for it links together past and future, since it is the beginning of one and an end of another'. Most would agree that a moving object is in movement as it travels from *A* to *B*. Zeno's paradox however, states that an arrow occupies a space equal to itself at any moment of its journey. As places do not move, the arrow has had no time in which to move, the same can be said for every other moment of the arrow's journey from *A* to *B*, and therefore the arrow never moves.

<sup>80</sup> 'Instants cast more light on motion than they obscure it. They enable us to define motion, and in a way which explains both the sense in which an arrow is at rest *in* (though not *at*) every instant of its flight, and why Zeno's inference from this proposition is fallacious', 'Time and the Static Image', *Philosophy*, Vol. 72, No. 280, (April 1997), p. 182.

<sup>81</sup> In a statement that seems to anticipate Muybridge's *Animals in Motion* series, Goethe's rapid repetition of Van Hoogstraten's '*oogenbliklike daedt*' sets the 'fugitive moment', as described by Goethe, into motion. Goethe writes, 'To seize well the attention of the Laocoon, let us place ourselves before the group with our eyes shut, and all the necessary distance; let us open and shut them alternately, and we shall see all the marble in motion; we shall be afraid to find the group changed when we open our eyes again'. Cited by Peter Wollen in "Time, Image and Terror", *Time and the Image*, edited by Carolyn Bailey Gill, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, (2000), pp. 140-161, 150. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, "Observations on the Laocoon", *Propylaen* 1, October (1798), lead article. Translator unknown, *Monthly Magazine* vii, (1799), London, pp. 3489-52.



Fig 1.7



Fig 1.8



Fig 1.9

Peter Paul Rubens' 1638 *Portrait of Helene Fourment (Het Pelsken)* [Fig 1.9] represents movement by employing an extreme bodily displacement. It is impossible for Fourment's upper body to join with her thighs and legs at the point marked by her left hand. This displacement creates the impression that the upper body is in the process of movement.<sup>82</sup> The above three paintings represent temporal order non-depictively, but all three appear to represent a different rate of change (Balla the fastest, Rubens the slowest with Duchamp somewhere in-between). Duchamp and Balla's asynchronous states, however, transgress Ashley-Cooper's temporal boundary and in doing so have ended up repeating themselves:

For if he [the painter] passes the present only for a moment, he may as well pass it for many years. And by this reckoning he may repeat the same Figure several times over.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Rubens' portrait is discussed by John Berger in *Ways of Seeing*, New York: Penguin, 1972, p.61. Berger however, is confident that the illusion of movement is accidental, 'Rubens did not plan this: the spectator may not consciously notice it'. This argument is challenged by Michael Betancourt. Betancourt supports his position by using an argument of artistic intention, 'To assume that a master painter with several decades of experience painting the human form is unaware of the discrepancy in a painting of his wife is difficult to believe. The reason that many viewers may not consciously notice it is they are not supposed to notice it. The fur wrap which covers her body also hides the displacement from immediate observation'. *Motion Perception in Movies and Painting: Towards a New Kinetic Art*, [www.ctheory.net](http://www.ctheory.net)

<sup>83</sup> Op cit.

Static images cannot depict movement as they would resemble movement, a movement we would perceive, and we clearly do not. It seems safer to say that static images depict instants. This depends upon a capacity to recognise instants which also seems unlikely. We cannot perceive instants. The question remains, what then are static images depicting, since it is neither movement nor an instant. According to Le Poidevin, one possibility is that static images depict unchanging states of affairs as we are in possession of the capacity to recognise such states - an awareness of the absence of movement. There is a problem with this position. If we look at Jean-Louis-Ernest Meissonier's (1815-1891) *Study of a Horse at a Gallop* (undated) [Fig 1.10], the drawing depicts a horse in dynamic motion, but to say that the painting depicts an unchanging state of affairs results in a paradox.



Fig 1.10

If we accept Zeno's paradox at face value, that the instant cannot be arrived at by the division of time into smaller and smaller intervals until we reach an extensionless point (one of Gombrich's central challenges to the *punctum temporis*), then an unchanging state of affairs seems unstable. This does not take us any closer to a satisfactory conclusion. One way out of this impasse according to Le Poidevin, in agreement with Gombrich's last challenge to Harris, one that sounds like Van Hoogstraten's blink of an eye, returns us to the limits of human perception:

For we are not cameras but rather slow registering instruments that cannot take in much at a time. Twenty-four successive stills in a second are sufficient to give us the illusion of movement in the cinema. We can see them only in motion, not as stills. *Somewhere along this order of magnitude, a fifteenth or a tenth of a*

*second, lies what we experience as a moment, something we can just seize in its flight.*<sup>84</sup>

Le Poidevin defines an instant in terms of ‘the smallest *perceivable part* of an interval’ of time.<sup>85</sup> This he refers to as the ‘specious instant’.<sup>86</sup> The word *specious* has several etymological roots, two of which, from the Latin *speciosus*, include ‘pleasing to the sight’, and ‘having a deceptive attraction or allure’.<sup>87</sup> The first definition in its appeal to perception dispenses with the need for any particular metaphysical position surrounding the question of instants. We are clearly capable of recognizing a specious instant. This according to Le Poidevin is what the static image depicts,

Static images depict what I have called the “specious instant”: the smallest perceivable part of an interval. But because many such images make reference to actions and events, we naturally take them as representing a much larger time-span. Finally, insofar as they depict particular spatial relations amongst objects which are interpreted to be in motion, they represent genuinely *exentionless* instants. There is no incompatibility between these answers.<sup>88</sup>

Poidevin’s ‘specious instant’ suggests that is apprehended in an interval or gap. Le Poidevin appears to support not only the temporal position of the instant in relation to the past and the future as thought by Ashley-Cooper, Harris and Lessing, but also states that the static image is ‘the *smallest* part of an interval’.<sup>89</sup>

Before concluding the question of instants I will turn briefly to a temporal condition of the static image that is perhaps the most relevant to my own practice, a condition where movement is neither depicted nor represented - the depiction of static things by

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<sup>84</sup> Ernst H. Gombrich, “Moment and Movement in Art”, *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, Vol. 27 (1964), p. 297.

<sup>85</sup> Here Le Poidevin follows Aristotle’s interval as existing between two *nows* (*nun*), a division of time between the past (*proteron*) and future (*husteron*). Aristotle’s interval therefore, depends upon the divisibility of time. Aristotle refers to the now (*nun*) as both an interval and a link of time. According to Aristotle ‘the now is a link [sunechia] of time...for it links together past and future time, and is a limit of time, since it is a beginning of one and an end of another’. See *Physics: Books 5-8*, translated by P.H Wicksteed and F.M. Cornford, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1934).

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> <http://www.merriam-webster.com/>

<sup>88</sup> Robin Le Poidevin, “Time and the Static Image”, *Philosophy*, Vol. 72, No. 280, (April 1997), p. 188.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

static images.<sup>90</sup> The attempt to represent movement in painting is foiled by the instant and results in unconvincing results. James Elkins writes of movement in painting in language that echoes that of Lessing:

Movement is a great temptation in painting...In general motion is a mistake in painting, because the motionless canvas rebels against it, making motion look ridiculous.<sup>91</sup>

The genre that distances itself from the temptations that provoke Elkins is Dutch still life painting, a genre that stretches the specious instant *ad infinitum*. All paintings are of course (discounting those afforded a kinetic nature) still. Some paintings however, make stillness their very subject in ways that make a challenge to the dynamic world beyond their edges.<sup>92</sup> Painting, unlike poetry, has no pronoun, adverb or verb to serve as temporal markers and the ephemera in Dutch still life are afforded, therefore, an endless *now*, a presentness that results not in an accretion of time, but timelessness.<sup>93</sup> Timelessness prior to the nineteenth century was an eternal refuge that we prayed to, and went to when we died. Eternity, after all, is not a long time; it is timeless.<sup>94</sup>

Dutch still life painting is normatively discussed in relation to the Reformation and the replacement of liturgical time with mercantile or profane time - a time that, according to Roland Barthes, results in, not the reading of images but an auditing of surplus.<sup>95</sup> The historical and reductive reading of Dutch still life painting cannot

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<sup>90</sup> The relevance of stillness inherent in Dutch still life painting is particularly important to the development of a body of paintings that constitute the core response to research questions. The importance of stillness in Dutch painting, *trompe l'oeil* and perspective will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2.4.

<sup>91</sup> James Elkins, *Time and Narrative*, an unfinished essay posted at [www.jameselkins.com/html/upcoming.html](http://www.jameselkins.com/html/upcoming.html), p.8.

<sup>92</sup> Walking into the National Gallery, London, from a very busy Trafalgar square to see the Dutch Flowers exhibition (6 April - 29 August, 2016), I experienced first-hand this challenge. The stillness in the room was shocking.

<sup>93</sup> Dutch still life painting replaces the diachronic (evolved through time) sequence of narration with a synchronic (existing at one point in time) order.

<sup>94</sup> Platonic thought describes a binary opposition of the eternal and time. The eternal signals a 'higher world of permanence and perfection', while time belongs to an 'imperfect lower world of flux'. Keith Robinson, "The New Whitehead? An Ontology of the Virtual in Whitehead's Metaphysics", *Symposium*, Vol. 10, No. 1, (2006), pp. 69-80.

<sup>95</sup> In a statement that seems to maintain still life firmly at the bottom of the hierarchy of genres. Barthes claims that 'Still life painters like Van de Velde or Heda always render matter's most superficial quality: *sheen*. Oysters, lemon pulp, heavy goblets full of dark wine, long clay pipes, gleaming chestnuts pottery, tarnished metal cups, three grape seeds - what can be the justification of such an assemblage if not to lubricate man's gaze amid his domain, to facilitate his daily business among objects whose riddle is so dissolved and which are no longer anything but easy surfaces?'. Roland Barthes, "The World as

explain, in full, the richness of time represented. I am, therefore, less interested in these reductive accounts of painting's temporality but rather the ways in which the qualities of painting are offered to the eye that result in a synthesis of painting's internal temporality, and duration as experienced by a beholder. This has been referred to by Celeste Brusati in relation to Dutch painting as 'the temporal dimensions of real-time viewing'.<sup>96</sup>

The temporal aesthetics of Ashley-Cooper, Harris and Lessing, the phenomenological challenge from Gombrich, and the metaphysical from Le Poidevin, have in common, arguments that obsess on the instant in relation to the divisibility or non-divisibility of time. Whether we agree with Harris or Gombrich, the arguments tend to rely on a quantitative rather than qualitative thinking of time. This according to Henri Bergson, results in the spatialising of time.<sup>97</sup>

It is unlikely that any changes to temporal conditions depicted or represented by painting can be achieved without resorting to a hybrid approach such as the projection of moving images onto painting's surface. My reluctance to combine the static image with the moving is not due to any attachment to medium specificity, but rather to an

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Object", published in *Calligram*, edited by Norman Bryson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 106-15, 107-8.

<sup>96</sup> The importance of 'real-time' viewing to my third research question will be dealt with in Chapter Four. See Celeste Brusati, "Perspective in Flux: Viewing Dutch Pictures in Real Time", *Art History*, Vol. 35, No. 5, (2012), pp. 908-933.

<sup>97</sup> French Philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941) in his first major work *Time and Free will* (1889) introduces his theory of duration (*duree*) in terms of affect, agency and embodiment. *Time and Free Will* was originally published as *Essais sur les Données Immédiates de la Conscience*, the English translation of which is, *An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*. The word 'immediate' in the original makes explicit the relation between Bergson's duration (*l'organisme qui vit est chose qui duree* - that which endures) and lived experience. Bergson's duration is a horizon of immediate experience, temporal and not spatial. It is irreversible, qualitative and not quantitative. *Élan vital*, according to Bergson, is the movement of evolution and creation within which we exist, a non-mechanistic framework, and image 'for the process of time as duration', as it unfolds. Bergson's duration escapes the quantitative spatial logic that dominates the normative understanding of temporality. In the *Essai* Bergson uses the analogy of counting to clarify the distinction between time and space. When we count, we must hold in memory the units as they are counted, and juxtapose them with each subsequent unit. This juxtaposition, according to Bergson, implies simultaneity and therefore takes place in space. We are counting in homogenous space and not in heterogeneous time. Bergson's duration is radically independent of space, a position that Bergson, depending on whom we read, struggled to maintain in a famous exchange with Albert Einstein at the Philosophical Society of Paris in 1922. For an excellent introduction to Bergson, See Suzanne Guerlac, *Thinking in Time*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006. For a facsimile of the 1913 edition by George Allen and Co., Ltd., of Bergson's *Essai*, see *Time and Free Will*, (London: Elibron Classics series, 2005). For the continued relevance of Bergson's thought, See Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, (Brooklyn NY: Zone Books, 1998).



interest in how time exists within painting *qua* painting.<sup>98</sup> Having already stated in the dissertation's introduction that repetition is the means by which temporal conditions might be re-positioned and having identified above the temporal condition to be re-positioned, not the instant in the service of movement or narrative, but the phenomenological encounter with painting as it occurs both in time and in space: it will be necessary to discuss repetition's relation to time, and the relation of repetition to difference. In doing so I will examine a temporal condition of the static image hitherto not mentioned, one that undermines the designation *static* and underpins all of the temporal conditions covered in this dissertation - the repeatability of images.

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<sup>98</sup> By 'medium specificity' I am referring here specifically to Clement Greenberg's appeal for dissimilitude between media, first advanced in *Avant-Garde and Kitsch* (1939,) and in *Towards a Newer Laocoon* (1940). Although I refer to a distinction between painting and the moving image, in *Laocoon*, Greenberg discusses abstract painting in terms of its purity, unsullied by the influence of other media. In language reminiscent of James Harris, Greenberg also attempts to distance the plastic arts from literature, 'It is easier to isolate the medium in the case of the plastic arts, and consequently avant-garde painting and sculpture can be said to have attained a much more radical purity than avant-garde poetry....Pure poetry strives for infinite suggestion, pure plastic art for the minimum'. See Clement Greenberg, 'Towards a Newer Laocoon', *Partisan Review*, 7, (July-August, 1940), pp. 296-310. W.J.T Mitchell in 'Ut Pictura Theoria: Abstract Painting and Language' challenges Greenberg's plastic 'purity' by arguing that both representational painting and abstract painting are dependent upon language, the representational tied to narrative, and the abstract to theory. W.J.T. Mitchell, *Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 213-40. For the privileging of concept over medium, an 'irrevocable break' with Greenberg's medium specificity, See Rosalind Krauss, *A Voyage on the North Sea: Art in the Age of a Post Medium Condition*, (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1999).

### 1.3: Repetition and Difference.

No device more effectively generates the effect of a doubling or bending of time than the work of art, a strange kind of event whose relation in time is plural.<sup>99</sup>

—Alexander Nagel and Christopher Wood.




Fig 1.11

Repetition is an everyday word that encompasses an extravagant range of enterprises; alliteration, appropriation, close copy, strict copy, duplication, ingemination, palilogia, reiteration, simulacrum, and we can, as Mel Bochner has in his *Portrait of Robert Smithson* (1966) [Fig 1.11], go on. I have been asked on many occasions (mostly by perplexed visual artists) - why repeat? What can possibly be gained by repetition that has not already been seen? In response, and in agreement with Briony Fer, a far more interesting question is what might the world look like ‘*without* recurrence, reiteration, repetition’ - without the already seen?<sup>100</sup> The answer to this question, I suspect, would be an incipient world of endless difference without any

<sup>99</sup> Alexander Nagel and Christopher Wood, an extract from “The Plural Temporality of the Work of Art”, *Anachronic Renaissance*, New York: Zone Books, (2010), pp.17-19. In *Time: Documents of Contemporary Art*, (London and Cambridge: Whitechapel Gallery and The MIT Press, 2011)3, pp. 38-42, 39.

<sup>100</sup> Briony Fer, *The Infinite Line: Re-making Art after Modernism*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 1.

possibility for recognition - an infinite and dizzying assault on the senses by the new.<sup>101</sup> Repetition in the world, however, is ubiquitous, an engine of difference that creates the possibilities for the new to emerge from the *already seen*, a process central to painting in the Western tradition. One of Gilles Deleuze's claims and one that will be returned to in more detail is that repetition always results in difference and never the same. While I agree with Deleuze's claims for the power of repetition, it is nevertheless a claim that continues to split opinion within art historical discourse.<sup>102</sup>

The pejorative associations that continue to haunt repetition are so entrenched, that doubt and uncertainty are confronted not only in the studio, but in the act of writing this dissertation. As I write I have an eye on that most academically unacceptable class of repetition; plagiarism. In writing about repetition, I risk not only repeating myself, but also the work of others. In my studio, another eye checks the progress of painting, determining the degree to which they produce a difference in *kind* and not of *degree*.<sup>103</sup> The key to success when repeating is to repeat with difference. A successful repetition

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<sup>101</sup> A situation that the eponymous hero of Jorge Luis Borges' short story "Funes the Memorious" found himself in due to an inability to perceive recurrence. See "Funes the Memorious", translated by James E. Irby, published in *Labyrinths*, (London: Penguin Modern Classics, 2000), pp. 87-96.

<sup>102</sup> Rosalind Krauss writes, 'That so many twentieth-century artists should have manipulated themselves into this particular position of paradox- where they are condemned to repetition as if by compulsion, the logically fraudulent original - is truly compelling'. Rosalind Krauss, "The Originality of the Avant-Garde: A Postmodernist Repetition", *October*, Vol. 18 (Autumn 1981), pp. 47-66. David Ryan discusses painting as a practice that 'points firstly to the fact that the medium's permeable nature refuses any idealised, determined picture of what "painting" actually is, and secondly how it can position itself within a differentiated landscape of media. This situation is one where the "medium" of painting, or other practices, can be seen as translation, transposition, infiltration and echo, rather than as core identity', David Ryan, "On Painting", *Art Monthly*, (April 2012), pp. 9-12, 10. Douglas Crimp discusses appropriation as regression thus, 'The strategy of appropriation no longer attests to a particular stance toward the conditions of contemporary culture. To say this is both to suggest that appropriation *did* at first seem to entail a critical position and to admit that such a reading was altogether too simple. Appropriation, pastiche quotation - these methods extend to virtually every aspect of our culture', Douglas Crimp, "Appropriating Appropriation", published in *On the Museums Ruins*, (Cambridge MA and London: The MIT Press, 1995), pp. 126-149, 126. Both Jean Baudrillard and Hans-Georg Gadamer regarded repetitive strategies in the arts as symptomatic of the failure of representation and a bankruptcy of ideas. See Jean Baudrillard, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*, translated by Charles Levin, (St Louis MO: Telos Press, 1981), p. 81. See also Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Speechless Image", published in *The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays*, translated by Nicholas Walker, edited by Robert Bernasconi, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.90.

<sup>103</sup> I refer here to a differentiation of difference - difference in kind and difference of degree. Difference according to Bergson is a question of quantity and quality, and of multiplicity. Quantitative difference is difference by degree, is actual, and inherently spatial. Qualitative difference is difference in kind, virtual and essentially durational. See Gilles Deleuze, "Intuition as Method", published in *Bergsonism*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, (New York: Zone Books, 1991), pp. 13-37, 31.

does not repeat.<sup>104</sup> Rather than attempting to present a thorough account of the philosophies of Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, and Walter Benjamin, I will, however, introduce aspects of their thinking on repetition, time and difference that are relevant to my research questions. For the sake of consistency, clarity, and to avoid misunderstandings generated by their colloquial interchangeability I will rely (in part) on Bruce Kawin's straightforward differentiation of constructive and destructive repetition:

Repetitious: where a word, percept, or experience is repeated with less impact at each recurrence; repeated to no particular end, out of a failure of invention or sloppiness of thought and Repetitive: when a word, percept or experience is repeated with equal or greater force at each occurrence.<sup>105</sup>

While Kawin's differentiation is partially useful, the binary opposition is too comfortable, too neat. The repetitious and the repetitive are interchangeable, and both Bergson and Deleuze argue that repetition *never* results in the same.<sup>106</sup> Here are two repetitions of an anecdote.<sup>107</sup>

As the train I am travelling on pulls into the station at Newcastle upon Tyne, I remember the time I visited the City as an eleven year old. The visit was organised by my school for purposes of an educational nature. With pocket money provided by my parents, I bought from a small shop on a steep side street, a set of four near identical colour transparencies of the Tyne Bridge taken sequentially. I then remember that I always remember this - every time my train pulls into Newcastle Station.

As the train I am travelling on pulls into the station at Newcastle upon Tyne, I remember the time I visited the City as an eleven year old. The visit was organised by my school for purposes of an educational nature. With pocket money provided by my parents I bought from a small shop on a steep side street, a set of four near identical

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<sup>104</sup> Throughout this dissertation I will be presenting examples of artists, whose work repeats successfully, and in some cases not. The successful repetition results in difference as opposed to sameness.

<sup>105</sup> Bruce Kawin, *Telling it Again and Again: Repetition in Literature and Film*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p.4.

<sup>106</sup> Bergson, according to Suzanne Guerlac, discussing the limits of language in relation to duration in the *Essai* writes, 'It is in the context of this critique of language that Bergson makes his strongest claim yet concerning the intimate relationship between intensities and time: one never experiences the same sensation twice. All sensations are modified through repetition for the very fact of recurrence alters the nature of the sensation'. Suzanne Guerlac, *Thinking in Time*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 73.

<sup>107</sup> Originally written while travelling on a train to Newcastle on the thirteenth of September, 2015.

colour transparencies of the Tyne Bridge taken sequentially. I then remember that I *always* remember this - every time my train pulls into Newcastle Station.

The anecdote is a riot of memory, time and repetition. It is in fact a repetition of Jorge Luis Borges' enquiry into life's abundance of repetition from his essay *A New Refutation of Time*.<sup>108</sup>

If we apply Leibniz's Law to these two texts, it is difficult at first glance to argue that they are separate entities.<sup>109</sup> They *are* in fact different. I made sure of it. But this is not the point. The anecdotes above are not a sequence - they are a series, albeit a small one. The terms sequence and series are used interchangeably but have distinct differences. A sequence is usually thought of as an ordered list of numbers or terms where the order of the numbers or terms is important. A series is the sum of the terms in a sequence and the order of these terms can vary. At the risk of a gross oversimplification a sequence can be written as 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. The sum of the series is 45, but the order of the sequence's terms can be varied several times over without altering the sum, and can be written differently, 5 + 8 + 6 + 9 + 10 + 7, or 6 + 5 + 10 + 8 + 7 + 9, and so on. This, according to American artist Mel Bochner, is nothing more than the variation of a theme, evident in the painting of Claude Monet or Giorgio Morandi. Bochner distanced his own work, with that of Sol Lewit and Donald Judd, from what he described as the series as 'style'.<sup>110</sup> Bochner differentiates the stylistic series from the more masculine 'method', 'attitude', and 'logic' of the serial along three modes of operation.<sup>111</sup> While Bochner's definitions seems to combine qualities of both

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<sup>108</sup> 'I never pass in front of Recoleta without remembering that my father, my grandparents and great-grandparents are buried there, just as I shall some day; then I remember that I have remembered the same thing an untold number of times already,' Jorge Luis Borges, "A New Refutation of Time", published in *Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings*, translated by James E. Irby, (London: Penguin Classics, 2000), p. 258.

<sup>109</sup> Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's (1646-1716) law of indiscernibles states that if two objects or entities share all their common properties, they cannot be thought of as separate entities. 'X is identical with Y if and only if every property of X is a property of Y', Julian Baggini and Peter S. Fosl, *The Philosopher's Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), p. 100. "But it is absurd that there are two distinct things, which cannot be distinguished even by an infinite intellect", an extract from "Leibniz's Argument for the Identity of Indiscernibles in his letter to Casati (with Transcription and Translation)", quoted by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Perera in *The Leibniz Review*, Vol.22, (2012), pp. 137-150, 139.

<sup>110</sup> 'Serial order is a method, not a style', Mel Bochner, "The Serial Attitude", *Artforum*, Vol. 6, No. 4, (1967), pp. 28-33, 28.

<sup>111</sup> The modernist series and minimalist seriality share an infinite extension, but not spatial arrangement or organisation. Bochner is succinct on this point. In *The Serial Attitude* he deploys a modular thesis that draws heavily from emerging system theories of the late 1960's. Bochner outlines three 'operating assumptions' that differentiate the serial from the series; '1. The derivation of the terms or interior divisions of the work is by means of numerical or otherwise systematically predetermined process

sequence ('The order takes precedence'), and the series ('permutation, progression and reversal'), his attempt to separate series from serial remains problematic.<sup>112</sup>

In Deleuze's book on Leibniz and the baroque, the series is discussed in terms of not only internal differences, but also the ways in which one series might be folded into another. Literature, to follow Deleuze, might be considered a series, as could medicine, dance, or painting, and they possess the potential to be folded one into the other.

Deleuze writes:

We have seen that the world was infinity of converging series, capable of being extended into each other, around unique points.<sup>113</sup>

I will return to the two anecdotes introduced above and discuss them, not in terms of Bochner's style, method, attitude or logic, but in terms of duration as thought by Bergson, and difference, developed from Leibniz, by Deleuze. The second anecdote *is* different to the first. They would, however, according to Bergson, still be different even if I had not manufactured the difference. The difference would be qualitative, and not quantitative. The act of repetition alters perception of the first anecdote. The anecdote's second appearance marks a temporal difference from the first, and in this qualitative difference over time, we are made aware of time flowing by qualities that differ at different times. The difference that the anecdote's second iteration performs is an internal difference (a mobility of consciousness), central to Bergson's *Pure Duration*, and not the discovery of difference by comparing the two anecdotes as they occur in space. The repetition of the first anecdote, according to Kawin's definition, is 'repeated to no particular end, out of a failure of invention', and is repetitious. This is too simple.<sup>114</sup> If we think of the second iteration of the anecdote from Bergson's perspective,

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(permutation, progression, rotation, reversal).2.The order takes precedence over the execution. 3. The completed work is fundamentally parsimonious and systematically self-exhausting.' Mel Bochner, "The Serial Attitude", *Artforum*, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1967, pp. 28-33, 29. For an account of systems theory See Ludwig von Bertalanffy, *General Systems Theory*, (New York: Braziller, 1968).

<sup>112</sup> What they both have in common however, is endlessness through repetition, an endlessness that undermined the temporal logic of Modernist painting as understood by a troubled Michael Fried in his 1967 essay *Art and Objecthood*. I will discuss Fried and his chronophobia in chapter two. Michael Fried, "Art and Objecthood," *Artforum*, (June 1967); reprinted in *Art and Objecthood*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

<sup>113</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, translated by Tom Conley, Originally published as *Le Pli: Leibniz et le Baroque*. (Minnesota: The University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 60.

<sup>114</sup> Bruce Kawin, *Telling it Again and Again: Repetition in Literature and Film*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p.4.

repetition produces an internal difference that relies on the perception of the two iterations as they occur in time. Memory of the first must be held in mind in order to account for the second. The elements of identity are therefore memory and repetition. Bergson writes,

It is duration that includes all the qualitative differences, to the point where it is defined as alteration in relation to itself....Memory is essentially difference and matter essentially repetition.<sup>115</sup>

In the *Essai*, Bergson refers to this as *confused multiplicity*, a multiplicity radically different to that encountered in space. The comparison of my two anecdotes may take place in space - does the arrangement and spelling of words correspond exactly in both? Bergson defines this as *distinct multiplicity*, the counting and manipulation of things that exist in space. *Confused multiplicity* has nothing do whatsoever with space or number, but with the radical force of time that appears as pure duration. The relevance of Bergson's pure duration to a distinction between sequence and serial is that it implies a temporal synthesis that challenges the temporal order of past-present-future. Pure duration to follow Bergson, challenges the idea of temporal succession (the sequence), by thinking duration as a force in which past, present and future coalesce (the series). At the risk of oversimplification, difference to Bergson and Deleuze is not a concept but another name for being. Being, however, is not static; it is an ongoing process, one that unfolds as a process of differentiation. Three discourses that help interrogate unfolding differentiation underpinned by repetition are encountered in the writing of Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze.

#### **1.4 Abilities, Iterability, the Murmur, and the Stutter.**

A reader of Walter Benjamin's language translated from the German into English will be aware of a preponderance of the suffix - specifically the suffix -ability (*barkeit*). The most well known of these *barkeiten* is perhaps *Reproduzier-barkeit* (Reproduce-ability).<sup>116</sup> Benjamin's recourse to this suffix performs a similar temporal function to the

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<sup>115</sup> Gilles Deleuze, "Elan Vital as Movement of Differentiation," in *Bergsonism*, (New York: Zone Books, 1991), pp.91-114, 92-93.

<sup>116</sup> I am indebted here to Samuel Weber's *Benjamin's -abilities*, (Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2008). See also Walter Benjamin, *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*, translated by J. A. Underwood, (London: Penguin Books, 2008), pp. 1-51, originally published as "Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner Technischen Reproduzierbarkeit" published in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, vol 1, (1936).

*Zeitwort* (time- word or verb) in that it signals an unfinished or ongoing process. Benjamin clarifies the abilities of this unfinished process by introducing the term *extreme*. A property that Leibniz ascribes to the monad and one that helps determine Benjamin's *extreme*, is that the singular contains the universal.<sup>117</sup> Benjamin's *extreme* describes a things potential or -ability to 'part company with itself', a process whereby the singular becomes a plurality, and virtual potentials become actualised.<sup>118</sup> Benjamin's term *extreme* can be thought of as the means by which multiplicity might be released from an original, through an internal process that remains virtual until it is released through repetition. Samuel Weber in *Benjamin's -abilities* explains,

The uniquely *extreme* in no way excludes repetition: as a "virtual re-arrangement" it presupposes it. But it also determines it as a movement of differentiation, of variation, of alteration.<sup>119</sup>

Here Weber agrees with Deleuze. Variation lies at the heart of repetition, and repetition can only be understood in light of this inextricable link between repetition and difference. Deleuze clarifies this in the preface to the English edition of *Difference and Repetition*:

[Variation] is not added to repetition in order to hide it, but is rather its condition or constitutive element, the interiority of repetition par excellence.<sup>120</sup>

The presupposition of repetition in Benjamin's *extreme* resembles Jacques Derrida's principle of iterability. Though not identical, they both question the either/or of

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<sup>117</sup> Four qualities ascribed to the monad by Leibniz.

'1. The monad, about which we will shall speak here, is nothing other than a simple substance which enters into compound, simple meaning without parts. 11. It follows from what we have just said that the natural changes of monads come from an internal principle [that they may be called active force], since an external cause would not be able to influence a monads interior. 12. [And generally it may be said that force is nothing other than the principle of change.] But besides the principle of change, there must also be a complete specification of that which undergoes the change, which constitutes, so to speak the specific determination and variety of simple substances. 13. This complete specification must encompass a plurality within the unity or simple. For as every natural change takes place by degrees, something changes and something remains; and consequently in the simple substance there must be a plurality of affections and relations even though it has no parts.' See Lloyd Strickland, *Leibniz's Monadology: A New Translation and Guide*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), pp. 14-16.

<sup>118</sup> Samuel Weber, *Benjamin's -abilities*, (Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2008), p.8.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., p.8.

<sup>120</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton, (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), p. xiv.



possibility/impossibility. The ability for a single occurrence to multiply itself *in advance* undermines this binary logic. Iterability is not in and of itself repetition; it is closer to Benjamin's ability - the potential for something to be repeated as a structural possibility *already* at work in the original.

Derrida, like Benjamin and Deleuze, maintains that repetition is always inscribed in an original and that in order for an original to function as a carrier of meaning, to continue speaking, it must be able to be repeated. If not, any uniquely original image would exist outside of symbolic register and its ability to transmit meaning would be nullified. Without precedence we simply would not know what we were looking at. *In Limited Inc*, Derrida writes,

If one admits that writing (and the mark in general) *must be able* to function in the absence of the sender, the receiver, the context of production etc., this implies that this power, this *being able*, this *possibility* is *always* inscribed, hence *necessarily* inscribed as *possibility* in the functioning or the functional structure of the mark...It follows that this possibility is a *necessary* part of its structure...Inasmuch as it is essential and structural, this possibility is always at work marking *all the facts*, all the events, even those that appear to disguise it. *Just as iterability, which is not iteration*, can be recognised even in a mark that *in fact* seems to have occurred only once. I say *seems*, because this one time is in itself divided or multiplied in advance by its structure of repeatability.<sup>121</sup>

This property of multiplicity 'in advance' is a temporal condition of an image that can no longer be described as strictly static.<sup>122</sup> It has the potential to be mobile in time through repetition. This mobility, the ability to multiply forwards, also possess properties that help address the question of how the temporal conditions of the static image might be shifted or re-positioned.

Repetition troubles normative temporal flow. The *then* becomes a *now* anticipating a *next* in contrast to a *now* passing into a *then* in order to make room for the *next*. In Deleuze's 1968 principle thesis for the Doctorat D'Etat *Difference and Repetition*, the relation between the singular and the multiple is discussed unequivocally in the introduction as central to the thesis. Deleuze begins his introduction with 'Repetition is not generality', and moves on in a vein that anticipates Derrida's iterability, to how repetition repeats in advance its subsequent repetitions:

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<sup>121</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc*, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998), p.47.

<sup>122</sup> *Opcit.*

[R]epetition is a necessary and justified conduct only in relation to that which cannot be replaced. Repetition as a conduct and as a point of view concerns non-exchangeable and non-substitutable singularities... [Repetitions] do not add a second time and a third time to the first, but carry the first time to the “nth” power...it is not the Federation Day which commemorates or represents the fall of the Bastille, but the fall of the Bastille which celebrates and repeats in advance all the Federation Days, or Monet’s first water lily which repeats all the others. Generality, as generality of the particular, thus stands opposed to repetition as universality of the singular.<sup>123</sup>

Common sense dictates that if repetition entails plurality it cannot simultaneously entail the singular. But as we have seen in Leibniz’s monad, Benjamin’s *extreme*, and Derrida’s iterability, - repetition’s stretching of the first to its “nth” degree no longer strikes us as paradoxical. A common question asked by visitors to my studio when confronted by a series of paintings is which one came first? Deleuze’s repetition unravels temporal foundations in ways that take us into surprising territories that undermine the very idea of firstness. If I attempt to answer the question in order to move on to something less taxing, the answer might be ‘the one that I finished first’.

This answer seems to have wrapped things up nicely despite the fact that at the time of answering I do not consider any of them to be finished. The first painting that I thought of *as the first* could only be so if it remained the first infinitely, and therefore would be the origin of nothing at all. In order for this first painting to be the first it needs a second hung in close proximity. The strange territory I mentioned above now shows its full force. Briankle G. Chang in *Deleuze, Monet and Being Repetitive* clarifies the way in which repetition causes a ‘troubling murmur in the regular rhythms of numbering’.<sup>124</sup> Chang explains:

A remarkable consequence follows: because the first time depends essentially on its second time to appear as the origin, the first time, for all its claim to chronological priority or non-derivativeness, turns out to be not the first time but, rather the third; for it now exists in essential relation to both the second time and the supposedly first time that anchors the whole temporal sequence.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, translated by Paul Patton (New York and London: Continuum, 1994), pp. 1-2. First published in France as *Difference et Repetition*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968).

<sup>124</sup> Briankle G. Chang, “Deleuze, Monet and Being Repetitive”, *Culture Critique*, No. 42 (Winter, 1999), pp. 191.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 189.




Fig 1.12

In a piece of text produced two years earlier to the one you are now reading I attempted to put together a sequence of images that might help illustrate Deleuze's repetition and Derrida's iterability. In choosing (from left to right) [fig 1.12] a nude by Praxiteles (fourth century B.C), Donatello's David (1430-1440), Edward Weston's portrait of his son (1925), and Sherrie Levine's repetition of a reproduction from Weston (1981), I had hoped to illustrate Praxiteles's advance repetition of his *Reclining Satyr's* subsequent repetitions. Instead I produced something rather different - a *stutter*. In attempting to illustrate repetition in advance, I had created a time line - a sequence - the very structure that I propose is undermined by repetition and the series. Concentrating on the similarities of form across the four images, I had originally missed the stutter in time caused by Levine's repetition of Weston's photograph. The insertion of Levine's repetition into the sequence performs an equally dramatic 'murmur in the regular rhythms of numbering' to that of my example given above. The temporality underpinning the sequence stutters as it encounters Levine's 'infrathin' repetition.<sup>126</sup> The sequence now runs not as 1, 2, 3, 4, but stumbles at 3, unfolding as 1, 2, 3, 3.

<sup>126</sup> Marcel Duchamp in attempting to differentiate indiscernibles, particularly the almost non-existent differences inherent in the mass produced object, introduces the notion of the infrathin. Although Duchamp stated that his concept was indefinable, he did give examples. Duchamp's infrathin describes a minimum of difference between identicals that nonetheless supports the singularity of all objects. This difference may be a temporal one. A mass produced object created from a single mold for example, must be produced sequentially. Duchamp stated that 'The difference/ (dimensional) between/ 2 mass produced objects/ [from the same mold]/ is Marcus Boon, *In Praise of Copying*, Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2010an infrathin /when the maximum? / precision is / ...obtained'. Quoted by Boon, p. 193, from Marcel *Duchamp, Notes*, edited by Paul Matisse, (Boston: G.K Hall & Co, 1983), note 18. The infrathin can be seen in the dot matrix of Levine's photographic repetition from Weston's original photograph. Levine's difference *beyond* the infrathin is a 're-coding' of meaning in relation to the discourse of original and copy. 'It was, of course Weston who said that the photograph must be visualized

In a 1993 short essay *He Stuttered*, Deleuze proposes that language, when put under stress begins to stutter. We might assume that in the repetition of syllables it is the speaker who stutters and not language itself. Unless we are speaking metaphorically or describing things anthropomorphically, (my Compact Disc player stutters as I never clean the discs) things themselves do not stutter. Deleuze cites examples from Kafka, Melville, and Beckett in order to qualify the difference between the author who makes his/her characters stutter and language itself that stutters. A stuttering language according to Deleuze results in difference. Discussing difference in T. E. Lawrence's language, Deleuze writes,

It is no longer the character who stutters in speech; it is the writer who becomes a *stutterer in language*. He makes language as such stutter: an affective and intensive language, and no longer an affectation of the one who speaks.... [He] makes the language itself scream, stutter, stammer or murmur. What better compliment could one receive than that of the critic who said of *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*: This is not English. Lawrence made English stumble in order to extract from it the music and visions of Arabia.<sup>127</sup>

I introduce Deleuze's *stutter* here due to its translatability. If, as Deleuze argues, language itself stutters, stuttering is not restricted to speech and it is legitimate to discuss a visual language that stutters. To encounter the body of work I have produced in response to my research questions is to come into contact with a series of paintings that stutter, return, defer closure, and in doing so undermine temporal order.

