POLITICS AND RESISTANCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. A STUDY OF THE EMILIANO ZAPATA ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (EZLN) AS A CRITICAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT.

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Abstract.

The 1994 mobilisation of the Emiliano Zapata Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in the Chiapas state of Southern Mexico prompted much academic and political debate. The EZLN proposed a variety of economic, political, social and . cultural demands in the ensuing days, weeks, months and years. Academic and political commentators using a variety of conceptual and interpretive frameworks sought to make sense of this social movement and assess whether the EZLN was truly significant. This thesis develops a distinctive coverage and critique of these approaches by arguing that the EZLN represents much more than current studies of the movement allow. The thesis argues that the EZLN represents the need and provides the opportunity for a profound rethinking of social movement theory and its assumptions. The thesis argues that the EZLN can help inform current interest in developing a thinking space in Critical International Relations Theory and invokes a problematisation of current conceptual approaches to the nature, the issues, the objectives and the strategies of contemporary social movements, in theory and practice.

<u>Preface</u>.

In 1994, the idea of revolutionary struggle, five years after the end of the Cold War
was regarded as unlikely. In effect the world we were told 'had moved on'. Indeed,
general optimism was evident in all corners of the world and particularly in Mexico, a
country which had had its fair share of economic and political crises during the 1980s
but now seemed to be settling in line with the new liberal market doctrine of
neo-liberalism. It is no surprise that the mobilisation of the Emiliano Zapata Army of
National Liberation (EZLN) on New Years Day 1994 came as a shock to many.

Indeed, the EZLN despite mobilising in the relatively small Southern Mexican
state of Chiapas seemed to strike at the very heart of the Mexican government's
program of economic liberalisation. The government along with others took the view
that the EZLN was a Marxist revolution acting out of synchronisation with the rapid
changes in the political economy of Latin America during the 1990s. This thesis
argues that the EZLN represents a disharmonious new world order but orchestrating a
rethinking of the site and nature of political resistance that eludes premature
methodological, conceptual and political classifications. My thesis shows that the
EZLN rethinks the site, meaning and nature of contemporary development, current
democracy and the strategies and tactics employed to achieve these objectives in
often ambiguous ways. By problematising conventional assumptions of what it means
to resist is the EZLN forges a critical reexamination of the meaning and nature of 'the
political' and the actual role and status of the critical enquiry itself.

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ACIEZ Emiliano Zapata Peasant Alliance.
ADN National Democratic Alliance.
AGP Global Popular Action.
ANCIEZ Emiliano Zapata National Peasant Alliance.
APPANET The Advanced Research Projects Agency.
ARIC Association of Rural Collective Interests.
CCRI-GC Clandestine Revolutionary Committee General Command.
CIOAC Independent Organisation of Agricultural Workers.
CIOAC-PWM Mexican Peasant Communist Party.
CISEN The Center of National Security Investigations.
CNTE National Coordination of Educational Workers.
CNC National Campesino Union.
CND Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.
CND National Democratic Convention.
CNOC National Network of Coffee Growers Association.
CNPA National Coordinating Commitee.
CNPI National Coordination of Indian Workers.
COCEI Workers, Students and Campesino Coalition of the Isthmus.
COCOPA Congressional Commission for Concord Peace and Conciliation.
CONAI National Mediation Committee.
CONAMUP National Coordination of Urban Popular Movements.
CONASUP National Company of Popular Subsistence.
CONPAZ Commmission for Non-governmental Organisations for Peace.
COPLNMAR National Plan for Repressed Zones and Marginal Groups.
COREO Chiapas Forestry Commission.
CPR Guatemalan Communities of People in Resistance.
CT Congress of Labour.
CTM National Conferation of Workers.
ENCR National Front Against Repression.
EPR Popular Revolutionary Army.
EZLN Emiliano Zapata Army of National Liberation.
FAC-MLN Broad Front for the Construction of a National Liberation Movement.
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.
FNALIDUM National Front of Women's Rights and Solidarity.
FIPI National Front of Indian Peoples.
FLN National Revolutionary Force.
FMLN Sandinista Forces of National Liberation.
FZLN Emiliano Zapata Front of National Liberation.
LFA Livestock Promotion Law.
MGCRI Indigenous Regional Movement of Workers and Farmers.
MRS Sandinista Revolutionary Movement.
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement.
NCDM National Commission for Democracy in Mexico.
NIEO New International Economic Order.
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

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OPEZ Emiliano Zapata Organisation of Peasants.
ORPA Guatemalan Revolutionary Organisation of the People.
PAAC Department of Agricultural Affairs and Colonisation.
PAN National Action Party.
PARM Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution.
PDPR Popular Democratic Revolutionary Party.
PEMEX National Oil Company.
PFCRN Cardenista Front of National Reconstruction.
PLM Mexican Liberal Party.
PMS Mexican Socialist Party. `
PNR National Revolutionary Party.
PP Party of the Poor.
PRD Party of the Democratic Revolution.
PRI Partido Revolucion Institucional.
PRM Party of the Mexican Revolution.
PROCUP Workers Clandestine Party of the People.
PROCUP-PDLP Workers and the Revolutionary Party of the People.
PROGRESSA Program for Education, Health and Nutrition.
PRONASOL National Solidarity Program.
RICA Intercontinental Network of Alternative Communication.
RMALC Mexican Action Network on Free Trade.
STI Syndicate of Indian Labourers.
STRM Telephone Workers Union.
UNAM National Autonomous University at Mexico City.
UN United Nations.
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
UNORCA National Union of Regional Peasants.
UNT New National Workers Union.
UP Union of the Poor.
URNG National Revolutionary Unity of Guatemala.
US United States.
UU Union of Unions.
WTO World Trade Organisation.

Contents

*This is who we are. The Zapatista National Liberation Army. The voice that arms
itself to be heard,*

the face that hides itself to be seen,

the name that hides itself to be named,

the red star that calls out to humanity around the world to be seen,

to be named. the tomorrow that is harvested in the past.

Behind our Black Mask.

behind our armed voice,

behind our unnameable name,

behind what you see of us

behind this, we are you,

*behind this we are the same simple and ordinary men and women who are repeated in
all races, painted in all colors, speak in all languages and speak in all places. Behind
this, we are the same forgotten men and women, the same excluded the same
untolerated, the same persecuted, the same as you.*

EZLN Communique, Opening Remarks at the "1996 First Encuentro for Humanity
against Neoliberalism," (quoted in Ruggiero 1998, 24).

POLITICS AND RESISTANCE IN CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. A STUDY OF THE EMILIANO ZAPATA ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (EZLN) AS A CRITICAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT.

Introduction.

Today, one is constantly struck by a feeling that all is not well in the world. Daily, images from far away and nearby places flicker across our television screens giving a sense of unease. Walker (1988) argued that this was:

> widely seen as a time of great danger, of looming cataclysms and barbaric injustices. For all the achievements and resources of the modern era, many people feel powerless in the face of huge forces beyond their control. These forces bring violence into the everyday lives of millions (Walker 1988, 1).

In the face of such daunting experiences many have striven to try to make a better life and to create and construct a better world. But in a world where the revolutionary ideologies have lost much of their vigour, leaving in their wake a terrifying tale of repression and violence, the question posed is what kind of politics of resistance is now left? This is particularly relevant given the axiomatic assertions that in a world of globalisation there is supposedly no alternative. Clearly, it is tempting to be pessimistic. But Walker (1988, 3) noted that:

> people have been able to articulate new understandings of what it means to work in a world free from excesses of violence, poverty and repression, despite the injustices of the present. They have found new creative energies on the basis of both highly specific forms of social and political struggle and more abstract, even spiritual explorations.

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On New Years Day 1994 a rebellion occured in Mexico. The rebellion was instigated by exploitation, repression and human misery in the small, mainly rural state of Chiapas, situated on the Mexican/Guatemalan border. The rebellion was called the Emiliano Zapata Army of National Liberation (EZLN), or the 'Zapatistas'. Approximately 1,500 insurgents carrying an assortment of guns and machetes, wearing military uniforms, traditional Indian costumes and even ski-masks, emerged from the lush tropical vegetation of the Lacandon Jungle and descended onto the towns of Altimarano (where the municipal palace was destroyed), Comitan, Las Margaritas, Ocosingo, Rancho Nuevo and San Cristobel de Las Casas (EZLN 1994; Marcos 1994, 1994a; Hilbert 1997). A person named Subcommandante Marcos, a representative of the EZLN, stood on the balcony of the municipal presidency building in the Zocalo of San Cristobel de Las Casas, a Spanish colonial town in the highlands of Chiapas and stated:

> Today the North American Free Trade Agreement begins, which is nothing more than a death certificate for the indigenous ethnicities of Mexico, who are perfectly dispensable in the modernisation programs of Salinas de Gortari. Thus, the campeneros decided to rise up on this same day to respond to the decree of death that the Free Trade Agreement gives them, with the decree of life that is given by rising up in arms to demand liberty and democracy, which will provide them with the solution to their problems. This is the reason we have risen up today. Don't forget, this is an ethnic movement (Marcos 1994a, 5).

In the First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle issued that night the EZLN (1994a) stated:

> We are a product of 500 years of struggle; first against slavery, then during the

War of Independence against Spain led by insurgents, then to avoid being absorbed by North American imperialism, then to promulgate our constitution and expel the French empire from our soil, and later the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz denied us the just application of the Reform laws, and the people rebelled and leaders like Villa and Zapata emerged, poor men like us. We have been denied the most elemental preparation so they can use us as canon fodder and pillage the wealth of our country. They do not care that we have nothing, absolutely nothing, not even a roof over our heads, no land, no work, no health care, no food nor education. Nor are we able to freely and democratically elect our political representatives, nor is there independence from foreigners, nor is there peace nor justice for ourselves and our children.

Cries of Basta!, or Enough! echoed around San Cristobel. The EZLN (1994a) demanded land, food, better housing, better health, better education, democracy, freedom, equality, justice and rights. Mobilising in 1994, the EZLN challenged premature pronouncements marking the 'end of history' (Flood 1996, 1999; Fukuyama 1991; Hoffman 1990; Huntingdon 1997; Lowenthal 1990; Nelson 1993; Rustow 1990). The sense of optimism ran through the pronouncements of President Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) of the Mexican government, the Partido Revolucion Institucion (PRI). Clutching the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in one hand and the membership of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the other, Salinas had voiced indefatigable admiration at Mexico's unique ability to adapt to economic and political neo-liberalism (Hilbert 1997).

Inevitably, early impressions were that on making a Revolutionary Declaration of War the EZLN simply fitted a revolutionary tradition spanning decades (Beesley-Murray 1999; Gilbert 1988; Starn 1995; Weinberg 1996). The implications

were clear. Either the EZLN had rekindled Marxist struggles of national liberation, or, the EZLN represented the final flickerings of the revolutionary flame.

Setting up the Debate: The EZLN as a New Struggle.

In the summer of 1994 an article cast doubt on these views. Coming from a socialist background Burbach (1994), using the term postmodernism proffered the view that the EZLN represented a distinctively *novel* politics of resistance *exactly because* it "came in the wake of the collapse of the modern bi-polar world of the post- Second World War and the ideological exhaustion of most of the national liberation movements" (Burbach 1994, 113). Burbach (1994, 113) claimed that the:

> Indian rebellion that burst upon the world scene in January is a postmodern political movement. The rebellion is an attempt to move beyond the politics of modernity, whether it be the modernisation of the Salinas de Gortari government or of past national liberation movements.

Burbach's (1994) argument precipitated much antipathy. The following year, Daniel Nugent (1995, 1995a) queried the novelty and profundity of the EZLN on historical and socialist grounds, lamenting that:

> the lure of intellectual fashion is so great that scholars who two decades ago worked with peasants in Mexico, and wrote about social movements, rural class formation, and the permanent character of the primitive accumulation of capital in dependent, peripheral states, now author postmodernist essays and books...postmodern concepts and assumptions, even casual turns of phrase, have a real seductive power over many intellectuals; and the freewheeling adoption of a postmodern vocabulary is having especially insidious effects on

the study of current historical developments (Nugent 1995a, 2).

Firstly, Nugent (1995) argued that postmodern intellectuals forced complex issues into a conceptual and political *cul-de-sac* (Nugent 1995; Routledge 1998, 257 *footnote* 4). Secondly, Nugent (1995) argued that the EZLN peasant mobilisation was precipitated, not by modernisation, but a specific *neo-colonial capitalism*, or "capitalist economic restructuration" (Nugent 1995a, 4). Thirdly, Nugent (1995a) wondered how a movement that was:

> aware of itself as the product of five hundred year of struggle, that quotes from
> the Mexican constitution to legitimate its demand that the President of Mexico
> leaves office, that additionally demands work, land, housing, food, health,
> education, independence, liberty, democracy, justice and peace for the people
> of Mexico, can be called a postmodern political movement when its language
> is so patently modernist (Nugent 1995a, 4).

Fourthly, Nugent (1995) argued that the EZLN *was* a Revolutionary movement, with its military organisation coordinated by the Clandestine Revolutionary Committee General Command (CCRI-GC) (Castaneda 1994; Long 1999; Serrill 1995; Shalif 1998). Indeed, the EZLN recognised that they were linked to the Mexican revolutionary, Emiliano Zapata (Brunk 1998; EZLN 1994a; Marcos 1994a).

The way the debate was set up by the intellectual protagonists was symptomatic of a debate between Marxism and postmodernism (Callinicos 1990; Meiksins-Woods 1995; Ryan 1982). The debate mirrored conceptual distinctions in social movement theory between old social movements and new social movements. These distinctions were mapped on the *location of grievance, objectives, strategies and tactics* of social movements.

Old Social Movements.

First impressions as to what the EZLN represented were based on a conceptual

framework delineating old social movements or Marxist/socialist class struggles. The

old social movements mobilised against an exploitative capitalism and its class biased

political institutions. The old social movements were successful in spreading the

revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality, democracy and progress which have

"become part of the primary political structures of the modern world" (Walker 1988,

26). The old social movements had transformative blueprints of 'what was to be done'.

Strategically, this would be achieved by capturing the state through violence or as a

political party (Marx and Engels 1967; Poulantzas 1981; Scott 1990; Taylor 1991).

Walker (1988) noted that socialists had an "overriding concern with the state as the

locus of political power" and however "suspicious particular nationalists or socialists

may have been of the state" both "nationalism and socialism became organised in

relation to state institutions" (Walker 1988, 28).

New Social Movements.

In contrast, Burbach's (1994) account was based on a conceptual schematic of the

new social movements. New social movements proffered the view that the proletariat

had lost its revolutionary vitality and recognised that the ideology of modernisation

rather than simply capitalism was a problem. Indeed the Enlightened Western ideas of

progress paradoxically served capitalism, socialism and neo-liberalism and the new

social movements represented a "crisis in confidence" with the promises and

repressive foibles of Western modernity (Grant 1998, 29). Critical attention

celebrated traditional cultures, philosophies and

organisations.

As such, the postmodern condition celebrated a 'politics of difference' and was *most commonly* understood to be a necessary move beyond modernity (Burbach 1994; Dallmayr 1997; Habermas 1981a Johnson 1993; Tester 1993). And other *single* issues such as feminism, culture, lifestyle, identity and gender emerged at the time (Cohen and Arato 1981; Gladwin 1994; Harvey 1998; Laclau and Mouffe 1992; Meiksins-Woods 1996, 1996a; Melucci 1984; Scott 1990). The new social movements questioned the revolutionary strategies and objectives on the basis of the legacy of post-revolutionary state authoritarianism and cooption (Taylor 1991). New social movements questioned the organisational deficiencies of old social movements because the "bureaucratisation of international communism revealed the extent to which it had become an organ of bureaucratic capitalism" (Grant 1998, 38). As such, new social movements favoured a strategically localised and pragmatic politics of resistance.

Problematising the Debate. Why is the EZLN Important to Critical International Relations Theory?

There is always a danger of conceptually (and politically) reifying a particular debate in order to problematise its central characteristics. This is particularly true of rethinking the political possibilities of postmodernism (Wickham 1990). Indeed, much of the literature on postmodern politics has taken a staunch and rigid understanding of what it means to engage in a 'politics beyond modernity.' Often this has resulted in a somewhat totalising and quite axiomatic refusal of the Enlightenment project leading to somewhat virulent reactions. But for many, such a peremptory postmodern critique, albeit literally taken, has been necessary. My argument is that a reassessment of the debate on postmodernism is now necessary and that a reexamination of the EZLN provides an ideal opportunity to set out the possibility of a more measured, creative and reflexive politics of resistance.

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I show how the EZLN informs the development of a Critical International

Relations Theory (CIRT). I show that the EZLN represents the opening out of the

exclusionary practices in the theory and practice of IR. Such a study draws out the

intriguing implications of the role and nature of the critical intellectual and the nature

of the politics of critique (Booth 1997). Indeed, it might be surprising that such

interest would be shown in a resistance from a relatively remote corner of Latin

America. I argue that the key to this ambiguity lies in the very nature of the Zapatista

struggle itself. I argue that as a *critical* social movement the EZLN has, since 1994,

engaged in an exploration of *connections* made by people in terms of their economic,

political, social and cultural sites of struggle. Consequently, the EZLN forces a

rethinking as to the meaning of *the political,* and of the intellectual routines (both

traditional *and* radical) "that keep us as we are" (Walker 1988, 10).

Undoubtedly, it was a sense of living in a dangerous one world that forged a major

impetus behind critical thinking in International Relations Theory (IRT). Critical

approaches eulogised the cause of the silenced, the marginal and the excluded. There

was a feeling that critical intellectuals might be able to play a part in this (Ashley and

Walker 1990; Bleiker 1997; Booth 1997; Brown 1992; George 1994; Hoffman 1991;

Lapid 1989; Smith 1997: Walker 1988). As such, critical writers looked for and

focused upon the most likely agents of radical change as the need for a politics of

resistance and a politics of *alternatives* was intensified. As such, critical attention

focused on the site, the objectives and the strategies of social movements (Gladwin

1994; Melucci 1984; Scott 1990; Touraine 1981). To this end, critical writers forged a

problematisation of the central ontological and epistemological constituents of IRT

(Ashley and Walker 1990; George and Campbell 1990). Crucially, there was

intellectual and political diversity *within* CIRT (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989; George

1994; Maclean 1988). Each brings to the fore distinctive methodological, conceptual

and interpretive frameworks attuned to understanding, explaining and informing the

development of a politics of resistance(s) in CIRT.

I argue that a study of the EZLN will inform a critical rethinking of a number of themes of interest to those working a critical IR. These themes primarily include the rethinking of the meaning and site of state development, the nature and site of community, the practices of sovereignty and security and the site and nature of state authority and democracy. Ostensibly, this is to be an engagement driven by *why* are such resistances mobilising, *how* are these resistances articulating their politics of resistance and finally *what* implications there are for the discipline of International Relations in theory and practice.

Framing the Critical Social Movements.

I argue that interest with the critical social movements will not engender a new and 'better' conceptual framework that fits with the reality of social movements 'out there' (Walker 1988). On the contrary, such a one-sided methodology (as much as is reasonably possible) is to be rejected. Instead, an interpretive account of such movements that can reasonably be termed as *critical* manifested through their creative explorations is to be advanced. Indeed, it was this emphasis on the 'critical' nature that generated an outstanding distinctiveness about these movements and a concomitant open critical enquiry that problematised the relationship between theory and practice.

Initially, critical interest in the movements was galvanised by a feeling that current conceptual and political schematics were limited in explaining the sheer creativity and diversity of a contemporary politics of resistance. In this thesis I am particularly interested in the way the EZLN rethinks the nature, practices and site of modern Mexican *security, sovereignty, development, community* and *democracy.* I am interested in the way the EZLN rethinks the nature, site and meaning of political power through its own different political strategies.

As such, Walker (1988, 62) argued that there were "serious limits to the extent to which it is possible to categorise and analyse movements." This should not be construed as a problem. Indeed, there was, and is, "always a danger of imposing premature classification onto political processes that have not yet run their course" (Walker 1988, 62). Indeed this was to be an empowering intellectual exercise which recognised that the site and meaning of power and "categories like 'revolutionary', 'reformist' or 'counter revolutionary'" are "notoriously slippery" (Walker 1988, 62). Indeed, Walker (1988) noted that "the difficulty of theorising about social movements in general gives an indication why they have become so interesting to people seeking to find some way through the conventional horizons of contemporary political debate" (Walker 1988, 62). Ostensibly the creativity of such movements introduced a need for reflection by critical enquiry because:

> it has become necessary to refuse received conceptual boundaries, to search for new forms of understanding, and to develop a clearer sense of the complex relationship between theory and practice, knowing and being (Walker 1988, 7).

Undoubtedly, this innovative, elusive, ambiguous quality of the struggles was regarded as a conceptual and political strength. But, in a troubled world of global structures it was a notorious weakness. Nevertheless, Walker (1988, 3) suggested that:

> although difficult to define, critical social movements are distinguishable in part by their capacity to recognise and act creatively upon connections among structures, processes and peoples that do not enter significantly into the calculations of conventional political actors...not only in struggles around specific problems but also in struggles that recognise the emancipatory potential inherent in certain kinds of connections and solidarities.

Location of Grievance Objectives.

In the critical enquiry the reductionist elucidating of the origin of a critical social movement is problematised. Whilst capitalism is accepted as a major historical development the critical enquiry now recognises that the economic, political, social and cultural features of a social movement are multifaceted, occur at concrete/specific locations and are experienced and affect peoples in different ways. As such, Walker (1988, 7) argued that under "present circumstances the question 'What is to be done' invites a degree of arrogance that is all too visible in the behaviour of the dominant political forces of our time." Walker (1988) argued that cries of revolution betrayed have been "a recurrent and depressing theme of modern history" (Walker 1988, 83). The critical social movements recognise that the revolutionary themes have become problematic. But crucially, Walker (1988) noted that it is not so much that these ideologies have become obselete but:

> the way these ideologies remain trapped in the intellectual prejudices of an
> earlier age have combined to deprive them of popular convictions. There is
> instead a widespread sense that the aspirations they express require
> reformulation and revitalisation (Walker 1988, 77).

Theme 1: Constructing an Inclusive Modernity.

Critical social movements accept that modernisation and the development of the modern state has meant that "the history of this century cannot be written as a simple tale of progress" because "this has also been an age of dark shadows" (Walker 1988, 22). Those movements understood as critical social movements problematise 'official discourse' and top down practices of state development and security. George (1994, 141) noted that, for instance:

> the issue of ethnic cleansing...is an *integral part of modern Western history,*

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particularly via its Realist narrative, which celebrates the process of state-making, of the triumphant march of reason, rational man: Ethnic cleansing is in this sense an integral feature of the story of modernization and Western triumph over "traditional" ignorance (original emphasis).

Critical movements are beguiled by the promises and myths of modernisation yet are concomitantly aware that "other interpretations of development" and "other possibilities for human well being" remain very open (Walker 1988, 129). Thus, for critical social movements, the idea of development "is not something to be grasped by the myth of history and modernisation" and it was recognised that "traditional ways of life become *at least as* important for understanding the potentialities of different kinds of human community" (Walker 1988, 131 my emphasis). Thus, this alternative thinking of the nature of modern state development brings together peoples at their specific locations in their attempt to render a sense of *control* over their own lives and destinies. Crucially, this is not a simple return to premodern romanticism galvanised by an absurd sentimentalism as implied by postmodernism. Instead, the key theme is a development that is based on *inclusivity* in order to create an enriching, fair and non-excluding modernisation.

Theme 2: Radicalising Democracy.

Critical social movements forge a democratic revolution of sorts, but without the destruction of the existing political institutions and nor do they engage in an equally problematic rejection of this revolutionary ideal. Indeed, Walker (1988, 51-52) argued that "there has also been no shortage of attempts to revitalise the cultural traditions that have been dominant for so long" and democracy is "one of the greatest projects of the modern world" (Walker 1988, 133). But the project has become somewhat disorientated with a feeling that "the established forms of politics do not work" (Walker 1988, 133). However, in reworking the nature, meaning and site of

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democracy critical social movements recognise that democracy does not have to be defined by party-political institutions. Instead, it is a constantly worked theme, teasing open spaces to think and act. Walker (1988, 140) argued that:

> democracy does not have a single defining characteristic. It is not to be equated with particular forms of government, with parliaments, representative institutions, party hierachies or national wills. Again the practice of movements are informed by a readiness to pursue different strategies of deepening democracy depending on circumstance.

As such, the practice of democracy can both include a reforming of existing political institutions and the development of a richer and direct form of participatory democracy. Thus, Walker (1988, 140) argued that:

> the importance of enhancing democratic processes within economic systems...leads to a recognition that democratisation is not the equivalent of voting in periodic elections. It requires an ongoing insinuation of peoples participation into all aspects of public life...constant vigilance about the preservation of substantial rights, about how the basic investment conditions of a society are made, about how production is organised and goods distributed, about how cultures, values and ideas are constructed.

Consequently, critical social movement think "most carefully about what is meant by a political institution" (Walker 1988, 133).

Theme 3: Strategies and Tactics.

The political strategies used require a rethinking of the nature and site of political *power.* Critical social movements intellectually and politically refuse a transcendental

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politics of critique wedded to sovereign actors. The refusal of the taking of state power and nonviolence/legality represents a distinctive rethinking as to the site and nature of political power. That is, peoples recognise that whilst the broader economic/political structures may seem remote, infact global structures are only articulated, interpreted and impact *specifically* on where they live, work, play and love. Consequently, this perspective opens out a new way of thinking about the potency of resistance and change. Indeed, the interpretive recognition that global structures are manifested through practices at concrete existence is a recognition that opens out a key terrain for agency (Amoore *et al* 2000; Jessop 1996). As such, the movements recognise how the "large scale structures" and the "big questions" are "related to the myriad of minor injustices that crop up every day" (Walker 1988, 63). Walker (1988, 5) argued that his book:

> begins by stressing the diversity of historical experiences on the basis of which
> different peoples interpret and respond to emerging global structures and
> pressures. If global struggles are inescapable, and if a just world peace must
> therefore be a struggle for One World, it must also be remembered that both
> *present structures and future aspirations are encountered and articulated on*
> *the basis of many different experiences, many different histories.* The pursuit
> of a just world peace and new forms of solidarity must be rooted in an equal
> respect for the claims of both diversity and unity (*my emphasis*).

This is a globally orientated struggle based upon connections rather than the somewhat ebulliant desire for the construction of new world orders (Cox 1999; Spegele 1997). On this basis, Walker (1988, 109) suggested that:

> the suspicion of universalism is not the same as a rejection of commonality.
> On the contrary it arises from movements that are able to understand fairly

well the interconnected nature of contemporary life and the potentiality it offers. An openness to difference and to the great variety of experiences and histories that lead people to respond to global processes in highly localised circumstances occurs simultaneously with a sensitivity to the reality of connections.

Outline:

In chapter one I discuss the conceptual schematics used to distinguish the old and new social movements. I discuss the ensuing debates and then outline what I believe to be the central tenets of the critical social movements. In chapter two, I discuss the economic, political, social and cultural development of Chiapas. In chapter three, I discuss the initial impressions of the EZLN from the Mexican government and various commentators and journalists who maintained that the EZLN was orchestrating, albeit historically incongruously another Marxist revolution. In chapter four I discuss the main challenges to this interpretation by specifically discussing the debate generated by Burbach's (1994, 1996) statement, outlining the central tenets of Nugent's (1995) critique. The debate is mapped upon the methodological, conceptual and political implications of postmodernism.

In chapter five I show how the EZLN reworks the nature and meaning of development. I show how the EZLN explores the possibility of engaging a different economic, political, social and cultural development constructed from the *bottom up*. I show how the key theme is inclusivity or a non-excluding modernisation. I show how the EZLN does not engage in a Marxist destruction of development nor a postmodern scepticism of modernity *per se*. Instead the EZLN forges a distinctive rethinking which now invokes a debate on the meaning and nature of Mexican state sovereignty and of Mexican nationalism.

Through a discussion of the 1996 San Andres Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture I show how Indian demands for economic, social, cultural and political

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autonomy has connected with a searching dialogue on the possibility of elucidating a different form of economic, political, social and cultural development(s).

The EZLN elucidates a Mexican modernity that is not to be imposed by the neo-liberal program of the PRI but to be a fair, equitable, open and inclusive modernity incorporating 'many worlds'. I also argue that the 'nationalist' orientation of the struggle shows how the EZLN demands the injection of 'difference' into the modern discourse. Indeed, I discuss the interpretation of these demands by the PRI which in turn regarded the demands from Chiapas as a threat to the power politics of Mexican security and Mexican development.

Significantly, I show how the modernist discourse of rights, justice and equality envisaged by the EZLN is now based upon a distinctive reworking of these Enlightenment themes and a reworking that can be informed by the work of Michel Foucault (1991).

In chapter six I argue that since 1994 the EZLN has embarked on a specific and radical democratic revolution in Mexico. I show that the EZLN has not engaged in a politics of revolutionary 'destruction' of the existing political institutions nor in a refusal of the particular Enlightened modernist discourse. I show instead, how the EZLN *reworks* and *reinvents* the site, meaning and nature of the democratic ideal and its concomitant institutions. I show how this desire for radical democracy has been invigorated by a consultation process which has occured in the Indian communities (Nash 1997).

Moreover, I will show how the EZLN thinks carefully about the existing process of 'democratisation' in Mexico and has cultivated quite distinctive relationships with potentially sympathetic actors within the existing political process such as the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). I show how the formation of the Emiliano Zapata Front of National Liberation (FZLN) in 1997 indicates a strongly cultivated EZLN reflection and debate on the nature of a political institution.

In chapter seven, I show how the EZLN engages in an innovative, creative and exploratory resistance that activates in the face of daunting global economic and political structures. I show how the EZLN engages in a reinvention of strategies and tactics that problematises the site and nature of 'the political'. I argue that the EZLN eludes the settings of the 'political chequerboard' and assumed distinctions made between *reformism* and *revolutionary*. Indeed, the EZLN and in particular, Subcommandante Marcos have elected to engage in a deliberately ambiguous understanding of politics. That is, I show how the EZLN recognises a diversity of sometimes contradictory views across the political spectrum. The EZLN recognises that whilst peoples are affected by neo-liberalism, capitalism and other forces at their specific locations the possibility of interpreting and building upon connections between peoples across time and space is also evident.

I show that this commitment to the National Consulta is a radical opening up in Mexico for discussing *alternatives* (de Huerta and Higgins 1999; Rodriguez 1999). This is a legal and Constitutional referendum for dialogue. I argue that the EZLN may be revolutionary in the sense that they have opened up a space for dialogue and have cultivated a recognition of solidarity between a plethora of concrete individuals and groups in Mexico, as well as around the world (Cleaver 1999, 1999a).

I discuss the EZLN's creative understanding of global struggle and the connection the EZLN makes between global structures and local struggle. This is not a reactionary politics or local parochialisms but rather a recognition that these sites are simultaneously and dialectically engaged with a one world of global structures. I will show this sense of connections through a discussion of the EZLN organised 'Encuentros (Encounters) for Humanity Against Neo-liberalism' that occurred in Chiapas in 1996 (Ruggiero 1998). I discuss this development showing the use by the EZLN of global technologies such as the World Wide Web (WWW).

I conclude that the EZLN represents an important challenge to cynicism and apathy by forging, with humility a space for thinking and practice. There are no

answers. Critical social movements may have an idea on what they would like the

world to be like. This makes the struggle more profound in its heartfelt reluctance to

offer such answers. This is a struggle for all, a space opened and nourished where

everyone "can act as a critic and conscience of the times" where everyone "can

remember forgotten promises and lost dreams" and where everyone "can resist

unquestioned authority whether it comes from the iron fist of dictatorship or the

velvet glove of the television set" (Walker 1988, 160). The word 'Zapatismo'

expresses this sense of questioning, seeping, filtering and subverting existing

classifications with creativity and ambiguity. The EZLN have opened a critical

thinking space. The very fact that they refuse to do anything more is incorrigibly

controversial. Only when the questions have been asked can real hope for dialogue

begin to take place. My thesis has been inspired by, and predicated upon the

following:

> Political change is not just a matter of replacing one group of politicians with
>
> another, nor even a reordering of government policies and institutions in
>
> response to large scale social and economic transformations. It also involves
>
> serious challenges to prevailing conceptions of human community, of the
>
> philosophical assumptions guiding peoples conceptions of what human
>
> community can possibly become, of what kinds of activities are to be
>
> considered political and even about where political activity is supposed to
>
> occur (Walker 1988, 81).

Chapter One.

Critical International Relations Theory: The Development of Critical Social Movements.

Introduction.

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the debates and conceptual developments distinguishing between the old social movements, the new social movements and the critical social movements. I map the debates by identifying and discussing the different conceptual and interpretive approaches used in social movement theory in elucidating the location of grievance, the objectives, the strategies and tactics of social movements. Consequently, I show how this conceptual schematic cultivating the old/new social movement literature has become politically limiting. I argue that intellectual interest in the critical social movements requires a more sensitive and at times perhaps introspective methodological approach to understanding and explaining social movements thereby eluding premature conceptual, political and ideological rigidity.

By focusing upon the critical social movements whilst profoundly aware of establishing an equally dangerous 'reification' of the nature of the critical, I explore the possibilities of reworking what it means to engage in a postmodern politics of resistance. The critical impetus is aided by a discussion of the 'Enlightened turn' of Foucault (Dumm 1996; Foucault 1991; Norris 1994, Simons 1995). Here, I discuss how critical social movements are understood to rework and rethink the meaning and nature of such themes of the Enlightenment as state modernisation/development, the nature of community and the practices of democracy. I will discuss the myriad of strategies used by critical social movements by bringing in the question of political power, space and time. This will give me a framework through which to elucidate the central tenets of the Emiliano Zapata Army of National Liberation (EZLN).

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i) The Political Problematic and Critical International Relations Theory (CIRT).

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a degree of optimism in the theory

and practice of International Relations. There has been a sense of triumphalism

mostly in the West as the threat of a 'no world' Cold War apocalypse has evaporated

and the Gulf War in 1991 indicated that states were willing to cooperate through

international law and international institutions to restrain and resist military

dictatorships and to intervene and protect minorities from persecution within

sovereign states. It was in essence what might be a New World Order (Bush 1990). As

George (1994) noted "the resultant sequence of events has been cause, generally, for

widespread rejoicing at the new opportunities for personal and political liberty within

the societies of, in particular, Eastern Europe. There has been smugness also" (George

1994, 1).

Mexican President Salinas (1988-1994) was not alone with his own brand of

1990s optimism concerning the economic and political changes driven by market

economics. Elsewhere the ideational foundation of the neo-liberal agenda was

regarded as being "rooted in notions of progress and perpetual change" (Amoore *et al*

1997, 179). This persuasive sense of optimism in a Panglossian world of no

alternatives was based on increasing prosperity, free trade and democratisation

(Clinton 2000; Fukuyama 1991; Hilbert 1997).

For traditional International Relations Theory (IRT) optimism was tainted. For

realists the end of the Cold War in 1989 was the end of a relatively stable bi-polar

balance of power and there was intriguing uncertainty with what the post-Cold War

world order might look like. As George (1994) noted, reality "is not what it used to be

in International Relations" (George 1994,1). Others focused upon the changing

nature of the 'international' system and the ongoing, deliciously irresistible prospect

of globalisation (Mayall 1998). Many writers were cautiously optimistic with

economic, political and cultural convergence and institutions for global humane

governance (Falk 1995, 1996). Moreover, globalisation signalled a reverent

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challenge to realism and its apparent moral limitations (Buzan, Held and McGrew 1998; Elshtain 1999; Held 1995; Linklater 1997; Smith 1992). The emphasis was placed on the possibility of extending political and moral community through cosmopolitanism and beyond the now explicitly historical boundaries of state territory, through this promotion of universal ideals of rights, justice and citizenship (Cox 1999; Linklater 1999; Lipschutz 1992; Shaw 1994). These values were becoming embedded within new global institutions of liberal humanism (Keohane 1989, 1998).

Indeed, surreptitious 'changes' had been noted by traditional IR. During the 1970s it became quite clear that the ontological parameters of state-centric classical realism were becoming increasingly limited as a means of explaining and predicting the complex reality of international politics (Keohane and Nye 1977). Keohane and Nye (1977) acknowledged a 'complex interdependence' characterised by the blurring of boundaries between high and low politics, the development of non-state actors and a recognition of new actors and organisations (Keohane and Nye 1977; Krasner 1983). States could now be classed in degrees of vulnerability and/or sensitivity. Neo-realism reacted to recover a lost methodological parsimony (Waltz 1979). For onlooking critical writers of the 1980s neo-realism had closed off the potential (albeit restricted) analytical richness of complex interdependence theory with another *cul-de-sac* of strategic battlegrounds (Ashley 1984; Gilpin 1984; Keohane (ed) 1986).[1]

Critical developments indicated a perhaps *initially* pessimistic perspective on a world indelibly etched with daily occurances of economic, political and cultural

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[1]Ashley (1984) made a distinction between realists and what he finds as the more problematic scientific structural neorealists. He suggested that classical realists had maintained a commitment to a richness of historical investigation and reflection.

repression, continuing exploitation, environmental destruction, a capricious balkanisation of nation-states, poverty, hunger, human rights abuses, international terrorism, the interminable list is catastrophic. Others were concerned with top down responses that generated a "spooky kind of order, emanating from the multinational corporations and globetrotting financiers who animate McWorld" (Wright 2000, 7).

Certainly what emerged was a sceptical view that the optimism and abstract indicators, facts and figures endlessly gushing from 'up there' or by politicians and intellectuals was obscuring the daily disharmony and suffering endured by peoples in their *concrete/specific* sites around the world (Walker 1988). George (1994) argued that "notwithstanding these instances of well-rehearsed polemic and the triumphalism integral to claims for 'new world' orders, there is also a widespread sense of crisis associated with the post-Cold War era" (George 1994, 1).

ii) Intellectual Role and Status.

Critical writers have been driven in their enterprise(s) by a normative concern with the state of the world and the state of the discipline. For critical writers, the reactions of 'problem solvers', policymakers and the intellectual endeavour that went with this were extremely limited and perhaps even ideologically orientated. Consequently, a more radical change was going to be needed (Walker 1988). But then who were going to be the actors and forces in this development, and how were they going to go about making this change? Essentially, critical IR forged a distinctive desire for a spirit of alternatives with a sense that peoples' lives could be so much better. This was a critical politics that undermined the ontological and epistemological closure of traditional IR.

As such, critical intellectuals in IRT have focused upon the activities of groups and individuals who have been and who are putting together with remarkable persistence

and fortitude, a hope for a better existence in the short and long term.

During the Cold War it was acknowledged that there was an invigoration of collective activity by social movements whose members were reacting strongly to the intellectually 'elite' agenda and fraught reality of Cold War geopolitics. These movements were operating through direct action protest such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and at Greenham Common. Critical writers took the opportunity to think about the possibility of engaging in a *politics of resistance* and a *politics of alternatives*. No where was this so significant in the rejection of the scientific assumption of there being a fixed immutable reality of IR as 'out there'. In order to tease open a critical space for theory and practice 'on the margins'critical writers had to instigate a problematisation and an unpacking of the most persuasive epistemological and ontological fundamentals of IRT. This challenge was a problematisation of the assumption that the subject was split from an objective reality 'out there' or the Cartesian dualism. Emphasis was not only placed upon the difficulty of accessing this reality, but, and more crucially, a serious scepticism on whether this 'reality' existed in the first place. Emphasis was laid upon the more complex nature of the relationship between humans, reality and the hermeneutic problematic (George 1994).

As such, once the idea of the reality of IR as being 'out there' was challenged then a space for contestation and change was opened up. Indeed, critical writers opened up the discipline by introducing philosophical and sociological issues into a study of IR which could no longer be based on the closure of parsimony (Ashley 1984, 1986; George and Campbell 1990; Cox 1981; Neufeld 1993; Waltz 1979). .Hoffman (1991, 169) argued that:

> International theory like the international system itself is undergoing profound
> transformation...this may sound like a trite observation...but these recent
> efforts in International theory have in common a scepticism towards

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traditional social theory with its belief that there is a hierachy of forms of knowledge and toward the metanarratives of modernity with its overriding emphasis on technical or scientific forms of rationality.

As such, the critical challenge recognised the at times positive influence of, but ultimately limiting 'problem solving theory' of technically orientated neo-realism. Essentially it was suggested that problem solving theory had fixed and frozen a wearisome reality of IR (borne of perennial conflict and anarchy) into an object for enquiry, explanation and prediction and marginalised the possibility of alternative world orders. In the process it was alleged that they had unwittingly served an ideological function for those interests benefitting from this order (Cox 1981; George 1994). In turn this precipitated a general criticism of CIRT approaches on the basis that CIRT writers tended to idealistically disengage from the concrete and often brutal reality of an anarchy ridden IR.

As such the traditional rebuke has been *generally* that critical intellectuals had no unified methodological commitment and with a rejection of the Enlightenment there was no justification for research or political engagement (George 1994, Wight 1999). Indeed, neo-realists claimed that the more "broad movement in the study of world politics" had "little or no interest in the project of developing adequate causal accounts of international relations" because it denied "the possibility that we could ever know the truth about such a reality" (Dessler 1999, 123). As such, the development of CIRT invoked condemnation (Booth, Smith and Zalewski 1996; Dessler 1999; George 1994; Hoffman 1987; Lapid 1989; Smith 1992).

Indeed, this paralleled multidisciplinary debates of "crisis talk" (Holton 1987, 507). Ashley (1991) argued that there was a controversy between traditional and CIRT because each approach was "presented as the basis

upon which other paradigms can be judged and shown to be misrepresentations, parodies or games" (Ashley 1991, 46).[2] Wallace (1996) suggested that critical academics are potentially inhabiting reclusive 'ivory towers' and that it was not possible to justify academic research in aesethic, political, ideological or philosophical terms. Smith (1997) questioned whether policy-makers in the 'real world' really listened to academics and simply used prestigious academic institutions through which to justify their own biases. Booth (1997, 371) argued in direct response that there was a "constant complaint that contemporary British academics in IR deny the relevance of day to day concerns" but that "I cannot think of anybody in the profession who has ever denied or disclaimed in this way" (Booth 1997, 371). Booth (1997) suggested that it was possible to engage in 'concrete research agendas' and yet at the same time engage in a critical reflection on ones' own ontological, epistemological and political commitments.

Debate within IR was not new *per se* (Beitz 1979; Halliday and Rosenburg 1998). But perhaps the multidisciplinary character has generated a soul-searching and a 'third debate' (Lapid 1989). Perhaps it has induced a dividing discipline (Holsti 1985, 1989). Some even asked us to forget IR theory (Bleiker 1997). This debate in IRT parallels general concerns with the status of academic knowledge (Bernstein 1976).

iii) Controversy within CIRT.

There was dissension within CIRT in the sense of *what kind* of politics and resistance is envisaged and engaged with. That is, what kind of methodological,

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[2]This was apparent in the Ashley (1984) and Gilpin (1984) debate. Gilpins' response seemed to suggest an apparent unwillingness to engage in debate with the critical aspect of Ashley's (1984) critique. Ashley (1984) argued that this was typical of a perspective whose ontological and epistemological commitments were being challenged and due to these commitments had no conceptual way of appreciating the critique. Wight (1996) argued that there is an incommensurability within the discipline, a lack of communication between competing paradigms.

conceptual and interpretive apparatus were used in the critical enquiry, to explain the site of struggle, understand and to guide a politics of resistance in theory and practice.

As such, this critical interest holds particular methodological, political and often prescriptive approaches, ranging from various forms of Marxism (Cox 1981, 1983; Kublakova and Cruikshank 1985; Maclean 1988), variations of critical theory (Hoffman 1991; Linklater 1986, 1990), feminist approaches (Spike Peterson 1994) and postmodernism (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989; George 1994). I argue that these distinctions were most apparent on identifying the location of grievance, the objectives and the strategies of social movements, or what they did and should represent. Such interpretive and conceptual debate on social movements and what they represent has a disciplinary heritage.

Indeed, the study of social movements has been a central feature of the discipline of sociology and disciplines specifically concerned with the apparent traumas of social change. Many theories of social movements exist (Gladwin 1994; Smelser 1962; Stryker 1994; Zald and McCarthy 1977). Generally, social movements are understood as those "collectivities that comprise a number of individuals exhibiting at the same time and at the same place, behaviour with relatively similar morphological characteristics" (Melucci 1984, 3).

Firstly, social movements are characterised as transformative or revolutionary. Secondly, social movements are characterised as seeking change but remaining within the existing political system. Thirdly, social movements are characterised as redemptive or which seek to 'rescue' people such as the new religious movements (Robbins 1988). Finally, there are alternative movements that seek to influence peoples' habits and behaviour, such as pressure and protest single issue groups (Tilly 1978, 1993). There has been a conceptual development.

Firstly, structural accounts of social movement organisation focused on the

location of grievance or specifically *why* social movements mobilised and what their objectives were (Smelser 1962). Secondly, there emerged a concern with the *strategies and tactics* of social movements or understanding why certain movements survived the passage of time and why others with similar grievances, did not. This 'resource mobilisation theory' focused on the resources used by social movements. Here, social movements were not construed as deviant or 'irrational'. [3] But rather, social movements were seen to attract rational and goal orientated individuals who were organised and who were motivated to efficiently use materials (economic) resources, support (political), organisation and access to information technology and the media outlets (Zald and McCarthy 1977). And finally, in a rejection of what for many appeared to be a rather instrumentalist approach interest turned back to the question of grievance as shown in the development of the new social movements (Gladwin 1994; Scott 1990; Touraine 1981).[4] Indeed, this chronological development impacted on conceptual distinctions made between the old and new social movements.

iv) Old Social Movements: Location of Grievance and Objective.

So what were the precipitating factors, long and short term? From this, the mode of enquiry rests upon a distinctive conceptual and interpretive apparatus. As such, many critical writers have been influenced by the historical and conceptual tools of Marxist theory and practice. Current deliberations on resistance to globalisation in IR

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[3]The earliest known 'theory' of social protest was Le Bon's theory of crowds (Rude 1959). This highlighted the reasons behind the development of intense mob frenzy in industrial areas and the psychological constituents produced by the 'crowd influence' on the individual especially on the question of violence.

[4]Smelser (1962) argued that movements also require definitive goals, beliefs, and are mobilised by many precipitating factors such as economic exploitation and a lack of political representation. What was required was a coordinated group and the success of the movement depends upon the reaction from the state or the authorities. Moreover, such studies tended to regard the participants of social movements as showing the social dislocations in the social structure (Parsons 1952).

and International Political Economy (IPE) carry through this intellectual heritage.

First order questions have been to problematise realism's and neo-realism's

ontological commitment to the state (Murphy and Tooze 1991). Marxists (and

neo-Marxists) have tended to focus on the development of the state in terms of the

development of capitalism, its institutions and its material and ideological resources.

This approach identified the state as an institution for the maintenance of capitalism.

This was derivative of the Marxist axiom that the state was the executive of the ruling

class (Marx and Engels 1967). Indeed, historical materialism focused upon the

interlinkages between production, ideas, institutions and social forces which injected

an historical movement into the study of IR and challenged what were regarded as the

politically moribund cyclical theories with a possibility of constructing alternative

world orders (Cox 1981, 1999). [5] Such a focus on capitalism as the location of

grievance and the principal mode of analysis linked to a theoretical heritage of the old

social movements.

Traditionally understood as representing revolutionary nationalist and Marxist

struggles, old social movements therefore represented class and political struggle.

Marxist struggles had an objective to destroy the exploitative development of

capitalism, its bourgeosie political institutions and to construct in their place a better

economic, political, cultural and social development, namely socialism. Marxism

emphasised the underlying dialectic of class struggle as part of the inevitability of the

grand narrative of world history. Marxism approached capitalism as a necessary stage

within the dialectic of world history and considered the capitalist mode of production

and the exploitative relationship between the owners and non-owners of production as

historically *specific*. Essentially, capitalist society was organised around the

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[5] Theda Skocpol (1979) disputed the idea that revolutions are so rationally decisive
and so well organised. In fact, revolutions she suggested are more complex and more
limited by changing concrete situations.

base/superstructure model and characterised by the two opposing classes of bourgeosie and proletariat, or more later, between developed core countries and developing peripheral countries (Meiksins-Woods 1996, 1996a; Seers 1995).

Thus, the 18th and 19th centuries were punctuated by short term protests, riots and political/social upheavals. Gradually, a grander and longer term objective was elucidated in the search for mass franchisement and equality. Ultimately, these were revolutionary desires for a better society as De Toqueville (1966, 35) exclaimed, stating, what:

> to start with, had seemed to European monarchs and statesman a mere passing phase, a not unusual symptom of a nations growing pains, was now discovered to be something absolutely new, quite unlike any previous movement, and so widespread, extraordinary and incalculable as to baffle human understanding.

Essentially, this development was based on the "struggle to reduce exploitation, coercion and inequality" (Antonio 1989, 724). The French revolution of 1789 set the precedent. These new Enlightened revolutions were not a 'coup d'etat' or the replacement of one set of coercive leaders by another. Instead, revolutions were in theory, meant to lead to major changes by a mass social movement guided by the hope of freedom and the spirit of a better society. The values of liberty, equality, fraternity and democracy were manifested through struggles both in the developed and developing worlds (Hibbert 1987; Pieterse 1997). Subsequently, the new Enlightenment politics brought in a veritable "critique of existing institutions" (Mclelland 1996, 309).

Revolutionary movements tackled and aimed to destroy the economic and political institutions of capitalism, aiming to generate a socialist, nationalist and democratic revolution and ultimately the transformation of society. According to Vilas (1989, 31):

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revolutions have to do with the transformation of the socio economic structure and the political system of a country; the transformation of the relations of power between the classes, of access to resources and of the adminstration of the means of production.

The Western vision of a progressive modernisation struck a definitive normative chord with radicals attracted by the idea of the actual *normality* of social change. Yet paradoxically both the capitalist world *and* the ideals of an unquenchably thirsty revolutionary socialism were reliant upon this 'liberalist' ideology (Wallerstein 1992; Walker 1988). Hobsbawm (1988, 9) noted that "revolutions triumphed throughout the world" and that "the years 1789 to 1848" were "the greatest transformation in human history." It seemed that the French Revolution had "transformed mentalities and established modernity" or "the sense that the new is good and desirable because we live in a world of progress at every level of our existence" (Wallerstein 1992, 292).[6] Eder (1993, 107) argued that:

> not every form of protest is a social movement...social movements are those
> directly and intentionally related to modernisation from the 17th century
> onward. In this sense there are only two, the first one appeared during the
> transition from traditional feudal domination to the early modern state...the
> second is the labour movement which challenged the restriction of
> emancipation to political emancipation. This notion of social movement
> clearly requires a reconstruction of their relation to modernity. Social
> movements are genuinely modern phenomena. Only in modern society have
> social movements played a constitutive role in social development.

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[6]Tilly (1978) pointed out that revolutions rely on the organisation of the group, common interests, opportunity and strategy and the material goods, arms, machinery and food required for long term and aggressive mobilisation.

Over the decades the revolutionary fervour became distinguishable between solidly class based socialist movements galvanised by the proletariat and nationalist movements which tended to rely upon a distinctive alliance of classes. This latter scenario became very apparent in nationalist and often radical bourgeoisie movements in the Third World (Halliday 1983). The role of peasants as a revolutionary strikeforce was invariably a hotbed for contestion as socialists did not regard the peasantry as a revolutionary *class for itself* (Hobsbawm 1994a; Marcos 1994, 1994a).

v) Old Social Movements: Strategies and Tactics.

Marxist writers developed a distinctive conceptual and interpretive device through which to explain the strategies and tactics of resistances. For instance, Cox (1999) suggested that the:

> most open challenge to the impact of globalisation on social and political
> structures has come from a new type of revolutionary movement, the Zapatista
> rebellion of the Mayan Indians in the Southern Mexico state of Chiapas...a
> rallying force in civil society...*(T)he organic intellectual uses historical
> investigation and critical thinking and can open new territory for resistances
> on an informative and strategical level* (Cox 1999, 23 *my emphasis*).

Here, the organic intellectuals were the exquisitely enlightened agents for strategically raising a radical political consciousness as "they serve to clarify the political thinking of social groups leading the members of these groups to understand their existing situation in society and how in combination with other social groups they can struggle towards a

higher form of society" (Cox 1999, 24).

So how was a revolutionary movement to achieve this goal? This strategic puzzle concerned the strategic and tactical nature of the movements. It would spark debate on the justification of the use of *violence* and the bearing of arms. Indeed traditionally, revolutions quite literally sought the destruction of capitalism and its political institutions. Revolutionary movements would attract and relied upon charismatic, sacrificial and heroic revolutionary leaders to 'raise the masses' into a revolutionary power (Castro 1967).

During the 19th century and in the aftermath of the so-called year of revolutions (1848) debates ensued within Marxism concerning the link between the short and long term objectives of the revolutionary movement. Crucially, specific emphasis was placed on the role of the strategic role of the state which was construed as the location of class/political power. [7]Anarchists insisted that focus on the state would enmesh the revolutionary movement into the confines of capitalism's economic and political relations because the state was a functionary for maintaining class relations. On the other hand the state was regarded as the revolutionary enabler and the first step towards global revolution (Taylor 1991). What emerged was a strategic local-national-global matrix and once captured the destruction of the state meant the destruction of capitalist development and the ruling class (Flood 1999a; Holloway 1996; Moore 1998).

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[7]Marx and Engels (1967) had argued that the state is the executive of the ruling class and that political power, is the organised power of one class opressing another. Consequently, the state in essence, is the 'committee for managing the affairs of the bourgeoise'. Therefore the state would have to be destroyed. Debate raged as to whether the state aided a particular class instrumentally, or whether the state structurally aided the interests of the capitalist society as a whole. For instance, Poulantzas (1981) argued that structurally, the state incorporated both an ideological apparatus, church, media and education, and a repressive apparatus, army, and the police. For Marx and Engels (1967) as stated in the last page of their Communist Manifesto it would be necessary to "forceably overthrow" the state and the existing social conditions, because the workers "have a world to win."

There were those who thought that the state would need to be captured, even destroyed, through a violent Leninist style armed guerrilla insurgency. This was not violence for violence sake nor simply a cathartic release. Rather, violence was used efficiently and professionally. The alternative would be that the state would be captured through parliamentary means and the revolutionary movement would be organised and conducted as a political party.

Later, Marxism split between those vying for global revolution and those movements remaining at the level of national liberation. National liberation was based on the state and 'nationalism' became regarded as a progressive ideological force representing a distinctive alliance of classes in the struggle against economic and political imperialism. It was accepted (as Lenin pointed out during World War One) that nationalism was a 'bourgeois' ideology and could be gratuitously used to divide the workers from their true and objective global solidarities. But nationalism was a powerful mobilising force. [8] Walker (1988, 27) noted that revolutionary movements in:

> contrast with most of the sporadic and fragmented movements that came before, these movements were remarkably successful. They have become part of the primary political structures of the modern world. This is not to say that their great visions have been adequately realised. Far from it. But it is impossible to deny their impact on what we have now become.

vi) New Social Movements and Postmodern Politics of Resistance.
Location of Grievance/Objectives.

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[8]The revolutions of the early twentieth century in Mexico and Russia were revolutions that according to Marxism could not, and should not have happened for the 'creative destruction' of capitalist relations had not been fully developed.

During the 1960s the old left remained convinced in the utility of class struggle. But the model of diametrically opposed and cataclysmic struggle between the bourgeois and the proletariat seemed incredibly outdated. With the 'new deal' and new information society, the proletariat was no longer a potent force in solidarity, with the new developing service sector and the new middle class emerging. Indeed it was said that other revolutionary subjects would perhaps now have to be found (Marcuse 1968).[9]

During the 1960s many groups and individuals began mobilising on issues that were not based on class concerns (Hobsbawm 1994: Scott 1990). Abramson and Inglehart (1987, 231) later argued that "the political norms of Western Europe are changing." Emphasis was put on new issues and new grievances. Usually these were single issue movements focused on an identity and lifestyle politics with a sense that capitalism was no longer or perhaps never had been the principal source of grievance (Gladwin 1994). Many of those searching for revolutionary struggle went to the developing world (Hobsbawm 1994a). Consequently, a distinctive periodisation was made. Touraine (1974) argued that the 'post-industrial society' rearranged class solidarities and work practices in the fragmented postmodern era (Harvey 1989; Jameson 1991).

What emerged, and this was significant, was a more outstanding questioning of the *ideology* of development/modernisation.[10] Emphasis shifted from capitalism to a

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[9].Undoubtedly the Civil Rights Movement in the Southern US and the Watts riots in Los Angeles in the late 1960's, galvanised focus on racism in President Johnson's Great Society. Moreover, there was much focus on the role of black Americans who were taking part in the Vietnam War. Malcolm X of the Black Panthers asked why the exploited of the West were fighting the exploited Vietnamese of the East. Chomsky (1969) argued that the rebellions in the late 1960s indicated disdain for the fabric of the Cold War state in the United States and elsewhere. He had argued that "there is a great many people who have been aroused by the Vietnam tragedy...there is a new mood of questioning and rebellion amongst the youth of this country, a very healthy and hopeful development" (Chomsky 1969, 8).

[10]For instance, whilst white women were considered 'imperialists' by colonised peoples, solidarity and empathy grew between white and black women as both groups

more resounding and overarching critique of the universalising metanarrative of

Western Enlightened progress. Indeed, Marx had not considered the forces of

progress and technology as problematic *in themselves*. The edifice of Marxism was

still rooted in the narrative of rationality, technology and the assumption of

teleological progress/emancipation. Hence later contentious debates between Marxists

and postmodernists (Meiksins-Woods 1996).

Whilst modernity was most commonly associated with the spirit of progress a

resounding break from tradition, superstition and liberation from the shackles of

nature, it became quite clear that the project of modernity was not worthy of such

trust. Science and the Enlightenment were creating a world of calculation, ruthless

efficiency, environmental destruction, bureaucratic claustrophobia and neutralising

human creativity and spirituality yet obscuring these perils through ideals 'in the

name of progress'. New social movements began to be concerned with the overall

fabric and direction of modern society (O'Neill 1986). Habermas (1976) termed this

the colonisation of the lifeworld.[11] Giddens (1990, 109) argued that to live in a

"universe of modernity is to live in an environment of chance and risk, the inevitable

concomitant of a system geared to domination of nature." This has evoked

postmodern considerations (Bauman 1989, 1992). [12]

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suffered the ignominy of patriachal dominance. This cross-over of issues and
coneerns somewhat diminished the rather mechanical versions of the world found in
traditional Marxism.

[11]Foucault (1991d) picked up on the paradoxical development of state welfarism,
which, whilst providing services to the economically vulnerable, also generated this
somewhat stifling bureaucratisation of society through increasing administration and
the bleak, anonymous institutions of functional efficiency. Ironically the new right
was also to respond vociferously to what it saw as the meddling of the 'nanny' state of
the old left.

[12]Zygmunt Bauman (1989) made a poignant study of the Holocaust on this basis. He
argued emphatically that whilst it makes subsequent generations dangerously
comfortable to condemn Nazism for its inherent irrationality, ideological
contradictions and parochial romanticism, in fact, the Holocaust was *the* emblem of a
barbaric modernity and instrumental rationality emphasising the importance of
efficient *means* over *ends*. Modernity created an ethic of 'distance' and the possibility
of abrogating individual ethical responsibility to the anonymous bureaucratic chain of

Consequently the objective was not to simply challenge capitalism but to challenge the whole fabric of the Enlightenment and modernisation which hid a secret of insidious discipline and governability (Foucault 1977). According to George (1994), postmodernism "whilst it is always directly (and sometimes violently) engaged with modernity" seeks "to go beyond the repressive, closed aspects of modernist global existence" (George 1994, 214). In critical IR much interest had focused on the development of the modern nation-state. The modern state was based on the ideals of suffrage, democracy and "the site of modern reason" (George 1994, 202). But the modern state wielded "the transplantation of unprecedented means of institutionalised violence and surveillance into political arenas" where "the emergence of the modern state in Europe also produced some of the worst forms of terror in the twentieth century" (Giddens 1985, 295).

As such, emphasis was placed on a celebration of tradition and of groups 'going back to nature' in rekindling a kind of lost philosophical and cultural richness which was in conflict with the ravages of an apparently barbaric onslaught of rationality and modernity. In this sense, a postmodern politics placed emphasis on groups marginalised by the metanarrative of the Enlightenment. This was a politics of difference and a sensitivity to those whose philosophies, methodologies and cultural forms of existence had been ruthlessly silenced by modernisation (Cochran 1995; McLennan 1996; Rengger 1993; Smart 1996). What must be recognised Walker (1988) noted, was that:

> whether understood as an extension of specifically Western cultural traditions,
> as a consequence of specifically capitalist forms of economic life, or even as a

command and abstract calculations. Bauman (1989) emphasises the term *normality*, to indicate the implications of the modern world (Horsnell 2000).   36

consequence of a particular form of patriachy, the culture of modernity is not so much universal in any absolute sense as it is an historical dominant expression of the claim to universality (Walker 1988, 49).

As commonly understood, postmodernism intimated a politics that was based on celebrating cultural diversity not Enlightened homogeneity and universalism. Postmodernism celebrated an ebulliant joy, a 'hotness' and a romantic enchantment of nature in contrast to a homogenising, dour, cold and mechanistic modernisation (Conley 1997). It is perhaps no surprise that interest in postmodernism has emerged in the developing world and as a challenge to all forms of Western imperialism (Rosenau 1990).

But by generating a resounding scepticism of the grand narrative of modernisation it was inevitable that a serious attack on previous forms of revolutionary resistance was going to be orchestrated. That is, the narrative of Marxism had also generated an oppressive legacy characteristic of the Enlightenment project.

Consequently, the objectives of the old social movements to create a new and better world based on 'what is to be done' were questioned. Most explicitly, in 1968, the objectives of the old movements were challenged (Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein 1989). Indeed, the global extent of the rebellions of 1968 indicated a profound sense of real disappointment.[13] Attention was drawn to the authoritarianism of state-socialism and imperialistic actions by the Soviet Union in Hungary 1956 and

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[13]Intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Sartre supported "the boycott of the olympic games in Mexico City, and on December 19, 1969, he gives a press conference to denounce once again 'the American massacre in Vietnam'" (Cohen-Solal 1991, 454). Sartre along with Michel Foucault also condemned the French War in Algeria. In response to the treatment of the French authorities, Sartre protested, and indicated the power of the intellectual stipulating "If we were just a dozen intellectual simpletons playing at judging the world, they wouldn't bother us. So why do they fear us?" (Cohen-Solal 1991, 456). On May 11, 1968, the tenth anniversary of De Gaulles rise to power, it was clear that these intellectuals were politicised "by the Algerian and Vietnamese wars, and violently opposed to the practices of the Western communist parties" (Cohen-Solal 1991, 457).

Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Kundera 1969).[14] Thus it was realised that it was not only

the myriad of capitalist states that had had inexorable imperialistic tendencies and

within state-socialism, repression and violence was all far too evident. And in the

West the post-war welfare state and the post-war fordist compromise had served to

quite effectively neutralise the left which as socialist party political governments had

simply maintained the economic and political stability of capitalism. Arrighi, Hopkins

and Wallerstein (1989) argued that socialist orientated struggle had helped spread the

capitalist law of value and Krushchev's slogan of 'we will bury you' becomes of

course, particularly ironic.

The revolutionary ideology was dealt the blow by the collapse of real existing

socialism in 1989, and in 1990 when the Sandinistas lost the elections in Nicaragua.

Burbach (1997a,1) contended that:

> Marxism is in profound crisis. It is not due just to the collapse of actually
>
> existing socialism with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union.
>
> Marxism was in disarray in theory and praxis well before this, mainly because
>
> Marxism no longer has a revolutionary subject...today we need to go further
>
> particularly by exploring the major new arena of critical thinking referred to
>
> as postmodernism...the ideologies of the twentieth century will disappear
>
> completely. This has been a lousy century. It has been filled with dogmas that
>
> one after another have cost us time.

Essentially this argument implied the need for a postmodern incredulity towards the

revolutionary objectives and metanarrative which would be through a peremptory war

on totality.

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[14]Vaclev Havel (1990) the Czech dissident poet who became the Czech Republic
President in 1990 criticised the Communist state as a "totalitarian machine."

Indeed, as an explicit postmodern writer Lyotard (1984, 3) argued that the postmodern condition was a condition where "we no longer have recourse to the grand narratives" (Lyotard 1992; Rosenau 1990, 1992).

vii) New Social Movements/Postmodern Resistance:

Strategies and Tactics.

