

**RELEVANCE THEORY AND PROCEDURAL MEANING: THE SEMANTICS
AND PRAGMATICS OF DISCOURSE MARKERS IN ENGLISH AND ARABIC**

Submitted by:

Miri Muhammad Hussein

In fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Supervised by:

Prof: Noel Burton-Roberts

Prof: Karen Corrigan

School of English Literature, Language and Linguistics

Newcastle University

February, 2009

© 2009 Miri Muhammad Hussein
all rights reserved

Declaration and statement of copyright

Declaration

No part of the material contained within this thesis has been previously submitted for a degree at Newcastle University or any other university.

Statement of copyright

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.

Abstract

The present study is an attempt to investigate the use of discourse markers in English and Arabic. The study uses Relevance Theory as a theoretical framework for the analysis of discourse markers in both Syrian and Standard Arabic. It benefits from Blakemore's (1987, 2002) account of procedural meaning, in which she argues that discourse markers encode procedural meaning that constrains the inferential phase of the interpretation of the utterance in which they occur. According to Blakemore, the procedural meaning encoded by discourse markers controls the hearer's choice of context under which the utterance is relevant.

The study concentrates on ten discourse markers, five of which are only used in Standard Arabic. These are *lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin*, *bal* and *fa*. The other five (*bass*, *la-heik*, *la-ha-sabab*, *ma'nāt-o* and *bi-ittalī*) are only used in Syrian Arabic. The choice of these discourse markers has been motivated by the fact that they can be compared and contrasted with Blakemore's two favoured discourse markers, *but* and *so*. The claim is that like *so* and *but*, such discourse markers encode procedural meaning that constrains the interpretation of the utterance in which they occur.

The study argues that like *but* in English, *bass* in Syrian Arabic encodes a general procedure that can be implemented to derive different meanings such as 'denial of expectation', 'contrast', 'correction' and 'cancellation'. The four discourse markers (*lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin* and *bal*) used in Standard Arabic are analysed as lexical representations of these different implementations.

The discourse marker *fa*, in this study, has also been analysed as encoding a general procedure that can be implemented to derive different meanings such as 'sequentiality', 'immediacy', 'non-intervention' and 'causality'. It has also been argued that the procedure encoded by *fa* can put constraints on either the explicit or the implicit side of the interpretation of the utterance in which it occurs.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deep and sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Noel Burton-Roberts. His wide knowledge and logical way of thinking have been a great value for me. His understanding, encouraging and personal guidance have provided me a good basis in the present work. Without his constructive comments, extensive discussions and constant support, this thesis would not have been possible.

I warmly thank my co-supervisor, Professor Karen Corrigan. Her detailed comments and suggestions of restructuring some parts of my thesis are valued.

During this work, I have collaborated with many colleagues for whom I have great regard. I wish to extend my warmest thanks to the following people who have helped me with my work in the School of English Literature, Language and Linguistics at Newcastle University: Nadeem Bukhari, Riaz Ahmed Mangrio, Ali Al-Gryani and Yousef Elramli. Special thanks go to Mamdouh Musabhien, Nasser Al-Horais, Abedal-mutaleb Al-zuweiri, Khaled Kakhia, Ali Allaham, Oudah Alenazi, Ahmad Mahfouz and Hammod Obaid for their help and advice on the Arabic data.

I would also like to thank the linguistics staff of the School of English, Literature and Linguistic especially, Prof Anders Holmberg, Dr Martha Young-Scholten, Dr Hermann Moisl, Dr William van der Wurff and Dr Isabelle Buchstaller for their great support.

Furthermore, I would like to thank the staff at Robison Library for their support and help, especially the interlibrary loan section.

I am greatly indebted to the Syrian Government and the Ministry of Higher Education for their financial support during my stay in the UK. Thanks go also to the Syrian Embassy in London and the British Council for their help and advice.

I owe my loving thanks to my wife and kids for their patience. Without their encouragement and understanding, it would have been impossible for me to finish this work. My special gratitude is due to my parents, sisters and brothers back home in Syria for their loving support. To them, I dedicate this thesis.

Glossary of Transcription Symbols

Letter	Name	ISO 233	IPA
ء	<u>hamza</u>	’	[ʔ]
ا	’ <u>alif</u>	’	various, including [a :]
ب	<u>bā’</u>	b	[b]
ت	<u>tā’</u>	t	[t]
ث	<u>tā’</u>	ṭ	[θ]
ج	<u>ǧīm, jīm, gīm</u>	ǧ	[ǧ] / [g]
ح	<u>ḥā’</u>	ḥ	[ħ]
خ	<u>ḥā’</u>	ḥ	[x]
د	<u>dāl</u>	d	[d]
ذ	<u>dāl</u>	ḏ	[ð]
ر	<u>rā’</u>	r	[r]
ز	<u>zāy</u>	z	[z]
س	<u>sīn</u>	s	[s]
ش	<u>šīn</u>	š	[ʃ]
ص	<u>ṣād</u>	ṣ	[s̥]
ض	<u>ḏād</u>	ḏ	[d̥]
ط	<u>tā’</u>	ṭ	[t̥]
ظ	<u>zā’</u>	z	[ð̥] / [z̥]
ع	’ <u>ayn</u>	’	[ʕ] / [ʔ]
غ	<u>ǧayn</u>	ǧ	[ɣ] / [ɢ]
ف	<u>fā’</u>	f	[f]
ق	<u>qāf</u>	q	[q]
ك	<u>kāf</u>	k	[k]
ل	<u>lām</u>	l	[l]
م	<u>mīm</u>	m	[m]
ن	<u>nūn</u>	n	[n]
ه	<u>ḥā’</u>	h	[h]
و	<u>wāw</u>	w	[w] , [u :]
ي	<u>yā’</u>	y	[j] , [i :]
آ	’ <u>alif madda</u>	’â	[ʔa :]
أ	’ <u>alif makṣa</u>	’â	[a :]
لا	<u>lām ’alif</u>	la	[la :]
أل	’ <u>alif lām</u>	’al	

Table of abbreviations

A, B: Linguistic expressions	MSA: Modern Standard Arabic
ACID: Alleged conventional implicature devices	OED: Oxford English Dictionary
AD: Anno Domini (after Christ)	Pas: Past
CA: Conversational Analysis	PM: Pragmatic marker
Cau: Cause	P, Q: States of affairs
CE: Christian Era	Pre: Premise
CLA: Classical Arabic	Pro: Proposition
CM: Contextual Modulation	Rea: Reason
COL: Colloquial Arabic	Res: Result
Con: Concept or conclusion	RT: Relevance Theory
DM: Discourse marker	SA: Standard Arabic
F: False	S1, S2: Sentences or Speakers
FC: Football club	SH: Sufficiency Hypothesis
FIP: Functional Independence Principle	S, P: Assumptions
GP: General procedure	SYA: Syrian Arabic
H: High	T: True
iff: If and only if	TCU: Turn constructional unit
Imp: Implementation	Trans: Translation
IQ: Indirect quotation	TV: Television
L: Low	UAE: United Arab Emirates
L1, L2: Languages	X, Y: Persons or participants
LA: Lebanese Arabic	‘\supset’: Material implication
MBC: Middle East Broadcasting Channel	‘\sim’: Logical operator ‘not’

List of Figures

Figure 1: Kinds of communicational content in Grice's theory.....	66
Figure 2: Grice and Carston on the explicature/implicature distinction.	71
Figure 3: Rieber's (1997) reanalysis of Grice's conventional implicature.....	80
Figure 4: Blakemore's vs. Iten's conceptual/procedural distinction.....	105
Figure 5: Pronouns as conceptuo-procedural linguistic expressions	113
Figure 6: Linguistically encoded information in Blakemore (1987)	169
Figure 7: Linguistically encoded information in Wilson and Sperber (1993)	172
Figure 8: <i>But</i> as encoding a general procedure	227
Figure 9: Free enrichment vs. procedural encoding in <i>wa</i> and <i>fa</i> -utterances	253
Figure 10: <i>Bass</i> : general procedure and different implementations.....	266

Table of Contents

DECLARATION AND STATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT.....	2
ABSTRACT	3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	4
GLOSSARY OF TRANSCRIPTION SYMBOLS	5
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS	6
LIST OF FIGURES	7
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	8
INTRODUCTION.....	13
1. RELEVANCE THEORY AND LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION.....	23
1.1. Introduction	23
1.2. Grice’s Theory of Conversation.....	26
1.2.1. The Cooperative Principle and conversational maxims.....	26
1.2.2. What is said vs. what is implicated	30
1.2.3. Explicit vs. implicit	32
1.3. Relevance and cognition	36
1.3.1. Relevance: communication, ostension and inference	36
1.3.2. Informative and communicative intention	40
1.3.3. The principle of relevance.....	44
1.3.4. The notion of context	49
1.3.5. Relevance to an individual and relevance of phenomena	54
1.3.5.1. Relevance to an individual	54
1.3.5.2. Relevance of phenomena	58
1.3.6. Cognitive effects and degrees of relevance.....	61

1.4. Relevance Theory and verbal communication	66
1.4.1. Explicature and implicature in Relevance Theory	66
1.4.2. Cancellable explicatures and uncancellable implicatures	71
1.4.3. Grice's notion of conventional implicature	77
1.5. Conclusion	84
2. LINGUISTIC MEANING AND TRUTH CONDITIONS	86
2.1. Introduction	86
2.2. Language and the world	87
2.2.1. Semantic vs. pragmatic non-truth-conditional meaning	89
2.2.2. Non-truth-conditional linguistic elements	90
2.2.2.1 Pronouns.....	90
2.2.2.2. Requests and questions	92
2.2.2.3. Sentence adverbials.....	93
2.2.2.4. Focus adverbs.....	94
2.2.2.5. Discourse markers.....	95
2.3. Linguistic meaning and Relevance Theory	96
2.3.1. Utterance interpretation: a complementary process.....	96
2.3.2. Linguistic encoding: concepts and procedures	98
2.3.3. The conceptual/procedural distinction	100
2.3.4. Procedures: constraints on implicature or explicature?	104
2.4. Discourse markers and truth conditions	105
2.4.1. Metarepresentation and linguistic communication	106
2.4.2. Purely conceptual expressions	109
2.4.2.1. Nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs	109
2.4.3. Conceptuo-procedural expressions	111

2.4.3.1. Pronouns as procedures.....	111
2.4.3.2. The definite article and procedural encoding.....	114
2.4.3.3. Parentheticals: concepts or procedures?.....	119
2.4.3.4. Parentheticals and reformulation.....	122
2.4.3.5. The case of ‘because’	126
2.4.3.6. Real and unreal conditionals	131
2.5. Conclusion.....	137
3. DISCOURSE MARKERS IN ENGLISH: TWO APPROACHES.....	139
3.1. Introduction	139
3.2. Coherence-based account of discourse markers	142
3.2.1. What is coherence?	142
3.2.2. Schiffrin’s account of discourse markers.....	146
3.2.2.1. ‘And’ and ‘but’	149
3.2.2.2. ‘Because’ and ‘so’	151
3.2.2.3. ‘Now’ and ‘then’	151
3.2.2.4. ‘Oh’ and ‘well’	153
3.2.2.5. ‘Y’know’ and ‘I mean’	154
3.2.3. Fraser’s account of discourse markers.....	156
3.2.3.1. The problem of definition	156
3.2.3.2. The grammatical status and function of discourse markers.....	159
3.2.3. The difference between Schiffrin’s and Fraser’s accounts.....	162
3.3. Relevance-based account of discourse markers	165
3.3.1. Discourse markers as semantic constraints on relevance.....	165
3.3.2. Blakemore’s revised account of discourse markers.....	168
3.4. Coherence or relevance?.....	175

3.4.1. Giora's views on discourse	176
3.4.1.1. Discourse coherence and well-formedness	176
3.4.2. Wilson's views on discourse.....	178
3.4.2.1. Discourse markers and relevance.....	178
3.4.3. Is coherence a linguistic or cognitive relation?.....	181
3.5. Conclusion.....	185
4. STANDARD ARABIC AND PROCEDURAL MEANING	188
4.1. Introduction	188
4.2. The linguistic situation in Arabic.....	189
4.2.1. Diglossia.....	189
4.2.2. Arabic as a special case of diglossia	191
4.2.3. Diglossia and discourse markers.....	193
4.3. Procedural expressions in Standard Arabic.....	204
4.3.1. 'Lakinna', 'bainama', 'lakin' and 'bal'	206
4.3.1.1. Syntactic analysis	207
4.3.1.2. 'But': a concept or procedure?.....	220
4.3.1.3. 'But': a Relevance-Theoretic account.....	222
4.3.2. 'But' as encoding a general procedure.....	226
4.3.2.1. Lakinna: the 'denial but'	227
4.3.2.2. Bainama: the 'contrast but'	229
4.3.2.3. Bal: the 'correction but'	231
4.3.2.4. Lakin: the 'cancellation but'	232
4.3.3. The case of 'fa'	235
4.3.3.1. Fa as a coordinating conjunction	235
4.3.3.2. Can 'fa' encode a procedure?.....	250

4.3.3.3. ‘Fa’ as encoding an inferential procedure.....	254
4.4. Conclusion.....	259
5. PROCEDURAL EXPRESSIONS IN SYRIAN ARABIC	260
5.1. Introduction	260
5.2. Syrian Arabic as a distinct language	262
5.3. The case of ‘bass’	264
5.3.1. Syntactic analysis	267
5.3.2. ‘Bass’ as encoding a procedure.....	269
5.3.2.1. ‘Bass’ and contrast	269
5.3.2.2. ‘Bass’ and denial	271
5.3.2.3. ‘Bass’ and correction	272
5.3.2.4. ‘Bass’ and cancellation	274
5.4. Other uses of ‘bass’	276
5.5. ‘la-heik’, ‘la-ha-sabab’, ‘ma‘nāt-o’ and ‘bi-ittālī’	278
5.5.1. Syntactic analysis	282
5.5.2. ‘la-heik’ and ‘la-ha-sabab’ as procedures	285
5.5.3. ma‘nāt-o and bi-ittālī as procedures	286
5.5.4. Some differences between ‘fa’ and these markers.....	289
5.6. Conclusion.....	291
CONCLUSION.....	293
REFERENCES	296

Introduction

In every language, there are linguistic expressions whose meaning does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterances in which they occur. Prominent among such expressions are discourse markers. Discourse markers have been studied by different researchers and within different frameworks. They are referred to as *cue phrases* (Knott and Dale, 1994), *discourse connectives* (Blakemore, 1987, 1992, 2002), *discourse operators* (Redeker, 1990, 1991), *particles* (Schourup 1985), *discourse signalling devices* (Polanyi and Scha, 1983), *pragmatic expressions* (Erman, 1987), *phatic connectives* (Bazanella, 1990), *pragmatic formatives* (Fraser, 1996), *pragmatic connectives* (van Dijk, 1979; Stubbs, 1983), *pragmatic operators* (Ariel, 1994), *pragmatic particles* (Östman, 1995), *pragmatic markers* (Fraser 1988,1990; Schiffrin, 1987), *conjuncts* (Quirk and Greenbaum et al., 1985) and *sentence connectives* (Halliday and Hasan, 1976).

Schiffrin (1987) and Fraser (1988, 1990) study discourse markers within the Coherence framework. They argue that discourse markers are lexical expressions that relate discourse units and play a major role in the interpretation of discourse by signalling coherence relations between discourse units. Other researchers study discourse markers within the Conversation Analysis framework. They argue that discourse markers play an important role in conversation, for example, marking topic shift and turn taking, summing up ideas, requesting

explanation and expressing conclusions (Heritage 1988, 1989, 1995 and Al-Khalil 2005).

Blakemore (1987, 2002), Blass (1990), Iten (1998) and others study discourse markers from a relevance-theoretic point of view. They argue that discourse markers encode procedural meanings that constrain the inferential part of the interpretation of the utterances in which they occur. Such expressions control the hearer's choice of context by guiding him to reach the interpretation of an utterance by constraining the context under which the utterance is relevant. According to them, discourse markers are linguistic devices used to maximize contextual effects and minimise processing effort in assessing the relevance of a given utterance. Blakemore's relevance-theoretic account of discourse markers will be compared and contrasted with Schiffrin's coherence-based one.

The current study is concerned with the analysis of some discourse markers within the latter framework, i.e. Relevance Theory, where discourse markers are analysed as elements that encode procedural meanings. A broad outline of the framework will be presented in this study, as well as how discourse markers are accounted for in this framework in comparison with the Coherence framework. The conceptual/procedural distinction and its relation to the analysis of discourse markers will be also discussed.

The main aim of this study is to investigate the use of some discourse markers in Arabic within the relevance-theoretic framework. Few researchers have studied the use of discourse markers in Arabic. These were Al-Batal (1994) and Al-Khalil (2005), who adopted the Conversation Analysis and Coherence

frameworks in analysing them. But there is no single study that investigates discourse markers in Arabic within Relevance Theory. It is hoped that this study paves the way for applying relevance-theoretic pragmatics to Arabic and contributes to the broadening of Arabic linguistics, which is mainly concerned with gender issues, syntax, phonology, phonetics, dialectology and diglossia (e.g., Blanc 1960, Holes 1983, Bakir 1986, Ibrahim 1986, Abdel-Jawad 1987 and 1990, Al-Wer 1991, Daher 1998).

The study does not aim to analyse every single discourse marker in Arabic (standard and non-standard). Such an enterprise would be impracticable given the vast number of discourse markers in Arabic. The concentration will be on ten discourse markers, five of which (*lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin*, *bal* and *fa*) are only used in Standard Arabic and the other five (*bass*, *la-heik*, *la-ha-sabab*, *ma'nāt-o* and *bi-ittālī*) are only used in Syrian Arabic as a representative of the non-standard form of Arabic¹. I have chosen these ten discourse markers for the sake of comparison with Blakemore's analysis of *so* and *but* in English on the one hand and the intricate differences between discourse markers in Standard Arabic and Syrian Arabic on the other.

Data in this study come from different sources. As far as the Standard Arabic is concerned, data are collected from the Holy Quran and from novels and newspapers. As for the data from Syrian Arabic, they are collected from TV programmes, soap operas and some extracts from conversations with friends and

¹ I have chosen to discuss the use of discourse markers in Syrian Arabic because I am a native speaker of Syrian Arabic. In addition, there is a good number of my colleagues in the School of English in Newcastle University who are also native speakers of Syrian Arabic. This was a great chance to discuss the data with them.

colleagues. Composed examples and scenarios are also used for illustration in both Standard Arabic and Syrian Arabic. Most data and examples used in this study have been glossed and translated by me into English. Some interesting translation problems have been faced. This was, in particular, the case with *fa* which does not easily lend itself to a proper translation in English, due to the vagueness of its meaning.

Chapter 1 provides a broad outline of the theoretical framework of this thesis, namely Relevance Theory. It starts by offering a historical background of this theory and the development it has undergone. I discuss Grice's theory of communication and show how Relevance Theory is considered as a development of it. I go further to highlight the main points of difference between Grice's theory and Sperber & Wilson's Relevance Theory regarding utterance interpretation.

Grice can be seen as offering a theory of the distinction between 'explicit' and 'implicit'. According to him, 'explicit' is equal to 'what is said'—semantically determined by the literal meaning of the conventional words used in the utterance, while 'implicit' is pragmatically derived by exploiting one or more of the conversational maxims. In other words, the distinction between explicit and implicit is mutually exclusive in Grice's theory. The proposition explicitly expressed in a certain utterance is an outcome of linguistic decoding and any other communicated aspect is considered as an implicature, pragmatically derived. This is questioned in Relevance Theory, which argues, against Grice, that the explicit/implicit distinction does not align with the distinction between linguistic encoding and inference. There are cases where what is explicitly communicated

(what is said, for Grice) is not determined by the literal meaning of words in the sentence but is rather pragmatically derived, as is the case of ‘reference assignment’ and ‘disambiguation’. Furthermore, in other cases, what is implicated (for Grice) is not pragmatically determined, but encoded, as in Grice’s notion of ‘conventional implicature’. Relevance Theory treats the explicit/implicit distinction differently, in terms of explicature vs. implicature. The important point here is that pragmatic inference is involved not only in deriving the implicature, but also in deriving the explicature.

The explicature/implicature distinction (and the problems associated with it) is discussed in some detail due to its close relation to the notion of procedural meaning discussed in this thesis. We know that Grice’s notion of ‘conventional implicature’ has been replaced by the notion of ‘procedural meaning’ in Relevance Theory. The notion of ‘conventional implicature’ has been criticised by many pragmatists (Rieber 1997; Bach 1994, 1999; Wilson and Sperber 1993 and Blakemore 1987, 2002; Levinson 1983; Kempson 1975 and Carston 2002). Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) notion of procedural meaning tries to account for the meaning of discourse markers without appeal to quote ‘conventional implicature’.

The investigation shows that the procedural meaning encoded by discourse markers can constrain either the explicit or the implicit side of the utterance interpretation. In some cases, such as the case of *fa*, it can constrain both the explicit and the implicit side of the utterance interpretation. The notions of cognitive effect, context and processing effort are also discussed in this thesis because Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) account of procedural meaning revolves

around these very notions. According to Blakemore, a procedure encoded by a certain discourse marker controls the utterance interpretation in the sense that it guides the hearer to the context under which the utterance is relevant. In other words, the use of a linguistic expression with encoded procedural meaning maximises cognitive effects by directing the hearer to the choice of context needed in the utterance interpretation and thereby, it saves the hearer processing effort in interpreting the utterance.

Chapter 2 reviews some of the core distinctions in semantics and pragmatics namely the truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional and the conceptual/procedural distinctions and highlights some possible confusion in literature. It starts by discussing the relationship between linguistic meaning and truth conditions by reference to Strawson's (1971) and Davidson's (1967, 1984) truth-conditional theories of linguistic meaning, in which they argue that there is a pairing up between natural language and the real world.

The chapter, then, moves to discuss some linguistic expressions whose encoded meaning does not contribute to truth-conditional content of utterance in which they occur such as personal pronouns (*I, he, she* etc.), sentence adverbials (*seriously, sadly*), focus adverbs (*even, too, also*) and discourse markers (*so, after all, but* etc.).

The second half of the chapter concentrates on the analysis of linguistic meaning and its relation to truth conditions in Relevance Theory. In this concern, (Blakemore 1987) assumes that the meaning encoded by linguistic expressions is either conceptual or procedural. Conceptual encoding contributes to the truth

conditions of utterances while procedural encoding does not. This claim has been revisited by Wilson and Sperber (1993) and Blakemore (2002), who recognise that such parallelism does not hold.

In general, the chapter offers arguments suggesting that the parallelism between these two distinctions does indeed not hold. There are some linguistic expressions whose meanings both contribute truth-conditional content and constrain the inferential part of the interpretation of the utterance in which they occur. It also claims that the conceptual/procedural distinction is not mutually exclusive; there are some linguistic expressions which encode both conceptual and procedural meanings and others with conceptual encoding but used procedurally. Given that, and as far as this distinction is concerned, this chapter classifies linguistic expressions into three categories: i) linguistic expressions that encode purely conceptual meaning, such as 'nouns', 'verbs', 'adjectives' and 'manner adverbs', ii) linguistic expressions that encode conceptuo-procedural meaning, such as 'pronouns,' the definite article 'the' and 'sentence adverbials', iii) linguistic expressions that encode purely procedural meaning. These are discourse markers such as *so*, *but*, *therefore* and *after all*.

Chapter 3 investigates the semantics and pragmatics of discourse markers in English. It discusses the different views researchers have on the analysis of discourse markers. These views are classified into two main approaches. The first approach analyses discourse markers as linguistic devices that contribute to the interpretation of discourse by signalling coherence relations in discourse. According to this approach, text interpretation is highly dependable on the

identification of certain coherence relations between discourse units. This approach is called the coherence-based approach and its main proponents are Schiffrin (1987) and Fraser (1988).

The second, relevance-theoretic, approach considers discourse markers as pragmatic devices that encode procedural meanings which constrain the inferential part of the utterance interpretation by guiding the hearer/reader to reach the interpretation, consistent with the principle of relevance. Proponents of this approach argue that the use of some discourse markers controls the hearer's choice of context against which, he should interpret the utterance as relevant and thus saves him effort in the process of utterance interpretation (Blakemore 1987, 2002, Blass 1990; Iten 1998 and Wilson & Sperber 1993).

The chapter gives a theoretical evaluation of both approaches, discusses the points of differences and similarities between them and concludes by claiming that the relevance-based approach is a more reliable theoretical framework for studying discourse markers than the coherence-based one.

Chapter 4 offers a relevance-theoretic procedural analysis of some linguistic expressions in Standard Arabic. The chapter starts by reviewing some literature written on discourse markers in Arabic, mainly by Al-Batal (1994) and Al-Khalil (2005). The first part of this chapter argues against Al-Khalil's two claims that discourse markers in Arabic are only used in the non-standard form and that Conversation Analysis is the only framework that can account for the use of discourse markers in Arabic.

Regarding the first claim, this chapter argues that discourse markers can be used in both standard and non-standard forms of Arabic due to the diglossic nature of this language. However, the discourse markers used in the standard form have different counterparts used in the non-standard form. For example, *lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin* and *bal* which are used in Standard Arabic, cannot be used in Syrian Arabic, where *bass* is used instead. As for the second claim, the chapter argues that Relevance Theory provides a more appropriate and ideal account for analysing discourse markers in both Standard Arabic and Syrian Arabic.

The second part of this chapter discusses the procedural meaning encoded by four discourse markers used in Standard Arabic namely *lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin* and *bal* which are equivalent to *but* in English. The argument is that each one of these discourse markers stands for one of the four different implementations of the general procedure encoded by *but* in English, i.e. *lakinna* stands for the denial *but*, *bainama* (= contrastive *but*), *lakin* (= cancellation *but*) and *bal* (= correction *but*). This leads to the claim that *but* in English encodes a general procedure that can be implemented to derive different meanings that can be represented by different lexical expressions in other languages as data from Standard Arabic show.

The third and last part of this chapter investigates the procedural meaning encoded by one of the most interesting discourse markers in Standard Arabic, namely *fa*. This chapter claims that *fa* encodes a general procedure that can be implemented by the hearer/reader to derive different meanings: ‘sequentiality’, ‘immediacy’, ‘non-intervention’ and ‘causality’.

Chapter 5 discusses the procedural meanings encoded by some discourse markers used in Syrian Arabic. The scope of discussion has been limited to five discourse markers: *bass*, *la-heik*, *la-ha-sabab*, *ma'nāto* and *bi-ittālī*. The chapter argues that, like *but* in English, *bass* in Syrian Arabic encodes a general procedure that can be implemented to derive four different meanings: 'denial of expectation', 'contrast', 'correction' and 'cancellation'. These four different meanings are represented by four different lexical expressions in Standard Arabic. The chapter claims that *bass* can also encode conceptual meanings such as 'enough', 'stop it' and 'only'. Given that, *bass* is listed under the conceptuo-procedural linguistic expressions discussed in chapter 2.

As regards the other four discourse markers, this chapter argues that they are all equivalent to *fa* in Standard Arabic and *so* in English. The first two *la-heik* and *la-ha-sabab* are analysed as an implementation (causality) of the general procedure encoded by *fa*, while the second two *ma'nāt-o* and *bi-ittālī* encode logical (inferential) consequence.

CHAPTER 1

1. Relevance Theory and Linguistic Communication

1.1. Introduction

Relevance Theory is a theory of communication grounded in psychology and cognition. The theory treats utterance interpretation as a cognitive process. According to relevance theorists, utterances are linguistically encoded inputs to inferential processes which affect the cognitive environment of the hearer. By the same token, utterances are verbal stimuli decoded by hearers to derive an assumption or set of assumptions treated as the representations of the actual world and/or thoughts (Sperber and Wilson 1995:2).

The whole theory is based on what is called the ‘principle of relevance’ and the balance of the two notions of ‘contextual effect’ and ‘processing effort’. This will be discussed in more detail in section 1.3.6:

Principle of relevance:

Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995:158)

By saying that a certain utterance is relevant, we mean that it achieves some contextual effect (Sperber and Wilson 1995:108). The strength or weakness of the contextual effect determines the degree of relevance an utterance has. Thus, utterances can be more relevant or less relevant depending on the contextual effect they achieve. According to the principle of relevance, when addressing someone, the speaker creates an expectation that her² utterance will achieve enough contextual effects to be worth processing on the one hand, and will not cause him any unnecessary processing effort on the other hand. This is known in Relevance Theory (RT henceforth) as ‘optimal relevance’ (Sperber and Wilson 1995:144). The hearer’s task, in this respect, is to assess what contextual effect could have been intended by the speaker. To put it differently, the hearer starts by making assumptions about the context under which the utterance is worth processing. Given this, relevance can be seen as a result of trade-off between contextual effect and processing effort, and the expectation of optimal relevance is seen as automatically created by utterances.

RT has developed in several stages. It starts with Wilson and Sperber’s (1981) paper “On Grice’s theory of conversation”. In this paper, Wilson and Sperber acknowledge their debt to Grice’s theory of conversation and indicate that most recent theories of utterance interpretation are a direct result of Grice’s William James Lectures (Wilson and Sperber 1981:155). However, they identify three areas of dissatisfaction with this theory. Firstly, they argue that the distinction between saying and implicating is not as simple as Grice suggests.

² In this thesis, I refer to speaker as ‘she’ and hearer as ‘he’.

Grice's maxims, they suggest, are not used only in deriving the implicature but also in deriving the proposition explicitly communicated by the utterance. This will be the focus of section 1.2.3. Secondly, there is more to the interpretation of 'metaphor' and 'irony' than the mere knowledge of the maxims of conversation as Grice assumes. Thirdly, not all Grice's conversational maxims are necessary for the derivation of implicatures. Sperber and Wilson argue that the maxims can be reduced into one general principle, the principle of relevance—a 'principle' rather than a 'maxim'. More detail on this will be given in section 1.2.1. The full presentation of relevance theory has been published in *'Relevance: Communication and Cognition'* (Sperber and Wilson 1986) and updated in (Sperber and Wilson 1995), (Sperber and Wilson 1998), (Wilson and Sperber 2002), (Wilson and Sperber 2004), and (Carston 2002).

This chapter is structured as follows: in section 1.2, I discuss Grice's theory of conversation and show how this theory constitutes the main base of Sperber and Wilson's RT. I also investigate some problems in Grice's theory and highlight the points of disagreement between Grice and Sperber & Wilson on utterance interpretation. In section 1.3, I discuss the cognitive nature of RT, investigate its mechanisms and discuss some crucial ideas such as 'ostension', 'inference', 'context' and 'cognitive effect'. Section 1.4 investigates the role relevance plays in verbal communication. This section also tackles some problems in RT such as the explicature/implicature distinction and the idea of 'development of logical form'. Section 1.5 is a conclusion.

1.2. Grice's Theory of Conversation

1.2.1. The Cooperative Principle and conversational maxims

Grice's theory of conversation aims to highlight the fact that there is no one-to-one mapping between linguistic form and utterance meaning. This is clearly shown in Grice's (1967) distinction between 'saying' and 'implicating' as we will see in section 1.2.2. In this concern, Grice analyses how speakers are able to deliver their implicit messages and how hearers are able to understand these messages. In order to explain this process, Grice (1967) introduces what he calls the Cooperative Principle and its four dependent conversational maxims:

The Cooperative Principle:

"Make your contribution such as required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged."

The Maxims:

Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required.

Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Quality: Do not say what you believe to be false.

Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Relation: Be relevant

Manner: Avoid obscurity of expression.

Avoid ambiguity.

Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).

Be orderly.

Grice (1967:45-46)

Grice (1967) assumes that there is an accepted way of verbal communication between speakers and hearers who look at it as 'standard behaviour'. Accordingly, when we produce our utterances, we as hearers are entitled to assume that a speaker's utterances express what she believes to be true, that they offer the right amount of information, no more no less; that they are relevant and that they are produced in clear and understandable way. If it is the case that a certain utterance does not on the surface conform to the way presented by Grice, this does not mean that the utterance is nonsense and that the speaker is not being cooperative or deceptive, but rather there is an implied meaning to be inferred by the hearer. This is known as 'maxim flouting' in Grice's terms.

It can be noted that Grice establishes a clear link between the Cooperative Principle (and the maxims) on the one hand and the derivation of conversational implicature on the other hand. He (1967) points out that sometimes the participants are unable to fulfil the maxims. The unfulfilment of the maxims can take different forms: the participant might violate a maxim, and in this case he might be liable to mislead. He might opt out from the Cooperative Principle and its maxims and show his unwillingness to be cooperative in the way the maxims require. He might face a clash; he might not be able to fulfil the first maxim of Quantity (be as informative as required) without violating the second maxim of Quality (have adequate evidence for what you say). Finally, the participant might flout a maxim. That is, he blatantly fails to fulfil the maxim. In this case, the hearer may feel that the speaker is being misleading and uncooperative on the assumption that she is not fulfilling some maxims just to avoid violating others. If

the hearer is aware of this minor problem, he will be able to understand that the speaker is not misleading but rather wanting him to derive some intended meaning of her utterance.

What Grice argues here is that maxim flouting gives rise to cases of conversational implicature. Once the maxims are flouted in such a way, it is better to say that the maxims are *exploited*. To demonstrate the role conversational maxims and principle play in generating conversational implicature, see the following example:

A: When is he travelling?

B: Some time next week.

In this dialogue, A is asking B about their mutual friend C who is planning to go back home for the Christmas vacation. *Prima facie*, B's answer violates the first maxim of Quantity since it is less informative than what is required by A's question. However, B's answer should not be considered as opting out because the violation of this maxim can be explained by the fact that if B's answer is more informative than it is, it will clash with the second maxim of Quality (don't say what you lack adequate evidence for). So the implicature communicated by B's utterance is:

(1) I don't know exactly when he is travelling.

Consider, by contrast, Grice's (1967) example in which the maxim of Quantity is flouted. A teacher is writing a letter of reference to his student who is applying

for a philosophy job. The teacher's letter reads as follows:

- (2) Dear Sir, Mr. X's command of English is excellent and his attendance at tutorials has been regular.

This letter seems to be less informative than what is required as reference for a job. However, it cannot be said that the teacher is opting out or being uncooperative. The teacher actually has more information about the student than what he wrote in the reference letter but he does not want to include any information that he is reluctant to write since the student is his own. Given that, the implicit message of the teacher's letter is (3):

- (3) The student is not good at philosophy.

Wilson and Sperber (1981) argue against Grice's claim that any case of conversational implicature is a direct result of flouting one or more of the conversational maxims. They maintain that there are cases in which the maxim is flouted without leading to a conversational implicature. Consider their example (1981:173):

- (4) a. Mary ate peanut.
b. Mary put a peanut in her mouth, chewed and swallowed it.

According to Grice's sub-maxim of Manner (be brief), (4-a) is more appropriate than (4-b). If the speaker uses (4-b) rather than (4-a), then she violates the maxim

of brevity and thus the result should be a conversational implicature. But as can be noticed, there is nothing implicated by the speaker of (4-b).

1.2.2. What is said vs. what is implicated

In his pragmatic theory of conversation, Grice aims at providing a framework in which every aspect of utterance interpretation can be fitted. He draws a distinction between what is 'actually said' and what is 'tacitly implicated'. According to Grice, 'what is said' is determined by semantics. What is meant by 'semantics' here is 'linguistic semantics' or the semantics of linguistic expressions, i.e. 'linguistically encoded meaning', which is assumed to be truth-conditional. By contrast, 'what is implicated' is determined by pragmatic inference (social and contextual factors and conversational maxims). Implicature covers all aspects of meaning that are not linguistically encoded and thus not semantic. Let us take one of Grice's examples and see how this distinction between 'what is said' and 'what is implicated' is drawn. Suppose that A asks B how C is getting in his job and B utters (5) as a reply to A's question (Grice 1967):

(5) Oh, quite well, I think: he likes his colleagues, and has not been to prison yet.

According to Grice, what is said in (5) is determined by the conventional meaning of the words used in the utterance. As far as Grice's theory of conversation is concerned, this is true in most cases. However, Grice (1967) refers to some cases in which the conventional meaning of the words used in the utterance takes part in

determining what is implicated rather than what is said. He labels these cases as 'conventional implicatures'. This will be discussed in more detail in section 1.4.3.

Now, on the assumption that the hearer of (5) knows English and that he is not provided with any previous knowledge of the circumstances under which this sentence is uttered, he will be able to understand the following: some particular person X is expressing a certain thought about a particular person Y at the time of the utterance. The thought is that Y has good relations with the people he works with, and that Y has not yet been imprisoned. In fact, this is the literal meaning encoded by the linguistic expressions in (5). Grice argues that what is communicated is not just what is said (the literal meaning of words) but a mixture of what is said and what is implicated. Given the circumstances and the context under which (5) is uttered, the hearer will recognise that the speaker's communicative intention goes beyond the encoded message that there is some male person who has got good relations with his colleagues and that this person has not been to prison yet. He will recognise that the speaker is suggesting (or implying) that the person is *dishonest*.

This aspect of what is meant by the speaker (the utterance meaning) is not linguistically encoded by the linguistic expressions used in the utterance. Or, to put it in Grice's terms, what is communicated (in this case) is not a part of the conventional meaning of the words used in the utterance, but rather implicated (pragmatically inferred). The derivation of implicature in Grice's framework is related to a set of conversational maxims and the Cooperative Principle. Grice argues that, whenever one or more of the conversational maxims is exploited, it

will lead to an implicature³, as we will see in section 1.2.3 which focuses on the role conversational maxims play in generating conversational implicatures.

As can be noticed, the Gricean distinction between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’ appears to be simple and straightforward: what is (linguistically) semantically encoded is actually said and what is pragmatically derived is tacitly implicated. However relevance theorists argue that there are cases, and perhaps quite pervasively, where Grice’s distinction between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’ does not hold. These are the cases where ‘what is said’ (as understood by Grice) is not determined by the conventional meaning of the sentence but rather pragmatically determined as we will see in the next section.

1.2.3. Explicit vs. implicit

The Gricean distinction between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’ is mutually exclusive. On the one hand, Grice argues that any proposition actually expressed by an utterance is the outcome of decoding the linguistic expressions used in this utterance. This is assumed to construct the *explicit* side of the utterance interpretation. By contrast, he claims that any implicature communicated by the utterance would be considered pragmatically derived using the conversational maxims. This is assumed to construct the *implicit* side of the utterance interpretation. A general rule in Grice’s theory is that what is explicit is determined by linguistically encoded semantics and what is implicit is determined by pragmatics. Pragmatics, in Grice’s terms, is ‘post-semantic’. In other words,

³ The term ‘implicature’ is used here to refer to ‘conversational implicature’.

implicature is not said but conveyed by the saying of what is said (so we need to have ‘what is said’ before we can get ‘what is implicated’).

Wilson and Sperber (1981) disagree with Grice in his correlation of the explicit/implicit distinction with the distinction between ‘linguistically encoded’ and ‘pragmatically derived’. This correlation cannot account for cases where the proposition explicitly communicated is not determined by semantics but rather pragmatically inferred. Wilson and Sperber (1981) suggest that Grice’s correlation should be reviewed to take account of such cases, which they maintain are quite pervasive in communication.

In some (perhaps many) cases, what is communicated by an utterance is not linguistically encoded but rather pragmatically derived. This is particularly the case of ‘disambiguation’ and ‘reference assignment’. Other cases are when conversational maxims such as ‘relation’ or ‘informativeness’ are observed. Consider Wilson and Sperber’s (1981:159) example:

(6) Refuse to admit them.

The above utterance can have different interpretations in different contexts due to the ambiguity of the word ‘admit’ on the one hand, and the reference of the pronoun ‘them’ on the other. If (6) is uttered in a context where it is an answer to (7), then ‘admit’ would mean ‘confess’ and the exact referent to the pronoun ‘them’ would be ‘mistakes’:

(7) What should I do when I make mistakes?

However, if it is uttered in a different context where it is an answer to (8), then ‘admit’ would mean ‘let in’ and the exact referent to the pronoun ‘them’ would be ‘people whose tickets have expired’.

(8) What should I do with people whose tickets have expired?

In this case, the two different interpretations of (6) are (9) and (10):

(9) Refuse to confess your mistakes.

(10) Refuse to let people in.

As can be noticed, there are three factors that play a role in the interpretation of (6). Firstly, Grice’s maxim of ‘relation’, i.e. the utterance of (6) can have two different interpretations in relation to two different contexts. Secondly, ‘disambiguation’: (6) can have two different interpretations depending on the two different meanings of the word ‘admit’. Thirdly, ‘reference assignment’: (6) can have two different interpretations due to the fact that two different referents can be assigned to the pronoun ‘them’. The second and third factors were first referred to by Grice (1967:25).

If Grice’s account of the explicit/implicit distinction is true, then the different meanings of (6) represented by (9) and (10) should be implicatures simply because pragmatics is involved in deriving them, in the sense that the maxim of relation, disambiguation and reference assignment play a role in constructing these two meanings. However, (9) and (10) are not implicatures of (6)

but rather are explicitly communicated by (6). For RT, in other words, they contribute to the ‘explicature’.

Consider another example in which, in addition to ‘disambiguation’ and ‘reference assignment’, the maxim of ‘informativeness’ is involved in deriving what is explicitly communicated:

(11) He plays well.

After disambiguating ‘play’ and assigning reference to the pronoun ‘he’ (which refers to John rather than Mike or Peter), what is explicitly communicated by the utterance of (11) could be the following:

(12) John plays football well.

Now, if Grice’s claim that what is explicitly communicated by a certain utterance is only determined by semantic decoding then what is proposed by (11) should be (13):

(13) Some human male person plays something well.

But since (12) entails (13), i.e. whenever (12) is true, (13) is true and given the fact that (12) is more informative than (13), then (12) would be what is explicitly communicated by (11) and not (13).

This undermines Grice’s claim that any proposition explicitly communicated by a certain utterance should be semantically decodable because some aspects of what is explicitly communicated are pragmatically determined, as

we have seen in (11) where the maxim of informativeness has been exploited to determine the proposition explicitly communicated.

In fact, this is an attempt by Wilson and Sperber (1981) to criticise Grice's said/implicated distinction which was considered as a central axis in the theory of pragmatics for quite few years. In short, they seek to point out (contra Grice) that what is 'explicitly communicated' cannot be equated with what is 'linguistically encoded'.

1.3. Relevance and cognition

1.3.1. Relevance: communication, ostension and inference

Sperber and Wilson (1995:23) point out that there are two different methods of conveying information: a) by giving direct evidence of the information to be conveyed; b) by giving direct evidence of the communicator's intention to convey the information. As far as the notion of communication is concerned, Sperber and Wilson do not consider the first way of conveying information as a form of communication because according to them, any state of affairs provides direct evidence for a certain assumption without *communicating* this assumption. They also argue that this method is only used with information for which direct evidence can be provided. What counts as a form of communication, for RT, is the second method because it involves the communicator's intention on the one hand and the audience's recognition of this intention on the other hand. This method can be used for any information whatsoever, as long as direct evidence of

the communicator's intention can be given. Sperber and Wilson call this method 'inferential communication' or 'ostensive-inferential communication'.

Now consider the two following scenarios to demonstrate the difference between the two methods of conveying information:

(i) First method: John and Clare are sitting in a restaurant and having a chat before the waiter serves their lunch. Clare wants to inform John that she has cut her hand. She can simply do that by raising her bandaged hand to be seen by John. By that, she is providing him with direct evidence that she has cut her hand. In this case, Clare's intention is fulfilled whether or not John is aware of it. He is able to realise that Clare has cut her hand without realising that she intends him to realise that she has done so.

(ii) Second method: John and Clare have just finished their syntax class. John would like to have some recreation. He asks Clare for a tennis game in the university sport centre. Clare raises her bandaged hand to show that she has cut her hand. By raising her bandaged hand, Clare is providing direct evidence of her intention that she will be unable to go with John to the tennis game because she has cut her hand. John will recognise Clare's intention and infer that she will not be able to go for this tennis game. Clare's behaviour, in this case, is *ostensive* behaviour or simply *ostension*.

As can be noticed, the second method describes the process of communication in terms of intention and inference. The intention is represented by the ostensive behaviour the communicator provides the audience⁴ with, while the inference is the set of routes the audience follows to recognise the meaning (or the implication) of the communicator's ostension. To find out how this process of communication

⁴ For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to communicator and audience as speaker and hearer.

is achieved and how relevance plays a major role in it, let us consider the following scenario given by (Sperber and Wilson 1995:48): Mary and Peter are sitting on a park bench. Peter leans back deliberately to show Mary something. By this movement, Peter tries to modify Mary's cognitive environment through making an assumption manifest to her. Mary pays attention to Peter's deliberate movement because individuals usually pay attention to assumptions and phenomena which are relevant to them. She is aware that Peter's action is to draw her attention to new important and worth processing information that can change her expectation of the world.

Sperber and Wilson (1995) point out that human beings are very complex information-processing devices and that human cognition always aims to improve the individual's knowledge of the world by adding new information which is more accurate and easily retrievable and capable of changing the cognitive environment of the individual. They look at relevance as the single property that makes information worth processing for human beings. As far as the idea of relevance is concerned, they identify three types of information:

Some information is old: it is already presented in the individual's representation of the world. Unless it is needed for the performance of a particular cognitive task, and easier to access from the environment than from memory, such information is not worth processing at all. Other information is not only new but entirely unconnected with any thing in the individual's representation of the world. It can only be added to this representation as isolated bits and pieces, and this usually means too much processing cost for too little benefit. Still other information is new but connected

with old information. When these interconnected new and old items of information are used together as premises in an inference process, further new information can be derived: information which could not have been inferred without this combination of old and new premises. When the processing of new information gives rise to such a multiplication effect, we call it *relevant*. The greater the multiplication effect, the greater the relevance.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995:48)

Suppose that as a result of Peter's leaning back, Mary can see the following: an ice cream vendor, an ordinary stroller and her acquaintance William. These three objects among others are more or less manifest to Mary.