### 1.5 Copia

Having discussed the relation of repetition to difference, it will be worthwhile discussing both as being indebted to Copia. Repetition invokes an obscure Roman goddess. The goddesses name - Copia, is not only the etymological root of copy but also of abundance, plenty, resource and opportunity. She is first mentioned in Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and is perhaps most familiar as the possessor of the 'cornucopia' or

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in full before the exposure is made. Levine has taken the master at his word and in doing so has shown him what he really meant. The *a priori* Weston had in mind was not really in his mind at all; it was in the world, and Weston only copied it'. Douglas Crimp, "The Photographic Activity of Postmodernism", *On The Museum's Ruins*, (Cambridge MA and London: The MIT Press, 1995), p. 119.

<sup>127</sup> Gilles Deleuze, "He Stuttered", published in *Essays, Critical and Clinical*, translated by Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 107-114. Originally published in French as *Critique et Clinique*, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1993).

horn of plenty.<sup>128</sup> The double meaning inherent in the goddess's name - of both copy and abundance might be re-written as repetition and abundance. Abundance is usually stored in a warehouse or storeroom to be used in the future. It is therefore not inexcusable to think of an original as a site of inherent multiplicity to be exploited at a future moment through repetition, and that the original cannot exist as an original without the copy.<sup>129</sup> We cannot after all, identify something satisfactorily as an original

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<sup>128</sup> In Ovid's *Metamorphoses* the horn was wrenched from a bull's head by Hercules. Another attribution suggests that the horn originated from the miraculous goat Amaltheia, wet nurse of Zeus, located on Mount Ida, Crete. The horn of plenty had the property of filling itself inexhaustibly with whatever food or drink was wished for. See *New Larousse Encyclopaedia of Mythology*, (London: Hamlyn, 1974), p. 91.

<sup>129</sup> While the relation between original and copy examined within discourses of the simulacrum is relevant to my research, it is not central. I will, therefore, refer briefly here to Baudrillard's *Simulacra and Simulations* with Deleuze's counter arguments as they present the most persuasive example of repetition thought of as a process that moves beyond arguments of original and copy. According to Baudrillard, the simulacrum is a copy whose relation to its model has been stretched so thinly that it can no longer be called a copy and stands on its own. Pop Art is cited by Baudrillard as typifying the simulacrum, in its triumph of the sign over its referent, and for Baudrillard, the serial production of artists such as Rauschenberg and Warhol articulates a temporal doubling, an 'indefinable redoubling of time'. Baudrillard's statement here seems to share the chronophobia of Fried, and bemoans the loss of the traditional relation between the world and representation. Brian Massumi describes the work of Baudrillard as 'one long lament' for the real, untouched by the copy. What Baudrillard laments is the failure of representation and the replacement of the real with the hyper-real, the simulacrum. The hyperreal for Baudrillard is, 'no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal.'<sup>129</sup> To follow Baudrillard's logic, the linear causality of the model and copy relation has been shattered, replaced by a repetition that results in indeterminacy. Brian Massumi's response to this apparent impasse is to remind us that the real, the loss of which Baudrillard laments, may not have been as real as Baudrillard originally thought. Massumi writes, 'He cannot clearly see that all of the things he says have crumbled were simulacra all along: simulacra produced by the analyzable procedures of simulation that were as real as real, or actually realer than the real, because they carried the real back to its principle of production and in so doing prepared their own rebirth in a new regime of simulation'. This new regime of simulation that Massumi refers to here is one formulated in Gilles Deleuze's *Plato and the Simulacrum*. The difference between Baudrillard's simulacrum and Deleuze's is, unsurprisingly a question of difference itself. The simulacrum according to Deleuze is not so much the copy of a copy but a very different phenomenon in that it negates the distinction between model and copy. Deleuze writes: 'The simulacrum is not a degraded copy, rather it contains a positive power which negates both original and copy, both model and reproduction.' It is important to note that, according to Deleuze, any resemblance to the model possessed by the simulacrum is merely an illusion. A passage from *Plato and the Simulacrum* that perhaps best explains the way in which the simulacrum can share the image of its model without resembling it:

The catechism, so fully inspired by Platonism, has familiarised us with this notion. God made man in his own image and to resemble Him, but through sin, man has lost the resemblance while retaining the image. Having lost a moral existence in order to enter into an aesthetic one, we have become simulacrum.

Whether we prefer Baudrillard's simulacrum as signifying a yearning for the loss of the real and of representation, or Deleuze's simulacrum as a kind of monstrous and subversive ghost of the real, what is clear is that simulacrum, simulation and the hyper-real are rampant in technologically advanced postmodern societies.

See Brian Massumi, "Realer than Real: The Simulacrum According to Deleuze and Guattari", *Copyright*, No.1, (1987), pp. 90-97. Gilles Deleuze, "Plato and the Simulacrum", translated by Rosalind Krauss, *October*, No. 27 (Winter 1983), p.53. Jean Baudrillard, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*, (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1981), p. 166.

until after it has been copied (made abundant). Repetition, if we follow Copia, has raided the storeroom using repetition as a means of entry in order to release difference.

The multiple possibilities for variability and future repetitions in an original are potentials theorised by the three inadvertent followers of Copia - Benjamin, Deleuze and Derrida. Copia haunts Derrida's iterability, Benjamin's -abilities (barkeiten), and Deleuze's difference.<sup>130</sup>

## Conclusion.

In order to summarise the temporal conditions of the static image, and how they might be repositioned, I first need to discuss a paradoxical property of time-based media (film) that has always fascinated me - its stillness. This fascination stems from a long interest in the stillness of painting, a medium that has been still for a much longer time than cinema. The temporal conditions of the static image are slippery, and in an attempt to clarify them I recount three encounters from cinema that are firmly lodged in my memory. In 1977 I watched for the first time, *Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid* [fig 1.13].<sup>131</sup> From one hour and fifty minutes of images, the image that I recall most readily is a freeze-frame at the film's end - an image of Robert Redford and Paul Newman's death. This mechanic of stillness, operating at the heart of cinema, is laid bare by Dziga Vertov in his 1929 film *Man with the Movie Camera* [fig 1.14].<sup>132</sup> The trotting white horse is stilled by using the freeze-frame, a cinematic illusion of stillness constructed from the repetition of a single image.

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<sup>130</sup> I am not suggesting here equivalence between the difference of Deleuze and Derrida. Although often discussed in the same breath they are different from one another in ways that are (unsurprisingly) temporal. Derrida's differance with an 'a' is difference as delay and deferral in that it deconstructs the notion of a fully present signifier in a chain of signification that defines the meaning of terms within any series. All that occurs is an endless 'play of differences'. Derrida's differance is therefore one of negation. Deleuze's difference differs from Derrida's to the extent that in relying on Bergson's theory of pure duration, he privileges qualitative and positive differences that emerge from a continuum without vacua, and not Derrida's deferral or delay that constitutes a temporal gap or interval. See Bruce Baugh, "Making the Difference: Deleuze's difference and Derrida's différance", *Social Semiotics*, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp.127-146, (1997). See Jacques Derrida, "Différance", *Margins of Philosophy*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 3-27. Originally published in the *Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie*, LXII, No. 3, July-September, (1968), pp 73-101.

<sup>131</sup> *Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid's* importance in the cultural archive was secured in 2003 in its selection for preservation in the US National Film Registry at the behest of the Library of Congress due to its cultural, historical and aesthetic significance. *Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid*, Directed by George R. Hill, Screenplay by William Goldman, (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, 1969).

<sup>132</sup> Dziga Vertov, *Man with the Movie Camera*, (VUFKU film studio, Soviet Union, 1929).



Fig 1.13



Fig 1.14

What impressed me most about *Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid*'s ending was its endlessness. A cross section of time had been stretched into an infinite but changeless future. As the full colour scene took on a sepia tone, it transformed into an image resembling a faded photograph. The agency of the film's ending is its shift from future orientated movement to stillness - timelessness. The tableau then casts a backwards glance - exchanging a frozen present for one of the past by using the cliché of the faded sepia photograph, a device that replaces a filmic image with the *imago*: an effigy that preserves the presence of the deceased. At the last moment *Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid* escapes linear time and mimics the temporal conditions of painting in its rich agglomeration of past, present and future held within the static

image. All of this unfolds as the audience continues to experience their own duration as the credits continue to roll.

Despite the best attempts of Harris, Ashley-Cooper and Lessing to suggest otherwise, painting is very much a time based media, but in ways significantly different to their arguments based on the binary opposition of space and time. A work of art is what Andre Malraux described as ‘an object, but it is also an encounter with time’, an encounter that cares little for the metaphysical and aesthetic questions of depiction, representation, evocation, referral, resemblance, the moment, instant, and specious instants.<sup>133</sup> For the sake of a conclusion I will however, side with the timelessness of the static image. By timeless I mean that time has been evacuated from the surface of the canvas out towards its spectator, and not that painting is somehow atemporal.

This timelessness of painting is unsurprisingly complex. Terms such as timeless, the enduring, and the eternal in relation to painting have become slightly suspect in contemporary discourse, but painting’s movement *in* time seems simultaneously historical and ahistorical, and this is a paradox. The paradox of art’s ability to endure beyond its historical moment of production is acknowledged by Karl Marx,

But the difficulty is not so much in grasping the idea that Greek art and epos are bound up with certain forms of social development. It lies rather in understanding why they should *still constitute* for us a source of aesthetic enjoyment and in certain respects prevail as the standard and model beyond attainment.<sup>134</sup>

Painting - like the Leibnizian monad discussed above, has time embedded within it as an originary potential, but struggles to address the flow of time (movement) on its surface, a failing that Theodor W. Adorno discussed in *Aesthetic Theory*.<sup>135</sup> Painting however, challenges its own staticity by appealing to the moving world beyond its edges. This has been described by Mieke Bal as:

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<sup>133</sup> Derek Allan, *Art and the Human Adventure*, (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2009), p. 73.

<sup>134</sup> My Italics. *Marx’s Grundrisse*, edited by David McLellan, (London: Macmillan Ltd, 1980), p. 45. Quoted by Derek Allen in *Art and Time*, (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholar Publications, 2013), p.34.

<sup>135</sup> Adorno asserts that works of art ‘perish the more quickly, the more they aim at duration. Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, translated by C. Lenhardt, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), p.254.



its appeal to an interaction with the viewer; to its own processing in time rather than to representing time in a represented fabula.<sup>136</sup>

I first experienced this outward address as a thirteen year old in an encounter with Oliver Hardy that dramatically collapsed time and space [fig 1.15]. Watching Hardy's signature glance to camera for the first time took me totally by surprise.



Fig 1.15.

The 1933 of Los Angeles and the 1975 of my parent's living room collided in a very personal way. Hardy looked at me from 1933 and as a thirteen year old I found this (and still do) both amusing and deeply shocking. One temporal condition of painting is this very ability to transcend the historical moment and context of its past production, to reverberate in, and haunt the present.

A temporal condition of painting that challenges painting thought of as *static* also answers the question of *how* repetition repositions temporal conditions. My first research question 'How does repetition reposition the temporal conditions of the painted static image' holds within it the germ of its own solution. Repetition re-positions the temporal conditions of the static image due to the essential repeatability of an image. Repetition affords the static image mobility in time and in space, mobility discussed

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<sup>136</sup> Mieke Bal, "Sticky Images: the foreshortening of time in an art of duration", in *Time and the Image*, edited by Carolyn Bailey Gill, (Manchester and New York: University of Manchester Press, 2000), p. 80.

above through Bergson, Benjamin and Deleuze. Temporal conditions of the static image can be re-positioned through, and *only* through the use of repetitive processes. If we consider the cultural archive to include memory, galleries, museums, photographic reproductions, printed material and the World Wide Web - any image's continuing agency within the cultural archive relies on its repeatability.<sup>137</sup>

In order to break from the theoretical and to discuss the work of a contemporary painter whose practice substantiates the claims made in this chapter for the relation between repetition and difference, I will turn to the practice of Cecilia Edefalk as an example of contemporary painting whose repetitive strategies make an appeal to Copia.

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<sup>137</sup> This can be seen in the recent "discovery" of the work of Swedish painter Hilma af Klint (1862-1944). Klint now seen as an important painter whose practice anticipated the abstraction of Wassily Kandinsky, Piet Mondrian and Kazemir Malevich, stipulated that her work should not be exhibited for at least twenty years after her death. This invisibility within the cultural archive has now been reversed. Klint's work has been shown extensively in blue chip galleries since their first showing at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art in 1986. Klint's position in the cultural archive is now safe. Klint's paintings were shown at the Serpentine Gallery, London in May of 2016 to critical acclaim. See <http://www.serpentinegalleries.org/exhibitions-events/hilma-af-klint-painting-unseen>.

## Case Study # 1.

### Cecilia Edefalk: *Echo* and *Another Movement*.

This first case study will examine two works by one of Sweden's most respected artists: Cecilia Edefalk (1954- ). Edefalk's *Echo* and *Another Movement* (*En Annan Rörelse*) will be discussed as examples of painting that instantiate the relation between repetition and difference as presented in the second half of Chapter One. Coming across Daniel Birnbaum's essay *Slow Motion* on Edefalk's *Echo* in *Frieze* played no small part in my initial desire to undertake a practice-based PhD.<sup>138</sup> It is fitting, therefore, that Edefalk is the first of the three case studies that punctuate the chapters of this dissertation.

Edefalk is an artist whose practice encompasses not only painting but sculpture, film, and photography. Her paintings, though comparatively scarce, are predominantly executed in series. Like many of Edefalk's painterly series, *Echo*'s singular point of departure is the photographic image. In this instance the silver gelatin print is a three-quarter profile self-portrait in a V-necked sweater, with black face paint. [fig a].



Fig a.

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<sup>138</sup> Daniel Birnbaum, "Slow Motion: Daniel Birnbaum on Cecilia Edefalk," *Frieze*, No. 29, (July/August, 1996), pp. 50-51.

The twelve oil paintings on linen that constitute *Echo* vary in size, from 60 x 40 centimetres to 100 x 60 centimetres. Edefalk's first painting in the series is informed by the photograph, the second painting by the first painting, the third by the second, and so on. This is key. Edefalk repeats *in order*, in order to lay bare a latent subject matter dormant until released by repetition. Edefalk explains the process in conversation with Eva Meyer:

I discover things in my paintings when I repeat them. It's a way to explore my own work. I am always surprised by the result. I think I can figure out what will happen. But with every new painting the others change.<sup>139</sup>

Repetition is central to Edefalk's practice, and in repeating a photographic image, already a reproduction, Edefalk releases the image's potential. Edefalk employs repetition in order to create an atmosphere in which any sense of self seems to oscillate; a back and forth between differences of likeness tracking back to the original photograph. In the loss of, and re-inscription of the sense of self through repetition, what we encounter here is painting as an echolalic process, echolalia not as a symptom of psychiatric disorder but as an epistemological process.<sup>140</sup>

What repetition uncovers in Edefalk's *Echo* [fig b] is the centrality of the ear as both subject matter and as the compositional fulcrum upon which the painting hangs. Edefalk's *Echo* does not, as it were, speak, but listens. In a telling statement, Edefalk describes a relation between repetition and subjectivity, and how sound, or to be more specific, the act of listening is released within the painting. Through repetition, the ear, formerly an insignificant part of the image takes on its decisive role:

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<sup>139</sup> Quoted by Daniel Birnbaum in "Slow Motion: Daniel Birnbaum on Cecilia Edefalk", *Frieze*, No. 29, (July/August, 1996), p. 50. Originally published in "Zum Sprechen Bringen - Ein Gespräch zwischen Cecilia Edefalk und Eva Meyer", *Be Magazine*, Künstlerhaus Bethanien, Berlin, p. 149.

<sup>140</sup> Echolalia, also known as echophrasia, is usually defined in terms of the repetition of words uttered by another, normatively symptomatic of a range of speech disorders and conditions such as autism. I prefer, however, to use echolalia here, to describe the means by which repetition can assist in the acquisition of language, and, therefore knowledge. Strictly speaking, Edefalk's repetition can be described as not echolalia but palilalia - the repetition of words uttered by oneself. See Webb, Stuart. "The Effects of Repetition on Vocabulary Knowledge". *Applied Linguistics*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2007, 46-65. See also, Fay, Warren. "Mitigated Echolalia of Children". *Journal of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research*, June, 1967, 305-310.

I don't feel I have a history, so repetition is a way of creating history...In the first painting it was just a beautiful ear, but when it is repeated, it is obvious that the paintings have to do with listening...Sound enters through the ear. The sound grows in the painting and gives the painting life.<sup>141</sup>



Fig b.

Formally, Edefalk's paintings are a world away from images that rely upon a self confident and expressive use of paint. Instead they are almost monumental in terms of dearth, immobility and quiescence. Edefalk's paintings seem to tread a fine line between emergence and disappearance. One painting, for example, is so washed out, the paint so thinned with turpentine that any residual representational content hovers on the brink of vanishing altogether [fig c]. Colour, in the majority of Edefalk's painting, is a subdued affair. Edefalk is, I would argue, a tonal painter whose use of colour relies on a play of cool and warm greys across a broad tonal range that at times does not move beyond *grisaille*. It is also evident that each painting has been invested with different durations of making. One painting that appears to have been arrived at quicker than others, for example, is an image that has been painted upside down as opposed to being hung upside down [fig d].

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<sup>141</sup> Ibid.




Fig c.

Fig d.

A second series of paintings from Edefalk that examine the relationships between original and copy through the process of repetition is *Another Movement (En Annan Rörelse)*. *Another Movement* was a breakthrough body of work for Edefalk and one that secured Edefalk's national and international reputation. The seven oil paintings on linen that constitute the series are, like *Echo*, based on a photographic image; in this instance, an image by British photographer Eamonn J. McCabe, published in the Swedish fashion magazine *CLIC* [fig e].<sup>142</sup>



Fig e.

The full page colour photograph accompanies an editorial reminding potential Swedish sunbather of the necessity for sunscreen lotion. Edefalk takes this rather banal image and extracts from it more than is apparent. A question often levelled at repetition is whether it enriches or impoverishes an image, 'whether a thing gains or loses in being

<sup>142</sup> *CLIC* was published in Sweden between 1984 and 1991.

repeated'.<sup>143</sup> Prior to embarking on a series of seven paintings, Edefalk loses the bottle of sunscreen lotion [fig f].




Fig f.

Daniel Birnbaum, a regular writer on Edefalk's practice, identifies this process of omission as an act of revealing the already visible:

Her most effective works depend not on information but rather on the lack of it. They create a sense of Dearth, which sharpens the eye. Instead of adding new visual data, they take away, and the details that remain gain a new clarity. In a world brimming with information, this appears the most effective way to make visible what is already seen.<sup>144</sup>

By removing the sunscreen lotion from her painting, Edefalk takes a photographic image whose composition already conforms to the golden ratio, and shifts its emphasis from the man's right hand to his left. Birnbaum speculates that the man's hand, touching the back of the young woman conveys 'either tenderness or a sense of icy

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<sup>143</sup> Arne Grøn, "Repetition" and the Concept of Repetition', translated by Bruce H. Kirmmse, *Topicos: Revista de Filosofia*, No. 5, (1993), pp.143-159, 148.

<sup>144</sup> Daniel Birnbaum, "Slow Motion: Daniel Birnbaum on Cecelia Edefalk", *Frieze*, No. 29, July/August, 1996, p. 50.

distance'.<sup>145</sup> What immediately struck me, prior to finding McCabe's photograph was an altogether different reading of this hand; a reading, I suggest, reinforced by repetition. To my mind, the man's right hand, emptied of the sunscreen lotion, now conceals a time-keeper used to *take* the woman's heartbeat. Time is now the central concern of the painting, emphasised by repetition and introduced into the image through reconfigured touch. A speculative interpretation of Edefalk's title *Another Movement* is, therefore, a reference to the movement of a watch's second hand, the movement of the heart, and the movement from one repetition to the next.

In these two series, Edefalk employs repetition to release a latent subject matter beyond that visible in her photographic departure points. What comes into being in Edefalk's *Echo* is sound. In *Another Movement*, Edefalk makes visible a relation between time, touch, and seeing. This ability to release an image from what Edefalk describes as a 'site of spectres' sounds more like the practice of a medium.<sup>146</sup> Are not all painters, however, mediums to varying degrees? They converse with and through the works of dead artists, allowing them, so to speak; a renewed voice. For Edefalk, this medium-ship is, however, a much more literal business.

According to Estelle aft Alborg, Edefalk possesses considerable abilities as 'a spiritual medium'.<sup>147</sup> It comes as no surprise perhaps, that Edefalk has also shown work that enters into dialogue with two dead Swedish painters whose practices were steeped in mysticism and esoteric; Hilda aft Klimt and Ivan Vaguely.<sup>148</sup> What is more surprising is the fact that Edefalk has had numerous *supernatural conversations* with Swedish polymath, August Strindberg (1849-1912). According to the Strindberg Museum, Edefalk met Strindberg in Tegnérslunden, a Stockholm park, whilst sitting on a bench. Strindberg approached Edefalk and instigated a conversation that touched upon Edefalk's love life and art - in particular a number of large paintings that should be

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<sup>145</sup> Daniel Birnbaum, "Self", in Ziba Ardalan, *Time and Memory*, (London: Parasol), p. 66. Cite in full

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.

<sup>147</sup> Af Malborg refers to Edefalk's contribution to a 2010 exhibition (*Moderna*) at Moderna Museet in Stockholm. Edefalk responded to the galleries permanent collection by producing an audio 'conversation' with the dead artists whose work is held by the gallery.

<sup>148</sup> Af Klint (1862-1944) belonged to a group called "The Five" (de fem), a group dedicated to contacting the so called 'High Masters' by way of séance. Aguéli (1869-1917), born John Gustaf Agelii, also known as Sheikh 'Abd al-Hādī 'Aqīlī, was a painter who converted to Islam in 1896 and Sufism in 1902, taught by Swedish artist Anders Zorn.



‘painted white inside’ [fig g].<sup>149</sup> The content of this conversation was subsequently presented as a text-based video, *History for the Future* at the Bonniers Konsthall, Stockholm.



Fig g.

What are we to make of Edefalk’s conversations with Strindberg, Af Klint and Aguéli? If some find Edefalk’s methodology an irrational one, it is perhaps worthwhile acknowledging that a great deal of art, from Palaeolithic cave painting, through movements such as Dada and Surrealism, to the practices of contemporary artists such as Marcus Coates, is a long engagement with the irrational; without the negation of certainty.<sup>150</sup>

The word occult, from the Latin *occultus*, also means ‘clandestine’ or ‘hidden’ as well as its more common association with the supernatural. Birnbaum concedes that his

<sup>149</sup> ‘One spring day, four years ago [2005], Cecilia Edefalk sat on a bench in Tegnérslunden. In the distance, she saw a man with a distinctive hat come towards her and realized that it was August Strindberg. He sat down on the bench beside her and said, “meaningless”. She did not hear his voice, but saw words as sentences written in front of her, in a certain rhythm. The text-based video work *History for the Future* puts forward, in the same rhythm, a long conversation between Cecilia Edefalk and the author. Strindberg expresses strong opinions on her love life and art, in particular a number of large paintings that should be “painted white inside”. During *Art of Memory*, Cecilia’s Edefalk’s *White Within* will be exhibited at Bonniers Konsthall – the specific works Strindberg spoke with her about. <http://www.bonnierskonsthall.se/en/cecilia-edefalk-2/>.

<sup>150</sup> British artist Marcus Coates assumed the role of shaman for the residents of a condemned block of Liverpool flats. *Journey to the Lower World*, 2004. See <https://www.theguardian.com/film/movie/146758/marcus-coates>

observation that Edefalk 'make[s] visible what is already seen' might have to be rethought in order to compensate for the occult:<sup>151</sup>

Recently, when seeing Edefalk's latest work, I believed to discern a new spiritual - even occult - atmosphere. I think now, however, that it has been there all the time. Not some tacky New-Age esotericism, but a cold and sometimes a little frightening phantomology. Here, in these images, absence makes its curious voice heard: angelic, demonic.<sup>152</sup>

Perhaps the phantom that Birnbaum alludes to, one that seems to haunt Edefalk's painting - awaiting, so to speak, an exorcism, is not absence but difference. Birnbaum's statement that 'Edefalk make[s] visible what is already seen' could perhaps be re-written as - Edefalk repeats *in order*, in order to release the occluded.

I have used Edefalk's painting as an example of repetition in the service of revealing latent subject matter. Edefalk's interrogation of identity and difference, original and copy takes us to the heart of these terms - terms that require definition. Chapter Two, therefore, will begin by examining these terms.

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<sup>151</sup> See Daniel Birnbaum, "Angelic, Demonic: On Cecilia Edefalk", <http://www.anthonymeierfinearts.com/attachment/en/555f2a8acfaf3429568b4568/Press/555f2ae9cfaf3429568b583e>

<sup>152</sup> Daniel Birnbaum, "Angelic, Demonic: On Cecilia Edefalk", *Kunsthalle Bern*, (1998), p. 52

## Chapter Two: The Repeating Image.

Raphael, in imitating endlessly, was always himself.<sup>153</sup>

—Jean-Auguste Dominique Ingres

That repetition always results in difference has been discussed in Chapter One through Deleuze, Derrida and Benjamin. The relation between repetition and difference in painting is a long and complex one that fluctuates according to the contexts in which it operates. This perhaps is clearest in the polar shift from repetition thought of as indivisible from originality, transparent in Ingres's appraisal of Raphael, to repetition defined by Kavin as the repetitious. In Chapter One I have discussed the abundance that repetition unlocks when appeal is made to *Copia*, an appeal that results in difference and multiplicity. Chapter Two will examine the shifting relations between repetition and the original as it is encountered in specific examples of pre-modern, modern, and contemporary painting. Repetition, as we have seen, places considerable pressure on the concept of the *originary* image defined as one without antecedence.

In order to situate my own practice within what James Elkins describes as the 'trackless domain between original and copy', I will discuss the differences between terms that operate within these boundaries. It is worthwhile acknowledging that Derrida's iterability, and what Roland Barthes referred to as a 'tissue of quotations', in a 'multidimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend or clash', are all at work over three hundred years prior to postmodernism.<sup>154</sup> Maria Loh substantiates this by quoting Baroque theorist Secondo Lancelotti (1583-1643).

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<sup>153</sup> Richard Shiff, "Representation, Copying, and the Technique of Originality", *New Literary History*, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. (1984), p. 333- 63, 342. Originally in Henri Delaborde, *Ingres, sa Vie, ses Travaux, sa Doctrine* (Paris, 1870), pp.139-40.

<sup>154</sup> See Roland Barthes, "The *Death of the Author*" in *Authorship: From Plato to the Postmodern*, edited by Sean Burke, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995), pp. 125- 30.

Lancelotti writes:

There are many books in one book, and many authors speak through the mouth of one author.<sup>155</sup>

## 2.1 Répétition, Imitation, Copy, and the Original.<sup>156</sup>

In Chapter One I stated that the key to success when repeating is to repeat with difference, a successful repetition does not repeat. In order to expand on this statement, the labyrinthine relations between original, imitation and copy should be examined. In Chapter One I discussed the shifting meaning of imitation from being synonymous with *invention* to its synonymity with *copy*. The reasons for this shift are inextricably linked to modernism's obsession with originality and its anxiety surrounding the influence of tradition. This obsession resulted in two ruptures that dictated subsequent thinking about repetition *and* painting. Chronological firstness becomes the hallmark of authenticity, and in turning away from tradition, the driving force of modernist painting was to create an inimitable style. This has the effect of arriving at the new, not by looking backwards in time, but by creating a new in the present and stretching that present into the future. If the modernist painting cannot be copied, it attempts to preserve its originality infinitely. Although Richard Shiff prefers 'long after the lifetime of its creator' to infinity, he lends weight to the extra-historical aspirations of modernist painting. Shiff writes:

Artists and critics of the nineteenth century sought to create or define a style which might insure from the start that any imitation or interpretation by another would be inadequate or simply impossible. These artists and critics sought a style outside of history, one that would endure in its *original* state long after the lifetime of its creator.<sup>157</sup>

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<sup>155</sup> Maria H. Loh, "New and Improved: Repetition as Originality in Italian Baroque Practice and Theory", *The Art Bulletin*, Vol. 83, No. 3, (2004), pp. 477-504, 477.

<sup>156</sup> I use the French spelling of repetition here in order to differentiate it from repetition in general. Répétition is the copying of an original by the artists own hand.

<sup>157</sup> Richard Shiff, "The Original, the Imitation, the Copy, and the Spontaneous Classic: Theory and Painting in Nineteenth-Century France", *Yale French Studies*, No.66 "The Anxiety of Anticipation", (1984), pp. 27-54, 28.

Not only do these painters (Shiff cites Manet and Cezanne) cut a technical and stylistic umbilical cord that connected them to their predecessors, but in a quest for originality they set themselves apart from their contemporaries:<sup>158</sup>

Additionally, the technique of originality called upon the artists to avoid reference to any other artist, even one who seemed to have developed a technique of originality himself.<sup>159</sup>

It is difficult to put an exact date on the waning of imitation as an acceptable practice for the painter but in 1852, the Paris Salon, in a move that institutionalises chronological firstness as the benchmark of authenticity, bans copies and previously exhibited works.<sup>160</sup> Ninety-seven years prior to the Salon's ban, Denis Diderot (1713-1784) gives us a typical eighteenth-century account of repeating successfully:

A good imitation is a continual invention. It must, so to speak, transform its model and embellish its ideas; through the transformation that the artist gives to these ideas, he appropriates them. Whatever he takes, he enriches, and whatever he can't enrich, he leaves.<sup>161</sup>

Ten years after the Salon's stand against imitation, Pierre Larousse in the *Grand Dictionnaire Universel*, laments the loss of repetitive practices:

The nineteenth century has transformed everything. First it outlawed as plagiarism what in the three preceding centuries was considered only legitimate imitation, fortuitous borrowing...<sup>162</sup>

Imitation, legitimate imitation, invention, appropriation, plagiarism, and borrowing. These quotes from Diderot and Larousse are awash with terms in need of a definition. The difficulty, as I have mentioned above, is that to attempt any definitions through the lens of the contemporary, results in short-sightedness.

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<sup>158</sup> Michel Foucault reminds us that Manet's training as a painter was nothing if not classical and conformist. Manet worked in the studio of the history and genre painter Thomas Couture (1815-79). According to Foucault, Manet used all the 'traditions he had learned in the studios where he studied'. Michel Foucault, *Manet and the Object of Painting* (London: Tate Publishing, 2011), p. 33.

<sup>159</sup> Richard Shiff, "Representation, Copying, and the Technique of Originality", *New Literary History*, Vol. 15, No. 2, (1984), pp. 333-363, 355.

<sup>160</sup> See Patricia Mainardi, "Copies, Variations, Replicas: Nineteenth-Century Studio Practice", *Visual Resources*, Vol. XV, (1999), pp. 123- 47, 139.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid. p. 138.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid. p.139.

According to Mariah H. Loh, Baroque spectators were familiar with demonstrative inter-textual play, enjoyed, and expected to see it in painting as a sign of both originality and wit (*actuezza*); ‘the shadow of the father in the son’.<sup>163</sup> Originality for the Baroque audience was simply inconceivable without repetition in its various forms. Before discussing how terms like repetition and appropriation are applied to modern and contemporary painting; it is to their definitions as *originally* understood, that I would like to turn.

*A répétition* is not a copy and a copy is not an imitation. The differences are questions of representation and technique. Shiff writes:

To paint a representation of another painting does not present the same technical obstacles associated with painting a woman....for both the original and its representation belong to the same class of object, and the replication is achieved by a technical procedure very much like that which produced the original.<sup>164</sup>

A copy, therefore, is a representation of another representation in the same medium with little distance, or difference. Imitation however, should always attempt distance from the original through technical and stylistic invention. As early as 1884 the difference between imitation and copy had been blurred to the point that they are used to describe the copy; a conflation of terms that remains in place today. The copy was produced outside of the original artist’s influence, or after his demise, and was usually created by the student in order to learn something of the original artist’s technique.

Eugene Delacroix (1798-1863), writing in his own *Dictionnaires des Beaux-Arts*, clearly advocates copying as a means of mastering a craft:

First he [the painter] learns the manner of his master, just like an apprentice learns how to make a knife, without attempting to display originality. Then he copies everything he comes across by contemporary or earlier artists. Painting begins as a simple craft.<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> Maria H. Loh, Maria H. Loh, “New and Improved: Repetition as Originality in Italian Baroque Practice and Theory”, *The Art Bulletin*, Vol. 83, No. 3, (2004), pp. 477-504, 489.

<sup>164</sup> Richard Shiff, “Representation, Copying, and the Technique of Originality”, *New Literary History*, Vol. 15, No. 2, (1984), pp. 333-63, 355.

<sup>165</sup> Quoted by Patricia Mainardi, “Copies, Variations, Replicas: Nineteenth-Century Studio Practice”, *Visual Resources*, Vol. XV, (1999), pp. 123-147, 127.

Once the painter has mastered his or her craft, she/he can begin to repeat his or her own originals. This is a *répétition*, and it was expected to vary from its first incarnation, like the theatrical performances that follow their rehearsal. A *répétition* attempted an improvement on its own rehearsal.<sup>166</sup>

The *répétition* differs however, from the replica. From the Renaissance onwards exact copies or replicas were produced by studio artist/assistant under the tutelage and gaze of the *master* painter. In hierarchical terms a *répétition* therefore, is the first order copy, the replica a second order copy, and the copy (*copie*) is the definition of the third order. According to Patricia Mainardi a *répétition* is a later version of the artists own work by his own hand.<sup>167</sup> For Elkins, however, a *version* need not be a *répétition* by the artists own hand but might function more like a ‘second original’, ‘almost an independent work’, and cites as an example Edouard Manet’s *Déjeuner sur l’herbe* [fig 2.2] and its possible *original*, Marcantonio Raimondi’s *The Judgement of Paris* [fig 2.1].<sup>168</sup>



Fig 2.1

<sup>166</sup> Stephen Bann gives the *répétition* certain neutrality, and not necessarily an improvement on its *original*. See Stephen Bann, *Parallel Lines: Printmakers and Photographers in Nineteenth-Century France*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 18-30.

<sup>167</sup> Op. cit., Mainardi, p. 126

<sup>168</sup> See James Elkins, “From Original to Copy and Back Again”, *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 33, No. 2, April (1993), pp. 113-19, 117.





Fig 2.2



Fig 2.3

Three of Manet's figures taken from Raimondi's engraving (after Raphael) are clothed [fig 2.2], we can think of this image then, as a masked or disguised repetition, disguised in the sense that the painting attempts to occlude any reference to history, and thereby reinforce its originality. This is a very different relation of the present to the past, and to the relation between repetition and originality as seen in similar paraphrasing undertaken by Padovanino (1588-1649) two-hundred and forty-nine years earlier.<sup>169</sup>

<sup>169</sup> I use the word paraphrase here to suggest that Padovanino is exercising an impulse to re-write.



Manet's version of Raimondi borrows only three figures from *The Judgement of Paris*. He also repeats a compositional structure but aligns it to different imagery. The arc described by the arm of the figure in the background is a repetition of the arc of the grass held in the hand of the figure on the right in the Raimondi [fig 2.3].

Padovanino's paraphrasing of Titian's three *Bacchanals* is naked, demonstrative, and in plain sight, and most evident in his *Triumph* (1614). Padovanino's *Triumph* [fig 2.4] appropriates trees, puttis, and mountains of flesh from Titian's *Baccus and Ariadne* [fig 2.5], *Bacchanal of the Andrians* [fig 2.6], and *The Worship of Venus* [fig 2.7].



Fig 2.4



Fig 2.5



Fig 2.6



Fig 2.7

A contemporary audience will be forgiven for thinking, as did I, that *Triumph* is not a triumph at all, but an unconvincing pastiche (*pasticcio*) of Titian's Bacchanals.<sup>170</sup> But as mentioned earlier, the meaning of these terms has meandered over time, and pastiche in the seventeenth and eighteenth century did not cause the affront that it does today.

<sup>170</sup> Pastiche, from the Italian for pastries, is for Maria H. Loh, a term introduced in the late seventeenth century to describe a mixture of styles. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, it has come to denote a lack of originality. Maria H. Loh, "New and Improved: Repetition as Originality in Italian Baroque Practice and Theory", *The Art Bulletin*, Vol. 86, No. 3 (September, 2004), p. 501.

Maria H. Loh quotes Italian painter and engraver Marco Boschini's (1613-1678) response to Padovanino's paraphrasing:

There are copies [Padovanino] in Venice, of an admirable style and celebrated virtue by the perfect and dignified hand of the Vice-Author.<sup>171</sup>

An important difference between Manet's repetition of Raimondi and Padovanino's of Titian is temporal. In Padovanino's *Triumph*, painted some ninety-four years after Titian's Bacchanals, Padovanino stitches together, not only images from other images, but anachronistically pulls the past into the present, 'different points in the temporal fabric', whereby the past continued to participate in the present in ways immediately recognised and understood by its audience.<sup>172</sup> This folding of time, has, as its antithesis, a linear model of time whose demarcation point is a schism, an attempt to distance itself from the past. Manet's repetition is hidden. Its audience is therefore also set to the same point in time, they can no longer recognise the past at work in the present.

This distancing from the past results in the ability to choose a radically *original* stylistic language, and signals the beginning of a freedom to create the new, that in my opinion at least, descends into the compulsion, even the necessity for an *always* new. Another word whose meaning has wandered over time is innovation. Innovation, according to the Oxford English Dictionary is the introduction of new methods. Up until the eighteenth century, however, innovation was heresy from a religious perspective and 'tantamount to rebellion' from the political.<sup>173</sup> The fluctuating relation between tradition and the new lies at the heart of Boris Groys' interrogation of the correlation of power structures to the production of the new. Groys writes:

Thus creation of the new is also not an expression of human freedom, as is often supposed. One does not, consequently, break with the old by a free decision that presupposes human autonomy, gives it expression, or offers it social guarantees. One does so, rather, only by complying with the rules that determine the way our culture works....That one must seek newness for newness' sake is a law that prevails in postmodernity as well [as modernism], now that all hopes for a new revelation of the hidden or for goal-orientated progress have been cancelled.<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> Op. cit., Loh, p. 482.