New social movements focused on the restrictive organisational aspect of the older struggles, the focus on the state as a strategical enabler and the spatial site of resistance. New social movements became increasingly concerned with the bureaucratic nature of the revolutionary movement. The older movements had become insurmountedly dislocated from their radical grassroots. Their internal politics and personal differences came to predominate strategical debates, as leaders and personalities clashed in an embittered Machiavellian 'cloak and dagger'. and Michels 'iron law of oligarchy' (Walker 1988). In this sense, new social movements favoured a more grassroots and flexible form of organisation which was not vertically organised, and rejects the hierachical bureaucratisation of the older struggles.

On the strategic issue Foucault's (1977) argument was that the emphasis on capturing the state was a strategic move bound by difficulties as the state was characterised not only by class *power over* but also by discreet practices of power, discipline and governability. It followed that it made little sense to regard class struggle and the sovereign repressive state the principal location of grievance. Indeed to capture the state merely reproduced these discreet networks of power (Sarup 1993). Inevitably, Foucault was criticised from Marxists for making the operation of power autonomous from the obvious practices of the bourgeois state apparatus which still maintained class repression (O'Neill 1986; Poulantzas 1981; Rachjman 1985, 75 *footnote 15*).

Finally there was a postmodern challenge to the pretensions of universal global

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theory and practice (Spegele 1997). Ostensibly, the postmodern argument was that there was now a "crisis of modern utopian dreams" (Jameson 1995, 91). This had led to a decline in the attractiveness of the revolutionary "grand narratives" (Alexander 1995, 82). As such, it was said that the "global theories are not in touch with concrete realities" (Schusterman 1994, 392). Drolet (1994, 265) argued that:

> modernism as an intellectual movement sought to discover hidden truths behind the surface of human reality. The endeavour to delve beyond the immediacy of that reality was a quest to liberate the human spirit...modernity violates the independent character of the event by seeking to place it within a comprehensive logic that embodies the claim to justice and truth...that which cannot be made to fit is silenced.

On this basis the counter-revolutions of 1989 represented a resounding defeat for the project of totalising order and repression (Bauman 1992; Lyotard 1984; Rocco 1994). On this basis a postmodern politics of resistance categorically rejected the strategies and organisation of national and global revolution. A postmodern resistance would instead attend to the sites of the local and the specific and without "recourse to grand programmes" (Docherty 1993, 4).

viii) Reaction and Debate.

It was the reaction of Marxists that set the terms and framing of what became a virulent debate on the political possibilities of postmodernism. Indeed, Marxists took exception to the idea of 'new times' and 'new issues'. For Marxists, the idea of an epochal break wrongly marginalised the continuing economic structure, the transformation of capitalism and the seemingly enduring yet historically specific

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capital/labour tension (Meiksins-Woods 1995, 1996, 1996a). Concern was levelled

at those for effectively 'freezing' capitalism and indulging in a politics of the affluent.

Particular concern was levelled at the idea of a new postmodern age (Baudrillard

1992; Boyne and Maffesoli 1990; Der Derian and Shapiro 1989; Foster 1983; Grant

1998; Harvey 1989; Hobsbawm 1994; Lash and Urry 1994; Sim 1998; Smart 1990).

Moreover, it was alleged that by accepting the fragmentation of class struggle new

social movements had played into the hands of the ruling classes. Indeed, by being

systematically enchanted by the post-material issues of ethnicity and culture

postmodernists had concentrated on issues somewhat archaic and reactionary

compared to the progressive dialectic of class struggle. Indeed, issues of culture and

identity were regarded as the *superstructure* of a class ridden capitalism. The debate

opened up controversy concerning the relationship between capitalism and

modernisation (Burbach *et al* 1997; Meiksins-Woods 1995; Nugent 1995).

Indeed, Burbach (1997a) argued that both capitalist and socialist development

had occured within the rubric of the metanarrative of modernisation and that it was

necessary to engage with "a critique of the particularly egregious tendencies of

modernity and modernisation located in capitalist and socialist societies alike"

(Burbach 1997a, 1). Burbach (1997a) argued that the history of capitalism was

closely linked to modernity "whilst the failed socialist project was all about

modernisation" (Burbach 1997a,1). As such, intellectual debate focused upon the

need to locate the underlying dynamic or logic that precipitated a politics of

resistance. In response Meiksins-Woods (1995, 5) argued that the development of

modernity did not have "much to do with capitalism" and to say it did merely

reproduced the 'naturalisation' of capitalism. The Marxist response was pretty blunt

in concluding that postmodernists were complicit in the continuation of the

ideological apparatus of the ruling class and

helped obscure the exploitative transformation of capitalism (Nugent 1995).

Moreover there was a concern that postmodernists had too easily and quickly abandoned the revolutionary heritage due to the poor climate of real existing socialism. For others, a total rejection of the revolutionary ideals, democracy, socialism and emancipation would lead to a dangerous and barbaric "descent into darkness" (Hobsbawm 1994, 41). Indeed there

> is something about this postmodern beast with which we are obsessed today that remains baffling: why has postmodernism been both acclaimed and decried by both ends of the political spectrum? What is it about postmodernism that has caused it to be labelled both radically revolutionary and nostalgically neoconservative? (Hutcheon 1988, 1).

Many have asked where in fact on the political spectrum do postmodernists come from? (Eagleton 1995; Meiksins-Woods and Bellamy-Foster 1996). For these writers it was self evident that postmodernism was a nefarious political strategy manufactured to activate apathy and to somehow destroy the left. Why bother resisting? So, on what possible foundational grounds could any form of struggle be ever justified? (Callinicos 1985, 1990; Denyer 1989). Meiksins-Woods (1995) has suggested that the development of a postmodern politics during the 1970s was simply a kneejerk reaction to the defeat of the old left after 1968. Meiksins-Woods (1995) suggested that postmodern nihilism was a recognition of the indomitable emergence of the new right during the 1980s.

Strategically, given the world of exploitative and repressive global structures this postmodern emphasis on rejecting the global programs of the past was virulently challenged on the

basis that it simply led to a locally reformist struggle. Indeed, Sklair (1995) posited

that such a celebration of localised struggle was not going to be radically useful in an

age of globalisation. Local struggle would invariably take attention away from the

possibility of forging a more globally orientated resistance to globalisation and

simultaneously fragmenting the possibility of this coordination. Strikingly, what now

emerged was a distinctive 'global/local' hierachy which implied that the localised

struggles must be deemed quite parochial and quite co-optable in the face of the

forces of neo-liberal globalisation. Indeed the argument was that the problems

identified hitherto with the strategies for global emancipation and the strategic gambit

of the state could now be bypassed. Indeed, paradoxically, globalisation was opening

up the opportunity for moving beyond the dilemmas of state co-option (Amoore *et al*

1997). So why postmodernism now, of all times (Zerzan 1997).[15]

ix) Critical Theory versus Postmodernism: Hoffman versus Rengger.

The Marxist/postmodern debate paralleled ongoing debate between critical

emancipatory theory and postmodernism instigated by Habermas and Foucault (Foster

1983). Indeed, there is a debate in CIRT between emancipatory critical theory and

intimations of postmodernism (Hoffman 1987; Hutchins 1992; Jahn 1998; Rengger

1988). This was George (1994) noted, a debate "between (broadly) emancipatory

approaches and postmodernism in International Relations" (George 1994, 186).

Hoffman (1987) argued that:

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[15]Habermas (1981, 1981a) aimed to uncover a more practical rather than mutated
instrumental reason. For Habermas, this would be the point for universal and
undistorted communication. This would be debate based on consensus and is itself, a
rejection of the increasing bureaucratisation and instrumentalisation of the 'life
world' (Habermas 1976). This ideal speech situation is a move considered equally
problematic by Lyotard (1984) who argued that this would simply generate a new
form of repressive universalism.

the potential for creating a new focus within the discipline of International

Relations that is postrealist and post-Marxist...(which) provides the basis for

the reintegration of International Relations into the broader traditions and

concerns of social and political theory (Hoffman 1987, 247).

Critical theory rejected Marxism's focus on class and considered the dislocation

of rational/instrumental modernity. But at the same time, critical theory retained a

faith in a different emancipatory rationality. The Enlightenment in effect, required

completion. Postmodernists queried the strategy wondering whether, given the legacy

of the twentieth century, the project could really be trusted anymore. The postmodern

argument:

> questioned the nature of his Critical Theory, as propounded by Hoffman,
>
> sounded uncomfortably like the orthodox perspective it opposed. The
>
> connection point, as Rengger noted, is the rationalism inherent in
>
> both...(C)ritical Theory appears to be (paradoxically) committed to the very
>
> foundationalism and positivism that it is constructed to overcome (George
>
> 1994, 186).

As such, robust globalism and the desire for unified or universal global theory and

practice invited exclusion and a more subtle form of homogenising repression

(Linklater 1997, 1998, 1999; Spegele 1997).

In response, it was argued that postmodernists had set their sights on only a

repressive *caricature* of modernity and ironically generated a rather reductive and

totalising vision of modernity based on this (Habermas 1981, 1981a; Venn 1997).

Johnson (1993, 10) explained that "this interpretation of the Enlightenment has

mistakenly reduced the dynamic, ongoing, self critical process of Enlightenment

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thinking to a set of fixed principles and dogmas." The disagreement here is not with

the radical critiques which seek to unmask the western constructions of the power of

reason but rather with those who desired a "radical surgery from the Enlightenment"

(Johnson 1993, 5). This was a challenge to postmodernists who collapsed reason into

a process of domination or those who believed that by abandoning reason they would

then be free. [16] Indeed, it was said that postmodernists are caught in what amounts to

a logical self-refuting thesis when the claim that there must be a rejection of

metanarratives is itself a metanarrative claim (Jarvis 1998; Noys 1997). Alleged

postmodernists such as Foucault "unwittingly get caught in the very reason with

which they wish to critique" (Smith 1992, 24). What is interesting as I will show now

is that Foucault's work became increasingly irascible with a critical theory response

which seemed to suggest that Foucault had, and could somehow 'step outside the

Enlightenment'. In fact, whilst Foucault was sceptical as to the whole idea of project

'completion' and maintained a scepticism to the self-congratulatory themes of the

Enlightenment he still maintained a faith in a different *ethos* of the Enlightenment,

thus reworking the whole basis of the postmodern debate.

x) Foucault and the Critical Social Movements.

The setting up of such debates through an array of dichotomies leads one to

suspect that there are a number of conceptual and political limitations involved. In

particular, given my interest in the way the EZLN has been framed in terms of

Marxist/postmodern politics of resistance, I argue that the EZLN represents a more

creative and reflexive politics of resistance. This requires a reworking of what it

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[16]Similar concerns have centered upon New Age jouissance and eclecticism or a
"designer religion, satanically tailored for our age.It borrows ideas from a whole
range of world views on sale in the supermarket" (Marshall 1993, 70). This
multifaceted religion encompasses different views and interpretations of great texts
(Rhodes 1995).

means to be engaging in a 'postmodern' critique. But let me make myself critically clear. It is evident that whilst there is a suspicion of 'caricature' setting, my argument is not based on a problematic of false dichotomies. On the other hand to engage in a different articulation of the postmodern debate one must of course start somewhere. This is unavoidable.

In order to do this I will draw on the distinctive approach to the Enlightenment, its themes and the nature of the relationship between power and political resistance as proposed by Michel Foucault. I will focus on the 'Enlightened turn' of Foucault, and his distinctive awareness of the ambiguities of the critical intellectual.

The arrival of Walker's (1988) 'One World: Many Worlds. Struggles for a Just Peace' came a year before the end of the Cold War. Walker (1988) noted that "any claims about the present potential for optimism-even where these claims have considerable substance-must be highly qualified" (Walker 1988, 18). The topics and themes concerning the critical social movements are clearly relevant to the state of the world in the 1990s/twentyfirst century.

In this one troubled world, Walker (1988) noted that "the challenges require more radical changes in the way human affairs are conducted" (Walker 1988, 17). Consequently, critical social movements were going to be of interest to those IR theorists sceptical as to the promises and agenda of problem solving theory. Ostensibly, what emerged was a problematisation of parsimonious and reductionist accounts of social movements and the conceptual/ideological schematics used to categorise and classify the politics of resistance. Moroever, this critical recognition induced a debate on the role and status of the critical intellectual in understanding and explaining the development, the objectives and the strategies of critical social movements such as the EZLN.

xi) Why Now?

One major intellectual and political criticism from the orthodox left has been of this endeavour, is this really the time and place for such exploration, reflection and creativity? The answer is straightforward. Yes, on the contrary, time is in fact pressing for investigation because:

> it is quite clear that the visions of the future that are now offered by postindustrial statists, neoconservatives, unreconstructed social democrats, technocratic modernisers, self-righteous fundamentalists, and disruptive violence prone groups can only produce two responses, both unsatisfactory (Walker 1988, 109).

It is Hobson's choice. The first option is chaos yet the other option is "managed order that excludes the poor and marginal from participation, and, over time, widens and hardens gaps seperating those who are saved and those who are damned" (Walker 1988, 110). Consequently, the creativity and dialogue is now necessary *exactly because* the world is complex with emerging patterns of convergence and divergence on a number of issues. Indeed, dogmatic responses are partly to blame for the state of the lives of millions precariously situated around the world.

xii) *Location of Grievance/Objectives.*

Critical movements explore and connect people and issues over time and space. As such they can not be categorised or understood as activating on the basis of a singular logic. Walker (1988) argued that the development of capitalism cannot be ignored, its significance can be:

> traced back to the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and to the emergence of the states system in early modern Europe. This transition has had such profound consequences almost everywhere that it almost

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monopolises our modern historical consciousness. It can easily appear as the only point of origin, the beginning of all modern chronologies, the ground on which to demarcate between ancient and modern, primitive and civilised, developing and developed (Walker 1988, 11).

However history and the present must be understood as specifically and concretely articulated and interpreted by real human beings. A critical enquiry must outwit even the sternest of reductionist categorisations. Here, the critique challenges scholars and academics who search for historical 'skyhooks' or a grand story of where we are, and why social movements mobilise. With the awareness of different histories, indeed even the question of 'whose history', then teleological approaches become extremely problematic. The political aspect is manifested at the point where intellectual analyses are "prone to treat these structures as cold, remote, and abstract, as huge determining forces beyond the reach of ordinary people" (Walker 1988, 34). This manouevre leads to a dangerous expunging of human reflection, creativity and agency (Amoore *et al* 2000). It follows that critical social movements cannot be simply limited to a critical enquiry that is based on schematics which are in turn based on the comforting and reassuring search for some kind of an underlying historical logic.

Indeed, there is inevitable concern with imposing artificial "disciplinary divisions" as the movements "are more likely to be open to the unexpected, to see what remains hidden by the categories and codes of conventional ways of thinking" (Walker 1988, 98). Therefore on these terms the critical enquiry must recognise:

> people going about their normal everyday tasks. They absorb muscle and sweat, contemplation, emotion, creativity, and corruption. People may be caught up in huge structural transformations over which they have little direct control. But structures are reproduced and reproduced by the practices and rituals of everyday life (Walker 1988, 34).

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For instance, many struggles with "economic vulnerability have to engage not only with structures of class, but also with those of caste, ethnicity, gender and age" (Walker 1988, 67). By implication, this established a critical challenge to academic and political categorisation as it was recognised that:

the capacity to interpret connections that gives certain kinds of movements a vitality and significance that goes beyond the claims of scholars and politicians, claims that are in any case often rooted in relatively limited interests and assumptions (Walker 1988, 62).

As a consequence the critical enquiry must recognise that "it is no longer possible to take a single view privileging the perspective of any particular group or people" (Walker 1988, 61). Indeed:

alongside this search for an underlying logic to the rise of capitalism, and sometimes converging dangerously with it, has been a simpler tale of 'progress' an ethnocentric celebration of both the power and civilizational pretensions of the West (Walker 1988, 23).

Similarly, Foucault engaged in a specific and "intellectual position which is different from technocratic or progressive uses of history for institutional reform and from Marxist uses of history for ideological criticism or some global alternative" (Hindess 1998, 47). Foucault recognised that the capitalist state relied upon a matrix of institutions to maintain the accumulation of wealth through the practices of governability (Foucault 1977; Krause 1998). Foucault (1991, 42) argued that:

we must never forget that the Enlightenment is an event or a set of events of

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complex historical processes that is located at a certain point in the

development of European Societies. As such it includes elements of social

transformation, types of political institution, forms of knowledge, projects of

rationalisation of knowledge and practices, technological mutations that are

very difficult to sum up in a word, even if many of these phenomenon remain

important today.

There was no sovereign or privileged subject of history. Walker (1988) argued
that there had been

an increasing recognition that utopian schemes for the future have usually

involved an artificial separation of theory from practice and that the future has

to be made rather than merely thought into being. There has been an

increasing awareness that the best-known utopian schemes have involved the

ethnocentric projection of Eurocentric concepts that do not translate very well

into other cultural or socio-economic contexts. There has even been an

emerging sense that attempts to bring grand designs down to earth in this

century have often involved the kind of violence that makes the creation of the

envisaged world simply impossible (Walker 1988, 77).

Clearly this realisation of the way global designs imposed from the abstract onto

the concrete fashions and fosters incredible atrocities is a 'postmodern' theme.

However the postmodern critique was to be *reworked* in order to induce a conducive

reinvention of the revolutionary ethos. That is, critical social movements "often reject

utopian visioning" (Walker 1988, 169). But crucially, they understand that "the

problem is less the relevance of visions or utopianism as such than the way in which

our understanding of visions has relied on the image of a model of human perfection"

(Walker 1988, 169). Here, the revolutionary themes of

the Enlightenment are reinvented and reworked.

Michel Foucault is commonly understood to have revoked these Enlightened ideals (Foucault 1977, 1994, 1994a). Foucault was also sceptical of the radical intellectualism of the left and that of 1968.[17] As Sawicki (1994, 288) explained:

> Foucault brings to our attention historical transformation in practices of self formation in order to reveal their contingency and so free us for new possibilities of self understanding, new modes of experience, new forms of subjectivity, authority and political identity...what he shares with the Enlightenment is the call to criticism.

As such, Foucault eschewed the traditional grid cementing the left and the right (Rachjman 1985, 1995). Foucault was often classed as a postmodern writer (Barash 1992; Connolly 1983; Fraser 1992; Megill 1979; Pasquino 1986; Rachjman 1995; Sheridan 1990, Shiner 1982; Thacker 1993). Indeed, Foucault's critics opposed "the very idea of postmodernism" for it "undermines the advances of liberalism" (Dumm 1996,7). But Foucault had never initiated a postmodern critique *in the first place.* Foucault had simply wanted to dispel the self-congratulatory pretensions of the Enlightenment (Barash 1992; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983; Dumm 1988; Fine 1979; Freundlich 1988; Horowitz 1987).

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[17] Sartre said of the older intellectuals that "They are always the same, even in my time-people who have written a dissertation they keep on reciting for the rest of their lives.But they fiercely cling to the little power they have, that of imposing, in the name of knowledge, their own personal ideas on others without allowing them the right to question them" (quoted in Cohen-Solal 1991, 461). Sartre maintained that "The French Communist Party has grown stiff and sclerotic. No action is no longer possible from it. That's why France has so many stereotypes of the left...(W)hat is happening now is a new social concept based on true democracy, a fusion of socialism and freedom" (quoted in Cohen-Solal 1991, 462).

As such, Rachjman (1985,1) noted that Foucault "changed his mind" constantly, refusing a politics of critique and of resistance that could be "fitted into a single program." Indeed he made this elusiveness "a virtue and obligation of doing so" (Rachjman 1985, 1). Foucault aimed to "avoid single methods" and often held "divergent and mutually inconsistent" views (Rachjman 1985, 2). This deliberate elusiveness fed into the distinctive form of politics and critique envisaged by Foucault. Here the idea of a transcendental critique that was able to 'step outside' and reflect in an autonomous sovereign space bereft of power and culture was rejected (Dallmayr 1997). Foucault developed an intellectual politics of resistance that accepted the ubiquitous and complex nature of power where power, discipline and knowledge were not sited in a sovereign and repressive entity but relational and perpetually threatened and unstable. Here, power relations were not understood as transmitting in only one direction but as transmitting through a network or as Foucault explained "we find ourselves here in a kind of blind alley: it is not through recourse to sovereignty against discipline that the effects of disciplinary power can be limited, because sovereignty and disciplinary mechanisms are two absolutely integral components of the general mechanism of power in our society" (Foucault 1983, 108). To articulate and to take up a political stance is one thing. It is quite another to seek a standpoint 'outside' power. Thus for Foucault, resistance is not to be conceived as external to power, or not inside or outside power but as being perpetually engaged with because "one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting regroupings, furrowing across individuals themselves" (Foucault 1976, 96). Foucault (1983, 231) explained:

> I am not looking for an alternative. You see what I want to do is not the
> history of solutions and that's the reason why I don't accept the work

alternative. I would like to do a genealogy of problems, of problematiques. My point is that not everything is bad but that everything is dangerous...my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper and pessimistic activism.

From this politics of critique the (ideological) classification of what it means to be radical, revolutionary or reformist becomes difficult as such classifications are based on common assumptions of the meaning, nature and site of 'power over'. Indeed, Foucault was critical of intellectuals who made it a *cause celebre* to 'set emancipatory agendas' where the "writing intellectual tries to become a conscience for everyone" (Rachjman 1985, 9). Foucault recognised that it could "no longer be a taken for granted that the engaged intellectual is automatically *de gauche*" or where the enemies are automatically *reduced* to capitalism, the state and/or US foreign policy (Rachjman 1985, 23). Foucault refused all claims to "bureaucratic or charismatic authority" (Rachjman 1985, 43). By implication, Foucault rejected the development of "global and millennial" projects (Brown 1998, 33).

Ostensibly, Foucault wanted a political engagement that developed an "alternative to utopias" (Hindess 1998, 50). The crux was that Foucault "rejected the idea of rupture" and a 'postmodern' move that strangely jumped from "the abyss of darkness to total daybreak" (Hoys 1998, 23). Foucault argued that his intellectualism and his teaching was to inspire a "new age of curiosity" and sought after "attitude of questioning" (Foucault *quoted* in Kritznan 1988, 724-725). Dare to know!, said Kant as Foucault returned to the Baudelairian experimental ethos of the individual as a "deportment, a way to behave and dress" (Hoys 1998, 18). Here, the *personal* was not to be confused with the *private* and the self reinvention of the romantic dandy (Elam 1992, Readings 1991; Wheeler 1993). By implication, Foucault rejected the "ideological self righteousness and the philosophical deception of collegues" who were intent on "ferreting" a demystification of ideology (Hindess 1998, 80). For

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Foucault the distinction between ideology and truth/reality made little sense as both were created within a specific time and through a specific discourse of power/knowledge (Merquior 1986; Poster 1985). Macey (1993, 292) argued that Foucault celebrated "a certain incoherence as to the role of the intellectual." [18] Indeed, Foucault "worked his way round to a position that was largely disabused of those old fashioned ideas about truth, knowledge, emancipatory critique" because "he cut these pretensions down to size" (Norris 1994, 163). Foucault invariably had little patience with interviewers who naively raised questions about the relation of theory to practice. Foucault insisted that theory should and could not be used as a blueprint guidance for action.

However, Norris (1994) suggested that:

> there is a near schizophrenic splitting of role between a, Foucault the 'public intellectual, thinking and writing on behalf of those subjects oppressed by the discourse of instituted power/knowledge, and b. Foucault...avatar of Nietzsche and Baudelaire, who espouses an ethos of private self fashioning and an attitude of sovereign disdain toward the principles and values of Enlightened critique (Norris 1994, 177).

Norris (1994, 187) wrote that Foucault's apparent rejection of revolutionary politics was not surprising given that:

> this was the heady period before and after the evenements of 1968, when French dissident or leftist intellectual were required to take their stand on numerous issues and to choose between a range of competing positions,

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[18]Despite his similar criticism of the old left, Jean-Paul Sartre was criticised in turn for not engaging in a practical struggle and was challenged for maintaining a somewhat aloof approach to the rebellions of France 1968.

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Marxist, Trotskyists, Marxist Leninist, Marxist-Leninist Maoist, anarchist, insipient post-Marxist etc.

But it was the forcing of his political position that Foucault found distasteful. For Norris (1994) to engage in local struggles at the time seemed more responsive to momentary shifts and the need for new tactical alliances. Such an eclectic intellectual engagement is shown by the work of Subcommandante Marcos. Marcos now insists on wearing a mask and conjuring up a highly poetic and reinvented biography (EZLN 1994m; Marcos 1999e, 1999f). In effect they reinvent the nature and rules of the intellectual and political game concerned with political power (Holloway 1996).

The justification for this critical engagement was found, perhaps quite ironically, in Kant. Here, the Enlightenment meant a commitment to an ongoing critique of prejudice, fundamentally irreducible to any one single formulation (Johnson 1993; Tester 1993).

Indeed, such a modernism is recognised by other 'postmodern' writers. Lyotard's (1993, 44) famous quote asked:

> What, then is the postmodern? What place does it or does it not occupy in the verrignious work of the questions hurled at the rules of image and narration? It is undoubtedly a part of the modern. All that is received, if only yesterday (*modo, modo,* Petronious used to sa*y*), must be suspected.

In the now classic argument in rethinking the Enlightenment Foucault (1991, 44) argued that "the thread that may connect us with the Enlightenment" is not so much an adherence to its universal and "doctrinal elements" but rather "the permanent reactivation of an ethos, a philosophical attitude that could be described as a permanent critique." By making this claim, Foucault could keep hold of the liberatory *ethos* of the Enlightenment whilst *coterminously* rejecting its dogma.

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Consequently the space of the specific intellectual redrew the relationship between theory and practice. This was because:

> most people struggling to cope with violence, poverty and injustice in the modern world, talk of global structures is simply alien and unreal. Scholars and politicians may speak of the world economy or the international system. They may attribute powers of determination to them. People may be told that sacrifices have to be made to the World Bank or "the national interest". But these seem to be sacrifices to remote gods, disembodied from the aching grind of everyday life (Walker 1988, 57).

xiii) Objective Theme One: Inclusive Modernity.

One of the central themes of the critical social movements was rethinking the meaning, nature and site of development. Critical social movements did not wish to 'destroy' development whether defined as capitalism, socialism or modernity. Walker (1988) pointed out that on:

> placing considerable stress on *the need to recognise the connections between* economic processes and other aspects of our social life, contemporary labor movements and movements for alternative forms of economic development repeat one of the most powerful messages being given by critical social movements everywhere (Walker 1988, 63).

Of course, modernisation theory is alive and kicking (Leys 1996). Economists, (now neo-liberal technocrats) continue to, and have:

> invented their own rather bizarre ideas about what constitutes rational

behaviour. these ideas often jar disconcertingly with the way people act in practice. What is more serious is that these ideas have enabled people to stop thinking about how to create forms of economic life that are appropriate for human development (Walker 1988, 68).

Indeed quite frequently an account of development is understood as economic modernisation based upon *top down* state planning. Even developmentalism of the 1950s through to recent neo-liberal accounts of development strangely carried similar assumptions on the nature of modern progress. The pressures on states to act to the whims of the new world economy accordingly has led to an often exploitative, violent and exclusionary climate.

Consequently, there is increasing importance given to exploring alternative "development movements" on the basis that "attempts to encourage development from the top down have often been disastrous" (Walker 1988, 84). Debate now centres upon "competing conceptions of what development ought to entail" (Walker 1988, 84). Consequently, there is a "recognition that that it is neither necessary nor desirable to confuse economic development with development as such" (Walker 1988, 132).

As such, critical social movements must rethink and explore in their specific locations what is meant by and what is the nature of development. Consequently:

the insights of critical social movements may be used to show that other interpretations of development, other possibilities for human well being, remain open. These insights begin with a recognition that the spatial structuring of the world economy is being transformed. This insight necessarily leads not only to explorations of new ways of acting on economic problems but also to a rethinking of the basic categories in which the

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possibilities of human development are now envisaged (Walker 1988, 129).

As such, rethinking development means getting away from the power discourse of top down development defined in terms of state security. Instead the aim is for a development which is not understood as "the myth of history and modernisation" (Walker 1988, 131). Instead development is to be "rooted in the needs of specific communities" and tailored towards economic, social, political and cultural needs (Walker 1988, 131). Consequently a recognition of multicultural plurality means an exploration of the way "alternative conceptions of development must involve the creation of new understandings of work, production and ownership that are more meaningful socially than just processes of individual or aggregate capital accumulation" (Walker 1988, 132).

Of course a concern with industrialisation and the vagaries of modern life may turn "into a romanticised idealisation of premodern life" (Walker 1988, 70). Hence the postmodern debate. However, critical social movements problematise this "notion of a deeply rooted contrast between tradition and modernity so essential to dominant economic and political categories" (Walker 1988, 70). Instead, the creativity of the critical social movements means that they look for and explore alternative and specific developments which generate dialogue on a development based on the theme of *inclusivity*.

As such, the demand for inclusivity is not "the replacement of an arrogant ethnocentrism with a romanticised or relativistic appeal to cultural traditions" because this "would be merely to reproduce the false choice between modernity and tradition in another form" (Walker 1988, 25). As such, to recognise "diversity is a precondition for any meaningful sense of human community" (Walker 1988, 137).

In this sense, critical social movements "find they have to engage with the most persuasive and deeply entrenched assumptions that constitute the prevailing 'common sense' 'rationality' and 'reality' of the modern world" (Walker 1988, 133). But as I will

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show in chapter five, the EZLN forges a distinctive approach to this inclusive

development through elucidating the demands for autonomous economic, political,

social and cultural development in the indigenous communities and the concomitant

dialogue on Mexican development (De Huerta 1999; NCDM 14 September 1998, 9

December 1998, 13 March 1999; Rodriguez 1999). Walker (1988, 128) argued:

> the concept of development has become problematic in an even more complex
>
> and far reaching way than that of security. It has long been subject to bitter
>
> theoretical and ideological dispute. As a synonym for progress it has been
>
> criticised for all the arrogance of a universalistic reading of History. As a
>
> synonym for economic growth, it has been embroiled in a century of debate
>
> about the character and consequences of capitalism, industrialism,
>
> imperialism and socialism. In some places it is still treated as short hand for
>
> the inevitable way forward. Elsewhere quotation marks around it symbolise
>
> increasing embarassment and anger.

As I will show, the EZLN have aimed to *unhook* modernisation from

neo-liberalism and aimed to construct a different understanding of modernisation

from the *bottom up*. Such negotiations as I will show, were prompted by discussions

between the EZLN and the PRI at the town of San Andres Larrainzar in early 1996

(NCDM 3 March 1998).

Consequently, the rethinking the nature of state development requires a rethinking

of the existing political and constitutional institutions involved. The importance of

radicalising existing institutions through a politics of accountability, rights and justice

is identified. Critical social movements such as the EZLN do not reject Enlightened

values. Critical social movements rework the revolutionary ideals of the

Enlightenment as generated and contested through grassroots

consultation. Such a move problematises the dichotomy between the universal and the specific and is a "tentative exploration rather than imperial assertion" and a concomitant refusal of the dichotomy between "being human or being a national citizen and between being an autonomous individual or a participant in a social community" (Walker 1988, 136).

Foucault (1977) questioned modernity and had argued on this basis that the "Enlightenment which invented emancipation, also invented the disciplines" (Foucault 1977, 222). Foucault had argued that the Constitutional ideals of rights, liberty and justice acted "as a smokescreen for covert operations" (McNay 1992, 106). Thus, it was suggested that Foucault had incited a deep "contempt" for the ideals and institutions of liberal humanism (Ivison 1998, 129). This Foucaultian critique plays a part in distinctive readings of disciplinary neo-liberal globalisation (Debrix 1999; Gill 1995, 1996). Indeed Foucault (1991c, 199) suggested that:

> Historians of ideas usually attribute the dream of a perfect society to the philosophers and jurists of the eighteenth century but there was also a military dream of society; its fundamental reference was not the state of nature but to the meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine, not to the primal social contract but to permanent coercions, not to fundamental rights but to indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to the general will, but to automatic docility.

However, despite this scepticism, Foucault sought to rethink these ideals and to open up a different and ultimately more progressive way of thinking about the ideals of modern Constitutions. His critical enterprise was to avoid the totalising 'blackmail of the Enlightenment' in the sense that Foucault (1991, 43) suggested that:

from this we must not conclude that everything that has ever been linked with humanism is to be rejected...the humanism thematic is in itself too supple, too diverse, too inconsistent to serve as an axis for reflection...this thematic which so often recurs...a principle that is at the heart of the historical consciousness that the Enlightenment has of itself.

As such, Foucault retained a different commitment to the rights and values of the Enlightenment and its institutions (Macey 1993). This commitment was based on a more localised and consultary effort. Foucault:

committed himself to the cause of human rights, to the transformation of the plight of prisoners, mental patients and other victims to both his theory and practice...an ever expanding embrace of otherness, the condition for any community of moral action...truth, ethics and social responsibility (Bernauer and Mahon 1994, 115).

And Michel Foucault showed interest in the fate of the Vietnamese Boat people and the claims of international refugees, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Polish solidarity movement of the early 1980s (Moss 1998). These concerns were coupled with the causes of Prison Reform and the Civil Rights movements. In the early 1970s he was interested in setting up a new Constitution on this issue (Hindess 1998). Given this, Ivison (1998, 135) warned that one must not be "too quick to dismiss" Foucault on the basis of a sceptical response to the ideals borne of the Enlightenment. Foucault believed that a *different* way of thinking about the ideals of citizenship, rights, justice, and liberation could be delivered. Essentially, this would be through a more concrete and reflexive appreciation linked to his historico-critical investigations (Keenan 1987; Patton 1989).

I show how the EZLN maintains a commitment to Constitutional reforms on the

indigenous question of rights as individual citizens but simultaneously remain obligated as members to Indian collective communities which desire a modernist discourse of self-determination and autonomy. Such investigations are based on grassroots dialogue and are not imposed through the primary structures of the state. According to Falk (1996, 24):

> Rethinking citizenship is crucial. The citizen, unlike the subject of a monarchy or authoritarian political order, is a participant in the polity...(I)f elections seem to avoid issues, to leave the electorate bored and indifferent and if political parties converge on a consensus, then other modes of participation need to be identified, and if necessary, invented, to avoid the atrophy of civic virtue.

Indeed, the radical citizen will be a concrete and politically active citizen and will not be a defined merely as an apolitical, *top down* legal abstraction. Mouffe (1992) suggested that this concrete form of modern citizenship should accommodate cultural diversity and the growth of citizen loyalty to an inclusive development of the modern state given the various cultural and political amalgamations generated by the forces of globalisation (Camilleri and Falk 1992; Held and McGrew 1998). Walker (1988, 132) made the point that:

> the primary message coming from the critical social movements in this respect, is again quite stark in its simplicity. It is the claim that in a world of connections and global structures, and yet a world also of increasing social and economic exclusion, ideas of development must be based on the principle of *inclusivity* and solidarity. An empowering development must be a development for all (my emphasis).

xiv) Objective Theme Two: Radicalising Democracy.

Critical social movements have aimed for a democratic revolution. But this is not to be revolution through Marxism objective, anything out of this world or a postmodern rejection of the modernist discourse. Instead, the critical social movements rework the meaning, nature and practice of the Enlightened ideal.

Indeed, there has developed a sense of individual powerlessness brought about by a lack of accountability of political institutions coupled with the instrumentalism of the globalisation axiom that 'there was no alternative'. Indeed, Walker (1988, 133) argued that: "the struggle for democracy has occured in a world in which the dynamics of capitalism bring unequal development" and that "with the transformations in global political, economic and cultural processes that are now under way, the possibility of democracy is especially problematic." The problem Walker (1988, 139) noted, was that in a world "in which the most powerful forces are global in scale, the promise of democracy to enhance the capacity of people to exercise control over their own lives is put into greater and greater doubt." George (1994, 214) argued that it was:

> acknowledged, for example, that formal political democracy is often connected to life experiences dominated by bureaucratic *stultification*, authoritarian state, elite sponsored apathy and cynicism and conditions to which most people are excluded from the decision making process...critical social movements like critical social theorists have become engaged in a broader agenda involving the reconceptualisation and rearticulation of emancipatory concepts and practices, such as democracy and progress.

As I show in chapter six, this reconceptualisation of democracy can help broaden the implications of the EZLN on this theme. Critical social movements are critical of

New World Order optimism and party-political democratisation. Critical social movements both aim to recover electoral institutions *and* nurture a consultary and direct form of radical democracy. This is a democratic revolution based on a reworking of the political institutions and a rethinking of the actual idea of a political institution because Walker (1988) argued, liberal democratic institutions are all "indictments of boredom and irrelevance on the one hand, and cynicism on the other. A sense of powerlessness is apparent in many societies" (Walker 1988, 133).

Critical social movements aspire to a radical reformulation and rethinking of democracy on an institutional/electoral basis and a localised and grassroots *direct democracy.* Here, direct participation was promoted through the construction of different political institutions from the grassroots as the bureaucratisation of politics, the 'iron law of oligarchy' is challenged (Cohen and Arato 1981).

In chapter six I will show how this features prominently in the EZLN's consultations as a direct participation in contrast to the market place of electoral politics. Crucially, there was also a willingness to work with the institutions that are available, imperfect as they may be. Hence the importance for example, of the EZLN's use of the existing legal mechanisms to introduce greater accountability into public life. But this was only the start. This was a:

> recognition that democratisation is not the equivalent of voting in periodic elections. It requires an ongoing insinuation of peoples participation into all aspects of public life. It requires constant vigilance about the preservation fo substantive rights, about how the basic investment decisions of a society are made, about how production is organised and goods distributed, about how cultures, values, identities are constructed (Walker 1988, 140).

Indeed, with conventional political institutions, politics has become "ever more a matter of image, of the gleaming smile and the benevolent gesture" (Walker 1988,

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142). Walker wrote that in "materially affluent societies , democracy is often reduced to a commercial pageant. In societies that act in the name of the universal proletariat, democracy has been largely reduced to bureaucracy and state planning" (Walker 1988, 16). This needs attention. Thus, critical social movements "seek not only to enhance democratic processes in the formal political arena but, perhaps even more so, to democratise within social processes" (Walker 1988, 140). As such, in their vision, Laclau and Mouffe (1987) argued that "the first condition of a radically democratic society is to accept the contingent and radically open character of all its values, and in that sense, to abandon the aspiration to a single foundation" (Laclau and Mouffe 1987, 101). Consequently, the idea of a new democratic revolution:

> does not pass through a direct attack upon the state apparatus but involves the consolidation and democratic reform of the liberal state. The ensemble of its constitutive principles, the division of executive, legislative and judicial powers, universal suffrage, multiparty systems, civil rights etc, must be defended and consolidated (Laclau and Mouffe 1987, 105).

For Mouffe (1992, 4) "the task of rethinking democratic politics is more urgent than ever given the tragic experience of totalitarianism."

Forces for radical democracy such as the Emiliano Zapata Front of National Liberation (FZLN) set up by the EZLN and at the call of civil society in 1996, recognise the dangers of bureaucratic party politics. Walker (1988, 137) noted that one of the main characteristics of the critical social movements is that they maintain:

> a suspicion of the urge to build institutions before underlying principles and ideas have been sufficiently worked through...there is a very powerful sense

that existing political institutions embody the wrong principles and ideas...it is

necessary to think what exactly is meant by a political institution...the very

idea of a political institution embodies the underlying image of yet another

structure that is somehow out there, another false dichotomy between

structure and practice.

This was a recognition that a new form of doing politics is required to break apathy

and disillusionment with politics (Falk 1996).[19] Critical social movements must also

negotiate with existing political parties. The EZLN keep the values of democracy,

fairness, equal participation, respect, freedom of speech and accountability but

challenge the basis of the party political machine.

Thus, Mouffe (1992) argued that groups must still defend the gains of the

democratic revolution. Radical democracy has been linked to issues of spatiality and

the generation of new sites of democratic struggle (Massey 1994, 1995; Mouffe

1995). The use of global technologies by movements such as the EZLN inspires a

belief that global technologies are positively altering the opportunities for enhancing

democracy (Held 1995). This is generating new forms of radical citizenship at the

local, national and now the global level (Falk 1996; Painter and Philo 1995).

. But what is interesting as I will show is that the EZLN are quite adept at using the

media/technologies for their own means, their symbolism and their image (Froehling

1997; Routledge 1998). Indeed, concern with image and daily opinion polls indicates

a sense of *vulnerability* emanating from the elites which can be used as a new terrain

of pushing democratic politics. This introduces the question of strategies and tactics.

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[19]Falk (1996) made assertions on the politics of global youth culture The point is that there are new politics being advanced by the worlds concerned youth, in developed and developing areas, as a cross over of issues and solidarity emerges. The average age of an EZLN combatant is 22. Originally it was a "scandalous 16" (Marcos 1994a).

xv) Strategies and Tactics. Reinventing National and Global Liberation.

The strategies used to achieve these objectives are creative and reflexive. The critical enquiry acknowledged that people exist in different and specific locations and are affected by global structures in different ways and circumstances. This is recognised in the strategies and tactics of critical social movements. Rather than *imposing* conceptual categories and strategical advice "it is necessary to listen carefully to the way that people in diverse circumstances struggle with these dangers and opportunities on the basis of quite different historical experiences" (Walker 1988, 24).

Consequently, critical social movements reinvent by their very actions the radicalism of a social movement. Walker (1988) admitted that to be so explicitly open and reflexive on even such basic terms and in a time of danger is to be especially vulnerable. Given the power of global structures, the power of the state and its continuing monopoly on legitimating violence critical social movements are "minor disturbances at the margins of vision" (Walker 1988, 31). But there was also this empowering "ebb and flow to their behaviour that makes it difficult to judge their strength at any particular time or place" (Walker 1988, 31). Evidently, critical social movements "can compete neither in analytical sophistication nor in overt power with which to respond to pressing problems" but the movements are "particularly sensitive to connections that may be invisible both to those with refined analytical categories and those who wield the instruments of power" (Walker 1988, 61).

As such, this 'invisibility' or this sense of 'chipping at the margins' now gives a sense of empowerment. Although critical social movements struggle in specific and local situations it is clear that strategically "many of them-those that can be called critical social movements-are able to look beyond the immediacy and specifity of their struggle to understand at least some of the wider connections in which they are caught" (Walker 1988, 62). Indeed, Walker (1988) warned that whilst "a sense of the

historical significance of the present moment may be common among intellectuals"

it is evident that "for many if not most, people everyday life goes on in a rather

familiar fashion" (Walker 1988, 12).

Consequently, the struggles discover new ways to act politically, due to their

marginality and scepticism with existing political institutions. Secondly, they

innovate new ways of acting within existing institutions and in these new spaces.

Thirdly, they articulate new conceptions of knowing and being. Fourthly, they explore

connections "that maybe achieved between seemingly different movements

struggling in different situations" and "explore the concrete connections that may be

made with other more familiar forms of political actions" (Walker 1988, 80). And this

gives a critical space for reinventing and reworking the revolutionary tradition.

Walker (1988) noted that these possibilities:

> may not add up to a resounding manifesto addressed to the waiting masses,
>
> nor to a policy agenda addressed to those closest to state power, nor even to a
>
> glorious utopian scheme addressed to the nascent visionary in all of us- some
>
> may judge this a sign of weakness.

These movements temper global aspirations with "a deep and often overriding

suspicion of all global visions. The crux is that the movements break down the

global/local hierachy that is imbued in the strategic debate between the old and new

social movements. As Walker (1988) suggested, the dichotomy between the 'one

world' and many worlds, the latter the terrain of 'postmodern' relativism, anarchy or

simple irrelevance as the debate on the political possibilities of postmodernism

implied, is to simply reiterate the "intellectual categories that, although primarily

associated with the West, have influenced contemporary thinking everywhere"

(Walker 1988, 104-105). Critical social movements creatively rethink this dichotomy

by forging their connections at their specific locations. Consequently:

>the diversity of confrontations, on the impossibility of privileged
>saviours-philosophers or priests, party leaders of chosen people-immune to the
>contamination of existing power. Unlike either the great revolutionary
>movements of the past or the fundamentalists of the present, many
>contemporary movements seem to consciously refuse the false comfort of
>knowing exactly where they are going (Walker 1988, 88).

The cynical response is that the movements have no power. However, this kind of response still works on fixed asumptions concerning the meaning and nature of 'the radical' and consummately "misses the point" (Walker 1988, 146). With the critical social movements:

>there are no untarnished models, saints or heroes that can be singled out for
>reverent emulation. Movements struggle in difficult and dangerous places, and
>their potential is often crushed by force, inertia, or lack of imagination.
>Nevertheless there is also no doubt that some movements, in some places, at
>some times, in some struggles, have been able to demonstrate a striking
>capacity for a creative politics (Walker 1988, 146).

Undoubtedly the strategic and tactical issue of nonviolence is an important theme. In 'traditional' ways of thinking about revolutions "violence is a prerequsite" (Walker 1988, 91). For critical social movements, it is an inhuman mode of being and must be eliminated" and non violence "is no longer discussed in moral terms alone" (Walker 1988, 91).

I will show how through the National Consultation the EZLN forges a distinctive

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inclusive, grassroots *and legal* struggle encompassing groups right across the entire political spectrum and recognising how people experience neo-liberalism in their different economic, political, social and cultural environments. This was to be a different form of mass mobilisation and there are no guarantees. But this does not mean political ineptitude. On the contrary it requires political skill and commitment to engage in a spirit not based on rule books and historical examples. Whilst eschewing reductionist accounts they recognise that their struggles are connected, generating a sense of interconnectedness through an experiment of possibilities. Let me again quote Foucault (1991, 44) who suggested that:

> if we are not to settle for the affirmation or the empty dream of freedom, it seems to me that this historico/critical attitude must also be an experimental one...open up a realm of historical inquiry and on the other, put itself to the test of reality, of contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable and to determine the precise form this change should take. This means that the historical ontology of ourselves must turn away from all projects that claim to be global or radical...we know from experience that the claim to escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of another society or another way of thinking, another culture, another vision of the world, has only led to the return of the most dangerous traditions.

As such, this was an ethic of "permanent resistance" or a frustration and resentment with the present through a critical thinking beyond limits (Simons 1995, 86). This allowed for a distinct space for the critical intellectual and used to explain the role of Subcommandante Marcos (1994a) who similarly rejects frozen ideologies and terrains delineating what is and what is not radical. Marcos explores alternatives by listening to all sides, capitalists, socialists, Trotskyists

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and Christian Democrats. Marcos (1994a) wants no politics 'out of this world.' Indeed, Foucault (1977, 230) argued that "to imagine another system is to extend ones participation in the present one." Foucault (1991, 43) as a specific intellectual aimed to discover an ethos:

> in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them...there is no question of simply having done with that entire heritage of thought, no way of jumping outside it into some alternative maybe postmodern terrain of disabused sceptical hindsight.

Moreover there is a distinctive reluctance to engage in the presentation of a 'postmodern' resistance as a 'local' struggle. Indeed, it is "necessary to insist that critical social movements do not 'think globally and act locally'" because this "merely reproduces the false opposition between general and particular that movements must and do challenge" (Walker 1988, 135). As such, the movements problematise what it means to be engaged in a politics of the local and the global. This problematisation has been given interesting sustenance by the dynamics of time/space compression which may be altering the sites of agency (Amoore *et al* 2000; Giddens 1990; Harvey 1987).

Walker (1988) was interested in the possibility of critical social movements of solidarity, of local and specific movements which are coterminously sensitive to global structures and connect and network with other groups. But the many worlds recognise that they are all part of one world. Yet this sensitivity to connections does not inexorably lead to a demand for unified global struggle and a new global alternative/order. Walker (1988, 89) argued that critical social movements:

> create new ways of being together. Connections are in fact

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made among groups...despite their celebration of diversity and the local, movements often exhibit a clear awareness that without closer connections and greater solidarity they can only remain weak...a recognition that behind the insistence on acting locally is a challenge to rework the meaning of political community in an age which our vulnerabilities are indeed global in scale...a recognition of the global connections...a recognition that in the modern world communities and solidarities have to be grasped as a dialectical moment, as a sense of participation both in large scale global processes and in particular circumstances.

Walker (1988) suggested that these concerns had been a part of the World Order Models Project (WOMP) but which had become increasingly criticised for its universalistic pretensions. This criticism was rejected. On the contrary, the central tenets of this project recognised the articulation between human solidarity *and* diversity. Camilleri and Falk (1992) and Falk (1995) contended that emancipatory resistance simultaneously recognised the significance and not the political impotence of local difference and local diversity (Lipschutz 1992; UN Commission 1995).

Ostensibly, there was a commitment to global but not a universal emancipation. This was cultivated with an "openness to difference and to the great variety of experiences and histories that lead people to respond to global processes in highly localised circumstances occurs simultaneously with a sensitivity to the reality of connections" (Walker 1988, 109). This concern links to and informs the problematisation of the way the local and the global are framed as spatial hierachies (Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Beck 1998; Spegele 1997). The EZLN as I will show in chapter seven is aware of the way global structures impinge on daily life. The EZLN is also aware of its connections with other movements in solidarity. This is not a systematic process of unified struggle. The EZLN does not wish to develop an incorrigibly defunct unified

global emancipatory movement (Cleaver 1999). Walker (1988, 102) argued that:

> .movements recognise that global structures represent quite specific forms of
> dominance...in spite of global structures and awareness, people actually live,
> work and play in specific places in a great variety of concrete
> circumstances.

Through a discussion of the EZLN organised 'Encounters' I show how this sense of connections is paradoxically generated by globalisation but at the same time, nurturing the possibilities of new explorations and resistance. But despite the exciting character of the new technologies in helping to problematise the local/global hierachy a sense of proportion is required. The EZLN is realistic. I show how the EZLN is aware of the reality of traditional state responses of militarisation/governability but nevertheless, explores and forges new networks and reinvents the meaning and site of resistance. Appadurai (1996, 176) pointed out that:

> as populations become deterritorialised and incompletely nationalised, as
> nations splinter and recombine, as states face intractable difficulties in the
> face of producing the people, transnations are the most important social sites
> in which the crises of patriotism are played out...these postnational spaces, the
> incapacity of the nation state to tolerate diversity (as it seeks to homogeneity
> of its citizens, the simultaneity of its presence, the consensuality of its
> narrative and the stability of its citizens) may, perhaps be overcome.

. Critical social movements are representative of the position that the:

> idea of grand revolution is graphic and spectacular. It is heroic, It invites

machismo And violence. And counterrevolution. The practices of multiple

transformation seem tame and unexciting, even evolutionary. They may seem

diversions from the real goal, radical change. Indeed very often this may be

the case (Walker 1988, 155).

But critical social movements do not glorify the future. The EZLN recognises that

it can be defeated. This is not the point. It is willing to try something different. If it

does not work, then it is their movement. I will show how the EZLN are critical of the

EPR for placing them within traditional schematics and judging their politics on these

terms. The failure or success of the movement is not in this sense quantifiable. There

must be awareness of how the passage of time changes our understanding of success

and/or failure. For them, change is always possible in the here and now, the present,

and is constantly reworked. This is not rejection, but recapture and reclaiming.

Walker (1988) concluded

Critical social movements, like many of the most powerful intellectual current

of our time, are engaged in a rethinking of what it means to live in a world in

which the certainties of modernity have been shattered. Under these

conditions, cynicism, parochialism, relativism, and self-righteousness are

possible and dangerous options. But certainty is also dangerous. It can give

rise to cynicism, to the parochialism and relativism of those able to insist on

the priority of their interpretations, and to the self righteousness uncontested

power. It can also tranquilize (Walker 1988, 170).

I argue that the EZLN struggle is a part of this creative exploration and thereby

eludes premature political and conceptual rigidity often found in the many debates on

the EZLN.

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Conclusion.

The purpose of this chapter has been to outline the conceptual framing which interpretations of the EZLN have used through which to make sense of the mobilisation in 1994. The chapter showed that a conceptual mapping is identified and the Marxist/postmodern debates have coalesced on who and what movements represent, the nature of objectives, strategies, tactics and the normative justification of these struggles. The chapter argued that the old/new social movement literature and its assumptions is particularly limited particularly given the influx of postmodern approaches and the remonstrating by Marxists. The chapter argued that these perspectives have a tendency to miss the complexity and creativity of social movements. The literature on critical social movements provides the basis for a creative exploration of the EZLN in theory and practice. In the next chapter, I discuss the economic, political and social climate in Mexico and Chiapas to indicate the historical backdrop and context to the mobilisation of the EZLN in 1994. I will consider the 'location of grievance' question, and identify the points where later interpretive controversy has coalesced.

Introduction.

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the historical political-economy of

Mexico and Chiapas (Conger 1994; EZLN 1994a; Harvey 1998; Routledge 1998).

This will not only enable me to show how and why conceptual and interpretive

controversy has centered on the mapping of identifying the EZLN's *real* location of

grievance (Burbach 1994; Nugent 1995). But it will enable me to highlight the

significance of the way the EZLN as a critical social movement rethinks the nature of

development and democracy in Mexico. I discuss the development of Chiapas, from

European colonisation through to the intensification of economic development

manifested through post-war developmentalism and finally to the development of

neo-liberalism in Chiapas. This will be discussed in the context of Mexican

development during the 1980s and 1990s, then focusing on the way this has affected

the more localised political-economy of Chiapas.

i) *Chiapas.*

Chiapas, one of 31 federal region/states of the United States of Mexico is located

in the Southern corner of Mexico. Chiapas was annexed by Mexico in 1824 from

Guatemala following Mexican Independence from Spain in 1821. The annexation of

Chiapas was justified on the basis that it would be better for the kingdom of Chiapas

'to be the tail of the dog rather than the head of the mouse'. Chiapas is noted for its

areas of outstanding natural beauty.

From the sweeping highland plateaus swathed in the early morning mists, to the

luscious vegetation of the Lacandon jungle rich in colourful species, flora and fauna,

Chiapas has been a magnet for tourists,

backpackers, anthropologists and natural scientists over the years. Chiapas remains a very Central American state with a very archetypical landscape, both natural and economic/political. The ripe tropical vegetation and landscape of the expansive Lacandon Jungle conjurs up indelible images of hovering Hueys and helicopter gunships, characteristic of the terrain in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua.

Chiapas is geographically divided into the Southwestern region, the Southeast low lands of the Lacandon Jungle and the high central plateaus. It is in the Lacandon Jungle where the descendents of the early Mayan Indians still reside and it is here, where the most vulnerable inhabitants of Chiapas live (Cohen, Gutkind and Brazier 1979). The Southwest low lands are agriculturally fertile. The Central Highlands, steep and rugged, considered to be the extension North of the Altiplano of Guatemala, are not so fertile because of the inadequate soils. To the east, towards Guatemala, the expanse of Lacandon whilst pleasant to the eye, is in fact mostly useless for agriculture. The state of Chiapas is the volcanic isthmus of the southern most frontier of the indigenous cultures of North America.

Chiapas has a total area of 75,634 square kilometers or some 7.5 million hectares. It is the eighth largest state of Mexico and is divided into 111 municipalites. Chiapas has 40% of the nations plant varieties, 36% of its mammal species and is home to 3.5 million Mexican people.

The early inhabitants of Chiapas, in pre-conquest days, were the Mayan peoples (Gossen 1996; Green 1995). The Mayan people had a rich culture, with their own Gods, knowledge, being, spirits, stories, philosophies and ways of thinking and being. The Mayan people developed their own systems of economic and political development, with emphasis on art, language, land, ancestory and heritage. Indeed, Mexico itself, is regarded as the most Indian country in Latin America. The original peoples and civilisations were represented by the Zoque, related to the Mixpopulaca, and the Mayans.

Chiapas is a microcosm of the impact of European colonialism and the disruption

of the Mayan ways of life. According to Green (1995, 54), Indian life "in the

highlands changed with the arrival of the Spanish in the 16th century." Main towns

still show the cultural contrasts between the Spanish *conquistadores* and the

indigenous populations. This former era is still evident in religion and the quaint

architecture of churches and zocalo's (squares) in the main sun-baked Chiapas

municipalities such as San Cristobel de Las Casas and Ocosingo (Goebring 1998;

Lowy 1998).

During the early days of colonialism, it was very easy to distinguish culturally,

between the Indians and non-Indians. Indeed, it was this sense of different history and

different identity which was important because it encapsulated economic, political

and social differences. Andres Puig (1995, 25) suggested that particular historical

tensions in Mexico still derive, from the original colonisation of the Americas which

in the years after 1492 had:

> produced a blunt interruption of native histories, in which the whole social
>
> and ideological order of its original inhabitants and cultures was radically
>
> transformed, and a whole cultural heritage was denied. The colonial order
>
> imposed its own views bludgeoned local intellectual patterns placed an
>
> interdiction on art and science and refused to recognise the culture of peoples
>
> who though new to European eyes had lived in these lands for thousands of
>
> years. Identities were badly bruised in their encounter with the new culture
>
> and they were especially affected by the harsh laws against the use of native
>
> languages and herbal medicene.[20]

Gradually Puig (1995) noted there was a formation of a resistance culture, as local

socio/cultural structures were being broken up. The "meaningful world" of the

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[20]This information sent by the Cultural Department of the Mexican Embassy, London,
UK   78   .

indigenous peoples was once "contained within the village boundaries" which had its own "religious hierachy" of the elders (Nash 1994, 13). [21] Indeed, with the pressures of the new modern world it was "the young people in these communities" who are "the first to look down on their traditions. 'That's something from long ago. That belongs to the old people. We aren't Indians anymore'. Such phrases are frequently heard in the countryside" (Giordano 1995, 24). Mexico, and the rich heritages of the Chiapas highlands show particular simultaneous forms of quite immense and multifold spheres of the rich Mayan civilisations and another cultural world (Green 1995; Lowy 1997, Marcos 1994). What was also occuring was a gradual penetration of capitalist relations and a break up of old economic, political, social and cultural relations.

During the 19th century, tensions began to grow between the Mayan Indians of the lowlands and the non-Indians of the highlands. Capital accumulation accelerated with the influence of scientific management through Western positivism. The non-Indians took advantage of the liberal laws and held the right to buy and sell land and property, an economic organisation anethema to Mayan Indian culture. The liberal, Emilio Rabasa became governor of Chiapas in 1892 and moved the state capital from San Cristobel to Tuxtla. The liberal doctrine was maintained, paradoxically, by increasing political centralisation (Knight 1986; Marcos 1998; Meyer and Sherman 1987; Miller 1985).

With the penetration of capitalism a new class formation disrupted the Mayan communities. Gradually, the Indians became a function for the new capital relations and reduced to the category of the Indian worker (Powell 1968). This meant a developing Indian peasantry and a non-Indian peasantry. Chiapas has it is said, "always been more a part of Central America than Mexico" (Henderson 1993, 236).

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[21] Indigenous peoples were originally understood to be peoples who were assumed to exist in "self contained" and "isolated" areas (Beteille 1998, 188). Indigenous peoples, were, and still are, often intellectually approached as inferior peoples or through a patronising romantic lens.

The Indian population has proven rich pickings for capitalism (Brunk 1993, 1998; Carr and Ellmer 1993). Spanish colonisation introduced new ways of organising land.

The arrival of the Spanish ushered in a period during which "Mexico's indigenous peoples were progressively pushed off these lands and cultural/ancestral heritage, by the expansion of plantations owned by Spanish speaking Ladinos" (Rosset and Cunningham 1994). The Mayan Indians from the West were pushed back into the highland regions and on to the Lacandon Jungle by the expansion of colonial plantations. Anthropological studies of the region have noted a marked pattern of internal migration and agricultural land use (Brady 1996; Nash 1994).

Many Indians survived wage labouring in the large coffee plantations and were encouraged to move further East. There was an Indian and peasant migration into Chiapas, credited as the last Southern frontier (Deneuve and Reeve 1995). This created a new and culturally mixed 'mestizio' within the Chiapas population through interaction with the original Mayan communities. The migrants were also given the poorest lands.

The specific question of the Indian 'question' and the relationship between the Indian and capitalist defined development became part of heated political debate. President Cardenas (1934-1940) developed the policy of *Indigenismo* in line with the positivist doctrine of society as an evolving organism (Knight 1994). Indians were to be assimilated and to form part of the Mexican nation. Cardenas' ideal was a Mexico inhabited in the near future, by the Mexican mestizio. Cardenas saw this development possible if through the organised education of the Indians. This became an issue not of culture *per se* but one of class as new cleavages of economic
development occured within and between the Indian communities. The sense of Indian identity and heritage now began to assume less importance for those Indians benefitting from capitalism.

For instance during the 1930s the Syndicate of Indian Labourers (STI) was set up

as the Cardenas adminstration became arbitrator between the Chiapas coffee plantation owners and the Indian workers. The administration penetrated the local Indian power structure by installing city educated allies. President Cardenas inaugurated the Inter American Indian Conference with the aim of 'enlightening' the Indian communities.

The post-war era saw 'the Indian' not as part of this evolutionary Mexican development but more as a cultural way of surviving in a particular environment. This was not a question of an evolution towards a Mexico of mestizios, but rather, that Indian cultures were contrasted to modernity. Now, it was more a question not of bringing the Indian to the city, but by taking the city to the Indians.

In Chiapas the 1950s and 1960s witnessed a rapid modernisation of agricultural production (The Green Revolution) that was financed by the World Bank and helped to solidify Mexico's fragile social relations. This development helped the rural areas to supply cheap food to the growing proletariat of the North. During the 1970s new dynamics of Indigenous unrest were emerging. Two movements set up, specifically attending to Indian issues and concerns were the National Front of Indian Peoples (FIPI) and the National Coordination of Indigenous Workers (CNPI).

The Etcheverra administration set up the National Indigenous Congress in 1974 and yet this move only served to unwittingly unleash a forum for coalescing radical indigenous forces (Flood 1999). Robertson-Rehberg (1998) noted that 1974 was a watershed year for the indigenous mobilisation. The Congress held in San Cristobel in Chiapas, a colonial town, focused on four main issues, the state of Indian education, health, the economy and access to land. Trujillo (1994a, 1-2) noted:

> in October, 1974, the First Indigenous Congress was organised in Chiapas convoked at first by the State government...from 1974, there began a very selective repression, a process that today completes a 20 year cycle with the

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explosion in January. The cycle can be divided basically into three
periods.The first was that of 1974-1980 with the great highlight of the
Independent Campesino Movement which began in a climate of great
repression on the part of the state government...this period concluded in the
month of July, 1980, with the assault on the community of
Gololehan...commanded by General Dominguez who later became state
governor.

In 1971 the World Council of Churches had met in Barbados to consider the
economic and social conditions of the indigenous situation in developing states.
In 1977 the United Nations (UN) set up the 'Inter Non-Governmental Organisation
Conference on Discrimination against Indigenous Peoples' which was then followed
in 1982 by the UN 'Working Group on Indigenous Peoples'. These concerns were
addressed in this 1974 Conference in the Chiapas town of San Cristobel de las Casas.
Thus, in 1974, 587 Tzetol delegates, 330 Tzotiles, 101 Choles and 152 Tojophales
representing 327 Indian communities met.at the Conference in San Cristobel.
Questions were asked concerning the state of Mexican development and the
possibility of a more favourable and a more sustainable/indigenous development. In
response, Rodriguez (1994, 5) noted that

> military uprisings have been reported in the Southern State. In 1974 there
> were insurrections in the municipalities of San Andres Larrainzar y
> Venustanio Carranza (this last brutally repressed by the Mexican army...(I)n
> 1975 the evictions in the army and the municipality of Simojevel; in 1976 the
> invasions of Frailesca, near Carranza and the violence in May...in 1978 the
> army assaulted Monte Libano in the middle of the jungle and carried out 'acts
> of punishment' against rebelling Indians in 1979 evictions and total state
> repression increased.

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Production in Chiapas was mostly based on cattle ranching, sugar, coffee and cacoa on plantations/haciendas. Chiapas has been and still is the principle source of Mexico's coffee production (Burbach and Rosset 1994).

During the 1970s new economic and social relations were generated as both non-Indian peasants and Indian peasants left to work in the more lucrative oil regions which were being opened up in Chiapas by the National Oil Company (PEMEX) (Ross 1996, 1996a). They returned in the early 1980s having experienced capitalist wage labour and bringing back with them a tide of accentuated class differences and more capitalist penetration through the new intensive agricultural technologies. Many returning workers (some Indian) now had the capital to purchase the modern machinery, new transport, and were able to hire additional labour. These migrants became the local enforcers or so-called caciques, controlling agricultural production in the highlands through money lending practices, land rental and sharecropping. Many had and still have political ties to the Partido Revolucion Institucional (PRI) and they would later benefit greatly from the neo-liberal agricultural reform of Article 27. Subsistence farmers and Indians in the East and in the Lacandon region were increasingly worse off because they had no access to the new technology which was now being used for intensive agricultural production on the plateaus and to the West (Martinez 1995).