As far as Sperber and Wilson's classification of information is concerned, the ice cream vendor is old information because she has already noticed him when she entered the park. This does not affect her cognitive environment at all. The stroller is new information because she has not seen him before but this does not change her views of the world too since this is unconnected to any old information in her cognitive environment. The arrival of William is the new information that affects Mary's cognitive environment because it is connected to some old information that this person is very silly and boring. This would count as the most relevant information to Mary among the three and thus it is worth processing. Mary does not consider processing the other two pieces of information because they do not seem relevant enough to her.

Sperber and Wilson argue that it is the guarantee of relevance that makes it possible for Mary to infer that Peter's behaviour is ostensive, i.e. the assumption

has been intentionally made manifest by him. The inference process might go as follows: Mary notices Peter's behaviour and recognises that this behaviour has been made deliberately to draw her attention to some new information relevant to her in one way or another. She looks at the area that has become visible as a result of Peter's leaning back and sees the ice vendor, the stroller and the dreadful William. She ignores the ice vendor and the stroller because no assumptions can follow from them and concentrates on William's arrival through which she can draw many conclusions. Given this, Mary becomes confident that Peter's intention was to draw her attention to William's arrival which she considers the most relevant information that is worth her attention.

In this section, I have presented a short analysis of the cognitive nature of RT and concentrated on certain notions such as information processing, ostension and inference. The next section discusses the difference between informative intention and cognitive intention in RT.

1.3.2. Informative and communicative intention

Sperber and Wilson (1995:54) emphasise that any account of communication is based on two questions: 'what is communicated?' and 'how is communication achieved?'. A generally accepted answer to the first question is that *meaning* is what is communicated. Though there has been some disagreement on a unified definition of meaning.

Sperber and Wilson (1995) argue that limiting communication in general to linguistic communication can lead to some distortions and misperceptions.

Suppose that Clare visits John on a cold winter day, she knocks at the door and John lets her in and asks her to have a seat in the living room opposite to an open window. While they are having a chat, Clare starts to tremble ostensively. John recognises that Clare's behaviour is ostensive, i.e. Clare wants to make some assumptions manifest to him or draw his attention to some relevant information. John looks around and sees that the window is open. In this scenario, a part of what is communicated by Clare's non-linguistic behaviour could be linguistically, explicitly expressed simply by uttering the following 'It is cold over here. Could you please close the window?' In other words, Clare can achieve the same communicative intention by putting it into words.

As can be noticed in the above situation, what is non-verbally communicated can be communicated by linguistic means through paraphrasing the situation and putting it into words, but this does not seem to be always the case. Imagine that after Clare's behaviour, John closes the window, serves Clare a cup of tea and goes on chatting. Clare recalls her last birthday and sighs in an ostensive way intending to draw John's attention to some events related to her past birthday. John is aware of this ostension and recognises that it carries some relevant information to him. It reminds him of some miserable events associated with Clare's last birthday such as that she failed her syntax exam, her dad died, John had a car accident and had his left hand broken, etc. All these memories, in addition to others, are raised by Clare's sigh. Unlike the previous case, Clare's communicative intention could not be paraphrased in one single explicitly expressed linguistic utterance.

The distortions and misperceptions resulted in limiting communication to what is linguistically explicitly expressed is also felt at the level of verbal communication. Pragmatists argue that what is communicated by a linguistic utterance is a set of assumptions (speaker's meaning). One of these assumptions is explicitly expressed, i.e. the content of this assumption is linguistically decoded. The other assumptions are implicitly conveyed through pragmatic inference. Consider the following example:

- (14) John: Are you free this evening?
 Clare: My syntax exam is tomorrow.

Clare's explicit assumption is that she has a syntax exam on the following day and this can be decoded through the linguistic expressions of her utterance. However, this is not all that is communicated by the utterance. There are assumptions which are pragmatically inferred such as 'Clare will not go out with John', 'she will study very hard to pass the exam', and 'she will be under pressure and might not see John again until she has taken the exam'.

What Sperber and Wilson seek to demonstrate is that the informative intention is not limited to what is linguistically expressed; it could be a thought, attitude, feeling or even an impression. Whatever it is, the main function of the speakers' informative intention is to modify the hearer's cognitive environment:

Informative intention: to make manifest or more manifest to the audience as set of assumptions I.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995:58)

For example, in (14) Clare's informative intention in uttering 'my syntax exam is tomorrow' could be described in the following lines: Clare intends to make manifest to John the assumption that she has a syntax exam on the following day in addition to any further assumption that is required to make this utterance relevant to John such as those implicitly conveyed by (14).

The second question Sperber and Wilson aim to reply is 'how is communication achieved?'. To answer this question, Sperber and Wilson introduce their notion of *communicative intention*. They argue that, for communication to be successful, the speaker's informative intention should be recognised by the hearer. Once it is recognised, the speaker's communicative intention is fulfilled and the communication is achieved:

Communicative intention: to inform the audience of one's informative intention.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995:29)

In normal situations, the hearer's recognition of the speaker's informative intention will lead to the fulfilment of the communicative intention as is the case in (14): Clare intends to inform John that she has a syntax exam and once John recognises this intention, he will go through some inferences, relate it to his question and come up with the assumption that Clare will not be able to go with him. However, in some situations, the communicative intention can be fulfilled without the fulfilment of the informative intention. Suppose that Clare, who is not that good at math, wants John to help her in some problems of her math homework. She does not want to ask him openly to do that for her. Instead, she

brings her math book and starts scratching her head. At this stage, she does not expect him to come and help her, since she has not asked him directly to do that. But if he comes and offers his help, then Clare's communicative intention will be achieved without Johns' recognition of her original informative intention.⁵

In fact, this type of communication is not considered as true by Strawson (1964) and Schiffer (1972) who argue that the speaker's communicative intention should be wholly overt. Schiffer points out that the communicative intention can be made overt by the notion of mutual knowledge, i.e. being mutually manifest to the speaker and hearer. What we have in the above situation is that Clare intends to inform John that she needs help without even asking for that, thus her intention is not made manifest to John. Given that, Sperber and Wilson found it necessary to reformulate their notion of communicative intention:

Communicative intention: to make mutually manifest to audience and communicator that the communicator has this informative intention.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995:61)

1.3.3. The principle of relevance

The ostensive-inferential communication does not explain how ostension works, i.e. how the ostensive stimulus makes the speaker's informative intention manifest or more manifest to the hearer. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 155) suggest that the best way to explain ostension is through the principle of relevance and this will be the focus of this section.

⁵ Burton-Roberts (PC) disagrees with Sperber and Wilson in this regard. He pointed out to me that Clare, in this case, has an informative intention and NOT a communicative one. However, she does not want John to recognise this informative intention.

An act of ostensive communication will not achieve its effect without attracting the hearer's attention. Thus, the speaker's ostensive stimulus can be seen as a request for the hearer's attention. If the speaker requests the hearer to behave in a certain way, then she has good reasons to think that it would be in the hearer's interest as well as hers to comply with the request. Ostensive communication requires the involvement of the hearer in the form of 'appropriate cognitive behaviour' (attention), as Sperber and Wilson (1995) put it. For instance, if Clare wants to request John's attention by pointing to something, lifting up something or even talking about something, then John is entitled to think that the stimulus Clare is trying to draw his attention to is relevant to him or at least he has the reasons to think that it is.

Sperber and Wilson (1995) argue that an ostensive stimulus comes with precise expectations of relevance. Thus, it would not achieve its effect if the hearer does not pay attention to it. It is known that human beings pay attention to phenomena that are relevant to them. Given that, the speaker, when producing her stimulus, must intend to make it manifest to the hearer and herself that the stimulus is relevant to the hearer. The speaker's intention to make mutually manifest that the ostensive stimulus is relevant to the hearer constitutes the basis of the principle of relevance:

An act of ostensive communication automatically communicates a *presumption of relevance*.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995:156)

The overall conclusion that can be drawn from our discussion so far is that the presumption of relevance communicated by the act of ostensive communication means that the ostensive stimulus should be relevant enough to be worth the hearer's attention. However, the presumption of relevance is more specific than that. The relevance of a stimulus is determined by two factors: the effort needed to process the stimulus optimally and the cognitive effect achieved by the optimal processing (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 156). On this basis, to achieve the optimal relevance of a stimulus, the presumption of relevance should never be less than what is required to make the stimulus worth processing and never be more than it is needed to achieve the cognitive effect. If the balance is not kept between these two lines, the relevance of the stimulus will be affected as we will see in section 1.3.6.

In ostensive-inferential communication, the speaker intends to communicate a set of assumptions to the hearer. It is the hearer's interest to assume that the set of assumptions communicated by the speaker is the most relevant information available to the speaker when producing the ostensive stimulus. This set of assumptions creates cognitive effect in the sense that it modifies the cognitive environment of the hearer and thus it is worth processing. However, to achieve her communicative intention, the speaker has to choose one of several possible stimuli to make her informative intention manifest to the hearer. She has to drop out any stimulus that requires more processing effort on the part of the hearer. If these issues, related to effect and effort, are made

mutually manifest to the speaker and hearer, then it could be said that, we have a presumption of optimal relevance:

Presumption of optimal relevance

- (a) The set of assumptions **I** which the communicator intends to make manifest to the addressee is relevant enough to make it worth the addressee's while to process the ostensive stimulus.
- (b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the communicator could have used to communicate **I**.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 158)

And on the basis of this presumption of optimal relevance, Sperber and Wilson redefine their principle of relevance:

Principle of relevance

Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance

(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 158)

Before we move to the next section, let us review some of Sperber and Wilson's comments on the principle of relevance. They argue that this principle is not suitable for all types of communication. It can only be used to account for ostensive communication⁶. It can never account for straightforward encoded types

⁶ Burton-Roberts (PC) disagrees with Sperber and Wilson in defining 'communicative' as 'ostensive'. He allows that non-ostensive stimuli, such as indexical signs, can be communicative. For examples 'black clouds', though not ostensive' communicate that 'it is going to rain'

of communication in which the communicator communicates through encoding direct messages rather than producing relevant information.

They also argue that the principle of relevance does not necessarily guarantee that the communicator always produces optimally relevant stimuli. It only claims that they intend to make the addressees believe that they do that. Given that, the presumption of relevance communicated by an utterance does not have to be accepted as true. There are cases in which the communicator fails to achieve optimal relevance. In such cases, it could be said that the presumption of relevance has been only attempted by the communicator. A communicator who fails to make manifest to her audience that she is being optimally relevant may succeed in making it manifest to her audience that she is attempting to be optimally relevant. However, in ostensive communication, the presumption of relevance should not only be attempted but rather achieved by making manifest to the addressee that the communicator is trying her best to make her stimulus relevant enough to her audience.

It does not follow from the principle of relevance that all the types of ostensive communication should necessarily be at the level of optimal relevance. There are situations in which, a communicator can communicate her assumption in a bad faith. What follows from the principle of relevance is that if the satisfactory level of relevance is not achieved, then it is the assumption that the communicator has tried to be optimally relevant.

1.3.4. The notion of context

Sperber and Wilson (1995:131) define context as the subset of the individual's old assumptions combine with new assumptions to yield a variety of contextual effects. But the issue for them was whether context is chosen or given. In this regard, they assume that much of the literature assumes that the context for the comprehension of a given utterance is not a matter of choice but rather determined or given before the process of comprehension starts or at an early stage of it. They claim that the assumptions explicitly expressed by an utterance combine with the hearer's old assumptions at the start of the utterance comprehension. This, in fact, leads to Sperber and Wilson's first hypothesis about the notion of context in RT:

The context for the comprehension of a given utterance is the set of assumptions explicitly expressed by the preceding utterance in the same dialogue or discourse.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 133)

This could be demonstrated in the following dialogue:

- (15) a. Clare: I have an appointment with the dentist.
 b. John: If you have an appointment with the dentist, I will do the
 housework in your absence.

It can be clearly noted that John's utterance in the above dialogue is intuitively relevant. Given the context in which Clare's assumption is explicitly expressed,

John's answer in (15) implies that he is willing to do the housework in Clare's absence.

Let us now consider the second dialogue which is a modified version of (15):

- (16) a. Clare: I have an appointment with the dentist.
b. John: I will do the housework in your absence.

It seems that there is a slight difference between John's response in the first dialogue and his response in current one. However, they are roughly relevant in the same way though the second is more optimally relevant. Now, if Sperber and Wilson's first hypothesis about context is right, i.e. the context for the comprehension of an utterance is only the assumptions explicitly expressed by the speaker in the preceding utterance, then John's two answers must be treated differently. In other words, John's answer in (16b), unlike his answer in (15b), does not carry any contextual effect whatsoever and for this very reason, it should be irrelevant while in fact it is. This made Sperber and Wilson review their first hypothesis of context and come up with a modified one: the context for the comprehension of a certain utterance contains not only all assumptions explicitly expressed by the speaker in the preceding utterance, but also all implicatures associated with this utterance. Given the second modified version of the first hypothesis of context, it can be seen that Clare's assumption in (16) would be relevant because it can implicate something like (17):

- (17) Clare wishes John to do the housework in her absence.

Eventually, both (16a) and (16b) would be relevant in the above dialogue which contextually implies (18):

(18) John does what Clare wishes him to do.

Consider now a third dialogue which is a modified version of the second one:

- (19) a. Clare: I have an appointment with the dentist.
 b. John: The washing is in the drier, the bedroom is tidy and the dinner is cooked. I will look after the kids.

Roughly speaking, John's answer in this dialogue is almost relevant in the same way as his answers in the first two dialogues (15b) and (16b). However, the relevance of John's answer in (19b) is not accounted for by the first and second hypotheses. (19b) could not have any contextual effect whatsoever in a context of either the assumption explicitly expressed in the preceding utterance or the assumption expressed via any of the implicatures associated with the preceding discourse. (19b) can only be relevant if the following premise has been introduced:

- (20) Doing the housework involves (among other things) tidying up the bedrooms, doing the washing, cooking and looking after the kids.

With this premise added to the context, the following contextual implication could be derived:

- (21) John will do the housework in Clare's absence.

This, in fact, has led Sperber and Wilson to apply another modification on their notion of context to come with a third version of their original hypothesis. In this version, they assume that the context needed for the comprehension of an utterance is not only the assumptions explicitly expressed or implicated by the preceding utterance but also the encyclopaedic entries attached to every concept of these assumptions. After several modifications on the notion of context, Sperber and Wilson eventually settle on the final version:

The context for the comprehension of an utterance consists of the assumptions expressed and implicated by preceding utterances, plus the encyclopaedic entries attached to any concepts used in these assumptions and in the utterance itself, plus the encyclopaedic entries attached to any concepts used in the assumptions contained in the encyclopaedic entries already added to the context.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995:136)

What has been presented so far is evidence that the context for the comprehension of an utterance is determined as given either before the process of comprehension gets started or at early stages of it. Let us now consider the other claim that the context is chosen. Sperber and Wilson (1982:76) argue that the context for the comprehension of an utterance is not given but rather chosen by the hearer during the process of comprehension. In other words, the pre-existing context is not a prerequisite for information processing but rather an outcome of

communication. This is an argument against the original hypotheses about context being given.

In much of the pragmatics literature, it is assumed that context is given independently of the utterance, comprehension takes place and then relevance is established. However, from a psychological point of view, this does not seem to be a reasonable model of comprehension. When communicating, people are not interested in establishing the relevance of new information, but rather obtaining as many contextual effects as possible for the least processing effort. Thus, the goal of comprehension is not the establishment of relevance but maximising the relevance of the information being processed. Given that, the order of priorities in the process of comprehension must be changed. Relevance should come first, then context simply because people hope that the assumption being processed is relevant then they go and search for suitable context that maximises the relevance of that assumption.

It seems to me that Sperber and Wilson try to strike a balance between the two different hypotheses of context. When the context is determined as given, this means that we have the initial context being immediately used before or at the start of the comprehension process. This initial context undertakes some modifications or more precisely some extensions. According to Sperber and Wilson, context can be extended either cognitively⁷ by going back in time and adding some assumptions derived in the previous deductive process or environmentally by adding some assumptions and encyclopaedic entries and

⁷ In this sense, context is 'cognitive environment' (set of assumptions. Given that, 'contextual effect' = 'cognitive effect').

information taken from the physical environment. Such extensions demonstrate that context is partly chosen. And the choice of the appropriate context out of the range of initial and extended contexts is motivated by the search for relevance. The next section will be discussing the notion of relevance to an individual and relevance of phenomena.

1.3.5. Relevance to an individual and relevance of phenomena

In the previous section, the notion of relevance in a context has been discussed. It has been concluded that the context for processing an item of information is partly given and partly chosen. What is given is actually the initial minimal context, whereas what is chosen can be any accessible context resulted from the extension of the main initial context. The section was concluded by highlighting the fact that the choice of any accessible context is motivated by the search for relevance. In this section, the notion of relevance will be discussed, but this time, in relation to an individual and phenomenon. Let us start with ‘relevance to an individual’.

1.3.5.1. Relevance to an individual

During the deduction process, an individual is faced with a particular set of accessible contexts ordered according to an inclusion relation, i.e. each context, apart from the initial context includes one or more smaller contexts, and each context, apart from the maximal context is included in a larger context. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 142) claim that this inclusion order of contexts corresponds psychologically to what they call the ‘order of context accessibility’. That is to say, the context that includes only the initial (minimal context) as a sub-part is

immediately given and thus it is the most accessible context, where as the context which includes the initial context in addition to one or more extensions of this context as a sub-part is not immediately given but rather generated through the extension of the initial context and thus, it is the next most accessible context. If one step is needed to access the first type of context, then, two steps are required to access the second. It is known in RT that a certain amount of effort is required for processing an item of information in a given context. However, effort is needed not just for information processing but also for accessing context. Thus, the less accessible the context the greater the effort needed in accessing such context and vice versa.

To demonstrate the relevance of a certain assumption to an individual in a given context, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 143) present the following six cases:

- (i) An assumption is irrelevant to an individual in all accessible contexts if that assumption is already contained in the initial context. It will be useless to search for relevance beyond the initial context.
- (ii) An assumption is irrelevant to an individual in all accessible contexts if that assumption is not contained or has no contextual effects in these contexts. In this case, there will be no point in extending the initial context for searching for relevance.
- (iii) An assumption is relevant to an individual in initial and accessible contexts if that assumption is already contained in the initial and the accessible contexts. The search for relevance in this case is justified by the extension of the initial context for the sake of getting more contextual effect for less processing effort.

(iv) An assumption is relevant to an individual in all accessible contexts if it is not already contained in any of these contexts but has some contextual implications in the initial context. Here, the justification for context extension is getting more contextual effect.

(v) An assumption is relevant to an individual in some accessible contexts if the assumption is contained in none of these contexts and it has no contextual effect in the initial context, but has some contextual effect in the extensions of the initial context. No relevance will be achieved if the initial context is not extended. The extension of the initial context in this case is similar to the extension of initial contexts in the case (iii) and (iv).

(vi) An assumption is relevant to an individual if it is not contained in the initial context but rather in the maximal context. The assumption has no contextual effects in the context in which it is not contained in. In this case, the relevance will be considered as of *reminder*, the main function of which, as Sperber and Wilson claim, is to make the information accessible for less processing effort than extending the context.

On the basis of these six cases of relevance of a certain assumption to an individual in a given context, Sperber and Wilson provide their *classificatory* definition of relevance to an individual.

Relevance to an individual (classificatory)

An assumption is relevant to an individual at given time if and only if it is relevant in one or more of the contexts accessible to that individual at that time.

(Sperber and Wilson 1986.95: 144)

It does seem that Sperber and Wilson are not only interested in a classificatory definition of relevance to an individual but in a comparative one as well. Their comparative definition of relevance to an individual is based on the 'effect' and 'effort' involved when searching for the relevance of an assumption. On the effort side, what is considered when processing a certain assumption in a given context is not only the effort needed for processing this assumption, but also the effort involved to access the context. On the effect side, processing a certain assumption in a given context yields contextual effect that changes the cognitive environment of an individual and thereby, relevance is achieved. The degree of relevance is measured against the amount of effort required and contextual effect yielded through the whole process. If a balance is kept between 'effect' and 'effort' in the deductive process, then the assumption has been *optimally processed*. This results in achieving the maximal relevance. Sperber and Wilson put that as follows:

Relevance to an individual (comparative)

Extent condition 1: an assumption is relevant to an individual to the extent that the contextual effects achieved when it is optimally processed are large.

Extent condition 2: an assumption is relevant to an individual to the extent the effort required to process it optimally is small.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 145)

1.3.5.2. Relevance of phenomena

In RT, phenomena affect the cognitive environment of an individual by making some assumptions manifest or more manifest to this individual at a given time. A certain phenomenon, whether it is an acoustic, auditory input, verbal stimulus, or even bare silence can make manifest to an individual a large number of assumptions at a given time. However, the individual is not going to construct (or pay attention to) all these assumptions altogether.

Let us take Sperber and Wilson's (1995:151) example for demonstration. The house has its own usual smells which we do not pay attention to in our normal life. But when a distinct smell such as the smell of gas is felt, assumptions such as (22) and (23) will be certainly made:

- (22) There is a smell of gas.
- (23) There is a gas leak somewhere in the house.

However, an assumption such as (24) is less likely to be made in this situation:

- (24) The gas company is not on strike.

It can be noticed that the assumption in (23) is a contextual implication of the assumption expressed in (22) in a context that contains the encyclopaedic entries of the household users of gas. The assumption in (23) is constructed as an attempt to maximise the relevance of (22) by yielding some contextual effects in this given context. Now, since processing the assumption expressed in (22) is governed by the search for relevance, an assumption such as (24) is less likely to

occur simply because the effort needed for processing this assumption will outweigh the contextual effect it yields.

The question that arises now is: why do we, as individuals, pay attention to some assumptions and not to others? A simple answer to this question can be the following: if an assumption can make a change in the individual's cognitive environment, then it is worth our attention. If it does not, then it is not. Take for example the auditory perception; it functions as a filtering system that allows certain items of acoustic information to reach to the level of attention where they become conceptual representations that undertake some central thought processes. Some other acoustic information is kept at the sub-attentive level for the reason that they do not give rise to any assumption of relevance at the conceptual level. Again, as individuals, we are exposed to different types of noise in our normal life. At a household level, parents do not pay attention to the noise coming from the TV, the washing-machine or the water pipes. However, they will be preoccupied with any particular crying coming from their little baby since this does affect their cognitive environment and maximises their cognitive efficiency.

This leads us to say that a certain phenomenon can be more or less efficiently processed depending on whether the assumption (or set of assumptions) it makes can be actually constructed. For some phenomena, the assumption can be filtered out at the conceptual level. For others, they have to be presented conceptually and processed in a rich encyclopaedic context. Given that, the relevance of a phenomenon is:

Relevance of a phenomenon (classificatory)

A phenomenon is relevant to an individual if and only if one or more of the assumptions it makes manifest is relevant to him.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 152)

Similar to what we have in the definition of relevance to an individual, Sperber and Wilson pay more attention to the comparative definition of relevance of a phenomenon than the classificatory one. Not only the effort needed to access the context and process the assumption within this context should be taken into account, but also the effort required for the construction of the assumption being processed. By the same criterion, the less effort required for constructing an assumption the more contextual effect this assumption yields and vice versa. By this, Sperber and Wilson construct their comparative definition of relevance of phenomena:

Relevance of a phenomenon (comparative)

Extent condition 1: a phenomenon is relevant to an individual to the extent that the contextual effects achieved when it is optimally processed are large.

Extent condition 2: a phenomenon is relevant to an individual to the extent that the effort required to process it optimally is small.

(Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 153)

As can be noticed, the comparative definition of relevance to an individual and relevance of phenomena are based on the notion of balance between contextual effect and processing effort which will be the focus of the next section.

1.3.6. Cognitive effects and degrees of relevance

According to Sperber and Wilson (1995: 123), relevance is a matter of degree. It is not only the fact that some phenomena are relevant and some are not, but also how more or less some phenomena are relevant to an individual. The concept of relevance is compared by Sperber and Wilson to the concepts *productivity* and *yield* in a commercial company, which are based on the cost-benefit analysis. A certain commercial company is considered to be productive if it has an output value, no matter how small it is. However the output value is not the only factor that determines the degree of productivity in a certain commercial company. Another factor, to be taken into consideration, is the input—the production cost needed to produce the output. Thus, if two commercial companies have the same output value this does not mean that they are productive in the same degree. The production cost each company needs affects the degree of productivity. In this case, the commercial company which is more productive will be the one that has less production cost. By the same token, a certain assumption with some cognitive effect, no matter how small they are, would be considered relevant. If two assumptions have the same amount of cognitive effect, then input cost for yielding this cognitive effect will be taken into consideration to assess the degree of relevance this assumption achieves. The input cost in relevance theory is

represented by the mental processing effort required to achieve the cognitive effect. In this case, the assumption that requires less processing effort for achieving the cognitive effects would be the more relevant and vice versa.

Consider Sperber and Wilson's *comparative* notion of relevance:

Relevance

Extent condition 1: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that its contextual effects in this context are large.

Extent condition 2: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that effort required to process it in this context is small.

(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 125)

Before giving an example to demonstrate the relativity of relevance, let us spend some lines explaining the notion of cognitive effect. The notion of relevance is mainly based on the cognitive effect that a processed assumption yields in order to change the cognitive environment of the individual. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 132) suggest that "the context used to process a new assumption is, essentially, a subset of individual's old assumption with which the new assumptions combine to yield a variety of contextual effects". Since human cognitive system is geared towards the maximization of relevance, as Sperber and Wilson propose, human beings will undertake a process of maximal improvement to their old assumptions (representation of the world) through integrating new assumptions. Sperber and Wilson (1995) propose that there are three ways in

which new information can improve the person's old assumption or create cognitive effect in the person's cognitive environment:

(i) New information P might yield a *contextual implication*. In other words, an assumption is derived from the synthesis of P and an old assumption (information) C. I will use Blakemore's (2002:61) example for illustration. Suppose we have a context which includes the assumption that if somebody is carrying a bus-pass, s/he is going to take a bus. In this situation, the bus-driver will derive the contextual implication that the person carrying the bus-pass will get on the bus. The derivation of the contextual implication goes as follows:

(a) If somebody is carrying a bus-pass, s/he is going to take the bus.

(Old assumption C)

(b) A person is carrying a bus-pass.

(New assumption P)

(c) This person is going to take the bus

(Contextual implication derived by the synthesis of P and C)

(ii) New information might strengthen an existing assumption. In the same context, the bus-driver's assumption of a person holding a bus-pass might be strengthened if that person is crossing the road in a hurry.

(iii) New information might contradict an existing assumption and eliminate that assumption. The driver's assumption that a person who is carrying a bus-pass wants to travel on the bus might be contradicted and eliminated if that person gives this bus-pass to another person waiting at the bus stop.

It should be taken into account that the derivation of cognitive effects in processing relevance is measured against the processing effort required for the

derivation of these effects. Thus, the more processing effort required for deriving the cognitive effects the less relevant the information will be and vice versa.

From what has been discussed, it can be observed that the assessment of relevance is mainly based on the notion of balance between the input and the output—the cognitive effect and mental processing effort. If the assumption processed yields greater contextual effects for small processing effort, then it is more relevant and if it yields small contextual effects for great processing effort, then it is less relevant. Consider Sperber and Wilson's (1995:125-6) example repeated here as (25):

- (25) a. People who are getting married should consult a doctor about possible hereditary risks to their children.
 b. Two people both of whom have thalassemia should be warned against having children .
 c. Susan has thalassemia.

Processed in the context of (25) the following two assumptions of (26) and (27) would be relevant because they both yield some contextual effects in this context:

- (26) Susan, who has thalassemia, is getting married to Bill.
 (27) Bill, who has thalassemia, is getting married to Susan.

The contextual effect yielded by the assumptions of (26) and (27) in the context of (25) is represented by the contextual implication in (28):

- (28) Susan and Bill should consult a doctor about possible hereditary risks to their children.

However, (27) is more relevant than (26) because (27) has contextual effects which (26) lacks. This is represented by (29):

(29) Susan and Bill should be warned against having children.

Sperber and Wilson argue that since both (26) and (27) have the same conceptual structure then they require the same amount of mental effort to be processed in the context of (25). Since processing the contextual implication of (28) requires some mental effort, this effort should be made in processing the assumption (27) which carries the contextual implication, and not in (26) which does not.

To consider how processing effort can affect the degree of relevance, compare (27) and (30):

(27) Bill, who has thalassemia, is getting married to Susan.

(30) Bill, who has thalassemia, is getting married to Susan, and 1967 was great year for French wine.

When processed in the context of (25), both (27) and (30) have the same contextual effect. The extra information in (30) is not related to the context and hence it has no contextual effects in this context. However, processing the extra information in (30) requires some processing effort, thus according to the comparative definition of relevance, (30) would be less relevant than (26) because it achieves the same contextual effects but with more processing effort.

This section has been an attempt to investigate the cognitive nature of relevance theory and the role this theory plays in linguistic communication. The last section of this chapter will be devoted to tackle some problems in RT such the

explicature/implicature distinction, the idea of conventional implicature and the ‘development of logical form’. This section also introduces Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) notion of procedural meanings and the conceptual/procedural distinction which will be the main focus of the next chapter.

1.4. Relevance Theory and verbal communication

1.4.1. Explicature and implicature in Relevance Theory

Carston (1991) tackles the problem of distinguishing the proposition explicitly communicated (explicature) from what is implicitly conveyed by a certain utterance (implicature). In Grice’s theory of conversation, the proposition explicitly communicated by the utterance is equivalent to ‘what is said’ (linguistically encoded) and any other implicit interpretation would count as ‘what is implicated’. It seems that the picture of communicated assumptions in Grice’s theory is as follows:




Figure 1: Kinds of communicational content in Grice’s theory.

Carston (1988:33) argues, contrary to the above picture presented by Grice, that what is explicitly communicated by an utterance is not 'what is said'. Consider the following example that demonstrates Carston's point:

- (31) a. How does John feel about his new job?
 b. He did not pass his probationary period.

It can be noticed that the following set of assumptions can be communicated by the utterance of (31b):

- (32) a. **John** did not do well in his new job.
 b. John **failed** his preliminary phase of his job.
 c. The manager is not satisfied with John's work experience.
 d. John cannot continue in his new job.
 e. John is not happy.

Given the above set of assumptions (32a-e), the question that arises now is what assumptions of that set contribute to the explicature of the utterance and what assumptions contribute the implicature. There is no doubt (32e) is the implicature communicated by (31b) since it is neither linguistically encoded nor part of what is explicitly communicated.

Grice assumes that the explicit meaning of an utterance is a result of accessing the conventional meaning of the linguistic expressions used in the utterance. But as can be noticed, (32a-b) are not part of that conventional meaning referred to by Grice. They are worked out through applying pragmatic principles: disambiguating the word 'pass' and assigning a referent to the pronoun 'he'.

According to Carston (1991), (32a-b) could not be implicatures of (31b) but rather part of the explicit content.

Carston (1991) aims to establish a criterion that distinguishes implicatures from explicatures—to specify which aspects of utterance interpretation contribute to what is explicitly conveyed and which aspects contribute to what is implicated. The criterion, introduced by Carston, is called the Functional Independence Principle (FIP). According to the FIP, Carston argues that the explicature of an utterance does not have to be arbitrarily confined to linguistic encoding plus disambiguation and reference assignment, but needs to go beyond that to the process of free enrichment of what is linguistically encoded to reach what is explicated. Consider the following example:

(33) He is ready.

Knowing the conventional meaning of the word ‘ready’ and assigning a referent to the pronoun ‘he’ in (33) will not be enough for the hearer/reader to decide the proposition communicated by (33). The hearer/reader has to do some enrichment to the logical form by going beyond what is linguistically encoded.

Carston (1991) claims that implicatures are distinct from explicatures; they do not overlap. Implicatures have distinct propositional form and truth conditions different from those of explicatures. According to Carston, implicatures function independently of explicatures as premises and conclusions. Consider the following example:

- (34) a. What about *osso bucco* for lunch?
 b. I am vegetarian.

- a. *Implicated premise*: *Osso bucco* is not a vegetarian dish.
 b. *Implicated conclusion*: The speaker of (34b) does not eat *osso bucco*.

In fact, Carston rejects the Gricean claim that any pragmatically determined aspect of the utterance interpretation apart from disambiguation and reference assignment is an implicature. She disagrees with the Gricean argument that the domain of grammar/sentences and the domain of truth-conditional semantics and propositions are the same. She rather argues that pragmatics does much more in establishing what is explicated than reference assignment and disambiguation. Consider Carston's (1988:39) example:

- (35) a. The park is some distance from where I live.
 b. It will take us some time to get there.

For the logical form of (35a) to be fully propositional, a referent should be assigned to the pronoun 'I' and the word 'park' should be disambiguated. In Grice's terms, the explicit meaning of (35a) is (36):

- (36) There is distance of some length between the speaker's home and the park referred to in the utterance.

But it seems that the utterance of (36) is not what is explicated by (35a). Carston argues that to know what is explicated by (35a), the hearer has to use some other pragmatic principles such as context, relevance and informativeness. Once such

pragmatic principles are utilized, the hearer will be able to know what is exactly explicated by (35a) and this can be the following:

(37) The park is some considerable distance from where I live.

According to Grice, (36) is what is explicitly communicated by (35a) because it stands for the logical form of the utterance, while (37) is an implicature communicated by (35a) because it is derived through pragmatic inference. This does not seem to conform to Carston's FIP simply because the implicature communicated by (37) (according to Grice) entails (35). Implicature and explicature should function independently and never overlap (FIP). What is implicated can never entail the logical form of the sentence uttered. Accordingly, (37) is an explicature rather than implicature.

The problem of explicature/implicature distinction can also be faced in the interpretation of conjoined utterances and utterances that require free enrichment. Consider the following examples:

- (38)
- a. I gave her the pen and she signed the contract.
 - b. She handed me the key and I opened the door.
 - c. I gave her the pen and she signed the contract (with the pen I gave her).
 - d. She handed me the key and I opened the door (with the key she gave me).
- (39)
- a. He entered the office and sat down on the chair.
 - b. He ate the poisoned food and he died.
 - c. He entered the office *and then* sat down on the chair.
 - d. He ate the poisonous food *and so* he died.

It is noticeable that the propositional form of (38 c-d) with the added phrases entails the propositional form of (38a-b). Accordingly, the enriched forms of (38a-b) represented by (38: c-d) could not be considered as implicatures but rather explicatures because they entail what is linguistically encoded. By the same token, and contrary to what Grice assumes, the enriched forms represented by (39 c-d) are explicatures rather than implicatures because they entail what is said in (39a) and (39b) respectively. Grice's justification for considering (39c-d) as implicatures is based on the observation of the sub-maxim of manner (be orderly) as can be noticed in the figure below:




Figure 2: Grice and Carston on the explicature/implicature distinction.

1.4.2. Cancellable explicatures and uncancellable implicatures

One of the major problems in RT is the absence of a clear criterion that distinguishes explicated from implicated assumptions. Carston (1991) introduced the 'entailment test' to distinguish explicatures from implicatures. According to that test, explicatures are the only communicated assumptions that can entail the logical form of the sentence uttered. Implicatures do not entail the logical form.

Implicatures, according to Carston, can be distinguishable through the defeasibility and calculability features since they are the outcome of pragmatic inference which is cancellable and defeasible. As noted, she also introduced the FIP which claims that implicatures and explicatures function independently without any overlapping.

Carston (2002) introduces a counter argument that turns the whole analysis of explicature/implicature distinction upside down. She argues that entailment is not a necessary condition to distinguish explicatures from implicatures, and furthermore, that cancellability is not a necessary condition to distinguish implicatures from explicatures.

Let us begin with explicatures and see how this counter argument is developed. Carston (2002:117) argues that an explicature is an assumption (proposition) explicitly expressed and communicated by an utterance. She makes a distinction between the propositions expressed and the explicature intended by the speaker. The proposition expressed by the speaker may or may not be communicated. It is considered an explicature of the utterance only when it is communicated.

Burton-Roberts (2005) distinguishes two types of 'what is said': 'what is *a*-said' and 'what is *b*-said'. What is '*a*-said' is equivalent to the conventional meaning of linguistic expressions used in a certain utterance (what is linguistically encoded). Burton-Roberts points out that what is '*a*-said' stands for linguistic semantics. What is '*b*-said' is equivalent to the proposition explicitly communicated by an utterance (explicature). This is reached by linguistic

decoding plus some pragmatic principles such as disambiguation and reference assignment. According to Burton-Roberts, this stands for RT's 'real semantics' as opposed to RT's 'linguistic semantics'.

According to the entailment test, an explicature should entail what is said because it is the development of the logical (linguistically encoded) form of what is said. It is assumed in RT that what is said could not be cancelled, because the speaker is committed to what she says or expresses. This means that explicature could not be cancelled either.

However Carston (2002:138) launches her big claim that 'explicatures are cancellable'. Her claim is based on her linguistic 'underdeterminacy thesis' that pragmatic inference plays a role in the derivation of explicatures as well as uncommunicated propositions. Pragmatic inference is characterized by 'cancellability' and 'defeasibility' (Levinson 1983:115, Carston 2002:135-36). Thus, explicatures are cancellable too:

- (40) a. John is tall.
 b. John is tall enough to be a basketball player.
 c. John is tall, but he is not tall enough to be a basketball player.

Carston (2002:138) points out that a sentence such as (40a), if uttered in an appropriate context, explicates the proposition in (40b). But, she claims that this proposition (pragmatically inferred) through free enrichment is cancelled in (40c). The same goes for her own example repeated here as (41):

- (41) a. He ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped.
 b. Lionel ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped over the edge of the cliff.
 c. He ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped (up and down) but he stayed on the top of the cliff.

Similarly, the proposition in (41b) is an explicature of (41a). This proposition, explicatured via free enrichment, is cancelled as can be seen in (41c), even though it entails the logical form of what is said, i.e. (41b) entails (41a).

Burton-Roberts (2005:401) argues against Carston's notion of 'cancellable explicatures' and describes it as a *logical impossibility* in Carston's own terms. Burton-Roberts (2005) points out that RT claims that explicatures are the domain of 'real' (truth-conditional, entailment-based) and propositional semantics that can never be cancelled because, according to Carston herself, speakers are committed to and endorse the proposition(s) they express.

Burton-Roberts (2005) suggests two possible solutions to this problem: we either withdraw the cancellability claim proposed by Carston or drop the 'commitment' or 'endorsement' factor from the informal explanation of explicature. He comments on Carston's example (77), used in this thesis as (41), and concludes that there is a misapplication of the term 'cancellability' by Carston. His evidence is that there are two verbs *jump* in English: (i) prepositional (directional) verb and (ii) intransitive verb. Burton-Roberts points out the verb *jump* in (41a) could be either (i) prepositional or (ii) intransitive. (41b) could be the explicature of (41a) if and only if the verb *jump* is prepositional. Given that, (41c) is a clarification as to which was the intended logical form. It seems that there is no explicature in (41-b) to be cancelled. (41c) itself (up to but) could be

an explicature of (41a) simply because it is what is intended to be communicated by the speaker.

On the implicature side, Carston (2002:139) argues that some implicatures are uncancellable. Consider the following example adapted from Carston's examples (79):

- (42) Peter: Does John drink vodka?
 Mary: He does not drink alcohol.
- a. Vodka is alcohol.
 - b. John doesn't drink vodka.
 - c. Whisky is alcohol.
 - d. John doesn't drink whisky.

As can be noticed, (42a) and (42c) are implicated premises of Mary's main utterance while (42b) and (42d) are implicated conclusions. Carston refers to Vicente (1998), who claims that (b) and (d) are entailed by the proposition expressed by Mary's utterance and thus they should be explicatures of that utterance because what is usually explicated is the truth-conditional content of the utterance, i.e. its entailment. Given the negative definition of implicature (a communicated assumption is an implicature if it is not an explicature) Carston argues that (b) and (d) could not be explicatures of Mary's utterance because there is no logical form (or sentential subpart of logical form) in Mary's utterance from which they can be developed. So they are implicatures. The same goes for (43):

- (43) a. The prime minister is John's mother.
 b. The prime minister is a woman.

(43b) is not explicature because it is not the development of the logical form of (43a) so it is an implicature. This implicature cannot be cancelled because it is entailed by (43a).

I strongly agree with Burton-Roberts (2005:399) that Carston's claim of uncancellable implicature is counter-intuitive (in Gricean terms) and inconsistent with the rest of her proposal concerning the explicature/implicature distinction. Carston (2002), in several places of her proposal, argues that pragmatic inference is 'cancellable' and 'defeasible'. Building on that, implicatures are cancellable since they are the outcome of pragmatic inference.

Carston's claim of entailed implicatures, given an argument in her own terms, is very strange. It turns the traditional explicature/implicature distinction upside down. Entailments should be explicated not implicated, but Carston insists that there are entailed implicatures. This, I think, will make her FIP sound less reasonable and reliable. If implicature and entailment are mutually unexclusive, then they will function dependently (they will overlap). The implicature should not entail or be entailed by the explicature. But as can be noticed, all Carston's examples of uncancellable implicatures are entailed by the logical form of the utterance.

Given that, the explicature/implicature distinction offered by Carston sounds very controversial. The line that separates between explicatures and implicatures in some situations is very thin. To get out of this controversy, I suggest that we either abandon the explicature/implicature distinction or we keep

things in their logical status by emphasising that what is implicated must never be entailed and what is explicature should never be cancelled.

1.4.3. Grice's notion of conventional implicature

When Grice (1967) first introduced the notion of implicature, the notion referred to cases of 'conversational implicature' where certain non-truth conditional inferences are calculated on the basis of the conversational maxims. Afterwards, Grice envisaged a totally different type of non-truth conditional inference which he calls 'conventional implicature'. This type of inference is not derived via pragmatic principles such as the maxims but rather generated through the conventional meaning of some lexical expressions. Grice mentions cases of few linguistic expressions such as *but*, *therefore* and *moreover*. However, the list could be extended to include expressions such as *although*, *nevertheless*, *however*, *anyway*, *moreover*, *whereas*, *even*, *after all*, *still*, *yet*, *besides*, *since* and *while* (Carston: 2002:53). Consider Grice's (1967:44) famous example on conventional implicature:

(44) He is English; he is, **therefore**, brave.

Grice claims that (44) *implicates* that his 'being brave' is a consequence of 'his being English'. This implicature is not derived via any pragmatic principle or previous contextual knowledge but rather generated through the conventional meaning of the word *therefore*. The conventional import of the word *therefore* does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterance in which it is used. If *therefore* is replaced by *and*, the truth conditions of the utterance will

remain the same, but the conventional implicature generated by *therefore* will be lost. In other words, *therefore* does not affect the truth or falsity of the utterance in which it occurs.

Carston (2002:107-8) comments briefly on Grice's notion of conventional implicature; she points out that this proposal is strong evidence that not all encoded meaning determines 'what is said'. There are cases where encoded meaning does not contribute to 'what is said'. Such cases are referred to by Grice as conventional implicatures.

Carston gives an alternative analysis of Grice's cases of conventional implicature. She claims that 'what is said' in an utterance is the propositional component of the basic (ground-level) speech acts. Conventional implicature is generated by the conventional meaning of certain linguistic expressions that relate between the ground-level speech acts. This relation will lead to less central (higher level) speech acts such as 'explaining', 'contrast' or 'adding'. Consider *but* in (45):

- (45) a. John failed his syntax exam **but** he is clever.
 b. John failed his syntax exam.
 c. John is clever.
 d. There is a contrast between (b) and (c).

As can be noticed, (b) and (c) are two ground-level speech acts of assertion. They stand for 'what is said' in the utterance of (45a), whereas (d) is a higher-level speech act that defines the type of relation between (b) and (c) which is here 'contrast'.

Levinson (1983:128), too, argues that Grice's conventional implicature is not an interesting concept. He considers it as an admission that the truth-conditional semantics has failed to capture all the conventional meaning of natural language expressions. Kempson (1975) also resists (the acceptance of) the notion of conventional implicature and points out that all Grice's examples of conventional implicature can be reanalysed as entailments, conversational implicatures or presuppositions.

There are other pragmatists who deny the existence of conventional implicature (Rieber 1997; Bach 1994, 1999; Wilson and Sperber 1993 and Blakemore 1987, 2002). These pragmatists have offered their alternative accounts of conventional implicature.

Rieber (1997: 51-54) reanalyses Grice's examples of conventional implicature as 'tacit performatives'. He argues that linguistic expressions such as *but*, *therefore* and *even* are used by the speaker to imply or suggest something without actually saying it. Rieber agrees with Grice that such expressions do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterances in which they occur. However, he disagrees with him in that such expressions do not generate conventional implicature, but rather suggest or imply something by means of 'performatives'. Consider the following example:

- (46) a. John is a pragmatist **but** he is happy.
 b. John is a pragmatist (I suggest this contrasts) or (I am pointing out that this contrasts) or (I ask you to notice that this contrasts) he is happy.

The analysis offered by (Rieber 1997) explains how utterances with such linguistic expressions involve two types of speech act: a) primary speech act, such as ‘assertion’, ‘telling’ or ‘asking’ made by the speaker of the utterance; b) secondary speech act, which is used as a comment on the primary speech act (what has been asserted, told or asked by the speaker). Rieber considers the secondary speech act as the vehicle of the performative function. Given that, Rieber would analyse (46b) as follows:




Figure 3: Rieber's (1997) reanalysis of Grice's conventional implicature.

Bach (1994, 1999) has also developed his own alternative account of conventional implicature in which he argues that there is nothing called conventional implicature in pragmatics. The phenomena described as such by Grice are simply instances of second-order speech acts. According to Bach, expressions such as *but*, *therefore* and *even* do not generate conventional implicature as Grice assumes, but rather perform ‘second-order speech acts’. Bach (1999:333) calls such expressions alleged conventional implicature devices (ACIDs).