<sup>172</sup> Alexander Nagel and Christopher S. Wood, "Interventions: Towards a New Model of Renaissance Anachronism", *Art Bulletin*, Vol. LXXXVII, (2005), pp. 403- 32,408.

<sup>173</sup> See Rene Girard, "Innovation and Repetition", *Substance*, No. 2, Vol. 3, (1990), pp. 7-20, 7.

<sup>174</sup> Boris Groys, *On The New*, translated by G.M. Goshgarian, London and New York: Verso, 2014, p. 4.

I have not yet discussed the form of repetition that can be found at the bottom of the hierarchical structure, images that result from their translation from painting into another medium such as engraving and lithography.<sup>175</sup> The importance, however, of processes such as engraving and lithography, to both the proliferation of images generally and the international marketing of artists work is inestimable.<sup>176</sup> While it is beyond the remit of this thesis to discuss in sufficient detail the relevance of Walter Benjamin's *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction* to this area of research, it is worth discussing in brief, as a relevant detour, the work of French engraver Claude Ferdinand Gaillard (1834-1887).

Benjamin defines lithography as a technique soon to be surpassed by photography. Benjamin discusses the directness of lithography and its ability to represent daily life for mass consumption. Stephen Bann however, reminds us that Benjamin fails to state that:

For virtually the whole century, the predominant modes for the diffusion of popular imagery were the wood-block and the steel engraving.<sup>177</sup>

When Louis Daguerre died in 1851, his image, printed in the *Illustrated London News* was not photographic but a photograph mediated by the wood-block engraving [fig 2.11]. The invention of the Daguerreotype in 1839 eventually led to the demise of these technologies, replaced by the hegemony of ever more sophisticated forms of photography with their claims of being the 'ultimate test' of visual realism.<sup>178</sup> In the aptly titled *Photography by Other Means?*, Bann discusses Gaillard's engravings as rival, if not superior to photography's claims. For Bann, Gaillard's contribution is two-fold, a triumph over photographic reproduction and the heightened awareness of engraving as a time-based medium:

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<sup>175</sup> Mainardi's source for her definition of terms in relation to repetitive processes in nineteenth-century studio practices, including the reproduction (engraving and lithography) are taken from the *Dictionnaire de l'academie des beaux -arts*, 6 vols, (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1858-96).

<sup>176</sup> See Stephen Bann, "Reassessing Repetition in Nineteenth-Century Academic Painting: Delaroche, Gerome, Ingres", in *The Repeating Image: Multiples in French Painting from David to Matisse*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, (2008), pp. 27-52.

<sup>177</sup> Stephen Bann, "Ingres in Reproduction", *Art History*, Vol. 23, No. 5, December (2000), pp. 706-25, 706.

<sup>178</sup> For the reproduction of images in nineteenth-century newspapers and magazines, see Tom Gretton, "Difference and Competition: The Imitation and Reproduction of Fine Art in a Nineteenth-century Illustrated Weekly News Magazine", *Oxford Art Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 2, (2000), p. 143-162.

Gaillard's unique achievement perhaps lay in the fact that for a time, he trumped the overriding claims of photographic reproduction through a revitalization of viewing habits...Probably the most interesting feature of Gaillard's prints, from a contemporary point of view, is the experience that they provide of visual representation as a time-based process.<sup>179</sup>

In support of Bann's claims, I include a few extraordinary images by Gaillard, that to my eye, support, if not exceed these claims [fig 2.8 - 2.10].



Fig 2.8



Fig 2.9




Fig 2.10

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<sup>179</sup> Stephen Bann, "Photography by Other Means? The Engravings of Ferdinand Gaillard", *The Art Bulletin*, Vol. 88, No. 1 March, (2006), pp. 119- 38, 135-36.





Fig 2.11 <sup>180</sup>

<sup>180</sup> I have, as yet, found it difficult to identify, with absolute conviction, the daguerreotype that has informed the wood-block engraving published in the London Illustrated news on the 26th of July 1851 to announce Daguerre's death. The London Illustrated News cites Antoine Claudet (1797-1867) as the photographer. The first two daguerreotypes shown above, however, are attributed to Oldham born photographer John Jabez Edwin Mayall (1818 - 1901), and dated to 1846. Mayall purchased a daguerreotype licence from Richard Beard in 1846, who held the patent for the process in England. The daguerreotype that most resembles the wood-block engraving is the first of the three shown above, attributed to Mayall by The United Photographic Artists Gallery. The central image, however, attributed to Mayall by the Museum of Metropolitan Art is attributed to Leopold Ernest Pierson by liveauctioneers.com, and they are confident to sell it as such. It is most likely that the first Daguerreotype by Mayall is the source for the wood -block engraving. The embroidery on the chairs seat-back in the wood-block engraving is an almost exact reversal of that in the Mayall Daguerreotype. Daguerre, however, does seem to be striking an almost identical pose in each daguerreotype and appears to be wearing the same clothing in both.

## 2.2 Repetition, Spontaneity, and the Series.




Fig 2.12

To read Claude Monet's correspondence is to encounter a written account of an obsession with repetition and deferral. In researching Monet, Steven Z. Levine collated a list of over thirty verbs with the prefix *re-* that persistently reoccur in Monet's correspondence.<sup>181</sup> These processes of deferral and repetition define Monet's legacy to modern painting. I have chosen to introduce Monet here for three reasons. Firstly, Monet does not paint the instantaneous moment from nature at one visit, he repeats his own work. Secondly, Monet's practice coincides with an explosion of repetitive processes in the mid to late 1800s synonymous with the strategy of working in series, and thirdly Monet's series is the precursor to an equally explosive re-emergence of repetitive processes in the 1960s; Monet's *Wheatstacks* and *Rouen Cathedral* paintings are, for example, used as the conceptual legitimization by John Coplans for his 1968 group exhibition at the Pasadena Art Museum - *Serial Imagery*.<sup>182</sup>

Monet's paintings are often discussed in terms of variations, but his practice was never a straightforward copying from nature. They meander between variation and

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<sup>181</sup> The thirty some verbs that Monet was most fond of using included retrouver (recover), remetre (reset), reprendre (resume), revoir (meet again), recommencer (restart), retoucher (retouch), refaire (remake), Steven Z. Levine, "Monet's Series: Repetition, Obsession", *October*, Vol. 37, Summer, (1986), pp. 65-75, p.72.

<sup>182</sup> British born artist John Coplans (1920-2003) was a founding editorial staff member of Artforum from 1962-1971, and editor in chief from 1972 -1977. As curator at the Pasadena Art Museum from 1967 -1970, Coplans brought together the works of Claude Monet, Alexei Jawlensky, Marcel Duchamp, Piet Mondrian, Josef Albers, Ad Reinhardt, Larry Bell, Ellsworth Kelly, Yves Klein, Morris Louis, Kenneth Noland, Frank Stella and Andy Warhol for his 1968 exhibition *Serial Imagery*.

*répétition*. Monet clearly states that his repetitions are intended to be an improvement on earlier rehearsals. Monet, in 1884 writes,

...it always seems to me that in beginning again I will do better.<sup>183</sup>

In Monet's use of the words *always*, and *beginning again*, the deferral of closure that accompanies repetitive processes is underscored as central to his practice. This is at odds with the temporal presentness, spontaneity, and instantaneity that are commonly thought of as hallmarks of originality in the nineteenth century. In Monet's deferral through repetition, he masters not instantaneity, but the ability to construct its *sign*, and as Rosalind Krauss remarks, Monet's spontaneity 'was the most fakable signifieds'.<sup>184</sup>

I have mentioned earlier Manet's occlusion of historical references in *Déjeuner sur l'herbe*. Monet's later paintings similarly hide a highly developed 'technical armature' upon which the illusion of spontaneity is constructed.<sup>185</sup> The instant in Monet's case is anything but. It is arrived at by repetitive processes. Krauss writes:

The illusion of unrepeatable, separate instants is the product of a fully calculated procedure that was necessarily divided up into stages and sections and worked on piecemeal on a variety of canvasses at the same time, assembly-line style. Visitors to Monet's studio in the last decades of his life were startled to find the master of instantaneity at work on a line-up of a dozen or more canvases.<sup>186</sup>

In a more far reaching challenge to Monet's originality and instantaneity, Steven Z. Levine suggests that not only did Monet repeat himself but that he repeated his predecessors:

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<sup>183</sup> A letter to Monet's mistress Alice Hoschede. Steven Z. Levine, "Monet's Series: Repetition, Obsession", *October*, Vol. 37, Summer, (1986), pp. 65-75, 72.

<sup>184</sup> Rosalind Krauss, *The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths*, (London and Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1999), p. 16.

<sup>185</sup> 'But as recent studies of Monet's impressionism have made explicit, the sketch like mark, which functioned as the *sign* of spontaneity, had to be prepared for through the utmost calculation, and in this sense spontaneity was the most fakable of signifieds. Through layers of underpainting by which Monet developed the thick corrugations of what Robert Herbert calls his texture-strokes, Monet patiently laid the mesh of rough encrustation and directional swathes that would signify speed of execution, and from this speed, mark both the singularity of the perceptual moment and uniqueness of the empirical array. On top of this constructed "instant", thin, careful washes of pigment establish the actual relations of colour. Needless to say, these operations - with the necessary drying time - many days to perform. But the illusion of spontaneity - the burst of an instantaneous and originary act - is the unshakable result'. Rosalind Krauss, p.16. Here Krauss refers to Robert Herbert, "Method and Meaning in Monet", *Art in America*, Vol. 67, No. 5, September (1979), p.118.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid. Krauss, p. 16



So Monet does not paint directly in front of nature at all. On the spot Monet paints nature after previous pictures, after those of his masters and after those of his past; and in the studio he repaints those same pictures after the pictures on the wall.<sup>187</sup>

When asked by Dutch essayist Willem Byvank whether fifteen *Wheatstack* paintings exhibited at the Durand-Ruel gallery, Paris, should remain together, Monet replied,

[the individual paintings] acquire their full value only by comparison [with the others] and in the succession of the full series.<sup>188</sup>

The word *value* here can be read as either conceptual or monetary, and this is the problem encountered when attempting to clarify Monet's intentions for his series. Painting in series is by no means a phenomenon particular to Monet. It has a long tradition that can be traced back to iconographic forms in the employ of state or church that rely upon narrative to retain an internal logic. The reliance on a narrative presented in a specific order suggests more of the sequence rather than the series as discussed in Chapter One. What is clear however is that to deduct one image from the narrative is to undermine its unity. Not so for Monet's series, a state of affairs that in part, leads to its dissolution. In order to propose a slightly different way of thinking about Monet's series, the relation of repetition to the original will be put to one side in favour of viewing his series through the lens of time and space.

What could be argued is that we see in Monet's series the creation of an *image of* time. This is a speculative proposition, and difficult to substantiate. As soon as Monet's series were exhibited, like the disappearance of the impressionist image the closer its spectator moves towards it, they were dispersed. The importance of the modernist series is commented upon by Charles Stuckey:

Its enormous role in the history of modern art notwithstanding, series art still escapes historical notice because so little of it is left to see as first intended.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>187</sup> Steven Z. Levine, "Monet's Series: Repetition, Obsession", *October*, Vol. 37, Summer, (1986), pp. 65-75, 74.

<sup>188</sup> Charles Stuckey, "The Predications and Implications of Monet's Series", published in *The Repeating Image, Multiples in French Painting from David to Matisse*, edited by Eik Kahng, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 83-126, 92.

This disappearance of the modernist series is primarily a result of market forces referred to by Clement Greenberg as ‘an umbilical cord of gold’.<sup>190</sup> The galleries of the 1890s were more shop fronts than sites for the permanent installation of the series, and the painter, collector, critic, and buyer all played a part in the dismantling of the modernist series. While many scholars refrain from claiming that the sole reason for Monet’s series was monetary - an undeniably savvy marketing strategy, few address the fact that Monet’s repetitive strategies continued long after he had achieved considerable wealth.<sup>191</sup>

Whether the dispersal of Monet’s series signals the triumph of the individual painting over the conceptual unity of the whole, or embodies a failed attempt to present a series of paintings that produce an image of time, any evidence of the serial installation of painting from the 1890s that might support the latter is scant.<sup>192</sup> In support of my premise however, it is worth quoting Kandinsky’s appraisal of Monet’s *Wheatstacks* on seeing them for the first time in Moscow in 1896. Kandinsky had, as he stated, ‘a dull feeling that the object was lacking in this picture’.<sup>193</sup> Kandinsky’s observation could be understood as suggesting that in Monet’s ability to paint, not the object, but its illumination at different times of the day, in different seasons, or from his other paintings, the object retreats and time advances as the central concern of these paintings. When seen in series, this image of time becomes all the more appreciable.

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<sup>189</sup> Ibid., p.104.

<sup>190</sup> Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch”, in *Art and Culture*, Boston: Beacon Press, (1961), p.8; quoted in John Klein, “The Dispersal of the Modernist Series”, *Oxford Art Journal*, Vol. 21, No. 1, (1998), pp. 123-135, 121.

<sup>191</sup> Levine concedes that, ‘Economics however, offers no reductive solution to the problem of repetition, for Monet’s discourse persists long after wealth has been secured’, Steven Z. Levine, “Monet’s Series: Repetition, Obsession”, *October*, Vol. 37, Summer, (1986), pp. 65-75, 73.

<sup>192</sup> I find it hard not to include here, American artist Robert Smithson’s (1938-1973) brilliantly incisive and witty take on time and modernism. ‘At the turn of the century a group of colourful French artists banded together in order to get the jump on the bourgeois notion of progress. This bohemian brand of progress gradually developed into what is sometimes called the avant-garde. Both these notions of duration are no longer absolute modes of “time” for artists. The avant-garde like progress, is based on an ideological consciousness of time. Time as an ideology has produced many uncertain “art histories” with the help of the mass media. Art histories may be measured in time by books (years), by magazines (months), by newspapers (days and hours). And at the gallery proper - *Instants!* Robert Smithson, “Quasi-Infinities and the Waning of Space”, Robert Smithson: *The Collected Writings*, (Berkley: University of California Press, edited by Jack Flam, 1996), pp. 34-37.

<sup>193</sup> Wassily Kandinsky, *Complete Writings on Art*, edited by Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter Vergo, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1994), p. 363; quoted in John Sallis, “Time and Image”, in *Time and the Image*, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 21.

What is also lost to art history is how Monet's series were exhibited, and what (if any) concessions were made to the spaces of their encounter.<sup>194</sup>

I have mentioned earlier that I prefer to think of Monet's Rouen Cathedral series as an image of time, rather than a means of maximising financial gain. The question that follows is - in what ways can, or does, time reveal itself as an image. Can time itself have an image in the way we think of other images. Plato in *Timaeus* gives us an image of time. God creates the heavens, a moving image of eternity, composed of planets, moons and stars, with their concomitant cycle of light and darkness.<sup>195</sup> Monet wrote that what he was interested in painting was 'only the surroundings that give true value to the subjects'.<sup>196</sup> These surroundings are not other objects but the light that allows us to perceive them. In painting the changing effects of light, whether repeated directly from nature or from his own paintings, Monet, as I suggest, advances time as the central concern of his painting. When seen in series, Monet's practice becomes an example of serial imagery as a Deleuzian crystal-image of time, not linear time traced in the time it took to create a single image at a single sitting, but a multiplicity of times as they mirror one another in a play between repetition and difference from one canvas to another.<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>194</sup> One of Monet's contemporaries who did understand the potential relations between painting and the space in which they were encountered was James Abott McNeill Whistler (1834-1903). Whistler, perhaps one of the first painters to capitalise on the potential for a commercial exhibition of paintings that moved beyond the importance of any particular painting, what we might describe as an event, presented an exhibition of work in 1873 where paintings in frames of his own design were given an identical amount of space around them, rather than being hung, as normally, from ceiling to floor. While this arrangement of objects in space might seem underwhelming to a contemporary audience, to an audience of the late 1800s it was most definitely something different, and according to Charles Stuckey, Monet was well aware of it. See Charles Stuckey, "The Predications and Implications of Monet's Series", in *The Repeating Image: Multiples from David to Matisse*, edited by Eik Kahng, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 83-126.

<sup>195</sup> 'And so he began to think of making a moving image of eternity: at the same time as he brought into order the heavens, he would make an eternal image, moving according to number, of eternity remaining in unity. This image, of course, is what we call "time"....He set the Moon in the first circle, around the earth, and the Sun in the second, above it. The Dawnbreaker [the Morning star, or Venus], and the star said to be sacred to Hermes [Mercury] he set to run in circles that equal the Sun's in speed, though they received the power contrary to its power'. Plato, *Timaeus*, translated by Donald J. Zeyl, (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), pp 24- 5, at 37e and 38d.

<sup>196</sup> Quoted by John Sallis, "The Image of Time", published in *Time and the Image*, (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), p.20.

<sup>197</sup> Deleuze's concept of the crystal-image of time relies on Bergson's conception of time. Duration according to Bergson, at each moment, splits between a present that passes and a past that preserves. According to Deleuze, 'the crystal image is the most fundamental operation of time: since the past is constituted not after the present that it was but at the same time, time has to split itself in two at each moment as present and past', Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema II*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 84. Essentially Deleuze's crystal image of time is an image of non-chronological time and is based on Bergson's contention that in our lived experience [duration], our recollection constantly produces internal circuits that link present and past, and that in

### 2.3 . Repetition and the System.



Fig 2.13

How different art history might have appeared had the modernist series survived its premature dispersal is a matter of conjecture. What can be discussed with more certainty are the reverberations that Monet's series transmitted forwards in time. If a contemporary understanding of a past event or of art works can be described as another phase in the perpetuation of an earlier reverberation or signal, Monet's signal is co-opted by Coplan's for his 1968 exhibition *Serial Imagery* in order to legitimise a break with Mel Bochner's serial production as defined in Chapter One.<sup>198</sup>

Despite the claims for spontaneity and instantaneity in modernist painting, it is clear that behind such claims lie repetitive processes. The significance of Roy Lichtenstein's response to Monet's series, his *Rouen Cathedral Set V* (1969) [fig 2.13], is the way it connects Monet to the emergence of systems based visual arts in the 1960s.

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turn, these internal circuits link to larger external circuits [history]. Deleuze states , 'Searching for the smallest circuit that functions as internal limit for all others and that puts the actual image beside a kind of immediate, symmetrical, consecutive or even simultaneous double...In Bergsonian terms, the real object is reflected in a mirror image as in the virtual object, which from its side and simultaneously, envelops or reflects the real'. Ibid., p.71. Deleuze uses the palace of mirrors scene from Orson Welles' *The Lady from Shanghai* as an example of the crystal image, or to borrow from Proust, an image of time in its pure state, where the virtual and the actual are indiscernible. 'In *The Lady from Shanghai*, where the principle of indiscernibility reaches its peak: a perfect crystal-image where the multiple mirrors have assumed the actuality of the two characters who will only be able to win it back by smashing them all...' Ibid., p. 73. For time in its 'pure-state', the return of a real past instantaneously into the present, See Marcel Proust, *In Search of Lost Time*, (London: Penguin, 2013).

<sup>198</sup> Coplan's exhibition takes place one year after Mel Bochner's "Serial Art, Systems and Solipsisms" appeared in *Arts Magazine*.

In the essay that accompanied *Serial Imagery*, Coplans' claims that Monet invented seriality are explicit.<sup>199</sup> Coplans defines the serial as,

A type of repeated form or structure shared equally by each work in a group of related works made by one artist...Serial Imagery is concerned not with the notion of masterpiece, but of process.<sup>200</sup>

Krauss described Monet's processes as an assembly-line style.<sup>201</sup> To confuse Monet's approach with that of the genuine assembly line is as awkward as suggesting that the serial production in the work of artists such as Donald Judd, Dan Flavin and Larry Bell signals an complete identification with 'capitalist industrial logic'.<sup>202</sup> According to James Meyer, Judd's work was 'well made not readymade, crafted not mass produced, even though his steel and aluminium and Plexiglass were indeed as "readymade" as any urinal or bottlerack'.<sup>203</sup> The same might be said of Monet's paintings if we substitute aluminium and Plexiglass for canvas and tubes of paint.<sup>204</sup>

Coplans' exhibition included only one sculptor, Larry Bell, and it seems as if Coplans' attempts to distinguish the serial from the modular revolve, to some extent, around a question of medium. In the exhibition catalogue Coplans differentiates the series from the modular:

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<sup>199</sup> 'The use of Serial Imagery in anything like the forms we know it today began with the work of the major Impressionist innovator, Claude Monet; and to a remarkable extent the Serial aspect of Monet's art parallels the most advanced mathematical concepts of his time'. Coplans is referring here to the work of German mathematician Julius Richard Dedekind (1831-1916), whose theories of algebraic functions, group and lattice theory contributed to the Dedekind-Cantor theory of serial order. John Coplans, *Serial Imagery*, (New York: Pasadena Art Museum and New York Graphic Society, 1968), p. 7.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>201</sup> Op. cit.

<sup>202</sup> James Meyer, *Minimalism: Art and Polemics in the Sixties*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2013), p.184.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid., p. 186

<sup>204</sup> Thierry de Duve makes a similar case for oil paint in a tube, invented in 1841, an invention that according to Renoir facilitated impressionism, 'Since the tubes of paint used by the artists are manufactured and ready-made products we must conclude that all paintings in the world are "ready made" and also works of assemblage'. Quoted by Joshua Simon, "Neo-Materialism, Part Two: The Unreadymade", Journal #23, 2011, [www.e-flux.com](http://www.e-flux.com). 'It [the invention of oil paint in a tube] was also one of the first instances of an avant-garde strategy, devised by artists who were aware that they could no longer compete, technically or economically, with industry; they sought to give their craft a reprieve by "internalizing" some of the features and processes of the technology by threatening it, and by "mechanizing" their own body of work'. Thierry de Duve, "The Readymade and the Tube of Paint", *Artforum*, May (1986), pp. 115 -16.

Judd for example, replicates parts by having identical units manufactured; they are then positioned to form one sculpture, one unit. Judd's images have a modular structure, and his range of similar sculptures relate more to sculptor's traditional use of editions than to true Serial forms.<sup>205</sup>

Coplans, in the essay to accompany *Serial Imagery* clearly differentiates thematic variation from Mel Bochner's seriality organised around 'principles of numerical or otherwise systematically predetermined [syntax and structure] processes'.<sup>206</sup> If the technology of the paint-tube allowed the early impressionists an access to spontaneity, albeit illusory as we have seen with Monet, serial art opens onto an extended duration in cooperation with a set of theories that responded directly to the burgeoning computer industries, particularly a 1968 theory with interdisciplinary aspirations: Von Bertalanffy's *General System Theory*. It was a theory closely linked to emerging theories of cybernetics, theories that according to Pamela M. Lee, were by 1972 'a model for conceptualising the art world'.<sup>207</sup> Frances Halsall gives us a clear definition of the system:

Broadly speaking a system is a set of elements integrated with one another to such an extent that they form a recognisable and coherent whole. In addition, this recognisable and coherent whole performs some type of recognisable function. Thus, in general a system is a collection of components that by virtue of its organisation and function, becomes *meaningful* in its own right.<sup>208</sup>

At the risk of tautology, systems theory is the study of systems, and in his book Halsall confines himself to complex systems, and by complex Halsall refers specifically to systems that 'change over time because they are open to influence from their immediate

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<sup>205</sup> John Coplans, *Serial Imagery*, exhibition catalogue, (Pasadena Art Museum, 1968), p. 9.

<sup>206</sup> Quoted by James Meyer in *Minimalism: Art and Polemics in the Sixties*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2013), p.179, originally in Mel Bochner, "Serial Attitude", *Artforum*, (1967), pp. 28-33. For Coplans on Monet, Stella and Kelly see, John Coplans, "Serial Imagery", *Artforum*, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 34-43.

<sup>207</sup> Pamela M. Lee, *Chronophobia: On Time in the Art of the 1960s*, (Cambridge MA and London: MIT Press, 2006), p.65. For Systems theory see Ludwig von Bertalanffy, *General Systems Theory*, (New York: Brazillier, 1968). David Mellor's book on art from the 1960s states that 'A dream of technical control and of instant information conveyed at unthought-of velocities haunted Sixties culture. The wire, electronic outlines of a cybernetic society became apparent to the visual imagination. See David Mellor, *The Sixties Art Scene in London*, (London: Phaidon, 1993), p. 107.

<sup>208</sup> Francis Halsall, *Systems of Art: Art, History and Systems Theory*, (Bern: Peter Lang, 2008), p. 23.

environment'.<sup>209</sup> Another significant characteristic of the complex system is its non-linear temporality. The complex system according to Halsall, is one in which,

Interactions need not happen in the same order for subsequent interactions. Non-linearity is a defining feature of complex systems.<sup>210</sup>

The serial image, according to Coplans 'ignores the rational sequence of time'.<sup>211</sup> In its non-linearity the system is cyclical and therefore recursive (repetitive). If the complex system is open to influence, and influences might include both the observer and the space in which the system operates, then we have arrived at a definition of many of the repetitive practices in the visual arts of the late 1960s. The system, as discussed earlier, changes over time, is open to influence from its environment, and its observer. The introduction of duration into an encounter with an art object is, therefore, a significant challenge to ideas of presentness prevalent in the modernism of the late 1960s.

## **2.4 Presentness.**

The most significant refutation of duration's incursion into the work of art is Michael Fried's 1967 essay "*Art and Objecthood*" published in the June edition of *Artforum*. Fried's canonical essay is not only a championing of medium specificity, but more importantly 'a championing of presentness'.<sup>212</sup> To return to Fried's essay here runs the risk of reiterating well rehearsed arguments. I do so, however, due to its relevance to my own research question - how repetition temporalises space. This question is approached by attempting to reconcile/combine Fried's oppositional concepts of theatricality and the absorptive image. In order to discuss the relevance of Fried's *Art and Objecthood* to my research question, it will be useful to examine these key terms as defined by Fried in *Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and the Beholder in the Age of Diderot*.<sup>213</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> Ibid., p.35.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid., p.49.

<sup>211</sup> John Coplans, *Serial Imagery*, (New York: Pasadena Art Museum and New York Graphic Society, 1968), p. 11.

<sup>212</sup> Pamela M. Lee, *Chronophobia: On Time in the Art of the 1960s*, (Cambridge MA and London: The MIT Press, 2006), p. 37.

<sup>213</sup> While it may seem anachronistic to discuss a 1967 essay through a 1980 book, Fried, in the introduction to *Absorption and Theatricality*, makes it clear that the themes developed therein, had been

Fried's absorptive images can be defined as having the property of delaying the beholder's distraction by confronting them with images of individuals or groups totally immersed in activities that have an ability to suggest the duration of the depicted activity.<sup>214</sup> The three stages that delay the beholder's distraction, borrowed by Fried from French engraver and critic Roger de Piles (1635-1709), by way of Denis Diderot (1713-1784) are famously, to attract (*attirer*), and then to arrest (*arrêter*) and finally to enthrall (*attacher*).<sup>215</sup> The paradox that underpins a painting's ability to attract, arrest and enthrall is that it does so by negating the beholder's presence completely.<sup>216</sup> Theatricality, in opposition to the absorptive image, makes instead, a direct appeal to the beholder, what Fried referred to as 'the actual circumstances in which the beholder encounters literalist work'.<sup>217</sup> Fried, paraphrasing Diderot, goes on to state his case:

In that event the painting would no longer be "une rue, une place publique, un temple" (a street, a public square, a temple); it would become "un theatre" (a theater), that is, an artificial construction in which persuasiveness was sacrificed and dramatic illusion vitiated in the attempt to impress the beholder and solicit his applause.<sup>218</sup>

For Fried, a temporal difference exists between the absorptive image and the theatrical. Theatre is a performance and takes place over time, it has a duration and plays to its audience. The absorptive image ignores its beholder. It must be acknowledged, however that Fried's tripartite attract, arrest and enthrall also unfolds over time. These temporal differences appear, none the less, as a limit condition of the modernist work of art in Fried's *Art and Objecthood*.<sup>219</sup> The work of art, to follow Fried's temporal logic,

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part of his teaching since 1966. Fried writes, 'Some of the matters dealt with in this book have been part of my teaching since the Spring of 1966, at which time, while still a Junior Fellow in the Society of Fellows at Harvard University, I taught a course on French painting from the mid-eighteenth century through Manet in the Department of Fine Arts....and at first thought of working backwards toward what I had come to see as the beginnings of the prehistory of modern painting in the 1750s and 1760s'. Michael Fried, *Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and the Beholder in the Age of Diderot*, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. ix.

<sup>214</sup> Fried uses beholder (with its temporal implication -hold in view - *keep hold of*) rather than spectator (to watch, not participate) throughout.

<sup>215</sup> Fried, *Absorption and Theatricality*, p. 92.

<sup>216</sup> Discussing the paintings of Jean-Baptiste-Simeon Chardin, Fried writes, 'simply disregarding the beholder was not enough. It was necessary to obliterate him, to deny his presence, to establish positively insofar as that could be done that he had not been taken into account', Fried uses Jean-Baptiste- Simeon Chardin's (1669-1779) *The Card Castle* (1737) and *Soap Bubbles* (1733-34) as examples of the absorptive image. Fried, *Absorption and Theatricality*, p. 103.

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*, Fried, p.149.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, Fried, footnote 129.

<sup>219</sup> What was at stake for Fried, what was most threatening from specific objects was a theatricality that undermined presentness, presentness not merely signifying instantaneity, but the purely present, or



whether painting or sculpture, must deliver an experience of time that refutes duration in favour of presentness. Fried, in a statement that seems to equate presentness with timelessness writes:

It is this continuous and entire presentness, amounting, as it were, to the perpetual creation of itself, that one experiences as a kind of *instantaneousness*: as though if only one were infinitely more acute, a single infinitely brief instant would be long enough to see everything, to experience the work in all its depth and fullness, to be forever convinced by it.<sup>220</sup>

In contrast, Fried saw the theatricality of minimalist sculpture, as the result of a medium polluted by the encroachment of duration, a duration that brings in its wake repetitiousness and endlessness:

The literalist preoccupation with time—more precisely, with the *duration of the experience*—is, I suggest, paradigmatically theatrical: as though theatre confronts the beholder, and thereby isolates him, with the endlessness not just of objecthood but of *time*; or as though the sense which, at bottom, theatre addresses is a sense of temporality, of time both passing and to come, *simultaneously approaching and receding*, as if apprehended in an infinite perspective.<sup>221</sup>

Fried's presentness returns us, and does so continuously, to an instant that puts us in mind of James Harris' *punctum temporis*, an instant in which we might apprehend the past and future of a given narrative. This, as we have seen in Chapter One, is what Ashley-Cooper referred to as anticipation and repeal. Fried's Theatricality however, despite, according to Fried, its antithesis to presentness, also addresses the past, present, and the anticipation of that which is to come. If Fried equates presentness, or as he puts

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as Fried puts it (quoting Puritan theologian Jonathan Edwards, 1703-1758) "presentness as grace"... 'It is certain with me that the world exists anew every moment; that the existence of things every moment ceases and is every moment renewed'. Quoted by James Meyer in *Minimalism: Art and Polemics in the Sixties*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2013), p. 235, originally published in Perry Miller, *Jonathan Edwards*, (New York: William Sloan Associates, 1949), pp. 329-30. According to Meyer the normative reading of Fried's interpretation of Edward's "presentness as grace" is faith in 'the self knowledge and confidence of a viewer secure in her judgments', A different reading according to Meyer is that presentness 'implies the passing recognition of a spectator burdened by doubt, a spectator whose belief in modernism must be renewed again and again'. (p.234) The first definition exists in the present and the second, a present passing, a present of continual repetition.

<sup>220</sup> Michael Fried, "Art and Objecthood", *Artforum*, (Summer 1967), p. 9

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*, p.9.

it 'the perpetual creation of itself' with timelessness and the theatrical with endlessness, then both are driven by repetition.<sup>222</sup>

In order to approach, as it were, my research question, it became clear that to do so would necessitate the creation of an environment in which theatricality and the absorptive image collaborated. Since both the theatrical and the absorptive are underpinned by repetition, one might be folded into the other in a space constructed for the actual circumstances in which the beholder encounters an art work. In order to discuss how this might be achieved, it will be first worthwhile discussing a different mode of repetition - appropriation.

## 2.5 Artists who appropriate.



Fig 2.14

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<sup>222</sup>Robert Smithson wrote a typically witty response to *Art and Objecthood*, directly targeting Fried's temporality. In a letter to the editor of *Artforum*, Smithson wrote, 'Sirs: France has given us the anti-novel, now Michael Fried has given us the *anti-theatre*...Michael Fried has declared a war on what he quixotically calls "theatricality". In a manner worthy of the most fanatical puritan, he provides the art world with a long-overdue spectacle - a kind of ready-made parody of the war between Renaissance classicism (modernity) versus Manneristic anti-classicism (theatre)....Fried, the orthodox modernist, the keeper of the gospel of Clement Greenberg has been "struck by Tony Smith", the agent of endlessness....This atemporal world threatens Fried's present state of temporal grace - his "presentness". The terrors of infinity are taking over the mind of Michael Fried...What Michael Fried attacks is what he is. He is a naturalist who attacks natural time. Could it be that there is a double Michael Fried - the atemporal Fried and the temporal Fried? Consider a subdivided progression of Fried's on millions of stages'. *Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings*, edited by Jack Flam, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 66-67. Smithson's "struck by Tony Smith" refers to Smith's interview in *Artforum* (mentioned in *Art and Objecthood*) where Smith discusses the endlessness of minimalist sculpture with Samuel Wagstaff. Smith, discussing a night time drive said: 'This drive was a revealing experience. The road and much of the landscape was artificial, and yet it couldn't be called a work of art. On the other hand, it did something for me that art had never done. At first, I didn't know what it was, but its effect was to liberate me from many of the views I had had about art...The experience of the road was something mapped out but not socially recognised. I thought to myself, it ought to be clear that's the end of art. Most painting looks pretty pictorial after that'. Samuel Wagstaff Jr., "Talking with Tony Smith", *Artforum*, Vol. 5, No. 4, December (1966), pp. 14-19.

At the time John Coplans was curating his *Serial Imagery exhibition* in Pasadena; Roy Lichtenstein paid him a visit in 1968 and encountered photographic reproductions of Monet's participating paintings. This encounter resulted in Lichtenstein's *Rouen Cathedral Set V* [fig 2.13], his own silkscreened industrial impressionism, or as Lichtenstein put it, 'manufactured Monets'.<sup>223</sup> In 1966 American artist Elaine Sturtevant (1924-2014) turned the tables on Lichtenstein's silkscreened response to painting by painting Lichtenstein's 1963 lithograph *Crying girl* [fig 2.14].<sup>224</sup> It is one of the few examples of remediation in Sturtevant's practice, a long career that has turned the visual logic of Pop Art against the works of, amongst others, Marcel Duchamp, Joseph Beuys, Andy Warhol, Frank Stella and Jasper Johns. It is however this act of remediation in Sturtevant's practice that I find more interesting than the discourses of originality within which her work is usually situated. Sturtevant herself denied that her works were copies and distanced herself from the label of proto-appropriation.<sup>225</sup>

The word refer, from the Latin *referre* is to carry something back. We can think of *refer* as an attempt to return something to its proper place, and an argument can be made that Sturtevant's painting from Lichtenstein's print seek to return a remediated image back to its *proper* medium. This is not however, a claim for the superiority of painting over any other media, or that *proper* medium equates with *original* medium, but simply that appropriation not only interrogates ideas of originality, but also the ways, in which art is reproduced, re-enacted, re-documented and re-disseminated.

American artist Mike Bidlo (1953- ) is an artist from the same mould as Sturtevant, and while much has been written about Bidlo's appropriation in relation to originality, I would like to briefly discuss his practice in terms of appropriation as a personal archive. Bidlo described his practice as re-writing, or paraphrasing - like being 'in a

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<sup>223</sup> John Klein. "Dispersal of the Modernist Series", *Oxford Art Journal*, Vol. 21, No. 1, (1998), p. 134.

<sup>224</sup> From left to right - Lichtenstein's source material, Lichtenstein's lithograph *Crying Girl* (1963), and Sturtevant's *Frighten Girl* (1966). A Lichtenstein print of *Crying Girl* sold for seventy-eight thousand dollars in 2007, and Sturtevant's *Frighten Girl* sold for three-million, four hundred and thirteen thousand dollars in 2014.

<sup>225</sup> For a comprehensive study of Sturtevant's practice see *Double Trouble*, a publication to coincide with the first major exhibition of Sturtevant's work since 1973, curated by Peter Eleey. *Sturtevant: Double Trouble*, (New York: MoMA Press, 2014). The exhibition incidentally was made possible through funding by, among others, The Andy Warhol Foundation. Warhol, far from being troubled by Sturtevant's repetition of his silkscreened flowers, lent Sturtevant the silkscreen used to produce the originals. See also Patricia Lee, *Sturtevant: Warhol Marilyn*, (Cambridge MA and London: MIT Press and Afterall Books, 2016). p. 13.

scriptorium'.<sup>226</sup> A photograph of Bidlo's studio, however, (1989) [fig 2.15] resembles the forlorn basement of a personal museum, or crime-scene photograph of a botched art heist.

Bidlo's appropriations, whether from Picasso or Warhol [fig 2.16], are to my mind, the result of *Sammeltrieb* (the urge to collect).<sup>227</sup> Bidlo is a collector whose collection gives him access to not only to some of the artists he appropriates but to other collectors.<sup>228</sup> Although Bidlo suggests that this is a form of institutional critique, 'I make art in order to sabotage and/or infiltrate the ivory tower', the language he uses to discuss his own work is clearly one of cannibalism and connoisseurship. Bidlo writes:

I make art because I am a cannibal, quite simply it feeds a bittersweet addiction, an omnivorous appetite.<sup>229</sup>



Fig 2.15

<sup>226</sup> Bidlo interviewed by Anney Bonney, www. <http://bombmagazine.org/article/1693/mike-bidlo>.

<sup>227</sup> See Walter Benjamin's essay on copying under "H" in *Arcades Project*, translated by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin, (Cambridge MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 201- 12.

<sup>228</sup> Although Bidlo's work does not secure prices equivalent to Sturtevant's, a Bidlo *Pollock* sold in 2011 for eighty thousand and five hundred dollars.

<sup>229</sup> Bidlo interviewed by Anney Bonney, www. <http://bombmagazine.org/article/1693/mike-bidlo>.