By the early 1990s half of the Chiapas population did not have potable water, two-thirds had no sewage service and 90% of the population paid little or no taxes. Communication services in Chiapas were poor. Subcommandante Marcos (1992) wrote that since the "days of Porfirio Diaz, the railroads lines have serviced capitalism rather than the people" (Marcos 1992, 2). In Chiapas, levels of education were the worst in the country whilst 54% of the population suffered from malnutrition

and in the highlands and the forests this rose to 80%. Marcos (1992) emphasised the terror of poverty, malnutrition and repression. With this, to the prospective tourist, he states "(Y)ou have arrived in the poorest state of the country, Chiapas" (Marcos 1992, 3),

Indeed Chiapas was a truly tragic case because it was a state truly rich in an untold abundance of natural resources. It could be so much better (Rosset and Cunningham 1994; Strong 1995). With just 3.8% of the country's land Chiapas is Mexico's largest producer of coffee, Mexico's third largest maize producer and exporter, Mexico's fourth largest cattle producer and in the top three in Mexico for the production of tobacco, bananas and soya.

It would be easy to say that the reason for this imbalance was that the large plantation owners control much of the land whilst the majority of the people in Chiapas were landless (Burbach and Rosset 1994). However, 54% of the population live and farm in the communally organised 'ejido's'. Therefore it is briefly necesary to show how land in Chiapas has been organised (Brady 1996; Cleaver 1995).

The organisation of farming in the Chiapas region has, since the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the construction of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 mainly been by this communal or this 'ejido' system of agricultural self-sufficiency. In Chiapas there are 179,000 producers in the ejido system in which 11% are commercially viable. But there are also subsistence peasants who form 31% of the ejido sector with about 27% of the land. The remaining 58% work the diversified ejido's but only make an annual $300 on average.

Studies of the region suggested that it was not a question of land ownership *per se*, but more a question of access to rich agricultural land, finance, new technology and the instruments of capitalisation. The ejido structure and the break up of the large latifundios was pushed (relatively late in Chiapas) by President Cardenas in the 1930s. This was a time when Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution was most

radically acknowledged by the Mexican government (Knight 1994; Levy and Szekely 1983). A large scale projects of construction, dams, irrigation, roads and large scale commerical production ensued in the 1940s. The Mexican state was to provide the appropriated latifundio land for communal ownership and production by the Chiapas peasants and this was to be implemented by Mexican Constitutional Article 27.

But over time the caciques began to manipulate credit and gained control of key properties and assets with the aid of the PRI and its affiliated Official Peasant Union (CNC). Their wealth was increased during the 1960s and 1970s through the Green Revolution and the rise in international commodity prices.

President Etcheverra (1970-1976) developed an extensive investment programme in Chiapas through the Public Investment Project for Rural Development used to coordinate the projects. The government developed purchasing organisations to buy staple grains and commodities off middle ranking producers and therefore bypassed the caciques. But the 'top down' program did not achieve its desired 'modernisation' due to bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption. During the 1970s the Chiapas economy grew by 10.5% but the cattle industry boom created a monopolisation of land due to the required extensive farming and the displacement of traditional farming. Credit also reinforced the power of the cattle barons. It was the *skewing* of land concentration/ownership in the hands of the caciques/cattle ranchers that has caused increasing frustrations in Chiapas.

Thus, neo-liberal reform during the 1980s enforced cuts in state credit and subsidies which hit the small commercial producers the hardest. The production of maize fell by 20% from 1982 to 1987 and the government, through military enforcers such as General Dominiguez and the White Guards (hired gunmen of the caciques) began to undermine the rising plethora of militant and *autonomous* peasant organisations such as the Emiliano Zapata Organisation of Peasants (OPEZ). The production of beans dropped by 18% but cash crops boomed due to the devaluation of

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the peso through the structural adjustment of the 1980s but the price of coffee fell from $120 per hundred weight in 1989 to $60 in 1994. This led to a 65% drop in income for coffee producers. There were also concerns with the environmental implications of neo-liberalism (Hogenboom 1996; Ross 1998). Organisations such as the Maquila Solidarity Network (1996, 1996a, 1996b) and the Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC) showed their concern (Magdoff, Bellamy-Foster and Duttel 1998; Laurence and Browne 1998; Kristof and Wodunn 1999).

ii) Mexican Economic and Political Development.

In order to understand *why* the PRI has enforced a neo-liberal programme it is necessary to put Chiapas into an historical context of the political-economy of Mexico. Mexico is the worlds largest Spanish speaking country. Geographically, most of Mexico is highland and plateaus criss-crossed by a multitude of valleys and canyons. The only low land is the long desert peninsular of Baja California. Mexico has a population of 78 million, a density of 40 persons per square km. The population is made up of Mestizio 55%, Amerindian 30%, and European 15%. Mexico, a country of contrasts and of shadows (Oppenheimer 1997).

The often overwhelming, seething and sprawling metropolis of modern day Mexico City with an estimated population of around 25 million contrasts to the Southern and sparsely populated highland and rural regions of Chiapas. The seductive opulance of the glittering modern buildings that now adorn the shimmering skyline of Mexico City contrasts to the arid bleakness of the Chiapas highlands and the tropical swampy jungles to the South which could almost lie perhaps in another time. Mexico etches an intriguing engraving on the fabric of world history. From the exotic riches of the Aztec and Mayan Empires to the conquest of Colombus. From the Mexican Revolution of 1910 to the debt crisis of the early 1980s, Mexico has been the locus of gripping intellectual interest, from historians, sociologists and anthropologists.

The United States of Mexico became independent from Spain in 1821. From

1861-1867 the French invaded leaving Maximilian until 1867, when Benito Juaraz became President who was succeeded in 1876 by Porfirio Diaz. Throughout the early 20th century Mexico developed through an intensive capitalisation and industrialisation organised by the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz. This was a modernisation based on capitalism which placed attention on attracting foreign investment and particularly that of the US. A new proletariat was burgeoning in the industrial north as a conglomerate of industrial finance interests then began a battle against the rural landowners and motivated growing discontent by the small petit bourgeoisie and workers.

By 1910 the industrial-finance sector led by Madero and supported by Villa and Zapata were challenging the General Huerta dictatorship 1913-1914. Zapata led the Zapatistas, the peasants in the South whilst Villa led the industrial petit bourgeosie, the Constitutionalists, the proletariats and the socialists in the North as a broad based movement. Ricardo Magon with his communist and anarchist aspirations for a political and social revolution organised strikes through the Mexican Liberal Party (PLM) and orchestrated seizures of the means of production.

In 1917 the Mexican revolution had succeeded in creating a nationalist, anti-imperialist and socialist populism. But the revolutionary state was creating a role for the powerful Mexican bourgeoisie and produced the enslavement of the working class by corporatism and the expansion of the petit bourgeoisie due to a defeated peasantry. The revolutionary state was a conglomerate of military men, bureaucrats and technocrats (Lawson 1997; Laurell 1992; Meyer and Sherman 1987; Miller 1985).

Gradually through a series of contests and assassinations, the revolutionary state/party system was cemented. The national government, although dominated by the Presidency has separate Constitutional powers, the executive, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies (Congress) (Knight 1986; Ross 1996; Thompson and Thompson

1991). Mexico's society and economy have since functioned under the shadow of this one party/state monolith (Laurell 1992).

In 1929 the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) was founded by Plutarco Calle, leading to the Mexican Revolutionary Party (PRM) which later became the PRI in 1946. Plutarco Elias Calle established an authoritarian state that was legitimated by patronage, coercion and the institutionalisation of class struggle. In essence the post-revolutionary state carried on as "a system of interest representation by hierachally organised and non-competitive groups recognised and regulated (if not created) by the state" (Hale 1985, 397). President Cardenas (1934-1940) broke Mexico down into the major economic sectors on this basis, labour, peasant and popular. The revolutionary state tried to keep the Mexican bourgeois out and yet the power of the business sector could not be overcome.

Essentially the revolutionary state is a bourgeois state seeking authority through corporatism (Proyect 1998). Collier and Collier (1979) took corporatism as the state where official unions are sanctioned by the states hierachy and penetrated by inducements and bureaucratic authoritarianism. In order to maintain its legitimacy, concessions were made to the proletariat through the practices of state/labour corporatism This was maintained through Official Unions led by 'charro' bosses such as Vincente Lombardo Toledo of the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) and the CNC. President Cardenas accelerated a widespread land reform program which gave access to the land to Mexico's peasants in line with Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution. This Article allowed land to be owned communally by the peasantry and the state played a role in providing this and privately owned plantations in the rural areas (latifundios) were broken up. From 1934-1940 President Cardenas developed a 'new deal' program of state regulated capitalism (Proyect 1998). This was ideologically cemented through consensus and a new found Mexican populism (Knight 1998). Cardenas took a gamble (Hodges and Gandy 1979). There were contradictions in the

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Revolutionary Constitution. There was a socialist Article 27 and a liberal ideological basis to the Constitution that allowed individuals to keep private property and business and the idea of the republic was "like a fig leaf that covers the sheer nakedness of Presidential power" (Hodges and Gandy 1979, 25). The revolution swept away feudal relations but a socialist state was not formed *per se*.

Despite its centralised government each state in the federation has its own governor and legislature. Both houses of National Congress are directly elected with 64 members of Senate with two from each confederation as a member for 6 years. But with its patronage the PRI is seen as synonomous with the Mexican state. The national Presidential elections take place every 6 years and yet the President is forbidden to take more than one term in office. Every three years there are mid-term elections. For instance the 1997 elections which proved for some to be a major turning point in Mexican politics (Blum 1997- see chapter six here) opened up for reelection 500 seats in Congress and 32 governorships in a number of federal states. These federal elections take place annually and are focused on the re-election of members of the state Congress and the re-elections of local mayors in the municipalities.

Ostensibly with efforts to maintain order the idea of succession in Presidential elections was and is meant to enforce a sense of continuity (Blum 1997). Incumbent Presidents commit themselves to their immediate PRI successor by supporting them through what is known as "the pointing finger" (Zinser 1987). The PRI maintained this presidential dominance on three main counts. Firstly, that a strong president is required for a strong national consensus. Secondly, that a strong executive and president is able to provide interests to all groups. Finally, that a strong president and executive is part of Mexico's distinctive historical tradition (Rogers 1988). Essentially the balance for the PRI has been one of maintaining its legitimacy consensually and the sometimes necessary stick of coercion and military intervention. Tutino (1998) noted that the repression of students in 1968 at Tlatelclso

Plaza de las Tres Cultuvas., Mexico City, heralded a new turning point for the PRI.

The idea of a dominant PRI underestimates the historical pertinence of resistances in

Mexico and the ideological cleavages within the PRI.

iii) Mexican Post-War Optimism.

During the 1950s and 1960s Mexico developed through a progressive

'developmentalism' strategy with emphasis on capitalist development. However the

state was to play a major part by providing adequate production/consumption trade

offs through welfare, insurance and cultivating and protecting national industry. This

was a national development plan which in the developed world became known

generally as 'fordism'. Emphasis was on the stability of economic growth through

constant state assistance. Emphasis was placed on policies known as import

substitution (ISI) and state subsidies to inspire domestic consumption.

This nationalist orientated development was influenced by the theoretical work of

Raul Prebisch. Prebisch had convened the 1964 United National Conference and

Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which had demanded fairer world trade for

products exported from the developing world. Moreover the policy agenda was based

more radically, on 'dependency theory' (Seers 1985). As such, the planned and

centralised import substitution strategies meant that developing countries could grow

without concerning themselves too much with the relative uncertainties of

internationalism. Middlebrook (1988) noted that the import substitution/national

strategy was secured by the implementation in the post-war era of a Mexican alliance

for growth. As such, the nationalistic ISI policy was regarded as an economic and

political consolidation of Mexico's economic and political sovereignty.[22]

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[22] The earlier sense of post-war optimism in the developing world, for
many, influenced and was influenced by the work of Walt Rostow (Hoogvelt 1996).
Rostows stages of growth model assumed that all states went through a series of
stages of development from agricultural and subsistence societies, preconditions for
growth, and finally to high mass consumption industrial societies. Classical Marxists

Some groups in Chiapas had gained from this hike in world oil prices and government investment in the region (Tanzer 1994).

The Etcheverra administration (1970-1976) responded to economic slowdown during the 1970s through a Keynesian inspired developmentalist strategy by increasing public expenditure and generated a further diversification of Mexico's exports. This desultory strategy did not work and only continued to fuel a climate of excessive public expenditure, stagflation, lack of investor confidence and pronounced economic and political instability. New economic and social concerns with the environment were also identified (Brecher and Costello 1994). According to a World Bank World Development Report, Gross National Product (GNP) per capita in the West was by 1980, $10,444 whilst in the South it was $650 per head (Frieden 1981).

Gradually it was realised that a new form of development was required. This neo-liberal development would be capitalist development based on the free market. There subsequently emerged a new challenge to national economic sovereignty. Through what became known as neo-liberal structural adjustment the divisive margin between rich and poor was to become greater. This was through an often brutal and deeper disciplining or neo-liberalisation of Mexico's economy and society (Bird and Selvage 1997; Depalma 1995; Roxborough 1992, 1992a).[23]

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had also pointed to the long term benefits of economic and political exploitation through the transfer of surplus capital, a necessary process, on the road to communism. This view was later challenged by the Neo-Marxist perspective which highlighted the continuing economic and political legacy of 'neo colonial' and economic exploitation/dependency (Brewer 1980). This economic hierachy took the form of surplus extraction between states through unequal terms of trade and exchange (Chomsky 1992, 1993).

[23]Some blamed global stagflatory problems on the oil crisis and the rise in commodity prices for world recession. Others suggested that there could be underlying and structural contradictions at work (Aglietta 1979; Lipietz 1989, 1994; Mandel 1976, 1980). Western and developing governments throughout the 1970s had continued to perceive the stagnation of the 1970s as one of mass global overproduction. The

iv) Mexico and Neo-liberalism.

Subcommandante Marcos emphasised the significance of the North American

Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in that first statement in 1994 (Marcos 1994a).

NAFTA was regarded as a manifestation of a broader structural change in Latin

American development. Thus, developing states such as Mexico began realising that

globalisation as a new economic reality was emerging and that all development

strategies had to be attuned to the dominance and mobility of foreign investment. In

order to attract this investment a new market orientated development was required.

Gradually there was an opening up to this investment by states leading it seemed to a

relative decline in state control. Cox (1979) argued that this process developed

through the New International Division of Labour. Third World countries used the

comparative advantage of low wages to attract TNC's where export processing zones

proliferated [24] (Mittelman 1996). Indeed, the Mexican debt crisis in 1982 sparked the

subsequent development of a new form of development in Mexico fraught with

instabilities and contradictions (Sanchez 1995). And neo-liberalism was to dictate

new strategies. It was stated:

> Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution which in 1917 had established land
>
> redistribution and the ejido as the building blocks of agarian reform in the
>
> countryside, was basically gutted by Salinas in 1992. The new legislation
>
> enacted by the PRI dominated Congress ended land redistribution and made it
>
> possible for private and foreign investors to invet in or buy existing ejido
>
> lands. Certain limits were placed on the move to privatisation, such as the
>
> requirement that twothirds of ejidatories on a given ejido have to agree to any

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response, more welfare, but it was a response that nearly bankrupted many states.
Infact, this time, the main problem was low profitability.
[24]The more radical global reach thesis (Dicken 1992; Ohmae 1990; Porter 1990)
suggests that there is occuring a gradual demise of the state. 92

privatisation scheme, and the setting of limits on the size (12.500 hectares) and number of shareholders (25) that could turn a former ejido into a commercial corporation (Burbach and Rosset 1994, 12).

Any old fashioned hint of re-claiming state intervention was thereby rejected (although not totally) by the De La Madrid (1982-1988) administration. Whilst De La Madrid increased public services in Chiapas and aided the construction of a new highway along the Guatemalan border to secure the further integration of Chiapas, the emphasis on market forces as Mexico's future was clear (Harvey 1998). It was understood that "the debt crisis was the end of an era" (Pastor and Wise 1997, 421). Moreover, it was clear generally that the "economic situation in Latin America" had called on the elites to devise a new approach to economic development, to develop new incentives and to inspire domestic and global investor confidence (Paus 1989, 223). Indeed, the PRI was becoming increasingly divided between the conservatives and the new neo-liberal technocrats (Centaros and Maxfield 1992). The dominant view was that "the failure to keep inflation under control would raise questions about the continuity of political stability in Mexico and about continuing progress on a path of political opening" (Roxborough 1992, 641).

Neo-liberal austerity seemed to work. Whilst inflation hit 200% in 1982, by 1988 and into the 1990s inflation was being controlled at around 14%. The theory was that this would inspire investor confidence, economic 'trickle down' and political liberalisation. Yet real evidence of democracy has been mixed at best (Cavorozzi 1992; Elizondo 1994; Ward 1993; Welch 1993). Burbach (1997b) argued that the first sign of a shift to the free market, privatisation and the roll back of the state was when "Nixon took the US off the gold standard in 1971" and after "the Cancun Summit in Mexico in 1982" when "the US and the Imperial Powers formally launched the era of global neoliberalism and began imposing structural adjustment programs." For

President Salinas (1988-1994) the market discourse effectively was progressive entry

to the First World. It was assumed that states had to fall in behind globalisation

because it was a teleological force 'out there' (Amoore *et al* 1997, 2000a). As such,

some view globalisation as an all encompassing panglossian process driven by

technological or economic dynamics.[25] The neo-liberal discourse is an "unfolding

Hegelian myth" of "progress, technical efficiency and problem solving" (Gill 1995,

405). With neo-liberalism modernisation theory has been resuscitated (Amoore *et al*

1997: Leys 1996). Neo-liberalism has come to define the nature and practices of

modernity and Mexican security (Hilbert 1997).

v) Globalisation versus the state.

The new forces of globalisation, transnational corporations (TNCs) and global

finance had to be bargained with as new matrices of power began undermining the

economic and political sovereignty of the state (Clarke 1997, 1998; Cohen 1996; Gray

1998; Mayall 1998; Perraton, Goldblatt, Held and McGrew 1997; Pooley 1991).

Gradually, globalisation became tied to the new free market ethos. In fact

neo-liberalism has been a spectacular transformation throughout Latin America

(Hojman 1995; Morales 1999; Pastor and Wise 1997). The power of the state has

moved elsewhere (Laurence and Browne 1998; Smadia 1999). According to Ohmae

(1990, 213) this neo-liberal sentiment accepts that "we are not one big happy family

in the world yet" but "we may be closer than we think."What this does mean for many

is that the fordist state system or developmentalism is now being eroded (Amin;

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[25]There are those who recognise that globalisation is a more multifaceted process, but whilst it has "introduced change in the nature of international relations".(Mayall 1998, 248), it is also a process that is overturnable (Amoore *et al* 1997; Cox 1999). The overpowering neo-liberal seduction is adhered to perhaps more paradoxically, by those on the traditional left (Meiksins-Woods 1996). It is commonplace among left observers and left activists, assuming that there is the dominating emergence of a new international division of labour, the globalisation of production and insistant corporate demands for concessions on wages, benefits and work conditions (Gordon 1988). 94

1994; Armstrong 1998; Barry-Jones 1995; Harvey 1989; Held and McGrew 1998; Jameson 1989; Jessop 1992; Waters 1994).[26]

Consequently there emerged an articulation and restructuring between the state and globalisation (Economist 7 October 1995). States have not disappeared. But in terms of the consolidation of previous economic and political sovereignty new pressures are evident. For instance global economic structures entail new economic and political articulations (Stopford and Strange 1991). States have to now be alert, adaptable to external change in the global economy and quick to note what other states are up to in the games that nations play (Armstrong 1998; Walker 1988). Essentially the state was now a self-seeking unity scouring the global markets for investment opportunities and wealth creation by developing attractive investment climates. The creation of these climates requires a dismantling of intervention strategies, an opening up of economies to foreign investment cutting taxes and a rolling back of the interventionist state.

According to Cerny (1990, 229) the state has now evolved as a bargaining and new "market player" because the traditional pillars of state development and its ideals

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[26] Clark (1997) suggested that this is a new and intensive stage of global accumulation but is a part of an "historical evolution" (Clark 1997, 31). Freysinger (1991) posited that neo-liberalism is a major magnification of everything known for the last 30 or more years. Neo-liberal development indicates that a new intensified phase of capital accumulation has been unleashed (Magdoff 1992). Consequently, Burbach (1997b, 1) argued that capitalism has now gone through four major stages in Latin America. This has been evolving, although not progressing *per se*, from Colombus' age of discovery and the colonisation of Latin America, to industrial capitalist development, to the dominance of finance and finally to globalisation manifested economically by the emergence of a new and dictatorial global capital. This capital is free to roam the world and is tapping into cheap labour markets and undermining wages. It is also suggested that "current neoliberal globalisation is not the same as the general historical spread of capitalism" (MacEwan 1994, 132). By the end of the 1980s an "unprecedented growth in foreign capital penetrate more widely and deeper than ever" (Magdoff 1992, 44). Magdoff (1992, 50) noted that the "slowdown of economic growth increases competition for foreign as well as domestic markets..there is no surprise there has been a great leap during the 1980s." It was also accepted that this form of "globalisation is the international spread of capital exchange and production is a very painful process" (MacEwan 1994, 130).

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such as maintaining labour rights, welfare and social production are being rendered

obselete or at best reduced to the lowest possible overhead costs (Fuenzalida and

Sunkel 1979; Hirst and Thompson 1996; Hutton 1995; Murray 1988; Scholte 1992).

Prevalent business economists such as Ohmae (1990) termed this epoch as 'the

borderless world' or crucially as the 'end of the nation state'.[27] But states now needed

to synchronise their development policies with neo-liberal globalisation (Block 1977;

Calleo 1982; Cohen 1995; Dunning 1988; Frieden 1981; Hood and Vahlne 1988;

Pooley 1991; Porter 1990; Strange 1986, 1995, 1996; Vernon 1971; Zysman 1996).

Throughout Latin America cracks emerged (Petras and Morley 1983; Hudson and

Ford 1992). [28]

vi) Discontent in Mexico and Chiapas.

In Mexico there had been a mix of liberalism and state centralisation in order to

maintain a viable and orderly investment climate particularly prevalent during the

Diaz era of the late 19th century. Now, in contrast to the more recent triumphalist

pronouncements it was said that the "triumph of neo-liberalism never occured"

(Kagarlitsky 1996, 36). [29] That is neo-liberal globalisation has not brought about this

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[27]There has in fact emerged a certain concern as to the long term benefits of
continuing neo-liberalism (Preston 1998). This is due to the spreading shock waves of
the recent global financial turbulence (NCDM 31 October 1998; Stevenson 1998a).

[28]It was also a time when the West was particularly concerned with the outrageously
truculant nature of socialist revolution and radical/national bourgeois states, the latter,
a development that at the time was a far greater threat than the leftist rebellions which
had sparked the re-generation of Reagans Second Cold War (Halliday 1983) in
Central America. Gills, Rocamora and Wilson (1993) suggested that few people
realised how threatened the US felt at the time. Yet aspirations for Third World
Solidarity were quelled by the divide and rule strategy of the West (Hoogvelt 1986).
Indeed, the role of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was
particularly ironic given that petrodollar deposits insidiously perpetuated a climate of
competitive lending to the developing world by the Western bank deposits (Cox 1979;
Feinburg 1989; Frieden 1981).
[29]Meiksins-Woods (1996) maintained that the underlying structure of the wage
relation of exploitative global capitalism remains intact. She argued that
"globalisation is the heaviest ideological albatross around the neck of the left"

inevitable exalted development but has brought about excruciating immiseration and poverty. Indeed, for some, neo-liberal globalisation is simply a manifestation of economic neo-colonialism where "the central factor that enabled the expansion of US capital overseas was the consolidation of the US as imperial state which functions to facilitate capitalism" (Petras and Morley 1983, 219).

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s there crystallised discontent with the general freezing of wages and welfare cuts. Burbach (1997a) argued that "when the debt crisis hit in 1982 and the Mexican peso collapsed in value, there was a large influx of US capital, as real wages dropped by 50%." However, Burbach (1997a) noted that:

> the IMF in many cases agreed to help the countries restructure their debt loads but only if they carried out neoliberal economic programmes. Social spending was severely curtailed and many state enterprises were sold off...these policies have failed. They have not induced growth in Latin America only more suffering and economic deprivation.

Moreover, Burbach (1992) noted that "most of the countries in Latin America bowed to the dictates of the neo liberal doctrine" and throughout the 1980s "capital was sucked out of Latin America by the transnationals" (Burbach 1992, 245). As a consequence "all social services were curtailed" street crime "jumped in every country, education at all levels declined and most importantly hunger and malnutrition increased" (Burbach 1992, 245). Indeed Latin American entrepreneurs during the era of developmentalism and who once saw US capital as a threat, were

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particularly its reliance on the theme of dominance and 'no alternative' (Meiksins-Woods 1996, 23). Hoogvelt (1996, 16) argued that the "periphery performs a special function" for global capital (Burbach 1993; Kolko and Kolko 1972; O'Connor 1971). As Schraeder noted (1992, 6) "the Third World is an important focal point for US investment...33.7% of total US imports and 23.7% of total private US investment."

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now quite willing to engage in a multiplicity of new joint ventures with US

transnationals (Burbach 1992). But Macewan (1994, 130) contended that:

> within Mexico, recent years have also seen rising inequality, especially
>
> since the middle of the 1980s when the government began to move strongly
>
> with its programme of neoliberal reforms. Indeed a worsening distribution of
>
> income was the general rule in Latin American countries during the
>
> 1980s...despite attempts to diversify its trade and investment ties, Mexico
>
> remains overwhelmingly dependent on the US.

During the 1980s Mexico's minimum wages fell by 41.3% between 1982 and

1983 (Middlebrook 1989). Unions such as the CTM also entered a generational crisis.

Pastor and Wise (1997) noted that the 1982 debt crisis marked the end of ISI as a

development strategy and was a watershed for a development which had traditionally

focused on industry and the state whilst there were also "recurrent cycles of conflict

over the terms of state/society relationships" (Fox 1994, 159). The PRI had

previously used a mixture of cooption and coercion to quell dissent. In 1973, the

Program of Rural Development and Investment was forged with implementation of

the National Plan for Repressed Zones and Marginal Groups (COPLNMAR). The

National Basic Foods Company (CONASUPA) aimed to provide staple food prices

for the rural areas. But by the 1990s there was emerging an uneven economic and

political development particularly in Chiapas.

Previously, most peasant revolts were particularist because the "grievance is well

defined and local" (Lichbach 1994, 389). However, a link between local issues and

more pressing national grievances was emerging at this time. Many urban and

squatter groups took advantage of factions within the ruling party and emerged in the

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outskirts of cities such as San Cristobel (Perritore and Galve-Perritore 1993). The PRI was dominated by sharp suited and educated neo-liberal technocrats. Lindau (1996) noted that many in Zedillo's administration had acquired their economic degrees from American Universities.[30]

In Mexico the development of neo-liberalism has now been termed 'Salinastroika' (Economist October 28 1995). President Salinas continued the neo-liberal programme which had been precipitated by his predecessor, President De la Madrid (1982-1988). The controversial privatisation was initiated in Chiapas by State Governor Garrido in 1989 with the privatisation of the Chiapas *Forestry Corporation (COREO)*. In *1989*, traditional economic help for coffee growers was disbanded and state subsidies reduced. An overvalued peso due to high interest rates plus an influx of cheaper grain now affected agricultural exports.

President Salinas on 1 October 1993 set up the Program Nacional de Apoyas Directos al Campo (PROCAMPO) which gave new support for the maize growers of about $103 per each hectare. The regions of Altos and Selva benefitted as areas of increasing PRD support. By 1991 in Mexico there were 29,951 ejidos encompassing 20 million people. The 1992 PRI reform to Article 27 had given the legal right to purchase, sell, rent or use land as collateral on individual and communal plots. Private companies were now allowed to purchase campesino and indigenous land. The Rural Association of Collective Interests (ARIC) in turn had offered to buy land for the benefit of the campesino's but this move was rejected by the PRI. Phillips (1991) noted that the PRI were already engaging in full scale economic transformation.

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[30] From January 1972 to July 1977 Lindau (1996) noted that there were 70 invasions by peasants which were ruthlessly repressed by the state. Instances of such overt repression had diminished with neo-liberalism, mostly because states waging war against its citizens, could not reasonably expect to attract much foreign investment. This 'public image' has beset the PRI during the EZLN mobilisation with constant dilemmas. The Coalition of Workers, Peasants in the State of Isthmus (COCEI) in Oaxaca, in 1983 was also ruthlessly intimidated.   99

vii) The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Subcommandante Marcos pinpointed NAFTA as a cause for the EZLN uprising. According to President Clinton (1993) NAFTA "promotes market reform and the benefits of them to both countries" in the "best interest of both countries." According to the Congressional Weekly Report (1994) the US House of Representatives had passed NAFTA on November 17, 1993, the Senate passed it on November 20 1993 and President Clinton Signed NAFTA on December 8 1993. With NAFTA funds were set aside for Import Relief for those businesses affected in the short term, by the free market agreement. Assistance to workers was to be provided along with anti-dumping legislation. But the concrete effects were more problematic. The influx of investment into the Chiapas region promoted by NAFTA was supplemented by the concern for the subsistence farmers and farmers who had produced the staple crop of maize for local markets and who required state assistance in order to maintain this function (Tabb 1997; Wallis 1998).

In contrast to this optimism Burbach (1997c, 1) suggested that "the old tired neo liberal panacea that free trade and open markets were the way to deal with hunger" was becoming extremely incredulous. NAFTA is undoubtedly symptomatic of the changing pattern of international economic relations and in particular, the shift to a new form of economic regionalisation (Hurrell 1995, 1995a; Nelson 1993). The treaty provided opportunities for other Latin American countries to benefit from free trade.

NAFTA was passed through the American Congressional Executive agreement which was a way of passing a treaty through Congress without requiring the two-thirds majority in Congress usually required. NAFTA required just a simple majority mainly because NAFTA was regarded as a revenue measure because it dealt with trade and taxes. However President Clinton (1993) stated:

keep in mind this is not simply a trade agreement, this is also an investment

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agreement...and the issue is whether, when we make it much more attractive

for the United States to invest in Mexico...to promote market reforms and the

benefits of them to both countries.

The breadth of economic benefits inspired by a free market agreement (Clinton

2000).[31] Marcos explained in an interview that "if NAFTA begins in first January of

1994 and the death of these people begin this day why don't why not begin the

liberation of these people right this day" (Ovetz 1994). According to Ross (1998,

6):the "Zapatistas warned that the Mexican government must find a final solution to

its agarian problems. According to Subcommandante Marcos the reform of Article 27

furthered poverty in Chiapas marginalised the indigenous population and forced the

rebels to declare war on the government."

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[31]This was the main argument of the revolts against the WTO in Seattle, December
1999 and against the global elite in Davos, Switzerland, January 2000. Free trade and
freedom of movement for global capital yes, of course. But not the free movement of
the worlds workers. This means that capital can play off workers and states against
each other, looking for the 'best deal'.This leaves those vulnerable to the vagaries of
corporate blackmail (Maquila Solidarity Network 1996).
The Maquila Solidarity Network has current campaigns against the activities of global
companies such as Mattel in Mexico and against Phillips Van Heusen in Guatemala,
aiming to support workers in these areas. In a Maquila Update (1996b) it was reported
that "two recent wildcat strikes in autopart plants in Mexicos northern maquiladora
region, highlight growing worker dissatisfaction with their declining standard of
living under the North American Free Trade Agreement. Their introductory flyer
(1996c) stipulates that "with the spread of free trade workers and communities in
Canada and throughout the Americas are subject to corporate blackmail. To compete
for jobs and investment, we are told we must accept lower wages, cutbacks in social
services, poorer health and safety and environmental standards." It was reported by
the Maquila Network (1996), that "Mexican workers protesting outside the Favesa
Maquiladora in Ciudad Juarez, were violently attacked by the police." Part of the
development of legitimising control over the Chiapas area is through the governments
drug enforcement campaign (Farah and Moore 1998; NCDM 3 April 1998).
There are groups such as the Mexican Action Network on Free Trade (RMALC)
networking and organising trade unions and small farmers (Garcia 1995). One
observer of the rebellion was reported to have said "I thought Mexico was peaceful,
but apparently this state is different" (Garcia 1995,1).   101

Burbach and Rosset (1994) noted that through neo-liberalism and NAFTA it was estimated that 3 million families or 15 million people would be expelled from the countryside as the grain market collapses. Indeed there was a concern that because of NAFTA there was not going to be enough for the peoples of the rural areas to eat (Burbach 1997c; Lehman 1995). Tarleton argued (1996, 4) that:

> a neoliberal economic regime is currently being imposed around the world. Sponsored by leading bankers, industrialists, compliant national governments and international agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, the neoliberal program is similar from one country to the next. So are the consequences...more unjust, authoritarian societies.

The Salinas administration helped ease the reform, through the setting up of the National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL) and reform to the Rural Bank (BANRURAL).[32] But the poverty in Chiapas during the 1990s was systematically enforced by a new development strategy and the disciplined state could ill afford rural subsidies, all "symptomatic of a larger malaise" (Burbach and Rosset 1994, 2). According to Ruggiero (1998, 6):

> The Zapatistas stunned the world for many reasons. First, precisely because they chose January 1, 1994, the first day of the enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to open their brilliantly coordinated campaign against economic globalisation, the Zapatistas illustrated the devestating impact that globalisation can have on the fabric of local cultures. In their earliest public statements the Zapatistas announced that NAFTA would not bring them jobs but a death sentence...seeking to activate

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[32]This emphasis on the ability of the PRI to maintain effective governance historically through its forms of hegemony and to regard such resistances as an indication of the break up of PRI hegemony is implicated in neo-Gramscian studies of the EZLN (Morton 2000).

and mobilise civil society a truly subversive project in a global economic

system that seeks to place corporate interest above democratic law, and

redefine citizen power as consumer choice.

The problem Burbach (1992, 241) noted, was that NAFTA would "enable US

corporate capital to tke advantage of the cheap labour resources to the south and to

better compete for markets on a global level" with the conclusion that "NAFTA, then,

is quite explicitly an agreement that pushes out the boundaries of unfettered capitalist

production, and in doing so, it limits democracy by limiting peoples power to exercise

political control over their economic lives" (Macewan 1994, 131). There had been

earlier PRI initiatives such as the 1980 agarian reform through the Agricultural and

Livestock Promotion Law (LFA), and an upswing in productivity and revenue

between 1982 to 1986 ensued. But by December 1987 a new pact between

government, business and the CNC on the progressive nature of neo-liberalism and

pacts between the private sector and certain favoured ejidos had occured. This

provoked ongoing unrest.

Indeed the ejido credit bank BANRURAL by the late 1980s was dogged by

accusations of internal corruption and gained antipathy from peasants even though it

cut its lending interest rates. Salinas brought in the 'concertacion' leading to the

National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL) and by 1990 there had emerged a

decentralisation. To no avail. It was all coupled with and suffocated by neo-liberal

reform and more controversial private commercialisation of ejidos. A Program of

Direct Support (PROCAMPO) emerged by October 1993 to help those ejidos moving

towards the private sector. This strategy was heavily criticised for its 'divide and rule'

intimation, creating further hardships amongst the rural poor of the Lacandon Jungle

who now felt utterly marginalised (Cox 1999; Welker 1994).

The richness of social composition in Chiapas was recognised by a number of commentators. With the implementation of NAFTA, Nobel Prize winner Jose Saramago (1998, 2) wrote that:

> six years ago in obedience to the dictates of the neo-liberal economic
> revolution masterminded from outside and ruthlessly enforced by the
> government, the amendments to the Mexican Constitution put an end to the
> distribution of land and to any hope the landless peasants may have cherished
> of having their own patch of ground.

Saramago (1998, 2) also noted:

> The native peoples believed they could defend their historic rights (or
> customery rights if you think Indian communities have no place in Mexican
> history...as a last resort they often had to flee to the mountains or take refuge
> in the forest and it was there, in the deep mists of the hills and valleys, that the
> rebellion was to take root.

From all over Mexico, Indian and nonIndian migrants are now forced Northwards to the US/Mexico border to what has become known as the corrugated 'Tortilla Border'. Burbach (1997c, 2-4) argued that in his view:

> particularly important...are global and regional trade pacts such as NAFTA
> which contain specific clauses dealing with the liberalisation of trade in
> agricultural products. Secondly as part of the globalisation process,
> agribusiness corporations are acquiring ever increasing control over all aspects
> of the worlds agro food provisioning system...a dark and adverse impact. It

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spawns new economic and social inequalities, uproots the peasantry as it accelerates the historic migration from the country side to the megacities, retains a rural workforce employed on modern agricultural estates at less than subsistence wages.

Smith and Korzeniewicz (1994) pointed out that NAFTA had activated growing groups of marginalised and excluded peoples. In real terms Mexican minimum wages fell 40% between 1980 and 1995 (Zermano 1994). The large landowners saw the 1992 reform to Article 27 and NAFTA as the nod of approval to continue their 'punitive actions'.on campesinos who were now seen as illegally and unconstitutionally soliciting privately owned land (Trujillo 1994a). As Ochoa (1996) argued land distribution in Chiapas was still extremely unequal as 667 people owned 817,000 acres and the remaining population (approx 3 million) communally owned 1.5 million acres. These mismatches were intensified by NAFTA. The scepticism with neo-liberalism was reported by a major NCDM (NCDM 10 September 1998) report stipulating that:

> Mexico remains a country with severe street crime and business corruption, desperate poverty in the countryside, a major insurgency in the Chiapas province, a falling currency and stock market, a dependence on a sinking export, oil, and a political system fiercely resistant to Mr Zedillo's scheme to strengthen the country's fragile banking system.

One American journalist who had worked in the region, John Ross (1994, 1-2) wondered rather ungraciously why so many leading American journalists, particularly Tim Golden and Anthony dePalma of the *New York Times*, having traversed the Central American region, were taken by surprise when the EZLN

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mobilisation finally erupted in Chiapas on New Years Day 1994, given these conditions.

Ultimately, the problem for the PRI was their vulnerable image. Any hint of unrest would cause capital flight. Any sign of political instability and investors jump from peso assets to dollar assets (Conger 1995; James Meigs 1996). Foreign investors withdrew their dollars later on that year, due to allegations of drug related political assassinations and the Indian rebellion in Chiapas (Whalen 1995). The *Economist* (January 7, 1995) considered that the Zapatista movement represented a Mexican volcano. Ross (1998, 2) argued:

> before the European invasion of 1519, South Eastern Mexico was covered
> with a densely wooded canopy extending from the Yucatan Peninsular to the
> Lacandon Jungle and Guatemala. Today these woods are a museum piece in
> enclaves such as Los Montes Azules (Blue Mountains) a biosphere reserve
> protected by the United Nations with the Zapatista community nearby...the
> plans for transnational planters for South Eastern Mexico are imperial...Pulsar
> has with close ties to the government (Pedro Aspe former treasury secretary
> heads the Stock Exchange) has planted almost a million hectares in Tabasco
> and Veracruz to produce cellulose for the next 25 years...the scheme to
> convert Maya Mexico into a vast eucalyptus plantation is a direct consequence
> of the reform of Article 27 of the Constitution.

The Chiapas air carried a light odour of petroleum production.[33] The free market agreement was crowding out local producers and local markets. Harvey (1995) explained that during the 1990s agricultural subsidies have fallen in the Chiapas region by about 17% annually and it was felt that the government, with its optimistic

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[33]Ross (1995, 1996a) noted that amongst the Selva, oil resources were plentiful. Why else was there so much interest from the PRI?

platitudes was bereft of political.and social empathy with the concrete Chiapas reality. Harvey (1995) noted that 50% of Chiapas population were malnourished only 70% are literate and that public interest was generated by a concern that the indigenous communal ejidos were going to be sold in favour of private and global capital. NAFTA contrived to reduce the local economic sustenance and self-sufficiency of more than 2 million maize producers in the Chiapas region (Morales 1996; Nash and Kovic 1996). Burbach (1997c) concluded that:

> the restructuring of many national economies often under the auspices of structural adjustment or stabilisation programs has driven a new export orientated emphasis in agriculture, often at the expense of local food crops and internal consumption...an international conference of over 100 peasant and farmer organisations from 45 countries held in Mexico in 1996 similarly declared that trade liberalisation is destroying the small farmers and peasants means of subsistence.

Five kinds of agricultural producer have now emerged in Mexico. These changes have been accelerated by the development of neo-liberalism and its ranging causes of injustice. The ejidarios, the owners of land are closely linked to the government, and minifundias land is sold to the salaried workers who bought land without bureaucratic hassle. There are middle class owners, large landholders and the new jornaleros. There are also the landless who were meant to find work in the city (Sanders 1986).

State elections held in the Chiapas region in August 1994 and the victory for the then PRI candidate Governor Robledo who took 50.4% of the vote suggested that this was a clear indication for the continuation of neo-liberalism in the region. Yet

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Burbach (1992, 239) concluded that:

> under the banner of neoliberalism and free trade, US governmental and
> corporate leaders in conjunction with other hemisphere elites are not only
> intensifying their exploitation of the continents human and material resources
> but are spreading immiseration and poverty more widely than ever.

The sheer enormity of the neo-liberal influence as Andrea Durbin (1998, 2) suggested
was shown in the once Keynesian inspired institutions such as the World Bank which
have maintained that the:

> private sector is now a recognised area of emphasis...the bank will often
> require a government to cut domestic spending, open up markets for foreign
> investment, expand exports and liberalise trade...(I)n the early 1990s, the
> World Bank underwent a mid life crisis. During this period, private capital
> flows to emerging market economies in the developing world increased
> significantly.

The *Economist* (12 November 1995) reported that many in Mexico had been critical
of California's punitive laws towards Mexican migrants as migrants had been
flooding the border since the implementation of NAFTA. The *Economist* (December
10, 1994) asked "listen carefully, can you hear a giant sucking sound of jobs and
investment disappearing from the US to the Rio Grande in Mexico."

But the optimism with free trade has continued unabated. From US to Mexico,
there had been a 23% increase in exports and from January-September 1994 and
imports from Mexico to the US were up 23%. President Zedillo (1994-2000) said that
these facts indicated that NAFTA was right for Mexico. Indeed, in the US, only
12,000 workers had applied for instance, to the Transitional Adjustment Assistance.

The *Economist* (July 23, 1994) reported that President Salinas had rightly liberalised the economy, making 18 banks independent and commercial but devaluation was unlikely as this would cause inflationary pressures. The Mexican government was split as to the costs and long term benefits of neo-liberalism.

The opulance of the financial sector of Mexico City, the crowded and sun drenched beaches of Acapulco indicate that Mexico's rich have benefitted enormously by pushing for an end to their countries protectionist policies and integrating themselves into the talons of the global economy. Today, Mexico has 23 billionaires. Meanwhile, lurking behind the cinematic paradise of Mexico's tropical landscapes and cocktail bars, resides the Mexican working class, the poor and the indigenous sectors continuing to suffer ignominiously from the readjustment imposed on Mexico by the international finance community.

Indeed, Cameron and Aggarwal (1996) highlighted the continuing viscious circle of Mexican financial instability. Mexico's dollar reserves have continued to drop since New Years Day, 1994 and foreign investment has continually lost its confidence in Mexico, pulling out short-term funds further disabling future Mexican development, engendering new rounds of neo-liberalism to quell capital flight which has further fuelled the discontent and despair in Chiapas. In turn this has further led to a loss in confidence by investors in the PRI's ability to govern effectively (Cockburn and Silverstein 1995).

Indeed, eleven months after the EZLN mobilisation the PRI floated the peso on December 22, 1994, and put up interest rates to stave of inflation (Fischer 1995). This restrictive monetary policy and wage freeze invoked recessionary conditions. The PRI are aiming for a strong international competitive position through privatisation and greater foreign participation.

In a later speech, Michel Camdessus (1995), Director of the IMF said that there

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had been profound changes in the global financial economy. From 1990-1994, the developing countries had an increase in capital inflows, $130 billion per year. The IMF provided assistance through country surveillance which was a policy that he suggested, was working. However, optimism was to be countered by constant vigilance and development was not guaranteed. He then turned to Mexico, a country that he said, had a special relationship and affinity with the IMF since the 1982 debt crisis. Between 1986 and 1987 the public deficit was 15% of GDP. Between 1992 and 1993 this was a surplus of 1.2% of GDP. Inflation fell from 160% in 1987, to 10% in 1993. Between 1990 and 1993, private capital inflows were 6% of GDP. Camdessus (1995) argued that the IMF was right to provide support in the aftermath of peso devaluation in 1994 in order to keep Mexico on track and in accordance with IMF member country guidelines.

By January 3, 1995, Mexico had hit a further liquidity crisis. By January 26, the IMF and the US had agreed on a stand by loan if the PRI went ahead with its plans to privatise state electricity, oil and cuts of $13.7 billion for social spending and a wage freeze.

In political terms, by July 1996, Zedillo had stated that there would be regulation of party finances and proper representation in the Senate. In Congress, such measures went to the vote and were cleared on a 455-0 majority. In Mexico's volatile economy there remained the threat of conversion from pesos to dollars by alarmed investors which was further fuelling domestic inflation by pushing down the value of the peso. This inflationary spiral was tending to crowd out much foreign investment. In order to stabilise the peso the Mexican government spent its huge dollar reserves, devaluing the peso and leading to a further spiral of speculation.

Despite the EZLN mobilisation, the neo-liberal programme continued. President Zedillo on Msy 31, 1995 presented his future predictions (World

Development Report 1995). The National Development Plan was to be based on

grassroots consultation and aimed for an annual growth of 5% once the financial

crisis was over, financed by a raising of domestic savings by Mexicans from 16% to

22% of GDP, a reduction in inflation, a more efficient workforce and more education

and training. In the first few months of 1995 foreign direct investment (FDI) was

$3721 billion which was a 300% increase over the same two month period the

previous year.

Indeed, during 1996 (World Bank 1996) the banking crisis was being effectively

handled and Mexico returned to the international financial markets. Inflation that year

was expected to fall from 50% to 20%. The main lesson learnt from the financial

instability of 1994 and 1995 was that Mexico needed to foster its domestic savings.

Sachs et al (1995) argued that Mexico was in a correct situation to follow a period of

export led growth, yet investor insecurity had led the Mexican Central Bank to

increase interest rates to stop further capital flight. This had led to an overvalued peso

and no exports. Expectations of peso devaluation were also rife leading to further

speculation during 1995-1996, of a serious inflationary problem. The World Bank

Annual Report (1996) noted that the containment of the peso crisis to a relatively

small group of countries was the major economic issue in the region in 1995.

Protecting and providing human resources is a key feature of the challenges ahead,

the World Bank Annual Report (1996) stated. But for the EZLN, neo-liberal

triumphalism was a mask.

Mexico remained a country with severe street crime and business corruption,

desperate poverty in the countryside, a major insurgency in Chiapas province, a

falling currency and stock market, a dependence on a sinking export, oil, and a

political system fiercely resistant to President Zedillo's scheme to strengthen the

country's fragile banking system (NCDM 10 September 1998). The peso crisis had

been brewing for some time through an external payments crisis (Sanchez 1995).

There was a 32 % overvaluation.of the peso causing uncertainties amongst foreign

and domestic investors leading to a depleting of the foreign reserves. Neo-liberal economics had nourished democratic political de-centralisation and traditional state authoritarianism and co-option was undoubtedly withdrawing its heavy hand (Fox 1994). The *Economist* (October 28, 1995) termed this a Zedillo crisis.

Yet there were members in both the Salinas and Zedillo administrations who still demanded the continuation of anti-poverty programs (PRONASOL) which appealed directly to the poor (The Economist August 6 1994 , March 4 1995). Moreover, there had been moves between organised Labour, business and government to create a new economic consensus in late 1994 (Economist 1st October 1994). But (Economist 29 October 1994) there was a major credit crunch after peso devaluation in 1994.

With hindsight, the rhetoric of optimism in President Salinas' pronouncements hid a secret of immiseration and repression. It was about to burst onto the world scene. They called themselves the Emiliano Zapata Army of National Liberation (EZLN).

Conclusion.

This chapter has outlined the historical development of Mexico as a modern state and outlined the historical tensions with the development of capitalism and modernisation. The chapter has suggested that an important relationship can be identified between neo-liberal development, the role of the state and its development strategies. The chapter argued that modernisation has now become inextricably tied to the forces of neo-liberal globalisation. I indicated why the kind of contradictory views on the EZLN's location of grievance may emerge. In the next chapter I discuss the validity of impressions of the EZLN which maintained that the EZLN represented a revolutionary struggle based on class struggle.

Chapter Three.

The Emiliano Zapata Army of National Liberation (EZLN): A Marxist Reading.

Introduction.

The purpose of this chapter is to show how it was possible that the EZLN was

interpreted through the conceptual apparatus of the old social movements. I suggest

that this interpretation was mapped on identifying the location of grievance, the

objectives and the strategies of the EZLN. Carlos Fuentes (1994) sensed at the time of

the EZLN mobilisation an exasperated deja-vu in that the EZLN represented the final

flickerings of a moribund revolutionary cycle.[34] I discuss the validity of this by

developing a chronological account of the EZLN in the context of the history of

Mexico and Chiapas. I discuss this account of the EZLN as a Marxist uprising that

was made by journalists, witnesses to the rebellion and the Mexican government. I

discuss an interpretation of the EZLN recently made in Critical International

Relations Theory (CIRT) that the EZLN was indicative of resistance to the

institutions and ideas of global capital (Cox 1999).

i) *Revolutionary Location of Grievance Objectives.*

Given the development of Mexico and Chiapas during the last thirty years many

anthropological studies have tended to regard the EZLN rebellion as centered purely

upon parochial issues of land tenure, land distribution and localised repression of the

peasantry (Proyect 1998). Coupled with the fact that the Mexican state "never broke

from the capitalist system" the EZLN represented repressed peasants resisting land

reform or as Marcos put it "the government really screwed us now that they destroyed

Article 27 (legal basis for land distribution) for which Zapata's Revolution fought.

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[34]Althaus (1996) expressed this concern when discussing the (re) emergence of the
Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) in June 1995 with "now we have another one."

Salinas de Gortari arrived on the scene with lackeys and groups and in a flash

destroyed it" (quoted in Proyect 1998, 2). Burbach and Rosset (1994, 3) noted that the

"backward, impoverished, and polarised condition of agriculture in Chiapas was a

fundamental cause of the January rebellion. The bulk of the populace lived off the

land, most in conditions of abject poverty." Hernandez (1994, 1-3) wrote of the EZLN

uprising:

> This peasant war, the current incarnation of a tradition of cyclic Indian revolts,
>
> grew out of nearly 20 years of political agitation in the countryside, primarily
>
> over land. The agarian reform that in some states practically eradicated the
>
> large latifundios of pre revolutionary Mexico, was never fully implemented in
>
> Chiapas...the growth of peasant struggle throughout the state after 1974 was
>
> influenced by a number of factors.

Indeed, one precipitating factor for growing unrest in Chiapas in the late 1970s and

early 1980s was the dramatic influx of 15.000 to 30.000 Guatemalan temporary

workers to the large coffee farms which helped to undercut the pay of migrants from

the Chiapas highlands, to the South east and the Southwest. Growing population and

unemployment increased pressure for land and drove many to petition for more

agarian reform as many were forced to relocate in areas of low agricultural worth.

This was further complicated by the arrival in the early 1980s of nearly 80,000

Guatemalan refugees fleeing the revolutionary war in their country.

When the insurgents entered the Chiapas towns, most armed, there was a sense

that such conditions had produced another guerilla insurgency, just like El Salvador

and Nicaragua. That is, if this struggle was to represent more than rural parochialism

then girding their conceptual loins, witnesses and journalists perceived that the

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insurgency looked familiar and seemed to fit into the conceptual and interpretive parameters of previous insurrections in Latin America. In this sense the EZLN represented the beginnings of a Marxist revolution in an age when Marxism was supposed to have evaporated.

Placing the EZLN snugly into this framing apparently made sense given the apparent grievance and the apparent objectives and strategies of the EZLN (1994a) stipulated that New Years Day, 1994. This was a revolutionary movement vying for the destruction of capitalism and the implementation of socialism with all the trappings of revolutionary glory and violence (Walker 1988).

Consequently, the EZLN could be effectively *reduced* to a struggle that represented a tale of the rich versus the poor, a mobilisation of much ferocity against capitalist exploitation and the bourgeois state with the objective, to destroy these developments. Indeed, Proyect (1998) argued that "there should be little doubt that the underlying dynamics of the Zapatista struggle are like that of the Shining Path or the Guatemalan Army of the Poor. It is a combined indigenous and agarian struggle against capitalist oppression which is centered on a fight for land."

Indeed, Guzman of the Shining Path in Peru had categorically regarded class struggle as the motor dialectic of history. Roman and Arregai (1997) pointed out that traditional images of resistance in Mexico rarely include industrial worker unrest and emphasis has been placed on peasant insurrections. For instance, in 1993 in Altos Horno de Mexico two workers were killed whilst the "EZLN acted as a catalyst" for peasant and urban unrest in Mexico City, Guadalajara and Torreon where previous Marxist cells had organised during the 1970s (Roman and Arregai 1997, 104). Indeed, it was stressed that Marcos continually used the language of the workers and of worker emancipation (Rodriguez 1997). Indeed, the language of the First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle and the Revolutionary Declaration of

War seemed to support the thesis that the EZLN was a revolutionary group
(Casteneda 1994).

After the uprising on New Years Day 1994 the EZLN in their First Declaration of
the Lacandon Jungle (1994a) stated the following:

> We are a product of 500 years of struggle; first against slavery, then during the
> War of Independence against Spain led by insurgents, then to avoid being
> absorbed by North American imperialism, then to promulgate our constitution
> and expel the French empire from our soil, and later the dictatorship of
> Porfirio Diaz denied us the just application of the Reform laws and the people
> rebelled and leaders like Villa and Zapata emerged, poor men like us. We
> have been denied the most elemental preparation so they can use us as canon
> fodder and pillage the wealth of our country. They don't care that we have
> nothing, absolutely nothing, not even a roof over our heads, no land, no work,
> no health care, no food nor education. Nor are we able to freely and
> democratically elect our political represntatives, nor is there independence
> from foreigners, nor is there peace or justice for ourselves and our children.

In the second part of the Declaration it stated:

> We are the inheritors of the true builders of our nation. The dispossessed we
> are millions and we thereby call upon our brothers and sisters to join this
> struggle as only possible path, so that we will not die of hunger due to the
> insatiable ambitions of a 70 year old dictatorship led by a clique of traitors
> that represent the conservative and sell out groups. They are the same ones
> that opposed Hidalgo and Morelos, the same ones that betrayed Vicento
> Guerrero, the same ones that sold half our country to the foreign invader, the
> same ones

that imported a European prince to rule our country, the same ones that formed the 'scientific' Porfirista dictatorship...the same ones that massacred railroad workers in 1958 and students in 1968, the same ones that today take everything from us, absolutely everything.

As I pointed out in chapter one, the location of grievance for the old social movements was the development of capitalism and the antagonistic battle between opposing classes. This meant that the old social movements resisted economic exploitation brought about the capitalist mode of production. Moreover, in the developing world, old social movements/national liberation movement were understood to be resisting economic and political imperialism. In the First Declaration, the words imperialism, dictatorship and 'poor men' seemed to suggest that the EZLN was an old social movement. This was a cry from the poor and a challenge to the rich. Basta! Consequently, Rodriguez (1994, 2) wrote that with the EZLN mobilisation "(C)lass war has started in Mexico, that is not doubted even by the PRI (the ruling party). Its causes are well known secrets" and "the country has become still more poor" where unemployment in the countryside and in the city "has increased suddenly, in accordance with the desperate situation for the majority of the population."

Indeed, two years before, Marcos (1992) had published his major work 'South East in Two Winds' in an attempt to show the discontent. Marcos wrote that the "poor cannot cut trees down but the petroleum beast can" (Marcos 1992, 2). The PRI and the *capitalist* "beast" he said, "is still not satisfied" whilst "the Campesinos cut trees down to survive" and "the tribute that capitalism demands from Chiapas has no historical parallel" (Downie 1998; Welker 1996). Welker (1994) explained that:

> when the already marginal peasants who depend on selling small purchases of corns and bean realised that NAFTA would take away the significant tariffs which made tortillas and bread more expensive for the urban middle classes,

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this was their coup de grace, by transforming land into a commercial commodity...an economic model centered on promoting development among the very rich in a society in which the poor are the overwhelming majority.

The Indians of Chiapas, had, as I showed in chapter two, long become a part of the capitalist system. The facts by the late 1980s and early 1990s said it all. In Ocosingo, half the homes lacked piped water, 5 out of 6 homes lacked septic systems, 3 out of 4 homes had earthern floors and only 3 in 10 homes had access to electricity. In Las Margaritas, the figures were 1 in 3 homes, and in Altimarano 1 in 4 homes were without access to electricity. The birth rate in Chiapas was 4.5% which meant a doubling of the population every 16 years. In Oaxaca, the number of homes without adequate sewage was 7 in 10, with no piped water 3 in 7 and in Guerrero, the poorest 20% of all the Mexicans, peoples received only 3.9% of all income. Marcos stated that "there are the rich men in Mexico, the medium men in Mexico, the poor men in Mexico, the very poor men in Mexico and at last, but not least, the Indian Mexico" (Ovetz 1994). Harvey (1995) noted that:the homes without electricity in Mexico were 12.5%, in Chiapas, and 37.1% in Ocosingo 67.9%. Next, the number of homes without water in Mexico were 20.6%, in Chiapas 41.6%, and in Ocosingo 49.2%: and homes without drainage numbered in Mexico 36.4%, in Chiapas 58.8%, and in Ocosingo 60.2%. In 1991 there were 29,951 ejidos in Mexico with 20 million producers (Harvey 1995).

Previously, Marcos (1992, 1994c) had stated that Chiapas had bled through its many veins: its oil, gas ducets, electric lines, trains, cars, bank accounts, trains, boats and planes, pays tribute he argued, to the imperialists (Rosen 1994; Tanzer 1996). The state capital Tuxtla Guiterrez Marcos (1994c) argued, was a warehouse for products from the rest of the state. The aluminium and uranium deposits in Chiapas have been

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exploited by the government's Council of Mineral Resources since 1983 (Marcos 1994). Marcos (1992, 5) wrote that the kingdom of Chiapas:

> which willingly annexed itself to the young independent republic in 1824, appeared in national geography when the petroleum boom reminded the country that there was a southeast...Chiapas' experience of exploitation goes back for centuries. In times past wood, fruits, animals and men went to the metropolis through the veins of exploitation, just as they do today. Like the banana republics but at the peak of neo liberalism and libertarian revolutions the Southeast continues to export raw materials just as it did 500 years ago. It continues to import capitalism's principal product, death and misery...(s)ix years ago in obedience to the dictates of the neo liberal economic revolution, masterminded from outside and ruthlessly enforced by the government.

Chiapas was Mexico's poorest state and:

> home to 1 million impoverished Indians who eke out a spartan living as small farmers, day labourers, charcoalmakers and artisans. The legacy of centuries of malnutrition is painfully obvious: most of the Indians are less than five feet tall. More than 30% of the states 3.2 million inhabitants are illiterate, 32% speak only an Indian language, and 72% of schoolchildren do not complete first grade. Although the state produces 55% of Mexico's hydroelectric power, 34% of homes have no electricity (Conger 1994, 2-3).

Indeed, the bulk of the populace lived off the land and 75% of the states population lived below the poverty line whilst 20% of the economically active population had no cash income and 39% of this population made less than the

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minimum wage of about $3 per day whilst the workers of Chiapas provided the rest of Mexico and the world with lumber, coffee, beef and their own labour power through the migration north (Cleaver 1997).

. Moreover, the First Declaration had stated concern with the undemocratic and repressive structure of the state and the Salinas dictatorship. Again, the grievance seemed to focus on the coercive institutions used to effectively maintain capital and the interests of foreign capital/economic imperialism which was a grievance that very much coincided with economic, political and social environments in Nicaragua and El Salvador during the 1980s. Then, there were the specific and explicitly entitled 'Revolutionary Laws' which stipulated concerns for different groups.

The Urban Reform Law (EZLN 1994d) stated that Chiapas and Mexican peoples were to stop paying taxes, to stop paying rents if they have lived in a habitat for more than 15 years and those who did pay rent were to pay only 10% of their salary. The Revolutionary Agarian Law (EZLN 1994e) demanded a reform to the reform of Article 27 and a re-distribution of national and foreign holdings of land, a distribution of land to the landless, the expropriation of the means of production, the manufacture of collective products and a new local system of purchasing campesino products (Harvey 1996). The Law banned the private hoarding of goods, virgin jungle was to be protected and collective and communal production was not to be taxed.

According to the Labour Law and Industry Document (EZLN 1994f):worker salaries were to be the same in dollars as those salaries earned outside of Chiapas and Mexico and there was to be a monthly increase in salaries with free medical care. Access to non-transferable stock in companies was to be made available for the workers and for rural workers, a Local Prices and Salaries Commission was to be set up. In order to provide welfare for these peoples, social security was to be paid to elders with a minimum level for pensions and families and individuals affected by the EZLN's revolutionary war

(EZLN 1994g). The Revolutionary Law on Justice (EZLN 1994h) would release all prisoners, except murderers and rapists, and Chiapas municipalities were to be governed by the people and for the people.

On May Day 1994 the Clandestine Revolutionary Committee General Command (CCRI-GC) (1994b) emphasised the exploitative accumulation of neo-liberal wealth as a precipitating factor and.according to Neill, Caffentzis and Machete (1996) the Zapatistas could be linked to the workers struggle. Indeed, the First Declaration (1994a) stated that "according to the Declaration of War, we ask that other people of the nation advocate to restore the legitimacy and the stability of the nation by overthrowing the dictator." Using the conceptual framework of the old social movements it was easy to see why the EZLN was interpreted as a Marxist revolution. In particular, commentators focused upon the revolutionary demands of the movement. Andres Oppenheimer (1997) of the *Miami Herald* took the EZLN as representing a Marxist insurgency (Rouse 1996).

Moreover, the EZLN seemed strongly committed to vehemently concluding the Mexican revolution of 1910. The NCDM (10 April 1998) reported that the EZLN wished to commemorate the death of Emiliano Zapata who had died "so that the EZLN could live" and stated that Emiliano Zapata lived in the struggle of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation. Nash and Kovic (1996) noted that the EZLN as their name suggested, linked with the earlier Mexican revolution of 1910.

Indeed, Ross (1994) noted that many journalists interpreted the EZLN as a group of 'reds' who wanted to build a socialist Mexican state in the mould of Castro's Cuba. Golden of the *New York Times* had not only missed the EZLN story. But with others, he simply saw groups of red brigades everywhere, mischieviously mobilising throughout the Latin continent. Golden (1994, 1) wrote:

That the Cold War had ended seems to mean nothing to the hundreds of

insurgents who stunned their countrymen Saturday by announcing themselves as the Zapatista Army of National Liberation and declaring war on the government. The struggle they describe is the timeless one of poor Indians against the rich, the new world they envision being one where things would be simply better...the rebels sway seemed a product less of any considered support than of confusion and fear.

For Ross (1994) this was a typical view based on interpretive biases confined within an ideological straightjacket because "the Times is a subscriber to the Big Man of History." Ross (1994, 2) noted that "Goldens reasoning in El Salvador has trained him to look for a red in every hut and he had a hard time understanding the non=Marxist Zapatistas. A January 4 backgrounder baited Zapatista irregulars outside of Altimirano for declaring that they wanted to build socialism."

The insinuation was, and is, that the EZLN were using the Chiapas region as an experiment for revolutionary careerism. This was allegedly the case in El Salvador where rebels were often portrayed as anti-nationalists by wishing to sell the country to foreigners and to the Soviet Union. Catholic Priests such as Archbishop Romero who were discredited as harbingers corrupting the youth of the country. It is perhaps worth noting that the PRI has offered strikingly similar interpretations of the activities of Bishop Samuel Ruiz. In Chiapas, changes to the penal code during 1988 led Chiapas state governor Garrido to begin enforcing stringent disciplinary techniques in the region (Harvey 1995). Becker (1997) noted that the early revolutionary Declarations of the EZLN (EZLN 1994a, EZLN 1994b) were principally based on the interest of the workers. The EZLN (EZLN 1994a) had a revolutionary Declaration of War. Certainly, President Salinas believed so. Younts (1998, 1) of NBC News noted that:

Zapatista rebels in Chiapas and the Popular Revolutionary Army in hills above Acapulco...come against a background of years of corruption, land abuse, religious conflict, crushing poverty and prejudice...regional supporters of the Zapatistas have set up 32 town councils independent of local government officials recognised by Mexico City. Most of these councils are symbolic in nature...Zapatista rebels officially declared war on the government of the then, Carlos Salinas and vowed to lead a Marxist uprising against the Mexican government.