Contrary to what Grice assumes, Bach (1999:340-1) claims that most of the linguistic expressions referred to as generating conventional implicature (ACIDs), contribute to what is said because they pass the IQ test:

(IQ test): An element of a sentence contributes to what is said in an utterance of that sentence if and only if there can be an accurate and complete indirect quotation of an utterance (in the same language) which includes that element, or a corresponding element, in the ‘that’-clause that specifies what is said.

Consider the following examples which illustrate that *but*, *even* and *too* contribute to the truth-conditional content of their utterances, which can be used as complete indirect quotations in that-clauses as can be noticed in (47), (48) and (49) respectively:

- (47) a. John failed his syntax exam **but** he is clever
 b. Clare said that John failed his syntax exam **but** he is clever. (✓⁸ IQ)
- (48) a. **Even** John can fail his syntax exam.
 b. Clare said that **even** John can fail his syntax exam. (✓ IQ)
- (49) a. John has failed his syntax exam **too**
 b. Claire said that John failed his syntax exam **too**. (✓ IQ)

However, Bach (1999:341) points out that not all ACIDs comply with the IQ test, i.e. some ACIDs do not contribute to what is said. But, to Bach, this does not

⁸ The tick sign indicates that the utterance passes the IQ test.

mean that such devices give rise to conventional implicature as assumed by Grice.

Consider *moreover* and *in other words* in the examples below:

- (50) a. **Moreover**, John failed his syntax exam.
 b. * Clare said that **moreover**, John failed his syntax exam. (⁹X IQ)
- (51) a. **In other words**, John is a plagiarist.
 b. * Clare said that **in other words**, John is a plagiarist. (X IQ)

It is true that *moreover* and *in other words* in the above utterances fail the IQ test, but this does not mean that they generate a conventional implicature. What Bach seeks to argue here is that this type of ACIDs should be treated as vehicles for the performance of second-order speech act. When ACIDs such as *moreover* and *in other words* are used by the speaker at the beginning of a sentence, the utterance of which adds something to what is previously said, the speaker does not implicate but rather explicitly indicates that she is adding something.

ACIDs that fail the IQ test are called *utterance modifiers* by Bach. They are used to comment on the main part of the utterance in which they occur. They are usually used at the beginning of the sentence, but they can occur elsewhere. They are set off by commas in writing and pause in speech. They are not semantically coordinate with the rest of the sentence which is why they do not contribute to truth conditions.

I suggest that neither Rieber (1997) nor Bach (1999) offer a genuine alternative to Grice's conventional implicature. Rieber's account of *tacit*

⁹ The cross sign indicates the utterance fails the IQ test.

performatives is built on ‘suggestion’. It is unreliable because there is no unique performative with which a discourse connective is synonymous. Consider again example (46) repeated here as (52):

- (52) a. John is a pragmatist **but** he is happy.
 b. John is a pragmatist (I suggest this contrasts) or (I am pointing out that this contrasts) or (I ask you to notice that this contrasts) he is happy.

As can be noticed, there is no specific performative associated with *but*. The performative can be one of the following (the list could be endless):

- (a) I suggest that this contrasts.
 (b) I am pointing out that this contrasts.
 (c) I ask you to notice that this contrasts.
 (d) I draw your attention that this contrast.
 (e) I let you know that this contrasts.
 (f) I make it clear that this contrasts.

Bach’s (1999) alternative account does not seem to be complete either. On the one hand, he divides ACIDs in to two types: ACIDs that pass the IQ and ACIDs that fail it. On the other hand, he argues all ACIDs encode conceptual meaning whether or not they contribute to what is said. According to him, an ACID such as *but* encodes conceptual information and contributes to the truth-conditions of the utterance in which it is used. I believe this is far from being true; *but* neither encodes a conceptual meaning nor does it contribute to truth-conditions. For instance, the contrast between ‘he is a thief’ and ‘he is good-hearted’ in (53) is not a second-order speech act carried by the device *but*. The relation between the two

propositions can be figured out without the presence of *but*. A hearer/reader will be able to judge that the relation between (a) and (b) is contrastive without making use of the linguistic encoding of *but*:

- (53) a. He is a thief.
b. He is good-hearted.

What seems to me a more explanatory account of conventional implicature is Wilson and Sperber's (1993) and Blakemore's (1987, 2002) notion of 'procedural meaning'. This notion has been developed within a relevance-theoretic framework. It argues that linguistic expressions such as *but*, *therefore* and *so* (analysed by Grice as cases of conventional implicature) encode procedures that constrain the relevance of the utterance in which they occur. The procedures encoded by such expressions offer guidance to the hearer/reader in searching for the optimal relevance of the utterance through maximizing the contextual effects and minimizing the processing effort and finally reaching the most accessible interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance. Such expressions do not contribute to the truth conditions of utterance, but rather put constraints on the inferential phase of the utterance interpretation. A full discussion of Blakemore's notion of procedural meaning will be given in the next chapter

1.5. Conclusion

This chapter offered a broad outline of the theoretical framework, Relevance Theory, within which some linguistic expressions (including discourse markers)

are analysed as encoding procedural meanings that constrain the inferential part of the interpretation of the utterances in which they occur. The attention was focused on some basic notions, the discussion of which is crucial to the analysis of procedural expressions. This includes the notions of 'context', 'inference', 'cognitive effect' and 'processing effort'. It will become clear that Relevance Theory, despite controversies that arise within it (e.g. the explicature/implicature distinction discussed in section 1.4.1) provides an ideal and reliable framework for the analysis of discourse markers.

CHAPTER 2

2. Linguistic Meaning and Truth Conditions

2.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the relationship between linguistic meaning and truth conditions. It points out that there are two types of distinction: the truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional distinction and the conceptual/procedural distinction. The chapter investigates the relationship between these two distinctions.

There are two main arguments in this chapter. Firstly, the alleged parallelism between the truth-conditional/conceptual and the non-truth-conditional/procedural meanings must be questioned. This is because there are linguistic expressions whose meaning both contributes to the truth conditions of the utterance and constrains the inferential part of the interpretation of the utterances in which they occur. Secondly, the relation between conceptual and procedural is not mutually exclusive; we will see that some linguistic expressions encode both conceptual and procedural meanings and others encode conceptual meanings but can be procedurally used as is the case with *because*. Such expressions will be called conceptuo-procedural expressions.

This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the relation between natural language and the world, investigates the difference between truth-

conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning and analyses some linguistic expressions whose meaning does not contribute to truth conditions. Section 2.3 investigates the conceptual/procedural distinction and its relation with the explicature/implicature distinction. Section 2.4 discusses how linguistic meaning is analysed in RT in terms of concepts and procedures and gives a new classification of linguistic expressions as 1) purely conceptual, 2) purely procedural or 3) conceptuo-procedural expressions. Section 2.5 is a conclusion.

2.2. Language and the world

Theorists and ordinary language users consider language as a medium of exchanging information about the world. In the fields of linguistics and the philosophy of language, this is captured in terms of the relation between natural language expressions and truth conditions. Strawson (1971) points out that the notions of truth and truth conditions can account for linguistic meaning, as he puts it:

It is a truth implicitly acknowledged by communication theorists-themselves that in almost all the things we should count as sentences there is a substantial central core of meaning which is explicable either in terms of truth conditions or in terms of some related notions...

(Strawson 1971:178)

As the above quote indicates, speakers use language to say something about the world or describe a state of affairs. They relate between ‘sentences’ and ‘states of affairs’. The relation between the two entities is truth-conditional—judged as either true or false.

The most prominent truth-based approach of linguistic meaning is undeniably Davidson’s (1967, 1984) truth-conditional theory of linguistic meaning. This approach is based on the pairing up between natural language sentences and the real world, in the sense that the meaning of a sentence is given by its truth conditions—the conditions that have to obtain for the utterance to be true. Consider the following example:

(1) The table has four legs.

According to the truth-based approach of linguistic meaning by Davidson, the utterance of (1) is true if and only if ‘the table referred to in this utterance has four legs’. This is captured by a T-sentence, (2), where *s* stands for the utterance and *p* stands for a state of affairs.

(2) *s* is true iff *p*.

It seems the truth-conditional account of linguistic meaning constructed by theorists such as Strawson (1971) and Davidson (1967, 1984) cannot account for linguistic elements whose meaning does not contribute to the truth conditions of utterances in which they occur. These elements include *pronouns*, *requests* and *questions*, *sentence adverbials*, *focus adverbs* and *discourse markers*. I will not go

through a detailed analysis of the non-truth-conditional nature of these linguistic elements here but rather introduce them briefly in section 2.2.2. The attention will be focused on non-truth-conditional nature of *discourse markers* and the procedural role they play in the process of utterance interpretation.

Before I move to the next section, I would like to point out that the notion of truth-conditional meaning adopted in this thesis is specific to RT. The meaning of a word is captured by the contribution it makes to the truth conditions of the sentence in which it occurs. Relevance theorists such as Wilson and Sperber (1993), Blakemore (1987, 2002) and Iten (2005) focus on the existence of some linguistic expressions (*so, therefore, but, after all, etc.*) whose meanings cannot be captured in truth-conditional terms. However, there are other approaches to truth-conditional meaning which argue that the meaning encoded by such expressions can be truth conditional (Recanati 2004, Bach 2001, and Ariel 2002).

2.2.1. Semantic vs. pragmatic non-truth-conditional meaning

Before moving to the analysis of the non-truth-conditional nature of the relevant linguistic expressions, let us specify what type of non-truth-conditional meaning is meant here. To do this, please consider the following example given by Iten (2005:2):

- (3) [Susan and Mary are talking about Mary's boyfriend Peter]
 Susan: Is he good at buying you presents?
 Mary: For my last birthday he bought me a pink scarf, **even though** I told him that I hate pink.

Iten (2005:3) points out that the utterance in (3) is true if and only if Peter bought Mary a pink scarf on her last birthday and (before that) the speaker told Peter that she hates pink. But Mary means (intends to communicate) more than that by uttering (3). There are two pieces of extra information communicated by Mary's utterance: (i) there is a contrast between Peter buying Mary a pink scarf on her last birthday and her telling him that she hates pink, (ii) Peter is not good at buying presents. The first piece of information is linguistically encoded by the linguistic expression *even though* and not contextually derived. For this reason, I will call this phenomenon, following Iten (2005), 'semantic non-truth-conditional meaning'. The second piece of information arises because Mary made her utterance in a particular conversational context. I will call this 'pragmatic non-truth-conditional meaning'. Neither meaning communicated by Mary's utterance affects the truth conditions of the utterance.

This distinction between semantic and pragmatic non-truth-conditional meaning has been introduced to show that the conventional meaning encoded by some linguistic expressions does not have to contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance in which such expressions are used. And this is one of the main themes in this chapter.

2.2.2. Non-truth-conditional linguistic elements

2.2.2.1 Pronouns

Among the expressions whose linguistic meaning is not truth-conditional are 'pronouns'. It is obvious that the linguistic meaning encoded by pronouns cannot

be captured in terms of the contribution to the truth conditions of utterances containing them. However, such expressions constrain the interpretation of the utterance and play a role in determining the truth-conditional content by providing some indicators to the referents to be assigned:

(4) **He** will give **it** to **her**.

The highlighted linguistic expressions in the above sentence are non-truth-conditional *per se*. However, their linguistic meaning affects the truth-conditional content by constraining the interpretation and leading the hearer to assign referents to the highlighted expressions. No truth conditions can be assigned to the sentence of (4) before referents to the marked expressions are supplied. Once that is done, propositions such as the following can be communicated by the sentence of (4):

(5) **Peter** will give **the book** to **Mary**.

(6) **John** will give **the letter** to **Clare**.

It seems that theorists who have discussed ‘non-truth-conditional meaning’ have excluded pronouns as elements of sentence semantics—and have done so simply because the linguistic meaning encoded by pronouns affects the truth conditions of utterances containing them. I will return to pronouns later in this chapter in section 2.4.3.1 and discuss the procedural relevance-theoretic account of pronouns (Wilson and Sperber 1993, Carston 2002 and Hedley 2005).

2.2.2.2. Requests and questions

It is generally accepted that the utterances of non-declarative sentences such as orders and questions cannot be given truth conditions. The reason for this is that such utterances do not refer to any state of affairs in the first place. Thus, the notion of truth or falsity cannot apply to them. Consider the following examples for demonstration:

- (7) Open the gate.
- (8) Are you vegetarian?

The utterance in (7) is a request which is usually complied with or disregarded, and the utterance in (8) is a question which can be given an answer or not. Thus, these utterances cannot be judged as true or false. Iten (2005:18) points out that some linguists have noticed that there are propositions that can be closely related to requests and questions. Thus, the equivalent propositions to (7) and (8) are (9) and (10), respectively:

- (9) $X_{\text{HEARER}} \text{ OPENS GATE}_Y$
- (10) $X_{\text{HEARER}} \text{ IS VEGETARIAN}$

Given that, what is communicated by (7) and (8) can be roughly paraphrased as (11) and (12):

- (11) The speaker is requesting the hearer to open the gate.
- (12) The speaker is asking whether the hearer is vegetarian or not.

Iten points out that the non-truth-conditional aspect of the meaning of (7) and (8) is due to the non-declarative syntax and not the meaning of their words such as *open*, *gate* and *vegetarian*. The meanings of these words are obviously truth conditional.

2.2.2.3. Sentence adverbials

Theorists such as Wilson and Sperber (1993) maintain that illocutionary and attitudinal (sentence) adverbials neither contribute to nor affect the truth-conditional content of utterances in which they occur. However, unlike requests and questions, sentences containing such adverbials do have truth-conditional element. But what is encoded by these illocutionary or attitudinal adverbials does not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance.

(13) **Seriously**, John is a genius.

(14) **Sadly**, I missed my train.

The truth conditions of (13) and (14) are equivalent to the propositions expressed by these two utterances minus the illocutionary adverbial *seriously* and the attitudinal adverbial *sadly*. An utterance of (13), for instance, can communicate two propositions:

(15) JOHN_x IS A GENIUS

(16) Y_{SPEAKER} IS SAYING SERIOUSLY THAT JOHN IS A GENIUS

(15) is the truth-conditional content of the utterance, not (16). The same goes for the utterance of (14). One should not confuse these adverbials with their ‘manner’ counterparts which contribute to the truth-conditions of utterances containing them. Manner adverbials are not separated by a comma in writing.

(17) John is speaking **seriously**.

(18) Peter sighed **sadly**.

Unlike the utterance of (13), which communicates two propositions as illustrated in (15) and (16), the utterance of (17) communicates only one proposition, i.e. JOHN IS SPEAKING IN A SERIOUS MANNER.

2.2.2.4. Focus adverbs

In addition to illocutionary and attitudinal adverbials, there are other adverbs such as *even*, *too* and *also* which do not contribute to the truth conditions of utterances containing them. These adverbs are referred to by Iten (2005:23) as ‘focus’ particles. Consider the following examples:

(19) **Even** Peter is on holiday.

(20) Peter is on holiday **too**.

(21) Peter is **also** on holiday.

The linguistic meaning encoded by the highlighted adverbs in the above utterances does not contribute to the truth conditions of these utterances. In other words, (19), (20) and (21) are true if and only if *Peter is on holiday*. However, there is obviously something more communicated by each of the highlighted

adverbs, depending on where the focus lies in each utterance. For instance, if the focus of *even* in (19) lies on *Peter*, then the utterance suggests that Peter's being on holiday is less likely than other people being on holiday. If the focus of *even* is on *is on holiday*, then the assumption is that Peter's being on holiday is less likely than his doing something else.

2.2.2.5. Discourse markers

Other linguistic expressions whose encoded meaning does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of utterances in which they occur are discourse markers (henceforth DMs). Such expressions include *but, therefore, so, after all*. They have been referred to in the literature as 'pragmatic markers' or 'pragmatic connectives', in addition to some other labels.

Theorists such as Blakemore (1987, 2002), Blass (1998), Rouchota (1998) and Iten (1998, 2000, 2005) argue that the linguistic meaning encoded by DMs does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of utterances containing them. Consider the following examples:

- (22) John is a lawyer **but** he is in prison now.
- (23) John is in prison now **although** he is a lawyer.
- (24) Thaksin Shinawatra will buy Manchester City FC. **So**, he is a millionaire.
- (25) Thaksin Shinawatra will buy Manchester City FC. **After all**, he is a millionaire.

The use of the highlighted expressions does not affect the truth-conditional content of the utterances they connect. What each marker encodes is a procedure

that controls the relation between the truth-conditional content of the utterances they connect. For example, (22), is an utterance of two sentences connected by *but*. There are two propositions expressed by this utterance: (i) ‘John is a lawyer’; (ii) ‘John is in prison now’. And, there is a procedure encoded by the linguistic meaning of *but* which points to the hearer that ‘there is a contrast between John’s being a lawyer and his being in prison’. This procedure does not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance of (22). The utterance is true if and only if ‘John is a lawyer’ and ‘John is in prison’. The sense of contrast encoded by *but* does not affect the truth or falsity of (22). If the speaker of (22) did not have the meaning of contrast in mind, this will not make her utterance false. Similar analyses can be provided for (23), (24) and (25).

2.3. Linguistic meaning and Relevance Theory

2.3.1. Utterance interpretation: a complementary process

It has been noticed in chapter 1 that RT is a cognitive theory of utterance interpretation, which involves mental representations and computation. Mental representations in the relevance-theoretic framework refer to ‘the language of thought’, or what is known as ‘Mentalese’ (Fodor: 1985, 1990). ‘Words’ in this language of thought are ‘concepts’ or ‘conceptual information’. The (Fodorian) idea here is that mental representations undergo computations due to their syntactic nature in a similar way to inference processes in formal logic where syntactic (rather than semantic) properties of mental representations are taken into consideration (Iten 2005:70).

Computation in the cognitive process of the utterance interpretation plays two roles. The first is required because the conceptual output of the decoding process or the logical form of the utterance does not yield a fully propositional form. The computation in this case is represented by the application of some pragmatic processes such as ‘disambiguation’ and ‘reference assignment’ to the logical form. For instance, the result of linguistic decoding of (26) would be something like (27) which does not encode a fully propositional form (assumption or thought):

(26) She plays it

(27) • PLAYS •

In order to know what is communicated by the speaker of (26), referents should be assigned to the pronouns ‘she’ and ‘it’. This cannot be done by linguistic decoding alone, but rather by the pragmatic process of ‘reference assignment’. The linguistic decoding of (27) could not give values to the pronouns. This has to be pragmatically inferred.

The second and equally important aspect of interpretation is when computation takes the output of decoding (logical form) as input to determine what is communicated by the speaker of a certain utterance. This happens when the hearer takes the logical form and processes it in the light of other information available to him from memory and other input systems, to infer what is communicated by the speaker. This is known as the inferential stage of the

utterance interpretation in which the logical form is fleshed out. Without this inferential process, communication between language users would not be possible.

2.3.2. Linguistic encoding: concepts and procedures

On the view outlined in the previous section, mental representations are ‘concepts’. It seems natural to say that most natural language words encode conceptual information—the building blocks of logical form, so to speak (Iten: 2005:71). For example, words such as *snow* and *white* in (28) would encode the concepts of SNOW and WHITE respectively:

(28) Snow is white.

Computation, unlike decoding, is a ‘procedure’ in the sense that it is a function carried out by pragmatics to flesh out the linguistically decoded logical form for deriving a full proposition.

It seems that procedural information (constraints on computation) can be linguistically encoded. Blakemore (1987) argues that some linguistic expressions encode information which constrains the inferential phase of the utterance interpretation rather than the conceptual representation.

As explained, RT accounts for utterance interpretation with the emphasis on minimising processing effort needed to achieve the intended cognitive effect. Since the processing effort is exerted in the computational process of testing the relevant interpretation, any information that constrains this computational process would be considered to be effort-saving. Consider the following example:

(29) (a) John can open Bill's safe. (b) He knows the combination.

If we follow the line of reasoning provided by Blakemore (1987, 2002), the hearer of the utterance of (29) will not find it easy to determine how (b) achieves relevance in respect with (a) and thus, he will exert more effort in looking for the cognitive effect. The inferential relationship between (a) and (b) could be that (a) is a 'premise' and (b) is a 'conclusion', but could also be the other way round: (b) is a 'premise' and (a) is a 'conclusion'. To save the hearer the effort of determining the inferential relationship in the sequence in (29), the speaker can use some linguistic means (linguistic expressions), such as *but*, *therefore*, *so* and *after all*, the encoded procedural information of which can provide him with some signals and clues to find out the interpretation intended by the speaker. For instance, Blakemore (2002) points out, if the linguistic expression *so* has been used to connect the two segments in (29), the interpretation would be that (b) is a 'conclusion' derived as a contextual implication from (a), and if *after all* is used, then (b) would be the 'premise' to (a), the 'conclusion'.

Blakemore's claim is that, in the absence of DMs such as *so* and *after all*, contextual assumptions and cognitive effect accessible to the hearer are not necessarily those intended by the speaker. Thus, the speaker finds it useful to use some linguistic constructions such *so* and *after all* to make it easy for the hearer to point to the intended interpretation.

2.3.3. The conceptual/procedural distinction

The notion of procedural meaning in RT needs further investigation. It is not known yet how the procedural meaning is represented in the mind, neither is it known how the process of ‘constraining the inferential phase’ of utterance interpretation actually works. When the notion was first introduced by Blakemore (1987), the purpose was to make a distinction between truth-conditional and non-truth conditional aspects of linguistic meaning. The correlation between conceptual/procedural and truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional meanings was assumed. It was also assumed that ‘conceptual’ and ‘procedural’ were mutually exclusive. Blakemore (1987) defines the notion of procedural meaning in a negative way. For her, if what is encoded by a linguistic expression is not conceptual, it should then be procedural by necessity, since linguistically encoded meanings in RT are either concepts or procedures (not both). Blakemore (1987) does not provide a criterion by which we can distinguish linguistic expressions that encode procedural meaning from those which do not. She just gives a list of certain expressions, particularly DMs, and argues that such expressions do not encode conceptual information, which means that they must be procedural.

It will become clear that the assumed parallelism between truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional and conceptual/procedural meaning does not hold:

It is tempting to assume that these two approaches are equivalent, and classify the data in identical ways. This would be so, for example, if any construction which contributed to the truth

conditions of an utterance did so by encoding concepts, while all non-truth-conditional constructions encoded procedural information. We want to argue that this assumption is false. The two distinctions cross-cut each other: some truth-conditional constructions encode concepts, others encode procedures; some non-truth-conditional constructions encode procedures, others encode concepts.

(Wilson and Sperber 1993: 2)

The equation that conceptual = truth-conditional and procedural = non-truth-conditional is invalid. Linguistic expressions such as personal pronouns do not linguistically encode conceptual information, but they play a role in determining the truth-conditional content of the utterances in which they occur. Conversely, sentence adverbials, for instance, encode conceptual information but their contribution does affect the truth condition of the utterances in which they occur.

We will also see that the conceptual/procedural distinction is not mutually exclusive. There are, I maintain, linguistic expressions which encode both conceptual and procedural meaning, as is the case with the definite article *the* and the conditional marker *if*.

Wilson and Sperber (1993) introduce some tests¹⁰ for the distinction between conceptual from procedural meaning. Although such tests do not give an explanation as to how the procedures constrain utterance interpretation, they provide some criteria for distinguishing conceptual from procedural meaning.

¹⁰ These tests have been also adopted by Rouchota (1998) and Iten (1998).

These tests are: 1) ‘accessibility to consciousness’, 2) ‘truth-evaluability’ and 3) ‘compositionality’.

As regards the first test, Wilson and Sperber (1993) point out that since concepts in RT are mental representations, conceptual meaning encoded by linguistic expressions should be consciously accessible to speakers and hearers. For instance, if we ask native speakers of English what the words *garden*, *library* and *car* mean, they would be able to answer the question by either paraphrasing the words or giving some of their synonyms. Procedural expressions¹¹, on the other hand, are not easily accessible to consciousness. By the same analogy, if we ask native speakers of English what the words *but*, *so* and *therefore* mean, they find it difficult to give a straightforward answer. Their answer, if any, would be much more likely to be about how these expressions are used rather than what they mean. Given the first test, it seems Wilson and Sperber are assuming that there is a parallelism between conceptual/representative on the one hand and procedural/non-representative on the other hand. Iten (2005:76) points out that there is evidence from second language learning that learners find it much harder to learn (or acquire) a procedural expression than to learn a conceptual expression. That is why most learners of English have some problems in learning and using words such *well*, *even* and *just*.

Regarding the second test, Wilson and Sperber (1993) maintain that concepts are truth-valuable because they are representations of states of affairs in the real world:

¹¹ For the sake of simplicity, linguistic expressions which encode procedural meaning will be called ‘procedural expressions’ and expressions encoding conceptual meaning will be called ‘conceptual expressions’.

(30) The shirt is blue.

The sentence in the above example can be uttered to refer to a state of affairs in the real world as in (31).

(31) The shirt John has bought from Debenhams on his 27th birthday is *blue*.

The word ‘blue’ contributes a constituent to the representation of this state of affairs. In other words, the contribution made by it can determine whether the representation is true or false. To put it differently, the concept encoded by the word ‘blue’ affects the truth or falsity of (30). By contrast, what is encoded by procedural expressions is not a representation that can be true or false. The contribution made by procedural expressions cannot be judged as true or false. For instance, the hearer could not object to the use of *after all* in (32) by claiming that it is not true. Thus, he cannot utter something like (33):

(32) (a) John can open Bill’s safe. (b) **After all**, he knows the combination.

(33) This is not true: ‘he knows the combination’ is not used as a premise.

The third test for distinguishing conceptually encoded from procedurally encoded information is ‘compositionality’. According to this test, concepts can combine (and modify each other) to form larger complex conceptual representations. For instance, the concepts BROWN and COW combine to form the larger concept BROWN COW. The notion of compositionality does not seem to work with procedural expressions. It is very hard to find a procedural expression that can combine with (or modify) another procedural expression. For

instance, *so* cannot combine with *after all* to form a larger procedural unit *so after all*. Only representational entities can combine to form larger representations. Procedural expressions are non-representational.

2.3.4. Procedures: constraints on implicature or explicature?

As we have seen in chapter 1, Sperber and Wilson (1995:182) distinguish two categories of communicated assumptions: explicatures and implicatures. According to them, a communicated assumption is an explicature if and only if it is a development of the logical form (sub-propositional incomplete conceptual representation) encoded by a sentence. If a communicated assumption is not a development of a logical form, it is an implicature. I do not want to rehearse the explicit/implicit distinction again since it has been discussed in chapter 1 (sections 1.2.3 and 1.4.1). What concerns me here is how this distinction relates to the conceptual/procedural distinction.

The initial assumption made by Blakemore (1987) is that conceptually encoded information is part of what is explicitly communicated since it appears in the logical form encoded by the utterance and in any development of this logical form. Procedurally encoded information, on the other hand, is considered by Blakemore (1987) as part of the implicit side of what is communicated by an utterance, since procedural information is not representational and does not appear in the logical form of the sentence. However, subsequent research has shown that procedural information can contribute to both explicit and implicit communication.

Below is a comparison between Blakemore's (1987) and Iten's (2005) views of linguistic encoding and its relationship to the explicit/implicit distinction:




Figure 4: Blakemore's vs. Iten's conceptual/procedural distinction.

We will see that Iten's picture is more reasonable, since there are some linguistic expressions such as pronouns which have been analysed as encoding procedural meaning, but contribute to the explicit rather than implicit side of the utterance interpretation. We will see also (in Chapter 4) that some linguistic expressions in Arabic such as *fa* encode procedural meaning that contributes to both the explicature and implicature of the utterance in which it occurs.

2.4. Discourse markers and truth conditions

Blakemore (1987) is the first theorist who developed a fully detailed account of DMs. She studied DMs such as *but*, *so* and *therefore* from a relevance-theoretic point of view, arguing that such markers encode procedural meaning which controls the inferential phase of utterance interpretation.

In relation to this, I would like to make clear that, in addressing Blakemore's account, I concentrate not just on DMs but rather on linguistic expressions whose linguistic meaning plays an inferential role in the utterance interpretation

I will classify linguistic expressions into three categories: a) purely conceptual linguistic expressions, b) conceptuo-procedural linguistic expressions and c) purely procedural linguistic expressions. It will become clear that DMs such as *but*, *so*, *because* and *after all* belong to both (b) and (c) categories. The first two categories will be discussed in this chapter, while the third category will be discussed in the coming chapters. Before moving to that, I will briefly introduce the notion of metarepresentation, given the strong link between the procedural and metarepresentational use of some linguistic expressions such as illocutionary adverbials and parenthetical constructions.

2.4.1. Metarepresentation and linguistic communication

Wilson (2000) defines metarepresentation as a representation of another representation. More specifically, a higher-order representation with a lower-order representation embedded within it. According to Wilson, the higher-order representation is usually an utterance or thought, while the lower-order representation can be public representations (utterances), mental representations (thoughts) and abstract representations (sentences, propositions). Suppose that Clare utters (34) to John:

(34) You are a careless guy.

And John reports her utterance in two different ways, as in (35):

- (35) a. Clare said to me, “You are a careless guy.”
 b. Clare told me that I don’t take things seriously.

In this case, both the lower-order and the higher-order representations are utterances. John’s reported direct quotation in (35a) and indirect quotation in (35b) are two metarepresentations of Clare’s original utterance.

There are some cases where the lower-order representations are of abstract nature: linguistic logical or conceptual:

- (36) a. ‘J’ai mal a la tête’ is a sentence of French.
 b. It is true that the Earth is the third planet from the Sun in the Solar System.
 c. ‘Earth’ implies ‘planet’.

Here, the higher-order representation is an utterance and the lower-order representation is an abstract representation: a sentence type in (36a), a proposition in (36b) and a concept in (36c).

Wilson (2000:141) argues that all types of metarepresentation (public, mental and abstract) can be analysed in terms of the notion of ‘representation by resemblance’. This entails that the relation between the higher-order representation and the lower-order representation is a matter of resemblance rather than identity. For instance (35a, b) are not identical to (34), but there is a resemblance between them.

Noh (1996) points out that metarepresentations can be either ‘interpretive’ or ‘descriptive’. They are interpretive if there is a resemblance in content between the higher representation and the original one as is the case with (34) and (35). They are descriptive if the representation is used to describe a state of affairs. Noh has also tackled other metarepresentational cases (pronunciation and word stress) where the metarepresentation involves resemblance in linguistic form rather than content. Consider Noh’s examples:

- (37) a. I eat TOMEIDOUZ (American pronunciation of ‘tomatoes’).
 b. If you eat TOMEIDOUZ, you must be from America.
- (38) a. I called the POLice.
 b. If you called the POLice, the poLICE will not come. (jokingly).
 (Capital letters indicate the syllable on which word stress falls.)

The metarepresentational antecedents given in (37b) and (38b) do not exploit resemblance with the originals in semantic content but rather in pronunciation and word stress.

Illocutionary adverbials and parenthetical expressions and constructions can be analysed as metarepresentational devices in the sense that they add a further layer of metarepresentation to the communicated content (lower order representation):

- (39) a. Allegedly, the fire is out of control.
 b. Confidentially, the fire is out of control.
 c. Unfortunately, the fire is out of control.

- (40) a. There is heavy rain tomorrow, the weather forecast says.
 b. There is heavy rain tomorrow, I warn you.
 c. There is heavy rain tomorrow, I am afraid.

The illocutionary adverb and parenthetical comment in (39a) and (40a) is used metarepresentationally to attribute a thought to someone other than the speaker. In (39b-c) and (40b-c), the illocutionary adverb and parenthetical comment are used to carry speech act or propositional-attitude information about the speaker's own utterance (Wilson 2000; Blakemore 1992; Recanati 1987; Urmson 1963).

Illocutionary adverbs and parenthetical constructions will be analysed as encoding procedural meaning in some uses, as we will see later in this chapter. This does not mean that the procedural analysis of such constructions contradicts with the metarepresentational one. It will become clear that there is a strong link between procedural and metarepresentational uses of linguistic expressions, in the sense that both contribute to the inferential part of the utterance interpretation.

2.4.2. Purely conceptual expressions

2.4.2.1. Nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs

As far as the conceptual/procedural distinction in RT is concerned, I will argue that most nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs in English (and almost in all languages) encode conceptual information. By applying Wilson and Sperber's (1993) three tests, it appears that language users are able to recognise that nouns such as *school*, *shirt*, and *hat* encode conceptual representations. If we take the

first test ‘accessibility to consciousness’, we, as speakers and hearers, notice that it is very easy to bring their conceptual content to consciousness. In other words, it is very easy for us (as language users) to know that the linguistic expressions *school*, *shirt* and *hat* encode the concepts: SCHOOL, SHIRT and HAT respectively. It could be claimed that this analysis of nouns is the same in all languages. The meaning of nouns can be brought to consciousness due to fact that what is encoded by a noun is a concept not a procedure.

This analysis is also true with verbs, adjectives and adverbs. The meaning of these expressions can be brought to consciousness in the same way the meanings of nouns can. It is quite easy for native speakers of English to bring to consciousness the meanings of linguistic expressions such as *write*, *huge* and *tomorrow*.

As for the second test ‘compositionality’, it is noticed that nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs which encode concepts can combine together to encode larger complex concepts. For instance, the expression *bed* which encodes the concept BED can combine with the expression *room* which encodes the concept ROOM to form the expression *bedroom* which encodes the larger complex concept BEDROOM.

Concerning the third test ‘truth-evaluability’, most nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs contribute to the truth or falsity of utterances in which they occur. In other words they contribute constituents of the representation of the state of affairs for utterances:

(41) The **sick boy** will **go** to **school tomorrow**.

The above utterance corresponds to a state of affairs in the actual world; it can be judged as true or false. The mental representations contributed by the highlighted expressions affect the truth or falsity of the utterance. It is true, if the highlighted expression correspond to the state of affairs and false otherwise.

2.4.3. Conceptuo-procedural expressions

2.4.3.1. *Pronouns as procedures*

Wilson and Sperber (1993) and Hedley (2005) argue that the linguistic meaning encoded by pronouns is procedural. They consider pronouns as communicative linguistic devices used by the speaker to point the hearer towards the intended referent. Hedley (2005:41) points out that, in RT, mind is seen as involving representations which are manipulated by mental computational apparatus (an approach broadly parallel to that of Fodor (e.g. 1980, 1983) and others). The general view is that linguistic expressions are linked to things in the real world via concepts (mental representations) manipulated by the computational apparatus. This in fact involves two different processes. The first one is based on decoding linguistic expressions into conceptual representations. The second one concerns the use of pragmatic faculties of inference in order to reach the intended meaning.

As far as this distinction is concerned, Hedley argues that pronouns operate within the second process. For him, pronouns do not encode conceptual representations—what they provide is the computational apparatus that manipulates concepts. Consider the following example:

(42) **He** is not John's friend.

According to Hedley, the pronoun *he* in the above utterance does not encode conceptual information. It rather gives instructions to the hearer to find the intended referent. In sum, pronouns in Hedley's account encode procedures not concepts.

The question that arises now: do pronouns indeed encode procedures? And if they do, are these procedures similar to those encoded by some DMs such as *but*, *therefore*, *after all* and *so*. An answer to this question could be that pronouns encode a different type of procedure. Unlike DMs, which control the inferential phase of utterance interpretation by constraining the contextual effect under which an utterance is relevant, pronouns offer instructions to the hearer to identify the referent of the pronoun. DMs such as *but*, *therefore*, *so* and *after all* do not encode concepts. None of Wilson and Sperber's three tests for distinguishing conceptual from procedural information apply to them: They can neither be brought to consciousness, nor combine with other linguistic expressions, nor contribute to the truth conditions of utterances in which they occur. I will call this type of linguistic expressions 'purely procedural linguistic expressions'.

The case of pronouns is different. Pronouns are not empty lexical items as the DMs mentioned above. Pronouns do carry some sort of conceptual meaning which can be considered as pro-concept or concept schema, following Carston 2002. For instance, a pronoun such as *he* can be brought into consciousness. It encodes the pro-concept of *singularity* and *masculinity*. By contrast, the pronoun

she encodes *singularity* and *femininity*. Other pronouns such as *they* and *we* encode *plurality*.

Of course, the conceptual nature of pronouns is different from that of nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs. The conceptual dimension is not as clear in pronouns as it is in the other linguistic expressions referred to. As for truth-evaluability, it can be noticed that what is linguistically encoded by pronouns plays a role in determining the truth conditions of the utterances in which pronouns occur. That is, the pro-conceptual schematic sub-propositional aspect encoded by the pronouns *he* in (42) affects the truth or falsity of the utterance. Furthermore, as regards ‘compositionality’, it is clear that pronouns combine with other linguistic expressions to form larger concepts.

What I seek to argue here is that pronouns are neither purely conceptual nor purely procedural. They encode both procedural and conceptual meaning as shown in the figure below:




Figure 5: Pronouns as conceptuo-procedural linguistic expressions

Such expressions are pro-concepts. They encode a sub-propositional form which affects the truth-conditional content of utterances in which they occur and at the same time they provide hearers with instructions on how to reach the fully propositional form, i.e. the intended referent of the pronoun. For instance, a pronoun such as *he* used in an utterance, instructs the hearer to search for a referent which is ‘male’ and ‘singular’.

2.4.3.2. The definite article and procedural encoding

I am introducing the definite article here because it is relevant to the discussion of procedural expressions. To my knowledge, articles have not been analysed by Wilson and Sperber, Blakemore, Blass or any other researcher interested in the relevance-theoretic account of procedural meaning. My argument (Hussein 2008) is that the definite article *the* encodes procedural meaning in a similar way to pronouns, in the sense that it directs the hearer to the reference of a noun phrase.

Lyons (1999:1) points out that in many languages, a noun phrase may contain an element which indicates the definiteness or indefiniteness of the noun phrase. This element could be a linguistic item such as the definite or indefinite article *the* and *a* as in English. It could also be a sort of *affix* as is the case in Arabic where the *prefix al-* is used to indicate definiteness and the *suffix -n* is used to indicate indefiniteness.

As far as the definite and indefinite articles in English are concerned, Lyons (1999:2) argues that definiteness and indefiniteness are expressed by the use of such articles in the noun phrase. In other words, definiteness and

indefiniteness are linguistically encoded by the use of the articles referred to. He maintains that articles encode definiteness or indefiniteness plus other things.

The notion of definiteness has been explained by some traditional grammarians in terms of ‘specificity’ and ‘particularity’. If the speaker or writer uses a noun phrase with a definite article, this means that she might be referring to a specific or particular thing. For instance, *the* in (43) indicates that the speaker refers to a specific or particular letter, not just any:

(43) I wrote **the letter** this afternoon.

Lyons argues that the ‘specificity’ or ‘particularity’ account of definiteness is vague and inaccurate. The speaker or writer of (43) could possibly use *a letter* as a noun phrase to indicate that she is referring to a specific or particular letter not just to any although the article used in the noun phrase is indefinite:

(44) I wrote **a letter** this afternoon.

Lyons suggests that definiteness might be explained in terms of ‘familiarity’. The speaker in both (43) and (44) refers to a particular or specific letter. However the reference of the letter in (43) is assumed to be clear to both the speaker and hearer of the utterance.

There are some cases in which the ‘familiarity’ account of definite article does not work either. Consider the following scenario given by Lyons (1999:6): Ann, who is putting up a picture on the wall, utters (45) to Joe who has just entered the room:

(45) Pass me **the hammer**, will you?

Joe looks around and sees a hammer on the chair. The familiarity account cannot work here because Joe, at the time of Ann's utterance, does know that there is a hammer in the room. He has to look around and find a referent to the word 'hammer'. The definite article used by Ann guides Joe to identify the hammer. This account is called the 'identifiability' account where the use of the definite article directs the hearer to the referent of the noun phrase by indicating that the hearer/addressee is in a position to identify it. In this sense, the definite article is similar to personal pronouns which are linguistic devices used by the speaker to point the hearer towards the intended referent.

Furthermore, there are cases where both the 'familiarity' and 'identifiability' accounts of the definite article fail to work. Consider Lyons, example (15) used here as (46) for convenience:

(46) I have just been to a wedding. **The bride** wore blue.

The noun phrase *the bride* in the above utterance is definite. The hearer knows that in a wedding there should be a bride. But does the hearer identify a referent in the real sense? Even though *the bride* is a definite reference, the hearer does not know who the bride is or anything about her. If he sees the bride in the street next morning, he will not be able to recognise her as a person.

In short, different accounts have been used to explain definiteness. The question that I want to raise now: is definiteness an outcome of conceptual or

procedural encoding? In other words, does the definite article *the* encode a concept or procedure?

It is not clear from Wilson and Sperber's three tests whether the article *the* encodes a concept or procedure. It is noticeable that *the* is not accessible to consciousness. Native speakers of English find it very hard to tell the meaning or give synonyms of *the*. What they can tell is just how the article is used. Given Sperber and Wilson's tests, this is evidence that it is procedural. As regards, 'semantic compositionality', the definite article *the* combines only with one type of linguistic expression, namely 'nouns'. However this combination does not form larger complex concept. As for the third test 'truth-evaluability', I assume that the definite article contributes to the truth-conditional content of utterance in which they occur. There is difference in truth conditions between (47) and (48) as can be noticed in (49):

(47) I wrote **the letter**.

(48) I wrote **a letter**.

(49) It is true that I did not write **the letter** this afternoon, but I did write **a letter**.

I will argue that the definite article is a conceptuo-procedural linguistic expression. It is neither purely procedural nor purely conceptual. It encodes a procedural meaning which leads to a concept.

The procedural nature of definite article is referred to indirectly by Lyons (1999:6) in his footnote 3:

Note that the article itself does not identify the referent; *the* is a "grammatical word" with no descriptive lexical content, and

therefore contains nothing which can itself identify a referent. The most it can do is invite the hearer to exploit clues in the linguistic or extralinguistic context to establish the identity of the referent.

This is actually what the account of procedural meaning is about (or at least how I understand it); linguistic expressions do not contribute constituents to the conceptual representations of the utterance but provide constraints on how those conceptual representations should be processed during the inferential stage of the utterance interpretation. To see how the procedural account of the definite article works, consider (45) repeated here as (50) for convenience:

(50) Pass me **the hammer**, will you?

The noun phrase *the hammer* in the above utterance is used to make a definite reference, on the identifiability account given by Lyons. However, the identifiability of the referent *hammer* is not conceptually encoded by the article. The article offers a guarantee by the speaker that there is an identifiable hammer though it does not identify it. We have seen that *the* is a linguistic expression with no descriptive lexical content. It encodes a procedure which leads to the concept of ‘definiteness’. I assume that the identifiability of the referent *hammer* is procedurally encoded by *the* in the sense that the article directs the hearer to find the referent by indicating that he is in a position to identify it (Hussein 2008: 75).

My analysis of the definite article as encoding procedural meaning is compatible with Hawkins’ (1991) analysis. The latter argues that the definite article introduces the referent to the hearer, instructs the hearer to locate the

referent in some contextually salient set of objects and refers to the totality of the objects or mass within this set which satisfy the description. He claims that *the* entails uniqueness and carries a conventional implicature that there is some P-set accessible to the speaker and hearer with which uniqueness holds.

The reason why I am including the definite article among conceptuo-procedural expressions rather than purely procedural expressions is that the procedural meaning encoded by the definite article is different from the procedural meaning encoded by purely procedural expressions such as *but*, *therefore* and *so*. The difference is that the procedural meaning encoded by DMs contributes to the inferential part of the utterance interpretation by constraining the contextual information under which the utterance is relevant. Whereas, similar to pronouns, the definite article contribute to the process of utterance interpretation by directing the hearer towards the referent of noun phrase and thus the explicature.

2.4.3.3. Parentheticals: concepts or procedures?

The relevance-theoretic notion of procedural meaning was limited to linguistic expressions that contribute to the interpretation by constraining the contextual information under which the utterances containing them are relevant (Blakemore: 1987). Blakemore's early work on procedural expressions assumes a parallelism between the terms 'procedural' and 'constraint'. She argues that any linguistic expression encoding procedural meaning puts constraints on the interpretation of the utterance in which it occurs. In other words, the procedure encoded by a

linguistic expression guides the hearer during the process of the utterance interpretation. On this account, conceptual meaning never provides inference that constrains the utterance interpretation.

However, Blakemore (2007a) reviews her earlier view of the assumed parallelism between ‘procedural’ and ‘constraint’. Her revision is motivated by the fact that some parenthetical constructions and sentence adverbials which have been analysed in conceptual terms by relevance theorists, do constrain the interpretation of their host utterances. Such constructions encode conceptual information which provides indication on how the host utterance is interpreted. This was referred to by Ifantidou (1993, 2001), even though she did not use the term ‘constraint’ herself. Ifantidou suggests that an utterance containing a parenthetical sentential adverbial should be treated as a collection of sub-utterances that communicate a variety of explicatures. For instance the utterance in (51) can be treated as two sub-utterances—the host utterance which communicates the explicatures in (52a) and the parenthetical utterance which communicates the explicature in (52b):

- (51) Unfortunately, Jo has no intention of leaving.
- (52a) The speaker believes that Jo has no intention of leaving.
 The speaker is saying that Jo has no intention of leaving.
 Jo has no intention of leaving.
- (52b) The speaker believes that it is unfortunate that Jo has no intention of leaving.

As can be seen, Ifantidou's analysis entails that the parenthetical sentential adverbial is a constituent of the propositional representation which enters the inferential computations needed to satisfy the hearer's expectation of relevance.