Fig 2.16

When asked by his interviewer how he differentiated his Brillo boxes from Warhol's, or indeed any of his appropriations from their referent, Bidlo gives, what I take to be a telling answer:

They are labelled "Not Warhol (Brillo Boxes. 1964) 2005," so the work doesn't say that it's something that it's not. Then they are signed and stamped with my handprint. I started doing the handprint because Pollock used to use handprints, so when I did Pollock I started putting handprints on the back and it's continued to the present time.<sup>230</sup>

In *doing* a Pollock, Bidlo not only signs it, but uses his own handprint as visual signature in order to claim its authenticity in a similar way to that of the ceramicist or silversmith stamping serial products as their own. The images of hands found in forty-thousand year old cave paintings are stencilled, and produce a negative image on the cave wall by blowing pigment onto the hand, signifying a brief temporal presence articulated as an absence, and make no claim of ownership on the wall. This is in effect, an act of indifference to the concept of ownership, a *depropriation*, not appropriation.<sup>231</sup>

<sup>230</sup> Bidlo interviewed by Nadine Rubin Nathan, TM magazine, New York Times, 2010, [http://tmagazine.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/02/asked-answered-mike-bidlo/?\\_r=0](http://tmagazine.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/02/asked-answered-mike-bidlo/?_r=0)

<sup>231</sup> 'If there is a "propriety of woman", it is paradoxically her capacity to deappropriate unselfishly', quoted by Marcus Boon in *On Praise of Copying*, (Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 224. Originally in Hélène Cixous, "The Laugh of the Medusa", *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism*, edited by Vincent B. Leitch, (New York: Norton, 2001), p. 205



Bidlo's handprint reverses this logic, and to my mind, undermines any critique of originality that might rescue Bidlo's practice from being described as repetitious. Kelly Oliver states that repetitive processes can be both 'conservative and subversive'.<sup>232</sup> Bidlo's hand print, in this instance, is an over-write and not a re-write.

Canonical American artist Sherrie Levine (1947- ), working at the same time as Sturtevant and Bidlo, continues to be exhibited internationally by blue-chip galleries to critical acclaim. Douglas Crimp included Levine in the seminal 1977 exhibition *Pictures* at the Artists Space, New York in 1977, exhibiting thirty-five of Levine's configurations of five silhouettes from portraits of the American presidents, Kennedy, Lincoln and Washington, and Levine's most recent exhibition at the David Zwirner Gallery in Chelsea, New York, in April of 2016, included an installation of monochrome paintings inspired by the palette of Renoir's nudes, accompanied by retro fridges designed by Italian company SMEG [fig 2.17].



Fig 2.17

The longevity of Levine's career is due in part, to the fact that her appropriation has transcended the discourses surrounding appropriation prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s. Rather than attempting an adumbrated account of Levine's practice here, I wish to concentrate instead on Levine's *Postcard Collage # 4, 1 -24 (2000)* [fig 2.18]. This provides an example of the serial repetition of appropriated images that foment a

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<sup>232</sup> See Kelly Oliver, "What is Transformative about the Performative? From Repetition to Working Through", *Studies in Practical Philosophy*, Vol. 1, No. 2, Fall (1999), pp. 144-66

temporal mode of looking in which the beholder's movements within space cause what David Joselit refers to as 'modulations in significance'.<sup>233</sup> This strategy, evident in *Postcard*, is a predecessor to the kind of contemporary art that examines the relations between painting and their attendant networks, whether of distribution, sites of encounter, or other artworks. Levine's *Postcard* is also relevant to the ways in which I approached my PhD research question: the temporalisation of space by the repetition of static images. Joselit, in *After Art*, applies the spatial logic of architect's Reiser + Umemoto to the *Postcard* series of Sherrie Levine. The logic that Joselit refers to is a collapse of the distinctions between architectural object and ground. Joselit describes Reiser + Umemoto's practice as analogous to the ways in which artists have performed an equivalent collapse, not an interest in an image's internal figure/ground relation, but how the image operates as a figure within a larger ground. Joselit writes:

Reiser + Umemoto's method undermines the firm distinction between an architectural object and its site by subsuming both figure and ground within a unified field of variable intensity where *function* inheres not in any single element but in systematic concentrations of elements.<sup>234</sup>



Fig 2.18

Levine's tactic in her *Postcard* series is to create an installation of images that operate as both figure and ground, a situation whereby a complex mode of looking unfolds in an encounter allowing single images and the network to which they belong to be visible both sequentially and simultaneously. The similarities between this mode of looking, as the viewer moves from image to image and the performative reception of

<sup>233</sup> David Joselit, *After Art*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 34.

<sup>234</sup> David Joselit, *After Art*, p.32.

images typified by Fried as theatrical in *Art and Objecthood*, are temporal. But so are the differences. It is worthwhile discussing the movement in Joselit's temporal and spatial observations of Levine's *Postcard Collage # 4, 1 -24* (2000):

If you slowly move from postcard to postcard and really *look*, something paradoxical happens: the experience of each picture is both the same as and distinct- spatially as well as temporally - from all the others...Within their population, the postcards function as both figure and ground, since revisiting the "same" image a moment later or a few inches away is never quite the same, and it occurs against the "ground" of every other occasion of looking. A spectator is thus pulled in two directions at once: drawn in and pushed out of any single postcard (in order to see the next; to keep in motion to gauge difference...<sup>235</sup>

Many theories of the gaze, whether gendered looking (Laura Mulvey), the returned gaze (Jean-Paul Sartre) or Michael Fried's concept of the painter/beholder, discuss the relation between the act of looking and its object as if it were almost an encounter between two static images, the object and the eye, an encounter where the beholder materialises miraculously in front of the object in an instant. With the exception of Merleau-Ponty's embodied seeing and Michel de Certeau's concept of the act of walking as a transgressive tactic, most theories of the gaze downplay the significance of the simple fact that the beholder is ambulatory - that she/he is mobile and approaches a painting, traversing time and space, and encounters other images along the way. This movement in space, and the discernment of difference between one image and its successor, is as Joselit points out, a consequence of Levine's repeated imagery and their spatial configuration. There is a difference in the delay that occurs between perception and its augmentation by memory when looking at identical objects in series, and of that occurring in the perception of non-identical objects. The cumulative effect of this delay is a property that Fried allocates to the absorptive image - that of entrapment. It forces a change in the temporality of seeing.

Perception, according to Bergson is dependent upon and inseparable from memory and the relation between memory and perception are at the heart of Bergson's conception of duration. Memory, as Bergson writes, 'is the point of contact between consciousness and matter'.<sup>236</sup> Bergsonian perception is embodied, a body with agency,

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<sup>235</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>236</sup> Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory: Essay on the Relation between the Body and the Mind*, translated by N.M. Paul and W.S Palmer, (New York: Zone Books, 1990), p. 77.



since it can change its relation to the objects within its perceptual field. In *Matter and Memory* Bergson defines the body as ‘centre[s] of action’.<sup>237</sup> Perception according to Bergson does not occur instantaneously, it is always in the service of embodied action, and the delay that I mention above occurs due to the fact that the human brain, unlike those of other organisms, delays its reaction to a stimulus in order to evaluate the usefulness of a perception to the *centre of action* (body) and then considers an appropriate reaction. The appropriate reaction is formulated by accessing memory, and by accessing memory a temporal synthesis is founded that encompasses past, present and future. In the case of Levine’s *Postcard* series, for example, a beholder must access the memory of a previously encountered image in order to discern its difference from its following image that in turn builds momentum, an anticipation of the next image, and the differences therein. Joselit’s observation suggests that it is the very discernment of difference that keeps the beholder in motion. In this situation, the body, according to Suzanne Guerlac, is ‘redefined as a moving limit between past and future’,<sup>238</sup> Bergson writes that the body is ‘a moving point that our past pushes into our future’.<sup>239</sup> The temporality of seeing is, therefore, contingent upon, first delay and then memory.

What I am interested here are the ways in which degrees of difference employed in the repeated image modulate a forwards and backwards movement, of not only perception and memory, but also bodily movement in space. A simple description of the operating logic within such a modulated field is the collapsing of linear time in order to scrutinise the workings of an extended present. According to Boris Groys an obsession with our own contemporaneity marks us as different from all of the now’s that have preceded us. The Middle Ages were obsessed with eternity, the Renaissance with the past and modernity with the future. This fascination with our own time, according to Groys, is a result of the synchronisation of the multiple and conflicting times that Jan Vervoert described as symptomatic of the *now*.<sup>240</sup>

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<sup>237</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>238</sup> Suzanne Guerlac, *Thinking in Time*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006), p 126.

<sup>239</sup> Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory: Essay on the Relation between the Body and the Mind*, translated by N.M. Paul and W.S Palmer, (New York: Zone Books, 1990), p. 83, 78.

<sup>240</sup> Appropriation in the context of postmodernity has a much more eschatological bent, the result of which Jan Vervoert describes as a ‘radical temporal incision’. Jan Verwoert, “Apropos Appropriation: Why stealing Images today feels different”, *Art and Research*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (Summer 2007), p. 1. Vervoert’s temporal incision is no less than the death of modernism and the suspension of the possibility for historical novelty. This suspension of historical continuity according to Vervoert, results in a fragmentary and inert historical time from which the artist is free to plunder a plethora of commodified

## Conclusion

At the beginning of this chapter I stated that one aim was to navigate the trackless domain between original and copy in order to situate my own practice. The registers of repetition discussed, range from an eighteenth-century understanding of originality yoked to repetition, to originality dissembled by repetition. What is clear is the ubiquity of repetition and its centrality to the development of painting in the Western tradition.<sup>241</sup> The relation between these registers of repetition and the original are dependent on the time in which they are played out. There is an assumed proper mode of repetition for the appropriate moment in time. For the eighteenth century painter, originality was inseparable from repetition, a repetition of that which had gone before. For the modernist painter, any claims for originality relied on a repetition that required a disguise. Both however, have a 'determinate relation to tradition'.<sup>242</sup> Boris Groys reminds us that the past is not monolithic; it can be reinvented in the present:

To prefer the old to the new, is also to strike a new cultural stance; it means breaking the cultural rules that require us constantly to produce newness and, accordingly, forge the radically new. Moreover, what the old actually *is* remains unclear. In every period, the old must be re-invented; that is why all renaissances are simultaneously great renewals.<sup>243</sup>

My own practice steps back, as it were, from a desire to forge the new, and instead, repeats from the history of art. It does so, however, without recourse to the mode of repetition employed by Sturtevant and Bidlo - appropriation that borders on the repetitious, but instead explores the ways in which painting in series temporalises both the act of looking and the space of their encounter. I have suggested that the premature

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visual imagery. For Vervoert, the situation he refers to as the present is one in which historical time has resumed with a difference. The model (albeit ideological) of a progressive linear time of modernity, overtaken by the arrested time of postmodernity, restarts as a multiplicity of equivocal times in pursuit of competitive advantage. Vervoert writes, 'Historical time is again of the essence, only that this historical time is not the linear and unified timeline of a steady progress imagined by modernity, but a multitude of competing and overlapping temporalities born from the local conflicts that the unresolved predicaments of the modern regimes of power still produce. The political space of the globe is mapped on a surreal texture of criss-crossing time -lines.' Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>241</sup> Briony Fer, in *The Infinite Line* begins her investigation of repetition from the point of view of 'repetition as the ground of all representation'. See Briony Fer, *The Infinite Line*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), p.3.

<sup>242</sup> See Boris Groys, *On the New*, translated by G. M. Goshgarian, (London and New York: Verso Books, 2014).

<sup>243</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

dispersal of the modernist series has produced a vacuum in art history, a vacuum that might have been filled by Monet's series as an image of time. I am not suggesting that the idea of Monet's series as an image of time is beyond debate here, but simply that the debate never really happened due to the dispersal of the modernist series and a lack of documentary evidence thereof through which such a claim might be substantiated. What is clear is that the potential relations between serial imagery, time and space that might have been central to the development of modernist painting were postponed due to market forces until the re-emergence of serial imagery in the 1960s.

One artist whose serial imagery has made a significant contribution to these deferred relations is Sherry Levine. Levine's *Postcard Series*, as I have shown, undermine the distinctions between painting and site, figure and ground, by subsuming them within a network of images that can be described as a system, a system set into motion, so to speak, by an observer.

A contemporary painter, whose practice engenders a temporal and spatialised form of looking, is American artist Ann Craven, the subject of this dissertation's second case study. Before presenting my own response to the relations between painting, time and space - the production of a series of paintings titled *Repetition from Reproduction*, this second case study will examine the ways in which Craven extends her networked images into secondary spaces.

## Case Study # 2.

### Ann Craven: Repetition, Entanglement and Recollection.

Cecilia Edefalk, as we have seen, repeats her paintings in order to uncover a latent subject matter; repetition as a quasi-spiritual category. New York based painter Ann Craven (1969 - ) repeats in order to re-member. The re-membering was for Craven, the re-collection of a series of one hundred and one paintings of the moon, destroyed in a 1999 studio fire. Craven's original series had previously been exhibited at the Lauren Wittels Gallery, New York in 1995 [fig h]. I will discuss this extended series as examples of repeating images that temporalise space in ways similar to Sherrie Levine's *Postcard Collage # 4, 1 -24 (2000)*, discussed in Chapter Two. Craven, however, extends the figure/ground relation in ways untouched by Levine.



Fig h.

Craven's initial one hundred and one moon paintings were painted without any photographic departure point, in oil on linen, *plein-air* and *alla prima* [fig i]. The results are not dissimilar to those of American painter Alex Katz (1927- ) [fig j]. The influence of Katz is perhaps unsurprising, considering that Craven was, for a period in the early 1990s Katz's studio assistant.



Fig i.



Fig j.

Craven in her own words, however, acknowledges Claude Monet as significant to her development as a painter. Craven writes:

Like Monet, or Georgia O'Keefe, I use nature as a source of inspiration. The moon is an ever-changing object that inspires my practice, and since each moon is painted from observation, it is a factual documentation of a moment in time.<sup>244</sup>

Craven's interest in Monet should come as no surprise. Craven spent, after the studio fire, three months at the Claude Monet Foundation, Giverny, France. It is difficult to imagine that Craven did not encounter Monet's serial production first hand, and that this encounter did not play some part in dictating the future direction of Craven's practice.<sup>245</sup>

<sup>244</sup> See Scott Idrisek, "Anne Craven", *BLOUIN modern painters*, December, 2015.

<sup>245</sup> See Sarina Basta, "Ann Craven", *Flash Art*, No. 272, May-June, (2010).

I have discussed Monet's spontaneity in the previous Chapter, a spontaneity that Krauss reads as the 'most fakable signifieds'.<sup>246</sup> Craven however, completes each moon painting at one sitting, without any of the studio work that undermined, for Krauss, Monet's claims for instantaneity. For Craven, the act of painting from observation, as she describes it, captures a 'factual' moment in time.<sup>247</sup>

The subject of Craven's MFA thesis, submitted to Columbia University in 1992 was the use of line in the painting of Agnes Martin. Craven's moon as motif, according to Matt Keegan, is a substitute for Martin's use of line as a means of measuring time. Keegan suggests that Craven uses the image of the moon as a marker of cyclical time, and Martin uses line to make endless minute shifts. Keegan seems to suggest an equivalence of infinity and the infinitesimal. What can be said, perhaps with more certainty, is that they are both incomplete processes and that it is repetition that underscores the inconceivability of their completion. In painting one hundred and one moon paintings, a series that depicts the lunar cycle of new moon, crescent moon, first-quarter moon, gibbous moon, and full moon, Craven's series presents a series of moments that build an image of celestial time as defined by Plato in *Timaeus*.<sup>248</sup>

Craven's repertoire of motifs extends beyond the lunar, encompassing images of birds, flowers and stripes. Regardless of motif, repetition is central to her painting process. Her later paintings, unlike the moon paintings, employ second-hand photographic imagery as source material. The painting processes employed by Craven in these later paintings also differ from those used in her moon paintings. Having mixed a colour, Craven rapidly repeats a brushstroke across three or four canvasses, one after the other, painting the paintings, as it were, together. Sarina Basta in *Flash Art*, discussing Craven's exhibition, *Puff Puff* at the Conduits gallery, Milan (2009), states that 'Craven is one of the rare artists to have ever presented four identical figurative paintings at a time in an exhibition' [fig k].<sup>249</sup>

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<sup>246</sup> Rosalind Krauss, *The Originality of the Avante-Garde and Other Modernist Myths*, London and Cambridge MA: MIT Press, (1999), p. 16.

<sup>247</sup> See Scott Idrisek, "Anne Craven", *BLOUIN modern painters*, December, (2015).

<sup>248</sup> Plato, *Timaeus*, translated by Donald J. Zeyl, Indianapolis Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, (2000), pp. 24-25, at 37e and 38d.

<sup>249</sup> See Sarina Basta, "Ann Craven", *Flash Art*, No. 272, May-June, (2010).



Fig k.

While Basta's use of the word 'identical' is questionable here, as is the claim being made for Craven's firstness, what can be said is that Craven's repetitions trouble the forward momentum of time. Matt Keegan describes the way that Craven's paintings line up to provide a contradictory account of the relation between succession and time; a *stuttering* time:

Being in a room with works existing in duplicate and triplicate elicits not only an emotional response but a cognitive shudder, something closer to *déjà vu* or a sense of the uncanny.<sup>250</sup>

Craven's use of repetition is not confined to motif alone. Not only had Craven's moon paintings been destroyed in a 1999 Manhattan studio fire but also all record and documentation of her painting practice. After a year-long hiatus, Craven returned to painting and began the process of recreating the originals, a process of painting as data-retrieval. Craven describes the mnemonic function of her painting:

I just wanted to embrace all the artworks I had lost, so when I got back I started painting from memories, just trying to replicate what had been destroyed.<sup>251</sup>

As traumatic as this loss must have been, Craven is clearly seduced by the possibilities of repetition. Craven does not stop at one hundred and one moons but goes on to

<sup>250</sup> Matt Keegan, "Erratic Systems and Irregular Cycles", *Modern Painters*, (February 2007), p. 89.

<sup>251</sup> Ann Craven quoted in Barbara Pollack, "You Must Remember This", *Modern Painters*, March, 2005, p. 44.

produce four hundred *new* moons, each identical in size to the originals. While this repetition in and of itself can be said to fulfil Craven's desire to re-embrace her original series, she repeats the four-hundred moons again, producing eight-hundred in total. For many, this repetition could be described as symptomatic of trauma, a coming to terms with the losses suffered in 1999.<sup>252</sup>

What elevates Craven's moon series from this association is the way that Craven decides to exhibit her eight-hundred paintings. In 2005, Craven exhibits four hundred moons at the Klemens Gasser & Tanja Grunert Inc. Gallery, New York, [fig l] and four-hundred at the Contemporary Arts Centre in Cincinnati [fig m]. The paintings are simultaneously exhibited six hundred and thirty-seven miles apart.



Fig l.

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<sup>252</sup> In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud makes clear that remembering is something that belongs in the past, and that its reinsertion into the present is the reappearance of the repressed. Freud writes, 'The patient cannot remember the whole of what is repressed in him, and what he cannot remember may be precisely the essential part of it. Thus he acquires no sense of conviction of the correctness of the construction that has been communicated to him. He is obliged to *repeat* the repressed material as a contemporary experience instead of, as the physician would prefer to see, *remembering* it as something belonging to the past'. Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, translated by James Strachey, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1961), p. 12.





Fig m.

Craven, discussing her moon paintings, makes clear her interest in the relation between repetition, time and difference:

I like to think that my work acts like a memory bank. I'm acknowledging the passage of time when I repeat a subject, and I feel lucky to be able to revisit something again and again, to track the variances and transformations.<sup>253</sup>

If Craven likens her practice, as she does above, to a memory bank, then the second and third iterations of her moon painting series are safely deposited, so to speak, in two locations at the same time, an insurance policy against their forgetting.

The distance from Cincinnati to New York is six hundred and thirty-seven miles, or five hundred and sixty-five as the crow flies. There is however no time difference between the two cities as they both share Eastern Standard Time. If, for arguments sake, an audience shows up for the private view of Craven's exhibition in New York at six in the evening, and another audience (it is difficult to call it the second) shows up at the exact same time to see the exhibition in Cincinnati, then Craven's duplicate same-scale paintings have performed a rather odd spatial and temporal entanglement. Einstein unhappily referred to its quantum equivalent as 'spooky action at a

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<sup>253</sup> Scott Idrisek, "Anne Craven", *BLOUIN modern painters*, December, 2015.

distance'.<sup>254</sup> Craven's paintings exist paradoxically as unique bodies of work in two places at once. Craven's repetitions, therefore, trouble modernity's assertion that the present can only be wholly present at once, or as Boris Groys puts it - 'The presence of the present can be experienced only at one moment'.<sup>255</sup> The sense of sameness across the two sets of moon paintings is formidable, though not beyond the human eye's capacity to apprehend the differences. Craven's repetition results not in the loss of uniqueness but in the multiplication thereof.

This multiplicity of uniqueness is, in part, the result of that most basic of painterly tools; the brushstroke. Craven in attempting the impossible; to repeat a brushstroke, machine-like, across several canvasses; must fail. What is important, however, is that Craven repeats her paintings, and not their model. Her first one hundred and one paintings fulfilled this goal. Repetition is in the service of something altogether different here; not mimesis but difference itself. Deleuze describes the process in *Difference and Repetition*:

One could try to assimilate these two repetitions by saying that the difference between the first and the second is only a matter of a change in the content of the concept, or of the figure being articulated differently, but this would be to fail to recognise the respective order of each repetition. For in the dynamic order there

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<sup>254</sup> According to Danish physicist Niels Bohr, we can discern a particle's position and its momentum, but not both at once. This, according to Bohr is a quantum phenomenon called complementarity, and commonly referred to by physicists as noncommuting variables. The crucial question when measuring a particles position or momentum, therefore, is what to leave out. The question, as explained by American theoretical physicist Lee Smolin 'is whether the choice the experimenter must make influences the reality of the system she's studying'. Lee Smolin, *Time Reborn: From the Crisis in Physics to the Future of the Universe*, (London: Penguin Books, 2013), p. 143. Entanglement, according to Smolin is a quantum phenomenon whereby two quantum systems can share properties once entangled. Having been entangled, they remain entangled despite the distance that separates them. This distance is referred to as nonlocality. In 1935 Einstein described the nonlocal interaction of objects as 'spooky action at a distance'. For Einstein this spooky action at a distance violated the laws of causality and the assumption that any particle must have a real value prior to any attempts to measure it. Recent experiments have however, demonstrated spooky action at a distance. Using homodyne detectors, which detect wave like properties, physicists at Griffith University's Centre for Quantum Dynamics, Australia and the University of Tokyo split a single photon between both laboratories. Measurements taken of one photon in one laboratory were shown to influence a change in the quantum state in the photon in the other. According to Griffith University's Professor Howard Wiseman 'Through these different measurements, you see the wave function collapse in different ways, thus proving its existence and showing that Einstein was wrong', See Maria Fuwa, Shuntaro Takeda, Marcin Zwierz, Howard M. Wiseman & Akira Furusawa, "Experimental Proof of Nonlocal Wave Function Collapse for a Single Particle using Homodyne Measurements", *Nature Communications*, (2015).

<sup>255</sup> Boris Groys, *In The Flow*, London and New York: Verso, 2016, p. 142.

is no representative concept, nor any figure represented in a pre-existing space. There is an Idea, and a pure dynamism which creates a corresponding space.<sup>256</sup>

The corresponding space that Craven's simultaneous exhibitions create is a *here* and *now* relative to spatial position and temporal order that has, in a sense, its mirror. An audience visiting the Cincinnati exhibition after the New York will experience, to varying degrees, a sense of déjà vu. If I am in the Cincinnati gallery, I experience the paintings in a *here* and *now*. If I decide I had better see the paintings in New York, I will see them *there* and *later*. Upon arriving in New York that is now a second *here* and *now*, I attempt to differentiate two sets of images, a *here* and *now* from a *then* and *there*. What Craven's simultaneous exhibitions have achieved is to allow the present an agency in the past, and the past much more purchase in the present than would have occurred with two exhibitions that did not repeat themselves.

If we can describe Craven's simultaneous exhibitions as an entangled system, then the circuit that connects them in time and space is at a distance, and the distance, as we have seen, is considerable. Differentiation has been complicated by distance and time. Craven's moon paintings prompted me to consider ways of reducing the distance between two entangled series to a minimum, and to create, in effect, overlapping spaces in which, not two, but multiple series might be encountered.

In order to negotiate the various attempts made to bring together overlapping spaces and repeating images, the central concern of Chapter Four; it will be first necessary to chart the development of a series of paintings titled *Repetition from Reproduction*.

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<sup>256</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, Translated by Paul Patton, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 20.

### Chapter Three: Sticky Images: *Repetition from Reproduction*.

The art I would like to talk about makes time its business and its medium yet is not deployed in the allegedly temporal media. It works with time on a level that simultaneously acknowledges and challenges the fixity of the visual image: the level of process in real time.<sup>257</sup>

\_\_\_Mieke Bal

Chapter Three turns to the series of paintings titled *Repetition from Reproduction*. This series, the material properties of which maximise the potential for the production of images that ‘incorporate into their aesthetic structure the duration of perception’, constitute the central contribution to this research project.<sup>258</sup> An interest in the speed of viewing was the departure point from which *Repetitions from Reproduction* initially developed. In the catalogue that accompanied *Serial Imagery*, Coplans concludes by claiming that the emergence of serial imagery in the United States is a response to the increased speed of American culture and industry, the ‘underlying control systems central to an advanced “free enterprise” technological society’.<sup>259</sup> This fascination with the *coup d’oeil*, the instantaneous apprehension of an image, is in diametric opposition to Mieke Bal’s definition of the sticky image, a kind of temporal image that is central to the concerns of this chapter. The sticky image is the antithesis of both the accelerated gaze and the *coup d’oeil*. Bal writes:

Sticky images hold the viewer, enforcing an experience of temporal variation. They enforce a slowing down as well as an intensification of the experience of time.<sup>260</sup>

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<sup>257</sup> Mieke Bal, “Sticky Images: the foreshortening of time in an art of duration”, in *Time and the Image*, edited by Carolyn Bailey Gill, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 79-100.

<sup>258</sup> Yve-Alain Bois, “Slow (Fast) Modern”, in *Time: Documents of Contemporary Art*, edited by Amelia Groom, (London: Whitechapel Gallery and The MIT Press, 2013), pp. 145- 49, 148. Originally in “Slow (Fast) Modern”, *Speed Limits*, edited by Jeffrey T. Schnapp, (Montreal: Canadian Centre for Architecture, 2009), pp. 122- 26.

<sup>259</sup> John Coplans, *Serial Imagery*, (New York: Pasadena Art Museum and New York Graphic Society, 1968), p. 18.

<sup>260</sup> In “Sticky Images”, Bal discusses two types of sticky images, both of which can be said to decelerate the gaze and enforce an experience of temporal variation. The first type of sticky image, according to Bal is embodied in the work of both Caravaggio, and American Painter David Reed. In the work of the latter, the sticky image operates, like the Dutch trompe l’oeil image (as discussed in Chapter Two), by using the three movements of trompe l’oeil to decelerate the gaze. Bal also suggests that the faux baroque folds of Reed’s paintings, do not simply re-stage baroque painting, but through their flatness ‘change [s] what we thought the past to be’. Bal discusses the ways in which Reed’s illusionism pushes the image into the spectator’s space. It is this encroachment of the image into the space of a spectator that

I first looked for useful examples of temporal variation and the decelerated gaze in the paintings of Nicolas Poussin (1594-1665). The reason for doing so was to re-familiarise myself with the ways that Poussin used colour to modulate the temporality of seeing. Poussin achieves this by setting up two extremes, a modulation of fast and slow looking in the tension created between colours encountered at full saturation and the browns and greens within which the primary colours go to work [fig 3.1].



Fig 3.1

### 3.1 The Frame.

In order to test the potential usefulness of Poussin's fast and slow looking, I produced a series of fifteen small-scale geometric studies [figs 3.2-3.4]. This series enabled me to evaluate the relation of colour at full saturation, the use of chromatic

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allows Bal to discuss the painting of Reed with that of Caravaggio. For Bal, Caravaggio's painting achieves its stickiness by eschewing narrative in favour of a similar encroachment. In conjunction with Caravaggio's play with light, and illusionism, it is this encroachment that 'disturbs the quick glance', compounded by the lack of a third person narrative. This lack makes it, according to Bal difficult to know where to start "reading" these large format paintings, a lack of certainty that decelerates the gaze. Bal's second type of sticky images are those that physically change over time. Bal cites as an example the work of Norwegian artist Jeanette Christensen, and specifically a work titled *Ostentio*, an installation comprising reproductions of old master images within frames that the artist has filled with Jelly. These works, unlike Caravaggio's and Reed's are subject to change in time. One property that Bal gives the sticky image in general, is its ability to ingratiate itself into the spectators 'life time'. 'They stick to you, after the intense experience of time has faded back into everyday life'. Mieke Bal, "Sticky Images", *Time and Image*, edited by Carolyn Bailey Gill, (Manchester and New York: University of Manchester Press, 2000), p.79-99.

grey, and specifically simultaneous contrast, to the development of my own sticky images. These images were developed from digital manipulations of reproductions of Poussin's *Madonna on the Steps* (1648) [fig 3.5], and Johannes Vermeer's *A Woman Holding a Balance* (1662-3) [fig 3.6].<sup>261</sup> In an attempt to create discrete temporal zones based on Poussin's modulated seeing reliant upon chromatic variation, a central point was located in each image and pushed out, using Adobe software, towards all four cardinal points until the image in its entirety became its own frame [figs 3.7- 3.8].




Fig 3.2

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<sup>261</sup> Poussin uses not only colour, architectural device and numerous light sources in order to speed up and slow down the eye, but also opaque and transparent zones. Columns, steps, balustrades and clouds are also used to move the eye around Poussin's composition. The steps at the bottom of the painting combined with columns act as an internal frame partly open at the left and right hand side of the painting, closed at the bottom, compounded further by the figure of Joseph whose illuminated right foot leads the eye out of the painting after encountering the robes of Mary and Saint Elizabeth. While these observations are the stock in trade of art historical analysis, they helped draw attention to the internal frame as a useful element towards the development of sticky images. Vermeer's *A Woman Holding a Balance* is a master class in composition. The painting, to my mind, is *about* composition, composition in painting is its subject. Vermeer, in painting a trompe l'oeil nail at the top of the painting, next to a trompe l'oeil hole where the nail was originally held suggests that the painting to the right of the hole has been repositioned. The scales in the woman's right hand speak to compositional balance and not perhaps, the weighing of worldly riches.






Fig 3.3




Fig 3.4



Fig 3.5



Fig 3.6



Fig 3.7





Fig 3.8

This simultaneous compression and expansion of the images was employed in order to ascertain how the reduction of a complex image to relatively simple blocks of colour might re-organise the order in which the paintings were looked at, and how the temporality of Poussin's chromatic logic might be employed to shift another temporal condition of painting, the successive order in which depicted elements are read. In terms of the relation between time and colour, this series of paintings failed to achieve anything significant or useful towards the production of sticky images. What this series did achieve, however, was to draw attention to the internal frame, how it both moved the eye around an image, and opened up the relation of painting to the space in which they are shown. The paintings were both open and closed to the wall.<sup>262</sup>

In aesthetics, one pervasive argument regarding the frame is that it functions to distinguish the art object from nature, from its surroundings, one perceptual field from another, and from the social world. The frame, therefore, isolates the internal temporal conditions of the static image from the world beyond its edges. George Simmel describes the discriminatory nature of the frame as an 'indifference towards and defence against the exterior and unifying integration with respect to the interior as a *single act*'.<sup>263</sup> For Simmel, it is the frame that defines what an art object is, and maintains its

<sup>262</sup> Open refers to areas where the delimiting edges of the painting have been painted to match the wall upon which it is hung, and to the use of a framing device on three, not four sides of an image. Framing devices were tried that were both open and closed to the wall (fig 3.2).

<sup>263</sup> George Simmel, "The Picture Frame: An Aesthetic Study", *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 11, (1994), p. 12.

coherence as an aesthetic object.<sup>264</sup> The inconsistencies of Simmel's analysis are revealed when, as discussed in Chapter Two, the spectator is ambulatory. There is a dynamic relation between the spectator and his/her field of vision when he/she encounters not the singular image, but the multiple.<sup>265</sup> To dispense with the traditional frame in order to open up the painting to its external framing conditions only replaces one frame with another. The edges of a painting contain and delimit, and John Berger discusses the format of the unframed painting as being one that both necessitates and dictates the act of composition. Regardless of how the use of composition changes from epoch to epoch, the act of composition always remains an act of organising forms in an interior space. The paradox of painting, according to Berger, is that it,

Invites the spectator into its room to look at the world beyond....To paint is to bring inside: yet what is brought inside is what is far away. The terms of this contradiction are never settled once and for all.<sup>266</sup>

What emerges when compressing the digital images of paintings by Vermeer and Poussin is an indeterminate boundary between inside and outside, where parergon (frame) and ergon (work) are exchangeable. An equivalent indeterminacy prompts Derrida's central response to parerga in Kant's *Critique of Judgement*:

What is the place of the frame. Does it have a place. Where does it begin. Where does it end. What is its inner limit. Outer. And the surface between the two limits.<sup>267</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> The lack of any frame or framing device that might differentiate the art object from its surroundings has, on many occasion resulted in errors of judgement. The work of artists Damien Hirst (Eystorm Gallery, 2001), Sara Goldschmeid and Eleanora Chiari (Museion Bolzano, 2015), were removed from the gallery by cleaning staff, having been mistaken for rubbish.

<sup>265</sup> For a counter argument to Simmel's aesthetic art object, and the frame, one that discusses the art object as operating within a much broader social context, see Hans-Georg Gadamar, "The Speechless Image", *The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 83-91.

<sup>266</sup> John Berger, "The Place of Painting", *The Sense of Sight*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), pp. 212- 18, 214.

<sup>267</sup> Jacques Derrida, "The Parergon", trans. by Craig Owens, *October*, Vol. 9, Summer, (1979), p.26. Jacques Derrida in *Truth in Painting* deconstructs the terms *parergon* and *parerga* in Kant's *Critique of Reason*. Kant uses the terms to define disparate objects across a range of conditions including adjuncts to works of art that include colour and tone, ornamentation to statues and architectural colonnades, all of which Kant considers not only supplemental, but also, in some circumstances detrimental to the work (ergon) they encompass. Derrida equates this encompassment with a frame - in that all Kant's examples frame the work. Derrida's identifies inconsistencies within Kant's definition of the parergon as "a composite of inside and outside, but a composite which is not an amalgam of half-and-half, an outside which is called inside the inside to constitute it as inside".

In locating the frame as simultaneously outside the picture and having agency within the picture Kant prompts Derrida to question the relation between parergon and ergon, stating that the status of the parergon as subordinate - mere appendage is problematic.

These small-scale paintings [figs 3.2-3.4] present a surface where a frame is both central to the image, the ‘pictorial milieu of the image’, and open to its outside.<sup>268</sup> The etymological root for milieu from the Old French is *mi* (middle) and from the Latin *lieu* (place). The locus of the frame, therefore, is clearly at the centre of things. Centrality in this case however, is not in opposition to the peripheral, not only are they the same, but they also stand in direct relation to what Deleuze refers to as ‘the out of field...that which exists elsewhere’.<sup>269</sup> The *elsewhere*, in this instance, is the whole to which individual paintings will come to belong. In order to allow the discrete image a voice within a population of voices, and to facilitate this conversation, discrete images must first be open to dialogue with the environment in which the dialogue takes place.<sup>270</sup> Space according to Coplans after all, has its own voice and must also be allowed its say.

This small series of paintings [figs 3.2-3.4] with their open and closed framing devices, albeit embryonic, suggested one element that might be useful towards the production of sticky images. Open and closed framing devices encourage the eye’s active scrutiny of the pictorial field and the space in which it operates. I am not suggesting that there is anything original here; simply that it might be done differently, rooted in repetition and in the service of time, and not space alone.

In search of images to repeat, images as the basis for the production of sticky images, I turned to the already given, already repeated reproductions of paintings found in a book. In turning to the pages of a book, I am returned to the site of my earliest encounter with painting [3.9].<sup>271</sup>

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<sup>268</sup> Meyer Shapiro, “On some problems in the semiotics of visual art: field and vehicle in image-signs”, *Semiotica*, (1969), pp. 223-42, 235.

<sup>269</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, (London: Bloomsbury, 1983), p. 21.

<sup>270</sup> Dialogism as theorised by Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin argues that all meaning is relative in the sense that it comes about only as a result of the relation between two bodies occupying simultaneous but different space. See Michael Holquist, *Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2002); Mikhail Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, edited by Michael Holquist, translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).

<sup>271</sup> ‘Suddenly I came across a picture whose only purpose was to wait for centuries and ambush me’, Images and dialogue from *Mishima: A life in Four Chapters*, written and directed by Paul Schrader, (Zoetrope Studios, 1985).

### 3.2 The Book.



Fig 3.9

To leaf through the pages of a book is to experience the workings of a non-mechanical time keeper. To open the book is to start the clock ticking. Here time is not measured by itself (one second per second) but by the movement of the images as they pass from the present-read into the past-read while building an anticipation for the following image, the not-yet-read. This order, unlike time itself, can be reversed. The reader returning to the book after some time need only remember the last image she/he looked at in order take up reading again, and if asked how much more time they will spend reading, the reader will often answer, not with “seconds or minutes”, but “pages or chapters”. The book is a site where the seen and the say-able, the icon and the logos

comingle, a marker of time constructed from recycled paper, from trees grown to replace the previous year's harvest. The book may be pulped, recycled, and in turn become another book. And so it goes on. The book, according to Deleuze, is not a matter of objects and subjects but 'variously formed matters, and very different dates and speeds'.<sup>272</sup> In discussing the book in the same breath as the tree, I do so, not only to draw attention to the fact that a book also has a spine and leaves, but to make a distinction between a book that has as its model the arborescent, and the book that is rhizomatic. The book that I chose to repeat from inadvertently manifests both.<sup>273</sup>

*Discovering Art: The Illustrated Story of Art through the Ages*, published between 1964 and 1966 is the kind of publication still available today. It is bought weekly or monthly and the sum of its parts, accumulated over time, delivers the desired outcome [fig 3.10].<sup>274</sup>



Fig 3.10

<sup>272</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, translated by Brian Massumi, (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), p. 2.