According to the NCDM (2 December 1998) the military commanders of the EZLN immediately portrayed the movement as representing the battle between the rich and the poor. But Rodriguez (1994) noted the immediate problem of premature interpretation. In the early months of 1994 it was perhaps "still premature to talk about a serious analysis of the Zapatista National Liberation Army. It cannot be known at this early stage who exactly are the members of the EZLN" (Rodriguez 1994, 4).

Nevertheless, the pronouncements from the Western media seemed to be pushing the idea that the EZLN was a Marxist revolution with their intention of 'discrediting' the insurgency. Carrigan (1998, 12) noted that the Marxist interpretations were staunch, including "the Mexican government of Carlos Salinas, which was then in power and which looked for a foreign conspiracy behind the revolution" along with "many of the foreign press who went to Chiapas" and were "looking for answers to the Indian rebellion through a rearview, a Central American rearview." In an early report, one insurgent stated that the military orders to the EZLN in relation to the state were "to knock it down", words from a thin 20 year old who identified himself as Jesus and stated that "(O)ur thinking is that we have to build socialism'" (Golden 1994). The military command called for solidarity with the rebel soldiers (EZLN 1994q). The command stressed that the Chiapas population should feed and

clothe them if required, the EZLN insurgents. But on this basis, Golden (1994) noted:

> the guerrillas military weakness was obvious today along a 30 mile stretch of
> rural highway that remained more or less under their control. From quiet
> conversations with townspeoples and villagers, the rebels sway seemed a
> product less of any considered support than of confusion and fear.

Ovetz (1994) asked Marcos, "do you seek the overthrow of the Mexican state?"
Marcos replies "What?" Ovetz (1994) asked "do you seek a new government?",
Marcos replies "yes." Ovetz asked, "Is it continuing the unfinished revolution of
Zapata?" and Marcos' reply was "yes" and "a counter revolution against Salinas."
Consequently, (NCDM 2 December 1998, 1):

> the world press snapped up the Zapatista rebel movement when its leaders
> wearing black ski masks surfaced in Mexicos remote and desperate Chiapas
> province, and thinking big demanded the removal of an elected president and
> the surrender of an undefeated army...Chiapas has come to mean a condition
> of disorder...found in many parts of the world...the insurgents have been able
> to maintain a local physical presence...the Zapatista leadership is devoted to a
> primitive Marxism at odds with what the rest of the world has learnt about
> changes in the 20th century.

As such, Rodriguez (1994, 4) noted that the "Maoists (in capitalist press coverage)
shouted that Chiapas began the popular war and that this uprising obeyed the
advanced Maoist international in the last minute of the centenary year" and "for their
part the Stalinist-Trotskyists...baptized the Zapatistas as the vanguard of the Mexican

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revolution and predicted the start of a socialist state in Mexico" (Rodriguez 1994, 4).

Indeed, the desire for a Marxist Mexico may have been brewing for some time. The original participants of the EZLN who had begun moving into Chiapas from the cities during the late 1970s had their roots and cut their revolutionary teeth so to speak, working with, and being affiliated to the guerrilla movements of the 1970s. Here, revolutionary objectives were discussed and leaders emerged. Guzman of Shining Path regarded it necessary to have a vanguard and where "violence was a painful familiarity" (Starn 1995, 409). [35] Revolutionary movements had always played a role in the Latin American region (Schraeder 1992). The EZLN seemed to fit this cycle albeit slightly out of synchronisation with the changes since 1989. Revolutionary organisations were comparable to well-oiled machines bound by revolutionary ideology (Langan 1999).

Indeed, National Liberation in the Third World had taken two stages. Firstly, in Latin America, there were the Declarations of Independence from European colonialisation. Simon Bolivar (1819) declared that Independence could be maintained through a Republic. Secondly, during the post-war era, "enthusiastic groups of young men in uniformily doomed guerrilla movements" joined these organisations, somewhat attracted by the lavish romantic visions of revolutionary vanguardism (Hobsbawm 1994a, 441). The events in Mexico City in 1968 had had a profound effect in cultivating revolutionary activity in Mexico (Gomez 1994).

During the Cold War the framing of revolutions took on a more problematic aspect with the complex link between Cold War geopolitics and Communist ideology (Ochoa 1996; Reagan 1986).[36] With the development of Reagan's low intensity

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[35] Fidel Castro (1967) maintained that it would take a committed few to make the revolutionary sacrifice, to lead the masses. The masses could not be relied upon to formulate their own radical consciousness.

[36] US advisors at this time made the distinction between the insurgent and totalitarian communist states in Latin America which were alleged to be directed by Moscow and on the other hand, the friendly and acceptably authoritarian states whose sovereignty

conflict the insurgencies were regarded as esoteric Communist agitators making use

of peasant naiveity and moving Northwards to the Rio Grande. During the 1980s the

Reagan Doctrine regarded conflicts in Latin America as part of a decisive

armageddon battle of good versus evil. This turbulent climate influenced journalists

interpreting the EZLN mobilisation in 1994 (Golden 1994; Ross 1994).[37]

ii) A Revolutionary History.

To some extent the EZLN had its roots back in the Mexican radicalism of the

1960s and 1970s. During the late 1950s and early 1960s movements such as the

Workers Clandestine Party of the People (PROCUP), the Workers and the

Revolutionary Party of the People (PROCUP-PDLP) and the Party of the Poor (PP)

had reacted strongly to economic discontent particularly in the urban areas.

Many groups were influenced by a new and politically motivated Catholic priests

such as Archbishop Samuel Ruiz of San Cristobel. Refuting the sanctimonious

axioms of a fatalistic Catholicism, these priests developed and preached a new

emancipatory ideal for the 'real world', a world that could be changed for the better.

This was inspired by a new libertarian philosophy that refuted the Catholic dogma

that the poor would have to wait until the afterlife to find their salvation. Instead, the

ideals of freedom, rights and justice could, and should be an absolute right in the

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was threatened by this foreign revolutionary insurgency and required military and moral support. Euphemistically, this 'support' was given to groups such as the Nicaraguan contras and the freedom fighters in El Salvador under the guise of protecting national sovereignty. Despite its grand rhetoric the Reagan plan in the Central American basin was still constrained by the psychological shackles of the Vietnam Syndrome and Congress's intervention through the War Powers Act. The justification for intervention according to Burbach (1993, 101), was that despite much

troublesome evidence these authoritarian governments "were allegedly open to change."

[37] Revisionist writers claimed that the Cold War had all along been based upon the economic and ideological threat of socialism (Chomsky 1993).

mortal and material world. Harvey (1995, 57) argued that the Catholic Church began a "rescue and resistance" strategy by focusing on the centrality of political mobilising. Brunk (1998, 474) noted that there was emerging "a recurring theme of dissent".

This ideological development would be a key influence on many of the early participants of the EZLN. This philosophy had developed by linking some of the progressive ideals of the Church to the more concrete issues of social justice, welfare and education in the rural areas.

According to Munez (1998), politically inspired priests set up the 'Vatican Council' in the early 1960s and became known as the 'red bishops'. This group organised major political rallies across Latin America between 1962-1964 and solidarity was further consolidated in a Conference at Medellin, Colombia in 1968 (Harvey 1998). The Council of Bishops began taking a secular route. Groups who gained the Bishops support were diverse but all had suffered the ignominity of oppression. Indian groups were taught the message of Christianity which worked in tandem with traditional Indian beliefs in a process of learning with humility (Proyect 1998).

The student protests of 1968 arranged in part, by Professor Adolfo Orive of Mexico City's Autonomous National University (UCAM) ended violently even as the world media centered on Mexico for the 1968 Olympic Games. Federal troops ended the protests on October 2 1968 with the massacre of 200 students on the Three Cultures Plaza in Tlatelolco. It was a spark that galvanised much unrest (Bennett 1992). It was to be a turning point.

Indeed events in the late 1960s were to provide this kind of organisation with enormous sympathy. On 29th August 1967, Senor Cabana set up the radical insurgent movement, the Party of the Poor (PP). As a response, the PRI sponsored National Company of Popular Subsistence (CONASUP) aimed to quell discontent in an effort to help rural workers and local producers by creating a stable price market.

One important disruption during the 1960s was led by a workers strike organised

by the National Railroad Workers Union. Its leader Vallejo was later arrested by the PRI for his alleged communist sympathies. The repression by the wielding talons of the Mexican state towards its youth was, according to the writer Octavio Paz "an instinctive return to sacrifice" (Miller 1985, 340). The National Strike Committee also asked for the release of political prisoners (Pointowska 1986).

At this time, urban leftist and maoist groups such as Linea Proletaria (Proletarian Line) began linking their efforts to the radical libertarian priests in the rural areas. Contacts were being made. Professor Orive provoked a mass line of non violent socialism (Harvey 1998). The spirit of ideologically motivated revolutionary resistance in the 1970s was manifested by urban movements such as Proletarian Line and the Politica Popular, the latter being a maoist cell/group. Other revolutionary groups mobilising were the National Liberation Forces (FLN) which had allegedly attracted a young Subcommandante Marcos in the late 1970s (Harvey 1998). These groups were influenced by Marxist and Maoist ideals and these ideals were still particularly attractive to revolutionary romantic students at the time (Hobsbawm 1994a).

By 1977 Politica Popular had emerged as a potent forum in Mexico City. Various cells of the movement cropped up throughout the Northern city of Monterrey. Its participants were middle class intellectuals. Flood (1994) noted that radical campesino groups such as the Emiliano Zapata Peasant Organisation (OPEZ) in Chiapas were now forging solidarity with these individuals.

In response, President Etcheverra (1970-1976) developed an economic and populist 'new deal' for the rural areas. But groups such as Land and Liberty in Monterrey, squatters in Durango, autonomous organisations reflected the break down in PRI corporatism. In the mid-1970s the.Etcheverra administration strove for an 'apetura democritus' but by 1977, PRI state repression, evictions, detentions and tortures resumed (Rodriguez 1994).

Various collective projects organised to solve smaller problems and on a number

of issues, began linking the local concerns to the broader national picture (Barry

1992). Local movements were infiltrated by urban revolutionaries who were thinking

big and wanting to stake their claim in Mexico's torrid revolutionary history. Various

autonomous National Coordinating Bodies began to emerge and these became known

under the term the 'coordinadoras'. A number of issues were in focus. Barry (1992)

noted that the National Coordination of Education Workers (CNTE) had called for

more local and national democracy. The National Coordination Plan of Agyala

(CNPA) forged civilian resistances whilst the National Coordination of Urban

Popular Movements (CONAMUP) which was set up in 1980 with the express aim to

coordinate radical actions and agendas in the larger city neighbourhoods. The

National Union of Regional Peasant Organisations (UNORCA) aimed to open up new

critical spaces in rural areas on issues of land and democracy and in 1979, the

National Front of Womens Rights and Liberty (FNALIDUM) was also formed

(Stephen 1996).

Proletarian Line helped organise campesinos during the late 1970s, along with

the groups such as the People United, the Independent Organisation of Agricultural

Workers (CIOAC) and The Peasant-Mexican Communist Party (CIOAC-PWM). The

Politica Popular proved to be a major forum for mobilising, recruiting and bringing

together future members of what was later to become the EZLN. Politica Popular

became linked to a number of radical peasant groups such as the Union of Ejidos and

the Independent Campesino Movement. The Union of Ejidos worked primarily in the

Lacandon Jungle to the East, the Northern part of the state and the Sierra Madre

Mountains. The Independent Campesino Movement bases its resistance on organising

the seasonal and permanent workers on Chiapas coffee farms and cattle ranches in the

towns of Simojevel, Huitiupa'l and El Bosque. And OPEZ grew out of the community

of Venustiano Caranza. It struggled for land and against repression primarily by

confronting the state through direct and violent action.

According to Stephen (1996), the Ejido Union United was set up in Ocosingo

around the mid-1970s whilst the organisation, Ejido Union Land and Liberty (Tierra y libertad) was set up in Las Margaritas. The aim of these groups was 'to go to the people'. These campesino movements along with the Ejido Union of Peasant Struggle came together under the Union of Unions (UU) or the Ejido Union and Solidarity of Peasant Groups. The UU was set up in 1980 in the Lacandon Jungle (Harvey 1998). Campesino groups were enhanced by the National Coordinating Committee (CNPA) which was formed in 1979. Concerns were levelled at the indelible corruption of the agricultural PRI bodies such as the Department of Agarian Affairs and Colonisation (PAAC) and the CNC.

By the early 1980s Proletarian Line was recognised as a solidarity between the PP and the Union of Peoples (UP). Proletarian Line and Professor Orive sent their recruits and organisers to each of these campesino groups. Campesino movements had by now tied together the fight for land with the question of the appropriating the means of production (Harvey 1996). By 1985 this sense of solidarity had been consolidated through the UNORCA. The PRI had during the 1980s allegedly stepped up its repression with, in 1988 the joint assassinations of Nunez of the CIOAC and Valasco of OPEZ. According to Constitutional Articles 129-135 the PRI could justify the crushing of protests stipulating that unarmed mass demonstrations were a threat to public order. The Rural Collective Interest Association (ARIC) now primarily focused on credit issues.

By 1988 two objectives were present. On the one hand there were those who had encouraged the formation of democratic organisations and the promotion of peasant self government. On the other hand there were those who believed that this was insufficient and that a more radical objective was required. The OPEZ maintained that only armed struggle could provide a real solution. The first vision therefore gave rise to organisations such as the UU. The second to what became known as the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Harvey 1995, 1996).

However, Deneuve and Reeve (1995) argued that there were cleavages within the

peasantry due to the oil industry boom of the 1970s where the peasantry have often shown a strong attachment to the ethos of private ownership. This put many of them at odds with the more radical peasant objectives for ejido production and land organisation based on community. Deneuve and Reeve (1995, 4) pointed out that in post-1968

the Maoist-Marxist Politica Popular decide to leave the student milieu to concentrate its activities on 'the mass of the people'. So it establishes itself in the towns in the northern part of the country, where due to the drift from the land, large areas of shanty towns exist, a favourable terrain for militant leftists...(B)eing in competition for control of the same masses, Marxists and priests rapidly reach an understanding.. (F)rom their miraculous cooperation 'torreonism'...the Mexican model for 'work on the masses'. In the middle for the 1970's the Mexican government, worried by the success of this tendency, begin a savage repression...the directors of the organisation revise its positions, the 'masses lines' which puts its emphasis on political work in the urban areas is replaced by the Proletariat Line, giving their priority to the implementation amongst the poor peasantry.

iii) Revolutionary Marches to the South.

Revolutionary red brigades at the bequest of radical campesino groups had begun the long march into the rural areas during the 1970s. These urban intellectuals and urban activists made their way to the South (Marcos 1999). Maoists used the already radicalised peasantry to create their own cadres from the roots and from the church. Marcos would most probably have been among the last of these red brigades and was probably sent by the organisation Politica Popular. According to Cuninghame and Corona (1998, 1):

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The situation of Mexico's forgotten people had been worsening at an even greater rate than the rest of the population...(R)esistance and organisations had also been increasing throughout the 1980s. The EZLN slowly emerged over 13 years from the remnants of those organisations who refused to be bought off or intimidated, a hybrid mixture including ex-maoist guerrillas with roots in the 1968 student movement, such as mestizo intellectual subcommandante Marcos.

By 1978 Politica Popular had stopped sending its own recruits. But its grassroots connections had been made. Proletarian Line took on the mantle in a more organised and ideological fashion. By 1984 Governor Dominiguez of Chiapas had began a punitive set of measures as social unrest accelerated. The CIOAC organised several protests and strikes amongst workers in the urban areas of Simojevel and Ocosingo. Again, land distribution was the main precipitating factor. By 1982 this movement had joined with OPEZ which by now had engaged in violent struggle in Verustiano Carranza and other Chiapas towns. The UU had split by 1988 into the ARIC and on the other hand, to the more radical Emiliano Zapata Independent Peasant Alliance (ACIEZ) which later became the Independent Peasant Nationale (ANCIEZ). This movement had gone underground by 1993 presumably to prepare for military operations (Stephen 1996).

From a radical Marxist cell called the 'Grupo Torreon' many of its participants had already moved into Northern Chiapas by 1977. Subcommandante Marcos was also alleged to have been among the last brigades of this group. This was a journey that he did not initially take too kindly to (Marcos 1999). Bishop Ruiz expressed his opinion that a few years before the appearence of Marcos many students of these small political organisations had already begun teaching an organised peasantry on issues of land, liberty and culture (Munez 1998). Consequently (NCDM 17 November 1998, 1) it was stated in November 1998 in a celebration of the EZLN that

Fifteen years ago the Ejercito Zapatista Liberacion Nacional (EZLN) was founded when the first group of insurgents arrived in the Lacandon Jungle in 1983...we recognise the importance of this event and the profound contribution the EZLN and Zapatista communities have made to the struggle for indigenous self determination...as well as the global struggle for humanity against neoliberalism.

With Politica Popular, Proletarian Line and the Tierra y Libertad organising in the Northern Mexican town of Monterrey, Bishop Ruiz of San Cristobel invited chosen members of these groups to the South building upon the previous networks with the campesino's Union of Ejidos, the UU and the ARIC (Cleaver 1995; Stephen 1996)

Indeed due to the geographical isolation of Chiapas, rebels could collect arms little by little, without notice, a point of organisation that urban struggles had not been able to do (Casteneda 1994). Many of the red brigades had romantic revolutionary objectives and Marcos later admitted this. But Marcos began living in the Lacandon rainforest (Carrigan 1998). Cevallos (1995, 1) noted that the main participants and Commandantes of the EZLN such as Marcos and Commandante Tacho of the Clandestine Revolutionary Committee General Command (CCRI-GC) had "been preparing themselves militarily for at least 12 years" with Subcommandante Marcos describing himself "as one of a group of several Mexican leftists who came to the Lacandon Jungle in the early 1980s to organise Indians and wound up leading a revolt" (Parfitt 1996, 121).

Marcos (1999) recalled his progress into Chiapas in August 1984. With the climbing of the Chiapas mountains and the constant slips on the mud of the rain soaked jungle floor, the 27 year old Marcos had had the feeling he admitted, that this had been perhaps the worst decision of his life. In March 1993, the Mexican army accidently stumbled across EZLN guerrillas in the area of Farrabundo. By this time, the Emiliano Zapata Army of National Liberation (EZLN) although as yet unnamed

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was now thought to have emerged as an organisational synthesis of the OPEZ and the ANCIEZ. Not every campesino and indigenous community in Chiapas has considered rebel EZLN incursions as helpful (Cevallos 1995). But it does seem that the EZLN "was virtually unknown" at the time of the 1994 uprising (Otero 1996, 2).

iv) Revolutionary Strategy and Tactic.

Early signs, given the military insurgency and the operation of the Clandestine Revolutionary Committee General Command (CCRI-GC) indicated that the EZLN were engaging in a violent revolutionary struggle. The masked insurgents entered the Chiapas towns on New Years Day and declared a Revolutionary War on the government (EZLN 1994a).

Indeed on New Years Eve, EZLN guerrillas apparently took a rickety bus through military barricades which were being manned by Federal border guards who in turn, failed to notice anything particularly unusual. This was not entirely surprising as allegedly they were sound asleep (Tzu 1996). The Mexican Ministry of the Interior stipulated in 1993 that there were "no guerrillas" in Chiapas and warned that "to say that there are causes grave danger to the states development" (Ouweneel 1996, 80). Mexico joined NAFTA at a time when the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement was already in place and thus Mexico had no call for any deferential treatment, a clear signal that Mexico had finally joined the status of the First World (Castillo 1996).

Perhaps ironically the Mexican left was shocked and appalled at events that night. The left felt that Mexico should never be the environment for violent revolutionary insurgency (Marcos 1994a). Mexico had had a more hegemonically cemented history particularly since its own Mexican Revolution. Anyhow, it was reported that "the EZLN probably will not reach Mexico City the seat of power, though large demonstrations in support for the groups fight for justice are now taking place there" (Garcia 1994, 3). But there was a sense of surprise. Parfitt (1996, 117) reported that one Chiapas resident:

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recalled how his wife awoke him, shouting in his ear, "The Revolution has begun." Indian rebels wearing ski-masks and carrying rifles, had blocked the road out of town, preventing him from driving to the airport early that morning. They pointed rifles at her little green volkswagan and said 'get out of here'. Nigh was stunned...(H)e knew they were angry about long term losses of culture and desperate about short term economic and political circumstances. The price for coffee, their main cash crop had fallen, and a population boom put pressure on the land the Indians already had...(B)ut he'd heard no rumours of armed rebellion.

The sight of revolutionary rebels waving and shouting in the streets of San Cristobel was an intoxicating and breathtaking experience (Ovetz 1994a; Trujillo 1994). But Marcos wrote:

> The War is immanent. I cannot save these letters.I should destroy them because if they fall into the hands of the government, they could cause many problems for many good people and a few bad people. Now the flames are high and their colors change. Sometimes they are an iridescent blue which never fails to surprise this night of crickets and far away lightening which announces the cold December of prophecies and pending accounts (Marcos 1994f).

The exhausted EZLN were tender but they had a fury (LaFrance 1996). Carlos Fuentes (1994) noted that Subcommandante Marcos could have said the word and insurgencies in Chihuahua, Michoacoa and Oaxaca would have easily broken out. The next night, January 2, 1994, in shopping precincts in Mexico City and Acapulco, two bombs went off. Many were concerned that this was the start of a coordinated

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nationwide guerrilla insurgency. Marcos (1994a) baited Zedillo with taunts of "Welcome to the nightmare" and he stressed that the "Zapatistas will not run from responsibility."

But the strategic isolation of the EZLN in Chiapas, the isolation which had allowed the movement to mobilise quietly, may it was suggested at the time have proved to be its undoing, *if* the EZLN wanted this longer term national mobilisation (Castaneda 1994). In Oaxaca, government interference was already evident over the formation of the Worker, Student and Campesino Coalition of the Isthmus (COCEI). But COCEI had in fact gained its significant control over the municipal government there (Rubin 1994). The EZLN wanted apparently, a nationwide military mobilisation. Church (1995) later asked *quo onda*, what is going on? According to a EZLN defector, Commander Daniel, the EZLN was composed of a hard core of 130 professionals and 500 militiamen. The strategy of surrounding the autonomous camps by the federal troops in the ensuing days was to promote disenchantment within the communities. In Ocosingo a bus was riddled with bullets by federal troops and there was much violence in the market place there. Ministry of Interior official Eloy Cantu reported that the EZLN was being manipulated by rebels in Guatemala.

Initially it was the apparently violent actions of the EZLN that immediately suggested that there were historical parallels with other revolutionary movements in the region. What was surprising was that the traditionally parochial Chiapas peasants and Indians had revolted on the basis of short term 'en corto' grievance and wanted the construction of longer term and unproven alternatives (Pare 1990). Within this climate Marcos (1994a) said "(T)hree or four hours ago we received information that an element of the federal army deserted and joined our ranks." Marcos noted the importance of media communication, "I was already up there looking for a telephone...(I) had to talk to Human Rights, to the National Commission. No, man, they have stolen everything."

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With the theft of communication lines by the federal troops he said that (Marcos 1994a) "There are computers and all that" but "we do not do anything with that."[38] He emphasised that "We hope that the people understand that the causes that made us do this were just and that the path we have chosen is a just one, not the only one. Nor do we think that this is the best of all paths." Violence was endemic to the region. For instance:

> Alfredo is a Tojolabal Indian who hails from the municipality of Las
> Margaritas...in the life of Alfredo it is possible to see the backbone of the
> EZLN. Alfredo became a member in 1988 but only after struggling around the
> issues of land against the discrimination suffered by his community. For seven
> years he prepared himself and struggled, moved silently from one community
> to another, hid and planned, held in suspense for the inevitable (Rodriguez
> 1997a).

But then:

> members of the army detained him. They covered his face, they insulted him,
> they took him to a river, although he does not remember which one. They
> forced him to strip naked and slipped him into a sack. From where they took
> him to another place, which he later learned was the 24th cavalry Regiment in
> Comitan. Without giving any reasons the military hung Alfredo from his
> hands. They gave him electric shocks in the most sensitive parts of his body.

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[38]Given the EZLN's reliance on the internet this was an important statement at first reading. Indeed, it was those who were interested in developments in Chiapas who set up the internet sites such as Professor Harry Cleaver at the University of Texas and various e-mail discussion groups from the Irish Mexico Group and the National Commission for Democracy in Mexico (NCDM) sources used in this thesis.

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But they were unsuccessful in forcing any kind of confession or information from him (Rodriguez 1997a).

Marcos (1992) concluded his major piece with:

> Everyone is dreaming in this country. Now it is time to wake up. the storm is here. From the clash of these two winds the storm will be born, its time has arrived. Now the wind from above rules, but the wind from below is coming. The prophecy is here, when the storm comes, when rain and fire again leave the country in peace, the world will no longer be the world, but something better.

Many were struck by the similarity between the EZLN's actions, broadcasts and the radio sounds of El Salvador and Nicaragua (Rosset and Cunningham 1994). Revolutionary fervour, according to Cockburn (1994, 20) "was most unexpected" and yet it was "brilliantly staged" (EZLN 1994; Flood 1996; NCDM 1 December 1998; Ross 1994; Routledge 1998). Trujillo (1994a, 5) pointed out that in San Cristobel:

> judging from the cheers and applause among the approximately 1000 people present at their rally shortly after sunset, the EZLN seemed to have estimated correctly. But it is a calculation subject to a tiny margin of error. If their militancy is not forthcoming their support they may be crushed or marginalised like many similar efforts before them in this hemisphere. Without such militancy their calculations assume the force of futile vanguardism.

But military planning was evident. Ovetz (1994a) wrote that

> The EZLN strategy was a combination of armed warfare and publicity orientated mass movements They took three small towns, Las Margaritas, Altimarano and Ocosingo, that composed a triangular zone of defense high in

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the mountains of Lacandonia bordering Guatemala, while presenting themselves only temporarily. When the army drove them...the EZLN easily disappeared into the surrounding mountains with the advantage of being at home on their own turf. That they were fighting on unfamiliar and inhospitable terrain dawned on the Mexican military on January 2 when it withdrew their helpless jets which could do no more than circle the mountain city.

The EZLN (1994a) made it clear that they would:

> have the Mexican people on our side; we have the beloved tricolored flag highly respected by our insurgent fighters. We use black and red in our uniform as our symbol of our working people on strike. Our flag carries the following letters 'EZLN' Zapatista Army of National Liberation and we always carry our flag into combat.

In the First Declaration they reiterated their concern with the years of poverty and injustice, and hoped the Mexican peoples understood (EZLN 1994a):

> To the people of Mexico. We, the men and women, full and free, are conscious that the war that we have declared is our last resort, but always a just one. The dictators are applying an undeclared genocidal war against our peoples for many years. Therefore we ask for your participation, your decision to support this plan that struggles for work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and peace. We declare that we will not stop fighting until the basic demands of our people have been met by forming a government of our country that is free and democratic.

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In the aftermath of the initial insurgency, Ovetz (1994) asked Marcos "is this an armed struggle against Mexico?." The subcommandante replied "yes...in all the country. It is the beginning." The crowds chanted that heady night 'Marcos our friend, the people are with you' and they chanted 'Transitional Government and a New Constitution' with 'Long Live Ramona and Anna Maria', 'Long Live self government by the Indians' and 'Let the National Convention be an electoral force' and 'all against the electoral farce'.

Indeed, with hindsight, any casual look around the bookstores of San Cristobel and elsewhere told a story. Consequently, the "rebellion could hardly be a surprise to anyone browsing the book stores" where one could read Che Guevaras Bolivian Diary, a history of World War One, the works of Marx and Engels, analyses of imperialism, books on Cuba, speeches by Fidel Castro and publications of the tiny US based Revolutionary Communist Party (Ovetz 1994a).

In carrying through their objective for a Marxist Mexico the Revolutionary Law on Rights (EZLN 1994i) confirmed that the EZLN would maintain a liberatory march through Mexico and that essentially, the EZLN was an armed defence. The General Command would maintain strict organisation and that this would be kept by the revolutionary forces. According to the Revolutionary Instructions laid to attain these aims and themes, ultimately, the military Generals command even in those areas without easy communication. The EZLN revolution was to be maintained and advanced at all times (EZLN 1994j).

The Declaration of War ordered the insurgents of the EZLN (1994a), to:advance to the capital of the country, overcome the Mexican federal army, protect in advance the civilian population and permit the people in the liberated areas the right to freely and democratically elect their own administrative authorities, to respect the lives of prisoners, to initiate summary judgements against the soldiers of the federal army, form new troops with Mexicans who show their interest in joining the struggle and to ask for unconditional surrender of the enemys headquarters (EZLN 1994a).

The EZLN responded to the pardon given by the Mexican government stating:

> What do we have to ask forgiveness for? What are they going to pardon us
> for? For not dying of hunger? For not accepting our misery in silence? For not
> humbly accepting the huge historic burden of disdain and abandonment? For
> having risen up in arms when we found all other paths closed? For not heeding
> Chiapas penal code, the most absurd and repressive in history? For having
> made careful preperations before beginning our fight? For having brought
> guns to battle rather than bows and arrows? For being Mexican every one of
> us? For being majority indigenous? For fighting for democracy, freedom and
> justice? (Trujillo 1994, 3).

As such, the EZLN (1994k) maintained that it had been provoked by huge misery,
loss of good land, repression, injustice and exploitation. The Mexican army was
alleged not to be using US military aid to fight the drugs war but to fight the
insurgents (EZLN 1994n). The EZLN (1994o) regarded itself as an organised national
force. The EZLN said that first week that their troops would withdraw and that
civilians in Chiapas would not be affected by EZLN troops (Marcos 1994b). There
were differences in opinion within the movement. For instance:

> there are internal differences within the EZLN regarding the conception of the
> struggle. The statements released by Mayor Moises and Commander Tacho
> are fundamentally different than those from Marcos. Marcos always insists
> that they are not trying to seize power. But Moises says we are going to seize
> power and carry out a socialist revolution (Casteneda 1994, 3).

Nevertheless, Casteneda (1994) noted that by making the move in 1994, the EZLN
had to take responsibility for being the 'vanguard' however much they subsequently

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would like to deny this. But the problem for the EZLN was that it not have its own press system or a national wide distribution, or radio station. In another report, one EZLN member said that the EZLN were "(F)ighting for socialism, like the Cubans, but better" (Golden 1994). This was an uprising of the poor and "regardless of ethnicity" (Rosset and Cunningham 1994).

So in this sense there was nothing that special about the EZLN. Similar, and violent insurgencies still abound in Latin America. For instance, Spencer (1998, 35) noted that

> As expected, guerrilla violence in Colombia has rapidly escalated. Since mid-1997 the guerrillas, particularly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have rapidly advanced from being able to launch successful massed attacks against single isolated posts, to open combat with an army battalion, and now to a coordinated and simultaneous nationalwide offensive.

In indicating the distinctions Berlanga pointed out that (quoted in Barkin, Ortiz and Rosen 1997, 2).

> Marcos and I are of the same generation...(A)t the same time he went with his people to the guerrilla movement in Chiapas, we came here with a very different perspective having nothing to do with armed struggle.When the Zapatistas emerged in Chiapas, for a moment we wondered whether we should have been armed revolutionaries and fought here for example in the Sierra. Marcos did it. Why didn't we?.

The year 1994 was meant to represent that Mexico had entered the capitalist First World. The EZLN destroyed that illusion (EZLN 1996c). Indeed, what could be more archaic, so out of synchronisation with the New World Order, a peasant/Marxist

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revolution from the rural area?

By the end of the year $11 billion had been taken out of Mexico by foreign investors (Matorell 1998). The New National Workers Union (UNT) had split from official Unions as the EZLN galvanised the urban workers (Alert 1996). May Day demonstrators carried banners in the Zocalo Square representing widespread working class opposition. The Congress of Labour (CT) and the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) cancelled official May Day demonstrations. This was rumoured to be a strategy of the Foro Group 21 dissidents from CT led by Hernandez Juarez head of the Telephone Workers Union (STRM).

One of the EZLN's more recent critics, the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) embarked on a wave of violent campaigns throughout urban and rural Mexico (Marcos 1996e). On June 28, 1995 there was the first appearance of the EPR. In 1997 the EPR activated in the town of La Crucecita in Oaxaca demanding according to its Commander Oscar, the violent overturning of an unpopular government. Interior minister Chauyffet later accused them of enacting a pantomime (Serrill 1996). On January 26, 1998, it was reported that the Federal General Attourney had detected 12 paramilitary groups in Chiapas (Associated Press Report 1998).

v) The EZLN: The Mexican Bureau of the Global Revolution?

The EZLN have been placed into a conceptual schematic of resistance to global capital restructuring (Cox 1999). Indeed, one of the inevitable and paradoxical characteristics of globalisation is that it is now enabling the possibility of organisation on a global rather than a national level. There is a sense that Marx was right and that workers of the world can now unite, take advantage of global economic crisis (Hobsbawm 1998; Waterman 1992, 1998). Such struggle can maintain a progressive strategic move beyond state cooption and the misnomer of state-socialism. Many have taken the EZLN as representing a part of a global revolutionary struggle or as part of a unifying counter struggle against

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neo-liberalism (Cox 1999; Krishnan 1996). Many are suggesting that "it is now time to overturn neo-liberal globalisation and in doing so to create a new world" (Amoore *et al* 1997, 193).

Indeed, Sivanandan (1999) suggested that the left has been somewhat disorientated by the seductive and perilous ideology of globalisation and now requires new conceptual apparati through which to understand the nature of the theory and practice of resistance to globalisation. [39] In contrast, Meiksins-Woods (1996) warned the left about casually subscribing to the 'domination' ideology. But there is a sense that the EZLN are at the forefront of a unified and coordinated challenge to globalisation, a "globalisation of social conflict" (Mittelman 1994, 434; Mittelman 1996).

However, Waterman (1992, 1998) noted practical caution as to the actual power and possibility of the kind of global alternatives of social movements but they do describe the current development of new emancipatory internationalisms which are unavoidably using attributes of globalisation and especially technology. The argument is that movements at the local level tend to become strategically fragmented, reformist and often parochial. A more coordinated struggle is now required.

Ostensibly, the aspect of global resistance makes a definitive spatial and strategic hierachy of the local-national -global. This global strategic move would defeat co-option and the critical argument goes that if a transnational capitalist class can mobilise on a global level, (Van Der Pijl 1984) then why cannot global resistances also make this critical gesture? According to Macewan (1994) there continues to exist the lingering question of whether or not these popular movements are likely to bring about larger changes. Globalisation has always produced social contradictions, but as it turns out, economic growth has always contained these movements. But it is clear

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[39]According to Levidow (1999) "Globalization and free trade are being widely promoted as inevitable historical forces, even as natural ones. In response, opposition movements have identified these slogans as weapons of the neoliberal project." New intellectual strategies were to be organised by the Conference of Socialist Economists (CSE).   144

that the world economy is mired in stagnation [40]and states are perhaps unable to

maintain this boom and bust capacity. Cox (quoted in Amoore *et al* 1997) concluded

that the challenge to globalisation will be global as a build up from the local to the

global. According to Marxism, the local would, melt away (Hall 1992). In rejecting

the more deterministic forms of anti-systemic analysis of the kind posited by Arrighi,

Hopkins and Wallerstein (1989) Coxs' critical endeavour posited a more agent

centered (although not idealist centered) critical emancipatory resistance to

globalisation. Cox (1999) argued that this critical emancipatory desire will occur and

be manifested in an emancipatory global civil society. This critical interpretation of

the Zapatista movement means that this movement represents an emancipatory pocket

of resistance of this global struggle representing that there are "colliding forces at

work" (Wagar 1996, 2; Shaw 1994). Chase Dunn (1996) pointed out that the:

> future success of resistance movements to neo liberal globalisation may be
>
> brought a step closer if resistance organisations themselves highlight the close
>
> relationship between the state and globalisation...to be successful resistance to
>
> neoliberalisation must be conducted in a coordinated manner on a local,
>
> national, regional and global level.

Could indeed globalisation be sowing the seeds of its own destruction as the

reformist capabilities of the quisling state are now being eroded through the discipline

of neo-liberalism and the possibility of mobilising and co-ordinating a unified

resistance on a new global terrain is more realistic? Indeed the prescient nature of

Marxism indicates that there is currently a belief that maybe Marx was right given the

recent fallibilities of an emerging neo-liberal global capitalism (Cox 1999;

Hobsbawm 1998; Sklair 1995).

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[40]Green peace (2000) reported recent concern with genetically modified crops for the
Chiapas region and the issue of biosafety.   145

Clearly, organised labour took a while to come to terms with the cunning nature of an expansive capital in order to mobilise on an internationalist scale. Labour was caught between strategic debates on the possibility of global revolution and the strategic implications of nationalism whilst the objective conditions for global class struggle may have been structurally fermenting. Indeed, the alleged cooption of Marxism and socialism by the promises of capitalism and the liberal democratic establishment is not a new criticism even with the benefit of hindsight. Accusations of revolutionary betrayal have been hurled at leftist 'revolutionaries' and the party-political left as it succombed to the foibles of capitalism and Michels 'iron law' throughout the halycon post-war consensus. Concerns with global capital and its promises have now focused upon the seemingly reformist language and pronouncements of Global Compacts and for a 'globalisation with a human face' currently manifested through promised packages of new deals and third ways.

Indeed, since the recent global financial crisis there has been a paradoxical feeling amongst the transnational class that the actors of global capital (productive and financial) are undermining their own interests through the proliferation of protests, heavy speculation and economic short termism. This is precisely the kind of contradiction imbued in capitalism that Marx had envisaged. But this form of global resistance has, as I pointed out in chapter one, been severely criticised for its universalism and aspirations for struggle (Spegele 1997).

Conclusion.

The chapter has outlined the roots of the EZLN rebellion. It has also shown how it was possible to place the EZLN into the conceptual parameters of the old social movements. That is, the EZLN were a class orientated struggle resisting neo-colonial capitalism and the vicissitudes of global capital. These Marxist interpretations have been based on the activities of previous Latin American revolutions and more recently this interest in international solidarity and resistance to globalisation as an expression

of an expansion of capital accumulation worldwide.

However, this Marxist view has become questionable and to some extent limited in elucidating the creativity of the EZLN and how it rejected the classic model of revolutionary insurgency. Therefore in the next chapter, I will explore and discuss one of the controversial reinterpretations of the EZLN. Placing the EZLN as a novel politics of resistance meant for some, reintroducing postmodernism into the debate (Burbach 1994, 1996). This put emphasis on the real 'newness' of the rebellion and concomitantly induced a decisive Marxist/postmodern debate.

<u>Chapter Four.</u>

<u>The Emiliano Zapata Army of National Liberation (EZLN), Burbach, Nugent and the</u>

<u>Postmodern Debate.</u>

Introduction.

The purpose of this chapter is to consider the view that the EZLN was not a

Marxist movement in the guise of previous Latin American insurgencies. I will

outline the deficiencies identified with the Marxist reading by considering the EZLN

within the mapping of the new social movement/postmodern literature as outlined in

chapter one. Having discussed the arguments which raise the issue of profound

difference and novelty I will more specifically consider one of the major debates

centered upon the EZLN which set up the EZLN as an intellectual battle between

Marxism and postmodernism.

As a leftist intellectual, Burbach (1994) used the word postmodernism to indicate

that there was a novelty about the EZLN. Others recognised the distinctions. Gomez

(1994) stated that the EZLN was "novel type of armed political movement clearly

distinguished from previous guerrilla movements in Mexico and elsewhere" in terms

of its "ideas and military practice" (Gomez 1994,1). Conger (1994, 3) noted that:

> The Zapatistas launched their uprising in unusual times, historical Lorenzo
>
> Meyer points out: 'the EZLN (rebellion) is the first postmodern rebellion of
>
> Latin America. The first that is born not only in postcommunism but also, and
>
> this is important, (born) in post anticommunism', Meyer wrote in the
>
> newspaper Excelsior. In this context, the Zapatistas explicitly renounced the
>
> standard leftist goals of leading revolution and taking power.

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Nevertheless, as a leftist writer, Burbach (1994) set the cat amongst the pigeons, asking for Marxists to take postmodernism seriously. This was important, because, as I showed in chapter one, Marxists were highly sceptical of postmodernism as a conceptual and political development. Burbach's (1994) piece incurred the wrath of expletives from the left with his 'appropriation' of the EZLN as a new social movement and his use of an intellectual fad such as postmodernism. I show how the debate with Nugent (1995) was based upon distinctive conceptual, interpretive, linguistic and political assumptions of postmodern resistance. I show Burbach's (1994) article precipitated heated debate. I argue that his postmodern account of the EZLN is a useful way of getting to grips with the way the EZLN eluded the conceptual schematics of the old social movements.

However, as I will show, Burbach's argument was ultimately constrained in the sense that the postmodern reading missed the more creative aspects of the struggle. This was manifested in its rethinking of modernisation and the Enlightenment. I will conclude that a further rethinking and understanding of the postmodern critique needs to be introduced in order to understand the creative and exploratory aspects of the EZLN on particular Enlightened themes.

i) Was the EZLN Really Marxist?

Indeed, it seems strange that such divergent interpretations can incur over just one movement in a matter of months. This indicates the potential elusiveness and ambiguity of the EZLN. Was the EZLN really a class based revolutionary struggle *a la* Sandinistas? Firstly, there was Marcos' emphasis on the 'ethnic' quality of the EZLN. Ethnicity did not, according to the conceptual schematic of the old social movements play a part in proper revolutionary struggle. Indeed, Marcos would parody the Chiapas tourist industry (Marcos 1994c) with an *alternative* guide to the

region. The tourist seeking the 'exotic' indigenous peoples is criticised for making

Chiapas another 'Jurassic Park' (Brady 1996, 616). Yet one participant of an Indian

march in 1992 indicated the political activism embedded within the Indian

communities. One Indian read a letter:

> addressed to Carlos Salinas de Gortari in which they accuse him of having
>
> brought all of the agarian reform gains made under Zapata to an end, of selling
>
> the country with the North American Free Trade Association and of bringing
>
> Mexico back to the times of Porfirio Diaz (Marcos 1994a).

As such, Marcos (1994a) remarked that the left could not believe that the Indians

would be a potential revolutionary force. Indians were considered reactionary. Marcos

(1994a) pointed out that Marxism/Leninism had been extremely scathing of the

Indians for representing a regressive and archaic force (Devereux *et al* 1994).

Moreover, the EZLN had very quickly stated in one of its first announcements that it

was not linked to other insurgencies in Central America with the following statement

(Trujillo 1994, 2):

> the majority of EZLN troops are indigenous people from the state of Chiapas,
>
> this being the case because we indigenous represent the most humiliated and
>
> dispossessed sector in Mexico, but also, as you can see, the most dignified.We
>
> are thousands of armed indigenous people and behind us are thousands of our
>
> relatives.

Indeed, the Clandestine Revolutionary Committee General Command (CCRI-GC)

was composed of four main groups of Indian descent, cooperating their actions

through a joint command structure that included military captains, lieutenants, lieutenant colonels and the peoples committee at the top. Women played a major role in this military organisation (EZLN 1994, 1994c).

Secondly, Ovetz (1994a) wrote "if I hadn't seen it myself I never imagined people with guns would ever feel themselves compelled to be questioned by unarmed people during a rebellion." Was this really the beginning of another guerrilla war in Central America? For instance, why did the EZLN return so quickly to the Lacandon Jungle after only six days? Was this simply a military defeat, a paucity of military expertise, or something more than this? Ovetz (1994a, 2) wrote on this ambiguity:

> the EZLN had entered San Cristobel suddenly...most wore green hats, some with Top Gun logos written on them...a handful wearing black ski masks held automatic or semiautomatic weapons...if the EZLN is backed by rebels in Guatamala (UNRG), El Salvador (FMLN) and Peru as the government insisted in the Press, the state of their firepower certainly didn't show it. And if they aren't, they maybe should be.

Undoubtedly, there were questions as to the revolutionary inclinations, because of the lack of actual violence that night. Take a witness statement. Ovetz (1994a) gave a sense of the atmosphere. He wrote:

> The revolt began just before dawn, sometime between 1 and 4am according to a few tourists who witnessed EZLN members seize the undefended building. Upon entering town they attacked the federales station on the main road and liberated a nearby prison freeing the prisoners and possibly gaining a few new volunteers. Since I never saw any fighting it was hard to conceive of it as an armed rebellion at that point. During the entire time I was in the presence of the EZLN no shots were fired, no fighting occurred, no threats made, no

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violence and no danger existed. When I was asked by CNN to describe the mood about town the word that immediately came to mind was festive, at least until the police and military arrived later the next day.

From this description by CNN's Robert Ovetz the initial insurgency was apparently relatively short and quiet. Ovetz (1994a) was surprised at the relative peace of the insurgency that night, until the military arrived, as Vietnam style Huey helicopters were used to deliver Federal troops and to bomb nearby villages on the supposition that the EZLN were vying for a Marxist Mexico. Ovetz (1994a) wrote:

By striking during a major Mexican holiday and at the heart of the tourist season in San Cristobel, our presence as visitors...afforded the EZLN an important protection from military attack, an advantage that quickly evaporated when the military swarmed into Chiapas and most of us fled. Future editions of travel books are sure include bold warnings about visiting Chiapas because of rebellion. Little did I realise that the fireworks of New Years eve would turn into weapons fire on New Years Day...I stumbled upon the rebirth of armed struggle in Mexico...(F)or a day the Tzetal and Tzotil Indians retook San Cristobel taken from them by Herman de Cortes troops in 1528 and later run by and renamed for the critical Fray Bartholome de Las Casas. Now they are taking it back. Someday it will be for more than a day.

Then another controversy arose, one with a background very much tied into the Cold War framework and its omnipotent mindset. The PRI had argued that the EZLN were linked to communist groups in Guatemala and Cuba (Conger 1994). The EZLN

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denied this. The EZLN had made it clear that the EZLN is not aligned to International Communist conspiracies. The EZLN had a military outfit but they learned their tactics:

> from Mexican history itself...from resistance to the Yankee invasion of 1846-1847, and from popular resistance to the French intervention, from the heroic deeds of Villa and Zapata and from the long history of indigenous resistances in our country (quoted in Routledge 1998, 249).

Indeed, Marcos had stated that the EZLN had learnt the military techniques from "a manual to the Mexican army that fell into our hands, and a small manual from the Pentagon, and some work by a French General whose name I can't remember" (quoted in Routledge 1998, 249). This militarism was purely self-defence. As I pointed out in chapter two, Chiapas has always been a state of impoverishment and alleged corruption, perpetrated by the 'family' caciques and local enforcers, big cattle ranchers with alleged political connections (Flood 1994; Gates 1996; Hernandez 1994). Marcos (Trujillo 1994, 3) claimed very quicky that night that:

> it is due to the fact that we never resorted to banditry to obtain resources that the states repressive apparatus never detected our actions during ten years of serious and careful preperations. Some have asked us why we decided to begin now if we have been prepared for some time. The answer is that before we tried all pacific and legal means without results. During these ten years as more than 150 thousand of our indigenous brothers have died from curable diseases...(If) we die now it will not be with embarassment but with dignity as was the case for our ancestors. We are prepared to die, another 150 thousand if this is necessary, to awake the people from the dream of deception to which the government keeps them.

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As such, Marcos (1994a) insisted that the EZLN "do not want a dictatorship of another kind, nor anything out of this world, nor international communism and all that. We want justice where there is not even now, minimum subsistence. This is in the whole state of Chiapas." Marcos (1994a) stated that that the EZLN "do not want to monopolise the vanguard or say that we are the light, the only alternative," reiterating that the "EZLN has no foreigners in its rank or command" nor with "any other armed movement in Latin America, North America, Europe" (Trujillo 1994, 2). Consequently, Marcos maintained that the US and others "must understand it is a struggle of Mexicans", saying to the Americans and others, "don't interfere with us" (Ovetz 1994, 6).

There were two ways of looking at this. Firstly, that any hint of change and the rhetoric that inevitably went with this was simply a cunning device through which to obscure the EZLN's underlying commitment to class struggle and a Marxist Mexico. Secondly, even those who remained convinced that the EZLN would still like to engage in a Marxist struggle and recognised that changes had had to occur, maintained that the changes were an ignominious admittance of revolutionary defeat.

Indeed, there seemed an immediate paradox in the response of President Salinas. A few months after the EZLN mobilisation President Salinas "scurried" (Conger 1994, 1) off for a tour of Europe with the express aim of quelling investor fears, saying that the EZLN was a localised insurgency, but, probably backed by the Guatemala Revolutionary Organisation of the People (ORPA), part of the National Revolutionary Unity of Guatemala (URNG). In this sense President Salinas was pressing for the idea that the EZLN was not a reaction to neo-liberalism but precipitated by outside forces. Ovetz (1994) stated that it was very likely that "the US military could get involved in Mexico trying to fight you, they've done it many times before." The reply from Marcos was "I don't think so. In past years there was the Soviet Union, Cuba" and thus "they must understand it is a struggle of Mexicans."

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ii) Tentative Ceasefire of a Violent Struggle?

One of the outstanding facets of the Declaration of War was the insistence on the legality of the struggle. The First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle had stated:

> according to our *constitution*, we declare the following to the Mexican federal army, the pillar of the Mexican dictatorship that we suffer from, monopolised by the one party state system and led by Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the maximum and illegitimate federal executive that today holds power (EZLN 1994a) (my emphasis).

Here we find one of the first uses of the term postmodern. The 'postmodern' guerrillas for Conger (1994) "distinguished their movement with their ready willingness to engage in peace talks" (Conger 1994, 4). Three weeks after the insurgency a strategy shift reversed the initial demands to overthrow the government. Indeed, many on the left criticised the movement for going to the negotiating table too early (Casteneda 1994). But it was a sign that maybe there was something distinctive about the EZLN. Maybe the EZLN did not want to take state power, like the Sandinistas, or a group of revolutionary guerrillas trying to goad the rest of the population into going to arms to topple the government (Burbach 1994). The CCRI-GC (1994) called for a just, peaceful and dignified solution to the war.

Thus, eleven days after the initial insurgency in San Cristobel on January 12 1994, 12,000 people marched in support of the rebellion in Mexico City (Hinman 1994). But the possibility of future violence made supporters in civil society elsewhere, to say the least, a little uneasy. Indeed, it was noted that earlier insurgencies such as the PP could never have staged and unleashed such a bold attack on cities such as these. Later that year on December 24, the Church led mediator (CONAI) was formed. But the EZLN recognised that the government was willing to negotiate and in good faith

(Serrill 1994, 1994a).

However, the tenuous grip of the ceasefire was shown, when, with EZLN arms allegedly found by the PRI in Mexico City on February 9, 1995, a strategy of cat and mouse engaged when President Zedillo after a year and with much political pressure, called for the arrest of Marcos and stepped up attacks on the EZLN. Troops were sent to the Lacandon Jungle. All they found was Marcos' pipe, all alone, placed on the ground, goading the PRI and still smoking.

By early February 1994 the EZLN and the Mexican governments peace commissioner Manuel Camacho Soli had agreed to a basic agenda for negotiation. These negotiations would address economic conditions, social conditions such as racism, marginalisation, exploitation and expulsions and the lack of space for legal participation in politics faced by Chiapas peasants and indigenous people. But Camacho said that electoral reform would not be on the negotiating table (Trujillo 1994b).

By February 12 1994 a space for peace in Mexico had been opened following an unexpected government ceasefire. The space created allowed the formation of the New Democratic Alliance which was set up (APN) on February 5 1994 with the aid of the Cardenista National Reconstruction Party. Presidential candidate Colosio was then assassinated on March 22. Marcos argued that this was clear evidence of a possible intensification of PRI violence towards the EZLN. The Chiapas conflict has in fact introduced a new national debate on the role of the military (Serrano 1995). Between February 21 and March 2 1994 a dialogue for peace subsequently occured between the EZLN and PRI.

In June 1994 the CCRI-GC (1994) rejected the governments proposal for Peace with Dignity and Reconciliation. The EZLN had vehemently demanded more substantial structural change, free and fair democratic elections, resignation of the head of the Federal Executive, an end to centralisation, and autonomy for the

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indigenous communities, the development of a dignified workforce, the cancellation

of debt, an overturning of NAFTA and the release of political prisoners. The CCRI

(1994a) reported that the EZLN will never surrender.

Both Salinas and Zedillo have been portrayed as the Boggie el Aceitoso, the

Argentinian comic caricature of the money mercenary. Conger (1994, 1) noted that

the "new reality in Mexico was summarised in dramatic and moving terms in a letter

sent to the rebel army by 280 organisations belonging to the State Indigenous and

Peasant Council of Chiapas."

Then, in August 1994, Subcommandante Marcos (1994) in his speech to the

National Democratic Convention (CND) stated that the EZLN did not regret using

arms against the government. But Marcos was aware of the nervousness of civil

society on the issue of violence. Marcos (1994d) had warned Zedillo of the storm

ahead.

Indeed, in June 1994, the EZLN (1994b) in the Second Declaration of the

Lacandon Jungle reiterated the legality of their struggle. Indeed, Marcos reiterated

that the insurgency had been within the confines of Constitutional Article 39 which

gave sovereignty to the people of Mexico and the justification to change a

government when the people saw fit. The Second Declaration stated:

> we have respected the international conventions of warfare while we have
>
> carried out our military actions. These conventions have allowed us to be
>
> recognised as a belligerent force by national and foreign forces; we order all
>
> of our regular and irregular forces, both inside national territory and outside
>
> the country, to continue to obey the unilateral cease fire; we condemn the
>
> threats against civilian society brought about by the militarisation of the
>
> country; we propose to all independent political parties that are suffering from
>
> intimidation and repression of political rights; we reject the manipulation and
>
> the attempts to seperate our just demands from the demands of the Mexican

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people.

As such, the EZLN provoked major debates on the feasibility of armed struggle and the politics of armed struggle (Veltmeyer 1997). On this basis, Conger (1994, 3) stated in the March of 1994 that:

> The Zapatista National Liberation army is unlike any other Latin American guerrilla movement, and in its short public life has shown a flexibility and moderation previously unknown in the hemisphere. The Zapatistas distinguish their movement with their ready willingness to engage in peace talks. Only one week after taking up arms, the guerrilla leadership responded favourably to government offers to hold a dialogue to debate the EZLN agenda of social and economic demands, a ceasefire, and political participation for indigenous and other citizens.

Was this simply revolutionary disillusionment where Marcos still harboured aspirations for revolution as a misty eyed vanguard, lamenting the demise of Marxism and support? (Bruce 1999). For the left, if the EZLN forewent its revolutionary commitments in this way the EZLN represented the final flickerings of the revolutionary flame. Indeed, the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) criticised the EZLN for selling out to capitalism (Althaus 1996).

Indeed, it would be easy to go down this path. However, for others, these actions suggested that the EZLN struggle required further explanation and exploration. This alternative way takes seriously the apparent changes in objectives, strategies and who and what the EZLN represent, the sheer novelty with this Central American insurgency and the way in which perhaps the EZLN could not be constrained and understood

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within the conceptual schematics of the 'old left'.

iii) Burbach, EZLN and Postmodernism.

As such, Burbach's (1997a) main argument was that the dogmatics of the old left had "cost us time" by not acknowledging what the EZLN represented, a hope (Burbach 1997a, 1). Meiksins-Woods and Bellamy Foster (1996) pointed out that there was a contradiction in the way that Burbach (1994) had used postmodern concepts to problematise the metanarrative of Marxism to celebrate a 'politics of difference' and to state in his first footnote of the 1994 article, that his work is primarily based on Harvey's (1989) notion of an 'epoch of postmodernity'. These two positions are unequivocal and contradictory.

Indeed, it seems strange to pursue these criticisms at this stage when I suggest that Burbach's account opened a critical way of thinking about and explaining the significance of the EZLN. My point is to show how traditional Marxism did not take kindly to postmodernism. It smelt of 'new social movement', of nihilism and intellectual 'faddism,' and the terms of the debate were cast.

Consequently, it is said that "not since the Sandinistas, has a movement generated such attention" (LaFrance 1996, 801). One of the reasons for this has been the coining of the term postmodernism to indicate this sense of novelty about the EZLN struggle. Burbach's (1994) opening statement went that the:

> Indian rebellion that burst upon the world scene in January is a postmodern political movement. The rebellion is an attempt to move beyond the politics of modernity whether it be the modernisation of the Salinas de Gortari government or of past national liberation movements. And even more fundamentally, to seek to end the victimisation of the Indians by centuries of Western modernity (Burbach 1994, 113).

By placing emphasis on the 'Indian' and 'centuries of modernisation', it was clear

that for Burbach (1994), the EZLN represented a new social movement and a form of

struggle that had been marginalised by the old left. Burbach (1994, 113)

argued that what "distinguishes the EZLN from its predecesors is that it is not bent on

taking power in Mexico City, nor is it calling for state socialism" nor is it a "single

minded revolt of Indian people focused only on retaking their land." Here, thankfully

Burbach argued, the EZLN were not just another Shining Path in which "a few

guerrillios try to goad the rest of the population into supporting them" in which "an

Indian or peasant army is intent on destroying all that stands in its way in order to

seize absolute control of the state." Burbach (1994) wrote that the postmodernity of

the EZLN was:

> rooted in part in the movements awareness of the dramatic changes occuring
>
> in the world scene and the past limitations of national liberation
>
> movements...in the wake of the collapse of the modern bi-polar world of the
>
> post Second World War and the ideological exhaustion of most of the national
>
> liberation movements (Burbach 1994, 113).

For instance, the Marxist writer Harvey (1989) had taken a sociological approach

to postmodernism by arguing that capitalism had entered a new age termed

postmodernity. The economic structure had changed so that production and

consumption was geared to new and fragmented practices of production through

footloose factories, hypermobile companies, new financial flows and a compression

of 'time and space'. As such, Burbach (1994) also identified the significance of the

role of Subcommandante Marcos was unlike previous vanguards or 'caudillos' and

the use of the term 'sub' is deliberate and "ironic" (Burbach 1994, 114). Finally, the

EZLN was organised "beyond democratic centralist structure of past national

liberation" that "resulted in

more centralisation than democracy" (Burbach 1994, 114).

Consequently, the accounts of the old left for Burbach, had to be taken further and to consider this overarching metanarrative. But Burbach (1994) does conclude that "one should not fall into the trap of romanticising the EZLN and the struggle of the Indian people in Chiapas" (Burbach 1994, 122).

iv) *Nugent: The EZLN and a Postmodern Methodology.*

The apparent 'appropriation' and use of the term postmodernism and the whole conceptual make up of the new social movement literature was challenged by Nugent (1995, 1995a). Nugent (1995, 127) was unimpressed by academics who have fallen for "the real seductive power"of postmodernism. Nugent (1995, 136) asked whether it was the role of Northern academics to simply measure reality against abstract methodologies in pursuit of trendy deconstruction and language games? Indeed, Nugent (1995, 2) wrote:

> it should come as no little surprise that some postmodern/postcolonial critics, seem, or pretend not to know that the arenas of discourse in which their work circulates are from several removes from the social reality they purport to represent. The privileges now enjoyed by intellectuals in the North have been so reduced that many seem to be compensating by providing to themselves an inflated sense of their own importance and the significance of purely intellectual or discursive practices.

This was rather unfair. Burbach (1994) had made a trip to Chiapas in February 1994 as part of an International Delegation and with the EZLN had "sensed something different" (Burbach 1996, 34). But the postmodern appropriation Nugent (1995, 1995a) argued, was inherently academic, a million miles from the concrete

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brutality/reality of capitalism. This is the site Nugent (1995) claimed, of the affluent Northern intellectuals. Nugent (1995a, 3) noted that postmodernism:

> is more a way of allowing some intellectuals to appropriate these events, to situate these complex historical developments on their own (intellectual) terrain, to assimilate them to a discourse that permits computer academics to feel good about themselves.

As such, Nugent (1995) took a typical understanding of postmodernism as a philosophical development driven by continental 'deconstruction', language, discourse and genealogy. For Nugent this enterprise lacked proper objective, scientific and critical enquiry being ostensibly academia for academias sake. Within CIRT similar criticisms have been made at those purporting to enhance a postmodern epistemology (Wight 1999). Given the socialist aspect to Nugent's (1995) own critical enquiry there was Nugent (1995a, 1) noted:

> one way of summing up the difference between postmodernism and Marxism. It isn't that Marxism is uninterested in language, discourse, or meaning, and the best historical materialistic work deals precisely with the many different concrete referents that words like "class" or "work" can have in specific historical conditions. But here I simply want to underline that Marxism can understand the practices through which meanings are produced in relation to the actions of people on and in the world and not just in relation to other meanings. Practices are undertaken in particular places at particular times, by particular subjects in particular conditions and these have to be studied historically.

Postmodernists he suggested, proposed a *methodology* of anti-history and

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intellectual absurdity ensues, an inevitability "to which the analysis can lead" (Nugent 1995, 136). Indeed more generally, Wickham (1990, 128) suggested that "if postmodernism is going to have anything to say to these other specific sites" then it must not be "in the form of yet another quest expressed in highly philosophical terms" (Wickham 1990, 133). Continuing his socialist orientated criticism of postmodern intellectualism Nugent stated that:

> (T)he rest of us should be content to see our intellectual activity function as a critical instrument, as a challenge to ruling ideologies, maybe as a guide to political action when possible, but above all as a way of enhancing or broadcasting, but not replacing, the voices of those who oppose oppression (Nugent 1995a, 7).

Others argued rather condescendingly and on their terms (the crux of the debate), that "postmodernism is about as academic as you can get" (Meiksins-Woods and Bellamy-Foster 1996, 44). These writers reported that there are now "those of us in academia" who "find its appeal to students and collegues deeply depressing." However, Nugent (1995a, 7) had accepted that there were "limits" to intellectual activity. But in a concluding attack on postmodern intellectualism he stated that "the determinative power that postmodern intellectuals claim for their own discursive practices-the power to create reality itself- is, in the real world, possible only for the servants of a ruling class, with the power of the state underwriting their discourses." Nugent asked of postmodernism:

> So where does this leave us? The language of postmodernity has added nothing to our understanding of Chiapas. If anything it has obscured and detracted from what is valuable in Burbach's account. It is especially

depressing to observe this effect in an otherwise illuminating and politically

sympathetic study, and it is a measure of the price we have to pay for this

surrender to fashion. Instead of bringing us closer to an understanding of a

complex social movement, it simply serves to underline the profound distance

between postmodern intellectuals and the activists or supporters of the EZLN.

However, Burbach (1996) argued that postmodernism was important. Its

scepticism rightly rejected moribund, mechanistic and totalising views of history with

a concomitant rejection of state-socialism, Stalinism and the Gulags. But Burbach

accepted that "of course this vulgar application of Marxism does not render Marxist's

traits of analysis invalid"(Burbach 1996, 35). There is an interesting parallel here

although Burbach (1996) noted that "Marxists have no capacity to link up socialism

with the concrete experiments or broad based social movements" (Burbach 1996, 36).

Problematically I suggest, Burbach (1996) remained within socialist historical

enquiry.

v) Location of Grievance Objective: Indian Struggle and a Politics of Difference.

The Marxist/postmodern debate set on the terms outlined in chapter one logically

meant that emphasis on modernisation and ethnicity was an affront to class struggle.

That is, the conceptual and political primacy of the dialectic of class and the ontology

of capitalism as the primary sources of grievance has been challenged. This logicality

is evident in the Burbach/Nugent debate. Both of course recognised capitalism yet

Burbach's emphasis moved on to a more resounding problematisation of 'modernity'

and his focus was on the Indian and ethnic quality of the EZLN. In terms of the debate

the EZLN was a new social movement.

Indeed, Burbach's (1997a) argument of late has been that postmodernism:

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can make its most vital contribution in the reconstruction of a new social basis for radical change. Postmodernists argue that societies and classes are fragmented, that workers, peasants, indigenous societies, and other social groups have very specific identities depending on their location, culture, history and other factors (Burbach 1997a, 2).

Burbach (1997a) argued that:

> Marxism no longer has a revolutionary subject capable of transforming the world. Neither the working class, nor its major twentieth century ally, the peasantry show signs of taking up socialist banners as we approach the new millennium (Burbach 1997a,1).

As I pointed out in chapter one, the conceptual fabric of the new social movements was aligned to the development of 'new times' by recognising the moribund conceptual (and political) focus on the proletariat as a revolutionary force and the new recognition of other subjects and other grievances. In this sense whilst capitalism was of course recognised, the concern was now levelled at the overarching ideology of progress and the grand narrative of modernisation. Here, the onslaught of modernisation, science and technology had repressed traditional cultures, philosophies and ways of being in the name of reason and progress. Marxism was complicit in this. Subcommandante Marcos stated that:

> the most orthodox proposals of Marxism or Leninism, theoretical concepts or historical references...that the vanguard of the revolution is the proletariat, that the taking of state power and the installation of a dictatorship of the proletariat is the aim of the revolution, were confronted by an ideological tradition that

is, how can I say it, somewhat magical (quoted in Devereux *et al* 1994, 5).