Blakemore (2007a:2) suggests that the issue of assumed parallelism between 'procedural' and 'constraint' could perhaps be solved terminologically, i.e. by adopting two different terminologies such as 'procedural constraints' and 'conceptual constraints'. On this suggestion, constraints can be communicated by either procedural or conceptual information. For instance, conceptual constraints can be communicated by expressions (or constructions) which are constituents of propositional representations, as is the case with the parenthetical sentential adverbial discussed in (51). By the same analogy, we can also have 'procedural constraints' imposed by expressions which encode procedures as is the case with most of the DMs.

However, Blakemore (2007a:22) seems to disfavour the terminological solution. She points out that the terminological solution will not help us understand how parentheticals contribute to the interpretation of their host utterances. According to her, it will be misleading to describe expressions such as 'frankly' and 'apparently' as constraining the interpretation of the host utterance. Blakemore (2007a) does not make her final statement about the acceptance of the terminological solution. But she points out that, if we wish to admit the existence of constraints on the interpretation which are communicated by expressions that encode conceptual content, we have to recognise that what is communicated is

communicated at the level of conceptual (propositional) representation rather than at the level of what is linguistically encoded.

Blakemore's notion of procedural meaning has been developed and broadened through different stages. Her initial argument (1987) was that procedural meaning puts constraints on the implicit side of the utterance interpretation, as is the case with the procedural meanings encoded by DMs such as *so*, *after all* and *therefore*. Further work (2002) allows for expressions whose linguistic encoding puts constraints on the explicit side of the utterance interpretation, as we have seen in Wilson and Sperber (1993) and Hedley's (2005) analysis of personal pronouns. Her current work claims that parentheticals place constraints on both the explicit and implicit side of the interpretation of their host utterances. Consider her example (56) in which the parenthetical clause is interpreted as constraining the interpretation of the host by implicitly communicating information about the degree of commitment that the hearer is expected to have towards the host proposition:

- (53) What is obvious – and we have the reports – is that they were killed (from a discussion of the causes of the destruction of the population of Easter Island, BBC Radio 4, 26 August 2005).

2.4.3.4. Parentheticals and reformulation

One of the most important and defining feature of parentheticals is that they interrupt the syntactic structure of the host sentence. In this respect, Blakemore (2007b) argues that the reformulations introduced by an appositional marker such

as *or* may be parenthetical, i.e. the *or*-reformulation in (54) is not part of the syntactic structure of the host sentence:

(54) Debka, **or folk dance**, is very famous in the Middle East.

Blakemore (2005, 2007b) investigates parenthetical *and*-reformulations, parenthetical *or*-reformulations and parenthetical *that is*-reformulations. The concentration, in this section, will be on her analysis of the reformulations introduced by *or* and *that is*.

Blakemore (2007b:311) argues that reformulations introduced by *or* are not interpreted in the same way as reformulations introduced by *that is*. This suggests that pragmatic reformulation is not a unitary phenomenon. Building on Burton-Robert's (1993) account of *or*, she suggests that the meaning of *or* in its appositional use is that of the standard disjunctive connective, but used metalinguistically. She maintains that the reformulations introduced by *that is*, by contrast, are analysed on the level of conceptual representation, not metalinguistically. Blakemore (2007b) agrees with Potts (2005) that, unlike *or*-reformulations, *that is*-reformulations communicate information about the propositional content of the host. In other words, such reformulations explicitly communicate a proposition which plays a role in the identification of the truth-conditional content of the host utterance.

The main difference between *or*-reformulation and *that is*-reformulations is that the former is metalinguistic, while the latter is meta-representational. *Or*-reformulations, in Blakemore's account, are analysed as the information

communicated about the *linguistic* representation used in the communication of the concept. To put that differently, an *or*-reformulation communicates that there is an alternative linguistic expression (or construction) which can be used for the communication of the concept communicated by an expression in the host utterance. This is the case in (54) where the construction *folk dance* is another way of communicating the concept communicated by *Debka*. *That is*-reformulations, by contrast, are metarepresentational. They are analysed as the information communicated about the propositional or conceptual representation communicated by the host utterance. Consider the following example:

- (55) We are looking for a hall for our Christmas party, that is, a hall which is large enough for 100 persons. We might find such a hall in the Union Society.

The parenthetical reformulation introduced by *that is* in (55) could not be analysed in terms of linguistic representation, but rather in terms of interpretive resemblance between conceptual or propositional representations. Parenthetical *that is*-reformulation does not offer a linguistic expression that communicates a concept communicated by another linguistic expression in the host utterance; it rather communicates a thought or proposition communicated by the host utterance. The parenthetical clause *that is, a hall which is large enough for 100 persons* plays a role in identifying the concept in the host utterance, i.e. the concept communicated by the reformation resembles that communicated by the original host.

It can be noticed that both *or*-reformulations and *that is*-reformulations put constraints on the interpretation of the host utterance no matter whether these reformulations are analysed as meta-linguistic or meta-representational. Other parenthetical expressions such as ‘sentence adverbials’ can also play a role in the interpretation of the utterance in which they occur as we have seen in example (51).

In relation to parenthetical constructions particularly parenthetical *or*-reformulations and parenthetical *that is*-reformulations, I would like to make the following three claims. Firstly, parenthetical *or*-reformulations and *that is*-reformulation are conceptuo-procedural. The elements in these reformulations can be analysed in conceptual terms. For instance, the linguistic construction *folk dance* is a conceptual combination which has two further concepts FOLK and DANCE. However, at the same time, this conceptual combination is used procedurally in constraining the interpretation of the utterance in which it occurs. The combination *folk dance* contributes to the interpretation of the host utterance. It is used by the speaker to point out to the hearer that *Debka* is a special type of dance performed by a group of people. This combination is used by the speaker because she may assume that the hearer will find it difficult to know which type of dance is meant by her.

Secondly, I assume that there is a unitary account of reformulation, in the sense that both *or*-reformulations and *that is*-reformulations, no matter whether they are analysed as meta-linguistic or meta-representational, put constraints on the interpretation of the host utterances. For instance, *that is*-reformulation in (55)

is used parenthetically. It is analysed by Blakemore in conceptual terms, but I assume that the parenthetical plays a procedural role in the sense that it constrains the interpretation of the host utterance. The speaker uses the parenthetical to indicate to the hearer that she is looking for a special type of hall, not just any hall, but a hall which is large enough to have 100 persons. Without this information given in this parenthetical, the hearer will not know what is intended by the speaker. It is true that the parenthetical in (55) has its own truth conditions, but it does not contribute to the truth conditions of the host utterance, it rather provides the hearer with a clarification of the speaker's intention.

Thirdly, I assume that a sort of parallelism does exist between the term 'procedural' and the term 'constraint'. In Blakemore's account of procedural meaning, all procedures encoded by linguistic expressions and/or constructions put constraints on the interpretation of the utterances in which they occur. All procedures provide the hearer with inference on how to interpret the utterance. By that, as single terminology (conceptuo-procedural) can be used to describe such expressions whose linguistic meaning is used both conceptually and procedurally.

2.4.3.5. The case of 'because'

Schiffrin (1987) considers *because* as a discourse marker which operates on the ideational structure of discourse:

Another structure of discourse is ideational. In contrast to exchange and action structure, the units within this structure are semantic; they are propositions, or what I'll just call ideas.

(Schiffrin 1987: 25)

In this sense, *because* relates two ideas and/or propositions in discourse. She points out that *because* is used by the speaker to indicate causal relations in discourse as shown in the example below:

(56) [Peter failed the exam] **because** [he did not prepare well].

As can be noticed in (56), the clause introduced by *because* 'he did not prepare well' is a real-world 'cause' for the 'result' in the main clause 'Peter failed the exam'. If we take this example from a relevance-theoretic of view, we can say that *because* encodes a conceptual relationship between two propositions and that there is nothing procedural in this use.

However, Sweetser (1990:77) points out that *because* can have three readings: 'content' reading, 'epistemic entity' reading and 'speech act' reading. The first reading is equivalent to Schiffrin notion of ideational *because*:

(57) Peter got sick **because** he ate the poisoned food.

(58) Peter may come back **because** he forgot his wallet.

(59) What is time now, **because** I have got an appointment with my dentist?

(60) Leave the room, **because** I want to clean it.

In the first sentence, (57), *because* has a content use. It indicates that there is real-world 'causality' between two clauses, namely 'Peter's eating the poisoned food' is a real-world 'cause' for 'his getting sick'. By contrast, *because* in sentence (58) does not indicate 'causality' but rather shows that the speaker is asking the hearer to consider Peter's coming back as a 'conclusion' and 'leaving his wallet' as a 'premise'. Sweetser calls this reading of *because* as 'epistemic'. In sentence (59),

there is no sense of ‘causality’. *Because* is interpreted by Sweetser as indicating a speech act within the main clause in the sense that (59) can be paraphrased as ‘I ask you: what is time now because I have an appointment with my dentist’. Similar analysis can be constructed for (60).

As far as the conceptual/procedural distinction is concerned, I would claim that *because* is conceptuo-procedural linguistic expression. It encodes conceptual meaning in some cases but it can be used procedurally in others. If we reconsider its use in (57), we can notice that *because* in this sentence operates on the conceptual level. It encodes that there is a concept of ‘causality’ between two events. In this sense, it contributes a constituent to the conceptual representation of the utterance containing it. Furthermore, this use of *because* contributes to the truth-conditional content of the utterance, i.e. (57) is true if and only if P (proposition communicated by the main clause) is true, Q (proposition communicated by *because*-clause) is true and ‘Q causes P’ is true as shown below:

(P because Q) is true iff:

P = T

Q = T

Q causes P

On the other hand, the use of *because* in (58) does not operate on the conceptual representational level. We can see that *because* does not communicate a sense of causality between two events as is the case with (57). It could be argued that this use of *because* can best be analysed in relevance-theoretic notion of procedural meaning according to which a certain linguistic expression encodes information

which operates on the inferential level of the utterance interpretation. *Because* in (58) encodes procedural information that constrains the inferential phase of the utterance interpretation by guiding the hearer to interpret the clause introduced by *because* as a ‘premise’ and the main clause as a ‘conclusion’. Moreover, what is encoded by *because* in (58) does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterance. (58) is true if and only if P is true and Q is true no matter whether there is a causal relation between P and Q or not:

The third use of *because* in (59) is similar to that in (58) in the sense that *because* in both uses does not communicate any causal relation between the two propositions it links. The use of *because* in (59) constrains the interpretation of the utterance, in which *because* occurs, by pointing to the hearer that the information in the second clause (introduced by *because*) is relevant to him.

As can be noticed, *because* can be used in three different types of sentence: ‘declarative’ (57) and (58), ‘interrogative’ (59) and ‘imperative’ (60). It can encode conceptual information in some uses as in (57) and used procedurally in others as (58) and (59) and (60).

It can be noticed that, no matter whether it occurs in declarative, interrogative or imperative sentence, *because* is used metarepresentationally. In (58), (59) and (60) *because* does not contribute a constituent to the semantic representations of the utterances or encode conceptual—‘causal’ relationship between the content of the two clauses. It rather contributes to the metarepresentational level of the utterance interpretation by relating between the

proposition it introduces and the reasons behind saying, asking or requesting what is said, asked or requested in main clause.

It could be argued that, in the metarepresentational uses, *because* can be analysed procedurally as constraining the relevance of the clause it introduces. Consider its uses in the following examples:

(61) He broke his arm **because** he fell off his bike.

‘result’ ← ‘cause’ ⇒ [representational]

(62) a. He is going out **because** he put his hat on.

‘conclusion’ ← ‘premise’ ⇒ [metarepresentational]

Unlike *because* in (61), *because* in (62) does not operate on the representational level—it does not relate the two representations in each sentence. In other words, it does not relate between ‘going out’ and ‘putting the hat on’. There is no indication made by *because* that one representation is a ‘cause’ or ‘result’ to the other. The relation encoded by *because* in this sentence is metarepresentational. *Because* relates between the representation it introduces ‘putting the hat on’ and that reasons behind saying that ‘he is going out’.

This metarepresentational use of *because* can be analysed in procedural terms. It can be argued that *because* in (62) contributes to the inferential phase of the utterance interpretation by putting constraints on the relevance of the proposition it introduces. It guides the hearer to interpret the proposition communicated in the first clause ‘he is going out’ as ‘conclusion’ to the ‘premise’ communicated in the *because*-clause (he put his hat on).

To sum up, *because* is a conceptuo-procedural linguistic expression. It has a conceptual content in general but it can be used procedurally, in metarepresentational cases, by constraining the relevance of the clause it introduces. It can be used representationally and metarepresentationally in declarative, interrogative and imperative sentences. Representational uses of *because* are similar to Sweetser's (1990) content use where *because* is used to indicate conceptual relations between two propositions. By contrast, *because* in the metarepresentational uses does not contribute a constituent to the semantic representation of the utterance, but rather works on the higher level of the utterance interpretation in the sense that it relates between the clause it introduces and reason behind uttering the first clause.

2.4.3.6. Real and unreal conditionals

Some researchers, such as Grice (1967), analyse the natural language expression *if* as semantically identical to the material implication in logic ' \supset ' which is a truth-functional connective. According to the truth table of material implication, $(P \supset Q)$ is true on all possible combinations except when P is true and Q is false:

(63)	P	Q	$P \supset Q$
	T	T	T
	T	F	F
	F	T	T
	F	F	T

On this analysis *if*, in natural language, encodes a truth functional operator on the two clauses it links, i.e. the ‘antecedent’ (protasis) and the ‘consequent’ (apodosis).

Consider the following conditional utterance:

(64) If the king dies, his son will take over the throne.

As can be noticed, *if* in the above example relates two states of affairs: ‘the king’s death’ and ‘his son’s taking over the throne’. The conditional in (64) is true in all situations except that in which the king dies and his son does not take over the throne. Furthermore, two logical inferences can be allowed in such conditionals:

(65)	Modus Ponens	Modus Tollens
	1. $P \supset Q$	1. $P \supset Q$
	2. P	2. $\sim Q$
Therefore:	3. Q	3. $\sim P$

According to Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens, if it is the case that P then it is the case that Q and if it is not the case that Q then it is not the case that P . In other words, if it is the case that ‘the king dies’ then it is the case that ‘his son will take over the throne’ and if it is not the case that ‘his son will take over the throne’ then it is not the case that ‘the king dies’. In this type of conditional, $P \supset Q$ does not entail P and Q , i.e. ‘if the king dies, his son will take over the throne’ does not entail that ‘the king dies’ and does not entail that ‘his son will take over the throne’.

Some researchers, such as Akatsuka (1986), Van der Auwera (1986) and Sweetser (1990), claim that *if* semantically encodes non-truth-functional relations such as ‘causal’ and ‘consequential’ relations between the antecedent and the consequent. For instance, *if* in (66) semantically encodes that ‘the king’s death’ is a ‘cause’ and ‘his son’s taking over the throne’ is a ‘consequence’. On this analysis, the conditional could have the ‘if p then q’ ($P \rightarrow Q$) interpretation:

(66) If the king dies, then his son will take over the throne.

In his analysis of conditionals, Van der Auwera proposes the principle of Sufficiency Hypothesis (SH) on which ‘if P then Q’ means that P is a sufficient condition for Q. In other words, the truth of the antecedent is a sufficient condition for the truth of the consequent. For instance ‘the king’s death’ in (66) is a sufficient condition for ‘his son’s taking over the throne’.

However, there is another type of conditionals where Van der Auwera’s principle of SH does not work and the ‘if p then q’ interpretation is not possible. Consider the following example:

(67) If you are thirsty, there is a lemon juice in the fridge.

The SH proposed by Van der Auwera could not account for the above conditional. The truth of the antecedent is not a sufficient condition for the truth of the consequent; the hearer’s thirst is not a sufficient condition for the presence of the lemon juice in the fridge. *If* in the conditional referred to, does not encode semantic relations—‘causal’ or ‘consequential’. It is not possible to say that ‘the

presence of lemon juice in the fridge' is a consequence of the 'hearer's thirst'. To put that differently, this sort of conditional does not lend itself to 'if P then Q' interpretation:

(68) *If you are thirsty, then there is a lemon juice in the fridge.

The truth conditions in such sort of conditionals are not identical with the truth table for material implication. The truth table shows that if P is false, (68) will be true no matter whether Q is true or false. But (68) does not suggest that if the hearer is not thirsty, there will be no lemon juice in the fridge. On the contrary, it suggests that, even if the hearer is not thirsty, the lemon juice is still in the fridge.

Such type of conditional does not lend itself to Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens logical inferences. For instance, the case that P (you are thirsty) does not lead to the case that Q (there is a lemon juice in the fridge). And, the case that not Q (there is no lemon juice in the fridge) does not lead to the case that not P (you are not thirsty). In this type of conditionals, $P \supset Q$ entails Q but not P—'if you are thirsty, there is a lemon juice in the fridge' entails that 'there is a lemon juice in the fridge', but it does not entail that 'you are thirsty'.

In her analysis of conditionals, Sweetser retains Van der Auwera's SH. She argues that 'conditionality' functions in three domains: content, epistemic and speech act domains. Content conditionals relate events or states of affairs. They indicate that the truth of the antecedent is a sufficient condition for the truth of the consequent; the 'king's death' is a sufficient condition for 'his son's taking over the throne'. In the epistemic domain, by contrast, conditionals relate between

epistemic states where the conditional could be paraphrased as ‘If I *know* the [antecedent], I *conclude* the [consequent]:

- (69) If Peter submitted his dissertation last Monday, then he was trying to finish by the deadline.

On this analysis, if the hearer *knows* that Peter submitted his dissertation last Monday, then he will *conclude* that Peter was trying to finish by the deadline. The knowledge of the antecedent, in epistemic conditionals, is sufficient for the knowledge of the consequent.

As for speech act conditionals, Sweetser maintains that the truth of the antecedent is a sufficient condition for a speech act involving the consequent. According to Sweetser, this type of conditionals performs a speech act assigned to the consequent on condition that the antecedent is true. For instance, (67) indicates that ‘if you are thirsty I *inform* you (speech act) that there is lemon juice in the fridge’. In other words, ‘your being thirsty is a sufficient condition for my *informing* you of the presence of lemon juice in the fridge.

My claim is that conditionals which fit the truth table of material implication are ‘real’ conditionals. Such conditionals operate on the representational level. They relate two representations (e.g. ‘the king’s death’ and ‘his son’s taking over the throne). Conditionals which do not fit the truth table of material implication are ‘unreal’ conditionals. Such conditionals operate on the metarepresentational level where *if* does not relate two representations as is the case in real conditionals. For instance, *if* in (67) does not relate between the two

clauses but rather between the ‘*if* clause’ and the reasons behind saying what is said in the second clause. This claim seems to be compatible with Horns’ (1989) claim that the conditional operator can be either used ‘descriptively’ or ‘metalinguistically’. In the descriptive use, *if* is equivalent to the material implication ‘ \supset ’ in logic, while in the metalinguistic use it is not. For instance, *if* in (64) is used descriptively, while in (67) it is used metalinguistically.

Based on that, my argument will be that that *if* can function as a conceptuo-procedural linguistic expression. It is used conceptually in real representational conditionals and procedurally in unreal metarepresentational conditionals. In the conceptual use, *if* contributes to the semantic representation of the proposition communicated in the conditional as is the case with (64). By contrast, in the procedural use, *if* does not contribute to the semantic representation of the conditionals but play a role in the inferential part of the conditional interpretation by constraining the relevance of the second clause. Reconsider (64) and (67) repeated here as (70) and (71):

(70) If the king dies, his son will take over the throne.

(71) If you are thirsty, there is a lemon juice in the fridge.

As can be noticed, *if* in (70) operates on the representational level, it contributes to the conceptual representations of the conditional by encoding the concept of ‘causality’ or ‘consequence’: ‘the king’s death’ causes ‘his son’s taking over the throne’ or ‘his son’s taking over the throne’ is a consequence of ‘the king’s death’. It is generally accepted that causal and consequential relations are conceptual

relations. As for (71), it seems that *if* does not encode conceptual information which contributes to the representations of the conditional as is the case with (70) where *if* encodes ‘causality’ or ‘consequence’. The linguistic expression *if* in (71) rather encodes procedural information which operates on the inferential level of the conditional interpretation. What is encoded by *if* in (71) constrains the interpretation by guiding the hearer to see how the proposition, given in the second clause, achieves relevance in accordance with the proposition given in the first clause. *If* explains to the hearer the relevance of the speaker’s saying that ‘there is a lemon juice in the fridge’. In other words, the speaker is telling the hearer that ‘there is a lemon juice in the fridge’ in case ‘if’ he is thirsty and this implicates that the hearer can drink the lemon juice.

Unlike the interpretation of (70) which involves two propositions; one of them causes (or is a consequence of) the other, the interpretation of (71) involves three propositions: a) ‘you are thirsty’, b) ‘there is lemon juice in the fridge’, c) ‘the presence of lemon juice in the fridge is relevant to the person referred to in the conditional’. That is why, ‘if P then Q’ interpretation is not possible in this conditional.

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter was a scrutiny of two types of linguistic meaning: the truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional and conceptual/procedural meaning. As for the first type, some non-truth-conditional elements have been discussed. Concerning the second type, the argument was, as far as the conceptual/procedural distinction

is concerned, linguistic expressions can fall into three categories: a) purely conceptual linguistic expressions such as ‘nouns’, ‘verbs’, ‘adjectives’ and ‘adverbs’; b) conceptuo-procedural linguistic expressions such as ‘pronouns’, the ‘definite article *the*’, ‘unreal conditional’, ‘*because*’ and the expression *if*, c) purely procedural linguistic expressions which include most discourse makers such as *but*, *so*, *after all* and *therefore*.

CHAPTER 3

3. Discourse Markers in English: Two Approaches

3.1. Introduction

Discourse markers have been much studied in the last twenty years; different proposals and approaches have been developed on this subject. Fraser (1999) refers to their problematic and controversial nature. He points out that DMs have been studied by different researchers under different labels. Fraser maintains that researchers have agreed that DMs are lexical expressions that relate discourse segments, but they have disagreed on how they are defined and what functions they carry.

Schourup (1999) expresses similar views. He argues that there is disagreement on fundamental issues in the study of DMs. Researchers are unable to agree on the grammatical category of DMs or how to delimit their class or even what types of meaning these markers express.

In this chapter, my purpose is to give a detailed analysis of the main approaches and proposals adopted in studying DMs in the last 20 years and highlight the similarities and differences between these proposals. I classify the researchers of DMs into two groups. The first group includes researchers who adopt a coherence-based account. The main figures of this group are Schiffrin (1987), Fraser (1988, 1990), Schourup (1999), Redeker (1990, 1991), Zwicky

(1985) and Giora (1997, 1998). The second includes the researchers who base their study and analysis of DMs on Sperber and Wilson's (1995) RT. This group includes Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2002), Blass (1990) Iten (1998), Wilson and Sperber (1993) and Rouchota (1998).

This chapter highlights the dispute between the two groups regarding different issues in the study and analysis of DMs. The major issue, in my opinion, is how the use of DMs contributes to discourse interpretation. Researchers in the coherence group argue that DMs play a major role in the interpretation of the text by signalling 'coherence' relations between discourse units. In other words, the interpretation of a text, according to the coherence group, depends on the identification of coherence relations between the units of that text (Schourup, 1999: 240). The notion of 'text', as a level of linguistic representation, is important here.

As for researchers in the relevance group, they consider DMs as indicators or procedures that constrain the inferential phase of utterance interpretation by guiding the process of utterance interpretation and offering clues that enable the hearer/reader to recognize the intended cognitive effect with the least processing effort (Blakemore, 2000: 464). In short, the coherence group looks at DMs as linguistic devices that maintain coherence in the text through linking its units, whereas the relevance group considers such markers as pragmatic devices that constrain the relevance of discourse units. In the latter, the notion of 'text' is less important and in fact plays no role in the theory in the sense that

relevance relations hold, not between linguistic representations but between relevance conceptual representations (thoughts).

It will become clear, towards the end of this chapter, that I favour the relevance-theoretic approach over the coherence-based one. It will be concluded that ‘coherence’ is replaced by ‘relevance’—which is a cognitive, not a linguistic, concept. The essential difference between ‘coherence’ and ‘relevance’ is that the latter considers discourse well-formedness as a cognitive (not linguistic) entity. In other words, ‘relevance’ will be offered as an alternative to ‘coherence’.

In addition to the above primary difference between the two groups, this chapter investigates some other sub-differences concerning the semantic, pragmatic and structural status and functions of DMs. The investigation also tackles the disagreement between researchers in the same group. For instance, some researchers in the coherence group argue for a unified grammatical category for DMs (Zwicky 1985), some others do not (Schiffrin 1987). Some researchers claim that DMs have semantic (core) meaning (Murray, 1979) and (Bolinger 1989), while others deny this (Schiffrin 1987). And, among researchers of the relevance group, there is disagreement (a) whether their meaning is conceptual or procedural and (b) whether they contribute to the implicit or explicit interpretation of utterances. Blakemore (1987) argued that DMs are lexical expressions whose meaning does not contribute to the truth conditional content of utterances in which they occur. The main function of these markers is to constrain the implicit side of utterance interpretation.

This chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 discusses the coherence-based account of DMs (Schiffrin 1987; Giora 1997, 1998 and Fraser 1988, 1990). This account argues that DMs play a crucial role in the interpretation of discourse by signalling coherence relations between discourse units. Section 3.3 investigates the relevance-based account of DMs (Blakemore 1987, 1992, 2002; Blass 1990; Iten 1998 and Wilson & Sperber 1993). Section 3.4 gives an evaluation of the two accounts and favours the relevance account which considers coherence as a cognitive rather than linguistic entity. Section 3.5 is a conclusion

3.2. Coherence-based account of discourse markers

3.2.1. What is coherence?

Halliday and Hasan (1976) point out that coherence is what makes a passage of sentences semantically well-formed (makes it constitute a 'text'). When two sentences cohere, a semantic relationship holds between them—and a text is created. Werth (1984:60) points out that the well-formedness of discourse is achieved through 'connectivity' which is realised in four forms; 'cohesion', 'collocation', 'connectors' and 'coherence'. Werth argues that these four forms are ultimately the same in the sense that the first three are subsumed under the fourth. I ignore 'collocation' and 'connectors' here and concentrate on 'coherence' and 'cohesion'. It seems that there is interrelation between these two concepts. Coherence is an umbrella under which cohesion operates. Cohesion is one of the linguistic devices that contributes to the coherence of a certain text through the syntactic process of interconnecting the sentences of this text.

Halliday and Hasan (1976) point out that the concept of ‘cohesion’ accounts for the semantic relationships through which a certain passage of speech or writing become a text. According to them, cohesion can have the following forms: co-reference, ellipsis, and conjunction as illustrated in (a), (b) and (c) respectively:

- (a) John visited me yesterday. He is my closest friend.
- (b) Would you like to have some more tickets to the party? I have ten left.
- (c) He is in the garden, but I cannot see him.

Halliday and Hasan (1976:1) provide a comprehensive discussion of the notion of cohesion. They point out that cohesion is a set of different linguistic devices through which one can judge whether a certain sequence of sentences is a text or not. If sentences maintain semantic relationships between each other through the use of some cohesive devices, then these sentences would form a text.

This makes the notion of cohesion very crucial to the term ‘texture’. The texture of a certain passage of sentences is achieved through the presence of some cohesive relations between the sentences of this passage. Consider an example:

- (1) I have bought some **pens**. I gave **three** of **them** to my brother.

As can be noticed, the sentences in (1) cohere; there is a cohesive relationship between them represented by the anaphoric reference where ‘pens’, ‘three’ and ‘them’ refer to the same object.

Halliday and Hasan (1976:5) argue that cohesion can be achieved partly through grammar and partly through vocabulary. This can result in having two

different types of cohesion: ‘grammatical cohesion’ and ‘lexical cohesion’. The famous examples of grammatical cohesion are those achieved through linking (connecting) linguistic expressions or DMs such as *and*, *or*, *but*, *yet*, *now*, *then*, *however* and *after all*. Consider the example below:

- (2) a. He has got a very good mark in the math test.
 b. **And** he has been the first in his class for the last two years (additive).
 c. **Yet** he failed his syntax test this term (adversative).
 d. **Now**, he feels very frustrated and thinks of leaving school (temporal).

The linking words in (2) are cohesive devices that express semantic relationships between the sentences as illustrated. As for lexical cohesion, it can be achieved through devices such as ‘repetition and ‘reiteration’. Consider the following example in which lexical cohesion is achieved through the repetition of the word *woman* and the synonymy of the word *mother*.

- (3) There was a great **woman**, who used to look after me when I was a kid. She used to feed me, play with me and tell me nice stories. The **woman** was my **mother**.

Halliday and Hasan (1976:8) argue that cohesive relations go beyond the sentence structure. They could be identified within a sentence or between sentences in a certain text. Cohesive relations are semantic relations between an element of the text and another element that is crucial to its interpretation regardless of grammatical or structural boundaries. Suppose that we pick up a novel (written text), turn randomly to a page and read the following:

(4) **They think so.**

As an element of a text, the sentence in (4) could not be interpreted alone. As readers, we have to go back and search for some referents to *they* and *so*. In other words, we have to identify the elements that semantically match (and cohere with) the present elements. This leads Halliday and Hasan to the following account of cohesion:

The concept of cohesion is a semantic one; it refers to relations of meaning that exist within the text and that define it as a text. Cohesion occurs where the interpretation of some element in the discourse is dependent on that of another. The one presupposes the other, in the sense that it cannot be effectively decoded except by resource to it. When this happens, a relation of cohesion is set up, and the two elements, the presupposing and the presupposed, are thereby at least potentially integrated into a text.

(Halliday and Hasan: 1976:4)

It is clear from the above quotation that Halliday and Hassan (1976:27) consider 'cohesion' as linguistic notion. For them, 'cohesion' is responsible for text-forming (texture or well-formedness). They view cohesive devices such as 'co-reference', 'substitution', 'ellipsis' and 'conjunction' as linguistic tools that semantically link elements which are structurally unrelated.

In this chapter, I argue that the well-formedness of text is not achieved by coherence which is signalled by linguistic means. It is rather achieved pragmatically through the establishment of relevance relations between

conceptual representations. I also argue that the linking ‘connecting’ words are not linguistic tools that contribute to the interpretation of text through expressing cohesive relations between elements of discourse, but rather pragmatic markers that contribute to the interpretation of text through controlling relevance relations between conceptual representations. Before introducing this argument, let us discuss two coherence-based accounts of DMs, namely Schiffrin’s (1987) and Fraser’s (1988) accounts:

3.2.2. Schiffrin’s account of discourse markers.

The industry of research in DMs has flourished at least since 1987. Three accounts were developed at roughly the same time; Schiffrin (1987), Blakemore (1987) and Fraser (1988). This section explores Schiffrin’s accounts of DMs.

Schiffrin (1987), one of the leading figures in the coherence group, presents a very detailed analysis of some DMs, explaining their semantic and grammatical status and their functions and characteristics. Schiffrin maintains that DMs contribute to the coherence of the text by establishing coherence relationships between units of talk (Schiffrin, 1987: 9). Schiffrin’s analysis of DMs shares some views with Halliday and Hasan’s (1976) analysis of the cohesive devices in English.

Both Schiffrin (1987) and Halliday and Hasan (1976) agree that DMs should be considered as linguistic devices that link adjacent units of talk to make the whole discourse coherent. Schiffrin proposes that DMs play a cohesive role in the sense that they relate informational units in the present discourse with

informational units in the prior discourse; this kind of coherence achieved by DMs is known as *local coherence* in Schiffrin's framework. It is local in the sense that DMs link two adjacent units in the text (or indicate coherence relationships between two adjacent utterances in discourse). Local coherence will be contrasted with Giora's (1979) global coherence later in this chapter. For the time being, I will concentrate on some of the DMs markers studied by Schiffrin and show what coherence relationships they indicate and how they contribute to the interpretation of the text they are used in.

Schiffrin gives a detailed analysis of eleven DMs in English: *and, but, or, so, well, then, now, because, oh, y'know* and *I mean*. My purpose here, is not to discuss all these DMs in detail, but rather investigate the functions (or coherence relations) achieved by such markers. The data that Schiffrin used to analyse these DMs are based on her sociolinguistic corpus which is composed of tape-recorded interviews with ordinary speakers. The data consist of long transcribed speech units taken from these interviews. I will use some of her examples for illustration.

Schiffrin maintains that DMs can function on different levels of discourse structure (linguistic or non-linguistic). They can operate on the 'ideational' (informational) structure in the sense that they indicate relations between ideas in discourse or in other words, they mark the organisation of ideas in discourse. For instance, a DM such as *but* indicates that what follows it contrasts with what precedes it. They can also operate on the participation framework (discourse exchange and interaction) in the sense that they play a role in controlling the

conversational labour between speakers and hearers as is the case with *oh* and *well*.

My discourse model has both non-linguistic structures (exchange and action) and linguistic structures (ideational). Speaker and hearer are related to each other, and to their utterances, in a participation framework. Their knowledge and meta-knowledge about ideas is organised and managed in an information state. Local coherence in discourse is thus defined as the outcome of joint efforts from interactants to integrate knowledge, meaning, saying and doing.

(Schiffrin 1987:29)

For example, Schiffrin argues that DMs such as *and*, *but*, *or*, *so* and *because* are operative on the ideational structure. DMs such as *well*, *oh*, *now*, *y'know* and *I mean*, operate on the other levels: *exchange*, *action*, *participation framework* and *information state*. Schiffrin (1987) argues that DMs contribute to the coherence of discourse through relating different components of talk in the sense that the interpretation of any component is dependent on the interpretation of the other:

Since coherence is the result of integration among different components of talk, any device which simultaneously locates an utterance within several emerging contexts of discourse automatically has an integrative function. That is, if a marker acts like an instruction to consider an upcoming utterance as speaker-focused on prior text within an information state, with a simultaneous instruction to view that utterance within a particular

action structure, then the result is a type of integration between those components of talk.

(Schiffrin 1987: 330)

It can be noticed that Schiffrin views ‘discourse unit’ as a linguistic entity. She uses the term to refer to syntactic (structural) units such as ‘clauses’ and ‘phrases’ as well as ideational (informational) units such as ‘ideas’ and ‘opinions’. She has used the term interchangeably with other terms such as ‘discourse segment’, ‘unit of talk’ and ‘component of talk’. No matter what as discourse unit is called, it will be argued later in this chapter that it is a cognitive rather than linguistic entity. In what follows, I give a brief summary of the functions and coherence relations expressed by DMs in Schiffrin (1987).

3.2.2.1. ‘And’ and ‘but’

Schiffrin argues that these DMs operate on the ideational structure. Contrary to Halliday and Hasan’s (1976) who claim that conjunctions such as *and* and *or* express semantic relations between elements of discourse without having any structural role, Schiffrin assumes that they have both cohesive and structural roles; structural because they link two (or more) syntactic units such as clauses, phrases or verbs, and cohesive because the interpretation of the whole conjunctive utterance depends on the combination of both conjuncts. As for *and*, it can precede support units of talk (explanation, evidence and clarification to previous units). It can also have a pragmatic effect in the sense that it indicates a speaker’s continuation. However, *and* does not provide information about what is being

continued. Such information is derived from the discourse content and structure (1987: 150). Consider Schiffrin's example in which *and* is used to indicate the speaker's continuation.

- (5) Debby: What made you decide t'come out here? Do y'remember?
 Ira: a. What made us decide t'come out here.
 b. Well uh we were looking in different neighbourhoods
 c. **and** then uh this was a Jewish community
 d. **and** we decided t'come out here
 e. Uh the-several of the communities we looked uh they weren't-
 they weren't Jewish.
 f. **and** we didn't wanna live there.
 g. Then we decide on Glenmore.

But, according to Schiffrin, indicates 'adversative' relations in discourse. It conveys contrast between two ideas or topics or it can be used to mark the denial of the speaker's expectation of something:

- (6) She drives a Porsche, **but** her husband drives a Kia.
 (7) She is a lecturer of psychology at Oxford, **but** she does not know how to spell SCHIZOPHRENIA.

As can be noticed, *but* in (6) indicates that there is a contrast between two clauses 'driving a Porsche' and 'driving a Kia'. It is true that both are cars. However, Porsche is a German manufacturer while Kia is a Korean one. In addition, Porsche is more expensive than Kia which means that it will cost more to drive a Porsche. As for *but* in (7), it indicates that there is a denial-of-expectation relation between

the two clauses. Knowing how to spell the word SCHIZOPHRENIA would be an expectation of a lecturer of psychology at Oxford. However, this expectation is denied by the second clause. The DM *but* will be discussed in more detail from relevance-theoretic point of view in chapter 4.

3.2.2.2. 'Because' and 'so'

These two DMs are operative on the ideational structure as well. They contribute to the coherence of discourse by signalling relations between discourse units. According to Schiffrin, *because* is used by the speaker to indicate a relation of 'cause and result', while *so* is used to indicate a relation of 'premise and conclusion'. Consider the following examples:

- (8) [John did not go to school]_{Res} **because** [he was is sick]_{Cau}.
 (9) [John was sick]_{Pre}. **So** [he did not school to school]_{Con}.

In (8), *because* indicates that the event 'John did not go to school' is a result of the event 'John was sick'. *So* in (9) indicates that the event 'he was sick' is a 'premise' and the event 'John did not go to school' is a 'conclusion'. More details will be given on *so* in the relevance-theoretic analysis in chapter 4.

3.2.2.3. 'Now' and 'then'

These two DMs function on the ideational level of discourse structure. They indicate temporal relationships between units of talk. Schiffrin claims that *now* is used to indicate a speaker's progression through a discourse which contains an ordered sequence of subordinating parts. It is also used to indicate the upcoming

shift in talk, or when the speaker wants to negotiate the right to control what will happen next in talk (1987:241). Consider Schiffrin's example in which Ira is discussing why he is against intermarriage. In this speech, Ira uses *now* to shift from recounting hypothetical events (a-d) in a narrative mode to interpreting them (e):

- (10) a. For example, eh...eh...let's assume that husband's a-w-a-a-a the husband's Jewish ,
 b. and the girl's, say, Catholic
 c. and they have an argument
 d. and she says 'You goddamn Jew!'
 e. **Now** she wouldn't say something like that, if she was rational.

Then is used in discourse to indicate succession between prior and upcoming talk—a succession from one topic to another. Consider (11) in which the first two uses of *then* indicate a temporal succession between two events and the third one indicates a succession to a different topic.

- (11) I arrived at home very late this evening. I was exhausted. I took a hot bath, and **then** I had a light dinner. When I finished my dinner, I switched the TV on and watched my favourite programme, and **then** went to bed. I woke up very early in the morning because I heard some noise coming from the living room, **then** I remembered that I forgot to switch the TV off before I went to sleep.

There are differences between these two markers: unlike *now*, which is used as a time deictic providing temporal index in discourse time, *then* can be

either deictic or anaphoric. As deictic, *then* indicates reference time, i.e. temporal relations between a linguistic event and speaking time, but as an anaphor, it marks temporal relations between two linguistic events (1987:246). Consider (12) and (13) in which *then* is used deictically and anaphorically respectively:

(12) a. When did you submit your thesis?

b. I submitted it **then**.

(13) a. Are you going to see your supervisor during the Easter vacation?

b. I will see him **then**.

3.2.2.4. 'Oh' and 'well'

These two markers are different from the markers discussed above in the sense that they operate on the interactional and informational level of discourse structure. Schiffrin presents *oh* as a marker of information management. It is used to indicate old information recognition and new information receipt, the replacement and redistribution of information and when locally provided information does not correspond to the speaker's prior expectations. It is usually used in repairs, questions, answers and acknowledgements (1987: 90-95). *Oh* can have a pragmatic function; it is responsible for the division of turn-taking in the exchange structure. Thus, it plays a role in the participation framework as well. Schiffrin agrees with Heritage (1984) that *oh* is used to indicate that the speaker has undergone some kind of change in her locally current state of knowledge,

information, orientation or awareness (1987: 99). Consider (14) and (15) in which *oh* indicates old information recognition and new information receipt respectively:

- (14) a. Did you invite your flatmate to your birthday party?
b. **Oh** yeah, the Nigerian guy. Of course I did.
- (15) a. Do you know who the new prime minister is? He is Mr. Smith.
b. **Oh!**
c. He is my father's best friend.
d. **Oh!** But I did not hear that on TV.

Well is used as a response marker which anchors its user in an interaction when an upcoming contribution is not fully constant with prior coherence options. Schiffrin argues that *well* can have pragmatic function; it is used to indicate a request for elaboration and clarification (1987: 120). Consider the following example:

- (16) a. How did you get your new mobile? Was it a contract or pay as you go?
b. **Well**, you mean the Nokia N95?

3.2.2.5. 'Y'know' and 'I mean'

These two markers are used on the informational level of discourse structure; they relate informational units in the present discourse with informational units in the previous discourse. Furthermore, they have functions in the participation framework. Schiffrin (1987:268) maintains that *y'know* has two discourse functions: a marker of meta-knowledge about what speakers and hearers share,

and a marker of meta-knowledge about what is generally known. It is also used to indicate a situation in which the speaker knows that the hearer shares some knowledge about a particular piece of information. Consider the following example:

- (17) a. Finally, John and Sarah got married.
 b. **Y’know** they have been in love for five years.
- (18) a. You study very hard these days.
 b. Oh ye, **y’know** “no bees no honey; no work no money”.

I mean functions on the participation framework; it marks the speaker’s orientation to two aspects of the meaning of talk: ideas and intentions. It is used by the speaker to mark her upcoming modification of the ideas and intentions of the prior utterance (1987:296). Consider the following examples given by Schiffrin:

- (19) a. But I think um ten years from now,
 b. it is going to be much more liberal.
 c. I could see it in my job.
 d. **I mean**, when I started working for the government, there were no colored people.
 e. And today eh...uh... twenty five, thirty percent, forty percent of the people I work with are—colored.

This discussion shows that DMs in Schiffrin’s proposal do not form a unified grammatical class, but rather functionally related group of items drawn

from other classes. They can be particles (*oh, well*), conjunctions (*and, but, or*), time deictics (*now, then*), lexicalised clauses (*y'know, I mean*) and others (1987: 327). Schiffrin treats DMs as members of a functional class of verbal (and non-verbal) devices which provide contextual coordinates for ongoing talk. She builds her definition of DMs on a theoretic level: "DMs are sequentially dependent elements which bracket units of talk". On that basis, Schiffrin (1987: 31-2) argues that, although DMs introduce sentences, they are independent of sentential structure. In other words, the removal of DMs such as *I mean, y'know* or *oh* from its initial position will not affect the syntactic structure of the sentences.

It can be concluded that Schiffrin's account of DMs concentrates more on the linguistic and structural role DMs play in maintaining discourse coherence through linking discourse units. However, she acknowledges that some DMs such as *oh* and *well* can have pragmatic functions.

3.2.3. Fraser's account of discourse markers.

3.2.3.1. The problem of definition

As Fraser (1999) points out, the study of DMs has turned into a growth industry in the last ten years. Dozens of articles appear yearly focusing on the nature, meaning and function of DMs. Fraser (1999) reviews the past research and concludes that no clear definition has been given of DMs. He mentions an early reference by Levinson (1983) who considers DMs as a class of linguistic expressions worthy of study in its own right. Levinson briefly comments on DMs, but neither gives a name to this class nor a definition of it:

There are many words and phrases in English, and no doubt most languages, that indicate the relationship between an utterance and the prior discourse. Examples are utterance-initial usages of *but*, *therefore*, *in conclusion*, *to the contrary*, *still*, *however*, *anyway*, *well*, *besides*, *actually*, *all in all*, *so*, *after all*, and so on. It is generally conceded that such words have at least a component of meaning that resists truth-conditional treatment... what they seem to do is indicate, often in very complex ways, just how the utterance that contains them is a response to, or a continuation of, some portion of the prior discourse.

(Levinson 1983: 87-8)

Like Fraser, Zwicky (1985) has explained DMs, but he, too, has not provided a clear definition. He points out that they must be distinguished from other function words; and that they should be prosodically independent; that they have to be separated by punctuation in writing and intonation pause in speech; that they are insulated from the rest of the sentence in which they occur and that they have pragmatic functions of relating the current utterance to the larger discourse:

Within the great collection of things that have been labelled 'particles', we find at least one grammatical class of items, in English and in languages generally. These have been variously termed 'discourse particles' and 'interjections'; here I will call them 'discourse markers'... on the grounds of distribution prosody, and meaning, discourse markers can be seen to form a class. But

like the ‘particles’ discussed, they are independent words rather than clitics¹²

(Zwicky 1985: 303)

Fraser (1999) is concerned with the following questions. What are DMs? What are not DMs? What is the grammatical status of DMs? And what do DMs link? The remaining of this section will answer the first two questions. The next section will be devoted to answer the other two questions. Fraser (1999) provides a comprehensive definition of DMs:

A class of lexical expressions drawn primarily from the syntactic classes of conjunctions, adverbs and prepositional phrases. With certain exceptions, they signal a relationship between the interpretation of the segment they introduce S2, and the prior segment, S1. They have core meaning¹³ which is procedural, not conceptual, and their more specific interpretation is ‘negotiated’ by the context, both linguistic and conceptual.

(Fraser (1999:831)

Given this definition, Fraser (1999:942), excludes some of the segment-initial expressions used to be as DMs. Consider the following example:

¹² An unstressed word typically is a function word that is incapable of standing on its own and attaches in pronunciation to a stressed word, with which it forms a single accentual unit. Examples of clitics are the pronoun *'em* in I see *'em* and the definite article in French *l'arme*, "the arm."

¹³ This core meaning is similar to Blakemore's notion of 'procedural meaning' where a linguistic expression encodes a procedure that guides the hearer/reader during the process of the utterance interpretation. This will be discussed in more detail in Blakemore's account of procedural meaning.

- (20) a. You should help John in his maths homework.
 b. **Frankly**, I am not very good at maths.