<sup>273</sup> By arboreal I refer to a linear and hierarchical logic that can best be explained and visualised by the kinds of images used when drawing up a family tree. The rhizomatic book in contradistinction, cuts across boundaries, spatial and temporal, it is a multiplicitous assemblage, is networked and can be thought in terms of the rhizome (root structures like ginger) and not the tree. The book that I chose to repeat from presents both a linear art history (arborescent) and an anachronistic history of art (rhizomatic).

<sup>274</sup> *Discovering Art: The Illustrated Story of Art through the Ages* is the kind of publication still available today from companies such as De Agostini, whether to build a story of art, a model of the Millennium Falcon, or a fully functional orrery.

*Discovering Art*, as I have stated, presents a linear or arborescent art history, but the serial nature of its publication inadvertently presents an anachronistic or rhizomatic history of art. A reproduction printed on the front cover of July's offering, for example, collides with the image printed on the back cover of June's. The gaze of Jean-Antoine Watteau's *Le Mezzetin* is returned by a Sumerian sculpture [fig 3.11], Giotto di Bondone's *Flight into Egypt* faces a Neolithic cave painting depicting Saharan hunters with domesticated animals [fig 3.12], and Pieter Bruegel the Elder's *Hunters in the Snow* is flanked by an Iron Age terra-cotta horseman [fig 3.13]. While these temporal collisions continue to occur throughout the publication, what first drew my attention to this book was the equivalence between the embryonic framing devices uncovered in the series of small scale geometric studies discussed above [figs 3.2-3.4], and the graphic designer's riot of cropping and framing brought into play on the covers of *Discovering Art* [fig 3.10].



Fig 3.11




Fig 3.12






Fig 3.13



Fig 3.14




Fig 3.15

The equivalence between the graphic design of *Discovering Art* and the emergence of internal frames in my painting can perhaps be best seen in the above images [fig 3.14-3.15]. The equivalence is not only one of colour and composition, but one of gaps, fault-lines and fissures. The cover of *Discovering Art* utilizes these fault-lines to demarcate

epoch from epoch, Frans Hals from Phoenician art, and Egypt from Thailand. In this instance, one property of the page is to force disparate temporal and geographical zones into dialogue.<sup>275</sup> The page can be thought of as a field of encounters delimited by a no-man's land that echoes Lessing's inviolable border as discussed in Chapter One.<sup>276</sup>

The images in *Discovering Art* are reproductions of painting and sculpture printed on pages of a book. Each page of the book is a smooth rectangular sheet of paper, an indispensable field upon which images reside. The page is not only that which can be turned, the carrier of an image from the present-read to the past-read, from the recto to the verso, it also can hold on its surface different temporalities due to the act of cropping. In the above image [fig 3.13], the verso reproduction of Bruegel's *Hunters in the Snow* is, apart from the cropping apparent in my own photograph, uncropped, while the recto images are. The act of cropping not only shifts the relation of image to its out of field, but also modifies an images temporality. Bruegel's uncropped image exists in what might be described as a composed and complete field. Its relation to the out of field however, is made explicit by Bruegel's painted footprints in the snow entering the painting from the bottom left of the painting, and we are given the time to complete the journey that Bruegel's hunters will make. Images on the recto however, are cropped and fragmentary. In one instance the frame traces the contours of an image. They are, more importantly, truncated images taken from larger images and have the effect of presenting a partial image at speed. Shapiro clearly equates cropping with tempo:

Such cropping, now common in photographic illustrations in books and magazines, brings out the partial, the fragmentary and contingent in the image, even when the main object is centred. The picture seems to be arbitrarily isolated from a larger whole and brought *abruptly* into the observer's field of vision. The cropped picture exists as if for his *momentary* glance rather than for a set view. In comparison with this type, the framed picture appears to be more formally *presented* and complete and to *exist in a world of its own*.<sup>277</sup>

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<sup>275</sup> Svetlana Alpers reminds us that the literal translation of the word "geography" is world-describer. Alpers presents a persuasive argument that mapping is analogous to seventeenth century Dutch painting.

<sup>276</sup> 'Painting and poetry should be like two just and friendly neighbours, neither of whom is indeed allowed to take unseemly liberties in the heart of the other's domain, but who exercise mutual forbearance on the borders, and effect a peaceful settlement for all the petty encroachments which circumstances may compel either to make in haste on the rights of the other'. G.E. Lessing, *Op cit*.

<sup>277</sup> My emphasis. Meyer Shapiro, "On Some Problems in the Semiotics of Visual Art: Field and Vehicle in Image-Signs", *Semiotica* 1, (1969), p. 225.



In order to explore the possible positioning of an image in relation to the space of the page, the ways in which images enter into dialogue with one another, and the ways in which these relations might be useful towards the production of sticky images, I produced a series of ink and wash studies based on the pages of *Discovering Art*. Dutch Painter Pieter Aersten's (1508-1575) painting *The Meat Stall* (1551) [fig 3.17] for example, sits above Bruegel's *The Return of the Hunters*.



Fig 3.16



Fig 3.17

Despite the fourteen years that separate their moment of production, the shared occupation of the same space, a page that collapses temporal *distance*, allows a dialogue to develop that speaks to collective hunting and plenty, the storage of food in order to survive a winter. A detail of Edouard Manet's *The Fifer* (1866) is brought into dialogue with a detail of Claude Monet's *The River* (1868) [fig 3.16]. The dialogue is not only one of music and bucolic pleasures and the cropping and quartering of images; but of space, pictorial depth and the textual gaps (the white of the page), that surround the images. A series of gouache studies [figs 3.18-3.23] were also produced in order to

examine not only how colour promotes dialogue between images on a page, but also the ways that aggregate images within the space of the page with conflicting pictorial depth, with or without the recourse to perspective, interrogate the space of the page.



Fig 3.18



Fig 3.19



Fig 3.20




Fig 3.21





Fig 3.22



Fig 3.23

It was clear that however interesting these dialogues might be, they are dialogues internal to a single page. The intention for *Repetition from Reproduction* had always

been that discrete images would enter into dialogue with other images in a network. The internal, self-contained dialogue might hinder this intention. It became clear that cropping and framing devices could be used in conjunction with images already thick with time, images from *Discovering Art*, to modulate the temporality of seeing and therefore play a role in the production of sticky images.

I would like to suggest that the images from *Discovering Art* were chosen after careful deliberation. This, however, is not strictly speaking true. The images chosen from *Discovering Art* are a given, and they are given in an order that results from the episodic logic of a publication accumulated periodically. The five images appropriated from the pages of *Discovering Art* are Giotto di Bondone's *Flight into Egypt* [fig 3.24], an unattributed photograph of a young woman admiring Le Corbusier's painted wooden sculpture *Ozon II* [fig 3.25], Antoine Watteau's *Le Mezzetin* [fig 3.26], a photograph of Henri Matisse's *La Serpentine* [fig 3.27], and Pieter Bruegel the Elder's *Hunters in the Snow* by [fig 3.28].



Fig 3.24




Fig 3.25



Fig 3.26



Fig 3.27



Fig 3. 28



To attempt an in-depth textual analyses of these images, all of which coincidentally exist on the verso in *Discovering Art*, would take up too much time and space within this thesis. Having invested so much time in looking at them, however, and in repeating them for a period of two years, a few observations about Bruegel's *Hunters in the Snow* are relevant.<sup>278</sup>

Discovering Bruegel's *Hunters in the Snow* in *Discovering Art* was serendipitous. The painting has fascinated me for many years. The appearance of Bruegel's painting in Andrei Tarkovsky's 1972 film *Solaris* is a favourite example of the simultaneous appearance of painting and book in cinema [figs 3.29-3.30].<sup>279</sup>



Fig 3.29

<sup>278</sup> I have already mentioned *Hunters in the Snow*, also known as *The Return of the Hunters*. Its lesser used title suggests temporal extension. The hunters *have* been hunting and they *will* return home. The painting represents a temporal extension immensely more complex than the depicted; a complexity exploited to great effect by Russian film director Andrei Tarkovsky in his 1972 film *Solaris*. Tarkovsky's panning shot, across the surface of Bruegel's painting, performs and completes the implicit narrative. We exchange places with the hunters and arrive at their destination and in doing so we access memories of our own homes. This panning shot enacts one temporal condition attributed to cinema by Tarkovsky. It *adds* time to lived experience, in this instance the experience of looking at a painting by Bruegel: Tarkovsky writes 'I think that what a person normally goes to the cinema for is *time*: for time lost or spent or not yet had....for cinema, like no other art, widens, enhances and concentrates a person's experience - and not only enhances it but makes it longer, significantly longer' Andrei Tarkovsky, *Sculpting in Time*, translated by Kitty Hunter-Blair, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987), p. 63. Tarkovsky's panning shot, in opposition to the digital animations of paintings by Van Gogh and Rembrandt discussed in Chapter One, does not impose a false movement on the static image, but elicits from it what Tarkovsky called its 'Time-Pressure', a temporal rhythm within an image that is unique *to* the image.<sup>278</sup> Time-pressure within a scene is autonomous, indivisible and impervious to any attempts to cut, edit or montage without destroying its temporal coherence. The scene, as I see it, also undermines the essentialist argument that movement is a necessary element of cinema.<sup>278</sup> Although Tarkovsky's camera does move/read Bruegel's painting from left to right, and right to left, the scene questions cinema's privileged indexical relation to time by analysing the temporal complexities of the static image within the temporality of the moving image, a cinematic paradox described by Laura Mulvey as 'the co-presence of movement and stillness, continuity and discontinuity', Laura Mulvey, *Death 24x a Second: Stillness and the Moving Image*, (London: Reaktion Books, 2012), p12.

<sup>279</sup> The book is an illustrated copy of *The Ingenious Gentleman Don Quixote of La Mancha* (1930), Miguel Cervantes, re-visited by Jorge Luis Borges in *Pierre Menard: Author of the Quixote* (1939). The film *Solaris* is awash with repetition, simulacra, books and painting.



Fig 3.30

I have included these images of the book in zero gravity in *Solaris* for reasons that will be elaborated in more detail in Chapter Four, as they specifically relate to the temporalisation of space by static objects. Briefly, however, it is a matter of parallax, the perceptual change in the relative position of objects dependent on viewing angle or movement.<sup>280</sup>

Having acknowledged the potential importance of the frame in earlier small-scale paintings, a series of drawings, watercolours and gouache studies were produced in order to develop the potential relations between figure and internal frame, image and page, and the ways in which the shadow might be brought into play. It is perhaps worth mentioning that these images were painted from observation, and not from photographs, a return to a way of working that I had not followed for many years. Until this point my practice as a painter had usually been one of *finding* an image through the act of painting, rather than of careful construction.

What became immediately apparent in these images was the problem of how to make a painting of a reproduction whose original painting depicts illusionistic depth, and how this space might be differentiated from the page it is printed on, and the book within which the pages are held. It became clear that in order to differentiate the illusionistic space flattened by reproduction, perspective would have to be brought into conversation with what Jean Baudrillard discusses as its antithesis: *trompe l'oeil*. Baudrillard describes *trompe l'oeil* as:

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<sup>280</sup> Parallax scrolling is perhaps most familiar to contemporary audiences in the layer method encountered in computer graphics, gaming, and web design. In the layer method, images scrolling either horizontally or vertically can be used to create the illusion of depth due to the speed at which they scroll and their relative position. A background image, for example will scroll at a slower speed than a foreground image. The relevance of parallax scrolling to the temporalisation of space by static images will be clarified in Chapter Four.

Haunted objects, metaphysical objects, they are opposed in their unreal reversion to the whole representative space elaborated by the Renaissance.<sup>281</sup>

### 3.3 Trompe L'Oeil.<sup>282</sup>

Having decided that *Repetition from Reproduction* would employ trompe l'oeil as an important element of the sticky image, I will discuss the development of *Repetition from Reproduction* through the lens of Jean Baudrillard's essay *Trompe L'Oeil Or Enchanted Simulation*.<sup>283</sup> Not only is everything that I find interesting about trompe l'oeil everything that Baudrillard finds suspect, but Baudrillard's essay inadvertently maps, page by page, the development of *Repetition from Reproduction*. Baudrillard's assault on trompe l'oeil, for example, not only begins by discussing the book in still life painting, but moves on to challenge these 'haunted objects' in temporal and spatial terms.<sup>284</sup>

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<sup>281</sup> Jean Baudrillard, "The Trompe L'oeil", in *Calligram*, edited by Norman Bryson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 53-62, 54.

<sup>282</sup> The term trompe l'oeil (to fool the eye), used here to discuss seventeenth-century painting, did not, however, come into use until ca. 1800. See Angela Ka Yan Ho, "Gerrit Dou's Enchanting Trompe L'Oeil: Virtuosity and Agency in Early Modern Collections", *Journal of Historians of Netherlandish Art*, Vol. 7, Issue 1, Winter, (2015), pp. 1-27.

<sup>283</sup> See Jean Baudrillard, "Trompe L'oeil Or Enchanted Simulation", in *Seduction*, translated by Brian Singer, (Montreal: New World Perspectives (Culture Texts Series), 1990), pp. 60- 6; First published as *De la seduction*, (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1979).

<sup>284</sup> The decision to discuss *Repetition from Reproduction* through the lens of trompe l'oeil rests on my conviction that the use of trompe l'oeil in Netherlandish painting signals an earlier emergence of what Michel Foucault refers to as the 'picture-object'. Foucault maintains that Manet's painting from 1862 onwards not only allow Impressionism but all the painting after Impressionism. In what is a brilliant lecture, delivered in Tunis in 1971, Foucault defines the 'picture-object' in terms that can be applied to Netherlandish painting produced some two hundred years prior to the advent of Manet's painting. For Foucault, painting prior to that of Manet, and since the *Renaissance* employs a range of strategies, including the use of perspective, to obfuscate the simple fact that, despite illusory depth, painting 'rests' on a more or less rectangular two dimensional surface. For Foucault, it is Manet who foregrounds the material properties of the surface on which he paints, and in doing so signals a rupture with earlier painting, resulting in the picture-object. What defines Manet's painting as a 'picture-object', according to Foucault, rests on three rubrics. Firstly, Manet's painting internalises the material properties of a painting's surface, the horizontal and vertical axes are the compositional armature, used to create a sense of space in the painting without recourse to perspective. Secondly, Manet plays with light, employing a light source that emanates from a space external to his painting. Thirdly, Manet extends this relation between painting's internal space and the space in which it is apprehended by making specific address to a paintings audience. He does this, to follow Foucault, by playing 'with the place of the viewer in relation to the picture'. By internalising the properties of a painting's surface, employing an external light source and by rejecting perspective in favour of both planar perspective, and by the illusion of an intrusion into the space of the spectator, trompe l'oeil painting satisfies all three of Foucault's definition of the 'picture-object.' *Repetition from Reproduction*, therefore, are both sticky images and picture- objects. See Michel Foucault, *Manet and the Object of painting*, (London: Tate Publishing, 2011). First published by Editions du Seuil, 2009.



Dutch painting, as Celeste Brusati has argued, has made its business the business of provoking a prolonged and active visual engagement with painting that petitioned the eye and mind of an embodied beholder in order to process painting in an extended present.<sup>285</sup> Brusati in an excellent paper on perspective in Dutch painting provides a salient quote from Flemish painter and theoretician Karel van Manders (1548-1606) that makes clear the goals of seventeenth-century painters.<sup>286</sup> For Manders, the extended present is engendered by scrupulous attention to detail and mastery of technique:

sweet nourishment to the eyes, making them *tarry long*, especially when joined close to its art, spirit and boldness, and when the image retains its appeal *both from afar and close by*; such things *entangle* [the viewer] and through his insatiable eyes, makes his heart cleave fast with *constant* desire.<sup>287</sup>

Baudrillard's essay begins its critique of the trompe l'oeil image by examining the 'second rate object' that trompe l'oeil purloins from the tradition of still life.<sup>288</sup> One such object mentioned by Baudrillard is the book.

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<sup>285</sup> See Celeste Brusati, "Perspective in Flux: Viewing Dutch Pictures in Real Time", *Art History*, Vol. 35, No. 5, November, (2012), pp. 908- 33.

<sup>286</sup> For Eric Jan Sluitjer the rise in quality, detail and verisimilitude in Netherlandish painting enabled painters to compete in a market already saturated by inexpensive painting. See Eric Jan Sluitjer, "On Brabant Rubbish, Economic Competition, Artistic Rivalry, and the Growth of the Market for Paintings in the First Decade of the Seventeenth Century", translated by Jennifer Kilian and Katy Kist, *Journal of Historians of Netherlandish Art*, Vol. 1, Issue 2, (2009), pp. 1-16. Originally published in "Kunst Voor de Markt", edited by R. Falkenburg, J. de Jong, and B. Ramakers, *Nederlands Kunsthistorische Jaarboek*, 50, (1999), pp. 112- 43.

<sup>287</sup> My emphasis. Quoted by Brusati, originally in Karel van Mander, "Den Grondt der Edel vry Schilder-const", *Het Shilder-boeck*, (Haarlem, 1604).

<sup>288</sup> Jean Baudrillard, *Seduction*, translated by Brian Singer, (Montreal: New World Perspectives (Culture Texts Series), 1990), p. 60.



Fig 3.31

In the small scale gouache studies [fig 3.31], I employed the oldest trompe l'oeil trick in the book. In these studies, the shadow not only helps to differentiate the page of a book from the text block beneath it, but brings into sharp focus a tension that the trompe l'oeil instigates between representation and presentation.<sup>289</sup> The images above combine representation *and* presentation. The reproductions (from painting and photography) are painted as pictorial representations, and the trompe l'oeil shadow is painted as being appreciably and substantially present. The shadow has presence in the present. To drop the prefix *re-* from representation is to change the temporality of the shadow from a *then* to a *now*. The conflation of representation and presentation in one image promotes the kind of visual entanglement that Van Manders advocates in *Het Schilder Boek*.<sup>290</sup> Baudrillard however, is equally critical of trompe l'oeil's shadow.

While the still-life uses classic shapes and shades, the shadows borne by the *trompe l'oeil* lack the depth that comes from a *real* luminous source....Not the result of chiaroscuro, nor a skilful dialectic of light and shadow (for these are painterly effects), they suggest the transparency of objects to a black sun.<sup>291</sup>

The drawings [fig 3.32] made from reproductions found in *Discovering Art* certainly attempt to skilfully represent light and shadow using chiaroscuro. They were drawn from observation, and attention was paid to the ways that light falls on, and is reflected

<sup>289</sup> Susan L. Feagin presents a persuasive distinction between representation and presentation in "Presentation and Representation", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. 56, No. 3, summer, (1998), pp. 234-240.

<sup>290</sup> Op cit.

<sup>291</sup> Original emphasis, Ibid. p.61-62.

from matte and gloss surfaces. While this approach might satisfy Baudrillard's definition of still life as opposed to *trompe l'oeil*, what I am interested in here however, is not the production of still life *per se*, but the construction of sticky images.



Fig 3.32

The above images are of books read either as images affixed to a vertical plane, or as an object lying on horizontal surface seen from above. In either case the field of depth articulated by the shadow is shallow and the book in both cases is parallel to the picture plane. Baudrillard's second assault on the *trompe l'oeil* is of a lack of natural light and its shallow depth. For Baudrillard, the *trompe l'oeil*, like the book in Tarkovsky's *Solaris*, defies gravity:

There is no nature in the *trompe l'oeil*, nor landscape, skies, vanishing points or natural light...Anachrony alone stands out, the involuted representation of time and space...Although a still life may sometimes play with a disorder, with the ragged edge of things and the fragility of their use, it always retains the gravity of real things, as underscored by the horizontalness. Whereas the *trompe l'oeil* functions in weightlessness, as indicated by the vertical backdrop, everything being suspended, the objects, time, even light and perspective.<sup>292</sup>

Baudrillard's equivalence of gravity and horizontality with the real is unclear. An astronaut's vertiginous experience of zero gravity, without an up or down may disorientate, but it is certainly a real one.

<sup>292</sup> Jean Baudrillard, *Seduction*, translated by Brian Singer, (Montreal: New World Perspectives (Culture Texts Series), 1990), p. 61-62.

In pursuing the sticky image, chance played its part in conjunction with an error of visual perception and bad practice. In making a drawing from the reproduction of Matisse's *La Serpentine* I had inadvertently stretched the image horizontally compared to the original. I had ignored what I was seeing. Looking at the open book slightly obliquely, I had disregarded the anamorphic distortion, and in order to fit the image into the rectangle I had already drawn in my journal, I stretched it to fit [Fig 3.33]. Noticing the discrepancy I compressed the image along its vertical axis using digital software and checked it against the original [fig 3.34].



Fig 3.33




Fig 3.34

I had decided at an early stage that individual sticky images would be apprehended in a network of sticky images in space, and that in navigating this space, the beholder will, by necessity, approach some images obliquely. To explore further, the potential of the image approached obliquely, a polystyrene cut out of Matisse's *La Serpentine* was produced, photographed and used to create a small-scale gouache study in order to find out how the trompe l'oeil shadow at the right hand side of the image might affect the illusion of depth, internal to the image [fig 3.35].




Fig 3.35






Fig 3.36

What I find interesting about the simple trompe l'oeil shadow in this instance, is the way that it produces a plethora of complex visual puzzles, spatio/temporal contradictions and perceptual indeterminacies. The gouache representation of the Matisse sculpture depicts an illusion of spatial depth faithful to the original photograph. The trompe l'oeil shadow however, not only reinforces the illusion of depth in the pictorial representation, it pushes the entire image out into the space of the beholder. This is however, not a complete reversal of Alberti's perspectival window on the world, as the image has both representational and presentational space operating together.<sup>293</sup> Not only does the trompe l'oeil shadow cause the book to *bend*, with its page projecting outwards into the spectator's space, it seems to bend the space within the representation of the reproduction. In attempting to ascertain the usefulness of the obliquely perceived image, I was reminded of a perplexing painting by Samuel van Hoogstraten, a painting it seemed, specifically designed to be encountered obliquely in a narrow space [fig 3.36].

<sup>293</sup> 'First of all, on the surface on which I am going to paint, I draw a rectangle of whatever size I want, which I regard as an open window through which the subject to be painted is seen...' Leon Battista Alberti, *On Painting*, translated by Cecil Grayson, notes by Martin Kemp, (London: Penguin Books, 2004)p. 54.

Van Hoogstraten's famous *View of a Corridor* seems to trouble the laws of perspective, particularly in the rhombuses of the floor tiles. The image when digitally altered using perspective warp (left and right images are edited, the central image remains as was), appears to suggest that the painting was constructed in order to be approached along a narrow corridor.

In transgressing the inviolability of the picture plane, pushing the image out towards the real space of the beholder rather than relying on perspective, the space of trompe l'oeil brings us to Baudrillard's penultimate criticism. This spatial transgression, according to Baudrillard, in its reversal of Renaissance space, not only challenges the reality of the third dimension, but of the 'reality principle reality itself'.<sup>294</sup> Baudrillard describes trompe l'oeil space thus:

Depth appears to have been turned inside out. While the Renaissance organised all space in accord with a distant vanishing point, perspective in the trompe l'oeil is, in a sense, projected forward. Instead of fleeing before the panoramic sweep of the eye (the privilege of panoptic vision), the objects "fool" the eye (trompant l'oeil) by a sort of internal depth - not by causing one to believe in a world that does not exist, but by undermining the privileged position of the gaze. The eye, instead of generating a space that spreads out, is but the internal vanishing point for a convergence of objects.<sup>295</sup>

Trompe l'oeil space for Baudrillard then, is a reversal of seeing. Trompe l'oeil is not seen by the beholder, it is the beholder that is seen by trompe l'oeil. Two images that at first glance, might substantiate Baudrillard's position are Gerrit Dou's (1613-1675) *Painter with a Pipe and Book* (c.1645-50) [fig 3.37], and *Girl at a Window with a Fruitbasket* (c. 1675) [fig 3.38]. Dou's *Painter with a Pipe* is undoubtedly a master class in trompe l'oeil, with the use of his trademark curtain, ledge, and fictive frame. Dou's *Girl at a Window with a Fruitbasket* is a painting that employs both perspective and trompe l'oeil.<sup>296</sup>

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<sup>294</sup> Jean Baudrillard, *Seduction*, translated by Brian Singer, (Montreal: New World Perspectives (Culture Texts Series), 1990), p. 63.

<sup>295</sup> Ibid.

<sup>296</sup> The most compelling description of trompe l'oeil's reversal of perspective that I have come across is from Hanneke Grootenboer. Grootenboer writes, 'If we turn the finger of a glove inside out, its structure will remain exactly the same but will now be articulated by its reverse side. Previously enveloped by the leather, the lining of the glove will emerge. Exteriority and interiority are reversed without actually changing the structure of the glove. Elaborating on this metaphor, we may imagine the



Fig 3.37



Fig 3.38

tip of the glove's finger as a vanishing point that once pulled out reveals the other side of the point, which normally falls beyond the horizon. Moving the finger of the glove back and forth, we see how the vanishing point can merge with the point of view when the structure within which these points are normally separated is mapped out'. Hanneke Grootenboer, *The rhetoric of perspective: Realism and illusionism in seventeenth-century Dutch still-life painting*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 55.

The painting simultaneously offers us representation and representation in the illusion of depth in the seated figures beyond the curtain and the projection into our own space as the girl reaches out towards us.<sup>297</sup> Dou's use of *trompe l'oeil* however, is one that presents a visual aporia that draws attention to the tension between artifice and verisimilitude. His *trompe l'oeil* can never be confused with the real due to their small scale. They are life in miniature.<sup>298</sup>

Celeste Brusati reminds us that *the* central project of Dutch painting was an experiential praxis that sought to negotiate the paradox of perspective, a paradox that attempts to *position* an embodied viewer both within virtual perspectival space, and external to it.<sup>299</sup> The strategies that Dutch painting developed in response to this paradox, whether of scale, views through doors, windows, across thresholds; multiple perspectives, foreshortening, anamorphic illusion and *trompe l'oeil*, all sustain what Manders referred to as *entangled* viewing. Entangled viewing is another way of describing the sticky image, and the tactics employed by Dutch painters have been, to a greater or lesser degree, appropriated in the service of my own sticky images. Before moving on to the discussion of the series of paintings *Repetition from Reproduction* that evolved from the exploratory drawings, gouache studies, and paintings discussed above, I would like to define what I refer to as the *three times* of *trompe l'oeil*.

*Trompe l'oeil* makes its first appearance as pictorial verisimilitude and its second appearance as such, is one that unmasks the first to reveal its duplicity. Jacques Lacan describes this second moment:

For it appears at that moment as something other than it seemed, or rather now it seems to be that something else.<sup>300</sup>

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<sup>297</sup> For a doctoral thesis on repetition in the practice of Gerrit Dou, see Angela Ka Yan Ho, *Rethinking Repetition: Constructing Value in Dutch Genre Painting 1650s to 1670s*, (University of Michigan, 2007).

<sup>298</sup> Dou's *Girl at a Window with Fruitbasket* is 37.5cm x 29.1cm and his *Painter with Pipe and Book* is 48cm x 37cm.

<sup>299</sup> See Celeste Brusati, "Perspective in Flux: Viewing Dutch Pictures in Real Time", *Art History*, Vol. 35, No. 5, November, (2012).

<sup>300</sup> Jacques Lacan, "What is a picture?", *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, translated by Alan Sheridan, (New York and London, W. W. Norton & Company, 1981), p. 112. In *What is a Picture* Lacan discusses illusion in the paintings of the fifth century Greek painter Zeuxis and his contemporary Parrhasius, both engaged in a competition to produce the most convincing illusion of the real. The distinction that Lacan makes between the lure and *trompe l'oeil* is one, that to my mind, differentiates an illusion that attempts to deceive from one that is constructed in order to reveal itself as an illusion, and is therefore self-critical. In the case of Zeuxis' painting of the grapes, a painting that lured birds into an attempt to partake of the grapes, Lacan points out that the birds were not attracted to the painting because of its realism. Lacan writes: 'It is not very likely that the birds would have been



Another way of approaching this is in terms of a perceptual gap, a temporal delay where the beholder attempts to reconcile her/himself with the difference between the first and second appearance of trompe l'oeil. For many this second appearance results in nothing more than a divided subject as perception perpetually shifts from the first appearance of trompe l'oeil to the second and back again without end. This second appearance causes, I would argue, a recurring perceptual *wobble*. As the wobble occurs over time and holds the beholder in front of a painting, it serves to decelerate the embodied gaze and therefore helps move the image towards that of the sticky image. There is however a third movement of trompe l'oeil that decelerates the gaze, and is one that I find critical as a painter. The third movement of trompe l'oeil, having exposed its artifice in its second, now focuses our attention on the construction of this artifice, the artfulness of artifice, to arrive at the conclusion that both representation and presentation are illusions constructed in paint on a two dimensional surface. The third movement of the trompe l'oeil, unlike other mimetic projects, defamiliarises the gaze, and in doing so forces a visual re-engagement with paint as material process. In this sense, trompe l'oeil is not an epistemological loop, but a self-critical process, and is, to adopt a phrase from Caroline Levine, 'the most realist of artistic projects and the most ironic antirealisms'.<sup>301</sup>

It is this third movement of trompe l'oeil thought as a self-reflexive movement that to my mind, rescues trompe l'oeil from some of its most passionate detractors, and re-focuses the eye and mind on paint and the act of painting.<sup>302</sup>

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deceived, for why should the birds see grapes portrayed with such extraordinary verisimilitude? There would have to be something more reduced, something closer to the sign, in something representing grapes for the birds'. Lacan differentiates Parrhasius' illusion from Zeuxis' as an illusion specifically addressed to a man and not a bird. In the case of Parrhasius' painting the goal of this address is to require its audience to see what is behind the illusion, to its construction as an illusion. Lacan writes, 'But the opposite example of Parrhasius makes it clear that if one wishes to deceive a man, what one presents to him is a veil, that is to say, something that incites him to ask what is behind it'. See Jacques Lacan, "What is a Picture", *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis*, pp.105-119, 111-112. W.J.T Mitchell in response to Lacan's position on trompe l'oeil reminds us that the trompe l'oeil has the potential to turn a man into an animal, to fool him, to make a monkey out of man. Lacan's reading of trompe l'oeil for Mitchell relies on an unsound differentiation between animals and man. This relation between master painter and dupe then, epitomises, according to Mitchell a power structure that trompe l'oeil reveals as one with troubling political and epistemological implications. W.J.T. Mitchell, "Illusion: Looking at Animals Looking, *Picture Theory*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 329-344

<sup>301</sup> Caroline Levine, "Seductive Reflexivity: Ruskin's Dreaded Trompe L'Oeil", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. 56, No. 4, Autumn, (1998), pp. 365-75, 365.

<sup>302</sup> Richard Wollheim argued that trompe l'oeil was anti-representational as it denied the surface painting, '[Some] paintings are non-representational . . . because they do not invoke, indeed they repel,

### 3.4 Finish, *non-finito*, and the Meta-Picture.

At the time of writing, forty-five paintings on linen and board constitute the series of paintings *Repetition from Reproduction*, the central body of work produced in response to my research questions. I have placed an image from this series next to a painting from 1658. Wallerant Vaillant's (1623-1677) painting *Wooden Board with Letters and Writing Implements* [fig 3.39], employs the use of oil paint on paper to create an illusion of boards upon which his trompe l'oeil objects are arranged. My own painting uses oil paint on board to create the illusion of paper, in this case the page of a book [3.40].



Fig 3.39



Fig 3.40

I have mentioned a range of strategies that might be used in order to construct sticky images, including the quotation of images from the history of art, internal framing devices, the shadow, and trompe l'oeil. Although the painting (after Giotto) [fig 3.40] successfully employs the above, one element that has not been discussed is the material of paint itself. Using paintings from the series *Repetition from Reproduction*, I will discuss what I consider to be the successful use of the strategies discussed above and the use of paint in order to produce sticky images that have agency within a *nexus* of images.<sup>303</sup> In order to maximise the differentiation between the representations of

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attention to the marked surface. Trompe l'oeil paintings are surely in this category. 'Richard Wollheim, *Painting as an Art*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 62.

<sup>303</sup> I use Alfred North Whitehead's definition of the word *nexus* here. Whitehead defines a nexus as 'a particular fact of togetherness among actual entities'. These actual entities share a common space and

reproductions on the page of a book, and the book in which they are held, I returned again to Poussin and his use of opaque and translucent colour. T.J. Clark writes of Poussin:

He is the most “constructivist” of painters...Scale and colour, and opacity and transparency are the very forms of an argument in Poussin: they *are* the argument, or what marks this argument off from many others.<sup>304</sup>

Opaque and translucent blocks of paint were used to capture the ways matte and gloss surfaces (page and book board) receive light. In *Repetition from Reproduction (after Giotto)* [fig 3.40] translucent glazes were used to suggest, though not mimic wood-grain, over which thicker layers of opaque paint were applied in order to *activate* the surface of the painting. This activation is a result of the ways in which the painting’s surface reflects light dependent upon the viewer’s position. Another consequence of this activation is the perceptual reversal of the image/page dependent upon the viewer’s position relative to the painting. The internal frame, seen in the hard back cover that holds the text block, is used not only to push the text block into the space of the viewer, but also to create a paradoxical pictorial space. The black frame at the bottom right of the painting, unlike that at the top right, moves *over* the image/page [fig 3.41] collapsing the trompe l’oeil. It is also used to *bend* the page towards the wall.



Fig 3.41

This relation between image, painting as object, and wall is accentuated through the use of two squares at the top left and bottom right of the painting [fig 3.42], painted to match the colour of my studio’s wall at the time of painting. In an attempt to *remove* the edges of the painting, the wooden support of *Repetition from Reproduction (after*

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time, connected by a ‘defining characteristic’. This commonality is the result of a process, and in the instance of my own practice, it is paint. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, (New York: Free Press, 1978), pp. 20-34.

<sup>304</sup> T.J. Clark, *The Sight of Death: An Experiment in Art Writing*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 48 - 9.

*Giotto*) was cut at a forty-five degree angle on all four sides. This served not only to create the illusion that the surface of the painting has the thickness of a single sheet of paper, but it also increases the illusion that the trompe l'oeil book intrudes into our own space, as does the painting as object [fig 3.42]. This combination of pictorial trompe l'oeil and physical trompe l'oeil is used to great effect in Cornelius Gijbrecht's cut out trompe l'oeil, *Painters Easel with Fruit piece* (1670-72) [fig 3.43].<sup>305</sup>



Fig 3.42

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<sup>305</sup> What we see in this image is a riot of representation and presentation. Gijbrecht places a representational still life painting on a trompe l'oeil easel that has been cut out of a single piece of wood. In order to confuse the viewer further, Gijbrechts introduces into the tableau, two trompe l'oeil paintings of the backs of canvas stretchers.



Fig 3.43



Fig 3.44





Fig 3.45




Fig 3.46

When viewed obliquely, the forty-five degree bevel helps to distort the trompe l'oeil illusion of the book, bending and buckling the page in relation to the book boards. This can be best seen perhaps, in the following images from the series *Repetition from Reproduction*. The following images are *after* Giotto [fig 3.44], Matisse [fig 3.45], and from a photograph of a young girl looking at a Le Corbusier's Ozon II [fig 3.46].

While the agency of the above images relies on trompe l'oeil, internal framing devices, shaped support, and a relation to the wall, a temporal condition of these paintings not yet discussed is the time of their making. I do not refer here to the question of how much time is invested in their making, but rather the difference between the *being* and the *becoming* of painting, a question of finish, not the finish of matte, gloss and varnished surfaces, but painting that questions its own temporal fixity. Painting is, as I have discussed, both an object and a process, a process that takes place in time, and an object that continues to have agency beyond the moment of its production. What I am interested in here, is painting as an object that continues to re-negotiate the premise that first set it in motion. All paintings can be said to continue *speaking* long after their historical moment of production - painting continues to specify its relations to other paintings within the system to which they belong. The system in this case is the history of painting, a fluid history, continually re-written as different paintings emerge to challenge existing paradigms. The re-negotiation to which I have referred is, however, less concerned with the shifting meaning attributed to individual paintings over time, but rather with the ways in which a painting's temporal *becoming* can be released from times arrow; its movement from initial premise to finished state. This, I argue, is achieved through repetition. Repetition defers closure, not only through the endlessness of serial imagery, but more importantly, as discussed in Chapter One, by means of a stuttering in time caused by repetition. This temporal stutter forces images within a network into an unending re-negotiation, where the premise of one painting is mirrored in images that share the same premise and at the same time present multiple variations of the originary premise *ad infinitum*. Not only is the idea of the finished painting undermined, but the ontological status of painting shifts from *being* to an *always becoming*.

In order to explore this diachronic *always becoming*, I produced a number of paintings in relation to adjacent paintings, painted not to appear intentionally unfinished, but more importantly, painted to re-create how they *had actually* appeared at

an earlier stage of their production based upon my ongoing documentation. In doing so, the paintings foreground the normally hidden processes used in their construction and confuse the temporal order of a painting's evolution.

The intentionally unfinished painting has, according to Elkins, in opposition to an incomplete image (*incompiuta*) a name; the *non finito* painting. Though similar to *non finito* painting in their shared interrogation of the idea of a *finished* image, my own are however, more concerned with their sequence of creation rather than 'a meditation on intention, completeness [and] confessional meaning', discourses that according to Elkins, are bound to the *non finito* image.<sup>306</sup> Elkins gives as a possible example of the *non finito* painting, Parmigianino's (1503-1540) *Madonna with the Long Neck* (1535). The *unfinished* areas of Parmigianino's *Madonna* are background drapery, a missing saint whose presence is intimated by a single foot, and the roof and column of a temple [fig 3.47].




Fig 3.47

A number of paintings from *Repetition from Reproduction* were painted to a *finished* state and *then* over-painted to resemble an earlier time of their making, turning, as it were, the painting's clock, and the pages of a book backwards [figs 3.48 - 3.53] . The normally hidden processes employed in the construction of these paintings, alluded to above, included the transference of an image onto a surface using templates, masking

<sup>306</sup> James Elkins, "On Modern Impatience", *Kritische Berichte*, Vol.3, No. 91, (1991), pp. 19-34, 21.



tape and tracing paper. Trompe l'oeil tracing paper was then painted over a *finished image*, and *held* in place by trompe l'oeil masking tape, similar to, though not identical to the position originally used by both to transfer an image onto the surface of a painting. I say not identical, as it became clear that the re-positioning of masking tape could also function as a fictive frame, and that this frame would require a decelerated gaze in order to parse it in relation to the rest of the painted surface. According to Elkins (borrowing the term from music), passagework 'is surface over which the eye glides on its way from one centre of interest to the next'.<sup>307</sup>



Fig 3.48



Fig 3.49

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<sup>307</sup> Ibid.