Indeed, Marcos' (1994a) first statement emphasised that the EZLN was a struggle against a *modernisation* program and that the EZLN was an *ethnic* struggle. Such pronouncements have served to fuel a belief that the EZLN was a new social movement protecting traditional cultures and ways of existing from the centuries of Mexican modernisation. Implicit in this argument was the essential dichotomy between premodern/traditional society and a modernity that sweeps all aside in its bluster. Undoubtedly this emphasis on tradition, culture, 'poetry' or 'jouissance' was progressively contrasted to the rational calculations of an homogenising modernity in all its (capitalist and socialist) forms (Cansino 1995; Castillo and Nigh 1998; Depalma 1995, 1995a; Fuentes 1994, 1994a; Gomez 1994; Hilbert 1997; Maffesoli 1994; Marcos 1994a; Nash 1997; Shalif 1998). This development was meant to be the mirror image of European nation state formation (Giddens 1981; Poggi 1978; Tilly 1993).

According to Burbach (1994), the imposition of the neo-liberal modernisation program is distinctive. Created by technocrats in the Partido Revolucion Institucional (PRI) the neo-liberal era inextricably forged a new rationality defined through the rationality of the market. That is, neo-liberalism represented Mexico's ticket to First World status manifestly as a disciplined state that was adaptable to the new world economy (Enloe 1996, Hilbert 1997).

Couched in these terms, the Indian cultures are a reminder of Mexico's traditional and ancient past that had no role to play in the new and exuberant modern world of globalisation. Enloe (1996) suggested that Chiapas fitted the criteria of an excluded space, distinct from the grand politics of Mexico City where the PRI constructed its logic of silence.

The discursive practice used to justify the direction of Mexican modernity was based on a unique Mexican heritage which maintained a flexibility and

an adaptability to change. President Salinas (1988-1994) stated that Mexicans were living "in a moment of history" that meant "looking for new terms of reference" (Salinas, *quoted* in Hilbert 1997, 124). President Salinas emphasised that Mexico must not be construed as a relic and must tune into the progressive and uplifting beat of neo-liberalism regarded as *the only* way for Mexican modernity. Hilbert (1997, 119) noted that President Salinas called this programme a "new realism" to be based on a "unified" modern state (Hilbert 1997, 128). The key terms for Salinas were maintaining territorial integrity and a unified sovereign Mexican state. Consequently, the implied intention was to "eradicate any part of Mexico" that was not tied to this vision (Hilbert 1997, 129).

Indeed, the EZLN mobilisation reminded Mexico that, contrary to the indefatigably optimistic pronouncements of Salinas, the only "connection Mexico has to the 1st World is that it sits next to it" (Ugalde 1999). Interior minister Labastida later scoffed "laws are not made in the jungle" (Ross 1999a). Indian groups rejecting neo-liberal modernisation were presented as ostensibly 'irrational' or *the other* Mexico. Parfitt (1996, 116) gave a sense of this *dichotomy* saying:

> the Road to Reality runs past a typical conglomeration of modern
>
> Mexico-fancy homes buried in bougainvilles , a Kentucky Fried Chicken
>
> franchise, new car show rooms, colonias of wood, and mud shacks. But then
>
> the pavement winds up into the rough piney mountains of the Chiapas
>
> highlands, mists adrift across the view, and suddenly there are Zinacantan
>
> Indian women walking beside the road like figures out of a time beyond
>
> memory, wearing their neon combination of magentas, oranges, pinks and
>
> flaming reds jumbled together with sparkling silver thread.

This tension between an extension of uniformity and homogenisation contrasts

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with the richness of Indian culture (Fuentes 1994, 1994a). Indeed, it is the 'seduction' of the Indian struggle that has according to Nugent (1995), attracted intellectuals to wrongly place emphasis on this 'politics of difference' and emphasis on 'alternative cultures', even lifestyles, all very disturbingly reminiscent of the 1960s counter culture. But postmodernism rejected the vicissitudes of neo-liberal modernisation.

Such vicissitudes were represented by the 'secret' Chase Manhatten Memos of January 1995 showed the concern from the PRI and the belief that the EZLN represented a security threat to Mexico as it represented a threat to neo-liberalism and a secure investment climate (Dominiguez 1998). The memos stated that "while Chiapas in our opinion does not pose a fundamental threat to Mexican political stability, it is perceived to be so by the investment community" and that "the government will have to eliminate the Zapatistas to demonstrate their effective control over its national territory and security policy" (Cockburn and Silverstein 1995, 1). Cockburn and Silverstein (1995, 2) noted that

> Chase is under no illusions that the December crash of the peso was prompted by the Zapatistas. It is fully aware that the implosion of the Mexican economy was caused by the overvaluation of the peso that enabled US investors such as itself to convert their killings on Mexican bonds into the safety of the dollar...Chase plays down the the possibility of a negotiated solution.

The key point was that the PRI had inextricably tied modernisation to neo-liberalism. As such, a resistance to neo-liberalism was interpreted as a threat to Mexico itself (Hilbert 1997). Indeed, specific attention from Non Governmental Organisation's (NGOs) such as Amnesty International (1997, 1998) has been given to the ongoing low intensity conflict in Chiapas. The EZLN (1995, 1995a, 1995b) reported that by February 1995 the Mexican army had been sent to destroy the

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autonomous indigenous region that had been set up by the EZLN after mobilisation in 1994. Tensions between the federal government and indigenous peoples came to a head in December 1996 later followed by the alleged massacre of Indians in the village of Acteal just before Christmas 1997. Marcos had reported that in his opinion "Acteal is symbolic of a form of government" which "plays at peace, but makes war" (NCDM 13 January 1998). Consequently, Carrigan (1998, 17) noted that the EZLN represent the "Indians from Mexico's forgotten past." The EZLN were a constant reminder to the Mexican government about the lack of modernity in parts of Mexico, a contrast to the 'gilt edged' modernity of Mexico City. Carrigan (1998, 17) noted that within "the vast, theatrical spaces of the great cathedral this dichotomy resonated. It was a dark subtext, full of pain and sorrow, pulsating like an open wound."

Undoubtedly, the EZLN represened the indigenous communities of Chiapas composed almost exclusively of Tzetal, Tzotil. Chole, Mam. Zocque and Tojolobal Indians. Each Indian "feels different" by exuding rich and diverse world views (Nash 1997, 268). Lowy (1997) examined the untold riches of a diverse Mayan culture in a tumultuous battle against the harshness of a Western rationality that eradicates cultural difference (Conley 1997). Moreover, Castillo and Nigh (1998) made a connection between the development of neo-liberal globalisation/modernity as a form of cultural homogenisation and the simultaneous fragmention of 'postmodern' cultures around the world (Maffesoli 1994).

vi) New Times Modernity Capitalism.

By turning his conceptual attention back to the development of capitalism and class relations in Mexico, Nugent (1995) argued that the 'neo-zapatistas' are not resisting a new modernisation program but are a part of a longer struggle resisting the transformation of neo-colonial capitalism and the bourgeois state (Dawson 1998). Nugent (1995) argued that emphasis on 'modernisation' gives an unwelcome 'newness' about a struggle that is enmeshed in a much longer history of

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capitalism, a somewhat nefarious history which is simultaneously obscured.

Essentially Nugent (1995a,5) wrote that:

> Neither the Wars of Independence and the Wars of Reform during the
> ninteenth century, nor the revolution of 1910 and the 'reforms' of
> Salinastroika in the period 1988-1994 during the twentieth century, signalled,
> irreversible, radical breaks with the past. Rather, they are moments in a
> sustained process of transformation. That series of political transformation
> was associated with a series of economic transformations that established the
> specific form of Mexican capitalism.

Consequently, Nugent (1995a,5) argued that the "language of 'pre' and 'post'
pretends to be about historical change" by "carving up history into discontinuous and
disconnected units" is 'anti-history'. It is this periodisation of capitalism that has
sparked unremitting unrest (Harvey 1989; Meiksins-Woods 1996a). Nugent claimed
that as a critical intellectual it is clear that Burbach (1994) had fallen for the
enchanting language of postmodernism, culture and identity. Nugent (1995a) wrote
that Burbach's:

> opening and closing paragraph, where the assertion of the fundamental
> "postmodernity" of the EZLN is repeated time and time again. The essay is
> symptomatic of what can happen when Northern intellectuals, even those on
> the left, become enchanted by a sort of postmodernist identity politics. This
> adoption of postmodern vocabulary and categories of analysis winds up
> revealing more about academic politics in the North than it does about
> situations these analyses are meant to explain.

Clearly, Nugent (1995) accepted identity politics as important. But culture and

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identity are hardly a revolutionary politics. Meiksins Woods (1995, 8) argued that postmodernism is a dangerous "celebration of the marginal" and a "repudiation of grand narratives such as Western ideas of progress including Marx's theories of history" into a "fractured struggle of identity politics." Meiksins-Woods (1995) accepted that issues of racism and sexuality are important. But these issues should be considered mere manifestations of the changing nature and logic of capitalist restructuring (Eagleton 1985).

Indeed, emphasis on such wildly revolutionary inept cultural issues based on the superstructure played a part in maintaining the stability of capitalism by diverting attention from the real issues of class and the exploitative relationship between capital and labour. Rather inevitably, the conclusion was that "the conflation of capitalism with modernity has the effect of disguising the specificity of capitalism" (Meiksins-Woods 1996a, 22). In this sense it was unfortunate that postmodernists had "downplayed" the differences between capitalist and non-capitalist forms of economic organisation and had "taken capitalism for granted" or again, "as part of the worlds universal laws."(Meiksins-Woods 1996, 26). Inexorably, this meant that capitalism had been effectively "conceptualised out of existence" (Meiksins-Woods 1996a, 34). Nugent (1995a, 4) argued:

Again, there is little particularly "postmodern" about struggling to that end (quite apart from the fact that pre-modern forms of exploitation are alive and well and continue to be major targets of struggle). Here it becomes increasingly difficult to get a grip on what is supposed to be postmodern.What is the "modernisation" which the neo-zapatistas are resisting? Does it have something to do with capitalism. Would any anticapitalist struggle be postmodern? For that matter, since one of the major conceits of postmodern

discourse is that capitalism doesn't exist, at least as a systematic totality, it hardly makes sense to talk about a postmodern anticapitalism. And since it is unclear what historical conditions are being opposed by a postmodern politics, we are left with the impression that the neo-zapatistas program is a kind of historical utopianism a pipedream of virtual reality, rather than a pragmatic response to real historical conditions.

Clearly, much intellectual energy is being exerted in an academic debate hinging on the apparent requirement of finding and locating the correct, singular and privileged 'logic' to identifying the grievance of the EZLN.

Perhaps it is worth mentioning other problems that have been identified with this focus. Deneuve and Reeve (1995) rejected the romanticism surrounding the somewhat ethnocentric celebration of indigenous customs and communities contrasted to modernity (Walker 1988). Many Indian communities are traditionally embedded with practices of racism, inequality and elitism. Deneuve and Reeve (1995) are highly critical of the naive groups of "revolutionary tourists" who are "seduced by the exoticism of the unique Indian culture" and "incapable of expressing the slightest critical element which could enable us to deepen our knowledge of the avant-garde struggle running the armed struggle" (Deneuve and Reeve 1995, 1). They argued that

> the totalitarian character of Mayan and Incan societies no longer needs to be demonstrated. Despite that, the myth of an idyllic Indian community has a long life...(A)mong the mayans for example, including the territory comprising Chiapas today, the overwork of the peasants was intended to maintain a minority of aristocrat and priests who formed the ruling class of these city states.

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In response, Burbach (1996) argued that Nugent's somewhat virulent attack "focuses almost exclusively on the opening and closing paragraphs" of the 1994 article. This is a fair point, but as Meiksins-Woods and Bellamy-Foster (1996) pointed out, Burbach (1994) did not adequately respond, apart from the suggestion that the Marxist critique was challenging postmodernism on the emphasis on digital simultaneity or "what passes as a variant" of postmodernism, a caricature (Burbach 1996, 38).

Evidently, Burbach (1997a) noted that "Marxist's do not have to be critical of modernity" because the Enlightened ideology of bourgeois 18th century society did not have much to do with capitalism and to make modernisation synonomous with a capitalist logic is to be problematically reductionist. On the other hand, Burbach (1997a) noted that one can not simply rip them asunder as Nugent (1995) and Meiksins-Woods (1995) tended to do. Crucially, Burbach (1996) argued that the left had ignored modernisation. Burbach (1996) argued that whilst capitalism was clearly important it was now necessary to go further than this and to engage in a more pronounced critique of modernisation on the basis of its horrific legacy. On this basis Burbach (1997a) remarked that the journal *Monthly Review* had been particularly "antagonistic" towards postmodernism.

Furthermore, as I discussed in chapter one a fundamental criteria for distinguishing a postmodern resistance is through its rejection of Marxist objectives. This is based on a view that as Mallon (1994, 1513) noted, there was "no single utopian technocratic answer" to solving the problems of the world. In other words a postmodern resistance will eschew the metanarrative of an Enlightened Marxism and global theory and practice. Moreover, this change was a direct reflection on the dismal legacy of previous national liberation movements. Burbach's (1994) argument stipulated that the EZLN was aware of this. The EZLN was also aware that mobilising in an era when the revolutionary dreams had

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ignominiously crashed and the modern bi-polar system had collapsed. Burbach's (1994) argument was that the EZLN was mobilising as a post-national liberation movement.

Indeed the rejection of grand, rational and unilinear revolution was at some stage influenced by facets of Mayan/Indian culture. This meant that prior to 1994 there had already been a profound sense of reflection by Marcos and the participants of the EZLN during the years in Chiapas with the Indians. This had ended in a rejection of revolutionary theory and practice. In fact the Mayan culture of Chiapas refuses to acknowledge the existence of any stable reality that can be known through reason and harnessed for utopian blueprints. Instead, this reality is always in a constant flux, a fluidity which does not allow for the imposition of grand revolutionary action (Gossen 1996). Indeed, Gossen (1996) noted the strange diffusion within the EZLN of Mayan epistemology and the reliance on modern arms, weaponary, the media and e-mail is the "postmodern mesh of profound social and economic assymetry" (Gossen 1996, 528). The Mayan epistemology of the Quiche people told a story of the Gods who refuted the human aspiration to be equal and, as a punishment made the reality elusive and a shattered mirror. Indeed this symbolism as I will show are pretty familiar in Marcos' communiques (Marcos 1995a, 1995c, 1995g). The Mayan universe was construed as unfolding and fluid and the Chiapas universe was multifaceted (Green 1995). Marcos explained that immersion with Mayan culture meant that the participants of the struggle:

> began to adapt itself to the surroundings in order to survive, that is to say, to permeate the territory, to make it survivable. But above all it began to forge in the combatant...the physical and ideological strength needed for the guerrilla process...(I)n this period there weren't cameras, there weren't recorders, there wasn't any press, nor were there military actions...in this period we had to

learn the world vision of the Indians (quoted in Devereux *et al* 1994).

Moreover, there was a definitive reflection and rejection of the objectives and strategies of revolutionary struggle prior and post-1994 (Gotlieb 1996). Indeed, in 1994 Burbach (1996, 38) wrote "no serious political analyst of the right and left is calling the Zapatistas Marxist and socialist" simply because "these labels don't fit." Indeed, Cuninghame and Corona (1998, 1) noted that "following the 1994 rebellion it was described by the Mexican intellectual Carlos Fuentes as a postmodern guerrilla movement" or as the "first rebellion of the 21st century" which was "in stark contrast to the rest of Latin Americas focist traditions of armed struggle."[41] Carrigan noted (1998, 14):

> Who would expect to hear a rebel leader openly declare that the rebels had neither the desire nor the capacity to impose their own program on the rest of the country...(O)n his way from the rainforest, he had shed all the ideological dogmas and the macho romantic myths so beloved of Latin American revolutionaries.

In an early interview with Marcos, Devereux *et al* (1994) asked Marcos about this apparent contradiction on being named after Emiliano Zapata:

> you have insisted that you are the Zapatistas. Even now we remember the words of an EZLN major who affirmed 'We are not Marxists, nor are we guerrillas. We are Zapatistas and We are an army'. In Mexico, the only precedents for your actions and attitudes go back precisely to those whose names you constantly evoke. Zapata and Magon.

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[41]The EZLN has been criticised by the EPR and the Broad Front for the Construction of a National Liberation Movement (FAC-MLN) for representing a regressive and misguided politics.   175

Marcos replied "Is that a question?" Devereux *et al* (1994) replied "No, a presentation" to which Marcos replied "I thought it was a speech." Marcos then stated:

> I'm going to explain. The EZLN was born as having points of reference with the political military organisations of the guerrilla movements in Latin America during the sixties and seventies. That is to say, political military structures with the central aim of overthrowing a regime and taking power of the people in general. When the first group of EZLN arrived here, to the jungles of Chiapas, it was a very small group with this political military structure that I am taking about (quoted in Devereux *et al* 1994).

There then appeared to be a gradual rejection of what he termed revolutionary "romantic visions." Marcos emphasised that:

> We should talk about this romantic vision, if you understand me, of guerrilla war, with its references to grandiose military actions, the taking of power and triumph, all those things that could be references to the triumphant guerrilla wars of that era, the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions. The environment brings you back to reality and makes you understand that all revolutions have a cost.

But he admitted that the early group "were both stupid and crazy."

On recognising the influence of the revolutionary mantle, the power of the seduction of class struggle he stated:

> you arrive at the conclusion, intuitively or scientifically, that another road is

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necessary, the road of armed struggle. We then confronted the common belief

that an armed revolution was possible in any country other than Mexico. That

is to say, Mexico was considered the country of solidarity, but never the

country of the revolution. When we proposed a revolution, we were

considered heretics among the left. The left said that revolution wasn't

Mexico's role, that we were too close to the United States, that the regime in

Mexico resembled the European model and that because of this a

revolutionary change was only possible by electoral methods, by peaceful

methods, or, in the most radical scenario, by insurrectional methods. This

means that the unarmed masses, with broad mobilisations, would disrupt the

economy and create a crisis in the state apparatus which would then fall and a

new government would take power.

Marcos stated that the vanguard groups replied to the lack of 'ideology' with:

> I will lend them one. Or they say, they are good people but they don't know
>
> what they want. I'm going to tell them what they want. Or, they're good people
>
> but they need a leader. I'll be their leader. This is the reality not just in the case
>
> of PROCUP but with groups of Trotskyites and Maoists, who say what the
>
> EZLN need, is me! (quoted in Devereux *et al* 1994, 6).

vii) Response.

The change has been termed postmodern (Burbach 1996). However, if the EZLN

has an objective to resist and reject modernisation and the Enlightenment then Nugent

(1995a, 4) argued from another angle:

> It is difficult to see how a rebel army of peasants, aware of itself as the
>
> product of 500 years of struggle, that quotes from the Mexican Constitution to

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legitimate its demand that the President of Mexico immediately leave office, that additionally demands work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, liberty, democracy, justice and peace for the people of Mexico, can be called a "postmodern political movement." How can the EZLN move beyond the politics of modernity when their vocabulary is so patently modernist and their practical organisation so emphatically premodern?

Nugent (1995, 1995a) argued that the EZLN very clearly had a Revolutionary military structure calling themselves after Mexican revolutionary Emiliano Zapata. Indeed, Peleaz (1996) notes that the "initial Revolutionary Laws, could appear on the surface to be very much socialist" (Peleaz 1996, 4; Regino 1997).

viii) *Postmodern Strategies and Tactics.*

On the postmodern reading the EZLN mobilisation was so short lived *exactly because* it had already recognised that revolutionary struggle was never going to be a viable option. In an early interview and with a swipe at the old left, Marcos called the Sandinistas "a mess" (Marcos 1994a). The EZLN he said, "is an organisation that has been preparing itself for over 10 years without a single assault, robbery or kidnapping." Harvey (1995) termed this rejection a "watershed" in the sense that the EZLN "differed from the foco strategies of the earlier guerrilla movements" by rejecting the strategy of "a small band of rebels rising up in arms" who did not "aspire to seize state power and lead the masses in social revolution" (Harvey 1995, 39). The strategic significance of the EZLN was evident in its early mobilisation (Eliorriago 1997). Common themes that suggested the novelty of this insurgency are evident in EZLN slogans, 'lead by obeying', and 'everything for everyone, nothing for ourselves', and 'we use solidiers so there will not have to be any more soldiers'(Cleaver 1995a).

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As such, the mess, Marcos (1994a) argued, of the Sandinistas was a legacy of cooption and violence. President Chamorro of Nicaragua tried "expunging the Sandinistas" (Falcoff 1996). The Sandinistas represented the conceptual apparatus of the old social movements. Although allowing a modicum of democratic participation, it was the party line that was to be followed at all times by Sandinistas. The FSLN (Sandinistas) Revolutionary Programme (1969) stated that the Nicaraguan people needed a vanguard, a political/military seizure of state power, destruction of bureaucratic and military dictatorship and the fascist clique of Somoza Garcia, in place since 1932. The vanguard were "self recruited" (Gilbert 1988, 31). Revolutionary organisation was the watchword. There was an awareness of the dangers of vanguard charisma and vanity, so rotation was encouraged. But strict discipline to the party machine.was justified on the basis that "the vanguard understood history" (Gilbert 1988, 33).

Here, there was a concern with "revolution mystique" and a need for "revolutionary modesty" (Gilbert 1988, 51). But the Sandinistas were a revolutionary vanguard. Indeed, there are now splits within Sandinistas, between the reformists, those who were in government and who wanted to adapt to neo-liberalism. And the hardliners, led by Sergio Rami of the Sandinistas Revolutionary Movement (MRS). This is a movement for renovation of revolutionary struggle. But the EZLN was based on grassroots consultations, from the beginning.

As such, the EZLN was "very different" (Wehlings 1995). The EZLN Marcos stated, "did not grow from existing Mexican leftist groups", reiterating "no God save us. God save us, no no, its different. no. This moment, it was born in the mountains" (Ovetz 1994, 4). Indeed, the EZLN was an army and not a guerrilla movement. This distinction was rendered important. Marcos stated that "the theoretical confronted the practical, and something happened-the result was the EZLN. Therefore our combatants are right when they say, We are not Marxist-Leninist, we are Zapatistas" (quoted in Devereux et al 1994, 5). There was no link to Shining Path who have

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executed betrayers. This is contrary to "some very biased press reports."

Undoubtedly, as I mentioned in chapter three, the EZLN leadership has its intellectual roots in Marxism. However the organisation of the EZLN was not the rigid organisation of previous national liberation struggles and developed a communal decision making body (Flood 1999c). Flood (1999c, 2) noted that this was not "a military structure" in the conventional sense. Emphasis has been placed on the role played by the local assemblies and decision making process including various delegates and processes of direct consultation within and between the communities (CCRI-GC 1994, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1995, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c).

Flood (1999c, 3) noted that:

> the CCRI does not have the power to make major decisions such as peace or war. These must instead be made through the consulta, crudely a referendum but one where intense discussions in each community is as central to the process of the vote itself.

The consultations take place in every community or ejido where there are EZLN members. Flood (1999a) wrote that "the educated leaders" have their "political backgrounds in Marxism" but "the army is not the decision making centre of the movement like it would be in a Marxist vanguard organisation." Consequently, the "secret of the rebellion's deep support among the Indian population of the rainforest rests on the subordination of the rebel leaders to the traditional decision making process in the village assemblies" (Carrigan 1998, 12). The EZLN argued that a revolutionary objective "closes things down" (Debray 1996, 135). The Clandestine Revolutionary Commitee General Command (CCRI-GC 1994, 1994a, 1994b) is organised unlike previous organisations.

On 8 January 1998, the insurgency of the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) and

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the Popular Democratic Revolutionary Party (PDPR) was stepped up. In showing its disdain for this kind of struggle, the CCRI-GC (1994a) criticised the Workers Clandestine Party Union of People (PROCUP). This was not the kind of struggle the EZLN want or that the EZLN envisage. The EPR are allegedly linked to the violent terrorist groups of the 1970s (Casteneda 1996). The Cardenista Front of National Reconstruction (PFCRN) wanted to be the political wing of the EZLN, with Senor Talamanta allegedly wanting to be EZLN's Presidential nomination for the EZLN in the 2000 elections.

ix) Response.

It was suggested that to say that the movement made a deliberate commitment to be 'postmodern' was a rather naive understanding of the potentially *violent and continuing Marxist* tone of the EZLN. That the EZLN did not demand power cynically put was due to the fact that the leaders knew very well that they could never obtain this objective anyway (Deneuve and Reeve 1995). Indeed, it was alleged that the campesinos and the Mexican proletariats found themselves alone as the EZLN were reduced to one voice, that of Marcos, who spoke both to and for others (Deneuve and Reeve 1995). But the EZLN was accepted as the first "avant-gardist guerrilla movement to try to find a way of operating in the era of the new world order."

Yet it was pointed out that the Marxist Leninist cadres of the EZLN never actually criticised the exploitative content of the socialist systems which collapsed. They simply acknowledge, pragmatically, that they had not worked (Deneuve and Reeve 1995, 2). In fact it was said that there was a clear separation between the us (the liberation army) and, to put it bluntly, the them (the masses). As such, sceptics put particular emphasis on the overarching revolutionary and undemocratic character of the CCRI-GC, an organisation to which Marcos himself must submit. Any difference was representative of revolutionary disillusionment or revolutionary rhetoric.

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Indeed, Marcos' fame, according to Parfitt (1996, 117):

> was not earned by military success. Soon after rebellion broke out, the
> uprising was beaten back by the government at a cost of 145-400 lives, the
> estimates of troops, civilians and Zapatistas killed vary widely, depending on
> who's talking. The government withheld a final blow and the Zapatistas
> retreated into a brooding tension.

Marcos sulked and switched from the sword to the pen through articulate letters and
diatribes (Marcos 1996d). Indeed, Conger (1994, 3) argued that three weeks:

> after their initial attacks, the Zapatistas announced a major strategy shift in a
> communique that reversed their initial demands for the overthrow of Salinas
> and the army and pledged they 'will not impede the elections of 1994.'

Younts (1998, 1-2) also picked up on this change of tact after the mobilisation
suggesting that the EZLN had overestimated the desire for other Mexicans to join in a
protracted military struggle. She pointed out that:

> after a few months of fighting the Zapatistas flamboyant leader...toned down
> his Marxist rhetoric and the guerillas groups calls for class struggle, putting
> greater emphasis on human rights for the indigenous Indians in the
> region...Mexicos pacific coastline states of Chiapas Oaxaco and Guerrero are
> home to many of Mexicos indigenous peoples. Yet the economies still tend to
> be in the hands of big landowners, leaving much of the indigenous populations
> in poverty.

Moreover, Moore (1998) argues that the reluctance of the EZLN leadership to aggressively seize the power of the state and to transcend the inherent power structures of the state makes the EZLN's a rather reformist and politically futile move, for the bourgeois state and its powers, ultimately remain.

Nugent (1995, 1995a) queried the 'novelty argument' pointing out that the EZLN's:

> democratic command structure is a slow moving form of organisation-requiring as it does, direct consultation and discussion with the base communities in five or six different languages-which is difficult to reconcile with postmodernist digital simultaneity.

Indeed, Indian struggles (if this is going to be the emphasis) have often regarded the state as "alien" (Nugent 1995, 134) and Emiliano Zapata did not get involved so to speak with the 'big politics of Mexico City' (Brunk 1993, 1998). The postmodern emphasis on the rejection of state-socialism was historically flawed. He argued:

> Whatever the extent of violence exercised during earlier popular uprisings, there has often been a strong antimilitaristic streak running through them, and an even stronger repudiation of the power of the state, whether colonial or neo-colonial, patrimonial or capitalist. Two obvious examples that spring to mind are the popular armies led by Emiliano Zapata and Francisco Villa between 1911 and 1920. But neither Villismo or Zapatismo (mark one) were "bent on taking on taking power in Mexico City": nor were either of them calling for "state socialism." To try to forge a new basis for social life in a way that is grounded in the experience and response to the demands-or the

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requirements for living-of los de abajo, of misnamed marginados (who are in

fact not the least bit "marginal" to the continuing reproduction of specific

forms of exploitation) is hardly to call for state socialism. In any event "state

monopoly capitalism" is a more accurate term for the sort of social system

Burbach correctly insists the neo-zapatistas are repudiating.

Nugent (1995a, 6) went on to say that:

> at any rate, throughout the world, peasant movements have tended to regard
>
> the state as alien and distant, and typically their revolts have been directed not
>
> at the seizure of state power, but at the replacement of an alien form of rule by
>
> a different social order. Hence it could be argued that the failure to aim for
>
> state power is rather more pre-than postmodern.

Indeed, Nugent (1995) argued that the claim that the EZLN are postmodern in the

sense that they are not challenging a Central American military dictatorship but the

Mexican revolution is contradictory. The First Declaration stipulated that the EZLN

mobilised "due to the insatiable ambitions of a 70 year old dictatorship led by a clique

of traitors that represent the most conservative of sell out groups" (EZLN 1994a).

However, Nugent (1995a, 6) noted:

> To begin with, it is unclear exactly what Batista or Somoza are supposed to
>
> typify. But the main thinking is that the rebels-communicating in languages
>
> understood only be themselves and a handful of anthropologists, linguists,
>
> missionaries, and former maoists-yet again pretty premodern and the enemy
>
> they have identified manifestly modern. What distinguishes the EZLN, even
>
> by this account, is not their postmodern redefinition of temporality, space, and
>
> experience itself, but on the contrary, their sense of palpable connection with

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a tradition.

x) Postmodern Era?

Nugent (1995, 132) questioned the idea of a postmodern epoch, and the idea of a post-communist new world order. Firstly, Nugent (1995) queried what he regarded as a dangerous emphasis on the idea of a new postmodern world lavishly webbed with new technologies and a new postmodern cyberspace. Indeed, the use of new technologies by the EZLN has injected debate on the political possibilities of new technologies such as the internet (Cleaver 1997, 1998). Burbach's (1994) original argument did not provide a lengthy discussion of these issues *per se*. Nugent (1995a) argued that for Northern intellectuals:

> Chiapan rebels has to do with the media of communcation through which "we" in the North learn about, and relate to, the EZLN "In Marcos' prose," writes one specialist "one senses an expertise and familiarity with computer-based text, if not directly with e-mail...(I)t shifts attention instead towards the postmodern world of digital simultaneity. In being asked to assess "what effect the e-mail activity (has) had on actual events" we are presented with the image of "new icons of romantic rebellion" "bursting through...TV screens" and the powerful effect of the "Zapatistas presence on the internet. Asserting that the multiple messages resonating "within the nocturnal hacker community" have a palpable historical effect fits perfectly the notion that neo-zapatismo is indeed a "postmodern political movement." Focusing on, even celebrating the EZLN's use of modem, fax machines, and e-mail suggests that their most distinctive feature as a political movement is to have shifted the object of struggle from control of the means of production, to control of the means of communication.

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Again, this has been a key feature of critical debates focusing upon the ideological insinuation of the new times thesis and the insinuation of the 'disappearence of capitalism' (Henwood 1996). Even more disconcerting Nugent noted, was that the appropriation of postmodernism has been made by a leftist intellectual. As such, Nugent (1995, 131) asked whether participants of the EZLN called themselves a Postmodern Army of Multinational Emancipation? Did they call themselves the movement of cyberwarriors? Postmodernists tended to rely heavily on the relationship between technology, images and reality (Peleaz 1996).

Moreover, Nugent (1995a) argued that the counter revolutions of 1989 can not just be rather simplistically read as the exhaustion of ideologies and the end of a revolutionary cycle (Fuentes 1994, 1994a). Instead, the 1989 revolutions were the ultimate triumph of modernism and the return of the dialectical forces of history (Berman 1981). Indeed, Nugent (1995) claimed that it was not so much the end of ideologies that precipitated a reluctance to engage in a drawn out military insurgency by the EZLN. Instead the EZLN rejected traditional national liberation through the fear of a more protracted military conflict and physical extermination by the federal troops, rather than anything else.

xi) In defence of postmodernism?

Clearly, Nugent (1995) was sceptical of postmodern labelling. The EZLN are named after a concrete revolutionary, Emiliano Zapata. Burbach (1996) made the case that whether the EZLN called themselves postmodern cyberwarriors or not is rather besides the point in terms of what the EZLN are politically galvanising. The intellectual has a role to play in this process of explanation, conceptualisation and interpretation. In response to Nugent's (1995) critique, Burbach (1996, 34) replied:

> like it or not, the collapse of communism and the national liberation
>
> movements has led to a global debacle for popular and progressive forces as

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well as Marxists who have led and sustained these movements.

Burbach (1996) noted that left and Marxist intellectuals must with postmodernism "draw out what may be useful" (Burbach 1996, 34). Burbach (1996) called the critiques an "all out attack on postmodernism from Marxists" (Burbach 1996, 36). Indeed, this peremptory support and rejection frames the set up of the debate. The EZLN were symptomatic Burbach (1996, 37) argued, of the reality that "it is unlikely that the wretched of the earth will turn to Marxism." Postmodernism he argues, must be taken seriously as what he calls, a "new world view" because postmodernism is "raising questions which need to be considered" and the positive aspect of the critique is that postmodernists "don't stop with a critique of capitalism" (Burbach 1996, 36). Burbach (1996, 37) wrote harshly in this defence that "modernism and the faith in progress" were at "the root of disasters that have wrecked humanity throughout the century." Burbach (1996) concluded by saying that the Indians:

> persevere and confront the form of modernisation imposed on them by the
> Mexican state and the new variant of US imperialism NAFTA. They want to
> build a new equitable society that will enable Indian culture and society to
> survive while they till their lands communally, using ecologically sound and
> sustainable production (Burbach 1996, 36).

xii) *Assessment: Problematising Burbach and Nugent?*

The crux of the debate is the question of novelty and profundity. What is also apparent given Burbach's (1996) comments that were made in defence of his position, that postmodernism has acquired a mystique and has been used in rather dogmatic and dangerously peremptory, sometimes contradictory, ways. Certainly this is in terms of the way the Marxist/postmodern debate has been set up and the

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antagonisms have been fuelled by the differences in conceptual and interpretive opinion concerning the EZLN.

Nugent (1995) in every way was convinced that the EZLN mobilisation is simply representative of the transformation in Mexico of the logic and structures of capitalism and the interlinkage with the bourgeois state. As such, Nugent's (1995) argument is logically opposed to any hint of 'appropriating' the struggle as 'new'. It is little wonder that given this ontology Burbach's (1994) argument caused such frustration. In this sense, Nugent (1995) hooked up what a politics beyond modernity is meant to represent and disregarded the postmodern reading on the basis that the EZLN represented a classic class struggle, used a modernist language and forged a strategic revolution against capital accumulation. The problem with postmodern intellectuals and intellectuals interested in postmodernism he intimated, is that they have been enchanted by a romantic and nostalgic vision of Indian culture.

Burbach (1994, 1996) used postmodernism to emphasise the novelty and profundity of the EZLN. Here, postmodernism was a politics beyond modernity, a politics beyond the grand narrative of progress, modernisation and the grand narrative of Marxism itself. Crucially, the conceptual and interpretive debate typically indicated something important about the status and role of the intellectual in classifying and conceptualising what a particular movement represents and means.

My argument is that there is something distinctive about the EZLN. But this distinctiveness has been lost in the rather rigid setting of the terms of the Marxist/postmodern debate which is driven by political momentum. For instance, Subcommandante Marcos made this distinction between the equally restricted positions, and stated that the "left is close minded. The traditional left is very close minded. They say, well these people don't draw from any of the known ideologies so they must not have one".(quoted in Devereux et al 1994). Moreover, Devereux et al (1994) made the point to Marcos that many 'intellectuals' and political

observers had represented the EZLN as a 'postmodern' resistance because the proletariat had lost its radicalism. Marcos, replied "no." The EZLN as I will show is 'postmodern enough' to reject neo-liberal modernisation and the traditional strategies of Marxist national liberation. However, I will show how the EZLN develops a more progressive rethinking and reworking of these issues. Subcommandante Marcos stated that when the EZLN "proposed a guerrilla war, an armed struggle, we broke with this tradition, a tradition that was very strong during that time...(*W)e broke with theoretical schema* " (my emphasis) (Devereuz *et al* 1994).

Conclusion.

In this chapter I have placed the EZLN into the Marxist/postmodern debate or within the conceptual schematics outlined in chapter one. In the following chapters I will argue that the EZLN over the past six years has embarked in a politics of resistance that eludes these mappings by engaging in a more inventive and ambiguous politics of resistance. I argue that what is required is a way of reworking and exploring the postmodern critique and the way the EZLN engages in this reworking. Indeed, "the Zapatistas are a contradictory phenomenon, a peasant, indigenous revolutionary force whose chief spokesman is an enigmatic sexy mestizio who writes wonderful prose and is himself like a character in a novel about revolution" (Somlo 1995,1). Thus, in the next chapter I discuss this ambiguity and creativity by considering the way the EZLN eludes the dichotomy presented in this debate between tradition and modernity. I argue that the EZLN rethinks and reworks modernity by opening a dialogue on the possibility of an inclusive modernity and by implication, problematising the classifications of the old/new social movements on this theme.

Chapter Five

The Emiliano Zapata Army of National Liberation (EZLN): The Constructing of an

Inclusive Mexican Modernisation.

Introduction.

In this chapter I show how the EZLN forged a problematisation of the

dichotomously presented debate between Marxism and postmodernism. I argue that

the EZLN did not presume to 'destroy' capitalism or modernisation but now *rethinks*

and *reworks* the nature, meaning and practices of Mexican development. This is in

contrast to the top down neo-liberalisation of Mexico which is seen to be inextricably

defining the official character of Mexican security and sovereignty.

One important manifestation of this interest was cultivated by the 1996 San

Andres Accords on Indigenous Right and Culture. I use the San Andres Accords to

show how the EZLN creatively rethinks state development on the key theme of

inclusivity. As such, this rethinking of development has three main elements.

Firstly, San Andres brought about a discussion concerning the possibility of

alternative development strategies cultivated from the local and incorporating

divergent views from socialists to capitalists and liberals. The EZLN now rethink the

edifice and practices of development by considering a variety of strategies (some may

be capitalist, some non-capitalist) and opened up ways in which these programs could

be organised and implemented. In this sense the EZLN did not want a development

"imposed from the top down" (Walker 1988, 131) but the EZLN linked to the view

that most people "recognise that the spatial organisation of economic life has been

transformed radically" (Walker 1988, 129). Instead, a rethinking of the relationship

between neo-liberalism and capitalism now introduces a rethinking of economic

sovereignty and the issue of how people are relating to such issues in their specific

sites.

Instead, critical social movements have aimed to "create strong communities of people grounded in the satisfaction of human needs without destroying ecological rhythms and to empower the marginalised and oppressed to take some control over their own lives under adverse conditions" (Walker 1988, 132).

Undoubtedly, Marcos and the EZLN regarded neo-liberal globalisation as a source of discontent and recognised that the world was being transformed. However, the way different peoples *experience* these effects in their specific locations was the key to a recognition of difference and diversity in terms of elucidating their economic, political, social and cultural development programs.

Secondly, the debates at San Andres brought in the question of 'inclusivity' as a theme for an open and non-excluding Mexican modernity. I show that the indigenous peoples did not reject modernisation and simply reiterate the dichotomy between "tradition and modernity" (Walker 1988, 70). Neither was this a romantic celebration of Indian 'otherness'. Instead, the EZLN proposed a modernisation in which Indians would be simultaneously a vital and enriching part of modern Mexico as a progressive awareness of living in 'One World' to construct an *inclusive* and progressive modernity.

Finally, San Andres invited a new way of thinking about Constitutional arrangements from the grassroots. This was a reflexive way of reworking modernist ideals rather than engaging in an apparent postmodern rejection (Foucault 1991). As such, there was a rejection of an Enlightened discourse as imposed from the *top down* but the EZLN aimed to rethink the site and meaning of these Constitutional arrangements and values of autonomy and rights from the *bottom up*. Intrinsically, this was a struggle that asked the fundamental questions, who are Mexicans, what is Mexico, what is the Mexican nation and what is Mexican history that "now permeate national life" (Conger 1994).

i) San Andres.

Here, I will lay out the central tenets of the San Andres Accords and the

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interpretive and political debate that incurred in 1996. Ostensibly, the San Andres Accords were to be signed by the EZLN and government representatives based on a recognition of indigenous demands for self-determination and economic, political, cultural and social autonomy. Infact, the desire for autonomous Indian communities was essentially an Indian idea reminiscent of 16th century self-sufficient utopian communities as a resistance to colonialism (Le Maitre 1997). As such, Harvey (1998, 77) noted that the Zapatistas could be seen to "represent a long cycle of demand for dignity, voice and autonomy." Indeed, as I mentioned in chapter two during the 19th and 20th centuries there were two ways of considering the Indian question in Mexico. Firstly, President Cardenas' (1934-1940) view was that the Indians would evolve as the new 'mestizio' in order to form a culturally integrated modern Mexico. Secondly, there was the view in the post-war era that the Indians would be understood as 'separate' and remain tied to their ancient and cultural heritages and essentially excluded from modern development.

However, as I will show here, the very significant aspect of San Andres was that the dichotmous presentation cultivated in postmodern approaches missed the situation where the Indians would keep their heritage but at the same time the Indians would become an integral part of a more progressive and inclusive Mexico. This it was contended, could and would be translated to a national level. Indeed, one of the EZLN 'slogans' recognised the space for national dialogue saying "everything for everyone, nothing for us" (CCRI-GC 1994). Here, the everybody was significant *equally* as the Indians, campesinos, workers, students, women, the faceless of neo-liberalism, but armed with truth and fire. There is no allowance for a conceptual hierachy, no debate on identifying the 'principal actors' or abstract 'principle logic'. Any reductionist effort was to be rejected for a critical and political enquiry

which recognises the complex processes in peoples daily lives at their specific locations, and recognises the reflection by social actors within these locations (Amoore *et al* 2000; Walker 1988).

At the beginning of 1995, the Third Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle (EZLN 1995a) called for a free Federal government, the breaking of the link between the state and the PRI, a new statute for the autonomy of Indian communities under the 1917 Constitution of the United States of Mexico, clean elections, a recognition of local, regional and national non-governmental political forces, an inclusive development and a reorientation of the national economic program but with no deception and lies. A sense of interconnectedness between economic, political and cultural issues is evident and was translated into discussion held in 1995.

At this time, negotiation with the government was seen as possible despite a climate of militarisation in 1995. Indeed, in February 1994, Subcommandante Marcos (1994h) stated that the government had made satisfactory responses to EZLN demands for better healthcare, education, housing, and a recognition of cultural rights. The communities had reacted calmly to the positive signs from the government. But negotiation had turned sour, then followed by militarisation in January 1995 (Cockburn and Silverstein 1995).

The CCRI-GC (1995f) stated in a declaration of complex and yet interrelated grievances, the continuation of misery and suffering, a lack of land, military repression, a violation of human rights, exploitation, a lack of indispensable services, a renaging of promises and that the Constitutional law was not being followed. The CCRI-GC recognised that the indigenous peoples' demands for autonomy, rights, freedom to information, recognition of language and elimination of racism were *connected* to the grievances of the campesinos on Article 27. This was based, not on a logic but on peoples' own specific recognition of connections.

There were demands for democracy with equal right of participation, demands for the government to resign, for the government to accept the EZLN as a belligerent force, for a new pact and new relationship between the federal government, state and local municipalities through a challenge to centralism, a revision of NAFTA, for more transparent information, for a reduction in illiteracy, the language of the communities to be made official, for Indian culture to be recognised, for lives not subject to misuse of national and foreign power, for justice in the Indian communities, for the Indians to be free from plunder, a cancellation of debt and the rights of the Indians to live peacefully and with tranquility.

There were demands from the women of Chiapas for greater childcare facilities, school resources and a market for goods at a fair price. Particularly significant was the recognition of the complex interconnectedness between economic, political, social and cultural grievances (CCRI-GC 1995f; EZLN 1996, 1996a). The EZLN stated that (Bellinghausen 1998):

> more people are emerging who are not only indigenous and we see that we have to understand that it doesn't matter whether they are indigenous or not, what matters is that we are all taken into account, that we all participate in this inclusion, that after this big national consultation on indigenous rights and culture more will come.

Ostensibly, the diversity emerged from specific institutions, and right across the political spectrum. This was the dynamism of the EZLN in its desire for 'inclusivity' for Mexico and not just for the workers or the Indians. Later reminiscing, for the government, San Andres was always going to be the site of a fight, the scenario for a struggle (Marcos 1998). Marcos alleged that the government wish to ignore Chiapas' cultural heritage as it wants to in effect, defeat history. But history Marcos warned,

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will return to "pummel a truncated reality" (Marcos 1995).

ii) The San Andres Accords are in Sight.

In the run up to San Andres in January 1996, the Fourth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle (EZLN 1996a) had emphasised the climate of concern. The EZLN stated that the fight was for 'roofs over our heads', for knowledge, for the land, for a job, for life, for respect for our right to sovereignty and self government, for liberty of thought and walk, for justice, for history, for the homeland and for peace. And in turn "the bad government" imposed laws of the few on the many, builds jails and graves, consists of criminals and assassins, proposes to erase history whilst the government dreams with the flag and the language of foreigners and announces war and destruction (EZLN 1996. EZLN 1996a).

Ostensibly, the San Andres Accords between Zapatistas and a governmental peacemaking body called for the recognition and creation of autonomous indigenous communities for the 900,000 Indians of Chiapas (NCDM 28 June 1998). The 'ethnicity' and plurality was to be fundamentally incorporated *within* an inclusive Mexico (Becerill and Urrilia 1998; NCDM 16 September 1998).

Throughout the months of 1995 and 1996 the EZLN had recognised that they could not speak for all Indian peoples. Therefore, a number of guests and advisors, representatives from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and social movements, intellectuals and anthropologists were invited to Chiapas during 1995 to discuss the Indian question. After November 1995 regional forums were held throughout Mexico to choose various representatives for the dialogues. By 9th January 1996 at San Cristobel, consultations were in full flow. The National Indigenous Forum presided.

In fact, 32 indigenous peoples and 178 indigenous organisations gathered in San Cristobel de las Casas. There were various speeches and documents drawn up leading to the final writing of a 39 page document which was to be discussed with the PRI at the small town of San Andres de Larrainzar. The Federal government allegedly came to San Andres with no actual proposals of their own.

The San Andres Accords proposed a radical rethinking of the direction of Mexican economic, political, social and cultural development. San Andres was therefore conceived over a process of grassroots dialogue and discussion, incorporating the views and advice from many worlds, intellectual worlds, anthropological worlds, and the Indians. The question of new institutions was discussed openly. But it was clear that this was not a *top down* political decision. The NCDM (17 December 1997) reported that the San Andres agreements if implemented would affect more than 10 million indigenous people in Mexico and would for the first time in that country's history recognise their rights to self determination. The San Andres Agreements (EZLN 1996b) were originally drafted for

> the basis of a new relationship between the state and the indigenous peoples it is necessary to recognise, insure and guarantee rights within an emended federalist framework. Such an objective implies the promotion of reforms and additions to the Federal Constitution and the laws emerging from it, as well as to State Constitutions and local Judicial Dispositions, to further, on the one hand the establishment of general foundations that may ensure unity and national objectives, and, at the same time, allow the federative entities the true power to legislate and act in accordance to the particularities of the indigenous issues coming before them (EZLN 1996b, 1).

In order for this to happen, more specific demands were made:

1. To urge a profound transformation of the State, as well as of the political, social, cultural and economic relationships with the indigenous peoples, which satisfies their demands for justice;

2. To urge the emplacement of an all inclusive new social agreement, based on the understanding of the fundamental plurality of Mexican society and on the contribution that the indigenous people can make to national unity, beginning with the constitutional acknowledgement of their rights, and in particular, to their right to self-determination and autonomy;

3. The legal reforms to be promoted must originate from the principle of the equality of all Mexicans before the law and judicial organs, and not by the creation of special codes of law that privilege particular people, respecting the principle that the Mexican Nation is a pluricultural entity which is originally supported by its indigenous peoples;

4. The Constitutional modifications represent one of the most important factors in the new relationship between the indigenous people and the State within the framework of reforming the State so that their demands may find support within the State legal system (EZLN 1996b, 1).

Such demands were based on a distinctive rethinking of development and a rethinking of the relationship between the primary structures of the modern state and the recognition of diversity. San Andres went on to stipulate the question of legality:

The creation of a judicial framework that establishes a new relationship between indigenous peoples' and the State, based on the recognition of their right to self-determination and the judicial, political, social, economic and cultural rights that obtain from it. The new constitutional dispositions must include a framework of autonomy (EZLN 1996b, 2).

This demand was based on the supposition that the Indians have "suffered colonial oppression" and that new Constitutional arrangements must "maintain and recognise their own identities" and allow the Indians to "preserve their distinctive cultural, social, political and economic characteristics" thus "constituted as subjects with rights to self-determination" (EZLN 1996b, 2). San Andres defined autonomy as the:

> concrete expression of the exercise of the right to self determination, within the framework of membership in the National State. The indigenous peoples shall be able, consequently, to decide their own form of internal government as well as decide their way of organising themselves, politically, socially, economically, and culturally. Within the new constitutional framework of autonomy, the exercise of self determination of indigenous peoples shall be respected in each of the domains and levels in which they are asserted, being able to encompass one or more indigenous groups, according to particular and specific circumstances in each federal entity. The exercise of autonomy of indigenous people will contribute to the unity and democratisation of national life and will strengthen national sovereignty.

The demands were in accordance to Agreement 169 of the International Labour Organisation (OIT) "and ratified by the Senate of the Republic." Consequently, "the recognition of autonomy is based on the concept of indigenous group, which is founded on historical criteria and on cultural identity." Consequently, San Andres demanded that the National legislation must acknowledge indigenous peoples as subjects with the right to self determination and autonomy and it was proposed to the Congress of the Union to recognise, in national legislature, these communities as entities with public rights, with the right to free association in municipalities with populations that are predominantly indigenous, as well as the right of groups of

municipalities to associate, in order to coordinate their actions as indigenous peoples. As an expression of self-determination, San Andres calls on the Federal and State government to recognise the right of the indigenous people to "decide on local issues within the framework of the national state" and allow for an "orderly and gradual transference of resources so that the people themselves may administer the public funds assigned to them."

iii) Setting the Terms of the Assessment.

San Andres emphasised new development strategies and ripping asunder neo-liberalism from the inextricable and defining characteristic of Mexican security/development. Interest was shown in the way peoples and voices across Mexico in their specific locations have tapped into rethinking local development projects and the question of resource sustainability in economic, political, social and cultural affairs.

Secondly, San Andres was based on a theme of inclusivity and a development that recognised difference and 'many worlds'. The demands of the indigenous peoples was not for 'ethnic nationalism', an ethnic secession from the state nor a defensive stroke against a brutal and rampaging modernisation. On the contrary, San Andres intimated that the real modern Mexican nation could only emerge when indigenous rights were acknowledged on the basis that this acknowledgement of diversity will 'strengthen and contribute' to national sovereignty This construction of an open and fluid modernity evoked interest from the many worlds of Mexico (Marcos 1999j).

Finally, San Andres showed a willingness to rework the ideals and themes of the Enlightenment in terms of constitutional affairs, rights, justice and citizenship. That was, the EZLN worked with a modernist discourse but this was a discourse with a difference. The Enlightened institutions and ideals are reworked creatively rather than imposed. San Andres problematises the relationship between the "general and the specific" as

the form and implementation of rights are discussed and consulted (Dietz 1998). Indeed, San Andres recognised the tension between the rights of the collectivity and the rights of the individual Mexican citizen.

Crucially, the San Andres Document was "based on a concept of indigenous groups based on historical criteria and cultural identity"(EZLN 1996b, 2). This was not a language of universally imposed legal abstractions but a demand from the concrete. Consequently, San Andres brought about debate which concerned the politics of defining what is, and who are the Indians. That is, whether to define the 'indigenous' peoples was a matter of history and politics or a creative frame of mind that lay beyond any rational counting of the number of 'Indian genes' in a human's genotype (Montoya 1998). Alternatively, the question was whether the indigenous peoples was a legal issue or alternatively an issue concerned with the recognition of the history of indigenous *struggles* against cultural oppression (Gossen 1996; Puig 1995).

Recent National Indigenous Institute research has been based on the ability to identify different indigenous cultures through the existence of different cultural languages. On this basis there are still 5.3 million indigenous peoples in Mexico. The National Coordinating Body of Indians by basing research on cultural identification on a more broader basis claimed that there were over 20 million indigenous peoples in Mexico. Indigenous Peoples' within the United Nations (UN) (1997/14) recognised an "urgent need to recognise, promote human rights and fundamental freedoms." But these demanded for rights are now tailored to concrete reflection and are not to be construed in San Andres as a technical and imposed issue of the state.

iv) Autonomy.

The key debate on inclusivity and the implications of this for rethinking development strategy, a 'different modernisation' and the Constitution was shown by points made in the document about 'autonomy'. According to San Andres (EZLN 1996b, 2) autonomy was to be based on terms of territory or "the material base of the reproduction of a peoples" and it "expresses the inseparable unity of people-land-nature." Secondly, it focused upon the demarcation of political boundaries or the application of "jurisdiction in the spatial, material and personal normative field of validity in which indigenous peoples apply their rights" whilst maintaining that the "Mexican state will acknowledge the existence of the said fields." Thirdly, autonomy required the state to give responsibility to the indigenous peoples and their communities the status of a new authority based on the "distribution of the political, administrative, economic, social, cultural, educational, and judicial resources for the management and protection of public resources with the purpose of responding to the opportunities, requirements and demands of the indigenous peoples." As such, self determination was to be based on a supposition that "the indigenous communities and towns themselves must determine their own development projects and programs" and that:

> for this reason it is considered appropriate to establish in local and federal legislatures the ideal mechanisms that would promote the participation of the indigenous peoples in the planning of development at all levels, so that the design of this participation may take into consideration the aspirations, needs and priorities of the indigenous peoples.

By allowing the indigenous people participation in national and state channels of representation where "local, and national participation and political representation must be ensured, reflecting the various socio/cultural characteristics" of the

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indigenous communities in order to "create a new federalism" (EZLN 1996b, 6).

San Andres called on the State and Federal Constitution to recognise the rights of the indigenous peoples to "develop specific forms of social, cultural, political and economic organisation" and a "recognition of the internal normative system of regulation" to be used as sanctions in the communities but which were "not contrary to Constitutional guarantees" because "state jurisdiction" was to be organised "in a better way" (EZLN 1996b, 3).

Consequently, autonomy ostensibly meant that the Indians would be allowed responsibility over the use of the natural resources of their said districts and that there would be a transfer of resources to the communities from the public funds of the Federal and State authorities. This would mean a program of sustainable self-development. The tailoring of development towards the indigenous communities also forged a new consensus on Womens' rights on issues of childbirth facilities and better equipped and financed schools. There were also provisions in San Andres for the protection of the local ecology.

v) Theme One: Rethinking Development Strategy.

Here, San Andres invoked a debate on the kind of development that would be fair and equal for all Mexicans. This was not a development program imposed from the top down or through a 'myth of history' whether by neo-liberalists or Marxists. This was a debate on the complexities of development strategy. Indeed, many in Mexico have been interested in the emphasis on local sustainability and recognised that their specific grievances are connected to other specific grievances. These connections were explored given that many feel threatened by global structures but who were also realising that their grievances somehow link up and connect to others.

On the issue of production and employment, San Andres stated that "the national

state must take into consideration the productive system of the indigenous peoples"

and utilisation of the projects must be encouraged. Consequently:

> the Mexican judicial system, both at Federal and State levels must push for the
> recognition of the indigenous peoples' right to the sustainable use and the
> derived benefits of the use and development of the material resources of the
> territories they occupy or utilise in forms so that in a framework of global
> development economic underdevelopment and isolation may be overcome.
> This action implies an increase in a reorientation of social spending (EZLN
> 1996b, 6).

This emphasis on distribution recognised the participation of the indigenous

communities to decide their own development projects and brings back a sense of

control in terms of economic, political, social and cultural development. Moreover,

San Andres called on the State to "facilitate this development " by allowing

indigenous peoples "participation in designing the strategies directed toward the

improvement of their living conditions and promises of basic services" (EZLN 1996b,

6). This also included a reasonable level of public management, a build up of

communication and a guarantee of the right to use indigenous language and free

expression.

The emphasis was on the ability to develop one's own idea of development

through dialogue and consultation and through an accountable and transparent pact

with the government. Moreover, this focus on alternative development has fed into a

discussion on how this could be transplanted carefully and accomodated within

national state and even global development.

The demands set out on the question of alternative development and the

interconnectedness found in the communities concerning different ideas about

development galvanised interest in Mexico. The EZLN indicated through their

willingness to dialogue through the National Consulta, that this development was not necessarily socialist, capitalist or developmentalist. The whole edifice of the struggle was to explore different forms of development and interconnections from the grassroots (Bellinghausen 1999). Consequently, this new national project carried "an equilibrium between different political forces in order that each position has the same opportunity to influence the political direction of our country" (Marcos quoted in Devereux *et al* 1994).

Indeed, Marcos justified this view on the basis that what Mexico has now does not work, what Mexico has had did not work and clearly now "something else" is required (quoted in Devereuz *et al* 1994). Marcos emphasised that the EZLN had an idea on what they thought Mexican development might entail but that this was going to be open dialogue engaged right across the political spectrum. Consequently, the Accords were representative of making a new form of national participatory politics manifested as the demand for alternative economic, political, social and cultural development strategies that were going to be fair and equitable for all and not decided and imposed from the 'top down'.

Indeed, this new kind of reflection and negotiation linked to a broader interest in redefining a progressive and fairer development in Latin America given the vicissitudes of neo-liberalism (Falcoff 1998). Latin American mainstream populist political movements whilst rejecting Marxist doctrine have for many decades forged a rethinking of the socialist enterprise (Leys 1996). A new document disseminating throughout the Latin American Left, *After Neoliberalism. A New Path* is attempting to bring together "left and center in a new coalition." The difference with the EZLN project was that it encompassed all views on the meaning and nature of development. Marcos makes the point that the "EZLN were born with indigenous demands due to how it developed" but "it aspires to organise the workers, non-indigenous peasants, students, teachers and all of the other social sectors in order to carry out a broader

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revolution" (quoted in Devereux *et al* 1994). Solidarity, a recognition of interconnections and empathy emerges. Garcia (*1994*) emphasised the sense of desperation in that the:

the EZLN is an immediate sign that widespread resistance to political and economic disenfranchisment, is on Mexico's agenda. And Mexico will not be alone from global pillage...the current globalising process increasingly marginalises and disenfranchises poor women and men, migrant workers and immigrants. The concept of citizenship and the practice of democratic rights are becoming meaningless as nation states either lack the means or the will to regulate capital, to legalise labor mobility and to provide access to a dignified and participatory life for greater portions of their populations.

An EZLN Communique then (NCDM February 5, 1998a) pointed out that:

thousands of voices in Mexico and the world have supported throughout an entire year...when all is done the history of the regime of Zedillo is the history of the word which it has not kept. Those military planes which conduct diving manouevres over indigenous communities in the jungle, what is their word? Without any legitimacy the government has had at its side only the power of force. On our side is history, reason and truth. The demands of the Indian peoples are supported by those three forces, only the law is missing to do justice to them, but it is clear force will do all that is possible to scam away the cover of law to rights, demanded in history, based on reason and animated by truth.

Consequently, Eliorraga (1996, 1) argued that the San Andres Document opened a "space for encounters" and "a new way of making politics." San Andres invoked a popular initiative which crucially, allowed Mexico's citizens to initiate and propose new laws. It was a document specifically targeting a new form of civic participation. San Andres accorded the promotion of a national consensus that was "woven into diverse local projects." It is this dialogue that gives the impression that the EZLN are embarking on a different and inclusive national project for all. Subcommandante Marcos stated that the EZLN:

> believe that it is possible to have the same Mexico with a different project, a
> project that recognises not only that it is a multi-ethnic state-in fact
> multinational- but also that new concepts are needed in order to reform the
> constitution (quoted in Devereux *et al* 1994).

As such, this was a recognition of the "intrinsic connection between development in economic growth and the reality of gross inequalities, exclusions, repressions, and violence in the modern world" (Walker 1988, 142). This sense of interconnectedness, the refusal to distinguish a 'principal' actor became explicit. People recognise effects in different and specific locations so Marcos stipulated:

> I think that the main actor has not been identified. It is what we call civil
> society and which cannot be delimited by the bourgeois, the proletariat, the
> farmers, the middle class. This process of globalisation, at the State national
> level, touches upon so many wounds and so many spots, that everyone is ill of
> the same thing, even though one is light skinned and the other dark skinned,
> even though one is a university professor and the other a member of the
> working class (quoted in Blixen and Fazio 1995).

vi) Theme Two Inclusivity.

Another major theme of San Andres was this emphasis on a modernity based on inclusivity. San Andres showed explicitly the demand for a different modernity. This modernity may be based on capitalist or socialist strategies of state planning or redistribution. The point about San Andres was that an inclusive Mexico, a Mexico open to plurality and difference, would be the real Mexico and encompass many worlds, from the technocrats, to the Indians.

As such, San Andres called on indigenous people to be allowed to have the right to collective use "and enjoyment of natural resources, except those which fall into national jurisdiction", the right to "promote development of the various components of indigenous ideas and cultural heritage, the right to interact with various levels of political participation", the right to representation in government and the administration of justice and the right:

> to cooperate with other communities of their ethnicity of different groups in joining efforts and coordinating actions for the optimal use of resources and their initiation of regional and general development projects for the promotion and defence of common interests (EZLN 1996b, 8).

And finally, San Andres stated that the indigenous peoples will have the right to design their communities in accordance with history and tradition. Under the title, *A New Relationship between the Indigenous People and the Rest of the Nation.* the Accords are summed up. Firstly, a pluralistic orientation of the nation of Mexico is demanded. That is, a development with a definitive "respect for difference" and a state which "regulates action to promote a pluralist orientation" and a "respect" for the "indigenous syatem of law" (EZLN 1996b, 9). Secondly, the demand for self determination "in all fields and territories" but "without endangering national

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sovereignty." The state and Federal authorities would "respect the abilities of the indigenous towns and communities to determine their own development as long as national and public interest is respected" so that "the government and the state institutions will not intervene unilaterally in the affairs and decisions of indigenous towns and communities in the organisation and forms of representation and in the current strategies of their use of resources" (EZLN 1996b, 9).

The San Andres Section on 'Consultation and Accord' stated that the indigenous people would be consulted to guarantee the protection of the integrity of the land and history of the indigenous groups taking into consideration the people of the indigenous towns by establishing procedures and mechanisms for recognising the various forms of indigenous property rights and cultural cohesion, and to privilage indigenous communities in the guise of concessions from those who have reaped "benefits from the exploited state" (EZLN 1996b, 9).

As such, San Andres called on insurances that the act would correspond to the characteristics of various indigenous towns. Crucially, San Andres made a categorical emphasis to "avoid the imposition of uniform policies and programs" on the nature and meaning of development (EZLN 1996b, 9). Consequently, the indigenous people demanded participation in all the phases of public action, including conception, planning and evaluation and would have the right to celebrate their customs, usage of plants and animals in their rituals, anti-racism and an emphasis on intercultural dialogue. As such these measures would help "strengthen the federal system" with "democratic decentralisation" in the Indian communities and municipalities. Essentially this was a transformation which would include and enrich all Mexican society (Bellinghausen 1998; CCRI-GC 1996). In this sense, San Andres strove to break down the dichotomous presentation of the Indian versus modernity.

Reaction to San Andres was divided. Brothers (1998) pointed out that the San Andres Agreements were plagued by immense controversy and by June 1996, she

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noted that the:

> talks broke down when the two sides could not agree on language that would
> enshrine the accords in law, while moves to give the Indians greater autonomy
> were seen as a sticking point. The rebels quit the negotiating table in
> September 1996 accusing the government of backtracking on its promises.
> Negotiations have been stalled ever since. In his statement Marcos insisted the
> government had to fulfill the San Andres Accords and said what the two
> parties had already agreed was not negotiable...the government assured that it
> wanted to find a legal form to express them.

Indeed, it was the politically charged language used by the protagonists especially on the issue of defining modernity, autonomy and self determination that gave the essence to the controversy of San Andres and the radicalism of the points it was making. The EZLN pointed out that (NCDM 3 March 1998):

> the talks that got underway in San Andres in the spring of 1996 dealing with
> democracy and justice, were nothing but a monologue...(t)he
> government...refused to listen to the hundreds of Zapatista advisors and guests
> and ignored the representatives of dozens of political and social organisations
> who took part in the special forum on the Reform of the State convoked by the
> EZLN.