According to Fraser, *frankly* does not relate two discourse segments¹⁴, but rather signals a comment of separate message that relates to the following segment. Fraser (1996) calls *frankly*, and similar segment-initial expressions such as *obviously* and *stupidly*, “commentary pragmatic markers” rather than DMs. Fraser also excludes particles such as *even*, *only*, *just* and pause markers such as *well* and *ah* from the class of DMs for the same reason. Consider his examples below:

- (21) a. The exam was easy. **Even** John passed.
 b. They are fairly restrictive there. **Only** poor Republicans are allowed in.
 c. What am I going to do now? **Well**... I really don't know.
 d. A: Do you know the answer? B: **Ah** ..., I will have to think about it.

3.2.3.2. *The grammatical status and function of discourse markers.*

Fraser (1999:943) argues that DMs do not form a unified grammatical class. They are rather linguistic expressions gathered from different classes. They have the grammatical status of the main class they belong to. For example, they can be conjunctions (*and* and *but*), adverbs (*anyway* and *however*) and prepositional phrases (*after all* and *in spite of this*). Such DMs differ in grammatical class, but have the same function.

¹⁴ The term ‘discourse segment’ is used by Fraser to refer to a ‘sentence’, ‘proposition’, ‘utterance’ or ‘message’.

Fraser (1999) also argues that DMs are syntactically subordinate conjunctions. They cannot introduce separate sentences. They require previous independent sentences as can be seen in the following example:

- (22) a.* **Unless** he finishes his maths homework.
 b. John will not go to cinema **unless** he finishes his maths homework.
 c. A: John will not go to the cinema. B: **Unless** he finishes his maths homework.

Contrary to his earlier writings (1990, 1993), in which he argues that DMs are only those expressions that can introduce separate sentences such as *since*, *because* and *although*, Fraser (1999:943) argues that DMs can include expressions such as *and* and *but* simply because such expressions can relate two separate messages no matter whether they introduce a separate sentence or not:

- (23) a. He plays football **and** I read my favourite novel.
 b. He plays football **but** I read my favourite novel.

As far as the function of DMs is concerned, Fraser (1999) argues that DMs signal a relationship between the interpretation of the segment they introduce (S2) and the interpretation of the prior segment (S1). For instance, the use of *but* in (24a) indicates that there is a contrastive relationship between ‘studying very hard’ and ‘failing the exam’, and the use of *so* in (24b) indicates that there is a ‘premise-conclusion’ relationship between ‘taking the metro’ and ‘arriving on time’:

- (24) a. Laura studied very hard. **But** she failed her exam.
 b. He took the metro. **So**, he arrived on time.

Fraser maintains that such markers contribute to the coherence of the text by indicating coherence relationships between ‘units of talk’. Thus, *but* in (24a) indicates that S2 and S1 cohere in relation to *contrast*, and *so* in (24b) indicates that S2 and S1 cohere in relation to *logical consequence*. However, Fraser (1999: 938) indicates that DMs do not have to signal any relationship between S2 and S1 (adjacent segments of talk). A DM can relate the segment it introduces with any other previous segment in discourse. This is known as ‘global coherence’ as contrasted to Schiffrin’s ‘local coherence’. Fraser goes further to argue that a DM does not even have to introduce any discourse segment whatsoever. It can occur in a medial or final position in discourse. Consider Fraser’s example (3) repeated here as (25):

- (25) a. Harry is old enough to drink. **However**, he can’t because he has hepatitis.
 b. It is freezing outside. I will, **in spite of this**, not wear a coat.
 c. We don’t have to go. I will go, **nevertheless**.

Finally, Fraser (1999:948) argues that DMs have a ‘core’ meaning which is procedural not conceptual. Fraser’s notion of procedural is similar to RT’s one in the sense that such expressions do not contribute to the truth-conditional content of utterances in which they occur. However, Fraser argues that such expressions work as syntactic connecting devices between units of discourse, not as cognitive devices that put constraints on the relevance of discourse. It is right

that they encode meanings that define the relationships between discourse segments, but they do not contribute to the truth-conditional content of these segments. Consider the following example:

- (26) a. Clare is a philosopher. **But** her husband is a soldier in the national army.
 b. John can help in installing this software. **After all**, he is a computer engineer.

The highlighted DMs in the above examples can be deleted without affecting the propositional content of the segments. However, if deleted, the hearer will be left with no guidance to the relationship between the two segments. Thus, the ‘core’ meaning encoded by DMs, provides the hearer/reader with the information on how to interpret the message conveyed by S2 vis-à-vis the interpretation of S1 (Fraser 1997:302, 1999:944).

3.2.3. The difference between Schiffrin’s and Fraser’s accounts.

Prima facie, Schiffrin’s (1987) and Fraser’s (1999) accounts seem similar. Both argue for a coherence-based account of DMs. That is, DMs convey coherence relationships between units of talk. Furthermore, both of them claim that DMs do not form a syntactic class but are rather linguistic expressions drawn from different classes. However, there are two main differences between the two accounts. The first is Schiffrin’s (1987) claim that DMs link adjacent units of talk.

This is known as a ‘local¹⁵ coherence’, whereas Fraser (1999) argues that a DM need not link two adjacent units of talk. DMs can relate the segment they introduce (S2) to any other previous segment in discourse. This is known as ‘global coherence’. Consider the following example adapted from Fraser (1999: 938):

- (27) He drove the truck through the parking lot and into the street. Then he almost cut me off, he ran a red light. **However**, these weren’t his worst offences. He was driving without a licence.

In this example, *however* does not relate the segment it introduces ‘these weren’t his worst offences’ with just the immediately previous segment ‘after that, he ran a red light’ but rather with all the previous segments including the immediately prior segment. Fraser also argues that a DM can occur in a medial as well as final position in discourse as we have seen in example (25).

The second difference concerns the structural, semantic and pragmatic status of DMs. DMs in Schiffrin’s proposal can be divided into three types: the first includes DMs that have referential meaning such as *and*, *but* and *or* which serve as cohesive devices that contribute to the coherence of discourse. The second type includes DMs which lack (referential) meaning, such as *oh* and *well*. Such markers are independent of the sentential syntactic structure of discourse. They do not have a cohesive role similar to those of the first type, but affect discourse interpretation in the sense that they indicate relationships at the level of

¹⁵ The term ‘local coherence’ was introduced by Schiffrin (1987) who argues that DMs indicate coherence relations between adjacent units of talk. This term has been later used by Fraser (1997, 1999) as opposed to ‘global coherence’.

‘information state’, i.e. markers of information management. The third type includes DMs that have referential meaning but are independent of the sentential structure such as *I mean* and *y’know*. Although they have semantic meaning, such markers can be removed from the text structure without affecting the meaning or grammaticality of the text.

Fraser’s (1997, 1999) account concentrates on the pragmatic functions carried by DMs. In the light of that, he calls them ‘pragmatic markers’ (PMs). DMs in his account are all linguistic elements that encode clues which signal the speaker potential communicative intention. Unlike Schiffrin, who concentrates on the structural and linguistic role of DMs in achieving coherence, Fraser concentrates on the cognitive role such markers play in building text coherence. DMs in Fraser’s account do not contribute to the truth-conditional (propositional) content of utterances in which they occur. They do not affect the truth or falsity of the utterance if they are removed. Fraser (1999: 945) argues that DMs have semantic ‘core’ meaning, which is not conceptual but rather procedural. The term procedural here is very similar to that discussed in Wilson and Sperber’s (1993), and Blakemore (1987, 2002). The difference is that Fraser studies DMs within a coherence framework, while Wilson and Sperber and Blakemore study them within a relevance-theoretic framework. Fraser (1997:302) argues that DMs work as procedures that provide the hearer/reader with information on how to relate between the interpretation of S2 and that of S1. This procedural meaning conveyed by DMs contributes to the coherence of the text. For instance, the use of

after all in (28) guides the hearer/reader to recognize that the message expressed by S2 is *coherent* as ‘premise’ with respect to the ‘conclusion’ expressed by S1:

(28) John felt sick. **After all**, he drank three bottles of beer.

Such an example is analysed differently by Blakemore. She argues that *after all*, in (28) has a procedural meaning that guides the hearer/reader in the inferential phase of the process of utterance interpretation. Thus it instructs the hearer to infer that ‘drinking three bottles of beer’ is *relevant* as a ‘premise’ to the ‘conclusion’ ‘feeling sick’ communicated in the first clause. This will be discussed in further detail in Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) account of DMs.

3.3. Relevance-based account of discourse markers

Much research has been conducted in studying DMs within a relevance- theoretic framework. Blakemore (1987), to my knowledge, is the first to have developed a relevance-theoretic approach which is considered to be a turning point in the study of DMs. This section discusses Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) relevance-theoretic account of DMs and how this account differs from those in the coherence framework.

3.3.1. Discourse markers as semantic constraints on relevance

Blakemore’s (1987) main argument is that DMs play an important role in the process of utterance interpretation by providing the hearers/readers with some guidance in the inferential phase of utterance interpretation and the search for

optimal relevance. Blakemore refers to the ‘procedural’¹⁶ nature of DMs. She argues that some DMs do not contribute to the semantic truth-conditional content of utterances in which they occur; such expressions are procedural in the sense that they constrain the process of utterance interpretation. The use of such expressions helps the hearer/reader to work out the implicit side of the utterance interpretation where linguistic decoding alone does not, as we will see later in this section (Blakemore 1987:18, 2000: 464).

Blakemore’s account of procedural meaning is a reaction to Grice’s (1967) notion of conventional implicature. As we have seen in section (1.4.3), Grice argues that some linguistic expressions have conventional (encoded) meaning which gives rise to implicature (hence conventional implicature). Such linguistically encoded meaning does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of utterances in which they. Consider Grice’s famous example again:

(29) He is English; he is, therefore, brave.

In this example, Grice argues that the conventional meaning of *therefore* gives rise to the implicature that: ‘being brave’ is a consequence of ‘being English’. Blakemore (1987) builds on that and argues that the linguistic expression *therefore* and similar expressions such as *but*, *so* and *after all* do not give rise to conventional implicature, as Grice assumes, but rather encode procedural meaning.

Blakemore (1987:75, 2000:472) analyses the meaning encoded by DMs such as *therefore*, *so*, *after all* and *but* as procedures that constrain the relevance

¹⁶ As note, Fraser 1999 has also used the term procedural. See footnote 13.

3.3.2. Blakemore's revised account of discourse markers

In the light of the subsequent research by Wilson and Sperber (1993) on the relation between linguistic form and relevance, Blakemore (2002) revises some of her views of DMs and the conceptual-procedural distinction.

In Blakemore (1987), it is argued that linguistically encoded (meaning) can either be conceptual or procedural. She claims that the linguistically encoded conceptual information is the truth-conditional information that plays a role in establishing the explicit level of utterance meaning; linguistically encoded procedural information is the non-truth conditional information that works at the implicit level of utterance interpretation. To put it differently, Blakemore (1987) argues that what is conceptual should always contribute to truth conditions and what is procedural should never contribute to truth conditions. Thus conceptual and procedural are mutually exclusive.

It follows from the argument that what is conceptual should only contribute to the explicit level of utterance interpretation, and what is procedural should only contribute to the implicit level. Accordingly, all DMs in Blakemore's (1987) account are considered as procedural elements that work at the implicit side of the interpretation of utterances in which they occur. The general picture of the linguistically encoded information in Blakemore's (1987) account is given below:




Figure 6: Linguistically encoded information in Blakemore (1987)

However, Wilson and Sperber (1993: 2) argue that the distinction drawn above is invalid. They propose that the conceptual/procedural distinction is not parallel with the truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional distinction. Their claim is that, on the one hand, there are linguistic expressions which encode conceptual information but do not contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterance in which they occur, as is the case in sentence adverbials such as *frankly* and *unfortunately*. On the other hand, there are linguistic expressions that play role in determining the truth-conditional content of their utterance without encoding conceptual information. This is the case with some personal pronouns.

Wilson and Sperber want to argue that these two distinctions cross-cut each other and are not isomorphic. To put it differently, some truth conditional constructions encode concepts, some others encode procedures; some non-truth conditional constructions encode concepts, some others encode procedures (1993:2). For example, illocutionary adverbials such as *seriously* and *frankly* encode conceptual information which does not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance in which they occur. The removal of such adverbials will not

affect the truth or falsity of utterances containing them. In this concern, Wilson and Sperber (1993:19) reach a conclusion that there are four types of linguistic expressions:

A. Linguistic expressions which encode conceptual information that does not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance in which they occur. These expressions include illocutionary adverbials such as *seriously* and *frankly* and attitudinal adverbials such as *unfortunately*:

- (i) **Seriously**, I am not coming to your birthday party.
- (ii) **Frankly**, I am not coming to your birthday party.
- (iii) **Unfortunately**, I am not coming to your birthday party

B. Linguistic expressions which encode conceptual information that contributes to the truth-conditional content of their utterances such as manner adverbials. Consider the synonymous manner adverbials of *seriously* and *frankly*:

- (i) She told me **seriously** that she is not coming to my birthday party.
- (ii) Clare told John **frankly** that she is not coming to his birthday party.

C. Linguistic expressions which encode procedural information that does not contribute to the truth conditions of utterance containing them. According to Blakemore (1987), such expressions (*so*, *but*, *after all* and *therefore*, etc.) put constraints on the implicit side of the utterance interpretation.

- (i) He did not prepare well for the chemistry exam. **So**, he failed.
- (ii) He did not prepare well for the chemistry exam. **After all**, he failed.

D. Linguistic expressions which contribute to the truth-conditional content of utterances in which they occur and yet they encode procedural information. Examples of these expressions are personal pronouns such as *I* and *he*.

In fact, the fourth type of these linguistic expressions is a big challenge to Blakemore's (1987) account. Wilson and Sperber (1993) argue that pronouns are linguistic expressions that encode procedural information which plays role in determining the truth-conditional content of the utterance. Furthermore, the procedural information encoded by pronouns puts constraints on explicature rather than implicature, in the sense that the use of a pronoun guides the hearer to the intended referent of that pronoun, which is part of the propositional content. Consider the following example:

(31) He is very optimistic.

The information encoded by the pronoun *he* in (31) contributes to the truth-conditional content of the utterance since it affects the truth or falsity of the utterance. Furthermore, the information encoded by the pronoun *he* is procedural in the sense that it guides the hearer in the process of the utterance interpretation (guiding the determination of the intended referent of *he*).

The general picture drawn by Wilson and Sperber (1993) on the conceptual/procedural distinction is given below:




Figure 7: Linguistically encoded information in Wilson and Sperber (1993)

Blakemore revises her account of procedural meaning in the light of the critical analysis of the relation between linguistic form and relevance offered by Wilson and Sperber (1993). In the revised version, *Relevance and Linguistic Meaning*, Blakemore (2002) gives up the claimed parallelism between truth-conditional/conceptual and non-truth-conditional/procedural. She acknowledges that sentence adverbials are linguistic expressions whose conceptual encoding does not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance in which they are used (2002:43).

Blakemore (2002) acknowledges that the notion of procedural meaning is not as simple as it is presented in her old version (1987). The notion of procedural meaning should be widened to account for some phenomena such as pronouns whose procedural encoding contributes to the truth conditions of the utterances containing them:

However, following Kaplan (1989), Wilson and Sperber (1993) have argued that pronouns do not encode constituents of a conceptual representation, but only procedures for constructing such a representation. In other words, they contribute to truth conditional content only in the sense that they constrain the hearer's search for the representations of their referents. If this is right, it would seem that there are expressions which encode procedures but which contribute to what is traditionally regarded as truth conditional content. In other words, it would seem that it is not the case that all procedural meaning is non-truth conditional

(Blakemore, 2002: 80)

In her new version, Blakemore (2002) reconsiders her old account of the DM *but* where it has been used to encode two meanings 'contrast' and 'denial of expectation'. The new analysis of *but* proposed by Blakemore goes for a unified account in which *but* has only one procedural meaning, namely, 'contradiction and elimination of an assumption' (2002:103).

No doubt, Blakemore has reconsidered several points in her old account of procedural expressions. However, one point is still not made clear: does the procedural information encoded by some DMs put constraints on the derivation of the cognitive effect or does it encode the cognitive effect itself? In other words, does the procedure encoded by a certain DM guide the line of interpretation or does it encode the elements of this interpretation? It seems that Blakemore (2002) makes no distinction between these two cases. In some places of her book, she argues that the procedural meaning encoded by some DMs puts constraints on the

derivation of the cognitive effect; in some other places, the claim is that the procedural meaning encodes the cognitive effect itself:

The analyses just sketched suggest not only that meanings of discourse markers or connectives are linked to cognitive effects, but more particularly, that they directly encode the type of cognitive effect intended. Thus *but* is analysed as encoding the information that the hearer is intended to follow an inferential route which ends in the ‘elimination’ of a contextual assumption, while *after all* is analysed as encoding the information that the intended inferential route is one which results in the ‘strengthening’ of an existing assumption.

(Blakemore, 2002:95)

Contrary to what Blakemore (2002) assumes, I think that the procedural information encoded by some DMs do not encode the cognitive effect. The information plays a role only in constraining the derivation of such cognitive effect. This is done through leading the hearer to certain inferential routes through which he can reach the intended cognitive effect. In other words, the presence of a DM in a certain utterance does not necessitate the presence of the cognitive effect and vice versa. For instance, the cognitive effect established in (30a) is not derived through the procedural meaning encoded by *so*. The assumption that what precedes *so* is a ‘premise’ and what follows it is a ‘conclusion’ is not encoded but derived by following the procedural information encoded by *so*. The same goes for *after all* in (30b).

The evidence for my claim is that the cognitive effect will not necessarily be lost by the removal of *so* or *after all* from the utterances of (30a) and (30b). The hearer will still be able to derive the cognitive effect in (30c) even though neither *so* nor *after all* has been used. In (30c), each clause in the sentence could be either a ‘premise’ or ‘conclusion’ as we have seen. This means that the use of *so* or *after all* only directs the hearer to the intended effect and not encodes the cognitive effect itself.

3.4. Coherence or relevance?

As has been discussed earlier, there are two approaches for studying DMs, namely ‘coherence’ and ‘relevance’. Coherence proponents argue that DMs are linguistic elements that contribute to the coherence of discourse by encoding cohesive relationships between conceptual representations. Relevance theorists argue that DMs encode cognitive (procedural) information which controls the relevance relations between discourse units by constraining the choice of contextual information under which an utterance is relevant. This section highlights the essential difference between these two approaches, discusses the heated dispute between Giora (1997, 1998) and (Wilson 1998) on the discourse analysis and finally suggests that RT is the ideal and more appropriate approach for analysing discourse and DMs.

3.4.1. Giora's views on discourse

3.4.1.1. *Discourse coherence and well-formedness*

Giora (1997:17) maintains that relevance should not be regarded as the only principle that controls human communication and that Sperber and Wilson's relevance account cannot replace the past and current accounts of discourse coherence. She argues that discourse coherence is not a derivative notion of relevance and that relevance cannot account for coherence and degrees of coherence, as Sperber and Wilson assume.

Giora maintains that discourse coherence is an independent notion. It has to be seen as a linguistic and semantic relation that contributes to the well-formedness of discourse. Giora (1985; 1997:22-3) formulates categorical conditions for well-formedness of discourse:

- (32) An informative discourse is well-formed if and only if:
- a. Conforms to the Relevance Requirement in that all its propositions are conceived of as related to a discourse–topic proposition. The discourse topic is a generalisation, preferably made explicit, and placed in the beginning of the discourse. It functions as a reference point to which all incoming propositions are assessed and stored.
 - b. Conforms to Graded Informativeness Condition which requires that each proposition should be more (or at least not less) informative than the one that precedes it in relation to discourse-topic. A message is informative to the extent that it has properties unshared by the previous proposition, which, in turn, allow it to reduce possibilities by half.

c. Marks any deviation from Relevance and Graded Informativeness by an explicit marker, e.g. by *the way*, *after all*.

To illustrate how these conditions work, consider the following example given by Giora:

- (33) It has often occurred in the history of science that an important discovery was come upon by chance. A scientist looking into one matter unexpectedly came upon another which was far more important than the one he was looking into. Penicillin is a result of such a discovery.

The discourse in (33) above is well-formed in Giora's terms. It conforms to the Relevance Requirement. It starts with the general topic and each of the propositions that follow develops the information mentioned in this discourse topic. This discourse also conforms to the Informativeness Requirements. It starts from the least to the most informative.

Giora argues that Sperber and Wilson's relevance account cannot be a replacement of the discourse coherence account. To support her argument, she gives the following couple of examples:

- (34) This first time she was married, her husband came from Montana. He was the kind that when he was not alone he would look thoughtful. He was the kind that knew that in Montana there are mountains and mountains have snow on them. He had not lived in Montana. He would leave Montana. He had to marry Ida and he was thoughtful (taken from *Ida* by Gertrude Stein).

- (35) This first time she was married her husband came from Montana. He was the kind who loved to be alone and thoughtful. He was the kind who loved mountains, and wanted to live on them. He loved Montana. But he had to Marry Ida and leave Montana.

Giora argues that (34) and (35) are equally relevant in Sperber and Wilson's terms, but there is a huge difference between (34) and (35) in terms of coherence. The reader of these two examples finds that (35) is more coherent (well-formed) than (34). Giora claims that the difference in coherence between (34) and (35) is not accounted for by Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory, but rather by discourse coherence. (35) is more coherent (well-formed) because it conforms to the Relevance Requirement; all the propositions in (35) are related to the main discourse-topic 'What Ida's husband had to give up upon marrying her'. It also conforms to the Graded Informativeness Conditions; each proposition in (35) is more informative than the one which precedes it in relation to the main discourse-topic. However, this is not the case with (34).

3.4.2. Wilson's views on discourse

3.4.2.1. *Discourse markers and relevance*

Relevance theorists such as Sperber and Wilson (1995), Wilson and Sperber (1993), Wilson (1998) and Blakemore (1987, 2002) have reanalysed past coherence accounts of discourse interpretation and concluded that relevance is the only principle that can account for all aspects of utterance interpretation.

Wilson (1998) and Blakemore (2002:161) argue that the coherence-based analysis of DMs is incomplete and unreliable. Coherence proponents classify DMs into categories that are very broad. For instance, they associate *so*, *therefore* and *hence* with ‘causal’ relations, and *however*, *but*, *yet* and *still* with ‘adversative’ relations. Such a classification ignores the difference in meaning between one DM and another in the same category. Accordingly this classification, *so*, *therefore* and *hence* are treated as having the same meaning.

This classification also implies that there is no one-to-one relationship between the DM and discourse function. To put it differently, each member of the same category can encode the coherence relationship encoded by the other members since all of them are considered to have the same meaning. For example, the coherence relationship encoded by *however* will be the same as that encoded by *still*, *yet*, and *but*.

Wilson (1998) and Blakemore (2002) argue against the above-mentioned classification. They point out that *however* and *but* do not have the same meaning and thus cannot be used interchangeably. However, Blakemore (2002:161) points out that the difference in meaning is very difficult to capture in an analysis in which these two expressions are associated with a relationship of ‘contrast’ or ‘adversity’. The same goes for *so* and *therefore* which are associated with the ‘consequence’. Consider the following examples:

- (36) He is a prime minister **but**/? **however** not a president.
 (37) a. I am on holiday next week.
 b. **So**/? **Therefore**, you will not attend the meeting.

Wilson (1998) and Blakemore (2002), argue against any coherence-based account of DMs. They claim that such account cannot give an explanation for situations such as (36) and (37) where *however* cannot replace *but* and *therefore* cannot replace *so* even though each pair of these DMs encode the same coherence relation. Such accounts are also unable to give an explanation of the utterance-initial use of some DMs. Consider Blakemore's examples:

- (38) [speaker looks in his wallet and finds a £5 note]
So I did not spend all the money.
- (39) [speaker, who is suffering from shock, has been given a glass of whisky]
But, I don't like whisky
- (40) **Well**, what would you like to do today?

The problem with the coherence account is that it considers DMs as devices that encode relations between linguistic units of discourse. On that assumption utterance-initial DMs should not be possible. Relevance theorists maintain that such relations are not necessarily between linguistics units, it could be merely cognitive —relevance of certain thoughts or propositions to an individual. That is why the coherence account is not able to account for the initial use of the above-mentioned DMs.

These difficulties, Blakemore suggests, can be overcome if DMs are analysed within a relevance-theoretic framework as encoding constraints on the relevance of the utterances in which they occur. DMs should not be looked at as marking connections in discourse, i.e. connecting propositions expressed by discourse segments. A better understating of DMs, Blakemore suggests, can be

achieved if these markers are considered to be contributing to the relevance of the utterance in which they occur by controlling the choice of context under which such utterances are relevant.

3.4.3. Is coherence a linguistic or cognitive relation?

As we have seen in the previous section, Giora argues that the well-formedness of discourse depends on discourse coherence which she considers as a linguistic relation. Giora claims that discourse coherence is not of cognitive nature—it is not a derivative notion of relevance. There is no need for any inference or calculation to achieve coherence in discourse. A certain discourse can be coherent no matter whether the propositions and thoughts it contains are relevant to an individual or not.

By contrast, Wilson (1998:57, 65) argues that relevance theory can account for the intuition of discourse coherence. To support this argument, Wilson uses the following examples:

- (41) Bill, who has thalassemia, is getting married to Susan, and 1967 was a great year for French wines.

- (42) Bill, who has thalassemia, is getting married to Susan. Both he and Susan told me that 1967 was a great year for French wines.

According to Giora (1997), (41) and (42) are not coherent (or unacceptable) even though they are relevant in Sperber and Wilson's terms. The sense of incoherence and unacceptability in these two utterances stems from the fact that the two segments in each utterance are unrelated. It seems that a part of the dispute

between the coherence and relevance approaches of discourse is the notion of 'acceptability'. Giora argues that a certain discourse is acceptable if it is coherent and well-formed, i.e. the units in this discourse are intuitively related and connected. Thus for Giora, notions such as 'coherence', 'acceptability', 'relatedness', 'connectedness' and 'well-formedness' are equivalent. However the notion of 'acceptability' is different in Wilson's terms. Acceptability in RT does not mean well-formedness or linguistic relatedness or connectedness but rather the consistency with the principle of relevance. To put that differently, a certain discourse is acceptable by an individual, if it is relevant to that individual no matter whether the utterances in this discourse are well connected or not.

Wilson (1998:66) argues that RT can account for the sense of acceptability or unacceptability in (41) and (42). In other words, RT can explain why these two utterances are relevant or not. To do so, Wilson provides the following scenarios. The first is when Peter and Mary, who are keen at catching up on the news, are clearing out the kitchen cupboard. Mary is carrying a newspaper and is about to tell Peter about the marriage of Bill and Susan. Simultaneously, Peter carries a bottle of French wine with a questioning look and Mary utters (41). In such a case each segment of this utterance is relevant to Peter. However, they are intuitively unrelated. The second scenario is when Peter and Mary are catching up on the events of the day and Mary has heard that Bill and Susan will get married on that day and then Mary utters (42). By hearing the utterance Peter has access to the following contextual assumptions:

- (43) a. People with thalassemia drink only red wine.
 b. When people get married, it is usual to give a present.
 c. A crate of wine is a suitable wedding present.
 d. The best present is one that pleases the recipient.

So, through following these deductive rules, Peter will recover the implicature that the 1967 French red wine would be a good wedding present to Bill and Susan. The utterance of (41) is consistent with the principle of relevance, it is also acceptable (coherent) since its segments are intuitively related. This relatedness of the two segments in (41) can be explained in terms of relevance; the interpretation of the first segment makes difference to the relevance of the second segment. That is, we might have got different cognitive effects if the second segment is processed in a different context.

Wilson (1998:68) argues that RT can account for the acceptability of discourse more than the Giora's Relevance Requirements. Giora's discourse coherence is achieved through the hierarchical structure of discourse-topics. A well-formed coherent discourse, according to Giora, should have a main discourse-topic to which all the other sub-topics are related. Both the main discourse-topic and sub-discourse-topics should be explicitly stated, and any deviation in the relevance requirements between the main discourse-topic and the sub-discourse-topics should be indicated by explicit marker.

Wilson points out that it is not the hierarchical relations of discourse topics what makes discourse hang together, but rather the contextual information carried by these discourse-topics as we have seen in (41) and (42). Thus, discourse is comprehensible if the propositions it contains carry contextual information to the

hearer or reader no matter whether its discourse-topics are explicit or not. Furthermore, Wilson (1998:71) argues that a deviation in the Relevance Requirement and the Graded Informativeness Conditions need not be indicated by an explicit DM as Giora assumes. Consider the following example:

- (44) a. What did you say?
b. Mind you head.

According to Giora (1997), (44b) can have two interpretations. The first is locally coherent; (b) is a direct answer to (a)'s questions; (a) and (b), as discourse segments are intuitively related. The second interpretation is non-coherent; (b) is considered as a discourse segment which is not related to (a), and thus (44) is an ill-formed discourse because it deviates from the Relevance Requirements. Wilson (1998:72-73) maintains that the acceptability or unacceptability of any deviation in discourse cannot be accounted for by Giora's discourse coherence. Giora considers an utterance such as (45) as well-formed because the deviation in this utterance is explicitly indicated:

- (45) a. What did you say?
b. **Oh**, mind you head.

Wilson (1998:73) maintains that not only (44) is ambiguous between two interpretations, but also (45), even though it has got an explicit marker for deviation. So, Wilson asks why (45) is 'well-formed' and (44) is not. An answer to this question could not be offered by the linguistic (semantic) notion of

coherence given by Giora. For coherence to be an effective tool in analysing discourse, it has to be reanalysed as cognitive rather than linguistic relation through maintaining that discourse coherence is derived through relevance of discourse to an individual. Thus, the acceptability or unacceptability of (44) and (45) will not be determined by the presence or absence of an explicit linguistic DM but rather by the notion of optimal relevance and the criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance.

3.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, two approaches for studying DMs have been investigated. The first approach maintains that DMs are linguistic expressions that relate discourse units. Proponents of this approach analyse DMs as cohesive devices that contribute to the coherence of well-formed linguistically constituted discourse by encoding cohesive (semantic) relationships between discourse units. The second approach treats DMs as pragmatic devices that contribute to the interpretation and comprehension of utterance by encoding procedural information that controls the choice of contextual information. In other words, such devices encode relevance relations between propositions (thoughts) and the cognitive environment of an individual.

It seems that there is something in common between the two approaches. The coherence approach has two goals. Firstly, it aims to provide a theory of comprehension of discourse, i.e. how discourse is understood and interpreted. Secondly, it is concerned with providing a theory of evaluation and explanation of

the intuition of discourse well-formedness. It is obvious that the relevance approach shares the first goal with the coherence approach since RT's main objective is to explain how utterances are understood.

The coherence approach suggests that the best way to account for discourse interpretation is to look at coherence relations between topics in discourse. By contrast, the relevance approach argues that the recognition of coherence relations between discourse topics is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for a successful discourse. What is needed for a comprehensible interpretation of discourse is the recognition of contextual (cognitive) effect held in that discourse. As for the second goal, RT rejects the notion of well-formedness of discourse. RT sees that well-formedness of discourse exists only in relation to a set of well-formedness rules which are independent of individuals, situations and contexts.

It seems that that the whole dispute centres on the notion of 'well-formedness' with respect to 'discourse'. Coherence theorists such as Schiffrin and Giora argue that the well-formedness should be maintained in discourse and it is achieved by linguistic means. A certain discourse is well-formed if and only if its segments are intuitively related. Thus discourse such as (41) and (42) are ill-formed because the segments in each utterance are unrelated.

As for relevance theorists, well-formedness does not exist. The relations in RT are not between articulated linguistic units, but rather between thoughts and propositions. To put that differently, the notion of discourse in RT is cognitive rather than textual. The acceptability of discourse is not determined by linguistic

or semantic relationships between units in discourse but rather by the consistency with the principle of relevance discourse has. Given that, discourses such as (41) and (42) would be acceptable in some circumstances as we have seen in section 3.4.3. It seems that Wilson's account is more convincing and reliable than Giora's one. After all, everything will be cognitively integrated in the interpretation and comprehension of discourse.

CHAPTER 4

4. Standard Arabic and Procedural Meaning

4.1. Introduction

The notion of discourse and DMs has not been given a great importance in Arabic linguistics. Very few studies have been conducted in the analysis of DMs and the role they play in the interpretation of discourse. Most of these concentrate on the colloquial (local) dialects, e.g. Al-Batal (1994) and Al-Khalil (2005). To my knowledge, the use of DMs in Standard Arabic has not been researched. Contrary to Al-Khalil's claim that DMs are only used in Colloquial Arabic (COL), this chapter argues that DMs can be used in both Standard and Non-Standard Arabic. As for the use of DMs in COL, I will limit the discussion to those used in Syrian Arabic (SYA). The little research of DMs in Arabic has been conducted in the framework of Conversation Analysis (CA). By contrast, in this study, I adopt a relevance-theoretic framework and argue that DMs encode procedural meanings. This chapter is devoted to investigate the procedural meaning encoded by some linguistic expressions in Standard Arabic (SA). The next chapter discusses the procedural meaning encoded by some linguistic expression in SYA.

This chapter is structured as follows: section 4.2 gives a brief introduction to the diglossic situation in Arabic and discusses why certain DMs are used in SA but not in COL and vice versa. Section 4.3 investigates the procedural meanings

encoded by some linguistic expressions in SA, such as *lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin*, *bal* and *fa*. Section 4.4 is a conclusion

4.2. The linguistic situation in Arabic

4.2.1. Diglossia

Before discussing the procedural expressions in Arabic, it is necessary to discuss the notion of diglossia and the impact it has on the use of DMs in standard and non standard forms of Arabic. Diglossia affects the use of DMs in Arabic in the sense that some DMs are used in one form but not in the other. For instance, *fa*, *lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin* and *bal* are only used in SA, while DMs such as *bass*, *la-heik*, *la-ha-sabab*, *ma'nāt-o* and *bi-ittālī* are only used in SYA.

The earliest notion of diglossia goes back in literature to the work of the German linguist Karl Krumbacher (1902) in his book *Das Problem der Modernen Griechischen Schriftsprache*. In this book, Krumbacher discusses the nature, origin and development of diglossia with special reference to Arabic and Greek. Another reference to diglossia is offered by the French linguist William Marçais (1930) in his article “La diglossie arabe”, in which he provides a formal definition of the phenomenon.

Ferguson's (1959) article on diglossia is a classic reference in the literature. Ferguson discusses the notion of diglossia in the context of four language situations namely, Arabic, Modern Greek, Swiss German and Haitian Creole and provides the following definition of the phenomenon:

A relatively stable language situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional standards), there is very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature either of earlier period or in other speech community which is learned largely by formal education and used for most written and formal spoken purposes but not used by any sector of the community for ordinary conversation.

(Ferguson 1959:325-37)

According to this definition, there are two varieties of the language used side by side in the speech community—the superposed variety which is called the High (H) variety and the primary dialects which stand for the Low (L) variety. Each variety is used for different purposes and in different contexts. As far as Arabic is concerned, the H variety is called *Al-fuṣṣḥa* (Standard) and the L variety is called *Al-a'miyyah* or *Al-dārijah* (Non-Standard).

The H variety (*Al-fuṣṣḥa*) in Arabic is used for formal spoken purposes such as religious ceremonies, political speeches, university lectures and TV and radio news bulletins and interviews. It is also used for written purposes; the history and literature of the Arabic nation is written in *Al-fuṣṣḥa*. The L variety on the other hand, is used for informal purposes such as personal letters, soap operas and spontaneous conversations with family, friends and colleagues.

4.2.2. Arabic as a special case of diglossia

It seems that Arabic diglossia is very ancient. In the Pre-Islamic period, there were two main spoken varieties: Classical Arabic (CLA), which was spoken by the tribes in the Arabic peninsula particularly by Quraish tribe in Mecca, and the urban vernacular dialects spoken in Bagdad and Damascus.

The written form of CLA was systematically codified in the 8th century AD. This form was the codification of the language variety spoken by Quraish tribe in Mecca. The main sources of this form were the Holy Quran and the Pre-Islamic poetry. The classical (standard) form of Arabic has not changed in terms of syntax and phonology since that time. However, it went through some lexical changes. For example, a large number of lexical items in the Holy Quran and the Pre-Islamic literature are no longer used in today's Standard Arabic.

The Arabic diglossic situation seems rather exceptional. Freeman (1996) points out that Arabic has two major varieties, CLA and COL. According to him, COL falls in four major groups:

- i. Magrebi (Morocco, Algeria, Tunis and Western Libya)
- ii. Egyptian (Eastern Libya, Egypt and Sudan)
- iii. Levantine (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine)
- iv. The Arabic of the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE and Kuwait).

People from these different groups find it difficult to communicate due to the lexical and phonological variation. For example, on the lexical level, [mara] in Palestine means 'wife', while in Egypt it means 'loose woman'. [Maša] in

Palestine means ‘walked’, while in Morocco it is ‘went’. In Egypt, [mašī] means ‘alright’ but in Yemen and Morocco, it is ‘nothing’. On the phonological level, ‘where’ is [fein] in Egypt and [wein] in Syria, ‘man’ is [riġġāl] in Syria and [riyyāl] in Kuwait and ‘gold’ is [dahab] in Syria and [dahab] in Saudi Arabic.

Al-Khalil (2005) claims that Arabic does not have two forms, as Ferguson assumes, but rather three forms as given below:

- a. Classical Arabic (CLA): This was used in the Arabic Peninsula in the Pre-Islamic period. It is a highly prestigious form of Arabic; the Holy Quran and Arabic Pre-Islamic classical poetry were written in this form.
- b. Colloquial Arabic (COL): this form is used as an informal spoken dialect in the Arab countries, and it differs from one country to another. This results in having different dialects of Arabic, such as Syrian Arabic, Lebanese Arabic, Sudani Arabic, Moroccan Arabic, etc.
- c. Modern Standard Arabic (MSA): It is used nowadays in the Arab countries for formal purposes (education, politics and media). It is a mixture of COL and CLA.

Al-Khalil’s claim, that Arabic is a triglossic language, is controversial. He tries to give two different terminologies to the same and single thing, namely SA. Arabic has only two major forms: the standard CLA and non-standard COL. The MSA, as a newly-invented term, is not distinguishable from CLA. Both CLA and MSA refer to the same variety, namely SA. There are no morphological, phonological or syntactic differences between CLA and MSA apart from some lexical changes which are common, I think, to all languages. Al-Khalil’s

classification might be motivated by the academic community in the US which names CLA as MSA. It is right that CLA has undergone some lexical changes. On the one hand, several words are no longer used in today's SA. For example, words such as 'ṭarmūq' (mud), 'mustšzir' (very high), 'ha'ha' (plant) are no longer used in SA. On the other hand, several words have been introduced to SA such as 'kumputer' (computer), 'tilfaz' (television) and 'lamba' (lamb). However, this lexical change does not make CLA and MSA two different varieties of Arabic. In this thesis, I treat them as one variety, namely SA (as opposed to COL).

The notion of diglossia has been introduced in this thesis because it plays a major role in the use and distribution of DMs and procedural elements in Arabic as we will see in the next section.

4.2.3. Diglossia and discourse markers

Al-Batal (1994) presents a detailed analysis of DMs used in Lebanese Arabic (LA). Al-Batal's data, collected from TV and radio programmes and recorded interviews, show that there are 21 DMs regularly used in LA. Al-Batal treats these DMs as cohesive devices that link phrases, clauses and paragraphs. Al-Batal's account of DMs is similar to the coherence-based account of DMs discussed in chapter 3 where DMs are analysed as elements that contribute the coherence of the text by indicating cohesive relationships between units of discourse. DMs in Al-Batal's analysis can occur on three levels: phrase level, clause level and discourse level. And they encode the following cohesive relations: 'additive',

‘adversative’, ‘alternative’, ‘causal’, and ‘conclusive’, ‘consequential’ and ‘explicative’.

Al-Batal shows that the Arabic diglossic situation affects the use of DMs in LA. He points out the DMs in LA fall into the following three categories:

a. DMs that are unique to LA: this includes *ya'nī*, *bass*, *halla'* and *ṭayyeb*. *Ya'nī* is used to indicate reiterative and explanative relationship between two elements it connects, similar to *in other words* in English.

- (1) All children under eight must be accompanied by an adult. **Ya'nī** your child cannot be admitted.

As can be noticed in the above example, *ya'nī* introduces a sentence in which the speaker further explains a point he had made in the previous sentence. *Bass* indicates an adversative relationship between two elements in the text as *but* does in English:

- (2) He is very clever **bass** he is unable to answer this question.

*Halla'*¹⁷ indicates a shift in the movement of discourse. It is often used to change discourse topic. Consider Al-Batal (1994:96) example:

- (3) In regard to the land, we can say that there was a goal: either to keep this land as it was during the Mutasarrifiyya Period or to expand it, either as little or a lot. **Halla'**, whatever the issue of the land was, they (in the resistance) agreed on the necessity of establishing a new system of government.

¹⁷ It can be also used as a temporal adverbial:

- (i) The president will arrive **now**.
 (ii) Let's sort out the problem **now**.

Halla' in (3) signals a shift in discourse topic; the speaker moves from discussing the issue of land to the issue of the system of government. *Tayyeb* indicates shift between speakers in discourse (Al-Batal: 1994: 94-97).

- (4) S1: We came to this land 50 years ago. It was very poor, just like a desert.
We worked very hard to make it good as you can see it now.
S2: **Tayyeb**, what are the difficulties you faced as new immigrants.

b. DMs used in both LA and MSA: this includes *wa*, *aw*, *la-'innu*, *'izzan*, *leekin*, and *ma''innu*. Al-Batal claims that *wa* and *aw* are connectives; the first indicates an additive relationship between two or more discourse units, while the second indicates an alternative relationship:

- (5) He travelled to Moscow **wa** stayed five years in it.
(6) He works five days a week. He is off on Thursdays **aw** Tuesdays.

La-'innu indicates causal relationship in discourse. *'Izzan* indicates conclusive relationship. *Leekin* and *ma''innu* indicate adversative relationships. Consider the following examples:

- (7) He sold his watch **la-'innu** (he) got bankrupt.
(8) He is Syrian. **Izzan**, he is generous.
(9) He is Syrian **leekin** he is stingy.
(10) He is stingy **ma''innu** (he is) Syrian.

c. DMs used in LA but borrowed from MSA: this includes: *fa*, *'ada 'an*, *inn*, *bilidafi li*, *fadlan 'an*, *innama*, *kazalek*, *'amma* and *'ay*. Al-Batal claims that *fa*¹⁸ is the most complex and interesting DM in this type. It has different functions. Most importantly, it can denote causal and inferential relationships.

¹⁸ *Fa* is used sometimes to indicate shift in discourse from LA to MSA.

- (11) a. John hit Mary **fa** she swore at him.
 b. John can answer this questions **fa** he is a mathematician.

'Ada'an inn, bilidafi li, faḍlan 'an (all mean *in addition to*) encode additive relations in discourse:

- (12) Dan Sperber is a French anthropologist, linguist and cognitive scientist.
'Ada'an inn (bilidafi li, faḍlan 'an), he is Research Director at the Jean Nicod Institute.

'Innama indicates adversative relationship and *ay* is used to signal an explicative relationship:

- (13) They don't live in Newcastle **'Innama** they live in London.
 (14) He is from Newcastle **ay** he is Geordie.

Recently, in his study of DMs, Al-Khalil (2005) gives a detailed conversational analysis of some DMs frequently used in Syrian Arabic (SYA):

- a. *halla'*: marking a topic shift, topic change and topic support.
 b. *ya'nī*: explaining and summing up ideas.
 c. *ṭayyeb*: requesting explanation and marking focus and request.
 d. *lakan*: making conclusions.

In fact, Al-Khalil (2005) makes two controversial claims. The first one is that DMs are only used in spontaneous informal conversation:

It can easily be noticed that these markers never appear in books, newspapers, articles or official documents. While they appear frequently in extracts [(1) New], [(2) No one to help], and [(3)

Rotten teeth] above, which were taken from spontaneous conversation, the case does not seem to be so in either the written or spoken forms of Standard Arabic. Extracts [(4) Asia Cup] provides an example of the written form of Standard Arabic. It is taken from a newspaper reporting the comments of a football official, and it is clear that there are no discourse markers at all.

(Al-Khalil 2005:30)

He gives a long extract¹⁹ taken from one of the Arabic newspapers to demonstrate that SA can never have DMs:

“inna man yadfa‘u sab‘a mi’aten wa hamsīna ‘alfa dolār lil-farīq at-Tailandī fima law faza ‘ala fariqinā musta‘idūna ḥatman lidaf‘i rub‘iha li-ḥakamen ḍa‘ifen wa hifnā min ‘iltiqā‘i ra’isi ba‘tati tāyland bi-ra’isi laḡnati al-ḥukkām akkadtu lil-ḡamī‘ fi ‘idarati al-bi‘ta ‘anna ḥakamana ḡadan sayakunu min šarqi ā’sya hatman li-‘anna tāyland lā taqbal biḥakamen ‘arabī li-hadihi al-mubarāh al-maširiyah lma‘niyyūn bil-murahanāt raḡibūna bi-daliaka ayḍan”

“Who pays seven hundred and fifty thousands dollars to the Thai team if they beat our team is surely prepared to pay a quarter of it to a referee who has a weak personality. We were worried about the meeting of the chairman of the Thai team with the chairman of the referee committee. I assured everyone in the team that our referee for the next day would certainly be from East Asia. The Thai team do not approve of any Arab referee for this decisive match. Those involved in betting want that too.”

(Al-Khalil 2005-31)

¹⁹ ISO 233 (1984 version) transliteration system has been used in this thesis.

It is true that the above extract does not have DMs, but, of course, this does not validate the claim. It seems that Al-Khalil has selected this passage rather carefully to show that DMs cannot be used in the standard form of Arabic. Contrary to what Al-Khalil claims, I argue that DMs are regularly used in SA. Consider the following passage taken from Mina's novel (1965).