Fig 3.50




Fig 3.51



Fig 3.52




Fig 3.53

The masking tape *frame* and the fictive frame (white of the page surrounding Watteau's *La Mezzetin*) are painted differently from the centre of interest [fig 3.53]. The trompe l'oeil masking tape is semi-gloss, the fictive frame matte, and the central image heavily glazed. This differentiation changes these surfaces from ones that are glided over, to surfaces that decelerate the gaze, sustain attention and engender a visual *rubato*.<sup>308</sup> I consider most paintings in the series to have five framing devices in play. The first being the depiction of folded paper at the periphery of the book board, the second being the white of the pages surrounding the reproduction, the third is represented by the trompe l'oeil masking tape, the fourth by the opening of the image onto its wall at the right hand side of each image, and the fifth being the shadow (specifically when at work on the right hand side of the painting in concert with the *open edge*).

At the beginning of this chapter I mentioned that the early geometric small-scale colour studies proffered little by way of a useful relation between time and colour beyond that employed by Poussin. Colour, however, does play a significant role in *Repetition from Reproduction*. The role played by colour does not make a contribution towards the construction of sticky images as such, but does link individual works to those within a differentiated whole. While most of the paintings in the series employ colour across a broad tonal range, colour at full saturation is seldom used. In *Repetition*

<sup>308</sup> The Oxford English Dictionary defines *Rubato* as a 'Temporary disregard for strict tempo to allow an expressive quickening or slackening'.



from *Reproduction*, a range of chromatic greys, high and low key colours are employed that rely heavily on the infinite gradations of colour that exists between two complementary hues. This decision was made in order to avoid any one painting dominating the series, that the whole series would exhibit a chromatic logic, and that the eye would also be drawn into appreciating the differences between repeated images within the series in terms of their colour. To paint in series, as Coplans reminds us, is not necessarily to be serial. There must be, however, a rigorous inter-relationship. In order to achieve a consistent chromatic relation throughout the series, few individual paintings were completed in isolation from the rest. In this way colour mixed and applied to one painting would be applied to others [fig 3.54].




Fig 3.54

This approach to painting undermines the idea of a first within the series. This approach also positions *Repetition from Reproduction* within the four definitions of serial form as theorised by the Dedekind-Cantor theory of variables. The first being ‘those that have

neither a first nor a last element': the second are 'those that have a first element, but no last'; the third 'has a last element but no first'; and the fourth are 'those that have both a first and a last'.<sup>309</sup> *Repetition from Reproduction* belong to the first.

In the series of paintings *Repetition from Reproduction*, there is however, one painting that does not quite belong [fig 3.55].<sup>310</sup>

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<sup>309</sup> John Coplans, *Serial Imagery*, (Pasadena: Pasadena Art Museum, 1968), footnote, p. 11-12.

<sup>310</sup> The image foregrounds one unavoidable interpretation that can be applied to *Repetition from Reproduction*, one that I have so far avoided. *Repetition from Reproductions* are images within and about images, repetitions of repetitions, nested images, and therefore come under the rubric of the self-reflexive image, or the meta-picture. While this field is too broad to discuss in depth within the remit of this thesis, I will however discuss the painting briefly here, within the discourses of the meta-picture as put forth by W.J.T Mitchell and Bruno Trentini. The painting shown above is the only explicit reference to the meta-picture in the series *Repetition from Reproduction*. The painting is based on the reproductions of photographs, found in a book, and then painted on linen. They are actually paintings of a lithographic reproduction of a photograph taken of a sculpture, and a painting of a lithographic reproduction of a photograph of a painting, re-painted on linen. The painting is a painting of paintings in a studio space that are in turn paintings of lithographic reproductions of photographs of paintings from a book. The reason for this torturous and hierarchical description is to draw attention to the reasons why this particular approach to sticky images was first attempted and then rejected. We are drawn not towards a sticky image as such, but into an abyss. The term *mise en abyme*, derived from heraldry, means to be placed into the abyss. The term is attributed to French author André Gide and is used to describe images within images, books within books, and plays within plays. *Mise en abyme* does not necessarily entail the kind of repetition seen in the Droste effect - an infinite regression but rather operates as metasignification. This particular approach to the meta-picture runs the risk of descending into a type of visual cliché epitomised by the Droste effect. See Lucian Dällenbach, *The Mirror in the Text*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). The Droste effect presents an extreme form of repetition, one that, theoretically, is endless, and signifies a self referential loop. The Droste effect is perhaps, most apparent, in the graphic work of M.C. Escher. Although the painting [fig 3.5] is not strictly speaking an example of the Droste effect, it does share with the meta-picture, properties that Bruno Trentini discusses as meta-cognition, a position that I feel, has more purchase than the concept of a 'self-reflexive image'. See Bruno Trentini, "The Meta as an Aesthetic Category". *Journal of AESTHETICS & CULTURE*, Vol. 6, (2014), 1-9. The three types of the meta-picture according to W.J.T Mitchell are images in which a picture re-appears inside itself, as exemplified by the Droste effect. See W.J.T Mitchell, "What do Pictures Want"? Interview with Asbjorn Gronstad and Oyvind Vagnes, *Image and narrative*. [Online], November, (2006). The second contains an image of a different nature, and therefore re-frames or re-contextualises the nested image. The third are pictures that reflect on the representation of representation itself, the nature of picture making. Mitchell cites Velasquez's *Las Meninas* as an example of this third category. 'Perhaps there exists, in this painting by Velasquez, the representation as it were of Classical representation, and the definition of the space it opens up to us', See Michael Foucault, "Las Meninas", *Calligram*, edited by Norman Bryson, (Cambridge; University of Cambridge Press, 1988), pp. 91-105, 105. *Repetition from Reproduction* fall into the second category of meta-pictures. A more problematic term used to discuss the meta-picture is self-reflexivity. Mitchell's use of the word meta-picture, owes something of its structure to the logic of metalanguage, a form of language used to describe or analyse another language. While Mitchell avoids discussing the meta-picture in terms of logic, semiotics, or the philosophy of language, privileging instead an iconological approach, I am interested in the relevance of Bruno Trentini's response to Mitchell and its bearing on my own production of sticky images. For Trentini it is impossible to parse the metapicture without discussing it in relation to the cognitive experience of a viewing subject. Self-reflexivity and the prefix *meta* in meta-picture exist for Trentini in the subject and not in the icon. Trentini describes the response to the meta-picture as a metacognitive and embodied experience. The strangeness of the meta-picture, according to Trentini is *also* processed within an interval. In order to make sense of the meta-picture, the subject is required to perceive themselves as a perceiving subject. On page eight of "The Meta as an Aesthetic Category", Trentini writes,



Fig 3.55

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However paradoxical it may seem, apprehending a meta-picture means experimenting with the picture in an aesthetic way. “Aesthetic”, because the individuals become aware of their own perceptions: their experiences are reflexive ones.

While I did not pursue the particular type of meta-picture shown above [ fig 3.55], the meta-picture, like *trompe l’oeil*, is employed in *Repetition from Reproduction* in order to enhance spectatorship and thereby hold the spectator in front of a painting for a longer period of time. Spectatorship is enhanced by the meta-picture in its ability to act as a decoy. Both *trompe l’oeil* and the meta-picture appear first as one thing, and then another. In this way the spectators attention shifts from the representational content of an image to his/her own perception of that image and back again, a cognitive equivalent to the stutter I have mentioned in chapter’s one and two.

## Conclusion

At the beginning of this chapter I discussed the importance of producing individual paintings that ‘incorporate into their aesthetic structure the duration of perception’, and how these images might, to adopt Mike Bal’s term, function as sticky images.<sup>311</sup> These paintings would, in turn constitute a nexus of images that temporalise space. By way of conclusion I will reiterate what I consider to be the properties of the sticky image as seen in *Repetition from Reproduction*. These properties can be divided, though never neatly, between the perceptual, the cognitive and the material. Before discussing these properties it is worthwhile re-stating that the repeated image not only builds time, it emphasises that which is repeated. Whether the image is from fine art, propaganda or advertising - repetition emphasises (rightly or wrongly) the import of that which is repeated, and therefore entraps. This affect, combined with another property of repetition - its appeal to engage in the perception of difference - underpins all properties that might be ascribed to the sticky image.<sup>312</sup>

The chapter began by stating that the departure point for *Repetition from Reproduction* was the production of painting that reversed both the accelerated gaze and the coup d’oeil. A number of strategies were developed in order to decelerate the gaze, hold a spectator in front of a painting for a protracted period of time, not only to intensify the experience of the painting, but to stretch time. Berger, echoing Bergson’s *durée*, articulates the relation between the richness of an experience and the perceived duration of the experience:

The deeper the experience of a moment, the greater the accumulation of experience. This is why the moment is lived as longer. The dissipation of the time flow is checked.<sup>313</sup>

At the risk of making a commonplace observation, the time invested in painting could be said to be directly proportional to the time spent in front of it by an interested observer. Individual paintings that constitute the series *Repetition from Reproduction* had a great deal more time invested in them than any painting I had produced for some

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<sup>311</sup> Op cit.

<sup>312</sup> At the time of writing each reproduction from *Discovering Art* has been repeated nine times.

<sup>313</sup> John Berger, *And Our Faces, My Heart, Brief as Photos*, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005), p. 35.



time. Strategies that developed over time and through the act of painting include trompe l'oeil, the internal frame, the *open* frame, and the shadow, all of which encourage the decelerated gaze. The internal frame, when painted differently (matte/gloss surfaces, hard edged/soft edged demarcations, analogous/complementary colour) from the repetition of a reproduction, act as a visual lure as the eye parses the gamut of painterly differentiation.

*Repetition from Reproduction*, as discussed earlier, owe a debt to the 1964 publication; *Discovering Art*. This dissertation's third and final cases study examines the work of an artist whose practice is not only indebted to the work of past artists but for whom space has its say. The third case study presents the work of American artist R.H Quaytman as a link between chapters, three and four, the becoming-book of painting, and the open labyrinth.

### Case Study # 3.

#### R. H. Quaytman: Rectilinear Plane and Orthogonal Object.

This third and final case study will discuss the work of American artist Rebecca Howe Quaytman (1961 - ). R. H. Quaytman's upbringing is firmly rooted in Minimalism and Modernism, 'the religion', as Quaytman puts it, 'of my family'.<sup>314</sup> Quaytman is the daughter of noted American poet Susan Howe, of the equally respected abstract painter Harvey Quaytman (1937-2002), and step-daughter of American sculptor David von Schlegel (1920 - 1992). While the work of R. H. Quaytman is not repetitive in ways reminiscent of Edefalk and Craven's practice, there are, however, significant parallels between my own research outcomes and the ways in which Quaytman's painting interrogates time and space. I will discuss, therefore, examples of Quaytman's practice that coincide with the temporal and spatial properties of my own practice as discussed in chapter's three and four.

R.H. Quaytman's paintings, for example, borrow extensively from the history of art; they are found images. For R.H Quaytman, the discrete image is rejected in favour of networked paintings that not only respond to the historical context from which they spring but also to the space of their encounter. The temporal significance of Quaytman's paintings within this network or field of images is to challenge linearity with laterality. Quaytman describes the temporal operation of her paintings as being equivalent to the temporal order of words in a sentence, an order however, that undermines the linearity of the signifier in a linguistic chain:<sup>315</sup>

Using repetition, rhyme, and rhythm, no particular painting remains unaffected by its neighbour. This group of paintings marked the beginning of my engagement with the production of serial objects. By serial I do not mean that there is a rhetorical story that I can control. Rather I intend for each painting to be informed by others in a temporal sequence.<sup>316</sup>

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<sup>314</sup> See Steven Stern, "Past, Present", *Frieze*, June, July, August, (2010), pp. 132-135, 134.

<sup>315</sup> See the temporal properties of the signifying chain in linguistics as posited by Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, translated by Roy Harris, (London: Bloomsbury Revelations, 2013), pp. 80-82.

<sup>316</sup> R.H. Quaytman, *Spine*, (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2011), p. 7.

Quaytman likens the practice of painting to that of writing, painting as poetry with its own ‘grammar’, ‘syntax’ and ‘vocabulary’.<sup>317</sup> She prefers to call her ongoing practice a book and describes each of the exhibitions presented since 2001 as chapters. Each painting, for Quaytman, is the page of a book.<sup>318</sup> The “book”, as Quaytman states, ‘may be like a story or a long poem, but I don’t have a conclusion in mind. My plan is to go on painting with this system for the rest of my life - and my hope is that I won’t ever find out how it ends’.<sup>319</sup>

In Quaytman’s practice, the territories, so to speak, of painting and the book are in a constant process of cross fertilisation, a process of territorialization and deterritorialization that Deleuze and Guattari ascribe to the book in *A Thousand Plateaus*.<sup>320</sup> Yve-Alain Bois makes a similar association in Quaytman’s most recent exhibition catalogue.<sup>321</sup> Quaytman’s “book” has reached *Chapter 30*, a chapter recently shown at The Museum of Contemporary Art, Los Angeles. Bois describes Quaytman’s practice, as rhizomatic and paratactic; ‘chapters’, as he puts it, ‘following chapters in an open ended temporal chain’.<sup>322</sup>

The importance of the book for Quaytman extends, however, beyond the surface of her meticulously constructed paintings and dictates, in all of her chapters, the manner in which her paintings operate in the space of their apprehension. Quaytman, for example, in three separate chapters, exhibited at the Neuberger Museum of Art, New York [fig n], the Tel Aviv Museum of Art [fig o] and the Kunsthalle Basel [fig p] uses the plan

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<sup>317</sup> See Steve Stillman, “In the Studio: R.H.Quaytman”, *Art in America*, (June/July, 2010), pp.87-95, 94.

<sup>318</sup> See R.H. Quaytman, *Allegorical Decoys*, (Ghent: MER Paper Kunsthalle, 2008), p. 12.

<sup>319</sup> See Steve Stillman, “In the Studio: R.H.Quaytman”, *Art in America*, (June/July, 2010), pp.87-95, 95.

<sup>320</sup> ‘A book has neither object nor subject; it is made of variously formed matters, and very different dates and speeds. To attribute the book to a subject is to overlook this working of matters, and the exteriority of their relations. It is to fabricate a beneficent God to explain geological movements. In a book, as in all things, there are lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories; but also lines of flight, moments of deterritorialization and destratification...A book is an assemblage of this kind, and is therefore unattributable. It is a multiplicity...’, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, translated by Brian Massumi, London: Bloomsbury, 2013, p. 2. Originally published as *Mille Plateaux*, volume 2 of *Capitalisme et Schizophrénie*, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1987.

<sup>321</sup> Bois writes, ‘In R. H. Quaytman’s universe, the book-painting couple is akin to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s famous pair: the orchid and the wasp. Musing about the marvel of botany - the capacity of certain species of orchids to look like female wasps (but also to smell like pheromones) in order to attract males - these authors warn against a purely mimetic interpretation’. See Yves-Alain Bois, “Of Wasps and Orchids and Books and Paintings”, in Bennett Simpson, Yve-Alain Bois and Juliane Rebentisch, *Morning: Chapter 30, R.H. Quaytman*, The Museum of Contemporary Art, Los Angeles: DelMonico Books, 2016, p. 44.

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48.

drawing of an open book to inform the placement of her paintings within gallery spaces.  
 [fig q]. Everything in Quaytman's practice, as Bois reminds us, 'is becoming a book'.<sup>323</sup>




Fig n.




Fig o.

<sup>323</sup> Ibid., p.72.



Fig p.

The departure point for Quaytman's *A WOMAN IN THE SUN - WITH EDGES* [fig q], one of a series of paintings that constitute *Chapter 16*, shown at the Whitney Biennial, is Edward Hopper's *A Woman in the Sun* [Fig r], a painting closely associated with the public identity of the Whitney Museum, and painted in the year of Quaytman's birth. All of Quaytman's *chapters* respond in some way to the space in which they will be seen, and each page of Quaytman's chapter enters into dialogue with the others. Describing the relational properties of her painting, Quaytman writes:

It's like a complicated puzzle. Each painting has to relate to where it is situated. It refers to the painting next to it, or where you're standing, or the size of the painting next to it.<sup>324</sup>

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<sup>324</sup> Quaytman's quote relates to the installation of *Chapter 15 at the Institute for Contemporary Art*, Boston, See Cate McQuaid, "Signs and Sensibility", *Boston Globe*, November 15, (2009). [http://archive.boston.com/ae/theater\\_arts/articles/2009/11/15/rh\\_quaytman\\_uses\\_op\\_art\\_to\\_tell\\_a\\_story\\_at\\_the\\_institute\\_of\\_contemporary\\_art/](http://archive.boston.com/ae/theater_arts/articles/2009/11/15/rh_quaytman_uses_op_art_to_tell_a_story_at_the_institute_of_contemporary_art/).



Fig q.




Fig r.

A WOMAN IN THE SUN - WITH EDGES, like many of Quaytman's paintings begins life as a Polaroid image. In this instance an image of Quaytman's friend and artist K8 Hardy is silk-screened onto a plywood panel coated with several layers of rabbit skin glue gesso. The panel's edges are always bevelled at a forty-five degree angle and all of Quaytman's panels conform to a predetermined size, based either on the golden section or the Fibonacci sequence. While Quaytman refers to this image as a painting, it is strictly speaking, a mixed-media image that uses oil paint and ink with silk-screen printing.

Silk-screen is a process that Quaytman describes as one that ‘gives access to content without having to paint it with a brush’.<sup>325</sup> In bypassing the historically loaded and authorial brushstroke, Quaytman instead, draws attention to the surface of her paintings, a surface that, as Quaytman describes it, is essentially an abstract painting onto which subject matter might be grafted.<sup>326</sup> The desire to introduce what Quaytman describes as the ‘picture’ into ‘painting’ was to think about perspective as being ‘at the heart of what had been contested by abstraction’.<sup>327</sup> Quaytman’s use of perspective, mirrors, so to speak, not only Hopper’s painting but the space in which her paintings are encountered. *A WOMAN IN THE SUN - WITH EDGES* mirrors the trapezoidal window designed by Hungarian born modernist architect, Marcel Breuer; a window that populates the Whitney gallery space in which *Chapter 16* was shown [fig s].

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<sup>325</sup> See Steve Stillman, “In the Studio: R.H.Quaytman”, *Art in America*, June/July, 2010, pp.87-95, 89.

<sup>326</sup> See David Joselit, “1 Modi”, *Mousse*, Summer, (2011), p. 131.

<sup>327</sup> Quaytman’s use of the word “picture” in relation to painting deserves a brief comment here. Quaytman, in conversation with Joselit, suggests that the picture (in Quaytman’s case the photographic image mediated by silk-screen processes), introduced onto the surface of a painting, performs as a mirror. Quaytman’s introduction of the picture, mirrors the space intended for her chapters and mirrors the moving viewer. In using the word “picture”, in contradistinction to painting, Quaytman revisits debates surrounding representation and perception, that are perhaps, most clearly articulated in the differences between Italian and Dutch painting of the seventeenth century. Svetlana Alpers reminds us, for example, that German mathematician and astronomer Johannes Kepler was the first to employ the word *pictura* when describing the inverted image formed on the concave surface of the retina. See Svetlana Alpers, “Ut pictura, ita visio”, in *The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the seventeenth century*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 34-36. Alpers makes a powerful case for the representational mode of Dutch painting as being one that privileged a precise and highly objective seeing that focuses, as it were, not on the world but on the world as formed in the eye, or as Alpers puts it, ‘the world prior to us made visible’. Ibid., p. 70. In contrast to Dutch representation yoked to objectivity and the eye, Alpers analyses Italian painting in terms of *disegno*, not ‘the appearance of things but to their selection and ordering according to the judgement of the artist...’. Ibid., p.39. In concert with the subjectivity of *disegno*, Alpers distinguishes Italian painting from Dutch in terms of the different approaches to the uses of perspective. For Alpers, Italian perspective emanates not from the ‘world prior to us’ but from a viewer external to the space of painting, whereas the use of perspective in Dutch painting refutes the existence of a viewer external to the picture. Alpers describes this as the difference between ‘the world prior to us made visible’ and ‘we prior to the world and commanding its presence’. Ibid. In introducing the “picture into painting”, Quaytman’s practice seems to be an attempt to simultaneously hold, on the surface of her paintings, both Dutch and Italian pictorial modes of representation, made manifest by the tension between the photographic image and the intrusion of perspective onto what Quaytman describes as ‘a painted object hung on a wall’. David Joselit, “1 Modi”, *Mousse*, Summer, (2011), p. 131.





Fig s.




Fig t.

As a counterpoint to her reversed Breuer window, Quaytman paints trompe l'oeil edges onto the surface of *A WOMAN IN THE SUN - WITH EDGES*. These edges, to follow Jacques Derrida, are the painting's *parergonal* structures, structures that in this case

describe a rectilinear plane as seen obliquely - an orthogonal object.<sup>328</sup> The insertion of edge onto surface is ubiquitous in Quaytman's practice and it may have been influenced, to some degree, by the work of her father, Harvey Quaytman. An interest in the conflation of surface, the painting's support, edge, and a use of trompe l'oeil is clearly at work in her father's work from the 1980,s [fig t].

The majority of two dimensional works of art, hung on a gallery wall, will first be seen obliquely, a perspectival and orthogonal object. As we approach, the orthogonal gives way to a rectilinear plane, a transformation that takes place over time as an ambulatory spectator moves from one painting to the next. What we encounter in Quaytman's paintings is a confusion of this temporal and spatial encounter. The connectivity of Quaytman's *Chapter 16*, the series of silk-screens based on Hopper's painting, relies on the directional emphasis intimated by Quaytman's trapezoidal devices; the trompe l'oeil edges, informed by Breuer's window. [figs u-w]. In Quaytman's *Vertical Pink Screen* from *Chapter 15* [fig x], for example, we seem to simultaneously encounter the image as both a now and a then, seen front-on and from the side. The painted trompe l'oeil edges are what we might see had we moved on to the next image and looked back. Quaytman's use of edges speaks to the ways in which her work is encountered by its audience, as an experience of seeing that unfolds in time. Quaytman writes:

I began to think of paintings as objects that you passed by, as things that you saw not just head on and isolated, but from the side, with your peripheral vision, and in the context of other paintings.<sup>329</sup>

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<sup>328</sup> See Jacques Derrida, "Parergon", in *The Truth in Painting*, translated by Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp. 15-147.

<sup>329</sup> See Steve Stillman, "In the Studio: R.H.Quaytman", *Art in America*, June/July, 2010, pp.87-95, 88.




Fig u.




Fig v.




Fig w.




Fig x.

The temporal mechanics, so to speak, of Quaytman's paintings are not confined to how paintings are encountered in relation to the others in a *chapter* but also dictate the ways in which the past is reconfigured in the present. Quaytman's images are, as discussed earlier, informed by images from the history of art, and each image, to my mind, attempts to complete the unfinished business that Quaytman perceives as being central to the found images she chooses to appropriate. Quaytman cites Polish sculptor Katarzyna Kobro (1898-1951) as an artist who puts into practice a similar desire. Quaytman writes:

Katarzyna Kobro, who made one of the few works I believe is travelling through time intact, wrote a motto I live by: "I like to have fun by correcting what was not finished in any former artistic movement".<sup>330</sup>

The unfinished business for Quaytman is the work of art's operation in time. Early modernist abstraction, for Quaytman, simultaneously addressed the viewer and its own concerns. This simultaneity, for Quaytman, is synonymous with generosity, legibility and life, the vitality of which is lost over time as painting, as Quaytman describes it, is reduced to emblem through over familiarity.<sup>331</sup> What much of Quaytman's practice addresses, I would argue, is the desire to create paintings that re-animate what has become atrophied after the floundering of modernist values, a painting that, as Quaytman puts it, 'could travel through time with its equivalency [to life] machine

<sup>330</sup> R.H. Quaytman, "R.H. Quaytman", *October*, Winter, (2013), pp. 49-52, 50.

<sup>331</sup> *Ibid.*

intact'.<sup>332</sup> Quaytman, for example, revisited Kobro's painted constructivist sculpture *Spatial Composition 2* (1928) [fig y] for her *chapter 2*, shown in the Lodz biennial in 2004 [fig z], a choice, as Quaytman concedes, inspired by Yve-Alain Bois' chapter on Kobro and Polish painter Władysław Strzemiński in *Painting as Model*.<sup>333</sup> Quaytman's choice, in agreement with Bois, is a response to what Quaytman perceives as a synchronic temporal quality in Kobro and Strzemiński's practice. Produced in the 1920s and 1930s, the work of both artists, according to Bois, writing in 1993, 'appears too early and makes a comeback too late'.<sup>334</sup> Quaytman's repetition of Kobro and Strzemiński's modernism seeks not rehabilitation - a revisionist historicism of their respective practice, but to rescue Kobro and Strzemiński's practice from historical specificity - and to undermine art history thought of as an unbroken chain.




Fig y.




Fig z.

<sup>332</sup> Ibid.

<sup>333</sup> Quaytman rebuilt Kobro's painted steel sculpture *Spatial Composition 2* and made a series of photographs from which her painting Kobro *Spatial Composition #2* (2000) was constructed. Although not discussed in the case study, it is also evident that paintings such as Strzemiński's *Unist Composition 9* (1931), have influenced the development of Quaytman's interest in Op Art in works such as *Distracting Distance, Chapter 16, 2010*. For Strzemiński, see *Painting as Model*, p. 140. For Quaytman's *Distracting Distance*, see Rhea Anastas, "A Nude Poses in the Whitney Museum", *Parkett*, vol. 90, (2012), pp. 188-193, 190.

<sup>334</sup> Yve-Alain Bois, "Strzemiński and Kobro: In Search of Motivation", in *Painting as Model*, (Cambridge MA and London: The MIT Press, 1993), pp. 123-155, 123.

This open ended relation of Quaytman's practice to time is described by Juliane Rebentisch in the catalogue for Quaytman's recent exhibition at The Museum of Contemporary Art, Los Angeles:

Each new exhibition engenders specific relations of correspondence to earlier works; each limns its own genealogy. In this manner the work - by insistently demanding to be addressed in holistic fashion - proves constitutively incomplete and open, not only in the direction of the future, but also, and especially, towards its past.<sup>335</sup>

When discussing the temporal conditions of painting in relation to those of time-based arts - is the best we can say about what constitutes time-based art a matter of its motion in and over time. Quaytman's paintings can be described, on the surface, as static images. The question that Quaytman's practice begs however, as do all static images, is what are they static in relation to? I have discussed above, aspects of Quaytman's practice that shift paintings temporal condition from one of staticity to painting that is temporal and relational. Quaytman's use of the edge connects one image to another and collapses a *now*, *then* and *next* onto the surface of a single image. Quaytman's chapters consider not only the surface matters of discrete images, but the ways in which each image relates to the chapter that they constitute, and the ways that each chapter forms a temporal chain in response to previous chapters. Quaytman's chapters move in relation to each other, move in relation to an embodied observer and continue to move in relation to an open future and an open past. Quaytman's chapters, therefore, are resolutely time-based.

As we have seen in Chapter Three, my own practice, in ways similar to Quaytman's, establishes dynamic relations between contemporary painting and works from the history of art as a critical temporal condition *of* painting, one that undermines time thought of as linear.

In Chapter Four I will discuss the ways in which these relations, in concert with painting as sticky image, are deployed in order to temporalise the space of their encounter.

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<sup>335</sup> Juliane Rebentisch, "Reflections and Refractions: Notes on R. H. Quaytman", in Bennett Simpson, Yve-Alain Bois and Juliane Rebentisch, *Morning: Chapter 30, R.H. Quaytman*, The Museum of Contemporary Art, Los Angeles: DelMonico Books, 2016, p. 110.

## Chapter Four: Temporalising Space.

Ts'ui Pên must have said once: I am withdrawing to write a book. And another time: I am withdrawing to construct a labyrinth. Every one imagined two works; to no one did it occur that the book and the maze were one and the same thing.<sup>336</sup>

—Jorge Luis Borges

In Chapter One I have discussed the ways in which a visual language might stutter when placed under stress by repetition. In Chapter Two the relation between the serial or networked image to time and space has been discussed in terms of their ability to present a heightened discernment of difference within a visual field. Chapter Three tracked the development of a series of paintings described as sticky images, images that decelerate the gaze and dilate time. Chapter Four will now discuss how the series of paintings that form the conclusive stage to this project, *Repetition from Reproduction*, temporalise the space of their encounter. This discussion will be framed within three sub-sections; the Closed Labyrinth, the Virtual Labyrinth, and the Open Labyrinth. By closed I refer to a walled labyrinth typical of those encountered in Greek mythology and by virtual I refer to a digital labyrinth designed to be encountered as a moving image, projected onto the walls of a black-cube space. The first two sub-sections discuss the failures of my closed and virtual labyrinth, while the third sub-section discusses the development of what I refer to as an open labyrinth. The open labyrinth is presented as a solution to the problems encountered in the first two labyrinths and as a significant element in the concluding phase of the project in response to my research questions.

The first three chapters of this dissertation, despite my reluctance to think of time as linear, track historical discourses that mark a shift from temporal concerns to what can be described as a *spatial turn* emerging from postmodernism and post-colonialism underwritten by twentieth-century post-structuralist thought.<sup>337</sup> Michael Foucault in a 1967 lecture makes clear that spatial networks had superseded teleology:

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<sup>336</sup> Jorge Luis Borges "The Garden of Forking Paths", translated by Donald A. Yates, *Labyrinths*, (London: Penguin Classics, 2000), p. 50.

<sup>337</sup> See Robert T. Tally Jr, *Spatiality*, (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 11-16.



We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein.<sup>338</sup>

I am not suggesting that this spatial turn is in any way unique to the twentieth-century. Chapter One discussed the erroneous differentiation of spatial and temporal arts in enlightenment aesthetics. Not only does modern philosophy emerge from the spatial discourses of the Renaissance and Baroque periods but the discovery of linear perspective in conjunction with the development of the printing press revolutionised the experience of space, inaugurating the rapid development of the arts, sciences and technology.<sup>339</sup> The history of painting, however, and particularly modernist abstract painting can be described in terms of its changing relation to space, a relation that ultimately foregrounds an autonomous interrogation of the space of painting, inviolable to the space that surrounds it.<sup>340</sup> My own enquiry has been from the outset, an investigation into the relation between my painting and a space constructed for their encounter. This specific space unlocks the temporal and spatial agency of *Repetition from Reproduction* in ways inaccessible had the paintings been exhibited in a more *conventional* gallery space.

The use of terms such as *conventional space*, or worse - *neutral space*, emphasise the pervasive, and misconceived habit of thinking of space as a container that exists prior to the introduction of objects. It is a misconception challenged by Bergson:

Space is not a ground on which real motion is posited; rather it is real motion that deposits space beneath itself.<sup>341</sup>

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<sup>338</sup> Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces", *Diacritics*, translated by Jay Miskowiec, Spring, (1986), pp. 22-27, 22.

<sup>339</sup> 'It should not be overlooked that almost coincidental to the appearance of linear perspective came Gutenberg's invention of movable type. Together these two ideas, one visual, the other literary, provided perhaps the most outstanding scientific achievement of the fifteenth century: the revolution in mass communication. Linear perspective pictures by virtue of the powers of the printing press came to cover a wider range of subjects and to reach a wider audience than any other representational medium or convention in the entire history of art. It is fair to say that without this conjunction of perspective and printing in the Renaissance, the whole subsequent development of modern science and technology would have been unthinkable'. Samuel Edgerton, *The Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear Perspective*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 164.

<sup>340</sup> See David Ryan, "Ian Davenport: Making and Seeing Meaning", *Talking Painting: Dialogues with Twelve Contemporary Abstract Painters*, (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 23.

<sup>341</sup> Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, translated by N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer, (New York: Zone Books, 1988), p. 206.

If motion actualises space, and therefore temporalises space, then specific motions with specific durations can create qualitatively different spaces. This possibility of space no longer thought as static and uniform is hinted at by Bergson in *Matter and Memory*.<sup>342</sup> Developing Bergson's lead, Elizabeth Grosz in *Architecture from the Outside* suggests that space is not the homogenous and neutral container of things, but a dynamic space conceived as 'the field for the play of virtualities'.<sup>343</sup> Grosz writes:

Instead of a return to the prescientific immediacy that Bergson suggests as a remedy for the containment that science places on space, I would suggest a different approach to the reenervation of space through duration, the restoration of becoming to both space and time. If time is neither linear and successive nor cyclical and recurrent but indeterminate, unfolding, serial, multiplying, complex, heterogeneous, then space too must be reconfigured not as neutral, nor as singular, and homogenous but as opening up to other spaces, not regulating processes and events so much as accompanying them.<sup>344</sup>

While the idea of an encounter with differentiated regions of space challenges space thought of as a homogenous and eternally fixed container, phenomenological experience of space allows us to perceive distinct and unrelated spaces simultaneously. I can no more enter, for example, the space of a painting while standing in a gallery space than visit the space projected onto a screen in the space of a cinema. My own interest however is in qualitatively different spaces that *are* related. Related here, refers to spaces between which we may physically travel. And as I have stated above it is the movement of an embodied spectator that constitutes space and performs the dialogue between the space of the page, the space of painting and the space of their encounter. Merleau-Ponty referred to this performance a dance.<sup>345</sup> In order to discuss how space is temporalised, it will be useful to briefly discuss the often interchangeable terms, space and place.

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<sup>342</sup> 'In regard to concrete extension, continuous, diversified and at the same time organised, we do not see why it should be bound up with the amorphous and inert space which subtends it...' <sup>342</sup> Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, translated by N.M. Paul and W. S. Palmer, (New York: Zone Books, 1988), p. 187.

<sup>343</sup> Elizabeth Grosz, *Architecture from the Outside: Essays on the Virtual and Real Space*, (Cambridge MA and London: The MIT Press, 2001), p. 117.

<sup>344</sup> Ibid, pp.119-20.

<sup>345</sup> 'One might show...that aesthetic perception too opens up a new spatiality that the picture as a work of art is not in the space which it inhabits as a physical thing and as a coloured canvas. That the dance evolves in an aimless and unorientated space, that it is a suspension of our history, that in the dance the subject and his world are no longer in opposition'. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, translated by Colin Smith, (London: Routledge, (1962), p.287.

Two useful definitions of the space/place binary are given by Chinese-American geographer Yi-Fu Tuan and French philosopher Michel de Certeau. For Tuan the interval between motion and motionlessness transforms space into place and for de Certeau it is conversely motion that transforms place into space. The space constructed for *Repetition from Reproduction* relies upon a tension between both for the temporalisation of space. Tuan describes the transformation of space into place:

What begins as undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to know it better and endow it with value...The ideas space and place require each other for definition, furthermore, if we think of space as that which allows movement then place is pause; each pause in movement makes it possible for location to be transformed into place.<sup>346</sup>

Michel de Certeau inverts the relation between space and place in *The Practice of Everyday Life*. For de Certeau, place is a static or totalizing overview of the kind we encounter in a map, an 'instantaneous configuration of positions'.<sup>347</sup> Space therefore, is actualized by the act of walking the place. The act of walking transforms place into space by introducing time, speed and direction. De Certeau writes:

Space occurs as the effect produced by the operations that orientate it, situate it, temporalize it, and make it function in a polyvalent unity of conflictual programs of or contractual proximities...In short, *space is a practiced place*...transformed into a space by walkers.<sup>348</sup>

De Certeau's theorising of place and space in *The Practice of Everyday Living* is predicated upon linguistic analogies, specifically his equivalence of *space* and *parole*, where *parole* is defined as the performance of language through speech. Kirsten Krieder in an excellent analysis of American artist Roni Horn's installation *Things Which Happen Again* at the Stadlisches Museum Abteiger Mönchengladbach (1991), describes a relation between language and the punctuation of space by architectural elements:

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<sup>346</sup> Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), p.6.

<sup>347</sup> Michael de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, translated by Steven Randall, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 117

<sup>348</sup> Ibid, p. 117.

For example, a wall prevents one from going forward, grounding movement to a “full stop”. A door acts like a “comma”, connecting two spaces together. And a bridge functions like a “dash” - cutting across space.<sup>349</sup>

Kreider suggests, developing the analogy, that we navigate a space in response to its given syntax, and that this syntax can be realigned through the act of transgressive movement that has the potential to connect previously unconnected spaces:

It follows that an embodied spatial practice of punctuation is intrinsic to one’s enactment of place: in practicing place we punctuate space. In doing so, we often move in keeping with the syntax of a given place. However, our movements can potentially create different alignments, instigate other ways of thinking, and develop alternative relationships and connections between things that are not necessarily in keeping with the normative syntax of a given spatial order.<sup>350</sup>

Both Tuan and de Certeau acknowledge the agency of the body in the actualisation of place and space, both relying to some extent, on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty’s ‘geometrical space’ equates to de Certeau’s place and Merleau-Ponty’s ‘anthropological space’ is re-defined by de Certeau as practiced place.<sup>351</sup>

## Chapter 4.1: The Closed Labyrinth

*Repetition from Reproduction* are, as we have seen in Chapter Three, images within images. In constructing a space in which to house *Repetition from Reproduction*, it seemed appropriate to create a nested space in contradistinction to an *any space wherever*. The nested space constructed to hold *Repetition from Reproduction* is, in this instance a labyrinth. The labyrinth seems to occupy a special place within architectural practice. Its only function as a space is to ensure that once entered, it is extremely difficult to leave. To enter the labyrinth is to be held hostage by time and space, to be forced back, to re-trace ones steps corner by corner within a space of multiple avenues.

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<sup>349</sup> Kirsten Kreider, *Poetics + Place: The Architecture of Sign, Subjects+ Site*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014), p. 52-3.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>351</sup> See Luigina Ciolfi and Liam J. Bannon, “Space, Place and the Design of Technologically-Enhanced Physical Environments”, in *Spaces, Spatiality and Technology*, edited by Phil Turner and Elisabeth Davenport, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), p. 222.