The PRI and the EZLN had very different views on the meaning and nature of Mexican modernity. The CCRI-GC (1995, 1995a,1998) stipulated its direct concern with the fate of the indigenous peoples. Marcos stressed the violence of neo-liberal modernisation (EZLN 1996; NCDM 9 July 1998; Patomaki 1999). In their Acteal

Article (NCDM 5 February 1998) the EZLN made this link between a new and extensive government intervention and neo-liberalism (Chiapas Bulletin 2 1995; NCDM 27 June 1998; NCDM 11 September 1998; NCDM 16 September 1998; Robertson-Rehberg 1998). The PRI were alleged, by the EZLN, to "constitute an arrogance of power, a power that lashes out worldwide when ever a population stands in the way of progress, profit or does not racially or ethnically conform to those in power" (NCDM 28 June 1998).

On January 10, 1998, the National Congress of Indigenous People (NCIP) sent the San Cristobel Declaration to the NCDM (NCDM January 10, 1998) stipulating that in their view "the policy of the National State of Mexico to exterminate indigenous people has not been successful." The EZLN made it clear that they were "still here and nothing's new, we're still being chased in this new extermination campaign" (NCDM 13 January 1998).

Crucially, the EZLN (NCDM 11 March 1998) have always maintained that their side of the bargain is both legal *and* driven forward by a wide grassroots and participatory audience through direct consultations (NCDM 17 December 1997) For the first time in history there would be Constitutional recognition of the right for self determination.

The neo-liberal modernisation program has forged a modernity defined as the only road to Mexican progress and the maintenance of sovereignty. Neo-liberal modernity has generated exclusion on the basis that the indigenous people represented a premodern and irrational 'other'. But in eluding the set up of this dichotomy between tradition and modernity the indigenous peoples through San Andres stipulated that a progressive modernisation program of color and fluidity would allow for the demands at San Andres to be fully implemented as an "inclusive path with all Mexicans, a force which will open up spaces, other voices, other steps and other hearts as well" (Le Maitre 1997, 1).

Therefore, the commonly held axiom that the postmodern argument situates the

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Indians as dichotomously opposed to 'neo-liberal' modernity becomes extremely limiting. For instance, Rosset and Cunningham (1994) questioned the concern with ethnicity proposed by the EZLN in 1994. They argued that if the EZLN was really proposing an ethnic struggle, then why had there not been a declaration of *ethnic nationalism* as expressed in Bosnia? Ethnic concerns for rights and self-determination have to be logically linked to ethnic ceding from the modern state (Scruton 1983). Moreover the dichotomous presentation found in the postmodern accounts as discussed in chapter four become limiting. Carrigan (1998) noted that in Marcos:

> the Zapatistas had found a unique linguist whose mastery of the idioms of both Mexicos allowed him to interpret each to the other. Straddling the historic chasm between the two, Marcos showed there were bridges to build and maps to be drawn to make each accessible to the other.

Clearly, the new Constitutional arrangements which would effectively secure and recognise the problematisation of this tension, would have to work within an inclusive modernisation. Consequently, many EZLN communiques have emphasised that the neo-liberal modernisation is in reality, the *false* Mexico. This rethinking essentially *unhooks* neo-liberalism from modernisation in the sense that neo-liberal modernity is a 'caricature' of modernisation. This unhooking is important. An EZLN communique (NCDM 11 March 1998) summed up a concern with the false and top down neo-liberal program as the *defining and inextricable* characteristic of Mexico's only current national economic and political development stipulating that:

> with great care and for more than 12 years the technocrats who administer the seasonal liquidation sale of national sovereignty...have been constructing a gigantic dome of protection over finance capital...but the indigenous rebellion is now a rock...with that brutal and bloody pragmatism which characterises it,

the Mexican government has prescribed the antidote KILL THAT ROCK.

Indeed, the EZLN have frequently used the language and imagery of Shakespeares' *Hamlet* to invoke this sense of the 'false' and ghostly chimera that is known as neo-liberalism. To open this space Marcos used the terms mask and mirror to indicate a possible and different Mexico hiding, ready to be opened and to blossom. The Nation cries out: "(T)hey have treated me like a piece of injured land, full of scars, of wounds that do not heal, from healings and downfalls. They have treated me like a never ending curse, like a home left in ruins and bitterness. How heavy is history!" (Marcos 1994g). Marcos (1995g) reported that:

> In the Power the mirror reflects a double image what is said and what is done.
> The mirror hides nothing. The resources are gone, it is not the same as before.
> Its surface is mildewed and stained. It can no longer reverse reality. On the
> contrary, it shows the contradictions. But in making this evident, it controls
> and puts it at its service. Now it simply attempts to make that contradictory
> image seem natural, as evident, as unquestionable.

But the connections accelerate. Marcos wrote

> There exists on this planet called 'Earth' and in the continent called 'America'
> a country whose shape appears to have had a big bite taken out of it of its west
> side, and which threw out an arm deep into the Pacific Ocean so that
> huricanes don't blow it far away from its history. This country is known by
> both natives and foreigners by the name of Mexico. Its history is a long battle
> between its desire to be itself and the foreign desires to have it exist under
> another flag. This country is ours...(A)nd they said globalisation and then we
> knew that this was how this absurd order was called, an order in which money

is the only country which is served and borders erased (Marcos 1995e).

As such, neo-liberal modernisation and the way the discourse and reality has colonised claims to defining modern Mexican state sovereignty and Mexican nationalism is ostensibly *out of step* with Mexico's true history. Indeed, throughout the struggle, Subcommandante Marcos has used the Zapata imagery to maintain the link through disseminating photos of the meetings between Zapata and Villa. Zapata now the grandfather figure has become "the object of a hero cult" (Brunk 1998, 463). This staging and imagery of ghosts, betrayal and the 'true' roots and direction of history is persuasive and extraordinary. Zapata symbolises this subversion for the EZLN.

This use of Zapata has become prevalent during the talks at San Andres, and especially on tackling the question of economic development, and 'land and liberty' reform to Article 27. Marcos quotes from Shakespeare's Hamlet, "I have heard much of your cosmetics...you swing your hips, you mispronounce, you give nicknames to God's creature and you make of your ignorance your lasciviousness" (Marcos 1998a). Marcos (1998a) stated that "another today is possible" because the real Mexico and the real Zapata live through the EZLN. He was not a ghost. An EZLN Communique from Marcos (NCDM 17 July, 1998) stated:

> In this Mexico there is a growing State criminality...the bloodiest is the daily crime of an economic model imposed with the irrefutable arguments of bayonets, jails and cemeteries...a country of masks and silences...it is evident that the masks hide and the silences silence, but it is also true that the masks reveal and the silences speak...(L)acking the legitimacy which is obtained only by consent of the governed, these personages of the Mexican tragedy at the end of this century, fill them with a mask made ex profeso that of a state of

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law, economic measures are imposed, assassinations carried out, jailings, rapes, destruction, persecution, war is made...replacing real history with official history.

The construction and legitimation of neo-liberalism through *official history* was largely made by power politics neo-liberal technocrats and concomitant intellectuals. Walker (1988) noted the significance of this interrelationship and role of the intellectual, and how distant from the reality of the concrete and specific such intellectualism can be. The insinuation from the EZLN was that once the neo-liberal mask is peeled open then opportunities for dialogue and an *alternative* modernisation would be offered. This is what San Andres was, and is all about. Marcos (NCDM 18 July 1998) reported:

> Beneath the masks of industrial conversion, the accommodation to the modern demands of globalisation, the rationing of public expenditures, the elimination of subsidies which impede free competition and economic development, the international struggle against drug traffiking and the end of the popularist state, the Mexican governments since 1982 until today have carried out a true campaign of extermination against the fundamental pillars of national sovereignty...freeing the process of basic products and controlling salaries, hooking the future of national currency to the arbitration of the great financial centers...assigning to the national armed forces the role of neighbourhood policemen in the global village...have managed to make this country less and less our own. Count it up, what is left?

Marcos stated that "something broke" in 1994 (Holloway 1996). This is why

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Marcos and the EZLN use the symbol of the mask. It was symbolic of a critical social movement which whilst rejecting the barbarism of the neo-liberal modernisation has given itself the possibility to recover a different understanding of development. Conger noted (1994, 8):

His mask has become controversial as peace negotiator has demanded that Marcos bear his face at the peace talks. Marcos replied fiercely to the demand that he take off his mask. 'Why such a fuss over the ski mask. Is Mexican political culture not the 'culture of the veiled'? ' he asked, alluding to the traditional secrecy that shrouds the naming of PRI Presidential candidates. The Subcommandante issued a challenge;' I am willing to take off my ski mask if Mexican society will take of its mask' and reexamine its images of 'modernity' to reconcile the Third World that this is Chiapas with Salinas claims that Mexico is entering the first World. [42]

Marcos (NCDM 17 July 1998) explicitly rejected the official and abstract neo-liberal language that inextricably defines Mexican 'modernity'. He stated that

official history is not learned in the books but created in the mental laboratories of graduate studies in foreign Universities, Harvard, Oxford, Yale and MIT are the modern fathers of the nation, of the real Mexican rulers. In this way the official history is as far from reality as the indexes of economic growth and in a world which already suffers the financial terrors of globalisation, these have the constancy of a weathervane in the middle of a storm...the official history has its mask, the mask of modernity...the modernity of the neoliberal rulers in Mexico reveal a dry and empty country. In spite of the publicity efforts and market technology and in spite of the millions

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[42]First World ha ha ha! they chanted, making a mockery of Salinas' prognostications (Cleaver 1995a).

invested in cosmetics and make up, the mask of Mexican modernity crumbles more each time.

Whilst neo-liberal modernity crumbles an inclusive modernisation may be waiting to take its place. Crucially, this alternative development would absolutely respect the sovereignty of Mexico, its institutions and Constitution. It is only when calls for self-determination are recognised that Mexico *could* be the true sovereign Mexico.

vii) Theme Three: Enlightened Discourse.Manifestation of Inclusivity.

Under the heading 'Political Participation' San Andres stated that constitutional reform is based on a decentralisation of Mexican politics and "to insure adequate political participation of the indigenous communities in the Congress of the Union and local congress' incorporating new criteria in setting the boundaries of electoral districts that correspond to indigenous communities and towns." Secondly, San Andres called on the right for the indigenous peoples to organise internal elections and nominations with official designations to be based on popular consultation and mechanisms that allow revisions based on this. The notion of Constitutional reform was a strong theme of San Andres. But it was reform with a difference. As mentioned, one of Nugent's (1995) main remonstrations with the postmodern account was that the EZLN 'patently used a modernist discourse'. To be sure, but the EZLN engages in a modernist discourse with a difference, and like Foucault, *reworked* the ideals of the Enlightenment in a grassroots and reflexive way. This is not Constitutional rights imposed.

According to San Andres the state must guarantee the indigenous communities "full access to the jurisdiction of the Mexican state with recognition and respect for their own internal normative systems" (EZLN 1996b, 10). This was followed by demands for a recognition of pluriculturalism and that the Federal government "promote laws and necessary policies so that indigenous languages in each state may

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have the same social value as Spanish." The State "must set up mechanisms to guarantee the indigenous towns" the "conditions that may allow them to satisfactorily tend to the nourishment, health and housing at an adequate level of well being" Therefore "social policy must set up priority programs for the improvement of all levels of health and nourishment of children as well as support programs in an egalitarian plane" and a "transfer of resources" to the communities to assist in economic, political, social and cultural development projects (EZLN 1996b, 6). And this alternative development can only be encouraged by a fair, equitable and inclusive Mexico.

The National Indigenous Congress (CNI) (1997) stipulated that the Accords "were designed to resolve the great backwardness in Mexico regarding indigenous people" but this would have ramifications for "democracy and justice in the whole country, social well being, economic development." There are those in the government who have accused the EZLN of being a security threat predicting that San Andres would represent "a breaking apart" of the State of Mexico. In defence of the EZLN, the CNI reported that "this is not true" and that no one "has expressed such wishes."

Crucially, the 'new pact' will refuse the dichotomy between being human or citizen, or an autonomous individual or a participant in a community. This reworking of Enlightened themes such as rights, autonomy and citizenship cast doubt on the way the Burbach/Nugent debate was framing the issues. The EZLN was aiming to recast the way Constitutional arrangements were organised, and how issues of rights and justice were discussed and developed within political institutions and the Constitution. Again, the emphasis seemed to be on a grassroots and concrete reflection on what was meant by these ideals and how they were going to be implemented in practice. Ostensibly, the EZLN (NCDM 14 September 1998) claimed that this was directly linked to the creation of a new kind of Mexican citizen. This citizen would be politically active (Mouffe 1992). This was:

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is above all, the struggle for politics to be citizenised if you will. The struggle

to find new ways to create spaces, to nurture initiatives which give voice and a

place to those who make a nation, the workers of the field and the city, the

indigenous, the squatters, the housewives, the teachers, students, retired and

pensioned, small businessmen, professionals, employees, handicapped, HIV

positives, intellectuals, artists, researchers, unemployed, homosexuals,

lesbians, youth, women, children and elderly, the everyone who, under

different names and faces, dress and name themselves, the people.

This is an empowered and interested citizenry contracted to the development of a

multicultural state (Mouffe 1992). People recognised in their specific locations that

they are connected and can be empowered by this.

viii) *PRI Response.*

Marcos (1996a) stressed that those in the PRI engaged in the peace process are

there for enhancing their 'shadowy political careers'. A BBC Correspondent stated that

despite signing the Agreements (but not ratifying) the "government views autonomy

as a threat to national security and is adopting a harder attitude towards the rebels and

their supporters" (BBC News Online 1998). With neo-liberalism taken as the defining

feature of a rational Mexican development any hint of challenge is understood as a

threat to the security and sovereignty of Mexico. This interpretation of San Andres

was based on the view that the EZLN wished to secede from Mexico. This would lead

to a balkanisation of the Mexican state. Indeed, the basic view of the government has

been in its willingness to recognise the suffering of the Indians, to recognise the

important contribution of the Indians in the history of Mexico and even to ratify

Constitutional Articles. However, there has remained the undercurrent that radical

new 'social pacts' and a new Constitution to accomodate demands for self

determination was not only unfeasible but a threat to Mexico, a slight at the legacy of

Zapata.

This was because the Constitution *as it stands* is the legacy of the Mexican revolution. Moreover, as I suggested in chapter four, the PRI regard neo-liberalism as the defining aspect of Mexican development and security. Any threat to neo-liberalism is logically construed as a threat to Mexico. Again, symbolism and myth play a part in this. The 'ghost' of Zapata and the expropriation of Zapata by the EZLN is criticised by the PRI. It is the revolutionary state that is the legacy of Zapata. The apparition of Zapata challenges those like Marcos who have betrayed his revolutionary legacy and who have deigned to wake his ghost up (Long 1999). President Salinas had tried to employ and stage the Zapata myth, as visage of national identity. Brunk (1998, 477) argued that the "state has disseminated Zapata's myth in a way that helped make him a component of the national ideal."

The government response to the proposals was more reticent. President Zedillo was alleged to have stated that the EZLN was Mexicos biggest paramilitary group and the federal Mexican army was therefore free to act as it sees fit within a war time logic (CCRI-GC 1995b). On 22 January 1998, the NCDM reported that the European Parliament warned the Mexican government to address the conflict in Chiapas.

After signing the Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture, negotiations were meant to take place on the issues of democracy, justice, well being and economic development (NCDM 11 March 1998). According to the NCDM (27 April 1998) mistrust between the PRI and the EZLN became most apparent after the San Andres Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture in February 1996. It was reported by the EZLN that the PRI broke these Accords "unilaterally." It was alleged that the PRI had justified their lack of communication with the EZLN on the basis that the EZLN uprising was illegal and that any Constitutional proceedings with the EZLN and its continued threat of armed terrorism could in fact never be discussed (Ochoa 1998; Zedillo 1998).

Indeed, Marcos in an earlier interview (Devereux *et al* 1994) noted shortly after

the original mobilisation that:

> when the concept of autonomy is brought up, the State understands it in this way: Well what the indigenous peoples want are reservations, like the ones the North American Indians have. This is where the campesinos say, No if we are going to end up like the North American Indians on reservations, no this is not the concept of autonomy that we want, rather that they recognise, for example, the structure of the government that I have explained, a structure that gives us validity. We don't want them to operate as if they were conquering territory.

Indeed, previous 'sectarian groups' or nationalist groups *a la* Nicaragua, Marcos noted in this interview "look to ethnicity in a perjorative sense, as if we wanted to create a bubble, a bubble like the one in the movie, a bubble that isolates you from contamination or from what happens outside it." This is not how the EZLN understood the relationship between the Indians, modernity and Nationalism. Their future Mexico is one that can accommodate these demands and not regard these demands as a threat to Mexican modernity.

Marcos (1998) argued that the PRI response to San Andres was and is a lie, stressing that the government fortuitously "learned somewhat late that those agreements constituted an act of treachery to the nation since they implied the wounding of national sovereignty, the fragmentation of the country and the creation of a state within a state" (Marcos 1998,2). Indeed, certain PRI senators were allegedly not succumbing to this kind of pressure, especially the members of the Galileo Group which is led by Senator Salazar who recognised the legality of the EZLN. Zedillo hinted at this tension in a recent speech (Zedillo 1999).

The PRI responded to San Andres with a counterproposal on December 19 1996. This was a response to the EZLN's own new proposal on November 29, 1996 which

had been drafted and agreed upon by COCOPA (the Commission made up of deputies and senators of all the political parties represented in the Congress of the Union). Later in 1996, COCOPA had produced their own revised alternative stipulating that the indigenous peoples had the right to self determination and as an expression of this, to autonomy as part of the Mexican state (NCDM 11 March 1998).

In this revision, Indian communities COCOPA said, were entitled to choose their internal forms of social, economic, political and cultural organisation, to apply their traditional judicial systems of regulation and solution to internal conflicts, to elect authorities and exercise their internal forms of government in accordance with their own norms and within the scope of autonomy, guaranteeing the participation of women in conditions of equity, to fortify their political participation and representation in accordance with their cultural specifities, to collectively agree on the use and enjoyment of the natural resources of their land and territories as understood as the total habitat used or occupied by the indigenous communities and to enrich and protect indigenous language (NCDM 11 March 1998; NCDM 31 March 1998).

But as Interior Minister Ochoa (1998) pointed out, the PRI would respect demands for the key issues, land and autonomy, but within "the current juridicial order." This is the sentiment that the EZLN react to unfavourably, insisting that the government set the debate on legal terms that are already embedded in the very constitution that the EZLN would like to see changed.

The EZLN rejected the new government proposal of 1996 on the basis that:though the PRI recognised the rights of the indigenous people as Mexican citizens there were no proposals for the *collective rights* of the Indians through their autonomous self determination as defined through a new economic, political and social pact as drawn out in San Andres. Moreover, given that the PRI refused to negotiate over the question of land resources and NAFTA, clearly, the idea of self development in San

Andres was crucial to the whole edifice of autonomy. Indeed, it was this interconnectedness of issues which made it for the EZLN, highly problematic to discuss issues seperately.

Nevertheless, COCOPA proposed reform to Article 18 which would allow the indigenous people to serve out their sentences preferentially in the establishments closest to their homes and Article 26.which would help establish the mechanisms necessary for taking into consideration the needs and cultural specificities of the indigenous communities and peoples in development plans and programs.

COCOPA proposed reforms to Article 53 which meant that, when.establishing the territorial demarcation of the uninominal electoral districts, consideration had to be given to the location of the indigenous communities in order to ensure their political participation and representation on a national level. Reform to Article 126 would mean a guarantee of the representation of the indigenous communities in State legislatures in the demarcation of the electoral districts, that consideration should be given to the geographical distribution of the said communities.

The EZLN questioned the motivations behind the PRI and COCOPA's move. By December 6 1996, Zedillo had said to COCOPA and the EZLN 'give us 15 days to clear up'. On December 20 1996 the PRI made objections to the EZLN proposals and to the proposals by COCOPA although it had reacted more favourably to COCOPA (Ochoa 1998).

Consequently, it was alleged that the PRI had never read the original accords, or, alternatively, it had never intended to implement them anyway since COCOPA proposals were very like the EZLN demands proposed at San Andres. Such distrust carries through 1997 and 1998. The Implementation and Verification Commission was set up in late 1996 but an impasse had already been reached.

The EZLN argued that the 1996 proposals from the PRI still meant no self government by the indigenous communities and that there had been no acceptance of claims for allowing the right for the indigenous peoples to use their own punitive

rules/regulations. Crucially, there was no question or debate over issues of collective access to land or reform or debate on reform to NAFTA. This was a problem as land and territory were the key basis for indigenous autonomy. The EZLN were also critical of COCOPA in not taking the economic issue seriously. According to the NCDM (9 December 1998), the EZLN accused the PRI of refusing to recognise the legislative proposal drawn up by the COCOPA. The PRI regarded San Andres as symptomatic of the EZLN's continued threat to national security and national sovereignty. This had to be dealt through in traditional sanctions of law and order (Mid-Atlantic 1998; NCDM 11 September 1998).

Support from the US has evolved in other ways (NCDM 3 February 1998; NCDM 26 March 1998, 17 November 1998). There are allegedly 70,000 army troops in Chiapas, which are forming a ring of militarisation around the EZLN's autonomous communities. This was almost about a third of the entire national army (NCDM 1 December 1998).

There has been concern at the military build up, manifested through bodies such as the Congress approved 'Law for Dialogue: Reconciliation and Dignified Peace in Chiapas' by COCOPA and concerned representatives of the government. This stated that one of the major principles of any negotiation between the parties must be agreement by consensus with the Joint Negotiation of San Miguel (signed on 9 April, 1995). The continuation of the dialogue and the negotiations are vital and above any other consideration (NCDM 15 January 1998).

Recently, there were calls for indigenous peoples from the EZLN not to succumb to the PRI publicity that the government was respecting the San Andres Accords and that the EZLN were baulking on the signed agreements with outrageous demands for the government to resign and a new Indian state based on ethnic nationalism to be created. The EZLN supported what they argued was the more honest approach of foreign governments and their reaction to the situation (NCDM 5 February 1998a; NCDM 31 March 1998), particularly following the massacre at Acteal in 1997.

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ix) Signs of Dialogue.

More recently the EZLN stated that:

> the Mexican government on Sunday pledged to steer Constitutional reforms
> on Indian rights through the next session of Congress...now is the time to end
> a conflict that is wearing down and wounding the nation...enough of
> obstructing efforts to overcome marginalisation and poverty suffered by the
> majority of Indians in this country...the government had every intention of
> fulfilling the terms of peace accords signed...it had never signed subsequent
> proposals by the nation's official peace negotiators grouped in Congress'
> multi party Committee for Concord and Pacification to translate the San
> Andres Accords into Constitutional reforms (NCDM 3 March 1998).

President Zedillo (1998) stated this:

> Our Constitution bears witness to and reflects the struggles that we Mexicans
> have lived through in order to build our nation. In the face of great challenges
> at different times and under varied conditions our constitution has embodied
> and ratified the fundamental aspirations and principles which identify and
> unite us, which dictate and order our co-existence.

Their argument was that it was the *already existing* Constitution that represented the spirit of Zapata and attempts to radically alter the Constitution were threats to his glorious name and to Mexican integrity (Hilbert 1997; Long 1999). President Zedillo (1998) pointed out that:

> In 1992 Congress amended Article 4 of the Constitution so as to guarantee the
> multicultural nature of the nation, based on the diversity of origin of the

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indigenous peoples, to guarantee them access under conditions of equality, to

the jurisdiction of the state and to make additional effort to promote their full

development...the bill of reforms to Articles 4, 18, 26, 53, 73, 115 and 116

of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States to make effective

the social, economic, cultural and political rights of Mexico's indigenous

peoples...preservation and free development of the indigenous peoples.

Despite this emphasis the inauguration of NAFTA and the unwillingness of the

PRI to even consider revising NAFTA made this statement to the EZLN, rather

hollow. President Zedillo (1998) admitted that the exercise of this autonomy will

contribute to the nation's democracy, sovereignty and unity. And he accepted that the

EZLN have just cause for autonomy but as long as it is under "The Rule of Law"

(Zedillo 1998). President Zedillo accepted that the EZLN had similar concerns with

maintaining the character of Mexico's territorial integrity and he has applauded their

commitment to the Mexican nation. But the PRI recognised autonomy on a legal basis

as defined in the Constitution.

Consequently, the EZLN (1996d) reported on theme one of San Andres that the

PRI had a disposition but "in no way is it willing to radically modify the relation

between the nation and indigenous people." President Zedillo (1998) has also

acccepted that the question of cultural diversity was important to the development of

Mexico:

indigenous Mexicans may fully participate in national development and

democratic coexistence with full respect for their identity...the exercise of

autonomy will contribute to the nation's democracy, sovereignty and unity

Diversity is characteristic of Mexicos indigenous peoples. 56 indigenous

tongues are spoken in this country...wealth, knowledge and a unique view of

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the universe, nature and society. *In our constitution the concept of people has a historical character but must fall under precise categories like nationality and citizenship...(R)ecognition of the rich diversity requires that the General Constitution of the Republic regulate general principles* (my emphasis).

As such, it was the nature of the language used here that caused concern. President Zedillo's emphasis on 'precise categories' suggested top down and imposed legal technicalities. This is the problem for a movement that is searching for a different understanding of rights and citizenship through a continuing process of consultation. According to NCDM (3 March 1998) the PRI felt that the conflict was in fact wearing down.

x) Redefining Mexican Sovereignty.

Ostensibly, the tensions between the EZLN and the PRI concerned the issue of Mexican sovereignty and its definition. The EZLN made it very clear that recognition of indigenous demands laid out at San Andres, would help strengthen national sovereignty. The EZLN claimed that it was the Mexican government who were threatening Mexican sovereignty by selling Mexican resources (and people) to the whims of foreign capital. In turn, the PRI were claiming that it was the EZLN who are threatening Mexican sovereignty on the basis that they were challenging neo-liberalism which was the absolute and inextricable basis of Mexican development and Mexico as a sovereign nation state.

By 1998, Interior Minister Labastida stipulated that he had had enough of the EZLN's obstructing efforts to overcoming marginalisation and poverty. The NCDM (22 January 1998) reported that the EZLN had continued to maintain that it was still the policy of the national state of Mexico to exterminate the indigenous people (Chiapas Bulletin No 2). COCOPA's 'Bill Initiative for Dialogue, Reconciliation and Peace with Dignity' of 1996 was and always had been simply a statement of good

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intentions but does not provoke confidence, confidence which was continuosly undermined. A sign of true PRI disposition to negotiate for the EZLN would be for the PRI to reduce its military presence in Chiapas and to allow all social actors to express their many concerns.

Interior Minister Francisco Labastida Ochoa reportedly said that "enough was enough" and that "the government had every intention of fulfilling the terms of peace Accords it signed with commanders of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN)" (NCDM 3 March 1998a). But the EZLN (NCDM 22 January 1998) claimed that the government was simply "created excuses without foundation for a supposed fragmentation of the country, reflecting a lack of juridicial technique." President Zedillo replied that "I am not sure whether they want to fix this situation" (NCDM 13 February 1998).

President Zedillo (1998) presented to Congress a reform to make effective the "construction of a new social pact integrating a new relationship between the indigenous peoples, society and the state." This social pact he stated:

> is based on our conviction that the new national and local situation of the
> indigenous peoples can only become firmly rooted and reach fruition with the
> participation of the indigenous peoples themselves and society as a whole
> within the framework of a profound state reform.

But this meant a Juridicial equality of all Mexicans before the law and the non-creation of special exemptions. Again, this seemed to be in contradistinction given San Andres' emphasis on the fact that the indigenous peoples must be recognised as having suffered continual colonial repression. The PRI will respect Indian education, their own new distribution of municipalities and new political demarcations to be able to fully participate democratically, coupled with respect of

rights to social internal affairs traditions and customs.

This new proposal of the Mexican government was based on consultations with the National Consultation on Indigenous Rights and Participation which was jointly sponsored by the executive and legislative branches, and whose conclusion was announced in March 1996.

In the 33 state forums, 120 meetings were organised, with indigenous peoples and communities in 18 states and was not based on outrageous demands that were seperate from real life. Minister Ochoa reported that the Mexican government and the Senate of the Republic had ratified Convention 169 on September 6 1991 even before the reforms of 1992.

This had stipulated that governments with the participation of the interested parties, must assume responsibility of developing coordinated and systematic action aimed at protecting the rights of those indigenous peoples and guaranteeing respect for their integrity. Interior Minister Ochoa (1998) stated that:

> President Ernesto Zedillo has instructed me to inform all Mexicans to the effect that today, he delivered to Congress the Bill of Reforms to our Constitution for expanding and strengthening the rights of indigenous peoples'...(A)ny problem or conflict that is a juridical one can and must be resolved by legal means. If it is political it will be done through dialogue and negotiation. The Chiapas conflict is one he say's, that has 'worried all Mexicans'.

In accordance to San Andres, Ochoa (1998) specified that the government "has never imposed conditions on them. The government has unceasingly kept its promises. It has honoured its commitments. Through every possible means available."
Here, Ochoa (1998) blamed the EZLN for cancelling dialogue and for violating the law. The PRI maintained its militarisation was justified on the basis of national

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security. It was a Mexican issue and foreign parties were told to keep out (NCDM 9 February 1999; NCDM 28 January 1998; NCDM 13 December 1997) reported that peace negotiator Coldwell and interior minister Chuayffet went on a public relations offensive, but still to no avail. On July 31 1998 a Mexican Department of Interior Joint Press Release stated that:

> the solution to the conflict in Chiapas through dialogue and negotiation demands a broad effort on behalf of the agencies involved...the federal government and the COCOPA within the sphere of their responsibilities reaffirm their willingness to achieve and peaceful and negotiated solution.

In a message from the Secretary of the Interior, Francisco Ochoa (1998) from Mexico City, (March, 15, 1998) the government stated its ongoing commitment:

> for expanding and strengthening indigenous rights...it is a conflict that has worried many Mexicans...not at any time during the last four years has the government suspended talks...it has never imposed conditions on them...the bill sent to Congress confirms the fact that the Mexican government has an unswerving commitment to all of the country's indigenous populations...nor does it endanger the unity of Mexico or the country's stability.

In a speech, President Zedillo (1998a) also stated that::

> there is more, much more that unites us as Mexicans than separates us...they know the federal government will not use repressive force...as expressed in the agreements of San Andres, the federal government agrees to promote juridicial and legislative changes that will expand the local and national political participation and representation of indigenous peoples, respecting

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their diverse situations and traditions, and strengthening a new federalism in the Mexican republic within it a constitutional framework that will ensure national unity.

President Zedillo (1998a) accepted that:

> we agree that in order to forge a new relationship between the state and indigenous peoples, we must develop a culture of plurality and tolerance; a culture that accepts the world views, lifestyles and development concepts of indigenous peoples...(T)he Federal Government agrees with what the San Andres Agreements say regarding the states' duty to guarantee the indigenous peoples' conditions that will allow them to adequately provide for their food, health care and housing.

Here, respect for diversity and tolerance to difference was clear. But it was the reality of neo-liberalism and the practice of this that remained the centre of debate. The NCDM (28 January 1998) reported that:

> President Zedillo made an urgent call for confirmation of the San Andres Accords signed between his government and the Zapatistas. This was the first time that he mentioned the Accords directly. However he said that his government would not accept any interpretation of the accords that would threaten national unity and sovereignty. Above all he insisted on implementing these points in the accords that seek to reduce poverty and conditions of political exclusion.

The EZLN stressed that there would be no further dialogue with the PRI, or any

backdown, until the requirements of San Andres were *fully* accepted (NCDM 13
December 1997). This included the question of resource distribution, the land
question and the whole issue of autonomy rather than simply 'recognition of
plurality.'

The PRI maintained that the deciding factor in the breakdown of the process was
the often exasperating and conspirational meddling of religious figures such as
Bishop Samuel Ruiz of San Cristobel who it was alleged by the EZLN, suffered a
visious attack from alleged PRI paramilitaries (NCDM 15 December 1997). The PRI
has accepted that (NCDM 3 March 1998):

> among other things the agreements set a requirement for national
> constitutional reform which would legally establish a new relationship
> between the state and indigenous peoples...the accords also included other
> required modifications of constitutional federal, state and local laws dealing
> with the remunicipalisation of indigenous regions of the country, the free
> determination of indigenous cultures and customs, the use of natural resources
> on indigenous lands, the promotion of bilingual and culturally aware
> education on indigenous communities and the right of indigenous women to
> hold positions of authority equal to men at all levels of government and the
> development of their communities.

The Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs (1997) maintained that the PRI had
always acted in good faith through the Law for Dialogue, Conciliation and Just Peace
in Chiapas passed by both Federal Chambers, Senate and Congress in March 11 1995.
The PRI recognised COCOPA and the National Mediation Commission (CONAI).
But, according to the PRI "the EZLN proposals were simply outrageous by calling
for a dismantling of neo-liberalism, the state, a new Constitution and the construction

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of a new social order" (Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1997).

In order to return to any kind of dialogue the EZLN stipulated the following

minimum conditions. Firstly, an inclusive political solution, secondly, the liberation

of the alleged Zapatistas now imprisoned, thirdly, a government delegation and

fourthly the installation of a Verification and Implementation Commission and

implementation of First Agreements with serious and concrete proposals on

democracy and justice.

The Chiapas state government was also split. Those holding the 'soft' line were

the interim state governor Ruiz who had links to COCOPA and on a national level, to

a number of Mexican billionaires and ex Mexico City mayor Hanz Gonzalez (Gilbreth

1997). Hard line reactions to 'eliminate the Zapatistas' were made by state

Government secretary Zepeda who linked to the state attourney general. On a national

level, these parties are linked to Salinas (allegedly in exile in the Republic of Ireland)

and to ex interior minister, Garrido.

According to non-government group 'Global Exchange' (1998) the PRI had

legitimated funds to paramilitaries through the existence of the current counter drugs

war (Chapman 1996). The War on Drugs showed that this commitment constituted

the new 'other Latin America' (George 1994; Nadelman 1989). Such resources from

the US were used to eradicate insurgent movements and narco-terrorism such as

Peru's Shining Path and FARC (Weinberg 1996).[43] It was aided by the development of

new surveillance technologies and through the punitive disciplining discourse of

neo-liberalism (Gill 1996; Warren 1997).

The EZLN delegate to the United States (US) Cecilia Rodriguez (1997) stated that:

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[43]Chomsky (1993, 59) noted that "for the US most of the basic framework remains
intact...within a narrow range policies express institutional needs...US policies have
been consistent over a long period." The new agenda fulfilled the smokescreen of
continuity (Watson 1994).

hundreds of indigenous peoples live by the same horror...the government bet is clear, but if you believe that misery and the military pressure will make us surrender, you are wrong. Before the legitimate demands of indigenous and Mexican civil society the federal government translates state politics into lack of fulfillment of the agreement and in further dividing our peoples.

Crucially, she also maintained that on looking back and reflecting:

This government has not respected its agreements since signing the San Andres Accords two years ago on Feb 16, 1996. It has only created excuses without foundations of a supposed fragmentation of the country reflecting a lack of juridicial technique; has not respected or fulfilled the covenant 169 of the International Labour Organisation...this dirty strategy only serves the enemy of peace for its only purpose is to discredit the labour of Samuel Ruiz head of CONAI.

It was alleged that the government is using political, religious and cultural differences within, and between indigenous communitues in Chiapas through which to divide and rule the Zapatista support (Davison 1998). Rodriguez (1997) maintained that:

These activities make us think that the federal government and the government of Chiapas plan to use paramilitary groups against indigenous peoples and generate more divisions in the communities through the selective financing of projects based on the production and services that will lead to the direct confrontation between our brothers and sisters.

There was increasing distrust and despair (Reuters 1998). The following announcement was made.by the EZLN (NCDM 3 March 1998):

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February 16, 1998 marked the two year anniversary of the signing of the

Accords on indigenous rights and culture between the Mexican government

and the EZLN...reforms to articles 4, 18, 26, 53, 73, 115 and 116...primarily

with regards to protecting the rights of free determination and autonomy of the

indigenous peoples of Mexico...the right to free determination and as an

expression of this, to autonomy as part of the Mexican state such that they

may choose their internal forms of social, economic, political and cultural

organisation, preserve and enrich their language, knowledge and all of the

elements which form part of their identity and culture.

Subcommandante Marcos pointed out that the indigenous question is

unquestionably not going to simply go away[44] (NCDM 13 January 1998).

So what does this show? As a critical social movement the EZLN found current

economic and political development in Mexico highly controversial. The

militarisation of the region has been linked to the demands of the global investment

community. Yet this does not stop the EZLN from retaining a faith in Mexico, a more

inclusive and progressive Mexico.

Clearly, the two parties remained at loggerheads. However, on the part of the

EZLN there was a distinctive loyalty to the state of Mexico, a loyalty which was not

only shown in their allegiance to the Mexican flag but also their belief that

neo-liberalism did equate with the *true* development of Mexico and its modernity

(Fuentes 1994a). As such, once neo-liberalism was *unhooked* from being the sole

definition of modernisation then a different Mexico might rise. This inclusive Mexico

would incorporate the demands laid out at San Andres.

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[44]Balboa (1999) observed a demonstration in Ocosingo, where 4000 Zapatista
sympathisers sprayed graffiti on the town hall.claiming the insanity of Governor
Guillen, warning Zedillo not to provoke Marcos.

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Whether or not the EZLN will be able to construct this remains to be seen.

However, the EZLN have teased open a critical space for a more nation wide thinking

about the nature of current and future Mexican development. This has been Marcos'

goal and was represented by the formation of the Emiliano Zapata Front of National

Liberation in 1997 and the organisation of the 1999 National Consulta.

The basis of this debate has been the Indian question. The EZLN have taken the

issue progressively. There was a concern that focus on Indian self=determination may

generated a culturally repressive apartheid system of ethnic nationalism and the

continuation of the exclusionary practices often found within the urban spaces of the

Chiapas municipalities (Le Bot 1997). Clearly, the Mexican government interprets

these demands as a possible 'balkanisation' of Mexico.

xi) Militarisation.

Given the way the PRI had approached San Andres a concomitant military build

occured during 1996 and 1997. Marcos (NCDM 13 January 1998) stated that:

> The EZLN salutes the national and global mobilisation which demands justice
>
> and an end to the war in Mexico...a peaceful solution to indigenous
>
> demands...on this day we remember and salute the fact that we have found one
>
> another. Our aspirations are the same, democracy, liberty and justice for
>
> everyone. Our paths are different but within us is the same commitment to a
>
> life enlightened.

On 15 January 1998, the NCDM printed a letter from the CONAI to the

International Observation Commission For Peace and Human Rights. It said;

> amidst all the suffering and concern due to this delicate and dangerous
>
> moment in the process of constructing the political conditions necessary for

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negotiation and peace in Mexico we extend our hopeful welcome to the initiative of various groups and civil and religious individuals from different countries who have decided to form an International Commission to help us with observation and follow up in respect of human rights and in the process of building peace with justice and dignity...mechanisms and tasks that will help us all move toward the common objective of human rights and peace.

In the 'Acteal Article' (NCDM 5 February 1998) the mood seemed grim and events in Acteal clearly cast a melancholic shadow over the EZLN. It stated

Zedillo's government has no real intention for peace but for geopolitical control of natural resources in the region. Indigenous resistance and autonomy directly threatens the overriding interests of free trade goals. The governments war strategy of annihilation is apparent in the facts that have come out from ACTEAL.

Certainly, Acteal made Mexicans feel rather uneasy and added to the sense of concern with the Indians living under the same government. Indeed, Marcos now termed the governments stance as 'ethnocide' (Greste 1998). The National Indigenous Congress (1998) stated that "President Zedillo's response to the Indigenous Peoples has been state sanctioned terror and incredible militarisation. Daily surveillance flights have increased dramatically."

Concerned with his public image Zedillo made a recent trip to Los Angeles where there are 3 million peoples of Mexican dissent (Collier 1999). He was taken aback by the incredible awareness of the Chiapas conflict and stipulated an end to injustice and excruciating poverty. But admitted that these problems could not possibly be resolved quickly. Social spending he argued, had risen from 5% to 9% of Mexico's GDP. In fact (Dillon 1998) the Acteal massacre had led to the replacement of Emilio

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Chuayffet, the 'pudgy hardliner' as Interior minister, by Ochoa (1998). Consequently, President Zedillo gave the latter several instructions to develop a sure process for peace and dialogue in Chiapas and to improve relations with the new opposition held Mexican Congress. President Zedillo expressed vehement resentment at the so-called interferences of Bishop Ruiz and his libertarian philosophy which had urged the poor not to wait until the afterlife for their salvation and for their spiritually better lives. Zedillo expressed his opinion that this was a clearcut violent theology which incites a definitive challenge to the Mexican state (Nannet 1998).

xii) National Consulta.

The build up in militarisation and the stalemate over San Andres has forged empathy and solidarity, a recognition of specific locations but similar concerns. A representative of the CCRI-GC stated:

> for us the Zapatistas, indigenous rights and culture represent the idea that after achieving that, other demands will follow; that this will create an enduring precedent for the Mexican people; that the solution is that we all make demands, that we all participate in making demands...(T)he consultation will be one way for the government to comply with the demands of the people, and not only that, but a great democratic exercise (Bellinghausen 1998).

Essentially, this was an open, all including, intelligent and creative dialogue between all of Mexican society and a new form of doing politics by recognising new voices and colors. This was a popular consultation that recognised Mexico's rich history and the right of all Mexicans to participate freely and voluntarily in all processes of the National Consulta (15 December 1998). The National Consulta included a process of preparation, diffusion, and realisation of the consultation for an

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all inclusive mobilisation, a debate on the character of municipalities, regions and states where all men and women over 12 years of age can take part and the consultation will be national and simultaneous, based on the following questions;

1. do you agree that the indigenous peoples should be included with all their power and richness in the national project and that they take an active part in the construction of a new Mexico;

2. do you agree that the rights of the indigenous people should be recognised in the Mexican Constitution in accordance to the San Andres Accords and the corresponding proposal by COCOPA ;

3. do you agree that we should reach the peace through the path of dialogue, demilitarising the country wth the return of the soldiers to their barracks as it is established in the Constitution and the law;

4. do you agree that the country should organise the government to lead by obeying in all aspects of national life.

Commander Tacho reported that the consultation was constructed "for people to listen to each other, and we are doing a way with the custom that that someone has to speak for the indigenous people" (quoted in Bellinghausen 1998).

However, mistrust continues as the EZLN (EZLN 1998) reported that the PRI had, through the use of counter-insurgent spindoctors maintained that Marcos was "dying of malaria" or that "they captured him gunrunning in Guatemala" and "ominous signs came on June 7 when Bishop Ruiz's CONAI mediation commission dissolved itself saying they could not serve any useful mediation role in an almost dead peace process."

In January 1998, Zedillo (1998a) had stipulated that any violence is not acceptable and stated that those who criticise the government know that they are not telling the truth. He stated that they (EZLN):

know their words serves only to win converts, to carry sympathy, to feed their

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propoganda in Mexico and abroad...(I)t is unacceptable that this conflict in Chiapas is being used to promote political ends that have nothing to do with solving the deep rooted causes of the just protests of indigenous communities (Zedillo 1998a).

And accusations of cocaine-filled wallets and bribes are endemic in the region, between the protagonists (Farah and Moore 1998). The Zedillo government claimed that the EZLN "has done everything but act in good faith" (NCDM 28 June 1998). According to Commandante David of the CCRI-GC (1998a):

> (O)n January 1st 1998, the government of the Republic broke the dialogue with the EZLN and violated the Law for Dialogue of March 11, 1995...(B)y initiating a campaign of persecution against the Zapatistas. This began on January 1st 1998 when it attacked the community of Yalehibtk and planted an arms cache in order to justify its aggression. Those weapons do not belong to the EZLN. House to house searches begun.

But according to Robertson Rehberg (1998) the Chiapas state should not be understood as homogenous or as a unified state. Different regions in Chiapas are being hit by the crisis in differing ways. For example, the Chilion region has been, since EZLN mobilisation in 1994, divided into three zones, war, neutral and conflict. There developed anti-zapatista sentiment which has discredited the EZLN for inviting unwanted foreign/Marxist troublemaking (Crawley 1994; Long 1999). However, the events in Chiapas have struck this national chord. Despite its position in the deep South, in some way, Chiapas has chimed a bell an unconscious resonance in every Mexican that rings out, 'maybe, just maybe, something is wrong here'. However, this space is marred by an egregious climate of military intervention (NCDM 17

December 1997, 1997a, 1997b).

In invigorating this wideranging national dialogue Marcos stated "there is a process of teaching and learning" so "we want a world where many worlds fit." That was the EZLN say to all Mexicans across the political divides from Marxism to neo-liberals "your world exists and it deserves recognition" let's have a debate (Bellinghausen 1999, 4). Marcos expressed the EZLN concern with, "we say let's fight for our rights which is also a form of fighting for the rights of everyone" (De Huerta and Higgins 1999, 272). In order to forge an equivocal debate the key for Marcos was to "recognise difference and to organise it so it can exist" as "a way to solve national sovereignty" so that there would no longer be "the homogenous nation that has never existed, that the powers have used to justify their existence, and that concept, very devalued today, of patria" (Bellinghausen 1999, 4). Marcos opened the door to a possible and new Mexico "opening space for something else" as the Consulta opened a space for and connected to those Mexican men and women allowing them to say 'We are interested in Mexico and we have an opportunity to make ourselves heard" (Bellinghausen 1999, 5). Thus, the NCDM stated that for:

> the year of 1999 the Zapatista Army of National Liberation has launched a new initiative of dialogue and peace calling for a mobilisation, both in Mexico and the rest of the world, that aims to achieve the recognition of the rights of the indigenous people and an end to the war of extermination (NCDM 9 February 1999).

The NCDM reported that the "government of Zedillo has mounted a propaganda campaign abroad to improve the image internationally...striving to convince the world that there is no war in Mexico's southeast" (NCDM 9 February 1999). As I discuss in chapter seven this kind of rhetoric was not working given the EZLN's use of information technology as a way of mobilising interested participants for a colourful

and inclusive Mexico that is fair and equitable.

Conclusion.

In this chapter the conceptual development outlined in chapter one focused on rethinking state development, has been linked to the EZLN as a critical social movement. Particular attention has been paid to the way the EZLN does not so much reject modernity but actually wishes to engage more reflexively with constructing a more inclusive and acceptable form of contemporary Mexican modernity to enhance indigenous cultural 'rights' but also to include other Mexicans right across the political spectrum. I showed how this rethinking of state development was based on interconnecting specific grievances, elucidating the debate on inclusivity and the radicalising of the Constitution. In the next chapter, I will consider more specifically upon the EZLN's democratic revolution as a critical social movement.

Chapter Six.

The Emiliano Zapata Army of National Liberation (EZLN) and the Radicalisation of Mexican Democracy.

Introduction.

My purpose in this chapter is to consider the democratic revolution engaged by the

EZLN since 1994. I argue that this cannot be understood within the schematics of

Marxism which understands a democratic revolution as a destruction of political

institutions, nor as the settings of the postmodern debate imply is this a postmodern

rejection of the revolutionary ideal. On the contrary, the EZLN reworks and rethinks

what is actually meant by democracy and democratic institutions by forging a

democratic revolution with a difference. I will show how the EZLN forged a

distinctive radical democratisation of Mexico. As a critical social movement, I show

how the EZLN demanded accountability and transparency within the existing political

institutions and yet remains sceptical with current multi party politics and the edifice

of the electoral process. Instead, I show how the EZLN was and is searching and

exploring the possibility of the richer and more direct site and nature of participatory

democracy. This democratic space at the grassroots reflects how the EZLN think

about what is meant by a political institution.

I show how this exploration has divested difficult and ongoing strategic choices for

the EZLN in evading the need to reform as a political party and in its relationship

with the party political left, particularly the Party of the Democratic Revolution

(PRD). I argue that the EZLN has opened up a space for exploring the possibilities of

a democratisation. The EZLN democratisation goes beyond party political democracy

and called into question the more recent and dramatic loss of power of the PRI in the

2000 Presidential elections. The EZLN have generated a forum that can now be used

to problematise the constant rhetoric of 'democratisation' and change used by

President Vicente Fox.

i) Democratisation in the New World Order.

Undoubtedly, the end of the Cold War and the sweeping changes through Eastern Europe heralded in an age of optimism. In the West a sense of smugness was also evident couched in triumphalist overtones (George 1994). Since the end of the Cold War this has tended to connote mainly Western visions of institutionalised, representative, accountable and participatory liberal democracy. But democracy is an irrevocably elusive concept (Hamilton and Mee-Kim 1993; Pinkney 1994). The indefatigable optimism of President's Salinas and Zedillo was inspired by the shift to multiparty politics. Indeed, the mid-term elections of 1997 and the run up to Presidential elections of 2000 seemed characterised by democratic change and a seemingly inexorable development evident throughout Latin America (Blum 1997; Huntingdon 1997; Lawson 1997).

However a sense of scepticism also emerged and a sense that this kind of democratisation was simply a useful elite buzzword, perhaps even ideological, as the old structures of economic and political marginalisation and exploitation remained intact (Gills *et al* 1993). Indeed, in:

> a world in which states have a monopoly on neither violence or legitimacy, in which the most powerful forces are global in scale, the promise of democracy to enhance the capacity of people to exercise control over their own lives is put into greater and greater doubt (Walker 1988, 139).

This scepticism with outpouring elite rhetoric and the emphasis on electoral polling and political trends or indicators telling a tale of 'winners' and 'losers', is limiting the flourishing of 'real' democracy whilst coterminiously generating a powerful sense of apathy and powerlessness in a world apparently where 'there is no

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alternative' a world 'out there' (Walker 1988). But the sense of political liberalisation is relative. In many states, even this limited democracy, such as Mexico, was a progression after the years of overt corruption, violence and intimidation. This is what made the EZLN's rejection of multiparty democratisation in Mexico so interesting.

ii) EZLN and Mexican Democracy: The Beginning of a Democratic Revolution.

In March 1994, Conger (1994, 1) wrote:

> On January 11, 10 days after guerrillas calling themselves the Zapatista
> National Liberation (EZLN) launched bold attacks on five towns and an army
> barracks in the Southern state of Chiapas, television newscaster Jorge Ramos
> fired a pointed question at a Mexican official 'Senor Consul, is the
> government concerned that in this election year people might want to vote for
> an opposition party because it might bring peace instead of staying with the
> ruling PRI that has brought war to the country?'" With that single question,
> Ramos put the PRI's much touted record of 65 years of social peace on the
> line.

Thus, Conger went on to suggest that the:

> deadline for clean elections is fixed. For decades, the conventional wisdom
> held about Mexico was that democratisation of the state/party regime would
> threaten political stability in a land with a fearsome history of bloody
> uprisings. Today democratisation seems the only guarantor of stability and
> peace (Conger 1994, 9).

The First Declaration of the Lacandon jungle mentioned the word *democracy* (EZLN 1994a) as did the opening statements of the San Andres Accords (EZLN

1996b).

Indeed, issues of democracy were to be discussed with the government in the summer of 1996. They were not. Allegedly, the government refused to discuss reform to a reformed Article 27. The way democratic revolutions are understood by the old social movements is clear. The democratic revolution will require a revolutionary political party and the toppling and the fall of dictatorships and the implantation of a democratic government. Marxist revolutions were largely based upon the supposition that liberal democratic political institutions were always going to be biased in favour of the ruling class. The First Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle asked for the end to the dictatorship and this move was justified on the basis of the Mexican constitution, Article 39 where it is stated that "National sovereignty essentially and originally lies in the people. All political power emenates from the people and its purpose is to help the people. The people have at all times the inalienable right to alter or modify the form of government" (EZLN 1994a). The problem has been that "democracy has occurred in a world in which the dynamics of capitalism bring uneven development" (Walker 1988, 133). And indeed, as I will show in this chapter the link between neo-liberal economics and democratisation is fraught with tension and ambiguity concerning current democratisation of Mexico. Subcommandante Marcos announced three weeks after the mobilisation in 1994 that (Conger 1994, 4):

> 'We do not intend to be the one, sole, and true historic vanguard,' said an EZLN communique published January 25. This sharply unorthodox approach reflects a keen reading of the political climate by the Zapatistas, who can maximise their impact by seizing the precise moment for striking in the election year and have now chosen to join the growing clamor for honest elections and democratisation, analyists say.

As such, in the First Declaration, the EZLN asked "that other powers of the nation advocate and restore legality and stability of the Nation by overthrowing the dictators" (EZLN 1994a). Emphasis was placed on the EZLN to use the existing legal and Constitutional frameworks in order to forge what Walker (1988) termed more generally a "politics of accountability." The Second Declaration stipulated that the "ascendency of the political power that has been in power for so long cannot be allowed to continue" (EZLN 1994b). The EZLN showed their concern with the undemocratic government, its neo-liberal programme and the levels of corruption and violence engrained in the Mexican political system (Oppenheimer 1997). This climate has bred apathy, disillusionment and a sense of increasing *powerlessness*.

In the Second Declaration (EZLN 1994b) concern turned to the relationship between democracy, jobs, housing, land, health and education, the structure of a direction for a transitional government and changes to the Constitution and Congress. The EZLN's Second Declaration (EZLN 1994b) was written in the context of the PRI ceasefire. However, Ross (1999) noted that this climate of reconciliation and the PRI's apparent acceptance of EZLN demands for better housing, food, shelter, rights and justice only a few months before the 1994 Presidential Elections was broken in December 1994 with the onset of the military campaign following the meetings at San Andres (NCDM 13 February 1998). But the Second Declaration had given an indication of the way the EZLN were going to treat the issue of democratisation that suggested neither a Marxist revolution nor a postmodern refusal of Enlightened values. The Second Declaration stated:

> this party...a party that has kept the fruits of every Mexican labourer for
> itself...cannot be allowed to continue. Understand the corruption of the
> Presidential elections that sustain the party that impedes our freedom and
> should not be allowed to continue. We understand the callous fraud in the

method with which this party imposes and impedes democracy (EZLN 1994b).

The EZLN insisted that democratic change must be taken carefully because:

> the problem of power in Mexico isn't due just to a lacking of resources. Our fundamental understanding and position is that whatever efforts are made, will only postpone the problem if these efforts are not made within the context of new local, regional and national political relationships marked by democracy, freedom and justice. The problem of power is not a question of the rules, but of who exercises power (EZLN 1994b).

In explicitly rejecting protracted revolution they also stated:

> We are not proposing a New World, but an antechamber looking into a new Mexico. In this sense, the revolution will not end in a new class, faction of a class or group in power. It will end in a form of democratic spaces for political struggle. These free and democratic spaces will be born on the federal cadaver of the state/party system and the traditions of fixed Presidential succession (EZLN 1994b).

This was not a democratic revolution based on class struggle nor based on any privileged interests or group. The EZLN's democratisation would not get tied down to revolutionary politics or party politics but opened a forum for equivocal debate. Consequently a "new political relationship will be born, a relationship not based in the confrontation of political organisations amongst themselves, but in the confrontation of their political proposals" (EZLN 1994b, 2). This meant that:

> political leadership will depend on the support of the social classes, and not on

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the mere exercise of power. In this new political relationship, different political proposals (socialism, capitalism, social democrats, liberalism, Christian Democrats etc) will have to convince a majority of the nation whether the proposal is best for the country.

The recognition of the diversity of political opinion was an important aspect of the debate and the EZLN. It gave each particular 'ideology' a credence on the condition that each ideology must democratically convince the peoples of Mexico. Consequently, the

groups in power will be watched by the people in such a way that they will be obligated to give a regular account of themselves and the people will be able to decide whether they remain in power or not. This plebiscite is a regulated form of consultation among the nation's political participants (EZLN 1994b).

These democratic demands formed the basis of the EZLN's democratic project. A few monthis earlier on February 5 1994, below the imposing arches of the monument to the Mexican revolution in Mexico City, Cardenas, leader of the PRD[45] had already announced the creation of the National Democratic Alliance (ADN). This was to be in the run up to the 1994 Presidential elections a pluralistic coalition that included party's ranging the political spectrum and scores of local civic and labour organisations, and the Citizens Movement for Democracy. This was a National Coalition of 150 urban community associations, peasant leagues, and ecology and human rights groups. In its Charter for Democratic Change, the ADN set as its goal an end to the 'corporatist and authoritarian system' and the election of a pluralistic Congress that would draft a new Constitution and promote an equitable social policy.

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[45]PRD Presidential candidate for 2000, he also won the race for mayor of Mexico City, in 1997.

In Guadaloupe Tepeyae, 5000 representatives of various interested peasant and Indian movements from all over Mexico met in Aguisclentes at the National Democratic Convention set up by the EZLN (Nash 1997) between August 6 and 9 1994. On August 21 1994 President Zedillo won the Presidential election.

Through the use of consultations the aim was to generate a new form of direct participatory democracy on a national scale beyond the party political machine. A wholehearted rethinking about Mexican politics was going to be required. This was to be discussed at the 1994 National Democratic Convention where the EZLN in the Second Declaration invited participants from ejidos, schools, collectivities and factories to attend, to show an interest, and not to 'sell out' to the smokescreen of party politics (EZLN 1994b).

By June 1994 plans were set up by the EZLN for a National Democratic Convention (CND) which was to be held in Chiapas prior to the 1994 Presidential Elections (Stephens 1996). From the CND would "come a transitional government and a new national law, a new Constitution that will guarantee the legal fulfillment of the peoples will." But despite the CND, the 1994 presidential elections were again treated with scepticism by most Mexicans now used to the cycle of electoral unaccountability, the lack of representation and post-electoral violence (Johnson 1994).

But the political will was there somewhere, shown by the fact that some 6000 delegates had made it to the CND indicated a tremour of support for a movement listening to civil society (Robinson 1994). Nash (1997) noted that during 1995 a number of negotiations with the government then took place after the 1994 Democratic Convention. It was a recognition that this was not just a concern for Chiapas. There were connections being made.

During the following year, the EZLN maintained their thrust for 'real' democracy and a belief that multiparty politics was a 'sell out'. Marcos (1995a) claimed that neo-liberalism was a plague "like ebola, cholera, AIDS" but that "it is more lethal and

more destructive, without any hint of a cure because it is the fast train of brutality."

On March 7 1995 the first dialogue with the government took place with the EZLN demanding autonomy of villages, redistribution of resources, to recognise the plural character of democracy in the communities.

iii) Radical Democracy.

There were two main facets to the democratic program of the EZLN. Firstly, a willingness to try *to legally* make the existing institutions accountable and transparent. Secondly, to forge a new participatory direct democracy from the grassroots and through new channels of decision making so that people felt 'empowered' that they could in effect 'have a say' and 'make a difference' fairly.

The significance of Indian culture on EZLN views on radical democracy, and the way the cultures are organised were noted. Nash (1997) showed how the act of placing the hand on the pulse of the arm makes a symbolic reference to the heart and to the blood of the Indian community. There was a radical EZLN commitment to the psychological state of 'Verguenza', the impertinent asking of questions and the impertinent and impolite seeking of answers. To ask a question previously this desire would have demonstrated a lack of good manners. No more. The EZLN maintained that it was better to ask and hear all the questions necessary rather than carry the verguenza of the inept government.

The model of the radical democratisation of Mexico demanded by the EZLN was based on the way democracy was organised in the communities, built upon consultation and direct democracy. Marcos stated that there was a change during the previous ten years in Chiapas but stated:

I can't say when-its not something that's planned- the moment arrived in which the EZLN had to consult the communities in order to make a decision...(A) moment arrives in which you can't do anything without the

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approval of the people (quoted in Devereux *et al* 1994).

During the 1980s:

> a flow of men and women left the communities to enter the
> mountains..(W)hen we reflect on this now, it isn't a question of us and them-
> now *we* are the entire community. It was necessary to organise, to establish the
> collective authority along side the absurdity of a vertical authoritarian
> structure..You could say that the EZLN is different because in most political
> military organisations there is only one commander, and in the EZLN the
> Clandestine Communities are composed of 80 people, 100 people, 120 people
> or however many. But this is not the difference. The difference is that even the
> Clandestine Committee cannot make certain decisions, the most important
> decisions. They are limited to such a degree that the Clandestine Committee
> cannot decide which path the organisation is going to follow until every
> campesino is consulted...(W)e have asked everyone and this is the result.

As such, an activated citizenry of men, women and children (over the age of 12)
are allowed to participate in the consultation process. For instance, the 1994
mobilisation and Peace Accord of March 1994 were based on the following process
(CCRI-GC 1994c). The Clandestine Revolutionary Committee General Command
(CCRI-GC) of the EZLN finished consultations with the communities in which there
were members of the EZLN. There was study, analysis and discussion of the peace
Accords which took place in democratic assemblies. The voting was direct, free and
democratic. Of the Zapatista population who took part in the consultations, 100%
were indigenous, 42.13% were adult women, and 8.32% were children over 12 years
old. After studying, analysing and discussing the peace accords those in attendance
could vote on whether to sign the peace accords or not sign them. The CCRI-GC

(1994d) reported those in favour of signing governments peace accords, 2.11%, those

against 97.88%. Only 3.26% were in favour of renewing hostilities. Those in favour

of a new national dialogue to be attended by independent political forces in the

country numbered 96.74%.

Indeed this inherent democratic organisation has enraged traditional Marxists and

the PRI who have consistently wanted quick and decisive answers to their proposals

(Flood 1996). A Mexican Non Governmental Organisation (NGO) reported that the

"communities of an indigenous zone or area, are the ones who decide, at an assembly

of all their members, whether or not they will belong to the autonomous municipality,

in the autonomous zone set up by the EZLN in 1994, and now surrounded by the

Mexican military" (Flood 1999c, 4). Moreover:

> It is the communities who elect their representatives for the Autonomous
>
> Municipal Council which is the authority for the municipality. Each
>
> representative is chosen from one area of administration from within the
>
> autonomous municipality, and they may be removed if they do not comply
>
> with the communities mandates...(T)hose who hold a position on the
>
> municipal council do not receive a salary for it, although their expenses should
>
> be paid by the same communities who request their presence, through
>
> cooperation amongst their members (Flood 1999c, 4).

Within each Zapatista community this council meets once a week. Overarching

this local community is the Autonomous Municipal Council. This is autonomous in

the sense that it is surgically removed from any PRI affiliated political organisations

and the local government structure. The assembly in each community is integral to

each Zapatista community and is based on the equal participation of both women and

men. Each assembly within the Zapatista indigenous communities selects its own

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officers and they also select delegates to participate in one of the six Clandestine Revolutionary Committees. Marcos says that this is a deliberate process of consciously immersing oneself and "(S)urrendering (to the communities)" which Marcos says "is what we did in 1990" (Blixen and Fazio 1995). The EZLN, Marcos argued was going to be useful as long as the communities thought it was useful to have the EZLN. Marcos stated that the Indian organisation:

> is another culture, another way of practicing politics. They are not politically illiterate. They have another way of conducting politics. And what those in power want to do now is to teach them political literacy, that is to say, corrupt them within the current political system (quoted in Blixen and Fazio 1995, 5).

Each CCRI has 16 to 40 members depending on the local regional population. Delegates from these groups are constantly chosen to sit and represent their communities on the CCRI-GC. Consultations are held regularly within the local communities and village assemblies (Flood 1998). To the extent that discussion on military action can take place and discussion on whether to buy a tractor or not for the community can also be debated (Flood 1999c).

In the Zapatista zone of Chiapas the rebels hold 32 municipalities within which each one there are up to 50 of these Zapatista communities. There were small communities of 100 families. Routine assemblies happen after mass on Sunday's. The councils inter community coordination is aided by councils known as autonomous muncipalities. 100 communities make up the autonomous municipality named after the Mexican anarchist Ricardo Flores Magon and communities elect representatives for the Autonomous Municipal Council (Petrich and Henriquez 1994).

In this sense, radical democracy was strategically tailored to the specific, concrete and the local. The CCRI pointed out that:

we decided that there is no way other than to organise and rise up like this in armed struggle. So we began to organise ourselves like that, secretly, in a revolutionary organisation. But as it advanced each people has elected its representatives, its leaders. By making this decision in that way, the people themselves have proposed who will lead these organisations. The people themselves have named us (quoted in Petrich and Henriquez 1994).

In this interview two members of the CCRI maintained that the EZLN are

revolutionary because we want change. We don't want to continue in this situation of so many kinds of injustice...we have to reflect deeply...(W)e have to consult the people about everything...(W)e just don't want a handout, to rise up quickly and to negotiate quickly...(W)e know that so many suffer and that there are so many kinds of injustice that we know they have laid in us as indigenous peoples, campesino peoples, working peoples...(W)e have had no other way left.