Lakinna 'ummī kanat tuğazif, **wa** tataḥmalu al- ḍarba **wa** al-šatma **wa** ta'tī 'ilaya **fa**-tafuku al- ḥabla, **wa** ta'hudunī min yadī ba'idan 'an al-bait, **fa**-nağlisu ma'an 'ala šahra, **aw** taḥta šağara, **wa** ta'ḥuḍu fi mulaṭafatī **wa** nuṣḥī.

“But my mother took the risk: she exposed herself to beating and cursing by releasing me. She used to take me far away from the house to sit together on a stone or under a tree. She was very kind and helpful to me”.

Although this passage is very short, it displays 10 occurrences of 4 different DMs frequently used in SA, namely *lakinna* (= *but*), *wa* (= *and*), *aw* (= *or*) and *fa* (= *so, then*).

Al-Khalil's (2005) agenda behind this claim would appear to be that he wants to study DMs in Arabic from a conversational-analytic approach using the Conversation Analysis framework (CA). The main concern of CA is 'ordinary conversation'. It does not attempt to come to terms with language, meaning or communication but rather an approach to the study of social action and the investigation of normative structures of reasoning which are involved in

understating and approaching courses of intelligible interaction (Heritage 1995:391).

Since the standard form of Arabic is not used in ordinary conversation, then Al-Khalil claims that this form cannot be studied from a conversational-analytic approach and thus it does not have DMs.

The second controversial claim proposed by Al-Khalil (2005:55) is that the conversation analysis approach is the only framework for studying and analysing DMs in Arabic. This claim entails that the relevance-theoretic procedural approach (Blakemore 1987, 2002; Blass 1990; Rouchota 1998; Iten 1998) cannot account for the analysis of DMs. Contrary to what Al-Khalil assumes, CA is not the only framework that can account for the use of DMs in Arabic. I argue that the notion of ‘procedural meaning’ developed, by Blakemore (1987,2002) within RT offers an ideal and more appropriate approach for studying DMs in both Standard and Non-Standard Arabic.

To my knowledge, Al-Batal (1994) and Al-Khalil (2005) are the only authors who give detailed accounts of DMs in Arabic highlighting the impact of diglossia on the use of DMs. However, both accounts are controversial in this respect. Al-Batal’s diglossia-based classification of DMs is far from perfect. On the one hand, he argues that certain DMs are unique to LA, while in fact they are not. Some of the DMs used in the set, such as *ya’nī*, *halla’* and *ṭayyeb* can be used in other Arabic dialects such as Syrian Arabic, Egyptian Arabic and Saudi Arabic. See the following spoken extracts taken from TV operas produced in Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia:

A. Son: 'assalamu 'alaikum.

Father: wa 'alaikum 'assalam. leiš t'aharit?

Son: mara'at 'albeit bit'illak 'mmī badha kilo laḥmi lalmiḥšī.

Father: w leiš ma riḥit la'ind 'abu 'alī w 'ahadit 'illaḥmāt.

Son: w ma lāzim 'illaq bil'awwal yabī

Father: **tayyeb** waddeit ilḥbizāt la'abu ḥater w 'abu 'isam w 'abu miḥi 'iddīn?

Son: waddeiton yabī.

Son: Peace be upon you.

Father: Peace be upon you too. Why are you late?

Son: I went home first. My mother needs one kilo of lamb meat.

Father: Why didn't you go to the butcher and buy the meat?

Son: Shouldn't I have told you first father?

Father: Alright! Did you take the bread to Abu Khater, Abu Isam and Abu
Mihī Iddin?

Son: Yes, Father".

(Syrian TV opera: Bab Al-hara: episode 31)

B. Lutfiya: **ya'nī** lazem 'alfawteh w 'ittal'a 'ahud 'il'izen ibn 'ammī?

Isam: **halla'** ya lutfiya la taḥdī w ti'tī ktīr 'ihṭī 'ā'deh 'am tistannakī w ṣihrī
'a'id 'am yistannanī. mu ḥilweh nit'ahar 'leihon 'aktar min heik. ya 'alla 'umī
ṭharrakī. **halla'** heik baddek 'idallī mbuzmeh. 'fridi halwiš šwai.

Lutfiya: Should I ask for permission whenever I am going in or out, my dear
husband.

Isam: Now, listen Lutfiya! Don't turn this to a big story. My sister is waiting
for you and my brother-in-law is waiting for me. It is not nice to keep
them waiting more than that. Come on! Let's move now. Come on!
Cheer up.

(Syrian TV opera: Bab Al-ḥara: episode 31)

C. Al-naẓer: 'ana 'āyez i'fel ilfasl

Al-'ab: ma tinsāš 'innahum wlād suġayyarīn

Al-naẓer: la yumkin

Al-'ab: **ṭayyeb** 'ala šān hatrī ma ti'filši ilfasl

Al-naẓer: **ṭayyeb** 'ifriḍ 'innī smi'ti kalamak w ma 'afaltiš ilfasl. ḥa
gibluhom mudarrisīn minen?

Head teacher: I want to close the school.

Parent: Don't forget that they are still children.

Head teacher: No way.

Parent: Alright, for my sake, don't close the school.

Head teacher: Alright, suppose that I listened to you and did not close the
school. How could I manage to get teachers for all of them?

(Egyptian play: Madrast Al-mushaghibeen: part1)

D. Ra'fat: sa'adtak ṭalabti minni ilḥa'i'a 'ultaha. w biraġmi min kida mntaš
misada'nī.

Boss: mīn illi 'āl kida?

Ra'fat: manta sa'adtak bit'ulī 'insa ilḥa'i'a

Boss: la la

Ra;fat: **Ya'nī** sa'adtak misada'nī?

Boss: bikulli ta'kīd

Ra'fat: Your Excellency asks me to tell you the truth and I did. But you don't
seem to believe me.

Boss: Who said that I don't believe you?

Ra'fat: You yourself. You are asking me to forget about everything.

Boss: No no.

Ra'fat: This means that you believe me.

Boss: Yes, of course.

(Egyptian TV opera: Ra'fat Al-Hajjan: episode 15)

E. Actor 1: 'itla' min hal-šāri' la'innu yšīr ḥarf T tm rūḥ ysār l-taṣl rabe' 'amārah
w tšūf lawḥa maktūb 'aleiha šaga lil-'ḡār.

Actor 2: ḡazak alla heir.

Actor 1: tfaddel ya huy abrak 'issā'āt.

Actor 2: maškurīn ma tgasrūn 'in šā' allah **bas** walla 'innī mista' ḡil.

Actor 1: Go straight ahead in this street until it shapes as a T letter and then
you will see a building with a big 'flat for rent' sign.

Actor 2: May God bless you?

Actor 1: Come on! Let us have you as guest today.

Actor 2: Thanks a lot, you are good people. May God bless you? But I am
really in a hurry.

(Saudi TV opera: Tash Ma Tash: episode 15)

On the other hand, Al-Batal discusses DMs used in LA and MSA and other DMs used in LA but borrowed from MSA. It is not clear what the difference between these two categories is. In the first category, he gives examples of DMs such as, *wa*, *aw*, *ma' innu* and *la 'innu*. In the second category, he uses examples of DMS such as *fa*, *lizalik*, *innama* and *amma*. In fact, there is no difference between these two categories; they should be incorporated in a single category. And by that, the new classification should look as follows:

- a. DMs used in LA
- b. DMs used in SA

The problem with this new classification is how to account for the DMs that occur in both LA and SA. In fact, this can be accounted for as follows: the DM used in

LA is sometimes used in SA to indicate a shift from LA to SA. By the same token, the DM used in SA is sometimes used in LA to indicate a shift from SA to LA.

Consider the two following extracts for demonstration:

Presenter: bism il MBC²⁰ w bism kil farī' il'amal w ilḥudūr w il-muṣahdīn badna nḥannīk **li-annak** ablaita bala'an hasanan.

Presenter: In the name of the MBC and in the name of the cast, attendance and spectators, we would like to congratulate you **because** you have done very well.

(Who wants to be a millionaire?)

The above extract is taken from *Man sa-yarabḥ Al-million*—the Arabic version of the famous programme: *Who Wants to Be a Millionaire*. In this extract the presenter, who is Lebanese, congratulates the winner. He starts his utterance in LA (bism il MBC w bism kil fari' il'amal w ilḥudur w il-mushahiin badna nḥannīk) and then shifts to SA (*li-annak* ablaita bala'an hasanan). This shift is indicated by the use of the DM *li-annak*:

Media star: dawam il-ḥāl min il-muḥāl akād akūn al-awḥad al-mudallal fi it-tilifizion al-ḡadid (New TV). **Bas** bil-aḥīr tla'ait 'ard min tilfizion afḍal w huweh il MBC.

Media star: Things always change. I was almost the only good presenter in the New TV channel. **But**, at last, I had an offer from a better TV channel namely, MBC.

²⁰ The Middle East Broadcasting Channel which is very famous in the Arab World.

In the above extract, which is taken from a TV interview with one of the most famous Lebanese media stars, the speaker starts his reply to one of the questions using SA (dawam il-ḥāl min il-muḥāl akād akūn al-awḥād al-mudallal fi it-tilfizion al-ḡadid) and ends it with LA (*Bas bil-aḥīr tla'eit 'ard min tilfizion afḍal w huweh il MBC*). The shift between the two varieties of Arabic is indicated by the DM *bass*. This could also be the case for all the other colloquial dialects. The shift from SA to local dialects and vice versa is indicated by the use of a DM.

Al-Khalil's claim that DMs in Arabic are limited only to the colloquial (informal form) is inaccurate. DMs in Arabic can be found in both Colloquial and Standard Arabic. Evidence of that is Al-Batal's own classification, even though it has its own shortcomings.

4.3. Procedural expressions in Standard Arabic

Ibn Jinni (961) claims that there are three categories of linguistic expression in Standard Arabic:

a. Nouns: every linguistic expression governed by a preposition or counts as a proper name is considered as a noun by Ibn Jinni. For examples, 'al-ḡabal' (the mountain), 'al-maktabah' (the library), 'al-ṭāwilah' (the table) are nouns because they can be governed by prepositions such as '*ala* (on), *fi* (in), and *taḥta* (under): '*ala* al-ḡabal' (on the mountain), '*fi* al-maktabah' (in the library) and '*taḥta* al-ṭāwilah' (under the table). 'souria' (Syria) and 'umarun' (Omar) are also nouns because they are proper names.

b. Verbs: This type includes linguistic expressions that can either be used for issuing orders and commands or preceded by the particle *qad*²¹. For example, ‘iğlis’²² (sit down) and ‘qom’²³ (stand up) are verbs because they issue the commands of ‘sitting down’ and ‘standing up’. ‘Ĝalasa’ (sat down) and ‘yağlisu’ (sits down), ‘qāma’ (stood up) and ‘yaqūmu’ (stands up) are also verbs because they can come after *qad*: ‘*qad kāma*’ (had stood up) ‘*qad yaqūmu*’ (might stand up), ‘*qad ġalasa*’ (had sat down) and ‘*qad*²⁴ *yağlisu*’ (might sit down).

c. Particles (al-ḥurūf)²⁵: This type can neither be preceded by *qad* or a preposition nor used for issuing orders and commands. For instance, the particles *fa*, *tumma* and *lakinna* cannot follow *qad*: **qad fa*²⁶, **qad tumma*, **qad lakinna* or be preceded by a preposition in **fi fa*, **fi tumma*, **fi lakinna*.

Ibn Jinni (961) maintains that the expressions in the third category do not have meaning in themselves. In other words, these particles have no semantics. The only way to interpret them is to look at the context in which they are used.

It seems that Ibn Jinni’s claim regarding particles in SA is controversial. According to him, particles such as *tumma*, *fa* and *lakinna* encode no meaning, but, let us consider their uses in the following examples:

- (15) a. John entered the office **tumma** Mary followed him.
 b. John entered the office **fa** Mary followed him.
 c. John entered the office **lakinna** Mary followed him.

²¹ This particle is used only with verbs (past and present) and it is only used in SA.

²² This is the imperative form “yağlisu” (sit down).

²³ This is the imperative form “yaqūmu” (stand up)

²⁴ *Qad* in SA is a very elusive particle; there is no word-to-word translation of this particle. It does not have an equivalent particle in English. When *qad* precedes verbs in the past tense, it indicates that the action encoded by the verb has started and finished in the past. Thus the best translation of ‘*qad ġalasa*’ is ‘had sat down’. However when it precedes verbs in the present tense, it indicates a state of uncertainty whether the action encoded by the verb takes place or not. The best translation of *qad* in this case is ‘might’: ‘*qad yağlisu*’ = ‘might sit down’.

²⁵ This is the technical name of this set of linguistic expressions in SA.

²⁶ The asterisk is used to indicate that the combination is ungrammatical.

If Ibn Jinni's claim is right, then utterances (15a-c) should have the same interpretation since no meaning is encoded by the highlighted particles. But this is not true. The interpretation of these utterances differs. This entails that the highlighted particles encode some sort of semantics which affects the interpretation of these utterances. For instance, *tumma* in (15a) encodes that there is a long-time span between the two actions, while *fa* in (15b) encodes the time span between the two actions is very short. As for *lakinna* in (15c), it encodes a denial-of-expectation meaning in the context where Marry is supposed to stay outside and wait for John to come out of the office, but instead she follows him to the office.

I will argue, contrary to Ibn Jinni's claim and following Blakemore's (1987,2002) analysis of DMs in English, that particles (= DMs) in SA encode procedural meaning that affects the interpretation of the utterance in which they occur by constraining either the implicit or the explicit side of utterance interpretation. In the light of this, Ibn Jinni's claim could mean that such expressions do not encode *conceptual* meaning.

4.3.1. 'Lakinna', 'bainama', 'lakin' and 'bal'

These four DMs are widely used in SA though very little has been written about them. They all correspond to *but* in English. In this section, I review some Arabic literature on these four DMs and link that to the literature on *but* in English. I then investigate the linguistic meaning encoded by each of these markers. Finally, I claim that the procedural meanings encoded by these four DMs can be treated as

translations of the different applications of the general procedure encoded by English *but*.

4.3.1.1. Syntactic analysis

Most of the literature written on these DMs in Arabic is of a syntactic nature. It explains the syntactic functions of these linguistic expressions and how they differ from each other. I will not discuss the syntactic nature of these markers at a great length here, since it is not my main interest, I will rather give a very brief description of their syntax.

Ibn Hisham (1340), Al-Murāḍī (1324) and Ibn Jinni (961) call these linguistic expressions *al-ḥurūf* (particles) and claim that they have different syntactic functions. Ibn Hisham (1340:382) argues that *lakinna* is a particle which is only used in nominal (subject-predicate) sentences. It assigns the accusative case to the subject and the nominative case to the predicate as is shown in the examples below:

- (16) a. al-ḡaw dāfi' haḍa al-yawm
 the weather warm this today

“The weather is warm today.”

- b. al-samā'u mumṭiratun **lakinna** al-ḡaw-wa dāfi'-un
 the sky raining **but** the weather (Acc) warm (Nom)

“It is raining **but** the weather is warm.”

- (17) al-riḥlatu ṭawīlatun ḡiddan **lakinna** al-sayyara-ta ḡadīdat-un
 the journey long very **but** the car (Acc) new (Nom)

“The journey is very long **but** the car is new.”

As can be noticed, the use of *lakinna* in (16b) which is a nominal sentence changes the case of the subject (al-ḡaw) into accusative (al-ḡaw-**wa**) and the case of the predicate (dāfi') into nominative (dāfi'**i-un**). The same goes for (17) where *lakinna* assigns the accusative case to 'al-sayyara' (the car) and the nominative case to 'ḡadīda' (new).

Unlike *lakinna*, *lakin* does not have this function of case assigning. The first noun after *lakin* does not occur in the accusative case. *Lakin* is usually used in a discourse initial position to introduce a new topic. *Lakin* is regularly used in news reports and can be followed by a question. Consider the following examples:

- (18) a. 'indamā taqaddamta bi-ṭalabi 'ijazah li-taqdīm al- musbāqa
 when asked+you to apply leave to participate the competition
 lam 'abkhal 'alaik
 not stingy on you
- b. **lakin** ma ma'na 'an tuḡādir ṭiwāla an-nahār wa lam ta'ūd
but what meaning to leave all the day and not come
 'illa fi sā'a muta'khira min al-lail
 just in hour late from the night

- a. When you applied for a leave to participate in the competition , I gave you.
 b. **But** why have you been away all the day and have not come back until very late at the night.

(The Bridge of Death²⁷ p.38)

²⁷ Abdo, I. (1997). *Ġisr Al-Mawt* (The Bridge of Death). Damascus, Dar Al-Marifa

- (19) a. ‘ala ’ayyati ḥāl, laisat hiyya al-marah al-oula al-latī tašḥaḍ fihā al-qiwa al-qolonialiyah al-ḡašimah anyabahā ḍidda souriya, wa lan takouna al-khirah...

‘Anyway, this is not the first time that the brutal colonial forces sharpen their teeth against Syria and it will not be the last time.’

- b. **lakin** ’aswa’-u ma yumkin ’an yurtakab min ḥata’ fi muwaḡatha tarihiyyah kahadihi huwa al-taqlīl – wa law lilaḥza waḥida- min ahammiyet kul min al-’iqtiṣād wa al-’idārah ’ada’an wa nata’iḡan...

“**But** the worst thing that can be committed as a historic confrontation is belittling- even for awhile- the importance of the economics and administration at the performance and consequence level.”

(Al-Baath Newspaper No 12774—4/1/2006)

- (20) a. tazīduni sanah faqaṭ wa hiya fi ṣaff Walad ’ibn ṣabrah
increase one year only and she in class son Ibn Sabra

- b. **lakin** man yarahā ya’jab min ’amriha wa ’amr ḥusniḥā
but who see here wonders from her and her beauty

fa-hiyya ṣarat ṣabiyya kabīrah wa jamīlah
that she became young lady mature and beautiful

a. She is only one year older than me. She is in the same class of Walad Ibn Sabrah.

b. **But** her beauty has fascinated everybody. She is now mature and handsome.

(Raspberry Tree²⁸ p.16)

²⁸ Abdul-Kareem, H. (2002). *Šaḡart Al-Tūt* (The Raspberry Tree). Damascus: Dar Al Kitab Al-Arabi.

As for *bainama*, it is only used on the sentential level. It relates two noun (or verb) clauses. It is similar to *lakin* in the sense that it does not have the function of case assigning. However, unlike *lakin*, *bainama* cannot occur in discourse-initial position. Consider the following examples:

- (21) a. ‘umar-un ṭawīl-un **bainama** zaid-un qaṣīr-un
Omar tall **but** Zaid short
“Omar is short **but** Zaid is tall”

- b. dahaba ‘umar-un ‘ila al-sinama **bainama** baqiya zaid-un fi al-bait
went Omar to the cinema **but** stayed Zaid at home
“Omar went to the cinema **but** Zaid stayed at home”

Concerning *bal*, Ibn Hisham (1340:152) claims that it can be used in utterance-initial positions where the utterances are uttered by two different speakers. It can also be used in utterance-middle positions when the utterance is articulated by a single speaker.

- (22) a. dahabta ‘ila al-sinama?
went-you to the cinema?

- b. **bal** dahabtu ‘ila al-masrah
but I went to the theatre.

- (23) lam adhab ‘ila al-sinama **bal** ‘ila al-masrah
not go to the cinema **but** to the theatre
‘I did not go to cinema **but** to theatre.’

In comparison, there is a great body of literature written on *but* in English—Lakoff (1971), Anscombe and Ducrot (1977), Abraham (1979) Horn (1989), Bell (1998), Blakemore (1987, 1989, 2002) and Iten (2005).

Most theorists, who studied *but*, agree that it encodes several meanings. Lakoff (1971) and Blakemore (1987, 2002) claim that *but* encodes a denial-of-expectation meaning between the two conjuncts it links. Consider Lakoff's example (1971:67):

(24) John is a Republican **but** he is honest.

According to Lakoff, *but* in this example involves an implication relation between two conjuncts based on the suggestion that Republicans are not normally honest. The idea is that the first conjunct (John is Republican) implies an assumption which is contradicted by the second conjunct (he is honest). In other words, on the basis of the first conjunct, the hearer might be lead to expect something which is then denied.

Lakoff (1971:133) points out that there is another use of *but* where the relation between the two conjuncts is not of a denial of expectation or implication but rather one of a simple contrast:

(25) Peter is rich **but** John is poor.

As can be noticed, *but* in the above utterance simply encodes a contrastive relationship between the states of affairs, represented in each clause.

Other theorists, for example, Anscombe and Ducrot (1977) claim that *but* can have a yet further meaning which is different from the first two discussed above. Consider the following scenario where both A and B attending a Christmas party; A comments on the person who sees for the first time with B.

- (26) A. Oh! Your brother looks exactly like you.
 B. He is not my brother **but** my friend.

The use of *but* in (26B) does not involve contradiction. It is not the case that the first conjunct (he is not my brother) implies the negation of the second conjunct or vice versa. This use of *but* is called the ‘correction’ use, where the clause introduced by *but* provides a correct replacement for the assumption in the first clause.

There is a fourth use of *but*, which is called by Bell (1998: 527) the ‘discourse’ or ‘sequential’ *but*. Usually, *but* in this case has an utterance-initial use. Consider the following example:

- (27) A. I am very happy; we’ve had a very nice dinner today.
 B. **But** did anybody see my wallet?

Bell claims that this use of *but* signals a return to the main topic of discourse. He describes the *but*-clause as a cancelling clause which cancels what comes before in discourse.

Since *but* has been seen as encoding a variety of meanings, some theorists including Anscombe and Ducrot (1977), Abraham (1979) argue that it is

linguistically ambiguous, i.e. there is more than one lexical *but* in English. Horn (1989) supports this argument by referring to cross-linguistic data which show that *but* in English could be translated to different lexical items in other languages. For instance, the denial *but* is translated as *aber* in German and *pero* in Spanish, while the correction *but* is translated as *sondern* in German and *sino* in Spanish.

Data from Standard Arabic show that there are four non-synonymous linguistic expressions that translate *but* in English namely, *lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin* and *bal*. The denial *but* is normally translated as *lakinna* in SA:

- (28) kana min aṭ-ṭullabi al-mumtazīn **lakinnahu** lam yaṣil 'ila
 was+he from students excellent **but+he** not reach to
 mustawana ad-dirasī ḥaiṭu kuntu wa farouq min al-'awa'il.
 our level study where was+I and Farouq from the first

“He was an excellent student, **but** he has never reached our level. I and Farouq were the first in the class.”

(Swimming in the Mud²⁹ p.21)

Lakinna in this example is similar to *but* in Lakoff's example (24) in the sense that it indicates a denial-of-expectation relation between the two clauses based on the fact that ‘excellent students should be the first in their classes’. However this expectation has been denied by the second conjunct.

²⁹ Al-Suleibi (2002). *Sibaha fi Al-Wahal* (Swimming in the Mud). Damascus: Dar Al-Ilm.

As for the contrastive *but*, it is translated as *bainma*³⁰ in SA. Consider the following example:

- (29) ḡalasa walad abi yusuf al-qurfuṣāa **bainama** ibn al-ṣabrah
 Sat down son Abi Yusuf squat **but** Ibn Al-Sabrah
- baqiya wāqifan
 remained standing

“Walad Abi Yusuf squatted **but** Ibn Al-Sabrah remained standing”.

(Raspberry Tree p.135)

Bainama in (29) indicates a contrastive relation between two states of affairs (squatting) and (standing) in a similar way to what is indicated by *but* in (25):

Concerning the correction *but*, it is traditionally translated as *bal* in SA as demonstrated in the following example:

³⁰ There is another DM (*'innama*) used in SA to encode a contrastive relationship between the two elements it connects. It differs from *bainama* in the sense that it is always preceded by negation:

- a. la 'uridu al-milḥa **'innama** al-bihāra
 not want the salt **but** the pepper
 'I don not want the salt **but** the pepper.'
- b. ma ḡahabtu **'innam** 'intazrtuka ḥatta al-ṭaniaya zuhran
 not went way **but** wait for you until 2.00 pm
 'I have not gone **but** waited for you until 2.00 pm.'
- c. lam ya'tū min al-baḥr **'innama** ḡā'ū min qalbi beirut
 not come from the sea **but** come from heart Beirut
 'They did not come from the sea **but** from the heart of Beirut.

(The Bridge of Death p. 41)

- (30) a. ahbir-nī ‘an ziarati-ka li-london fi nisān 1995
 tell-me about visit-your to-London in April 1995
- b. ‘naa lam ‘zur london fi nisān 1995 **bal** zurtu-ha fi ‘yyār 2001
 I not visit London in April 1995 but visited-it in May 2001
- a’. Tell me about your visit to London in April 1995.
- b’. I did not visit London in April 1995 **but** (visited it) in May 2001.

As can be noticed, the clause introduced by *bal* in (30) corrects the assumption communicated in the first clause.

Bell’s (1998) utterance-initial *but* is translated as *lakin* in SA. As can be seen, *lakin* in (19) indicates a return to the main topic in discourse and it cancels what comes before in discourse.

Iten (2005:125) argues against the ambiguity account of *but*. She maintains that the presence of a word in one language which can have more than one translation in another language does not mean that the word itself is ambiguous. She gives an example of the word *cousin* in English which can be translated (in German) as *Vetter* for the male cousin and as *Base* for the female cousin. However, nobody would say that the word *cousin* in English is ambiguous. She also claims that if *but* in English is ambiguous, then this should lead to sentences containing *but* being ambiguous. But this is not intuitively the case.

However, theorists who argue that *but* in English is ambiguous might think of ambiguous sentences containing *but*. Consider the following example:

- (31) My friend is not the smiling quiet gentle man sitting at the table **but** the frowning angry one quarrelling with the waiter.

But in the above sentence can have three different readings. Consider the following scenario: John and his friend Peter are at the restaurant having their lunch. Co-incidentally David, John's brother, comes to the same restaurant. John comes to David and asks him to join their table. David asks John whether he is alone or accompanied by somebody. John tells David that his friend the gentleman is having lunch with him. David looks at the table and sees two men around to the table and then says to him 'your friend must be the smiling quiet person sitting at the table' and John replies uttering (31). In this scenario, *but* encodes a denial-of-expectation meaning. The brother's expectation 'the gentleman is the quiet smiling person sitting at the table (given in the first conjunct) is denied by the second conjunct 'the frowning angry person quarrelling with the waiter'. *But*, in the same scenario, can have a contrastive meaning as well. It encodes a contrastive relationship between two clauses 'the smiling quiet person sitting at the table' and 'the frowning angry person quarrelling with the waiter'. *But* in this very scenario can also have a third reading namely 'correction'. In this sense, by uttering (31), John intends to correct his brother's assumption about his friend. Thus, in (31) the second conjunct 'the frowning angry person quarrelling with the waiter' provides a correct replacement to the second conjunct 'the smiling quiet person sitting at the table'.

However, my purpose here is not to establish whether *but* in English is lexically ambiguous or not but rather to show that the corresponding linguistic expressions in SA encode procedural meanings. Nevertheless, I agree with Iten (2005) and Blakemore (1987, 2002) that *but* in English is not ambiguous. Iten is

right in her claim that *but*-sentences are not ambiguous because the three separate interpretations derived in (31) are related in the sense that what comes after *but* contrasts with what comes before it.

If one word in L1 has more than one translation in L2, it does not mean that this word is lexically ambiguous in L1. *But* is different from linguistic expressions which encode real ambiguity. Take, for instance, the word *šahāda* in SA. This word is lexically ambiguous; it has four different linguistically encoded meanings. It can be translated as *evidence, martyrdom, degree* (BA, MA, PhD etc.) or *the seen*³¹ (as compared to the unseen). Consider the following examples where the word *šahāda* is translated as four different words in English:

(32) wa huwa al-ladī ḥalqa al-samawati wa al-arḍa
and he who created the heavens and the earth

bil-ḥaqqi wa yawma yaqūlu kun fa-yakūn qawluhu al-ḥaqqu
with truth and the day say be will become his saying the truth

wa lahu al-mulku yawma yunfakḥu fi al-šūri ‘alimu
and to him the dominion day blown in the trumpet knower

al-ḡaibi wa al-**šahāda** wa huwa al-ḥakīmu al-ḥabīr.
the unseen and **the seen** and he wise aware

“It is He Who has created the Heavens and the earth in truth, and on the Day (i.e. the Day of Resurrection) He will say: "Be!", - and it shall become. His Word is the truth. His will be the dominion on the Day when the trumpet will be

³¹The word *šahāda* in this sense (as well as when it means *evidence*) is often used in religious text, especially in The Holy Quran.

blown. All Knower of the unseen and **the seen**. He is the All-Wise, Well-Aware (of all things).”

(The Holy Quran³², Al-An‘am Verse. 73)

(33) wa la taktumu al-**šahāda** wa man yaktumuha
and not conceal the **evidence** and who conceals it

fa-’innahu ’aṭimun qalbuhi wa Allāhu bima ta‘maluna ‘alīm
that he sinful his heart and Allah about your deeds knower

“And conceal not the **evidence** for he, who hides it, surely his heart is sinful. And Allah is All-Knower of what you do.”

(The Holy Quran, Al-Baqarah Verse. 283)

(34) wa ’ahamu ma yamlikuhu ‘anšāru Hizbu Allah
and most important what own followers party Allah

huwa al-’imān bi-qaḍiyyatihim wa ‘azimatihim ‘ala al-qitāl
it the belief in their cause and their resolution on fighting

ḥatta al-**šahāda** aw al-naṣr.
until the **martyrdom** or the victory

“The most important thing followers of Hezbollah rely upon is their belief in their cause and their determination to fight until **martyrdom** or victory.”

(News report³³ Sunday 6th August 2006)

³² This translation of The Holy Quran is provided by Dr. Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali, and Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan; available online on <http://muttaqun.com/quran/e/index.html>. Link retrieved 16/01/2008

- (35) 'uridu 'iġāza qaṣīrah limudat tamani wa 'arba'īna
 I want leave short for time either and forty
- sā'ah min 'ġli 'ġ rā'i al-muqābalaḥ al-ṣafawīyyah
 hour for sake doing the interview the oral
- wa taḥqīq al-naġaḥ fi al-musābaqa li-ḥamalti
 and achieving the success in the competition for people
- al-**ṣahāda** al-ġāmi'iyya
 the **degree** the university

“I would like to have a short leave—just 48 hours. I would like to do the interview arranged for people with university **degree** to get the job”.

(The Bridge of Death p. 33)

It is generally agreed that the meaning encoded by *but* cannot be analysed in terms of the contribution it makes to the truth conditions of the utterance in which it occurs:

- (36) It was snowing **but** John went out cycling.

In other words, the meaning encoded by *but* does not affect the truth or falsity of the (36). The utterance is true if and only if the first and the second conjuncts are true regardless of the relationship encoded by *but*.

³³ Retrieved at the following link
<http://www.inbaa.com/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=14451> on 17/01/2008

Similarly, the meanings encoded by *lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin* and *bal* do not contribute to the truth conditional content of utterances in which they occur.

Reconsider (16b) repeated here as (37) for convenience:

(37) al-samā-u mumṭirat-un **lakinna** al-ḡaw-wa dāfi'-un
 the sky raining **but** the weather warm

It is raining **but** the weather is warm.

As can be noticed, *but* in (37) indicates that there is a denial-of-expectation meaning. However this meaning does not affect the truth or falsity of the utterance. (37) is true if and only if the two conjuncts ‘it is raining’ and ‘the weather is warm’ are true no matter whether there is a denial-of-expectation relation between the two conjuncts or not. Similar analyses could be composed for the other three DMs. Consider (18), (21) and (22) in which *lakin*, *bainama* and *bal*, respectively, do not affect the truth or falsity of their utterances.

4.3.1.2. ‘But’: a concept or procedure?

It is quite hard to find a concept that covers all the meanings encoded by *but*. In this respect, it is more appropriate, following Blakemore (1987, 1989, 2002) and Iten (2005), to argue that *but* is best accounted for in procedural terms. My claim will be that *but* in English encodes a general procedure which can be implemented to generate four different interpretations: ‘denial of expectation’, ‘contrast’, ‘correction’ and ‘cancellation’. It will be argued that the four linguistic expressions corresponding to *but*, i.e. *lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin* and *bal* are translations to the different implementations of the general procedure encoded by

but. Before I do that, I would like to give more evidence about the procedural nature of *but* in English.

If we examine *but* in the light of Wilson and Sperber's (1993) tests, it would become clear that the meaning encoded by *but* is procedural rather than conceptual. The first test—'accessibility to consciousness' shows that *but* lacks conceptual content. Unlike linguistic expressions with conceptual encoding, such as *cat*, *tree*, and *table*, *but* cannot be brought into consciousness. It would be very hard for a native speaker of English to answer a question such as 'what does *but* mean?'. It would be much easier for her to answer a question such as 'how is *but* used?'.

Regarding the second test 'truth evaluability', it is widely accepted that the meaning encoded by *but* is not truth evaluable. Consider Iten's example (83) used here as (38):

- (38) a. John is gay **but** he's a nice guy.
 *b. That's not true—there's no incompatibility between him being nice
 and him being gay.
 *c. Come on. You can't seriously suggest that being gay is incompatible
 with being nice.

As can be noticed, the hearer cannot object to the sense of 'contrast' or 'incompatibility' encoded by *but* in (38a). Thus, the hearer's reply in (38b) is not accepted.

As for the 'semantic compositionality' where conceptual representations can combine with other conceptual representations to form larger complex

conceptual representations, it is obvious that *but* could not combine with other linguistic expressions in the same way as conceptual words do. Consider the following examples given by Iten (2005:132):

- (39) Sheila is rich [I strongly suggest this contrasts] she is unhappy.
- (40) Sheila is rich [I don't suggest this contrasts] she is unhappy.
- (41) * Sheila is rich **strongly but** she is unhappy.
- (42) * Sheila is rich **not but** she is unhappy.

Iten points out that there is a difference between *but* and the linguistic expressions (between square brackets) which would have to be taken as synonymous with *but* on conceptual accounts. She maintains that unlike (39) and (40) which are perfectly acceptable, (41) and (42) are neither grammatical nor interpretable.

Wilson and Sperber's (1993) three tests show that the linguistic meaning encoded by *but* is best analysed in procedural terms. As far as my classification of linguistic expressions in English (given in the last chapter) is concerned, *but* comes in the second category namely 'purely procedural linguistic expressions'.

This section has presented a brief analysis which supports the procedural account of *but*. Next section investigates the general procedure encoded by *but* and shows how this procedure is implemented to reach the four interpretations derived in *but*-utterances.

4.3.1.3. 'But': a Relevance-Theoretic account

Blakemore (1987, 2002) concentrates on the two main interpretations of *but* namely, 'denial of expectation' and 'contrast'. Her account demonstrates that *but*

encodes a procedure which constrains the relevance of the utterance in which *but* is used. According to her, the procedure encoded by *but* reduces the processing effort by pointing the hearer towards the contextual effect of the clause it introduces. In other words, the use of *but* helps the hearer/reader see how the proposition communicated in the clause it introduces is relevant to what is expressed in the first clause.

Blakemore (1987, 2002) argues for a unitary account of *but*. Her claim is that the procedure encoded by *but* puts a single constraint on the relevance of the utterance in which it occurs, no matter whether it encodes a ‘contrast’ or ‘denial of expectation’. This procedure encoded by *but*, as given by Iten, (2005:147) is the following:

- (43) What follows (Q) contradicts and eliminates an assumption that is manifest in the context.

Blakemore uses the procedure given in (43) to account for both ‘denial’ and ‘contrast’ meanings of *but*. In the case of ‘denial of expectation’, she uses examples such as the following:

- (44) John is a lawyer **but** he is in prison now.

The assumption manifest in the first clause of (44) is that ‘John should not be in prison’. It is usually known that lawyers work to save people from being in prison; thus it is unexpected (and rather strange) for John himself to be in prison.

However, this assumption is denied by the conceptual content in the *but*-clause ‘he is in prison now’. Blakemore calls this type of denial as a ‘direct denial’.

Blakemore gives another type of denial where the propositional content of the *but*-clause does not contradict and eliminate the assumption, but rather the implicature communicated in the preceding clause. Consider the following example:

(45) It is freezing outside **but** John needs some milk for the kids.

As can be noticed, what is denied is not the truth-conditional content expressed in the first clause of (45) but rather the contextual implicature communicated in the first clause—that ‘John might be expected *not* to want to get out’. Blakemore calls this type of denial as an ‘indirect denial’.

Blakemore accounts for the contrast *but* in two different ways. She (1987, 2002) argues that the contrast *but* is a special case of the denial *but*. She treats it the same way as the denial of expectation *but* as in (44) where *but* encodes a procedure of contradiction and elimination. Consider her example used below as (46):

(46) John is tall **but** Bill is short.

Blakemore (1987, 2002) accounts for this use of *but* as follows: we might take the first clause ‘John is tall’ to imply that ‘Bill is tall too’ if John and Bill are twin brothers. In this case the implicature manifest in the first clause ‘Bill is tall too’ is denied by the *but*-clause ‘Bill is short’. However, Blakemore (1989:17) accounts

for the contrast *but* in a different way. She claims that the contrast case of *but* involves a different procedure from that involved in the denial case. Thus, she claims that *but* should be treated as having more than one single meaning.

Hall (2004:199) develops an interesting account of *but*. She claims that the procedure encoded by *but* suspends an inference that would result in a contradiction with what follows. Consider (45) repeated below as (47) for convenience:

(47) It is freezing outside **but** John needs some milk for the kids.

As can be noticed, *but* in (47) introduces a clause the propositional content of which provides a suspension of an inference that might be derived from the first clause such as ‘people do not get out in freezing weather’. This inference is cut-off or suspended by the *but*-clause.

The discussion presented above shows that theorists have different views regarding the procedural meaning encoded by *but*. Blakemore and Hall analyse the procedure encoded by *but* in different ways. Building on that, I argue that *but* in English encodes a general procedure the different implementations of which put constraints on the interpretation of the utterances in which it occurs. Thus, the implementation of this general procedure results in generating four different constraints on the interpretation of the utterance in which *but* occurs, namely ‘denial’, ‘contrast’, ‘correction’ and ‘cancellation’. I will claim that these four implementations of the procedural meaning of *but* are translated as different linguistic expressions in SA: *lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin* and *bal* as will be discussed in the next section.

4.3.2. 'But' as encoding a general procedure

The ambiguity account of *but* proposed by Anscombe and Ducrot (1977) and Horn (1989) has been argued against by Iten (2005). Iten's argument is based on two claims. On the one hand, she maintains that a word which has more than one linguistic expression equivalent to it in other languages does not mean that the word is ambiguous and she gives an example of the word 'cousin' in English. On the other hand, she argues that if *but* in English is ambiguous then sentences containing *but* must be ambiguous which, we do not find in English.

Iten's argument seems to be correct. *But* in English is never ambiguous. The different readings of *but*, i.e. 'denial', 'contrast', 'correction' and 'cancellation' stem from the fact that *but* is a sense-general linguistic expression. *But* is not an ambiguous expression because the different interpretations communicated in *but*-utterances are related. 'Denial', 'contrast' 'correction' and 'cancellation' come under one procedural umbrella. This, I claim, is the 'contrast' encoded by the linguistic expression *but* (this is discussed in more detail in the next section).

My argument (Hussein forthcoming) will be that *but* is a DM that encodes the general procedure given below:

- (48) Treat the proposition communicated by the *but*-clause as *contrasting* with the assumption explicitly or implicitly communicated by the utterance of the preceding clause.

The above procedure is implemented in particular contexts to generate the different meanings communicated by *but*-utterances namely: ‘denial’, ‘contrast’, ‘correction’ and ‘cancellation’. My claim is that the four SA linguistic expressions corresponding to *but* are not exact translations of the linguistic expression (*but*) but rather translations of the specific implementations of the procedure encoded by *but*:

4.3.2.1. *Lakinna*: the ‘denial but’

Data from SA show that there are four different lexical items corresponding to *but* in English. The argument (Hussein forthcoming) will be that each of these lexical items stands for a translation of one of the different implementations of the general procedure encoded by **but** as shown in the figure below:




Figure 8: *But* as encoding a general procedure

The first implementation of this general procedure leads to the denial-of-expectation meaning communicated in *but*-utterances. The translation of this

implementation would be *lakinna* in SA. This implementation can be put as follows:

- (49) What follows *lakinna* denies and replaces an assumption communicated by what precedes it.

Consider the following example for demonstration:

- (50) jon lişş-un **lakinna**-hu tayyibu al-qalb
 John thief **but**-he good heart
 “John is a thief **but** he is good-hearted”

As can be noticed, the assumption communicated in the first clause in (50) is that John is not a good-hearted person on the expectation that ‘thieves are not good-hearted’. However, this assumption is denied by the proposition communicated in the clause introduced by *lakinna*. The use of *lakinna* in (50) does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterance. The utterance is true if and only if the two propositions ‘John is a thief’ and ‘John is good-hearted’ are true. The contribution of *lakinna* lies on the implicit level. It constrains the inferential phase of the utterance interpretation by guiding the hearer to interpret the proposition communicated in the *lakinna*-clause as denial and replacement of the assumption in the first clause. In other words, this implementation of the procedure points to the hearer that the *lakinna*-clause achieves relevance as denial and replacement of the assumption communicated in the first clause.

The other three translations (in SA) cannot be used for this implementation of the procedure encoded by the English *but*; the use of *bainama*, *bal* and *lakin* is not accepted in (50):

- (51) a. John is a thief **lakinna** he is good-hearted.
 *b. John is a thief **bal** he is good-hearted.
 *c. John is a thief **bainama** he is good-hearted.
 *d. John is a thief **lakin** he is good-hearted.

4.3.2.2. *Bainama: the ‘contrast but’*

Unlike *lakinna*, which is the translation of the ‘denial’ implementation of the general procedure encoded by *but*, *bainama* is translation of the ‘contrast’ implementation. Given that, *bainama* in SA is analysed as encoding a contrastive relationship between two propositions:

- (52) What follows *bainama* contrasts a proposition explicitly communicated by what precedes it.

Consider the following example in which *bainama* indicates a simple contrast between two states of affairs:

- (53) ‘umar-un qaşīr-un **bainama** zaid-un ʔawīl-un
 Omar short **but** Zaid tall
 “Omar is short **but** Zaid is tall”

As can be noticed, *bainama* in (53) indicates a contrastive relationship between two states of affairs: ‘Omar is short and ‘Zaid is tall’. Similar to *lakinna*, the contribution made by *bainama* does not affect the truth-conditional content of the utterance. The utterance of (53) is true if and only if both propositions ‘Omar is short’ and ‘Zaid is tall’ are true regardless of any contrastive relationship between them. The contribution made by *bainama* is operative on the implicit level by guiding the hearer to see that the proposition communicated by *bainama*-clause achieves relevance as a contrast of the proposition communicated in the first clause. There is no denial-of-expectation meaning involved when *bainama* is used. In addition, the other two translations, i.e. *bal* and *lakin* cannot be used for the contrast implementation referred to here:

- (54) a. Omar is short **bainama** Zaid is tall.
 ?b. Omar is short **lakinna** Zaid is tall.
 *c. Omar is short **bal** Zaid is tall.
 *d. Omar is short **lakin** Zaid tall.

It is interesting to say that *lakinna* can be used instead of *bainama* in (54). However the interpretation would be different. If *lakinna* is used, the proposition communicated in the *lakinna*-clause is interpreted as a denial of the assumption communicated in the first clause. This could happen in scenarios where Omar and Zaid are taken to be twin brothers, which indicates that both are tall. The implication then is that ‘Zaid is tall’ too. However this implication is denied by the proposition introduced by the *lakinna*-clause.

4.3.2.3. *Bal*: the ‘correction but’

The translation of the third implementation of the general procedure encoded by *but* is *bal* which is used as a correction marker in SA. It is usually used by speakers to correct previous assumptions in discourse. It is regularly used in religious texts specially the Holy Quran. Consider the following example:

- (55) ’am yaqulūna bihi ġinatun **bal** ġa’ahum bilḥaq
 Or they say in him madness **but** brought them with truth
 ‘Or say they: “There is madness in him?” Nay, **but** he brought them the truth.’

(The Holy Quran: Part 23, Verse 70)

In this verse, the Almighty God (Allah) defends his prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). The disbelievers referred to in the clause that precedes *bal* accuse the prophet of being mad because he is asking them to worship one god. In the *bal*-clause, Allah corrects the disbeliever’s assumption and points out that the prophet is not mad but is the messenger of truth to mankind.

Bal in (55) does not encode a denial-of-expectation meaning. It is not the case that the disbelievers in the first clause expect that the prophet to be mad, but rather accusing him of madness. So, the purpose of the *bal*-clause is not to deny any contextual expectation. The use of the *bal*-clause is rather to correct the disbeliever’s judgement that the ‘prophet is mad’ and replace it with ‘a messenger of truth’. Building on that, the claim is that ‘correction’ is an implementation of the general procedure encoded by *but* and that the translation of this implementation into SA is *bal*:

- (56) What follows *bal* corrects and replaces an assumption explicitly communicated by what precedes it.

Consider another example:

- (57) a. 'uhtu-ka tušbihu-ku tamaman
 sister-your like-you exactly
- b. hiya laisat 'uht-ī **bal** 'umm-ī
 She not sister-my **but** mother-my

“a. Your sister looks exactly like you.”

“b. She is not my sister **but** my mother.”

The use of *bal* in (57b) contributes the inferential part of the utterance interpretation in the sense that it guides the hearer to see that the proposition expressed in the *bal*-clause is relevant as a correction and replacement of an assumption communicated in the previous clause. Similarly, the other three translations are unacceptable in the correction case:

- (58) a. She is not my sister **bal** my mother.
 *b. She is not my sister **lakinna** my mother.
 *c. She is not my sister **bainama** my mother.
 *d. She is not my sister **lakin** my mother.