In this sense, the labyrinth is also a metaphor for the series of paintings *Repetition from Reproduction*, in their endlessness and potential for infinite variation and multiple readings.<sup>352</sup> The labyrinth, according to Deleuze, can be thought of in terms of an encounter with the endlessly folding. Deleuze describes the labyrinth thus:

A labyrinth is said, etymologically to be multiple because it contains many folds. The multiple is not only what has many parts but also what is folded in many ways.<sup>353</sup>

The choice of the labyrinth might seem at first unpromising. The labyrinth of antiquity is an encounter with obfuscation, disorientation and danger.<sup>354</sup> The etymological definition of labyrinth according to the *Oxford English Dictionary* informs us however, that the word labyrinth can also be thought of in terms of its architectural properties, ‘an intricate, complicated or tortuous arrangement (of physical features, buildings, etc), and not the more often used term maze, defined as ‘a state of mental confusion’, or ‘a delusive fancy’.<sup>355</sup> The development of my own labyrinth privileges the former and not the latter.<sup>356</sup> My own labyrinth, I will argue, maximises the potential for charging space with time by folding the successive and the simultaneous, by maximising the apprehension of difference through the repeated image, and by presenting a constellation of perspectives activated by the movement of its audience.

In order to visualise the possible development of an appropriate labyrinth for *Repetition from Reproduction*, a drawing on a small scrap of paper [fig 4.1], later reproduced with graphite powder on board [fig 4.2] embodied a visual logic stemming from nothing more than an interest in differentiating the inside of a space from its external space. This space played with the conceit that the temporal and spatial

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<sup>352</sup> My open labyrinth, however, unlike the classical Greek encounter, is decentred. In this sense, the open labyrinth can be thought of as being without a ‘signified to discover’. I have stated that the open labyrinth is a metaphor for the attempt to make meaning in an encounter with *Repetition from Reproduction*. I am not suggesting however that without a signified to discover - meaning is unattainable. I am suggesting, to follow Barthes, that the path might be equivalent to the goal. See Roland Barthes, “The Metaphor of the Labyrinth”, *The Preparation of the Novel*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 113 - 24.

<sup>353</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, translated by Tom Conley, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p.3. Originally published as *Le Pli: Leibniz et le Baroque*, (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1988).

<sup>354</sup> See W.H. Matthews, *Mazes and Labyrinths: Their History and Development*. (New York: Dover, 1970).

<sup>355</sup> *Oxford English Dictionary*. 2nd ed. 2007.

<sup>356</sup> See Valerie Mandeville Morrison, *The Labyrinth as Metaphor of Postmodern American Poetics*, PhD thesis, University of Georgia, 2008.

properties internal to the space were significantly at odds with those without. In order to respond to this challenge to the laws of physics, the space needed to be braced against its temporal and spatial differential. While this temporal and spatial differentiation of inside and outside might at first seem an imaginative flight of fancy, it is however, significant in ways that will become apparent in the discussion of subsequent incarnations of the labyrinth.




Fig 4.1



Fig 4.2

My original labyrinth, like many labyrinths of antiquity was enclosed. Subsequent iterations are without walls and open to their outside. Before discussing the significance of the open labyrinth to the temporalisation of space, I will discuss earlier and relatively unsuccessful attempts to construct an appropriate labyrinthine space for *Repetition from Reproduction*. The flawed physical structure of these early labyrinths, as I came to see them, does not however, undermine the relevance of the thinking that set them, as it were, in motion.

The interior of the closed labyrinth was subdivided using a recursive division algorithm and complicated further by repeating the single cell [fig 4.3] four times while flipping the floor plan both vertically and horizontally [fig 4.4].<sup>357</sup>

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<sup>357</sup> To follow De Certeau, these images are of places, not spaces.




Fig 4.3




Fig 4.4

A foam-board model was produced in order to visualise both the potential distribution of paintings within the labyrinth and how an audience might navigate the space [fig 4.5-4.6].




Fig 4.5





Fig 4.6

My attention was drawn to the equivalence between the avenues through which an audience moves and the negative spaces between image and page on the cover of *Discovering Art* [fig 3.10] and image and internal frame in *Repetition from Reproduction* discussed in Chapter Three. These negative spaces and fictive frames can be said, despite being two dimensional surfaces, to be places until activated by their *walking*. The walking in this instance is an optical journey, the results of which can also be said to develop alternative connections, meaning and relationships. The architectural syntax of the model labyrinth is, however, realised in three dimensions and the potential for traversing space is limited and partially proscribed. We cannot walk through solid walls. De Certeau reminds us, in a similar vein, that ‘there is no spatiality that is not organised by the determination of frontiers’.<sup>358</sup>

An artist, the majority of whose practice examines the activation of the two dimensional surface through the act of optical promenade; or the meander as he prefers, is Croatian painter Julije Knifer (1924-2004). From the 1960’s until his death in Paris, Knifer’s sole motif was the meander. The meander for Knifer, inscribes place with temporal dimensions, relying upon the repetition of predominantly monochromatic abstract images that resemble two- dimensional maps of three-dimensional labyrinths. I introduce Knifer’s practice here in order to discuss the limitations, as I came to perceive them, of my own labyrinth’s architectural syntax. These limitations can perhaps be best

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<sup>358</sup> See Michael de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, translated by Steven Randall, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

discussed through the spatial and temporal potentials presented by Knifer's drawing in relation to his environmental art.

Knifer's drawing [fig 4.7] at first glance resembles the cell of a labyrinth without an entrance. If however we imagine the black lines as flat pathways approached across a flat grey field, then the labyrinth can be walked. If we reverse the ground/image relation in Knifer's painting, the grey becomes the walked space approached from outside the canvas and the black lines become walls. Despite reading from left to right in the West, rarely does the eye or mind, ignoring the spatial logic of the labyrinth's map; cut across the image. There is therefore, a temporality of looking that accompanies these images bound to the graphic representation of the map, or to follow Kreider, 'the syntax of a given place'.<sup>359</sup> The spatial and temporal conditions of these images are shifted significantly when encountered as images that may be walked physically. In Knifer's *Arbeitsprozess, Tübingen* [fig 4.8] and his *White Road* [fig 4.9] the meanderer has the option of submitting to the given, to walk the architectural syntax of the place, or transform place into space by shifting the spatial and temporal conditions at will.

At risk of stating the obvious, this is achieved by traversing and transgressing the map's syntax, by walking from A to C without necessarily having to navigate B, or to put it another way, to cut across the place. In this sense the body re-draws the map and introduces a temporality based upon the direction and duration of movement that connects previously unrelated places. This potential for cutting across the syntax of a labyrinth is denied in the first iteration of my labyrinth. The closed labyrinth is ultimately unidirectional.




Fig 4.7

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<sup>359</sup> Kirsten Kreider, *Poetics + Place: The Architecture of Sign, Subjects+ Site*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014), p. 52-3.




Fig 4.8



Fig 4.9

## Chapter 4.2: The Virtual Labyrinth.

While exploring how *Repetition from Reproduction* might be encountered within a closed labyrinth, I became interested in investigating the ways in which paintings described as nested images, images within images, might be apprehended within a space that was itself nested within another space: specifically a virtual space within the real. The experience was initially intended to be interactive and to take place in what is often referred to as real time.<sup>360</sup> A digital walkthrough of a closed labyrinth was designed with assistance from a games designer as means of testing out how an audience might navigate a digital encounter with *Repetition from Reproduction* [figs 4.11-4.12].

My own closed labyrinth is, as discussed earlier, a resolutely linear encounter that presents isolated images in a predetermined order. Paintings are encountered successively like a PowerPoint presentation of photographic images. The original impetus for my virtual labyrinth was an attempt to not only create a virtual repetition of my closed labyrinth but to explore ways in which the syntax of the virtual labyrinth might be transgressed. This might be achieved by walking, as it were, through virtual walls.



Fig 4.10

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<sup>360</sup> Interactivity would be achieved through the use of virtual reality headset technologies such as Ocular VR's Oculus Rift.

In Chapter Three we have seen that *trompe l'oeil*, for Baudrillard, not only extends into real space but collapses, as seen in the Montefeltre studiolo [fig 4.10], the distinctions between painting, sculpture and architecture. The studiolo is a windowless, private space at the heart of the ducal palace. It is a space 'actualised by simulation', one; that Baudrillard discusses in terms of the relation between perspective and power.<sup>361</sup>

For many, virtual reality requires a new subjectivity, a re-thinking of the body in relation to simulated spaces. Author David Thomas for example, writes that virtual reality has the potential to 'overthrow the sensorial and organic architecture of the human body'.<sup>362</sup> The human body is the labyrinth's 'unspoken condition'.<sup>363</sup> The unspoken condition of cyberspace is also the subject's body, and in the case of virtual reality, bodies and subjects. Technologies emergent in the late 1980's such as the head-mounted display (HMD), whose most recent development can be seen in the Oculus Rift, allow their users immersion in an image space with the potential for varying degrees of interaction. This interaction takes place in cyberspace, a software space that operates within the real space of hardware.

Due to the ever increasing computer speeds this immersive encounter occurs in what is referred to as real time. This term real time is something of a misnomer, a retronym that gives an old thing a new name. Computer speeds allow the rendering of frames fast enough to create the illusion of movement in a subject's brain. This speed of rendering also allows the subject a degree of interactivity; the subject is granted an illusion of control in terms of what is about to happen next. The computer predicts and displays the next frame dependent on feedback from the subject. In both cases the claims that these processes occur in real time are at best dubious. The processes are dependent upon the clock cycle of a given computer's central processing unit, a system that will only allow one process to happen at a time and in a specific order.

Not only is this linearity at odds with our experience of duration, or lived time, but we have all been communicating in real time long before the advent of the central

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<sup>361</sup> See Jean Baudrillard, *Seduction*, translated by Brian Singer, (Montreal: New World Perspectives (Culture Texts Series), 1990), p. 65.

<sup>362</sup> Cited by Elkins. Originally published in David Thomas, "Old Rituals for New Space: Rites de Passage and William Gibson's Cultural Model of Cyberspace", *Cyberspace First Steps*, edited by Michael Benedikt, (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 32-40.

<sup>363</sup> Elizabeth Grosz, *Architecture from the Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Space*, (Cambridge MA and London: The MIT Press, 2001), p. 14.



processing unit; it is referred to as a conversation. It is unsurprising therefore, that the participants in virtual realities are often referred to as ‘puppets’.<sup>364</sup>

I have introduced Baudrillard’s critique of the trompe l’oeil studiolo at Urbino in order to clarify the reasons for rejecting the digital labyrinth as a site of encounter for *Repetition from Reproduction*. These reasons relate to the human body in relation to virtual reality, and virtual reality in relation to the virtual. While the latter is complex, the former is relatively straightforward. There is no-body in virtual reality.




Fig 4.11




Fig 4.12

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<sup>364</sup> Ibid., p. 42.

For Elizabeth Grosz, the fantasy of disembodiment in a phantasmatic space is the underlying attraction of virtual reality. Grosz writes:

The fantasy of disembodiment is that of autogenesis, a megalomaniacal attempt to provide perfect control in a world where things tend to become messy, complicated or costly: it is a control fantasy.<sup>365</sup>

Despite the seductive nature of immersive technologies, the lack of sensory intimacy and embodied responses make them, in this instance, an impoverished space in which to encounter *Repetition from Reproduction*. The second reason for not pursuing a virtual labyrinth is the difference between virtual reality and virtuality. In Chapter One I discussed Derrida's iterability and Benjamin's extreme as examples of virtuality, where the virtual refers to a potentiality rather than an actual. The term virtual reality is therefore, something of an oxymoron and in no way synonymous with the term virtual.<sup>366</sup>

In order to clarify the virtual, Deleuze makes a distinction between the terms realised and actualised. I consider *Repetition from Reproduction* to be actualisations of the virtualities that inhere in the five images chosen from *Discovering Art*, and the site of their encounter is designed as a space in which the virtual (the past as thought by Bergson) is activated in cooperation with repetition. Deleuze writes:

It is because the "virtual" can be distinguished from the "possible" from at least two points of view. From a certain point of view, in fact, the possible is the opposite of the real, it is opposed to the real; but in quite a different opposition, the virtual is opposed to the actual...the possible is that which is realised...The virtual, on the other hand, does not have to be realized, but rather actualized. Actualized is not resemblance and imitation, but those of difference or divergence and of creation.<sup>367</sup>

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<sup>365</sup> Elizabeth Grosz, *Architecture from the Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Space*, (Cambridge MA and London: The MIT Press, 2001), p. 43.

<sup>366</sup> Keith Ansell-Pearson discusses the misuse of the term in *The Reality of the Virtual*. Ansell Pearson writes: 'Today the notion [virtual] is widely treated in imprecise and ill defined terms, namely as all the other stuff that is not actual, something like the universe in its totality and unfathomable complexity.' Keith Ansell-Pearson, "The Reality of the Virtual: Bergson and Deleuze", *MLN*, Volume 120, No. 5, December, (2005), p. 1112.

<sup>367</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, (New York: Zone Books, 1991), pp.96-97.



For Bergson the process whereby the virtual becomes actual is inextricably tied to perception, and occurs specifically when we attempt to recover a memory. Bergson argues that:

Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection, to call up some period of our history, we become conscious of an act of *sui generis* by which we detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves, first in the past in general, then, in a certain region of the past - a work of adjustment like the focusing of a camera. But our recollection still remains virtual...<sup>368</sup>

The past for Bergson therefore, is virtual. It exists as that which no longer acts in the present, but participates in the becoming present. This cannot happen in virtual reality as nothing is actualized. Only the possible is realized. It is for this reason that the virtual labyrinth was rejected.

It is worthwhile stating here that my criticisms of virtual reality developed from my own foray into digital technologies and not from an expansive exploration into the work of artists for whom virtual reality, and specifically an interactive and immersive virtual reality is central. An in-depth exploration of work by these artists is beyond the remit of this dissertation. Although my criticism of virtual reality stems from philosophical and political responses to my own virtual labyrinth, it is clear that there has been, from the 1990s onwards an explosion of artists for whom the attempt to create an interface between virtual and real space is a central concern. Pioneers of this attempt to instantiate such an interface and to develop the relation between science, art and technology are the Austrian artist Christa Sommerer and French artist Laurent Mignonneau. Working collaboratively since 1992, their work has met with critical acclaim and a considerable number of international awards, including the Prix Ars Electronica, Linz, 1999, the Inter Design Award, Japan Inter Design Forum, Tokyo, 1995, and the Ovation Award, Interactive Media Festival, Los Angeles, 1994.

According to Oliver Grau, Sommerer and Mignonneau's practice instantiates a 'new chapter in the history of interactivity'.<sup>369</sup>

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<sup>368</sup> Henri Bergson quoted by Keith Ansell Pearson, in *Henri Bergson: Key Writings*, (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), p. 151.

<sup>369</sup> Grau, *Virtual Art: From Illusion to Immersion*, (Cambridge MA and London: The MIT Press, 2003), p. 297.

The result of this new chapter, according to Grau, is the creation of virtual spheres in which the human may be brought into contact with artificial beings that have, so to speak, been brought to life. In Sommerer and Mignonneau's first installation, *Interactive Plants Growing*, 1992 - human touch brings to life over twenty-five species of virtual plants in the process of virtual growth. These virtual plants are animated when their audience touches a collection of real plants, placed on five wooden plinths situated in front of their virtual counterparts. The revolutionary principle of *Interactive Plants Growing* is in its early manifestation of an interface between the real and the virtual. Sommerer and Mignonneau achieved this by designing software that measured the varying voltage emitted by the real plants as they were touched by human hands and the intensity of the touch. These factors dictated the rate of growth exhibited by the virtual plants. The evolutionary and revolutionary principles of *Interactive Plants Growing* - with human touch releasing simulated growth in the virtual, have given way in recent times to the desire for replication that does not, however, rely on the human, and results instead in Artificial Intelligence.

A more contemporary and, to my mind, a less sophisticated attempt to construct an interface between the real and the virtual is Mat Collishaw's 2017 work, *Thresholds*, an interactive and immersive recreation of the world's first photographic exhibition - the work of William Henry Fox-Talbot at King Edwards School, Birmingham in 1839. Unlike Sommerer and Mignonneau's desire to bring to life virtual beings, Collishaw attempts to bring to the past to life and life to the past. According to *Frieze* magazine, however, Collishaw has not recreated an historical experience, but has instead created an entirely new one'.<sup>370</sup>

Collishaw produced the work in collaboration with Paul Tennent from Nottingham University's Mixed Reality Laboratory, Architectural Historian, David Blisset, Photographic Historian Pete James, authority on Fox -Talbot, Larry Schaaf, and VMI studios. What this collaboration entails, according to *Frieze*, is an authentic re-enactment of the past one hundred and seventy-eight years after the fact.

*Thresholds'* audience are decked out with VR headsets connected to a computer carried in a backpack as they traverse a white space filled with solid white rectangular boxes, identical in size and relative location to the 1839 vitrines in which Fox-Talbot's

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<sup>370</sup> Laurie Taylor, "It's a Kind of Magic", *Frieze*, May (2017).

photographs were originally displayed. The VR headsets, of course, transform these non-descript boxes and the sterile white space into wooden and glass vitrines, originally situated in King Edwards School circa 1839, complete with burning coal fire, paintings, mirrors, windows, masonry and chandeliers.

*Thresholds*, shown at Somerset House, London, afforded visitors to the gallery a glimpse into Collishaw's white space replete with a VR-kit bedecked audience moving hesitantly around its obstacles by creating a small window-like opening from which the spectacle could be observed. This look from one space into another recorded by photographer Graham Carlow and published in *Frieze*, is reminiscent of Diego Velasquez's 1618 painting *Christ in the House of Martha and Mary*, in more ways than one. The correspondence is actually in four ways - three spatial and one temporal. In Velasquez's painting, three spaces are implied - the space of the painting's viewer, the space of a kitchen in which Martha and Mary, contemporary to Velasquez's 1618 prepare food, and the third space, seen through a window in the kitchen wall that depicts Martha and Mary with Christ, clearly coterminous with an earlier time. Carlow's photograph of *Thresholds* depicts a woman looking into Collishaw's white space from another gallery space - watching an audience member attempting to navigate a virtual space of 1839 that has been 'mapped' onto a 2017 'real' space. While Velasquez manages to pull off these temporal and spatial gymnastics, I am less convinced by Collishaw's. Perhaps the inclusion of the window was a mistake as it allows a view into Collishaw's white space without recourse to the digital 'overlay' of the King Edwards School of 1839. What is witnessed, therefore, is the comedic as defined by Henri Bergson. While it is clear that both the audiences of Fox Talbot's 1839 exhibition and Collishaw's 2017 iteration did and do not have access to Fox Talbot's photographs - they are under real and virtual glass - Collishaw's audience continue to attempt to pick things up - as witnessed by the external observers mentioned above. In *Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic*, first published in 1900, Henri Bergson defines the comedic in terms that describe, perhaps, the unforeseen result of the decision to include a window and to attempt to map 1839 onto 2017.

Now, take the case of a person who attends to the petty occupations of his everyday life with mathematical precision. The objects around him, however, have all been tampered with by a mischievous wag, the result being that when he dips his pen into the inkstand he draws it out all covered with mud, when he fancies he is sitting down on a

solid chair he finds himself sprawling on the floor, in a word his actions are all topsy-turvy or mere beating the air, while in every case the effect is invariably one of momentum. Habit has given the impulse: what was wanted was to check the movement or deflect it. He did nothing of the sort, but continued like a machine in the same straight line. The victim, then, of a practical joke is in a position similar to that of a runner who falls,--he is comic for the same reason. The laughable element in both cases consists of a certain MECHANICAL INELASTICITY, just where one would expect to find the wide-awake adaptability and the living pliability of a human being. The only difference in the two cases is that the former happened of itself, whilst the latter was obtained artificially.<sup>371</sup>



Left: Mat Collishaw's *Thresholds*, Somerset House, London, 2017. Photographer Graham Carlow.

Right: Diego Rodríguez de Silva y Velázquez. *Christ in the House of Martha and Mary*, 1618. 63 cm x 103 cm. National Gallery, London.

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<sup>371</sup> Henri Bergson, *Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic*, translated by Cloudesley Brereton and Fred Rothwell, (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications Inc, 2005), p. 5.

### Chapter 4.3: The Open Labyrinth.

Having rejected the closed and virtual labyrinth as a site of encounter for *Repetition from Reproduction*, I was afforded the opportunity to construct an open labyrinth in a gallery space in the Department of Fine Art at Newcastle University. Having produced what I considered to be an unpromising small-scale maquette without walls, it became clear that an open labyrinth constructed at full size would allow everything I have suggested its closed and virtual counterparts could not [fig 4.13].

The labyrinth was constructed from the kind of timber usually used in stud-wall construction and followed closely the floor plan of a single cell from my closed labyrinth. I refer to this third iteration of my labyrinth as open for two simple reasons. It is open to the space around it; its walls are removed and its construction is laid bare. The outside to which the labyrinth is open, is however, already an inside, a temporary gallery space in which I had exhibited nineteen years previously as an MFA student.<sup>372</sup>

The Fine Art Department is inside University grounds, which are themselves inside the limits of a city centre space. To be in an outside space is always to be inside another space, and so it goes on; an endless dialectic of division. Gaston Bachelard described space as ‘nothing but a horrible outside-inside’.<sup>373</sup>

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<sup>372</sup> Not only did this re-visitation after a period of nineteen years perform a temporal and spatial synchronicity, the labyrinth and its contents inadvertently function as a kind of ghost image. The temporary exhibition space in which the labyrinth and its paintings were installed had been a first-year undergraduate painting studio, subdivided with timber and walls similar in size to my own. Prior to conversion into a temporary exhibition space for the MFA exhibition, the space had been full of people and full of paintings. The labyrinth with *Repetition from Reproduction* therefore, represents a kind of ghost image of the space’s prior use, a *transparent* layer placed over the space that re-inserts the past into the present. This *ghost image* suggests ways in which the labyrinth might be developed in the future as a means of bridging the past uses of a space with the present.

<sup>373</sup> Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, translated by Maria Jolas, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), p. 218.




Fig 4.13

Having placed *Repetition from Reproduction* on the timber-frame labyrinth (it no longer makes sense to use the word inside), and on the walls of the space in which it was housed, the first phenomenon I noticed was parallax. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, parallax, from the Greek word parallaxis (alteration), is defined as ‘the apparent difference in the position of an object when viewed from different positions’.<sup>374</sup> I was intrigued by the ways its participants chose to ignore the labyrinth’s given syntax. While some chose to follow the labyrinth’s floor plan, many chose to ignore it and to walk instead across the thresholds that separated one corridor from another (through walls). In revealing the geometry of this dialectic, eschewing solid walls, the open labyrinth allows the binary of inside and outside to become more fluid. The participant, or ‘peripatetic viewer’ converts inside to outside at will by cutting across the labyrinth; walking, so to speak, through walls.<sup>375</sup> This ability to re-write the syntax of the labyrinth is encouraged by the fact that the open labyrinth allows a line of direct and peripheral sight to all paintings therein.<sup>376</sup>

<sup>374</sup> Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 2007.

<sup>375</sup> Kirsten Kreider, *Poetics + Place: The Architecture of Sign, Subjects+ Site*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014), p. 61.

<sup>376</sup> Any recourse to peripheral vision, is at best severely restricted, or worse, completely absent in my virtual labyrinth. Finnish architect Juhani Pallasmaa describes the importance of peripheral vision in relation to space. Pallasmaa writes: ‘Focused vision confronts us with the world whereas peripheral vision envelops us in the flesh of the world...A forest context, and richly moulded architectural space, provide ample stimuli for peripheral vision, and these settings centre us in the very space...Unconscious peripheral perception transforms retinal gestalt into spatial and bodily experiences. Peripheral vision integrates us

Parallax, succession and simultaneity have all been explored in depth by American Psychologist, J.J. Gibson (1904-79). While one detractor claimed that Gibson ‘handicapped a generation of workers by his blinkered and oversimplified approach’, it is Gibson who made the most significant contribution to the study of visual perception.  
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Gibson’s contribution to Hermann von Helmholtz’s (1821 - 94) 1909 theory of motion parallax and relative size, for example, was to state that ‘optic flow’ (movement of the embodied eye in space) within what he referred to as an ‘optic array’ (a multiplicity of surfaces within an illuminated medium) were not simply yet more depth perception clues but formed ‘the basis of an alternative “ground theory” of space perception’.<sup>378</sup> In Gibson’s 1958 paper, *Visually Controlled Locomotion and Visual Orientation in Animals*, he describes the relation between objects within the optic array and their affect on motion in terms that can be applied to my open labyrinth. Gibson writes’,

The total array can then be registered only by rotating the eyes and head. The registration process is successive, not simultaneous, since different angular sectors of the array are picked up at successive moments of time. Nevertheless, by a mechanism as yet not well understood, successive registration seems to be equivalent to simultaneous registration....the whole flux of focusable light pervading the medium is a potential stimulus which can be sampled at various station-points in the medium, although it must be explored by locomotor rather than by oculomotor action.<sup>379</sup>

The above describes the two stages of viewer response to my open labyrinth. Spatial behaviour (motion) is, to follow Gibson, intimately connected with spatial perception.

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with space, while focused vision pushes us out of the space, making us mere spectators’. Juhani Pallasmaa, *The Eyes of the Skin: Architecture and the Senses*, (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), pp. 10-13.

<sup>377</sup> Sutherland, N.S. *Macmillan Dictionary of Psychology*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991).

<sup>378</sup> Brian J. Rogers “Deep implications or an oversimplified approach: Gibson’s ideas 50 years on”, *British Journal of Psychology* (2009), Vol. 100, pp. 273-276.

<sup>379</sup> J.J. Gibson, “Visually Controlled Locomotion and Visual Orientation in Animals”, *British Journal of Psychology* (1958), Vol. 49, pp. 182-194.



During the work's opening night I showed the majority of its audience a digital walkthrough of my closed labyrinth on a Samsung Tablet. The consensus was that the open labyrinth was by far the most successful iteration of my three labyrinths. The reasons most commonly given for its success were the ways that it allowed parallax to be perceived. The perception of parallax allows the whole space, including the paintings, to be set into motion at different rates, relative to any individual audience member's position within the labyrinth. Paintings hung on the walls of the gallery space are perceived to move at a slower rate to those hung on the labyrinth's supports. I have discussed earlier that there is no spatiality that is not determined by boundaries or frontiers. The open labyrinth replaces behaviour determined by boundaries with boundaries determined by behaviour, turning, as it were, observer into participant. In this configuration, participants also become more aware of each other, as they mirror one another's act of looking in ways not commonly experienced in a space where paintings are solely wall based [fig 4.14].



Fig 4.14



Fig 4.15



Fig 4.16



Fig 4.17



Fig 4.18



Fig 4.19

If parallax can be described as setting the open labyrinth into movement, another way of stating that something is continually in motion is to describe it as eventful. Theatre, for example, is also, on the whole, eventful. Similarly, the system, in its ability to be altered in time and space by both its external conditions (audience) and its mechanism of control (syntax of place), is also eventful. *Repetition from Reproduction* encountered in an *open* labyrinth can therefore be described as an event. Deleuze, describing the event, does so in terms that coincides with an encounter with my *open* labyrinth:

Extensions effectively are forever moving, gaining and losing parts carried away in movement: things are endlessly being altered; even prehensions are ceaselessly entering and leaving variable components. Events are fluvia. From then on what allows us to ask, is it the same flow, the same thing or the same occasion?<sup>380</sup>

Alfred North Whitehead makes the distinction between an occasion and an event. An occasion for Whitehead is a single incident and an event is the singular extended into series. My open labyrinth, to be more precise, is an extensive set, or temporal series of static images [figs 4.15-4.19].<sup>381</sup>

To adopt a term from Aspen Aarseth, *Repetition from Reproduction* are ‘ergodic’ images, a neologism Aarseth employs to describe the ways in which texts are read interactively and non-sequentially.<sup>382</sup> These paintings, therefore, can be rearranged like books on a library shelf and *read* in any order. In an *open* labyrinth, an individual creates a different book each time the labyrinth is walked. The *open* labyrinth is, therefore, a physical manifestation of the book as non-mechanical and non-linear time keeper as discussed in Chapter Two.

What I have described above are the ways in which space is temporalised by an ambulatory subject encountering static images. I am however, as mentioned earlier, interested specifically in how repeated images (paintings) temporalise space in ways that differ from our normative experience of time in space. The space of my open

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<sup>380</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, translated by Tom Conley, (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 79. Originally published as *Le Pli: Leibniz et le Baroque*, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1988).

<sup>381</sup> See Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, (New York: Free Press, 1978), p.73.

<sup>382</sup> An encyclopaedia is, for example, one example of an ergodic text. See Epsen J. Aarseth, *Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

labyrinth for example, would still be temporalised in an encounter with forty-five unrelated paintings. In the above quote, Deleuze discusses ‘things’ that are endlessly altered.<sup>383</sup> My open labyrinth contains things; forty-five repeated paintings. My interest is therefore, in things that are endlessly the same, but different.

Kirsten Kreider discusses the differences between present perceptions and present memories of past perceptions in her excellent discussion of repetition in Roni Horn’s *Things that Happen Again*. Kreider describes how an encounter with two identical copper objects in two different gallery spaces re-inserts the past into the present.<sup>384</sup> It is however, Horn’s description of *Things that Happen Again* that is perhaps most relevant to, and supportive of my contention that repetition causes time to stutter. Horn describes the movement from the object in the first gallery space to its repetition in the second [fig 4.20]:

Then you go into the next room and enact exactly the same experience, but of course it’s unexpected and it’s so many minutes later; it’s a slightly younger experience in your life. Whereas when you walked into the first room, you had the experience of something unique, you can’t have that a second time.<sup>385</sup>

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<sup>383</sup> Op cit.

<sup>384</sup> ‘Having had the unique experience of the object in the first room, she [the viewer] can draw upon this when engaging with the object in the second. This is key. Throughout the viewer’s encounter with the object in the first room, the object referred, indexically, to the ‘now’ of the viewer’s performance... With the object in the second room, the indexical-meaning referencing the viewer’s enactment of the object shifts to the present moment of the viewer’s engagement with this object, or the ‘now’ of the viewer’s performance of the object in the second room. At the same time, the indexical-meaning of the viewer’s experience with the object in the first room shifts its reference to ‘then’...the physical experience of the viewer’s present performance, ‘now’, is duplicated in the mind with the memory of her past performance, ‘then’.’ Kirsten Kreider, *Poetics + Place: The Architecture of Sign, Subjects+ Site*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014), pp. 59-60.

<sup>385</sup> Ibid., Roni Horn, cited by Kreider, p. 58.






Fig 4. 20

Repetition, in denying a second time, a second ‘unique’ experience, must reinsert the first experience (the past) into the present. The differences between Horn’s installation and my own labyrinth are temporal *and* spatial. Horn’s identical objects are, unlike *Repetition from Reproduction* in two rooms and cannot be seen simultaneously. The time taken therefore, for the difference between present perceptions and present memories of past perceptions to register is dependent upon the time it takes to walk from the first room into the second. Unless the viewer continually moves from one room to the other, the stutter occurs only once. In my open labyrinth, the stutter continues for as long as the labyrinth is walked.

### **Conclusion.**

At the beginning of this chapter I began with a quote from Jorge Luis Borge’s *The Garden of Forking Paths*. I suggested that my own paintings emerged, not only from an interest in addressing the question of how static images temporalise space but also in response to a question fielded by Daniel Birnbaum, prompted by Borges’ description of



a ‘spreading labyrinth that would encompass the past and the future and in some way involve the stars’.<sup>386</sup> Birnbaum asks ‘Could a painting not perform such a task?’<sup>387</sup>

Birnbaum uses the term painting broadly, to bring under the aegis of painting, practices employed by an eclectic group of artists that include Olafur Eliasson, Francis Alÿs, Thomas Struth and Andreas Gursky.<sup>388</sup> I have, however, taken Birnbaum literally.

My interest has been the temporalisation of space by a constellation of paintings, specifically forty-five paintings on linen and wood; nine repetitions of five images from the pages of a book, placed into an open labyrinth. I began by stating that one way of temporalising place is to introduce motion, and in doing so cut across the pre-given syntax of a place thereby constituting a space. This is not to suggest a simple case of overlaying, as it were, time onto space, a straightforward process of mapping, but rather a process whereby a stuttering time might be intuited within a space that allows a multiplicity of exits and entrances, directions, turns and detours. The first two iterations of my labyrinth prohibit such an encounter.

The closed labyrinth, while allowing its audience a limited degree of freedom of movement, both backwards as well as forwards, is essentially a linear encounter with *Repetition from Reproduction*. This linearity presents *Repetition from Reproduction* in a given order without an ability to experience the paintings both simultaneously *and* successively. The closed labyrinth, therefore, cannot promote the kind of temporal stutter, that I have outlined earlier. The temporal stutter I refer to is a future and past bound to an extended present. *Repetition from Reproduction* encountered in a closed labyrinth are merely visual points of interest that punctuate a predetermined temporal experience.

An attempt to ameliorate the future orientated temporality of my closed labyrinth was investigated by constructing a virtual labyrinth wherein virtual boundaries might be transgressed. It soon became apparent, however, that the virtual labyrinth presented shortcomings, both in terms of temporality and embodied experience. There is, as I have mentioned earlier, no-body in virtual space, and an encounter with *Repetition from*

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<sup>386</sup> Jorge Luis Borges “The Garden of Forking Paths”, translated by Donald A. Yates, *Labyrinths*, (London: Penguin Classics, 2000), pp. 44-54.

<sup>387</sup> Daniel Birnbaum, “Where is Painting Now?” in *Painting: Documents of Contemporary Art*, edited by Terry Myers, (London and Cambridge MA: Whitechapel Gallery and The MIT Press, 2011), pp.157-160.

<sup>388</sup> Ibid., p. 158

*Reproduction* still unfolds in software driven and predetermined order, despite the illusion of choice. Virtual reality, in order to convince us of its reality must, quite literally, render its own medium invisible at all times.

In rejecting the closed and virtual labyrinth, I turned instead to a space that would, to adopt a line from Hal Foster, deliver a ‘sensuous particularity of experience in the here-and now’.<sup>389</sup> In order to overcome the shortcomings of the closed and virtual labyrinths, I constructed, as a solution to these shortcomings, and as the concluding phase of this project an open labyrinth.

The open labyrinth, though a simple solution to what I perceived to be the failings of its closed and virtual antecedents, promotes, nonetheless, an apperception of time as that which has ceased to flow ceaselessly; a space/time event incapable, as it were, of being set into motion without the stuttering and dynamic force of repetition.

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<sup>389</sup> Hal Foster, *The Art-Architecture Complex*, (London and New York: Verso, 2013), p. xii.

## Conclusion.

Deleuze declared that a problem, ‘always has the solution it deserves, in terms of the way in which it is stated’.<sup>390</sup> My research questions have attempted to properly state a desire, not only to uncover but to invent relations between painting, repetition, time and space, to make a new contribution to repetition studies, and in doing so construct better questions. Invention is usually thought of as the act of giving being to that which did not previously exist. The series of paintings titled *Repetition from Reproduction* have been informed, however, by the already extant. This should come as no surprise considering that each of my research questions has at its centre the word repetition, a word that functions simultaneously as part-question and potential solution.

Before discussing better questions, new knowledge, the implications of outcomes for future research, and the limitations of the open labyrinth as presented in Chapter Four, I will restate the arguments made in response to this dissertation’s research questions. These arguments, taken together, present a cohesive response to an overarching question raised in the dissertation’s abstract; what, if anything, can be achieved in painting from what is often perceived to be a most unpromising strategy for the visual artist - that of repetition?

### **How does repetition reposition the temporal conditions of the static image (specifically painting)?**

In order to examine how repetition might reposition the temporal conditions of the static image, Chapter One first scrutinized long held assumptions about painting and time. Enlightenment formulae from Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, James Harris and Anthony Ashley-Cooper have entrenched the idea that in observing the limits of its medium, painting must be debarred from sharing the temporal conditions of a time-based medium such as poetry.

The pervasiveness of these assumptions has led to a narrowed thinking on the temporality of painting, one that exclusively addresses itself to painting as an object -

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<sup>390</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, (Brooklyn NY: Zone Books, 1998),

how it may or may not mark, represent, depict, signify or speculate on time, and how painting as an object negotiates the vicissitudes of time. I have argued that in order to apprehend the richness of painting's temporal conditions, painting's internal temporal conditions must be folded into an encounter with painting's external temporal conditions. I have defined painting's external conditions as its processing in time and space by an audience.

This folding of painting's internal and external temporal conditions allows us the latitude to explore an expanded notion of time-based painting. We may, therefore, consider not only time-based painting, but painting-based time. I have defined painting-based time as an apperception of time, a heightened awareness of past, present and future.

The mechanics, so to speak, of repetition's ability to reposition the temporal conditions of painting lie in its capacity to challenge normative temporal order by creating a murmur or stutter in time. What is chosen to repeat, however, is also critical. I have produced a series of paintings, *Repetition from Reproduction* that have fulfilled the requirements for what Mieke Bal described as the 'sticky image'.

I have argued that what gives *Repetition from Reproduction* its stickiness, is in part, the three movements of trompe l'oeil. Trompe l'oeil's first movement is its pictorial verisimilitude, the second lies in its unmasking of the illusion, and the third focuses attention on the artfulness of the artifice, the means by which illusion has been constructed in paint. This is an example of what I have referred to as a self-critical process and by Caroline Levine as 'the most realist of artistic projects and the most ironic antirealisms'.<sup>391</sup> The relevance of trompe l'oeil to the construction of sticky images is, therefore, not only its ability to deceive and then undeceive but more importantly, in the time it takes to parse the movement from one to the other.

### **What are the operational means of repetition as an *engine* of difference?**

In light of this practice-based research, the question might now be re-written as a statement that reads; Repetition is *the* operational means by which an engine of difference functions.

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<sup>391</sup> Caroline Levine, "Seductive Reflexivity: Ruskin's Dreaded Trompe L'Oeil", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. 56, No. 4, Autumn, (1998), pp. 365-75, 365.

In Chapter Two I have argued that in terms of painting - difference is manifested as different only in relation to tradition, that modernism's obsession with originality and its misgivings regarding the influence of tradition, results in a disguised repetition, one that attempts to sever the bonds between present and past in the service of the future.

The result of this disguised repetition, one that occludes its indebtedness to the past, is a drastic reversal in the understanding of terms. Repetition, once thought of as synonymous with invention is replaced with its synonymy with copy, a shift from a positive to a negative act of adaptation to tradition. These claims have been substantiated by examining the shifting relations between repetition and originality through examples of pre-modern, modern, and contemporary painting. Painters, whether engaged in an unmasked or disguised repetition, do so in order to re-negotiate the value of the already valued.<sup>392</sup>

That difference is a latent temporal condition of painting, released by repetition, has been substantiated by appealing, as it were, to the Roman Goddess Copia. I have suggested that Copia's cornucopia can be thought of as a warehouse of virtual potential unlocked by repetition. Repetition has the potential to unlock the unrealised or virtual potential of any extant painting or photographic image. This dissertation has presented *Echo*, a series of paintings by Swedish artist Cecilia Edefalk as material substantiation for this particular claim.