The question posed is whether this model of direct consultation can work at the national level? (Beillinghausen 1999). The EZLN recognised that changes have occurred in Mexico despite their sense of 'betrayal' during the 1994 Presidential campaign. The EZLN recognised the new significance of the PRD but are sceptical as to the party political left, the 'iron law of oligarchy' and the party political machine. This was not as Walker (1988) argued, simply a demand for more periodic elections and more ballot slips.

Indeed, Marcos (1994) maintained that the EZLN had *always* aspired to a common effort for radical democratic change in Mexico and to uncover the electoral mockery elevated by the events and scandals at recent Mexican elections (Oppenheimer 1997).

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But this was not to be achieved by Marxist or socialist revolution. This democratic space was open to all. Democracy, Marcos explained, should not simply be *accepted* as a corporate machine (Bellinghausen 1999). He stated that.

> There are many kinds of democracy. Thats what I tell them (the Indians). I try to explain to them. You can do that (to solve by consensus) because you have a communal life. When they arrive at an assembly they know each other, they come to solve a common problem. But in other places it isn't so. I tell them. People live separate lives and they use the assembly for other things (quoted in Blixen and Fazio 1995, 3).

I suggest that this rethinking of direct democracy is the kind of *empowering* concrete democracy that is advocated by the EZLN on a national scale and links to what Walker (1988, 140) argued is the point in that democracy:

> does not have a single defining characteristic. It is not to be equated with particular forms of government- with parliaments, representative institutions, party hierachies or national wills. Again the practice of movements are informed by a readiness to pursue different strategies of deepening democracy depending on circumstance.

iv) Political Climate(s) and the 1997 Elections.

Carlos Fuentes (1994b) argued that the 1994 economic crisis in Mexico, was tied to the deficiency in democracy and the fact that Salinas had acted outside the checks and balances of the Congress by using his presidential prerogative. This understanding of democracy becomes problematic for the EZLN. For *real* democracy can not be accommodated by, and even be regarded as functional to the kinds of

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exclusions and pressures generated by neo-liberal globalisation.

However, Fuentes (1994b) argued that there are five 'commandments' for Mexican democracy. Firstly, electoral reform, the consecration of alternation in power, an independent electoral organism and clear rules to party access to funding (Zedillo has pushed this). Fuentes stated that Mexico cannot go on bleeding itself through post-electoral conflict. Fuentes wanted a better political system. Secondly, Fuentes wanted four more articles of democracy implemented, a working federalism, a true division of powers, electoral statute for Mexico City and rule of law through reform of corrupt judiciary. Thirdly, Fuentes wanted a reform of the media and its 'comedy of errors'. Fourthly, Fuentes wanted a respect for human rights and NGOs, and finally, and provocatively for the EZLN, a market economy but with a social dimension and balance between the public and private sectors. Is this enough for the EZLN? I suggest, no, not necessarily. Surely the EZLN wanted more than simple reform of the *existing* political system?.

The kind of changes envisaged by Fuentes (1994b) were beginning to come to fruition in the 1997 mid-term elections which seemed to have galvanised much optimism in Mexico and has rather concerned the EZLN at the same time. What concerned the EZLN was that the euphoria surounding the 1997 mid-term elections and concomitant academic and political commentary gave the impression that real democratisation was occurring in Mexico leading to the inevitable response, what is their actual problem?

One response, the obvious response would be that Chiapas was undergoing an ongoing militarisation campaign. The second response was that this was not real democracy, merely a mirage and a relief from the years of corruption and coercion throughout Mexico. The election of Salinas and the defeat of the PRD's candidate Cardenas in 1988 was for many a perfect example of this. It was felt the PRD candidate Cardenas had actually won the national election. But the PRI could not, and

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never did confirm this because the electoral computers somewhat mysteriously and propitiously crashed on the night of the election.

As I showed in chapter two, Mexico's political system has been based on centralism and corporatism with a definitive symbiosis of party and state (Laurell 1992). Given this heritage any hint of relative change or inevitably creaky opening of the democratic door hinge was taken with glistening euphoria both in the present day, and for its implications for the future. Anything is better than outright coercion and corruption. But the EZLN wanted this opening to be just a beginning, not the end.

However, worldwide optimism spread with President Zedillo's emphasis on his democratisation and his apparent willingness to hide his disappointment at a crop of PRI defeats in both local and national mid-term elections. [46] The EZLN regarded this as abstract political bluster, the glistening smile hiding the reality in Mexico. The 1997 elections in Mexico were held to elect 500 seats in Congress, 32 senators and governorships around the country seemed to suggest that in contrast to a strong authoritarianism, Mexican democracy was finally occurring. This opening was apparently tied to the free market doctrine.

Lawson (1997) noted that in the Chamber of Deputies the PRI monumentally lost its majority control, the first time in its history. The figures showed that the PRI had gained 29% of the vote, with 239 seats, the PAN 27%, gaining 121 seats, the PRD took 26% of the votes with 125 seats, Green Party 4% gaining 8 seats, and finally, the Mexican Labour Party (PT) with 3% of the national vote, having 7 seats in Congress.

A year before, President Zedillo had allowed for the first time in the PRI's history, Mexican citizens to form part of the board that oversees the elections process, the Federal Electoral Tribunal (IFE). Previously the board had consisted of renowned magistrates appointed by the legislature on the recommendation of the President (Laurell 1992). President Zedillo remained committed to changing the system of party

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[46]Although this may be down to the fact that the PRI remained the country's strongest political party and retained its hold over the Senate.   257

funding. The state was also financing opponents, a tradition allegedly of cooption. But $315 million had been set aside with the PRI allowance of $109 million, the PRD $48 million and the PAN $65 million (Falcoff 1997). The EZLN were nervous with effectiveness of PRD as a leftist party apparently committed to the free market (Falcoff 1996b). Lawson (1997) argued that the electoral shift in 1997 was more structural and represented profound dissatisfaction with neo-liberalism and the PRI's economic record, particularly its handling of the economic crisis. Blum (1997) placed much emphasis for this defeat of the PRI mostly on the internal factions within the PRI (Anderson 1998a).

As such, was the democratic space these writers identified in 1997 either a profound shift or merely a lack of a PRI willingness and with a disciplinary economic model, an ability to provide patronage and resources. This perspective puts the emphasis truly in the court of the PRI and multiparty democratisation was construed merely as a governmental device to ensure cooption and stability in Mexico and for foreign investment.

Allegations of PRI pressure and coercion remain. On May 4, 1997 the UN Committee Against Torture criticised a report from the PRI on human rights in Mexico and Mexican democracy has been inordinately plagued by accusations of intimidation and corruption. For instance, in the most recent state elections in Chiapas (October 1998), the power of the PRI was still notoriously evident. The PRI won 77 of the 103 municipal jurisdictions and 17 of the 24 seats in the Chiapas State Congress that were up for election (NCDM 6 October 1998). Apathy and intimidation still reigned.

Many questions are now asked. Is it merely party political language used as a marketing device to attract the undecided voter? Or could it be interpreted as at least a recognition by the PRI that it now needs to take a more competitive edge in a party

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political system of pluralism? Could multi party democracy be heralded as a new stage of political transition when there were 40.000 federal troops in Chiapas? (Lawson 1997). Was multiparty democracy and Zedillo's optimism the final practice of 'cooption' by an ailing authoritarian state that was desperate to cling to power? Was the PRI in a recurrent process of transition that maintained a dominating rule by another round of reconstructing its hegemony and its legitimacy? By July 2000, the PRI lost its dominant position after 71 years to Vicente Fox and the National Coalition Party (which still includes PRI representatives) . However I would like to suggest that Fox's national coalition and the undoubted commitment to neo-liberalism, NAFTA and an accelerating technocratic bureaucracy seriously questions the underlying changes that are meant to be occurring in Mexico despite this historic change in elite power. Mexico has endured years of stability through elite cooption. For instance, in 1968 during the mass demonstrations and violence the PRI had set up a number of party deputies to allow for access to party politics through a more representative Congress. In 1977, the PRI tried to incorporate the left, a left which was in fact already split between the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM) and the Mexican Socialist Party (PMS) by pushing more resources into certain regions.

In Chiapas now, it is being alleged that economic funds have been put aside for injection into areas of PRD support (Harvey 1998). Or was a real space for democracy now being opened up here? Corruption has also played a part in this. Why, the EZLN asked have these practices been tolerated? Surely these practices were not accepted for being a part of Mexico's fatalistic 'culture'? But it was a 'waking up' of a soporific civil society provoked by the EZLN's carefully orchestrated and timed insurgency in front of the global cameras that suggested a far more resounding crisis for the PRI (Avendano 1998; Conger 1994; Froehling 1997; Routledge 1998; Stephen 1996).But if we contrast 1988 Presidential elections and 1997 mid term elections, then palpable democratic change is evident. During the 1988 Presidential elections

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won by Salinas there were constant accusations of vote-rigging, intimidation and kidnappings by the PRI. Salinas' brother was arrested for his alleged part in the murder of another favoured PRI Presidential candidate at the time (Oppenheimer 1997).

By contrast Klesner (1998) noted that the PRI had lost its crucial control of Mexico City's local government in the local elections of 1997 and opposition parties now controlled City halls in 11 of Mexico's main municipalities. And in 1997, the PRD Presidential candidate Cardenas became the mayor of Mexico City. During 1997 the PRI had lost its majority in the Chamber of Deputies and forging a new era of political pacts. The transfer to democratic electoral politics was not however a transfer akin to situations other authoritarian and military ruled states (Vilas 1989).

So, despite continuing executive and PRI dominance there has certainly been a crumbling of dictatorship, a hint of change most evidently witnessed in the 2000 elections. But the main question was how to interpret the change. Moreover, pressures were coming from elsewhere as well. Firstly, international pressure that no longer tolerated electoral intimidation and vote rigging particularly with the threat of economic sanctions. Secondly, the rise of NGOs and other actors within Mexican civil society with online (WWW) information. Klesner (1998) placed particular emphasis on the Mexican earthquake of 1985 which showed the potent alacrity of effectively organising social movements at both grassroots and institutional levels due to the alleged ineptitude and non-intervention of the authorities at this time. The National Democratic Front (FDN) was set up in 1988.

Indeed Klesner (1998) identified new and distinctive pressures on this familiar pattern. There were in his opinion, three distinctive approaches to current economic and political liberalisation. There were anti-systemic elite groups headed by political parties such as the PRD. There were systemic progressives or the neo-liberal technocrats, and

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finally there were the systemic conservatives such as the PRI dinosaurs (Anderson 1998a). But it was still said that the Mexican political system is not simply bedevilled by corruption. Corruption *is* the political system (Morris 1999). This was shown through the practice of 'mordida' or, the traditional process of dues or bribes. Sardonic insults continued unabated from a still disillusioned Mexican public and it was still said that a poor politician was a politician who is poor. Blatant apathy was still engrained in many sectors. In this sense, the EZLN were reacting against a very 'Mexican' problem. Given that the EZLN linked the democratic problems to the neo-liberal agenda this was not just a Mexican problem and connections were being made with groups around the globe as the National consulta showed.

The National Civic Alliance occurred in August and September 1995. This was "a broad opposition front" a Plebiscite for Peace and Democracy with the "necessity to construct those spaces where the different aspirations for democratic change could find expression, even among the different countries" (EZLN 1996a, 4).

Consequently, various pressure groups have emerged in Mexican civil society to assist the nurturing of democratic transition in the political system. Their role is applauded. But there are problems. Groups such as the Anti-Corruption League and the Public Accounts Commission aim to correct the system and to make the political system more accountable. Indeed, members of these groups now feel that political accountability may be served up if the public begin sponsoring their own politicians on the basis of maintaining political integrity and by keeping away from the temptation of bribery and corruption.

The EZLN recognised that this was important and it may be the start of further democratisation. The problem now is that tinkering with the existing political system or making it better means the structural democratic deficiencies remain and are aided by this as radical challenges to the political system become regarded as unrealistic and marginal. Certainly, the PRD have now begun to keep a distance

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from the EZLN.

Consequently, Marcos (1999l) claimed that the EZLN "did not rise up in arms to support a political party nor to make electoral change." The EZLN want a radicalisation of the relationship between the governors and the governed and Marcos (1999l) claimed that the rebellion would probably finish in 5 years.

Certainly what has most alarmed those who are sceptical as to the rhetoric over multiparty politics is the continuing emphasis on neo-liberal economic development by the PRI and its main political opponents within the political system. President Zedillo (1995) emphasised the PRI's continuing concern with economic development. He noted that the following targets for 1996 were 20.5% inflation, a GDP of at least 3%, investment growth 4%, foreign investment $5 billion based on a tight fiscal policy that would foster export promotion, decentralise fiscal resources, rationalise public expenditures, use public resources to increase and promote infrastructure investment, strengthen social development programs and to reduce public debt. As such, economic liberalisation would foster political liberalisation. President Zedillo (1996) admitted to Mexicans that "we were facing a grave economic problem that would inevitably affect the living standards of the population in keeping with my commitment to always speak the truth." He also proposed initiatives that would secure Mexico's future growth. He said that it was necessary to "maintain fiscal and monetary discipline and a floating exchange rate." President Zedillo admitted that not everyone shared his confidence that Mexico would get through the financial crisis (Zedillo 1996, 1996a). But President Zedillo (1996a) was optimistic on the political front. The Federal Electoral Authority was independent and members were proposed by an independent Supreme Court with the backing of 3/4 of the Senate. The President would no longer have the power to choose the Mayor of Mexico City. Zedillo said that he had reduced fraud and corruption and he recognised that the greatest single threat to party political democracy was party funding.

The government condemned groups such as PROCUP for its violence and

unstabilising the democratic process (Mexican Government Official Document 1996).

However the 1996 Alliance for Growth and the Alliance for Economic Recovery

sparked new concerns for the EZLN with the agenda of the party political left. The

goals of the Alliance were an economic growth of 4% in real terms, inflation down

and stable at 15%, an increase in the minimum wage above inflation, continuing

monetary and fiscal discipline, a public sector budget deficit of only 0.5% of GDP

and a current account deficit in the balance of payments of less than 2% of GDP

(Mexican Embassy UK 1996). This would be brought about by tax incentives, public

spending, poverty reduction, rural programs (Alliance for Rural Areas), housing

development, employment and training. This emphasis on disciplined and prudent

economic development is clear and the PRD were involved in this alliance.

Moreover, the PRI maintained a commitment to attacking the drugs trade

(Mexican Government Official Document 1995). The drugs trade is still seen as a

national security threat and international cooperation is seen as vital for the nurturing

of economic and political development.

v) EZLN and Democratic Revolution: Beyond Party Politics

Despite the reluctance to get excited about democratisation as it stands, the EZLN

recognise that a tentative space has been opened up. The EZLN does not want a

destruction of these institutions. Their argument is that the institutions can be made to

work effectively, but differently, and pressure for further democracy must come from

consultations at the grassroots. Nevertheless, Subcommandante Marcos, far from

applauding the move to multiparty democracy rejected the intensification of

multiparty politics, a partisan politics and the market place of political parties. He

takes his cue again from the Indian communities and says:

Try to place yourself on the side of the ski mask. On this side there are people

who have lived twelve years in the Indigenous communities. Who have lived

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with them. He is an Indian, as they say 'Marcos is an Indian like us'. And he

thinks like them. For them, what do the political parties do? A political party

arrives to divide a community. The parties look for the people to back them

up, and those who don't follow another party. The strongest ones wins.

Political parties divide the communities and fracture everything...(P)olitical

parties prevent the community from agreeing, because a political party is out

to win individuals, then it is necessary to build a political force which will not

divide. Which will not confront (quoted in Bellinghausen 1999, 8).

The EZLN do not engage in power politics. Quite ironically the initial mobilisation

of the EZLN provoked a multiparty consensus on January 27 1994, called 'Pact for

Peace Democracy and Justice' with concern centered upon the corruption within the

electoral system saying that "honest elections acceptable to civil society and political

parties are "a necessary condition" for establishing a just and durable peace. A system

would be set up to give full reliability to electoral registration and clean elections.

Attention was given to the 1988 Presidential elections where it was alleged that the

voting registers had been filled up with the names of dead people (Conger 1994). It

was alleged that the ballot boxes had been 'stuffed full' of PRI marked ballot slips

before the election booths opened. This reform was going in the wrong direction.

For the EZLN, multiparty democracy was not enough. Consequently, the PRI

argued, as they had done during San Andres in 1996, that the EZLN simply wanted

outrageous demands for a transitional government and a destruction of the state. The

EZLN, replied no, they wanted a *different* form of democracy that could not be

understood in conventional political terms. The Fifth Declaration of the Lacandon

Jungle (EZLN 1998a) stipulated:

Time and again, since the beginning of our uprising on January 1 1994, we

have called on all the peoples of Mexico to struggle together, and by all means possible, for the rights which the powerful deny us. Time and again since we saw and spoke with all of you, we have insisted on dialogue and meeting as the path for us to walk. For more than four years, the war has never come from our side. Since then the war has always come from the mouth and the steps of the supreme governments. From there have come the lies, the deaths, the miseries...(A)long the path which you asked us to walk, we held talks with the powerful and we reached agreements which would mean the beginning of peace in our lands, justice for the indigenous of Mexico and hope for all honest men and women in the country...(S)ilence, dignity and resistance were our strengths and our best weapons. With them we fight and defeat an enemy which is powerful but whose cause lacks rights and justice.

The EZLN have aimed to break through the cultivated cynicism. Indeed, cynicism was regarded as a carefully nurtured product of the political system. The EZLN link the democratic question to the question of neo-liberalism. And it is *this* I suggest, which crucially gives the EZLN a radical space and solidarity with groups around the world. Marcos (1997) stated that to say neo-liberalism equals death is:

(V)ery dramatic maybe. But there are children who live in the sewers of a militarised city, an electoral process which could be advertised in a newspaper section of 'seasonal bargains', there are street cleaners who strip their bodies and stomachs naked, there is an irate President who reads and is a follower of of Mandino, there is a region of Mexico where questions are answered in the prisons or in the grave, there is a skull which questions a political system, and there is a small rebel army which refuses to surrender.

To say that there is even limited democratisation is a view challengeable with the

overt militarisation of the Chiapas region. Marcos noted (1996c):

> we have been visited by bomber planes, armed helicopters, war tanks, spy
> satellites, military advisors and agents, some secret and some not so secret,
> from the spying organisations of several countries. All these visitors have a
> common objective, assassination and robbery...(A)n armed multinational force
> persecutes us and tries to destroy our example. The powerful of the world are
> bothered by our existence and honour us with their threat. They are right. The
> Zapatistas defiance is a world defiance. We never pretended it to be so, we
> never imagined it. But given that role, we will be as uncomfortable as
> possible. [47]

The EZLN aimed "to open up a space so that the citizenry can manifest its opinion"
(NCDM 2 September 1998).

vi)   The Emiliano Zapata Front of National Liberation (FZLN).

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[47] Marcos told a story on the power of the push from the grassroots. Again, this links
to the Mayan world view. It went:
The moon was born right here in the jungle. They say that a long time ago the Gods
had overslept, tired of playing and doing so much. The world was somewhat silent.
Quiet it was. But a soft cry was heard up their in the mountain. Seems like the Gods
had forgotten a lake and left it in the middle of a mountain. When they divided up the
things of the earth, the little lake was left over, and since they did not know where
else to put it, they just left it there in the midst of so many hills that no one could find
themselves there. So the little lake was crying because it was alone. And its cries were
such that the heart of the mother cedar, who is the sustainer of the world, was sadend
by the cries of the little lake. Gathering its large white petticoat the Cedar came near
the little lake What is wrong with you now, the Cedar asked the water, which was
becoming a puddle because of its incessant crying, I don't want to be alone, said the
little lake...January emerged and 1986 dawned.Times to still be hidden, to be occult
from those we would become a part of later. I looked toward the West, and ambushed
behind the pipes smoke, I tried to dream of a different morning (Marcos 1996b). 266

The critical social movements think very carefully about what a political institution is and are wary of premature institutionalisation. As such, critical social movements recognised the dangers of political parties and the party political machine. One of the outstanding characteristics of the EZLN is its desire for consultation from outside the party political process and its debate over the nature of a political institution. This kind of debate was evident in the formation of the FZLN.

The Fourth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle (1996a) indicated the EZLN's willingness, if civil society wanted them to, to form the Emiliano Zapata Front of National Liberation (FZLN). This was not the political wing of the EZLN. The FZLN (EZLN 1996a) would not aspire "to hold elective positions or government office" but aim to create a "space for citizen political action."

On 2 September 1997 (CCRI-GC 1997), the Zapatista Army of National Liberation mobilising against the militarisation of the indigenous regions and in demand of the fulfillment of the San Andres Accords, marched on Mexico City and inaugurated the FZLN. On September 12 the EZLN held a political event in Xochimilco, with demonstrations in front of the palaces of the powerful. On September 13, the actual founding conference of the FZLN occurred after a wait of 20 months. Here, the FZLN was to be "a new type of political organisation...(I)nspired by Zapatista banners of not struggling for power, but rather for a new relationship between those who govern and those who are governed" (CCRI-CG 1997). The FZLN was inaugurated in Mexico City on September 17, 1997.

The march had started at San Cristobel where 15.000 ski masked members of the EZLN came to see off the 1,111 participants of the Zapatista delegation on September 8, 1997 (EZLN 1997). Defence Minister Enrique Cervantes welcomed the Zapatistas and hoped everything would go off without incident (Day and Esther 1997).

During the ceremony, 12 EZLN commanders, Zebedeo, Emiliano, Carlos, Pdedro, Lorenzo, German, Rosalia, Florentina, Yolanda, Rosa marie, Hermelinda and Patricia had handed over the representation of the Zapatista communities and leadership

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which was symbolised by the Mexican flag and the flag of the EZLN to Issac. The gesture, emphasised that it was the turn of civil society to organise. The EZLN had opened up a space for dialogue amongst different peoples', experiences and political views. The Mexican flag it was stated, was "our flag, and it is loved and respected by all the men, women and children and elderly, the bases of support...it is the symbol which represents all of us." Again, the key theme was a Mexico of tolerance, difference and inclusivity. With regard to the EZLN flag, a symbol of national pride and liberation it was stated:

> (T)his is our banner of struggle and rebellion. The flag with a black
>
> background, a red five pointed star and the letters EZLN. The flag of black
>
> and red which are the symbols of the pain and rebel dignity against a bad
>
> government...(I)n it are the blood and death of our people. But also in it is the
>
> struggle, and the hope for justice, liberty and democacy which all Mexicans
>
> deserve (CCRI-GC 1997).

The EZLN marchers, exhausted and slightly bewildered by the rapturous reception were 'welcomed' in Mexico City by the presence of 20,000 police officers, specialised police, helicopter surveillance, and all fearing that the 1994 revolutionary declaration of war (EZLN 1994a) had come into fruition.

One of the EZLN political commission who were involved in the founding Congress of the FZLN Hugo said "Only united...can we advance toward the construction among us all of a great Mexico in which the riches are distributed for the benefit of all Mexicans, and not only for a handful of millionaires" (CCRI-GC 1997). The marchers took the same route that Emiliano Zapata had taken on November 24 1914, from Milpa Altos, and through Tlahuac. An 18 year old Zapatista called Claribel, reported that the EZLN were not alone and they had finally arrived in Mexico City after nearly four years. It was a long journey. A Communique was then

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read out on the formation of the FZLN (EZLN 1997). It stated:

> This rebel organisation which is the FZLN must go forward, must continue to
> grow...(Y)ou must be born now and walk without us inside your body. Your
> country called Mexico needs you now and you should fulfill the call which
> history makes to you...(I)t is time once more for the powerful to tremble for
> the Zapatista Front of National Liberation is born.

On September 14 1997 working groups had aided the National Organisation
Commission of the FZLN including Javier Ellorriaga, to set the agenda and to
organise. It was based on Principles, Program of Struggle for a new type of political
force for a new, just constitution, a horizontal, direct democracy, a defence of the
environment, the rights of workers and campesino's as well as the creation of strategic
alliances with other social and political organisations called for a just and dignified
peace and to show that the FZLN was not the enemy of political parties.

The new Zapatista front was created for those who could not find a place for
themselves and their views in existing political organisations and parties. It did not
believe in struggling to take state power and it did not bar EZLN 'militants'. Here is a
rethinking of the meaning and the site of a political institution shown by the debates
over its structure and organisation. Was it to be a traditional hierachal pyramid, a
bottom up organisation, a circular multilateral organisation or maintained through a
coordinated web. Discussions were aided by the National Indigenous Congress (CNI).
It was stated that the Mexican people "have stated clearly that they do not want a
war" (Rodriguez 1998, 1). They wanted to form new centers of resistance and local
consultations/projects. But aware of the connections and of interpreting connections
this forum would also have a national basis. A peaceful civilian

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resistance was required to build a truly democratic government. But militarisation was still evident in Chiapas and the EZLN are still armed for 'defensive purposes' [48] Day and Esther (1997) reported that.

> Support for the EZLN was evident in Mexico City on 17 September 1997 at the inauguration of the FZLN where People cried, blew kisses, chanted 'No estan solos!', you are not alone, and thrust their fists or the v for victory symbol in the air. The Zapatistas, obviously weary and slightly overwhelmed by the size of the crowd and the city itself (some looked up warily at the buildings towering above them) returned the peoples' show of love by waving and chanting back.Once they arrived at the stage, the Zapatistas called on the government to comply with the San Andres accords and to remove troops from Zapatista communities in Chiapas. The ferocity of the Zapatistas demands in the zocalo contrasted starkly with their purpose in the city, to participate in the founding of a peaceful and civil grassroots organisation.

The front was and is an organising mechanism, public, pluralistic and prohibited from becoming a political party. There was a constant suspicion of political institutions and of becoming a political institution. There was also suspicion of the PRD for situating itself within the party-political machine and ineluctably working with the wrong principles and ideas. Consequently, the FZLN was seen as a forum for working through and rethinking the site and meaning of political institutions and the theme of democracy. According to the CCRI-GC (1997a) the FZLN was a new type of political organisation which would not struggle to take power but to grow all over the national territory in answer to a national consultation on democracy and justice that was held on August 1995. The EZLN were reacting to a serious lack of

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[48]BBC News Online (1998a) reported that "the army temporalily surrounded the headquarters of the rebel Zapatista movement. One witness said the Zapatista leader, sub-Commandante Marcos had narrowly escaped capture when troops drew close to the rebels stronghold at La Realidad."   270

political oxygen evident in contemporary Mexican party politics (Marcos 1997). According to the NCDM (20 March 1999), the EZLN represented those who have been left out of the "corporatist project" of the PRI monolith (Fox 1994, Laurell 1992).

The NCDM (9 December 1998) reported that the new political space was created for those who "don't have to ask permission to be free." However, the EZLN later confirmed their concern and uneasiness with the nature of the reactionary right-wing PAN and the political space that the EZLN had opened which had seemed to let such movements enter (Libra 1995). It was reported (Economist August 13, 1994) that Zedillo's honesty on the nature of the democratic process was remarkable. Zedillo was concerned with those who were confusing this democratic evolution with a political crisis (Economist October 2, 1995). Even so, Zedillo sent the federal troops after Marcos in February 1995. Marcos, later that year looking gaunt, threatened to cause havoc in the October 15th local elections.

Subcommandante Marcos recognised the critical need to be able to define another form of politics. This was not a democratic politics defined by an "account of the state" (De Huerta and Higgins 1999, 271). This democratic project (NCDM 13 March 1999) was a practice of radical and direct democracy enabling the development of a new relationship between the government and the governed that was generated from the grassroots as stipulated at San Andres.

But for the government the EZLN remained decidedly 'military' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1997). However the EZLN stressed that the bearing of arms was essentially a defensive strategy. And clearly, no one can make any judgement given the military presence in the Chiapas region by the Federal troops.

vii) PRD and EZLN.

For the party political left optimism was high with the increasingly potent role of the PRD coupled with various economic and political splits occuring within the PRI

(Stevenson 1998, 1998a). But the relationship between the EZLN and political

left was, and is fraught and raises some important issues of political strategy. The

PRD is a center-left party with a broad support base amomngst workers, peasants ,

and the petit bourgeoisie. The PRD led by a charismatic Cardenas formally split from

the PRI in 1988 because it was concerned with the program of neo-liberalism and its

devestating social effects. Kidnappings and violence between the PRI and PRD were

evident during the 1994 Presidential elections.

However the EZLN have been highly critical of the PRD as the PRD is certainly

not questioning the reality of neo-liberalism. [49] Kincard (1998) noted that the voting

patterns in Chiapas in 1998 suggested a democratic wind of change as the whole

process was more calmer than the burning of ballot boxes during the mid-term

elections of 1997. In 1998 the PRI only got 48% of the State vote but it took 18 of 21

Congress seats and the presidency of 78 of 101 municipalities. In fact, 60% of the

population eligible to vote abstained from voting at all. 24 of 40 electoral districts

were based on direct voting whilst the remainder were based on proportional

representation.

The PRD obtained 70% of votes and federal and local deputies with mainly

working class support (Paulson 1997). The death of Fidel Velazquez, the union leader

had caused chaos for the PRI at the time, and official unions were not being forced to

support the PRI. Velazquez had been the aged 'charro' and his death was for many,

symbolic of a greater political storm. The right-wing National Action Party (PAN)

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[49]It is unlikely that neo-liberalism and NAFTA was going to be seriously questioned
by political parties. It was said that "Mexico and the United States are inextricable
linked.We share the common challenge to turn this inexorable geographical condition
into a renewed source of opportunities, into a guarantee for regional peace so that it
becomes a key factor for prosperity and understanding our two countries...(W)e share
a long common border, with more than 300 million crossings per year. More than
two/thirds of our commercial and investment exchanges are carried out with the
United States. Since the enactment of NAFTA our bilateral commerce has increased
by 25% reaching over one hundred billion dollars" (Gurria 1995). But it was NAFTA
and neo-liberalism which the EZLN discredited as undemocratic.

gained 28% of the vote, but only gained support from the big bourgeosie and to gain any credible ground in the political game needed a broader base of support. The real threat to the PRI came from the PRD.

Consequently, the PRD's relationship with the warring factions in the Chiapas conflict was significant. It was the PRD that gained post-1997 and in Mexico City, the workers celebrated. But clearly, the PRD was still embroiled in traditional electoral politics.[50] And the roots of the crisis in Chiapas and the way the PRD were, and are distancing themselves focusing more on the conventional 'big politics' of Mexico City frustrated the EZLN (Falcoff 1999). Marcos (1999e) wrote:

> It is Mexico and the year 1999 is going frantically by. May is the new tyrant
>
> on the calender...(I)n the fifth declaration the Zapatistas called for a
>
> mobilisation in order to demand this recognition of the rights of the very first
>
> inhabitants of these lands and to demand a complete halt to the governments
>
> war of extermination.

Clearly, the EZLN recognised that issues of democracy and the isues at San Andres were interconnected to neo-liberalism. The problem was that the PRD regarded the development of Mexico as being inexorably tied to neo-liberalism. Cardenas begun distancing himself from the conflict in Chiapas (Falcoff 1999). Marcos stated (Bellinghausen 1999, 5):

> in the political arena, we have two great realities; One is the real reality where
>
> the people are greatly disenchanted with politicians. But the opposition forces
>
> have also had election victories. They are creating expectations in the people,

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[50]"Some of the air that is beginning to exist in Larealidad reaches the strange chamber of the obscure shadow and disturbs the watchful watch that magnifies the shadow" (Marcos 1999e).   273

sometimes justified, that things can change. That's good. But the economic

problems are continuously overwhelming everything.

Marcos stated here of the party political system that:

> the real problems are left aside, the loss of sovereignty, the privatisation of the
>
> electrical sector, the social and political deteroriation. No what is important is
>
> that Fernando de Cevallos fought with Fox, or whether or not Zedillo told the
>
> PRI he was going to be involved in the succession, in the most absurd speech I
>
> have ever heard. The Zapatistas aren't leaving to do election
>
> propaganda...(N)or are they going to be promoting a military solution. We are
>
> not going to fall in with any candidacy (Bellinghausen 1999, 5).

Booth and Seligson (1993) argued that for real democracy to occur in Mexico

there had to be a strong civic culture and a tolerance for political opponents. This

does not yet happen in multiparty Mexico despite the euphoria of 1997.[51] However

over the last few months a distinct change of heart (and strategy) has been invoked by

the EZLN which suggested that Marcos now recognised the importance of the party

political changes, particularly the role of the PRD. The NCDM (17 November 1998a)

reported that:

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[51] Moreover, the democratisation of the media also plays a part in this. Government
revenue was the main source of income for public owned newspapers (Palacio 1994).
This has changed with an increase in capital from the free market. In 1994 many
papers were taken aback by the revolt "what happened?." According to Palacio
(1994) the EZLN guerrillas failed to their achieve goal of a national uprising but they
did shock Mexicans in to asking the questions, who they were and what they wanted.

Subcommandante Marcos states his conviction that there is still space in

Mexico for dialogue and for the construction of new alternatives...he clarifies

that this process will not come from the government nor with the government

which has already made the decision to maintain the economic model without

regard to the political cost and neither are they interested in resolving the

transition to democracy.

But the neo-liberal initiative has continued to undemocratically concentrate

economic power and undermine rather than sustain whatever democratic institutions

may exist. This is where the tense relationship between the EZLN and the PRD is

most clearly expressed. The EZLN (NCDM 2 September 1998) claimed that

democracy would only occur if:

national politics are no longer dictated exclusively by the Executive. This is

democracy, government of the people, by the people and for the people..The

proposal of the Party of the Democratic Revolution to carry out citizen

consultation about Fobaproa, is a serious effort to open a space so that the

citizenry can manifest its opinion about the issue...the struggle for democracy

in Mexico is not only a struggle for fair, free and just elections, multiparty

participation or a change in power.

The PRD wanted free and fair elections, more transparency and more

accountability (Fox 1994). The problem was that according to Ochoa (1996):

in internal government, the right wing has maintained a strong hold on

government. The PRI and their more right wing partners the National Action

Party (PAN) have been the dominant parties with no serious

opposition...politics in Mexico seems stable compared to its Latin American neighbours. Regular elections with civilian candidates were held but this was not the fair process it appeared.

Moreover, the EZLN recognised that the politics of the PRD was technically orientated within this self same political system. Indeed, any democratic demand that did not take into account the restrictions laid upon the democratic process by neo-liberal economic development was flawed and was always going to be a restricted democracy. But more ironically Anderson (1998,1) noted:

> it seems that a small angry band within the PRI may have succeeded in doing what the so called Zapatista rebels have tried to do in the past but never accomplished.They so throughly disrupted the elections that the state legislature may not be able to convene legally. In dispute is whether the 40 member state legislature has a legal quorum of 21. When a group of PRI members prohibited voting in a large town in the Chiapas highlands according to opposition politicians and independent election monitors it nullified that district's vote, leaving the state congress with only 20 members and not enough to convene legally they proclaimed.

But it was also clear that "apathy prevailed" (NCDM 6 October 1998). According to the NCDM (7 November 1998) leaders of the EZLN announced that they would come down from the mountains on November 20 1998 to meet with legislators seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict in Chiapas. These would be direct and unmediated talks between Zapatista rebels and the COCOPA. Indeed the NCDM (10 September 1998) reported that the PRI was still optimistic with its democratisation:

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Mr Zedillo who has two years to go on a six year term celebrated his historic contribution to multiparty democracy. He has conducted a conservative economic policy that has helped his country start recovering from the depths of recession...he will conduct a presidential transition without falling into personal corruption and without loss of democratic momentum.

The point Subcommandante Marcos made was that the EZLN wished to go beyond electoral and institutional party politics. The EZLN in reacting to the continuing of executive dominance over the Mexican Congress and its continuing monopoly of power reported (NCDM 2 September 1998) that truly:

> the democratisation of the country has been set aside...there is no widespread democracy...we must salute the struggle for the autonomy and independence of some Parliamentarians in the legislative branch. The country needs a congress which is truly independent as well as representative of the interests of all Mexicans. The struggle for the independence of the powers should continue to its ultimate consequences. In a healthy republican regime the Executive obeys the legislative. The Presidentialism suffered by our political system should disappear completely...democracy by the people and for the people. The proposal from the PRD to carry out a citizen consultation about fobraproa is a serious effort to open a space so that the citizenry can manifest its opinion about the issue...an inclusive and democratic politics.

As such, the EZLN maintained that the struggle for democracy was not only a struggle for fair, free and just elections. It was a struggle to find new political ways of inclusivity and equivocal dialogue and to tentatively create new democratic spaces for consultation and to nurture direct and concrete civic participation in economic and political initiatives which give voice and a place to the people. As such, the PRD was

creating spaces that may expand and inflate. In a Communique (NCDM 16 January, 1998), the EZLN in responding in a strong reaction to the National Commission for Intermediations view concerning the dialogues between the government and the EZLN on this issue of democracy, violence and the armed struggle, argued that:

> we have become aware of the document called a Strategy for Peace wtih Democracy which you addressed to the branches of government, the EZLN, to civil society and to the peoples of the world...you demand that we continue to act within the parameters of the law of March 11, 1995 sustaining our will for dialogue and negotiation...our civil initiatives have not been few or small...examples of these peaceful initiatives include the dialogue of the Cathedral and the National Democratic Convention in 1994, the dialogue of San Andres and the National and International consultation for peace in 1995, the call to organise the FZLN, the celebration of the national Indigenous Forum...(T)he government response to our apparent will has been lack of fulfillment.

The NCDM (5 February 1998) reported that the Zapatista rebellion was rooted in a true cry for justice and authentic democracy. Reflecting on the National Consulta, Moguel (1999) argued that:

> The Zapatista consultation will be a breath of fresh air in the national political arena that has become stagnant...because it represents and will represent without a doubt an unheard of method of social mobilisation and action capable of revitalising the space of civil and political participation...although it is no way opposed to electoral opportunity.

viii) A Change of EZLN Heart?

A democratic revolution will be based on reflection and care and a "readines to pursue different strategies of deepening democracy depending on circumstance" (Walker 1988, 140). This kind of strategical nuance comes across in the relationship between the EZLN and the PRD. Walker (1988) noted that:

> all existing political systems come with claims to democracy attached. Yet, there is a deep scepticism in many different situations, not only about whether particular regimes or states live up to such claims, but also whether prevailing understandings of what democracy is, or can be go far enough.

Negotiations continued between the EZLN and the existing political parties on the left. Indeed, Marcos admitted that he had perhaps miscalculated the dissent within the existing political system and that this could be capitalised on. Subcommandante Marcos admitted that perhaps the EZLN had made:

> hasty judgements of some political forces...among which he mentions the PRD and some sectors of PAN and even the PRI which would seem to be sensitive, not just to the indigenous cause but also to the struggle for democracy...in political statements one tends to be very reductionist to not make allowances to not make distinctions not recognise degrees and it is very easy to seize an example and say they are all like that...a whole new space for dialogue was opened, a dialogue that was also very intense with ups and downs with what we call civil society, and with various political actors constantly broader in terms of their ideological spectrum, regarding the

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national question and constantly more varied in culture, race, colors

and flavours in the international aspect (NCDM 17 November 1998).

Marcos also admitted that

> history has accelerated, I don't know if it's been since 1994 and progress has
> been so dizzying, the positions of the political forces have been changing but
> not in the sense of opportunism but rather in adapting to the new
> circumstances and we were not aware that the crisis was also affecting the
> political forces and actors...we judged many times unjustly, precipitously
> positions, statements, behaviours of the political forces...the most obvious was
> regarding the Mexican left, the Revolutionary Democratic Party.

The EZLN are creative and exploratory enough to recognise and admit mistakes in
this process. A recognition of the complexities and the political situation and
adjustment of strategy thereof is important for a critical social movement. It is the
essence of their creativity. In taking the broader picture Marcos stated that:

> there are more advantages than disadvantages in the fact that we don't enter
> into the basic code of political relations: it allows us a certain difference more
> depth in analysis, a more critical position although it also leads into
> errors...the possibility of presenting new political proposals, the basic ones
> being the indigenous problem and the transition to democracy, through
> another process, that process did not exist prior to 1994. If it had existed there
> would not have been an uprising. It is a space which had to be opened (NCDM
> 17 November 1998).

Here, Marcos was arguing that the initial insurgency was short lived in 1994

deliberately, as the whole basis of the mobilisation was well timed, coordinated to wake up Mexico and the world. Consequently, there was a tentative sign of success, a dialogue has erupted and has affected many people. International and global awareness of the Zapatista struggle was enormous. On 15 January, 1998, the NCDM printed a letter from the CONAI to the International Observation Commission For Peace and Human Rights. It stated:

> we extend our hopeful welcome to the initiative of various groups and civil
> and religious individuals from different countries who have decided for form
> an International Commission to help us with observation and follow up in
> respect of human rights and in the process of building peace with justice and
> dignity...mechanisms and tasks that will help us all move toward the common
> objective of human rights and peace.

Finding connections and linking issues such as human rights to the broader issue of democracy and justice was seen as crucial. The EZLN, shifting gear, particularly in its relationship with the PRD suggested that new and perhaps even unintended consequences may emerge from this alliance. But the EZLN are now also fearful that having called for democracy, political groups and parties such as the PRD may then take a back seat and wait to let events somehow take on a life of their own. Marcos in an answer to the question 'what is the Zapatistas national project?' replied:

> we can summarise our project in the same manner in which we end all our
> communiques...that is a nation with democracy, freedom and justice. By
> democracy though, we do not simply mean elections...we fight for a
> democracy that will create a new relationship between those who govern and
> those who are governed, what we have called 'command obeying'. Until now
> and in the best of cases representative democracy or electoral democracy has

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referred simply to the citizen participating in an electoral process, choosing a candidate on the basis of programmes or policies...in the new relationship that we are proposing representative democracy would be more balanced (De Huerta and Higgins 1999, 271).

Walker (1988) argued that democratisation was all about rethinking political institutions and enriching a direct and participatory democracy in creative ways. This was not simply reform to the existing system (Cleaver 1997). Instead, it is a democratic project that now goes beyond regarding Mexicans as voters in the electoral market place and focuses more upon consultations and direct voting. Rodriguez (1999) reported that the Mexican Consulta would be a democratic and "a mass mobilisation designed to encourage Mexicans around the world to organise a popular vote, a plebiscite, a direct vote in which an entire peoples' is involved to express an opinion." The EZLN listened, suggesting another democratisation was necessary, possible, but it was not definite.

ix) EZLN: The Internet and Empowering Radical Democracy.

The democratic revolution now takes on another dimension with the exploration into the possibilities of global technologies such as the World Wide Web (WWW), the internet. Without embarking on a course of technological fetishism or technological determinism, three advantages are identified. Firstly, the internet provides ongoing and up to date information on democratic struggles. Secondly, the internet forms new networking communities and facilitates an efficient method of communication and consultation, which can then, through political agents, be used for whatever cause is deemed fit. Finally, the internet may provide a space for direct democracy and the widespread lobbying of national governments by movements from

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the grassroots. The democratic nature of the new global technologies plays a part in the strategies and objectives of the EZLN in their attempt to re-construct radical democracy in Mexico in two main ways.

Firstly, it enables individuals and groups to lobby the Mexican government, and gives access to government information and speeches. Secondly, it enables the EZLN to communicate with its sympathisers, locally, nationally and globally. The use of the internet is a strategic issue for the simultaneous mobilisation of interested participants in the National Consulta. Lipschutz (1992) argued that the character of global civil society involves discussion on issues of development, human rights and democracy, its site and its nature.

More generally new critical projects were concerned with how regular citizens could use the internet to change politics and the site and understanding of democratic politics. The development of global electronic communications has not surprisingly, initiated debates on the possibility of generating a new democratic space of decentralisation of existing political institutions. According to Hurrell (1995, 144), the development of these new technologies were:

> facilitating the flow of values, knowledge, and ideas and in allowing like minded groups to organise across national boundaries...they democratise information flow, break down hierachies of power and make communication from the top and the bottom just as easy as from horizon to horizon.

However, there is a scepticism with the radical democratic potential here. Firstly, there is the question of who has access to this technology, and an argument that those utilising such information technology are those who are in fact already using communication techniques anyway and those who are generally enjoying fairly affluent incomes. Secondly, whilst information is now available through the internet, what can people actually do with this information given the continuing dominance of

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the existing economic and political institutions of authority and at the end of the day, the state? The internet facilitates discussion to be sure. But it is still restricted in the sense of forming concrete face to face solidarity and community which is vital for any political struggle. However, the implications for a spatial rethinking of the site of democracy and the democratic struggle are still significant.

However, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the PRI to manage/govern this new democratic space. Cleaver (1997) suggested that this meant that the EZLN bypassed traditional governance and the bureaucratic 'iron law of oligarchy'. Cleaver (1997) suggested that the 'net' had overcome isolation and division, engendering new connections for the EZLN, between their locality, and the global, and/or with other interested parties. Cleaver (1996, 1996a) argued that the internet should not be understood as technological fetishism. It was still a human creation and not the elimination of physical space and the human senses. But the net allowed the experience of alternatives and new democratic ways of being and connecting.

Indeed, Cleaver (1996) argued that even the capitalist organisations and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recognised the need for a more flexible counter organisation and were carrying out multiple and particular missions against these kinds of democratic threats to governance. There were also he noted:

> new forms of self-activity which escape and undermine capitalist authority and control, on the shopfloor, in the community, in the village, across borders and many other previously sharp divisions among workers. Integral to these new organisational forms are new patterns of communication including new kinds of horizontal rhyzomatic linkages (Cleaver 1996).

Cleaver (1997) noted that the EZLN and the net have "carved out new spaces, cyber

space pioneers" and chopped down electronic boundaries and liberated information creating a pirate underground of free activity constantly slipping beyond corporate and state control." The Advanced Research Projects Agency (APPANET) was set up in 1969 to aid the military communication and the construction of projects over a long distance. Cleaver wrote that "when the Mexican state sought to block the flow of information about the Chiapas uprising it was outflanked every bit as effectively as a Soviet strike might have been."

For instance, on the day of mobilisation the EZLN brought a printed declaration of war. News of the declaration went out through a student's telephone call to CNN. But only the Declaration of War made it to the global audience and this was censored and based on the media's ideological biases. Many found this situation quite intolerable and USEnet, and PEACEnet, e-mail, uploading and reproducing were instigated. Cleaver (1997) noted that the result for "business, the state and the ruling class generally is a crisis of governability where virtually every historical mechanism of domination is being challenged. Capital's response is more surveillance and monitoring."

Indeed, the coining of the phrase a politics of cyberspace is lifted from the Greek word 'kybernan', or to steer or govern (Arquilla and Ronfeld 1993). Responses from the government have been the intensification of legal rights and intellectual property rights over the internet and an operational security barbed wire in the Chiapas region with increased militarisation. In 1995, Jose Guru, Mexican secretary of state had admitted that the PRI would have to recognise that the EZLN activated a war of ink, of the written word, and the war of the internet (Froehling 1997).

But what is clear, is that the use of new technologies indicate the possibility of democratic empowerment. Again, it is the issue of exploration.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to consider the question of democracy and

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the democratic reformulation of Mexico by the EZLN. The EZLN has provoked radical interest in re-thinking democracy and the site of democratic struggle. The EZLN has rethought and radicalised the existing democratic institutions as a critical social movement theme. But the EZLN has aimed to go beyond the current reform of multiparty democracy, to problematise these institutions and break through apathy and disillusionment with the existing political process. Through consultations and direct participatory democracy, the EZLN have effectively aimed to radicalise democratic participation and in the next chapter, I will consider in more detail, the strategies and tactics of the EZLN which have been used to effectively achieve this objective(s).

The Emiliano Zapata Army of National Liberation (EZLN) as a Critical Social Movement: Rethinking Strategies and Tactics.

Introduction.

My purpose in this chapter is to show that the strategies and tactics of the EZLN since mobilisation in 1994 elude the conceptual schematics of Marxism and postmodernism. Without blindly constructing just another set of conceptual schematics I do suggest that as a critical social movement the EZLN engaged in critically reflective strategies inducing a debate on the relationship between political radicalism, political power and the politics of resistance.

Firstly, I discuss the role of Subcommandante Marcos as a specific intellectual. Secondly, I discuss the EZLN's mass mobilisation of the 1999 National Consulta. I show how the EZLN rethink the meaning of power and the radical and refuted premature classification of its political direction by consulting views from across the political spectrum. The National Consulta was forged on the basis that neo-liberalism affected peoples in different ways and at their concrete/specific locations. The consulta gave a forum for people to recognise connections. Thirdly, I explore how the EZLN rethink the site and meaning of political power and global struggle. I show how the EZLN problematised the hierachical classification of the local/global relationship apparent in debates on postmodernism. Indeed, Walker (1988) noted that to take the movements seriously was "to celebrate an apparent contradiction" (Walker 1988, 145). This is a world of global structures and yet critical movements act on local, specific terrains. But it was the theme of 'connection' which gives these movements creative vitality as the movements problematise the understanding of

the local and the global through their actions.

Through its use of the World Wide Web (WWW), I show how the EZLN was engaged in a global struggle but rejected a unified.coordinated global struggle within the conceptual parameters of the old social movements and more recently interest in resistance to globalisation (Amoore *et al* 1997; Cox 1999). They may 'fail' and they may even 'succeed' but their strength lies in this exploration and ambiguity. This is the essence of the critical social movement in their day to day engagements.

i) *Marcos. Specific Intellectual.*

Burbach (1994) pointed out the significance of the 'sub' commandante, a deliberately ironic play on words. However, this was a distinctive rethinking as to the role of the critical intellectual. Within CIRT as I discussed in chapter one, there has been a distinctive debate on the role of the critical intellectual. Marxist approaches tended to regard the intellectual as a universal intellectual. This intellectual role was rejected by Michel Foucault. Foucault's distinctive examination of the specific intellectual engaging in concrete historical study and reworking of the Enlightenment not only heralded a useful corollary for CIRT intellectuals but it was a role taken up by activists such as Subcommandante Marcos. The key to understanding Marcos' political strategies was to recognise the elusiveness and unwillingness to be trapped in both premature conceptual and political classifications even down to his own personal biography.

Marcos had already indicated a deep concern with demonstrative ideological struggle by the early 1980s with much antipathy levelled towards what was regarded as a perfidious leftism and "the cultural contamination of Marxism" (Harvey 1998, 167). Indeed, it was stated:that:

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It has been 15 years since the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) was founded...in those 15 years the EZLN has gone through various stages...the most important is when the nucleus established and it began to work with the indigenous population, its growth exploded and it decided to break out (NCDM 17 November 1998)..

The arrival of Marcos in 1983 with more than a dozen others does suggest that these activists were recruited from other small cell groups that had already broken away from Maoist/Marxist groups such as the Grupo Torreon (Peleaz 1996). These break away groups had proceeded South with very different values and ideals. Radical Campesino Movements formed a key feature of this solidarity during the 1980's and they stayed clear of party politics (Backgrounder, Democratic 1997). Bishop Ruiz has also been accused of operating as a quintessential Communist agitator. But his first pastoral address in 1960 was entitled "Christiantiy Yes, Communism No" (Iliff 1999). The Indian cultures Ruiz had argued, were not just languages but encapsulated different worlds and conceptions of life. Communism was alien, an abstract imposition. But the emancipatory values were not rejected, just reworked.

Like Michel Foucault, Marcos has been placed in a wide berth of political mappings much to his enjoyment. Marcos has been accused of working with the Sandinistas (Serrill 1995). Marcos has been accused of being an authoritarian, a foreigner, to the PRI (Serrill 1994a). Alternatively, Marcos has been accused by the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) for 'selling out' to capitalism. To this end he has taken a risible view on the subject of vanguardism and the old left with a politics steeped in sardonic intention as he cut through intellectual arrogance. Indeed, through the use of poetry, Marcos has eluded the ruthlessly instrumental and rational calculations of strategy and tactics evident in traditional vanguardism.

As I mentioned in chapter one, the role of the 'leader' or caudillo was traditionally,

an aspect of revolutionary struggle *a la* Castro, Daniel Ortega of the Sandinistas, and Guzman of Shining Path. Did Subcommandante Marcos, the spokesman of the EZLN, the man who read out the Declaration of War represent this tradition? In San Cristobel the masked Marcos left the square giving the Mexican flag the leftist organisation, the National Front Against Repression (ENCR). He did not take off his mask. Marcos (1994a) in an interview, argued that the mask was deliberate and a staunch recognition of the futility of the vanguard 'caudillo'. He quipped that:.

those of us who are more handsome always have to protect ourselves...(W)hat is happening is that in this case, the officers are those who are masked for two reasons. One the primary one, is that we have to watch out for protagonism in other words that people do not promote themselves too much. The mask is so that there is no protagonism, if you understand me, that we sometimes have a lot of those of us who get into the business of appearing a lot. So now, since it is not well known who is who, probably in a little while another will come out or it could be the same one. It is about being anonymous not because we fear for ourselves but rather that they cannot corrupt us...the one who speaks is a more collective heart, not a caudillo. This is what I want you to understand, not a caudillo in the old style, in that image (Marcos 1994a, 2).

.   But Marcos was also serious. In a sharply worded communique shortly after the 1994 insurgency Marcos:

warned the army it would have to kill every Zapatista to eradicate the guerrilla command. Subcommandante fired a shot at Mexican insensitivity to the indigenous 'question' by saying 'will all of this serve so that at least the 'Mexicans' learnt to say Chiapas instead of Chapas (Conger 1994, 3).

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Mexico has had a rich tradition of masked men leading popular causes. Recently, the so-called figure of superbarrio, a masked maverick who dresses like the popular 'Lucha Libre' wrestlers was born it is said, out of the ashes of the 1985 Mexico City Earthquake, defending the urban homeless in their fight for housing aid and he defends the side of inner city renters who are battling the threat of evictions. Superbarrio's protests were manifested in the form of graffiti sprayed on the walls of the Zocalo of Mexico City. This note of humour was important. It undercut what is regarded as the pious nature of vanguardism, the array of 'blood' and 'personal sacrifice'. It seems to be that this injection of humour, caricatured the vanguard elites and this kind of unwanted intellectual pretension, on the streets and in the Universities.

On his way down South and into the rainforests of Chiapas Marcos had already begun shedding all intentional ideological dogmas and the macho romantic myths so beloved of Latin American revolutionaries "and in their place he appeared to be seeking something very different" (Carrigan 1998, 14). They saw themselves as teachers and leaders in the classic mould of organic intellectuals whose role it was to raise consciousness. But they soon realised with much humility as it transpired that they would have to become the students and that they would have to learn the ways of the indigenous cultures and of the peoples they met in Chiapas. Marcos was under no obligation to change the world. But he did offer a critical space, a political possibility and he left it up to others in civil society to make the decisions (Bellingahausen 1999). Marcos fraternises with humour. When asked what was the weakest point of the EZLN organised National Democratic Convention in August 1994, Marcos replied sardonically "well the roof, obviously" (Shalif 1998).

Marcos represented many worlds, the excluded and repressed of the world, the Palestinian in Israel, the feminist in a political party, the pacifist in Bosnia, the ombudsman in a government department, the woman on a deserted and grimy metro

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station in one of world's many metropolis' at 10pm, the peasant with no land, the

unemployed worker, the underground editor, and the non-conformist student (EZLN

1994m). [52]He talked of the Indian's story and the Indians in dramatic overtones

(Marcos1999f):

> The story I am going to tell you comes from very far away. And I am not
>
> speaking of distance, nor of time, but of depth. Because the stories that birthed
>
> us do not walk through time nor space, no, they are just there, being, and in
>
> being, life is above them and makes the skin more double, because such is life
>
> and such is the world, the skin with which history wraps itself up warmly in
>
> order to be. And just like that, histories gather together, one above the other,
>
> and the very oldest are quite deep, very far away. That is why, when I say that
>
> the history I am going to recount to you comes from very far away, I am not
>
> speaking of many kilometers, or of years, or of centuries.

The cultivation of an 'archeological' approach indicates an acute awareness of the

problematic of delineating 'whose history' as historical reductionism is rejected in

favour of a more complex historical account. There is no doubt that the writings and

communiques of Subcommandante Marcos have come to symbolise the EZLN and

the image of the pipe smoking intellectual doning the almost eponymous ski-mask has

become, perhaps ironically, one of the most foremost and persuasive global images of

the EZLN. The Partido Revolucion Institucional (PRI) have throughout the conflict,

tried to discredit Marcos, his middle class and non-Indian background. According to

Carrigan (1998, 11):

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[52]Interestingly, this 'living with the people' was also a facet of revolutionaries such as
Chairman Mao, who insisted that revolutionaries had to "live with the masses like
fish in water" (Eco 1989, 124). But for Marcos, this was not to teach and raise
consciousness, but to 'lead by obeying'.

military intelligence declared Marcos to be one Rafael Sebastian Guillen, the son of a middle class Mexican family who had been an honors student in Philosophy at the National Autonomous University in Mexico City in the late 1970s. A Marxist of the French School (his thesis was on the influential French philosopher Althusser) he taught graphic design and communication before moving into clandestiny in 1983, at the age of 27. In 1994 however, nothing was known about Marcos save that, while he was not Indian, he had been living in the rainforest since the early 1980s sharing the Indians' hardships, learning their culture, training young Indian fighters and helping to organise their rebellion.

As such, Marcos' usage of the prefix 'sub' commandante was deliberate and aims to show his disdain for vanguard leadership and organic intellectualism. Marcos aimed to be creative, poetic, reflexive, subtle and importantly, full of humility. The use of prose and poetry was used as subversion to elude familiar mappings of political resistance and the nature of the reformist and revolutionary which were based on 'rational' criteria. Marcos deliberately used this somewhat at times elusive and irascible playfulness to show how he systematically refuted the pretensions and self-righteousness of revolutionary theory and practice.

Indeed, his writings have been credited by established Mexican writers such as Carlos Fuentes and Octavio Paz. Marcos' politics was progressive and emancipatory in the sense that Marcos reflected and rethought the nature of resistance through a variety of consultations and at the bequest of the communities. In line with Foucaults assessment of the intellectual, Marcos' critical enquiry was not forging something 'out of this world' (Marcos 1994a). This was not a use of theory to guide practice.. Instead, Marcos was provoking a critique of limits, the possibility of alternatives without grand visions. This has been evident throughout the build up to the 1999 National Consulta

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(Bellinghausen 1999).

Indeed,. Marcos could have been anyone today, yes Marcos but tomorrow, it could be Pedro or even an Alfonso (Harvey 1998). With a deliberately elusive biography and what appeared to be a permanent reinvention of the self, the individual who has come to be known as Marcos took the name because it is an acronym of the major Chiapas towns caught up in the initial EZLN insurgency in 1994 (Routledge 1998).

With a striking familiarity and intellectual resemblance to the criticism and conceptual pigeonholing of the politics of Michel Foucault, Marcos has been simultaneously criticised from the traditional left and right, for both being a Marxist, and for not being a Marxist, for having a coherent revolutionary program and for not having a coherent revolutionary program. Marcos relished the elusiveness (Devereux *et al* 1994; Holloway 1997, Holloway and Peleaz 1998). Many make easy and cheap swipes, to produce plays that castigate his politics and private life (Long 1999)[53] (Marcos 1995; Marcos' 1999, 1999a). He rejected vanguard struggle and yet Marcos accepted that the EZLN were traditional guerreros. What are we to make of this ambiguity? Is this incoherence a confused ideology or fundamentally deliberate? Parfitt (1996, 128) noted that:

> Marcos, like many Mexicans, combines a sense of the absurd with fateful views. He's invented fanciful pasts for himself. He told one journalist that he'd worked as a waiter in San Francisco, and that he was gay. Tonight he was grim. He spoke about a dramatic shift in goals, changing the Zapatistas from an army into a national political movement. Then his speech took familiar flight, embracing the extravagant expectations of Chiapas and Mexico, death, darkness, glory, and redemption.

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[53]One major topic of conversation at Mexico City dinner parties in 1998 was the whereabouts of Marcos. More exotic theories were delivered from a city taxi driver who said that Marcos had gone to the World Cup in France whilst women "swooned over his sultry eyes" (Paterson 1998).

This kind of poetic symbolism permeats throughout [54] and allegory, metaphor, imagery and poetry play a major part in Marcos' repertoire.

What is interesting is that his privileged position and his non-Indian or mestizio background did not seem to have impacted a major concern amongst the Chiapas Indians and peasants despite the constant revelations by the PRI and the Mexican media (Long 1999; Parfitt 1996). The Indians, often refusing to speak Spanish required such a learned figure through which to communicate with the government for purely practical purposes. [55] The PRI and other critics have developed an account of Marcos as an urban outsider. Marcos replied that this particular image was having severe and detrimental implications for his relationship with what he termed 'his female fans'. Marcos has developed "an ample rainbow of thoughts" according to the NCDM (14 September 1998) and rejected the *machismo* of caudillo leadership.[56]

According to many observers on the night of the EZLN uprising in San Cristobel there were chants from the crowd for Marcos to take off his ski mask (Ovetz 1994a).

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[54] Marcos (1999g), poetic on the development of a neo-liberalism wrote "the moon is a bitten apple. The burning furnace of May in the mountains has torn the clothing from the mother of pearl; it has painted it in red and a black wind from the west gnaws at it, insistently and lewdly recounts." A ferocious Chiapas rainstorm at the 1994 Democratic Conference in August 1994 was regarded as symbolic of the inevitable political storm and winds ahead (Robinson 1994).

[55]Marcos (1995a) has used the character of 'Durito' or the little beetle, his learned friend, who sits on a bewildered Marcos' shoulders and who tries to make sense of the chaos of the crisis, telling the naive Marcos about the situation. His prose is a poetic metaphor for the struggles in Chiapas. Marcos tells of the story of the lion and the mirror by the raconteur, Old Man Antonio (NCDM 18 July 1998). It is the story of tricking, resisting and defeating the lion (neo-liberalism and the PRI). Only the lion, Old Antonio says, can defeat the lion. Old Man Antonio tells a narrative of how the lion was tricked into carrying out its own death as it was wounded by the jagged and cracked fragments of a mirror from which it had been admiring itself. The symbolic importance of the 'bleeding' and 'wounding' plays a major part in Marcos' work (Marcos 1992).

[56]Mexican soldiers played out a stage show for the Indians, mocking and mimicking Marcos on his lack of machismo, playing with the word 'marcos' which is very near to the slang 'maricos' used to denounce homosexuals (Long 1999 *footnote* 5). The imagery of Zapata ghost awakening, staged in a play put on by federal soldiers.Shakespeares' tragedy *Hamlet* (Marcos 1998a).   295

He was apparently willing but the crowd as a whole wanted Marcos to remain

anonymous. At the same time according to Wehlings (1995) the hood did not allow

Marcos to become the new 'superstar' or corrupted by star status and power.

According to Simons (1994) the pipe-smoking Marcos enjoyed a mythical

construction from the EZLN base in the Lacandon Jungle by baiting and confusing

US journalists over his exotic past. Marcos (1995h) claimed that all Zapatistas had a

price on their head. Supporters of President Salinas claimed that the EZLN were

delirious, an army of crazy people. Marcos (1998b) claimed that the cultivation of

apathy was another form of making war as Zedillo was treated by the EZLN as a

traitor to the homeland (CCRI-GC 1995e; Long 1999). Zapata had not died. They

finished the letter with a provocative 'fraternally yours'.

The CCRI-GC (1995d) reported that the aim of the EZLN is for a great Mexico.

But the specific intellectual engagement of Marcos was not promising the earth, just

opening up a space. Marcos in no way wanted to be the new Emiliano Zapata. The

role of Marcos as a specific intellectual was recognised during the build up to the

national consulta.

ii) *Rethinking National Liberation.*

I argue that the call for a national consulta or national dialogue on the state of

Mexico was a unique form of mass mobilisation which provided a forum for peoples

in their specific location of grievance to explore and make connections with peoples'

of many worlds. The National Consulta was a non-violent mass mobilisation,

encouraging all sectors of Mexican society to dialogue. The Third Declaration of the

Lacandon Jungle (EZLN 1995a) maintained that the EZLN had now gone through an

armed insurgent stage and a democratic/legal stage. Consequently, the consulta was

based on the Mexican constitution, calling for a legal politics of accountability.

The call to a National Consulta on this basis, was for many, evidence of defeat. Cynicism abounded. The Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) criticised the EZLN for not following through the revolution and for 'selling out' to capitalism and the PRI. But as a critical social movement the EZLN was trying something different. Indeed, Marcos (1996) refuted movements such as the EPR for jumping on the EZLN bandwagon by using the space opened up by the EZLN to activate terrorist violence across Mexico (Marcos 1994). The EZLN cry was 'leave us alone'. If the EZLN failed in their new methods at least they said, it would be their failure. Marcos (1996e) later wrote to the EPR:

> I only want to say that we do not need your support.We do not need it, we do not seek it, we do not want it. We have our resources, modest, true, but they are ours. Until now we are happy not to owe any political organisation, national or international anything. The support which we seek and indeed, is that of national and international civil society, their peaceful and civic mobilisation is what we await...not to achieve power but to exercise it.