4.3.2.4. *Lakin*: the ‘cancellation but’

The last implementation of the procedure encoded by *but* is translated as *lakin* in SA. *Lakin* is a DM which is used in an initial position in discourse. It is used to

introduce a clause which communicates a proposition that relates to a previous proposition in discourse in the sense that the proposition in the *lakin*-clause cancels the importance of the proposition in the previous discourse. Consider the following example:

- (59) a. maṣṭabatu baitika šabihatun bi-maṣṭabati baiti 'abi yusuf
 the terrace your house similar to the terrace house Abi Yusuf
- b. **lakin** 'aba yusuf tarak baitahu wa 'abna'ahu 'iqtala'u
but dad Yusuf left his house and his kids pull out
- al-šağarah wa hadamū al-bait.
 the tree and demolished the house.

“a. The terrace of your house is similar to the terrace of Abi Yusuf’s house.”

“b. **But** Aba Yusuf left his house and his kids pulled out the tree and demolished the house.”

(The Raspberry Tree: p80)

Unlike *lakinna* and *bal*, the use of *lakin* does not deny or correct an assumption communicated in the preceding clause. The clause introduced by *lakin* in (59), ‘Aba Yusuf left his house and his kids pulled out the tree and demolished the house’ neither denies the preceding clause ‘the terrace of your house is similar to the terrace of Abi Yusuf’s house’ nor corrects it.

The clause introduced by *lakin* in (59) is a cancellation and replacement of the proposition communicated in the preceding clause. In this sense, *lakin* points

to the hearer that the proposition communicated by the *lakin*-clause is more important and significant than the proposition communicated by the preceding clause and that it has to cancel and replace it: The implementation can be put as follows:

- (60) What follows *lakin* cancels and replaces a proposition communicated by what precedes it.

Consider another example to demonstrate that *lakin* is the best translation of this implementation:

- (61) a. 'unzur al-'adīd-u min al-nās yatağmma'una fi sāḥti al-baldah
look many of people gathering in square the town
- b. **lakin** limāda ḡamī'u-hum yarfa'una 'a'lām-an ḥudr-an
but what all of them carry flags green

“a’. Look! Many people are gathering in the town square.’

“b. **But**, why are they all carrying green flags?”

Lakin in (61) introduces a clause, the proposition of which relates to the proposition in the previous clause. It guides the hearer to see that the proposition it introduces cancels the importance and significance of the proposition in the previous clause. There is no, denial or correction involved in this case of *lakin*, which means that the other three translations cannot be used instead:

b. ra'ait-u aḥmad-an **wa** ḥālīd-an
 saw-I Ahmad **and** Khaled

“I saw Ahmad **and** Khaled.”

(64) a. daḥala aḥmad-un **fa**-ḡalasa ‘ala al-kursī
 came in Ahmad **fa**-sat down on the chair

“Ahmad came in **fa** sat down on the chair.”

b. a. daḥala aḥmad-un **wa** ḡalasa ‘ala al-kursī
 came in Ahmad **and** sat down on the chair

“Ahmad came in **and** sat down on the chair.”

On the semantic level, *fa* encodes further meanings not encoded by *wa* such as ‘sequentiality’, ‘immediacy’, ‘non-intervention’ and ‘causality’. As regards ‘sequentiality’ (temporal ordering), *fa* indicates that the events (or actions) described in the two conjuncts linked by *fa* take place in a chronological order. Consider the following examples:

(65) a. ḡa’a ‘umar-un **fa**-zaid-un ‘ila al-ḥafla
 came Omar **fa**-Zaid to the party

“Omar **fa** Zaid came to the party.”

b. ḡa’a ‘umar-un **wa** zaid-un ‘ila al-ḥafla
 came Omar **and** Zaid to the party

“Omar **and** Zaid came to the party.”

On the syntactic level, there is no difference between (65a) and (65b); both *fa* and *wa* function as coordinating conjunctions. However the difference lies on the semantic level. The difference in meaning between (65a) and (65b) is very clear to

native speakers of Arabic. *Wa* in (65b) does not semantically give any indication of sequentiality (temporal ordering). In other words, *wa* does not semantically specify any temporal ordering of the events. In this sense, an utterance of (65b) can have three interpretations:

- (66) a. Omar came **before** Zaid.
 b. Omar came **after** Zaid.
 c. Omar and Zaid came **at the same time**.

However, *fa* in (65a) semantically encodes a temporal ordering of the two actions: the action in the first clause takes place before the action in the second clause.

Given that, (65a) can only have one interpretation:

- (67) Omar came **before** Zaid.

Another piece of evidence that *fa* in SA encodes ‘sequentiality’ is that it is used to link events (or actions) but not ideas (or states). Consider the following examples:

- (68) a. tanawala aḥmad-un ġada’a-hu **fa**-šariab-a ka’san min al-šāi
 had Ahmad lunch-his **fa**-drank-he cup of tea
 “Ahmad had his lunch **fa** drank a cup of tea.”

- b. tanawal aḥmad-un ġada’a-hu **wa** šariab-a ka’san min al-šāi
 had Ahmad lunch-his **and** drank-he cup of tea
 “Ahmad had his lunch **and** drank a cup of tea.”

As can be noticed, *fa* in (68a) indicates that there is a sequential relationship between two actions: ‘having lunch’ and ‘drinking a cup of tea’; that the action in the first clause takes place before the action in the second clause.

Fa, in such uses, has the meaning of the English *then* which has three meanings³⁴ : ‘sequentiality’, ‘immediacy’ and ‘contiguity’. As regards ‘sequentiality’, *then* indicates that actions occur next in order of time. Concerning ‘immediacy’, it indicates that one action takes place at the moment immediately following another action. Regarding ‘contiguity’ (non-intervention) *then* indicates that an action takes place directly after another action.

The concept of sequentiality can also be communicated in (68b). The two actions in this sentence can be interpreted as taking place in temporal ordering, i.e. the action in the second clause takes place after the action in the first clause. However, sequentiality in this case is not encoded by *wa*, it is rather pragmatically derived. It can simply be denied by adding the phrase ‘but not in this order’ after (68b):

- (69) a. Ahmad had his lunch **wa** drank a cup of tea /but not in this order/.
 *b. Ahmad had his lunch **fa** drank a cup of tea /but not in this order/.

By contrast, *fa* cannot be used to link ideas or states. Compare the acceptable uses of *fa* in (64a) and (68a) to the unacceptable uses of it in (70) and (71):

³⁴ Picked up from OED at the following link:
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50250557?query_type=word&queryword=then&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=1&search_id=p1Ta-FaVYKe-2172&hilite=50250557 Retrieved on Saturday 28/03/2008 at 3.30 pm.

- (70) *al- ġaw-wu bārid-un **fa**-al-kahrabā'u maqtū'a
 *the weather cold **fa**-the electricity off
 *"The weather is cold **fa** the electricity is off."
- (71) *yaṭfu al-ḥaṣab 'ala al-mā' **fa**-tatamaddad al-ma'ādin
 *float the wood on the water **fa**-expand metals
 bil-ḥarārah
 by heating
 *"Wood floats on water **fa** metals expand by heating."

As can be noticed, *fa* cannot be used in (70) and (71) because ideas and states do not have sequential relations. For connecting clauses or phrases expressing ideas or states, *wa* is used in SA. (70) and (71) can correctly be used with *wa* but not *fa*:

- (72) The weather is cold **wa** the electricity is off.
 (73) Wood floats on water **wa** metals expand by heating.

It can be noticed that sequentiality is communicated in both *wa* and *fa*-utterances. The difference is that in *fa*-utterances, it is linguistically encoded while in *wa*-utterances it is pragmatically conveyed.

Grice (1967) argues that *and* (*wa*³⁵) in natural language is identical to the truth-functional logical counterpart '&', which means that the two conjuncts in *and*-utterances have the same truth-conditional status. Any other assumptions communicated in *and*-utterances would be considered as conversational implicatures pragmatically conveyed. For instance, the temporal ordering

³⁵ Unlike *wa*, *fa* in SA is not truth functional. There is a difference between the truth-conditional content of the two conjuncts linked by *fa*. In 'Ahmad had his lunch **wa** drank a cup of tea', the two conjuncts can be put in any order because they are equal in truth conditions. However in 'Ahmad had his lunch **fa** drank a cup of tea', the only possible order is that the event in the second conjunct follows the event in the first conjunct.

communicated in *and*-utterances is analysed by Grice as conversational implicature due to the manner submaxim ‘orderliness’. Given that, an utterance such as (69a) implicates (74) below:

(74) Ahmad had his lunch **and then** drank a cup of tea.

For Grice, the *and then* interpretation of *and* is not a part of the truth-conditional content of the utterance in which *and* is used simply because it is not encoded by the linguistic form of the utterance but rather pragmatically derived.

Francois Recanati (1989, 1993, 2004), Kent Bach (1994, 2000), Anne Bezuidenhout (1997, 2002), and Stephen Neale (2000) generally agree with Grice that *and* in natural language is equivalent to the truth-functional logical operator ‘&’. However, they disagree with him as regards the analysis of the temporal ordering and causal relations communicated by *and*-utterances. Unlike Grice, these pragmatists argue that the temporal and causal relations communicated by *and*-utterances (though pragmatically conveyed) are not conversational implicatures. According to them, such relations are the outcome of the development of the logical form of *and*-sentences. Since they are inferred by developing the logical form, these relations are analysed as contributing to the truth-conditional propositional content of the utterance in which *and* is used. This is known in RT as ‘explicature’ where pragmatics plays a role in determining the truth-conditional content of the utterance.

To show that temporal and causal relations communicated in *and*-utterances contribute to the propositional content of the utterances, researchers in

RT use the ‘embedding’ test (Cohen 1971) or the Scope Criterion as (Recanati 1989, 1993) calls it:

A pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is part of what is said³⁶ (and, therefore, not a conversational implicature) if - and, perhaps, only if – it falls within the scope of logical operators such as negation and conditionals.

According to this criterion, temporal ordering and causal relations communicated by *and*-utterances contribute to the explicature ‘what is said’ because they can fall under the scope of negation and/or conditionals:

(75) a. Ahmad did not have his lunch **and** drank cup of tea, but (he) drank a cup of tea and had his lunch.

Or: b. Ahmad had his lunch **and** drank a cup of tea (but not in this order).

(76) If Ahmad had his lunch **and** drank a cup of tea, then he would have come back to work now.

According to the negation scope criterion, the explicature in (74) that has been pragmatically inferred by developing the logical form of (68b) is cancellable as can be noticed in (75a-b). This is compatible with Carston’s (2002) notion of cancellable explicatures, in which she argues that what is pragmatically conveyed can be cancelled no matter whether it is communicated on the explicit or implicit level. By contrast, temporal ordering expressed in *fa*-utterances is not pragmatically conveyed, but rather linguistically encoded by *fa*. It is part of the

³⁶ The notion of explicature in RT is referred to as ‘what is said’ by Recanati and Levinson.

truth-conditional propositional content of the utterance. In other words, it contributes to the explicature (what is said) by the utterance and thus it can come under the scope of logical operator such as conditionals:

- (77) If Ahmad had his lunch **fa** drank a cup of tea, then he would have come back to work now.

The sequential relation communicated in *fa*-utterances is different from that communicated in *wa*-utterances. In the latter, this relation could not be cancelled because it is linguistically encoded and not pragmatically inferred, as was demonstrated in (69b) repeated here as (78).

- (78) *a. Ahmad had his lunch **fa** drank a cup of tea (but not in this order).

The sequentiality linguistically encoded by *fa* can be understood in two ways: ‘immediate sequentiality’ and ‘non-interventional sequentiality’. I refer to the former as ‘immediacy’ and to the latter as ‘non-intervention’ treating both meanings as two subcases of ‘sequentiality’. Regarding the first subcase ‘immediacy’, *fa* indicates that there is a very short time span between the event described in the first conjunct and the event described in the second conjunct. Consider the following example:

- (79) ḍarab zilzāl-un ‘anīf-un al-balada **fa**-tahaddamat al-‘adīd
 hit earthquake strong the country **fa**-collapsed many
 min al-manāzil
 of buildings

“A strong earthquake hit the country **fa** many buildings collapsed.”

Fa, in (79), indicates that there is very short time separating between the two events, namely ‘an earthquake hitting the country’ and ‘many buildings collapsed’. The short-time span encoded by *fa* is not defined, but it is very short, as can be noticed in (79). It is generally known that in cases of strong earthquakes, buildings collapse in few seconds or minutes. Given that, *fa* in SA cannot be used with temporal adverbs such as ‘immediately’ or ‘promptly’ since the short-time span or the ‘immediacy’ meaning is already encoded by *fa*:

(80) *A strong earthquake hit the country **fa** many buildings collapsed *immediately*.

(81) *A strong earthquake hit the country **fa** many buildings collapsed *promptly*.

The meaning of ‘immediacy’ encoded by *fa* is not ‘punctual’. The linguistic import of *fa* does not give a specific point of time in which the second event or action takes place. Given that, *fa* cannot be used with punctual time adverbials such as *on Monday* or *at 10.30 am*.

(82) *A strong earthquake hit the country on Sunday **fa** many buildings collapsed *on Tuesday*.

(83) *A strong earthquake hit the country at 10:00 am **fa** many buildings collapsed *at 10:30 am*.

However the meaning encoded by *fa* in this use can be understood as ‘durational’. In other words, *fa* indicates that the second event takes place shortly (or

same token, *tumma* cannot be used instead of *fa* in (79) because the period of time separating between the two events is very short:

- (88) a. *ḍarab zilzāl-un ‘anīf-un al-balada **tumma** tahaddamat al-‘adīd
 hit earthquake strong the country **tumma** collapsed many
 min al-manāzil
 of buildings

“*A strong earthquake hit the country **tumma** many buildings collapsed.”

The short-time span cannot be encoded by *wa*. However it can be pragmatically communicated in *wa*-utterances by developing the logical form of the sentence containing *wa*:

- (89) ḍarab zilzāl-un ‘anīf-un al-balada **wa** tahaddamat al-‘adīd
 hit earthquake strong the country **and** collapsed many
 min al-manāzil
 of buildings

“A strong earthquake hit the country **and** many buildings collapsed.”

Given general knowledge of the world, the hearer will be able to infer that there is a very short period of time separating between the two events in (89). Thus what is communicated by (89) is the explicature given in (90):

respect, *fa* can be contrasted with *tumma* where other comparable actions can take place in between:

(94) Omar visited Damascus **tumma** Baghdad.

Tumma in (94) indicates that visiting Damascus does not take place directly after visiting Baghdad; it could be that Omar visited another country before visiting Baghdad.

The non-intervention meaning linguistically encoded by *fa* can be pragmatically communicated in *wa*-utterances. Thus (95) can communicate the explicature in (96). However, this explicature is cancellable as can be seen in (97):

(95) Omar visited Damascus **wa** Bagdad.

(96) Omar visited Damascus **wa directly after that** (he) visited Bagdad.

(97) Omar visited Damascus **wa** Bagdad/but he visited some other capitals in between/.

The last meaning encoded by *fa* when used as a coordinating conjunction is ‘causality’. In this use, *fa* indicates that there is a cause-effect relationship between two actions joined by *fa*. Consider the following examples:

(98) saqaṭa Zaid-un ’arḍan **fa**-’aṣaba rukbata-hu
 fell Zaid down **fa**-hurt leg-his

“Zaid fell down **fa** (he) hurt his leg.”

(99) ’ahana ḥālīd-un mona **fa**-taraka-t al-ḥafla
 Insulted Khaled Mona **fa**-left-she the party

“Khaled insulted Mona **fa** she left the party.”

Fa in (98) indicates that the action expressed in the second conjunct ‘Zaid’s hurting his leg’ happens as a result to the action expressed in the first conjunct ‘Zaid’s falling down’. The same goes for (99) where the second action (Mona left the party) is a result of the first action (Khaled insulted Mona).

Causality can also be pragmatically communicated in the counterpart *wa*-utterances; (98) and (99) can also be uttered with *wa*:

(100) Zaid fell down **wa** (he) hurt his leg.

(101) Khaled insulted Mona **wa** she left the party.

(100) and (101) communicate that the action in the second conjunct happens as a result of the action in the first conjunct. However the cause-effect relationship communicated in these two utterances can be cancelled:

(102) No, Zaid did not fall over and hurt his leg. He hurt his leg and fell over

(103) No, Khaled did not insult Mona and she left the party. She left the party and he insulted her.

When used as a coordinating conjunction, it is quite hard to find a word-to-word translation of *fa* in English. This is due to the syntactic difference between *fa* in SA and the corresponding expressions in English namely, *then* and *so*. Unlike *fa*, *so* and *then* in English are not used as coordinating conjunctions. So the challenge is to find a linguistic expression whose meaning is equivalent to the meaning of *fa* and functions as a coordinating conjunction. The only way to get out of this problem is to consider a two-word translation of *fa*. For instance, in order to show that *fa* is a coordinating conjunction, behaving like *and* in English

and highlight the extra meanings it encodes, we should translate it as *and then* in the case of ‘sequentiality’, ‘immediacy’ and ‘non-intervention’ and *and so* in the case of ‘causality’. Building on that, a translation of *fa* in (68), (79), (93) and (99) could be given in (104), (105), (106) and (107) respectively:

(104) Ahmad had his lunch **fa** drank a cup of tea.

“Ahmad had his lunch **and then** drank a cup of tea.”

(105) A strong earthquake hit the country **fa** many buildings collapsed.

“A strong earthquake hit the country **and then** many buildings collapsed.”

(106) Omar visited Damascus **fa** Baghdad.

“Omar visited Damascus **and then** Bagdad.”

(107) Khaled insulted Mona **fa** she left the party.

“Omar insulted Mona **and so** she left the party

As far as the truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional distinction is concerned, it can be noticed that the four meanings encoded by the coordinating conjunction *fa* contribute to the truth-conditional (propositional) content of the utterances in which *fa* is used. The relations of ‘sequentiality’, ‘immediacy’, ‘non-intervention’ and ‘causality’ can fall under the scope of a logical operator such as ‘if then’:

- (108) If Ahmad had his lunch **fa** drank a cup of tea, then he would have come back to work.
- (109) If a strong earthquake hit the country **fa** many buildings collapsed, then the new government would have been in a real challenge.
- (110) If Omar visited Damascus **fa** Baghdad, then he would have spent all his savings.
- (111) If Khaled insulted Mona **fa** she left the party, then Khaled would have put himself in trouble.

4.3.3.2. Can 'fa' encode a procedure?

It is not clear whether the conceptual/procedural distinction can apply to the four meanings encoded by *fa* (when used as a coordinating conjunction). Two of Wilson and Sperber's criteria show that the meaning encoded by *fa* is procedural. These are 'accessibility to consciousness' and 'semantic compositionality'. As for the first criterion, it is noticed that native speakers of Arabic find it hard to come up with a conceptual representation of *fa*. They would struggle to answer a question such as 'what does *fa* mean?'. They will not be able to give an explanation of (or paraphrase) this linguistic expression. However, they will find it much easier to demonstrate by example how *fa* is used. My own analysis of its meaning has been arrived at after considerable thought and research.

Regarding the second criterion, it is known that conceptual representations can combine together to form larger complex conceptual representations. For instance, the concept ZILZĀL 'EARTHQUAKE' can combine with 'ANĪF

‘STRONG’ to form the larger concept ZILZĀL ‘ANĪF ‘STRONG EARTHQUAKE’. In fact, it is not clear whether *fa* can enter this sort of semantic compositionality or not. The reason behind that could be the morphological nature of *fa*. It is known that *fa* in SA is used as a prefix (bound morpheme) with nouns and verbs, which means that it can combine with other linguistic expressions. For example, *fa* in (63) combines with the noun ‘*hālīd*’ (Khaled): **fa-hālīd** and in (64) it combines with the verb ‘*ǧalasa*’ (sat down), **fa-ǧalasa**. But the question that arises now: does this sort of combinations exhibited by *fa* lead to complex conceptual representations in the same way ZILZĀL and ‘ANĪF do. The answer would definitely be ‘No’. The combination of *fa* with other linguistic expressions does not result in larger complex representations. It is a mere morphological combination due the morphological nature of *fa* which is always used as a bound morpheme. *Fa* does not add any conceptual import to the verb *ǧalasa* in the combination *fa- ǧalasa*. The same goes for the combination of *fa-hālīd*. This is not a larger complex combination of *fa* and *ǧalasa*, but rather a morphological one.

By contrast, Wilson and Sperber’s third criterion shows that the meaning encoded by *fa* is conceptual. According to their truth-evaluability test, if a linguistic expression contributes to the truth-conditional (propositional) content of the utterance in which it occurs, then this linguistic expression is conceptual. We have seen that the four meanings encoded by *fa* contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterances in which *fa* occurs. The relations encoded by *fa* can fall under the scope of logical operators as has been demonstrated in (108), (109), (110) and (111).

If we assume that the conceptual/procedural distinction applies to the linguistic expression *fa*, then the claim would be that *fa* encodes a procedural meaning that instructs the hearer to derive the four concepts expressed in *fa* utterances, namely ‘sequentiality’, ‘immediacy’, ‘non-intervention’ and ‘causality’. In this respect, the four concepts expressed in *fa*-utterances are not the conceptual encoding of the linguistic expression *fa* but rather the outcome of the implementation of the general procedure encoded by *fa*. This general procedure can be put as follows:

- (112) Treat both conjuncts in *fa*-utterances as related constituents in a higher cognitive super-ordinate topic where the event expressed in the first conjunct precedes³⁷ and/or causes the event expressed in the second conjunct.

This general procedure encoded by *fa* put constraints on the explicature of the utterances since the four concepts generated by this procedure contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterances in which *fa* occurs. By contrast, there is no such procedure encoded by *wa*. The four concepts are pragmatically conveyed in *wa*-utterances by developing the logical form of the sentence containing *wa* as shown in the figure below:

³⁷ ‘Precedes’ here stands for ‘sequentiality’ including the two subcases of ‘immediacy’ and ‘non-intervention’.




Figure 9: Free enrichment vs. procedural encoding in *wa* and *fa*-utterances

To sum up, *fa* in SA is syntactically used as a coordinating conjunction. Like *wa*, it connects two or more phrases (or clauses). However, *fa* is morphologically and semantically different from *wa*. It is used as a prefix (bound morpheme) with the first noun and verb in the second conjunct. Furthermore, it encodes a general procedure that instructs the hearer to derive some extra meanings not encoded by *wa*. As far as the truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional distinction is concerned, all the meanings derived by implementing the general procedural meaning encoded by *fa* contribute to the propositional content of the utterances in which *fa* occurs.

4.3.3.3. 'Fa' as encoding an inferential procedure

Fa in SA is not always used as a coordinating conjunction. There is one use where *fa* does not conjoin two phrases or clauses as we have in (63) and (64). In this use, *fa* introduces an independent sentence which involves some sort of relation with the previous sentence. In this use, *fa* is always preceded by a full stop. Consider the following examples:

- (113) *yaṣṭaṭī*'u 'umar-un al-taṣḡīla fi 'ayati mubarāt.
 can Omar scoring in any game
- fa**-huwa lā'ib-un mumtāz
 fa-he player excellent

“Omar can score in every game. **Fa** he is an excellent player.”

- (114) *yaṣṭaṭī*'u aḥmad-un al-qiyāda bi-dūni murafiqen 'al-'ana.
 can Ahmad driving without supervisor now.
- fa**-huwa ḥaṣala 'ala ruḥṣati al-qiyāda al-dā'ima
 fa-he got on license the driving the full

“Ahmad can drive without a supervisor now. **Fa** he has got his full driving licence.”

As can be noticed, *fa* in (113) and (114) is not used as a coordinating conjunction. It is rather used to introduce a new sentence the proposition of which is related to

the proposition expressed in a previous sentence. In this respect, *tumma* cannot be used instead of *fa*:

- (115) *Omar can score in every game. **Tumma** he is an excellent player.
 (116) *Ahmad can drive without a supervisor now. **Tumma** he has got his full driving license recently.

This use of *fa* corresponds to the inferential use of *so* referred to in the relevance-theoretic procedural analysis of linguistic expressions. Blakemore (1988:184) points out that *so* in English can either be used to express a causal relation between two events or states of affairs or indicate an inferential relation between two propositions in discourse. Consider the following examples:

- (117) a. David fell down. **So** he broke his arm.
 b. John drank three glasses of vodka. **So** he got intoxicated.
 (118) a. There was some porridge in the fridge. **So** the guy hadn't eaten everything.
 b. Omar is your friend. **So** he must help you.

In (117a-b), the proposition introduced by *so* is interpreted as a causal consequence of the state of affairs expressed by the proposition in the first clause. In other words, the proposition of the *so*-clause is interpreted as an 'effect' to the 'cause' referred to by the proposition expressed in the first clause. However, in (118a-b), the proposition introduced by *so* is interpreted as a logical consequence of the proposition expressed in the first clause. The proposition expressed in the

so-clause is interpreted as a ‘conclusion’ to the ‘premise’ referred to by proposition expressed in the first clause.

Blakemore (1988) argues that meaning of *so* (in the inferential use) cannot be analysed in terms of the contribution it makes to the proposition expressed by the utterance containing it, but should be analysed as a constraint on the relevance of that utterance. The meaning encoded by *so* minimises the hearer’s processing effort by guaranteeing that the information communicated by the utterance containing it is relevant in a specific context. For instance, the meaning encoded by *so* in (118b) indicates that the hearer is expected to process the utterance in a context where the proposition introduced by *so* is interpreted as a ‘conclusion’ to the ‘premise’ in the first proposition. To put that differently, the meaning encoded by *so* indicates that the relevance of the proposition *so* introduces lies in the fact that it is a contextual implication of the first proposition (Blakemore 1988:188). The effect of using linguistic expressions such as *so* in (118b) is to constrain the hearer’s choice of context during the process of the utterance interpretation. For instance, for the hearer to achieve an interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance, he must apply another assumption such as the following:

(119) Friends must help each other.

In (118a-b) the meaning encoded by *so*, does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterance in which it occurs. A & B is true in only if A is true and B is true no matter whether there is an inferential relation between the propositions or not.

Like *so* in (118a-b), *fa* in (113) and (114) encodes a procedural meaning that contributes the inferential phase of the utterance interpretation by instructing the hearer to interpret the proposition introduced by *fa* as a contextual implication. The meaning encoded by *fa* puts constraints on the relevance of the utterance in which it occurs by pointing to the hearer that the proposition expressed by the clause introduced by *fa* is relevant as a ‘conclusion’ to a ‘premise’ expressed by the proposition communicated in the first clause. In this use, like the inferential *so*, *fa* does not contribute to the truth-conditional (propositional) content of the utterance. In other words, the inferential connection encoded by *fa* does not affect the truth of falsity of the two propositions in the utterance. Thus Pro1 (Omar can score in every game) and Pro2 (he is an excellent player) are true regardless whether Pro2 follows from Pro1 or not. In this respect, it can be argued that the procedure encoded by the inferential *so* put constraints on the implicit side (the implicature) of the utterance interpretation by introducing a contextual implication:

- (120) a. An excellent player can score in every game. (Pre 1)
 b. Omar can score in every game. (Pre 2)
 c. Omar is an excellent player. (Con)

For the hearer to reach an interpretation consistent with principle of relevance, he has to supply an extra premise given in (120a) which is not linguistically encoded in (113) but inferentially derived by applying the procedural meaning encoded by *fa*.

Another linguistic expression—‘*ala ’ayati hāl*’ encodes a procedure that provides the hearer with a different line of reasoning:

(121) Omar can score in every game. ‘**Ala ’ayati ḥāl**, he is an excellent player.

This procedure encoded by ‘*ala ’ayati ḥāl*’³⁸ in (121) indicates that the proposition expressed in the clause introduced by ‘*ala ’ayati ḥāl*’ is analysed as a ‘premise’ to the ‘conclusion’ expressed by the proposition in the first clause. The line of reasoning in this case is different:

- (122) a. An excellent player can score in every game. (Pre 1)
 b. Omar is an excellent player. (Pre 2)
 c. Omar can score in every game. (Con)

To sum up, *fa* in both uses³⁹ (causal and inferential) encodes procedural meaning. It gives instructions to the hearer during the process of the utterance interpretation. In the causal case, *fa* guides the hearer to reach the concept of causality which is not conceptually encoded by *fa* but rather by implementing the procedural meaning encoded by *fa*—both conjuncts are related constituents in a general cognitive topic where the second conjunct is seen a consequence of the first. The procedure encoded by this use of *fa*⁴⁰ puts constraints on the explicature of the utterance because it contributes to the truth-conditional content of the utterance in which *fa* occurs. The procedure encoded by the inferential *fa* is

³⁸ It is equivalent to *after all* in English.

³⁹ This claim is compatible with Blakemore (1988) where she argues that both uses of *so* instruct the hearer in the process of the utterance interpretation: “This is not to say that *so* is ambiguous between the non-truth-conditional sense discussed in the previous section and a further truth-conditional sense. The use of *so*, as always, instructs the hearer to establish an inferential connection. The fact that this connection is interpreted as part of the propositional content of (23) is due to the same factor that leads any hearer to enrich the content of a conjoined utterance—the assumption that it expresses a conjoined proposition consistent with the principle of relevance.” (Blakemore 1988:193)

⁴⁰ This is a departure from Blakemore (1988) where she argues that *so* constrains the implicit (inferential) level of the utterance interpretation. Carston (1993:47) argues that *so* can constrain either the implicit (inferential) or the explicit (representational) side of the utterance interpretation.

slightly different. It instructs the hearer to find a cognitive inferential relation between two propositions as ‘premise’ and ‘conclusion’ (Pro1= premise & Pro2 = conclusion). By contrast, this procedure encoded by the inferential *fa* constrains the implicit side of the utterance interpretation because it does not contribute to the truth-conditional content of the utterance in which *fa* occurs.

4.4. Conclusion

This chapter has argued, contrary to what Al-Khalil (2005) claims, that DMs are used in both standard and non-standard forms of Arabic as a matter of the diglossic situation. We have seen that DMs such as *lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin*, *bal* and *fa* are only used in SA, while other DMs such as *bass*, *la-heik*, *la-ha-sabab*, *ma'nāt-o* and *bi-ittālī* are only used in SYA as we will see in the next chapter.

The most important claim in this chapter is that CA is not the only framework for studying DMs in SA and SYA. The relevance-theoretic procedural account proposed by Blakemore (1987, 2002) is an ideal and more appropriate account to analyse DMs in both SA and SYA.

Building on the data given from SA, this chapter has argued that the DMs *lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin* and *bal* all correspond to *but* in English, which illustrates that *but* encodes a general procedure the implementation of which leads to the recovery of four different interpretations. It has been also argued that *fa* (in all its uses) encodes procedural meaning which controls either the explicit or the implicit side of the interpretation of the utterance in which it occurs

CHAPTER 5

5. Procedural Expressions in Syrian Arabic

5.1. Introduction

Discourse markers in SYA have been little studied in the literature. To my knowledge, there is one single PhD (Al-Khalil 2005) on the use of DMs in SYA. The study was conducted within the CA framework. Al-Khalil (2005:54) claims that none of the approaches (e.g. coherence and relevance approaches) used for studying DMs in the last 20 years are appropriate to the study of DMs in SYA:

These studies mentioned above partially focussed on the relationship between the markers and the surrounding context but what is more important here is to pay more attention to stretches of discourse in order to be able to grasp the exact mechanism of how speakers use discourse markers to signal an activity and how that activity corresponds to the activities preceding and following it. It is crucial, therefore, to use a framework which allows the detailed analysis of turns at talk, and which has the ability to show us how conversants do activities with words.

(Al-Khalil 2005:54)

Al-Khalil's main purpose is to show how DMs used in SYA affect the relationship between the preceding and the following turn constructional unit (TCU). So, it is crucial for him to study at what point of conversation DMs are

placed and how their activities depend on the placement. For example, if the DM *ṭayyeb* is used TCU-initially then it is a request for explanation (*ṭayyeb*, what do you mean by that?) and if it is used TCU-finally then it is a request for action (be patient, *ṭayyeb!*).

Al-Khalil's claim that CA is the only framework for studying DMs in SYA is controversial. It can account for some (but not all) DMs used in SYA. For instance, it cannot account for DMs such as *bass*, *la-heik*, *la-ha-sabab*, *ma'nāt-o* and *bi-ittālī* which cannot occur TCU-finally in CA terms. This chapter offers an alternative framework for studying DMs in SYA, namely the relevance-theoretic procedural analysis developed by Blakemore (1987, 2002). Unlike CA, the new framework is not concerned with the point of conversation at which a certain DM is used but rather the role played by the DM in determining what is communicated by the utterance. It is generally known that the main concern of CA is turn-taking and how DMs are used by speakers to organise conversation. In other words, the role of DMs in this theoretical framework is organisational. However, for RT, it is not necessary to consider turn-taking in order to understand and interpret discourse. What matters in RT are the contextual effects carried by discourse units and not how these discourse units are organised or how turns in a conversation are distributed between participants. Building on that, the role of DMs in RT is to constrain the choice of contextual effects which eventually contributes to the understanding and interpretation of discourse. Moreover, in restricting itself to turn-taking, CA only takes account of issues that arise in one kind of discourse, namely conversations (i.e. discourses in which several speakers make alternating

b. al-walad	'ara	al-dars	(SYA)
S	V	O	
the boy	read+Pas	the lesson	

“The boy read the lesson.”

The difference also involves phonology and lexis. On the phonological level, many words which might be regarded as the same word in SA and SYA are pronounced differently in the two. Consider some examples:

(2)	SA	SYA	
	[waraqa]	[wara'a]	(a paper)
	[ʔtnān]	[tnein]	(two)
	[dahab]	[dahab]	(gold)
	[danb]	[zanb]	(sin)

On the lexical level, a large body of vocabulary is used in SYA but not in SA.

Here are some examples:

(3)	SA	SYA	
	dahaba	maša	(to go)
	sayyida	sitt	(lady)
	zalameh	rağul	(man)
	ħirmeh	'imra'a	(woman)

As we have seen in chapter 4, SYA is a Levantine variety of Arabic, spoken in Syria. This variety has three dialectal zones: Central Syrian which is spoken in Damascus, Homs and Hama, Northern Syrian, spoken in Aleppo and Idleb and Eastern Syrian, spoken in Al-Hasakah, Al-Raqqah and Deir Al-Zor. There are no

significant differences between the Central and Northern dialects of Syrian Arabic; they are similar in many aspects. However, the Eastern dialect is crucially different. It is much closer to Iraqi Arabic than to Syrian Arabic. As far as the study of DMs is concerned, the concentration will be on one dialectal variety of SYA, namely Central Syrian Arabic and more specifically the one spoken in Damascus and the surrounding areas. It is the dialect that will be referred to in this thesis as SYA.

In section 4.2.3, I have discussed the influence of diglossic situation in Arabic on the use of DMs. It has been claimed that certain DMs are used in one form but not in the other. In section 4.3, I presented a set of DMs whose use is limited to SA. This set includes *lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin*, *bal* and *fa*. In this chapter, I present another set of DMs which are only used in SYA. These are *bass*, *la-heik*, *la-ha-sabab*, *ma'nāto* and *bi-ittālī*. Let us start with *bass*.

5.3. The case of 'bass'

Bass is a DM which is only used in SYA (not in SA). It is equivalent to *but* in English in the sense that it encodes a general procedure that constrains the inferential phase of the interpretation of the utterance in which it occurs. As with *but*, the general procedure encoded by *bass* is implemented in different ways to derive different interpretations: 'denial', 'contrast', 'correction' and 'cancellation'. It will be argued that the different implementations of the general procedure encoded by *bass* results in recovering meanings that correspond to the meanings of the four DMs used in SA, namely *lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin* and *bal*.

The general procedure encoded by *bass* could be treated as an abstract instruction that leads the hearer/reader to derive further contextual meanings. This is compatible with Borderia's (2008:1419) monosemy analysis of procedural elements. Borderia argues that discourse connectives with procedural meanings are not polysemic (ambiguous) but rather monosemic (sense-general). According to this analysis, a procedural element has one basic meaning which undergoes contextual modulation resulting in different (but related) contextual meanings. As far as *bass* is concerned, it would be argued that *bass* encodes a general procedure (an abstract instruction) that leads the hearer/reader to derive different meanings in different contexts. The general procedure encoded by *bass* could be put as follows:

- (4) Treat the proposition communicated in the *bass*-clause as a 'contrast' of an assumption communicated in the preceding clause.

The procedural meaning of 'contrast' encoded by *bass* could be considered a general umbrella under which further sub-meanings ('denial', 'correction' and 'cancellation') come. These sub-meanings are related in the sense that they can all be analysed in terms of 'contrast'. What I seek to point out here is that 'contrast' is a general term that can take the more specific forms of 'denial', 'correction' and 'cancellation' in appropriate contexts, as we will see in the discussion of the different implementations of the general procedure encoded by *bass*. The relation between the general procedure encoded by *bass* and its different implementations is given in the figure below:




Figure 10: *Bass*: general procedure and different implementations

On the polysemy side, Silva (2006) gives a polysemic analysis of the discourse marker, *pronto* in spoken Portuguese. He argues that *pronto* is a polysemic linguistic expression which has different meanings and functions in discourse. According to Silva (2006:2188), *pronto* can be used in spoken Portuguese to indicate ‘concluding’, ‘agreeing’, ‘explaining’, ‘imposing’ and ‘summarising’.

As far as this monosemy/polysemy debate in discourse markers research is concerned, I claim that discourse markers in Standard and Syrian Arabic used in this thesis, especially *fa* and *bass* are best analysed in monosemic terms. As we have seen, *fa* in Standard Arabic has one general meaning (a single procedural instruction) that can be implemented differently in different contexts, thereby yielding different understandings of the use of those expressions. But these different understandings are not different meanings of the expressions themselves (i.e. those expressions are not ambiguous). More generally my claim is consistent with the fact that, given its focus on context and use, pragmatic theory is able to

explain how an expression (more strictly, the use of an expression) can be understood in more than one way without being ambiguous. The same goes for *bass* which encodes a general meaning of *contrast*, but this general meaning is understood in different ways as we will see in the next section. Before moving to that, I provide a very short syntactic description of the discourse markers *bass*.

5.3.1. Syntactic analysis

The linguistic expressions Blakemore (1987,2002) analyses as semantic constraints on relevance vary syntactically from coordinating conjunctions such as *but*, to subordinating conjunctions such as *although* to adverbs such as *so* and *therefore*. No matter what the syntactic identity of such expressions is, they have been treated (by Blakemore) as DMs that encode procedural encoding.

Most of the DMs used in SA and SYA belong to the three categories given by Blakemore. As far as *bass* is concerned, it is syntactically classified as a coordinating conjunction⁴¹. Consider the following examples:

- (5) 'š-šms řāl'a **bass** 'ğ-ğaw barid
 the sun shining **but** the weather cold

“The sun is shining **but** the weather is cold.”

- (6) 'umar bi-yiřrab řāi **bass** zaid bi-fađđel 'ařir
 Omar drinks tea **but** Zaid prefers juice

“Omar drinks tea **but** Zaid prefers juice.”

⁴¹ *Bass* can also have utterance-initial uses as in (15) where the *bass*-clause is uttered by a different speaker and in (21) and (22) where *bass* encodes a concept.

As can be noticed, *bass* in the above two sentences is used as a coordinating conjunction. It links the two clauses: ‘*’š-šms ṭāl’a*’ and ‘*’ğ-ğaw barid*’ in (5); and the two clauses: ‘*drinks tea*’ and ‘*prefers juices*’ in (6).

What distinguishes *bass* as a coordinating conjunction is that it cannot be pre-posed to initial position in the sentence. Unlike the subordinating conjunction in (7), which can occur in both medial and initial position in the sentence, *bass* in (8) can only be used in medial position:

- (7) a. *ba’* *bet-o* **la-’inn-o** *fallas*
 sold-he house-his **because-he** got bankrupt
 “He sold his house **because** he got bankrupt.”

- b. **la-’inn-o** *fallas* *ba’* *bet-o*
 because-he got bankrupt sold-he house-his
 “**Because** he got bankrupt, he sold his house.”

- (8) ***bass** *’ğ-ğaw* *barid* *’š-šms* *ṭāl’a*
 ***but** the weather cold the sun shining
 *“**But** the weather is cold, the sun is shining.”

As a coordinating conjunction, *bass* cannot co-occur with other coordinating conjunctions in the same sentence:

- (9) a. *kan* *ḥarāmī* **bass** *’albo* *ṭayyeb*
 was-he thief **but** his heart good
 “He was thief **but** good-hearted”

- b. *kan ḥarāmī w **bass** 'albo ṭayyeb
 *was+he thief **and but** his heart good
 “*He was thief **and but** good-hearted”

As can be noticed, (9a) is ungrammatical; *bass* and *w*⁴² cannot occur in the same sentence because they are both coordinating conjunctions.

5.3.2. ‘Bass’ as encoding a procedure

Due to the diglossic situation in Arabic, the four DMs referred to in section 4.3.1, i.e. *lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin* and *bal* are not used in SYA. Instead, there is *bass*—a single DM, the different implementations of its general procedure result in recovering meanings equivalent to those carried by these four DMs, ‘denial’, ‘contrast’, ‘correction’ and ‘cancellation’. This section is devoted to discuss how this procedure is implemented to reach these different meanings.

5.3.2.1. ‘Bass’ and contrast

It has been argued in section 5.3 that ‘contrast’ is the general procedural meaning encoded by the DM *bass* in SYA. In most cases, *bass* is used in its basic meaning to indicate a ‘contrast’ between two states of affairs. In this sense, the meaning encoded by *bass* corresponds to the meaning carried by the DM *bainama* used in SA. Consider the following example:

- (10) mona profesora bi-ḡami’t al-qāhira **bass** zoḡ-a ṣāne‘ aḥdiyeh
 Mona professor at university Cairo **but** husband-her maker shoes

⁴² *Wa* in SA is used as *w* in SYA.

“Mona is a professor at Cairo University **but** her husband is a shoemaker.”

Syntactically speaking, *bass* in the above sentence is a coordinating conjunction that links two clauses ‘mona profesora bi-ğami‘t al-qāhira’ and ‘zoğ-a şāne‘ahdiyeh’. In this sense, *bass* has the truth functional characteristic of *and* here. However, *bass* controls the relationship between the two clauses. The use of *bass* in (10) plays a crucial role in the process of the utterance interpretation. It guides the hearer to interpret the proposition in the *bass*-clause as a contrast to the explicature communicated in the first clause. In other words, the procedural meaning encoded by *bass* would show the hearer/reader that *bass*-clause is relevant as a contrast of the proposition given in the preceding clause.

The procedural meaning encoded by *bass* does not contribute to the explicit truth-conditional content of (10). The utterance is true if and only if the two propositions ‘Mona is a professor at Cairo University’ and ‘her husband is a shoemaker’ are true. So, on the explicit, truth-conditional level, (10) would be equivalent to (11):

(11) mona profesora bi-ğami‘t al-qāhira **w** zoğ-a şāne‘ ahdiyeh
 Mona professor at university Cairo **and** husband-her maker shoes
 “Mona is a professor at Cairo University **and** her husband is a shoemaker.”

The procedural encoding of *bass*, rather contributes to the implicit side of the utterance interpretation. It leads to the implicature that there is a sense of contrast between the two propositions. This sense would not be clear without the use of lexical indicator such as *bass*.

5.3.2.2. ‘Bass’ and denial

‘Denial of expectation’ is one of the meanings recovered by implementing the general procedure encoded by *bass* in SYA. In this sense, this implementation results in recovering a meaning that corresponds to the meaning carried by *lakinna* in SA. Like *lakinna*, *bass* controls the implicit side of the utterance interpretation. It indicates that the speaker has reasons to think that the optimally relevant interpretation yields a proposition which is inconsistent with the assumption held by the speaker. This implementation of the general procedure encoded by *bass* could be put as follows:

(12) *Implementation 1:*

The proposition communicated in the *bass*-clause denies and replaces an assumption communicated in the preceding clause.

Consider the following example:

- (13) hāled mūsiqī **bass** mano sam‘an b-mozārt
 Khaled musician **but** not hearing about Mozart
 “Khaled is a musician **but** he has not heard of Mozart”

The implication communicated by the utterance of (13) is that ‘Khaled should have heard of Mozart because he is a musician’. This implication is derived by pairing the old contextual information ‘any musician should have heard of Mozart’ and the given contextual information ‘Khaled is a musician’:

- (14) a. *Contextual information*: Any musician should have heard of Mozart.
 b. *Newly presented information*: Khaled is a musician.
 c. *Conclusion*: Khaled should have heard of Mozart.

On the basis of the contextual information in (14a) and the newly presented information given in (14b), the implication in (14c) is denied by the proposition communicated in the *bass*-clause ‘mano sam‘an b-mozārt’.

5.3.2.3. ‘Bass’ and correction

The second implementation of the general procedure encoded by *bass*, in SYA, guides the hearer to derive the meaning of ‘correction’ which is carried by *bal* in SA. Consider the following example:

- (15) Ahmad: šlon kan faḥṣ ’in-naḥū mbāriḥ?
 How was exam syntax yesterday?

Khaled: **bass** ’ana ma kan ’indī faḥṣ mbāriḥ
but I not was have exam yesterday

“Ahmad: How was your syntax exam yesterday?”

“Khaled: **But** I did not have an exam yesterday.”

In the above example, Ahmad is asking his friend Khaled about his syntax exam, thinking that he did it yesterday. Khaled’s reply, which is started by using *bass*, shows that Ahmad’s assumption is not correct. This implementation can be put as follows:

(16) *Implementation 2:*

The proposition communicated in the *bass*-clause corrects and replaces an assumption communicated in the preceding clause.