The mode of looking that serial practices release in concert with the repeating image, engenders a spatial and temporal mode of looking that makes an appeal to the eye's ability to differentiate near identical images, to register 'discrepancies that leap to the eye'.<sup>393</sup> As an example of serial practice that makes this mode of looking its business, I have argued that Sherrie Levine's *Postcard* series present an installation in which a population of mechanically reproduced and identical postcards; function as both figure and ground. A contemporary example of this mode of temporal and spatial looking and one that further complicates the relation between repetition, time, and space is evident in the paintings of American artist Anne Craven. I have shown that while Cecilia Edefalk's painting employs repetition to release difference, Craven uses the

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<sup>392</sup> The modernist painter, according to Groys, repeats only when 'old values are archived...protected from the destructive work of time'. Boris Groys, *On the New*, translated by G.M. Goshgarian, (London and New York: Verso, 2014), p. 21.

<sup>393</sup> See Leo Steinberg, "The Line of Fate in Michelangelo's Painting", *Critical Enquiry*, Vol. 6, No. 3, (1980), pp. 411 - 54.

repeating image to entangle space and time. Craven binds together, so to speak, two discrete spaces simultaneously.

I have examined, as the third and final case study, the work of American artist R. H Quaytman. I have done so in order to present examples of contemporary painting that have, from their inception, a space of reception in mind. Quaytman has also been included as her practice interrogates the book as a territory for painting, the results of which are described by Yves-Alain Bois as ‘the becoming-book of painting’.<sup>394</sup> The becoming-book of painting engenders a mode of seeing that is both diachronic and synchronic when encountered in what I have referred to as an open labyrinth.

### **How does repetition temporalise the space of its encounter?**



Fig 4.21

In order to reiterate my responses to this question, it will be useful to do so by beginning with the composite image above [fig 4.21]. The first image was taken during the research’s midway point, and the second was taken nearing its conclusion. The images are a convincing testament to the veracity of the well worn idiom: a picture is worth a thousand words. The picture on the left shows *Repetition from Reproduction* being installed in Newcastle University’s appropriately named Long Gallery and the

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<sup>394</sup> See Yves-Alain Bois, “Of Wasps and Orchids and Books and Paintings”, in Bennett Simpson, Yves-Alain Bois and Juliane Rebentisch, *Morning: Chapter 30, R.H. Quaytman*, (The Museum of Contemporary Art, Los Angeles: DelMonico Books, 2016), p. 46.

picture on the right shows the same paintings placed into what I have referred to as an open labyrinth.

My third research question specifically asked how repetition temporalises the space of its encounter. These two very different spaces prompt a re-ordering of the question from its original sequence. In light of these two spaces, the question becomes; how does space temporalise repetition? I am not suggesting that the original question is inferior or badly stated but that in its second ordering, parsed through these two pictures, my responses to the original question and conclusion to this practice-based research might be clearly stated.

Both spaces contain repeating images - *Repetition from Reproduction*, and in both spaces the repeating image, as I have argued earlier, reinserts the past into the present. All spaces, as I have stated earlier, must have their say. The first space into which *Repetition from Reproduction* was installed is a long space. It is a corridor/gallery that connects two distinct areas of the University's Fine Art Department. This bridging space, by nature of its proportion and function speaks to linearity. It is a monocursal space, walked from exit to entrance and conversely from entrance to exit dependent upon a point of view.

In the Long Gallery, while *Repetition from Reproduction* certainly punctuate space, and having introduced a temporal stutter into a space; the space itself, so to speak, dissipates the temporal stutter, due to its linear nature. The Long Gallery, unlike *Repetition from Reproduction*, is itself not sticky enough. It does not hold its occupants above and beyond its function as a bridging space as they move from entrance to exit. This linear space negates what Henri Lefebvre has described as enlivened repetition - repetition 'cut across' by the cyclical.<sup>395</sup> I have argued in Chapter Four that what enlivens repetition is the open labyrinth.

The photograph to the right of the Long Gallery image shows *Repetition from Reproduction* installed in an exhibition space converted from studio spaces, as part of Newcastle University's MFA show in 2016. In this photograph, a linear and monocursal space has been replaced by a cyclical and multicursal space, one in which an audience cuts across its spatial syntax. In an open labyrinth, the walls have been removed in order

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<sup>395</sup> See "The Rythmanalytical Project", in *Henri Lefebvre: Key Writings*, edited by Stuart Elden, Elizabeth Lebas, and Elenore Kofman, (New York: Continuum, 2003), p. 191.



to transform the gallery into a space that shares some properties with what Kristen Kreider describes as a ‘symbolising domain’.<sup>396</sup> I have shown in Chapter Four that Kreider’s symbolising domain arises is an encounter with repeating objects shown in adjacent rooms. Describing an encounter with Roni Horn’s *Things which Happen Again*, Kreider writes:

The viewer is thus able to conceive of the object in the first room and her experience of it by comparing the object in the second room with the object in the first and identifying characteristic features of the first object in this different context. In this sense, the viewer’s movement into the second room and her encounter with the second object therein enacts a shift into a symbolising domain.<sup>397</sup>

This is another description of the ways in which differences between present perceptions and present memories of past perceptions are parsed. The difference, however, between Kreider’s symbolising domain, encompassed within two separate but connected spaces, and an open labyrinth in which a single space is divided and interconnected, is in its ability to simultaneously embody two definitions of how undifferentiated space is transformed by an embodied spectator. I have stated in Chapter Four that for Yi-Fu Tuan, the interval between motion and motionlessness transforms space into place. For de Certeau it is conversely motion that transforms place into space. In accentuating the differences between present perceptions and present memories of past perceptions in a single space rather than across discrete spaces, the open labyrinth, like the paintings installed within it, stutters. This stutter continues as long as the space is walked.

The engine that drives both the stutter and an audience’s desire to remain long enough to experience the stutter is repetition. *Repetition from Reproduction* are a ‘sensuous particularity of experience in the here-and now’ that act as way-points between motion and motionlessness, a point at which an image’s difference from one encountered earlier might be parsed in anticipation of a future repetition.<sup>398</sup> The embodied spectator connects repeating images in space and folds space into space, and

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<sup>396</sup> Kirsten Kreider, *Poetics + Place: The Architecture of Sign, Subjects+ Site*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014), p. 57.

<sup>397</sup> Ibid.

<sup>398</sup> See Hal Foster, *The Art-Architecture Complex*, (London and New York: Verso, 2011), p. XI.

therefore, performs not only the temporalisation of space but specifically a stuttering time.

I began Chapter Four with this quote from *Jorge Luis Borges' The Garden of Forking Paths*:

I am withdrawing to write a book. And another time: I am withdrawing to construct a labyrinth. Every one imagined two works; to no one did it occur that the book and the maze were one and the same thing.<sup>399</sup>

When I began this research, it did not occur to me that I would be repeating images from a book. Having done so, however, and in concordance with Borges' Ts'ui Pên, creator of both book and labyrinth, it is evident that *Repetition from Reproduction* and the open labyrinth are one and the same work. Meaning inheres, not in any single image that constitutes the series but is constructed as an audience fashions their own book as they navigate the open labyrinth.

### **Limitations, future research and better questions.**

As a means of examining, on one hand the limitations of the open labyrinth and conversely its potential to generate future research, I will relate an anecdote that was passed to me by a third party, one that has some relevance to painting and the open labyrinth, and to the overarching question posed in the dissertation's abstract. The anecdote returns us to the two images of *Repetition from Reproduction*, the first in the Long Gallery and the second, separated in time by twelve months, installed within an open labyrinth.

Two members of staff from the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, who had first seen *Repetition from Reproduction* in the Long Gallery, remarked upon an overall improvement of my abilities as a painter, upon seeing *Repetition from Reproduction* twelve months later in my open labyrinth. This raises interesting questions. The paintings encountered in the open labyrinth were the same paintings encountered in the Long Gallery (with only a few additions to the series). The open labyrinth, it seems, had altered the perception of the paintings. Another way of stating this is that, encountered

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<sup>399</sup> Jorge Luis Borges "The Garden of Forking Paths", translated by Donald A. Yates, *Labyrinths*, (London: Penguin Classics, 2000), p. 50.

within the open labyrinth, the paintings that constitute the series *Repetition from Reproduction* were different. I am tempted to go as far as stating that while exhibited within an open labyrinth, *Repetition from Reproduction* had undergone a change of temporal conditions - they were perceived to have changed over time.

The question that this anecdote provokes - how and why the above has occurred, for example, has not been addressed in this dissertation, arriving, as they did, quite late in the research project. The inability to respond to this and attendant questions earlier, highlights one of the limitations of my research into the relation between painting and the open labyrinth.

Like many practice-based research projects, the ability to test research depends on the ability to secure spaces in public arenas that facilitate both audience participation and access to audience reaction. While spaces were successfully secured in order to test the relations between painting and an open labyrinth, they allowed me to construct a labyrinth of a much less ambitious scale than originally intended. I am convinced, nonetheless, that my research questions were responded to cohesively despite this reduced scale.

In terms of better questions and future research, it may have been useful to undertake a much more rigorous collection of data in order to build an understanding of how an audience navigated the open labyrinth, and specifically the ways in which the repeated image did, or did not affect the order in which an audience performed the labyrinth, and how long they spent doing so. This research, for example, may have something to contribute to the field of movement analysis systems and spatial behaviour as explored in contemporary architecture.<sup>400</sup> In the field of neurosciences, research has been carried out in order to discern whether static images that depict movement result in a perception of time slowed - or time dilation.<sup>401</sup> Future research, might, for example, examine the ways in which an encounter with the repeating image affects perceived duration of the time spent in contact with them. Having said this, it might be argued that research in these directions, particularly the latter, is the purview of science and not painting. In terms of the future development of my practice-based research, it is clear,

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<sup>400</sup> See Sam McElhinney, *Labyrinths, Mazes and the Spaces In between*.  
[http://www.academia.edu/6869043/Labyrinths\\_Mazes\\_and\\_the\\_Spaces\\_Inbetween](http://www.academia.edu/6869043/Labyrinths_Mazes_and_the_Spaces_Inbetween).

<sup>401</sup> See Kentaro Yamamoto and Kayo Miura, "Time Dilation caused by static images with implied motion", *Experimental Brain Research*, Vol. 223, No. 2, (2012), pp. 311-19.

however, that there are other books from which to repeat, and different labyrinths to construct.

I reiterate, however, that more empirical evidence might have been collected in order to document viewer response to a network of repeating images. In many ways, architectural spaces are pre-programmed to elicit behaviour from their occupants in ways appropriate to them. At risk of stating the obvious, we behave, on the whole, differently in churches, museums and libraries to the way we do so in the home. In *Space is the Machine: A Configurational Theory of Architecture* (1999), Bill Hillier remarks, however, that ‘in spite of the apparent closeness of the association, the relation between form and function in buildings has always proved resistant to analysis’.<sup>402</sup>

The form of my open labyrinth could be described as an epistemic object that, in its encounter with an audience, releases quantifiable data of a qualitative experience. While I have reservations about the usefulness of questionnaire based evidence of viewer response - questions often influence answers - It is my intention, in future iterations of an open labyrinth, to gather data that records how repetition affects the motion of a viewer by digitally tracking such movement with motion-tracking hardware and in turn to use this data in concert with software designed for the purpose of creating a printed vector diagram that records the motion of individuals within the open labyrinth. This will produce visual empirical data of a much more convincing nature than that gathered by questionnaire and allow the open labyrinth to function as an artwork that generates a second-level of art works - a series of prints unique to the motion of an individual through the open labyrinth by treating each individual painting in the labyrinth as an orientational node.

In light of the lack of empirical data, I will, however, and despite their anecdotal nature, relate here a number of observations I made while observing viewer response to the open labyrinth at Newcastle University and the Isherwood gallery.

- Upon entering the room in which the open labyrinth was situated, viewers hesitated at the threshold - unsure as how to proceed. Having realised that the

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<sup>402</sup> Bill Hillier, *Space is the Machine: A Configurational Theory of Architecture*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 288.

open labyrinth did in fact have an entrance, they moved around the labyrinth, faithful to its floor plan.

- As the viewer numbers increased, one viewer decided to ignore the syntax of the space and walk, as it were, through the walls of the labyrinth. This gave permission, so to speak, for other viewers to follow suit and to begin to connect one painting to another in a more complex and less linear fashion.
- Once viewers realised that the open labyrinth contained repeating images, they moved back and forth between images in order to discern their differences, ignoring the labyrinth's floor plan. Viewers also began to move from painting to painting dependent upon the placement of nine repetitions of five 'originals'. The organisation of these images affected, therefore, the movement of viewers as they moved back and forth between sub-sets of images as a process of discerning difference and sameness.
- Viewers were often observed, when in pairs, pointing to paintings in the distance that were equivalent to the one they were standing in front of before moving towards it in order to verify their perception that it was connected to others encountered earlier. At all times, viewers, having approached a painting, would look check it with those adjacent to it and then turn to check it against the rest of the paintings in the labyrinth.
- Viewers who had entered the labyrinth in pairs were often observed gesturing to their partners from the other side of the labyrinth in order to draw their attention to a painting they thought they had already encountered.
- Where similar paintings were positioned diagonally across the labyrinth from corner to corner, many viewers were observed following this line upon deciding to ignore the labyrinth's floor plan.
- Many viewers were observed standing in the centre of the labyrinth and rotating 360 degrees in order to apprehend all of the paintings. Others were observed checking a painting against the painting to its left and to its right in a rapid and repeated 180 degree movement of the head.
- Upon leaving the open labyrinth, all viewers were shown my digital labyrinth 'walkthrough' on a Samsung tablet and asked to comment. 100% of those asked stated that the digital walkthrough was uninteresting; with some viewers stating that it resembled a 'game'.

This practice-based research has, from its beginning, addressed itself to the relations that exist and may be made to exist, between repetition, time, and painting. I have spent three years painting, with a statement in mind, made by Deleuze - that the 'The painter does not paint on an empty canvas, and neither does the writer write on a blank page'.<sup>403</sup>

The statement reminds us that the impulse to depart from the past has been overtaken by the desire to repeat it. While for many painters, Deleuze's admonition may seem hollow, I am, however, ever more convinced that difference, or the new, is a form of repetition, that the temporal conditions of painting are extraordinarily potent in ways that far exceed the apparent limitations of its inertia as an object, and that when the repeating image is introduced into spaces that share the properties of what I have referred to as open labyrinths, their temporal conditions affect time.

Having examined the temporal conditions of the painted static image, it is perhaps worthwhile saying something here about the ways in which this research has affected my practice.

Prior to undertaking this research, I was, according to one of my MFA lecturers, "a painter in a hurry". I was in the habit of usually spending no more than twenty-fours on a painting - loathed to return to it once the paint had dried. I have stated on page ninety-nine of this dissertation that one property ascribed to the 'sticky image' by Mieke Bal is its ability to ingratiate itself into the spectators 'life time'. In attempting to construct what Bal defined as the 'sticky image' as a means of decelerating the gaze, it has become clear that the research project in general has ingratiated itself into my life - having the affect of decelerating, so to speak, aspects of my practice. I have become a much slower painter. This temporal deceleration combined with repetition - the reinsertion of the past into the present - can be described as an abandonment of telos.

In the decision to repeat - to eschew the expression of a so-called unique and individual authorial perspective on the world, and to release, instead, difference from the already given, I have, ironically, become an academic painter. By academic, I refer here not to

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<sup>403</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, (New York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 204.

academic in its pejorative use but to an understanding of the academic as privileging the re-interpretation and re-organisation of the already given at the expense of self expression. While for some, this may sound like a minor ramification of this research project, it is, however, something that I consider to be significant.

Another significant consequence of this research project has been, in a sense, a temporal one. Having no qualms as a painter in relation to repetition, this research project has afforded me, at the risk of making a grandiose claim, a grand deferral of closure.

My intention is to continue with the open labyrinth until such time that it is no longer possible to do so. The open labyrinth will continue to grow in size as more paintings from other books are brought into conversation with those appropriated from *Discovering Art*. If one starting point for this research project, specifically my third research question, was Jorge Luis Borges' *The Garden of Forking Paths*, it is equally true to say that in continuing to develop *Repetition from Reproduction* in an open labyrinth, the ambition is to move towards an installation that mirrors aspects of another of Borges' short stories - *The Library of Babel* (*La biblioteca de Babel*, 1941), in which Borges conjures a universe conceived in the form of an endless library containing all possible books.<sup>404</sup>

I have stated previously that the temporal conditions of painting must be discussed in broader terms than those that rely on a definition of the static image limited to its lack of motion. The implications are, therefore, significant to painters interested in painting's temporal conditions and to the teaching of painting in Higher Educational institutions. The temporal conditions of painting, ascribed by Lessing, Ashley-Cooper and Harrison continue to reverberate in the present. Film, photography and performance are referred to as time-based media, while painting and sculpture are not. We can see, therefore, the degree to which we have inherited, embraced and continue to embrace the notion that the static image, whether painting or sculpture, is a spatial and not a temporal media. I have, however, shown that painting can be set into motion relative to those paintings around it, in relation to an embodied observer and in relation to both an open future and an open past. In this way, as we have seen in the work of R.H. Quaytman, painting is a resolutely time-based medium. I suggest that the teaching of painting in Higher

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<sup>404</sup> I might add here that my own vision of Borges' endless library is not as Kafkaesque as Borges'. See Jorge Luis Borges, "The Library of Babel" (*La Biblioteca de Babel*), *Labyrinths*, Edited by Donald A. Yates and James E. Irby, (London: Penguin Classics, 2000), pp. 78-87.



Educational institutions should, at the very least, encourage painting students to consider the temporal conditions of their medium and how they might set it, so to speak, into motion in ways I have suggested in this dissertation.

Anyone browsing, for example, through the numerous anthologies of contemporary painting such as Thames and Hudson's *100 painters of Today* or Phaidon's *Vitamin P2: New Perspectives in Painting*, will encounter a dazzling pluralism, an array of approaches to painting, from symbolism to surrealism, constructivism to colour-field painting. None of these appropriated approaches to painting can claim to present new perspectives or to define the period in which they are contemporary with but rather they collectively resist periodisation. This in itself says a great deal about the period we currently inhabit. It seems to me, and this research project supports my position, that as our cultural institutions begin to struggle with the ceaselessly expanding archive (we live in an age where nothing disappears), painting might be better served if it rejects the production of discrete and hermetic objects in favour of what Joselit defines as 'image populations...networks...the reframing, capturing, reiterating and documentation of existing content - all aesthetic ground'.<sup>405</sup> I am not suggesting the kind of homage-making that Thomas Lawson described as the 'nostalgic desire to recover an undifferentiated past', a 'vaguely, ironic, slightly sarcastic response to the world', nor a revisionist historicism<sup>406</sup> but rather the production of a discursive constellation of images that seeks to rescue past painting from historical specificity while scrutinizing the ways in which these painting are and have been encountered, disseminated, curated, valorised and validated within what I have referred to as the cultural archive.

Repetition, it seems, has a great deal to offer the painter, and painting, when unworried by its relation to repetition is, as stated at the beginning of this dissertation, an object 'that does not shrink from impossible tasks'.<sup>407</sup>

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<sup>405</sup> David Joselit, *After Art*, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2103), p. 94.

<sup>406</sup> Thomas Lawson, "Last Exit: Painting", published in *Theories of Contemporary Art*, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1985), pp. 143-155.

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## Appendices

### ***Repetition from Reproduction and the Labyrinth.***


The following images constitute the series of paintings, titled *Repetition from Reproduction*. The development of the series has been charted in Chapter Three of my doctoral dissertation, pages 98-143. *Repetition from Reproduction*, are followed by a series of images that document the development of a space constructed for their apprehension. Chapter Four of the dissertation, pages 155-181, tracks the development of what I have referred to as a closed, virtual, and open labyrinth.



Once is Not Enough # 4. Isherwood Gallery, Wigan. May, 2017.



*Repetition from Reproduction (after Giotto) # 1. Oil on board, 28 x 25 cm, 2016.*



*Repetition from Reproduction (after Matisse) # 1. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm, 2014.*




*Repetition from Reproduction (after Le Corbusier) # 1. Oil on board, 28 x 25 cm, 2015.*





*Repetition from Reproduction (after Watteau) # 2. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm, 2016.*



*Repetition from Reproduction (after Bruegel) # 1. Oil on board, 28 x 25 cm, 2016.*



*Repetition from Reproduction (after Watteau) # 3. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm. 2015.*





*Repetition from Reproduction (after Watteau) # 4. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm. 2015.*





*Repetition from Reproduction (after Giotto) # 2. Oil on board, 28 x 25 cm, 2016.*




*Repetition from reproduction (after Matisse) # 2. Oil on board, 28 x 25 cm, 2015.*




*Repetition from Reproduction (after Watteau) # 5. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm, 2015.*






*Repetition from Reproduction (after Bruegel) # 2. Oil on board, 28 x 25 cm, 2016.*




*Repetition from Reproduction (after Giotto) # 3.* Oil on linen. 28 x 25 cm, 2015.





*Repetition from Reproduction (after Matisse) # 3. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm, 2015.*




*Repetition from Reproduction (after Le Corbusier) # 2. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm, 2015.*





*Repetition from Reproduction (after Watteau) # 5. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm, 2014-16.*





*Repetition from Reproduction (after Bruegel) # 3. Oil on board, 28 x 25 cm. 2015.*



*Repetition from reproduction (after Giotto) # 4. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm, 2015 -16.*






*Repetition from Reproduction (after Matisse) # 4. Oil on board, 28 x 25 cm, 2015.*



*Repetition from Reproduction (after Le Corbusier) # 3. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm, 2015.*



*Repetition from Reproduction (after Watteau) # 6. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm. 2016.*





*Repetition from Reproduction (after Le Corbusier) # 4. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm, 2015.*



*Repetition from Reproduction (after Matisse) # 5. Oil on board, 28 x 25 cm, 2016.*





*Repetition from reproduction (after Giotto) # 5. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm, 2015 -16.*



*Repetition from Reproduction (after Bruegel) # 4. Oil on board, 28 x 25 cm. 2015.*



*Repetition from Reproduction (after Bruegel) # 6. Oil on board, 28 x 25c m. 2015.*





*Repetition from Reproduction (after Bruegel) # 5. Oil on board, 28 x 25 cm. 2015.*



*Repetition from Reproduction (after Watteau) # 8. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm. 2015.*



*Repetition from reproduction (after Giotto) # 6. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm, 2015 -16.*





*Repetition from Reproduction (after Watteau) # 9. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm. 2016.*





*Repetition from Reproduction (after Watteau) # 10. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm. 2015.*



*Repetition from Reproduction (untitled)*. Oil on board, 23 x 25 cm, 2016.



*Repetition from Reproduction (after Le Corbusier) # 5. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm, 2015.*






*Repetition from Reproduction (after Le Corbusier) # 6. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm, 2015.*



*Repetition from Reproduction (after Watteau) # 11. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm. 2015.*




*Repetition from reproduction (after Giotto) # 7. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm, 2015 -16.*





*Repetition from reproduction (after Giotto) # 8. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm, 2015 -16.*






*Repetition from Reproduction (after Le Corbusier) # 7. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm, 2016.*



*Repetition from Reproduction (after Matisse) # 5. Oil on board, 28 x 25 cm, 2016.*



*Repetition from Reproduction (after Matisse) # 7. Oil on board, 28 x 25 cm, 2015.*





*Repetition from Reproduction (after Watteau) # 12. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm. 2016*





*Repetition from Reproduction (after Watteau) # 13. Oil on linen, 28 x 25 cm. 2015*

## The Closed Labyrinth





Research journal pages and foam-board model of single cell labyrinth.





Foam-board maquette of closed labyrinth.






Foam-board model of four single cell labyrinths combined.

## The Virtual Labyrinth




Screen-grabs of a virtual 3D walkthrough of the closed labyrinth.



Screen-grabs from virtual labyrinth.





Screen-grabs from virtual labyrinth.



Screen-grabs from virtual labyrinth.






Screen-grabs from virtual labyrinth.




## The Open Labyrinth.



Maquette for an open labyrinth.




Once is Not Enough # 4. Isherwood Gallery, Wigan, 2017.



Once is Not Enough # 4. Isherwood Gallery, Wigan, 2017.





Once is Not Enough # 3. Newcastle University, 2016. Photograph, Colin Davison.



Once is Not Enough # 3. Newcastle University, 2016. Photograph, Colin Davison.





Once is Not Enough # 3. Newcastle University, 2016. Photograph, Colin Davison.






Once is Not Enough # 3. Newcastle University, 2016. Photograph, Colin Davison.



Once is Not Enough # 3. Newcastle University, 2016. Photograph, Colin Davison.



Once is Not Enough # 3. Newcastle University, 2016. Photograph, Colin Davison.

## Journals, Source Material and Studies


The following pages document a range of journal entries, examples of source material, digital animations, drawings, and gouache studies. While Volume Three is not intended as a comprehensive document, it does, however, provide evidence of the scope and range of the practice-based methods employed.







Screen-grabs from digital animations, *I'm Not Going Back Into the Studio*, 2015, and *Another Fine Mess*, 2015.



THE 300 DRAWINGS FIRST SHOWN AT THE BLUEBOAT IN 2010 WERE RE-VISITED IN AN ATTEMPT TO SEE WHAT, IF ANY THING MIGHT BE GAINED FROM ANIMATING THE IMAGES - AND MORE IMPORTANTLY TO TRY AND UNRAVEL THE 'TEMPORAL CONDITIONS' OF STATIC + TIME-BASED IMAGES AND WHAT PART REPETITION MIGHT PLAY IN RESOLVING THE QUESTIONS.

WHAT 'DURATION' CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THESE IMAGES AS STATIC?

BY PLACING THE IMAGES IN THE GRID - HAS THIS PLACING IN SPACE RENDERED THE IMAGE UNABLE TO 'SPEAK' TO DURATION?

THE ANIMATION CREATED THE ILLUSION OF MOVEMENT AND STRICTLY SPEAKING (BERGSON) HAS DEFINED ITS TEMPORAL CONDITION AS A 'MOVEMENT IMAGE' (DELEUZE) AND NOT A TIME-IMAGE.

THIS BEGS THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS THAT NEED TO BE ADDRESSED AND RESOLVED. IS THE STATIC IMAGE ALREADY A TIME-IMAGE IN THE BERGSONIAN AND DELEUZIAN DEFINITION?

IF SO - THEN THE ANIMATION



SHOULD BE SLOWED DOWN TO SHIFT THE EMPHASIS FROM ONE OF MOVEMENT TO ONE OF TIME. IN THIS INSTANCE IT IS CLEAR THAT SOME RESEARCH IS NEEDED INTO MOTION(LESS) PICTURES'. THE CINEMA OF STAGIS. (JUSTIN REMES).



### MARAT'S LAST WORDS: A DEFERENCE OF CLOSTRE

THIS SPECULATIVE ANIMATION TESTS THE NOTION THAT REPETITION WILL UNCOVER A LATENT SUBJECT MATTER — A DEVICE USED BY SWEDISH PRINCE CELLIA EDEN. IN THIS CASE THE LATENT SUBJECT MATTER IS MARAT IN THE ACT OF WRITING INTO THE DUST OF HIS APARTMENT FLOOR (A DEATHBED CONFESSION).

IN ORDER TO DEVELOP THE FORMAL PROBLEMS (QUALITY OF MATERIAL) THE ORIGINALS NEED TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED IN HD. THE SAME QUESTIONS ARISE IN THIS PIECE — DOES THE ILLUSION OF MOVEMENT CLING TO THE IMAGES TEMPORAL CONDITION FROM



## RACHEL'S PHOTOGRAPHS - BLADE RUNNER - RIDLEY SCOTT, 1982.



THIS SCENE FROM BLADE RUNNER IS A PERFECT EXAMPLE OF THE PLAY BETWEEN STATIC + TIME BASED IMAGE WITHIN THE SAME IDIOM OF CINEMA -

CAMERA ZOOMS IN ON ELIA'S HAND HELD PHOTOGRAPH (STILL - STATIC). CAMERA FOOLS YOU INTO THINKING THAT WE HAVE CUT TO CLOSE UP OF STILL IMAGE - SCOTT HAS IN FACT CUT TO LIVE FOOTAGE (SLOWED) AND WE NOTICE LIGHT FLASHING ACROSS THE FACES OF RACHEL AND HER MOTHER. SIMPLE BUT INCREDIBLY EFFECTIVE STATEMENT ABOUT - STILL - MOVING IMAGES AND MEMORY.

① SHOOT LIVE SCENE.

② TAKE STILL FROM TIME - LINE.

③ ?? THE PROBLEM HERE IS THAT RIDLEY SCOTT SETS UP THE EFFECT BY INTRODUCING US TO THE PHOTOGRAPH FIRST

DETERIORISATION - TO - RETERRITORIALISATION?  
(movement) → static)

WHAT ELSE CAN BE DONE WITH THIS WITHOUT SIMPLY RECREATING SCOTT'S MOVEMENT FROM STATIC (this image - index) to MOVEMENT IMAGE (BY SLOWING IT DOWN IT EXISTS SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE TWO)

THIS HAS BEEN USED TO SOME DEGREE IN SAM TAYLOR WOODS EARLIER WORK.



Cinema of Stasis — imperceptibly 'moving' image.


Repetition — deferral of closure

the look to Camera — deterritorialisation — Oliver Hardy.

Animation without movement — from static to moving image and back again.


'Painting that stutters' — Repetition of Painting in order to uncover a latent subject matter.

Still life that 'stutters' — that wants to move.



REPETITION IS THE 'GLUE' THAT BINDS THIS LOT.





Journal pages, 2014.



Screen-grabs from unfinished digital animations, 2015.








Digital compression (perspectival) of Samuel van Hoogstraten's *View of a Corridor*, 1670. Screen-grab from *Duck Soup*, 1933. Oil study on board, 2015. 10 x 12 cm.





Digital manipulation of images from Nicolas Poussin's, *Madonna on the Steps*, 1648, and Johannes Vermeer's, *A Woman Holding a Balance*, ca. 1662-3.



Untitled paintings, 2015. Based on the digital manipulations shown on the previous page. 12 x 10 x 3 cm.



Candidate: 120389713

HSS804: Texts, Images and Sounds. Dr Ian Biddle.

## Marat's Last Words: The Deferral of Closure.

### INTRODUCTION

'Whatever a man prays for, he prays for a miracle. Every prayer reduces itself to this: Great God, grant that two and two be not four'<sup>1</sup>

As a practice-based PhD candidate whose epistemological methodology is held within my practice, the best I can expect (epistemologically) from resulting research is that it compels us to re-examine and re-appraise our assumptions in respect to how we approach the question of knowledge, its constitution and how *understanding* in relation to knowledge can be extended non-propositionally.

In order to assess the problematised relationship between epistemology and art I will read Jacques-Louis David's *The Death of Marat* 'through' Bergson<sup>2</sup> and Deleuze<sup>3</sup>, an image presumably lacking (additional) *a posteriori* revelation in order to evaluate epistemology in relation to my current research<sup>4</sup>. I will be taking the singular step<sup>5</sup> of 're-reading' David's *Marat*<sup>6</sup> 'through' digital animation software, to explore what I will term, for the sake of this

<sup>1</sup> Turgenev, Ivan, from *Prayer*.

<sup>2</sup> Temporally....'Questions relating to subject and object, to their distinction and their union, should be placed in time rather than of space.' Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*


<sup>3</sup> Repetition.....'Multiplicity is unity', Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Columbia University Press., 2006.

<sup>4</sup> The temporal conditions of static and time-based images.

<sup>5</sup> To my knowledge this approach has not been applied to David's *Marat* or any other painting in order to examine the ability of 'temporal-re-iteration' to uncover a latent subject matter or 'signifier-felt- and -not seen'.

<sup>6</sup> I will refer to *The Death of Marat* for the remainder of this essay as *Marat*.





Top: Digital photograph of Jacques-Louis David's *The Death of Marat* in Eik Kahng's, *The Repeating Image*. Baltimore: Walters Art Museum, 2007. Bottom: Untitled digital animation, 2014. Images of all five versions of David's painting were overlapped in an attempt to not only apprehend the differences between them but to discover if repetition might uncover more than the *already seen*.






Top: André Malraux collating images for *Voices of Silence*, 1953.

Bottom: Image from Aby Warburg's *Mnemosyne Atlas*, 1927-29.





Top: Screen-grab from Dennis Adams' *Malraux's Shoes*, 2012. Bottom: Image from Aby Warburg's *Mnemosyne Atlas*, 1927-29.






Screen-grabs from Andrei Tarkovsky's *Solaris*, 1972.



Screen-grabs from Paul Schrader's *Mishima: A Life in Four Chapters*, 1985.



Top. *Discovering Art*, Vol.1, No. 1-12, 1964. Bottom. Journal Page, 2015.






Top. Untitled watercolour on paper (after Watteau), 2015. 16 x 15 cm. Bottom. Untitled drawing (after Matisse), 2014.



Henri Matisse, *La Serpentine*, 1909. Bronze, 56.5 x 28 x 19 cm.

Untitled photographic source for *La Serpentine*, 1909. Archives Matisse, Paris.





Top. Digitally manipulated images from Bruegel's *Hunters in the Snow*, 1565. Bottom. Screen-grab from Andrei Tarkovsky's *Solaris* (library scene), 1972.




SPACE

JOURNAL

IV

Journal cover, 2015.






# REPETITION: RECURSION: RETURN: ECHOLALIA

IMAGES THAT BOTH ILLUSTRATE AND VEHICLE FOR CONTENT. IF THE CONTENT IS REPETITION - WHAT ASPECT OF REPETITION? REPETITION IN TIME - IN HISTORY? REPETITION IN CINEMA- AND PAINTING? WHAT KINDS OF IMAGES MIGHT BE VEHICLES FOR THE CONTENT - IMAGES THAT REPEAT - SUGGESTING MOVEMENT IN TIME THAT IS ENHANCED/AMPLIFIED BY THE WAY THAT AN AUDIENCE ENCOUNTERS REPETITIONS OF THE IMAGES IN 'REPETITION'S' SPACE (MAZE). MOVEMENT WITHIN THE IMAGE - ELUSED (ECHOLALIA) BY MOVEMENT IN SPACE THAT REQUIRES A RECURSIVE JOURNEY - TO CHECK THE 'DIFFERENCES' BETWEEN IMAGES.

INSINUATION WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY 'ECHOLALIC' SOUNDTRACK THAT EITHER REFERS DIRECTLY TO IMAGES OR THROUGH AN 'ABSTRACT' INDIFFERENCE ELEVATES THE APPARENTLY NON-SENSUAL SOUNDTRACK TO A MEANINGFUL ENCOUNTER WITH IMAGE.

- ① PAINTING THAT ENGAGE VIEWERS BY ACTIVELY ENGAGING/CONFRONTING THE GAZE OR
- ② BY NEGATING THEIR PRESENCE THROUGH THE DYNAMICS OF AN 'ABSORPTIVE' STATE, AS DESCRIBED BY FRIED. SIMILARLY MAKE VIEWERS AWARE OF THEIR VIEWER POSITION


PARSE PROJECT 17.9.2014



ABSORPTIVE IMAGE - ABSORPTION + THEATRICITY: PAINTING IN THE AGE OF BIERST MICHAEL FRIED BUY THIS

- RECURSIVE DIVISION MAZE ② MORE COMPLEXITY. ASYMMETRICAL.
- WHERE WILL PAINTINGS BE PLACED?
- SCALE? FURTHER OR ABSTRACTION THAT MIRRORS FLOOR PLAN?
- PAGES TURNING IN A BOOK? A BOOK OF PAINTING (ART HISTORY) OR OF HISTORICAL EVENTS.
- THINGS THAT REPEAT, THINGS THAT FOLD
- IMAGE THAT EMPLOYS A DYNAMIC OF THE ABSORPTIVE?
- IMAGE THAT ENGAGES/CONFRONTS VIEWERS GAZE?
- SOUNDTRACK?
- ECHOLALIA IN CONTRAST/INSTEAD OF ECHOLALIA?
- TELEVISION IMAGES ('Seeing at a distance').

# REPETITION RESEARCH PARSE PROJECT.



TOO SIMPLE

# PARSE PROJECT -


UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG SWEDEN

DEADLINE 1 MARCH 2015 CAN APPLY NOW! FOR PETER REVIEW.

'WE ARE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN CONTRIBUTIONS THAT CRITICALLY REFLECT UPON, AND/OR IN SOMEWAY WORK TO MODIFY THE FAMILIAR CONVENTIONS OF THE ACADEMIC PAPER, THE PANEL DISCUSSION AND THE ARTISTS TALK'. (ANOTHER COULD CALLING 'PERHAPS').

# RECURSIVE DIVISION MAZE

SIMPLE - SYMMETRICAL - LOGICAL PROGRESSION



■ = PAINTING



Single Cell

Entry and Exit the same (Flow Problem ??)

Needs a separate Ex.

A CRITIQUE OF THE SYSTEMATIC?





Top. Foam-board maquette for closed labyrinth, 2015. 28 x 128 x 92 cm. Bottom. Foam-board maquette of single-cell-closed labyrinth, 2015. 28 x 32 x 23 cm.

The labyrinth without walls - ~~to~~ collapses these distinctions - ?  
allows the outside to be seen from the inside and vice versa - the act of walking across the thresholds folds inside and outside - ~~the~~ the walker stitches inside and outside together. By standing on the threshold one is neither in nor out?


The open labyrinth allows a critical evaluation of ~~the~~ inside and outside at the same time.

↓  
PARADOX!

According to Grosz the inside cannot be thought without the outside and for Grosz the outside is not the architectural facade - but the 'other' - The insides other might be the economic, political or gendered outsider - her main premise however is that space's most significant outsider or 'other' <sup>the untamed</sup> is time, and that 'time change and emergence' [XIX], following Bergson have been reduced to the quantitative?

In the case of my own labyrinth the outside (mirrors) or repeats the inside - punctuated by repeating images the inside is a fold or doubling of the outside.





Screen-grabs from Orson Welles, *The Lady from Shanghai*, 1947.

*Once is Not Enough # 3*, 2016. Installation of open labyrinth. Newcastle University.



Painting, book, and architectural space. Detail of Masaccio's *St Jerome and St John the Baptist*, 1428.