Then turning the tune on revolutionary thinking he said:

> I know you will say this is utopian and unorthodox, but this is the way of the Zapatistas. Too bad. Go on with your path, and let us follow ours. Do not save or rescue us. No matter our fate, we want it to be ours. Do not worry about us. We will not attack you (Marcos 1996e).

There was no castigation of the EPR.(Marcos 1996e). The EZLN recognised all sides of the political spectrum. This was their profundity. Indeed, as Marcos said:

what upsets the Pentagon most is that when you punch Zapatista into the

computer, nothing comes out that says, Moscow, or Havana, or Libya, Tripoli,

Bosnia or any other group. And the left, accustomed to the same way of

thinking says, well they don't fit in anywhere...(I)t doesn't occur to them that

there might be something new, that you have to retheorise (quoted in

Devereux *et al* 1994).

Marcos from early in 1994 made it clear that negotiation was paramount.
Absolutely fundamental, all sides of the spectrum were acknowledged, that maybe,
they might have something to say. The EZLN:

don't believe that the result of this revolution that we are proposing will be a

new world, a new country, it will only be a first step...(I)f there is a neoliberal

project for the country, we shouldn't try to eliminate it, but confront it. If there

is a Trotskyite proposal, a Maoist proposal, an anarchist proposal, or the

proposals from the Guevarists, the Castrists, the Existentialists or whatever

ists that you may think of, they shouldn't be eliminated. They shouldn't be

discussed in the way we are discussing them now, in small groups.

This sense of fluidity makes the conceptualisation of the EZLN difficult.This is their

creativity. One of the interesting aspects of the struggle is that it had continued to

express the point that the EZLN was legally entitled, according to Article 39, to

mobilise for a new government. Indeed, Conger (1994) noted that "it is telling that no

one in government, from President Salinas down, has questioned the legitimacy of the

Zapatista Army's demands for jobs and social programs" as well as "independence,

freedom, democracy, justice and peace" and "Mexicans have taken the Chiapas crisis

to heart" (Conger 1994, 2).

In a first interview Marcos reiterated that the Declaration of War was an "armed struggle" yes. But still he reiterated that this was done "with the maximum law of Mexico, the constitution. There is an article that said that the people have the right to change the government, anytime, anyplace and kind" (Ovetz 1994, 2). Ovetz (1994, 2) asked provocatively, "Lets hope this spreads to the United States". The reply again, stressed the legality, "This is the 39 of the Constitution that says we don't want anymore this government so we have to right to change it because the pacifist does'nt have the solution", question, "you mean the Cardenas election?" and Marcos replied "yes." Indeed, in January 1994, after the retreat back to the jungle, the EZLN stated that their "revolutionary change is not just the product of action in a sole arena" and not in the strict sense "an armed or peaceful revolution." The EZLN's revolution would in fact be an alliance of organisations "with many methods within different social forms" and with "different degrees of committment and participation" (quoted in Dominiguez 1995, 1).

One of the routes taken by the EZLN is this consultation and negotiation. Originally based in the indigenous communities, the EZLN since 1995 have aimed for nationwide consultations within the bounds of the Constitution but which the Mexican government can also legally ignore. However, the consultations provided a forum for a showing of discontent and organisation among once disparate groups and the state of Mexican development/democracy.

During 1995, there had been numerous consultations within the communities. Dominiguez (1995) noted that these were based on issues such as land, housing, jobs, education and health. The consultations were broad based involving citizen participation. But the consultations were not to be based around a political forum, organisation or through the transformation of the EZLN into a political party.

On August 27 1995, with 41% of the votes counted from transparent *glass* boxes

left all over Mexico, 95% indicated that the EZLN commitment to democracy was right and 56% stated no to the formation of the EZLN as a political party (Dominiguez 1995).

Undoubtedly, the issue of violence is a thorny issue. The EZLN still have arms, although they said, for purely defensive reasons. Indeed, Rivas (1999) pointed out that pacifists such as Parmenides Cano called for a replacement of guns with votes. But the National Consulta [58] was a recognition of this concern. According to the EZLN (NCDM 13 March, 1999) the Consulta, occurring on the 21 March 1999 was a national:

> Consultation for the Recognition of the Rights of Indian Peoples and the End
>
> to the War of Extermination will be carried out. In it we will ask four
>
> questions to the people of Mexico in order to know their opinion on four
>
> essential points of the National Agenda, the recognition of indigenous rights,
>
> the fulfillment of the San Andres Accords, demilitarisation and the democratic
>
> transformation of Mexico..the EZLN has designated 5000 of its members
>
> (2,500 men, 2,500 women) to visit the municipalities of the 32 states of the
>
> Mexican Republic (Rodriguez 1999).

The consulta and the process leading up to it was an example of a critical social movement opening spaces for a different politics, thinking and dialogue. It might

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[58]In response to the rape of Cecilia Rodriguez, Marcos wrote:

we salute your determination, your refusal to be humiliated and converted into what the powerful call a normal women, a conformist, a resigned, quiet and objectified women. As you have pointed out, the aggression against you is part of a silent war, a 'discrete' war, a war beyond the reach of the headlines and therefore, distant from the financial markets (Marcos 1995d).

The EZLN invited government delegates for initial consultation..Marcos was under orders from campeneros (Marcos 1995f). 300

have been peripheral at least to conventionally radical views on the nature of 'power over' and its sovereign site. But the EZLN recognised that there were many forms of power and not just coercive. The EZLN explored how power effects different peoples in specific sites. According to Carrigan (1998, 12):

> Four years ago when the rebellion was still young, and everyone had a different theory about who these little hooded figures were who had descended from the mountains on New Years Eve, a graffiti appeared in San Cristobel de Las Casas 'We are not guerrillas. We are revolutionaries.' At the time, the distinction was unclear to many people. In hindsight, that statement said everything needed to learn about the Zapatistas. It forecast the arrival of a revolutionary force quite unlike Latin America had ever seen before.

The fabric of the EZLN was a revolution that would make a revolution possible. The EZLN made the space and grabbed the headlines (Somlo 1996). It was then up to civil society to take advantage of this if they wished to. There was no leading of a broadbase coalition of classes however fragmented they may have been. Crucially, the EZLN recognised that peoples were affected by economic, cultural, political and social pressures in their different and specific locations. Clearly, neo-liberalism, capitalism and the financial markets were cause for concern but the EZLN acknowledged that the effects of the complex processes were only recognised by peoples in their specific locations. Through this mass mobilisation a sense of empathy was identified. The National Consulta was for people to recognise that there were connections.

During 1998 and into 1999 this whole consultation procedure was stepped up to

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the national level. For the National Consulta many groups affected by neo-liberalism were invited to participate in a nationwide referendum on the Indian question and more broadly about the state of Mexico. Marcos (1999b) put emphasis on the student population at the National University as well as international solidarity through the participation of coordinator's and affiliated groups of interest in the US, Asia and Europe (Marcos 1999c).

Consequently an EZLN Communique (NCDM 15 December 1998) maintained that the thrust of resistance aimed to promote a situation of peace with democracy, liberty, justice and dignity. This was a right for every Mexican man and woman where peace was only going to be possible when there was an acceptance of the rights of indigenous peoples and an end to war of extermination. This was an open, all including, ample intelligent and creative dialogue between all of Mexican society or a new form of doing politics by recognising new voices and colors. This was a popular and direct consultation that would recognise Mexico's rich history and the right of all Mexicans to participate freely and voluntarily in all proceses of the National Consulta. The National Consulta included a process of preparation, diffusion and realisation of the consultation for an all inclusive mobilisation, a debate on the character of municipalities, regions and states. All men and women over 12 years of age could take part and the consultation would be national and simultaneous. A member of the CCRI remarked that

> for us the Zapatistas, indigenous rights and culture represent the idea that after achieving that, other demands will follow; that this will create an enduring precedent for the Mexican people; that the solution is that we all make demands, that we all participate in making demands...(T)he consultation will be one way for the government to comply with the demands of the people, and not only that, but a great democratic exercise (Bellinghausen 1998).

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Just prior to the 1999 National Consulta, Marcos (1999) reported that the EZLN "greet and hope everything is going well in the tours of the Zapatista delegates" and the Delegation Coordinating Committees. Marcos (1999) concluded "That's all, now we leave it to the people." This was not a defeat but a new form of mass struggle for all those who felt *powerlessness*. Marcos (1999g) reported that three million 'strong' took part in the National Consulta through small and thoughtful acts of organisation. Crucially, the EZLN·recognised the difficulty of defining political power (Holloway 1996). Here, the true victory Marcos had said was not about the quantity of votes cast in the exploratory consultation or a matter of facts and figures to abstractly define the site and nature of radical political power. But it was all about hope. There were 15,000 voting tables. The result of the Consulta would be based on the demands for the constitutional recognition of indigenous rights at the forefront of the national dialogue in Mexico by organising an international dialogue on Mexican indigenous rights, the Accords of San Andres and the legal initiative on indigenous rights developed by the Mexican Congressional Commission on Concord and Pacification (COCOPA). It was organised with the aim to break the military blockade, by.organising national and international civil society and by uniting people with different agendas. But this was a common aspiration, a desire to completely alter the paradigm of power which kept them from establishing a more just society (Marcos 1999g). This was a movement which:

> like the wind, spreads the seeds and pollinates the flowers of struggles locally, nationally and internationally binds us to a practice that aspires to self governance and to ask what is resistance to us wind from below a network, whispering hope to all who will listen.

Indeed, it was this emphasis on listening that was important. The EZLN listened

to the many colorful voices of Mexico. The Consulta chipped away at the margins, elusive, and could not be silenced. In organising the Consulta, Marcos (1999i) reported that 5000 Zapatista delegates had gone to all the municipalities in Chiapas and around the country. Messages had also been left on various answer machines from interested participants. In the Northern city of Chihuahua the local radio phone in show 'Live and Direct' had reportedly given the opportunity for many to find out about the Consulta and had been inundated with numerous calls on this. Marcos (1999h) also said that solidarity had come from many unexpected sources, Jordan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, Canaries, Indonesia, and in Germany, the 'Zapata Nebt Noch" (Zapata Lives).

Given that the EZLN had taken the initiative, it was asked, did the Zapatistas have a burden, did they feel a responsibility? (Bellinghausen 1999). Marcos replied "No", stating that in fact "Zapatismo discovered at the moment it went out into the world that it was not alone. Not just at a national level, like what happened on September 12, 1997, when there had been the march of the 1,111 to Mexico City who shouted 'you are not alone" (quoted in Bellinghausen 1999, 3).

Indeed, Marcos said that it would be possible to rediscover and rebuild an image of Zapatismo, not an image of the EZLN which was based on their long marches and their military insurgencies (Bellinghausen 1999). As Walker noted, symbolism and imagery has played an increasingly important role for critical social movements.

And certainly, in 1994, Marcos intimated that the rebellion was finely timed, not for revolutionary tactics but for the impact of the images from Chiapas. Marcos noted that the whole basis of the National Consulta was to go out and meet the people, listen to what the people wanted. But he also stated that the "primary difficulty facing the National Consulta continues to be finance" in contrast to the PRI's "investment publicity" (quoted in Bellinghausen 1999). Marcos noted the possibilities ot the global technology and media medium. He said:

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navigating the internet is like entering the waters of a great river where many

boats are travelling and we discover we're going to the same place, a place

where we will have space without having to cease being ourselves. This gives

our word backing and support beyond what is stated. It is a movement on the

five continents (Bellinghausen 1999, 8).

For those interested the EZLN had provided a true independent and autonomous

forum for more debate and dialogue (Marcos 1999k).[59] More recently, Marcos noted:

> (T)here is a war here, an armed conflict between two armies, the government
>
> and the EZLN's: a suspended dialogue, which leaves all the spaces open for
>
> violent actions...the political proposal of zapatismo...points towards a political
>
> ethic, 'govern obeying'. We say that the people from below, the governed,
>
> should have the primary role in all political processes or governmental
>
> activity...(I)t is the people who should be given voice and the weight of
>
> opinion (quoted in Bellinghausen 1999, 8).

Ultimately the PRI could have ignored the Consulta as the political system

currently stood. But with its constant concern with its 'public' and 'international' image

the PRI might not have been able to resort to overt militarisation and ignore the

demands *tout courte*. Marcos stated:

> First we announced that there would be a consulta, and what the consulta
>
> would be about.We called on the people to mobilise themselves for that. The
>
> next stage is that the zapatistas could meet with and dialogue with the people.
>
> It was no longer going to be through intermediaries or communiques. No

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[59]The Consulta was organised through 9000 ballot boxes, an ambitious project to win
hearts and minds. A threefold demand, that Indians share in the wealth of the nation,
Constitutional Rights and demilitarisation (BBC News Online 1999a). 305

longer through the press, or whether the news items say bad or good, close to or removed from what was really happening. The people are going to learn directly from the zapatistas, just as they are (quoted in Bellinghausen 1999, 8).

The EZLN were not offering a new Mexico although it is clear that they had a general idea of what this might entail. Indeed, this made their willingness to listen important. Especially if they were willing to listen to the government and to hard line Marxists. Proof of success? Well, contrary to inexorable cynicism, the EZLN took 11 days (rather than the year of the FMLN in El Salvador) to determine the basis of the peace process and to dialogue with a government on their own terms in order to generate a new vision amongst civil society (Peleaz 1996). Thus, an EZLN Communique (NCDM 15 December 1998) stated:

a new form of doing politics was necessary, a politics created with all, by all, and for all making it possible for all Mexicans, regardless of color, religion, language, culture, social position, sexual preference or political conviction to have their voices heard and to have their weight felt in the important national decisions...rich in experiences and lessons and that it is the right of all Mexicans to participate freely and voluntary in various processes of consultation and with the purpose of demanding solutions to all the problems already affecting the country...part of the great mobilisation of the country.

This new way of making politics had no way of being fitted into the criteria to distinguish radical from reformist. In an interview with Blixen and Fazio (1995), Marcos maintained that the EZLN, through their short lived insurgency were in effect:

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planning a revolution which will make a revolution possible. (W)e are planning a pre-revolution. This is why they accuse us of being armed revisionists or reformists, as Jorge Castaneda says. We are talking about making a broad social movement, violent or peaceful, which will radically modify social relationships so that the final product might be a new space of political relationship.

As such the idea of a 'stages of transition' revolutionary model was revoked. This was not the model that is pursued. Marcos stated that the EZLN "are not saying that neoliberalism collapses a new social system is installed. It is not, in short, the stages of the struggle toward socialism of the sixties and seventies in Latin America" (quoted in Blixen and Fazio 1995). The NCDM (13 March 1999) emphasised that the Consulta was a fourfold demand for an alternative Mexican national agenda, a recognition of indigenous rights, the San Andres Accords and the democratic transformation of Mexico.

On 22 February, 1999 the NCDM had reported that the Consulta would essentially be a mass mobilisation designed to encourage Mexicans around the world to organise a popular vote. Moguel (1999) noted that the Mexican consultation organised by the EZLN was like a breath of fresh air in "revitalising the space of civil and political participation." But the EZLN were aware of the limits and the naked force of power. Coercive activity enflamed by neo-liberalism still continued and was manifested through the ongoing low intensity conflict (Brian-Wilson 1997). Thousands of Indians were displaced and forced to retreat into the highlands. However the consulta provided a creative and exploratory struggle. Moreover there was another dimension to the consultation process. The issue of technology and awareness which was again forging new connections.

iii) The EZLN use of the Media.

The national extent of the Consulta emphasised the new impetus and role of the

media (Ross 1994). In this age of 'image' and symbolism the consulta and the use of

the Internet by the EZLN was generating a different space for politics. The PRI had

been aware of its own public image to global capital (Conger 1994; Palacio 1994).

This was particularly significant given the fragility of the economic system and the

constant dangers of capricious capital flight (Sanchez 1995). Indeed, the role of the

media drew out a whole new way of explaining and interpreting the original EZLN

insurgency. The Clandestine General Command (EZLN 1994p) stated that:

> since the first of January, of this year, the Zapatista troops began a series of
>
> politico/military actions with the principal objective being to let all the people
>
> of Mexico, and the world, know how miserable conditions that millions of
>
> Mexicans, and the indigenous people, live in.

The short-lived nature of the insurgency suggested that the EZLN mobilisation was

perfectly timed to attract a large audience and staged for the cameras. In an age of

soundbites and the apparent freezing of political debate through the image conscious

politicians, the media campaign was being used, carefully, by the EZLN.Ross (1994,

1-2) noted the indelible worry for the PRI:

> smoke from the Zapatista uprising was first detected in March 1993 when two
>
> Mexican army officers were executed in the Chiapas highlands, near San
>
> Cristobel. The army outraged by the killings sent 4000 troops to scour the
>
> region for guerillas. A firefight with the then unnamed EZLN took place...two
>
> days later the army found a Zapatista training camp...the then governor of
>
> Chiapas signed off on the results and sent them on to then Secretary to the

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Interior Patrocinio Gonzalez, where the trail died...the document apparently

buried because it would have been unwise to make public the resurgence of a

guerrilla movement in Southern Mexico at a moment when NAFTA was

hanging in the balance.

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The fear for the government was that any disturbance in Mexico would be

interpreted and represented in Cold War terms as 'Mexico's abiding otherness'

(Economist October 28 1995). The Mexican radical daily *La Jornada* took up the

stories, publishing EZLN communiques whilst other editors were away on holiday

(Palacio 1994). The sense of timing was ezquisite media management by an EZLN

aware of its capacity to be a thorn in the side of the PRI. Marcos noted:

> We had not planned to rise up on 1 January...(W)e thought about various
>
> dates, taking various factors into account. For example we needed to show
>
> clearly that we weren't drug traffikers. We had to do something related to
>
> cities, the pretext couldn't be just about rural conditions so that they couldn't
>
> write us off in the jungle, as they did in the incident in the mountains of
>
> Corralchen, that garrison of ours they discovered...(W)e didn't say anything,
>
> because we were watching to see what would happen...(T)hen there were
>
> logistical questions, apart from political ones...when would our food reserves
>
> be greatest, given that the war would be long, that we would be surrounded
>
> (Marcos, quoted in Routledge 1998, 253).

The imagery was staggering. Indeed it was a form of struggle that was just as

symbolic, staged, than real in the sense as Routledge (1998) noted:

> armed guerrillas occupying Chiapan towns, then disappearing back into the
>
> Lacandon Jungle was a visually arresting event-action with a deep cultural and

political resonance throughout the Americas...such event actions are specifically symbolic and media orientated, attempting to create spectacular images that attract the attention of a variety of public's in order to catalyse political efforts (Routledge 1998, 250).

Despite the issue of who owns the rights to television broadcast, (the Mexican national service *Televista* is strongly influenced by the PRI) the development of global media services enhanced the ferocity of image breaking and puts local issues immediately to a wider audience. According to Routledge (1998, 243):

the Zapatistas articulate challenges to the *material* political and economic power of the Mexican state, and to the monopoly of representations-imposed by political elites- of Mexico as an emerging market, economically and politically stable for foreign investment.

It was pretty obvious that the PRI were media conscious. The danger of capital flight was constant and the EZLN were aware of this (Carrigan 1998; Hilbert 1997; Ross 1994). Consequently the EZLN "staged their uprising in a spectacular manner to ensure maximum media coverage and thus gain the attention of a variety of media audiences" (Routledge 1998, 248). Routledge (1998, 248) noted that "the Zapatistas use of the media formed part of a political strategy" that consisted of three interwoven facets, the physical occupation of space, the media-ation of images (the movement as a form of media) and the manipulation of discourse (a war of words).

Indeed, the manipulation of the new technologies reached another stage when the EZLN 'hacked' into the Mexican Finance Minister website, baiting the PRI with verbatim quotes from Shakespeare's Hamlet. Impertinent references to the

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haunting spectres of trouble and fate also warned the PRI with a play on Orwell's

intimidating *1984* 'big brother is watching you!' (Wired News Report 1998). Indeed,

the government was realising that "the political struggles that have undermined its

authoritarian political structure and contributed to the collapse of its speculative

economy must be recognised as explosions that are cracking the New World Order as

a whole" (Cleaver 1995a).

According to Walker (1988, 59-61) there were six issues as to what it meant to live

and act in such a world of global problems. These were the character and significance

of modern states, the ways people organise themselves in the face of global structures

when conventional ideologies have lost vitality, elucidating the spirit of appropriate

response by appropriate groups, the right method, and finally, elucidating the

character of social change.

As such, I show here that the EZLN were simultaneously acting on a local and

global space through a flexible appreciation of global solidarity. Indeed, the

geographical isolation of the Chiapas region was spelt out in initial commentaries

(Castaneda 1994). This made the global awareness of the EZLN significant. And the

role of the internet has kept interest alive (Cleaver 1999a). A significant aspect of

these developments was evident at the Encounters against neo-liberalism.

iv) Encuentros for Humanity Against Neo-liberalism.

The Encuentros, or 'encounters' represent a distinctive exploration of connections

between specific contexts shown in the setting up of a Conference in Chiapas in the

summer of 1996. Here, the EZLN played host to, and a major role in setting up the

Encuentros (1996) for 'Humanity against Neo Liberalism' a forum that was organised

in Chiapas and made up of various non-governmental organisations, 2,000 delegates

represented 43 countries, in solidarity with the EZLN, concerned with the effects of

neo-liberal globalisation (Ruggiero 1998). The opening remarks by EZLN, Encuentro,

1996 specifically targeted and used the word neo-liberalism:

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We are the Zapatista Liberation Army. For ten years we lived in these mountains, preparing to fight a war. To these mountains we built an army. Below, in the cities and plantations, we did not exist. Our lives were worth less than those machines or animals. We were like stones, like weeds in the road. We were silenced. We were faceless. We were nameless. We had no future. We did not exist. To the powers that Be, known internationally by the term 'neoliberalism' we did not count, we did not produce, we did not buy, we did not sell. We were a cipher in the accounts of big capital (Ruggiero 1998, 20).

However, it was recognised that the impact of neo-liberalism is experienced differently and in many forms. The EZLN stipulated its unquenchable respect for the "thousands of small worlds"(Ruggiero 1998, 28).

During the Encuentros (1996), 5000 people discussed politics, economy, culture, media, civil society, creating a *mesasa,* or network of connections of local experiences. There was no central headquarters and no central command. Held from July 27 to August 3 the participants were searched for narcotics. Encounters were held in an area, surrounded by the Chiapas hills, as participants paid respect to the Indian marches, and for putting on the event (Flood 1996b). Marcos stated:

During the last years the power of money has presented a new mask over its criminal face. Disregarding borders with no importance given to race or colors, the power of money humiliates dignities, insults honesties and assassinates hopes Renamed as neoliberalism the historic crime in the concentration of privileges wealth and impunities democratises misery and hopelessness. A new world war is waged, but now against the entire humanity...by the name of globalisation...(T)he new distribution of the world economy consists in concentrating power in power and misery in misery...the

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modern army of financial capital and corrupt governments advance

conquering in the only way it is capable of destroying (Marcos quoted in

Ruggiero 1998, 11).

As such, whilst there was absolute recognition of living in 'one world', the

connections and explorations made in these encounters still refuted global

revolutionary struggle. Whilst engaged in solidarity there was no desire for unified

coordinated action. Marcos stated in his closing statements in La Realidad 1996

(Ruggiero 1998, 20):

> Today thousands of different roads that come from the five continents meet
>
> here in the mountains of Mexico's southeast. Today thousands of small
>
> worlds...(W)elcome to the Zapatista R/reality. Welcome to the territory in
>
> struggle for humanity. Welcome to the territory in rebellion against
>
> neo-liberalism...(T)he globalisation of markets erases boundaries for
>
> speculation and crime, and multiplies them for human beings. Countries are
>
> obliged to erase their national borders for money to circulate but to multiply
>
> their internal borders. Neoliberalism won't turn many countries into one
>
> country, it turns each country into many countries...(I)t is not possible for
>
> neoliberalism to become the world's reality without the argument of death
>
> served up by institutional and private armies.

The recognition of difference and diversity is the key. However, recognition of

plurality of such many worlds was linked *simultaneously* and *dialectically* with the

problem of global structures. That is, the local-global hierachy framed around the

state is problematised meaning that to engage in a global struggle does not have to

mean a global program as the debate on the political possibilities implied. The EZLN

stated (Ruggiero 1998, 48):

A global program for world revolution? A utopian theory so that it can maintain a prudent distance from the reality that anguishes us...a reflected image of the possible and forgotten; the possibility and necessity of speaking and listening..not an echo that peters out or a force that decreases after reaching its apogee. An echo that breaks barriers and reechoes. An echo of small magnitude the local and particular, reverberating in the echo of great magnitude, the intercontinental and galactic. An echo that takes its place and speaks its own voice yet speaks the voice of the other. An echo that reproduces its own sound yet opens itself to the sound of the other.

The EZLN stated that the Encuentros represented a

> network of voices that not only speak but also struggle and resist for humanity against neoliberalism...(A) pocket mirror of voices...humanity recognising itself to be plural, different, inclusive, tolerant of itself in hope continues. The human and rebel voice consulted on the five continents in order to become a network of voices and resistance, continues (Ruggiero 1998, 56).

They added that this was an exploration of connections and networking from the grassroots, an open and inclusive politics of resistance. Emphasis on networks problematised the idea that globalisation was ostensibly 'out there' as an objective form and instead was only manifested and experienced at localities. The EZLN cultivated:

> a collective network of all our particular struggles and resistances. An intercontinental network of resistance against neoliberalism: an intercontinental network of resistance for humanity...recognising differences

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and acknowledging similarities, will strive to find itself in other resistances around the world...the intercontinental network of alternative communications is not an organising structure, nor does it have a central head or decision maker...(B)rothers and Sisters, we continue to be awkward (Ruggiero 1998, 56).

Undoubtedly, the awkwardness and the lack of direction in terms of what struggle was traditionally assumed to be about enriches the struggle (Falk 1996; Held 1995; Painter and Philo 1995; Walker 1988). The EZLN recognised that political power and practice was more subtle than as simply located in the sovereign power of the state. Here, the form of critique and resistance envisaged by the EZLN queried the site and nature of power and its forging of connections showed the difficulty and ambiguity of terms such as revolutionary and reformist. The EZLN made it clear that criticisms from the EPR relied upon a limited understanding of what to be political was all about (Holloway 1996). Thus, the NCDM (9 February 1999) reported that "the Mexican government has forgotten that international civil society is well informed about what is actually going on in Mexico's Southeast."

According to the Encuentros (1996) the new technologies would engender a "true space for democratic struggle" and develop in a struggle for humanity against an undemocratic neo-liberalism through "a new form of participation" as a development in Mexico and "part of a worldwide struggle."

Consequently, it became evident that the EZLN in Chiapas, "links to the global" and this spatial and political "simultaneity possesses a dynamic" which allowed and showed how local resistances simultaneously impinge on the larger scale processes which were manifested at these concrete and specific locations (Hilbert 1997, 115-117). This opened up new dynamic forms and sites of radical democracy (Massey 1995). According to Davis (1995) this radical democracy was simultaneously empowering sites of political and cultural autonomy. This was a polyspatial

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movement (Dominiguez 1998).

v) The World Wide Web (WWW), or the Political Possibilities of the Internet.

The Encuentros relied upon the internet. The Center of National Security

Investigations (CISEN) accepted that the internet represented a new site of social

struggle (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1993). The way the EZLN has used the new global

technologies was a significant aspect of interest with the movement (Cleaver 1997).

The EZLN recognised the reality of militarisation and traditional forms of state

governability but recognised the new possibilities of using new technologies in order

to connect with other groups and to maintain their struggle in the consciousness of

activists around the world.

Indeed, the networks and connections implicit in the critical social movements

such as the EZLN could only emerge and be advanced through the advancement of

technology such as the internet. Many popular myths have been cultivated by the

EZLN and in particular this cultivation has coalesced around the EZLN's use of the

World Wide Web (WWW).[60] Parfitt (1996, 127) pointed out that Marcos "is a rebel

of the 21st century. He posts his manifesto on the internet." Carrigan (1998, 9) set out

the technology problematic as follows:

> how has an indigenous army that has no foreign military support, that has not
>
> taken up arms for four years, that has been contained in inaccessible mountain
>
> camps deep in the rain forest, isolated and encircled by 40, 000 Mexican
>
> troops and tanks, with helicopters and surveillance aircraft overflying their
>
> territory, managed to inspire and sustain this growing support network at
>
> home and abroad?

She suggested that:

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[60]The PRI is not adverse to the information revolution and advertising credibility of
the internet with its own website at (http://www.pri.mx/). .   316.

A part of the answer, the easy part is modern technology. The Zapatistas are the first movement of its kind who have understood and used the internet...and it is ironic that from the extremes of feudal conditions of their dirt poor rainforest camps, and Indian runner carries a floppy disk that is then communicated electronically to an international readership around the globe (Carrigan 1998, 9).

Contrary to popular belief, Marcos did not relax in his Lacandon jungle habitat, tapping away at his laptop computer. This was a myth but which the EZLN were quite happy to maintain. In fact computer networks were accessed from outside the militarised jungle region and it still required the determination and dexterity of hardened 'operatives' to get the communiques and information out of the area, through the military encirclement, and then posted onto the net on computers outside the militarised region, in a clearly highly dangerous operation (Froehling 1997). However, the internet had provided an opportunity for organising and connecting. The EZLN played a distinctive symbolic and real part of understanding the nuances of this novel development (Cleaver 1997; Peleaz 1996). According to Cleaver (1997, 1):

in the narrow terms of traditional military conflict, the Zapatista uprising has been confined to a limited zone in Chiapas. However through their ability to extend their political reach via modern computer networks the Zapatistas have woven a new electronic fabric of struggle to carry their revolution throughout Mexico and around the world...participants in social conflicts in society have extended their struggles from other zones of human space into cyberspace...the net has dramatically speeded up this process...the net provides new spaces for new political discussions about democracy, revolution and self

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determination but it does not provide solutions to the differences that exist.

The internet is usually regarded as an indulgent instrument of the affluent or as Nugent (1995) would put it 'Northern intellectuals'. This made its use by an Indian force in the rural areas of Southern Mexico particularly interesting (Carrigan 1998). New strategies were required in a new economically, politically and culturally mobile world (Jameson 1991; Lash and Urry 1994; O'Tuathail and Luke 1994).

Consequently, sites of struggle have become more complex, fluid and ephemeral. Routledge and Simons (1995) argued that this had an explosive impact on the sites and strategies of resistances as there was a new rhizomatic spirit of resistance that could not be tamed by fixed strategies and rational calculations (Zald and McCarthy 1977; Routledge and Simons 1995).

Three effects emerged. The local emerged as a result of national and global pressures, the local was a manifestation of larger struggles, the local produced effects elsewhere and was no longer seperated into spatial and political domains of local, national and global (Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Luke 1994).

As mentioned, words and poetry played a major part of Marcos' reportoire (Marcos 1999, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d, 1999e, 1999f). The military, material and war of words were indelibly entwined. Their startling counter discourse relayed on the internet through their communiques was designed to make the people aware of Chiapas and the unequal distribution of welfare (Cleaver 1997; Routledge 1998). The turn to new information flows and the way the EZLN was able to access this new technology and mobilise its Declarations through the electronic media rather than print media.

From the beginning, Cleaver (1999, 2) noted that "the most striking thing about the sequence of events set in motion on January 1 1994, has been the speed with which

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news of the struggle circulated and the rapidity of the mobilisation of support which resulted." He noted that there were important implications for the maintenance of PRI governance and authority over the region because:

> during the peasant uprisings in Chiapas in 1994, it became clear that the government could no longer control information as it had done in 1968...(T)he press and domestic and international NGOs monitored the conflict closely, and electronic mail became one of the main mechanisms through which the EZLN communicated with the world (Cleaver 1999, 2).

The Zapatista Net on Autonomy (1995) pointed out that the movement was able to traverse many landscapes and terrains and that distance was becoming increasingly irrelevant as the movement was operating on an increasingly de-territorialised political space. The EZLN used technological weapons to rally support and solidarity across the globe (Robberson 1995). Cleaver (1997) noted that what he termed the new 'electronic fabric of struggle' indicated that the net is now providing the coveted opportunity to engender new spaces of resistance. Consequently, Arquilla and Ronfeld (1993, 145) have argued that the use of the internet would in the future engender a problem for practices of traditional state authority and governability over their territory. Indeed, the heaviest users of the internet were groups and political parties of the center and the left. Traditional hierachies and institutions that stem such protest politics could possibly be defeated. In this new cyberwar, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have aimed to expose, disrupt and misinform (Cason and Brooks 1998) such groups using so-called 'clipper chips' to intercept EZLN information. However, it appeared in vain as the EZLN had already placed information about their struggle and news and reviews through various sites and discussion groups (Froehling 1997; Weinberg 1996).

Froehling (1997) noted that the internet is a site of struggle rather than a tool of

struggle *per se*. This is essentially a non-hierachal, molecular and rhyzomatic flow of ideas and debate. But there are limits. Only San Cristobel and Tuextla the state capital have internet plugs and access. Indeed Chiapas is a region where in some places there is no network of electricity or telephones. Indeed originally, the internet was used by academics providing information and background to the struggle and , particularly from the University of Texas and the websites of Professor Harry Cleaver (1997) (all used in my thesis). As such, Torres (1996) noted that this information age sees the emergence of new cybercommunities and a virtual (and democratic) politics of resistance. But technology is human and there is no technological determinism here (Cleaver 1996). This apparent janus quality of technology is creating incredible instability by leaving a government's image susceptible to movements such as the EZLN and the inability to govern thse new democratic spaces through coercive authority (de la Gorza 1999). Whilst this thesis was being written the fall of Slobadan Milosevic on October 5th 2000 was linked to the continuing flow of information through interent sites which the Serbian government was unable to cut off. . The EZLN were sophisticated, and compact. The EZLN also used short wave VHF radio and the radio frequency of 6975 Khz at 300,000 watts could not be tampered with by the Mexican authorities. The daily flow of information kept the movement in the public eye (Jones 1998).

In an interview, Cleaver noted that the EZLN never intended to use new technologies, but clearly they caught on very quickly to its uses (Sirius 1998). The EZLN set up the Intercontinental Network of Alternative Communication (RICA). There was hope. Falk (1996, 26) argued:

> as populations become deterritorialised and incompletely nationalised, as
> nations splinter and recombine, as states face intractable difficulties in the
> face of producing the people, transnations are the most important social sites
> in which the crises of patriotism are played out...these postnational spaces, the

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incapacity of the nation state to tolerate diversity (as it seeks to homogeneity

of its citizens, the simultaneity of its presence, the consensuality of its

narrative and the stability of its citizens) may, perhaps be overcome.

Solidarity came in many forms. According to the NCDM (31 October 1998),

Global Popular Action (AGP) was a movement based on the idea of new forging of

connections between groups resisting corporate global capital. The EZLN played a

part in the motivation of this action groups. The AGP believed that global capitalism

was in deep crisis and that its ideas and institutions were losing credibility

The principal social movements of the world, including more than 20 million

persons, have begun to work together in new solidarities. Groups such as 'Reclaim the

Streets' (London) are now mobilising against the vicissitudes of free trade and world

business organisations and yet refuse the construction of global programs for change.

Essentially it represents a global movement, of which the EZLN are a part, that is

developing an international net for communication between all those who struggle in

their specific sites. Whilst maintaining a global outlook such movements are tending

to build local alternatives and strengthening patterns of direct democracy through

popular power. AGP is in fact the consequence of two major international meetings of

activists inspired by the Encuentros held in 1996 in Chiapas and in Spain 1997.

Here, the central issues were a rejection of institutions which have built

multinational and speculative corporations based on confrontations and resistance

with no lobbying through the biased and non-democratic organisations of

neo-liberalism. Emphasis is on civil disobedience and a new organisational

philosophy based on decentralisation and autonomy. Marcos (1996d) had stated:

> The world of money, their world, governs from the stock exchanges. Today

speculation is the principal source of enrichment and, at the same time, the best demonstration of the atrophy of human beings' capacity to work. Work is no longer necessary in order to produce wealth, now all that's needed is speculation. Crimes and wars are carried out so that the global stock exchanges may be pillaged by one or the other. Meanwhile, millions of women, millions of youths, millions of indigenous, millions of homosexuals, millions of human beings of all races and colors, participate in the financial markets only as a devalued currency, always worth less and less, the currency of their blood running a profit.

Undoubtedly, Marcos and the EZLN recognised that the world was being transformed. However, the way different peoples *experienced* these effects in their specific locations was the key to a recognition of difference and diversity. In contrast, President Zedillo proclaimed (1999) that there had been social, economic and political progress based around the Program for Education, health and nutrition (PROGRESSA), to alleviate the causes of poverty. Zedillo wanted the legislature to take more responsibility and the judicial sector to remain independent.and called for more participation. He was also indicating his concern with the continuation of the Program for Direct Support for Mexico's marginalised whilst Mexico's economy grew from 5.1% increase in 1996, to a 6.8% increase in 1997. The EZLN stated that this mask of abstract economic figures and abstract electoral vote counting was simply outrageous and the kind of farce they reject.[61] Marcos continued to reject the 'inevitability of globalisation thesis' saying (Bellinghausen 1999, 6):

[61]The CCRI-GC communique made a denigrating response to the malpactices and the alleged corruption of the PRI following its response to the natural disaster in Chiapas caused by Hurricane Mitch and the alleged incapacity of the state of Chiapas and corruption of those who hold power in the state, a political class more concerned with its public image, the scandalous theft of humanitarian aid such as that practised by Nicaraguan President Somoza in the city of Managua. Similarly it was alleged that aid has made its way into private banks of Governor Guillen (NCDM 15 September. 1998).

That's the logic they're telling us. The world is globalised. We have no choice but to enter it and put up with all the disadvantges.We say that is false, the world isn't globalised but fragmented...(W)hat it is, is a unipolar domination by the power of money, pure and simple, which is trying to enter everywhere. This is provoking an economic crisis.

The EZLN *unhook* the nature of development from the official security discourse of the PRI technocrats as inextricably defined as neo-liberalism. Alternatives are possible and they require exploration because these explorations change an understanding of the nature of political power and its practices. Implied in this is a rethinking of what it means to be radical. [62] How many people were concerned enough to be involved in the Consulta, Libra (1997) asked Marcos. Marcos replied "I don't know how many is many people-he responded between laughs." Libra (1997) noted that "for the first time he did not respond with his classic "a shitload."" In a sense the number of people did not matter *per se*. This was not a question of numbers or the game of 'winners and losers.' It was about exploration and changing the meaning and understanding of power. The sense of solidarity and connections was aided by the National Network of Coffee Growers Association (CNOC) forged local and regional networks, a strategy which the EZLN has built upon (Stephens 1996). Such innovative tactics were developed by the Worker, Student and Campesino Coalition of the Isthmus (COCEI). The EZLN has built upon these and taken them further.

Mexico still had a hazy and perhaps unstable future. Revolts at UNAM against tuition fees (Falcoff 1999). The primaries were on November 9, 1999. During 1996,

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[62]Hobsbawm on Marx stated "what the man wrote about the nature and tendencies of global capitalism" ring true today (Hobsbawm 1998). However, even the self contradictions of global capital do not produce a unified resistance in the traditional sense.

3/4 million lost jobs, inflation 50% and interest rates 100% The PRI cancelled May

Day celebrations for the first time since 1920 (Falcoff 1996a).

vi) *Militarisation. 1995-2000*

But as Walker (1988) noted, conventional state responses of authority and

repression are always apparent. In Mexico, the PRI has responded harshly to what it

sees as an internal security threat of indigenous 'balkanisation'. Critical social

movements are mosquitoes, they can be crushed, obliterated. What was interesting

about the EZLN struggle was that despite the heavy military presence their struggle

was still debated and people were still aware of the struggle. Maybe if the EZLN had

engaged in a protracted revolutionary war the government might have won. This is

speculation of course and there was no idealism here (Marcos 1995). Gilbreth (1997)

noted that in November 1996 a new wave of repression swept Chiapas.

The EZLN maintained that militarisation was shown most ferociously in 1997

during the alleged massacre of 45 Indian peoples in the village of Acteal (NCDM 31

December 1997). The EZLN claimed that Acteal was a symbol of an ongoing and

systematic war of an extermination campaign by a government haunted by amnesia

(NCDM 8 January 1998). The EZLN claimed that militarisation was the

government's way of getting rid of the problem (NCDM 29 October 1997; NCDM 22

January 1998; NCDM 13 February 1998; NCDM 26 March 1998).

The period 1997-1998 witnessed an underlying resuming of alleged military

atrocities forging a nefarious backdrop to any possible reconciliation. In a Chiapas

Bulletin other strategies of militarisation were examined (NCDM 13 February 1998).

A wave of indigenous displacement and 'sweep and clear' ran from the North to Los

Altos and many fleeing communities had to avoid the violent actions of the

paramilitary group Los Chinchulines in Bachajon, municipality of Chilon.

Meanwhile there were allegedly PRI affiliated paramilitary groups operating in

Chenalho known as Red Mask and White Guards which operate in San Andres

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Larrainzar. The displacement strategy began on April, 11, 1998 with the dismantling of the Autonomous Municipality. Indian peoples were living in the style of the Guatemalan Communities of People in Resistance (CPR) who are fleeing to the mountains, moving from one camp to another, without food or even the most basic necessities of life. This corridor begun in Marques de Comillas in the municipality of Ocosingo. Much of this was based on the disagreements over the 'autonomy' question at San Andres (NCDM 11 March 1998).

The EZLN (1996d) reported on theme one of San Andres, 'Indigenous Rights and Culture' accepted that the PRI had a disposition but "in no way is it willing to radically modify the relation between the nation and indigenous people". In order to return to any kind of dialogue the EZLN stipulated again, the following minimum conditions. Firstly, inclusive serious political solution. Secondly, the liberation of the alleged Zapatistas now imprisoned. Thirdly, a government delegation required. Fourthly, installation of a Verification and Implementation Commission and implementation of First Agreements and finally, serious and concrete proposals on democracy and justice (Global Exchange 1998).

In the autumn of 1996, President Clinton sent $112 million in military deployment and aid (Weinberg 1996). In April of 1996 the International Drug Enforcement Conference was held in Mexico. The narcotic economy has been a major part of everyday survival in Central and South America and mega cities such as Mexico City also show the growing rich/poor divide (Chapman 1996). The War on Drugs shows this commitment was now being constituted as the new 'other Latin America' (George 1994; Nadelman 1989; Warren 1997).

vii) Change of Agenda?

During the past two or three years, a distinctive change in governmental attitude towards the free market had ensued. Mobilisations such as the EZKN may have

played a role in this. What was clear, was that this new shift in attitude caused distinctive strategic gambits for the question of resistance to globalisation (Boyes 1999; Panitch 1998).

Recently, President Clinton (2000) in his State of the Union Address accepted that "Globalisation, is the central reality of our time. There is no turning back" and said to his fellow Americans, "understand and act on reality." Clinton (2000) said that government and business must now "forge a new consensus" based on trade and "open markets" which are the "best engines we know for reducing global poverty" and stated that "Globalisation is about more than economics" but enabled a process "to bring together the world" based on ideals of "freedom, democracy and peace."

Despite this emphasis there was also a recognition that unfettered market forces create disturbances in the 'system'. Clearly, the EZLN were representative of this (Cox 1999). Concern from major Washington consensus institutions was shown recently. The NCDM (25 September 1998, 1) reported that US Treasury Secretary Rubin, the Clinton Administration's Chief Lobbyist for the IMF admitted that the IMF was not perfect. The EZLN responded by saying:

> That is like Monica Lewinsky saying 'Linda Tripp has not been a perfect friend but she is a good listener and so I will continue to confide in her and trust her advice'...it is now well recognised that the IMF actually helped create the crisis by encouraging countries...to open their financial markets to vast amounts of unregulated overseas borrowing.

However, there was a recognition that the neo-liberal reform over the past twenty years was causing social and political unrest and instability in the global markets is beginning to undermine the interests of capital itself (Panitch 1998). This 'questioning' by certain factions put a new slant on resistances such as the EZLN. Are they being listened to, or is this another form of cooption? Ruminations of

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agenda change are clearly not structurally profound. Governments *are* accepting the

global reality but simultaneously aiming to perhaps *structurate* their policies with

globalisation 'with a human face'. This generated an emphasis on 'redistribution'

rather than 'the creation of wealth'. It was not really surprising that Giddens (1994,·

1999) has been instrumental in this intellectual and political development.[63]

Consequently, United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan (1999)

recently stated that globalisation "is a fact of life. But I believe we have

underestimated its fragility." History tells us he said, that "the imbalance between

economic, social and political realms can never be sustained for very long." and there

is a need for developing social safety nets and other developments on a global scale.

This was the challenge from groups demanding "The International Labour

Organisations Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work."

One way of maintaining this process was through this international policy arena

and the UN promoting peace and development. Secondly, by business taking action in

their own corporate sphere as the global economy was accepted as being fragile and

born of calculations. But another globalisation could be one that had "this human

face" (Annan 1999). He said to business leaders "I am sure you will make the right

choice." Panitch (1998) termed this a new form of "safe reform" invoked by a still

ostensibly "efficient capitalist state" (Panitch 1998, 20). This accepts globalisation as

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[63]This theory aimed to problematise the impasse between determinism and free will,
or structure versus agency (Jessop 1996). Giddens' argument was that structures can
both enable and inhibit actors because structures are rules and resources. The word
structuration implies a synthesis of structure and agency. It implies serious concern
with social change and the relationship between individuals and society. Giddens
(1984; 1990a) considered a conceptual re-orientation of structure/agency, preferring
to view the dichotomous relationship as a more complex and mediated articulation.
This kind of re-thinking has been more recently invigorated by multidisciplinary
concerns with the issue of reflection, subjectivity and interpretation (Germain and
Kenny 1998). Cerny (1990, 1995) suggested that globalisation is a set of economic
and political structures and processes, deriving from the changing character of goods
and assets held by different actors, individuals, institutions and/or states. Cerny
(1995) contended that structures are more or less embedded sets, patterns, constraints
and opportunities.   327

reality, *yet at the same time* shatters the myth that neo-liberal globalisation can, or should be based simply on the market.

According to Wodall (1999) it is now apparently recognised by many supporters of the neo-liberal ethic that there are troubled waters in the world economy ahead, although one must applaud the class of 1979 and Paul Volcker, President of the US Federal Reserve. However, it must be recognised by governments she argues, that low inflation must only be a means to economic and social progress rather than an end in itself (Roxborough 1992, 1992a).

In Mexico, this new form of national populism was more fluid than earlier forms of state populism of the kind seen in Brazil during the 1960s (Knight 1998). The autonomy given to Central Banks such as the Bank of England and the Bank of Mexico was recognised as a positive move. But governments were becoming aware of the dangers of these unfettered market forces. Signor Montano, the President of the National Chambers of Commerce said that the stalemate of the 1988 economic package was provoking uncertainty among many business organisations and therefore postponing trade and investment projects which would harm everyone. Brazier (1999) noted that the failure of the rational market philosophy was a failure now recognised by institutions such as the World Bank (Durbin 1998). Brazier (1999) denigrated these institutions as the 'thought police' (Gill 1996).

Indeed, the once marginal and radical critiques of neo-liberalism are now becoming part and parcel of the more mainstream political agendas. This is why the EZLN are carefully watching the situation. Indeed, as I mentioned in chapter six, there is concern that pronouncements from 'the elite' would placate those elements resisting whilst the long term costs of neo-liberalism in fact remain. Yes, they are finally being listened to but this is meagre satisfaction if this is a surreptitious cooption because any elements left over seem impervious and incongruous to concrete reality.

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Indeed, Walker (1988) showed the limitations of 'problem solving' but at the same time, does not disregard it. There was the view that "established political actors are already beginning to get things done." Consequently, there was and is a strategic and fraught tension between short term and long term objectives as different critical social movements assume different importance in varying parts of the world (Walker 1988 152-153).

In this case, reform as Durbin (1998) noted should be that the US continue in demanding a transparency and an accountability from the World Bank. But is this making neo-liberal better? Is this what grassroots resistances actually want? Marcos (NCDM 18 July 1998) called neo-liberalism "the tragicomedy of national political life." President Zedillo reported that he had aimed to strengthen the banking system against corruption (NCDM 10 September 1998). But there was a feeling that 'tinkering with the system' was not enough.

Nevertheless, economic neo-liberalism has brought about splits in the PRI by conservative groups such as the 'breakfast club' (Anderson 1998a), a

> small off the record breakfast meeting of the ruling party faithful, or more
> precisely, about 50 current and former lawmakers faithful to one particular
> wing of the party, the old guard, autocratic faction known as the dinosaurs.
> Manuel Bartlett an urbane, charismatic state governor and key leader of the
> dinosaurs saying 'we are not going to commit suicide.'

In a sense, this was indicative of the kind of 'regressive' resistance of concern to Coz (1999). In a recent interview at his governor's mansion in Puebla, capital of a state with the same name southeast of Mexico City, Bartlett reported:

> I didn't call for a revolt in the PRI, because I believe the unity of our party is a
> fundamental principle...(B)ut maintaining that unity is not an easy task

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because our party has many currents in it...(W)e have lost our dynamism...(W)e have lost our creative thinking. The party has become very bureaucratised. It has just followed, without any discussion whatsoever, the lines of the government and it should be the other way around. The government should follow the lines of the party (Anderson 1998a).

So serious accusations are levelled at the neo-liberal technocrats for selling out to the global markets, and for selling Mexico to foreigners. The language and concerns are familiar but this is not the progressive resistance the EZLN envisage. Anderson (1998a, 2) noted that "the old guard believes that the culmination of the technocrats rule came last summer when the PRI made its poorest election showing ever, losing the race for Mexico City mayor." Nevertheless, splits in the PRI opened up a space to explore for the EZLN (NCDM 17 September 1997).

Undoubtedly the recent global financial crisis also added to governmental concern in a country prone to capital flight and short term investment (Kaletsky 1999; Laurence and Browne 1999; NCDM 31 October 1998; Panitch 1998; Smadia 1999). Peoples around the world recognise the common problems of neo-liberalism (Economist May 25, 1996). And the bargains of neo-liberalism were questioned (Smith 1995). And resistances such as those in South Korea against the 'Sekekwa' or 'total globalisation' of the South Korean government were, like the EZLN, carving a new critical space for dialogue even within global financial institutions (Swift 1997). These developments provided a rich terrain for rethinking strategies, tactics and alliances of solidarity and connections.

Conclusion.

What is clear is that the exploration of different strategies and different sites of strategies, outwits even the staunchest of Marxist interpretations and postmodern interpretations. The EZLN is a mass mobilisation with a recognition of difference, a

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new form of global struggle and a recognition of new technologies and the janus power of the media. This is a revolution which is not based upon any blueprint or a movement that is promising the earth. Their explorations allow the recognition of the way neo-liberalism for instance, is affecting 'many worlds' as it evolves and reflects, eluding conceptual schematics and the bases of common criticisms from other groups, as it problematises the edifice of what we actually mean by radical and revolutionary resistance.

Thesis Conclusion: The Emiliano Zapata Army of National Liberation (EZLN) as a Critical Social Movement.

We live in one world of increasing danger, of immeasurable exploitation, of repression and suffering which economic indicators obscure. Modern living is based on distance. Daily, images from around the world instantaneously forge shock. We are in the one world and connected up and sometimes the connections are hard to face. It gives a sense of unprecedented responsibility which, paradoxically, may give birth to immeasurable apathy, introspection and disengagement. The sheer enormity of the task, a better world, and the sheer acceleration of our awareness of this enormity can nurture intellectual and political frustration.

It is also quite clear that any indication of human beings living together in harmony, in one world, a global village is pretty unlikely in the foreseeable future. Too many interests benefit from 'the way it is' and the world is unlikely to move towards the 'way it ought to be'. Indeed, making such normative judgements is itself a risky business. Nevertheless it is a business worth pursuing. The rejection of the optimistic rhetoric emenating from intellectual and political pronouncements about the New World Order or the End of History is depressing but necessary.

Indeed, resignation and parochialism are evident around the world. But this seclusion is deceptive as the relationship between locality and globality is becoming more complex. Global structures impinge and affect our everyday lives and this is becoming recognised by many individuals and groups around the world affected in their specific existences. Such connections are the reason why a small band of insurgents in Southern Mexico produced intellectual and political interest in the ensuing six years.

Indeed, it seems that "Mexico is in the news, and the hidden face of Mexico that is emerging is quite different from the clean facade that country has presented to the world. Mexico, we see, is full of intrigue" (Somlo 1995, 1). But the dominance of

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neo-liberalism and the indefatigable optimism that there is no alternative is apparently having its desired effect (Flood 1994a). Mexico attracted $12.4 billion in foreign investment and made new trade ties with the European Union and Israel. The Mexican economy was expected to grow by 4.5% in 1999 and President Zedillo had claimed that global productive investment pay wages 48% higher than national business. Yet Padgett (1998) noted that it was hard to feel safe in Mexico.

It is the diversity of peoples, groups and classes of this world who suffer from the concrete results of global finance speculation and global overproduction (Ransom 1997). In France in 1995 the protests on the street from a malaise of students, workers and middle class entrepreneurs, forced the resignation of Alain Juppe the right wing Prime Minister (Krishnan 1996). Ironically, the powerful nations have grouped together in the wake of the financial crisis (NCDM 31 October 1998a). The G7 states endorsed resources for the poor people and loan gurantees were made to businesses threatened by financial disorder.

The halycon images of a Panglossian globalisation and the optimism inspired in Mexico by President Salinas to make the country 'feel good' and to inspire welcomed and much needed confidence in the global investment community during the early 1990's was shattered by the EZLN mobilisation and the cries of 'Basta!.

But even 5 years after the EZLN mobilisation the Mexican government was recalcitrant in its optimism. The NCDM (10 September, 1998) reported that President Zedillo:

> who has two years to go on a six year term celebrated his historic contribution to multi party democracy in Mexico. He has conducted a conservative economic policy that has helped his country start recovering from the depths of recession. It is his intention to avoid the massive disruption that has accompanied every presidential transition since 1976. He can fairly claim to

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have made substantial delivery on reforms that were the Clinton

administration's price for its $50 billion bailout of Mexico four years ago.

Among the emerging market countries, Mexico is given a certain credit for its

readiness to deal with the current global economic upheaval.

i) Burbach/Nugent and the Set up of the Debate.

Yet it is fundamental to recognise the dangerous romanticism surrounding a

politics of resistance galvanised by the indelible images of a once beautiful and virgin

jungle environment marred by the savages of modernity and imperialism. But neither

should this obvious danger negate the impact of the Emiliano Zapata Army of

National Liberation (EZLN) and the possibility that maybe, just maybe, the EZLN

represents an important resistance as we enter the next millennium.

In contrast to the view that the EZLN represented the final flickerings of a

moribund Marxist revolutionary model, Burbach (1994) coined the term

postmodernism, to argue the novelty of the EZLN, and to argue that the EZLN

represented a step towards a new kind of struggle in Latin America, one that was

tantamountly aware of its historical situation and the failiures of past national

liberation operations.

However in 1995 came a serious backlash from the left who were virulently

opposed to what they regarded as this kind of 'intellectual faddism'. The essence of

the Marxist/postmodern debate centered upon identifying the 'real' location of

grievance, objectives, strategies and tactics of the EZLN. Ostensibly, such controversy

paralleled an ongoing debate in the social movement literature and its political

connotations between old social movements and new social movements. As I outlined

in chapter one, the old social movements represented revolutionary class struggle in

an auspicious challenge to the exploitative tendencies of capitalism and its political

institutions. Here, old social movements forged a resistance based on grand

blueprints, convinced in the possibility of constructing a new and better world. And for many journalists in Chiapas in 1994, as I discussed in chapter three, the EZLN seemed to fit these conceptual parameters (Golden 1994).

Burbach's (1994) account was based on slightly different parameters. New social/postmodern movements emerging in the 1960s and 1970s, concomitant with academic analysis emphasised the emergence of new issues, new actors and rejected the edifice and format of the older struggles on the basis that they had been extremely limited in their politics. Moreover their track record was not good

As such, new social movements emphasised that capitalism may not be the only, and principal location of grievance and as the counter culture momentum accelerated, there was a strong and often impelling castigation of the ideology of 'modernisation' which was apparent in both capitalist *and* socialist societies.

Inexorably, postmodern resistances would (and were understood) to represent groups and existences reacting to the onslaught of Western triumphalist progress by defending and celebrating their rich and multifaceted traditional existences, philosophies and languages.

As such, given Marcos' opening statement on the 'ethnic' quality of the EZLN, and Burbach's (1994) opening statement concerning the 'Indian' nature of the rebellion against 'modernisation', as I outlined in chapter four, the EZLN was construed in this way, a postmodern political movement and a politics beyond modernity.

Burbach (1994) had also emphasised that the EZLN were not engaging in a classic national liberation based on guerrilla insurgency. The EZLN recognised that previous insurgencies had failed, and that the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, in 1990, closed the revolutionary circle. Thus, the EZLN were trying something different.

As such, reactions were harsh. Nugent (1995) questioned the way 'Northern

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intellectuals' had been seduced by 'postmodern enchantment'. Nugent (1995) questioned the whole 'novelty' and 'profundity' argument on the basis that the EZLN were paramountly a class struggle resisting capitalism as many struggles had done before.

The debate indicated not only political differences but also conceptual and interpretive differences. Moreover the debate effectively highlighted the complex and often ambiguous role of the intellectual in theory and practice. That is, the EZLN mobilisation and subsequent controversy showed the limitations on intellectually conceptualising a politics of resistance through apparently fixed conceptual classifications. I argued that the EZLN engaged in a new politics of resistance but this was a more creative form of struggle which eluded premature classification due to its often ambiguous politics. I argued that the EZLN forces a reworking of postmodernism.

ii) Critical Social Movements.

An awareness of the kinds of difficulties enveloping the majority of the world's population led to critical intellectual interest in International Relations Theory (IRT). The critical impetus in Critical International Relations Theory (CIRT) was forged by a recognition that the glossy triumphalism of the end of the Cold War disguised a number of secrets which gave the impression that the reaction of problem solvers and policymakers, in theory and practice was not enough (Walker 1988). As such, the distinctions in CIRT represented debates elsewhere and the introduction of Marxism and postmodernism was symptomatic of this.

Crucially, there emerged a more critical way of thinking about this debate and a recognition of the dangers of premature classification and premature stifling of more creative social movements. Inevitably, this invoked an introspection on the role of the critical enquiry, in theory and practice. George (1994) argued that:

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It is acknowledged, consequently, that critical social movements will, and

must, continue to struggle against the most obvious and reprehensible

injustices and dangers in the one world (e.g. against nuclear arms, apartheid,

and brutal military repression in Africa and Central and South America). But

these struggles whilst connected to a broader sense of radicalism, will be

energised, directed and articulated by a process of understanding derived not

from some sovereign center, some privileged omnipotent presence, but from

the creativity and critical capacities of people learning about their world in

their own ways and through their own struggles (George 1994, 213).

But the critical enquiry was self-conscious enough not to draw out new conceptual

rigidity, however subtly. Through engaging in exploratory resistance, "people

discover that they are not powerless in the face of daunting problems but are capable

of making enormous advances in the immediate situation in which they live, love,

work and play" (Walker 1988, 9). I argued that the EZLN represented this kind of

exploration. The term 'Zapatismo' has galvanised and given impetus to other groups

around the world. Indeed, paradoxically, the EZLN has been given a somewhat

iconoclastic mystique in challenging the practices of exploitation and repression as

experienced in different locations around the world.

Many foreigners (many deported) have made the 20 hour trek from Mexico City

to Chiapas, to support community projects such as the 'Schools of Chiapas' (Bruce

1999). It is said that Chiapas is Mexico. The imagery and symbolism of the EZLN,

and the connections the EZLN made, directly and indirectly to other human beings

around the world is I believe, critical and exciting as it challenges conventional ways

of appreciating the activity of 'resistance.' This concern was based on three main

themes explored in the thesis.

iii) Development.

In chapter five, I suggested that the EZLN is *postmodern enough* to be sceptical

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as to the development of neo-liberal modernisation. But the EZLN *rethinks* rather than simply rejects *contemporary* modernisation. The EZLN *unhooks* neo-liberalism from modernity and aims to locate and construct another or *different* Mexican modernity that is open, fluid and inclusive of 'many worlds'. I showed this concern through a discussion of the San Andres Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture by identifying three main aspects of rethinking development.

Firstly, the EZLN expressed solidarity with groups who have experienced in their different contexts the practices of exclusion, women, gays, lesbians, the homeless, the unemployed, the dissidents, the students and the badly paid. The EZLN recognised that neo-liberalism is a complex process affecting different peoples at different and specific situations and experiences. But from the demands for Indian economic, cultural, political and social autonomy a debate was instigated on the possibility of generating new local and national development strategies. Secondly, I showed that San Andres was inspired by a belief that this inclusive Mexican development could be constructed. This was most starkly showed in the beleif that Indian demands for self-determination and autonomy would be accomodated within this different modernity. Finally, I showed how the EZLN maintains a distinctive faith in a modern language of rights, justice and liberty but which are reworked as an Enlightened discourse and constructed through a malaise of *grassroots* consultation rather than through *top down* legal impositions. I argued that this produces distinctive reflection over the nation and community, and the obligation of a new and empowered citizenry.

iv. Democracy.

The 2000 Presidential elections were regarded as a political battle between potential PRI candidate, former Interior Minister Francisco Labastida, Cardenas, the candidate of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and current Mayor of Mexico City, son of former President Cardenas (1934-1940), and Vicente Fox of the National Coalition who won the election in early July 2000. My argument in chapter

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six was that despite Vicente Fox' optimism with the end of the PRI reign and growing electoral multiparty politics, the EZLN have demanded a richer democratic revolution. This was not a revolution which was designed to destroy the existing political institutions but rather a democratic revolution that aimed to rework the meaning, nature and site of democracy.

As such, I showed how the EZLN both demands more accountability and transparency with the democratic process. But, and perhaps more crucially, the EZLN aims to forge a new way of making politics, democratically. I showed how this radical democracy was based on the kind of politics at work in the Indian communities. Democracy would be based on consultations rather than the party political machine, the glistening politician's smile and the whims of electoral agenda and market place.

v) New National Liberation with a Difference.

In chapter seven I argued that the EZLN rethinks and reinvents the meaning of the revolutionary and the emancipatory strategies. I argued that the EZLN engaged in a reinvention in two ways. I showed that the National Consulta was a legal form of mass mobilisation/participation that opens a space to connect people's experiencing neo-liberal development in different and specific locations. I also showed how this 'revolution to make a revolution possible' cut across the political spectrum, inspiring voices from many worlds, and from those traditionally regarded as 'the powerful'. Indeed, through Marcos, the EZLN problematised the meaning and nature of the political and political power.

I showed how the EZLN engaged in a global struggle but is simultaneously reacting to historically specific circumstances and the recognition of difference. I showed how the EZLN creatively problematises the assumptions of global emancipation which have been characteristic of the postmodern debate by articulating different spatial and ethical moments of struggle. I showed this specifically through

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the demands for a National Consulta and the Encuentros for Humanity against Neo-liberalism. But the exploration recognised the threat of militarisation and the traditional gauntlets of power. There is much unrest in Mexico, still (Balboa 1999). The somewhat perfunctory rhetoric of those in Mexico City, the seemingly immeasurable importance of abstract economic indicators, the abrogation of responsibility for concrete heartache through rhetoric of multiparty democracy is a strangely transparent mask. Marcos (NCDM 18 July, 1998) said:

> Oh the macro economic achievements! But, where are they? Are they in the fortunes of the richest men of Mexico and is the place they occupy the Forbes list? You search, search and find what behind the macroeconomic mask is hidden, an economic model which has been imposed on the country since the beginning of the decade of the eighties, 16 years of a political economy...(F)rom 1968 to 1977 the proportion of those living in poverty descended rapidly. Between 1977 and 1981 this accelerated...a brusque changed occured which made poverty increase rapidly...now at the beginning of 1998 we are at the same levels of poverty as in 1968, 30 lost years.

Like a benevolent force, the EZLN bring a lot to the academic debate on the politics of resistance. It forces a critical introspection which is important because it has questioned the role of the critical enquiry and has engaged debate on the process of conceptualisation, interpretation and the relationship between theory and practice. Walker (1988, 142) argued that the:

> primary dynamics that affect peoples lives arise from very complex global structures...(Y)et as I have suggested in this book, in the face of tremendous historical accelerations, of global structures and intractable problems, small and fragile critical social movements open up particularly hopeful possibilities

for the future. In a time of acute dangers and a widespread sense of powerlessness, critical social movements articulate new aspirations and create new energies.

There are signs of possibilities here, for everyone to communicate, to think, to act with humility and to continue to learn. The EZLN bring energy to many worlds. This is I believe, the EZLN's message.

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