Like *bal* in SA, *bass* in SYA works as a correction marker which is used by the speaker to correct a previous assumption in discourse. The procedure encoded by *bass* in (16) helps the hearer/reader interpret Khaled's reply as a correction and replacement of the assumption communicated by Ahmad's question. The other three DMs in SA, *lakinna*, *bainama* and *lakin* cannot be used here because they do not carry the meaning of correction:

(17) ***lakinna** I did not have an exam yesterday.

***Bainama** I did not have an exam yesterday.

***Lakin** I did not have an exam yesterday.

Unlike the first implementation of the general procedure encoded by *bass*, this implementation does not involve a denial-of-expectation meaning. Khaled is not denying the assumption communicated by Ahmad's question, but rather correcting it.

Similar to the meaning encoded by *bass* in (10) and (13), the meaning encoded by *bass* in (15) does not contribute to explicit side of the utterance interpretation but rather to the implicit side. The notion of correction is inferentially worked out by implementing the procedure encoded by *bass*. Apart from the lexical meaning of *bass*, nothing in what is said tells us that Khaled's reply is a correction of Ahmad's assumption.

5.3.2.4. 'Bass' and cancellation

Bass in SYA, can be used in an initial position in discourse in a similar way to *lakin* in SA. Like *lakin*, *bass* in this use introduces a clause which communicates a proposition that cancels and replaces another proposition in the previous discourse. This leads us to the third implementation of the general procedure encoded by *bass*:

(18) *Implementation 3:*

The proposition communicated in the *bass*-clause cancels and replaces an assumption communicated in the preceding clause.

Consider the following example:

- (19) a. aḥmad šāb kwayyes kl yom bi-rūḥ ‘ala šiglo
 Ahmad chap nice every day go on his work
- ’is-sā’a tmāneh ’iṣ-ṣibiḥ w bir ḡa’ is-sā’a tlāteh
 o’clock eight morning and come back o’clock three
- il-masā kl rif’āt-o bi-ḥibb-o w bi-ḥtirmū
 o’clock all his colleagues loves him and respect him
- mudīro biš-šiḡl ṣaraflo mukafa’a 3000 lera sūrī
 his manger at work gave a reward 3000 pound Syrian
- la-’inno kān mabṣūt minn-o ktīr kl hamm-o
 because was happy from him a lot all his care
- yihdom waṭano w ykūn ‘nṣor fa‘al fī-h il-ḥa’ī’a

	serve	his home	and	be	member	effective	in it	in fact
	aḥmad	namoḍağ	liš-šab	is-souri	il-muḥliṣ			
	Ahmad	example	chap	Syrian	sincere			
b. bass	aḥmad	halla'	tarak	balado	w	safar	lal-ḥalīğ	
but	Ahmad	now left	his country	and	travelled	to the Gulf		
	b-'id	'amal	il-ḥa'ī'a	rātbo	b-sūrya	ktīr	'alīl	
	contract	job	in fact	his wage	in Syria	very	low	
	iz-zalameh	baddo	yizzawağ	w	yiftaḥ	beit	w	yištiri
	the man	needs	marry	and	open	house	and	buy
	sayyarah	w	ir-rātteb	il-lī	bi-yaḥd-o	bi-sūrya	lāzem	
	car	and	the salary	which	takes it	in Syria	must	
	ywaffir	rātbo	tlātīn	sineh	la-yi'dir	ye'mil	heik	
	save	his salary	thirty	years	to be able	do	this	

- a. Ahmad is a good guy. He goes to work everyday at 8:00 am and comes back at 3:00 pm. All his colleagues love and respect him. His manager paid him an extra 3000 Syrian Pounds as a reward because he is happy about his performance at work. All what Ahmad cares about is to be good and active member in the society. Ahmad is really an example for the Syrian sincere guy.
- b. **But** Ahmad has left the country now and headed to the Gulf region after he got a job contract. In fact, his salary in Syria was very low. He wants to get married, buy a house and have children. If he wants to do so in Syria, he has to save all his salaries for 30 years.

As can be noticed, *bass* in (19b) introduces a new paragraph. The proposition(s) in this paragraph relates to other proposition(s) in the previous discourse. Unlike the first and the second implementations of the general procedure encoded by *bass*, this implementation does not involve a ‘denial of expectation’ or ‘correction’. The proposition(s) in (19b) does not deny expectation or correct proposition(s) communicated in (19a) but rather cancels the contextual implications of this proposition(s) because the information provided by the speaker in this proposition(s) is either insufficient or not what is expected by the hearer.

It has been argued that *bass* encodes a general procedural meaning of ‘contrast’ which can be implemented in different ways to derive further sub-meanings: ‘denial’, ‘correction’ and ‘cancellation’. If this argument is true, then these three further sub-meanings should have something in common because they are derived from the same procedure. It can be noticed that these three sub-meanings can be analysed in ‘contrast’ terms. For example, it could be argued that the proposition communicated in the *bass* in (13) contrast with assumption communicated in the preceding clause. The correction meaning derived in (15) can also be analysed as a contrast between the proposition communicated in the *bass*-clause and the one in the preceding clause. The same goes for the cancellation meaning derived in (19).

5.4. Other uses of ‘bass’

What it is interesting about *bass* is that it can encode conceptual meaning as well. There are three extra meanings encoded by *bass* in SYA, which are not encoded

by any of the four equivalent DMs in SA, namely *lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin* or *bal*. In addition to the procedural meaning of *bass* discussed in section 5.3, *bass* can encode the meaning of ‘only’ and ‘enough’ (or ‘stop it’). Consider the following examples:

(20) ‘ind-o tlat ’tfāl **bass**
 has-he three children **only**
 “He has three children **only**.”

(21) **bass** šabāb il-wa’it hilis, ’da samaḥto ḥiṭṭo ’lāmkon.
enough guys time over if you please put pens-your
 “**Enough** guys! Time is over. Please put your pens down!”

(22) **bass** ya walad naza‘-t mubāyl-ī
Stop it! oh boy broke-you my mobile
 “**Stop it** boy! You broke my mobile phone.”

Bass in (20), (21) and (22) does not encode procedural meaning. It does not contribute to the inferential implicit part of the interpretation of these utterances as it does in (10), (13), (15) and (19). In (20), (21) and (22), it has a conceptual encoding; it carries the meaning of ‘only’, ‘enough’ and ‘stop it’. This conceptual meaning contributes to the truth-conditional content of the utterance in which *bass* occurs. In this respect, *bass* can stand alone as an utterance.

In this respect, *bass* in SYA is different from the four equivalent DMs in SA in the sense that the four DMs are purely procedural while *bass* in SYA is

conceptuo-procedural linguistic expression. None of the four DMs in SA can encode the conceptual meaning encoded by *bass*:

- (23) a. *He has three children **lakinna** (**bainama**, **lakin** or **bal**).
 b. ***lakinna** (**bainama**, **lakin** or **bal**) guys! Time is over. Please put your pens down!
 c. ***lakinna** (**bainama**, **lakin** or **bal**) boy! You broke my mobile phone.

To sum up, the meaning encoded by *bass* in SYA is conceptuo-procedural. On the procedural level, *bass* encodes a general procedure that can be implemented to derive different meanings—equivalent to the meanings encoded by the four DMs in SA. On the conceptual level, unlike the four DMs in SA, *bass* in SYA has conceptual meaning which contributes to the truth-conditional propositional content of the utterance in which it occurs.

5.5. ‘la-heik’, ‘la-ha-sabab’, ‘ma’nāt-o’ and ‘bi-ittālī’

These are four DMs used in SYA. The first two markers encode ‘causality’ between the two elements they connect, while the second two encode ‘logical (inferential) consequence’ between two propositions in discourse, as we will see in the course of this section. It could be argued that these four DMs together are equivalent to *fa* in SA, in the sense *fa* encodes both ‘causal’ and ‘logical (inferential) consequence’ between two propositions. The claim is that, like *fa*, these four DMs encode procedural meaning that constrains the interpretation of the utterances in which they occur.

The argument will be that the procedural meaning encoded by the first two markers *la-heik* and *la-ha-sabab* is slightly different from the procedural meaning encoded by second two markers *ma‘nat-o* and *bi-ittālī*. With the first two markers, the procedure encoded leads the hearer to derive the concept of ‘causality’ which contributes to the explicit propositional truth-conditional content of the utterance. With the second two markers, the procedure encoded constrains the choice of contextual effects to reach the intended interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance. Unlike the first type of procedural meaning, this type does not contribute to the explicit propositional truth-conditional content of the utterance but rather to the implicit side as will be demonstrated in section 5.5.2 and 5.5.3.

The claim that DMs have different types of procedural meaning is acknowledged by Blakemore (2002:148). She maintains that the DM *well* does not encode a procedure in the same way as *but* and *so* do. According to Blakemore (2002:143), the procedure encoded by *well* encourages the hearer to renegotiate the context (look for contextual assumptions he has not looked for). Consider her example (108) used here as (24):

- (24) A: Anna’s much taller than Verity.
 B: **Well**, she is two years older.

Blakemore argues that the ‘renegotiation’ of context is a consequence of the hearer recognition of the speaker aiming at optimal relevance. The use of *well* encourages the hearer to recognize a contextual assumption the speaker believes the hearer should recognize as relevant but he did not.

It is noticed that the procedure encoded by *well* in the above example differs from that encoded by *but* and *so* in the sense that it does not put constraints on the cognitive effects of ‘contextual implication’ or ‘contradiction and elimination’. Given that, Blakemore (2002:122) acknowledges that her account of semantic constraints on relevance should be broadened to incorporate constraints on context as well as on cognitive effects.

I believe that Blakemore’s account of procedural meaning should be broadened to account for the non-inferential uses of some conceptually-empty linguistic expression such as *so*. *So* has been extensively analysed and quoted in the literature as encoding a procedural meaning of contextual implication. It guides the hearer to infer that the proposition communicated in the following clause is a ‘conclusion’ to the proposition in the preceding clause. However, the other use of *so* (causal *so*) is non-inferential. It does not guide the hearer to follow any inferential routes in deriving the cognitive relations between the two clauses. Causal relations as such are non-inferential. Consider the following example to show the subtle difference between the two procedures encoded by *so*:

- (25) a. He fell off his bike. **So** he broke his leg.
 b. He broke his leg. **So** he fell off his bike.

So is procedural in both utterances (25a) and (25b). However, no one can deny there is a difference in meaning between the two utterances. In the first utterance, *so* encodes a non-inferential procedure which helps the hearer to reach the ‘concept of causality’ communicated in the utterance. There is nothing inferential

here because the proposition communicated in the second clause is a natural ‘result’ of the ‘cause’ given the first clause. By contrast, the procedure encoded by *so* in the second utterance is inferential. There is no natural cause-effect relationship between the two propositions communicated in the first and second clause. The procedure encoded by *so* guides the hearer to establish the cognitive relationship between the two propositions. As far as the four DMs (*la-heik*, *la-ha-sabab*, *ma‘nāt-o* and *bi-ittālī*) used in SYA are concerned, it would be claimed that the procedure encoded by the first two is non-inferential while the procedure encoded by the second two is inferential:

- (26) a. He fell off his bike. **La-heik (la-ha-sabab)** he broke his leg.
 b. *He fell off his bike. **Ma‘nāt-o (bi-ittālī)** he broke his leg.
- (27) a. He broke his leg. **Ma‘nāt-o (bi-ittālī)** he fell off his bike.
 b. *He broke his leg. **La-heik (la-ha-sabab)** he fell off his bike.

In Blakemore’s account of procedural meaning, a sort of parallelism was assumed between ‘procedural’ on the one hand and ‘inferential’ on the other. The procedural meaning encoded by the linguistic expressions she uses puts constraints on the inferential phase of the utterance interpretation. However this parallelism does not hold in all cases. In the case of causal *so*, the procedure does not constrain the inferential relation between two propositions but rather directs the hearer to derive the concept of causality; what is represented by the proposition communicated in the second clause is a direct result to the cause represented by the first clause. This can account for the claim that the procedure

of *la-heik* and *la-ha-sabab* on the one hand and the procedure of *ma'nāt-o* and *bi-ittālī* are not encoded in the same way. The latter is *inferential* while the former is *non-inferential*.

As is the norm in this thesis, I provide a brief syntactic description of these linguistic expressions before moving to discuss their procedural meaning.

5.5.1. Syntactic analysis

These four DMs have one thing in common, i.e. they are all compound expressions. The first DM *la-heik* consists of two morphemes: *la*⁴³ which is a preposition used in SYA equivalent to *for* or *to* in English and *heik* which is a complementiser (translated as *that* in English). The second DM *la-ha-sabab* consists of three morphemes: the preposition *la* (*for* or *to*), the demonstrative pronoun *ha*⁴⁴ (*this*) and the word *sabab* (*reason*). The third DM *ma'nāt-o* consists of two morphemes *ma'nat* (*means*) and the pronoun *o* (*it*). The fourth DM *bi-ittālī* consists of the preposition *bi* (*by*) and the word *ittālī* (*consequence*). Given that, the literal translation of these four DMs is the following:

- (28) a. **la-heik** = for that
 b. **la-ha-sabab** = for this reason

⁴³ This corresponds to *li* in SA:

i. 'a'ṭa 'umar al-qalma **li**-zaid
 gave Omar the pen **to**-Zaid
 "Omar gave the pen **to** Zaid."

ii. ṣaraft-u kull nuqud-ī **li**-'aḡli-ka
 spent-I all money-my **for**-sake-your
 "I spent all my money **for** your sake."

⁴⁴ This corresponds to *haḍa* in SA.

c. **ma'nāt-o** = it means

d. **bi-ittālī** = by consequence

We will see that each of these four DMs, regardless of its compound nature, works syntactically and semantically as one unit, equivalent to *fa* in SA and *so* in English. On the semantic level, it will be argued that each one of these markers puts constraints on the inferential part of the utterance interpretation; on the syntactic level, these expressions will be treated as adverbs.

As far as the syntactic status of these DMs is concerned, they cannot be used as sub-ordinating conjunctions. Unlike sub-ordinating conjunctions, these expressions cannot be preposed with their clauses to the initial position in the sentence they are used in. Consider the following examples:

(29) a. wa'a' il-fāres min ḥṣān-o **la-heik** 'inkasar kāḥl-o
 fell the knight off horse-his **so** broke ankle-his
 “The knight fell off his horse. **So**, he broke his ankle.”

b. wa'a' il-fāres min ḥṣān-o **la-ha-sabab** 'inkasar kāḥl-o
 fell the knight off horse-his **so** broker ankle-his
 “The knight fell of his horse. **So**, he broke his ankle.”

(30) a. 'umar musiqi **ma'nāt-o** huwe sam'ān b-mozārt
 Omar musician **so** he hearing by-Mozart
 “Omar is a musician. **So**, he has heard of Mozart.”

b. 'umar musiqi **bi-ittālī** huwe sam'ān b-mozārt
 Omar musician **so** he hearing by-Mozart
 “Omar is a musician. **So**, he has heard of Mozart.”

The clauses introduced by these four DMs cannot be preposed to initial position as can be noticed below:

- (31) a. ***La-heik** he broke his ankle, the knight fell off his horse.
 b. ***La-ha-sabab** he broke his ankle, the knight fell off his horse.
 c. ***Ma'nāt-o** Omar is a musician, he has heard of Mozart.
 d. ***Bi-ittālī** Omar is a musician, he has heard of Mozart.

These four DMs are not coordinating conjunctions either; they can be used side by side with another coordinating conjunction such as *w*. Consider the following examples for illustration:

- (32) a. The knight fell off his horse **w la-heik** he broke his ankle.
 b. The knight fell off his horse **w la-ha-sabab** he broke his ankle.
 c. Omar is a musician **w bi-ittālī** he has heard of Mozart.
 d. Omar is a musician **w ma'nāt-o** he has heard of Mozart.

As can be noticed, these DMs are neither sub-ordinating conjunctions nor coordinating conjunctions. The best category describing such expressions is 'adverbs'. Such expressions can be used with other adverbs (such as *immediately* and *possibly*) in the same sentence:

- (33) a. The knight fell off his horse. **La-heik**, *immediately*, he broke his ankle.
 b. The knight fell off his horse. **La-ha-sabab**, *immediately*, he broke his ankle.
 c. Omar is a musician. **Bi-ittālī**, *possibly*, he has heard of Mozart.
 d. Omar is a musician. **Ma'nāt-o**, *possibly*, he has heard of Mozart.

5.5.2. '*la-heik*' and '*la-ha-sabab*' as procedures

As we have seen in the previous chapter 'causality' and 'logical consequence' are two meanings (among other meanings) derived by the implementation of the general procedure encoded by *fa* in SA. In this respect, I claimed that *fa* is equivalent to *so* in English, which is known to encode these two types of meaning. As far as these four DMs used in SYA are concerned, it will be argued that they encode procedural meaning in the same way *so* and *fa* do. *La-heik* and *la-ha-sabab* encode a procedural meaning which leads the hearer to recover the concept of 'causality' in the utterance in which these two markers are used. In this sense, the contribution made by these two markers affects the truth-conditional (propositional) content of the utterance and thus, they will be analysed as putting constraints on the explicit side of the utterance interpretation (explicature) in a similar way to what we have in the case of 'causal *so*'. The other two markers *ma'nāt-o* and *bi-ittālī* encode a procedural meaning which does not affect the truth-conditional content of the utterance in which they occur, but rather constrains the inferential implicit side of the utterance interpretation (implicature). This section discusses the procedural meaning encoded by *la-heik* and *la-ha-sabab* and the next section is devoted to investigate the procedural meaning encoded by the other two DMs.

The procedure encoded by the two DMs *la-heik* and *la-ha-sabab* instructs the hearer to recover the concept of 'causality', which is not conceptually encoded by the DMs *la-heik* or *la-ha-sabab* but rather derived by applying the procedure encoded by these two markers:

- (34) Treat the proposition communicated by the *la-heik* (*la-ha-sabab*)-clause as an ‘effect’ to the ‘cause’ represented by the first clause.

Consider the following example:

- (35) a. The knight fell off his horse. **La-heik**, he broke his ankle.
 b. The knight fell off his horse. **La-ha-sabab**, he broke his ankle.

The procedure encoded by *la-heik* and *la-ha-sabab* in (35a) and (35b) instructs the hearer to interpret the proposition in the second clause as an effect to the cause represented in the first clause. The procedure in this case is non-inferential; it contributes to the truth-conditional content of the utterance and thus constrains the explicit side of the interpretation (explicature). Utterances containing such DMs can come under the scope of logical operators such as ‘if then’:

- (36) a. If the knight fell off his horse and **la-heik** he hurt his ankle, then he should be taken to hospital.
 b. If the knight fell of his horse and **la-ha-sabab** hurt his ankle, then he should be taken to hospital.

5.5.3. *ma'nāt-o* and *bi-ittālī* as procedures

The procedure encoded by *ma'nāt-o* and *bi-ittālī* is slightly different from that encoded by *la-heik* and *la-ha-sabab*. This procedure instructs the hearer to find the cognitive inferential relation between the two propositions it connects. In other words, it guides the hearer to see how the proposition communicated by the clause

these two markers introduce achieves relevance towards the proposition communicated in the first clause. In this sense, the procedure is *inferential*:

- (37) a. Omar is a musician. **Bi-ittālī**, he has heard of Mozart.
 b. Omar is a musician. **Ma'nāt-o**, he has heard of Mozart.

The procedure encoded by *bi-ittālī* and *ma'nāt-o* in (37a) and (37b) instructs the hearer to interpret the proposition in the clause they introduce as a 'conclusion' derived on the basis of the proposition expressed in the first clause and an assumption supplied by the hearer from context:

- (38) a. Omar is a musician. (Pre1: communicated in the first clause)
 b. All musicians must have heard of Mozart. (Pre2: supplied by hearer)
 c. Omar has heard of Mozart. (Con: derived from Pre1 and Pre2)

By combining these two premises—the proposition given in (38a) and the assumption given in (38b), the hearer will be able to derive the conclusion given in (38c). Thus, the procedure encoded by *ma'nāt-o* and *bi-ittālī* constrains the hearer's choice of contextual information to reach the cognitive effect. The use of these two markers guides the hearer to supply the external assumption in (38b) in order to reach the conclusion and eventually the interpretation which is consistent with the principle of relevance.

There are three main differences between *la-heik* (and *la-ha-sabab*) on the one hand and *ma'nāt-o* (and *bi-ittālī*) on the other hand. The first difference is that unlike *ma'nāt-o*, *la-heik* cannot occur without an immediate linguistic antecedent.

Compare the acceptable use of *ma'nāt-o* in (39a) with the unacceptable use of *la-heik* in (40b):

- (39) a. There is five pounds in my wallet.
b. **Ma'nāt-o**, you did not spend all the money

- (40) a. There is five pounds in my wallet.
b. ***La-heik**, you did not spend all the money

The acceptability of *ma'nāt-o* in (39b) and the unacceptability of *la-heik* in (40b) can be attributed to the fact that *la-heik* is only used to encode the representational (propositional) concept of 'causality', while *ma'nāt-o* encodes inferential consequence. The second difference is that in some situations, the use of *ma'nāt-o* is acceptable, whereas the use of *la-heik* is not. Consider the following example:

- (41) a. Take the first turn on your right hand.
b. **Ma'nāt-o** I should walk for about three minutes.

- (42) a. Take the first turn on your right hand.
b. ***La-heik**, I should walk for about three minutes.

The unacceptability of *la-heik* in (42b) can be attributed to the fact *la-heik* is only used representationally not inferentially. By contrast, *ma'nāt-o* in (41b) is used inferentially in the sense that it confirms (or strengthens) the relevance of proposition expressed in the previous utterance. The third and the last difference between *la-heik* and *ma'nāt-o* is that the latter (but not the former) is used in situations where the hearer is unable to see the significance of what the speaker says. In this use, *ma'nāt-o* communicates the meaning of 'so?' or 'so what?':

- (43) S1: Omar will not be able to attend the party tonight.
S2: **Ma'nāt-o?**
- (44) S1: Omar will not be able to attend the party tonight
S2: ***la-heik?**

5.5.4. Some differences between 'fa' and these markers

Although the meanings encoded by the four DMs *la-heik*, *la-ha-sabab*, *ma'nāt-o* and *bi-ittālī* in SYA can be derived by the implementation of the general procedure encoded by *fa* in SA, there are some morphological, syntactic and semantic differences between *fa* and these four DMs. On the morphological side, we have seen that *fa* is used as a bound morpheme (prefix) attached to the first word in the second conjunct or clause. However, these markers are free morphemes. Consider the following examples repeated here for convenience:

- (45) Ahmad had his lunch **fa**-drank a cup of tea.
- (46) a. The knight fell off his horse. **La-heik**, he broke his ankle.
b. The knight fell off his horse. **La-ha-sabab**, he broke his ankle.
- (47) a. Omar is a musician. **Ma'nāt-o**, he has heard of Mozart.
b. Omar is a musician. **Bi-ittālī**, he has heard of Mozart.

On the syntactic level, we have seen in the last chapter that *fa* is often used as a coordinating conjunction. However, it can be used as an adverb which introduces an independent clause. By contrast, these four DMs cannot be used as

coordinating conjunctions. They are only used as adverbials. Given this, these four DMs cannot be used instead of *fa* in (63) and (65) of chapter four:

- (48) a. *I saw Ahmad **la-heik** Khaled.
 b. *I saw Ahmad **la-ha-sabab** Khaled.
 c. *I saw Ahmad **ma'nāt-o** Khaled.
 d. *I saw Ahmad **bi-ittālī** Khaled.
- (49) a. *Omar **la-heik** Zaid came to the party.
 b. *Omar **la-ha-sabab** Zaid came to the party.
 c. *Omar **ma'nāt-o** Zaid came to the party.
 d. *Omar **bi-ittālī** Zaid came to that party.

On the semantic level, not all the meanings encoded by *fa* are encoded by these four DMs. As it has been argued, *fa* in SA encodes a general procedure that can be implemented by the hearer to derive the meanings of 'sequentiality', 'immediacy', 'non-intervention' and 'causality' as well as the logical consequence encoded by *fa* when it is used as an adverb to introduce an independent clause. These four DMs just encode two of these meanings encoded by *fa* namely 'causality' and 'logical (inferential) consequence' as has been demonstrated in examples (29) and (30) of this chapter. Given that, (99) and (113) of chapter 4 can be used with these four DMs instead of *fa*.

- (50) a. Khaled insulted Mona. **La-heik**, she left the party.
 b. Khaled insulted Mona. **La-ha-sabab**, she left the party.
- (51) a. Omar can score in every game. **Ma'nāt-o**, he is an excellent player.
 b. Omar can score in every game. **Bi-ittālī**, he is an excellent player.

The meanings of ‘sequentiality’ (temporal ordering), ‘immediacy’ and ‘non-intervention’ derived by implementing the general procedure encoded by *fa* in SA, are not encoded by these four DMs. It is unacceptable to have the utterances of (52) (53) and (54) below with these four referred to DMs:

- (52) a. *Ahmad came in **la-heik** sat down on the chair
 b. *Ahmad came in **la-ha-sabab** sat down on the chair
 b. *Ahmad came in **ma‘nāt-o** sat down on the chair
 c. *Ahmad came in **bi-ittālī** sat down on the chair
- (53) a. *She handed me the knife **la-heik** I cut the bread.
 b. *She handed me the knife **la-ha-sabab** I cut the bread.
 c. *She handed me the knife **ma‘nāt-o** I cut the bread.
 d. *She handed me the knife **bi-ittālī** I cut the bread.
- (54) a. *Omar visited Damascus **la-heik** Baghdad.
 b. *Omar visited Damascus **la-ha-sabab** Baghdad.
 c. *Omar visited Damascus **ma‘nāt-o** Baghdad.
 d. *Omar visited Damascus **bi-ittālī** Baghdad.

5.6. Conclusion

Bass in SYA is similar to *but* in the sense that both DMs encode a general procedure that can be implemented to derive different interpretations of the utterance in which it occurs. The implementation of such procedure enables the hearer to derive four different meanings: ‘denial’, ‘contrast’, ‘correction’ and ‘cancellation’. These four different meanings are represented by four different

lexical expressions in SA, while they are not English. The big difference between *bass* and *but* is that *bass* can stand alone as an utterance whereas *but* cannot.

As for the other set of DMs discussed in section 5.5, it has been claimed that the first two markers, *la-heik* and *la-ha-sabab* encode non-inferential procedure (causality) while the second two, *ma'nāt-o* and *bi-ittālī* encode logical inferential consequence.

Conclusion

This thesis was a scrutiny of the use of discourse markers in English and Arabic. The theoretical framework used in this thesis was Sperber and Wilson's (1995) Relevance Theory. Discourse markers in Arabic have been analysed in line with Blakemore's (1987, 2002) account of procedural meaning.

Under the theoretical framework, several related notions have been discussed. Grice's explicit/implicit distinction, developed in terms of explicature/implicature distinction in Relevance Theory, has been investigated in great length in this thesis due to its close relation to (and substantial impact on) the procedural meaning encoded by some discourse markers. Blakemore's (1987) early work on the procedural meaning argued that some discourse markers encode procedural meanings that put constraints on the implicit side of the utterance interpretation. However, subsequent research (Wilson and Sperber 1993) showed that the procedural meaning encoded by some linguistic expressions, such as personal pronouns can constrain the explicit side of the utterance interpretation. This thesis even showed that some linguistic expressions can constrain both the explicit and the implicit side of the utterance interpretation as is the case with *fa* in Standard Arabic.

Grice's notion of conventional implicature was also discussed due to the fact that the whole notion of procedural meaning could be seen as a reaction to (or rather replacement of) this notion.

The conceptual/procedural distinction and its relation to the truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional distinction was discussed in detail. This thesis

argued against the alleged parallelism between these two distinctions. It agreed with Wilson and Sperber's (1993) claim that what is procedural can be truth-conditional and what is conceptual can be non-truth-conditional.

The thesis also discussed other frameworks used for the analysis of discourse markers such as Coherence Theory and Conversation Analysis Theory. It argued that Relevance theory offers a better and more ideal framework for analysing discourse markers than these two theories.

The analysis of Arabic discourse markers in this thesis benefited from Blakemore's (1987, 2002) analysis of discourse markers in English as encoding procedural meanings. According to Blakemore, discourse markers encode procedural meanings that constrain the inferential phase of the interpretation of the utterances in which they occur. The procedure encoded by a discourse marker controls the choice of context under which the utterance, containing it, is relevant. That is why she calls them 'semantic constraints on relevance'.

As far as Arabic is concerned, the discussion dealt with discourse markers used in Standard Arabic as well as Syrian Arabic. The reason is that some discourse markers used in Standard Arabic are not used in Syrian Arabic and vice versa. For example, *lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin* and *bal* are used only in Standard Arabic, while *bass* is used in Syrian Arabic instead. The same goes for *fa* which is used only in Standard Arabic, while *la-heik*, *la-ha-sabab*, *ma'nāt-o* and *bi-ittālī* are used only in Syrian Arabic.

The purpose of discussing discourse markers in both Standard and Syrian Arabic was to reply to AL-Khalil's (2005) claim that discourse markers are only

used in the colloquial form of Arabic. Data in this thesis show that discourse markers can be used both in colloquial and standard forms of Arabic. In this respect, Syrian Arabic was chosen as one representative of the Colloquial Arabic. The choice of these ten discourse markers was due to the fact that they can be compared and contrasted with Blakemore's two famous discourse markers, *but* and *so*. In this concern, *bass*, *lakinna*, *bainama*, *lakin* and *bal* could be considered as counterparts of *but*. And, *fa*, *la-heik*, *la-ha-sabab*, *ma'nāt-o* and *bi-ittālī* are counterparts of *so*.

The major claim in this thesis was that *fa* in Standard Arabic and *bass* in Syrian Arabic encode general procedures that can be implemented to derive different meanings. For example, the general procedure encoded by *bass* can be implemented to derive the meanings of 'denial', 'contrast', 'correction' and 'cancellation'. By the same token, the general procedure encoded by *fa* can be implemented to derive the meanings of 'sequentiality', 'immediacy', 'non-intervention' and 'causality'.

References

- Abdel-Jawad, H. (1987). Cross dialectal variation in Arabic: competing prestigious forms. *Language and Society* **16**, 359-367.
- Abdel-Jawad, H. (1990). Language and women's place with special reference to Arabic. *Language and Science* **11**(3), 305-324.
- Abraham, W. (1979). But. *Studia Linguistica* **33**, 89-119.
- Akatsuka, N. (1986). Conditionals are discourse-bound. In Traugott, E. C., ter Meulen, A., Reilly, J. S. and Ferguson, C.A. (eds.) *On Conditionals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Al-Batal, M. (1994). Connectives in Arabic diglossia: the case of Lebanese Arabic. *Perspectives on Arabic Linguistics* **5**, 91-119.
- Al-Khalil, T. (2005). Discourse markers in Syrian Arabic: a study of *halla'*, *ya'nī*, *ṭayyeb*, and *lakan*. PhD thesis. Department of Language and Linguistics. Essex: Essex University.
- Al-Murādī, Ed. (1324). *Al- Jani Al-Dānī fi Ḥurūf Al-Ma'ānī*. (eds.) Qabawa. F and N. Fadel (1992) Saudi Arabic: Dar Al-Kutub Al-'Ilmiyya.
- Al-Wer, E. (1991). Phonological variation in the speech of women from three urban areas in Jordan. PhD thesis. Department of Language and Linguistics. Essex: Essex University.
- Andersen, G. (1998). The pragmatic marker *like* from a relevance-theoretic perspective. In A. H. Jucker and Y. Ziv (eds.) *Discourse Markers: Descriptions and Theory*. Benjamins, Amsterdam: Netherlands: 147-170.
- Anscombe, C. and O. Ducrot (1977). Deux mais en Français. *Lingua* **43**, 23-40.

- Ariel, M. (1994). Pragmatic operators. *The Encyclopaedia of Language and Linguistics*. Oxford: Pergamon Press 3250-3253.
- Ariel, M (2002). Privileged interactional interpretations. *Journal of Pragmatics* **34.8**, 1003-44.
- Bach, K. (1994). Conversational implicature. *Mind and Language* **9**, 124-162.
- Bach, K. (1999). The myth of conventional implicature. *Linguistics and Philosophy* **22**, 327-366.
- Bach, K. (2000). Quantification, qualification, and context: a reply to Stanley and Szabo. *Mind and Language* **15**, 262-283.
- Bach, K. (2001). You don't say. *Syntheses* 128:15-44.
- Bakir, M. (1986). Sex differences in the approximation to Standard Arabic: a case study. *Anthropological Linguistics* **28** (1), 3-10.
- Bazanella, C. (1990). Phatic connectives as intonational cues in contemporary spoken Italian. *Journal of Linguistics* **14** (4), 629-647.
- Bell, M. (1998). Cancellative discourse markers: a core/periphery approach. *Pragmatics* **8** (4), 387-403.
- Bezuidenhout, A. (1997). Pragmatics, semantic underdetermination and the referential/attributive distinction. *Mind* **106**, 375-409.
- Bezuidenhout, A. (2002). Truth-conditional pragmatics. *Philosophical Perspectives* **16**, 105-134.
- Blakemore, D. (1987). *Semantic Constraints on Relevance*. Oxford, UK; New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.

- Blakemore, D. (1988). *So* as a constraint on relevance. In R. Kempson (ed.) *Mental Representation: The Interface between Language and Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Blakemore, D. (1989). Denial and contrast: a relevance theoretic account of *but*. *Linguistics and Philosophy* **12**, 15-37.
- Blakemore, D. (1992). *Understanding Utterances*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Blakemore, D. (2000). Indicators and procedures: *nevertheless* and *but*. *Journal of Linguistics* **36**, 463-486
- Blakemore, D. (2002). *Relevance and Linguistic Meaning: The Semantics and Pragmatics of Discourse Markers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Blakemore, D. (2005). *And*-parentheticals. *Journal of Pragmatics* **37**, 1165-1181.
- Blakemore, D. (2007a). Constraints, concepts and procedural encoding. In N. Burton-Roberts (ed.) *Advances in Pragmatics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Blakemore, D. (2007b). *Or*-parentheticals, *that is*-parentheticals and the pragmatics of reformulation. *Journal of Linguistics* **43**, 311-339.
- Blanc, H. (1960). Stylistic variation in Classical Arabic: a sample of interdialectal educated conversation. In C. Ferguson (ed.) *Contributions to Arabic Linguistics*. Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Blass, R. (1990). *Relevance Relations in Discourse*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bolinger, D. (1989). *Intonation and its Uses: Melody and Grammar in Discourse*. Stanford University Press: Stanford
- Borderia, S. P. (2008). Do discourse markers exist? On the treatment of discourse markers in Relevance Theory. *Journal of Linguistics* **40**, 1411-1434.

- Burton-Roberts, N. (1993). Apposition. In R. E. Asher and J. M. Y. Simpson (eds.) *Encyclopaedia of Language and Linguistics*. Oxford: Pergamon. **1**, 184-187.
- Burton-Roberts, N. (2005). Robyn Carston on semantics, pragmatics and 'encoding'. *Journal of Linguistics* **41**, 389-407.
- Carston, R. (1991). Implicature, explicature and truth-theoretic semantics. In Davis, S. *Pragmatics: A Reader* (ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press 33-51.
- Carston, R. (1993). Conjunction, explanation and relevance. *Lingua* **90**, 27-48.
- Carston, R. (2002). *Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication*. Oxford, UK; Malden, Mass: Blackwell.
- Cohen, L. J. (1971). Some remarks on Grice's views about the logical particles of natural language. In Bar-Hillel, Y (ed.) *Pragmatics of Natural Language*. Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Cowell, M. (1964). *A Reference Grammar of Syrian Arabic*. Washington: Georgetown University Press.
- Daher, J. (1998). Linguistic variation in Damascus Arabic: a quantitative analysis of men's and women's speech. PhD thesis. New York University.
- Davidson, D. (1967). Truth and meaning. *Syntheses* **17**, 304-323.
- Davidson, D. (1984). *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Erman, B. (1987). Pragmatic expressions in English: a study of *you know*, *you see* and *I mean* in face-to-face conversation. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell.
- Ferguson, C. (1959). Diglossia. *World* **15**, 425-444.

- Fodor, J. (1983). *The Modularity of Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Fodor, J. (1985). Fodor's guide to mental representation. *Mind* **94**, 76-100.
- Fodor, J. (1990). *A Theory of Content and Other Essays*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Fraser, B. (1988). Types of English discourse markers. *Acta Linguistica Hungarica* **38** (1-4), 19-33.
- Fraser, B. (1990). An approach to discourse markers. *Journal of Pragmatics* **14**, 383-395.
- Fraser, B. (1993). Discourse makers across languages. *Pragmatics and Language Learning*. Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press.
- Fraser, B. (1996). Pragmatic markers. *Pragmatics* **6** (2), 167-190
- Fraser, B. (1997). Contrastive discourse markers in English. In A. Jucker and Y. Ziv. *Discourse Markers: Description and Theory* (eds.) Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Fraser, B. (1999). What are discourse markers? *Journal of Pragmatics* **31** (7), 931-952.
- Freeman, A. (1996). Andrew Freeman's Perspectives on Arabic Diglossia. Retrieved 24/09/2007 from: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~andyf/digl_96.htm
- Giora, R. (1985). Towards a theory of coherence. *Poetics* **6** (4), 699-716.
- Giora, R. (1997). Discourse coherence and theory of relevance: stumbling blocks in search of a unified theory. *Journal of Pragmatics* **27**, 17-34.
- Giora, R. (1998). Discourse coherence is an independent notion: a reply to Deirdre Wilson. *Journal of Pragmatics* **29**, 75-86

- Grice, H. P. (1967). Logic and Conversation. Printed in Grice (1989), *Studies in the Way of Words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hall, A. (2004). The meaning of *but*: a relevance theoretic analysis. *UCL Working Papers in Linguistics* **16**, 199-236.
- Halliday, M. A. K. and R. Hasan (1976). *Cohesion in English*. London: Longman.
- Hawkins, A. (1991). On (in)definite articles: implicatures and (un)grammaticality predictions. *Journal of Linguistics* **27**, 405-442.
- Hedley, P. (2005). Pronouns, procedures and Relevance Theory. *Newcastle and Durham Working Papers in Linguistics* **11**, 41-55
- Heritage, J. (1988). Explanations as accounts: a conversational analysis perspective. In C. Antaki (ed.) *Analysing Everyday Explanation: A Casebook of Methods*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Heritage, J. (1989). Current developments in conversation analysis. In D. Roger and P. Bull (eds.) *Conversation: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters Ltd.
- Heritage, J. (1995). Conversation Analysis: methodological aspects. In U. Questhoff (ed.) *Aspects of Oral Communication*. Berlin: Water de Gruyter.
- Holes, H. (1983). Patterns of communal language variation in Bahrain. *Language in Society* **12**(2), 433-57.
- Horn, L. (1989). *A Natural History of Negation*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Hussein, M. (2008). The truth-conditional/non-truth-conditional and conceptual/procedural distinctions revisited. *Newcastle Working Papers in Linguistics* **14**, 61-80.

- Hussein, M. (forthcoming). The discourse marker *but* in English and Standard Arabic: One procedure and different implementations. *Newcastle Working Papers in Linguistics* **15**.
- Ibn Jinni (961). *Sr Şinā'it Al- I'rāb*. (eds.) Hasan, M and A. Rushdi (2007). Saudi Arabia: Dar Al-Kutub Al-'ilmiyya.
- Ibn Hisham (1340). *Muğnī Al-Labīb*. (eds.) Muhammad, H. and A. Ya'quob (2005). Saudi Arabic: Dar Al-Kutub Al-'ilmiyya.
- Ibrahim, M. (1986). Standard and prestige language: a problem in Arabic sociolinguistics. *Anthropological Linguistics* **29** (3), 219-245.
- Iten, C. (1998). The meaning of *although*: a relevance theoretic account. *UCL Working Papers in Linguistics* **10**, 81-108.
- Iten, C. (2000). Non-truth-conditional meaning, relevance and concessives. PhD thesis. University of London.
- Iten, C. (2005). *Linguistic Meaning, Truth Conditions and Relevance*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kaplan, D. (1989). Demonstratives. *Themes from Kaplan*. J. H. A. et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 565-614.
- Kempson, R. M. (1975). *Presupposition and the Delimitation of Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- King, J. S. (2005). Semantics, pragmatics, and the role of semantic content. In Z. Szabo (ed.) *Semantics vs. Pragmatics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Knott, A. and R. Dale (1994). Using linguistic phenomenon to motivate a set of coherence relations. *Discourse Processes* **18** (1), 35-62.
- Krumbacher, K. (1902). *Das Problem der Modern Griechischen Schriftsprache*. Munich.

- Lakoff, G. (1971). The role of deduction in grammar. In C. J. Filmore and D. T. (eds.) *Studies in Linguistic Semantics*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Levinson, S. C. (1983). *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Levinson, S. (1988). Generalized conversational implicatures and the semantics/pragmatics interface. Ms. University of Cambridge.
- Levinson, S. (2000). *Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Lyons, C. (1999). *Definiteness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Marcas, W. (1930). La diglossie arabe. *L'Enseignement Public* **97**, 401-409.
- Murray, D. (1979). Well. *Linguistic Inquiry* **10** (4), 727-732
- Neale, S. (2000). On being explicit. *Mind and Language* **15**, 284-294.
- Noh, E.J. (1996). A relevance-theoretic account of metarepresentative uses in conditionals. *UCL Working Papers in Linguistics* **8**, 1-41.
- Östman, J. O. (1995). Pragmatic particles twenty years after. *Anglicana Turkuensia* **14**, 95-108.
- Polanyi, L. and R. Scha (1983). The syntax of discourse. *Text* **3**, 261-70
- Potts, C. (2005). *The Logic of Conventional Implicature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Quirk, R. S. and G. L. Greenbaum, et al. (1985). *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*. London: Longman.
- Recanati, F. (1987). *Meaning and Force*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Recanati, F. (1989). The pragmatics of what is said. *Mind and Language* **4**, 295-329.
- Recanati, F. (1993). *Direct Reference: From Language to Thought*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Recanati, F. (2004). *Literal Meaning*. Cambridge: Cambridge Press.
- Redeker, G. (1990). Ideational and pragmatic markers of discourse structure. *Journal of Pragmatics* **14** (3), 367-81.
- Redeker, G. (1991). Review article: linguistic marker of discourse structure. *Linguistics* **29** (6), 1139-72.
- Rieber, S. (1997). Conventional implicatures as tacit performatives. *Linguistics and Philosophy* **20** (1), 51-72.
- Rouchota, V. (1998). Procedural meaning and parenthetical discourse markers. In A. Jucker and Y. Ziv (eds.) *Discourse Markers: Description and Theory*. Amsterdam John Benjamins 97-126.
- Schiffer, S. (1972). *Meaning*. Oxford: Clarendon Press
- Schiffrin, D. (1987). *Discourse markers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schourup, L. (1985). *Common Discourse Particle in English Conversation: 'Like, 'Well', 'Y'know'*. New York: Garland.
- Schourup, L. (1999). Discourse markers. *Lingua* **3**(4), 227-265.
- Silva, A. (2006). The polysemy of discourse markers: The case of pronto in Portuguese. *Journal of Pragmatics* **38** 2188–2205.
- Sperber, D. and D. Wilson (1995). *Relevance : Communication and Cognition*, Oxford : Blackwell.

- Sperber, D. and D. Wilson (1998). The Mapping between the mental and the public lexicon. In Carruthers, P. and J. Bouchre (eds.) *Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, with Hang Seng Centre for Cognitive Studies, University of Sheffield 184-200.
- Strawson, P. (1964). Intention and convention in speech acts. *Philosophical Review* **73**, 439-60.
- Strawson, P. F. (1971). *Logico-Linguistic Papers*. London: Methuen.
- Stubbs, M. (1983). *Discourse Analysis*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Sweetser, E. (1990). *From Etymology to Pragmatics: Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantics Structure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Urmson, J. (1963). Parenthetical verbs. In C. Caton (ed.) *Philosophy and Ordinary Language*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press 220-240.
- Van der Auwera, J. (1986). Conditionals and speech-acts. In E. Traugott, A. ter Meulen, J. Reilly and C. Ferguson (eds.) *On Conditionals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- van Dijk, Teun A. (1979) Pragmatic connectives. *Journal of Pragmatics* **3**, 447–456.
- Vicente, B. (1998). Against blurring the explicit/implicit distinction. In Mateo Martinez, J. and F. Yus (eds.). *Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses (Special Issue on Relevance Theory)* **11**, 241-258.
- Werth, P. (1984). *Focus, Coherence and Emphasis*. London: Croom Helm.
- Wilson, D. (1998). Discourse, coherence and relevance: a reply to Rachel Giora. *Journal of Pragmatics* **29**, 57-74.

- Wilson, D. (2000). Metarepresentation in linguistic communication. In Sperber, D. (ed.) *Metarepresentations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 127-62.
- Wilson, D. and D. Sperber (1981). On Grice's Theory of Conversation. In Werth, P. (ed.) *Conversation and Discourse: Structure and Interpretation*. New York: St. Martin 155-178.
- Wilson, D. and D. Sperber (1987). An outline of Relevance Theory. *Notes on Linguistics* **39**, 5-24.
- Wilson, D. and D. Sperber (1993). Linguistic form and relevance. *Lingua* **90**: 1-25.
- Wilson, D. and D. Sperber (2002). Truthfulness and Relevance. *Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy* **111** (443), 583-632.
- Wilson, D. and D. Sperber (2004). Relevance Theory. In Horn, L. and G. Ward (eds.) *Handbook of Pragmatics*. Oxford: Blackwell 607-632.
- Zwicky, A. (1985). Clitics and particles. *Language* **61**, 283-305.